DR. S. RADHAKRISHNAN
SOUVENIR VOLUME

(Collection of 76 Articles by Scholars of International Fame)

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Publisher's Note

We are very happy to present this Souvenir Volume to Dr. Radhakrishnan, the President of our Indian Republic, who in being the President of one of the largest States of the world, fulfills the dream of 'a philosopher king' of Plato, on his 77th birthday. It contains 76 papers contributed by some of the greatest thinkers of the world on various topics of Philosophy, Science and Religion. With the presentation of this Volume we earnestly pray for a healthy and vigorous long life for our dear President. May he continue to guide our nation for long.

We are very grateful to the learned contributors and offer them our thanks for the trouble they took in writing for this volume. We are, however, very sorry that we could not publish the volume earlier as planned, on account of many difficulties in getting it printed. We are very thankful to Shri Kowtha Suryanarayan Row, Hony. Managing Director of Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha for advancing us a loan free of interest for the purchase of paper for printing this volume and to H. H. Raja Sadashivrao R. Pandit Pant Sachiv. of Bhor, who has been kind enough to send us some financial help.

We are very grateful to our editors Dr. B. L. Atreya and Prof. J. P. Atreya, and others who have taken great pains in editing this volume.

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FOREWORD

Padmabhushan Dr. B. L. Atrey, M.A., D. Litt.,

Wisdom and power have rarely gone together; yet for the betterment of the world it should be so. That is why Plato, the ancient philosopher of the West, dreamt that philosophers should be kings.

It is one thing for a king to be a philosopher and another for a philosopher to be a king. The world has seen at least two king philosophers in its history, viz., Marcus Aurelius in the West and Janaka in the East, but it is for the first time that it has seen a philosopher king in the personality of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. Of course, there is a difference between a king and a President, the former wielding more or less unlimited power and President enjoying limited powers given to him by the people. Still a President also is, in theory, the most powerful of all the people in a state. So we can say that in Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the dream of Plato has been for the first time realized. It was possible perhaps in India alone, where wisdom born of philosophical thinking is valued most highly. It is why Dr. Radhakrishnan has been installed in the Rashtrapati Bhawan of Delhi. Naturally India expects from her philosopher-President all that Plato thought of philosopher-kings. The world knows Dr. Radhakrishnan's work as a philosopher, and, I am sure, it will know and recognize his work as a President in no time.

He being a rare example of a combination of philosophy and politics, the Organizers and Editors of the Darshana International did the right thing in honouring him on his 77th birthday by presenting to him a Souvenir Volume containing 76 articles by eminent writers from all over the world. He eminently deserves this honour. He is the one man who has brought the East and the West closer in thought by interpreting the one to the other; and he is pushing forward the ideal of one world and of world-government, which alone will establish world-peace. May God give him robust health and long life to see the world shaped in accordance with his ideas which give due weight to religion and to science. We felicitate him most cordially on his Seventy Seventh birthday and congratulate the Darshana International on honouring itself by honouring the 'Philosopher King' Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.

B. L. ATREYA
Biographical Sketch

Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Kt. (1931), F.R.S.L., M.A., D. Litt. (Hon.) LL.D., D.C.L., Litt.D., F.B.A., Bharat Ratna (1954), German pour la merite (1955), Master of Wisdom (Mongolia, 1957), Goethe Plaquette (1959), President Indian Republic, since May 1962. Born on 5th September, 1888. Educated at Madras Christian College. For sometime Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, Madras, and in Mysore University; Upton Lecturer in Comparative Religion, Manchester College, Oxford; Hibbert Lecturer, 1929-30; Vice-Chancellor, Benares Hindu University 1939-48; Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, Oxford 1936-52; George V Professor of Philosophy, Calcutta University 1921-39; Member, International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, 1931-39; Member and Leader, Indian Delegation, Unesco., 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950; President 1952; Elected Chairman of the Executive Board, UNESCO 1948; Chairman University Commission, Government of India, 1948; Indian Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Soviet Russia, 1949-52; Chancellor, Delhi University 1953; Chairman, Indian P.E.N.; Vice-President International P.E.N.; Elected Vice-President Indian Republic, 1952 and again 1957; Went on a two months' good will tour of European countries, namely, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria, and African Countries, namely, East and Central Africa, June-July 1956; received the Hony. Professorship of Moscow University June 18, 1956; Visited Singapore, Indonesia, Japan and China on a goodwill tour, September-October, 1956 went on a three-week tour of the Indo-China States, China, Mongolia and Hong Kong, September 1957. Attended East-West Philosophers' Conference in Honolulu, visited U.S.A., attended the P.E.N. Congress in Germany, July 1959; went on a goodwill tour of England and Scandinavia, January-February 1960; attended the UNESCO Conference at Paris, November 1960; Visited also the U.S.A.; Acted as President of India, June-July 1960 while Dr. Rajendra Prasad was away and August-September 1961 during his illness; Elected Hony. Fellow of the Brititish Academy, July 11, 1962.

PUBLICATIONS

Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Two Vols., The Hindu View of Life, An Idealist View of Life, East and West in Religion, Kalki or the Future of Civilization, The Religion we need; Gautama the Buddha, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, India and China, Religion and Society, Education Politics and War, Bhagavadgita, Dhammapada, The Principal Upanishads, Recovery of Faith, East and West—Some Reflections, Brahma Sutra.
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Our Contributors

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Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan is regarded by the common concurrence as one of the greatest philosophers and thinkers of the modern world. He has rendered a yeoman's service to the cause of Philosophy and right thinking in order that a balanced and intellectually adequate attitude may be adopted. An eminent thinker like Dr. Radhakrishnan realized long ago that in the war-weary and confusion-stricken world only a proper image of a wholesome thought and Philosophy could restore a happy, intellectual, and emotional harmony, which, in its own way would serve as a hypothesis for an adequate political, economic and cultural edifice the confused minds have been unsuccessfully striving to raise.

Dr. Radhakrishnan is a versatile genius who has rendered service not only as a philosopher but also as an intellectual reformer and a clear-sighted statesman. That his service to Philosophy has been recognized equally both by the West and the East can be evinced from the contributions made to this souvenir by philosophers of various shades of thinking belonging to almost all the countries of the world.

Dr. Radhakrishnan succeeded happily in evolving a mean between the oriental and the occidental thinking, thereby presenting the beacon-light to all those who had been grovelling so far in the mire of misunderstanding and erroneous evaluation of the varied intellectual operations. Dr. Radhakrishnan has synthesized the different currents of light and fused them into a light house which is bound to guide humanity along the path that leads to the ultimate truth and salvation.

The organisers of Darshana International decided to present Souvenir Volume to Dr. Radhakrishnan on his 77th birthday. Such a collection of articles is timely needed and editors of this Souvenir feel delighted that they have succeeded in bringing out one. Of course, there have been different kinds of difficulties which the editors have experienced in bringing to culmination their efforts, but they feel more than compensated for by the joy they receive from this little bit of service done by them to the world of philosophy. The editors believe that this book will evoke a new flash of thinking and a balanced approach to Philosophy which is highly essential in the present intellectual set up.

The Editors owe a debt of gratitude to all those who in one way or the other have been instrumental in making this volume a success.

J. P. ATREYA
Managing Editor
Darshana International
OMNI-BLESSED RADHAKRISHNAN

मिली हैं दोरों की भी ता उसे नज़र न लगे ।
बनी हैं शृंदियां सब राजाकिशन के लिए ॥

Measurment and calculation have also invaded psychology. Although happiness is a purely subjective feeling, we can gauge it by the number, degree, and grade of the blessings a person has in his possession. The dictionary meaning of “blessing” is “any means or cause of happiness”. We may also define blessings as realized values, or obtained goods, or usually desired or required objects actually secured. In ancient India they were called Riddhis (रिड्धि). It is not given to every man to realize all the values or to have all the blessings, to have them in large measure, or to have the values of all grades. People vastly differ in this respect. This difference makes one less or more fortunate.

People have differed in different ages with regard to what should be considered as blessings, but there is a common consent also, as the nature of man has always been more or less the same throughout the ages. Changes in our environment and in civilization and culture do bring about changes in the objects of desire, but the desires do not change very much. It is interesting to note what have been considered as blessings by thinkers and writers.

The ancient Greek philosopher Thales considered three things as blessings for him, namely, being a human being, being a male, and being a Greek. “The three blessings for which I am most grateful to Fortune are”, he said, ‘First that I was born a human being, and not one of the brutes; second, that I was born a man and not a woman; third that I was born a Greek, and not a barbarian”. (Diogenes Laertus, Thales, Sec.

* Others have also been given some blessings
Lest an evil eye be cast upon him;
All the Blessings, however, are made
For Radhakrishnan and for him alone.
33.) To the modern Western thinkers the requirements of a good and happy life are: Self-preservation, a life above the mere subsistence level, a life free from drudgery, want, and fear, a life of abundance, of security, affection and belonging (vide-Samuel L. Hart: Ethics, 46).

The ancient Aryans of the Vedic age regarded Longevity, Health, Strength, Valour, Progeny, Cows, horses and others domestic animals, Corn and other agricultural wealth, intelligent Wives, Friends, and Peace. They prayed for them, and were proud of having them. A classical Sanskrit writer has listed blessings in the following ascending order. Birth as a man; malehood, belonging to the profession of a Brahman, learning and nobility of character, capacity to understand, eloquence, sympathetic understanding of others' heart and mind, success in worldly matters, and above all, religiosity. Another Sanskrit writer mentions the following blessings: A son of a good character, a faithful wife, a pleased and satisfied employer, sincere and loving friends, reliable colleagues, worryless mind, handsome physique, secure wealth, a face shining with learning and wisdom, and God's Grace which bestows all these things. Another Sanskrit writer has enumerated the following as blessings: birth as a human being, and that too in a Brahman family, wealth, long life, health, loving friends, a good son, faithful wife, devotion to God, learning, self-control, inclination to help the poor and the needy. Still another Sanskrit writer mentions the following as blessings: a happy and beautiful home, good-natured and educated children, sweet-tongued wife, reliable friends, secure and perpetual income, fidelity to one's wife, obedient servants, hospitality, devotion to God, delicious food and drink, and association with great men. According to Vidura, in the Mahabhārata, a fortunate man has six blessings, namely, perpetual income, freedom from disease (health), a sweet-tongued and devoted wife, an obedient son, and knowledge which brings money (artha karī vidyā). Manu makes a mention of the blessings in the order they should be valued or honoured: they are I. Wisdom, II. Good Character, III. Longevity, IV. Friendliness, and V. Wealth. The Brahma Vaivarta Purāṇa emphatically states that the highest value or the greatest blessing in life is the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality (Philosophy). It says that neither Power, nor Wealth, nor Learning, nor Valour is equal in value to the 16th part of the Knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. In the same way another Sanskrit writer grades Freedom from all desires as the highest blessing. He says, the pleasure or happiness derived from all the blessings of this world and that derived from the blessings available in heaven are not equal to one-sixteenth of the joy that a man free from all desires experiences.


The Hindu Dharmashāstras (ethical literature) thought more deeply on values or blessings of human life, and classified all the blessings under four Purushārthas, objects of human endeavour, namely, Dharma, Artha, Kāma, and Moksha. Under Dharma (ethical life) they included all the moral principles, practice of which makes individuals prosperous and happy, and the society peaceful and stable. Manu mentions 10 such principles, namely, (1) Fortitude or Patience, (2) Forgiveness (3) Self-control, (4) Honesty (non-stealing), (5) Cleanliness, (6) Control over one’s senses, (7) Rationality (reasonableness), (9) Pursuit of knowledge, (9) Truthfulness, and (10) Non-anger (non-violence). These principles are mentioned differently by different writers. The Yoga-sūtras of Patanjali has mentioned them as 5 Controls and 5 Observances, namely, (1) Non-violence, (2) Truth, (3) Honesty (non-stealing), (4) Control over one’s sexual urge, and (5) Non-accumulation of unnecessary goods; (6) Cleanliness, (7) Patience or contentment, (8) Austerity, (9) Studiousness, and (10) Faith in God’s Grace. The second set of values or blessings comprises of all that can be regarded as one’s property or wealth. They should be acquired not by violating any of the moral principles mentioned above but by strict adherence to them. The same is the condition for the third class of values, coming under Kāma or enjoyments. All kinds of pleasures rightly to be enjoyed by men, such as pleasures of all senses, pleasures of sex, and pleasures of art, literature, and philosophy come under this head. When enjoyed within the limits of law, of morality, and one’s capacity, they are great blessings of life. The highest blessing or value, however, according to the Hindu (including Jaina and Baudhaha) thinkers is Moksha or Freedom (of the Spirit)variously called by different philosophers. Freedom (Moksha) has not only a negative sense as freedom from delusions, worries and anxieties and sufferings; it has also a positive sense as unconditional and abiding inner joy, which is the very nature of the Spirit, the ultimate reality in man and the universe.

The fullest realization of life, so to say, the perfection of life of man, consists in realising all the values of life, in having all the above-mentioned blessings. But how many human beings are so fortunate, or so ambiti-
ous and effortful, as to have all the blessings of life. Neither history nor mythology knows any other man except Shri Krishna who has had all the blessings in their greatest possible measure or degree. That is why he is regarded as the fullest manifestation of the all-perfect God among men. What to say of common men who lack in more than they have of the blessings of life, even the great geniuses of the world today, and of the past history of the world, have had only lop-sided development of their personality and were endowed with a few blessings, and lacked in many. Some may have had an abnormally long life without riches and learning, others may have had abundant wealth but poor health and low intelligence quotient; others might have been very learned scholars but poor in health and financial resources; most of the wisest men and philosophers of the world have been extremely poor and unsocial. Men in very high position very rarely have sincere friends; they have too many enemies. Many great teachers and professors are unpractical. There is a very common saying in India that learning (Saraswati) and wealth (Lakshmi) never go together. Hardly any wealthy man is learned and endowed with philosophic calmness. Very rarely good speakers are good writers. Very rarely great thinkers have very great memory. Every blessing seems to have a tax on man in the shape of depriving him of some other blessings. If one works hard with his brain he loses the vitality of his lower senses and organs. This lamentable fact of life was expressed by Emerson by ‘the law of compensation’. Having been convinced of it he wrote, “I do not wish more external goods....neither possessions, nor honours, nor powers, nor persons. The gain is apparent, the tax is certain”. “Every thing has two sides, a good and an evil. Every advantage has its tax.”

Dr. Radhakrishnan, the President of Indian Republic, however, is an exception. He is one man in the world today, and perhaps in the history of the world, who is exceptionally fortunate in having all the aforementioned blessings of human life, in having realised all the values of life; in having got all the goods that men can have on earth. All human desires and ambitions have found fulfilment in him. There are many long-lived men in the world; there are many healthy and active old men; there are many learned men; there are many thinkers and philosophers; there are many speakers of eloquence and elegance; there are many great statesmen; there are many diplomats and politicians; there are many great writers; there are many kings and presidents; there are many rich men; there are many lovable persons; there are many good and saintly persons; and there are many religious persons in the world. But there is only one Radhakrishnan who enjoys all these blessings, greatnesses, and qualities, all together and at the same time.

God has given Dr. Radhakrishnan in abundance every thing that any man can desire and aspire for. Thanks God, he has enjoyed a long, healthy and active life of about 76 years (May he live long!). He is a
deep thinker, eloquent speaker, fascinating writer, and an inspiring teacher. He is a great professor, a great statesman, a great politician, a great diplomat, a great administrator, and a great man at the same time. He has been recipient of innumerable doctorate degrees without having supplicated for any. He is immensely rich. He has enjoyed all the pleasures of life, and has travelled to his heart's content. He has been all that any teacher could aspire to be. He has become what any politician can aspire to be. He is at the top of political greatness without having undergone any throes of election. He is honoured as a thinker, as a philosopher, as an interpreter, and as a politically great man. He is honoured in every country of the world as a great writer, as a great speaker, and as a great exponent of the ancient Indian thought. He is fully conversant with Indian philosophy as well as with the Western. He has worked hard in his life, at all its stages, without any evil effect on his body. He is sufficiently tall, yet straight and unbending. He is always cheerful, calm, and undisturbed amidst all the disturbing world-events and internal political situations. He is a philosopher as well as a king, which is a rare combination. He has had a successful and happy family life. He has numberless friends, admirers, and pupils all over the world, who sincerely love him. He has few enemies if any.

Some men are born great, some achieve greatness, and greatness is thrust upon others. Dr. Radhakrishnan comes under all these categories. He has inborn qualities of greatness; he has achieved greatness by virtue of his ambition, hardwork and friendliness; situations and circumstances in India and the world have also made him great. The more we think of his greatness and of the blessings God has showered on him, the more we are amazed; and it is he alone who convinces us, by his rare example, that a man like Shri Krishna might have lived on earth. If Radhakrishnan is an actuality, Shri Krishna might have been one. We have been fortunate in having come in contact with three greatest men of our times, namely, Malaviya, Gandhi and Radhakrishnan. If only the blessings were to be the criterion of our measurement, we have no hesitation in saying that Dr. Radhakrishnan is the most blessed one, and, perhaps, omnipresent. May God grant him still more and greater blessings. We offer him our felicitations on his all-round success in life.

May God bless him and the country, Bharat, which has produced such an extraordinarily great man as our beloved President Radhakrishnan.
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23 शाश्वः: सज्ज्यसेते हि सतार्थ यथो व्रह्मसाहयमः।

24 भ्राह्मणां निष्ट्यमरोपिताः च प्रिया च भार्यां प्रियवारिणी च।

25 वांशः पुनुःंकरोऽर च विधा भागमेश्वर सुधार्नि राज्यः।

26 विशिष्टः बन्धुः वयः कम्य विधा भवति पञ्चमः।

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28 तेषां च वर्तक्य विधा च विशिष्टः च वर्तक्यां च।

29 जानाय प्रभावन स्त्रां नाहिति वोक्षिशी।

30 यन्त्र कामोंलं लोके यन्त्र दिश्यं महज्जुमुः।

31 तृणालायस्मुलस्य नाहिति: पोषणी कलम्।
It is a common practice to divide our life into various stages. We are all familiar with the four stages of ancient Indian thought which reveal profound psychological insight into human need and the waxing and waning of desire. Shakespeare spoke of the seven stages of life in picturesque, poetic language. Actually there are no stages in life. Life is a continuous process. The concept of stages is merely a methodological device which enables us to understand it better—bridges built at convenient vantage points across the stream of life. However it is not altogether an analytical fiction. No one can deny the existence of change both within and around us. Some have talked of the seven year itch, the belief that the physical content of our body is completely transformed once every seven years. The biological and physiological changes of adolescence are too obvious to brook contradiction. What is objected to is water-tight compartments and neat labels.

Let us make a rough division of life into five stages. Childhood—birth to seven years, Boyhood—seven to seventeen, Adulthood—seventeen to thirty, Middle-age—thirty to fifty and Old-age—from fifty onward. Let me hasten to add that this division made by me is quite arbitrary and completely unscientific.* However let us assume that these five stages exist and go on to our next question—Which of these is the happiest stage? Is one stage really better than the other?

* Here is a more scientific and detailed classification given by Justin Pikunas—Early infancy—2 to 15 months, Late infancy—15 to 30 months, Early childhood—2 years 6 months to 5 years, Middle childhood—5 to 9, Late childhood—9 to 12 (also known as preadolescence), Puberty (early adolescence)—girls 11 years 6 months to 14, boys 12 years 6 months to 15 years 6 months, Mid-adolescence—girls 14 to 16, boys 15 years 6 months to 17 years 6 months, Late adolescence—girls 16 to 19, boys 17 years 6 months to 21, Early adulthood—women 19 to 30, men 21 to 35, Middle adulthood—women 31 to 45, men 36 to 50, Late adulthood—women 45 to 70, men 50 to 70 and Senescence—70 onward. Psychology of Human Development.
There is a popular belief that childhood is the happiest period of our life. The joys of childhood has been sentimentalised a good deal in song and poetry. If happiness is the result of security then it is true that we have a good deal of it at this stage. Our parents certainly look after us with loving care, many of our wants are anticipated and catered to with thoughtful thoroughness. Going backward a little more it is claimed that the pre-natal period is one of complete security, free from all problems. But let it not be forgotten that the problem of living space and over-crowding began for the Dionne quintuplets even when they were in their mother's womb. Indeed the very act of birth is a shock—since we leave a position of comparative security to face the hazards of a cold and critical world. Freud speaks of the trauma of birth which may be the cause of some types of neurosis. We make our entrance into this world with a shock and continue to receive them as we grow older.

Childhood problems are real to children, quite as real as adult problems are to adults. It is a mistake to laugh them off or treat them as inconsequential. What are these problems? In all big families there is the obvious one of sibling rivalry. Some children are petted and made much of, others neglected and looked down upon. Parents often commit the mistake of typing their children—"my second son is clever, my third daughter is not intelligent but hard working". This sort of thing is resented by children bitterly. Then there is the matter of adjustment with relations—uncles and aunts, the well-meaning but ineffectual grand-mother, the doting grandfather. All these represent a different point of view to that of the parents and cause many perplexing conflicts in the minds of children. Lastly let us not forget the servants. The old-fashioned type of family retainer whose unreasoning and interfering love did more harm than good is no longer with us. Indeed all servants are disappearing rapidly. But every modern child has to come to terms with the vacuum cleaner and the refrigerator and get some shocks both literal and figurative in the bargain.

At the fifth year in school, the child who says that it loves its first experiences here must be a born hypocrite. A creature of some importance at home, he is a nobody at school. The only notice that other children take of him is for the purposes of bullying. It is at school that we make our first acquaintance with the examination system—a necessary evil which remains to plague us for twenty years and in some cases even more. Kenneth Walker rightly points out that the child's biggest problem is the adjustment between the outer world of fact and the inner world of idea—the world of fantasy so rich and rewarding and the world of reality so crude and cruel.

But let us not paint too gloomy a picture of childhood. Its joys are undoubtedly there. Friendships at school. Happy home life with brothers and sisters. Sacrificial mother's love to partake of which is almost a sacrament. The comfortable feeling that comes from the consciousness
that other people are getting things done for you. Father's bounty is unlimited, so is mother's benevolence.

The next stage is that of boyhood. This is the gangster age when you learn to enjoy the company of your equals. Games become interesting and adventure, all absorbing. But soon the biological problems of puberty involving many delicate adjustments loom ahead and cause a furrow on the smooth care-free brow of youth. But the shock of puberty is not so shocking as some people try to make it out. When nature shocks it provides its own shock absorbers. A retreat from reality may start at this time because reality continues to be so perverse. Schizophrenia often begins at this stage. This is an age of robust joys and introspective sorrows.

ADULTHOOD This is the most adventurous period of our life. The two major landmarks of this stage are employment and marriage. Both mean hard work. By the first act you gain your independence and by the second you surrender it. Uncongenial work and an unsuitable wife can both cause a lot of misery. But the human organism has considerable powers of accommodation and adjustment—psychological and physical. Marriages may be made in Heaven but they have to be lived out on Earth. It is a mistake to leave the sexual side of marriage entirely to instinct. Insight is equally essential. Fortunately pride in prudery is dying (slowly in some cases, rapidly in others) all over the world. Occupational misfitting is the cause of considerable economic and psychological wastage. It is better to wait and even to suffer till the right job comes along than to rush and grab the first job that is available and be miserable for the rest of your life. The joyous companionship of wife and children is one of the greatest blessings of life. Marriage may be a lottery but it also a risk worth taking. During adulthood the tyranny of the time-table and the rigours of formal education come to an end but you continue to read from the book of life. You start gathering experience at this stage.

MIDDLE-AGE While childhood suffers from oversentimentalization, the sober joys of middle-age have not been sufficiently proclaimed. This is the calmest period of our life. A time of steady work and solid achievement. We continue here the process of acquiring experience started at later adulthood. It is here that we lay the foundations of a happy old age. We gather property—material and intellectual. We give the most to the world and take the most out of it. This is the time when we should acquire a second string to our occupational bow, some kind of an hobby or side-line which will keep us busy when we retire from our work and until we retire from this world.

OLD-AGE We have stopped searching for the elixir of youth. We no longer monkey with the monkey gland. But progress in medical science has done much to make old age a happy and useful time. There is no need to dread its approach with the intensity that we use to. Today old-age has a new look. The first step in this new approach to an old problem lies in the frank recognition of its limitations. It is better to grow old
PSYCHOSYNTHESIS

It is not possible for me to present a systematic exposition of psychosynthesis within the limits of an article. I shall therefore deal only with the more specific points that characterize psychosynthesis as I have conceived, expounded and practised it for more than forty years.

I. SEMANTIC AND HISTORICAL OUTLINE

The word psychosynthesis and expressions such as "mental synthesis" and others similar have been used by a number of psychologists and psychiatrists. Considering only the field of psychotherapy, we find first Janet (1908), followed by Bjerre (1920), Neutra (1923), de Jonge (1937) and Trüb. Freud speaks of the synthesizing function of the ego. But they have used these expressions only in the sense of "healing the functional dissociation", that is, re-establishing the condition that existed before dissociation produced by a traumatic experience or severe conflicts. Others, such as Jung, who mentions synthesis when dealing with "the transcendental function", Maeder (1918, 1927), Caruso (1952), Stocker (1957) and W. Kretschmer Jr. (1958), used the terms synthesis, psychosynthesis, synthesis of existence and synthetic psychotherapy in a deeper and wider sense as the development of an integrated and harmonious personality. Recently the word psychosynthesis has been adopted by Crawford (1956) and Lepp (1957).

II. WHAT IS PSYCHOSYNTHESIS?

Psychosynthesis, as I have conceived and practised it, while including the preceding, differs from them in part, and is more comprehensive and at the same time more definite and technical. It is based on the

* The text of this article is a slightly modified version of the writer's Introduction to the Symposium on Psychosynthesis, read at the International Congress for Psychotherapy at Vienna, August 1961.
integral consideration of all the elements and functions of the psyche, which is outlined in the following diagram. "A picture," said a Chinese sage, "is worth more than a thousand words," and indeed symbols and diagrams are being increasingly employed in psychology. I am aware that this diagram is elementary and gives only a structural and static representation, but it may serve to provide a convenient overall view.

![Diagram](image)

**Diagram**

1. The Lower Unconscious
2. The Middle Unconscious
3. The Higher Unconscious or Superconscious
4. The Field of Consciousness
5. The Conscious self or "I"
6. The Higher Self
7. The Collective Unconscious

In the unconscious we can distinguish three areas or sections. (1) indicates the primitive or lower unconscious, which in a certain sense can be regarded as bio-psychic and which must be included in the full integration of the individual. In this respect a more exact term for psychosynthesis would be bio-psychosynthesis. Then there is (2) the middle unconscious, which corresponds more or less to Freud's preconscious. The upper section (3) represents the superconscious or supraconscious which is beginning to be the object of scientific investigation.
("Height Psychology"—Hohenpsychologie). The central point (5) indicates the self-conscious "I", and the circular area surrounding it (4) the field of personal awareness in which the "psychic contents" (sensations, images, emotions, ideas, etc.) of which we are conscious succeed each other.

The larger oval area is the seat of all the psychic elements and functions of which we are not directly conscious. It in its turn is contained within the unlimited sphere of the collective unconscious (7) or meta-individual psychic world. The star at the top (6) represents the Self, considered not as a mere "transcendental function", but as a psycho-spiritual reality, which can be consciously experienced, as is affirmed by a large body of testimony. Lack of space forbids an explanation of the relationship between the conscious ego and the Self, beyond a statement that they should not be regarded as two separate entities, but as two different aspects of one and the same reality. This subject, which is of fundamental importance in arriving at a knowledge of the self and in psychotherapeutic and educational practice, has been developed in the author's pamphlet Dynamic Psychology and Psychosynthesis (Psychosynthesis Research Foundation, "Valmy", Greenville, Delaware, U.S.A.).

All the demarcation lines in the diagram are dotted in order to indicate that the different zones or fields are not strictly separated from each other, but allow of the passage and exchange of "psychic contents" between them, an osmosis that is occurring constantly.

The writer wishes to emphasize that the elements and functions that habitually reside in, or descend from, the superconscious (intuition, inspiration, the aesthetic and moral senses, religious and mystical experiences) are factual psychically and real in a pragmatic sense (wirklich, to use the significant German word), because they are effective (wirkend), that is, they both produce changes in man's inner life and influence his activities in the external world. They are therefore amenable to observation and experiment through the use of the scientific method in ways adapted to their nature. They can be aroused, directed and utilized by means of appropriate psycho-spiritual techniques.

At this point a question may easily arise: what is the relationship between this conception of the human being on hand and religion and metaphysics on the other? The answer is that psychosynthesis does not attempt in any way to appropriate to itself the fields of religion and philosophy. It is a scientific conception, and as such it is neutral towards the various religious forms and philosophical doctrines, excepting only those which are materialistic and therefore deny the existence of spiritual realities. Psychosynthesis does not aim nor attempt to give a metaphysical or theological explanation of the great Mystery—it leads to its door but it stops there.

In the list of the techniques used in psychosynthesis (see page 18) the various phases of psychosynthetic treatment are indicated. The starting—
point of the treatment is the ascertainment of the unique existential situation of each patient, of the problems which it presents and of the ways of solving them. This naturally includes a psychoanalytical phase. Then follows the activation of the latent aspects and functions and the development of the weak ones through the use of the active techniques suited to each task. After, and indeed while this is being done, the harmonization and integration in one “whole” of all the aspects and functions of the individual must be aimed at and actively fostered—the central purpose of psychosynthesis. Such harmonization and integration both allows and requires the constructive utilization and expression of all the liberated and activated drives and energies of the personality. In its turn this brings up the many problems and psychosynthetic tasks of inter-personal relation—ships and social integration (psychosynthesis of man and woman, of the individual with various groups—particularly the family one—of groups with groups of nations and of the whole of humanity).

In the actual treatment all these phases are not dealt with separately and in succession, but are carried on in a parallel way. For instance, tackling at the beginning the central existential problem, one often finds that it includes ethical or religious conflicts, and their treatment must be taken up at once. On the other hand, the analytical investigation can be made at intervals, whenever a block or resistance has to be eliminated.

A distinctive characteristic of the psychosynthetic treatment is the use of all available active psychological techniques, made in a systematic way, which means used according to the specific plan of the treatment and directed towards clearly envisioned aims. It is thus not a mere eclecticism, as might appear from a superficial view.

This occasion does not allow of an examination of all these techniques; it is possible to mention only a few that the writer considers to be of paramount importance and that receive little application. The basic one, which aids and indeed makes possible the employment of all the others, concerns the arousing and development of the will. The will is, curiously, not recognized as the central and fundamental function of the ego. It has often been underrated, as being ineffective against the various drives and the power of the imagination, or it has been regarded with suspicion as leading to self-assertion (will-to-power). But the latter is a perverted use of the will, while its apparent futility is the result of its faulty and unintelligent use. The will is ineffective only when it attempts to act in direct opposition to the imagination and to other psychological functions; its skilful and consequently successful use consists in regulating all other functions and directing them towards a deliberately chosen and affirmed aim.

The use of the will is not simply and solely “will power” as this is customarily regarded. It comprises six phases or stages, all indispensable for its complete and effective expression:

1. Purpose—aim—objective
2. Motivation—evaluation—deliberation
3. Choice—decision
4. Affirmation—command
5. Planning—programme of action
6. Direction of the execution

Each of these aspects of the will can be developed and used through the agency of appropriate techniques.

Another psychological method of the greatest individual and social importance is the transmutation and sublimation of the bio-psychological energies, particularly of the sexual and the combative or aggressive drives. Modern psychology, and particularly psychoanalysis, has discovered (or, more exactly, has re-discovered) the transformation these energies can undergo—and often undergo spontaneously. Thus a scientific "psychodynamics" is being developed, which aims at discovering the laws that govern these transformations and the techniques for bringing about those which are desired. It offers the means where by the present enormous waste and deplorable misuse of incalculable amounts of sexual, emotional and combative energies which can be offset and the same forces directed and employed for creative activities and achievements. It seems no exaggeration to say that such utilization may gradually parallel that which is now being made of the once neglected or ignored power of electricity.

A different, and in a certain sense opposite, group of procedures are those aiming at the awakening, releasing and employment of the potent superconscious spiritual energies, which have a transforming and regenerating influence on the personality. They may be compared to the release of the intra-atomic energy latent in matter.

Before concluding, may I draw attention to the fact that, while psychosynthesis has been developed mainly for use in treatment, its principles and methods are no less applicable in other fields: First of all in psychological hygiene or mental health for the prevention of neurotic and psychological troubles; Secondly, in education, where the many techniques it uses can be applied widely and fruitfully. (In this connection, it can be of special advantage in the education of gifted and supergifted children, since in them the superconscious functions are spontaneously awakened or awakening, and their activity needs to be wisely directed and integrated with that of other functions.) A third large field is that of inter-personal and group relationships, which stand in sore need of adjustment and harmonization.

Finally, psychosynthesis can be applied by each individual to him or herself, thus fostering and accelerating inner growth and self-actualization, which should be the aim of all and is sometimes felt as an imperative inner urge, as a vital existential necessity. Such autopsychosynthesis should be practised, or at least seriously attempted, by every therapist, social worker and educator (including parents). Naturally
a "didactic psychosynthesis" can be of great help, and it is advisable to undertake it under expert guidance whenever possible.

This exposition, although very cursory, may suffice to indicate that psychosynthesis has much to offer. Yet the writer disclaims any intention of giving the impression that it is, or that he considers it, something already fully developed. It is, on the contrary, only in an initial stage that corresponds to infancy or at most adolescence, with many sides still incomplete but holding great promise of potential growth.

An earnest appeal is addressed to therapists, educators and psychologists to engage actively in the needed work of research, experimentation and application. Let us feel and respond to the urge aroused by the pressing necessity of healing the serious ills that at present beset humanity. Let us realize the contribution we can make to the creation of a new civilization characterized by the harmonious integration of individuals and groups and pervaded by the spirit of synthesis.

III. INTRODUCTION TO THE TECHNIQUES

The reader's attention is drawn at the outset to the differences existing between techniques and exercises and between both of them and methods. A technique can be regarded as a specific psychological procedure used in order to produce a definite effect on some aspect or on some function of the psyche.

An exercise consists of the combination or association of various techniques in order to produce a more general effect. For instance, the rather simple exercise for evoking serenity includes the use of a number of techniques, such as relaxation, rhythmic breathing, mental concentration, visualization, creative imagination—all of them used and directed by the will.

A method is a combination of techniques and exercises used in a specific succession or alternation, according to a definite plan, in order to achieve the therapeutic aim considered necessary or valuable.

In psychosynthesis the emphasis is put on a holistic or integral conception of the treatment, which should always be kept in view and to which every method, exercise and technique should be subordinated. The needs not only of the individual patient but also of the different phases of the treatment in each case are very different, and sometimes even opposite. Therefore, the use of a specific technique or exercise which may prove useful in one case or in one phase may be unsuitable or even harmful for other individuals, or in different conditions. The following is a clear instance of this. The exercise for evoking serenity is obviously very useful in counteracting the excessive tension, emotional stress and anxiety so widespread nowadays, not only among patients but also among "normal" people; indeed it should constitute a daily practice of psychological hygiene in modern life. But it would be a mistake to make it, or similar
exercises, the central part of a treatment, neglecting the use of other and
different procedures. If used opportunely, this exercise can eliminate
obstacles to deep analysis (such as excessive anxiety) and support the
patient during the inevitable crises and upheavals produced by it. But if
it is used merely as a psychological “tranquilliser”, it might produce a
false sense of wellbeing and security, and therefore give the illusion of a
cure, which would be only apparent, because the real issue would have
remained unresolved.

A similar warning should be given concerning all other techniques
and methods. For instance, the sole use of psychoanalytic techniques in
the narrow sense is often demonstrably insufficient to establish in the pati-
ett the control, harmonization and constructive employment of the ener-
gies welling from the unconscious. For this the help of the active techni-
quies is required.

As therapists, then, we should, while utilizing to the full all existing
techniques, constantly bear in mind that they, per se, are not enough,
and that, as L. W. Dobb has warned, "technicians tend to fall in love
with, and then be corrupted by, psychological weapons." (Personal
Problems and Psychological Frontiers, p. 274, Sheridan House, New
York, 1957). However, in the case of psychosynthesis, this danger can,
and we hope will, be offset: first, by the very multiplicity and variety of
the techniques, which prevent undue importance being given to any one
of them; second, by the steady cultivation and use of the synthetic spirit,
by the constant endeavour to keep the entire picture in view, to relate
always the part to the whole; and last, by emphasizing in theory and in
practice the central, decisive importance of the existential situation and
problems, of the human factor and of the living inter-personal relation
between the therapist and the patient.

IV. METHODS AND TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED
IN PSYCHOSYNTHESIS

(This list is not final. Information about other techniques and methods
will be gratefully received.)

1. INITIAL TECHNIQUES
ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS
a. Biography—Autobiography—Diary
b. Questionnaires
d. Dream analysis
e. Tests (various)
f. Projective techniques: 1. Rohrschach; 2. Thematic Apperception
   Test (T.A.T.); 3. Free drawing—Modelling—Musical improvisa-
   tion—Free movements—etc.
2. EVALUATION, DISCOVERY AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXISTENTIAL SITUATION AND ITS PROBLEMS AND TASKS

3. SPECIAL TECHNIQUES

(Owing to the great difficulty of making a systematic classification of the techniques, they are given here in alphabetical order.)

Acceptance
Acting “AS IF”
Bibliotherapy
Bio-Psychosynthesis
(Physical training—Games—Sports—Rhythmic movements)
Catharsis.
Chromotherapy
Concentration:
  a. Inner
  b. In action
Creative expressions
Disidentification
Graphotherapy
Humour (Smiling wisdom)
Hypnosis
Imagination (Visualization, etc.):
  a. Reproductive
  b. Creative
Inspiration
Introspection
Intuition
Logotherapy
Meditation and Contemplation
Model (Ideal):
  a. of oneself
  b. outer models (historical figures, etc.)
Music:
  a. Listening
  b. Performing
Objective observation
Playful attitude
Proportion (Sense of)—Right emphasis
Psycho-shock
Relaxation
Repetition
Self-Realization
Semantics
Silence (Inner)
Substitution
Suggestion and Auto-suggestion:
  a. Direct
  b. Indirect
Superconscious (Awareness of):
  a. Ways and methods: aesthetic—ethical—devotional and mystical—heroic (through action)—illuminative—ritual
  b. Utilization of superconscious energies
Symbols (Use of)
Synthesis of the opposites
Transmutation and Sublimation of psychological energies (sexual—combative, etc.)
Will: Stages—
  a. Purpose—aim—objective
  b. Motivation—evaluation—deliberation
  c. Choice—decision
  d. Affirmation—command
  e. Planning—programme of action
  f. Direction of the execution

4. COMBINED EXERCISES
  a. Directed day-dreams (Reve eveille)—Symbolic Visualizations
  c. Imaginative training
  c. Evocation and Cultivation of higher feelings (Peace—Joy—Love—Compassion)
  d. Series (Grail legend Dante’s Divine Comedy, etc.)

5. PERSONAL INFLUENCE
  a. Through presence and example (catalytic)
  b. Deliberate

6. GROUP TECHNIQUES
  a. Group analysis
  b. Psychodrama
  c. Co-operative group activities

7. TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED IN INTER-INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOSYNTHESIS
(Several of the techniques listed above can be used for inter-individual psychosynthesis, for instance: Visualization—Imaginative training—Humour—the Group techniques. Only those that are specific for inter-personal and social psychosynthesis are mentioned here below.)
  a. Comradeship—Friendship
  b. Co-operation—Team work—Sharing
  c. Empathy
  d. Goodwill
  e. Love (altruistic)
  f. Responsibility (Sense of)
  g. Right relations:
1. Between the individual and the group
2. Between groups
h. Service
i. Understanding—Elimination of prejudice

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HOW EXACT IS OUR KNOWLEDGE
OF EARLY GREEK THOUGHT?

One who reads the accounts of early Greek science and philosophy cannot but be impressed by the confidence with which historians speak of the achievements of early thinkers in these fields. Such writers on history of science as George Sarton, Benjamin Farrington, and W. H. Turnbull, as well as the standard writers on the history of Greek philosophy, are examples of this type of work.

In the writing of history it is always essential to consider the sources from which the information comes, and the nearer to contemporary evidence one can come the better. In the case of the history of thought the ideal is to have first hand records; the very writings of the men whose views are being presented. It is desirable to know what a man says for himself. To obtain such records it is necessary to have the thinker's own writings, and ideally they should be in the same form in which they were composed. This involves consideration of the state of the texts even when they come from the author's own hand. For in the course of transmission they can be mutilated, or marred by copyist's errors, or other such disturbing influences.

Where first hand documents are not available all the historian can do is to rest upon reports which others give of a writer and his ideas. But such reports are always the impressions received from the original. They are records of how the reporter understood the conceptions and beliefs of the writer, and such records are subject not only to the common human errors to which a first hand statement is subject, but also to the misunderstandings that often arise in the attempt to expound and interpret views other than his own.

1 History of Science. Volumes I—III, 1950-3
2 Greek Science, 1953
3 The Great Mathematicians; in The World of Mathematics. J. R. Newman, Volume 1, 1956,
In the light of such difficulties it is essential that the historian constantly raise in his own mind the question as to the sources upon which he is relying, whether primary or secondary, how nearly perfect, or how imperfect the records are, and whether or not the conditions under which they were produced were conducive to accurate reporting. Unless such questions are kept in mind it is easy for confusion to arise, and for secondary reports to be treated as if they were primary.

It is customary for historians of western ideas in science and philosophy to take Thales of Miletus as the first great figure in the sequence of thinkers, and to state that various ideas were his. Thus he is credited with certain theorems in geometry, with the prediction of a solar eclipse, recognizing the magnetic character of lodestone, an interpretation of the nature of the universe as a whole, and with an effective knowledge of economic principles. His interest in abstract ideas is said to have led him into difficulty, as when while contemplating the stars he fell to a ditch, for which he was taunted by a handmaid for his impracticality. His knowledge has been ascribed to his travels as a merchantman, and consequent contact with the wise men of Egypt. Another frequently cited story intended to show his skill as a solver of practical problems is that he diverted the course of a river in order to remove an obstacle to an army's crossing.

How reliable are these stories? Upon what evidence do they rest? How authentic are they? Let us look at the sources, and see whether they are based on primary or secondary information.

The first writer to mention Thales is Herodotus, of the fifth century B.C., the historian of the Greco-Persian wars. Herodotus lived a century and a half after the time commonly assigned to Thales. He does not tell us what his sources of information about Thales were. Presumably he is recording oral traditions and reports he receives as he travels from place to place. As to how authentic those traditions and reports are we may judge from such frequent expressions of his as "They say, but I do not believe it", and "I am under obligation to tell what was reported but I am not under obligation to believe it" (Book II, 123: Book VII, 152). "I am informed" is his phrase in some cases.

In the First Book of his "Histories" he tells us that the day was turned into night during a battle between the Lydians under Alyattes and the Medes under Kyaxares, and that Thales had predicted the year in which it happened.

The statement of Herodotus that the day was darkened is interpreted as meaning that there was an eclipse of the sun. But it is worth noting that this is not the explicit statement of Herodotus; it is an interpretation of the meaning of his phrase. It may seem too pedantic to remark that there are cloudy days, as dull as at the time of an eclipse, which yet may not be due to such an occurrence, and which are ominous to the unsophisticated. The dubious nature of the Greek conception of an
eclipse is seen in the summary by Thucydides of the disasters associated with the Peloponnesian War. Along with drought and pestilence he declares there was an unusual number of earthquakes and eclipses of the sun. (Thucydides, thirteen years younger than Herodotus uses the word "eclipses"). But since solar eclipses come in cycles of about eighteen years there could have been no more than two in the period of the war—431-404 B.C. On August 3, 431 B.C. occurred an eclipse of the sun; and on August 27, 413, one of the moon.

It is not until the first century A.D. that Thales is said to have understood the nature of a solar eclipse. Neither Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle nor Callimachus says explicitly that this darkened day was due to an eclipse. Cicero, six centuries after Thales, in the first century B.C. next refers to it, and his phrase is "defectio solis", failure of the sun. This is important because upon the assumption that it was an eclipse has rested a good deal of inference as to when the event occurred, and the confirmation of the dates assigned by later biographers to the life of Thales. Ancient authors set the date in various years, 625, 610, 603, 597, 585, 579, or, 584 B.C.; Astronomers now calculate that there was an eclipse of the sun on the date we now call May 28, 585, B.C., although Tannery notes that there also was one in 610 B.C. Stein held that Thales explained the occurrence after it had happened, and was later given credit for having anticipated it.

It is sometimes surmised that Thales was acquainted with Babylonian astronomical tables, and on this basis was able to anticipate a solar eclipse. It is fair to raise the question of evidence concerning the contact of Thales with Babylon. Josephus, in the second half of the first century A.D., is the first to state that Thales studied Babylonian knowledge. H. Rawlinson noted that Ptolemy, the Egyptian astronomer of the second century A.D., entered only lunar eclipses, resting on Babylonian records. The calculation of solar eclipses requires not only knowledge of periods of recurrences, but the track of the moon's shadow along a particular line on the surface of the earth. There is no evidence that the Babylonians had advanced so far in astronomy, (See G. Abetti's The History of Astronomy pp 14, 17; and D.H. Menzel, Our Sun p. 7.)

As for the ability of the ancients to forecast astronomical events, a half dozen classical writers state that Anaxagoras foretold the fall of a meteorite. But this is certainly impossible; the utmost he could have done was to make a general statement about such objects. He certainly could not have forecast the path of any individual one. Such stories indicate the penchant people had for ascribing forecasting ability to noted men. In the light of such consideration all the modern astronomical calculation of solar eclipses may be irrelevant racking of brains.

Continuing his story Herodotus says that Croesus, having a quarrel with Cyrus, led his army to Persian territory. When he came to the Halys River he transported his army across it by bridges that were there, as Herodotus believed; though the general belief of the Greeks was that Thales

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got them across by making the river, which flowed on the left of the army, flow also on its right side, and that he did it by digging a deep, crescent-shaped channel above the camp so that, being turned aside from its old course, it might take the camp in the rear, and again passing it would issue into its old bed; and thus as soon as the river was divided it became passable at both channels. "But this I do not believe", says Herodotus, "for how, when they came back did they cross it"?

Herodotus, in a third passage tells of Thales, advising the Ionians to unite around Teos as a single place of counsel because of its central position.

It is worth while to note the interval between the time when Thales is said to have flourished and the time of Herodotus. What may happen to an oral report in a century and a half must properly be taken into account. Herodotus' own uncertainty makes him less useful as an authority for the occurrence of the events he reports.

The next mention of Thales in ancient literature is in Plato's Dialogue Theaetetus, in the fourth century B.C., a century after Herodotus. Plato is here concerned with the contrast of the range of interest and freedom in discussion of a philosopher as compared with that of a lawyer at court. Philosophers always have leisure, and talk at their leisure in peace; they do not care whether their talk is long or short, if only they attain the truth. But law pleaders are always in a hurry, for the water flowing through the water-clock urges them on; and the other party in the suit does not let them talk about anything they please. Philosophers remain ignorant of the way to the market-place, do not know where the court room is, or the senate house, or any other place of public assembly; they neither hear the debates nor see them when published; and the strivings of political clubs after public offices, meetings, banquets, revelings with chorus girls,—it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such things.—The philosopher's mind, considering all these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions,—studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature of everything that is.

It is as an adjunct to this statement that he refers to the story about Thales that while he was studying the stars and looking upwards, fell into a pit, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeers at him because he was so eager to know things in the sky that he could not see what was there before him at his very feet.

As Turnbull tells the story the pit has become a ditch, the "neat, witty Thracian handmaid" has grown up into the "old woman attending him"; and he knows the exact words by which she expresses her sentiments (in Shakespearean English): How canst thou know what is doing in the heavens when thou seest not what is at thy feet?"

Plato's real interest was in the contrast between the momentary immediacy of practical things and the wide sweep of the ultimate meaning of life, not in an authentic detail of Thales' biography.
The next story is from Aristotle's *Politics* (A II, 1259 a 6), a further half century later, where he is speaking of monopoly as a technique for getting rich, and cites the story about Thales where people reproached him for his poverty on the ground that philosophy was useless; they say that while it was yet winter he studied the stars and determined that there was to be a plentiful harvest of olives. He provided himself some money and made a deposit for all the olive presses of Miletus and Chios, hiring them at a low figure when no one else was interested. When the season came round many people sought for the presses suddenly, and let them out on whatever terms he wished. Having made a lot of money he showed that it was easy for philosophers to get rich if they wanted to, but that this is not what they are interested in. Turnbull has gathered from some unspecified source the additional information that instead of victimizing his buyers he magnanimously sold the fruit at a price reasonable enough to have horrified the financiers of today.

Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics* is the first to hold that Thales was the founder of the type of philosophy which derives all things from some form of matter, and said that this was water; also that the earth floats on water. To these statements he adds his own surmise as to the reasons why Thales took water to be the basic substance. He also reports (in *De Anima*, A2 405a 19) that Thales thought all things are full of gods, that he knew that lodestone moves iron, and must have regarded the soul as a source of movement.

In the third century B.C., now four hundred years after Thales, there appears in a poem of Callimachus (scholar, poet, and librarian at Alexandria) the story that a golden cup was to be given to the wisest of the seven sages, among whom by this time Thales has become included. The text is mutilated, but the drift of the story is that a man named Thyreion sailed to Miletus to give the cup to Thales, who had mapped out the 'Wain' or Lesser Bear, by which the Phoenicians sailed. He found Thales in the temple of Apollo, scratching the ground with a cane and drawing the figures which the Phrygian Euphorbus had discovered. When the cup was offered to him he struck the ground with his staff and said it should be given to Bias of Priene.

In the first century A.D. we find plenty in his *Natural History* noting Thales' observation of the time of the morning setting of the Pleiades, and reporting that Thales had determined the heights of the pyramids by measuring their shadows at the time when one's shadow is equal to one's height. Now he is credited by Dercyllides with being the first to understand the nature of an eclipse of the sun, and the extremes of the sun's movement.

Seneca ascribes to Thales a theory which he says is absurd, that earthquakes are due to the shifting of the earth on the waves of the water on which it rests.

Plutarch tells of Thales being visited by Solon to whom he explained
his aversion to marriage as due to the distress children cause their parents; though he was said to have adopted a nephew. Plutarch also is the first to assert that Thales engaged in commerce; and learned from the Egyptians that all things are made of water.

In his imaginative work, The Banquet of the Seven Sages, Plutarch represents a certain Niloxenetus as saying that it was by similar triangles that Thales measured the height of a pyramid, comparing the length of its shadow with that of his staff. This indicates a more elaborate understanding of similar triangles than that suggested by Pliny's story. In this same work Plutarch remarks: "It seems fairly certain that the lapse of time will bring about much obscurity and complete uncertainty regarding actual events, if at the present time, in the case of events fresh and recent, false accounts that have been concocted obtain credence."

In another work, Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer, Plutarch takes a fable of Aesop concerning an ass which was loaded with bags of salt. When fording a stream the ass slipped. The salt dissolved in the water and the burden lightened. When the ass deliberately lightened his load at the next ford his driver changed his load to sponges; and when the ass submerged himself in the stream his load became so heavy he drowned. In the version of Plutarch Thales was the driver who detected the trick and punished the ass, but with less dire result. This is the story Turnbull takes over, transforming the ass into a "sagacious" mule.

Aetius, of whom we know nothing except that he made a collection of opinions of philosophers, and who is assigned to the second or third century A.D., enlarges the account saying that Thales spoke of a mixing of elements (which seems like a distortion) that the cosmos is a unity; and with the pythagoreans he divided the sphere of the heavens into five zones, across which the Zodiac cuts, and also the meridian, at right angles. The stars are made of earth, but are on fire. An eclipse of the sun is caused by the interposition of the moon between the sun and the earth; and the moon shines by light reflected from the sun. God is the mind of universe. (Thales has now become theologian).

Galen, in the second century A.D., claims to be acquainted with the writings of Thales and quotes a work "On First Principles" now believed to be a forgery.

About the third century A.D. we come to Diogenes Laertius, of whom nothing is known except that he is the author of Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. In this he gathers up the traditions to date and gives us a general life of Thales upon which most later writers depend. He mentions Herodotus, Douris and Democritus as sources for his statement about the parentage of Thales, though we are not able to confirm his statement by passages in any works of the three men. He says the parents of Thales were Phoenicians of very high birth, that he was the first one named a wise man, and that this occurred during the time
of the Archonship of Damasius at Athens (582–1 B.C.). He was later registered as a citizen in Miletus. According to one tradition he wrote nothing. According to another he wrote treatises “On the Solstice” and “On the Equinox.” Certainly nothing from his hand has survived. Now he is declared to be the “first” to study astronomy, to predict solar eclipses (plural), to maintain the immortality of the soul, (he apparently overlooked some Egyptian teaching) and to set thirty days to a month, to discuss physical problems, to inscribe a right angled triangle in a circle, whereupon he sacrificed an ox, though others tell this story of Pythagoras. He was credited with having frustrated the plan of alliance between Miletus and Croesus, yet he was also said to have asserted that he always lived in solitude and kept out of state affairs.

Diogenes cites six versions of a story concerning a tripod circulated among the Seven Wise Men until Solon sent it to Delphi.

By this time Thales is more productive and is reported to have written two hundred lines of poetry, including songs and aphorisms. He is also said to have explained the floods of the Nile as due to winds blowing upstream.

The date of his birth is now definitely set in the first year of the 35th Olympiad (640 B.C.), and his death is set at the age of seventy-eight or ninety years, being due to heat, thirst and weakness as he was watching an athletic contest. He was also credited with the injunction at Delphi, “Know thyself”. Diogenes then presents a latter to Pherecydes concerning a book he was writing on theology, and one to Solon inviting him to come and live at Miletus. There are five other men who also bore the name of Thales.

Continuing the tradition, Proclus in the fifth century A.D., says Thales showed that a circle is bisected by a diameter, that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal, that when two straight lines intersect the opposite angles are equal; that two triangles are identical if they have a side and the including angles equal; and that this must have been the way in which he showed the distance of ships on the sea. When we recall the statement of Callimachus that Euphorbus dealt with triangles before Thales did, we wonder how far Thales was original in his geometry, and what he contributed to it.

The striking feature in this entire succession of accounts is the way in which detailed knowledge of the life and work of Thales increases as the centuries pass. The process snowballs so that the farther we get from him the more we know about him. A thousand years after his time we know the details of his mathematical and astronomical studies, whereas the sources nearest to him make no mention of them.

In reply it may be said that perhaps new materials, new sources of information kept coming to light as years passed. This would be possible, and if later writers would cite in detail what sources they were using and how they knew they were authentic, first hand documents, we would be
glad to have such additions to our knowledge. But later writers do not present evidence with such detailed and exact care as to give us the desired assurance.

Without such assurance we can hardly believe confidently with Sarton that Thales was the founder of Greek science and philosophy, that he travelled many years in Egypt where he became familiar with Egyptian mathematics and astronomy and predicted the solar eclipse of May 28, 585 B. C.. According to J. R. Newman the two chief sources of our knowledge of Egyptian mathematics are the Golenischev and Rhind papyri. But their content does not show anything to which Thales and the Greeks in general are deeply indebted. Says Newman: “Their methods were clumsy and they were incapable of grand generalizations—a pre-eminent ability of the Greeks”. (The World of Mathematics. Vol. I, p. 169), To hold that Thales visited Egypt at all, and that if he did he studied their mathematics, is pure speculation. And at the end of his broad summary of the achievements of Thales, Sarton makes the fatal statement; “No writings of Thales have survived.”

All assertions made about Thales are based upon secondary sources; and these sources range from a century and a half to twelve centuries after his time. What ground is there for making any confident statement about his ideas, and the debt of later generations to them? What ground is there for Farrington’s assertion: “He not only knew that a circle is bisected by its diameter, but proved it”? Where can we find his proof? What basis is there for such a statement?

When such stories are told in serious histories of science we wonder just what are the criteria of acceptable thinking in science. If they are not intended to be serious why include them at all? If the purpose is to develop popular appeal is it necessary to dress scientific development of ideas in ornamentation that has no serious basis? Why not let science and philosophy rest upon the force of their own character to convince humanity of their significance? Should such specious appeal to popular pleasure parade as honest history of ideas? Is this history of science or pseudo-history?

Is Thales to be classed as a great mathematician and a great astronomer? One might reply that he was regarded as great for his time. But if this is what we mean should we not say so? There is another point of view from which we estimate personalities—their significance in the light of a total view. Some persons we regard as great, not only for their contemporary fellows but for all time so far as we can estimate it, and for the thought and life of all humanity. In the light of the evidence available, it is a generous, over-generous, view to give Thales credit for all the achievements commonly ascribed to him. It is not from the motive of debunking anyone that such a judgment is made. The basic question is: what is the real situation? What are the facts of the case? Let us know the truth, not a collection of fairy tales, based upon unscholarly
methods of procedure, and pawned of upon us in the name of history of thought. If the result seems depressing it is because the previous impression was unwarrentedly inflated. If in the result we see how meager and indirect are our sources of information we cannot help this. We can only find satisfaction in having acquired the truth.

If we are to have confidence in the writers of history of science and philosophy we must insist that they be conscientious in ferreting out sources, and less imaginative and emotional in their presentation. After all, the function of history is more realistic than "creative literature." The author's reaction to events is not the events but the psychology of the author. Psychology is interesting, but it is not history. If these same tendencies are operating in other sections of history must we not be suspicious of all historians? A basic aspect of all historical writing must be modesty, and a sense of the tentative character of all judgments.

The case of Thales is an extreme one, doubtless, but in various degrees other personalities are in a similar position in that most of what is said about them is secondary report, tradition which has accumulated around them through the centuries. From the epistemological standpoint the situation shows how much of what we call our knowledge is inference from a minimum of data. It behooves writers in the interest of exact thinking to check sources, to distinguish inferences from data, and to make assertions with abundant and befitting modesty. It behooves readers to retain a touch of skepticism as they read history.
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RADHAKRISHNAN: FROM AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

One need have no hesitation in honoring S. Radhakrishnan for here is a person to whom honor is obviously due. In America his name is better known than that of Shankara or even Aurobindo. He is better known in the United States today than any other Indian except Gotama, Gandhi Nehru and perhaps Tagore. His command of Western philosophy makes Western philosophers respect him quite apart from his other achievements. And his ability to speak to them in a language which is closer to their own way of thinking than most others who have tried to express Indian philosophical ideas to them gives him a ready audience in America.

But his success not merely as a teacher of philosophy, writer on philosophy and as a philosopher but also in the world of practical political affairs gives American philosophers cause for notice. Only in India, and certainly not in the United states, could a life-long philosopher and teacher of philosophy become the head of a great nation. Although there are now more than four thousand teachers of philosophy in the United States, only two that I know of have ever risen to political prominence, both as United States Commissioners of Education, Wm. T. Harris about a century ago and Sterling McMurrin during the past two years. The profundity of interest in philosophy in India is the envy of philosophers in all other countries. And the success of Radhakrishnan not only in teaching philosophy but in rising in personal stature to a position of practical political prominence gives many American philosophers further cause for envy. Since the time of Plato, Western philosophers have idealized philosophers as rulers; hence when an Indian philosopher attains power as a political leader, with opportunity for employing philosophical wisdom in influencing the affairs of state he automatically fulfils that West-
ern ideal. The story of how Radhakrishnan employed his philosophical wisdom in public affairs is yet to be written. It should become a classical document of the history of philosophers in politics.

Turning to another side of Radhakrishnan's success story, there is an aspect which serves to dismay some Americans. He so thoroughly dominates the field of honour that every person who writes a book seems to feel that he has failed unless he has obtained the blessings of Radhakrishnan in the form of an introduction to it. The practice of having a noted authority prepare an introduction is indeed a common one. But in the case of Radhakrishnan, this has become a mass phenomenon. Such phenomenon seems to have certain implications. One of these is that Indian thinkers appear to be unable to stand on their own feet and live by their own personal honour; at least this appearance to individualistic Americans is hard for them to understand, even though they may recognize the actual kinship of thought by so many Indians immersed in feeling themselves as children of "The Mother" presents no problem here to Indians. Yet, so long as the towering stature of Radhakrishnan overshadows all others, the undoubted capacities of other Indian thinkers may be left unnecessarily in the shade. Another apparent implication, with may be an appearance only, is that such a seemingly great quantity of introductions to long and complex works must signify some lack of thoroughness, in face of multitudes of other duties; however, a man with indefatigable energy can accomplish marvels unattainable by others.

Although I have admired Radhakrishnan's world outlook and universal vision and his personal efforts in behalf of world peace and harmony through mutual understanding by philosophers of different cultural traditions, I was startled here in Banaras recently when an Indian teacher of philosophy said he disliked my views because they resembled Radhakrishnan's. He was referring to my interest in comprehensive constructive synthesis of a world hypothesis which would include the essential virtues emphasized in each of the world's great cultural traditions. I fear that Radhakrishnan would not approve my Organicism as a World Hypothesis, even though he might commend its breadth of scope and optimistic outlook.

Surely the time has come for both historians of philosophy and philosophers concerned with their own philosophical systems to take full account of the major contributions of both Hindu, Western and Chinese philosophical traditions. To omit any one of them is to short-change our histories and our emerging philosophies. The History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western, edited by Radhakrishnan, was indeed a landmark in tendencies in this direction. It included chapters on Chinese philosophies as well as Hindu and Western. But also, the portion devoted to Chinese thinkers was thin as compared with the others. Both Indian and Western thinkers including Radhakrishnan, continue to fall short in their appreciation of, and appropriation of, the wisdom of China. This failure is
easily attributable to the great linguistic difficulties in learning and interpreting Chinese languages and need not indicate any lack of willingness to admire and profit from Chinese insights. Yet, the fact remains that without some grasp and integration of Chinese contributions into a world vision, such a vision will remain inadequate to serve as a long-run world philosophy. Radhakrishnan may yet make further contributions in this direction; his joining with P. T. Raju in preparing The Concept of Man, an introduction to comparative philosophy calling upon Hebrew, Greek, Chinese and Indian philosophers in a cooperative effort, may be a significant gesture in this direction.
I am a poor product of Western thought and I know nothing of India. I learned in bewilderment that millions of Indians are degraded as "Untouchables." Why? Apparently some religious leaders of the past said so. I learned in sorrow that millions are always hungry, and I learned in consternation that they feed millions of marauding cattle, which they are not allowed to eat. Why? Because cows are sacred. Who said so? Apparently some religious leaders of the past.

I learned that millions of monks are roaming India. Food is put into their begging bowls by the people who are beggars themselves. Why? Because monks are sacred men. But in a survey on India I read that 80% of these monks are fakes. Why are they fed? Apparently it is impossible to distinguish between monks who are saints and monks who are loafers. Both use pious language.

I learned that some monks carry a piece of gauze before their mouths for the protection of flies. Yet, they do nothing for the protection of humans who die like flies. I read in horror that moslems and Hindus massacred each other in 1948.

But the same religious hatred exists in the West. The adherents of the 400 divided Christian denominations despise heartily each other—thanks to their religious leaders. Throughout the centuries, Christians have massacred Christians in the name of Christ.

Articulate language is man's most important tool for communication and cooperation with his fellowman. But apparently religious language is a tool for division, dissension and destruction. How then is it with the creatures which have no religious language—the animals?

In 1938 new massacres began to sweep Europe, this time caused by the "religion of race." Hitler and his hechmen started to exterminate inferior races. I too was transported with millions of others to the extermination camps of Nazi Germany.
Buchenwald concentration camp was commanded by the sadist koch. His wife Ilse loved lampshades from human skin. Koch loved creatures in cages. He had a zoo of caged animals erected next to the gigantic cage which held 20,000 human animals. Often I stared in sorrow from my cage into the cages of my fellow creatures, they too victims of human bestiality and brutality. Aren't these words derived from the animal "beast" and "brute"? But can animals ever be so brutal as human beasts?

I was released through the love of my good wife Claire, who fought fearlessly the Gestapo. We fled to China, and after the war to Australia, the greatest massacre in human history had just ended. Thanks to the linguistic concept of a "national language" and "nationality" (unknown a few hundred years ago) the nations had slaughtered each other by the millions. Now, the new linguistic concept of "communism" promises more murderous massacres. The leaders of mankind are engaged in making monstrous missiles, and megaton bombs, in order to kill off hundreds of millions of people, who will be lead with language to the slaughter bank.

Apparently, the most desperate task in the world is to expose the catastrophic falsehoods in the many words which lead to strife and war. What every boy and girl should learn in school is a simple semantics and logic in order to recognize the ambiguities, the fallacies, and the demagogies in the words which cause debates, dissension, despair, destruction and death to many millions.

I developed such a simple semantics and symbolic logic which I called Semantography. The greatest living logician Lord Bertrand Russell wrote that support of my work is "an important service to mankind." Sir Julian Huxley wrote that "it provides something of real importance." Professor Oliver L. Reiser declared before the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

"Bliss realized the ambition of the great mathematician Leibniz."

Three hundred years ago, Leibniz dreamed of a simple system of pictorial symbols which could be operated like mathematical symbols in a simple "Algebra of Thought", and which could be read (like 1 + 2 = 3) in all languages. The first issue of Darshana contains my article "India and Semantography" where I proposed the use of my pictorial symbols for bridging the languages and dialects of India.

I sent out informative letters to thousands of educators. Few showed any interest. I forgot that their masters in the governments are mostly demagogues and dictators. A simple logic would enable everybody to see through the falsehoods of their speeches. They wouldn't like this. Worse even, everybody would see through the falsehoods of his own speeches. Nobody would like that. But the worst are my findings on the consequences of articulate language.

In the following pages only a meagre outline of my thoughts can be given. You can read all in detail in my writings which are available from
It was easy to find logical symbols for words on which people can agree, like sun and moon, day and night, etc. But there are words which have the opposite meanings for people who oppose each other. These are the meanings of good and bad, righteous and evil.

Shortly after the second world war, the United States Government invited the eminent psychiatrist Dr. Brock Chisholm (later the first Director General of the World Health Organisation) to lecture on the burning question:

"Why does man go to war against his fellowman?"

Chisholm’s answer created an uproar among the various religious leaders. He blamed their pious language, and especially their catastrophic use of the word “evil” for many massacres among men. Hatred is incited against other people by saying that they are evil, because they pray to other gods and obey other priests and kings. Soon there was slaughter. Of course, the accusation of “evil” was usually only a pretext for plunder. But it worked beautifully in the minds of men. They killed with a clear conscience the evil enemies.

If Chisholm is right how is it with those creatures which have no articulate language—the animals? I searched through books on zoology and found that untold trillions of the tiniest and the largest animals adher strictly to the ethical law “Thou shalt not kill” even when they are starving. They live by the food provided by the plants.

However, there are other animals, which must have gone through terrible times millions of years ago. They had learned to kill other creatures for food. But they don’t kill their brothers. Lions don’t kill lions; tigers don’t kill tigers, wolves will die of starvation in a severe winter, but no wolf will kill a fellow brother—wolf.

Furthermore, if a lion baby is taken away from its killer parents, before it receives from them an education in murder, it will not kill. It will remain the best of pals with other animals, and will eat with them out of the same trough.

Of course, animals get sometimes angry at each other. In the mating season there are mighty scraps over female favours. But the wrestlers have no intention to kill nor eat each others. Professor Ashley Montagu summed it all up in these fantastic words:

"Among the same species of animals the highest ethics is supreme law." He proved too what every zoologist knows, namely that cannibalism among the same species of animals is extremely rare, and it happens only when the animal is “out of its mind” by panic, the sudden loss of freedom, etc.

In terrible contrast, human cannibalism is practised in cold reasoning in an open boat, or in religious reasoning when highpriest presides over the frying and the feasting on the evil enemies.

The unescapable catastrophic conclusion from all these scientific facts
is: MAN IS THE ONLY SPECIES WHICH KILLS ITS OWN KIND. MAN IS THEREFORE ETHICALLY THE LOWLIEST CREATURE ON EARTH.

The zoologists, biologists, moralists, and militarists try to explain and excuse human warfare. They say that "biological warfare" is going on among the killer animals, and human warfare is part of it. But this is a life.

**Biological warfare** is the hunt for food from other species.

**Human warfare** is the hunt for destruction of the same species.

A fantastic thought gripped my mind. If articulate language has perverted the mind of man, Chisholm said, how was it in the distant past, when man emerged from the animal, and had NOT YET evolved articulate language?

Bertrand Russell said that it must have taken untold generations of primeval men, until they realized that two men, and two tigers, and two snakes have something in common, namely the abstract notion of TWO. Similarly I thought, it must have taken untold generations of primeval men, until they realized that a ferocious tiger, and a poisonous snake, and a dangerous man have something in common, namely the abstract notion of BAD.

The remedy for a bad tiger, and a bad snake is simple: kill it! From this kill to the kill of the bad man was only one step in abstract reasoning. The next step was organised warfare against the bad people across the river.

Chisholm said that human warfare is only due to a mental perversion a brain epidemic, which can be stopped. If only I could find the proof in the distant past that man was not a killer of his kind—then Chisholm's theory could give mankind the breath—taking hope that human warfare could be abolished by psychiatric treatment of the populations.

I studied the 7000 years of recorded human history. Alas, the historians recorded in ancient times as in modern times, that the righteous kings of kings made war on the evil kings and slew them and their men. For older records I had to go down into the caves of stone age man. Archeologists reported that the kitchen refuse heaps of neolithic man contain animal and human bones intermingled and broken to extract the marrow. "They were cannibals" the scientists say. But no signs of cannibalism is found in the caves of paleolithic man who lived 30,000 to 50,000 years ago. And in their cave paintings I found the proof I was looking for.

Man was, and still is, a hunter of animals, which he needs for food. He is proud of his victories. The caves of paleolithic man show the same pictures as modern hunting lodges: animals pursued by hunters. But nowhere do we see a man raising a weapon against another man. Apparently, the idea to hunt and kill his fellowman did not enter the mind of paleolithic man. Otherwise he would have depicted his victories
over men, as did modern man from 5000 B.C. to our time in monu-
ments, in the market places, and in museums.

I began to look for more evidence of ethics as a natural force in the
universe. I found it in the findings of the eminent medical biologist
Alexis Carel. He proved that the atoms which build living cells, and
the cells which build complex organs and organisms, are guided by a
supreme ethics. He wrote:

"Cells act as though each of them understood mathematics,
chemistry, and biology, and unselfishly act for the interest of the
total community."

What does this fantastic statement really mean? Let me explain it to
you in a fantastic tale.

Imagine our young planet one billion years ago. Torrential rains and
terrific thunderstorms rage over the surface of a turbulent ocean. In its
raging waters atoms and molecules, sand and pebbles, are tossed about in
wild and aimless chaos—until something happened—the greatest moment
in the history of our earth.

We don't know how it happened and why. But we know that it
happened. Inspired by some mysterious force from the depth of space,
a group of atoms and molecules began to form an ethical cooperative
in which each one "acts unselfishly for the interest of the entire com-
unity." And so the first one cell creature came to life—the amoeba
which still sails the seven seas. They built their nucleus, which is
in fact their town hall with various departments for food gathering,
food processing, food distribution, waste disposal, oxygen renewal, trans-
portation, and medical and repair stations, should an accident happen to
some brother molecules.

Now listen and learn! Their Town Hall is no Tammany Hall! There
is no greed, grab, and graft. There are no bureaucrats and no aristoc-
rats, no partisans and plebeians, no brahmins and untouchables, no
demagogues and dictators, and no loafing and hate—inciting rabbis and
monks. There is only one ethical principle at work: "One for All and
All for One!"

Later they divide into two communities. And as the millions of years
pass by, these ethical cells "act as though they understood mathematics,
chemistry, and biology"—although a million times more than all our pro-
fessors of mathematics, chemistry and biology—they built more and more
complex organs and organisms with more and more ethical engineering
wonders: a miraculous heart, eyes, ears, lungs, brain, bones, and the most
fantastic chemical factories—for one ethical purpose only: that the cell
communities of creatures should be able to survive the rigours of nature.

Here is but one example. There was abundance in the sea, but for
the creatures on land there were often terrible times of starvation and death.
Billions of babies must have died. And so our ethical engineers were
again inspired by the cosmic force. They began to build into the mother
animals a complex processing plant with udders and nipples—and when the babies arrived—lo, there arrived also the most wholesome of food for them: milk.

For Western scientists however, my tale of ethical cooperation is nothing but blooming ballyhoo. "There is no sense nor ethics in the universe," they cry, "only chaos!" All living beings were evolved by chaotic chance combinations and mutations of atoms and molecules without any aim nor purpose. When the waters receded and the fish were left on dry land, they grew legs and learned to walk. Later they grew feathers and learned to fly.

It was just as simple as that. But a fish, or you cannot grow feathers if you want to. A miraculous ethical energy must work in the living cells of your mother when you began life as a foetus in her womb. They built the amazing organs which you need for survival: a heart pump, television eyes, ear telephones, and many more engineering miracles. But the most fantastic engineering feat is this:

When you are injured, the cells in the central switchboard of your brain send out directions over the electric nerve network. Medicines are manufactured and shipped through the bloodstream to the scene of the accident. Ambulances and nurses arrive to help the injured brother cells. Then repair cells begin to rebuild the broken bone, the broken muscle, the broken skin—until all is health and happiness again. Don't think that your doctor can heal. He can only help the ethical cells to do the healing. You owe your life to them.

THIS IS THE GREATEST FORCE IN THE UNIVERSE: ETHICAL COOPERATION FOR THE CREATION OF HIGHER CREATURES OF HIGHER HARMONY.

"This is utter nonsense" the scientists cry. Darwin had explained that creatures evolved through the merciless selection by the survival of the fittest. But the Darwinians are deceiving themselves and the world with language. They have perverted Darwin's own words.

Imagine a pack of wolves in an ice age. Which wolves will survive? Those, whose cells are fittest in ethical cooperation to produce the warmest fur, the strongest limbs, the keenest eyesight, the greatest intelligence, stamina and endurance.

Imagine helpless animal babies in a catastrophe which overtakes herd. Which babies will survive? Those, whose parents have brain cells which are fittest in cooperation to produce the greatest love and intelligence, care, conscience and courage. In my writings I have cited numerous instances of animal parents who sacrificed their lives so that their babies shall survive.

But ethical cooperation of cell communities go further than the family bond. Single creatures form a community with a leader who "acts unselfishly for the interest of the entire community". The queens of bees and ants are the hardest workers of them all. The leader of an animal herd
risks his life first, when he guides the herd over mountain cliffs. He watches out for danger, when the others graze. His senses are taught even when he snatches a biteful of grass, or an hour of sleep. He has less leisure than the lowliest of the herd.

In terrible contrast, most leaders of human communities were, and still are, the most selfish of despots. And their lackeys in the schools and the churches teach children to adore and obey the monsters on the throne, who became leaders by their "divine rights". The shameless trick is done with words.

In the communist countries Darwin is revered like a god, and his theory is perverted to mean survival of those fittest in despoty, who can command the fittest bodyguards, the fittest battalions, the fittest bombs. Then the despot is killed by one of his officers, and he himself becomes the new despot. When he faces chaos, he plunges his people into a war to create more chaos. All this is in line with the theories of our scientists who proclaim that this universe is the product of chaos. And so they are leading mankind into the chaos of self-destruction by their nuclear devices. They refuse to see even the ethical cooperation working in the cells of their own bodies.

My friend Professor Reiser, the philosopher, explains in his cyclic-creative cosmology that besides the seen universe of matter, there must exist an unseen ocean of energy into which matter dissolves, and from which matter is created as hydrogen atoms in the depth of space. May I add my belief that there must be an unseen ocean of ethical energy which manifests itself in the cells of all living creatures.

The living cells, which built the body of my wife Claire, produced in ethical cooperation a masterpiece of love and affection, intelligence, care, conscience, courage, and beauty. Now that she has left me in sorrow, I cannot believe that all which remains of her are her ashes only. The ethical agents which pervaded her body has returned to the unseen ocean of ethical energy, and new creatures are created which are imbued with it. For me, the spirit which was my wife is recreated in the most ethical of all living creatures the flowering trees. There cells produce in ethical cooperation sweet nectar for butterflies and insects, sweet fruits for animals and humans, and sweet beauty and harmony for all to behold.

What I am trying to prove here in halting words—the philosophers of India have known it all the time. Their reverence for the life of the tiniest creature, their ideas of reincarnation prove to me that they have recognized ethics as the ultimate force in the creation of the cosmos. When will we idiots in the West learn our lesson from the philosophers of India? When? Or will it be too late?
THE NATURE OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

According to Hildegard von Bingen (1098 to 1178)

In comparison with Meister Eckhart, Suso, Tauler and Thomas a Kempis, Hildegard Von Bingen (St. Hildegarde of Bingen) is not much known even in Germany. And yet, there is in her extended writings one of the most instructive and penetrating accounts of the essence of mysticism in the whole of Western medieval thought. It is a piece of autobiographical report which, in my opinion, deserves much closer scrutiny than has as yet been accorded to it even in the more recent scant literature on Hildegard.

Though the whole folio 197 of J. P. Migne’s monumental Parisian edition of Latin Church Fathers is dedicated to Hildegard’s writings, her delineation of her mystical experience is not to be found there but only in the much less known Analecta Sacra edited by J. B. Pitra, Paris, 1882. It is a letter which Hildegard wrote in 1171, in the seventy-third year of her life, to the monk Guibert of Gembloux—one of those letters of her correspondence with secular and spiritual leaders of her time, among them the dominating religious mind of the age, Bernard de Clairvaux who showed special appreciation of her writing. There certainly is some peril of modernizing involved in the interpretation of any medieval or ancient document. But I hope it can be avoided as far as possible in this case.

1 Neither the five volumes of Friedrich Uberwag’s standard work Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie nor Joseph Bernhart’s extremely valuable and thoughtful Die philosophische Mystik des Mittelalters von ihren antiken Ursprüngen bis zur Renaissance mentions her name. Rufus M. Jones, in The Flowering of Mysticism, 1940, quotes only a few sentences of hers out of Charles Singer’s From Magic to Science, 1928.
Hildegard von Bingen, in her letter, keeps completely aloof from what seems to me one of the most misleading, though extremely widespread shortcomings in modern definitions of mysticism. This is the limitation of mystical experience to one topic only, union with the godhead—a narrowing down the subject matter so rigorously that Yoga mysticism, for instance, would have to be almost excluded from relationship to mystical thought in Judaism and in the Catholic as well as the Protestant Western churches. Hildegard, however, reports right from the beginning that her mystical experiences are not confined to seeing a divine light and hearing divine words; but her insights extend even to a deeper understanding of nature and “shifting clouds” no less than to the history of “people in distant lands”, “to writings, sermons, virtues” and certain other “works of men”\(^2\). As mistaken as it seems to me to exhaust oneself in controversies over definitions, the history of what is generally called mysticism certainly justifies Hildegard’s extension of the term to the interpretation of all possible phenomena of life and nature.

Numerous types of mystical teaching are indeed not concerned with the divine only. All of them, however, testify to a particular way of grasping and interpreting whatever opens itself to the mystic’s mind. In this sense it was Hildegard’s main endeavor to impart something of this peculiar non-rationalistic character of mystical experience and to see not merely one specific topic considered as the only genuine one but many non-divine themes which she saw in a special mystical light. To this effect she stresses primarily that she does not report of a hearing with her corporal ears and a seeing with her bodily eyes but of an inner awareness, “a seeing with the soul” or, as she calls it in her “Scivias”; a hearing with “the sharp ears of an inner understanding” (“acuta aures interioris intellectus”)\(^3\); and, as she emphasizes, the light she sees in her visions, is “not locally limited” and has “neither height nor length nor breadth.”\(^4\) But, “as the sun, the moon and the stars, appear in waters in such a way writings, sermons, virtues and certain deeds of men shine to me in this light”. Thus it seems clearly enough indicated here that the perceiving organs as well as the meaning of the objects perceived in these visions are not in any way comparable to the ways of observing ordinary data of normal or superior bare facts.

It would hardly make sense to assume that Hildegard saw factual “sermons” “dialogues” and “virtues” in a light factually more “lustrous” (“lucidior”) than that of the sun. Hildegard herself frankly and

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\(^2\)Jean Baptiste Pittra, *Analectæ sacre spliclegio Solesmensi parata*, Paris, 1882, Vol. V III p. 332: “Anima mea...ascendit...in vicissitudinem diversi aeris (et nubium)... at que inter diversos populos se dilatat, quamvis in longinquus regionibus et locis a me remotis sint...Et ut sol, luna et stellas in aquis apparent, ita scripturae, sermones, virtutes, et quaedam opera hominum formata mihi in illoc lumine) resplendent”.


\(^4\) See for this quotation and the following one *Analectæ Sacra*, 1882 Vol. VIII, p. 332 f: “Lumen...quod video, locale non est...nec altitudinem, nec longitudinem, nec latitudinem in eo considerare valeo.”
explicitly confesses that she was "unlearned" ("Indocta") and "not taught to write as the philosophers do" (sicut philosophi-ribunt, scribere... non doceor") But without doing any hermeneutic violence to the text, it seems to me obvious that Hildegard struggled here—indeed in primitive and unschooled intimations—to express the "philosophical" truth that there is a vast realm of meaning which can in no way be indicated by given or miraculous facts observable by common or superior organs of perception. On the contrary, as in poetry so in this area, sensuous images and sounds are deprived of any immediate naturalistic meaning and are instead endowed with a much wider and emotionally richer inner significance.

It seems to me, therefore, a service of rather dubious value when Evelyn Underhill insists, in her only reference to Hildegard's writings, that "the Living Light" the saint saw should not be interpreted to mean "a poetic metaphor" but a truly higher light. The veracity of great mystics is, in my opinion, not questioned but heightened if we maintain that the meaning they wish to convey is indeed related rather to poetry than to "precise" doctrine, contrary to what many historians of mysticism, even Joseph Gorres and Joseph Zahn maintain. The poet becomes no more a liar than the mystic when he speaks of scientifically "incredible things" because what mystics and poets want to express is a world of meaning totally different from all given soberly observable facts.

It is as unnecessary as it is misleading to demand we believe—as Underhill and many others do—that St. Francis really tamed a wolf in Gubbio or that Shakespeare and Goethe honestly believed in the existence of witches. (Shakespeare hardly did, Goethe definitely did not and he, never the less, tells us in his Faust even about the "Hexen—Einmal—Eins." Neither the honor nor the devotion to truth of the poet or the mystic requires this kind of rather questionable justification. It is, after all not by chance that most of the greatest mystical and religious writings are composed in the language of the poet and not in Scholastic or scientific terminology.

In her letter to Guibert, Hildegard tells us, however, of far more than of a light brighter than any light visible to bodily eyes. She also reports that in her visions "at the same time I see and hear, I call on my memory, know and, as it were in the same instant learn what I know. Again, this is graphic description of what modern psychology and philosophy have called a particular density and compactness of perception typical of moments of high creative thought and feeling, far nearer to art-

5 E. Underhill, Mysticism, 1949, pp. 276.
8 Goethe, Faust, Erster Teil, "Hexenkuche".
istic inspiration than to cool critical observation of scientifically verifiable facts. True, the inventive, original mind in science is also often guided by intuitive flashes of insight; but the scientist’s intuitions are valueless if finally they cannot stand the test of strictly rational commonplace or laboratory observation. In mysticism, however, we hear of rare or unique intellectual and emotional experiences which can never be checked by everyday perceptions and which are quite alien to the calm, slow, discursive analyzing and reasoning that is indispensable to scientific inquiry.

In mystical thought, instantaneous intuitive insights are presented in highly personal expression, intuitions generally not accessible by common sense and rational training or learning. It is a contradiction and stratification of thought loaded with feeling, with that marked emotional significance which science as science has to exclude at all costs in its research. To the poet, however, to the prophets in the great world religions and to the mystical these states of mind have always been familiar; and among them, five hundred years after Hildegard, the theosopher and mystic Jakob Bohme described in a similar way quite the same experience. He speaks in this connection—with a very appropriate analogy—of an intellectual and emotional “downpour” that occurred to him in sudden outbursts mystical insights.

Further, along with the instantaneous density of experiences and their non-literal meaning, there is for Hildegard, as for other mystics; the closest interweaving of the contents of their different perceptions. She sees, for instance, “the elements of the world” disordered and moving no longer in “accustomed rounds” but “spinning about like the sails of a windmill” disturbed because of mankind’s corruptions; and at the same time she hears these elements “crying” with a “mighty voice” of “wailing” and she “smells”, in addition to this, how they now “stink from pestilence and from hunger after justice”. What is seen, heard and even scented here expresses all the very same meaning: the perturbation of nature in consequence of the corruption of man, a disturbance in nature signified by an abnormal movement of nature’s elements, their cries as well as their stench. All these are certainly powerful utterances of a profound symbolic consonance of specifically differing data of the senses, a coincidence of differences characteristic again of poetical language, especially romantic lyrics as well as religious expressions of all times. In her letter to Guibert, Hildegard goes even so far as to report of “tasting words” and “hearing a light”. In other words, she sees the contents of different perceptions symbolically mixed in the same way as for instance, poets speak

of shrill colors and many-colored noises.

In addition to these three points mentioned so far, the same brief letter to Guibert contains another item once more especially typical of artistic creation and mystical experiences, their inexhaustibility. Hildegard expresses this the following way: "What I see and hear in this vision, my soul draws as from a well and yet that spring remains full and inexhaustible". While scientific statements must have a definite, clearly circumscribed meaning, works of art always point to something never adequately exhaustible; and exactly the greatest artistic achievements offer a challenge to ever new interpretations, to the discovery of hitherto unnoticed connotations and implications.

A fifth point to which Hildegard refers in her letter is by no means common to all mystical teaching; and yet it excels just in some of the most expressive ones. This is the acknowledgment of the mighty role that evil plays in the inmost setup of human existence. Hildegard did not wish to shut her eyes before the undeniable power of morally destructive forces in our world. Toward the end of her letter, she, therefore explicitly warns the monk Guibert against any slight of the strength of evil: "Fix your regard", she writes, "on the eagle who soars up to the clouds on both his wings" "(see" The Book of The Revelation to John", chap. 12, verse 14). "Should he injure one, he must remain seated on the earth and, no matter how much he would like to, could not fly. Man, too, flies on two wings of reason, that is, with the knowledge of good and evil, so that the right wing is the knowledge of good and the left wing the knowledge of evil. And the knowledge of evil must serve the knowledge of good; and the knowledge of good must be sharpened and directed by the knowledge of evil." Whoever tries to deceive himself and others about the might of evil can never rise to true wisdom. He will have to lower down on the ground like an eagle with a wounded wing. The understanding of evil is to the honest seeker after truth as indispensable as the knowledge of good.

Finally, however, Hildegard has not forgotten to mention a special trait which again is as characteristic of the creative artist as of the mystic. It is the power of an almost effortless and involuntary inspiration which seems to stem from incomprehensible superior sources. Hildegard graphically describes this profound experience as follows: "Because of the persistent infirmity from which I suffer, it is sometimes irksome to bring forth the words and visions shown me; but when my soul tastes and sees them, I become completely changed and forget all sorrow and tribulation... In myself I find no security whatever. I stretch out my han-

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12 Ibid., P. 332f: "Et quae tune in eadem visione video, et audio, haec anima mea quasi ex fonte haurit; sed illa tamen plena et inexhausta manet."

13 Ibid. p.333: "Attende agilam a duabus ales suis ad nubem volantem, quae tamen si in una laeditur, super terram residet, nec se levare potest, cum se libenter ad volandum elevaret: sic etiam homo cum duabus ales rationalitatis, Scilicet cum scientia bona et mali volat, ita ut dextera ala scientia bona sit, et sinistra scientia mala est, et mala boreae m. i. strat, bonaque per malam acuitur et regitur."
ds to God, like a feather free from all weight and carried by the wind; by him I shall be sustained."¹⁴

Friedrich Nietzsche, the avowed atheist, strangely enough comes rather near these lines by Hildegard when he, too, gives a surprisingly similar picture of his inspired moments of thought which, in his "Zara thustra", somtimes took indeed a turn to mystical insights. "Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century", he asks, "any distinct notion of what poets of a stronger age understood by the word inspiration? If one had the smallest vestige of superstition left in one, it would hardly be possible completely to set aside the idea that one is the mere incarnation, mouthpiece, or medium of an almighty power. The idea of revelation, in the sense that something which profoundly convulses and upsets one becomes suddenly visible and audible with indescribable certainty and accuracy—describes the simple fact...The involuntary nature of the figures and the similies is the most remarkable thing; one loses all perception of what is imagery and metaphor; everything seems to present it self as the readiest, the truest and simplest means of expression."¹⁵ Despite the gulf of centuries between these two writers and the even much greater abyss between their religious convictions, nevertheless, how much have these two passages by Hildegard and Nietzsche in common!

Standing at the dawn of the German Middle Ages Hildegard shares, of course, most primitive concepts of nature and world with her environment. Her book on medicine Causae et curae¹⁶, her fantastic description of exotic animals laid down in a kind of zoology can today be of interest only to the historian of ideas. But her attempt at characterizing her basic mystical experience is, I hope I could intimate, even this day well worth pondering over by the friend of Western as well as Indian mysticism.

¹⁴ Ibid., 332f "Prae assidua infirmitate, quam pastor aliquando, taudium habeo verba et visiones quae mihi ibi ostenduntur proferre : sed tamen cum anima mea gustando illa videt, in alios mores ita convertor quod...omnem dolorem et tribulationem oblivioni trado ... Nullam securitatem ullius possibilitatis in me scio, sed manus ad Deum pro-rigo quatenus velit penna, quae omnis gravedini virium caret et quae per ventum volat, ab ipso sustineam."


¹⁶ The title of this work by Hildegard is: "Physica, subtilitatum diversarum naturarum creaturarum libri novem".
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IMMORTALITY THROUGH ART

In this essay art, all art, is considered a phenomenon of equilibrium rather than an expression of the sense of beauty. Thus it is part and parcel of ethics, rather than the exclusive province of esthetics. For, as Malraux says so well: "The world of art, long thought to be dedicated to dreams and to the Gods derives from the very heart of humans, for it is not the association with the idea of beauty which makes of it the most efficient instrument of civilization which the wisdom of the ages has seen in it, it is the fact of its being humanism in the most vital meaning of the word". And so, we shall in this brief but basic excerpt of our social psychology of art indicate the philosophical concept underlying our efforts.

IMITATION AND THE FORMING OF TIME

In his primitive state, whatever his activities, Man's most intense longing is, and will continue to be, to soften his knowledge, his consciousness and his fear of death. Therefore, his practical behavior is an uninterrupted chain of precautions; from alimentation, procreation and shelter-building to the most complicated spiritual forms of prevention of his death, a death which he knows to be irrevocable. His psychic behavior is the constant magic invocation of death in order to eliminate even this death, a death known to be irresistible. Only the one who knows that he lives eternally does not fear death. But against what is the struggle directed if Man knows—and he does know—that he cannot escape, prevent, circumvent, or encircle death? What constitutes death?

It is Time running through Man; it is Time itself. His struggle is directed toward the standing still of Time. It is just this that the average subconscious constantly seeks, the standstill of Time in order to eliminate death.
It is not even to be hoped that such an idea, which can only be considered presumptuous, foolhardy, and from the viewpoint of Christianity, blasphemic, could ever be successfully carried out. But the attempt can be made; it must be made. Man's fear is dire and urgent. Death shall be stopped. Time shall be brought to a standstill. However, Time at a standstill is simply a form of equilibrium with dreaded time on one scale and a counterbalance on the other. Thus, this counterbalance must be found, to stop the running Time; and there is only one which can truly serve that purpose—another “time.”

Just as we need tamed elephants to tame wild ones, so we need another, a created and therefore governable “time” to control our wild Time—our Death. If we could find another “time” which we could tail or to match the one which goes through man irrevocably, irresistibly, and leads to his inescapable death—another time which would balance that dreaded Time—it would be possible to overcome death: these two times brought into equilibrium would be poised on the level scales of eternity. Time would stand still. Death would be eliminated. Immortality would be achieved. And toward this end mankind strives restlessly, unceasingly, even though it can never be fully attained. Yet it can be approximated; it must be; it will be.

Now, Man has found this second time. At first he did not see it, he did not hear it, he did not even feel it, But it was in him. It was the discovery that his ape-relatives had made many ages ago when they jumped up and down howling and beating their breasts with the fists. This was his discovery: the beating of his own heart, the hearing of this his own rhythm. Further, this sound could be transferred, controlled, imitated in the beating of two wooden sticks one against the other, first predecessor of the drumbeat.

And what is more; it could be used, for his dread purpose of thwarting death, to cut up the ungraspable running Time, to interrupt it, to form it. This was his discovery of the second time, the Echo-Time,* in him and through him. And so creating it, he began to move in his own rhythm, and this projection of it, his own first movements of interrupting time, led him to repeat certain of the movements, led him to dance. It was an outward form for his rhythm that he found himself, in himself, for himself. And it was his first step toward art. And it became his first art.

RHYTHM AND THE FORMING OF SPACE

Man in his endless search to eliminate death by stopping Time with a counter-Time, an Echo-Time, has found rhythm. And this rhythmical interruption of time we now recognize as the first step toward art. Whatever art has achieved in the succeeding centuries, however great and

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*The world is Hermann Broch's
manifold the forms of expression became, the musical principle of rhythm was kept and was imitated, immediately in dance and music and in the rhythmical speech of the actor, mediately in the two and three dimensional arts. But, the interruption alone of Time is not music, nor art in itself; it is not actually more than an attempt to create Echo-Time; but it is near to art; just as the easy of the dance is not religion but is near to it and brings Man close to it. One other element there is to complete the formation of Time into music and this is rhythmical perception—through consciousness—the hearing, the re-molding of it by the audience. This element gives it final shape, a shape with true spatial characteristics.

For it is space which every music hearer feels. It may be in the form of landscapes, from which program music largely derives, or in the form of abstract intangible fantasies. But his imaginative reaction has a strong spatial character, evident in the descriptive terms he uses such as: wide, floating, elevating, matching, storming, etc.—all space terms.

Space, of course, does not necessarily mean any exactly describable form of space but the filling of the spirit with extradimensional gain, even with ideas. It is impossible to hear without seeing, consciously or unconsciously. Most people, for instance, close their eyes for the full enjoyment of music in order not to be disturbed by any outer world picture, which they would not do if they were not seeing—or filled with space inwardly.

Thus, in space we perceive what before was only in Time. Our art music then is really—deliberately, intentionally—formed space. If therefore, Time is transformed in another medium, we, by hearing or by seeing it, perceive the echo of Echo-Time. And in this perception the gain of a dimension is to be recognized, in which we find social effects of art an arresting and essential relationship, i.e., the interdependence artist, artwork and audience.

Such a development, of course, is not proper to music alone. Every artwork is produced in these steps: first, in order to provide balance—to stop Time—the creation of another time, called Echo-Time, by rhythmical interruption; then the formation of this rhythm to space, becoming thereby, through consciousness, art, with the gain of an additional dimension to be created by the audience. Thus, although in music less obviously than in any other art, we see art complete in its three components—rhythmical medium, purposeful creator, visual audience. Space shaped in concept by the search for eternity, the still-standing of Time, and as final art by visual shaping in the human mold which receives it.

In music and dance, space is formed immediately. Since the camera allows us to keep the dance, this statement may seem to have lost its absoluteness, but actually the dance, the movement, is not kept—only its shadow. That space is formed mediately in the plane of painting, in the buildings of architecture and the works of sculpture needs no comment.
THE FORMING OF EQUILIBRIUM.

Rhythm is only one part of the counterbalance in the scales eternal equilibrium. There is one other factor which can bring about the same or similar effects. We have noted the development of rhythm, projected into movement, the physical repetition of which has become dance. There with Man becomes the Mimus of himself; here we find the origin of the theater. And we recognize another forming of Time—in a certain sense an even more direct one, simultaneous and interrelated with rhythm, a second way to come to art, once seen by Aristotle but differently interpreted—the way of imitation. Man sees himself as a mirror. Man depicts a beast, thereby killing it—magically. Man observes the painter, and the visible picture of the tree appears, directly formed in space, imitated but seen “through a temperament.” Through this, the audience, using imagination to reconstruct it, creates the third, the plastic dimension. Works of sculpture and architecture are, of course, directly formed out of space. The artist sees; he imitates and reconstructs “through his temperament,” there by creating.

Tschuang-Tse narrates that the master maker of bell-stands was once asked how he made them so divinely. He answered that he went to the forest after fasting and praying for seven days, forgetting all fame and blame, defines and clumsiness, his own body and the royal court. There, in the forest, he looked for a tree and when he saw in the tree the bell-stand in full form, so that he had only to execute what he had seen, he felled that tree. Had he not seen the bell-stand, fully developed, he would have given up the effort. Thus imitation is the part of the artistic act but it is never alone—and rhythm is very rarely alone. Rhythm and imitation together, however, and only these two, create equilibrium, create Echo-Time. Thus, we have found two means of approximating the equilibrium sought uneasingly by man, and with them the two basic principles of art:

The rhythmical—ornamental, symbolized by the drumbeat
The imitative—naturalistic, symbolized by the mirror

The drumbeat then is a symbol of life, the mirror a symbol of death, or more exactly, the continuation of death, of running time. True imitation as well as rhythm promises life, even eternal life; both are forms of equilibrium, both attempting to create Echo-time, both destined by Man to bring deadly time to standstill; but naturalistic imitation does it in the form of death. Therefore, imitation alone will never create equilibrium or approximate it far enough to create Echo-Time and become art.

If, for example, a trial is to be enacted on the stage, its wordings must be changed or it will never affect the audience. Its imagination has to be collectively planned and directed and rhythmized. Scenes must be omitted—others injected. Gestures must precede words, although in normal speech even in affectus the gesture will follow, or at the highest,
accompany the word. Dramatic pauses—impossible in the courtroom—must be added; the living scene in a court plays entirely in the third dimension, and the actual audience has nothing to perceive except perhaps the sensation of seeing a murderer; but in the theatre it has to imagine facts, statements, consequences, in brief, the entire attitude of fictitious world. Thus, the elements of art, imitation and rhythm, combine and complement each other. The so-called naturalistic or realistic author plays upon the imagination of the audience as he believes the audience to expect it.

COLLECTIVE IMAGINATION AND THE FORMING OF DIMENSIONAL GAINS

Here we encounter, beside the principles of art, another and important factor of the arts; namely, a state of mind out of which the audience may co-ordinate artistic events. By general consensus the master of the bell-stands was considered divine. What gave the people this idea? Certainly not every one could have made the bell-stand so beautifully: some would have made it differently, a few perhaps even more artistically; but this man was called divine, won the praise and high respect of people and court. He worked not only beautifully but well. Such agreement must be based upon some power. Agreement upon symbols for concepts, concrete and abstract, can come only from a common idea of the same thing. That the same symbol has the same meaning for a great number of people is a fact of collective imagination; doubtless its main source is language, the convention of signifying by one word actions, their subjects and their objects. This means mutual understanding, through symbols known to all, even a collective effort, like the tower of Babel will disintegrate through distortion and distrust. Common language, by force of its collective imagination, has united, and reunited, people through its symbolization of both concrete objects and abstract ideas, making possible understanding of the meaning behind the movement, the word behind the cry.

Language accompanies man through all stages of cultural development in his attempt to eliminate death. The prayer and lyrical expression of the individuum offer parallels to music, dance and acting, and is often associated with all three, or with one only. It is caught and built by a rhythmical cycle and rightly belongs to the first dimension, from which it is created and brings man close to ecstasy. Thus far, the art of language, somewhat vaguely called literature, is partly of the first dimension. The audience by imagination and understanding, gains another dimension from the time-created space through its collective imagination. This imagining does not take the same form in everyone, in fact, it does so in very few people, but it creates some common feeling, some togetherness —yet time, rhythmically interrupted and formed, becomes a living power in the receptive individual or group.
Epic art is closely related to painting in its broad and descriptive character. Neither in origin nor in elaboration does it really correspond to the plane of the second dimension, and the state of ecstasy in its relation to the audience is more distant; but the idea of a picture of world-totality in a given moment—and this is the idea of the novel, at least today—assigns to it a second dimension. Linguistic rhythm and the imitative quality of narration remove this art form from the first dimension, the immediate space-building sphere of art.

Collective imagination makes the events narrated in script, or transmitted orally, appear plastically to everyone's mind. And again the audience by co-creating and re-producing gains another dimension in addition to the two already created by the artist.

The theater, a good example, developed from the first dimension by way of the actor who became author. But it is in its complicated form, through collaboration of many if not all arts, that we consider the theatrical event truly as one of the plastic, the third, dimension, describing the thought and life of an epoch and a world-moment as fully as any gothic cathedral. The theater, using both rhythmization and imitation, is rightly placed in the third dimension, according to its ethics and the laws proper to it. Collective imagination then works to create the spiritual space out of which the work has grown, adding "atmosphere" to the perception of the audience, thus creating the fourth dimension which we may call the dimension of attitude, characterized by its artistic style. So, the collectively working audience gains a dimension, whereby they find the equilibrium lacking in their lives. This is summarized in the following chart.
AXIOMATIC NEED FOR IMMORTALITY

in order to alleviate fear of death

Physical behavior

(mental progress)

Invocation of Death

Running Time

ECHO-TIME

Shelter-Building

Rhythm

Imitation

symbolized in

Drumbeat

Mirror

EQUILIBRIUM

Time immediately formed in space

Dancer

Musician

Actor

1st Dimension

Dancing

Acting

Music

Poetry

Time mediately formed in space

Painter

Sculptor

Architect

2nd Dimension

Painting

Sculpture

Architecture

Novel

Theater

Movie

3rd Dimension

Drama

Opera

TIME

Transformed in Space

SPACE

Transformed in Space-Time

PROJECTED into

TRANSMITTED into

WORLD TOTALITY
UNITY OF ETHICAL VALUES IN THREE SIGNIFICANT TWENTIETH
CENTURY PHILOSOPHIES OF EAST AND WEST

In this crucial twentieth century when constructive thinkers are searching for all possible bases for uniting mankind, it is encouraging to notice that in the important field of ethical values many great philosophers in both East and West are largely in agreement. Significant examples of such global agreement are to be found in the philosophies of Morris Raphael Cohen, the Socrates of American philosophy, Fung Yu-lan, greatest of the twentieth century philosophers of China, and Sri Aurobindo, one of the two greatest Indian philosophers of this century. Morris Raphael Cohen and Fung Yu-lan develop ethical goals and values that are similar on the foundations of a metaphysics fundamentally Aristotelian; Aurobindo, whose metaphysics is basically idealist, advocates ethical goals that include and transcend those of the Aristotelian rationalistic systems.

MORRIS RAFAEL COHEN'S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM
AND ITS RESULTANT ETHICAL VALUES

The fundamental metaphysical foundation of Cohen's system is his well-known Principle of Polarity, founded upon the Aristotelian opposites, Matter and Form. As in Aristotle's thought, the substance or nature of every individual consists of forms or universals.¹ The subject-

matter of each science is a certain relevant set of universals in their systematic relationships. Since the separate sciences have been successful in abstracting certain classes of relationships in formulating their systematic bodies of knowledge, Cohen thinks this indicates that the universals or forms and laws of nature do not form an organic whole characterized by internal relations. If all relations were part of one organic system, we should be obliged to know the whole in order to understand any part and human knowledge would be impossible.

Fung agrees with Cohen on this issue, but Aurobindo (and Radhakrishnan) disagree. Nevertheless, Cohen, a rationalistic mystic by temperament, leans towards a monistic unity in the logical structure of nature based upon what he thinks is the fact that the laws of logic (which he identifies also with the laws of pure mathematics) are common to all the separate sciences. If the sciences reveal reality, then the laws of logic underlying all their systems of propositions are real and are the “invariant laws of all possible being.” The sciences, in fact, strive to attain a completed rational system similar in nature to the Bradleyan Absolute.

The rationalistic mysticism which follows from this vision of nature as a logical system unified at least by the laws of logic is made explicit in Cohen’s essay “The Intellectual Love of God.” Here Cohen advocates the Spinozistic ideal, that man’s highest goal, as in Aristotle’s philosophy, is the devotion to and contemplation of cosmic truth.

Subvalues and goals related to this highest goal in Cohen’s philosophy are, in general, the finest ethical ideals of a liberal civilization. Freedom of thought is primary and is directly related to the intellectual love of God, because freedom of thought is the freedom to investigate all aspects of the logical system of nature including human nature and social relations. In relation to this pursuit of truth the Greek ideal of the contemplative life is praised. In an essay with the title “In Defense of the Contemplative Life” Cohen makes clear that American life lays too much emphasis upon doing, upon Theodore Roosevelt’s busy-bee philosophy which is “to improve each shining moment, to be ever striving upward and onward without ever asking where is upward, and why onward?” Cohen reminds us that the great out-

3 Ibid., p. 146 and p. 146 note 3 in which Cohen points to Whitehead and Russell’s *Principia Mathematica* in defense of logic as the foundation of mathematics. He says, “As a consequence of a century of labor many, though not all, mathematicians are convinced that mathematics can be developed in terms of the ideas of pure logic.”
5 Ibid., p. 158.
8 Ibid., p. 290.
standing contributions in philosophy, religion, the arts and the sciences come from those who lose themselves in contemplation of the object, in the disinterested pursuit of knowledge.

Since freedom of thought is a fundamental value, the social and political organization of society must be of such a kind as to encourage it; totalitarian systems are bad because they discourage it. A liberal democracy is best and the most humane political form for the encouragement of all freedoms. Cohen does not confuse liberal democracy with laissez-faire capitalism which, he thinks, can be far from humane and has often inhibited many from that access to knowledge and the arts essential to enjoyment of the contemplative life, or from realization of other valuable potentialities more practical in nature.

Although it is true that liberalism has been identified traditionally with individualism, especially in economics and politics, in the present state of world economics individualism, Cohen says, has become bankrupt in the industrial field throughout the world, just as in the political field the supremacy of individual rights has also been irretrievably undermined. In an essay “The Future of American Liberalism,” he writes:

Thoughtful people today can no longer hope for salvation through economic warfare and anarchy. There is a general consensus that some social plan of production for the needs of a community, rather than for individual profit, is necessary if the routine of civilized life is to continue. The real question is: Shall the planning be done by some irresponsible dictatorship, or by democratic representatives whose acts are subject to discussion and criticism?

In politics, also, individualism has in recent times served as merely “the stock justification for all sorts of immoral and unsocial activities on the part of privileged groups and vested interests.” Liberalism requires freedom for individuals, but a socially responsible freedom.

Cohen advocates a socialistic democracy as the political form best suited to liberalism today because he has a great concern for the social values of equality and fraternity as well as for liberty. Aurobindo, we shall see, is also concerned for these values. The faith of the liberal as Cohen understands it envisages the progress of man towards a rationally ordered free and humane society in which every individual will be able to maintain his human dignity; and this means that he will be able to develop the highest constructive human potentialities of which he is capable, whether these are directed to man’s practical life or pursuits of truth and beauty, the contemplative life, man’s highest kind of happiness. Fung Yu-lan’s and Aurobindo’s final values and goals for man are much the same.

10 Ibid
11 Ibid., p. 466.
FUNG YU-LAN'S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM AND ITS RESULTANT ETHICAL VALUES

Fung Yu-lan, like Cohen, bases his ethical values upon a metaphysical system that is basically Aristotelian yet given a characteristically Chinese coloring. The Aristotelian ultimates matter—called Ch'i, and form—called Li are the basic ones. Li includes the entire world of possible and actual forms. The entire world of Li Fung names the T'ai Chi and is also what he calls "The Supreme Point of Perfection." This is because existence is viewed as a whole as the process of actualization of the T'ai Chi by the primordial Ch'i (matter). The Evolution of Tao is the name given to all the continuous processes involved in this actualization of the T'ai Chi. The sum total of the world of Li, of Ch'i and of evolutionary processes is called the Great Whole. The Great Whole is also the One, yet it is not characterized by internal relations. "The One is only the general name for the all," 12 Fung explains. Although this sounds like a philosophical pluralism, Fung insists upon the oneness of the Great Whole and appeals ultimately to mystical intuition as the only mode of its real comprehension. This is because the Great Whole equals all being including the thought that thinks it, therefore, mystical intuition is the only mode of its comprehension. Fung states explicitly that his philosophy is "near to mysticism and the Inner-light Ch'an position." 13

This kind of metaphysical pluralism within a Great Whole founded fundamentally upon the polarity of matter and form is similar to Cohen's metaphysics. Both strive for an impersonal oneness called either God or the Great Whole. In both systems man's highest happiness is contemplation of this Great Whole. Cohen's Whole is the logical system of nature; Fung's embraces everything—the All. The language of Wholeness in Fung's system is characteristically Chinese. Chinese philosophy throughout shows an intense love and concern for Wholeness. The four seasons correlated with waxing and waning yang and yin influences are often used as the basic analogy for all wholenesses microcosmic or macrocosmic.

Fung's praise of man's highest happiness as contemplation of this Wholeness rather than the life of practical activities is expressed in a beautiful passage in a mood similar to Cohen's and Spinoza's intellectual love of God:

"The concerts of Li and Ch'i can enable men's minds to wander in that which is prior (ch'u) to things and the concepts of the Evolution of Tao and the Great Whole enable mens' minds to wander..."


13 Ibid., p. 215.
in the wholeness of being. With the aid of these concepts men can
know Heaven, can serve Heaven, and can rejoice in Heaven."14
The man who achieves this goal is called a Sage.

Although the sage is not by virtue of being a sage a practical man
of affairs, he is best suited to become a king. By "king" Fung says that
he means a man "who has the highest qualities of leadership in a soci-
ety."15 Such a man does not have to do much himself; he should be wu-
wei as the ancient Taoist thought expresses it. This means that the sage-
king does not perform any priticular operations for the welfare of society
but "gets all the talents in the country to do their best."16 The supreme
leader of men needs a mind that is contemplative, that dwells in what
Fung calls the Transcendent Sphere. Such a man can be impartial and
all-embracing, for he identifies himself with the Great Whole and can
see things from its disinterested standpoint. He is, therefore, the most
suitable to be the supreme leader of a society. The whole purpose of
philosophy, Fung declares, is to make clear "the Tao by which men
can become sage men, or in other words how men can develop 'sageli-
ness within and kingliness without.'"17

Few men, however, attain this highest ethical goal which lies in the
Transcendent Sphere of ethical value. There are three lower ethical sph-
eres.18 The lowest is the unselfconsciously, natural sphere. This is an un-
effective level of primitive innocence wherein man follows his natural
tendencies or the customs of the society in which he lives. The second is
called the Utilitarian Sphere. Here man becomes ego-conscious and sees
his own greatest advantage through acquisition of personal property or
reputation. The basic motivation of significant action is egoistic profit.
At the third level, the Moral Sphere, egoism is superceded by a con-
cern for society as a whole; the individual acts for the good of society,
rejoices in its joy and sorrows in its sorrow. The fourth and highest, the
Transcendent Sphere, which we have already described, is man's highest
goal.

Fung has recently rescinded his philosophy and has "confessed" to
his totalitarian government that it is aristocratic and based upon "landlo-
rdisn." Whether or not his retraction is sincere or merely prudence in
a delicate situation, we do not know. His philosophy is, of course,
like almost all the great philosophies of mankind, addressed necessarily
to a learned few and those who have had the opportunity to enjoy
the luxury of some measure of a contemplative life.

Cohen shows how to combine an aristocratic philosophy with a
democratic liberalism of the kind which can provide stimulation for

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14 ibid., p. 218
15 ibid., p. 219.
16 ibid., p. 220.
17 ibid.
18 ibid. "Summary of Chapter III in Dr. Fung's Hsin Yuan Jen (Chungking, 1943)
pp. xiii f. The Hsin Yuan Jen translated "New Treatise on the nature of Man" is the
title of Fung's book on the ethical system based upon his metaphysics.
an appreciation and enjoyment at some level of the delights of man’s highest activities in the arts and sciences. Sri Aurobindo maintains that this is actually man’s destiny in the next evolutionary phase of his development, the stage of Spirit. Radhakrishnan agrees, but since Aurobindo is the Indian idealist thinker who has most in common with Cohen’s more empirical mystical rationalism, we shall limit ourselves to his views.

**SRI AUROBINDO’S METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM AND ITS RESULTANT ETHICAL VALUES**

The metaphysical foundation for Aurobindo’s ethics is a Western idea of evolutionary progress. The Ultimate Reality is spiritual, infinite organic unity, a One with the qualities of Being, Consciousness and Bliss. These qualities manifest themselves in creative activity, in a Many. We can explore the fundamental planes of this activity, a spiritual energy, in the evolutionary development of our universe. Our universe manifests the involution of the Infinite into the Inconscient level of being, Matter; evolution begins with the Vital or subconscious level; Life: from this level evolves the self-conscious or Mental level, the human; finally the next and highest level will evolve, that called the Super mind, Spirit, or Gnostic level of being. All four levels as manifestations of the Divine are to be revered. Man’s ethical goal, when the final level of Spirit is attained is what Aurobindo calls an integral yoga. This means an integration of the values of Matter which makes the yoga of Action significant; the values of Love initiated at the Life level; and the values of knowledge initiated at the mental level and fulfilled at the Spirit level.

Knowledge at the Spirit level becomes knowledge-by-identity, a knowledge in which subject and object are one because this knowledge intuits directly the Infinite One and also the many as the manifestations of Its delight in creativity, The knowledge of Intellect, although praised by Aurobindo in its pure, disinterested form the contemplative life, is criticized for its weaknesses when it applies itself to practical problems.20 Reason, for example, has been used in defense of every kind of social system—democratic, aristocratic, oligarchic or despotic, furthermore, Reason is limited because it can deal only with the finite; therefore, it cannot found the perfect life for man. Aurobindo thinks that “A purely rational society could not come into being and, if it could be born either could not live or would sterilise and petrify human existence”.24 This is because “the root powers of human life, its intimate causes are

21 Ibid., p. 149
below, irrational, and they are above, supra rational.\textsuperscript{23} Reason itself, in yearning for its ideal limit of completion has an intimation of the knowledge, the Light that surpasses it, a luminous intimation of God as the Soul, the Self in the world.\textsuperscript{23} The mystical rationalism indicated here reminds us of Cohen’s “intellectual love of God”. Aurobindo, in what seems to our western minds a wild, occult and even irresponsible spirit of prophecy, predicts the actual realization of the stage of a Divine knowledge-by-identity in the near future.\textsuperscript{24}

Human society is now evolving towards such a climactic level out of an Age of Reason and Individualism. The Age of Reason and Individualism has placed in the forefront of social values those of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity to be realized in a democratic order of society. The actual achievement, however, in liberal democratic societies has amounted to a merely political equality and freedom of thought. Both of these are great values, Aurobindo thinks, but Fraternity has not yet been achieved under any social order. Aurobindo believes that the ideal of Fraternity can be realized only when a sufficient number of men have attained the evolutionary level of Spirit.

When this occurs society will take the form of what he calls a “spiritual anarchy”.\textsuperscript{24} No coercive powers will be needed; all men will identify themselves with all others as organic parts of God, the one. In this era the physical, the vital and the mental aspects of being will be under conscious control and will be integrated into one harmonious whole to be utilized for blissful enjoyment and creative activity.

This spiritual level is one beyond that of particular and discriminated ethical values because it is a suprarational level of spontaneous, intuitive knowledge and activity; the good is known and performed spontaneously, intuitively. Beauty and truth are also known, for in the knowledge-by-identity of the One which includes the All in Its Being, Consciousness and Bliss—in this direct Vision of God, the highest intimations and values are intuited. The “intellectual love of God” of rationalistic mysticism has resulted in its highest consummation, knowledge-by-identity with the Divine.

CONCLUSION: UNITY OF ETHICAL IDEALS AND VALUES

Fung’s concept of the primary values, of man’s highest good and happiness—contemplation of the Great Whole—is a state realized ultimately by a supraconscious intuition, i.e., a mystical consciousness, an Inner Light which goes beyond discursive reason. This is somewhat similar in its mystical vision to Aurobindo’s view of man’s highest consummation, but unlike Aurobindo Fung does not posit a One characterized

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., pp. 272—274.
By internal relations and therefore does not envision the knowledge-by-identity of Aurobindo's system. The Great Whole, itself, presumably does not have this knowledge since it is not characterized by internal relations and is impersonal and probably not conscious. Aurobindo's Absolute, on the other hand, has the qualities of Being, Consciousness and Bliss.

From one important point of view Cohen seems closer to Aurobindo than does Fung: Cohen admits that the ideal of scientific knowledge is an integrated system, one logical whole, which would imply internal relations. At the same time he thinks that logic does not exhaust existence. It is, in fact, part of the principle of Polarity that the logical has no meaning apart from the alogical. This means that there are some irrational or surd elements in nature, itself. Even with respect to the logical the knowable aspects of Nature, Cohen advocates an attitude of intellectual humility. He believes, like Einstein, that human beings will never be omniscient and will probably always have but a limited view of what it might be possible to know; always there will be mystical intimations of a horizon ever beyond their reach. There is a mystical reverence for this unattainable whole of knowledge in the "intellectual love of God" which links Cohen and Aurobindo; yet there is a significant difference between the two related to the differences between the Western rational-scientific and Eastern aesthetic orientations in philosophy. Contrary to Aurobindo, Cohen thinks that man does not and never will have access to the vast total system of truth through intuitive thought (which can, however, suggest valuable hypotheses to informed geniuses). Such knowledge as man will be able to have will always be the result of "hard intellectual effort." It is, then, only in the "intellectual love of God" with God as the symbol of the spiritual reality of all laws and principles of the universe, that Cohen comes at all close to the mystical intuition of the suprarational kind that Aurobindo advocates. Intuition in Fung's philosophy has an aesthetic emphasis of a more concrete kind (typically Chinese) than we find in Aurobindo's thought.

Despite these differences among the three philosophers related to their different cultural traditions, there is a large place for mystical intuition: an "intellectual love of God" (Cohen); a suprarational knowledge-by-identity of God (Aurobindo); or a mystical consciousness of the Great Whole perceived by the Inner Light (Fung). For all three philosophers this perception or love of the Divine is man's highest goal and happiness.

There is much agreement also upon the secondary values. Fung is most aristocratic of the three in his concept of the ideal state ruled by a philosopher sage-king whose morality is that of the "transcendent sphere." Only through such a ruler, Fung thinks, will the people attain the good and

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25 E. A. Burtt, "A Basic Problem in the Quest for Understanding Between East and West," the summarizing paper read at the East-West Philosophy Conference at the University of Hawaii, 1949. The papers read at this conference are now published in book from by University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii.
happy life. Cohen is more democratic both in his approach to methods of
government and in his active concern for equality of economic and educational
opportunities for all men. Aurobindo's democracy is far more extreme.
His concept of "spiritual anarchy" as the next phase of man's evolution
would, if it could be actualized, mean, as Aurobindo says, the concrete
realization of the West's own ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity.
There is agreement between Aurobindo and the West\(^2\) about the ideals
even though the Western philosophers, because of their different tradition,
find it difficult to accept a "spiritual anarchy" based upon a knowledge-
by-identity as the next stage in evolution.

Although there are the differences we have noted, there is a funda-
mental unity of ethical goals and values both primary and secondary
among the three great philosophies we have reviewed; not an absolute
unity, but a unity with diversity related not only to the originality of
their authors but also to the diversity of cultural traditions in which the
systems were developed. Each philosophy, therefore, has its own unique
flavor which colors its interpretation and method of implementation
of human values that are basically the same in all. Around these values,
recognized in some form by thinkers of many cultures and countries, all
mankind might rally.

\(^2\) The Communist world, too. In its idea of the second phase of Communism holds
to a similar ethical ideal, a society in which no coercive government forces will be
needed—liberty, equality and fraternity will be actualized.
In the writing of British Empiricists there is no more popular example of a clearly mental circumstance than the having of a visual image. And even though epistemological preoccupations make these writers especially concerned with images, we will have to agree that having an image, is one kind of circumstance that should obviously be called a mental circumstance. They erred, however, in their wont of using the having of an image as a model by which to characterise all mental circumstances. For one thing the having of an image is something we commonly say ‘happens solely in one’s head’, but we would not apply this phrase to many other mental circumstances. There is little temptation to say that a person’s rage or despair, sullenness or enthusiasm, clumsiness or skill are things that ‘happen solely in his head’, and yet there is equally little temptation to deny that they are mental traits and happenings.

In recent years, investigation of what we understand by words for diverse mental circumstances has been spurred by the vexatious problems of ‘other minds’. One of the most prominent of these is how a person is to verify the ascription of a mental circumstance to someone not himself. We commonly suppose that the proper and the only way to settle whether another person is contented, sad, or good at logic is by looking at and listening to him. Recent investigation of such concepts as pain, emotion, intelligence and volition has gone far to justify this supposition by showing that dispositions to behavior, and hence to what can be seen and heard, are fundamental to our understanding of these things. But when we reflect on the having of images, relations to conduct may seem less obvious than in anger and despair, and looking and listening accordingly less justifiable as means of verifying that a person has an image. Ordinarily, however, and apart from such reflection, we still sometimes regard ascriptions of imagings settled in these ways past all reasonable doubt. In what follows I shall discuss the rationale of our practice here.
First, a few comments about verifying must be made.

We commonly allow only one manner of verification to be fitting for statements about things that are perceivable, namely the perceiving of these things. Other sorts of statements, about irrational numbers or proofs in logic, are settled in other ways. But: settling the existence of what can be perceived waits on the perceiving of it. We may say more generally that this statement can be verified by perceiving, then perceiving is ipso facto the only proper way of verifying it. That the class of statements that can be verified by perceiving is larger than the class of statements about things that can be perceived is something I shall shortly try to show.

Whenever we can claim to verify a statement by perceiving we must be able to claim to perceive that such and such is the case. For e.g. seeing that something is the case is just finding out by seeing that this is the case. It is not, however, true that whenever one claims to see that something is the case one must be able to claim to have verified thereby the statement that it is the case. A man may see that it is going to rain (from the clouds he sees) or that there is a fire in a valley out of sight (from the smoke he sees). Here he finds out by seeing that it will rain or that there is a fire; but verifying the statement that it will rain, or that there is a fire, requires something more: namely seeing the rain or fire itself. When I verify a statement about what can be perceived I must see that what it says is true; but I must also see the object or event in question. If in such contexts as these, I see that there is a fire, but I do not see the fire, I can be said to know there is a fire by inference: by perceiving one thing, smoke, I infer the existence of something not perceived, the fire. And to speak of inference here is to indicate the possibility that what is inferred may not be as one thinks, and hence to exclude all claim of verifying.

When I see an object, say a teacup in the closet, and verify thereby the statement that there is one there, the situation has at least these traits. First, the teacup, something with distinctive perceptual qualities must be there before my eyes. Second, what I have noticed in looking at the thing before my eyes must provide logically sufficient grounds for the truth of ‘There is a teacup here’. All verifying by perceiving will have this second trait. It amounts to this: that the traits I see, when looking in the cupboard, are such that when a thing in a certain situation has then we may say that all reasonable doubt is excluded that it is a teacup. That a thing’s having these traits precludes all reasonable doubt that it is a teacup does not mean that one could not fancy or pretend to oneself that a thing with these traits is not a teacup. I could pretend to myself that the thing in the cupboard with the traits I see is really an exotic fungus or a vessel made of sugar. To see such traits of a thing as are logically sufficient for the truth of ‘There is a teacup here’ is simply to be apprised of such traits as remove all reasonable doubt that it is something else, an exotic fungus or a vessel made of sugar.
It must be emphasized that in other contexts in which we verify a statement by perceiving, it is not necessary or even fitting to say we see the thing the statement is about. To settle whether a piece of iron is magnetic one must observe it under certain conditions. When these are fulfilled I can say 'I see that this iron is magnetic, and I have verified the statement that it is magnetic thereby.' Yet it is a solecism to say 'I see its magnetism.' What one sees is iron filings move toward it. For a thing to be magnetic is to have such statements as 'If it is placed proximate to iron filings then the filings move toward it' true of it. Even though we can see that the iron has this dispositional property (when the conditions are fulfilled) and verify by seeing that it has this property, one cannot really claim to see the dispositional property, as one can see the mauve color or teacup shape of something. In an obvious sense the property in question is not there before our eyes. Of course just because one can see that a thing is brittle, but cannot properly claim to see its brittleness, one should not infer, as would have been true in the case of the fire in the valley, that an inference is being made to the existence of something out of sight. This would be doubly unfortunate, for it would make dispositional properties sound like things that must be always hidden from us, and it would make verifying the existence of such properties wait on the perceiving of them (which is impossible to do), just as verifying the existence of the fire waited on the perceiving of it. But in fact 'This is magnetic' can be verified in situations in which we simply see that it is magnetic, and without the addition of any such dubious item as seeing the magnetism itself. What I am contending is that we may verify by seeing that something exists even though it may be a solecism to speak of seeing that which we verify to exist. One circumstance of this sort will be where dispositional properties are at issue. I see no reason why there may not be other circumstances of this sort as well.

This digression has been important, for many writers, looking to criteria we have for verifying statements about objects and events, have tried to show not just that we can verify by perceiving ascriptions of mental circumstances, but also that a person's mental circumstances are items we perceive. It seems only common sense that we sometimes see that a person is angry or that he believes that it will rain. But it is more awkward to say that we see a person's anger, and more awkward still to say we see his belief that it will rain. That it does seem awkward need not imply that his anger or belief is something hidden from our sight and inferred from what we do see. It only shows, I think, that anger and belief, in common with magnetism and brittleness, are items of which it is not quite proper to say that one sees or fails to see them, even though we can verify ascriptions of them by seeing.

At least part of the reason that it is awkward to speak of seeing a person's anger or his belief that it will rain is simply the dispositional characteristics of these properties he may have. To say that a man is angry, for instance, is to imply that he would presently deport himself in various ways
were certain conditions to be realised: ways, that is, that he deems detrimental to whatever he is angry at or some substitute thereof. The chairman is furious, we say; were Jones in there now what a show there would be. That he would chastise Jones, berate others, and be testy toward any number of persons were they to be there now is what we expect of him by dint of the disposition to detrimental action that is part of being angry. Moreover, there may easily be cases in which observation of his specific actions, together with what we know about the circumstances, may establish that he is angry beyond all reasonable doubt. When a bottle breaks its brittleness is settled; and in watching the chairman in his tirade against Jones reasonable doubt that he is angry may be excluded. Of course we may never be granted a fulfillment of the relevant conditions, and this is one reason we may never be able to verify the dispositional ascription. That this material will shatter at a certain pressure may always remain unverified by dint of our inability to produce such pressure. And even though the chairman is angry, his display of anger may be impeded by his monumental self-control. A condition for deporting himself in angry ways would be the absence of this self-control; and this condition we may not find fulfilled. These considerations, however, do not bear on the contention that we may sometimes establish, by looking and listening, that he whom we see or hear is angry. They justify no general scepticism about knowing other minds.

There is one further difficulty I must mention about verifying statements about mental circumstances. The specific actions in which a man's anger, contentment or desire may manifest themselves are determined by rules of conduct he has learned and his beliefs about what is the case. To be disposed to act to the detriment of what one is angry at is part of what it is to be angry. Yet whether this behavior takes the form of a blow, a whispered remark, or singing a contract with his competitor, depends on what one believes about the situation in which one is involved, as well as what one regards as the detrimental thing to do in such situations. A man's beliefs or certainties about matters of fact are themselves good examples of the way that dispositions to conduct depend on rules of behavior, or 'practical principles.' Though being certain it will rain is clearly a disposition to some sort of conduct, there are no specific actions to which a man is *Ipso facto* disposed by this certainty. Whether I shut the window from my certainty or put on a bathing suit depends on what conduct I deem fitting to the truth of 'It will rain' in conjunction with other statements about what is the case. Hence, telling from a man's actions what factual beliefs or certainties he has could not be done unless we are sure what he deems fitting to do when certain things are the case. Fortunately we learn to do much the same sort of thing in similar situations, so that in many cases a man's action can exclude all reasonable doubt about what he believes. Just as in the case of anger or contentment, however, we may be utterly defeated in telling whether a man believes a thing or
not. Whether the diplomat believes the treaty is unwise may remain an enigma to us. My contention is only that the ascription of these mental circumstances may sometimes be verified by observation and that we need not entertain any general and pervasive doubts about their application.

Yet though it be granted that many ascriptions of mental circumstances may be settled by observation, there remain to be considered the things that 'happen solely in one's head.' Our idiom here may suggest that imaging is something severed from any conduct that could be observed. And indeed there seems at first blush little conduct to which a man would be disposed by having an image; at least by contrast to being angry or despairing.

Supposing that there is no necessary connection between imaging and conduct, many have contended that we can have no verifying of these ascriptions to another mind unless we can perceive the very image the other mind is having. And of course if this is the criterion that verifying such ascriptions must meet, 'the profounder sceptics' must always triumph, since there is no way to intrude upon the images of others. Nevertheless, both this criterion of verification and the sceptical consequences of it are tempting views. If no disposition to conduct is part of our understanding of 'the having of an image' how else could we be certain that a man is having an image of the shore, but by perceiving the image he is having? And since we are prevented from ever perceiving the image he is having, must we not say that we can never know whether or not he is now having an image of the shore?

This criterion, however, presupposes that a person's images are themselves somewhat preceivables. And this rests on the further supposition that it is right and proper to say of a man that he (and he alone) perceives his images. To this I should add that if it is proper to say of a man that he alone perceives his images, then it follows that they are perceivables, and hence that statements about the existence of his images can be verified only by the perceiving of those images, just as statements about the existence of a teacup in the closet can be verified only by the perceiving of it there. The propriety of the idiom, the criterion of verification and this scepticism about other minds are inextricably entwined. In what follows I hope it will be clear, however, that 'perceiving images' is a very misleading expression for the having of one, such that 'the perceiving of another's image,' taken literally, does not express even a possible criterion of verification, much less the thing we would have to do to really know another's imagings. Another circumstance worthy of attention is this: if 'perceiving images' were an expression we could without qualms take literally, we should find that the perceiving of another's image would never suffice to verify a statement about what images he is having i.e. about his present experience or state of mind. The reason this is so now follows.

It is fundamental to the concept of perception that whatever we say
a person perceives we could have said he failed to perceive, and whenever we can say a person perceives a thing the way it is, we could also have said that he does not perceive the thing the way it is. So if we were to intrude upon a person's private world and perceive an image there, we could not claim thereby to have established that he is having any certain image; i.e., to have established what his experience is now. For it must always be possible that he is not perceiving the image we perceive, or he is perceiving it differently from the way that we perceive it. Hence perceiving his image would not settle any belief about the present condition of this other mind.

To this it could be replied that even though it must be possible for what is perceived to have been overlooked or misperceived, in the case of images such mistakes do not occur. We are, toward our images, so fortunately placed that we cannot be in error about them. Hence if one were to be able to perceive another's image one would have the right to conclude that the other person had the same experience one was then having. In reply to this I maintain, that if images are indeed perceivables, and hence not exempted from our erroneous beliefs by the very notion of them, then no person has one shred of evidence that he does not have countless images 'unperceived' and that he does not always err in supposing the images he does perceive are the way he thinks they are. For if I could make mistakes about my images—as the language of 'perception' perforce requires I can—then the only way to know whether there now exists an image of mine which I fail to perceive would be to have others look and corroborate my view. But the alleged privacy of these mental objects of perception would prevent any such corroboration; and hope of showing that all images are perceived should therefore be abandoned. A further curious consideration is that if we could overcome the barrier of privacy and perceive the images he perceives, there would be little further point of the speaking of the images of his. What could be the rationale of ascribing images we can all perceive to him?

These queer results of applying the notion of perceiving to imaging testify that these concepts are quite different. One benefit of refraining from viewing the having of an image as perception is that we would free ourselves thereby from an insoluble problem about other minds. If we do not say a person perceives his images there would be little reason left to say they are perceivables at all. And if they are not perceivables others could not possibly be obliged to perceive them in order to verify that a person has an image now. The 'perceiving' of his image would then be excluded as a possible criterion verification of such ascriptions might have to meet. If perceiving his image is not a possible criterion any verifying could fulfill, we need feel no frustration due to being unable to fulfill it, nor confess the scepticism about knowing other minds to which the pretended criterion led us.

There is another benefit from avoiding the language of perceiving
here. Together, alas, with the very phrase the 'having of an image' it fosters a picture of this mental circumstance that is misleading. This picture is of imaging as a circumstance in which a person is related to something different from his present mental state, i.e. to an item called an image. Now if my having of an image were being related to something different from my present mental state, then it would be logically possible for that same image to exist at time when 'having an image' is not a true description of my mental state—whether or not we wish to claim that this in fact ever does occur. And if my having of an image is being related to something different from my present mental state, then there seems no reason why it is not logically possible for you to be related in the same way to the very same thing. Such is the way with things we perceive; and such the way with things we own. It is this supposition that imagings relates states of persons to items different from those states, that is the foundation of the difficulties I have been discussing. And clearly this foundation is destroyed by the following consideration.

Necessarily, whatever a man perceives he might have failed to perceive and hence might have been wrong about. He might have thought of a thing perceived when it was not; and he might not have thought the thing was there because it went unnoticed. But if it is true of a person that he is having an image, it is necessarily true of him that he could not now be wrong that he is having an image. Afterwards, of course, he may be wrong about having had an image, for he can fail to remember things correctly. While he is having the image, it cannot sensibly be said of him that he could be wrong about it: that he might sincerely claim to have it when he is not, or sincerely deny having it when in fact he is. To perceive presupposes the possibility of being wrong, just as it presupposes an object different from the perceiving of it, and hence an object that could go unperceived. These traits are interwoven; and are all excluded from the having of an image if it is true that necessarily a person could not be wrong about being in this mental circumstance.

Having an image is not the only circumstance of which it is true that necessarily a person could not be wrong about being in that circumstance. Paying, attention is another such, and so is 'having a thought.' It is obvious that 'He is paying attention to x' entails 'He could not be wrong now that he is paying attention to x' and 'p occurs to him now' entails 'he could not now be wrong that p occurs to him.' There is no logical gap between his paying attention and his inability to wrong about it, as there is between the existence of an object of perception and the knowing of it. That having an image shares this character with paying attention provokes the following suggestion: it would be less misleading, at least in discussing problems of other minds, to look at the having of an image as a circumstance very like paying attention—we could say a mode or way of paying attention—rather than a circumstance very like perceiving an
object. Such an outlook would prevent us from abstracting images from the having of them, i.e., from speaking as if they were different from certain states of persons, and hence would spare us from the epistemological dangers thereof. Quite generally, viewing imaging in this light may lead to more fruitful investigation of its logical traits than regarding it as a kind of seeing has.

The consideration that when he has an image a person cannot then be wrong about being in this mental state may reveal the rationale of the occasional certainty of others that he is in that mental state. For if he asserts that he is having an image now, and we are certain that he has no reason to deceive us, we can be certain that he has an image now. Or, to put it differently, when in fact he has an image he is disposed, by dint of not being able to be wrong about it, to such conduct as being sure or certain of something disposes one, and the problem of ascertaining whether a person has an image is not much different from that of settling whether he believes or is sure that something is the case. One kind of conduct to which a person who believes or is certain of something is disposed is telling what he believes or is certain of when he is seriously asked, and when he has no reason to withhold his view. Thus what he says may be a way to establish his convictions; likewise it may be a way to establish that he has an image. Of course if he should wish to keep it secret, we may be utterly defeated in knowing such a thing. The point is only that there are circumstances in which we can, by looking at and listening to him, establish that he has an image beyond all reasonable doubt.

I think that the phrase we can apply to images, 'happens solely in one's head,' is misleading to the extent it may suggest that imaging is something logically served from all conduct. For we can sometimes perceive that a person is having an image, and regard the statement that he is doing so verified thereby. To say this does not commit me to any flagrantly behaviorist account of imaging: for the behaviorist will contend that having an image is something we can see, whereas it seems to me that 'seeing his anger' and 'seeing his belief' are both queer phrases and 'seeing his having of an image' is another one. Just as the impropriety of 'perceiving magnetism' or 'belief,' however, does not prevent us from saying that we perceive that this is magnetic or that a man believes, the impropriety of 'perceiving his having of an image' need not prevent us from sometimes claiming to perceive that 'having an image' is now true of him.
Blodwen Davies

MARKHAM, ONTARIO, CANADA

RICHARD MAURICE BUCKE AND
THE SOURCES OF GENIUS

There may be no more appropriate idea for a Canadian to add to the tribute of ideas, offered at this time to Dr. Radhakrishnan, President of India, as a tribute to his stature as a world philosopher, than the story of a pioneer in the western science of the human mind. This pioneer was Dr. Richard Maurice Bucke, who, more than sixty years ago, wrote a book called *Cosmic Consciousness*, and who was the friend, biographer and literary executor of the poet, Walt Whitman.

This book, which dealt with research into a problem very strange to the western world, has never been out of print. Today it is read more widely and more seriously than ever before and at present appears in its twentieth edition. The significance of what he thought is now part of the bridge being built between the oriental and the occidental outlook.

Canada's recorded history of four centuries with India's history of many millennium. The discoverers and the settlers had to cross a continent on foot or in canoes. Their families and household goods and tools followed in little ships and ox-drawn wagons, until the forests were cleared, the prairie sod broken, railways thrust across the wilderness and through the mountain ranges. There was little time in the first three centuries for contemplative philosophy or scientific research, few contemporaries to encourage or papers to publish revolutionary ideas. There was no national identity in this new society spread over three thousand miles from Atlantic to Pacific and from the 49th parallel of latitude to the North Pole.

By the time these boundaries were fixed, a nine-year-old boy, living on a farm in a clearing in the forest, was already thinking strange thoughts. As he helped with the farm work, tended cattle, and carried in firewood, his mind was involved with universal problems. Later he recalled this:
"He never, even as a child, accepted the doctrines of the Christian church; but, as soon as old enough to dwell at all on such themes, conceived that Jesus was a man—great and good, no doubt, but a man; that no one would ever be condemned to everlasting pain; that if a conscious God existed he was the supreme master and meant well in the end to all ............ He was subject, at times, to a sort of ecstacy of curiosity and hope."

This boy was the son of an Anglican minister who left his church in England, when the child was only a year old, to settle on a homestead in the forest of Upper Canada, where the city of London now stands. There were ten children in the family and all helped with the daily tasks of a homesteading family on the frontiers of Canada in the 1840's.

But there was one difference in this settler's home which set it apart from its neighbors. The father brought with him from England a library of nearly six thousand books in seven languages. His idea of education for his children was to teach each one of them two or three languages and then give them the freedom of the library. Richard never attended school. Both parents died while he was in his youth.

In India a man in search of answers to his self-generated questioning sets out, according to tradition and custom, alone and possessionless, to walk the roads of India seeking experience and wisdom. Bucke went off alone as a boy of sixteen to work his way across the continent to the Pacific. He worked as he went, as a farm laborer, a gardener, a cook, taking any job that would help him on his penniless way. He travelled with convoys of settlers going off to the western prairies, he fought bands of American Indians and lost everything but his life. He fell in with adventurers seeking minerals, among them the men who had discovered the famous Comstock lode of silver in Nevada. With them he ran into tragedy, for he was the sole survivor of four men who were caught in winter, high in the mountains. Both his feet were frozen, one was amputated and the other badly crippled. At twenty-one he was handicapped for life but with a profound insight into all sorts of men and nature. He returned home, claimed a legacy from his mother and decided to become a doctor.

He applied to McGill University Medical School in Montreal. In spite of his lack of formal education, he was accepted. Four years later he graduated as a gold medallist. Then he went on to post graduate studies in Britain and on the continent and worked in hospitals. In these years he learned of the need for scientific help in the field of mental medicine, and he returned to Canada aware both of the new attitude to the treatment of the mentally ill and of the urgent need for more enlightenment.

After some years of private practice he became superintendent of the largest mental hospital in the Province of Ontario. It was in London and within a stone's throw of the homestead on which he had lived as child and youth. In those days humane ideas in the treatment of the mentally
ill were rare indeed. This was in the year 1877 and Bucke's ideas were revolutionary. He removed shackles, the doors of cells were opened and he eliminated all forms of restraint, because restraint, he said caused the need for restraint. He gave the patients work to do, for work, he said, was a great therapeutic factor. He gave them music and sports, companionship, garden parties to which the outside world was invited, and all the skills available from medicine and psychiatry.

But now to go back a little. Bucke was a born student. From the library on the homestead he had learned to be a tireless reader. His interests were wide, history, science, literature, especially poetry, and biography. He had an immense circle of distinguished friends, at home and abroad, and carried on correspondence with many of the best thinkers of his day.

In 1872 Bucke made a trip to England and there he spent an evening with two friends discussing poetry. He had recently come upon a book called *Leaves of Grass*, a collection of poems by an American poet, Walt Whitman. Whitman was born on Long Island, to a family of the Quaker Left, who were farmers. He became first a carpenter, then a writer and finally an editor of a newspaper. Essentially he was part of the eruption into American intellectual life of transcendentalism. The acknowledged leader of the movement was the scholarly Emerson who was committed to religious individualism. Another was Thoreau, who was a social critic whose writings, falling later into the hands of Gandhi, suggested to him the policy of civil disobedience.

Emerson and Thoreau were among the very first in North America to possess English translations of Vedantic literature. Whitman was unknown to them until he published *Leaves of Grass* in 1855. Recognizing the significance of this new poet, both Emerson and Thoreau saluted him. The book was written as a consequence of Whitman's experience of illumination or enlightenment, an experience which recurred from time to time in Whitman's life. Emerson and Thoreau both introduced him to Vedantic literature but he was only vaguely interested.

Whitman's function was to shake his fellow Americans out of their complacent second-hand culture, imported from Europe. They had up to then no sense of identity with their own American backgrounds in cultural affairs. The increasing wealth meant merely increasing imitation of the culture of an older world. Whitman cried out to them:

"You shall no longer take things at second or third hand, nor look through the eyes of the dead, nor feed on the spectres in books; you shall not look through my eyes, either nor take things from me; you shall listen to all sides and filter them from yourselves."

Whitman died a year or two before Vivekananda went to the United States. Some of Whitman's friends became Vivekananda's friends and Vivekananda read *Leaves of Grass*. It seems, however, that he felt some distaste for the roughness of Whitman's style and his biographers glossed over the relationship. Perhaps it was a resentful American attitude to
Whitman that influenced him. Romain Rolland, writing in *Prophets of the New India*, regrets this and sees a significance in the relationship. He writes:

“There is nothing hidden in the meaning of his thought in *Leaves of Grass*... What does he say there? ‘I inaugurate a new religion... Know you solely to drop in the earth the germs of a greater religion. I sing... the greatness of love and Democracy and the greatness of religion’. The one word that embodied Whitman’s teaching was Identity with all forms of life, at every instant and the certainty of Eternity.” His religion consisted only of inner illumination, “the secret, silent ecstasy,”

Rolland spoke of Whitman as a typical example of a “predisposition to Vedantism” which existed in America long before the arrival of Vivekananda, as it was “indeed a universal predisposition of the human soul in all countries and all ages” and is not contained in a body of doctrine or dogma; rather the doctrine grew out of the experience of those early Aryans who reached the psychological strata that opens up spiritual or cosmic vision. The Yoga Sutras deal specifically with seven levels of vision, naming the seventh level that of Cosmic Sight and describing it as inconceivable to man. These types of vision are described so that the student may discover where he stands in the spiral of evolution and what he may attempt by future effort. The first four kinds of vision are all inclined to error: physical vision, ethereal vision, clairvoyance and symbolic vision, which is a faculty of the mental body. Only the fifth, pure vision, is a faculty of the soul or gnosis and is manifested when the soul achieves control of the mind. There then remains to man cosmic consciousness, nirvana, beatitude, spiritual insight, some of the many names applied to this advanced psychological state. It is the realm of intuition, inspiration, the source of archetypal and revolutionary ideas that mark the turning points in human history. It is potential in every truly creative individual. No poet of his time in the west was so strongly possessed of that cosmic sense as Whitman; he transmuted his intuitions into “faith in his people, faith in the world, faith in humanity as a whole,” Rolland maintained.

This was the man that Bucke later recognized as the greatest man he had ever known. As perhaps the most distinguished psychiatrist in North America, Bucke was the best equipped man on the continent to realize the whole range of the potential of the human mind, in frustration and in fulfilment.

Without doubt that night in London Bucke rehearsd his own reactions to Whitman. At midnight he left his friends to drive to his lodgings in a hansom. On the way he became conscious of a rosy glow of light which he first thought was a fire. Suddenly he realized that the light was within himself. Bucke says “there came to him a sense of exaltation of immense joyousness,” and an intellectual illumination which he could not describe. He said that into his brain “streamed one momentary lightning flash of Brahmic splendor,” and that “on his heart fell one
drop of Brahmic bliss”. He saw and knew that the universe was not dead matter but a living Presence, and that the soul of man is immortal and that all things work together for good. The experience lasted only a few minutes and never recurred.

For all his reading and all his training in the sciences of the mind Bucke was totally unprepared for what had happened.

Five years later Bucke went to visit Whitman at Camden, New Jersey. He was impressed with the poet so profoundly, as a personality, that he became his devoted disciple. Whitman discovered in Bucke the man who knew best, and understood most clearly, what Whitman embodied. Whitman had fifteen more years to live and in that time he constituted, for Bucke, a living example of a cosmically conscious individual, and became for Bucke’s scientific and experimental mind, a unique example of a very high level of human consciousness by which to measure all his work.

Since 1872 Bucke had been working out the thesis that had possessed him as a result of his illumination. Two years after meeting Whitman he published Man’s Moral Nature, (1879) the essence of papers and talks he had presented at psychological and psychiatric conferences on two continents. It was probably the first study in endocrinology, for Bucke paralleled; by his theory of the evolution of the glands in relation to the moral nature, the Vedantic teaching on the chakras or centers. At the same time he had been at work on researches for the book for which he is chiefly celebrated, Cosmic Consciousness. The last thirty years of his life were concerned with that work. It was published in 1901, the year before he died.

During all this time Bucke’s professional reputation was growing. His hospital was one of the finest in the world. He was a founding member of the Royal Society of Canada, he was elected president of the psychological section of the British Medical Association, and the following year, president of the American Medico-Psychological Association, the forerunner of the American Psychiatric Association. In 1882 when the University of Western Ontario in London opened a medical school, Dr. Bucke became professor of mental and nervous disorders and taught for twenty years, until his death.

In Cosmic Consciousness Bucke explored the evidence for the history of illumination through the ages, using Whitman as his measuring rod. He began with the Buddha and the Christ, and went on with Mohammed, Paul, Plotinus, Dante, Bacon, Behmen, Blake and of course, Whitman, along with many others. His thesis was that the evolution of consciousness in man had brought the race to a state of self-consciousness, and that it had also produced, rarely, men who achieved another kind of consciousness which he called cosmic consciousness. He thought that normally this experience came at full maturity, about the age of 35, and that it could be identified in the life history because of the significant changes in the quality of the work done, and that these changes indicated the same
range of new qualities in all illuminati, a new birth, a sense of joy, an enhanced moral nature and a highly enlightened intellect. He said, also, that the rate of incidence was accelerating. Because of all this he felt the future was "indescribably hopeful".

Today, sixty years after Bucke's death, science considers a Fifth Dimension, also called the Eternity Domain. In July, 1949, three British scientists, Bennet, Brown and Thring, said in the Proceedings of the Royal Society that the mathematical foundations of theoretical physics could be simplified and generalized by the assumption that the universe has five dimensions. Bennet called this the Eternity Axis and said that the reason we have no immediate experience of events in this non-physical dimension is because we are eternity blind.

Bennet also suggested a sixth dimension which has the quality of "ableness to become" which he named Phyaxrris.

Bucke foresaw three revolutions. First, the material, economic and social revolution resulting from aerial navigation. This prophecy was published two years before the Wright brothers made and flew the first power-driven airplane in 1903. The second was a social and economic revolution due to the abolition of private ownership, which would rid the world of wealth and poverty. The third, the greatest by far was the psychological revolution inherent in the spread of the cosmic sense. All religions would be "melted down" but religion would dominate society when all creeds, priests and rituals would be superseded by man's direct intercourse with God and his knowledge that he was immortal.

Bucke appears to have had no knowledge of Raja Yoga or the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. Today the relationship between Bucke's work and these ancient teachings seems apparent.

What Bucke called cosmic consciousness was not something that came in a package. It is expressed in terms of the evolution of the race. The capacity of the person involved is the measure of the illumination. Men limit their vision by the size of the cup they bring to the spring. The cup is not the measure of the spring's abundance. We have as yet no recognized means of discovering, educating, conserving and applying genius. We are anxious to gather up the crumbs that fall from the table of genius, if they can be turned into power, wealth and gadgetry. We do not yet think of genius as the expression of the Buddha consciousness or the Christ consciousness, potential in every man, everywhere in the world. The west conceives of genius as something to push "progress" along under pressure; in terms of gross national product.

To the people of India with their Aryan traditions of culture, a man's search for illumination, or nirvana, is part of the pattern of life. In the west men must stumble into it. When a professional man leaves a successful career for a life of contemplation, he is a consternation to his family and suspect in his community. Nonconformity, essential to genius, is a social handicap. Yet Raja Yoga is a common heritage of
east and west. It came west as the Aryans moved to the western frontiers of their times, in unpopulated Europe, newly emerged from the ice age. In the Near East and Europe the secret doctrines were taught in Mystery Schools which were not totally erased until the 10th century, when the tradition went underground and survives symbolically in Masonry. The discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls brings the Essene Mystery into modern life. When the Christian church, as an institution, assumed the power to make and unmake kings, then the Mysteries that taught the way to spiritual insights constituted the chief foe of the church and had to be destroyed. Millions of martyrs testify to the difficulty encountered in wiping out the ancient Aryan traditions of man’s ultimate destiny. Authoritarianism required that a roadblock be set up to stop man in his pursuit of reality.

Dr. Radhakrishnan writes:

“The reality of the Self is not to be found by means of the objective mind, but by a suppression of its activities and penetration beneath the mental strata with which our ordinary life and activity conceal our diviner nature.” Yoga is the Way, or in western terms, meditation is the means, to outwit the “intoxicated monkey” of the lower mind. Always, in spite of dogma, priestcraft and custom, some rare souls in every generation by-passed the barriers and achieved the vision of the Whole, and translated some parts of it into science, the arts, philosophy, and religion. Vivekananda said that “one single man contains within himself the whole universe.” Whitman called himself a cosmos.

What the west has learned is that cosmic consciousness, spiritual insight, perhaps fifth dimensional vision, can transform this world, give it “the life more abundant.” In America, Vivekananda became a revolutionary because he realized that the ancient spiritual aristocracy of India had condoned ignorance, hunger, poverty and disease. Democracy was an ideal of those who honestly believed in caring for the needy, the helpless, the handicapped, even the delinquent and the criminal. The western visionary assumed the responsibility for transforming and transmuting the outer world. Is there any reason why spiritual aristocracy and spiritual democracy cannot unite the whole world to eliminate fear, hunger, ignorance, poverty and preventable disease? Why man’s great potentials cannot be evoked and applied everywhere? Christ asked men to love one another, to feed his sheep, and to heal the sick. “Nirvana is only the destruction of lust, hatred, and ignorance” says Dr. Radhakrishnan. Is there any sane man, then, who is not seeking nirvana?

Western psychology now admits that the mind has other powers of perception than the senses. ESP is the kindergarten of this new attitude. Raja Yoga heightens the powers of concentration and is never concerned with trivialities. “It is,” writes Dr. Radhakrishnan, “A necessary corrective of our present mentality, overburdened with external things and estranged from the true life of the spirit by humdrum toil, material greed
and sensual excitement." Yoga means effort, method, direction, disciplined activity. Christ illustrated our alternatives by the story of Mary and Martha.

The crisis in the science of the human mind is now. Bucke’s theories on the relationship of illumination to genius may provide a bridge, frail and experimental as it is, between the active, rational mind and the abstract, intuitional levels of universal mind, and reveal the functions of each of them in creating an integrated, responsible person. In a united world in which synthesis and goodwill can pool all our knowledge and skills, we may work out a plan not only for survival of the human race, but for a mutual aspiration to raise the level of human society to its highest common denominator. The future is ours and we can, if we choose, share both the spiritual and the material riches available to the human race and we can begin to live "the life more abundant." The stark reality of our alternative is that of abundant life or no life at all.

"Human speculation falls short of the ideal, which it can neither abandon nor attain. We are far more conscious of the surrounding darkness than of the power to dispel it... The most important thing is the future. We are able to see farther than our predecessors, since we can stand on their shoulders," writes Dr. Radhakrishnan.

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IS NUMBER A QUANTITY?

I

The use of the word "number" suggests that number is a quantity.\(^1\) We talk of groups being equal in number, or of one group being greater in number than another, just as we talk of objects being equal in length, or of one object being longer than another. Also it is not difficult to specify ordering relationships\(^2\) by which groups of things can be arranged in order of the number of things they contain. That is, we can say:

"Two groups A and B are equal in number if and only if every member of group A can be paired off with a member of group B and vice versa."

and:

"A group A is greater in number than a group B if and only if every member of group B can be paired off with a member of group A, but not vice versa."

But on the other hand, it seems to make no sense to speak of measuring the number of things in a group. We can speak of counting, calculating, or guessing the number, perhaps, but not of measuring it. Moreover, there appears to be no such thing as a scale or unit of number, and consequently, no problems of choice of scale or unit. With all other forms of measurement, there are a number of problems of choice involved in setting up a scale.\(^3\) But with number it doesn't even seem to make sense to talk of a scale, much less of fundamental problems of choice in the adoption of a scale.

For these reasons, I am initially torn between saying that number is a quantity and that it is not. If, however, "counting" were only the

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\(^1\) I have attempted to state necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and identity of quantities in my article: "Some Fundamental Problems of Direct Measurement" *Aust. J. Phil.* Vol 38 No. 1 (May, 1970) (FPDM)

\(^2\) For an explanation of this term, see *F.P.D.M.* pp. 37-39

\(^3\) Some of these problems are formulated and discussed in *F.P.D.M.*, and also in my article: "Some Fundamentals Problems of Indirect Measurement", *Aust. J. Phil.* Vol 39, No. 1, (May, 1961)
name given to a special kind of measuring procedure—that appropriate to the quantity number—then at least one of my *prima facie* objections to saying that number is a quantity must be dismissed. But here again I find that I am of two minds. In some respects counting is like measuring, but in others it is not.

The verb “to count” can be used transitively or intransitively. Intransitive counting, *i.e.* the idle recitation of the numeral sequence, is admittedly not very like measuring. If we are measuring then we must always be measuring something in some respect. We cannot simply be measuring. But transitive counting certainly has the essential characteristics of a measuring procedure. For it is an objective procedure for assigning numerals to groups (“objective” in the sense that anyone who follows the same procedure with sufficient care will be led to assign the same numerals to the same groups). Also, the numerals thus assigned will be the same if and only if the groups are equal in number, and those groups higher in the order of number will be assigned numerals which occur later in the sequence of numerals.

But on the reverse side, it seems that we can say what it is for a group to contain a specific number of things without describing a counting procedure. And further, not any procedure which enables us to assign the same numerals to groups equal in number, and numerals occurring later in the sequence to groups greater in number, qualifies as a counting procedure. The restrictions imposed upon counting procedures are much more severe than those imposed upon measuring procedures.

With regard to the first of these two points, we can say:

“A group B contains 2 things, if and only if it is greater in number than a group A containing one thing, and there is no possible group greater in number than A, and less in number than B.”

and

“A group C contains 3 things, if and only if it is greater in number than a group B containing two things, and there is no possible group greater in number than B and less in number than C.”

and so on. And any counting procedure must lead to the correct assignment of numerals to groups. It is not enough that groups equal in number should be assigned the same numeral or that the sequential order of the numerals assigned to groups should correspond to the numerical order of the groups (given by the numerical ordering relationships).

Thus Gasking’s “counting procedure”⁴ is no counting procedure. If I take an object from a given group of objects, count “ONE,” place it separately, count “TWO,” take a second object count “THREE,” place it separately, count “FOUR,” and so on, until the group is exhausted, then whatever I have done, I have not counted the number of objects in the group. It is true that the same numerals would thus be assigned to groups equal in number, and that numerals occurring earlier or later in

the sequence would be assigned to groups less or greater in number respectively. But the procedure must nevertheless be rejected as a counting procedure. If counting were like, say, length measurement, then it would have to be admitted as an alternative. But the restrictions on counting are more strict than those on measurement. The reason for this is simply that the sentence: "This group contains four things" has a meaning independent of counting operations. It does not state that if you follow a certain objective procedure with the things concerned you will finish with the numeral "4". It states that the given group has certain numerical relationships with other possible groups. Our counting procedures are counting procedures if and only if they give correctly the numbers of things in groups.

Counting also seems to differ from, say, length measuring in that there is apparently nothing corresponding to a Standard set. In all fundamental measurement the thing to be measured is matched in respect of the quantity concerned by a series of operations with the members of a set of standards or their equivalents. The standards are kept under special conditions, are made of special materials and so on. At first sight it seems that there is nothing corresponding to this for the quantity number. But when we consider the matter more carefully, we see that the numeral sequence itself plays a role in counting similar to that of a standard set. For it is certainly true that in all counting we pair the members of the numerals sequence with those of the group being counted. Accordingly we can say that we match numerically the group to be counted with a subset of the numeral sequence. The subset "1" "2" "3" "4" therefore serves as a standard group of four. And when we count a group of four things, we automatically show that it is equal in number to the subset of numerals "1" to "4".

It is conceivable that we should use groups of stones or marbles as numerical standards, and that they should be kept in special museums to protect them from destruction. All number determination would then be done by matching the group whose number is to be determined with one of the standards—or its equivalent in number. We can imagine, indeed, that we should all carry around little bags of marbles labelled "2", "3", "4", and so on, and that when we wish to find the number of things in a given group we should simply find the bag which contains the same number of marbles. This would be logically very similar to carrying around a set of feeler gauges.

In fact, of course, this would be very cumbersome, and it is much easier to use subsets of the numerical sequence itself as numerical standards. The subset of numerals "1" to "12" is a far more convenient numerical standard than a bag of 12 marbles. But this must not blind us to the fact that it is a numerical standard.

In all fundamental measurement the standard set is built up from an

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5 The term is explained in F.P.D.M., pp. 42-44
initial standard by some sort of combination procedure. In the case of length, a second member of the standard set is obtained by placing two objects equal in length to the initial standard, end to end. A third member is obtained by placing one of the second members thus formed end to end with an initial standard used to produce sets of stones standard in number. Here the combination procedure is simply that of forming a composite group out of two groups each containing one stone. A standard group of three is formed by combining a standard group of two with another of one, and so on.

In forming a scale of length, however I may select any object which has stable length relationships to other objects as an initial standard, and assign the numeral “1” to it. Further, it enables us to form a standard and sub-standard set. And finally, I may assign numerals to the members of the standard set accordingly to whatever rules I like, provided only that the sequential order of the numerals indicates the length order of the objects to which they are assigned. Depending upon which choices I make, I may assign different numerals to the same objects as the measure of their length. I must, of course, indicate which of the above choices I have made, by specifying a unit. It is useless to say: “This has a length of 4”. Rather I must say that it is 4 inches or metres long.

But with the quantity, number, it seems that there are no such choices. The only area of choice seems to lie in the way we regard a given group. For example, we may regard a given group of 2 men as a group of 4 legs, 4 arms, 2 bodies and 2 heads, i.e., 12 bodily parts. We may regard a group of 2 men and 2 women as a group of 2 couples. The number of things in a group may therefore depend on how we regard it. And in this respect, there is certainly a degree of freedom. But, nevertheless, the words “men”, “women”, “couples”, “heads”, and so on, are not much like unit names such as “inch” and “metre”. The function of the latter words is simply to indicate which of the above choices we have made in setting up our scale. But the use of the former is not to indicate any such or analogous choices.

Indeed, there are no such choices. I cannot arbitrarily select a group of apples, and assign to it the numeral “1” saying: “This group contains one apple”. For this statement is already true or false. Nor can I simply invent a word and say: “This group contains one clong”. For until I know what a clong is, I can never find a group which I should say contains 2 clongs. Moreover, I can never give instructions for pairing off. I cannot pair the members of a group A with those of a group B, unless I can recognize a member of group A and a member of group B when I see one. It follows that I cannot arbitrarily select a group as a unit of number in the way that I can arbitrarily select an object as a unit of length. Any object which has stable length relationships with other objects

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6 This proviso has been fully explained in F.P.D. M.
7 This point has been established in F.P.D.M.
will do as a unit of length. But only a group which contains one, as opposed to none and more than one, recognizable thing can be said truly to contain one x, (where x is the name of the thing). With the selection of a unit of length, no question of truth or falsehood arises. If I say “Let this be I minch long” what I say is neither true nor false. The “Let” signifies that I am giving a part definition in use for the word “minch”. But I cannot say analogously: “Let this group contain one apple”. For it contains no term whose use is not already fixed. The proposition “This group contains one apple” is already true or false. Nor can I say significantly: “Let this group contain one elong”. For if I do not know what a elong is, I cannot match the given group in number with any other group. And if I do know what a elong is, then it is just like saying: “Let this group contain one apple”.

It follows that there is nothing which can be described as a unit or scale of number. According, it is very misleading to speak about correlating numerals with groups. Such talk is only appropriate where there is arbitrariness and choice. To specify a group, we must always say what it is a group of—whether of physical objects, numerals, ideas, events or what. Once the specification has been made, the number of the group is now entirely an empirical question with one important exception.

This exception is the numeral sequence itself. It is not an empirical fact that the numeral sequence “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, contains 4 things. For the way in which we establish that a group contains 4 things is simply to show that it is equal in number to this group of numerals. We cannot call into question the proposition that the group of numerals “1” to “n” contains n numerals without automatically calling into question our means of deciding the number of things in a group. It follows that the proposition “The sequence of numerals “1” to “n”, is n in number” is an analytic proposition. No conceivable evidence could show it to be false.

But it will be objected, surely there is more than one criterion for saying that a group contains a specific number of things. Haven’t I already given another criterion in terms of the numerical ordering relationships? Yes, this is certainly true. A group contains 4 things if and only if it contains one more than a group of 3. And a group contains 3 things if and only if it contains one more than a group of 2, so on. And we can explain the concept of containing one more than by saying that a group A contains one more than a group B if and only if A is greater in number than B, and there is no possible group greater in number than B, and less in number than A.

But when all this is said, it does not follow that the proposition “The sequence of numerals “1” to “4” contains 4 numerals” is a synthetic proposition. If our criteria for the number of things in a group diverged, then we simply would not know what to say.

8 We can, of course, say: “Let us suppose that this group contains one apple”. But this is a hypothesis, and obviously very different from “Let this be I minch long”.

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In discussing whether number is quantity, I described certain procedures for deciding whether groups are equal or unequal in number, and I called the relationships established by these procedures the basic numerical ordering relationships. I then tried to show how other numerical relationships, e.g., that of containing two more than, can be defined in terms of those basic relationships. But although these relationships may be basic in the sense that it is possible to give such definitions, a doubt may arise as to whether they are basic in the sense that the length ordering relationships are to length measurement. For it seems that in order to understand these numerical relationships, or to be able to follow the procedures by which they may be established, we must at least understand the distinctions between one, none, and more than one.

The idea of none is required for the understanding of “every”. For we can say that we have paired every member of group A with a member of group B if and only if we have paired each member of group A with a member of group B until none remain to be paired. And the distinction between one and more than one is required for the understanding of the distinction between singular and plural. If we could make no such distinction, then I take it that we could not distinguish between one apple and more than one apple. In this case it is clear that we could never compare groups of apples in respect of number—or for that matter, groups of anything in this respect.

Hence the distinctions between one, none, and more than one seem to be a prerequisite for understanding the basic numerical ordering relationships. And if this is the case, it may be thought that my analysis involves circularity. However, when we consider the matter more carefully, we see that much the same criticism could be made of my analysis of length relationships. To understand the basic length ordering relationships, we need the concept of overlap. For this we need the concepts of spatial and temporal coincidence, and we need to be able to understand what it is for one thing to be spatially between two others. That is, an understanding of the basic length ordering relationships requires an understanding of certain spatial and temporal relationships. These spatial relationships are already in a sense length relationships. For to say that two points are in the same place is to say that they are separated by no distance, and to say that one point C lies between two others, A and B, is usually to imply that the distances AC and BC are each less than the distance AB.9 We may say therefore, that to understand the basic length ordering relationships, we need to have some basic concepts of length. However, neither analysis involves circularity. For there is a hierarchy of both length and numerical relationships, some being logically prior to others. And what I have done is simply to show how the more derivative relationships depend upon the more fundamental.

9 If the topology of our space were very different from what it is, then the concept of betweenness may not have this implication. See Reichenbach, H. Space and Time. (Dover) 1958.
Nevertheless, the question arises whether it is possible to take this analysis a step further. We are in fact able to distinguish at sight whether a group contains four or five objects. With special training, or in special circumstances we can distinguish groups containing considerably more, e.g. where 20 objects are arranged thus:

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But obviously we can still have the concept of number, even if we cannot make such distinctions at sight. If we cannot tell the difference between a group of 4 and a group of 5 objects without research, this difference may be no less intelligible to us. Similarly, if we could not distinguish immediately between groups of 2 and 3 things, our concept of number would be none the poorer. But according to the argument I have presented, we must be able to distinguish between 1 and more than 1 before we can have any numerical concepts at all. However, in view of the fact that we may learn to make the distinction between 2 and more than 2 after we have learned to make it by counting or by carrying out numerical matching procedures, we may wonder whether the distinction between 1 and more than 1 is not similarly dependent on logically prior distinctions. For example, could it not be argued that being a group of 2 or more apples is only a special case of not being an apple, just as being a horse is another such case. And, if so, do we really need to have the concept of more than one in order to have the concept of one? Isn't the distinction between one and not one somewhat more fundamental than the distinction between one and more than one.

I concede the whole of this argument. There is certainly a sense in which the distinction between one and not one is more fundamental than that between one and more than one. For if I can recognize that a group of two apples is not an apple, and if I can usually say whether a given thing is an apple or not, then I can use and understand such sentences as "Here is an apple", and "This is one apple", even though I may not be able to use or understand such sentences as "Here are several apples" or "This basket contains more than one apple". In other words my having the concept of one does not depend upon my having the concept of more than one. It only depends upon my having the concept of not one.

It does not follow, however, that I could carry out numerical matching instructions if I had no concept of more than one. For such instructions must contain a phrase like "select another one from group A", and if I have no concept of more than one, I do not see how I can have the concept of another one.

I conclude therefore, that the concepts of one, none, and more than one, are all necessary for the understanding of the basic numerical ordering relationships. But once we have these distinctions, the remaining numerical distinctions can be explained. We can then say what it is for a group to contain 2, 3, or more things, for one group to contain 2, 3, ... or n more things than another.
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METHODOLOGIES OF CONTROL IN IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT

I do not expect the internationally esteemed scholar, to whom this symposium is dedicated, to accept, in its entirety the following essay, but I do feel confident that he will approve its underlying purpose. No contemporary philosopher, in any land, is more concerned to advance mutual understanding among peoples everywhere than S. Radhakrishnan.

The world of human discourse to-day is in a state of direful discord. Scholars and statesmen, who can furnish formulas for dissolving the disunity, are in desperate demand. In the present article I do not explain the causes and consequences of the controversies in contemporary culture; and, I do not, except for indicating in my conclusion one common defect which they all possess, evaluate the prevailing methods to control ideological conflict. My purpose is merely to display and define the main ways in which present day man is seeking to bring some sort of single-mindedness into societal life. We cannot intelligently improve or abandon established procedures, if we do not know clearly their essential characteristics.

I cannot claim general authenticity for my analyses, because they are exclusively based upon limited observation of the American cultural process. Assuming that this symposium will be of interest to readers who are not trained in the technical terminology of professional philosophy, I have labelled my various concepts with names from everyday language. To any reader who may be interested in basic philosophical background for the four major categories discussed below, I suggest, respectively, and in the order of their presentation—Naturalistic Social Theory which follows the biological Principle of Natural Selection; Pragmatic Social Theory which adheres to the General Happiness Principle of Utilitarianism; Eudaemonistic Social Theory in which the principle of Self-Realization
demands Service to Society; and Idealistic Social Theory which accepts the Monistic, Mystical, Metaphysical Principles in its interpretation of Community Life.

I suggest that twelve methodologies are discoverable in contemporary quests for ideological concord. They are classifiable into four main categories, with each category containing three sub-divisions. The order, in which the methodologies are here stated, represents, in my judgment, their comparative efficacy in the making of a rich and rewarding community experience.

In the first category I place controversies which are concluded without the achievement of any unity of thought or feeling between the controversialists. In this group of methodologies are situations of Imposition, Indifference, and Irrelevancy.

Imposed tranquillity occurs when one party in a dissension, from fear of painful reprisals, ceases, in public, to oppose the doctrines of its adversary. Coercion, whether physical or economic, does not, however, change the inner thought of the suppressed, or establish mutual understanding between the opponents.

Indifference prevails between rival thinkers when competing ideas are found to be mutually tolerable, and when the need for reconciliation is not vitally imperative. Each side pursues its own position, and a situation of acceptable, if not amiable, co-existence results.

The principle of Irrelevancy develops when the causes of contention between the parties becomes unimportant. New cultural or social developments destroy the significance of both the doctrines which were in opposition.

An illustration of Imposition is the use of threats by either corporation owners or labor unions in forcing solutions in industrial disputes. An example of Indifference is the breakdown of conflict which results when both the scientists and humanists, in a university curricular dispute realize, without great enthusiasm for the viewpoint of their opponents, that both science and the humanities have a rightful place in higher education. Irrelevancy is illustrated when defenders of one kind of medicine and spokesman for a different kind quit their disputation to favor a new medical cure which is more proficient than either of the remedies previously endorsed by the disputants.

The second main category of methodologies embraces ideological harmony which, without outward coercion, sets up practical and expedient solutions. The primary aim is not, mainly, to promote a feelingful fellowship between the contestants, but to get a program of social action into operation. The three sub-divisions are Concession, Combination, and Compromise. The procedure by which workable goals are reached is that of the historic Social Contract.
In the process of Concession the contenders admit that neither of the championed proposals is practicable. They agree to work, separately or jointly, for a new, effective program.

The methodology of Combination operates when each side in a controversy defends its own position, but acknowledges its partial proficiency. In this situation, the disputants unite their respective views and develop a combined plan which contains the benefits of both standpoints.

Compromise occurs when each side in a conflict confesses to deficiencies in its position, and agree to a new program in which the weaknesses of both sides are eliminated.

Concession is illustrated when one civic organization, promoting a municipal observatory, and another group, working for a municipal aquarium, separately decide that its respective project is economically unadvisable for the city, and when they mutually concede that it would be more feasible for them to unite their efforts in a common, practicable municipal improvement. The device of Combination occurs in “pork barrel” legislation when bills, which two opposing sides support, are both enacted. Compromise is evident in the case of a family dispute, when the husband wants a four thousand dollar car and the wife wants a four thousand dollar fur coat, a two thousand dollar car and a two thousand dollar coat are purchased.

The third category of ideological solutions contains methodologies which are similar to some of those which have already been defined. The difference lies in the fact that, in this group, the operations are much more effective in producing a vital community spirit. The procedures in this third class of unifiers are Co-operation, Conciliation, and Confidence.

When the process of Combination is followed by a zeal on the part of each former contender to co-operate fully in a new joint program, Co-operation, which makes for ardent comradeship results.

Conciliation is manifest when the parties engage in the methodology of Concession with mutual gratitude and good will.

Compromise, which is practiced usually for the sake of expediency of practicality becomes a promoter of mutual Confidence, when each compromiser sincerely considers the rights and needs of his opposite in the formulation of a workable agreement. Contracts, which do emerge in the spirit of pleasant, trustful friendship do not need threatening legal sanctions to make them binding.

To illustrate the above methods, marriage, in which comradeship is regularly enjoyed, smoothly transmutes the joint interests, sustained in the methodology of Combination, into the continuous practice of faithful Co-operation. Expedient Concession in the settlement of an industrial strike will quickly be transformed into gracious Conciliation if each side will try honestly and generously, to respect the integrity and sincerity of its opponent’s motives. When professors in a university refrain from consi-
dering the financial welfare or social prestige of their respective departments, and view their professional function with broad vision. Compromise in curriculum development will be transfigured into a mutual confidence which is dynamic and creative.

In all this discussion about the advantage of Co-operation, Conciliation, and Compromise I am not forgetful that there are some convictions too true and noble for any courageous, rational man to replace hastily. The problem, which every proponent in an ideological dispute has to face, is that of deciding, honestly, intelligently, generously, to what extent he has the moral right to champion, without reservation, his own thesis.

My fourth and final class of methodologies contains operations which to the speculative observer, definitely possess metaphysical connotations. The three operations in this category are Conversion, Consecration, and Consummation.

As the emotions in the third category responses are more intense than those of the second category activities, so, in their religious-like intensity, the fourth category methodologies produce a vibrant feelingfulness which the third category processes do not attain.

In the fourth group of operations, community becomes more than an aggregation of separate selves thinking and working together: community now becomes one All-Embracing, All Transcending Reality in which individual minds find unity with each other and fulfillment for themselves. For the Christian this over-all community is the Church: for the Communist it is the State.

In Conversion, when a man disavows his creeds and codes and commits himself to the ideals of another, he becomes a new creature in his new loyalties. No man will repudiate completely his long-held, cherished beliefs and habits, unless he is convinced that his converter champions a cause of spectacular, if not super-natural significance. To join such a cause is to receive a redeeming experience.

Persons, who are converted to one and the same heroic enterprise, become more than single-minded participants in joyful fellowship. The blessedness, which they mutually feel, provokes a zeal to share with others their magnificent possession. They become missionary witnesses of their great, good fortune. In other words, they engage in the experience and endeavor which I here call Consecration.

Service in a community of consecration involves severe hazards and hardships, but the servants are freed from the feelings of shame and shallowess which cowardly followers of unimportant, and unchallenging objectives often endure. A man who aspires to attain the highest level of fellowship and service may not reach his goal, but he can be humbly but profoundly satisfied that he is trying to do his best. This contrite contentment with life’s opportunities and responsibilities is what I mean by Consummation.
Three human beings, I suggest, have lived the consummate life—Socrates, Jesus, and Gandhi.

This survey of ways by which men can conquer the ideological conflicts which they have with each other, has one grave weakness. My analysis has been mainly concerned with methodologies to reconcile opposing ideas which emerge in public discourse. Oral and written statements cannot, however, divulge accurately or completely the intentions of the asserter. Words are too cold and formal, too vague and too limited, to express the warm and vital feelings which a speaker or writer has in his heart. Ideational controversy can never be fully resolved until disputants freely and openly share with each other the meanings and motives behind their outward affirmations. To understand others is to realize what "stands under" their public disclosures.

Many quarrels would wither away, if disputants would reveal to each other the fears, doubts, and longings which reside in their respective inward souls. One can never know truly the what and the why of another's remarks, until he learns what the other is really trying to say.

What the realms of education and diplomacy most seriously need to-day is more Communion, and not more Communication between the peoples of earth.

Western minds can learn a lot from the minds of the East about the way and wisdom of Communion. For ages Orientals have been taught the meaning and method of intuitive understanding. More deeply and more keenly than Occidentals, they "know people by heart."
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE

It seems well fitting that in making my contribution to the Souvenir Volume in honour of the President of India I should discuss a topic so basic to the democratic way of life as the relation between the State and the rights of the individual.

Totalitarianism may take two forms. One it assumed in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. According to this the state or at least the race, the nation as a whole, was treated as a sort of mystical entity over and above the individuals making it up and the latter were regarded as of no value compared to it so that they could and should be sacrificed ruthlessly as an individual cell in my body should be sacrificed to the welfare of myself. The state or race acknowledged no law above itself, and the supreme end of life, the one thing that mattered, was service of the state or race. Against this we should insist that the state (or race) is a mere abstraction, nothing over and above the individuals who make it up. There is no evidence whatever that the state has a consciousness of its own; and if not so the good of the state must be found solely and wholly in the experiences and lives of the individuals who make up the state. And the associated view that the state is always right is not really consistently held by anybody. For though Nazis and Fascists might apply it to their own state when governed by the people they wanted in power, they never showed any inclination to apply it to the British or the Russian state, or even to their own states before the regimes they favour were established there.

But there is a more plausible form of totalitarianism. According to this the individual should still, if necessary, be sacrificed and count it his duty to sacrifice himself to the state, but this only means that he should be sacrificed to the welfare of the individuals who make up the nation. Service to the state is service to other men. The only criterion is the general good, it may be said, and the good of one must be ruthlessly subordinated to this, for we cannot give up the greater for the sake of the less. The part
is less than the whole. Further, who can judge who should be sacrificed but the state, which is just the whole organized so as to make decisions on its behalf? The experts who in effect make these decisions know better than the ordinary man does what the effects of his action on others will be and even what is better for himself. Then let them decide. This is more like the totalitarianism of communist states. We had better however not let the issue be confused by the particular personalities and the particular policies of the states concerned. A totalitarian state might very conceivably be administered by men of much more attractive character than the rulers of the states I have mentioned, and it might pursue policies that did not display any tendency to aggressive expansion. The question I am asking is, not whether e.g. Hitler's policy was good or bad—that certainly is a question of politics rather than of philosophy—but how totalitarianism as such compares with what we call democracy. What reasons of principle can be given for preferring the one to the other.

It would not be right to deny the presence of some element of truth in the totalitarian case. All moralists have insisted that the individual ought to be prepared to sacrifice himself for the general good, and it seems plain that experts are very likely to know better when this sacrifice is needed than is the average man. Further, the individualist has too often forgotten that the only danger to individual liberty is not from the state. Especially in the economic sphere state interference often gives more liberty than it takes away. To take a simple example, suppose the state passes a law restricting the number of hours of work. Indigo so it takes away from the liberty of employers to work their men long hours, but it adds to the liberty of the far more numerous employees. Indeed, further, it may even increase the liberty of most employers themselves. E.g. most shopkeepers might have wished to close earlier but dared not do so for fear of competition. And in debates about totalitarianism its opponent may easily find himself manoeuvred into the position of the selfish man who prefers his own convenience or interest or mere conservatism to the general good. It may be argued that the individual has no right to do or enjoy what it is not to the common good that he should do or enjoy, and that if it is to the common good that he should do or enjoy it his right to it depends on this and is therefore not his as an individual. This is not the same as saying that the rights of the individual depend on recognition by the state. For the state might be mistaken, as in fact it often is, and interfere with rights which it is really for the general good that the individual should have. Legal rights of course can be created by the state as the laws are, but moral rights are facts to be discovered, and to say that they are created by the state is like saying that human beings created America by discovering its existence or that Copernicus made the earth go round the sun. Of course in the absence of state recognition there are no legal means of enforcing a right. But the fact that there are no means of enforcing a particular duty cannot prevent it from
being a duty unless we identify obligation with compulsion and say that I am not morally bound to pay my debts unless it is the case that I shall be sued and penalized if I do not pay them; and the same surely applies to a right, for to say that somebody has a right implies that others are under an obligation to respect the right. But it might still be contended that the sole foundation of moral rights was the general good and that therefore the individual had only one right, that of doing and suffering whatever it was best for the common good he should do and suffer. And what place does this leave for individual rights? Is it not then a superfluous notion? For either a proposed course is the best one to be taken in view of the general good or not. If it is, should it not be taken, however it may affect particular individuals?

This seems plausible enough—is it not right to do what produces the greatest good and wrong to do anything else?—yet if we once admit it, have we not set our feet on a slippery slope which may lead to the utmost excesses of totalitarianism, and has not the difference between Hitler and ourselves become only a matter of degree and not of principle at all? He claimed for all his crimes the excuse that they were for the greatest good. Whatever right we take, however fundamental, it is at least conceivable that it may conflict with the greatest good and, if so, according to this principle it ought to be sacrificed.

Now that there are cases where e.g. the individual right of free speech must be limited is obviously true: We cannot e.g. allow people freely to advocate the murder of cabinet ministers. But I think they may all be regarded as cases where non-interference with the right in a particular individual would involve directly or indirectly greater interference with the rights of other individuals. However the difference between the individualist and the totalitarian is not to be expressed by saying that the former asserts and the latter denies a universal law to the effect that the state must not interfere, for instance, with freedom of speech: it is rather that, while both admit that the right of free speech may have to be limited as e.g. the law of libel limits it, the totalitarian sees no appreciable value in it and is therefore prepared to suppress it wherever he anticipates the slightest advantage from doing so, while the individualist rates it so high that he regards general respect for it as a necessary condition of any tolerable civilization and will be most reluctant to limit it even slightly. You can call this a difference of degree if you like, but it is one of those differences of degree which amount to differences of kind. The one values individual rights so much that he will violate them only in the face of the direst need, the other values them either not at all or so little that he is prepared to ignore them almost entirely in deciding what to do. The dispute is not ultimately about abstract negative laws or rights, but about the value or worthlessness of individuality, and the important point in combating totalitarianism is to realise the positive value of individuality both for the individual himself and for the community.
There will be thus two points to be made if we want to satisfy ourselves that an individual right is to be respected. (1) We must be clear as to the evils involved for the individual whose rights are violated. We must put ourselves in the position of those e.g. who are never free from the fear of being carried off to a concentration-camp or prison without warning and without proof of guilt or for "offences" which no decent government ought to regard as such or in the position of those who have no chance of a decent life because of avoidable poverty and ignorance. For individual rights are violated not only by state interference but by non-interference where interference is required. (2) We should also realize that the preservation of individual rights is not valuable only for the individuals who have the rights but also for the other members of the community. E.g. without underestimating the terribly evil effects on individual happiness and morality of a system in which the right of free speech is persistently violated we should note that the right is not founded merely on the interests of the man who holds unpopular opinions, but equally on the fact that it is for the benefit of the community that each individual should be free to express himself as he wishes. For, if the right of free speech is not allowed, the individual is prevented from making his contribution of ideas to the community and there is no chance of what is wrong in the prevailing views being separated from what is right by the winnowing-fan of criticism. Further, if free speech is systematically and persistently repressed, the individual will be far less of an individual than he would otherwise be and will therefore be less able to serve the community in any other way than as a machine. The community consists of individuals, and we shall be without the material to build a good state if there are not properly developed individuals. The state will then be like an elaborately constructed milling machine which has only chaff to grind and not wheat or like a wonderful safe which contains nothing but dust and ashes. And how far they can be individuals under a system of rigid coercion may be questioned: By "real individuals" I mean beings with freedom, intelligence, initiative and responsibility. The right of free speech is thus not important merely because people find it amusing to grumble about governments in social gatherings. It is not something which the community ought to sacrifice to the individual, because the latter has a right to it, at the expense of others, but a vitally important means of doing good which the community ought to allow for its own sake as well as for the sake of the unorthodox individuals.

But the right that people perhaps most often have in mind in discussing this question is the right to take part in the government of one's country. It is closely connected with the right of free speech and the arguments for the right of free speech are largely also arguments for democracy. Democracy is desirable because it is desirable that all interests and points of view should have, as far as possible, their share in determining public
policy and the nature of the government, and this is also an argument for free speech. Again, democracy is desirable because of its educative value, because it treats men as individuals and because the atmosphere of liberty is likely to have favourable repercussions on the whole of their life. These are again arguments also for free speech. Though a democracy may in practice violate this right, the existence of a democracy that is one more than in name is bound up with it, for without free speech which enables the different parties to put their point of view the elector will not really be free to choose since he will not know what he is choosing, nor in the absence of criticism of the government can its actions be democratically controlled. We could theoretically have free speech without democracy, for a government might conceivably allow criticism of itself without power to overthrow it and without letting that criticism affect its actions. That is however an unlikely possibility, and we could hardly have the converse, democracy without free speech. Going deeper, the rights of free speech and of democratic participation in government are necessary if there is to be any tolerably adequate realisation of a deeper principle which is of supreme importance and the violation of which will like a subtle poison carry with it all sorts of unanticipated evil consequences and strike at the roots of civilization itself, the principle that man ought to be treated as an end-in-himself and not as a mere means. It is not treating a man as an end-in-himself to refuse him the opportunity of expressing his opinions and of finding out about the views of others in a way which will enable him to form his own opinions. It is not treating a man as an end-in-himself to allow him no voice in deciding the question by whom and how his life is to be directed to the extent to which the state does increasingly direct it.

I do not, however, wish to put all alleged rights in the same position. The difference is this. Some alleged rights are rights to control one's own life, some are rights to control the lives of others. For instance, a good deal is said about the right to property. Now one thing that may be meant by this is the right to the material goods necessary for health and a decent life, and the right to sufficient personal possessions to express some individuality and exercise choice. It is most desirable that all men should have this. But, as often used in controversy, "the right of property" means the right to employ large possessions in the way their owner likes where it very much affects the welfare of other men. What is property? In the form of money, land (not tilled by the owner himself) and industrial capital it is the power to command the labour of others and therefore control their conditions of life. Obviously such a power to control others should be subject to limitations to which a primarily self-regarding right is not. There is always a presumption in favour of a claim to a right to control one's own life; other things being equal that should obviously be granted. But the presumption is against a claim to a right to control the life of others. Barring complete state socialism such
powers must to some extent be granted to individuals, but obviously the presumption is at any rate in favour of their severe limitation as far as that is practicable. Individuality and individual freedom are sacred things; but for this very reason we must put a check on so-called rights which are really claims to interfere with the individual freedom of other men and distinguish them from rights which only involve a claim to express one's own individuality and control one's own life. No doubt we must not press the distinction too far; since I cannot alter even my own individual character without indirectly affecting others; but still there is a very clearly marked difference between the claim for what is primarily a right to manage one's own life and the claim for what is primarily a right to control the labour and so the lives of others. I am not committing myself to the view that we should have a system of state socialism or even a great deal of state control of industry, investigation may show that the consequences of this are likely to be bad, and even conceivably that it would be better to leave the individual capitalist more to himself than is usually done in the west to-day. What I am saying is that we must judge by the consequences without allowing ourselves to be affected by appeals to 'the sacred rights of property,' for the individual's 'right of property,' except in so far as it means the right to the minimum needed for a decent human life and for reasonable liberty to express one's tastes in one's personal possessions, is in a very different position from a right such as that of free speech. This would still be so if we decided against any socialistic developments on grounds of expediency or because it was thought that it threatened other rights by making the state too strong.

Rights claimed by parents over their children provide another example of alleged rights to control the lives of others. Again there are obvious reasons for allowing them the rights within certain limits when the children are young, but again, since they are not in the same position as rights to control one's own life, the presumption is in favour of rather than against their limitation if the good of the children require it. For instance, interference by the state with the propagation of children would usually be regarded as a gross violation of individual rights, yet it should be obvious that it is in a quite different category from interference with rights to control one's own life, since the act in question primarily affects others, namely the children. It may be argued that the state should not interfere, e.g., by compulsory sterilization of certain people, on the ground of the danger of abuse, once state interference is admitted at all; but this is an appeal not on the ground of the rights of the parents but on the ground that the practice might ultimately do more harm than good if once admitted. Similarly I cannot see that it is a violation of a parent's rights for the state to take steps to regulate the education of his children, if this is not carried to such a point as to separate the children from their parents altogether and the education is not of such a kind as to strike at
the very roots of family life with all its values. An individual has a right to his own opinions, but he has no right to insist that another individual should hear these opinions exclusively in the process of education.

There remains one difficult and painful question on which I should touch if my argument about rights is not to have an air of unrealism. Should the right of free speech be allowed to those who would not allow it to others if they were in power themselves? To the right of free expression of opinion there are in any case two obvious limits: (1) Since the state cannot allow the individual the right to disobey the laws or rise in rebellion, it is only logical to refuse to him also the right to employ his freedom of speech for the purpose of inciting others to do so. No doubt it will often be wiser, even in the interests of preventing sedition, to turn a blind eye to a seditious speech or pamphlet, but this will not always be so. (2) The individual can hardly be regarded as having a right to spread deliberate lies or give away secrets of state. But sharp distinction must be made between deliberate misstatements about provable facts and matters of opinion. The state has indeed the right to take action against opinions which it thinks mistaken, but the weapon it should use is not force or legal penalties but arguments to show the opinion was mistaken. Surely if the government with its strategic advantages as a disseminator of propaganda cannot adequately refute opinions opposed to it without the use of force there must be something very wrong with its own views. And, if feeling is such that the promulgation of opinions contrary to the government is likely to lead a considerable section to adopt the extreme course of revolt, this can only be because either there is no machinery for securing a change by peaceful means or the government has been grievously oppressive or inefficient in some respect, in which case it will be better and safer for the government to amend its ways than to stifle criticism of them.
Many psychiatrists and psychologists in practice have experiences which suggest the possibility of extrasensory perception, but few publish them. Their reluctance to publish is quite understandable since the level of acceptance of such data is very low among their colleagues. As long as the laws underlying such phenomena have not been formulated it is much easier to deny their existence than to look for explanations. This situation is reminiscent of the experience of one of the authors when he applied to take his psychoanalytic training simultaneously with his residency in general psychiatry. His application was refused by the analysts, who said that they would not accept candidates who were still arguing about the existence of certain manifestations of the unconscious mind, but only after they had been convinced of their existence and were eager to look for explanations. For instance, the analyst may say that the nose is often symbolic of the male genital. Such a statement by itself may be shocking and unbelievable until one sees a patient who describes feelings of the greatest discomfort when anyone looks at his face because he thinks his nose is alternately growing larger and smaller, and who even draws a picture of his nose flanked by testicles. When the evidence is this strong one no longer doubts that the nose may symbolize the penis; one wants to know how and why? Common sense, therefore, is often merely limited knowledge unhampered by humility, and closes doors more often than it opens vistas. One of the doors it often closes is the one leading to the investigation of parapsychological phenomena.

The experiences reported here are gathered from private practice, from research projects, and from friends. They suggest that ESP occurs in mental illness, in so-called normals, and even in people of extraordi-

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1 All research projects reported were sponsored by the Consciousness Research Foundation, San Pedro, California. President, Kurt Fantl, M.D.
narity high mental functioning. They confirm the existence of a mode of transmission of information from mind to mind without the use of the five senses. They hint that mind can influence matter directly (telepathy or psychokinesis); that matter can influence mind (clairvoyance, psychometry); and they also give us examples of events foreshadowed by Mental impressions (precognition). Because of the relationship of these phenomena to mental illness as well as to creativity, they are of special interest to the psychiatrist and to all those who wish to understand and to improve the range of human consciousness. Because of the influence of mind on matter, which can be demonstrated by physiological changes, they are also of interest to the physician who devotes himself to physical healing.

One of our first observations concerned the responses of a schizophrenic adolescent girl to standard psychological tests of intelligence. She was very pleased with her performance and thought she had done very well. On closer examination, however, it was evident that she had on two or three occasions given the incorrect answer for the question asked, but the correct answer for the succeeding question, which had not yet been asked. Did she anticipate the question telepathically, and if so, why could she not have perceived the correct answer to the question asked? The mother of the patient confirmed that the girl was often apparently telepathic in her behavior at home. On one occasion, for instance, the mother had bought many groceries and thought she should telephone her daughter to meet her at the street and help to carry the packages to their second-floor apartment. She neglected to telephone, however, but her daughter met her just the same, and said, “You wanted me to help you carry in the groceries?”

This incident led to a research project designed to explore the influence of ESP on intelligence tests in children and grew to include comparison of ESP ability with personality traits. Mrs. Shields, the director of this project, herself has many precognitive dreams and reports the following one as typical: “I dreamed I walked along a hillside marked ‘Keep Out’ and signed by Walt Disney. He let us go in anyway. I found a huge feather there. Then I saw a huge cricket about a foot long that was starting to bite some children so I killed it. It was on a big log just inside a big cave.” Approximately a week later Mrs. Shields attended a meeting of the Photographic Society of America where a natural science movie was shown as part of the program. In one of the scenes there appeared a cricket blown up to full-screen size, and following it a scene of a cockroach in a cave. Both the cricket and the cave were immediately recognized as identical with the dream images. The importance of this illustration does not lie in the precognitive aspects of the dream as a whole, but rather in its implication that individual elements of the dream may be selected from either past or future events.

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Other examples of telepathy, this time in a schizophrenic adult, are contained in the following dreams. This man consulted a psychiatrist after his discharge from a mental hospital where he had been confined when he had had an automobile accident as a result of his hearing voices which told him to kill. His resistance to the voices had led him to drive his car into a telephone pole to escape hurting anyone else. In the first dream this patient saw the capital letter “M” in block print, the number 44481, and the name Hamilton. His associations to the dream were meager; he thought the number might be a telephone number, and that Hamilton might refer to a watch (a well-known brand in America). The therapist, however, was aware that on the night of this dream the following experiment had taken place: several people, including Dr. Hamilton, a psychologist, had met at the home of the therapist to attempt to influence a photographic film by concentrating in a darkroom on the block capital “M”. The street number of the therapist was 1481.

In a second dream this patient reported that he saw a book which somehow looked like a medical book. On one side of the cover he saw the number “77,” and on the other side the number “45.” He had no associations. This dream occurred five days after the therapist’s father, a physician also, had celebrated his seventy-seventh birthday, and when the therapist was forty-five.

The third dream contained three elements which appeared to be telepathic. He dreamed he was looking at a street sign and saw a name he had never seen before. It was spelled “Kea” or “Keeya.” There was a restaurant and a tall man took a dime out of his hand and gave him something in return. There were no associations. This dream occurred two days after an experiment conducted by his therapist with a group of other people in the presence of a table-rapping medium in which an effort was made to trigger a telegraph key connected to a buzzer without anyone touching either the key or the table on which the key was placed. This experiment being successful, an attempt was made to see whether or not an electric typewriter could also be triggered by this force. Since the typewriter did not react, it was necessary for the experimenter to borrow dimes from several individuals to compare the sensitivity of the telegraph key and the typewriter keys. It took the weight of six dimes to trigger the telegraph key, but many more to trigger the electric typewriter. At the time of the exchange of dimes the participants in the experiment were having refreshments consisting of coffee and cake. Therefore, three elements in the dream refer to three actual events: “Keeya” to key, “restaurant” to refreshments, and “dime” to the exchange of dimes.

Another adult male schizophrenic patient reported a dream in which he was visited by a friend whom he had not seen since his medical discharge from the Navy nine years ago. In the dream his friend demonstrated several Yoga exercises, emphasizing the importance of keeping his spine flexible to promote health and to achieve long life. In the dream
the patient explained to his friend that his psychiatrist was also interested in Yoga and had suggested certain practices to him. Three days later the friend actually visited the patient, told him that he had been studying Yoga for years, and stressed the importance of keeping the spine flexible. Such a dream is suggestive of precognition, since it is highly unlikely that after nine years the patient would have been thinking of this particular friend, and certainly not in connection with Yoga.

In contrast to these dreams of mentally ill patients illustrating extrasensory perception, is the story of a friend who was working on her doctoral dissertation in the social sciences. She had written the introduction and the conclusion but was completely at a loss to know how to develop the central portion of her paper. After several days of nervous tension verging on despair she suddenly awoke one night with a tremendous urge to write, and within a few hours of intense concentration and excitement she wrote the entire middle section, thus linking her introduction with her conclusions. Furthermore, she used concepts and a vocabulary far beyond that of her conscious knowledge. Indeed, she had to look up many of the words in a dictionary. Her dissertation received high recognition by the faculty and was generally conceded to be beyond her usual performance. Our friend felt guilty, as though she should not accept praise for something she herself had not done, but she was reluctant to explain the circumstances to her professors for fear they would think she was insane. This is an example linking ESP with creativity. In the history of literature, art and science there are many such instances.

One of the research projects undertaken in an effort to discover the nature of psychokinetic force was the tablerapping experiment alluded to in the "Keeya" dream. In the presence of a certain medium raps occurred on a table and were of sufficient intensity to be recorded by a tape recorder and an oscilloscope. After all precautions against fraud were taken the phenomenon continued, even at times without anyone touching the table, and on one occasion in the absence of the medium.  

Analysis of the wave form produced by the raps on the table indicates a 170-330 cycle carrier wave which resembles the frequency wave of a nerve impulse. The pulse modulation of this carrier wave at 0.2 cycles per second (with extreme values up to 20 cps) is similar to the envelope wave of the electro-encephalogram, especially the alpha waves. An EEG of the medium disclosed a dual alpha rhythm which, while not considered abnormal, occurs in only two percent of the tested population.

This tablerapping experiment was characterized by raps which answered questions in a simple code. These answers were sometimes correct.

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more often false, and rarely exceeded the intelligence or knowledge of the participants. On one occasion, however, a prediction was made by the raps which was later fulfilled, and which could not have been known by anyone present. In the room at this time was an instrument for the measurement of temperature, humidity, and barometric pressure, its purpose being to indicate whether the raps were influenced by humidity, as static electricity would be. The raps predicted that a phenomenon would occur which we could feel, and that the sensation would be in the nature of a temperature change. Examination of the instrument disclosed that within the past half hour the temperature had dropped seven degrees Fahrenheit. As we continued to watch the instrument the temperature rose six degrees F. within the next twenty minutes. In this instance it appears that precognition was combined with psychokinesis, though it is impossible to identify either the sender or the receiver, or even to establish positively that telepathy was involved.

In addition to the rappings which were investigated by our research group, two patients reported the occurrence of spontaneous raps in their homes. One of them, a married woman in her forties, said that raps started immediately after the death of her father and continued for about ten years. They seemed to be on the metal bedstead and were so loud that they were very disturbing. Her husband took the bed completely apart but could find no cause for the raps. This story was confirmed by the patient’s husband. Another female patient told about loud raps which occurred in her home after her father was reported missing in action. Similar raps were heard by this patient in the apartment on the floor above her own, and there the husband was missing in action. Her father later returned home safely but the neighbor man was killed.

Another field of investigation for our group was thought photography, considered as a possible manifestation of a function of the mind known as psychokinesis.4 This investigation, conducted from both a psychological and a physico-chemical point of view, suggests that there is a time interval in the process of developing the film during which the volitive mind may influence the distribution of precipitation and create an image, generally abstract in nature but on a few occasions quite concrete.

The influence of matter on mind, or psychometry, was illustrated by Peter Hurkos, a Dutch medium who has won great fame in the States, at least partly because a few years ago he accurately predicted that the Dodgers baseball team would win the World Series even though they had been in last place the year before. He had previously received official recognition for his help in solving murder cases, both in Europe and in the States, by simply touching articles of clothing worn by the victim or objects left at the scene of the crime. We met him only once, at the hotel where he was staying in Los Angeles. He knew nothing about us.

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As we were leaving, Peter, apparently wishing to give a demonstration of his powers asked if he might hold Dr. Fantl’s keys in his hand a moment. He said, “You are mixing the medicine wrong.” Dr. Fantl thought Peter was talking nonsense, since he does not mix medicines, but Peter continued, “It is not oxygen and I get a feeling of being very short of breath. It is good medicine but you are not using it right. Also I see a valve that is leaking.” Suddenly Dr. Fantl knew what Peter was talking about, and as soon as possible he went to his office to check the two tanks he had there, one containing a mixture of carbon dioxide with oxygen, the other nitrous oxide. According to the treatment method developed by Dr. Medina at Illinois Research Institute, these two gases are used in combination in the treatment of certain neurotic or psychosomatic disorders. Five percent carbon dioxide in oxygen is considered the therapeutic agent, but since it often causes anxiety and shortness of breath, nitrous oxide is added to counteract these unpleasant effects. As soon as Dr. Fantl walked into his office he noticed the smell of nitrous oxide and discovered that the valve had allowed all the gas to escape. He replaced the empty tank with a new one, even taking the precaution of attaching a new valve. The next morning, as he was giving his first treatment with the gases, he found that the gases were not mixing properly and that again the valve to the nitrous oxide tank was defective. Had he not been especially alert to this situation due to Peter Hurkos’ warning, the treatment would have been given with insufficient nitrous oxide and the patient would have experienced exactly the discomfort of shortness of breath and anxiety which Peter had described so vividly merely by holding the keys in his hand.

Peter has been studied from many points of view. One of the most interesting recent studies was done by Dr. Barbara Brown, psychoneuropsychiologist of the Veterans’ Administration, in which an electroencephalogram was made on Peter while he was psychometrizing objects presented to him by members of the staff. The EEG showed a double peak spike pattern in the mid-parietal-temporal area while Peter was concentrating on an object and describing his impressions; otherwise, it was normal. In this connection it is interesting to note that Peter’s unusual faculties developed after a head injury resulting from a fall from a ladder.

Before relating the next incident it might be well to mention that neither one of the authors has considered himself particularly telepathic. Each has had a few “hunches” and a few precognitive dreams. But in the incident to be described Dr. Paul became a “sender” without any intention to do so. On this occasion Dr. Fantl and Dr. Paul took Amanita Pantherina, a hallucinogenic mushroom, along with a Professor of Philosophy from Stanford University, and under direction of Dr. Andrija Puharich author of The Sacred Mushroom (Doubleday, N. Y., 1959). The experiment had not been planned in advance and therefore no one knew of it. It was designed primarily to determine whether there in an increase in ESP under the influence of the mushroom. On preliminary tests of ESP
each of us scored negatively, and because of subsequent confusion and
disorientation the follow-up tests were not administered. The toxic mush-
room quite overwhelmed Dr. Paul; she experienced it as a catastrophic
threat to survival. She was unconscious for three hours, between eight
and eleven o’ clock on a Friday night. During this time she was actively
hallucinating. For several days following the ingestion of the toxic mush-
room she was liable to sudden waves of giddiness and confusion. On Mon-
day, three days after the experiment, Dr. Paul was informed by two of
her patients that they were amnesic for exactly that same period of time
that she had been unconscious and hallucinating, without, of course, know-
ing that she had been in that condition. One of them, a thirty-year-old
male clinical psychologist, reported that he had purchased mushrooms
in the afternoon for his evening meal, the first time he had ever done so,
and that he could remember nothing that had happened after eight o’
clock. Furthermore, ever since then, he said, he had been “floating in
and out of a mild psychotic episode.” The other patient, a young married
woman, was able with the help of her husband and friends, to piece to-
gether her behavior during her period of amnesia, only to discover that
she had acted entirely out of character and was quite irrational. The im-
portance of this incident should not be underestimated. Two patients, at
a distance of three hundred miles from the therapist, underwent a tempo-
rary psychotic episode in response to a temporary drug-induced psychot-
episode in their therapist. Although hereditary, chemical and emo-
tional factors are probably the most common causes of mental illness, at
times there may be telepathic factors which deserve careful exploration.

We have related a few of the parapsychological phenomena which
we have personally witnessed in our roles as psychiatrists and research
workers. No attempt at explanation has been made. These phenomena do
not fit into any pattern of established science, but they can be observed by
anyone who becomes interested in them. A better understanding of them
will undoubtedly lead to better diagnosis and treatment of the mentally
ill, will illuminate the creative process, and will advance our knowledge
about the true nature of man.
Alfred Farau
THE ALFRED ADLER INSTITUTE, NEW YORK, U.S.A.

THE HERITAGE OF ALFRED ADLER

(A Comparison between Adler's Individual Psychology and Existentialism)

When I am thinking of mankind today, the following picture comes to my mind: I see a naked infant, sitting on a ball of fire, and with wide-open baby-eyes it is staring—into space, and playing with the stars. This is not a pretty picture. I know.—The situation of our species on this planet is increasingly getting out of hand. This holds true for all areas of living as well as for all nations and countries. The very same century, which has made savages long for democracy, has also made the most educated people of Europe long for a "Fuehrer" out of the jungles. The very same century, which has produced Depth Psychology is gradually transforming the relationship between physician and patient into a mathematical equation out of a computer. For every meal we eat, two other people eat nothing, or hardly anything. "And one of those two people is a child. On World Children's Day, June 14, 1961, there were approximately 1,000,000 children in the world-most of them inadequately fed, stunted and disease-ridden. Less than one third of them will ever see the inside of a school." These are facts, taken from an official report of the United Nations, and quoted by Marian Maury in "Birth Rate and Birth Right"; a compendium, just published by world authorities on the immensely important topic. No longer is our birthrate mounting steadily; it rather has become a birth-flood. In addition, there looms automation. One of our professors was recently asked by a journalist: "What are the people going to do in this world of automation?" Answered the professor: "A group
of highly qualified men and women will always be needed, even then...”
“And how about the others”, the reporter asked, “the billions of
common people?” “We scientists”, said the professor, “must work on
automation; what it will mean socially is not our business.” The
professor was very proud of his answer.

It is interesting, that after countless discussions in various circles,
last year, about the complete uselessness of fallout—shelters, almost over
night, thousand of buildings in New York City now are displaying
black and yellow signs, which read “Fallout—Shelter”. (And this when
for the first time there is real hope for the realization of a test—ban
agreement between Russia and USA). Again I quote a few authentic
facts from a study undertaken by the Rockefeller Institute, New York:
at the present time the U.S. possess a destruction—potential of almost
30,000 megatons of Trinitrotoluol (the so-called TNT). Probably no
body can visualize what that means. However, if we consider, that during
the entire Second World War, from 1939 to 1945, including the atom
bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, five megatons of TNT energy were
used, while at the present time America alone possesses six—thousand times
more than the entire world possessed twenty—five years ago, this might
tell you a story. The study of the Rockefeller Institute states further,
that in the event of an attack, at the present stage of development, assum-
ing one 10,000 megaton bomb of an enemy were directed against the
military objects and largest cities of the U.S.A., not more than 11% of
the population would survive.

The question may arise: what has all this to do with Existentialism?
A great deal. Both, the atomic age and existentialism were born simulta-
aneously: namely during the darkest days of world War II. Existentialism
is the philosophy of the atomic age.

What actually is existentialism? Since there are so many definitions
in existence, why not permit myself my own? I should say (and I know,
it sounds somewhat malicious): existentialism is the non-philosophy of the
masses of isolated and unhappy individuals, who are marching together in
no direction. Psychologically speaking I would define it this way: exist-
entialism is the striving for a personal meaning of an individual’s life in a
completely meaningless world. There will be objections raised to every-
thing I shall say from here on. If I should say, that existentialism iso-
lates the individual...this or that person will ask: “How about Martin
Buber ‘I and Thou’?” Should I claim that existentialism is negativistic.
...many will contradict me: “How about Paul Tillich’s ‘Courage to Be’ ?”
And when I am going to state that existentialism is materialistic...“How
about Martin Heidegger ?”. And all these contradictions will be valid,
because it depends who, just then, has been chosen as personal idol. Al-
ways assuming, that this very idol has not also just changed direction.
Heidegger of 1920, Heidegger of 1927, Heidegger of 1945...these are
three entirely different Heideggers.
What then, really is existentialism?—It really is: no philosophy at all. And this for two reasons: in the first place it constantly refers to “experience”, whereas any true “philosophy”—at least in the Western meaning of the word—must be the result of an experience. Secondly it is not a philosophy, because it has not been originated by a philosopher. It is, at best, a philosophical syndrome. It contains everything in symptoms: the devoted Christian Kierkegaard and the fanatical Christian of Byzantine character, Dostojewski; Nietzsche, the anti-German superman; Heidegger, the typical German thinker, including even the incomprehensible style; delicate poets like Rilke and Kafka; theologians like Tillich and Buber; metaphysicists like Jaspers and Marcell; atheists like Jean Paul Sartre; they all are considered to be existentialists or its forerunners. And in addition, some of the contemporary existentialists fight against each other. Jaspers rejects Heidegger’s belief, that knowledge can be transmitted through philosophy; Heidegger considers Jaspers’ discussion of the transcendent betrayal on the possibility of concrete explorability of all phenomena, and both refuse to be called existentialists, because this is indeed what Jean Paul Sartre considers himself to be. Co-existence of the existentialists is truly in very bad shape!

I might say: the largest common denominator of all existentialism seems to be man’s distress; his fear, his despair, his loneliness, and his being lost completely on this planet. I am wondering why Arthur Schnitzler, the great Viennese writer at the turn of our century, has never been included for his THEME OF LIFF—one could say paradoxically—has been DEATH and it is quite inconceivable to me, why no one as yet has noticed, that the most important forerunner of existentialism was a musician, namely Gustav Mahler, whose work—in my opinion—is the most important artistic exploration of modern man’s despair, of his fear of LIFE and his fear of DEATH.

Let us now turn to Alfred Adler. It can be easily assumed, that any reader of this article is familiar with the work of this pioneer of Depth psychology, who broke away from Sigmund Freud in 1911, and founded Individual Psychology, the first stepping stone, which led modern psychology into social science. Adler’s concepts are known today not only to the experts in the field; some of the most important ones, as e.g. Inferiority feeling, Inferiority complex, Family constellation, Style of life, and Social interest especially, have become part of our everyday language. Surely, the problem of human existence was the core of Adler’s work. At any rate, I see far more connection between Individual Psychology and the so-called “forerunners” of existentialism than with the contemporary ones, and particularly do I have in mind Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Individual Psychology and Kierkegaard are connected through the latter’s concept of the “Human Situation”: man must make decisions. It matters less, says Kierkegaard, whether the decision is moral or not; the essential thing remains the decision per se. Much as Adler accepts the
necessity for making decisions, he would never have deemed it irrelevant whether that decision is useful or harmful for the community as a whole; and similarly, the attitude of Adler’s courage is—in contrast to Nietzsche—not super-human and anti-social, but it is human and democratic.

What connects today’s existentialists with Adler is the fact, that man can exist only as social being, and the awareness of the individual’s fear of life. Existentialists and Adlerians share also the holistic viewpoint. This holistic viewpoint has been so widely accepted today, however, that it appears almost everywhere: in Gestalt-Psychology, the physiological and neurological circle of Kurt Gold-stein, in psychosomatic medicine, with the Neo-Freudians, with Karl Jung and the Eranos movement, with the experimentalists and even with the academic psychologists.

And this leads us to the existential analysts, whose therapy is based on existentialism. Among the originators we find Binswanger, Medard Boss, Minkowski, Gebsattel, a.o.; Wilson van Dusen, an existential analyst himself, undertook to examine both, Adlerian and Existential analysis. He writes: “Our theory is based on an attempt to discover the phenomenology of the other person, his unique way of being-in-the-world. This parallels Adler’s attempt to discover the style of life of the individual” ...(By “Style of Life” Adler means the direction in which an individual moves, in order to reach his goals). “Here”, van Dusen continues with his examination, “is the real difference between the two schools... with his own understanding of a case, Adler undertakes to explain this knowledge to the patient... It is unlikely that an existential analyst would ever conceive the process as one of explaining the patient to himself”. — This remark implies that the existential analysts are convinced—as are so many other psychologists—that they are digging deeper than the Adlerians, whose therapy is essentially nearer to ego-psychology and conscious approach, and that their therapy, in contrast to Adler’s is a real exploration of the ontological ground of man. However, they are mistaken. Van Dusen, surprisingly undogmatic, must admit that “they are merely laboriously rediscovering what Adler has set forth to discover thirty and forty years ago already.” For the “Style of Life”, and the innate capacity for social interest, are also ontologically grounded.

I do believe, however, that in one respect the existential analysts do have an advantage over the Adlerians. Adler says that one basic dynamic force is behind all human activity, namely the “Striving for Superiority and Perfection.” This is an axiom in Adlerianism. It has been accepted by the existentialists(regardless of whether they are familiar with Adler’s theories, or not). But they also say, that it covers not everything—possibly there is another purpose behind this recognizable one, which we cannot—at the present stage of development of psychology—as yet recognize. Perhaps they are right; perhaps they are wrong. In any event, I believe that this speculation is worth to be explored. The thought in itself might stimulate neglected Adlerian research, and it might widen and en-
lighten the horizon of Individual Psychology in a fruitful way. Adlerians should move on a little; perhaps they should strive towards earning some laurels of their own, instead of resting securely on those of Alfred Alder.

We still have not penetrated to the most essential part of Existentialism. For this we learn only partially from philosophy and analysis. It is contemporary literature we must turn to, in order to find complete expression of what existentialism has achieved, or I should rather say, distorted: and I refer to its endless preoccupation with dread, fear and despair; to its horrifying mixture of Nihilism, which far overshadows all Materialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with a Mysticism, which exceeds all theological eccentricities of the Middle Ages. We all know, of course, that there are excellent writers and thinkers among the existentialists; the fact remains, that through it a door was opened to those innumerable mediocre and less than mediocre "poets" and playwrights, who speak forever in symbols, because there is no human language left to them any longer, with the possible exception of vulgarity. Unfortunately they confuse vulgarity with reality. Did many of you not also notice, that fewer and fewer films and plays, not to speak of novels, which have come out lately, have a "Happy End"? Does that truly mean that art has become adult? I doubt it. Rather do I believe that for modern man the unhappy end has become the only acceptable one. Actually it is not even an "Unhappy End"; it is an "Existential" one. The formerly negativistic neurotic attitude of many individuals has deteriorated into a collective one. People derive a certain feeling of comfort, a faint glimmer of satisfaction from finding confirmation of their misery and hopelessness through facts. And the reason for this is that they no longer can imagine any kind of existence without unsolvable confusion and complete senselessness. This reminds me of a well-known anecdote: Johannes Brahms was a notorious pessimist, and a very witty musician of his time, Hellmesberger, once said: when Brahms is in a particularly good mood, he composes a song which is titled "The Grave is my Delight," Yet—what a difference! The composer Brahms, the philosopher Schopenhauer, the poet Ibsen, the psychologist Freud—true, they all were essentially pessimistic. But how productive were these nineteenth century pessimists, how creative, how full of strength! Surely, they did not simply whine in company with their own audiences !!.

And here the most significant difference can be found between the existentialists and Adler—in spite of many similarities—namely the difference, which in my opinion must bring about the final separation: Adler is full of courage, even in his despair; the existentialists are full of despair even in their courage. There is such a thing as courage in existentialism, undoubtedly, but what kind of courage is that? I always have the feeling they are brave with their teeth set! Man is doomed to live, and he might just as well make the best of it! It really is a puritanical courage, and it might be well worth the while to explore, to what extent it has but
replaced puritanical sex-morale. We shall get an entirely different picture, when we visualize the “courage” of Individual Psychology, expressed in Adler’s writings and in case histories of Adlerians. Adler says YES to life. With open arms. To life, which is beautiful; precious; important; and well worth living—in spite of every-thing!!! Adler knew only too well that man is capable of living only in community with others, and that he is full of fear in an unknown world. But strange—these very facts—with Adler they often turn into comfort.

It is inconceivable that Adler could ever have written a sentence like the following by Sartre, one of the most highly gifted existentialists: “Man is the being who wants to be God. But the idea of God is contradictory, and man therefore is a useless passion.”

To give credit to existentialism, which it does nevertheless deserve, one must repeat here once more when and how it originated. One can well neglect it as an intellectual orientation before the year 1940. But then, during the occupation of France by the Nazis, at the time of the “Resistance”, it became an important historic phenomenon. Albert Camus has formulated this most clearly. At the time the situation was that of Sysiphos, the damned one in the Underworld. There was really nothing one could do, but accept the damnation: nothing but to bear it, and—at best—not to lose one’s dignity. IT WAS TRULY THE HEROIC TIME OF EXISTENTIALISM. And it really is the tragedy of existentialism that it continued with this feeling of life (this heroic Nihilism of a desperate and exceptional time, which we must respect, if not admire), and believed it to be still valid, when immeasurable oceans of new discoveries and experiences already opened up before us. Between 1940 and 1963 not twenty—three years have gone by, but twenty three thousand years! Yes, it is a world of misery and madness at the present time, but it is also a time of grandeur, which cannot even be grasped yet. Existentialism, which still has remained so fashionable in many parts of the world, does not even know yet that—seen from a historic perspective—it has become obsolete. Heroic nihilism has become a saturated one; its courage is drowning in the self-pity of lonely individuals; and the Space—Age still clings to this outlived and inappropriate philosophy whose themes are despair and resignation.

Before returning again to individual Psychology, I should like to discuss something, which to me seems to be extraordinarily important. Again and again we hear of the great inner relatedness of existentialism and Zen Buddhism; and I believe this to be a complete misunderstanding and a lack of knowledge of the Eastern attitude towards life; and the few similarities taken into account are quite superficial, indeed. True, Baso Matsu has called Zen “the daily consciousness” already more than thousand years ago. This daily consciousness is nothing other than “to sleep when one is tired, to eat when one is hungry.” But how far removed is this from modern existentialism! For the “consciousness” Zen
is concerned with (incidentally an entirely different consciousness than
that of European-American psychology!) only becomes consciousness
when it stops being consciousness and still remains just that. "Man is
a thinking being, but his works are created when he does not think",
says Daisetz T. Suzuki. "We eat no longer when we eat, we sleep no
longer when we sleep. Man must think as rain is falling from the skies...as
the stars are shining at night...as the grass in the gentle wind of spring.
He indeed is himself: if rain, stars and grass". These are thoughts much too
difficult for Western man to grasp in their simplicity; because he lacks
all tradition, all training and all belief to do so.

When Zen Buddhism concentrates on one moment, it does not isolate
it. For past, present and future, goal, way and interrelation are one.
Nor does it exclude anything, for all is contained in it existentially; we
could also say, it can exclude all because all is included in it.

Measured by such a deeply metaphysical from of "existentialism"
todays existential philosophies are typical of modern Western nihilism,
which derives from fear and not from meditation, from the struggle
for existence and not from understanding existence, and they represent a
narrowing rather than a cosmic widening of philosophical development.

Adler's theory is of course also a Western one, which deals very
concretely with concrete problems. Still it is a strange fact, that, while some of
the existentialists are related to metaphysics (though less than they claim),
it is the realistic Adlerians who are much more related to it, though
most of them do not know it. (They have "repressed" it!) Here is the
paradox namely that Adler, whose Individual Psychology was the first
"realistic" reaction to "mystic" original psychoanalysis, has at the same
time initiated—in the beginning surely quite un-intentionally—a reaction
against his own "down to earth" orientation.

Adler, who was the first one to introduce vocational guidance clinics,
consultation centers, advisory councils, etc., through his practical work
with people became increasingly aware of "Gemeinschaftsgefühl", that
concept which more and more proves to be metaphysical, the clearer we
see the process from a historic point of view.—The translations of the
term, which are still in use, "social sensitivity", "social feeling", "social
interest" (I myself have been using the latter in this article) are without
exception inadequate, because they contain only a part of the concept.
Therefore more and more psychologists and other scientists have recently
stopped using these translations, and the original and quite untranslatable
German term Gemeinschaftsgefühl has been used instead.—And only
now and only gradually do many of the Adlerians themselves begin to
understand clearly that it is this very concept which has turned out to be
Adler's most important contribution, not only to psychology and philoso-
phy, but to the history of mankind in its entirety.

Gemeinschaftsgefühl, as Adler sees it, is not a theoretical command
and demand for human brotherhood, but a basic fact of nature, given by
Life itself to our species, which lives on the crust of this planet. Here we can sense definitely the relatedness with the age old wisdom of religion, that mankind is a unit and that man can find himself only by loosing himself in a higher goal than himself. It is the task of Adler’s Individual Psychology, for the first time to prove this fundamental truth through scientific psychological methods.

Assuming hopefully that our world will not come to an end, the world of the future must certainly will be more socialminded than any other before, and at the same time it will be transcendentally orientated. The writer of this article has expressed these convictions for many years. I believe that the metaphysical trend must be clearly visible to all who do not close their eyes to it, in the newest mathematical formulae as well as in research in biology and physics, in the rise of parapsychology as well as in the dawning of space-sociology. And the alert observer will notice that even technical science—in spite of its horrifyingly maniacal character we spoke of—begins to show spiritual traits!—And still we are lacking for the Space Age a philosophy which points to the future. Yet, I do believe that with the mutual influence of astronautics and parapsychology (and here I include Jung’s School) in connection with a realization of truly experiencing the Eastern attitude towards life and its feeling—a new and positive-optimistic philosophy will develop. This is a goal to be reached only in generations but it can be reached and it will be reached. Possibly Adler’s concept of Gemeinschaftsgefühl will climax only during this new historic process of change. And this, because of the very fact that Gemeinschaftsgefühl is not only “social interest”. It is the invariable interrelationship between the social needs of earthborn man and the cosmic consciousness of his psyche. I would like to emphasize as strongly as possible that I have said: earth—born, and not earth-bound. Man is a socio-biological being and a transcendental phenomenon. He is the son of the Earth and the child of the Universe.

One more thought should be added here. Just as Plato’s “Ideas” or Aristotle’s “Entelechy”—to give but two examples—today are different from what they were 2500 years ago, the last word about Adler’s “Gemeinschaftsgefühl” has not been spoken by Adler. No genius ever spoke the last word. Others must continue to build and enlarge on his concept. It was Goethe who said: “Was Du ererbt von Deinen Vätern hast, erwirbe es, um es zu besitzen.” (“What you inherited from your fathers must first be earned before it’s yours.”). Gemeinschaftsgefühl as a concept is Adler’s greatest heritage. At the same time it is an obligation. An obligation for all people, who—at the present time, which is still so depressingly influenced by a tortured outlook on the future—believe as did Alfred Adler: that Life is worth living, and that it has a meaning. A personal meaning for the individual, a social meaning for the community, and let us not stop here—A SPIRITUAL MEANING FOR MANKIND.
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HUMAN NATURE AND INSTITUTIONS

What precisely is "human nature"?

The existence of a property common to all individuals has long been recognized, and it has for the most part been identified with the limited range of possibilities, usually those of an affirmative nature, extremes of behavior in terms of ab olus, as for instance those of absolute good or evil—Calvary and Buchenwald—being regarded as lying either well above ordinary human behavior or far below it. Evidently, a humanist is one who engages only the favorable side of human nature, its virtues being obvious, its foibles forgivable. In a more precise sense, the term has been employed to designate the inherited tendency toward those actions which are the same in all societies despite acquired cultural differences. It is further supposed that human nature never changes, that it always has been and always will be the same.

As with so many deeply accepted beliefs, the prevailing view of human nature was established without rigorous examination; the enthusiasm expressed for it from the eighteenth century onward was in inverse proportion to the vagueness of its meaning. For just what is the property common to all individuals? The early Greek attempt to isolate the essential property turned up many; Aristotle found that man was the only animal capable of acquiring knowledge, incapable of moving its ears, able to stand erect, to use speech, etc. These features, it has developed, are accidental rather than essential. Moreover, human nature has meant something at once more profound and more elusive.

The extremes of behavior which had been ruled out of human nature prove on the contrary to be peculiar to it. Man is not only a rational animal but also—and equally—devoted to paradoxes and conflicting actions. The term, bestial, no longer applies aptly to human ferocities, for it is simply not fair to characterize all the animals with the cruelties that
only humans possess. No dog so far as we know has ever made pyramids of dog skulls; no horse has ever burned up millions of other horses. But it is also true that no bull ever died for his fellow bulls nor denied himself ordinary satisfactions in order to bring cattle the truth. No other animal ever invented the iron maiden or other instruments of torture of the Middle Ages or the benefits of modern hospital and modern medicine. We have the term, "humanitarian," for those who dovote themselves to the welfare of their fellows, and we need no such term for sheep or goats in order to describe their behavior among themselves. The human has no peer for planned and organized mass cruelties or for equally wholesale mutual benefits. Planned altruism is as alien to pigs as planned revenge. Whatever understanding of human behavior we reach must be one in which such extremes are combined. It will not do to search for some excellence, such as the acquisition of knowledge, or for some peculiarity, such as might be arrived at by averaging his various excesses of behavior. The analysis of human nature must be found to reveal some characteristic so essential that whatever man has done as well as whatever he is capable of doing are safely included in it.

It is not likely that we shall find any property of the human which other animals do not possess, at least to some rudimentary extent. Man is an animal and, like all animals, part of nature. He has gained ground over the other animals by exploiting his own weaknesses and over-compensating for his own shortcomings. His arms and teeth are not as strong or as sharp as the gorilla's, and so he has invented weapons; his legs are not as swift as the deer's, and so he has ridden upon the backs of swifter animals and invented the automobile, the train and the airplane. He cannot roar like a mountain lion, and so he has learned to communicate by smoke signals and later by telegraph and radio. But the gorilla does have strong arms and teeth, the deer strong legs and the lion a strong voice.

Even the feature that we note everywhere around us is like the others, man's only in excess: the capacity to affect himself by changing the available environment. Man build cities, but then ants build colonies, bees hives and beavers dams. The capacity to act in concert with his fellows in order to complete projects too large for single individuals is not peculiar to him. At every turn in the comparison between man and the other animals we are defeated in our efforts to discover some component that we can say is essentially human and employ in the definition of human nature. Perhaps our methods of inquiry are wrong. We have for instance been looking for some inborn capacity of the human being, such as superior intelligence or moderate actions. But this is to subscribe to the assumption that human nature is inherently subjective. What if it is not? We shall try the assumption that human nature hangs upon a different kind of skill, more specifically upon a peculiar technique for dealing with the external world.

We shall try the hypothesis that what man has that other animals have
not is the ability to learn how to fashion and transmit the use of material tools. By means of tools, bits of the external world are made to alter the condition of other bits—the external world, so to speak, induced to assist in effecting its own changes. True, some animals can be taught to use tools for a limited purpose and time, but they do not use them in a deliberate fashion nor make them for this purpose. By means of tools man has been able to rearrange the elements of his immediate environment to an amazing extent. In the large metropolitan cities, he still breathes air, still eats food and still copulates; but these basic animal activities are conditioned by a background that can at this stage safely be labelled artificial: he has to a large extent constructed his own environment. In addition to the ordinary sensible effects there are the planned ones. Music furnishes an environment of sound, art and architecture an environment of sight, chefs and cuisines an environment of taste, and history and knowledge generally an environment of depth. Human nature is not subjective but consists in those external relations between people which are made possible by artifacts, here defined as material objects altered through human agency.

The transmission of tools and techniques, the capacity for passing on to succeeding generations the artifacts and skills which have been learned, is perhaps uniquely human. In addition to producing an artificial environment it is the special property of human nature to train the young in the traditional ways. From the abstract artifacts of language to the concrete artifacts of material objects out of which have been made houses, transportation systems, industries, men have known how to construct and preserve the instruments of culture. For such preservation some kind of stability and continuity is required. There is a mechanism for this, called establishment.

It is clear at this point that we are speaking of human culture generally. History is the account of past cultures, but tools are not exercised in the service of cultures so broadly conceived. Tools belong to lesser-social organizations called institutions. An institution is an organization made up of men and their tools directed toward the fulfillment of a central aim, with customs rendered constant by means of establishment. Tools are for the service of specific institutional purposes: agriculture, educational, military, etc.

We have said that institutions are social organizations, now we shall have to point out that the societies in question are not merely those of a single generation. This is the meaning of establishment: that institutions are enabled to survive the death of their founders and go on to serve their successors. Thus institutions carry a permanence and stability that the brief lives of human individuals do not allow.

Institutions are organizations intended to satisfy human needs in specific ways, but not specific individuals. Perhaps it ought to be admitted here that the understanding of human nature as an individual affair has
come to an end. What makes an individual human is not his uniqueness but the possession of properties in common with his fellows. Nature is more zealous in the protection of the type than concerned about the welfare of the individual. Thus it is society which we shall seek to penetrate for an understanding of human nature, since the human being is clearly a gregarious animal: he is rarely found alone, and when he is it is, with some, at least, of the customs and tools that society has provided him. The name for the smallest unit of social organization is the institution. And so it is within the competence of the institution that we shall have to look for human nature.

Thus human nature can hardly be explained on the basis of human beings alone. There is more to life than its fullness if we consider its accomplishments. It is not only personal ruin that we bequeath to our fellows but also social achievement. The world may be better or worse off—it certainly will be altered—if we have found or made something in it that was not there before. Artifacts and the values embodied in them are the measures of man, and so there is no telling by what units he may next be judged, for he is constantly being reassessed by means of novel and unfamiliar standards.

Man, then, is a tool-using animal; he is also an institution-establishing animal. We have already noted that some other animals work together on institutional types of projects, but beehives, beaver dams and ant colonies do not survive successive generations of inhabitants who make it their business to improve the constructions. Man has the capacity to embody his discoveries, his tools and institutions, and to increase the extent to which he is able to influence himself by them. His behavior is thereby rendered more precise and specific. Money was invented many thousands of years ago, but the institution of banking had to wait a long time and the complications of modern international finance even longer. No doubt the cave man had his technology, his bowls and flints and clubs, and we continue to unearth his artifacts; but what are these compared to the technologies of a modern industrial culture? The accumulation and transmission to successive cultivated generations of techniques and formulas, and their consequent and increasingly intensified effects upon behavior, cannot be overlooked. They amount to a capacity to compound himself which man has and which specifies him completely.

How have the existence and recognition of the power of institutions affected the conception of human nature? As usual with theories, in terms of all possible ways. For Hobbes, for example, man is a ferocious animal held in check only by the state; whereas for Rousseau man is a noble savage who has been made bad by the wrong social institutions. Institutions have been thought to be the humanizing forces—and also the corrupting influences. But in either case it is usually supposed that institutions, and indeed all social organizations generally, are impositions from without, whereas human nature is what is constituted from within.
That the capacity for the building of social structures and the need to participate in them might be fundamental in human nature, has been envisaged by few. A proper understanding of what human nature involves will require us to depart from the wholly individualistic version which has been taken for granted for several centuries and which is as a consequence difficult to dislodge even though its powers of elucidation are too confining.

Meanwhile, the older conception of human nature as an invariant goes merrily along. When we discover that someone in antiquity committed a crime similar to one that we see in our daily newspapers, when we find accounts of crooked politicians in our history books or hidden examples of sudden and spontaneous kindness in peoples far away and long ago, we feel that we have new evidence. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*, we like to say thus feeling that we have justified the pettiest of shortcomings in our selves.

Those who feel secure in this view do so because they are safely locked inside a set of conceptions provided by their own culture and have no qualitative appreciation of it in others, especially perhaps in those of the past. Beliefs are prejudices which are adopted emotionally and afterwards defended through the use of logical fallacies. Their content can be analyzed into an ontology, whose axioms furnish the consistency which exists in the ground common to all and only those propositions which are required to systematize empirical findings. To a fish whose characteristic habitat is two miles down in four miles of ocean and who therefore could swim almost as far as he could wish in any direction, a chance encounter with the surface of the water or with the ocean floor would seem to go against nature.

Of course there is some justification in the claims made for the constancy of human nature. There is strong evidence in the discovery of flush toilets in the Harappa Culture of northeast India of some twenty-five hundred years before our present era—forty-five hundred years ago. There is strong evidence in the discovery of ball game courts in the remote and unconnected Maya culture of Yucatan dated about 700 A. D. There is strong evidence in the costumes of the women of Crete about 1000 B. C. It must be true that we are in many ways the same as our remotest ancestors, and these ways are fundamental ways. We have the same basic needs; needs for water, food, and sex, and for knowledge, activity and survival. And even though we do not satisfy them in the same way we feel that the need is somehow more fundamental than the mode of its satisfaction.

This is true: but what we do not recognize is what we have admitted in admitting the claim. Our appetites are animal; it is precisely in the mode of their satisfaction that we betray our humanity. The dog experiences hunger, the rabbit sexual desire, and the monkey a strongly developed curiosity: but man, who shares these appetites, has his own way of insisting upon their satisfaction. He will not eat any thing that comes
along or allow intercourse with just any body or be satisfied about the nature of things by looking at them from every angle as he turns them over.

Are we not to take seriously the effects upon us of changes in our modes of satisfaction? If man is no different for the acquisition of moral traits, of a conscience, and of the possession of abstract knowledge, then these things must be more superficial than we would be willing to admit. And if we do not admit it, then man—human nature—is not the same. In what sense is man the same when he cannot calculate except upon his toes and fingers, and when he can calculate by means of electronic computers? In what sense is man the same when he can only point and name, and when he understands and can freely manipulate elaborate languages? In what sense is man the same when he drinks at a stream and tears raw flesh with his teeth, and when he demands sole a la bonne femme and Chateaux Haut-Brion 1953? Does the vast increase in the intensification and complexity of experiences mean so little after all to human nature that it does not alter at all as a result? The increase in the capacity for alteration for improvements in technology, and for the organization of world government, is notable.

The evidence from evolution would seem to point to the existence of slow but definite increments of difference in human nature. So at least the Darwinian theory. If man and ape have a common ancestor, then human nature does change; and the fact is no less a fact because the changes may require millions of years in order to take place. Change is change regardless of the rate of change, and either there is change or there is not. For developmental theories in biology at least, there is.

Thus far we have argued that human nature is a recognizable affair, that it is affected by tools and institutions, and therefore that it changes. Now it is up to us to see whether we can discern anything of the mechanism which produces the changes.

Changes in human nature must be initiated from without. Both, we will begin by assuming, require causes. Now the internal causes of changes in man belong within the province of human biology, and if they exist are too subtle to have yet been discovered. Presumably there is no such thing as spontaneous change, change produced so to speak by its own motivating factors. We are scarcely in need of purely behavioral studies, for behavior is always behavior about something. Behavior, in other words, is always a response to a stimulus from without (or to a change from within which is in turn a response to a stimulus from without). The stimuli from without may be divided very broadly into three kinds. They issue (a) from non-human nature; (b) from artifacts; and (c) from other human beings.

(a) The external world, exclusive of society and its works, is a large and imposing one. Estimates of the size and age of the universe are increasing. It contains many factors which affect human beings, and some
of these have long been known. The fertility of the soil, upon which man depends for his food, is influenced by the sun; it is affected also by the atmosphere. The need to keep cool in summer and warm in winter, to regard weather as a source of comfort or a mortal threat, is one with which human beings have been long familiar. More recently, new forces have been discovered, cosmic radiation from outer space and the oil supply beneath the earth's surface, to name but two. All have existed constantly for the span of human existence, and many have influenced man in unknown ways. Such influences are difficult to assess and all but impossible to predict. Who could have foreseen that the effort to place a satellite in an orbit of Venus would count in the political rivalry of nations in the second half of twentieth century? The relative stability of the external world, with its incredibly delicate balance, has affected human nature most profoundly perhaps by allowing it to exist at all, and is therefore responsible for the invariance in human nature. We have very largely to deal with the same set of natural conditions which confronted our remotest ancestors; we expect the same set of stimuli from these conditions; but we do not make the same set of responses to them. Yet neither is this the whole story; for changes within geologic time, however small, do occur, and must be having their effects upon human nature. Infinitsimal accretions of this sort are difficult to measure, though it is hardly possible to doubt their presence.

(b) Most of us live only to a small extent in a world untouched by other beings. The closest part of our environment, short of the air we breathe and the water we drink, has been made for us. We live in cities or if in the country then largely by means of the tools provided by factories; we inhabit the houses and travel the roads and, in general, maintain a strict dependency upon artifacts. The bullfighter, the solitary salior, the gambler, the alcoholic, the empire builder, the saint, the ascetic—all try to look outside what seem to them to be the narrow walls of human society. But not the human forms employed as the means of escape. Death through a game, life on a boat, the future by way of a risk, oblivion in a beverage; all of these are efforts to get outside the society by possessing it wholly, by rising above it, or by denying it. But then what sort of successes are accomplished in such fashions? Even the most solitary of hermits takes with him a gun or a fishing-rod, prayer-beads or a book, some tool or intimate momento of his reliance upon the tools or institutions which were made by men. Tools make the man. Human nature can hardly be said to remain unaffected by the changes which the artifacts produce in behavior. The artifacts change. But there are always artifacts, and because they change, their effects must change with them but the chief point here is that there must always be some artifactual effect.

(c) We follow in general the customs, and work in the institutions, laid down for us by society in the past; and we obey the laws brought about in the same fashion. We have about us indeed very little that has
not somehow been touched and transformed by men at some time. The hands of the dead are heavy upon the efforts of the living, and what the dead have not fashioned for us as artifacts their established ways have determined. Artifacts are of the past and present and the dead are of the past, but the living also are makers and inventors, and we are at their mercy also.

We live largely at the sufferance of our fellows and we struggle very hard to earn their good opinion. It must be said, then, that human nature is strongly affected by human natures. Society is a whole of which the individual is only a part, and in this case whether or not the whole is more than the sum of its parts, it is certainly true that the individual is not an individual apart from his role as a part of the whole—the whole being in this case, society.

In the last analysis, it is the alterations wrought by society that have brought about the most radical effects on human nature. Tools are employed in institutions; men live largely in institutions and work for them. It is the social institution, that vast accumulation and organization of artifacts and established ways of behavior, that affects human nature to the greatest extent and is the most responsible for its changes.

Of course the institution itself does not remain the same. Men live for decades, institutions last for centuries and even millenia; and so in comparison with the brevity of human life, institutions exhibit a stability and a permanence: yet they do change, however slowly. Men do not pray in the same churches nor fight with the same weapons over any extended period of known history. The governments of past countries are not those of today. Practices well established, such as alchemy, and beliefs, such as those of astrology, which are the longest sanctioned by custom, are suddenly no more acceptable; while new practices, such as vaccination, and new beliefs, such as those of nationalism, become the most highly regarded and the most widely adopted.

Man exists in the midst of an environment, and if we choose culture as our collective name for the largest organization of human society, its ways and its products, then culture is man's immediate environment, and therefore most likely to bring about modifications in his nature: in his faculties, and in the types of his responses. Man in short, makes the things which alter man: civilization consists in the sum of the ways in which he manipulates and controls himself. Both concrete artifacts and abstract principles, both tools and characters, are the somewhat elaborate means taken by man to effect changes in himself.

We are pressing hard now upon the trail of the essential ingredient which makes for human nature, but we have not yet got it in our hands. We have seen that human nature is not a constant, that it changes slowly in terms of non-human nature and more rapidly in terms of institutions. What is the nature of this change? It is not qualitative surely, though it have its qualitative side. The persistence of art is strong evidence
against this. The beauty of the ancient cave drawings in southern France and Spain, and their resemblance to the contemporary drawings of Klee and Dubuffet, and in these terms the failure to achieve progress in art, argues that man has remained much the same.

Not quality, then, but complexity is to be our criterion. Human nature seems to have changed specifically in its increased complexity, in the enlargement of its capacity both to understand and to affect the external world. As human beings enter more and more into partnerships with artifacts and through them with larger social units which would be impossible without them, human nature must deepen to some extent and man become more intelligent: Man's capacity for making responses is altered by the responses he makes.

Will this tell us anything of what we want to know about human nature? What is human nature? Is it the capacity of the individual to interact with his environment and to affect it in such a way that it affects him? Man is the animal in whom the responses are so out of proportion to the stimuli that they result in further and more drastic stimuli. But there is more to it than this, for were this all, mankind would perish. It is also true that if we are touched by the littlest happening or remain unaffected by the most cataclysmic of events, this too is human nature. For there must be resident in man a flexibility which enables him to suffer changes and then to transmit their results. Human nature must also have the endurance required by his capacity to pass on new environmental factors to successive generations. In man the responses are excessive, but they look to the future. Imperturbability as well as sensibility enter into the human constitution. Human nature is the southbound end of a circuit which reaches out to include much on or near the surface of the earth in the way of doing and something beyond that surface in the way of understanding.

The suggestion that human nature changes is an uncomfortable one for the average citizen. It is a hard truth that organic evolution which calls for the development of man from lower forms calls also for higher forms in the future; that, in short, through his own efforts man is to be surpassed. The challenge to weaker individuals contained in the truth about the human situation is nothing less than appalling, and they reel under the suggestion that there is nothing to cling to except a kind of stubbornness which does not resist change but indeed makes it possible. Most men feel safer when they detect in others responses akin to their own, and look back upon these as well as forward to them for support. They wish to find for themselves the security of a human nature that never changes.

Philosophy, like religion, has been repeatedly subverted by those who would put humanity above the search for truth and thus have done a disservice to humanity. There can be no long comfort in such false elevation; in the end humanity only suffers the more as a result. In this world a constancy of effort must represent some kind of failure of achievement,
and we should anticipate rather that those who come after us will be better than ourselves, partly, we may hope, as the result of our efforts to transcend our limitations by means which lie close to them. If human nature does not change, so much the worse; and if it does change, then it may change for the better. The world is so large that anything as small as humanity can serve as no more than an example; and the example must illustrate the need for what is large to be high in quality. Who knows yet what we are capable; who can guess the immensity of our building powers, particularly if he does not limit his imagination by what has been done but extrapolates beyond it in a logic whose axioms are fervent? And if instead we have come to worship the core of permanence which has been necessary to keep improvement continual, is not that the fault of a nature which can only work in an atmosphere of self-esteem?

Human nature is not an isolated element in a hostile world but a part of that world and as such confronted equally by both the friendly and unfriendly elements in it. Men influence nature by means of what ought to be done; they tend to regard as good what is natural and to say of the bad that it is unnatural, and they think in this way to recognize an unfriendly element in a hostile world in time to repudiate it in themselves or their fellows. But knowledge has not yet come to this kind of discrimination, and we must meanwhile accept as human nature whatever human beings think, feel or do. And, most difficult of all, we must accept also as indispensable whatever it is that human beings do to themselves. It is safe to say that, working with all possible allowances from the environment, man is on the way toward the construction of a new kind of human nature, which will be when it is finished one of his most prodigious achievements.
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INSCRIPTIONS AND EPIGRAPHAPS

A modest way of sharing in the glory of the great is to make them inscribe books or sign portrait photographs for us. It increases our ego feelings as the narcissistic satisfaction is proportionate to the degree of intimacy which such possessions reveal.

Distinction should be made between an inscribed book and one that is dedicated in print. The latter comes very close to an identification with the famous and the great, and reveals a unique association.

Both inscriptions and dedications may reveal glimpses of character and personality and render the study a rewarding one.

A humorist will try to be funny at all cost, even at the sacrifice of his own privacy. Only P. G. Wodehouse could have made this confessional dedication:

“To my dear wife, without whose help this book would have been ready six months earlier.”

The same satirical vein appears in Betty MacDonald’s inscription of The Egg and I to her sister, Mary, “who has always believed I can do any thing she puts her mind to.”

Milder aggression, with a smirk of satisfaction, is present in Franklin P. Adams inscription of his Nods and Becks to his former boss, the New York Post editor: “To Ted Thackrey, who fired me with ambition.”

A complimentary inscription is therapy to a wounded ego. Columnist Earl Wilson dedicated his book, I am Gazing into my Eight Ball “to the wonderful woman who cooks my meals, darns my socks and rears my son—my mother-in-law”. We know how his mother-in-law must have felt, but we have no information on his wife’s reactions to the concealed Jibe.

A judicious amount of levity in inscription should meet with general approval but poking fun at the recipient is questionable.

“To my ex-wife, who taught me the high cost of leaving”—is amusing
but savors of bitterness. Doubt may be entertained as to the reception accorded this inscription by the owner of an antique store.

"To the innocent in a den of antiquity."

Obscene inscriptions are to be frowned upon even among intimate friends. Strangers may read them and be scandalized. I confess to such an indiscretion at the time when Bell, Book and Candle was a hit on Broadway. I inscribed my Poltergeist book to an actress friend: Here is the Book, get the Bell and Candle yourself, and you will suffer from no deviltry in the coming year.

A butcher should not be reminded that he "mutt'n kill". Nor should Mr. Smellie be wished that "he should do something about it." The best inscriptions are those that are impersonal or of literary value. The author can afford to diminish his ego if thereby he increases that of the recipient. I have inscribed a book to an interior decorator friend "as from one interior decorator to another." And when a biography of Gertrude Stein was reviewed in the N. Y. Times, I sent a Christmas Bell greeting to my friend, Sidney Steiner with this:

"A bell is a bell is a bell, and no Gertrude can make it Steiner."

There is only one other inscription I am proud of: it was to Archduchess Charlotte, the daughter of King Charles of my native country. I was in a dilemma how to compromise between a call of old allegiance and the spirit of American democracy. I solved it by this:

"To Her Imperial Highness, the Archduchess Charlotte Hapsburg, from a subject to her charms."

Inscriptions of a book cannot be divested from the touch of personal relationship. On walls, blackboards, notice boards or over doors they are more uninhibited and even reckless.

Oliver Herford, who rated as the foremost wit of his time, wrote: "When I look out of my studio window, and see the club flag at half-mast, I hurry over and look at the bulletin board to see who it is; but it's always the wrong man."

His death notice had not been on the bulletin board for long when someone penciled on it: "Always the wrong man."

Oliver Wendel Holmes was a medical practitioner in his early youth. He had an inscription over his office door: "Small fevers gratefully received."

The sign was no more dignified than the sticker of a Park Ave doctor over his overdue bills: "Long time, no fee."

In the Bronx a sign was seen: "Piano lessons; special pains given to beginners."

Not very encouraging!

A shoe repair shop had a sign on which a beautiful girl says: I am in love with America's No. 1. heel. Underneath, in a small feminine hand, appeared: "Too bad, sister, I married him."

Actor Dick Erdman had a motto on his car: "Some of the world's
bravest women pass through these doors.”

An impersonal sign may advertise wisdom for all to consider, as in a General Motors plant:

“According to the theory of aerodynamics and as may be readily demonstrated through wind tunnel experiments, the bumblebee is unable to fly. This is because the size, weight and shape of his body in relation to the total wingspread make flying impossible.”

“But the bumblebee, being ignorant of these scientific truths, goes ahead and flies anyway—and makes a little honey every day.”

Let us now turn to epitaphs. If self composed they often poke fun at themselves as the following celebrities illustrate:

Ilka Chase: I’ve finally gotten to the bottom of things
Dorothy Parker: Involved in a plot
Clive Brook: Excuse me for not rising
Lionel Barrymore: Well, I have played everything but a harp.
Walter Winchell: Here lies Walter Winchell in the dirt he loved so well.

Genuine epitaphs may be both humorous and pathetic. Here is one from a grave in South Carolina:

Ma Loved Pa, Pa
Loved Wimmin
Ma Caught Pa with
One in Swimmin
Here Lies Pa.

Another example:

Here Lies the Father of 29
He would have had more but did not have time

In Woburn, Mass. there is a gravestone with this epitaph:

Here Lies Ada Spurgeon
Who Died An Absolute Virgin
(So Help Me !)

From overseas, in a British churchyard, this epitaph is reported:

Here Lies the Corpse of Dr. Chard
Who Filled the Half of this Churchyard.

Finally, on the portal of Gethsemane Cemetery in Detroit this sign appears:

Drive carefully
We can Wait.

This presentation is made in a whimsical vein, regretting that Freud had failed to deal with this variety of humor in his Psychopathology of Everyday Life.
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ON IMPUTING RESPONSIBILITY

This essay is, in a sense, a recantation. For many years I have been accustomed to emphasize that aspect of political liberalism which concentrates on immunities, initiative and personal decisions. I do not wish to leave this aspect behind me; but in attempting to explore the concept of responsibility, I find myself compelled to emphasize another aspect which I have allowed to recede into the background. I refer to the involvement of the human agent in social purposes other than his own.

"Being responsible" is, by etymology, and in common usage, "being answerable", and "being answerable" is "being answerable to somebody." Responsibility arises from an interpersonal situation. So much might be generally acknowledged. But public responsibility does not depend on personal relations; on the contrary, it depends on a certain impersonality. One's fellow citizen is not necessarily an acquaintance: if he is that should not affect us one way or the other in the performance of our public duties. This responsibility, therefore, depends on our social function. It is owed to anyone within a defined area or group; or, if we extend the sphere of duties into an international context, to anyone sans phrase. But, in this case, each of us is anonymously responsible to every other, and responsibility may fairly be imputed to us whether we acknowledge it or not.

This conclusion, which will be worked out in more detail later in the paper, is relevant to recent attacks on the notion of responsibility. These are directed for the most part to the capacity of the individual agent to decide or direct himself. They have no hold on responsibility as imputed to a man in virtue of his social situation.

There is, of course, nothing new in the downgrading of responsibility. It has always been a concomitant of determinist psychology. In Ethical Studies, 1876) F.H. Bradley had occasion to quote, from that "advanced" periodical, The Westminster Review, (Oct. 1873) a description of "responsibility or moral deserts in the vulgar sense" as "a horrid figment of the imagination". But the attacks are now more persistent. Bradley, in

1 Ethical Studies, 2nd Ed. 1927, p. 2
excoriating the "advanced", could still appeal confidently to the "vulgar". But even the vulgar, thanks to the diffusion of what purports to be modern psychology, have now got it into their heads that it is unkind to impute responsibility, and particularly unkind, for some reason or other, to impute it to murderers. There are two essays in a recent American collection which make the point with refreshing clarity: those contributed by Professors Paul Edwards and John Hospers to a volume entitled *Determinatism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science* (Collier Books, ed. Sidney Hook, 1961). Edwards admires the courtroom tactics of the late Clarence Darrow, who won cases by asking jurors were they would be if they had been born and brought up like the accused; but he is not only concerned with malefactors: he concludes in entirely general terms. "From the fact that human beings do not ultimately shape their own character, it follows that they are never morally responsible."

Hospers puts it more ambiguously: he admits the possibility of making efforts, adding only, "whether or not you are the kind of person who has it in him to exert the effort is a matter of luck." On this one can only observe that if it is possible to act responsibly, even if only because one has been lucky, the difference resulting from the effort will be more than a matter of luck.

I believe these doctrines to be thoroughly demoralizing; but that is incidental. The point which concerns us is that the universe of discourse in which these writers move is one in which "not being able to shape one's own character" serves as an excuse. Now quite apart from the psychiatric case-histories which they appear to regard as normal, no one is able to shape his own character. The shaping of character is a continuous and delicate operation, occurring only in a social context. For the most part, it is a constructive activity; other people sometimes get in the way, but far more often they help—they help others to become active themselves. If what the critics are looking for is a wholly self-fabricated character, and if they think that only such a character can be properly responsible, no wonder they find it difficult to understand responsibility. Responsibility arises precisely because we make or unmake each other. It comes at people from the side of other people's expectations and requirements, making them what they are, and bringing them nearer to what they have it in them to be. It is part of the process whereby a man's centre of gravity being thrown outside himself; he can recover himself from the resources of others. This is what happens in vital and vigorous communities, with a sense of common purpose. It is also, by a singular good fortune what happens to the ordinary man in most epochs of history. He is anchored by his daily round and his continuing attachments. Alienated intellectuals presenting their defects as virtues are, happily, exceptions.

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\[\text{a} \quad \text{The antics are the author's; and he drives it home by insisting that "follows" is used in a sense at least "closely akin to that in which the conclusion of a valid syllogism follows from the premises." cf. op-cit p. 125}

\[\text{b} \quad \text{op. cit. 137: cf. 142}

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To begin with, in general if people believe in themselves and their destiny and enjoy what they are doing, and doing it along with others who also enjoy it, they will ride over difficulties which by themselves they would find insuperable. All of us have our traumatic experiences, though most of us keep them decently under cover; but if we are launched on a significant common enterprise, we shall be less likely to cherish them as major incapacities. On the contrary, we shall be properly ashamed of them, and shall be happy when they are squeezed into shape by the urgencies of our environment. Now and then they will fester and the victim will wrestle with self-pity in the small hours of the morning, and he will get up not quite as efficient as he would otherwise have been, but he will be caught up by the public business in the course of the day, and in the performance of his duties he will find the solace of fatigue and the satisfaction of achievement. That is what happens when he is kept afloat on a strong social current; and it is the responsibility, both of Governments and of voluntary organizations, to see that such currents flow vigorously. The pitiful problems of the isolated individual arise because no one has any business to be isolated.

That, it will be said, is all very well: but there remain at least some individuals whose traumata so incapacitate them that they cannot respond. Are they to be held responsible? The answer is twofold. Subjectively, they are not responsible, they are not able to do what they are called upon to do. That is the point which is made in and out of season by those whom I am accustomed to call, I hope not disrespectfully, the "psychiatric liberals", and I am not disposed to dispute it. But objectively they are responsible: merely by being where they are, they owe it to other members of the society to do what they are subjectively unable to do. That is the point which we are endeavouring to illustrate. It does not obliterate the first point, but it radically qualifies it.

Consider what we call "responsible government". It is distinguished from old-style despotism simply because the people have claims on the sovereign in the name of the common enterprise. These claims are not merely claims against government, thought, again in the name of the common enterprise, such claims may have a certain force. The primary claim of the subject on the Sovereign is the claim to be governed. To perform this function, governments must certainly not be so hopelessly divided as not to be able to decide: hence the salutary custom of Cabinet responsibility, and the acknowledgement by all parties in a democratic state of the rules of constitutional procedure. But, in rulers as in others, responsibility is not the private attribute of an individual substance: it is answerability to others. It is we who hold our rulers responsible, for governing us properly. That is why, if they let us down, we have to replace them. There was something to be said for the former Japanese custom of expecting them to commit suicide: it cleared the decks, and it dramatized one major point of social ethics, that incapacity is no excuse for failure.
But it was inconvenient, because yesterday’s failure may, with a change of circumstances, become tomorrow’s bright hope. Voting them out of office is a far more flexible expedient.4

Our object, however, is not to explore techniques but to pinpoint responsibility; and our preliminary example shows that it cannot be located in the abstract capacity for decision. It depends not only on what one has to give but also on what others have a right to expect. A further example will show that they have a right to expect what one does not have it in one to give.

A district magistrate is appointed in quiet times to an area for which, at the time of his appointment, his moderate capacities are adequate. He may have certain aptitudes, like the art of letting well alone, which are actually assets for an everyday assignment. But when the area becomes an oil-field or a communications centre for a campaign, he has neither the energy nor the gift of decision to carry his duties out. He has not changed: he was always the tranquil mediocrity who is now so miscast. Nevertheless, he is responsible: he is answerable to the whole community for what happens in his district, until he resigns or is dismissed. He is responsible, though he does not have it in him to succeed, because in virtue of his position, responsibility is imputed to him.

The point of this pen-sketch is to show that responsibility is not determined simply by one’s abilities, whether lucky or laborious, but by what others demand of any one in one’s situation. It is not, in the first instance, a psychological concept: it is sociological through and through. And that means that psychological incapacity, even if proved, is not an alibi. It may seem tough to demand of people, under penalty, what they cannot possibly give; but that is the only way society can get going. Assuming that murderers are as frantically pitiable as Hospers suggests: assuming that they are, in the popular sense, not responsible for their actions: they are still answerable to their fellow-citizens, and their fellow-citizens, if only in self-defence, have the right to treat them as if, in the popular sense, they were responsible for their actions.

But, it will be said, a responsibility thus one-sidedly imputed, and in no way depending on its recognition and assumption by those to whom it is imputed, is as unsatisfactory as one which depends wholly on an estimate of subjective capacity. There is force in this objection. From the point of view of the individual, regarded as a self-subsisting view, it is in fact unjust. But the whole purport of our protest is that this point of view does not give us the whole panorama. The individual belongs to his environment, and his environment has claims on him which, in the nature of things, will cause him inconvenience. This inconvenience he has to take as best he can. Amongst other things, if he is not good enough, he must expect to be bypassed by someone who is. It is the claims which a society puts upon people which bring them to a realization of themselves. It is their citizenship and their mission which makes them important. In fact, to
impute responsibility to those who do not have it is the highest compli-
ment that can be paid to their humanity. It is often, in practice, the only
way of eliciting it. The real degradation of a man is not in being asked
for what is beyond him but in being spoonfed and asked for nothing at all.
As a matter of fact, if he is asked imperatively enough, he may find him-
sell giving what he thought to be beyond him. On the social current he
will be carried over his private obstructions: if his own will he will
assume the responsibility imputed to him, merely because it is imputed.
It will still be said that there are cases in which the imputation
of responsibility fails to establish it, and in that case it remains unfair to
impute it. But, in the first place, such instances are then pinpointed
as exceptional and can no longer provide an universal alibi. In the second
place (and this will have to be developed more extensively) in these in-
stances, we have no business to talk about rights. We can preach compass-
ion, but that is an extra-political concept.
Confusion in this region has been the besetting sin of humanitarian
thinking: it signally illustrates the use of one muddled concept instead
of two clear ones—the evil which, at least in the Republic, is represented
as Plato's main reason for invoking the theory of Forms. If a man
is genuinely irresponsible, and not merely evading responsibility, then not
being able to answer to the community when he is none the less answer-
able, he is at the best a passenger and at the worst a plain nuisance; and
the distinction is a slim one, for in a decently working community every
passenger is a nuisance.
On the other hand, because he cannot sustain human dignity, it does
not follow that he should forfeit ordinary human consideration. There
are distinguishable levels of human capacity; even if, after all the salutary
effect of pressures of tradition and environment, a man cannot rise
to the privilege of the higher, he can still receive the benefits due to the
lower. It is no credit to medical science, to the clergy, to psychiatrists,
to social agencies and to governments that the lower should exist; but as
long as they do, they are entitled to kindness and charity. It is in fact
a moral duty laid upon the more capable to act on their behalf. But
they have no social right to expect it. Rights, as has been said over and
over again, but to little effect, have to be justified by the performance of
comparable duties.
The view which has been presented on the imputing of responsibility
entails the rejection of atomic individualism. If the centre of the in-
dividual were wholly in himself, such imputation would be wholly arbit-
rary. Seeing that it is not arbitrary, but arises from the primary require-
ments of social life, the suspicion grows that the centre of the individ-
ual is not wholly in himself. We are back with the old picture of the
individual as a social construct, without what Bosanquet called his
"hexagonal fences", taking from his community not just a protective
colouring but his substance and structure: the individual whose form as
will and initiative has to be respected, but who receives from his society and his friends all but a fraction of what is worth willing and initiating. And within this picture the notion that responsibility rests on imputation is wholly in place.

It would be wrong to suppose that the individual centre has nothing to contribute to the process. Each centre, however slightly, affects the course of other centres, and of the whole. Therefore, it matters whether or not the imputation can be taken up and adopted as a personal decision. The defence of responsibility by reference to choice and freedom is by no means irrelevant. If no one had any control over his actions, what might be called the mechanics of responsibility would be unavailable. All that we are contending is that responsibility itself is not the capacity for choice and freedom, but an answer to the claims of others, of which the agent may not even be conscious, and with which he is confronted whether he has assented or not.

This conclusion is not in the least undemocratic. It actually underlines the conception of society as a common enterprise which is what distinguishes democracy from absolutism. But it is a revolt against abstract notions of individuality with which the defence of democracy is too often associated. It is not particularly democratic in spirit to take one's rights with one into a corner and to sit snarling over them like a dog with a bone. Nor is it appropriate to a country which is consolidating manfully under threat of invasion. Democracy, first and last, is a matter of public spirit; and responsibility is its inward and personal expression.
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A "FASCIST" SYSTEM OF ETHICS
Personality in the Philosophy of
Giovanni Gentile

This paper was occasioned by at least two considerations. Its first purpose is to be informative. Incredibly little has been done, in English with respect to the ethical system of Giovanni Gentile, one of the foremost Idealists of our time. What has been done has largely been in the pursuit of a negative interest and consequently the results have been essentially negative, more often telling us more about the biases of his various and sundry critics than about the ethical thought of Gentile. The subsidiary purpose of this paper is to consider a system of ethics that has been self-identified as 'fascist,' in the effort to discover if, and to what measure, a serious and competent philosophy can indeed depart from the current of Western, if not world, philosophy and do service in the cause of evil.

In a world becoming ever smaller, in which diverse ideologies come more and more frequently into brisk contact, it is important to be able to estimate at what point two systems diverge to the extent that they no longer share a common complex of values, where discussion is no longer possible, much less practicable, and a recourse to violence is the sole conceivable recourse in dispute. Certainly the beginnings of such an analysis can now be undertaken of Fascism, when Fascism no longer constitutes a present danger.

I

There is really no need to inspect the credentials of Actualism, the

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1 This has become less true since the appearance of Professor H. S. Harris' excellent, The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960).
philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, to identify it as "fascist." Giovanni Gentile identified himself, in life, as a Fascist, and in that guise died before the guns of his anti-Fascist assassins. That this philosophy was "fascist" is certified by the fact that the first, the "philosophic," portion of the *Dottrina del fascismo*, which appeared over the name of Benito Mussolini as a definitive statement of the philosophy of Fascism, was, in fact, written by Gentile.

Our concern, then, will be with providing a brief exposition of Gentile's ethics and peripherally to indicate where, should such be the case, his position differs radically from the philosophy of the West which has delivered itself of some of man's finest aspirations.

II

Critical to the understanding of Actualist ethics is an appreciation of its radically human temper, its commitment to the thesis that the full realization of the self is the unique duty of man. It conceives man as activated by the imperative need to realize himself, to pass and surpass himself, to rest discontent with the man he is and to seek out the ideal man he should be. There is alive, Gentile contends, in the moral conscience of the individual, a sentiment which assigns to man an infinite responsibility in the fashioning of his own life and personality which, when denied, leaves him no peace.

The corollary of this is that the ethics of Actualism, literally understood, like the general idealist ethics out of which it sprang, is an ethics of freedom, of liberty. It makes an imperious demand for freedom in

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4 Cf. *Bibliografia filosofica italiana: 1900-1950* (Rome: Istituto di studi filosofici, 1952), II, p. 3; cf. H.S. Harris, op. cit., p. 188.
7 "Superare se stesso: questo e......l'istinto.....essenziale dello spirito." *GS*, p. 177.
8 "Ogni uomo......scontento di se, distingue questo se di cui non si appaga da quel se superiore e migliore che lo appaga......" Gentile, *Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere* ([Hereafter referred to as *SL*] 3rd Ed. Florence: Sansoni, 1940), II, p. 142.
act, for it sees in that freedom the only possible source of value which we conceive as attending the moral life of the individual. Man becomes a personality, truly human, only in so far as he chooses freely to live by a moral law he lays upon himself, a law which appears inwardly compelling to him as a moral agent.

The difficulties of this position do not become evident until it is identified with an absolute moralism, a moralism which extends to the farthest corners of our lives, leaving no single act beyond the jurisdiction of moral imperative. If each act is subject to moral adjudication, and moral judgments can only be entered with reference to free acts, Actualism can only conceive all acts potentially free. And such is precisely the position assumed.

Actualism demands, for the moral agent, an absolute freedom. A "given, extrinsic, natural world," it seems, would mechanically "coerce" the will to conform to "regularities," to "laws," ultimately denying freedom of the will itself, while the imperative demand of man's inmost Spirit is, as we have seen, not not conformity of will to law but the establishment of will as law. If life is to retain its full value, indeed any value at all, then the "natural world" must in some fashion be conceived as "created" by the free act of the individual. "Liberty," Gentile contends, "can have no real significance if it does not coincide with an absolute creativity."

The apparent extravagance of this position can be dispelled only by seeking a full and careful explication of its meaning and by divesting it of hyperbole which all too often characterized Gentile's exposition.

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11 Cf. *DR*, p. 81
13 "Comunque, quale che sia il grado di razionalità delle considerazioni che c'inducono a riconoscere un'autorità, questa e reale in forza del nostro riconoscimento..." *FD*, p. 77.
14 "La vita nella sua pienezza non e per l'uomo ne arte, ne religione, ne scienza. E bensì moralità." *DR*, p. 40.
16 ".....chi dice libertà, dice incondizionato, infinito....." *SL*, II p. 325.
18 "La volontà che operi sulla base di una natura, che le condizioni...non e volonta. La sua liberta non avra un reale significato....." *FD*, p. 61.
20 ".....non la conformità del volere alla legge, ma il porsi del volere come legge." *DR*, p. 85.
21 *FD*, p. 61.
The principle of morality, if moral acts are to have value, is the explicit self-determination of the will; the will must be consciously free.\textsuperscript{22} The individual wills freely to conform to law because law does not stand extrinsic, but intrinsic to him, and in willing to conform to such law he conforms to his truest self.\textsuperscript{23} He has found the law in himself. The force of law is an interior force, resident in the spiritual nature of man.\textsuperscript{24}

Gentile commences his analysis of moral experience with the awareness that, as individual men, we first entertain the conviction that we live in a material world which limits our freedom and confines our will.\textsuperscript{25} Gradually, we accede to the conception that there exists a realm wherein man’s will is free to choose between alternate possibilities and if he choose badly we feel justified in calling him to account.\textsuperscript{26} But as a matter of fact, Gentile contends, we demand that man give an account of his thoughts as well as his deeds. We evaluate not only what he does but what he thinks as well. We acclaim or deplore his thoughts in turn and prevail upon him to abjure those which he should not entertain. In such fashion we give evidence of our conviction that the thought of each of us is not simply a logical consequence of given premises, a necessary effect determined by the machinery of the mind. We give evidence of the conviction that thought depends upon man, upon his disposition, upon his personality; it is not mechanically subject to premises which he can in no wise modify.\textsuperscript{27} If man “thinks rightly” it is because he has so chosen. He recognizes the “laws of thought” because they are inwardly compelling, because they appear necessary if he is to realize himself as a person through science, art and religion.\textsuperscript{28}

Our very conviction with respect to the efficacy of thought, itself, is a faith freely taken up.\textsuperscript{29} because essential to the full development of

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. DR, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{23} “Questo e il punto a cui bisogna guardare. La forza che e diritto e la forza inferiore, l’attività o potenza dello spirito, nella sua intimità.” FD, p. 83. “...tutte le autorità si fondano nell’autorità ond’è rivestito dentro ciascuno di noi, nel seno dello spirito, che e il più proprio essere di ciascuno di noi...” Ibid., p. 79.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 83.
\textsuperscript{26} DR, p. 22, cf. PF, pp. 41 f.
\textsuperscript{27} “Infatti all’uomo non chiediamo conto soltanto delle azioni, si’anche dei detti, e cioè dei pensieri...voigliamo perciò corregga quello che pensa e non dovrebbe pensare. E dimostriamo così di esser convinti, che il pensiero di ciascuno non è soltanto una conseguenza logica di certe premesse...ma dipende da lui, dalla sua capacità, dalla sua personalità...ne soggetta a premesse che non posso più modificare.” Gentile, Riforma dell’educazione ([Hereafter referred to as RE] 5th Ed. Florence: Sansoni, 1955), pp. 38 f.
\textsuperscript{29} “Non c’e ricerca filosofica o scientifica...senza la fede del pensiero in se stesso...” Gentile, Atto del pensare come atto puro ([Hereafter referred to as AP] Florence: Sansoni, 1937), p. 11.
ourselves as persons. Thus our very judgments of truth and validity evince, for Gentile, moral responsibility.

An examination of our conception of truth shows that in the final analysis we accept a judgment as true not because of anything transcending us but because we think it true in accordance with standards which we, in our freedom, and in accord with that which we conceive to be required in our development, have selected. There is no truth so compelling that a living, forced and or momentous option could not prompt its abandonment. In thus freely establishing the criteria for truth and validity, Gentile suggests we “create” that world which had but a moment before been conceived as confining us. We have freely chosen that it be such as it is.

It will be observed immediately that the use of “create, here, is almost intolerably ambiguous. Gentile does not pretend that the physicist “creates” the law of gravity. Surely the physicist, while he might formulate the law employing arbitrary symbols, does not create the fact that “1/d^2” is a more accurate symbol for the law than “1/d^2” would be. We shall see that Gentile means nothing more than that the physicist must acknowledge the fact of this law if he wishes to operate effectively in the world and in so doing further his development as a personality. He is free to accept or reject this law, just as he is free to accept or reject the principles of logic. But if he wishes to sustain his spiritual growth he will accept the one just as he accepts the other.

Much of the sense of paradox and extravagance which attends Gentile’s position is dissipated when “creativity,” and the “absolute freedom,” which is its consequence, are so understood. As such, Actualism approximates an operational or pragmatic posture. It is as thinkers that we are truly free and creative, for it is as thinkers that we freely accept or reject a truth.

Thinking, to sharply distinguish it from the truth it mediates, is an indefectible certainty; it possesses self-certifying being. There is no doubt radical enough to undermine the compelling conviction we entertain with respect to its existence, for even in doubting itself, thinking affirms itself.

Thinking, for Gentile, constitutes the being of the world in which the subject and the object are progressively defined as constituent moments. This articulation constitutes the “dialectic,” the self-development (autocitisi) of the spirit.

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31 This refers to truth, not to certainty.
32 Cf. PF, pp. 41 f. IF, pp. 176 f., GS, pp. 4 f.
33 “Non c’è modo, infatti, di pensare nessuna realtà, se non si mette a base d’ogni realtà il pensiero.” RE, p. 56.
If we pursue Gentile's exposition we find that he conceives one beginning one's life possessed of a vital sense of individuality which opposes itself to the ambient world. But the world against which the real but limited self (the empirical ego) defines itself is itself composed of elements of past or present thinking. The full compass of thinking constitutes the transcendental Self. Within this Self man first defines himself as a real but limited self against the "otherness" (alterità) of himself, his object world.

The subject with whom Gentile commences his ethics is one possessed of two constitutive attributes: existence and essence. The subject would be nothing if it did not exist, but it would be as little if it possessed no consciousness of itself. This consciousness arises out of its affirmation of itself, and it affirms itself in dialectical fashion in facing problems, meeting needs and overcoming felt limitations. Thinking (pensiero pensato) certifies existence, but only thoughts thought (pensiero pensato) defines essence.

The living subject of Actualist ethics affirms himself, defines his essence in a conscious endeavor to overcome limitations, obstacles. He faces life as a problem to be solved, problems to be solved. Spiritual development proceeds only in the necessity of meeting specific problems. They afford content, substance, to the developing self. Each such problem, theoretical or applied, of science or art, is felt by a particular moral conscience, constituting a specific moral problem.

Within the compass of general epistemological systems the objectivity of truth excludes moral attribution. Problems, particularly those conceived as "intellectual," are resolved by "discovering" or "perceiving" truth. In resolving the problem of whether Boston is North of New York or not our judgment seems determined by the external facts of the case. Since it is in this manner that we customarily conceive the solution of most problems, Gentile's description of the process as moral seems perplexing.

Gentile's contention is, essentially, that the individual is not compelled to make a "correct" choice. The judgment, for example, rendered by the positivist, that only that which is given empirically, which can be "verified" by given empirical procedures, constitutes "fact," is not itself

35 Cf. FA, p. 158
36 Ibid., pp. 158.
37 "...la vita stessa...e sempre un problema..." Gentile, Memorie italiane e problemi della filosofia e della vita ([Hereafter referred to as MI] Florence: Sansoni, 1936), p. 328, "...il pensiero e un travaglio che consuma anima e corpo, perché impegna tutto l'uomo incessantemente in problemi da risolvere, e non concede all'uomo un istante di tregua e di gioia senza svegliargli dentro un nuovo problema, che lo spiona a nuova guerra col dolore che torna a cogliargli." FA, p. 15.
38 Cf. Ibid., pp. 13 ff.
40 Cf. DR, p. 41
a fact. The judgment is predicated upon an act, which is a moral choice. The positivist so sees the world because he has so chosen to see it. He may have so chosen in order to facilitate communication, or to eliminate "empty" theological speculation, but ultimately his choice rests upon a system of values he has freely taken up.

The relationship between the thinking self and the "otherness" against which it defines itself, is a result, Gentile contends, of the free activity of the conscious self, of judgments freely entertained, of a choice so to conceive the world.

Actualism agrees that the world can be conceived of mechanically, as a constraint upon man, in which the limits of human freedom are continually reduced. A man is free to construct a world adequate to himself, small or large. He is nowhere compelled to render assent to a given conception of the world. There is but one inalienable certitude: thinking. What man tenders are judgments concerning "reality." He thus freely creates his world. For judgments cannot be coerced.

Every judgment of the truth of things, every element of knowledge, involves a self-conscious assent on the part of the thinking subject: that which we accept as true accords itself with the entire system of our antecedent thinking, with the entire body of needs and aspirations which constitute ourselves.

"Man constructs his life and his world as a real being whose development necessitates the defense and amplifications of gains made, needs satisfied, things and persons maintained in the full compass of his life..."

One "creates" one's world by resolving the problems which arise in a given spatio-temporal dimension, within the concrete and positive circumstances of an historical and moral situation.

There is no way of exercising a spiritual influence on things of the world by means of a human will power...without first having a clear conception of the particular and transient reality on which the will power must act....To act effectively among men as well as in nature it is necessary to enter into the process of reality and master the forces available.

42 Cf. DR, p. 37.
43 "L'accertamento dell'esistente, onde si costruisce il mondo, da cui pare all'uomo naturalmente di essere circondato, e il primo pensamento degli enti che esistono, onde ciascun di essi si definisce in una sua specifica natura che appare di diversa da quella del pensiero che li pensa, e quasi sì colorisce perciò il mondo costruito, sono tutti giudizi in cui si spiega liberamente l'attività pensante del soggetto....." FA, p. 17.
44 "Infine, si sa, che il mondo in cui ogni uomo vive, di cui e pieno il suo pensiero, può essere un piccolo mondo e può essere un grande mondo." FA, p. 4.
45 "......l'uomo......con la sua libera volontà puo e deve crearsi il suo mondo." Gentile, Dottrina del fascismo ('Hereafter referred to as DF'), p. 7.
46 Cf. FA, p. 17.
47 "Quel che accettiamo come vero dei nostri pensieri, è quello che s'accorda con noi, ossia col sistema dei nostri pensieri, e si dica pure col sistema dei nostri bisogni, delle nostre aspirazioni, con la natura insomma della nostra personalità." SP, II, p. 19.
48 FA, p. 158.
49 Cf. MI, pp. 343 f.
50 DF, pp. 4, 10.

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One "creates" one's world, in this sense, by effectively directing the forces available within the given concrete situation toward a freely chosen goal. One fails when one thinks ineffectually, abstracting from the real, determine conditions of the problem which presents itself. In this there is nothing novel nor unique. Men seek to achieve their ends by resolving their problems. To do this they must think and think effectively, in order to act effectively.

Men affirm themselves against otherness, the things and persons they encounter, as problems, in the world about them. To affirm themselves effectively men must think profoundly and carefully. This is particularly true with respect to interpersonal contacts, for men constitute critical elements in the otherness against which we define ourselves. In and through other persons language speaks, ideas arise, science is created, art manifests itself. We are intimately and substantially linked with others—each of their acts reflects itself mediately or immediately in us, for they are in us in the critical sense of affording an occasion of affirming ourselves in the realm of our highest spiritual interests. They are the most substantial elements of the "situation" in which we create ourselves as personalities. They constitute not obstacles to our development, but the means to that development. As such each man is intrinsically valuable to us. We seek to know him, we seek to better him, for he is the otherness of us.

The individual never is in any final sense. He is forever involved in a process which promises the fullness of being but which is never concluded. Life, for man as spirit, is this restless becoming. Unlike "things", fixed and finished, destitute of that inner energy which is restless in any confinement, man has a constant awareness of the otherness which marks the ever-changing periphery of himself as personality. Thinking is always generated by this awareness of limitation, by the attempt to overcome, to master obstacles. This is taken, by Actualism, as a sign that the personality is not, but wills to be, infinite—that the personality is

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62 "Il pensante che formula pensieri inefficaci, astrae dalle condizioni in cui il pensiero si attua e alle quali dovrebbe, per non ricominciare poi da capo, aderire...." FA, p. 265.
55 Cf. GS, p. 8.
53 "Pensa! ossia non risparmiare fatica, non esitare, non cedere alle tentazioni della pigizia, della vanità e d'altra bassa voglia; metti tutto te stesso nella lotta che sostieni con la materia da domare affinchè rifulga in fine la bellezza della tua opera." GS, p. 52.
56 Cf. RE, pp. 20 ff.
57 Ibid., p. 28.
59 "Se gli altri sono veramente me stesso, io non potro in verità intender me senza intendere gli altri; ne promuovere con il mio vigile intendere la mia esistenza e venir foggiano così me stesso, senza promuovere eo ipso lo sviluppo degli altri e il loro sempre più perfetto adeguamento alla mia essenza..." GS, pp. 46 f.
60 "...la vita....e continuo fluire e divenire." DF, pp. 9.
61 Cf. FA, pp. 62 f.
forever balanced on a constantly shifting center of gravity between finite and infinite liberty.

Empirically one observes that this infinity and energy which is spirit activates itself and lives its life indefatigably satisfying its needs, resolving its problems, struggling with nature and with men who attempt to place limits upon it, in order to affirm without limitations its own power.63

The essence of spirit, for Actualist ethics, is this striving after being, this limitless self-affirmation.64 There is forever before man, as personality, the ideal of true and absolute freedom. But it remains forever an ideal which gives meaning to the individual human involvements of day by day concerns, the multiplicity of duties which rest upon the fundamental and unique duty of man to be fully himself, to realize himself as free and universal being.65 That being is the ideal being toward which the individual strives;66 it is that being which man needs to be and wills to be.67

Man affirms his dedication to this ideal in the need he feels to overcome felt limitations, to overcome limits and to advance beyond them that is beyond things, beyond others, beyond his confined and meager self, to a vaster, truer Self. To transcend himself.68 Actualism contends that this is the "instinct" which characterizes the spiritual life, its natural constitutive impulse.69 To surpass oneself, to go beyond one's immediate self, to seek out the being which one should be, to live as spirit, to negate one's narrow self in order to affirm oneself more fully, more truly, in the spirit which is unity, harmony, in a life more social,70 more moral and universal,71 means, in the context of Actualist ethics, to live efficiently and effectively in the world, to learn the importance of others in our lives and to understand the things and the forces through which we must operate.72

Such a position does not tax the philosophic imagination. Certainly, within this context, the individual has the free choice of "creating" himself, and his world, badly or well; it will largely be a function of his disposition to think profoundly and well. This interpretation seems to be borne out by Gentile's refusal to distinguish theory from practice.73 The

63 FA, p. 63.
65 SP, II, p. 7.
66 ".....oltre i doveri c'è il Dovere, di cui essi sono tutti forme transuenti. E il Dovere...[e] l'idealità, l'universale....." DR, p. 90.
68 "Nasce della stessa vita dello spirito che lo genera...come il proprio ideale, ossia come quel vero spirito che egli ha bisogno di essere e vuol essere." Ibid., p. 178.
69 Cf. SL, II, p. 142.
70 GS, p. 177.
71 Ibid., p. 117.
72 MI, p. 331, DR, p. 41.
73 DF, pp. 4 ff.
74 GS, pp. 3 ff., FD, p. 5; cf, Carlini, op. cit., p. 131.
will, we have seen, is the impulse toward the fullness of free personality. Its determinate acts are knowing acts.\textsuperscript{76} Thinking and act are one.\textsuperscript{76} Thinking that does not concretize itself in efficient action is a velleity, an evil;\textsuperscript{77} it is thought without resolve—incomplete thinking—not quite thinking at all. Thinking resolves itself in act. The quality of the act will be the expression of the sum total of knowledge entertained by the agent.\textsuperscript{78}

This emphasis upon knowledge, the notion that practical action, will, are the outward\textsuperscript{79} and manifest sign of the sum of our knowledge\textsuperscript{80}, leads to an interesting, if at first, paradoxical, theory of good and evil.

\textbf{V}

Each act, according to Actualism, is undertaken because it is believed good,\textsuperscript{81} i.e. leads to a further development of self. No man knowingly undertakes a bad act.\textsuperscript{82} In some decisive sense the act, at the time of its commission, is considered, by its agent, to be good.\textsuperscript{82} To contend that a culprit "knows better" is meaningless for Gentile.\textsuperscript{83} Had he known better he would have acted better. The acts of cruelty, savagery and insensibility are acts, then, which evidence, to others, a distracted, obtuse and/or inept intellect.\textsuperscript{84} But to the acting agent, at the time of their execution, his acts are always good acts.

Will is simply knowledge in act. To act, then, can only be the fullness of knowledge made manifest, and the will which activates it can only be a good will.\textsuperscript{85} Each present act, then, in this qualified sense, can only be good. Only past acts, as facts, can be bad. Having attained a broader and more incisive knowledge, the individual, himself, now abjures those acts.

At this point something should be said concerning Gentile's conception

\textsuperscript{76} "......il volere non e altro che la concretezza del sapere..........." \textit{SP}, II, p. 40; cf. Zacchi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 275.
\textsuperscript{77} Cf. \textit{GS}, pp. 3 f., \textit{FD}. pp. 3 ff.
\textsuperscript{78} "......pecchiamo......per non voler pensare......mancanza di critica, e cioe di pensiero," \textit{SL}, p. 319.
\textsuperscript{79} Cf. \textit{SP}, II, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{FD}, pp. 61 f.
\textsuperscript{81} "Nostra volonta...e sempre volonta buona." \textit{PF}, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{82} "Chi fa male, no lo sa." \textit{DR}, p. 95. "Al bene nessuno, che se n'avveda, volge mai le spalle." \textit{GS}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{83} Cf. Holmes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{84} "Tutti gli uomini infatti crudeli, malvagi, insensibili al dolore che seminano intorno a se, ignari della devastazione interna di cui sono insieme autori e vittime, non possiamo rappresentarceli se non come intelletti ottusi, distratti, incoscienti, disattenti e inetti......." \textit{GS}, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{85} "La volonta e sempre energia morale, sempre volontà buona..."\textit{PF}, p. 44. "Conoscere e fare il male non e possibile..." \textit{DR}, p. 95.
of evil as a past moment of spiritual development. No time would be devoted to such an undertaking had Professor Marcuse's travesty of Gentile's position constituted the only source of criticism, but similar, if more knowledgeable, criticisms have, in the past, been forthcoming from Gentile scholars and, in a modified form, even from so careful and sympathetic a critic as H.S. Harris.

If every present act is undertaken as good, by its agent, must we then reserve judgment with respect to the commission of those acts? Must I, starting from the premise that I cannot legitimately set myself up as someone else's conscience, necessarily surrender the right to condemn their behavior and/or restrain them in the commission of those acts?

Such is manifestly not the case. Gentile specifically states that one can, and does, condemn the acts of others, just as one condemns one's own past acts of senselessness, foolishness and cruelty. But to condemn is not to preach, nor is it simply to enforce conformity. Where one is dealing with children, the mentally or morally impaired, force can be judiciously employed—but even there it must be tempered by reason and love (for even those who have not, or cannot, attain our level of spiritual maturation have revealed something to us of ourselves—they have assisted our further spiritual development).

Only a careful reappraisal, by themselves, can bring moral agents to abjure the acts we deplore. We, as observers, espy the evil of the act because we can more clearly see its consequences, its intrinsic demerits, the limitations it has made insurmountable for its developing agent. Its agent was activated by dull or obscure reasoning, by faulty logic and dim and irregular judgment. His knowledge was defective, his moral world confined; his act was a consequence of his limitations.

To insure ourselves of his conversion we must teach him. The agent must be made to realize the act was bad; he must himself place it in the scale of human reason and find it wanting. Until such time, Gentile maintains, such acts will continue to constitute, for him, good and proper acts.

88 Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 305 f.
90 "La quale dottrina del male non e un paradossale urto contro la coscienza umana che afferma (e bisogna che affermi) solennemente l'esistenza del male. Ma e semplicemente un invito a riflettere che si rivolge a questa coscienza: 'Invito a riflettere, che questo male...e quel male che appunto bisogna avvertire come male; cioe non solo conoscere, ma condannare..." DR, p. 94.
Within the conceptions of Actualist ethics all present acts are good. Evil is but a past, a negative moment of spiritual development. When taken to task the agent of an act may realize that he had thought but superficially, or lapsed into shoddy surmise, or had given himself over to passion. But the acts he thus considers are past acts. The only acts that are evil in this sense are acts rejected by the thinking agent, past acts, acts which are no longer living moments for him who had entertained them.

This is not to say, as Chiocchetti contends, that all chronologically past acts are bad. Some "past acts are taken up as vital, momentous elements of present thinking. They are revitalized by the thinking, acting agent. They are therefore contemporary. The subject takes them up and makes them his own, charging them with moral significance.

We are now in a position to summarize, briefly, the ethical system of Actualist humanism.

VI

Man’s duty is to create himself as man in a given historical situation. He creates himself by transcending himself, universalizing himself by seeing himself in others, by loving others as himself, for they are essential in the making of himself. They constitute the "we" of us, the source wherein our lives find dimension, truth, meaning and moral worth. In understanding this we understand the necessary conditions requisite for our spiritual growth.

We come to know these things, and since to know is to will, our action will be the outward expression of wisdom entertained. Should we judge the acts of others bad, it is because we have achieved a higher spiritual plateau. Our responsibility, then, is to assist others to that level: ours is a pedagogical responsibility.

Adequate knowledge will reveal, to the particular individual, his involvement in the historic community as well as the natural world around him. Only in losing himself in the otherness of his community and his world will he truly find himself. This is an Actualist, as well as a Christian, precept.

Such an ethic can express itself in no more definite formulae. Duty defines itself in concrete situations. In each such situation the individual must assume full responsibility for his acts. His acts constitute living moments of his spirit. They express the wisdom he has made his own. For an act results not from habit, or from submission to external pressure, but from an interior conviction in the moral fitness of the act. As such duty continually defines itself in particular acts. A moral commandment, an ideal, is only an abstract formula, an assist by which each

92 GS, p. 50.
93 "Il dovere non si definisce, perche bisogna definirlo sempre." DR, p. 90.
man of judgment and good will can resolve his problems, problems which forever present themselves in novel forms, problems which require a continual development and a progressive interpretation of the concept of moral duty.

His ultimate duty is to become that which he should, and can, be. He seeks to affirm himself in absolute liberty and universality. But this remains always an ideal, a goal, forever beyond his attainment. In freely obeying the laws intrinsic to this “becoming” he seeks the "Uebermensch" of which he is the promise. He seeks forever to transcend the “given”, by seeing the “given” as something against which to affirm himself. With a will animated by a desire to be the better man he is not, does he transform the “real” and “given” world, which will always oppose him, through act, a spiritual act infused with truth and moral worth.

VII

Needless to say, a number of special problems attend this kind of ethical system and space does not permit us, here, to attempt an adequate analysis. The principal purpose of this paper was to inform, to provide a tolerably accurate account of Gentile’s ethical system.

The system develops out of a conviction that the only inwardly compelling motive which could govern man’s rational conduct, consonant with man’s freedom, is self-development. In the ethical writings, Gentile delivers a vindication of this first principle by a rather detailed comparison of alternatives, a validallon of sorts, it would seem, is attempted in the metaphysics of Actualism, but this enterprise is afflicted with so many difficulties (not to speak only of the seeming logical impossibility of demonstrating first principles) that for our present purposes a defensible position can be assumed by taking one’s stand on the ground of comparative preference.

VIII

In the course of our discussion, it is hoped, the subsidiary question broached at the commencement of this paper has been answered. Nothing fundamental, it would appear, distinguishes Gentile’s position from that of any orthodox ethical system current in the West (one might say, with perhaps greater reservation, in the world). On philosophic grounds the differences which distinguished this type of “fascist” ethics from the “liberal” (for lack of a better word) ethics of non-fascist countries

95 “...ci presenta sempre problemi nuovi, e chiede alla coscienza nuove soluzioni, nuovi imperativi.” GS, p. 49.
96 Cf. MI, pp. 363 f., FD, p. 9, DR, pp. 88, 90.
were not of the type which made discussion impossible. Where significant differences might arise, and did arise, was in applications, in methods—factual considerations subject to analysis, comparison and evaluation. Fundamentally, both systems, alike, shared the same values.

That this was true, personally, of Gentile is supported by all the evidence available. Gentile, by way of illustration, systematically opposed the tragic racism which emanated from National Socialist Germany\textsuperscript{100} as well as forced conformity. On the day he was for ever silenced by the guns of his opponents he was returning from an attempt to intercede in behalf of students arrested because of their political dissidence.\textsuperscript{101} For Gentile consistently advocated a freedom of discussion and toleration of differences consonant with his major theses.\textsuperscript{102} Whatever failures there were (and in a life rich in public and academic service there were many) were, perhaps, the consequences of weakness of character and/or lack of logical rigor, defects which could be, and sometimes were, demonstrated.\textsuperscript{103}

Much of what men do cannot be explicated rationally and must be left to the troubled analysis of psychologists. What men do as Fascists National Socialists, Communists, Socialists, “Democrats and what-have you is, as often as not, the consequence of caprice, insensitivity, stupidity and venality. The responsibility for these shortcomings cannot often be laid at the door of philosophy \textit{per se}, although individual philosophers, like ordinary mortals, have been known to sin in just such wise. Of these, Gentile was perhaps no more, nor no less, guilty than many others who find themselves in the Socialist, Communist or “Democratic” camps.

The mistakes Gentile made are lessons to us as men. His philosophy can be salvaged as an interesting and informative phase in the philosophical

\textsuperscript{100} Cf. Harris, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 244 f.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 289.


\textsuperscript{103} As an illustration, in 1925 Gentile seemed to advocate the use of the truncheon as an instrument of moral suasion (cf. \textit{Che cosa e il fascismo}? [Florence: Vallecchi, 1925], pp. 50 f.), a notion quite at variance with his moral philosophy. With the writing of the \textit{Genesi e struttura della società} he explicitly abjured the use of force in moral education: “Our human world is full of children; the man who has no patience and is disgusted by the nonsense he hears talked all round him... can swing his mace—but to what purpose? One cannot teach or spread truth like that. The kingdom of the spirit that we would like to build remains simply a disappointed desire.” (\textit{GS}, p. 136).
development of our century, and as evidence for the contention that men, even of the most diverse allegiance, share essentially the same values. Where differences develop they are largely the results of (conscious or unconscious) misapplication of accepted principles and are subject to factual scrutiny and determination.
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NEGATIVE FACTS
AND THE
ANALOGICAL INFERENCE
TO 'OTHER MIND'

I wish to focus on a little-noticed implication of the pretended skepticism which says: Perhaps other human beings are mere behaving bodies, and I alone am a behaving and experiencing (feeling, sensing, thinking) person. I suppose the "skeptic" to concede that, behavior for behavior, others are not observed to be in principle less adaptable, less able to reach the goals their behavior suggests to observation, than he is himself. Under "behavior", I also include physiological structure, even microscopic. My point then is, the skeptical hypothesis entails the notion of a mere privation, a purely "negative fact". The proposal runs, "My neighbor's body and behavior are just what they might be if he did have thoughts and feelings, but for all I know the thoughts and feelings simply aren't there." The hypothetical absence of experience would, thus, be a sheer privation with no positive significance whatever. But is such a merely negative fact so much as intelligible?

How do we detect "negative facts"? The question has been much discussed, but not always with sufficient clarity concerning its exact meaning. Am I happy? No, because I feel intense anxiety, or mild annoyance. Is there anyone in the room? No, because whichever way I look I see something I should not see were there a human being in that direction. Thus I see the opposite walls, and people are not transparent; I see the chairs with a completeness which would be impossible if anyone were sitting in one of them. In all cases of verified negative judgements,
the verification depends on positive characters which are incompatible with some proposed positive character. We do not see simply “not blue,” but various other colors, we do not see merely “not round,” but various other shapes, or perhaps an homogeneous expanse with vaguely delimited boundaries. Similarly, I suggest, “not conscious” or “insentient” is meaningful only if some positive character is incompatible with being conscious or sentient. But the skeptic is not affirming such a character, even hypothetically. He is saying, granted a perfectly good human body, equivalent to mine, still perhaps feeling is absent. I suggest that he is here talking nonsense, in that no such purely negative trait of a situation is ever observed, nor can we conceive how it might be observed. One may simply fail to experience $X$, being perhaps dead or asleep (states which themselves are partly positive); or one may, if you wish, experience “the absence of $X$”, but this itself is a positive act, and it requires a partly positive datum. We are offered no such positive datum, even hypothetically, for the supposed absence of feeling in normal bodies.

It is to be noted, also, that whereas my feelings are given, at least for me, in memory or retrospection, and your feelings for you, an absence of feeling (including sensation) in me could only be observed by someone else. But, according to the theory we are considering, this is impossible (so long as I act as a waking person). One would have to observe in my alert and active body a sort of hole in reality, a vacuum, which might have been filled with feeling, but in fact is not. However, vacua, in the sense in which they do exist, have positive characteristics. Things go on in them which would not go on if any bodies, e.g., air molecules, were present. But the supposed vacuum of feelings releases no positive possibility which the presence of feeling would curtail. Therefore, we are dealing with a meaningless idea.

The “sceptical hypothesis” concerning other minds, then, confronts us with the disjunction: either the “argument by analogy” to other minds is cogent or the notion of mere privation is legitimate. But is the notion legitimate? In the light of this question, the contention, “‘other mind’ is unobservable” loses some at least of its terrors. For $X$’s mind is observable, at least by $X$, but a mere privation of mind in $X$, by no one.

I do not at all wish to imply that $X$’s mind is observable only by $X$. This notion seems to arise partly from underestimating the relative truth in behaviorism, and still more from an arbitrary restriction of “observer” or “experimenter” to the human case. (Nor am I thinking merely of a divine observer.) But in this essay I am arguing: at worst, the unobservability of $X$’s mind (his body being normally active) is relative, while that of the absence of his mind under these conditions must be absolute. Hence this absence has no standing in speculation.

We must, no doubt, grant that there could be entities whose affects upon the world were too subtle for our means of detection: however, this possibility cannot be relevant to my neighbour’s mind, for the “expression”
of feeling and purpose in one's own behavior includes many aspects that are not especially subtle. The positive meaning of an "absence" must be somehow appropriate or proportional to this absence. Otherwise it would not be the positive meaning of just that absence.

A possible objection to our argument might be the following: Suppose there were "no world", what could this be but a sheer privation, a complete vacuum of being? I reply, What indeed, and for that very reason should we not suspect the idea of being nonsensical—even though we are thereby committed to holding that the existential statement, "some world or other is real" is necessarily true? Here we recall the current dogma that all existential statements are contingent. The dogma perhaps commits a category mistake. Existential statements mentioning particular or specific existents—men, lions, Churchill—are contingent; but existential statements of such a form as, "The most general class of concrete particulars is not empty", are not only on a high, but in a significant sense, the highest, logical level, or level of abstractness, and they commit one to no proposition on any lower level, even though they say that there are some on lower levels which are true. There is thus no reason why the contingency of the lower levels must carry over to the highest. Each particular, or special class of particulars, may be contingent, even though "there are some particulars or other" is not: just as, "You must do something" does not say that there is any particular thing you must do.

A theist, of course, might suppose that "No world exists" means, "God enjoys his own solitariness", or, "He knows that he has not created anything." This is in a way positive, but is it self-consistent? It implies that creating is something deity might or might not do, whereas perhaps any coherent meaning of "deity" includes an activity of creating, not necessarily this world, but some world or other. And is not the notion of a knower knowing only himself absurd? Could even God observe a mere privation? I hold that we have no right to suppose this, since we have no idea what he would be observing as the objective situation. "Nothing" is not a situation. In any case, even if there could be divine knowledge of a mere privation, this knowledge itself (that God has not created a world, though he might have done so) would be a positive fact and a contingent one. Hence even a theist cannot consistently maintain that all contingent facts might be purely negative.

I have elsewhere argued at length that "the non-existence of God" could have no possible positive meaning, and that this suffices to render it logically null and void. Whether this justifies "God exists", depends only upon whether this apparent assertion is more than verbally positive, and upon whether it is self-consistent. But if it really asserts something and something non contradictory then, since its denial is meaningless, it must be true. This is Anselm's great discovery, persistently misunderstood. Anselm failed only to make sure that "God exists" is in better
case than "no God exists" with respect to its positive character and consistency. Indeed, with this type of theism, I maintain that consistency is in truth lacking. But if another type can avoid this defect then his argument becomes valid, in support of that type.

A thoughtful reader may wonder if I have not contradicted myself. For I have said that "God exists" may be necessarily true, while in a previous paragraph it is said that statements asserting the existence of "particular or specific existents" are contingent. Is not God a specific, indeed a particular existent? I answer, certainly not. He is individual, but to confuse this with specific or particular is another category mistake which is only possible because theistic philosophers have done their job so poorly. I say this bluntly because I have strong feelings in the matter. It is tragically true that the theistic problem has been mishandled precisely by those supposed to be its most masterly exponents. Specificity, particularity, and individuality, are irreducibly distinct ideas, all three, and it is above all in dealing with the idea of God that there confusion is most fatal. Ordinary individuals are close enough to particulars and species to come under the same rule of contingency, but even with them there is a real distinction between all three aspects, and the uniqueness of God includes a uniquely vast gap in him between particularity on the one hand and individuality on the other, and by virtue of this infinite gap (for it has no finite measure) the rule forbidding the necessity of particulars is quite compatible with the necessity of the divine individuality, or of God's bare existence as God. God is just not a "particular individual"; this phrase is sheer absurdity in his case. Yet he is individual, and he is particular. I have explained this elaborately elsewhere and shall not repeat the entire analysis here. In my view, what is particular about God's existence is not who exists, or that he exists, but only how, or in what concrete "state" he exists. The state itself is particular and therefore it is contingent; what is necessary is only that some state or other, expressive of the divine individuality, will be actualized no matter what else is actual or inactual. I hold that the divine individuality differs from others not in being less flexible in its capacity for alternative states, as some of the supposed masters of doctrine tell us, but the exact opposite, in being infinitely flexible, precisely and incomparably the most variable of all individualities. But just as we remain "ourselves" through a certain limited range of variations, so does God, but through an unlimited range. God is not the least but the most "movable" of all movers of others, the most able to be himself through absolutely infinite variations in concrete detail.

I think that Indian Philosophy has been closer to seeing this, in some of its many traditions, than the main stream at least of European philosophy. It is, however, a plain implication of Whitehead's doctrine of the Consequent Nature of God.

1 See my The Logic of Perfection (Open Court, 1962) pp. 92f.
The almost universal neglect in the literature of the requirement that all fact have its positive aspect, and of the immense consequences for metaphysics of this requirement illustrates, to my mind, now rudimentary current analysis of “metaphysical statements” mostly are. In my opinion, nearly all the energy has been put into analyzing the aberrations of metaphysicians, not the essential meaning of the metaphysical enterprise. That “we cannot know the past”, or other minds, and the like paradoxes, are egregious failures in the trial and error business of groping for the metaphysical truths. The acceptance of the impossibility of merely negative facts, with its implications and applications, and other sober logical (and axiological) truisms, and their implications, will be among the successes of metaphysics, when it begins to have success. Perhaps it has already had some, but the writers who have contributed most to it during the past one hundred years are not at the moment being read very widely.

Assuming the axiom of positivity, the argument by analogy to other minds, while not indeed the full explanation of how we know “other minds” (this would be a task for another occasion), appears nevertheless cogent, since skepticism concerning it depends upon an idea of mere privation which has no standing in experience, and no positive coherent meaning whatever.

The reader will also note that phenomenalism is likewise cut off by the same type of argument. If the positive character of actual and potential experience is entirely as if there were an independent world, then there is (only, however, in the sense of “independent” which has positive meaning in some mode of experience). For the contrary view asserts an hypothetical absence which would be simply that, and this no one could conceivably experience or genuinely conceive. Nor are manifestly skeptical doctrines the only ones cut off by the principle, “every fact must have positive aspects.” Certain forms of dualism also fail to meet its demand. It is one of the most powerful of truistic axioms. Yet I believe it really is a truism—that is, not open to well-considered denial. (The attempts to deny it sometimes fail to distinguish between partly and wholly negative facts. Our axiom does not say, “A factual statement must, or even can, have exclusively positive implications:” it merely denies the possibility of the contrary extreme, that it can have exclusively negative ones.)

When Heidegger echoing Schopenhauer, asks, “why is there something rather than nothing?” he seems to suppose the question has a consistent meaning. But does it? (Perhaps he does not intend the query to have a literal meaning.) “There is something” is incapable of falsity. “There” already implies something.

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2 See Lazerowitz, The Structure of Metaphysics, pp. 181, 183, for an illustration of the trivializing of the question of negative facts which result when the above distinction is not made.
Lest it seem intolerably suspicious that so much be held to follow from a mere truism, I must add that the propositions thus derived are all capable of cogent support in other ways, without employing the axiom of the positivity of fact. Certainly, in the present instance (the belief in other human minds), one need not have connected this belief with the axiom in order to be perfectly and reasonably confident of its validity. Nevertheless, appeal to the axiom affords welcome confirmation, here and elsewhere; while no “counter-intuitive” consequences appear to follow.

\(^3\) R. Wolheim, in “Privacy”, *Mind*, 51 (1950-51), esp. pp. 92—94, seems to show how neglect of the question of negative facts can be connected with depreciation of the argument by analogy.
THE MORAL MEETING OF EAST AND WEST

East and West are destined to have not one meeting only, but several meetings. The age-old factual contacts through travel and commerce—once partial and superficial but now universal, penetrating, irresistible—now effect a genuine meeting by begetting common coins of thought and the elementary community of knowledge implied in a world technology: in the rudiments of physical science and of "business", East and West are already one.

But where imagination is involved, or the esthetic and moral feelings, the history of "meeting" (in our sense of reaching agreement) is more complex. The first shock of difference tends to excite aversion and distrust—very probably mutual. Then an enlargement of mental hospitality takes place, with a selective appreciation of what is different. In the fine arts, West has met East chiefly as Fenolossa met the art of Japan—becoming its devotee and apostle, even to the point of reproving Japanese self-distrust,—caring for it just because of its significant otherness. But a third stage follows, especially in the realms of ethics and law. Even while we cherish differences and enjoy the various flowerings of the human spirit, we sense the germs of conflict, requiring resolution, and seek an underlying identity of principle: only then have we truly "met".

Thus, in what we call "nationalism", we recognize a desirable plurality in the shaping of human institutions, and at the same time, the chief obstacle to an international order capable of banishing war.

It may therefore be in order, in view of President Radhakrishnan's nobly fertile labors toward the philosophical meeting of East and West, to give attention to the special theme of a moral meeting, as bearing on the now insistent necessity for a working international law.

We are here dealing with great civilizations, East and West. And to
speak of a "civilization" is to acknowledge at once a degree of ethical community. For a civilization implies, not alone customary respect for the normal goals of human living, but also a recognized order for attaining these goals without conflict; we find custom ripening into law, and maintained by recognized authority.

But the spirit of these customs, like the "spirit of the laws" in Montesquieu's great and audacious treatise, is widely variable. Set in the midst of a civilization other than our own, we feel ourselves only more or less "at home", more or less moral strangers. We raise questions of ultimate right and wrong; we seek a core of necessary agreement in principle, and until this is found, there are barriers.

To many western travelers, these moral barriers are felt chiefly in Japan and India. In Japan, because of a perfection of exterior which seems to well-controlled, as if the esthetic of behavior were dominant, to a certain loss of the ultimate value of sincerity. In India, because of an apparent disparagement of the tangible and practical: her pacifism, her premium on elaborate, world-discounting pieties, her evasion of the literal,—all this commonly summarized in the word "mysticism". For us, the mystic is commonly considered as a man with whom you cannot do business; he is not "on the ground".

By comparison, pre-Communist China often seems to the western temper as indeed a "Middle kingdom",—neither too external nor too internal,—still tempered by that great spirit long since repudiated as an authoritative guide, the spirit of Confucius. For while Confucius has been depreciated—not wholly without excuse—as bequeathing to China a mesh of formalities, a cult of "propriety", Confucius himself insisted that sincerity is the soul of all valid behavior.

Without accepting any of these temperamental judgments, let us—on the principle of taking our hardest problem first—examine the "mysticism" of India as we find it in the new India with which we have now to deal.

One morning in late October, 1931, a visitor was announced at our hotel in Bombay, a Swami Trivikrama quite unknown to me. He entered, an aged man of dignity, and weary with much foot-travel. "What can I do for the Swami?", I asked. It was precisely the wrong question. "He has come because you have need of him." He was right. My instruction began with that rebuke.

I learned that this man had been at the head of an important temple, and that he had retired because the amount of business connected with his office "interfered with his spiritual life." He had taken the vows of a "sannyasi," vows which dissolved all social ties, including the ties to his family. He must live by giving instruction to those who had need of it, and in default of this by public charity. He could receive no money—nothing but food and shelter. He could travel only on foot.

"What are you seeking?" I asked him.
"Mukti"—salvation.
"What do you mean by mukti ?"
"Getting rid of illusion."
"Can you give me an example ?"

"Yes. I suppose you have an idea of what is real, something like
the walls of this building? Let us say they are brick. Let us unbuild the
wall, brick by brick. Have we destroyed anything?" "No." "Yet we have
destroyed the wall." "Yes." "Then the wall was nothing; The wall
was simply the form into which the bricks were set. We might then con-
sider that each brick is real. Let us pulverize it. We have destroyed
the brick, have we not; yet we have destroyed nothing. The brick was
simply the form into which its particles were moulded. And the process
might be continued?" "Yes." "Without limit?" Perhaps."

The Swami was in his own way following our present problem of the
analysis of matter; and finding, as contemporary physics finds, that
matter vanishes at last into something immaterial, for which it has the
name of energy—quanta,—out of the Swami's range. Scientist and Swami,
each in his own way reveals an illusory element of the experienced world,
but for the Swami, the result was the superior quality of the self for the
physicist, the superior reality of the electron. Results not necessarily in-
consistent, but leaving the question, which is nearer the final truth?

As I looked at the aged man, I saw in the serenity and strength of
his bearing a quality which we of the west, busy and concerned about
many things, seldom attain. One might call it dignity or, perhaps better,
peace. He had nothing; I could give him nothing except my attention. But
he had reached one of the goals of living. I shall not judge that he was
living his life ill.

Today India is free and independent, a new India growing out of the
past. How can this New India cooperate in the New World? Admitting
that it is still the most religious land on earth, mother of the earliest sys-
tematic philosophy and much of the greatest, are its feet on the earth to
an extent which makes it a possible companion in the ethical task of
mankind at large?

I will pass over the reply which would be made by many a student of
Indian ethics, that India has always had its practical side; that its tradi-
tional four stages of life make every Indian first a student and then a
householder; that its philosophies include the empirical and positivist as
well as the idealistic; that its forms of yoga include the yoga of action
(karmayoga) as well as the yoga of withdrawal. I will content myself
merely with two factual observations; that even under British rule
India produced two creative scientists of first rank, Raman and Bose;
and that in industry the largest cotton cloth mills and the largest steel
mills were Indian owned and Indian operated.

Now let us glance at the ethical genius of China, whose kinship we
more immediately feel. The old China had the choice between two great
teachers, Confucius and Lao Tze, the one practical, sober to the point of platitude at times, and systematic; the other speculative, extravagant, and obscure. Old China chose Confucius. It needed both. New China, on the other hand, has rejected both, together with the Buddhist supplement which entered during the first few centuries of our era, and has replaced all with a secular and pragmatic philosophy. The leaders even of the pre-war literary movement, which did so much to bridge the gulf between the learned and the commoner, were already convinced of the sterility of the philosophical inheritance of China and sought a new foundation based solely on science.

Among those renewers of Confucianism, Lim Boom Keng, formerly president of the University of Amoy, has an honorable place in my memory. It was my privilege to sit with him once in his rock garden, on a peak of the then International Island, while he compressed the substance of the Confucianism for present-day China into five articles, as follows:

1. Every man has a rendezvous with Destiny at some time, and he must be prepared to meet it.
2. Every man is bound to master the sciences of his day.
3. Man is by nature good. We must believe this and treat men accordingly.
4. The family is responsible for the moral education of the children.
5. The children owe respect to their parents, if they are respectable. If they are not, it is their duty to admonish them so that they become worthy.

In this guise, Confucianism appears hardly more Chinese than universal in its scope, an epitome of good common sense, and a contrast to the doctrine of Lao Tze.

It is hard to think of Lao Tze as a product of the Chinese: for he is as speculative and abstract in his thinking as Confucius was flat-footed and practical. Yet the main outlines of his view of the world are so simple as to be almost self-evident, once we allow ourselves to grant two things; first, that the world of nature has its unity, and second, that this unity has a character which eludes all our efforts to define it. If the world of the real coincide, with the world of the definable, Lao Tze was wrong; the corner stone of his thinking is that the most real is just beyond the reach of our explicit ideas. "The name that can be named is not the eternal name." The Unnameable is of Heaven and Earth the beginning. The Nameable becomes of the ten thousand things the mother."

To say the same thing in terms of a wholly literal British philosopher, Herbert Spencer, there is one truth which is the most certain of all, because it is that on which science and religion agree—that there is an ultimate mystery in the nature of the world. There is an 'Unknowable'. All that we can know are the Manifestations of the Unknowable, the 'Ten thousand things' for Spencer the fact of universal change, and the law of that change evolution and dissolution.
The chief difference between Lao Tze on one hand and the Westerners on the other is that for Spencer the Unknowable is recognized and then dismissed; for Lao Tze it is recognized and kept in mind as a standard for human life. That is where we, and Confucius, are likely to drop out. How can the Unknown be a standard? The logic is good, yet it was not Lao Tze but Spencer who said Unknowable—Lao Tze said Unnameable. This is significant, for there may be, in fact there is, that which we can know (let us say, intuitively) even while we cannot define it.

Definitions are helps but seldom illuminations. Meaning is first and language afterward, and upon this we can strike hands with the Orient at an important juncture and say that probably the most important things are never completely said in words. Not everything unsayable is important; but everything important is only partly sayable. With this, we may return to Lao Tze.

The strict corollary of this principle is that the most important elements of teaching have to be conveyed without words, (like the meaning of music) a principle which will be accepted by every one who has studied any branch of art. Lao Tze is strong on this point. "Heaven acts," he said, "but does not speak"; and the action of Heaven (that is, of the Unnameable) is without violence—it is effectiveness by "Non-assertion", Wu-wei. The law or method of action of the Unnameable, its Tao, is Wu-wei.

Now the importance of this for human action is very great, because of the simple ethical rule which is of the essence of Taoism, the philosophy of Lao Tze, the principle of human action is to be the same as the principle of Heaven's action; we also must have Tao; we also must act by non-assertion. With this clue, some of the enigmatic sayings of Lao Tze the obscure, become intelligible, and we may forgive him his delight in paradox:

"Assert non-assertion, practice non-practice (ch 63)
"Requite hatred with virtue."
"One who knows does not talk; one who talks does not know. Therefore the sage keeps his mouth shut and his sensegates closed."
"If beauty makes a display of beauty (self-assertion) it is sheer ugliness. If goodness makes a display of goodness, it is badness."
"The holy man abides by non-assertion in his affairs, and conveys by silence his instruction." *(2)*

The point of misunderstanding between Confucius and Lao-Tze, if there was one, is precisely the point at which we too are likely to misunderstand; how can we live a life in society without systematic thinking and clear conceptions? In brief, without principles?

Confucius was a man of principles. The term 'Li', which we translate propriety, would much better be translated 'principle', a formulated maxim of conduct. Propriety has its suggestion of formalism and insincerity, whereas for Confucius, sincerity was an absolute essential of any good living. Like Socrates, Confucius was in search of clear concep-
tions. For Confucius the chief task in beginning to reform a community is to "give things their right names" i.e., to call a bribe a bribe rather than a gift. No social life is possible without a negotiable language of valuations, the most important element of language.

And yet if we feel the unfinished character of any system of ethical ideas, we see what Lao Tze saw. We see that Tao is above all the well-named 'virtues' and beyond all the 'principles' that have been formulated. We are prepared to hear from the Old Teacher (which is the literal meaning of Lao Tze) these striking words:

"If one loses Tao, virtue appears (to consciousness),
"If one loses virtue, benevolence appears;
"If one loses benevolence, justice appears;
"If one loses justice, propriety (li) appears;
"Propriety is the semblance of good faith and the beginning of disorder".

From such a view, the teaching of Confucius is directed to the secondary levels of the moral life; that of Lao Tze to the primary level.

Perhaps we of the west will be surprised to see ourselves in the mirror of this distinction. For we have grown, in the last century, out of the Confucian and toward the Taoist conception of moral standards. We have become distrustful of definable principles. We do not know what it is we have grown into, for on the whole we are morally a somewhat obtuse civilization. What we are clear about is the negative side of things; principles are not enough. The more one engages in the struggles of concrete action in which the players are not individuals and ideas alone, but groups, causes, issues of life and death for enterprises, purposes, peoples, the more one finds that maxims fail to fit the exigencies.

Surely the fixed rules of Confucian code for the classical eras of China are no longer valid in detail; and even the much concentrated formulations of the renovaters have proved inadequate for the strains of recent events. Yet the 'return to the root' of the great Teacher of Tao suffers no such fragility; it is beyond principle, without halting in the shifting refuges of causes-to-promote or men-to-hold-by, it gives an attachment in the nature of things, where all ethics must ultimately discover its peace. But why must the follower of Tao reject the method of reason? Why is it not Tao and principle, with the reflection that all conceptions must be held subject to the One, which is Tao? Tao is not hostile to "giving things their right names", nor is a conceptual morality hostile to Tao; but the two can unite only when it is understood that the reversion to Tao is not to escape the rule, but to revise it. The Confucian outlook might provide a code for an unchanging society, but only Confucian and Taoist together for a society undergoing change.

We must not overlook, in all this, the influence of Buddhism. The extraordinary position of China in Asia was largely due to the fact that it was, until closed by Communism "The Middle Kingdom" of the mind, traversed by all the currents of thought that affected Asia, and governed
by a wise selectiveness that neither rejected nor adopted without judgment. It received from India, it transmitted to Korea and Japan. The reverse current was less perceptible, with Japan culturally the youngest, although the most precocious in the appropriation of western tools, and at first the least developed in gifts of the mind. The most original contributions of Japan to the ethos of the new Asia were its adaptations of Buddhism to the uses of a military state.

In China, Buddhism worked its way into the atmosphere of the nation. Its Buddhas and Bodhisattvas entered into folklore and art: its temples carried on, with the Taoist temples, the major ceremonies of the round of life, marriage, mourning, and the management of special prayers; its monks, vowed to contemplation and scholarship, and finally (under the lash of Tai Hsu) to public preaching and public need. But its vitality as an ethical force appeared broken. For the most part, it was not a membership-group at all, it was an offering of certain services to those who would pay for them. Yet it conveyed and still conveys the spirit of universality, being itself an overnational community. Addressing itself to the human lot and the human destiny, independent of sex, party, race, caste, it strengthens bonds and asserts the meaning of human brotherhood.

One thing should be evident through this many-colored picture, that Asia reaches into the universal more easily than we do. Asia has been less competitive, and therefore less concerned about measurable differences. It is perhaps for this reason that the notion of the 'relativity' of ethical ideas offers in Asia no obstacle to an ethical community between men of different nations, as it does in the West. Variety there is, and ought to be; Gandhi was Christian in many of his thoughts, more Christian in his spirit than many a Christian; yet he was resolutely Hindu in his allegiance, because, as he puts it, God had indicated India as the place for his life-work. This localism is self-conscious, and therefore wholly different from the localism which mistakes its provincial outlook for the universal truth; the Asiatic localism respected the localisms of others, and met with them, as Gandhi met with Christian and Moslem without impediment on the broader platform of a common moral standard.

If we had time to examine the concepts of ethics in each of the great cultures of the East, we should find them intertranslatable. To be sure, all our scrupulous translators protest their own translations; they aver that Tao cannot be rendered Reason nor The Way not The Order of Heaven-and-Earth; also that Nirvana is not existence nor yet non-existence; also that that Jen is not benevolence nor reciprocity nor justice nor love nor humanity, though it is the root of all Confucian virtue; also that Maya is not illusion, nor subjectivity, nor appearance, nor the pageant of forms which constitute the dream we call 'experience'. In short, all
fundamental ideas, whether in the East or in the West, are the happy hunting grounds for those interested in un-bridgeable chasms. We have only to reduce philosophy to semantics (as the 'analytic' school now prevalent in certain western areas tends to do), and the hope of meeting of minds, even within a single nation, tends to vanish.

Yet all moral chasms are bridged, even without language, by the simplest act of address—and—response involving a ‘you’ and an ‘I’ and a common ‘world’ and a notion of ‘ought’. Locke spoke for all when he made the remark—thinking of English traders dealing with American savages with tempting possibilities of fraud—“Truth and the keeping of faith belong to man as man, and not as a member of (any specific) society”. If you in distress call me and I turn away—whoever we may be or wherever I am committing the radical wrong between man and man, and we both know it. We have felt—no matter how we express it—the universal moral ‘ought’; which is, in fact, bringing East and West together, even while we prize the wide variety among the national customs and temper seeking the foundation for an all-human ethic.

Will this sense of an unformulated universal be firm enough to support the weight of a vastly enlarged international solidarity in the next lap of history? This is the momentous matter; for on it depends the possibility of a working international law, commanding the allegiance of nations, ideologies, world-segments each of which feels in itself a relative “sovereignty, under the unspecified dominance of the moral universal.

In my judgment, the outlook is full of hope. A careful enquiry into development of national law-making in this present century, in India, China, Japan, reveals a remarkable awareness of the problem and of the gravity of the issues at stake. I hope to be able shortly to present the evidence for this judgment. Let me cite only a single item. In the Preface to a Civil Code published in China in 1930, Hu Han-min writes these words: “It follows in its theoretical portions the principles which the modern juridical science is spreading steadily all over the world, and which are tending to constitute a sort of universal common law...thus facilitating the development of international relations. In this respect, its coming into force will strengthen the ties which link us with the friendly nations of the world, and will foster our trade relations with them.”

Note that the “common law” of England and most of U.S.A. is not in the first place a written code: it originates as the “living law”—the effective custom—of a developing civilization. The idea of a “universal common law” is of itself a powerful impetus to the moral meeting of East and West, the more so since the task of codification with all its perplexities is willing to follow in due time, assured that in the interval the accepted purpose—the names r'ra of India, the tao of China, the jus of Rome and the West—various names for the goal of universal right—will take command. Nay: is already doing so: in this purpose we meet.
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THE CONCEPT OF SELF-TRANSCENDENCE IN RADHAKRISHNAN AND NIEBUHR

Now that Radhakrishnan and Niebuhr have realized the degree of sophistication on theorizing about and actualizing the value of selfhood, they would readily agree with the poet’s ideal, “Who is not rich, with summer nearly done, will never have a self that is his own.” It is the investment of their personalities, in the late summer harvest, as Rainer Maria Rilke expressed it, which has made them symbolic figures in their time. Aside from the common interest in selfhood and the fact that Radhakrishnan was one of the sponsors of the Chair in Social Ethics named for Reinhold Niebuhr (1960), the two figures have much in common.

The common core of meaning between them is the myth of self-transcendence with its mystic overtones. They share a similar mystic sensitivity toward selfhood through the medium of this doctorine. With this capacity the self can function on a level of activity beyond the immediate situation while simultaneously being engrossed in its natural environment. Radhakrishnan’s spiritual idealism constantly warns the individual to live beyond the threshold of the sensory world and to seek some non-temporal good. The same impulsion, to rise out of nature and the immediate situation, is the significant truth about selfhood for Niebuhr also.

They likewise share a common core of meaning in their views of psychological transcendence. The belief that temporary experience is transitory and does not offer complete satisfaction is well expressed by Radhakrishnan in An Idealist View of Life. “It is because the universal spirit which is higher than the self-conscious individual is present and operative in self-conscious mind that the latter is dissatisfied with any finite form it may assume” (P. 302). The individual becomes disenchanted with his earthly existence; nothing satisfies him less it be the eternal (ibid., p. 89). Niebuhr’s reflections point up similar enduring dissatisfactions
with the temporal process. As Radhakrishnan views it, "It is the presence of the universal in him that goads him on to activity, and ever urges him to transcend his individuality (The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 409). When one assumes that the individual is isolated apart from the transcendent ego, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion except the one of psychological transcendence.

Epistemological transcendence or the capacity for creativity and for going beyond what is learned is another core of meaning the two men have in common. An individual, it is believed, can surpass the present boundaries of personal experience in learning and interpersonal development. This is true both of idealistic and existential modes of thought.

Although the various versions of self-transcendence, mentioned above, prepare the ground for more exalted definitions of transcendence, there is no rational necessity in the views already mentioned why they should lead directly to God. This next step is usually regarded as the added assertion either of one's intuitive grasp or that of faith. The mentioned definitions of self-transcendence do, nonetheless, indicate the different levels of performance of this ubiquitous symbol and might possibly hint at the impulse to ascend in the scale of being, which is essential to any transcendentalist outlook.

The essential difference in outlook between the two men is shaped by the fourth stage of development, or what I would call theological transcendence (Niebuhr) or mystical transcendence (Radhakrishnan). Niebuhr's concept is, for all Christian purposes, a dialogue in the upper reaches of self-consciousness with the infinite. While the dialogue is none too clear, since it is clouded by mystery, it is real and meaningful to the man of faith. The case is perhaps less dramatic but more extreme with Radhakrishnan's monological view of mystical transcendence. The summit of religious experience is characterised by the loss of the subject-object relationship in which the self's feelings are fused with the universal spirit. As Radhakrishnan views it, "Past and present fade away in a sense of timeless being. Consciousness and being are not there different from each other. All being is consciousness and all consciousness being. Thought and reality coalesce and a creative merging of subject and object results. Life grows conscious of its incredible depths. In this fulness of felt life and freedom, the distinction of the knower and the known disappears. The privacy of the individual self is broken into and invaded by a universal self which the individual feels as his own (An Idealist View of Life, p. 92). It is at this point that the transcendent reference achieves a measure of unicity and continuity that is lacking in Niebuhr's perspective. What is lacking in Radhakrishnan is the element of discontinuity which, Niebuhr averters, is essential to the dialogue between finite and infinite being. The tension, paradox, the feeling of otherness, and the experience of unworthiness are absent in the Hindu mystic's felt experience of the universal spirit. (cf. my article on, "Human Moods and Transcendent Modes of
Reference” in “Darshana”, October, 1962, for more detailed analysis of transcendence in Niebuhr.)

What is lacking in Radhakrishnan’s perspective is the voice of revelation which dictates the terms of the dialogue and cuts short the possibility of a self wholly integrated with the infinite. The Hindu seer’s concept of revelation, as a synonym for human contemplation, does not require that self-transcendence stop at this point. The impulsion of self-transcendence is to move on beyond the level of self-consciousness to that self-forgetfulness in which the self, to be of service to the absolute, anticipates the loss of its particularity The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy p.436 ff). The quest for an impersonal unity of life is preferred to the personal encounter implied in the dialogic approach. The most benevolent interpretation of God as person by Radhakrishnan is the following: “A personal God can only be an aspect of the Absolute, perhaps the executive authority of the Absolute” ibid, 410). Since the difference between finite man and infinite being is merely one of degree (principle of nonduality,) the stage is set for the total absorption of the self by mystic sensitivity in the universal spirit. The passion for self-transcendence is consummated by seeking its own downfall in the unitive life. It is precisely this passion for self-transcendence that is prevented by Niebuhr from reaching full fruition in the controls he sets upon it. The pattern is true to history; it is one of an organized effort, in the case of Niebuhr, theological and traditional sanctions, to control the mystic.

The issue can be summarized in still another way. While Niebuhr finds no difficulty in immersing himself in the religion of mysticism, he has trouble extricating himself from mystic literature. He would go as far, say, as Henry Vaughan, whose similar insight took the following verse form: “And yet, as angels in some brighter dreams/Call to the soul, when men doth sleep;/So some strange thoughts transcend out wonted themes/And into glory peep” (ed.L.D.Cecil, The Oxford Book of Christian Verse p.245). But Niebuhr would stop the process of self-transcendence at this point in order to preserve the particularity of the self to make dialogue with the infinite possible. The case is other with Radhakrishnan, whose transcendent thoughts must go farther than “into glory peep”, for the fixed limits of selfhood must be broken in order to achieve union with the universal spirit. As he would put it, “we can realize the potentialities of spirit only by a process of moral ascesis which gradually shapes the soul into harmony with the invisible realities” Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 487). There is no desire on Radhakrishnan’s part to withdraw from the implications of the doctrine of self-transcendence; he shows a greater degree of consistency by going all the way.

The conclusion is unmistakably clear that Niebuhr uses the mystic notion under discussion as a weapon for apologetics. In the case of Niebuhr’s system this doctrine bears a limited value for the particular tradition which he defends. This limitation, it is hoped, has been brought out
in the comparison above. The transcendent rebel in Niebuhr does not quite date outface the reality of a particular self by crossing its boundaries to the extent that Radhakrishnan does. The success of the apologetic depends on magnifying human values to cosmic proportions. As he states in his work, *Applied Christianity* (p. 30), "human values must achieve cosmic validity if any religion is to live." While he gives the concept of self-transcendence cosmic validity, he shrinks from the implications of it in the highest reaches of its performance.

The Hindu philosopher, statesman and mystic, on the other hand, is less apologetic for the personal effacement confronting him at the end of the process of self-transcendence. It is in keeping with his plea for a more neutral fire of the spirit on the alters of historic faiths. In his work, *Recovery of Faith* (1955), he states the need on the part of mankind for the unification of the faiths through a type of intuition which is called "integral experience", hoping thereby to achieve religion on the highest plane of universality. He views the different religions as being similar to the various languages in which God speaks to man.

The obvious danger to this position is that the religion of the spirit will reach such a high level of transcendence as to obviate the necessity for religious traditions altogether. The same difficulty that faces the transcendentalist in ethics is the one that faces the transcendentalist in religion. The attempt to save mankind from groups in society in a transcendent ethics, rather than with them, by the belief in a unitary conception of humanity, merely throws the problem of collective egoism on a higher level. What is there to guarantee that group dominance and other forms of collective egoism will not generate similar evils on the abstract level of mankind? A similar case is presented by religion in its attempt to save mankind from externals by the religion of the spirit. Religion must save us not from the world, and not from traditional historic faiths, but with them. The consequent danger which Radhakrishnan, the apostle of pure religious experience, faces, is the possible dissipation of religions for the sake of the religion of pure spirit. In spite of an occasional reference to the contrary, the path of intuited mysticism leaves him little choice. Mysticism has seldom been regarded as a community building agency.

Radhakrishnan faces a similar problem, as an apostle of man's self-transcendence, with reference to the dissipation of the nature of the self. Although he guards himself against this possibility, as when he denies the prospect of an immediate absorption of selfhood in the universal spirit, it does not change the monological nature of selfhood in the final reaches of consciousness. E.S. Brightman's comment to the effect that Radnakrishnan's mysticism is inconsistent on several counts is to the point. "To the present writer, Radhakrishnan seems not to arrive at a coherent decision about the problem of singularism and pluralism—in Hindu terms, 'nondualism, and 'dualism'; not to be fully clear about the nature of God as personal or impersonal; not to assign a clear place to the
individual..." (Ed., Paul Schilpp, The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, p. 441). Radhakrishnan’s answer to Brightman, to the effect that the individual retains his distinction from the universal consciousness “till the cosmic consummation is reached” (ibid., pp. 799-800), is, nonetheless, still a far cry from the I-Thou relationship necessitated by Niebuhr’s position. In Niebuhr the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body requires the dialogue to continue even after the consummation, which means explicitly that even the saved man cannot become a god. At the point of return man, it is alleged, retains the unity of body and soul to give him the distinctive nature of particularity and individuality.

In fact, there is no need to push the case for a particular self if it is assumed that universal reality is one with the reality of the self. The final denial of selfhood in Radhakrishnan’s spiritual idealism is incompatible with the assertions of the developmental nature of the self, as viewed from Niebuhr’s doctrine of self-transcendence. The self, for Niebuhr, has its final mode of justification in God; for Radhakrishnan the self has its ultimate validation in the method of intuition. For Niebuhr the method of intuition is not a sufficient guarantee to insure the survival of the unity of self in body and soul; it needs the further guidance of a historic revelation. Niebuhr’s reply to spiritual idealism at this point is that the good it envisions it cannot realize through intuitive contemplation because the self as creature (as nature) will always prevent such perfection.

In the final analysis the kind of self that Niebuhr envisions is the particular self perfected in dialogue with God. The acting self is certainly transformed by its transcending acts, but never to the point where the boundaries of selfhood can no longer be distinguished from the eternal. Transcendence is the essence of subjectivity and freedom is its flowering expression. But they both presuppose selfhood. It is clear that Niebuhr takes the path of inconsistency to preserve man’s distinctive nature. In order to achieve this he is constrained to part company with the mystic notion of self-transcendence. Radhakrishnan, on the other hand, forsees the uniqueness of selfhood (its particularity and individuality) for that which is universal in selfhood (the universal consciousness). What starts out as an innocent flirtation between finite man’s intuitive consciousness and the universal consciousness ends by the loss of finite selfhood and the assertion of the omnipotence of the universal spirit. Radhakrishnan maintains a consistent attitude toward the individual’s self-transcendence but at the cost of losing the self’s particularity and individuality.

When there exist such divergent points of view in the area of spiritual endeavor as between Niebuhr and Radhakrishnan, the philosophic issue of man’s self-transcendence is still an open case. As F.R. Cowell reminds us: “The content of religious ideas, no less than ideas about cultural values, needs profound study if they are to have the status of transcendent values.
THE BUDDHA
AND DAVID HUME

No two representatives of philosophy East and West have been more frequently related than Gautama Buddha and David Hume. References to Hume are sprinkled throughout books about Buddhism written recently in the West. This paper is an effort to show to what extent the connections drawn between Hume and the Buddha are justified by the actual writings of the two men.

Hume, of course, is a philosopher pure and simple; the Buddha is both a philosopher and a religious leader of mankind. Hume is not tortured with any fundamental wrongness in the way man lives; he is almost exclusively preoccupied with faulty reasoning and with certain steps he believes may be taken to throw more light upon the sources of error in the way men use their minds. The Buddha, on the contrary, is involved in a quest for certainty, in a complete removal of all doubts. Hume considers honest scepticism a natural accompaniment of a good life and to the very end viewed himself as a sceptic. The path of the Buddha is less man-centered than the philosophy of Hume, the analysis of experience being undertaken for the sake of uprooting that experience, while Hume's analysis aims at the improvement of human understanding and the sharpening of perception. Both of them, however, consider the concept of substance useless or worse, because it throws no light upon any of these issues.

The most important similarity between Hume and the Buddha, and the one with the most far-reaching implications within the structure of their thought, is their conviction that human reason is the slave of the passions. Man's intellect but carries out what it is bidden to consider by the sensitive side of man's nature. "Reason is, and ought to be the slave
of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." Passion is Hume's word for the emotions, feelings, sentiments, instincts, and other non-rational, non-logical factors which play an overriding role in all knowledge of self and the world. The intellect does not mediate directly the nature of the world as it is in itself; it does not confront us with some external permanency upon which our thinking has no effect. Hume reversed the roles previously ascribed to the rational and the passionate sides of man's nature.

As a consequence of this reversal of the roles of reason and the sensitive side of human nature, both the Buddha and Hume shift mankind away from reliance upon established beliefs as a guide and directive to human living. The whole effort to take established beliefs as the guide to life is mistaken. No man ever makes his decisions in the light of the best he knows. Life is much too subtle to be based upon a concept, however logical or "scientific" it may be.

It was Hume's youthful efforts to establish his life in such concepts, to find in them his foundation, which very nearly landed him in psychoneurotic illness. It might also be said that his failure to find an entirely satisfactory substitute for these concepts kept Hume in emotional and mental tension all his life. For four years, while his youthful mind was wrenching itself free from fixed doctrinal traditions, Hume lived on the borderline of psychosomatic trouble. And the liver tumor or ulcerative colitis with which in all probability he died is today known to be greatly aggravated by the tensions associated with his sceptical habits of thought.

If it be true that the passionate and sensitive side of our nature sweeps us along from infancy to the grave, it may properly be questioned which is the better choice, whether to attempt to uproot the unconscious drives and compulsive clinging of our sensitive nature, or to harness man's deliberative powers in pursuit of their fuller and more peaceful satisfaction. The Buddha chose the first way; Hume the second. Hume did not see that the passionate drives could be uprooted. Reason ought to be the slave of the passions; it "can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." "Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy." "...belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures."

Unlike Hume, Buddha considered it possible to destroy the hold of unconscious motivations and the whole passionall side of man's nature and "to transcend the experience of this conditioned world," indeed, to achieve the greatest clarity of mind in what is called "supernormal perception."

3. *Ibid.*, I, iii, 8 (103)
Hume, on the contrary, held the view that clarity of mind was at the sensory level and that ideas about the world grow increasingly confused and obscure the farther we leave sense impressions behind. While he recognized with the Buddha that man "must strive against the current of nature," if he is to loosen the shackles that bind him to an ignorant enactment of whatever custom and convention and personal bias dictate, Hume in no sense of the world knows a reality beyond transitory sense data and their combinations. As far as can be ascertained from his writing, Hume defended the principle of continuity in human experience, though the nature of this continuity remained in doubt. He bears witness to no sharp line dividing normal and supernatural perception. The Buddha, on the contrary, testified to a type of experience that bears more certitude than either sense impression or theoretical construct. Anyone with a genuine meditative experience in the higher levels is willing to argue with even the most learned monk who may have read thousands of books in the Buddhist tradition.

II

Not only do Hume and the Buddha agree that non-logical factors play an over-riding role in human experience; they also agree that life cannot be lived upon a concept. Both stand in opposition to inherited tradition with its concepts about the ultimate nature of man, the soul, the power behind the universe, and the eventual destiny of man. Both struggle against any notion of substance enduring through changes. Both would have understood Whitehead's remark, "I sometimes think that all modern immorality is due to the Aristotelian-Christian doctrine of substance." Hume and Gautama agree with Kant and Locke that the concept of substance is useless in all efforts to understand the world.

For the Buddha there is no soul behind the skandas (khandas) and there is no God behind the universe. The mind can form no concept regarding the totality of things. The totality of all happenings is too complex and diverse to be gathered up into any one concept the human mind is able with complete honesty to conceive. If there is any unitary purpose in everything, the mind can never know it. The Buddha's position here is the same as Hume's, that such efforts attempt to use the mind in a task for which it is not adapted. Even if we had such concepts, logically correct and scientifically verified in some possible world, they could not for Hume yield more than probable knowledge.

Logic and science require us to stop where our evidence runs out. "Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both in extent and duration, can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the whole of things." All such inferences are unjustified for Hume because they rest

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6. Treatise, 1, iv, 7 (269)
7. Charles Hartshorne tells me that Whitehead made this remark at a seminar of his at Harvard.
upon some kind of non-sensory perception for which evidence is always lacking. It is unreasonable to appeal with Locke to an unknown Substratum, or with Berkeley to the God who is "always on the quad," or with Leibniz to Pre-established Harmony, or with Spinoza to an all-embracing totality in which all the diversities and ambiguities of human experience are gathered up. Hume argues that for all our experiences warrant deity could be imperfect and plural as well as perfect and unitary.

Gautama also sought to divert thought from issues beyond the limits of reason. The Pali Canon is full of people who want the Buddha to tell them whether the world is eternal or not, whether it is infinite or not, whether the soul is the same as the body or not, whether a man exists in any sense after death or not. These are Buddha's "indeterminables." One of his major battles was against just this rich theorizing which characterized the taught world of his day. Of such speculations, the Buddha "knows that these speculations...will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them." His attitude toward matters on which no good evidence is possible, and which divert attention from the really pressing issue of suffering, is expressed many times in the following way: "The jungle, the desert, the puppet-show, the writhing, the entanglement of such speculations is accompanied by sorrow, wrangling, resentment, the fever of excitement. It conduces neither to detachment of heart, nor to freedom from lusts, nor to tranquility, nor to peace, nor to wisdom, nor to the insight of the higher stages of the path, nor to Nirvana."10

It should probably be stressed, because the opposite is so frequently implied, that the nature of the self was one of those matters that the Buddha considered indeterminate and unhealthy for speculation. When a brahman urged that "there is no self-agency," the Buddha expressed himself as being amazed, as never having heard such an avowal, and he finally convinced the brahman that a "self agency" is presupposed for even the simplest events of life, such as walking, standing, and initiation of action.11 His position here seems to be the same as Hume's that we have no way of knowing the nature of whatever unifying agency controls human behavior. Of these speculations the Buddha is "quite free."9

Buddha argued that metaphysical dogmas and "eternal truths" were a major obstacle to the defeat of suffering. The Buddha "escaped the jungle of speculation and controversy which had grown up around the ātma-idea. His position was such that he neither was compelled to affirm nor to negate this idea. And in the same way the problem of God had lost

its importance to such an extent that the Buddha could leave it entirely to the individual to decide it for himself.”

The simplest explanation, therefore, of the speculations that became a part of the first Buddhist scriptures, despite their obvious violation of the spirit of Buddha’s teaching, is to call them “adopted doctrines.” His followers found it impossible to continue his one-pointedness and imper turbability before the momentous spectacle of natural events and their possibilities. They forgot his emphatic teaching that the problem of suffering dominates all else, and we find throughout the Pali Canon the theories that would bring all facts into a unitary view of the ultimate nature of sentient existence, such as the theories of karma and rebirth which offer themselves as universal principles for the explanation of the existence of suffering, of why some men are rich and others poor, of why we find happiness and woe at opposite ends of the human spectrum. Rebirth through almost endless cycles of rising and dying becomes the principle that seeks to settle the question of where the individual goes when he dies. Speculations like this carry us beyond the range of all human inquiry, despite the claims of various Buddhists that they remember their previous births in detail. In the interest of getting on with the solution of the problem of suffering, these speculations would properly come under the Humean plea to commit them to the flames.

III

Both Hume and the Buddha agree that the proper study of mankind is man. Self-knowledge for both is the beginning of wisdom. “Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible. Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass.” “It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another.”

All we think occurs in an atmosphere of human thoughts and standards; we cannot overlap this atmosphere with the satellite of some human speculation. All that man knows bears the trademark of the human animal. All the sciences are expressions of human nature; the physical sciences are as much humanities as poetry and art. It is human nature that determines what kind of events shall be taken up for investigation. It is

14 Treatise, I, ii, 6 (67-68)
15 Ibid., xxix (Introduction)
human nature that determines the purposes that control such investigation, it is human nature that designs certain tests and measures to find out certain features of things and events. It is human nature that constructs the conceptual apparatus that shall guide our investigations. Until we come to Hume in Western thought, there is no one who has argued as convincingly that all knowledge tells as much about the knower as of the known and that we can understand only what can be reduced to the human scale and spectrum. It is in this sense that “we never really advance a step beyond ourselves.” Knowledge is not the project of an autonomous Reason domiciled within the skin-enclosed self, but originates in the peculiar conditions of human situations. The attempt to keep knowledge free from all “taint” of social wish or passion is futile and mistaken.

Likewise the Buddha. Against all speculation and theological accretions the Buddha maintained that the solution to the problem of suffering lies within ourselves. His is a more man-centered philosophy than we meet in the Buddhist Canon today. “The Buddha is convinced that the highest reality dwells within us—and this is not a theory to him because he himself has experienced it—but he emphasizes that as long as we have not transformed our consciousness into a receptacle of such a reality we shall not be able to take part in it. This reality is super-individual and therefore we have first to overcome the individual limitations of our consciousness if we want to attain it...”[16] In Buddhism the centre of gravity lies within the individual, in his own private experience which must furnish proof of the truth of what is first of all assumed to be worthy of confidence. Here what makes the man blessed is not belief (in the sense of the acceptance of a definite dogma), but the becoming conscious of reality, which latter is metaphysics to us only for as long as we have not experienced it.”[17] In ourselves we find everything required.

When we make the distinctions indicated between the early teachings and later accretions to the Buddhist Canon, and particularly when we remember the single-minded focus of Gautama upon the problem of suffering and its solution, it becomes only natural to characterize the inquiry of both the Buddha and Hume as centered around human nature.

IV

What distinguished Hume from the Buddha in these respects as well as others is that their philosophies lead in opposite directions, Hume leads the individual, chastened and enlightened by his philosophy, back to the social interchange in which Hume thought the “ultimate propensities” of human nature were rooted. The Buddha’s thought leads to the divorcement of the individual from social involvement, meditation being

a solitary experience in conquering in oneself all causal forces playing upon one, and salvation means disengagement from ego-centered and social drives. Hume, on the contrary, sees man as a social being from first to last; Buddha sees the individual removed into the sumnum bonum of Nirvana. The chief aim of the Buddha's thought is to distinguish a path of salvation, a way of extricating oneself from the pain and suffering of human living. The Buddha wishes to lead men to a supernormal type of vision and experience and ultimately to lead them out of the human predicament entirely. Hume, from first to last, is a companionable Scotchman with no panacea of salvation.
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PARAMĀRTHA DARŚANA:
A Revolutionary Trend in
Contemporary Indian Thought

It may be an interesting piece of news to most foreign scholars that even in the present century a philosophy can be cast in the mould of Sūtras like those of Gautama and Kapāda. This has been done in Bihar (India) by the great scholar, (Late) M.M. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā in his Paramārtha Darśana (published in 1913) which for the sake of this very achievement, if for nothing else, may be regarded as a unique contribution of this age.

Paramārtha Darśana consists of 445 Sanskrit Sūtras, arranged into six chapters (adhyāyās), each divided into two sections (āhnikas). Each topic that is discussed in the Sūtras is introduced beforehand in a couple of Ślokas which give in a nutshell the point at issue, the opponent's stand-point (pūrva-paksha) and the author's own view on the subject (Siddhānta paksha). There are 240 such Ślokas interspersed in the Śūtras. They are collectively known as Adhikaraṇ- ratna-mālā. Concurrently with the topics, the author gives a running exposition of his views in 926 Ślokas which are printed as foot-notes. They are called Vārtika. Not content with these, the author has tried to elucidate his views further by preparing a detailed commentary (Bhāshya in Sanskrit) on his Sūtras. The first chapter of it was printed after his death in the journal 'Sanskrit Sanjītvān' in 1943. Now the whole thing is brought to light by the Mithila Institute of Darbhanga.

M. M. Ramāvatāra Śarmā (1877-1929) was a free thinker, conspicuous for his critical mind and creative genius. Having drunk deep from the fountains of Oriental and Occidental thoughts he propounded a peculiar system of his own which is ancient in style, but modern in spirit.
Highly impressed by the achievements of western science and philosophy (particularly Hegelian philosophy), Śarmā seeks to reform Indian philosophy in that light. He is actuated by a spirit of revolt against the traditional concepts of orthodox philosophy. Like Bacon, he tries to build philosophy anew by demolishing the age-old Idola. He wants to base philosophy on the scientific method, which he considers to be the only method of acquiring true knowledge. Experience and reason alone can deliver the goods. He has no faith in intuitions or supernatural visions. Perception and inference are the only means of valid knowledge. Authority by itself is no proof of factual propositions. He is opposed to dogmas and superstitions of all kinds. In his search for truth he is above racial and zonal prejudices. He is prepared to accept the right thing whether it comes from Rāmānuja or Hegel. His philosophy is thus eclectic in spirit. The main features of Śarmā’s philosophy are his strong insistence on the scientific method and his vigorous protest against a blind adherence to traditional beliefs deep rooted in the Indian mind. He is a keen advocate of the rational outlook, which consists in accepting only those facts for which there is reasonable evidence.

Strongly armoured with this critical attitude, Śarmā proceeds to fight against the vast array of time-honoured notions in the different systems of Indian philosophy. He is out to clear the jungle of superstitions. He is unsparing in his criticism of untenable statements, irrespective of the sources from which they come. The traditional notion of five elements (viz; earth, water, fire, air and ether), he points out, is falsified. Water and air etc. are compounds and should no longer be treated as elements. Similarly, sound should no longer be taken as the quality of Ākāśa, as the former cannot be produced in a vacuum.

Śarmā is merciless in his attack on the Vaiśeshika categories, Sāṅkhya dualism, Nyāya theory of creation and Vedāntic theory of world-Illusion. He vehemently criticises the God of the Naïyāyikas as well as the Nirguna Nirākāra Brahman of the Vedāntins. He finds fault with the various systems of Indian Philosophy, both orthodox and heterodox. According to him subject (sākshi) and object (vishaya) are inseparable aspects of the same Reality. There is no subject without the object, no object without the subject. To forget this is to fall into error. Such error is found in Kapila, Chārvāka and Śāṅkara. Kapila makes an artificial divorce between the subject and the object. Chārvāka reduces the subject to the object, Śāṅkara reduces the object to the subject. All these are unjustifiable. Another error is to pulverise the one into many. This is exemplified in the Jaina view of many souls (Jīvas), in the Buddhist theory of momentary cognitions and the Nyāya Vaiśeshika pluralism of selves and atoms. A third error consists in trying to limit the Illimitable in some supposed locus. This has given rise to false beliefs in personal gods, divine incarnations and supernatural beings. A seeker of truth should beware of such misconceptions.
Sarma thus girds up his loins against veteran champions and assails their theories with the rigour of an uncompromising logician. But the main target of his attack is the central pivot of Hindu philosophy, i.e., the concept of Punarjanma or rebirth. He tries to bombard the entire edi- fice of orthodox which rests on the four pillars, viz: Atmā, Punarjanma, Karma and Moksha. These four propositions are related in such a way that each succeeding proposition implies and depends upon the preceding one. In other words, the falsity of the preceding implies the falsity of the succeeding. Let us take the four questions separately:

(1) Is there a soul (i.e. an entity apart from the body) which survives after death?
(2) If so, is that soul reborn in another body?
(3) If so, does that soul enjoy or suffer according to the Law of Karma?
(4) If so, does that soul get liberation (from rebirth) after the fruits of Karmas are exhausted?

All these questions are answered by the orthodox Hindu Philosophers in the affirmative. But Sarma gives an emphatic ‘No’ to the very first question and so, for him, the other questions do not arise at all. If the very foundation (i.e. the soul) is taken away, the entire superstructure of Punarjanma, Karma and Moksha topples down like a house of cards.

So Sarma uses all his ingenuity to attack the basic concept of the Soul-substance. The Soul, he contends, is not a thing located in the body; it is the function of the living organism and comes to an end with death. The primitive people in their ignorance, fettered consciousness and gave it the status of a substantive, independent of the body. They also believed in disembodied souls in the forms of ghosts, spirits etc. But we who are enlightened ought to know better. There is not an iota of evidence for post-mortem existence. There are no signs of disembodied soul anywhere. The soul is not encased in the body like a bird in a cage that will fly to another. But endless generations have laboured under this delusion. They have pleased themselves with the supposition that the soul can assume a fresh body just as one can put on a new coat after the old one is worn-out. This is a make-believe. Some put credence in memories of past lives. They do not see the absurdity of such conception. Has the process of remembering ever been found in the absence of the brain? Does consciousness float in the air when the body along with the nervous system is disintegrated? To speculate that there can be a psychosis without a neurosis is to go against the established conclusions of scientific investigation. The very question: where does the soul go after death? betrays a colossal ignorance of scientific knowledge. This question is as absurd as the question: where does the length of a pillar go after the pillar is demolished? or, where does the ticking of a watch go after the watch is broken? To suppose that a soul jumps from one body to another would be as incongruous as to suppose that after a flute is destroyed, its music travels to another; or, that after a mirror is smashed its image flies to another.
Yet many people believe in the soul and call it immortal too. This satisfies their vanity. To feel that one is imperishable is self-flattering. Belief in personal immortality gives a great satisfaction. Hence it is popular among people. This is the very prop of orthodox religion. But it is all self-deception, an imaginary wish-fulfilment. As a matter of fact, there is only one life in which the individual can enjoy or suffer i.e. the period between the cradle and the grave. There is no ‘before’ or ‘after’ for the same individual who grows and bursts like a bubble and is no more traceable in the ocean.

After refuting the basic concept of soul, Śarmā finds it easy to refute the rest. When there is no soul, rebirth becomes meaningless. And when there is no past or future life, the Law of Karma becomes an empty tale. And when there is no bondage of Karma, there is no meaning in Moksha. Thus in the absence of rebirth, all talk about Karma phala and Moksha becomes unmitigated nonsense.

Some Naiyāyikas try to prove rebirth by arguments. They argue that the suckling of the mother’s breast by the baby is a proof of the experience that he had in a previous life. Similarly they contend that inequalities in this life are indicators of differences in virtue in the past life. But Śarmā characterises such arguments as merely childish. When these things can be explained in terms of heredity and environment why should one take recourse to a fantastic hypothesis which does not refer to a vera cause and is by its very nature unverifiable?

In this way Śarmā fights a strong battle against Punarjanma and the other concepts that hinge on it. The law of Karma is true only in the sense of the causal principle that operates in Nature. One is reborn in his progeny. To be liberated means to rise above selfishness. All these terms have a meaning with regard to this very life. Beyond this life, these things have no significance. In that sense, rebirth is a myth, Karma is a fiction and Moksha is misnomer.

Thus Śarmā makes a bold departure from, nay, he throws an open challenge to, the fundamental postulates of orthodox Indian Philosophy. His doctrines smack of materialism and bring him apparently near Chārvāka. But the philosophy of Śarmā is not materialistic or atheistic. He criticises the Lokāyata School which denies God and takes matter as the sole reality. Śarmā upholds the concept of a Universal Self (Sarvātman) who has been from all eternity manifesting himself in the form of this constantly changing universe. The individual selves are like bubbles in the ocean. Just as water assumes the forms of froth and foam, so the Universal Self assumes the forms of finite selves and objects. God is a dynamic principle that is always unfolding itself in an eternal process of cosmic evolution. Thus Śarmā is a thorough-going pantheist like Hegel.

The novelty of Śarmā lies in his mode of presentation. While some contemporary thinkers have tried to present the ancient Vedāntic thought of this land in the ultra-modern European garb, Śarmā tries to clothe
modern monistic idealism of the west in the old Indian style. While the former put old wine in a new bottle, Śarma puts new wine in an old bottle. His Paramārtha Darśana will attract the old-fashioned Pandits by its unconventional matter and the modern scholars by its unusual form. He fights the old sūtrakāras with his new sūtras which are surcharged with the energy of the present times. It is amusing to imagine how the propounders of the six systems would have reacted to this seventh system, had it been produced in their age.

It is a pity that a work of such singular worth should be little known outside the circle of Pandits in Bihar. This is due to the fact that Śarmā's thoughts are locked within the iron-safe of Sanskrit and are accessible only to a few scholars who are well-versed in the technicalities of classical philosophic texts. If his philosophy comes out in its full force in European languages, it is bound to evoke a wide interest as it is a typical approach towards a reorientation of Indian Philosophy.
More than forty years ago, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan achieved international recognition for his writings on religion and philosophy. His Upton Lectures at Oxford made a profound impression on western intellectuals and won him friends and admirers in India and outside. Since then he has gone from strength to strength. As India's representative in the Committee of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations, he made a profound impression on all his colleagues. That work was continued and deepened in his contributions to the development of Unesco, whose programmes owe much to his large hearted sympathies and vision. He was called to serve the nation in the political field soon after freedom came. First as India’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union and then as the Vice-President of India, he showed a remarkable clarity of view and deep human sympathy. His election as the President of India is a recognition of his manifold services to the nation.

Radhakrishnan’s striking eloquence flows from a phenomenal memory and an unusual sensitiveness to words. Masses of facts are marshalled with the mastery of a consummate general. Quotations, references and statistics are repeated without any apparent effort. Calm, self-possessed and statuesque, Radhakrishnan holds his audience by the sheer brilliance of his speech. There is for him no need to resort to the usual tricks of the platform speaker. There are no theatrical gestures nor any attempt to play upon the emotions through subtle inflexions of the voice. Steadily, equably and with an almost inevitable flow, the words come direct from an intellectual furnace. They glow with intellectual passion but the appeal is to the audience’s intellect, not to its feelings.

Though Radhakrishnan’s approach to life is intellectual, there is an essential kindliness in his nature which only they know who have had the
privilege of coming into contact with him. The quality of his mind is that of a steel rapier. Sharp, precise and true, it cuts through the masses of detail and isolates the essential elements unerringly. He penetrates to the core of an argument as easily as he unravels the tangled skein of a concrete human situation. The world outside is dazzled by his brilliance and impressed by his wit and humour. To his pupils, associates, and friends, it is however his essential humanity which is most impressive. With his phenomenal memory, he rarely forgets even a casual acquaintance. Every man he meets has the feeling that Radhakrishnan recognizes and values him as an individual.

Essentially a self-made man, Radhakrishnan has achieved national and international recognition through sheer merit. Starting life as an Assistant Lecturer, he rose steadily till he reached the highest position in the university world. He was the first Indian to hold a Chair at Oxford, perhaps the most exclusive of universities. A teacher in five and Vice-Chancellor in two universities, he was appointed Chairman of the First University Education Commission in free India. His election to the British Academy was a recognition of his services to the cause of learning in many lands. Today, a grateful nation has offered him the highest office in its gift.

Radhakrishnan's first published work was devoted to an exposition of the philosophy of Tagore. Later, he was invited to be the Editor of the Commemoration Volume presented to Gandhi on his 70th Birthday. Today, he is a colleague and friend of Nehru in interpreting India's thought to the world outside and introducing values from outside into our rich and complex national heritage. His association with three of the men who in recent times have played the most decisive role in shaping Indian life is not accidental. He shares their passionate desire at reconciliation of differences and construction of bridges between diverse outlooks. Like them, he seeks to combine deep love for India's heritage with equal record for the universal values common to all men.

Today, when conflicting ideologies seek to destroy all the achievements which human civilization has built up through the effort of centuries, we need men who combine intellectual detachment with passionate feeling for human liberty, equality and justice. Never was it more necessary to analyse with clear vision and judge with dispassionate detachment every issue brought before the public mind. Never have statesmen needed so much the disinterested wisdom which a philosophic temper alone can give. Never was there greater need for a humanist and a teacher to be in immediate contact with political problems which, if not handled with honesty, integrity and judgment, may destroy civilization in one common convulsion.

Scientific and technical progress has achieved the physical unity of the world. There has unfortunately been no corresponding progress in the realm of moral values. A world united through the achievements of science is administered by men and women divided emotionally and
psychologically. Man's knowledge threatens his future unless the claims of individual freedom and social welfare are reconciled in the conception of a common good. In his first speech as President of India, Radhakrishnan pointed out that national security must be realised within the context of world security and pleaded for freedom, equality and justice within and among nations. It is fortunate that in the present critical phase of man's development—when the harnessing of nuclear energy has opened the possibility of total advance or total annihilation for mankind—a philosopher, intellectual and humanist should be the symbol and representative of India's nationhood.
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SYNOPTIC
PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy is not merely an unusually obstinate effort to think consistently, not a construction of a superstructure of thought, nor is it a mere collection of noble sentiments. For Plato, and Bradley philosophy was the knowledge of reality, of that which is. For the Logical Positivists the function of philosophy is only linguistic analysis. Philosophy, however, would not be complete except as a synoptic view of life; as a world view. In this sense alone can philosophy be a guide to life.

In India, realization of the ‘Ātman’ is the highest end in philosophy:¹ there is no other way². In this sense, philosophy is ‘darśana’ and intimately connected with life.

HISTORICAL SURVEY

Philosophic enquiry has proceeded in two directions: (i) The first uses apriori and deductive methods. It is analytic in approach and is the way of the rationalists. (ii) The second adopts inductive methods and is the empiricist way. In ancient Indian thought, philosophic speculation relied on Śruti and Śmṛti.

The course of philosophy has been long and arduous. From Plato and the Upaniṣads to the present day, philosophers have sought to find solutions to the perennial problems of philosophy, and by pursuing the one way or the other have reached either the summits of speculation removed from human experience, or have ultimately faced the impossibility of metaphysical speculation.

¹ Brhadāraṇyaka II. IV-5 ‘ātma vāre drśtavyah’
² Yajurveda. I. 18. ‘Na anyathyā vidyate’
(a) Apriori Approach: We may first consider the apriori approach to the study of Philosophy. In Western thought, deductive and apriori methods were first used by Parmenides and his disciple Zeno, who made, for the first time, a distinction between sense and reason. The philosophic speculations of Plato were largely based on apriori methods. He abstracted sense from reason and built a world of ideas independent of the physical world. In the middle Ages of Europe, philosophy was sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. In the modern Age, Descartes and Spinoza built systems of rationalism. From 'cogito ergo sum', he went on to heaven and looked at the physical world with confidence, which is, indeed, a way far removed from that of common sense. Descartes split the world into two substances distinct from each other and postulated a God separate from each of them. Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between God and the world on the basis of mathematical deduction. The result is, Spinoza's Substance became a lion's den to which all tracks lead and from which none return. In Hegel and Bradley we go much further away from common sense. We see the superstructures of philosophic speculation, and we are left in the world of appearance only to gaze at the ivory towers in which these philosophers lived. Thus the apriori speculative method led us far from the maddening crowd to the dizzy heights of the 'Absolute'.

In India, we were saved from the separation of the speculative and the practical, because philosophy, with us, is essentially spiritual: "it takes its origin in life and enters back into life". In Śankara we come to a great speculative system. Still, we do not feel ourselves strangers, here as we are not cut off from the ideals of life. "Śankara presents to us the true ideal of philosophy, which is not so much knowledge as wisdom, not so much logical learning as spiritual freedom".

(b) Empiricist Approach: Empiricism uses a posteriori and inductive methods. In the Theaetetus, Socrates explains the Protagorean doctrine that knowledge is through perception, and shows the impossibility of arriving at any objective truth. For the Sophists, sense experience was the only source of knowledge; while Gorgias asserted the impossibility of any knowledge or communication whatever.

In ancient Indian thought the Cārvākas led us to a similar conclusion. For them, lokāyata is the only Śāstra, and perceptual evidence the only authority. This would logically lead to scepticism and nihilism; but they did not go the whole length, because their immediate aim was to break down the ecclesiastical monopoly and still assert the spiritual independence of the individual. The Buddhist empiricism was to have gone the way of Gorgias in the Mādhyamika School, but for the predominance of the ethical ideal and the goal of nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna's philosophy is

4 Radhakrishnan (S) Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (1941) pp. 447:
5 Prabodhacandrodaya. Act II.
now nearer to scepticism and now to mysticism. The rigour of logic would have led him to nihilism, but for his spiritual fervour and thirst for \textit{nirvāṇa}.

English empiricism repeats this logical movement but does not save itself from its own conclusions. We can see the empiricist method steadily marching from Locke to Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley denied matter, and Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid, summing up the English empiricist movement, states that ideas, first introduced for explaining the operations of the human understanding, undermined everything but themselves, pitifully naked and destitute, "set adrift without a rag to cover them".\(^7\) Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go no further without a radical reconsideration of its fundamental position.

But the Humean tendency has been recently revived, by the Cambridge philosophers who brought philosophy to the brink of extinction. Wittgenstein's \textit{Tractatus} discusses problems of meaning, the nature of logic, facts and propositions and the task of philosophy. It states: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly, and where of one cannot speak, there one must be silent'. 'The world is the totality of facts not of things'. There must be simple entities called objects because there are names, and there must be names because propositions have a definite sense. Names have no sense except in the context of propositions; and propositions are related to facts as 'pictures of facts'. He states that all the truths of logic are tautologies, and logical proofs are only mechanical devices for recognising categories. Mathematics consists of equations, and the propositions of mathematics are also without sense. The metaphysician talks nonsense in the fullest sense of the word, as he does not understand "the logic of our language". Metaphysical suggestion is like the composition of a new song. We are told that he made no essential change in his attitude towards the aim of philosophy.\(^8\) Russell writes that the influence of the \textit{Tractatus} on him "was not wholly good", and that the philosophy of the \textit{Philosophical Investigations} remains to him completely unintelligible.\(^9\)

Logical Positivism is a philosophical movement emanating from 'The Vienna Circle'. It was a thoroughgoing empiricism backed by the resources of modern logic and tempered by exaggerated respect for the achievements of Science.\(^10\) Ayer's Philosophy is the logical outcome of Hume's empiricism. Like Hume, he divides all genuine propositions into two classes:(1) apriori propositions of logic and pure mathematics, which are analytic and therefore necessary and certain; and(ii)propositions concerning empirical matters of fact which may be probable but never certain and need to be tested by the verification principle. No statement which

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\(^{8}\) Radhakrishnan (S) \textit{Indian Philosophy}, Vol. I, pp. 644.
\(^{7}\) Reid \textit{Works.} pp. 109.
\(^{8}\) Stenius (Eric), \textit{Tractatus}—A critical exposition of its main lines of thought (1960) pp. 226.
\(^{9}\) Russell (B) \textit{My Philosophical Development} (1959) pp. 216-217.
\(^{10}\) Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers Edited by Urnson (J.O.) (1960),
refers to a "reality" transcending the limits of all possible sense experience can possibly have any literal significance. Ayer shows that the Logical Positivist change against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the understanding in a field where it cannot probably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. A metaphysician talks nonsense because he is deceived by grammar. Thus, Logical Positivists claim that they have completely overturned speculative philosophy. Philosophy, to them, is only logical analysis; not a theory, but an activity. Its function is analysis, logical clarification of concepts, propositions and theories proper to empirical science. Thus, philosophy is identified with logical syntax, the higher level discussion of language, and the perennial problems of philosophy are dismissed as nonsense. Philosophy classes are, accordingly, converted into super-grammer classes.

However, Logical Positivism has ceased to become a fashionable philosophy today, because (i) its attack on metaphysics has damped the vigour and chastened the style of its remaining adherents, and (ii) its approach to language is unnecessarily rigid and doctrinaire. Even Ayer is doubtful about carrying through the programme of phenomenalism and uneasy about the verification principle.

Still, the impasse that Logical Positivism has reached is unfortunate, because:

(i) The doctrines of Logical Positivism have led to dogmatism and intolerance; so that metaphysical questions are dismissed as unworthy of attention of sensible men. Theories like the verification principle, the emotive theory of ethics and logical construction are simply announced as if they formed a part of revelation denied to other philosophers except Hume.

(ii) Sense experience, as the criterion of truth, has led to solipsism, as it did in the case of the Sophists and Hume. Sense experience is private and cannot be communicated. The more radical among them, like Carnap and Neurath, were hence led to physicalism, which is nearer to behaviourism in psychology.

(iii) For logical positivists, as for other empiricists, sense experience is the only criterion of knowledge. Modern Psychical Research, on the other hand, affirms the possibility of extra-sensory experiences. In addition, there are certain other experiences, like the speculation moral and aesthetic.

The problem of supersensuous experience is not new to us in India. All schools of Indian philosophy, except the Carvākas and the Mīmāṃsakas, believe in it. Supersensuous experience transcends the categories of

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15 Joad (C.E.M.) *A Critique of Logical Positivism* p. 149.
16 Joad (C.E.M.) *A Critique of Logical Positivism* p. 29.
time, space and causality: 'our sense organs are narrowly specialised to serve biological and practical ends, and our normal consciousness is also largely specialised' 17. In the face of these facts, it would be narrow and anatitical to insist on sensory experience and the verification principle as the only criteria of knowledge. Like the men chained against the walls of the cave in The Republic, the empiricists refuse to see beyond what they would like to affirm.

(iv) Moreover, for the Logical Positivists the verification principle has been a dogma and a commandment. But the principle of verification is not a self-evident statement, nor is it capable of verification by sense experience. The logic of the analytic philosophy is itself based on a metaphysic, certain presuppositions about the universe. 18

(v) Nevertheless, the effects of Logical Positivism have been serious. It has engendered a negative climate of opinion, and was likely to shatter the old beliefs in the social, moral and religious spheres with nothing else to fill the gap, except analysis of propositions. It has produced a ‘wasteland’ of mind, of which T.S. Eliot’s poem is at once a description and, by implication, a denunciation. 19

THE WAY OUT

A survey of the course of philosophy in the past shows that philosophy continually faced this impasse. The apriori deductive method took us to the lion’s den. At the height of its speculation, it built superstructures of philosophy and was cut off from common sense. The empiricists were led to solipsism and to the feverish denial of metaphysics.

To save philosophy from this impasse, we have to adopt a synoptic view towards the problems of philosophy. We should realize that reality is complex and life is a many-coloured dome. Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood, while empiricism could not see the wood in the trees. 20 These were two ways of approaching the problem; but they are not the only ways, nor were the approaches absolute. This is the synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life steadily and see it whole. Broad says, “If we do not look at the world synoptically we shall have a very narrow view of it”. He thinks that a purely critical philosophy is arid and rigid. 21

The Jaina view of anekānta comes nearer to this approach. Anekānta consists in a many-sided approach to the study of problems. Intellectual tolerance is the foundation of this doctrine. It is the symbolisation of the fundamental non-violent attitude. It emphasizes the many-sidedness of

17 Tyrrell (G.N.M.) The Personality of Man (Pelican) pp. 265.
truth. Reality can be looked at from various angles. Two doctrines result from the anekānta: nayavāda and syādvāda. Naya refers to the point of view one takes when one looks at an object. The Jainas give the example of the blind men and the elephant. Different points of view have been stated:

(a) Dravyārthika naya is the synthetic point of view. In this, we seek to approach the unity amidst the diversity. Absolute monism is the outcome of this point of view. But it presents only a partial point of view. The synthetic point of view has four subdivisions:

(i) Saṁgraha naya—synthetic point of view.
(ii) Vyavahāra naya—the empirical point of view.
(iii) Rūjusūra naya—a narrower point of view, looking at an object only at a particular point of time. The Buddhist Ksanikavāda is an example of rūjusūra naya, and
(iv) Naigama naya—referring to the end or purpose involved in the action.

(b) Paryārthika naya is the linguistic point of view and involves linguistic analysis. It has three subdivisions:

(i) Śabda naya; (ii) Samabhiruddha naya; and (iii) Evambhūta naya.

The Logical Positivist attitude is analogous to the Paryārthika naya. Syādvāda is the logical expression of the nayavāda. The various points of view from which reality can be looked at give the possibility of a comprehensive view of reality. Syādvāda shows that there are seven ways of describing a thing and its attributes. In the Bhagavati Sūtra there is a dialogue between Mahāvīra and his disciple Gautama: “Are souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?”

“Souls are eternal in some respects and non-eternal in some others”.

Gautama, the Buddha, described his attitude of Madhyama mārga as Vibhajjavāda. It is analogous to anekānta in its general attitude. It is suggested that the doctrine of evolution as presented by the Sāṁkhya school implies the anekānta attitude. Whitehead’s fundamental attitude in philosophy is essentially the same as the anekānta view of life. Whitehead defined speculative philosophy as the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.

We have to note that the function of philosophy is not merely an academic pursuit of reality. It is a way of life. Philosophy has had the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue. Philosophers have sought to provide a principle to live by and purposes to live for. For this practical end, philosophers have striven to achieve a synoptic view of the universe. The consciousness of the finiteness of our being makes us

23 Bhagavati Sūtra: XIII 7495.
yearn for the Beyond in the spirit of the Upaniṣads, from the unreal to
the real, from darkness to light, and from death to eternal life.\textsuperscript{56}

For this, we have to look to the spiritual experiences of the great
seers. Broad says there is one thing which speculative philosophy must
take into most serious consideration and that is the religious and mystical
experiences of mankind.\textsuperscript{27} It is they who are in constant touch with the
innermost depth of life and to them we are to look for guidance. Such
‘enlightened ones’ or ‘sages’ are the first-hand exponents of philosophy.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{56} “Asado mā sad gamaya; tamaso mā jyotirgamaya; mṛtyor mā amṛtam gamaya.”
\textsuperscript{27} Contemporary British Philosophy: Ed. Muirhead (J. H.) (1924): Critical and
Speculative Philosophy.
\textsuperscript{28} Huxley (Aldous): The Perennial Philosophy (1959) pp. 10, 11:
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NATURALISM IN RECENT INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

It is a charge against recent Indian philosophy that it is in the main translation or annotation in English idiom of the ancient scriptures or texts or at best reinterpretation of them. It is blissfully insensitive to the problems posed by the methods and conclusions of science and the developments in logic and axiology. It is repetitive with some variations on the main thesis of Brahmavad or Atmavad.

These charges ignore the cultural stress under which the Indian philosopher worked. It was a period of national self-assertion. The philosopher felt it his duty to expound the unique wisdom of its ancient scriptures in English language to find recognition and appreciation for it in the Western world. Again the ancient wisdom, which the modern Indian philosophy interpreted, had a ready made solution for the challenge of science to the philosophic thesis of supersensible reality. It drew a sharp distinction between Vyavaharic Gyan and Parmarthic Gyan. The Indian philosopher filed the scientific knowledge as Vyavaharic Gyan and that was the end of it.

However, one Indian philosopher took back the file and made it his life work to examine and reconstruct his philosophy in the light of what he read in it.

This philosopher was no other than Shri Satya Nand Agnihotri. He was born in December, 1850 in the small town of Akbarpur, district Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh. As a young adolescent of 16 years he joined Thompson Engineering College, Roorkee in the year 1866. In 1873 he came to be appointed at Lahore. He was caught by the intellectual and social ferment in this capital of undivided Punjab. He was drawn towards the intellectual reconstruction and specially by the social reform programme of Brahma Samaj. He left his service in 1882 and put his heart and soul into the missionary work of Brahma Samaj.
He felt inspired to work for a higher moral idealism than he found practical in Brahmo Samaj and to this end he established a new society of Dev Samaj in 1887. He worked wonderful changes of character in the lives of men and women who came under his influence. As he reached his spiritual maturity, he renamed himself, in accordance with the tradition of his country by the spiritual excellence which he had achieved. He called himself Dev Atma. Dev Atma he defined, as a soul which has developed complete love of truth and goodness and complete hatred for untruth and evil. In the rest of the article, we shall refer to him as Dev Atma in place of Shri S. N. Agnihotri.

This emotional equipment gave him exemplary independence, courage and impartiality. He would not allow any scriptural authority to decide his thinking. He put himself to the study of science and scientific method and he fell in love with the principles of scientific investigation. He says, "The canons of scientific method of investigation which were essential in all the scientific study and research acquired complete domination on my heart. The principles of experimental investigation together with Univer-

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doic had possessed my heart so completely that it became impossible for me to accept anything solely on the basis of intuition or speculation."

The old philosophic maps of the universe were drawn by intuition or speculation. If scientific method is the true measure, the outline and the geography of the universe was to be redrawn. He could see that noumenal world of God and souls which, exhypothesis, excludes verification, must be rejected. He had the courage to cut the universe to the lengths of scientific methods. He thus represents naturalism in recent Indian philosophy. No other Indian philosopher in recent past gave whole hearted acceptance to scientific methods as the sole method of truth verification, nor clipped off the non-spatial and non-temporal world of Atmas or Brahms from the geography of the universe.

However, his chief interest in philosophy was not metaphysics but ethics. He was throughout occupied with problem of conduct. His ethical idealism was founded on theism. But with the rejection of supersensible world, he had to rethink out his ethics and religion. The problem for him was: If Nature is the only reality and scientific method of verification the only true method, can we make sense of values on which alone ethics and religion rest? How must human soul be, interpreted? What must be its ideal and future, its Moksha and Vikas? It was the attempt of his genius to answer there and such questions.

Though the motif of his philosophic reconstruction is the problem of conduct, he, like Spinoza, considers it in the cosmic context, rather than in purely social context. His great work is entitled 'Dev Shastra'. The first volume deals with his philosophy of Nature, the second with his epistemology, the third with his psychology, ethics and religion. We shall say something about his philosophy of Nature on which his Ethics and religion rest.
The domination of scientific temper determined his metaphysics. He rejected all transcendental metaphysics with the vigour of logical positivist and his ground is the same for rejection—absence of the possibility of verification. He vigorously questioned the possibility of any form of the verification of transcendental metaphysics or theism. Kant held that reason knows nothing unless joined to experience. Hence mere rational speculation which in the nature of the case admits of no verification is according to Dev Atma, mere fancy. Whatever be the source of belief, its verification alone stamps it with truth.

II

He held that Nature alone is real. Nature is “terra-firma of positive existence and actual life”. It is the totality of all existence, self existent and self explanatory, timeless and eternal. However, he does not identify Nature as that which is closed to mind, to put it in the words of Whitehead. He does not hold Nature to be matter in motion. Such interpretation of the Universe makes human mind epiphenomenal in character. Leibnitz was so clearly able to show how such a concept was inadequate as applied even to physical universe. If the exclusive predicate of matter is extension, then a thing in motion will always be in motion, for there is nothing to check motion. Leibnitz went to the other extreme of identifying matter with force and called spatial character of things as bene-fundata, due to finite perception. According to Dev Atma, every particular object in Nature is constituted by matter and force. These are the two inseparable aspects of all existences.

Matter and force are fundamental aspects of all existences in Nature. Materialists belittle force by reducing it to motion. Idealists belittle matter by reducing it to a duller aspect of force. Without subscribing to either materialistic or idealistic reduction, Dev Atma, however, gives greater metaphysical reality to Force, for it alone makes meaningful and explanatory the staggering facts of evolution of the different levels of existences.

Force is the principle of change. Matter is in ceaseless change for it is never by itself as a separate existence. With Bergsonian strikingness, Dev Atma underlines the fundamental reality of change. Nature is ceaseless process of becoming, of change, growth and decay, of development and death, of creation and dissolution.

How is this ceaseless process of becoming, of change, to be interpreted? There are different interpretations of change. Change may be regarded as juxtaposition of parts governed by mathematical laws, the individual parts not undergoing change themselves. This is the atomistic interpretation of change. Or even if the parts change, it is of the same pattern as in the case of things. Such interpretation of change, as Bergson points out, does not take Time to be real. If change is just juxtaposition of
parts, juxtaposition is independent of time, so that it could take place now or an infinity without any difference. Further all those thinkers who hold to this interpretation of change regard every thing as 'nothing but'. Life, for example to such thinkers, is nothing but chemical composition. And a chemical is nothing but electrons and protons in certain relation. All such views suffer from reductive fallacy. Reduction or analysis is only an aspect of thing. But no other view is possible to those who regard change as juxtaposition of parts.

There are other thinkers who go a step further. They admit that change is the bringing forth of the new. But the new is a 'change product' meaning there by that it is an expression of mathematical laws. Darwin's theory and similar variation of Darwin's theory interpret in such manner the rise of different species right upto man. They hold that there is change variation in the individual members of species. Some of the change variations help better adjustment with changing circumstances and lead to their preservation and hence the rise of new species in course of time. Adjustment to environment is made to explain the rise of different species. But as Bergson points out, if adjustment to environment is the only principle of evolution, evolution should have long ceased, for the lowest living being is far better adjusted than its more evolved species. The adjustment to environments is there, because there is the impulse to evolve. Lamarck recognises the individual psychological effort as the cause of the rise of different species. But such stupendous drama of evolution cannot be credibly held to be result of individual efforts. This theory again rests on the dubious basis of transmission of acquired characters. Hence we are forced by the logic of facts, as Bergson points out, to hold that there is elan vital, a psychological force which is responsible for the multifarious evolutions in Nature.

However, Bergson is reluctant to interpret the evolutionary process in teleological terms. If all the facts of evolution are taken into account, they do not present a picture of a process pushing the changes to an ideal state of affairs. The incalculable colossal waste, the development of certain species into blind alleys, eternally condemned to stagnation and the disappearance of unnumbered species, all show that evolution is not a designed or planned process.

Yet Bergson holds that man is the highest creation of evolution. It is not due to chance variation, it is not due to design. How to interpret it?

There is one way open. It is to recognise that there are two processes of change. There is the process of change which gives rise to entities which hold the promise of value actualisation in greater and greater degrees. There is the process of change which gives rise to entities and species which mitigate against values. Both these processes of change are there, giving rise to both types of entities and species and they alone explain how the facts of evolution do not present a pattern of continuous growth towards value ideals.
Dev Atma avoids monism here as he avoids in the case of matter and force. He accepts that there are both these processes of evolution and devolution which explain the muddy pattern of the facts of evolution in their bewildering varieties. The two processes contend for supremacy in their concrete manifestation of entities and species. But which process is metaphysically higher than the other? If devolutionary process holds complete sway over the entities of Nature it passes comprehension why some of the single cellular entities should have emerged into multi-cellular entities. If we allow change to have played the part once, why did not the living entities sink back into non-living, instead of some of them emerging as conscious entities. To give credit to chance for every step upward in emergence of new levels of existence is to turn chance into a God. The facts of the emergence of different levels inductively show that the process of evolution is an invincible character of Nature. Nature is essentially creative of the trinity of values of truth, goodness and beauty.

III

It is in the light of his evolutionary naturalism that Dev Atma interprets the nature of human personality. Human soul, for him, is an organised life force which possesses four groups of characteristics: (i) Body building, body sustaining, body controlling and body repairing powers, (ii) Knowledge imparting mental powers, (iii) Pleasure and pain giving various kinds of consciousnesses, (iv) Various kinds of low loves and low hates and in some cases one or the other higher love or higher hate.

Like modern psychology, Dev Atma holds to a voluntaristic interpretation of human personality in contradistinction to 19th century intellectualistic interpretation. He avoids the false psychology that animals are motivated by instincts and man is motivated by reason. He holds with the latest psychological thesis that man, like animals, is governed by certain drives or wants. It is these that determine the movements of man’s thoughts and body.

However modern psychology holds the biological drives and egoistic impulses to be the only native equipment of man and then it find itself in a quandary to explain peculiarly human springs of actions, like sociability, altruism, idealism, love of truth, goodness and beauty. Freud and McDougall indulge in elaborate intellectual constructions to account for man’s sociability and altruism. We know how advances in social psychology have made such theories of McDougall and Freud redundant. We know that man’s sociability, his altruism, is as much a basic fact as man’s biological need of hunger and fear. Such limited view on man’s original make up arises out of the dogmatic perspective to view human personality with the categories true of animals. Such dogmatism ignores the supreme truth that the human personality is emergent from animal life force and hence needs its own categories for interpretation. It is absurd to hold that the native constitution of man’s life force or soul is the same as that
of guinea pigs, cats and dogs and all that is different in him is a result of environments and education.

Dev Atma like Butler, shows great moral insight in human psychology when he holds that there are different levels of motivation. His moral insight makes him keep clear of false theories of egoistic psychology. He holds that Altruism is as much an original motivation in man as egoism. Man does not act from self-interest but he acts from altruism also.

What is the principle that operates on human motives? Freud once recognized two principles, the pleasure principle and the reality principle. He held that human motives when dominated by pleasure principle ignore facts and reality which hinder their satisfaction and sometimes even make it impossible. But such by-passing makes satisfaction also difficult. So willy-nilly man has to take cognizance of facts i.e., guide himself by reality principle. It was Freud's contention that when man is dominated by pleasure principle he risks his mental health and when he is dominated by reality principle, he insures and furthers his mental health. However, Freud thought that the recognition of reality is in the interest of pleasure principle so that man is ultimately guided by pleasure principle.

Dev Atma also holds that man's motives are governed by pleasure principle. He also holds that the dominance of pleasure principle cuts one from truth and reality and thereby risks the health of the mind or soul. However, Freud worked out the implications of the dominance of pleasure principle in the sphere of mental life i.e., how the dominance of this principle leads to mental disorders: It was the genius of Dev Atma to work out the implications of Pleasure principle in moral and spiritual fields. This takes us to his ethics.

IV

According to Dev Atma there are various kinds of urges, in human soul. Some of these urges are for food, sex, children, name, fame, honour, wealth, sociability etc. etc., When the satisfaction of any of such urges deviates the urge from its goal, as set by the evolutionary process, and determines the individual to take to courses of action which mitigate against truth and goodness, it is a case of love for the pleasure of that urge. Such a love for the pleasure of above such urges is called by Dev Atma a 'low love'. Take the urge for food. There is pleasure when this urge is satisfied. If a person develops love for the pleasure of food or its satisfaction through which hunger was satisfied, he starts taking food, even when there is no biological demand for it, or when it is not acceptable to his digestive system, or when he knows that such food, say meat eating, does injustice to other existences. The same drama of love of pleasure can be demonstrated in connection with the urges of consciousness of self. There is a pleasureable satisfaction to know that one does possess some qualities in superior degree in comparison with others. But when a person develops a love for pleasure of such satisfactions he
becomes vain. A vain person takes pleasure even in falsely imagining himself to possess certain qualities and falsely considers others to be lacking in certain qualities. The same can be demonstrated with regard to every one of the urges listed above.

Again when there is an interference in the satisfaction of any one of the pleasures of the urges, there is hatred for the obstacle. Such a hatred is termed by Dev Atma as 'low hate'. For example, if a person has developed low love of idleness, he wants his parents and relatives, friends and others to satisfy his needs, and if his parents or relatives refuse to give in, he feels hatred for them. When he develops love for the pleasure that he derives from such hate and indulges in false condemnation of his obstacle, makes false complaints against it, feels an urge to injure or destroy it, he is said to possess low hate.

There are thus two kinds of vices—'Low loves' and 'low hates'. He classifies these vices in eight groups: (1) The low love of palate, of intoxication, of sloth and of sex, all connected with body, (2) The low loves of vanity, praise, honour, and selfishness, all connected with self-consciousness, (3) The low love of children, (4) The low love of money or property, (5) The low love of association, tradition and habits (6) The low love of violence connected with urge for violence, (7) Various loves concerning false beliefs and (8) Low hates of jealousy, vindictiveness, revenge, and sectional, communal, colour and racial hates.

It was his main thesis that these low loves and low hates constitute the pathology or diseases of the human soul and can destroy the life force of the soul and mean its extinction.

One can judge if some motivation of a person has become a low love or low hate by the following criteria:

(1) Every low love or hate turns one insensitive to the truths concerning its field. The sex urge in a person, for example, develops into low love of sex satisfaction, when he gradually becomes insensitive to the truth that over-indulgence is evil, that he is tyrannical and unjust to life partner, that he wrongs himself and society in trangressing the social sex ethics. He gradually fails to see the harm, the wrong, the injustice, the false-hood involved in this low love. In his heart he does not feel in the low love, the repulsion of a disease endangering the very existence of his soul organism. The ethical insight gets clouded and closed to the light of ethical truths.

(2) Every low love or hate creates a perverted vision. A person who has developed low love of intoxication e.g., takes those who oppose him as his enemies and those who join him as his friends. He sometimes returns from the perversion of his vision, but if the dominance of the low love is continued and strengthened he relapses into hardened perverted vision, and he sees good as evil and truth as falsehood.

(3) Every low love and low hate involves a person into avoidable pain, misery and suffering. We see it in daily life how low loves connected with body, say, the low love of intoxication and sex involves its victims
in terrible physical ruin, all of which could be avoided if these low loves were not present. Again low hates like jealousy, revenge and vindictiveness put one on the oven of pain, a situation which could be avoided if one were free from these low hates.

(4) Every love and low hate saps the constructive power of the life force of soul. A life force continues to exist only under certain conditions and disappears when those conditions become inoperative. A seed of a grain loses its life force when kept for long. After some such specific period it loses its power to construct. If we sow such a seed, it will not grow into a plant. So the constructive power of the life force has a conditional existence. According to Dev Atma the constructive power of the human soul has also a conditional existence. It is lost if individual indulges in low loves and low hates.

There are certain points worthy of notice in this statement. Though Dev Atma holds to the metaphysics of evolutionary naturalism, he rejects evolutionary Hedonism no less ethical Hedonism. For him, pursuit of pleasure is human bondage for it produces ethical insensitiveness, moral perversions, and endangers the life of soul.

Dev Atma is the first thinker to put forward this thesis of the casual relation between existence and value. In Buddhism and Hinduism there is relationship shown between value and suffering but not between value and existence. Both Buddhism and Hinduism assert that evil-doing produces rebirth and misery. A vicious man, according to them, is condemned to rebirth in this empirical world where he gets conditions of miserable existence. Dev Atma holds with Hinduism and Buddhism that vicious life is condemned to a life of avoidable but terrible miseries here and hereafter. But he goes further than this and holds that vicious life vitiates the constructive power of the soul. He takes vices as diseases, as forces that sap and strangle the life force to death. Vicious Karma is not only causative of misery but also of soul's death.

V

In contrast to low loves and low hates which constitute human vice, there are higher loves and higher hates which constitute human virtues and human freedom.

Just we have got biological urge of food, drink, and sex, social urges, of acquisitiveness, children and sociability, ego urges of self-assertion the urge to destructiveness and also the urge to accept falsehood in the interests of the satisfaction of any of the urges, similarly we have the urge to serve others, to see and appreciate beautiful qualities and character of others, to serve the cause of some truth in the way of investigation and discovery or propagation of it, to serve the cause of social good in the way of developing acute sensitiveness to social wrong and social injustices and working to remove them, to work to increase the beauty and riches of plants, birds or the mineral world.

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A person with a strong urge to serve others through repeated satisfaction of this urge comes to love to serve others. Such a love is called higher love. Such a higher love is a spiritual light in its field which increases its sensitivity to and understanding of the truths connected with it and makes it contribute to the social good and thereby strengthens the constructive power of the soul. All such higher loves are altruism respect, reverence, gratitude, loyalty, chastity, sense of beauty etc. etc.

Accompanied by higher loves are higher hatreds. Higher hates differ from the lower hates in number of respects. Low hates are hatreds for individuals and things. Higher hates are not aimed at individuals. They are aimed at the evils in the individuals, and are accompanied by sympathy and understanding for them. Again low hate is hatred for what is good. A jealous person feels pain and even hatred for the points of superiority of the victim of his jealousy. Higher hates is hatred for what is evil and ugly.

Higher loves and higher hates install one in the heart of the evolutionary process. The person takes to creativity and constructive participation in evolutionary process, experiences the sense of harmony and identity with the universe and enjoys that peace that passeth understanding. The individual in siding with and strengthening the evolutionary process, through his higher loves and higher hates, participates in the fundamental and grand drama of the Universe.

All this is true in contrast with low loves and low hates. However, this statement is not true without qualification. For, according to Dev Atma, higher loves and higher hates are also subject to pleasure principle and therefore subject to courses of untruth and evil. A man of sympathy may defend the object of his sympathy, even if, it involves some wrong doing, say telling a lie. Such a person may save a poor man from gallows by giving false evidence in the witness box. The misery of the wife and the children of the culprit may so over-power the man of the mercy as to impel him to save him even by falsehood. A charitable man may pay to a charitable cause and always postpone to pay his debts to his creditors.

Thus higher loves open up a limited world of ethical life. This is because the pleasure principle lets down the higher urges in sticking to undeviating path of truth, goodness and beauty. Whereas pleasure principle cripples the man when dominant in his biological, social and self urges, it limits the maturity of the man when dominant over higher urges.

Hence the higher virtues open to a human soul do not constitute the complete condition for the safety for the human soul and human personality. They do not provide the complete environment for complete moral maturity of man.

There is need of association of human personality with a supra-virtuous personality whose urges are not under pleasure principle but are under the principle of truth, goodness and beauty and hence who avoids the pitfalls of higher loves and higher hates. Personal affection has always
been regarded as one of the highest values in human ideal. Prof. Moore regards it as one of the two highest intrinsic values. But the value of personal affection is determined by individuals involved and the understanding, appreciation, and appropriate emotions evoked in this relation. If a person feels personal affection for the inferior qualities of a person, or if he imputes qualities to a person of which he is completely devoid, or if the emotions felt for the person are not appropriate, then such a personal relation has not a high intrinsic value. Ethically speaking, that relationship is highest from the human level of existence when the other person involved is supra-virtuous personality dominated by truth, goodness and beauty and the basis of relationship is understanding and appreciation of such supravirtuous characteristics of a person and this understanding and appreciation of the characteristics of the person arouses emotions of reverence, gratitude, faith and love.

It is here that ethics merges into religion. The highest ethical stage is religious. When personal affection is for the supra-virtuous personality, it is the climax of the highest human good.
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IS EXISTENTIALISM A PSYCHOLOGY?

Existentialism begins with the rebuke of Hegel: as a reaction to system. The system is the master's mansion; the philosopher lives in the servant's wing: he is not the master. The system is not his home, is not his existence; the system is his machine, is his tyrant. Yet man builds systems, he invents machines, he tyrannizes over himself; this, too, is the meaning of his existence, is his daily existence. Man invents man: man discovers his object in the world, but he creates its momentum in his life. The system, as neither Kierkegaard nor Sartre saw, was the momentum of man at one with the world, though such at-one-ness was not man-made, it was available to man in the very contradictoriness of his relations with the world, it was realizable by man in the very entanglements which meant his orientation to himself. All modern philosophy can be understood as an effort to deny mediation between subject and object, to deny a dialectic which implies the loss of the world as well as of Being with the disintegration of their tie. The rebuke against Hegel can be understood in two ways: as either the effort to deny the inherence of the subject-object structure of reality in every dealing between man and the world, or as the effort to build anew the relations between man and the world on the basis of a clearer perception of the subject-object structure of reality. Existentialism wavers between the two. Heidegger claims that the Being which itself sustains the subject-object structure of reality is obscured by man's dealings with the world. Sartre and Kierkegaard claim that man's dealings with the world and, invariably, himself, since he is of as well as in the world, are corrupt because of man's blindness as to the essential nature of his being, which is his being only by virtue of its being Being. It is the primary Being which existentialism feels is absent; and the winning of this Being is the effort of all existentialists, whether we win this Being only by specifying, as Heidegger does, the limits of our approach to it, which he calls 'ontology', or whether we win this Being by in some sense being ourselves, as Kierkegaard and Sartre insist we must be; and which
enterprise of being oneself Sartre calls "existentialism" and Kierkegaard calls "Christianity." We are interested in existentialism because we are interested in psychology, which has as at least part of its concern man’s relations to and orientation in the world; and such concern is part of the pursuit of one’s Being which is of the essence of existentialism.

The obscurity of the structure of Being, of the significance of this structure, implies the dissolution of the relations between man and his world and the disorientation of man in his world and subsequently the misunderstanding of man by himself, the obscurity of man to himself. Such a degeneration of man implies the exaggeration of man’s objects or purposes, which give man his objectivity, or, as Sartre calls it, his transcendence, or implies the extremeness of man’s subject or character, which gives man his subjectivity, or as Sartre calls it, his self. In other words, the singular effect of man’s blindness to Being is man’s forfeiture of his wholeness, of the integration of subject with object. Each declares itself sovereign; each eliminates the other to annihilate itself in the isolation of not merely a first but an only principle. This isolation of subject and object, this absence of one from the other which makes each an empty abstraction, is technically called ‘phenomenological reduction.’ Phenomenological reduction is, as Husserl, its formulator, understands it to be, the bracketing of the empirical world to determine the intentionality which sustains and grounds (constitutes) it. This separation of intention from the objects of intention has the philosophical advantage of permitting an examination of the distinct structure of man’s intention, the intention which man has by the nature of what he is, by virtue of his unique Being. Heidegger pursued Husserl’s reduction to its more elusive and abstruse end: Heidegger brackets man’s intentionality itself, bracket’s man’s being, and asks what the meaning of Being per se is, asks what the meaning of pre-intentional Being—Being which is not man, but Being which sustains man’s intention even before these intentions become pre-occupied with the empirical world. Why is such a phenomenological reduction the irrevocable cleaving of subject from object, the irrevocable movement beyond a point of no return to man—this is what is implied by a bracketing of man’s intentionality? And why is this assumption of an unbridgable subject-object split so important for a consideration of the question: Is existentialism a psychology?

The phenomenological reduction of man’s intentionality means that man is in constant pursuit of his nature, he does not have himself because he has lost himself to his philosophical investigations; if not in the labyrinth of his philosophical system. Man does not have himself, man qua subject does not have himself as an object, man qua object does not have himself as a subject, because man is preoccupied not with man, but with Being. Now the assumption of Heidegger’s ontology is that once man, by virtue of his questioning and by virtue of understanding the meaning of his questioning, has understood, has grasped Being he can again become man. This man
he can become after he has Being is called 'authentic man'; authentic man reveals Being in his manhood. Man uninterested in Being, man without Being, is, as Sartre says, mere 'facticity,' is in 'bed faith' with himself as well as with the world—because he is in bad faith with respect to his very origin, his very source, the fons et origo of his being, namely, Being. Heidegger claims, however, that Being can never be had, possessed; it is revealed in the very pursuit of Being, in the very searching for Being, in the very direction towards Being—in the very questioning of the searcher for Being. This questioning is at once the limit, the horizon of my movement towards Being, and the, as Sartre says, revelation of Being per se. Being is never possessed, it is revealed. The very methods, says Heidegger, by which we pursue Being, are the signs of Being. The very concern with Being is the manifest appearance of Being. But the reality of Being is never had, is never mine, is never owned. I am rather Being, more or less. I am the appearance of Being, but Being is never my appearance. I am insofar as Being reveals itself through me, but at Being, at the source of beings, I am not—and never. Thus, despite my being, insofar as I am philosophical, insofar as I ask the ontological question as to the meaning of Being, the sign and/or intention of Being, despite my being the very horizon of Being. I cannot see Being, I never have an illumination of Being. Rather, Being illuminates me—I have nothing to do with illuminating it, and, in fact, it shines by its own light, unfortunately always in the dark for me, so that I can do nothing for Being. I can do nothing for Being, and so I am nothing—I am in dread. The point to hold fast is that while man cannot sense Being, Being can always sense him, so that Being takes human being for granted, but man can only take Being on faith. Faith is necessary to men only because they are irrevocably cut off from their origins, from the source of their nature, from the very intentionality of their intentions. Heidegger assumes that man is, qua man, irrevocably alienated from that which gives him his manhood. This means that man can never know the reality of which he is a part, or, as Heidegger says, of which he is a district. Man is a district fixed within a region of reality and can never venture out of it, and yet, within this region, he can never find whatever it is that makes it a region, i.e., he can never know the limits of his region, however much he may explore the district which he himself is within this region, he can only sense something beyond himself—this sensing of something beyond himself is called 'horizon' and is most discoverable in death—the more ontological he becomes, the more he inquires after the limits, and the more he, in death, moves towards them. But he is stuck in enquiry—the time of his life is itself an enquiry into his limits—, he can never get an answer to his questions, even a false answer, and so, reflexively, he turns to examine his very inquiring, and finds that it makes sense to inquire without expecting an answer, i.e., to ask metaphysical questions, questions with no answers, but which orient him to whatever in him led him to question in the first place—and that is.
Being. Thus man can, according to Heidegger, never know reality, he can only try more or less to be himself by questioning in an authentic way. He cannot even know himself—because to know himself he would have to grasp Being. The most he can try to do is to have a genuine relation to Being. What are the controls on his questioning? How does he know if his questioning is authentic or unauthentic? By way of his feelings. His dread or his joy tells him his distance or his closeness to the source of his being, Being. Man's moods, as Heidegger calls them, his emotions, as Sartre calls them, are his living, which in turn is the indication of his tie to Being, his authenticity or unauthenticity. Man cannot have knowledge of reality, he cannot have self-knowledge, the most he can do in his existence is to be authentic or unauthentic, be ontological or ordinary, be himself or be anybody, be somebody or be nobody. This parallelism is strict for existentialism. It is perhaps not so strict for Heidegger's phenomenological ontology, but only by reason of the fact that for Heidegger every effort to show a dialectical tie between the antipodes is a falsifying of the originality and precedence of Being.

Man is thus forever estranged from his manhood. The only reality left in his life is his existence, which reality can be made into a thing or a livingness Existentialism is the philosophy which aims to show what it means for a man to be a thing or a livingness, and, insofar as existentialism has a moral import to it, insofar as it is concerned to show men how to live an authentic life, how to be authentic—which concern is not Heidegger's—in so far, in other words, as existentialism has a morale to it, it becomes existential psycho-analysis. Existential psychoanalysis is psychoanalysis aiming to make man himself. Existential psychoanalysis is a psychology which commits itself not merely to an analysis of man but to a synthesis of man—to making man man. Psychology, for existentialism, is a science with a moral import and political impact, a science which is concerned to change man as well as account for man. But this science is based on the assumption that man is hopelessly cut off from the source of his being, and so this science is highly philosophical, for, in order to change man, it must understand what the source of man is, what Being means, for changing man can only mean making man a revelation of Being, orienting man towards Being, relating man to his fons et origo. Heidegger speaks of the question as to the meaning of Being as a Verhalten, i.e., behavior, orientation, towards Being. And existential psychoanalysis is concerned just with such a Verhalten: for existential psychoanalysis is above all else concerned with asking the question as to the meaning of Being as revealed in the patient's being. When the patient of the existential psychoanalyst 'learns' to ask the right kind of question, he is 'cured,' made as authentic as he will ever be.

But this question can only be asked meaningfully if reality is forever obscure. This asking of the question as to the meaning of Being is a turning towards the light to be illumined in one's own being, it is a sunbathing in the light of Being to obscure the darkness of one's daily life. This question
could only be asked if I had, in the first place, presupposed that man was shut off from what made him man that man’s ignorance was so radical that his intelligence could be nothing but an acknowledging of his ignorance of his own intentions, and in this way very acknowledgement discovering himself. Man cannot have self-knowledge, he can only have self-recognition. This doctrine that man can only have self-recognition is what makes existential psychoanalysis a behavioristic psychology, and not a depth psychology. For depth psychology assumes that man can indeed know himself, however difficult and excruciating the enterprise. But the burden of Sartre’s objections to Freudian psychoanalysis in Being and Nothingness is to emphasize that man cannot know himself, that the dichotomizing of the psyche into id and ego is a destruction of the essential integration of man qua man, which integration is the very reason man cannot know himself, for he can never see himself whole, he can only be, live himself wholly. If man thinks he is knowing himself, seeing his whole, he is only hiding his making of himself into a thing his alienating of himself from himself by splitting himself into parts. His analysis of himself is not a knowing of himself, it is a destroying of himself.

Our question is not whether Sartre’s criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis is correct, our question is not as to whether Freudian psychoanalysis is indeed merely another way of turning man into a thing, into ‘the one,’ into anyone by assuming the universality of id and ego, of, to put it Bergson’s way, intellect betraying the essential integration of man’s life, of man as living, our question is rather to note that existentialism is indeed a psychology insofar as it is concerned to change man, but insofar as it is phenomenological—as Sartre claims it is—it is necessarily behavioristic, and so cannot at all truly change man, can at the most give an account of man, even if the account must implicate what is beyond man. I agree with Sartre that every psychology must be a methodology which is concerned to change man; and, if I can show that Sartre’s psychology, existential psychoanalysis, does not do what it thinks it is doing, I can show that existentialism is not at all a psychology, it is merely another philosophy, a quite unphilosophical philosophy, i.e., a theological philosophy, a philosophy whose essence is to deny man his self-knowledge and to orient him exclusively to what is not himself. Whether Being be God or a voice out of the void, what is important for us in our attention to the question, Is existentialism a psychology?, is to note that to relate man to what is not himself in such a way as to forbid him to know himself, means to forbid man to change himself, since it deprives him of the one ground, knowledge, which can justify change; man must change himself for a reason. All this will lead us to view the meaning of authenticity and bad faith in a new light. For if man does not have a reason for changing himself, his change cannot be a kind of action, it must be ‘inner change’. Man’s authenticity, if it cannot be a knowing of himself, a knowing which alone can lead to action, can only be a contemplating of Being, can only be an
Being, can only be an actionless—however inwardly active—attention to Being, a fear of ever for a moment to stop questioning, for then the questioner might lose his ontologicality, and have to suffer the consequences of discovering that his contemplating, whatever it has been for him inwardly, implied, all along, a stance toward the world, an attitude of action, whether that action be inaction, the inanition of inertia. Such a conception of man trusts the self to be so transcendent in its fullest nature, its authentic nature, that in its manifestation in the empirical world of purposes it is merely an instrument of a higher order. The self of existentialism is an instrument of the higher order of Being. For existentialism, the whole sphere of human action is merely a matter of signs and tools—action is undertaken on a cue, is itself a cue to Being—not of integration between practice and theory, subject and object. The only real integration and wholeness anywhere in existentialism is in mood or emotion.

Let us turn to Sartre's book *The Emotions* (New York, Philosophical Library, 1948). "If we wish to found a psychology, we shall have to go beyond the psychic, beyond man's situation in the world, to the very source of man, the world, and the psychic; the transcendental and the consecutive consciousness which we attain by "phenomenological reduction" or "putting the world in parentheses". (P. 11) If we put the world in parentheses we cannot act on it or in it. The world of behaviorist psychology is also a world of non-action. It agrees with Sartre in being interested not in facts, but in the continuity of consciousness, which it understands in terms of the successiveness of stimulus and response, and which Sartre understands in terms of the self-consistent intentionality of consciousness, whether it be pre-reflective or reflective. There is a wide discrepancy between the terminologies of Sartre and behaviorism. But both agree in denying exclusive attention to experience. They are less interested in the actual events of experience, than in the structure of experience—than in what structures experience. For behaviorism, experience is grounded on the stimulus-response pattern, which permits behaviorism to dispense with attention to the psyche as much as the phenomenological reduction permits Sartre to do so. For behaviorism, the conception of psyche is a remnant of faculty psychology—a psychology which assumed hidden entities controlling all experience and determining all action. For Sartre, experience is grounded on the human reality's assumption of its being, which is most apparent in its emotions. This seems quite wide of behaviorism. The stimulus-response pattern is fundamentally mechanistic. Sartre's conception of emotion is metaphysical. But what is significant is that both conceptions have the same heuristic function; both permit us to dispense with the particularity of actions, and to concentrate on the motivation of actions. Both turn action into behavior, trivializing it, and so justifying a shift of attention to motive, less apparent, for its tie to the object which inspires it is less apparent, but more profound, because it permits us to determine the ground of behavior. This conception of ground
is the residue of a conception of faculty functioning, unless it is understood, as Heidegger understands it to be, a constitutive principle. For behaviorism, action is motivated by—grounded on—stimulus—the content of the action, though not denied, is relevant to its essential structure. For Sartre, action is motivated by—grounded on—emotion—by my orientation to the being of the world, more essential than the kind of being of the world. What this being is is very important in determining the particular deed; but whatever its particularity, the deed is preceded by emotion. Emotion in Sartre and stimulus in behaviorism function as motives for any particular behavior. Moreover, both assume that the motive is integrated with its deed insofar as, for Sartre, its expression in doing, insofar as, for behaviorism, its expression in response, is presupposed by the very structure which grounds the character of action. Motive is, for Sartre and behaviorism, strictly speaking, not causal, it is rather the determination of a general approach to the deed—the deed itself appears in a vacuum, is a mere happening, an event at an instant for Sartre, ably determined reaction-like response for behaviorism. The character of the inevitability of the causal relation is obscured by the automatic and instantaneous quality of the deed or response. The deed or response happens in essential isolation from its motive, which serves merely to trigger it off, but not to determine its particular content. No stimulus, no emotion, guarantees its effect, its deed. At the most, it guarantees that something will happen—but it can never say what. Thus, by speaking of an ‘expression in response, an ‘expression in doing,’ I mean no more than the completion of the pattern of the fundamental ground: the automatic movement from stimulus to response, the automatic movement from emotion to doing. In both cases any conception of psyche is secondary—is merely factual for a conventional account of behavior. The consecutive movement over the fundamental ground of human reality is primary.

It is also important to understand more explicitly that doing is not expressly action for Sartre. It is, more precisely, living, having a sense of living. In a similar way response need not imply action. It may imply some subliminal physiological reaction. Why is not a sense of livingness, of being alive, action? Why is not a physiological reaction an action of the body? Because action explicitly implies sociability—explicit involvement with the other for a purpose. But in behaviorism and Sartre such involvement is absent. One has rather the touch-and-go of reflexivity, reflexivity playing a kind of game of tag with the object, reflexivity provoked by it, excited by it, but never quite taking it seriously as an object for itself and of itself, never quite going so far as to assume that this object has a purpose which requires assent or dissent to. This level of interpersonality is never reached by behaviorism or Sartre. They remain fixed in the reflexive fundament. For Sartre, man remains fixed in this fundament because he has taken the phenomenological reduction of intentionality made by Heidegger as absolute. Once intentionality has been ousted from human
being, it can never be returned. In Heidegger a conception of 'care' replaces 'purpose' for a definite reason. Actual interpersonality of purpose is impossible when intentionality is insecure, is remote if not absent, is at the end of an incalculable and unreachable distance. Purpose is replaced by the concern to have purpose, viz., care. The existentialist becomes so concerned to have a purpose he never quite decides upon one and he in truth can never decide upon one. Because he never had any to begin with. His fundamental intentionality had been suspended by phenomenological reduction. His care to have a purpose is in truth a preoccupation with his own reflexivity's movements, i.e., its questions. Existentialism replaces purposes with questions, unanswerable questions, and so never does anything, never acts, and degenerates the meaning of action. Sartre speaks of France under Nazi occupation as The Republic of Silence, not as the republic of sound. In this essay Sartre points out how each, threatened at every moment, had the chance to be truly authentic. But this true authenticity is a matter of silence, of keepings silent. Action—sound—is secondary to the primal silence, of the authentic self, the secrecy of silence enclosing the mystery of authenticity. The underground movement was important not because it fought the Nazis, but because it gave each man a chance to be authentic, a concern with his authenticity. The political purpose was secondary to the reflexive concern. Behaviorism has dissolved all action into a similar silence—the silence of fixed patterns, moving like gears on reflexive ballbearings. Behaviorism is an endless game of dominoes. Purposes of action are displaced—misplaced—into some remote, trivial realm, irrelevant for disinterested science, the realm of politics, of the unscientific world. Even this unscientific world can be scientitized if we only regard it as being a confusion of patterns of stimulus-response. The patterns must be sorted out, the world put in order, without assuming any purpose motivating its whole and cohering its parts. Behaviorism has gone so far as to have forgotten the meaning of action. Sartre merely retreated from action in a more important discovery of man's impotence.

Thus we see that the ground of existentialism and behaviorism is one whatever the name for the ground, and whatever the techniques used to explicate and make fertile the ground. The principles are distinct, but they have the exact same fertilizing effect. Sartre, speaking about 'emotion' sounds like a behavioristic account of behavior: "...the emotion signifies, in its own way, the whole of consciousness, or, if we put ourselves on the existential level, of human reality. It is not an accident because human reality is not an accumulation of facts. It expresses from a definite point of view the human synthetic totality in its entirety. And we need not understand by that that it is the effect of human reality. It is the human reality itself in the form of 'emotion,'" (p.17) Here is a behavioristic account of learned action, "There is a hungry organism: somewhere in the surroundings there is food, but it is not within sight. How does the organism reach
the food or "find" it? This is for most behavioristic formulations the prototype of psychological action: an organism in a state of primary need or tissue deprivation. It is asserted that the condition of need spurs the organism to restless activity. Its movements are random: that is to say, they are elicited by native action tendencies or earlier acquired tendencies, but they are blind with reference to the goal. In the course of this exploratory trial and error the organism will by chance make the movement that is "correct;" it will find food at a given place. On successive trials it will tend to repeat the previously successful action, will move when hungry more and more readily to the spot where it previously found the food. This adaptive result is held to be the expression of a fundamental principle of neural action, according to which the response to a situation is automatically strengthened if it is followed by reward or by need-reduction. The organism as a result has formed a habit under the pressure of a need. The process of restless activity or random exploration brings it in contact with the object of the surroundings, and the occurrence of the reward strengthens the movements just preceding. In this way the organism is said to form habits of approaching, retreating from, and manipulating objects." (Solomon Asch, Social Psychology, pp. 12–13. New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1952.) Just as emotion, in its own way, symbolizes the whole of consciousness, so the organism's random exploratory behavior symbolizes, in its own way, the whole of the organism's need. Just as the emotion is itself the form of human reality, so the habit is per se the texture of human behavior. Sartre, in stating that emotional consciousness is at first unreflective (p. 30), deals with the organism searching for its authentic being, searching for its sustenance. Sartre, in stating that "the emotion returns to the object at every moment and is fed there" once it has found the object, is reminiscent of the organism in its habit of seeking its reward, returning to the spot at which it found its food, and feeding there. Sartre's unreflective emotion is fundamentally equivalent to behaviorism's habit. Emotion is a kind of organism returning to the point of its origin, which is coincidently the source of its satisfaction in its being.

The organism returns to the same feeding place because it believes it will find food there. Sartre says: "In order to understand clearly the emotional process with consciousness as the point of departure, it is necessary to bear in mind the twofold character of the body, which is, on the one hand, an object in the world and, on the other, something lived by consciousness. We can then grasp the essential point: emotion is a phenomenon of belief." (p. 75) Moreover, says Sartre, emotion is not reflective; it does not deliberately decide to believe in its object; it has been established by perception of its object and so it believes in its object. In a similar way, the organism does not reflect, initially, on its reasons for returning to the place at which its hunger was satisfied. It, in fact, may keep up this pattern of behavior for the span of its lifetime and not for a
moment reflect on its reasons for its behavior. We may have such-and-such an emotion whenever we meet X sort of object, but we may never in our life understand why we have this emotion—in fact, Sartre seems to imply, the ultimacy of belief as a phenomenon seems to dissuade us from even being interested in the reasons behind the emotion. There is nothing behind the emotion. Everything is in front of us when we have emotions.

"Consciousness," says Sartre, "can 'be-in-the-World' in two different ways. The world can appear to it as a complex of instruments so organized that if one wished to produce a determined effect it would be necessary to act upon the determined elements of the complex.... But the world can also appear to it as a non-instrumental totality, that is, modifiable by large masses and without an intermediary. In this case, the categories of the world will act upon consciousness immediately. They are present to it without distance." (pp. 89-90.) Let us transfer this to the organism. The organism's movement towards the spot where it has been habituated to find its food is an instrument for securing a determinate effect upon the totality of its world. The organism's forming of the habit of returning to this place as its feeding place is its immediate awareness that this is the place at which it can satisfy its hunger, that this place represents the totality of its world of satisfaction of hunger. Sartre also says: "The passage to emotion is a total modification of 'being-in-the-world'...." (P. 93) And indeed, so is the forming of a habit.

So we see that existentialism is, strictly speaking, not a psychology, because it offers only an account of man in the world, without a conception of how to change man. If existentialism is to be taken seriously as a psychology we must say it deals with subliminal patterns of stimulus-response; man's authenticity is just such a pattern. My authenticity is invisible to you. It is, so to speak, part of the physiology of my Being. My authentic action may seem unauthentic to you. The determination of my authenticity or unauthenticity is unique to my reflexivity. My authenticity is preintentional—is prior to my actions. And is never apparent in my actions. To me, my actions reveal my authenticity, much as my authenticity reveals my being—but you may not think so. Community, even the merest of communities of observation, has been forfeited by existentialism. My authenticity is not observable. Living being is not observable; it is only felt by me in my emotions. Perhaps others may feel it as discomfort—but for them it is not an emotion, it is a mere sensation of a pain in the neck. Behaviorism 'observes' on the level of reflexivity. It overlooks the point that the stimulus-response patterns it notes are pointless without the particularity of action which implied them. Stimuli and responses are connotations of particular actions. The actions ground them, rather than they the actions. Sartre pushes behaviorism to its reductio ad absurdum: emotion is the structure of reflexivity per se, which grounds the stimulus-response pattern. Emotion is the medium which grounds stimulus-response. It is the mystery in the interstices between

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the neural synapses, transmuting stimulus to response at the limits of the reflex arc. Response is not action; it does not account for purpose, it is compelled by stimulus. 'Human purpose' is a meaningless expression for behaviorism; and for Sartre, for whom it can only mean the purpose of being oneself, which only indirectly has to do with being someone else, indirectly in the mode of dailiness, of being-in-the-world. But the being-in-the-world of existentialism is not an acting-in-the-world, it is a contemplating-in-the-world, which, whatever else it is, is a loafing-in-the-world. It assumes—with the exception of Kierkegaard—that it grounds itself prior to its acts, not in and by its acts.

How can existentialist psychoanalysis claim to change man when it does not understand man's world? Existentialism is economically, politically, socially ignorant. The authentic-unauthentic syndrome precludes a critical relation to society. It ignores the inevitable tension between a society and its members. It does not see that man's world is the world of his property, as well as of his reflexivity. One may never possess Being, but one may possess property—and this certainly will make some difference is one's being-in-the-world, which, after all, is, for Heidegger, ontological. Existentialism does not understand that the world is someone's property, and insofar as I am of the world I am also someone's property, or the owner of property—authority. And we are all in hock to the authority of the State, as Hegel correctly saw. Existentialism, in its modern origins in World War II, can be understood to be an effort to free man from authority from a power relationship, always unauthentic, apart from its appearance in what Heidegger calls a stepping into the breach for another—and especially the wrong authority for France, the alien Nazis. It has lost its impetus in the war's aftermath; it has become, not accidentally, a cocktail party philosophy—much as behaviorism, also not accidentally, has found its justification in the manipulations of motives carried on by advertising and mass media. Existentialism is impotent as an individual psychology—it does not see the individual in the context of his history. Reflexivity is per se anti-historical; it is stuck in its instants, its past is mere memory of its instrumentality, its future is a bland hope for authenticity. But existentialism as an effort at social psychology is a unique symptom of the decadence of post-war Europe. Sartre remains an authentic existentialist only insofar as he is a genuine Communist: only insofar as he realizes that the advantage he had in living under the Nazis was to be deprived of his property, of his, as he puts it, unauthentic mode of being of having. But, of course, since the end of the war he has acquired new property: the property of the fame he has. The truly authentic Sartre would be a man who has left private psychology behind him because he has left a crumbling society—who emerges with his reflexivity because he is free from property-relations.

It is no accident existentialism is a philosophy of despair, and that it has been displaced by beatnikism. Despair begins with the absence of
society, with the feeling that the world around one has fallen to pieces, is a worthless ghost of a past. Existentialism begins with this corrupt and decadent world. But it does not see its advantageous position. Free of past obligations and old psyches, it is in the envious position of being in a propertyless world—it is free because it has nothing. And so it is truly able to change. It has the beginning condition necessary for all change—but it has no conception of the end of change. Existentialism is in that state of goodness which Plato held was universal before money and the accumulation of property brought the fall of man—before man began to hoard the apples from his tree of knowledge. But existentialism does not understand the meaning of working for a future and a society; its paradise is the stagnant world brought about by an inability to respect the past or to give allegiance to the present or to be responsible for the future. Existentialism has withdrawn from the world to discover the emptiness of its own despair. And of its despairing account of man trapped in his reflexivity.
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THE SELF AS
INTELLIGENT SUBSTANCE

I

The concept of the self is perhaps the most important of all philosophical concepts. There is also the metaphysical concept of God. But nobody claims to know God. We cannot say the name thing of the self; for the self is somehow known directly. Moreover, the self is believed to be made in the image of God, which is very significant.

There is the concept of the Absolute. But the Absolute is only an idea, variously conceived. When therefore a philosopher says that to know the Absolute we must know It as the Self, we are giving some concrete meaning to the concept. The key to all metaphysical entities, in our opinion, lies in the self.

The only ultimate realities we can claim we know are nature on the one hand and the self on the other. Knowledge of nature in the widest sense constitutes what we call science. It would be no exaggeration to say that knowledge of the self constitutes the special subject-matter of philosophy. It is true that metaphysicians of the west seek the knowledge of a transcendent reality beyond self and nature. But Indian philosophers are more realistic in this respect. They identify philosophic knowledge with ādhyātmic vidyā or the science of the self. This is more in conformity with the spirit of empiricism and less with that of pure speculation.

The first and the most important question to decide in connection with the self is whether it is a substance or an appearance of a substance or of the nature of an occurrence. A substance is understood as something permanent. It may exist in time, but it can never change in time. For this very reason, it has no cause beyond itself. It is literally self caused and self-existent. It is eternal. A substance is never created. Only an appearance of a substance can be created.

The self has at least the appearance of a substance. It has unity and an evident self identity. I am the same self today as I was yesterday, and
more generally as I was in the indefinite past of which I have any memory. Is this mere appearance or something more real, something in the nature of things themselves? Is the self a real substance or only an appearance of one?

Hume found no real substance called the self. Long before him, Buddha had come to the same conclusion. There were only momentary mental states, but no permanent self. Many votaries of temporal flux in modern philosophy and genuine empiricists agree with these thinkers. But the question has to be answered by all these sceptics, how to explain the appearance of substantiality of the self? May be, there is a real substance behind the appearance—only we fail to attend to it. We fail, because we look for an identifiable object. There is no such object. May be, there is a series of events, quick in succession, which we wrongly interpret as a unitary substance. The unity and the self-identity of the self is thus a mental illusion. May be, there are certain intimate relations between the mental states themselves or between them and the body which create the illusion of a single self-identical entity. But what every reflective individual has got to admit is that any mental state or act cannot perceive directly what has gone before it. Who then perceives the series? A succession of states is only presentable to an entity which is without succession and which is at least co-present with the states it perceives. Does this not mean that we must go beyond the changing states to a higher level of consciousness which is changeless and without states? A real substance is thus necessarily indicated beyond the appearance of one.

Let us concede, for the sake of argument, that the self is not a substance, and that all that lies behind the appearance are certain mental states and their relations. But what is the nature of that relation which gives rise to the appearance of their ‘belonging to me’? Any relation between the states will be some kind of objective relation, such as the causal relation. An objective relation will be a relation given to me, it will in no sense constitute myself. It will presuppose the self. Any relation between the mental states themselves is one thing, their relatedness to me is another. The former is an objective impersonal relation, the latter is essentially personal and subjective. There is a world of difference between the two kinds of relation. It is the personal relation that makes all states “mine”. All things are so related to the self,—the body, the mind, the world at large in so far as it is perceived. They are “mine”. This relation is fundamental to them, and takes precedence over all other relations. We can never successfully reconstruct the intuition of ‘I’ from any intuition of objects or their relations.

The self is not a hypothetical entity. We have a direct intuition of it. This intuition is a mixed one to begin with. But when it is purified of all objective elements, there remains the pure subject or the absolute subject that is never an object. Since this subject is only related to all kinds of
objects,—the body, the mind and the world—through the relation of false identity, it is never affected by the relation. We say the house belongs to me, the body belongs to me, certain experiences belong to me, etc. They all belong to me in the same sense, i.e. through false identity. Only the ownership of the house is mediated through the body, the ownership of the body is mediated through the mind, but the ownership of the mind is mediated through nothing. This is because there is nothing between the mind and the self. Their relationship is direct and immediate, so that we often fail to distinguish the two. But in certain states, such as deep sleep, we throw off the mind too. There is no necessary relation between the self and what belongs to it. The relation is fortuitous. The two are simply confused together and wrongly imagined to constitute some kind of unity. If we are discriminating enough, we should be able to know the self for what it is through negation of what is thus falsely identified with it.

The self is a pure intelligence beyond the mind. Its permanence and self-identity are never in question. We can legitimately question the self-identity of an object. We do not know an object from within. We can never therefore be certain of its identity. We know this identity only through certain observable characters; and our perception of these characters is eminently unreliable and even misleading. The object is always changing; but we fail to perceive this change in all its stages. Again, we see a face, and seem to recognise an old friend in it; and yet the face may have only a certain resemblance to the face of our friend. The truth is that we can always be deceived by appearances. That makes doubt almost inevitable.

It is quite different with our own self. As soon as we reflect upon our intuition of it, this identity forces itself upon us. We know it directly and from within. There is no room for doubt. The identity of the self is the presupposition of our knowing anything whatsoever from one moment to another, whether in the physical world or in our mental life. And yet the sceptical philosophers, empirically minded as they are, seek the identity of the self as they do the identity of an object. Quite evidently, this is just the wrong way to go about it. The self identity of the self is more certain than that of any object. It is the very limit of certainty.

II

We have tried to show that the self is a substance. But what is the nature of this substantival self? Is it a characterless substratum about which we can know nothing? Mr. C. A. Campbell in his book "Selfhood and God-hood" puts forward the thesis that introspection can reveal the real characteristics of the self qua self. "The subject self as apprehended in self-consciousness is in that sense always a determinate or
characterised self. To deny that the self is *reducible to* its experiences is by no means to deny that the self manifests its real character (in whole or in part) *in and through* these experiences.” p. 82.

Let us suppose that this is so. But how can we reconcile the self-identity of the self with changing experiences which form part of it? To this Mr. Campbell replies: “But this charge of self-contradiction rests on the assumption that sameness totally excludes difference; and this is an assumption to which all self-conscious experience gives the lie direct... It can hardly be accepted as an irrefutable principle of philosophic criticism that sameness excludes all difference, when it is a datum of self-conscious experience that it does not.” p. 83.

We cannot accept this answer. To a superficial view, identity and difference seem to go together almost in all substances. Things are the same and still they change. Now it is quite certain that a thing cannot change in that aspect of it in which it is self-identical. Either than it is not one thing, but two things; or alternatively, the changing aspect is subordinate to the identical aspect and is no more than an illusory appearance of it. The fact is that what is logically contradictory cannot be true of reality. Sameness does exclude difference always and everywhere. If it does not, we do not mean what we say. We contend that we can distinguish the self-identical self from the changing experiences. The experiences are functions of the mind. The self, on the other hand, is of the nature of pure intelligence beyond the mind. Our introspection no doubt may be said to reveal in a very broad and general way both the identity and the difference in the self. But what it does not reveal to a superficial view is the fact that the two belong to different levels. Everybody seems to know the difference; but very few know the identity clearly enough to recognise it for what it is. It is not the identity of an object that can be detected through introspection. Introspection is only a form of looking for objects within. There is another form of intuition that is appropriate to the self as it is.

Kant made a distinction, in this connection, between the phenomenal ego and the noumenal self. According to him, we knew the former only. So far as the latter was concerned, we knew that it was there, but not what it was. In this sense, we had partial knowledge of the noumenal self only. But even this limited thesis of Kant cannot be sustained. The self was conceived by him on the analogy of an object, which had a ‘that’ and a ‘what’. But the noumenal self is no kind of object, and the division between its being and its nature is quite unjustified. The self is never given as ‘that’. It is always ‘not this’, ‘not that’. It is transcendent in its being, and reveals itself as such. If we know the self at all, we know it without divisions of any kind, and so fully and completely as it is in itself.

Our knowledge of the self is unlike our knowledge of objects. No object is ever self-revealing. It is revealed to us through a subjective
process. Thought both determines the object and makes it known by relating it to intelligence. Knowledge of the self is different. The self has no qualities or relations which need to be determined. Again, it is not something unintelligent that needs to be related to intelligence. For these reasons, knowledge of the self is not discursive. There is neither the relation of the subject and the predicate, nor the relation of the subject and the object. It is a non-divisive and intuitive kind of knowledge. Thought plays only a secondary role. It is informed by the self and assumes the form of the self. It is a species of knowledge in which error is ruled out and certainty is absolute. The thing-in-itself determines thought.

Mr. Campbell, like all European thinkers, cannot think of the self except as mind. According to him, it is possible in principle to conceive of a self apart from the body, but it is certainly not possible, even in principle, to conceive of a self apart from the mind, Kant called the self as it functions through the mind, the empirical self. This we certainly know. But is it the real self? Mr. Campbell thinks that it is part of the real self,—only it is not the whole. He says, "In my view...it is false to suppose that the self in the form in which we apprehend it is not the self as it really is.....given that the self is thus distinguishable from its experiences, we have no right to assume that that self manifests all that it is in the human experiences through which we know it—its empirical manifestations. It may well be, for all we know, that there are latent in this spiritual substance capacities whose expression is inhibited under the conditions of human experience, and in particular under the condition of union with a physical body...."

Here a distinction is certainly made pp. 107-108, between the self and its experiences which we are said to know. But what is the nature of that self which has the experiences? What are we to understand by the noumenal self? Is it unknowable to us? With such an analysis, some thinkers will naturally feel impelled to drop it altogether. The experiences are all there is—there is nothing beyond them called a substantival self. The non-empirical self is only an unverifiable and unnecessary hypothesis. And then as to the contention of 'a possible functioning outside of human experience', this is really meaningless to us. All intelligent functioning is mental functioning as far as we can see. That will throw no light on the nature of the noumenal self. If there is in truth a higher function of intelligence beyond the mind, let us recognise it for what it is. It is the function of pure intelligence which reveals the mental life itself.

We need to combine our intuition of the self with a larger human experience, which embraces the experience of the states of wakefulness, dream and deep sleep. We shall then see the necessity of a higher level consciousness or a pure intelligence, which reveals the states in question. We need not grope in the dark about the reality and the nature of the noumenal self. It would be unphilosophical to confess to an ignorance of the latter as something irrevocable. Mr. Campbell makes too much of
our finitude. He says that for us finite beings there is no alternative to accepting certain brute facts which we do not understand or which"could become intelligible to a finite being only if, per impossibile, he could transcend the conditions of his own finitude". p. 108. We need not feel so helpless. We are certainly not omniscient, but we must feel competent to solve all those problems which arise within our own experience and which can only be solved by an analysis of that experience. All philosophical problems have this character. We can say confidently that if any philosophical question cannot be resolved in that way, it is a question that is wrongly formulated and illegitimate.

There is, in our opinion, no mystery about the noumenal self. The mystery lies in putting the wrong questions, and making an insoluble problem where there is none. We merely add to mystery when we say, as Mr. Campbell says, that self is permanent, but that it has a structure which undergoes continual modification from its experiences. How can a really permanent entity really undergo any modification? Again to say that there are relatively permanent selves with relatively permanent structures is to give away the whole case for permanence. Permanence admits of no degrees and of no relativity. It is only material substances that are popularly and uncritically spoken of as being relatively permanent. We should not transform this loose popular way of speaking about permanence into a metaphysical verity. The self is literally immutable; and because it is also self-revealing and self-effulgent, we are saved from all forms of agnosticism. In fact, we can build up a thorough-going form of gnosticism on this basis.

There is no notion in European philosophy answering to the Indian conception of the noumenal self or ātman. There is the conception of person, endowed with intellect, will, etc., and having a more or less stable character. There is also the conception of the individual soul that functions with a mind and that answers to the conception of jiva in Indian philosophy. The conception of ātman or the Self is the conception of something that goes beyond the mind (antahkarana), beyond the intellect (buddhi), and beyond the individual self (jiva). It is the Universal Self. It is transcendent but not unknown, much less unknowable. It is on the contrary the best known of all things, because it is absolutely immediate (pratyak). The goal of all philosophy is no other than to recognise intellectually what is otherwise completely known but overlaid by ignorance.

The notion of the 'person' plays the same important role in European philosophy as the notion of the 'Self' plays in Indian Philosophy. The person is understood as the only concrete spiritual reality. The self identity of the self is regarded as more or less an abstraction. It must develop into a person with a stable set of dispositions called the character of the person. A mere self, or a pure self or a noumenal self cannot be the ultimate reality, because it has no content in it. It becomes fully real and concrete when it becomes a person. For us, this is reversing real
ontological values. A person is a complex entity, made up of the body, the mind and the real noumenal self. We need to discriminate between these elements, and recognise the spirituality of the self and the non-spirituality of the outer sheaths. The person can be analysed away. He is not the ultimate or the stable reality. More exactly, he is a product of ignorance or the ignorant identification of the non-intelligent (jada) with the intelligent. The Self is the inmost reality, the ground and the substance of the changing personality,—that which forms the person and enables him to function intelligently.

The conception of the Universal Spirit or that of God in European Philosophy is the conception of something transcendent. It is the great Beyond. But this Great Beyond is still conceived as essentially a person, with all good human qualities raised to infinity. This naturally reduces the gap between the human person and the divine person, and to that extent the conception is certainly very valuable. But the concept of the person involves limitation and is in the end anthropomorphistic. What we seek in metaphysics is the unlimited, the absolute and the ultimate. We must therefore reject the personality of God as a passing phase only necessary for the realization of the Absolute Spirit that goes beyond it. That is why the identity of the Self (ātman) and the Universal Spirit (Brahman) makes eminent sense metaphysically. Can it be any more doubted that Vedanta scores over all other systems in its conception of the Spirit and the thoroughness with which it develops that concept to its logical conclusion and spiritual exaltation? There is no God but God, and that God is fully and completely within us as the Self.
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THE

REALITY OF GOD

By 'God' is understood here a Being who is worshipped and is worshipful by men. In this connection two questions crop up:

1. Is there one and one God only whom all men knowingly and unknowingly worship? Are Rama, Krishna or Christ so many local and accidental variations of the one and the same God?

2. What are the characters by virtue of which a Being can be worshipful? What claims can be made for the reality of such a worshipful Being?

As to the first question I maintain that there are gods, but there is not one God. At no time in human history there has been a God whom all men have worshipped. Any talk about God appears to me a talk about an abstraction which underlies the reality of gods. On the basis of logical and historical considerations, the claims of Semitic religions in favour of the sole monopoly of religious truths seem to me unfounded. Let us take any monotheistic religion, we shall find that its adherents pay their lip service to one God in theory, but in practice their God of worship differ with its various sects. Even St. Peter and St. Paul differed about Jesus. *A fortiori* it is much truer of other adherents, belonging to the different sects and denominations of Christianity. However, mere denial would not do. We have to explain the reason for this monopolistic claims in favour of one God. The reason most probably will be found with regard to the next point of enquiry which concerns with the characteristics of worshipfulness.

A god to be worshipful must appear to his devotees as infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, infinite love and so on. Unless a god is 'infinite', he is not worshipful. At least this is the verdict of the theologians with regard to the teaching of James¹ and Ward.² Further, a god who is not

¹ James, W. *The Pluralistic Universe*—p. 294.
' *The Will to Believe*'—p. 61
² Ward, J. *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 29, 52 and 191.
actual, but is ideal, is not at all acceptable to worshippers. At least this is the burden of criticisms of Samuel Alexander’s concept of ‘deity’.

Now if a god in order to be worshipful has to be infinite and necessary, then logically speaking there can be one God only. Here I dare maintain that the reality of god is neither empirical nor logical if ‘god’ refers to an extra-psychic entity. The characteristics of ‘necessity and infiniteness’ concerning god are indicative of the psychical states of the worshippers. To a worshipper his god, Rama or Krishna or Christ, must appear to be infinite, infinitely loving, and even the creator of the universe. Otherwise the worshipper will be lisping like a babe and he will not be said to be praising him. The commitment of the worshipper to his god is absolute, non-hypothetical and non-tentative. With these remarks I am maintaining the following:

1. The reality of god is psychological.
2. ‘The reality of god’ becomes a nonsensical statement if it means to refer to a non-psychological and empirical entity, existing in its own rights independently of the human psyche.
3. God is a psychological entity, but is not a fiction. God-statement has both sense and significance.

The main part of the paper proposes to deal with the third point. However I shall very briefly deal with (1) and (2) so that the contention may be evaluated in its proper setting. I would take (2) first, since from this (1) follows.

**GOD-STATEMENTS IN TRADITIONAL USAGE ARE MEANINGLESS**

‘God-statement stands for an abbreviated form of ‘God is an infinite Being who has created the whole universe and has infinite love for his human worshippers’, Usually it is held that such a Being can be empirically known as an entity existing independently of the human mind. Very few traditionalists would hold that god can be seen or touched in some favoured vision of him (*). But a number of religionists do hold that God can be known by mystic intuition. The names of Radhakrishnan, James and Bergson along with Dean Inge and Miss Underhill can be cited in this connection (*). However this claim is open to serious objections. First, there is no unanimity concerning the statements obtained by intuition (*). So all that intuition can give us is a plurality of gods and this has been accepted by William James. But the most serious objection is that in intuition, as Bella K. Milmed observes, we perceive what we ardently desire

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4 Shaktas do claim this even now. A deputy director of animal husbandry has testified to me of his experience of seeing Devi Ji. But he doubts the claims concerning her infinite powers even after this ‘Darshana’ or ‘vision’.
or wish to perceive. He, the deliverance of intuition is vitiated by auto-suggestion. Thirdly the deliverance of intuition is paradoxical. For instance, the Brahman is described as moving and not moving, as far and near, and as the smallest and the biggest of entities. Similarly, man is said to be an image of God who is essentially formless. Here the position of Prof. W.T. Stace appears to be most intriguing. According to him, the paradoxical statements are descriptive of actual states of affairs:

“The paradox which he (the mystic) has uttered has correctly described his experience. The language is only paradoxical because the experience is paradoxical. Thus the language correctly mirrors the experience”.

However, the mystic experience is ineffable and unutterable, as James and Wittgenstein have noted. If one utters the unspeakable, he falls into linguistic confusion and cannot but utter nonsense.

Apart from ‘vision’ and ‘mystic intuition’, some theologians hold that God is cognised by way of ‘discernment’ or ‘interpretation’ and ‘reflection’. But the function of ‘discernment’ in revealing God does not seem to be clear. Prof. Ian Ramsey holds that religious statements do not describe a group of hard, objective ‘facts’ glanced at by passive observers. But he does not take god statements to be merely ‘emotive’. For him, such statements have objective reference and are descriptive of objective ‘depth’.

Hence, if god-statements refer to an objective entity, without any personality-involvement of the user of them, then they have to be made meaningful as thing-statements concerning tables, chairs are. But if treat God in this traditional manner, then some important god-statements become meaningless. For instance, let us take the statement ‘God is the creator of the universe’. Now, has God created the universe out of something pre-existing or out of nothing? If the former, then he is an architect, as Kant had observed, and not a creator. If, however, he has created out of nothing, then he is self-creative and self-manifesting. This at once changes theism into pantheism where there is no room for creation-theory.

Again, can we say that God is infinitely loving? well, on account of the non-tentative and absolute character of a believer’s commitment to God’s love, no particular instance can be found which counts against the statement. In every case of evil the believer would say ‘God has given and

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8 Ramsey, I. T. ‘Religious Language’—p. 19 ff
9 John Hick, ‘Faith and Knowledge’—chap. 6
12 Ibid. p. 27
13 Ibid. p. 28.

14 Alexander, S. ‘Septimana Spinozana’ 1933—p. 131; The historicity of things—p. 15; Philosophical and literary pieces—p. 327; Space, Time and Deity Vol. II—pp. 399-400, 420.
God has taken away. Blessed be the name of the Lord. Hence no factual god-statements can be made concerning the infinite love of God, since there are no ‘facts’ which can count against them. I need not summarise here the views of many able analysts who have shown the meaninglessness of many other god-statements. Thus, in the light of the remarks made above, I hold that god-statements in their traditional usage have no linguistic clarity. But I do not hold that no precise and clear statements can be made concerning god. A ‘god’ for me is a psychological entity, as dream-images and delusions are. Now a god statement in this usage can have sense, for we can point out its cash-value in terms of psychical experience. At least in principle we can hold that under certain conditions god-experience can be repeatedly induced and as such is a psychical fact. For example, according to Freud, in every case god is a projection of the repressed image of one’s physical father in infancy. This psychological substrate according to him is an observable fact.

Further, god-statements have significance, for they have a great value for human beings. They give meaning to individual lives and certainly have directed some epochal changes in history. Usually they are said to have ‘emotive meanings. Personally I do not think that the term ‘emotive’ is appropriate at least in the light of Otto’s analysis of religious experience. I prefer to call religious experience holistic, since god-statements result from and often evoke the feeling of becoming a whole, entire and complete.

with the above remarks we can proceed to the last section of the paper.

THE MEANING OF GOD-STATEMENTS

By saying that god-statements are psychological, I mean that a god has his locus in human psyche. Besides, it also means that the idea of god has not been directly obtained by an encounter with extrapsychic being. In this sense archetype-statements by Jung may also be called psychological. The whole thing may be expressed a little differently.

According to Freud and Ferenczi, as also according to F. H. Bradley, as a result of many painful failures as babes, individuals finally succeed in making a correct distinction between the outer and inner world or between the self and not-self. We also find that in adjusting ourselves to the outer world, we also change from within. A cat effects a change


17 Interpretation of Dreams—pp.496ff, 521.

18 S. Ferenczi, ‘Advance in knowledge of the sense of reality’, ‘Belief, disbelief and conviction’ in Further Contributions To The Theory And Technique of Psychoanalysis.

not only in the puzzle-box, but as a result of solving her task she changes also from within. She gets satiated, more experienced and familiarised with the problem-situation. We say that an organism gets affected by her own behaviour and experience. Now individuals may set before them the task of being affected and of being suitably changed from within. By drugging themselves individuals do get insensitive to pain at least temporarily. Similarly, in relation to art, literature, specially tragedies, individuals do undergo certain experiences which they highly value. I dare hold that religious experiences are akin to experiences in relation to great works of art and literature. The artistic products owe their motivation and construction to the inner needs of the artist. The ‘god’ of religion is akin to wish-product. At least this is the view of Freud concerning god statements. As he noted only the neurotic side of religion, so he derided god-statements. The whole thing in religion, according to Freud, "is so patently infantile, so incongruous with reality, that to one whose attitude to humanity is friendly it is painful to think that the majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life."  

I do not agree with Freud’s explanation of religion because it is full of unverifiable hypotheses and does not take into account the significance of god-statements for human history and for individual’s psychic health and happiness\(^{21}\). But Freud is right, I think, in holding that god-statements pertain to psychic domain. However, it is Jung who holds that god-statements have both psychological sense and significance.

For Jung, in each individual there is a central or a master drive to become a whole. Usually in the first half of life, according to him, this takes the form of strengthening one’s ego which is formed out of active commerce with the outer world. However, even satisfactory progress in ego-formation is felt inadequate in the second half of life, since the demands of the inner psyche, at this stage get insistent. The problem of recentring at once becomes a persistent problem. The achievement of a new centre is felt as numinous of religious experience. God-statements for Jung refer to the encounter with and assimilation of the archetypes which well up from the depth of the Unconscious with their accompanying feeling-tones and dynamic innervations. Rama or Krishna or Christ are so many mana personalities which individuals encounter at a certain stage in their development towards self-realization. Whenever they meet them in their visions or dreams or phantasies, there is always a stirring or a shaking experience for the individual. By assimilating these archetypes the individual expands his personality and gains peace which passes all understanding.

Jung mentions four stages of Shadow—Anima, Anima, Mana personalities and Mandala Archetypes in the process of self-realization or individuation. Each of these four stages yields numinous experience. Which one of them is the highest? Of course, the manadala-experience is the highest. This

\(^{20}\) Civilization and its discontents—p. 23.

\(^{21}\) For a critical account, see the author’s forthcoming volume ‘Freudianism and Religion’ (Thacker Spink).
is realized by the rare few. However, each stage is equally true if it offers 'peace and pistis' to an individual and gives him the feeling that he has realized now what he was destined for. Hence, Jung teaches the relativity of gods. By the way his theory supports also the correlativeity of gods and their worshippers. Individuals belong to different types according to their attitudes, functions and mental make-up. So a god who is appropriate for one type of individuals is not so for other types. As the individuals are, so are their gods, and vice versa. This appropriateness can be ascertained by the readiness, promptness, intensity, expansiveness of the personality, psychic health and happiness of the individual as soon as he has an encounter with his god. If there is all-out commitment to one's god and if there is also a correlative feeling of peace and pistis, a feeling of having reached one's destination, then the religious experience may be styled as genuine.

**IS GOD A CREATURE OF ONE'S FANCY?**

No mistake would be greater, according to Jung. The god who comes up in one's vision, dreams and phantasies, Jung holds, does not depend on one's will. The individual is gripped, seized and controlled by his god. This was observed long time ago by James also.

"...the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power." 

No doubt, principalities and powers are within us, but we need not create them:

"It is merely incumbent on us to choose the master we wish to serve, so that his service shall be our safeguard against being mastered by the 'other' whom we have not chosen. We not create 'God', we choose him".

Most probably because god is within an individual's psyche, so from this people infer that god is a subjective entity. They forget as Jung correctly reminds us that psyche is an independent reality on par with the external world. The Unconscious which is the seat of religion, both according to Freud and Jung, is also racial, primordial and collective, even according to Freud. So God having his seat in the Unconscious cannot be said to be a private entity.

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22 *Modern man in search of a soul*—p. 282 Here William James agrees with Jung concerning the relativity of religious types and sects and creeds (The Varieties—pp. 135, 487; Pluralistic Universe—pp. 315-316; Will to believe—pp. xii-xiii. 30)

23 Vol. 11—pp. 7, 14, 22.

24 The Varieties—p. 381.


27 Moses and monotheism—pp. 151, 159-161.


29 W. T. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*—pp. 139, 137. Stace has devoted the whole chapter 3 concerning the objectivity of god. Of course, by 'objectivity' here is meant what Kant meant by it as that which all men dream and must for ever dream is not a dream but a reality. Here by 'objectivity' we do not mean that which does not involve anything of the personality of the reporter of the objective facts.
God-experience is distinguishable from fancy by the fact that a standardized reference is possible here.

"And this means that mystical experience is potentially just as 'public' as sense-experience, since to say that an experience is public only means that a large number of private experiences are similar, or would be similar if the appropriate steps were taken"\(^{29}\).

True, god-experience has its locus in an individual, but it is shared by a society—by a *consensus gentium*\(^ {30} \).

Further, religious experience is quite different from 'demonia possession'. The latter has a disintegrating influence on the personality, but religious experience helps to make life healthier, more beautiful, more complete and more satisfactory to the individual\(^ {31} \).

Again, the distinction of subject and object cannot be applied to psychical facts. All that can be said here is that a certain communicable language is possible about 'gods'. Thanks to dogmas and creeds, we certainly do possess a language which an adherent in a religious community does use with greater or less precision. The saying of prayers, hymn-singing, recitals from the Holy Books etc., are the physical forms of religious language. The various kinds of rituals also come under the same heading. Fervour, intensity, regularity, evangelistic zeal speak both for the adequacy of a certain kind of religious language for the members of a particular religious community and for the reality of the objects of worship.

True, in matters of religion that which is felt most intensely in the depth of one's psyche is most true. However, neither the psyche nor an individual is a capsular cocoon. An individual is in an inter-active commerce with an outer world and fellowmen. The reality felt most inwardly is also realized to be all-comprehensive, all-pervasive and equally true for all. As a result of spilt of spread–out effect of an intense religious feeling, god appears to be infinite and all–loving. The reality is felt so keenly that its denial appears to be impossible. Hence, the necessity with regard to the 'necessary Being of god' is psychological and not logical.

Thus, we conclude that god-statements have empirical meaning in terms of psychologism. They have significance because they add meaning, value, health and happiness to individuals. They have also a holistic function. They tend to evoke the best in man and help him to become a fully blossomed flower as is prescribed to him by his destiny.


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SCIENCE AND THE DEOCENTRIC PREDICAMENT

Why do the social sciences, the sciences of man, today lag behind the physical and biological sciences?

Several answers have been given to this question. It has been said, for example, that human beings are fundamentally irrational, that they are inherently incapable of being studied by science, that they represent an ultimate surd in the scheme of things: that, in short, the very idea of extending scientific method and scientific knowledge to cover human subject-matter rests upon a flagrant misconception.

A second theory has it that man is not fundamentally mysterious, that his behavior is no more irrational by nature than is the behavior of atoms or stars, that given a proper perspective it can be seen to exhibit patterns of regularity quite comparable to any discovered by the exact sciences. The difficulty lies solely in the achieving of the necessary perspective. Whether this is possible to merely human minds is of course a question. The evidence available so far would seem to indicate that it is not.

According to a third theory, the two sets of sciences are strictly incomparable. The subject-matter of the natural sciences is such that in relation to it man's knowledge tends to be cumulative. In these fields verified generalizations can be handed down from generation to generation. In the social sciences this is not the case. Here there is a systematic feed-back of knowledge into subject-matter, and this insures that social behavior at time $T^2$ cannot be what it was at time $T^1$, and that at time $T^3$ cannot remain what it was at time $T^2$. Thus, thanks to social science, we do not behave as our ancestors did, and our descendants will not and cannot be expected to behave as we do. Either, then, there is no lag, since the dimensions within which the separate disciplines move are
commensurable, or "lag" is simply a name for the relation all non-cumulative sciences have with respect to cumulative ones.

A fourth hypothesis has it that the concept of a science of man is fundamentally sound but that intellectually trained persons have been slow to take advantage of this fact. The social sciences, on this hypothesis, are still in their infancy but are destined soon to catch up with their more mature relations. The lag, therefore, is real, but is temporary only. Given enough time it will disappear.

Closely related to this is the Marxian thesis that objectivity with regard to social questions is impossible so long as the human family is divided into conflicting classes. The advent of social science properly so called awaits the advent of a world-wide classless society. When that condition is realized the sciences of man will take their place side by side with the sciences of nature—but not before. During the present historical epoch, in the greater part of the world at least, the lag we are discussing is inevitable.

With such a multiplicity of alternative ways at hand in which to account for something, it seems presumptuous to offer still another. I venture to do so in this case because some of the alternatives offered are contradictory—progress in social science cannot, for example, be both premature and impossible—and because, taken together, they do not seem to me to exhaust the possibilities. None of them appears to take into account the history of philosophy, and only one the philosophy of history. The explanation I offer is therefore partly historical, partly philosophical and dialectical, to some extent even Hegelian.

I wish to propound a double thesis. First, that since "lag" is a relative term, since no X can "lag" except in relation to some Y which either is or is thought to be not lagging, any serious examination of the alleged lag should give consideration to the condition of the second term as well as the first. It is barely conceivable that some part of the gap is due not to faulting or deficiency in the X here concerned but to a kind of elephantiasis in the Y. Second, that if and insofar as this is the case, if that is to say a pathological factor is operative in the natural sciences, the etiology of this can be traced to sources in the general field of philosophy, which is the immediate ancestor to both sets of disciplines.

If this thesis can be established it will reveal, I think, that the situation here concerned contains within itself no self-corrective tendencies, that the standard diagnoses of it tend rather to be self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating. The observation, on the other hand, that this is so does contain self-corrective tendencies, for this thesis places the blame squarely on philosophy, and once the need for them is recognized changes in philosophy are relatively easy to effect.

Western philosophy was dominated fifty years ago by one of its subdivisions namely, epistemology. And Western epistemology may fairly be said to have reached its high water mark then in the appearance, within
two years of each other, of two widely published articles. The first of these, "The Ego-Centric Predicament," by Ralph Barton Perry, came out in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* in 1910. The second, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," was authored by Bertrand Russell in 1912. It appeared as a chapter in his book, *The Problems of Philosophy*. A glance at the contents of these papers is necessary to make clear what philosophy through epistemology contributed, and failed to contribute, to science in the half-century just passed.

The ego-centric predicament was defined by Perry as "the predicament in which every investigator finds himself when he attempts to solve.....the problem of determining the modification of things by the knowing of them." It is peculiarly embarrassing to philosophers inasmuch as this problem is a philosophical one *par excellence*. For unless it can be determined whether and how much we change the world by virtue of our knowing it speculation concerning its status, or even its reality, independently of that act of knowing must forever lack empirical significance. Only the fond hope that such determination is possible had kept metaphysical speculation alive; but this hope, Perry asserted peremptorily, is groundless. Whenever things known are involved, he contended, the compresence of a conscious ego is invariably necessary.

The relation $Re (E)$, that is, the relationship to a knowing ego, he wrote:

is peculiarly ubiquitous. There can be no question concerning the fact: it owes its importance in the estimation of philosophers to its being one of the few facts to which philosophy itself originally called attention. Science......has no occasion to eliminate consciousness altogether; and therefore has not discovered that it is impossible. We cannot, then, disagree as to the fact......

Perry's "The Ego-Centric Predicament" thus effectively reinstated for the modern age the quasi-solipsistic subjectivism of Berkeley and Hume. It did so with the stated aim of "freeing the operation or relation 'know' from its narrower intellectualistic meaning," and the implied aim of strengthening realism by impugning ontological idealism. In both these aims it fell short—notably in its intent to do full justice to the meaning of the verb "to know"—but it exercised a nonetheless determining influence on the succeeding decades of American epistemology.

Russell's famous classification of the knowledge we have of things, into knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, represents an apparent advance over the Berkeleyan position defended by Perry. "The chief importance of knowledge by description," we are told in Russell's article, "is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience." For we can "have knowledge by description of things which we have never experienced...Until this is understood, most of our knowledge must remain mysterious and therefore doubtful."

The author strove valiantly to show how indubitable knowledge of
things might be justified. The primary objects of knowledge by acquaintance are, of course, not things but sense-data. But acquaintance gives us also knowledge of our own past, through memory; of the contents of our own minds, through introspection; and "probably" (the antics are the author's) of our own selves, likewise through introspection. It also gives us, through conception, knowledge of universals such as "whiteness, diversity, brotherhood." All of these are, as the writer stated. "extensions beyond sense-data." But they are still not things. For knowledge of things a type of knowing beyond acquaintance was required, and knowledge by description offered itself as a way of filling this need.

Yet what Russell gave with one hand he took away with the other. In the analysis of descriptions, he wrote in this same paper, the fundamental principle is this: "Every proposition which we understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted." If this were not so, he argued, we might "make a judgment or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing about." The possibility that one might know the judged object in some way other than by acquaintance was thus discounted, and philosophers were assured again, though from a different direction, that the ego-centric universe is the only one with respect to which genuine knowledge is available.

Though no brief summary can do justice to the insights contained in the foregoing articles, the quotations and paraphrases I have given will clearly evidence I think their subjectivist orientation. At the very least they suggest a question of some importance. In what manner was a scientist, a zoologist, let us say, or a geologist or an astronomer, most likely to be affected by such theories of knowledge? Would he, or would he not, be a better scientist for having learned about the ego-centric predicament? Or would he stolidly refuse to let information concerning it change in any way his behavior as a scientist?

One is tempted in this situation to choose the last alternative, to say that the scientist would go about his business and let the philosophers go about theirs. By and large this answer is I think correct. Certainly it represents a choice which many scientists did make in the past fifty years. But a significant number, I am convinced, were not satisfied to stop at this point. In action, and unconsciously perhaps rather than consciously, they positively repudiated the subjectivist philosophy, and they did so in the interest of discovering truths about a world which is common to all mankind. And not the poorest of them, having learned that philosophers are not always the wisest counsellors, compensated for the latter's errors by adopting a diametrically opposite position. Having by dint of much labor escaped from the snares of egocentricism—a fate epistemologists insisted they could not avoid—they became easy victims to a far different orientation.

An entire history of thought might be written to show the regularly alternating emphases, on the paramount importance of the self in know-
ledge at any period, one the utter irrelevance of the self to knowledge during the period succeeding. One could make a strong case for a "challenge and response" pattern in intellectual history, quite independently of the one Toynbee offers in explanation of the rise and fall of cultures. A "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" motif reminiscent of Hegel and Marx would also be appropriate in some instances. Though historiography dedicated to patterns such as these is more often than not fallacious, the insight inspiring it is I think fundamentally sound. Partial truths, dogmatically asserted, do tend to call forth equally partial and dogmatic counter-assertions.

The truth responsible for the so-called ego-centric predicament was a partial one because it failed to recognize the increments to knowledge resulting from collective wisdom embodied in language. The subdivision of knowing into knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description was similarly partial. Even when extended—as Russell in another paper did extend it—to include knowledge of truths, it leaves out of account the knowledge creating function of the language structures by which such truths are expressed.

There is then a third kind of knowledge arising from the nature of language, which supplements in a unique way both the first-hand experience engendering knowledge by acquaintance and the second-hand experience associated with knowledge by description. It is achieved through extension from the other two kinds, just as knowledge by description is achieved through extension imaginatively, of the observer from the perspective determined by acquaintance to a second-hand perspective determined vicariously. For want of a better term I designate this third cognitive mode knowledge by projection.

The driving force behind all knowledge is curiosity. This compels the learner to widen and deepen first-hand experience to its extreme limits, and when these are reached to make as much use as possible of experiences available to others. But, fortunately or otherwise, curiosity does not cease when it encounters the limits of even secondhand knowledge. It continues to demand satisfaction. In childhood it achieves this through fairy stories and myths. In adulthood it rejects these means as juvenile, though the questions they were designed to answer remain. Imagination again, therefore, steps into the breach. In place of fairy stories it now creates treatises concerning entelechies, phlogiston, celestial ethers, vital fluids, mutations of diverse kinds and, to mention something quite recent, right—and left-handed neutrinos. Some of these wonderful creatures will last a millenium, some a couple of centuries, some a generation. All depends on the amount and kinds of criticism thrown up by the environment, and upon the circumstance of there being a dearth or an abundance of competing mythologies. Every one, however, regardless of its life span, will meet the demands of the curiosity which engendered it.

Notwithstanding its dependence therefore, on both first-and second-
hand experience, every original treatise in science is primarily a work of imagination. Knowledge by projection hence plays a role in science comparable to the one it plays in literature and art.

Though no one thing is by its nature any better or worse than another as an illustration of the kinds of knowledge we have of things, an especially interesting example is offered by the cesium-powered wristwatch. Any ordinary owner of such an article can truthfully say that he knows it, solely because he has handled it, has consulted it and so checked its timekeeping ability, has in short become as well acquainted with it as one does normally with any other piece of jewellery. But even the ordinary owner of such a watch is not likely to stop with knowledge of it by acquaintance. He will undoubtedly wonder what makes it tick, or if it does not tick, then, what makes the hands go round. And the literature accompanying it or his jeweller or someone else who has seen the watch’s insides will tell him there are gears attached to the hands and wheels attached to the gears, that each wheel has cogs which mesh with those of a smaller one, that the smallest wheel is on a tiny pinion activated by a particle of cesium, and that this is what makes the hands go round.

Thus knowledge by description answers the questions left unsettled by simple acquaintance. At the same time, however, knowledge by description provides material for further questions which neither it nor knowledge by acquaintance can answer. Precisely how does the cesium activate the opinion, and what activates the cesium? If one could convert oneself magically into a microscopic particle of cesium he might have the knowledge by acquaintance required to answer these new demands. Or, failing this, one could obtain satisfying answers to them through knowledge by description by communicating with anyone else who had so converted himself. But these conditions are contrary to fact. Particles of cesium have an indiscernible and exclusive claim to the points of view they represent, a claim which no human being certainly is ever likely to abrogate. If we, therefore, wish to enjoy the cesium particle’s perspective we must do so not only vicariously but imaginatively; we must project ourselves preleptically into a situation which by its nature is beyond both first- and second-hand acquaintance. For the sake of and in the interests of knowledge we must become creative scientists. This requires that we pretend to be not only some person other than ourselves but a being other than human.

This third kind of knowledge is therefore, first, a venture into the realm of make-believe, an act of imagination; second, a leap into the unknown, a saltation or break from the usual methods of gathering facts; third, an act made necessary by the expectations which acquaintance and description create but leave unfulfilled. As to the way in which we take this leap we are free to choose but we are not allowed to escape taking this leap—for that is part and parcel of the knowledge-gathering enterprise. Religion, music, architecture, literature, creative science, all are but alternative ways of doing it.
dwell at some length on knowledge by projection not merely because notwithstanding its all but universal occurrence in science, few methodologists or philosophers of science have deigned to recognize it, but rather because important consequences for the study of man followed from this oversight, all of which converged on the extraordinary notion that science as such has no standpoint. This notion, in turn, has supported the myth that the pronouncements of science embody simply facts per se, involving no relation to angle or perspective. Such a myth was of course plausible, for projection does make possible extension of human standpoints in every direction almost limitlessly. It was at the same time flattering to the scientist, since it ascribed to him one of the prequisites of omniscience, namely, the all-seeing eye. In a climate of opinion congenial to such a conception of knowledge, the devotee of science would have had to be more or less than simply human to escape its influence.

I do not wish to deny or in any way to belittle the accomplishments of the natural sciences. These it can be said in all fairness, have been prodigious. My point is simply that they have been achieved on the basis of inevitably histrionic preconceptions; that the preconceptions in this case have been deo-centric ones, although their make-believe character still awaits acknowledgement; and that such preconceptions are the natural counterpoise to the equally untenable egocentric ones seriously advocated by epistemologists in the past generation. It is worthy of comment that philosophers meanwhile, instead of observing and helping to control this pathological growth have unwittingly encouraged it.

In what way the natural sciences might have progressed under a frankly homo-centric orientation—with knowledge by projection legitimized and rationally conceived as a proper scientific procedure—is of course conjectural. In any event standpointless deocentricism, the orientation presently in vogue, is profoundly inimical to the social sciences. For it forces the scientist to identify himself, not merely methodologically or tentatively but permanently, with "the spectator of all time and all existence" immortalized by Plato. In an effort to carry off this difficult role the scientist-actor reports on everything under the sun—with one exception. That exception, the one thing he does not scrutinize scientifically, is himself and his all-too-human habitat. For the Vatican from which his descriptions and projections emanate does not, and naturally cannot, fall within his scope; diagnostic instruments refuse to focus when turned in its direction.

He who in the name of science undertakes to explore this forbidden area places himself in double jeopardy. He is likely, first, to become disenchanted, to learn that standpointlessness is simply a pose and, in the final analysis, an impossible one to maintain. Second, he runs the risk of ricocheting into the waiting arms of egocentricism, a prospect which alone should be enough to frighten away trespassers.

In summary, the lag we have been considering is partly real, partly
illusory. Insofar as intellectual workers attracted by the prestige of the natural sciences have neglected social science disciplines, the lag is real. But to the extent that this prestige owes its being to an unrealistic and misleading image of what science itself is the lag is illusory. If and when this distorted image can be corrected, or replaced by one involving an honestly homo-centric orientation, both disciplines will stand on an equal footing and an objective judgment of their progress will then be possible. But the changes needed for even this small gain are not inconsiderable. They involve the philosophies of cultures. Yet changes in these, like war and peace, being in the minds of men, with perceptions of possibilities and values. And these, I am optimistic enough to believe, are circumstances over which we—even we academicians—have a measure of control.
SPINOZA'S QUEST
FOR CERTAINTY

The quest for peace and certainty has become the Via Dolorosa of Western man whose civilization has turned against itself and repudiated the values on which alone it can survive. The age of anxiety writes a strange postscript to the triumphs of science over environment denying inner peace to man even though he achieve a truce of nations. What William E. Hocking calls "the freedom to hope" implies a spiritual dimension of man and a new grasp of philosophical perspectives, in the framework of a scientific civilization. The story of modern philosophy has been largely a search for this metaphysics of hope.

In the story of philosophy there is no more original and thoroughly emancipated character than the famous Jewish thinker Benedict Spinoza. That seventeenth century Holland should have produced such a mind is not surprising for even in that age of strife and religious fanaticism there was a liberal tradition in that tiny but great-souled country. Judged by modern ideals what was called freedom in the seventeenth century left much to be desired. Nevertheless Jewish refugees and oppressed liberals found in Holland a measure of freedom denied them at home.

Not long after the revolt of the Netherlands a colony of Jewish refugees from the Spanish peninsula settled in Amsterdam. Here Spinoza was born in 1632. He was educated in the synagogue school where his teachers soon came to look upon him with much pride. His early education was hardly adapted to the needs of a future philosopher for it was confined to synagogue learning. The little Jewish community was very conservative and did not trouble itself about the new science that was awakening the mind of Europe.

While still a boy Spinoza became aware of the contrast between the narrow schooling and Talmudic lore of the synagogue and the liberal
culture beyond the ghetto of Amsterdam. His interest in the new learning of Europe found no favor with the elders of the cautious Jewish community; so Spinoza sought elsewhere for his training in Latin, then the language of science. A free thinking Dutchman, Van den Ende, initiated the rather frail young Jew into the new world of science, mathematics and political thought. For a young man of twenty brought up in the half light of Jewish tradition this contact with a many-sided personality was like stepping into a lighted room.

Soon the elders of the synagogue began to suspect that Spinoza was learning a good deal beside Latin and grammar at Van den Ende’s house. Spinoza’s school days were hardly over when he was diplomatically asked to recant his unorthodox views on religion. His father was a man of standing in the congregation and no one wanted a scandal. The elders found the young rebel mild enough but deaf to their entreaties and threats. At length things came to a head. In 1656, not long after his father’s death, he was officially cursed and cast out from Israel. He changed his name from Baruch to Benedict which means blessed though he could hardly have felt blessed just then. At this late date such intolerance seems strange to us. Perhaps our treatment of economic reformers will seem equally strange to our descendants three centuries hence.

To any other young man of twenty-three such fanaticism would have been destruction, for after all, he was still confirmed in Jewish ways and associations. Even his sister denounced him and tried to disinherit him. Had our young outcast been a less balanced character he doubtless would have become an embittered radical. But he possessed among other traits of the wonderful Jewish character the rare ability to preserve mental health under seemingly impossible conditions. He kept his faith in the finer side of life. “All the better”, was his calm reflection, “they do not drive me to anything I should not have done of my own accord, had I not dreaded the scandal.”

The simplicity of Spinoza’s life is the grand simplicity of a life completely governed by reason. In later life he repeatedly refused help from admirers, being content to earn his living as a lens maker and calling no man master. After his untimely death at the age of forty-four his friends published his masterpiece the Ethics. The author of this great classic lived with remarkable plainness and exemplified the ideals he taught, earning the sobriquet blessed Spinoza.

The age of Spinoza had outgrown the sanctions of Medieval thought. Thinking minds had broken with old traditions and were captivated by the new science of Galileo. Though alchemists still groped for the philosopher’s stone all things occult were banished from the thoughts of the wise. The ruling ideas of the seventeenth century were that nature is a mechanism, that human reason, not magic, is most competent to understand

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1 Sir Frederick Pollock’s *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy* (2d. ed., Macmillan) p.19
and explain natural laws, and that nature's truth is essentially mathe-
ematical.
Previous ages had found the world mysterious, a fairy land of gods
of wood and stream. The wisest were often pathetically superstitious and
bound to primitive beliefs. We read in old literature, like Homer and
Herodotus, how childlike were even kings in the presence of adverse nat-
ural forces. For thousands of years life had been passed in bondage to
things little understood and often feared. Though the ignorant still carried
amulets it was different in the seventeenth century. Thinking men had
learned to see in nature a realm of law that clear thinking and exact
definition was most fitted to understand. This new scientific attitude soon
gave man the freedom and power magicians and occultists sought so many
years with pathetic futility.
Now Spinoza, though a true mystic, a profoundly religious soul, was
a typical thinker of this scientific age. The modern mind began with its
declaration of intellectual independence, its faith in reason. After a time
a reaction set in and then came the years of doubt, inner conflict the effects
of which are felt to this day. It was believed that reason could not vindic-
cate our higher faiths. It was claimed that once you admit nature is a
mechanism it is only a step to the materialism that claims man is a mach-
ine whose mental life is but a passing glow in the darkness of blindly
driven forces. Indeed Hobbes had already reached a consistent materialism
in the seventeenth century. Spinoza was keenly aware of the conflict bet-
ween science and religion, faith and reason and had read Maimonides' learned attempt to unite Scripture with Aristotle's conceptions. He must
have had his inner conflicts too but while still a young man he realized
that to abandon faith in reason and natural law was to muddle back into
the Middle Ages. In that way one might save faith but at the price of
putting it on the level with rationalizing and priestly authority. He went
forward with the thought that God's world was a rational and profoundly
reasonable world that expressed divine thought in immutable law. He
believed that scientific thought if rightly understood and followed far
enough would point unmistakably to a comprehensive world view, to a
level of philosophical thought which unifies human understanding of life
in a spirit of calm detachment above the tumult of controversy. For to see
nature scientifically is to rise above the illusions of sense and understand
things in terms of order, law, cause and effect. Then nature no longer
seems capricious and utterly alien to mind. Modern writers sometimes
represent man's quest for knowledge and rational living as an idealistic
battle against a sheerly brutal and indifferent universe against a universal
order that is not friendly to man's higher faiths. But for Spinoza the
nature of the universe and the nature of man go together. He believed in
the dignity and worth of man when he has reached his full moral stature
and admitted nothing into his philosophy that is not illustrated in human
history and clearly seen by reason. He says:

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As regards the human mind, I believe that it is also a part of nature; for I maintain that there exists in nature an infinite power of thinking, which in so far as it is infinite, contains subjectively the whole of nature, and its thoughts proceed in the same manner as nature—that is, in the sphere of ideas. Further, I take the human mind to be identical with this said power, not in so far as it is infinite and perceives the whole of nature, but in so far as it is finite, and perceives only the human body. In this manner, I maintain that the human mind is part of an infinite understanding.\(^2\)

In spite of his famous geometrical method Spinoza’s central thought of world unity and human intelligence as a spark of cosmic mind is comparatively easy to grasp. It is not the airy abstraction of some ferociously highbrow pedant whose meditations are steeped in Medieval Scholasticism. On the contrary the harmonized life of reason and spiritual rest is the polestar of Spinoza’s thought. Human welfare is seldom out of his mind. The philosophy of Spinoza is not a philosophy of escape but a way of life. He recognizes no conflict between spirit and matter as two foreign powers. For the natural world without and the spiritual world within are not intrinsically alien and repellant to each other but co-operative expressions of one infinite reality. Like Socrates Spinoza identified virtue not with a strained attempt to observe arbitrary rules imposed from without but with self-knowledge and reasoned insight.

The infinite variety we experience in this bustling world of change is the expression of divine law which rules human life as the higher truth rules the lower, as the storm rules the raindrop. Everything in nature is grounded in and comprehended by Divine Thought. God has written His all-pervading character in the changeless laws of matter as well as in the laws of mind. Nothing is the creature of chance or blind caprice. All things are rationally linked together and related to the Ultimate Cause. The idea of chance has been exploited to the limit in scientific accounts of the origin of the universe. This is rather strange because chance, the idea of meaningless caprice, is not congenial to the scientific mind. The late Dr. Edwin Frost said,

I cannot imagine the planets getting together and deciding under what law they would operate. Nor do we find anywhere, in the Solar or Stellar systems, the debris that would necessarily accumulate if the Universe had been operating at random.\(^3\)

For Spinoza our world is a world of immutable law which makes no exceptions and grants no favors, an essentially orderly cosmos in which nothing lives by chance.

Everything is to be understood either as the result of its own nature or some higher nature. Now if this be so Spinoza claims there must be one supreme existence beyond the relativity of every finite point of view

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\(^2\) Above quotation from Spinoza’s letter to Oldenburg (1665), number 32 in Van Vlotan edition.

\(^3\) The above quotation from Frost was obtained from a magazine article I read several years ago. The article in question was an interview with Doctor Frost by a writer who was getting scientists’ opinion on religion.
that explains and comprehends all the rest. The God-idea of Spinoza is
more easy for us to grasp because three centuries of science have trained
us to see the togetherness of things, the relativity and interdependence
of all forms of life and activity. He denied the permanent distinction be-
 tween mind and matter without denying the reality of consciousness. Both
are parallel attributes of God or Substance, a term which has the advan-
tage of being free from misleading theological associations. The limitation
of our understanding confines our knowledge of Substance to the
two attributes of Thought and Extension, or spatiality. But God has
counter attributes besides these. His nature is like an infinite sacred
scripture that is endlessly translated into many languages, or a cosmic
symphony that is endlessly transcribed for different instruments and plas-
ners. There are possibly countless orders of life beyond our remotest fancy
though we cannot guess what they might be. Spinoza honored reason but
did not think the limits of our wits were the limits of truth.

In contrast with Medieval thought, which it supplanted, modern
science shifted the accent from spirit to matter, from idealism to materia-
ism and empiricism. Nature was championed by the new science as the
only object of exact knowledge and everything not tangible was relegated
to the realm of opinion. Agnostics rejected the claims of religion on the
ground that mechanism of nature was the only reality. From the new
scientific point of view these sturdy empiricists were not so mistaken,
for viewed solely through the eyes of mathematical science nature san-
cctions no spiritual values. Questions of immortality and the foundations
of faith belong to the borderland, the remoter frontiers of science. They
lead us into the realm of philosophy and religion.

Spinoza was too well versed in scientific thought not to see its limi-
tations and at the same time the weakness of any appeal to gaps in scienti-
fic knowledge by religious pleaders who sought to save their position by
pointing out facts science could not immediately explain. For every ad-
vance in science was teaching its followers to regard such refractory prob-
lems as a means of correcting and clarifying their idea of nature's laws.
Early in life Spinoza was convinced that the conflict between science and
religion was at bottom due to some fault of our uninstructed human type
of consciousness which in its ignorance sets artificial walls within the
mansion of wisdom. These mysteries which confront us on the border-
land of science are closely allied to the problem of human understand-
ing. They demand a critical examination of every motive that lies behind our
point of view, of the processes of reason itself. Kant had no monopoly
of criticism of the knowing process. Long before him Spinoza ventured a
critique of reason and pointed out that learning is an active process that
should merge ultimately in an immovably peaceful reverence for the divine
manifestation of truth in natural law and infinite power.

The idea of Infinite Power or Activity is given a materialistic cast in
modern cosmologies of thinkers like Spencer and Huxley. But in recent
years materialism has become old fashioned and mathematical physicists
now look with favor on the idea of God as the Supreme Mathematician.
A noted astronomer has said the universe is more like a thought than a
machine. Each year the mysterious universe yields more of its secrets to
the solvent of mathematical thought. No doubt Spinoza, a lover of
mathematics, would approve the thought of mathematical laws as the
external expression of infinite mind that reaches the remotest solitudes of
limitless space. However it is not likely he would accept the idea of God
as the Supreme Mathematician without reservations. Not because he
does not believe in a super-personal God but because the material realm
whose mechanism mathematical truth so beautifully illustrates is only one
attribute of God. The nature of God is not fully expressed in spatial exis-
tence that mathematics comprehends. That represents only a merest
fraction of God’s manifestation. What we see out there in space consists
of modes of one Attribute of God, the Attribute of Extension. But Thou-
ght is another Attribute of God whose modes constitute the inner realms
of mind and spirit. We should not base our interpretation of God on
only one aspect of His existence.

In recent years the exponents of emergent evolution have put forward
a novel and most significant conception of mind as an emergent quality.
Nothing illustrates the modernity and freshness of Spinoza’s thought more
than the attention bestowed upon his philosophy by the most eminent
and forward looking scientists of our day. Discussing the relation between
the two Attributes of Mind and Matter in the process of evolution the
distinguished scientist C. Lloyd Morgan says in “Emergent Evolution,”
(Holt, 1923, p. 28):

It need hardly be added that there is no causal relation of the one
attribute to the other. To modernize Spinoza: The orderly plan of
advance in the psychical attribute is strictly correlated with that in
the physical attribute. We have ‘one and the same thing (evolution),
though expressed in different ways.”

Like Spinoza Professor Morgan correlates the successive stages of
matter and life with mental or psychic attributes. Space does not permit
us to discuss his conception of mind as an emergent quality.

In the light of astronomy and geology the span of human history passes
before us as a flash in the eye of eternity. We no longer fancy we were the
only creatures placed on this earth that can give meaning to life, that with-
out us the universe is mindless and purposeless! Science has prepared us
for a broader, more philosophical view. A scientist when asked if God
troubled Himself about men at all replied that it depended on how big
a God one believed in. Spinoza’s God is so absolutely infinite that with-
out Him nothing can be conceived. “Hence we clearly understand,” says
Spinoza, “that our salvation, or blessedness, or liberty consists in a con-
stant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of God toward men.”

4 *Ethics*, Part 5, in Note to Proposition 36 (White’s translation).
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THE SPIRITUALITY OF WESTERN "HUMANISM"

There are four reasons for writing this brief article.¹  
In the first place, the writer some time ago published in *The Aryan Path*² an article ("The West as Not Materialistic") in which reference was made to the fact that some of the philosophical attitudes and moral activities of people in the, generally speaking, Christian West continue to be branded even by scholars in the East as "not spiritual" but as "mere humanism," and sometimes as "worldly". And this despite the fact that these Christian (or Judeo-Christian) Westerners regard their own moral philosophy and actions as essentially spiritual and religious in motive, purpose, foundation, and justification. At that time the writer stated that there are numerous textual—meaning Biblical—admonitions to justify, to demand, and to explain such a spiritual interpretation. But, unfortunately, the specific defense of that thesis was not presented at that time, and a more thoroughgoing—even if still brief—explanation is called for.

Second, in a volume to be presented to Dr. and President Radhakrishnan, certainly the world leader in the area of mutual understanding between the peoples of Asia and the peoples of the West, and especially in the areas of philosophy and religion, it seems quite appropriate to examine this problem. Although Dr. Radhakrishnan probably would not agree with the thesis of this paper in all of its ultimate bearings, the fundamental point of view described here would seem to conform quite thoroughly with his general religious philosophy, and certainly in part with his deep concern about the common spirituality of peoples, East and West. It is surely in accord with his words: "A spiritual view is sustained not only

¹ This paper makes no pretensions of being comprehensive or conclusive, but it does claim to be factual enough to undermine certain serious misunderstandings.  
² Published in *The Indian Institute of World Culture*, Reprint No. 26, March, 1958.
by insight but also by a rational philosophy and sound social insti-
tutions," and with the thesis of his volume Religion and Society.4

Third, this paper is an attempt to reply to the aforementioned and
constantly repeated Asian interpretation of Western spirituality, especially
when it takes the form of the practice of humanitarianism or humanism
and is then considered not spirituality, not religion, but "mere humanism"
worldliness, and, at the extreme, even materialism! This charge is not
against the admittedly humanistic—or even "merely humanistic"—think-
ers and movements in the West but against the West as a whole.

Fourth, the writer is deeply concerned with the mutual understanding
of East and West, and especially in terms of their respective fundamental
convictions in religion and philosophy. In the matter of mutual under-
standing, one or two important facets of the situation seem to receive little
attention, and, in the case under consideration, this is tragic for mutual
understanding. One of these generally ignored conditions is the fact that
mutual understanding is a two-way process whereby Asians must attempt
to understand Western points of view just as Westerners must understand
Eastern points of view—as, fortunately, seems to be the contemporary
trend. The second special consideration lies in the fact that mutual under-
standing depends, much more deeply than is generally realized, upon
seeing the other point of view from within its own context and perspec-
tive as far as possible rather than from the outside and from the biased
point of view of one's own tradition and one's own concepts and attitudes.
In the present situation—the effort to achieve genuine understanding of
the Western attitude which sees spirituality in its so-called humanism—
may be difficult for Easterners to reach into the minds of the West, but,
difficult though it is, it is indispensable to any genuine understanding.
Also, such genuine understanding is impossible without a prior genuine
willingness and even a determination to understand the other point
of view truly and as it is understood by the other tradition itself. An
attempt will be made here to express the Western point of view in a way
which will be intelligible to—and possibly worthy of appreciation by those
who do not necessarily believe this point of view and who certainly do
not as yet appreciate it, finding it falling far short of the ideal of true
spirituality, or a truly spiritual life.

The major point to be made in explanation—and possibly in defense
of the "humanism" or humanitarianism which seems to be so prominent
in Western culture is simply that such humanism or humanitarianism is
not mere humanism and is not worldly and is certainly not materialistic.
Such humanism is only part of the Western way of life—there is full-fledged
religion, too, and, generally speaking, this humanism or humanitarianism

3 Eastern Religions and Western Thought (Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 76.
Quoted by P. T. Raju as a key to the question of the status and significance of
religion in Indian thought and culture, in "Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian
Thought," in Charles A. Moore, ed., Philosophy and Culture—East and West

is spirituality grounded in this religion. This is true because it is intimately related to Christianity, and is thus authentic spirituality in practice.

To be sure, there is a considerable amount of mere humanism in Western culture, and some observers feel that this attitude is increasing. After all, the West is rather essentially a synthesis of Greek rationalism and humanism, on the one hand, and the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, on the other. But part of the genius of the West is and has been the fact that these two do not stand in contradiction to each other but have much in common or are at least compatible. The West, too, has a synthetic point of view—as does much of the East. Someone recently said in this connection—with America as his example: “A sense of charity stemming in part from the humanistic tradition and in part from that of Judeo-Christianity, coupled with the idea that the performance of acts that contribute to the well-being of individual persons and of society are in themselves religious acts of merit.” At least, that is the way Westerners—perhaps Americans especially—interpret such acts: that is what such acts mean to the people concerned, and that is their motive.

Of course, also, there are many, and perhaps an increasing number of, at least allegedly strictly humanistic people—both thinkers and people of action—who are, shall we say, pure humanists. There are humanists who deny, or at least ignore, the religious background of the Christian aspect of Western humanism and who think and act in terms of man as a product of bibliological evolution, though he is, of course, the highest product of that evolution. Also, there have been occasional serious humanistic—and anti-“spiritual”—movements in the history of Western thought and culture. There is no attempt here to deny or to belittle these. But, except possibly for the Greeks and the early Renaissance, this tendency has been rare in its expression and significance. It must be mentioned, too, that Western humanism is practically never “materialism”. (In America, for example, there have been and are some highly respected humanists—naturalistic and otherwise but not one of these can justly be called a “materialist”. They have been humanitarian and even “spiritual” in the anti-materialism sense that their philosophies foster the highest ideals of brotherhood, peace, man’s living up to the best that is in him, and even a religious sense of the almost infinite potentialities of every human being as created by, and sometimes in the image of God). Also, some thinkers have called themselves humanists without meaning that they believe that man is the ultimate reality and without at all denying the supremacy of God and the supreme truth and validity of the basic principles of religion. Some of these are outstanding members of the clergy. They think of themselves as humanists only because Christianity thinks so highly of man, a spiritual person created in the image of God and of supreme value in the eyes of God. This is Christian humanism.

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Despite some significant elements of mere humanism—if it must be called that—it is much closer to the facts to note that so-called humanism in the West, generally speaking, is not "self-sufficient humanism" with no outlook beyond the world; or merely "scientific humanism" or "mere humanism" of the biological kind, but is a very specific expression of the underlying spirituality and the essentials of the Christian religion in its doctrine of man, its conception of the relationship between God and man, and the demands it makes upon man. This is the essential compound point of this presentation. But just how can these statements be justified—if at all?

For one thing, few Westerners will admit that the worldly welfare of man is the ultimate purpose of life. Certainly the very great majority of Christians who make up Western culture would contend, with deep conviction, that spiritual salvation is the ultimate teaching of their religion. But, along with the realization of this more ultimate purpose of life, Christianity—the major religion of the West—is a religion of both worship of God and service to our fellow men—not a religion of contemplation. And it is very important to realize that these attitudes and practices, far from being in conflict, are essentially aspects of one religious purpose. In explaining the point made earlier to the effect that humanism is an expression of religion, it is essential to understand that, for Christianity, love of and service to our fellow men is an essential part of the worship of God—and emulation of God. Service to our fellow men is an expression or exemplification of the worship of God. And respect for the individual person—a mark of most of the West ever since and because of the rise of Christianity—is strictly a spiritual attitude based upon the Christian view of the individual person as created in God's image and of infinite value in the eyes of God himself. "What is man that You should be mindful of him, or the son of man that You should care for him? You have made him little less than the angels, and crowned him with glory and honor. You have given him rule over the works of Your hands, putting all things under his feet" (Psalms 8: 4-7). "Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God......" (I John 3: 1). "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" (I Cor. 3:16)

This is the way a Christian thinks. Here, too, there is a synthesis in Christianity. God and man, the natural and the supernatural or divine, go together in some special intrinsic sense, though they are also essentially distinct. Here is a basic synthesis of God and man that cannot be denied, a synthesis which is essentially distinct from the relationship between God and man in any of the other religions or cultures of the world. This is not to say that it is superior. It is simply to say that it is different and that one must understand the spirituality of the Westerner in terms of this basic characteristic of the underlying religion of the West or he does not really understand it at all—and therefore has no right to condemn it.
Further, God is a loving and even serving God who created the world in the first place for the use of man. Man’s service of man—either in the sense of positive help or in bearing his burdens and having mercy for others—is an emulation of the love which this loving God has for man. and this is a spiritual aspiration.

The motive of the life of service, to those who are serious about life, is, based upon a complex of perhaps three basic considerations, all of which are essentials of Christianity: it is God’s will; it is expressed in the commandments of God; and, even in its most materialistic appearances, the abundant life which the Westerner strives to achieve for himself and for mankind does not violate any of the principles of his religion, unless such worldly values become the dominant value and replace the spiritual values, which are obviously supreme and ultimate. Recall, for example, that the love of money, not money, is the root of all evil. Westerners do not—should not—worship money, as their critics so often contend they do but neither do they condemn it. Attachment to the worldly is just as wrong for the West as for the East. It is the motive of doing God’s will which makes such actions spiritual, for the Bible also says, “Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him” (I John 2: 15).

In a sense, the essence of the Christian religion, which serves as the foundation of Western culture—at its best, of course—is what might be called the aforementioned intimate or substantial or essential harmony of God and man. This is metaphysically the very purpose of Christ—the God-man. It has been said that in Christianity neither God by himself, neither the human nor the divine, is all-important; similarly, neither the world nor the hereafter, neither the natural nor the supernatural, is exclusively all-important if that implies that the world is in any sense unreal or insignificant or evil and that life in the world is in violation of spirituality or of God.

This synthetic attitude is also expressed frequently in less metaphysical terms. “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matt. 22:21). “......let us...... be sober, putting on the breastplate of faith and love” (I Thess. 5:8). “Beloved, I wish above all things that thou mayest prosper and be in health even as thy soul prospereth” (III John 1:2). And: “Man shall not live by bread alone” (Matt. 4:4) but also, “Give us this day our daily bread.” (Matt. 6:11).

God’s will is that man love his fellow men—also that by doing this man is actually serving God. It is also the order of God, or the commandment of God, that man love and serve his fellow men. In fact, the basic commandments of Christianity, as is well-known, are two: love of God and love of our fellow men. Of course, if man mistakes the relative importance of these two commandments and subordinates love of God to love of fellow men or love of the world, then this is simply not
Christianity. This would be the basis of a condemnation of the individual rather than of a branding of the basic ideals because of practical deviations from those ideals. Furthermore, love of our fellow men must take the form of service, because love basically means the desire to serve, as expressed in the life of Christ, and is based partly upon the attitude of respect for man and emulation of God, who loves all men. "God is love" (I John 4:16). After all, in the Judeo-Christian tradition man is a purposeful special creation of God and is created in the image of God. He is not identical with God, He is not divine. He cannot become God. But he can emulate God by doing God's will and by love.

The Ten Commandments of Judaism are also intrinsic to the Judeo-Christian Western world, and it is worth nothing here that these, too, command the same way of life: first, worship of God and "remember the sabbath to keep it holy," and, then, an honest, truthful, faithful, life, honoring parents, refraining from murder, and having no covetousness, but engaging in presumably productive and socially useful work in a normal, good life approved and commanded by God. Repeatedly, the admonition of the Golden Rule is expressed as of the essence: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you" (Matt. 7:12)—and the full meaning and implications of this "commandment" obviously demand the best in man himself and toward his fellow men.

To put this complicated and perhaps confusing point more simply: in Christianity God is love, and love is service, and the commandment of love and service of man as well as of God becomes the essence of Christianity, and therefore of the Western way of life, in the large. Recall the well-known principle of Christianity: "There are these three, then, faith, hope, and love (charity), and the greatest of these is love" (I Cor. 13:13). This is of the essence of the misnamed humanism of Christianity, that is, love and worship of God and love and service of our fellow men. And service does not mean merely spiritual service, as it does—primarily—in Hinduism and Buddhism, but service to man as man in his dual aspect as spiritual and God-like and at the same time a creature in and of the world.

To a Christian it would be inconceivable to contend that poverty, disease, and ignorance are good for man, a person. It would seem equally inconceivable to condemn the attempt to eliminate these evils from the life of man as a merely worldly purpose and a merely worldly activity. Their removal is essential for man as man or person. Radhakrishnan has spoken very clearly on this specific point: "There was never in India a national ideal of poverty or squalor. Spiritual life finds full scope only in communities of a certain degree of freedom from sordidness. Lives that are strained and starved cannot be religious except in a rudimentary way. Economic insecurity and individual freedom do not go together." The West—and certainly America—agrees thoroughly

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and most emphatically with this basic ground of its way of life and of worldly goods as instrumental and helpful to genuine spirituality. Also, while these are "worldly" conditions, the motive behind the attempt to eliminate such evils is fundamentally that of attempting to enable man to be a human being in the higher sense of the word, a person, a creature created in the image of God. It must be remembered that Christ himself fed the hungry, and healed the sick, and did many other "worldly" services to man during his lifetime. He ministered to the spiritual needs of man, of course, but he neither ignored nor belittled man's worldly needs—he ministered to them as well, and he commanded his disciples to go out into the world and do likewise.

The brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God is not an empty phrase of Western culture. It is in a sense the essence of the Christian point of view as the basis of a cultural attitude which takes for granted the fatherhood of God and which shows great concern for the bringing about of the fulfillment of the brotherhood of man. In this attempt Western man is also following the teaching of Christ, that he came to bring life and to bring it more abundantly—and it is a distortion to think of this as purely other worldly or "pure" spirituality—for, to repeat, man is not God or wholly divine, but divine-human, the great truth of which Christ is the embodiment.

These many generalizations may be open to serious challenge: first, on the ground that what has been stated here is untrue to Christianity—that this is not what Christianity really means, teaches, and demands; and, second, on the ground that the West is not a Christian culture or a Christian thought-tradition. An attempt will be made to show—in terms of specific quotations from the Christian Bible—that the thesis of this paper cannot be challenged insofar as the essence of Western culture is basically Christian.

The denial that the West is predominantly Christian is, in fact, so clearly untrue that it hardly requires an answer. Not, of course, that all Westerners live up to the ideals of their religion—what people does?—but that Christianity and its teachings constitute the ultimate truth and the recognized ideals of Western culture and Western man generally. A look at the West, country by country or area by area, will reveal the unquestioned Judeo Christian character of all of them: for example, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, and practically the whole of Latin America and South America are Catholic; England, Germany, Switzerland, and Holland, Protestant; and the United States certainly predominantly Christian (with a strong Jewish element, too), though of many sects. And, in so-called "materialistic" America, statistics show over one hundred million actual Church members and a 98 per cent belief in God.

As said at the beginning, one of the reasons for preparing this paper lies in the need to bring to bear upon this problem many of the precise and undeniable textual or Biblical admonitions, commands, and counsels
that make humanism not what would seem simply a healthy way of life, but an indispensible means to the achievement of the ultimate goal of spiritual salvation, and also a way of life based upon a grounding in the Judeo Christian religion. The following quotations (predominantly from the New Testament) provide part of the factual foundation upon which the preceding observations are based. They express the justification for and the spiritual basis of the love of our fellow men which is the essence of the so-called humanism or humanitarianism of the Western (or, at least, the Christian) world. Here—in addition to passages already cited—is what Christianity says and what the West, generally or at least at its best, believes and tries to fulfill in practice.

"...thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself...." Lev. 19:18
"By mercy and truth iniquity is purged...." Prov. 16:6
"......I desired mercy, and not sacrifice......." Hos. 6:6
"......what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God? Mic. 6:8
"......and they brought unto him all sick people that were taken with diverse diseases and torments, and......he healed them," Matt. 4:24
"Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy." Matt. 5:7
"But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you;
"That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven:...." Matt. 5:44-45
"Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that man should do to you do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets." Matt. 7:12
"And whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward." Matt. 10:42
"The blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up and the poor have the gospel preached to them." Matt. 11:5
"...I will have mercy and not sacrifice..." Matt. 12:7
"...Jesus said, Thou shalt do no murder, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, 'Honor thy father and thy mother: and, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.'" Matt. 19:18-19
"Jesus said unto him, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind."
"This is the first and great commandment.
"And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"
"On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." Matt. 22:37-40 (And: "...There is no greater commandment than these." Mark 12:31.)
"For I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in:

7 These quotations are not grouped in any topical manner. Rather, they follow their order in the Bible—and repetition demonstrates the continuity of the ideas expressed.
“Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me.” Matt. 25: 55-36

“And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.” Matt. 25:40

“He answereth and saith unto them, He that hath two coats, let him impart to him that have none; and he that hath meat, let him do likewise.” Luke 3:11

“And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise?” Luke 6:31

“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful.” Luke 6:36

“And he sent them to preach the kingdom of God, and to heal the sick.” Luke 9:2

“Which now of these three [in the story of the good Samaritan], thinkest thou, was neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves?

“And he said, He that showeth mercy on him.”

“Then said Jesus unto him, go, and do thou likewise.” Luke 10: 36-37

“...sell all that thou hast, and distribute unto the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven...” Luke 18:22

“For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him shall not perish but have everlasting life” John 3:16

“...I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.” John 10:10

“By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another.” John 13:35

“A new commandment I give unto you, Thou ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another.” John 14:34

“This is my commandment, That ye love one another, as I have loved you.” John 15:12

“Greater love have no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends” John 15:13

“Be kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly love...” Romans 12:10

“Owe no man anything, but to love one another: for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law.” Romans 13: 7-8

“...Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

“Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore love is the fulfillment of the law.” Romans 13: 9-10

“And now abideth faith, hope, and charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.” I Cor. 13-13

“...God loveth a cheerful giver.” II Cor 9:7

“...He hath dispersed abroad; he hath given to the poor; his righteousness remaineth for ever” II Cor. 9:9

“...by love serve one another.

“For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” Gal. 5: 13-14
“Bear ye one another’s burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ.” Gal. 6:2

“...ye yourselves are taught of God to love one another.” I Thess. 4:9

“Now we exhort you, brethren, admonish them that are unruly, comfort the feebleminded [fainthearted], support the weak, be patient toward all men.” I Thess. 5:14

“And let us consider one another to provoke unto love and to good works;...” Heb. 10:24

“...see that ye love one another with a pure heart fervently.” I Peter 1:22

“...giving all diligence, add to your faith virtue: and to virtue knowledge: and to knowledge temperance; and to temperance patience; and to patience godliness;
and to godliness brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness charity.” II Peter 5–7

“Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren” I John 3:16

“Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God and everyone that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God.” I John 4:7

“He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love.” I John 4:8

“...if God so loved us [as to send His Son to save us], we ought also to love one another.

“...if we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us.” I John 4:11–12

“And this commandment have we from him, That he who loveth God love his brother also.” I John 4:21

“...This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments....” I John 5:3

This, then, is the “good” life of Western man and Western culture insofar as they are determined by or based upon the Christian religion—and they are, fundamentally. This is not “mere humanism.” But in the sense given in these significant teachings, Christianity itself is humanistic and humanitarian. Obviously, this does not mean that it is unspiritual or non-religious, as so often contended by Asian critics of the West. As said earlier, the basic doctrine is that of the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God. In this life—when it is lived in accord with basic Western ideals and values—Western man is emulating, serving, and obeying his God. This is not “mere humanism” or unspiritual worldly humanitarianism. To the West, it is true spirituality, or true religion, which has been described as “the love of God in heart of man expressed through service.”

And—as a matter of fact—is this way of life so very far from the essential teachings of the Bhagavad Gītā—non-attachment, lokasāṅgraha, and living and acting and doing our duty “in My name”—or from Dr.

8 Ascribed to the Founder of the Baha’i World Faith.
9 III. 20.
10 Christianity says, “Whatever you do in word or work do all in The name of the Lord Jesus” (Col. 3:17). “And, as a matter of fact, Christianity has the same significant practical and religious significance for Western man as the Gītā does for practically all Indians”. 247
Radhakrishnan's conviction concerning the purpose and practice of religion? It is interesting that an outstanding authority on Indian thought and culture recently made the following statement: Indian religion believes: "That humanitarian activities are a part and parcel of religion." I am sure that Radhakrishnan would agree—and so would most of the West.¹²


¹³ To be sure, ultimate spirituality and the ultimate goal of man in much of Hindu thought is beyond this life of disinterested service to our fellow men in the name of God. In Hinduism—and in the Gita and Radhakrishnan, man's ultimate goal is identification or unity with the impersonal, undifferentiated Absolute, the only real. In essence, Hinduism goes "one step beyond" Christianity—a big step—but up to that supreme point the charge of mere humanism or worldliness is utterly inappropriate.
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PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

I. RELIGIOUS LIFE

Considering what types we can find out in our religious lives, we generally classify religious lives into two groups, say, individual one and collective one.

The following belongs to individual religious life: personal prayer which each person offers; belief toward the super-natural—God—and putting the belief into practice in his daily religious life, and further religious discipline which particular religious men practise—(i.e. meditation Zen priests practise and meditation and fasting Catholic monks do) and ecstasees brought about by their disciplines and lastly experiences of the unity with God. The following belongs to collective religious lives or activities: worship, religious services, sermons, missionary work which are done in a church or temple, and lives of collective discipline and collective devotional services.

II. PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS OF STUDYING RELIGION

What kind of methods do we have when we are going to study psychologically about such human religious lives and religious activities as mentioned above? Observations and experiments are of course main ways of psychology like other sciences, as far as psychology is a kind of science. But it is still hard to catch human religious activities completely by these scientific ways of observations and experiments. For instance, when we observe someone claps his hands and worships God at a Shinto shrine, we can only notice his physical movements by means of scientific observations, but we cannot understand that it is a kind of religious
behavior. We can only understand his religious behavior by being informed that he showed reverence to super-natural God. If, however, the observer knows the inside meaning of such action—reverence to God—he can guess the action is a kind of religious behavior. Anyway, it depends on knowing the reverence to God caused the action to find it to be a kind of religious behavior. Such "Reverence to God" can be understood only by means of introspection. And without introspection we cannot understand experiences of mysterious unity at all. Then, the introspection might be more important in studying religious activities and lives psychologically than in studying any other psychological objects.

However, if we solely adopt introspection, the study is prone to become subjective and to lose objectivity of psychology as science. Religious psychology should be developed in cooperation with scientific observations, experiments and introspection; religious psychology will make ample advance when psychologists offer theories and approved facts based on the methods of observations and experiments, and religious men bring their individual religious lives or experiences obtained by introspection and then both scientific knowledge and empirical knowledge interact.

Now, I am going to give a brief description of studies of W. James, S. Freud, C. G. Jung and J. B. Rhine who are well-known for psychological study on religion and the religious lives by applying either or both of the above-mentioned methods. And I will give a brief description of their studies making it the focus of the description how they consider the supernatural or God. For the heart of religions is something supernatural or God, toward and with which human reaction and relations are the religion.

III. W. JAMES

W. James called the super-natural or God as the "More" (It has a personality), thinking the substance of religion is found in individual religious experience, that is, the unity of individual and the "More".

According to him the mind of individual is built up with the so-called conscious area which has a center and its rim, and subconscious area which lies outside of or below the former. The subconscious area is the source of all momentary and inactive memory, vague but active passion, impulse, taste, hatred, prejudice, and the source of unreasonable action and dream. If the energy in the subconscious area become stronger, indescribable impulsive action, prohibition of movements and autokinetism phenomena occur. The subconscious area in mind is also the source which brings up religion. At an advanced stage of religious life, a door which stands between the conscious area and the subconscious area of mind is extremely widely open. The subconscious area contacts with the "More" in his rim (periphery) and they are connected with a path. When the "More" makes a gate of the path open and flows into our egos—subconscious ego and conscious ego—the unity with the "More",
namely, religious experience arises.

The above-mentioned theory was established by W. James on the basis of a great number of data of psychical phenomena collected by Myers, of Myers’ theory of subconsciousness established from his data and on the basis of autobiographies and records of experiences of the well-known religious men in the world. W. James admitted in his theory the existence of the “More” as the other on the basis of over-belief.

IV. S. FREUD

S. Freud asserts that super-natural God is simply a product of unconsciousness and an illusion. He considered on the basis of the relationship between son and father, son’s formulating an idea about God as follows: As a child, being exposed to the menace of an external world, realizes his powerlessness and unreliability, he gets to appeal to his father for protection. He threatens and at the same time pays respects to a mightier father who can protect him from the menace of an external world. The image of the father who is threatened and respected makes a form in the son’s unconsciousness. As a child gradually grows up however realizes that he is still a child and that he needs a protection which guards him from the menace of the external world, he gives what gives him menaces characteristics of fatherhood by means of his unconscious projection and considers it as God. He entertains fears to it on the one hand and entrusts protection to it on the other hand. Freud said that the same process would be applicable to the God-concept-formation and religion-formation made by adults. In other words, when a human being realizes that he has to carry on his back despairing powerlessness and unreliability towards the menace of nature which bring death to him and towards agony or want which come from community life, he gets to seek for the existence of another more powerful father who can protect him against such external fears. Thus, his desire leads to create a merciful god. Freud insists that such god is illusion.

A super-natural god has been admitted as the “More” which exists outside of and beyond a personal self in over-belief by W. James. Contrarily, according to Freud the super-natural god is a product of unconscious self and an illusion. Well how does Jung consider God?

V. C. G. JUNG

C. G. Jung classified ‘mind’ into three stages. The first one is consciousness, and the second is individual unconsciousness. “Individual unconsciousness firstly consists of all the contents that become unconscious because consciousness has avoided them or the content of consciousness loses its strength and secondly consists of the contents that creep into mind by some means though they can not reach to consciousness
because their strength is not enough and partially consists of perception by means of sense organs." This individual unconsciousness is roughly corresponding with Freud's unconsciousness. The third is collective unconsciousness. (Kollektives Unbewusstsein). Jung makes clear by observing neurosis and analyzing dreams that unconsciousness (unconscious activities) which is different from individual consciousness or individual unconsciousness and which has nothing to do with individual experiences, namely a sort of super-individual unconsciousness (super-individual unconscious activities) which is independent of individual consciousness or individual unconsciousness is occupying deeper region in mind than consciousness or individual unconsciousness does. The content of super-individual unconsciousness consists of mythical motives or images—mythical types—, being universal and of humankind. Jung calls the super-individual unconsciousness which are universal and of humankind collective unconsciousness.

Such a mythical motif and image of collective unconsciousness—mythical types—are projected upon consciousness, that is, the inside of collective unconsciousness which is in depth of mind discloses its secret. Then, religious experience and revelation are built up. Jung, however, claims that even if a symbol of God or the god-like is experienced in such religious experience and revelation, it does not manifest the existence of God who is as an objective existence beyond human beings but simply proves the existence of a mythical-type idea related with God or the god-like. Jung maintains the standpoint of psychology—the study treating of ideas, any other content of mind and psychological phenomena—, and does not refer to God who is the objective existence beyond human beings. He proclaims that a mythical-type idea about God subsists in collective unconsciousness, and that it is projected upon consciousness.

Consequently, God remains only as the mental content of human being. On this point, Jung's thought is similar to that of Freud that God is illusion. The dissimilar point, however, is that Freud regarded God as a product of the unconsciousness which corresponds to Jung's individual unconsciousness and Jung regarded God as the content of collective unconsciousness (or the idea of collective unconsciousness).

We paying attention to the collective unconsciousness of Jung again, he explains that the essential quality of the collective unconsciousness consists in the ideal perfection of order and harmony, the unification which contains all things, and the collective unconsciousness transcends individual experiences, is restricted by no time and no space springs out into individual consciousness at any time and any place, and is super-individual unconsciousness which contains individual self in itself. And he explains that the collective unconsciousness is in human being and however transcends individual self. From the preceding explanations the collective unconsciousness of Jung seems to have a feature of God.
Judging from the explanations about God given by James, Freud and Jung, what is common to the three is: first, they take God into consideration in relation with unconsciousness; second, they consider problems of God or the super-natural and problems of religion on the basis of psychological phenomena and facts obtained in methods of observations and introspections.

Then, I will briefly explain the study of J. B. Rhine who has been researching into the super-natural by means of experimental and statistical methods, although not researching into God himself.

VI. J. B. RHINE

J. B. Rhine has proved by experimental and statistical methods that everyone is endowed with the ability with which one can apprehend an external event directly without sensory means—it is called Extrasensory Perception or E.S.P.—and the ability with which one can influence upon things directly without using the limbs—it is called Psychokinesis or P.K.—and he has partly made clear their nature—Parapsychology—.

Ways of Experiments:

E. S. P. card test is; a pack of 25 cards composed of each five of the five symbols, say, star *, circle O, waves ~, square □ and plus +, is placed face down on the table, a subject is asked to try to identify each card of 25 cards and the experimenter checks up how many hits have been obtained. This is one run test. After having done several ~ scores runs tests, we calculate P from S (the total score made in a given number of runs tests) and calculate the ability of E. S. P. as you see in the following:

\[ S \text{ (the total score)} \]

\[ D \text{ (Deviation)} = S - \text{M.C.E.} \]

\[ SD \text{ (Standard Deviation)} = \sqrt{n \times p \times q} \]

\[ CR \text{ (Critical Ratio)} = \frac{D}{SD} \]

M.C.E. (Mean Chance Expectation) = 5 \times the number of runs 5 hits made in one run is Chance Expectation.

n = the number of trials. One run is composed of 25 trials and two runs are composed of 50 trials.

\[ p = \frac{1}{5} \]

\[ q = 1 - p \]

P is found by looking up CR in the table of standard distribution. In case P is less than \(10^{-8}\), we admit there is ability of E.S.P... P = \(10^{-8}\) means that an event occurs only one time in 100 by chance. That P = \(10^{-8}\) is obtained on the basis of the above-mentioned calculation means that the ability of the subject in scoring can always cause on the average what ordinarily occurs only one time in 100 by chance. When such an event as occurs only one time in 100 is expected to occur always, we
admit by scientific experience that there is something other than chance. In the above-mentioned case, we admit that E.S.P. is working on. By means of the said methods Rhine testified that everyone is more or less endowed with E.S.P... Suppose that someone always makes high scores, i.e. 15 hits on the average. It cannot be well explained why his scores are high without assuming the existence of E.S.P.

P. K. TEST

P. K. test is the test in which we try to throw dice and to let the target face appear.

\[ p = \frac{1}{6} \]

D = S - M.C.E. (Mean Chance Expectation)

\[ D = \frac{1}{6} \times \text{the number of trials} \]

\[ SD = \sqrt{npq} \]

\[ CR = \frac{D}{SD} \]

P is found out by looking up CR in the table of standard distribution. In case P is 10^-2, we admit there is ability of P.K... It goes for the case of E.S.P...

As we have seen above, it has been made clear that everyone is endowed with abilities of E.S.P. and P.K... It has been also approved that such E.S.P. is not restricted by time and space, differing from physical objects—matter—. Namely, in such a case of E.S.P. test as a subject was in Europe and the experimenter was far in U.S.A., the score obtained was not influenced at all. And in the case; subject was asked to identify cards before shuffling a pack of cards and after the subject finished to identify a pack of cards the number of hits were checked up; there was also no significant change on the score. It has made clear that persons who usually make high scores can do so even in such an experiment and that persons who usually make low scores do so. The above-mentioned facts prove that E.S.P. ability is restricted by no time and no space. In this point, we know E.S.P. is the one distinguished from physical energy which is restricted by time and space. E.S.P. might be said to be supernatural or super material. The same goes for P.K...

What has been mentioned is concerned with psychological study about the process of the super-natural in relation with individual or about individual religious activities. Although religious psychology lays stress upon the study about the process of the super-natural in relation with individual or about individual religious life, it is natural that psychology should originally be the study on individual from the nature of psychology.

However, psychological study on collective religious activities should be also undertaken, and in fact, the theory of collective psychology is applied for the study on collective religious activities. In considering religious phenomena as a kind of social phenomena, social-psychological
study of collective religious activities is undertaken. As I have mentioned above, psychology lays its stress on the study of individuality, and the leading religious psychology of today is chiefly dealing with religious psychology regarding individual. Well, one of the main purposes of this paper is to describe the leading religious psychology of today, therefore, I confine myself to describe individual religious psychology and leave it for future study to describe the psychological study on collective religious activities.

Next, I will briefly consider the following problems: How does and should the said leading “study on religious psychology concerning individual” develop in future. What type of quickening can we foresee in such religious psychology at the present stage.

VII. MOVEMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN FUTURE

1. Giving consideration to the state of consciousness which is attained in Samadhi of Taoism, Buddhism and Yoga, Jung induced his collective unconsciousness on the basis of the data which Jung collected through clinical observations of neurosis and analysis of dreams and so forth. The state of consciousness which is attained in Samadhi of Taoism, Buddhism and Yoga may be defined as super-consciousness which leads to upper bonds of human consciousness, and Jung, however, was of opinion that collective unconsciousness leads to lower bounds of human consciousness and that it is connected with animal life. Besides, on the other hand, he gave the collective unconsciousness super-conscious characteristics found in Samadhi of Buddhism and Yoga. In this point, we could find out a confusion in Jung’s collective unconsciousness. It will become an important problem in future to study comparatively the state of consciousness in Samadhi of Buddhism and Yoga, Jung’s collective unconsciousness and Freud’s unconsciousness on the basis of the concrete standpoints and the concrete facts on which each of the three is based.

2. The study of Rhine statistically proved the existence of E.S.P. and P.K., but he has not yet got any definite findings about processes in which E.S.P. and P.K. work upon things, say, cards and dice, or about correlation between mental function such as E.S.P., P.K. and matter or body. It may be one of the most important problems of parapsychology in future to study on correlation and reciprocal action between E.S.P., P.K. and matter or body. Today, the correlations between E.S.P. ability and the autonomic nerves are getting clearer as research workers at universities and institutes concerned in U.S.A., Japan and Soviet Russia have been simultaneously making E.S.P. test and the autonomic nervous functions’ investigation (by measurement of changes in R and C at viscerocutaneous reflex points, G.S.R. measurement, measurement of plethysmogramm obtained by plethysmograph) to find out the correlation between E.S.P. ability and the autonomic nerves. On the other hand, E.S.P.
tests and measurement of electroencephalogramm are simultaneously undertaken to research into the relations of E.S.P. ability and consciousness. That E.S.P. ability is shown more clearly in a hypnotic state than on awaking is also gradually proved through getting a subject in a hypnotic state to make E.S.P. test. Why E.S.P. ability can more clearly display itself in a hypnotic state? I guess as follows: the E.S.P. ability is unconscious, and this unconscious E.S.P. ability can easily display itself in a hypnotic state where the unconscious works stronger.

3. When researching into the super-natural and the super-individual both inwardly and outwardly in cooperation with Rhine's experimental-psychological study or experimental physiological study and Jung's study on depth-psychology based on introspections and observations, we shall cast a further light on the super-natural forming the substance of religion as scientific knowledge and empirical knowledge of the super-natural influence on each other interact. Therefore, what is demanded for development of religious psychology in future is the cooperative research into the super-natural by means of experimental psychological way and depth-psychological way based on observations and introspections.

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THE NATURE AND THE
MECHANISMS OF MIND

By using methods of statistical and comparative dream analysis, differing radically from anything otherwise known to us, my colleagues and I have uncovered revolutionary indications as to the identity of the physical organs which evoke the phenomena of mind. These indications are revolutionary in the extreme, upsetting conventional ideas as to the nature of mind and the responsibility of the nervous system for its evocation. Yet revolutionary as these discoveries are in the context of modern thought, they plainly repeat in the terms of modern thought what was evidently known to older peoples and expressed by them in symbolic terms.

In this brief article I propose to outline the elements involved in the above statement, and this I shall do under six heads, as follows:

1. The basis of the quest which resulted in the said discoveries;
2. The discovery that mind is evolved in the human individual through configurational resonance between the unborn organism and a structure inherent in the cosmos;
3. The primary instrument of mind is not neural, but is to be found in electrovascular activities of the fetal heart, the umbilical cord and the placenta;
4. At birth there begins an elaborate effort to accommodate the configurational aspects of the newly-lost placenta and umbilical cord, resulting in some anatomically and physiologically odd identities;
5. Ultimately the brain achieves the configurational resonance which was lost at birth.
6. The indications in the myths and märchen.

I

The inquiries which led to the revolutionary discoveries noted above began in the formulation of a nonmathematical cosmology, the essence of which was configurational. It was predicted that the cosmos is the
product of a simple and unchanging pattern of relations which, by its repetitive manifestation upon a number of interacting levels, produces the complex world of our experience. This simple and unchanging pattern of relations is that of a nucleus or focal point set within a supportive periphery and linked to it by a two-way beat of energy. Indications of this pattern were found upon a number of integrative levels, and this led to the making of a prediction, namely that if the aforesaid pattern were truly universal, then its formative influence ought to be detectable in the human mind, provided that a suitable method of mental analysis could be evolved. As a result of this conclusion a method of statistical and comparative dream analysis was eventually developed and applied over a period of some twenty years, the outcome of which is now to be briefly described.

By the use of the aforesaid methods, the common contents of the deep human feelings were established step by step. Similar elements dredged from the depths of individual minds were statistically determined and compared, and from them was established a 'piece' in the total 'jigsaw puzzle' which we slowly and laboriously built up from such 'pieces', until at length we had before us an objective picture of the mind's nature and origins, from which it was possible to make certain justifiable extrapolations as to the mechanism involved in its evocation in the individual.

Clear indications were discovered that the developing feeling—patterns of the embryonic organism are 'guided' into configurational significance by the same pattern as that which we had already discerned in external nature. Every man, woman and child, so our evidence shows, contains the deep feeling that his fetal body was sensed as a nucleus lying within the periphery of the womb, linked to it by a two-way flow of energy. The evidence shows that this is not a simple physical sense, but that it is related to cosmic influences. Thus it was that the pattern of relations first seen in external nature was found, as predicted, in the mind.

In short, therefore, the prediction we made was validated by the experimental observation of dreams carried out statistically. Thus in addition to the discovery of the matters to be briefly described in this article, an entirely novel application of formal scientific methods was made in the field of nonmathematical cosmology.

II

All the indications uncovered by us, indications fully supported by myths and Märchen, are that mind is first evolved in the individual by configurational resonance between the 'uterine organism' and some basic structure in the cosmos. We have coined the term 'uterine organism' as a means of identifying a complete unit consisting of fetal body, placenta and umbilical cord. Deep in the feelings this lost organism and its functions are represented in terms which preclude any chance that they are merely an
organic memory of anatomical and physiological details. Even if it be supposed that the mind would tend to apotheosize these deeply buried uterine organs and processes, we should still be left without any explanation as to why they are specifically and universally represented in cosmic terms. This circumstance is interpreted as signifying that a universal formative influence is operative upon the developing patterns of feeling in the fetus. Since it can be shown that the human sense of self, the very ability to say 'I' derives from the primary sense of the fetal skin (and heart) as focal to the periphery of the womb, these primary uterine elements cannot be interpreted as purely anatomical and physiological memories without denigrating the whole status of mind. Our discoveries offer clear evidence that mind in man is a cosmic resonance, and that the pattern of the primary feelings is formed by just such a resonance between the 'uterine organism' and the formative design of creation.

III

The indications are that the primary instrument of mind is not neural but electrovascular. We have uncovered clear indications that the fetal heart, through its generation of action currents, is felt to play a nuclear configurational role to the peripheral functions of the placenta, this latter being sensed as a specialized segment of the womb. The fetal skin appears to act as a transformer of the electrovascular configurations into neural ones. Indeed, our first indications of the nuclear elements of uterine configuration suggested that the fetal skin itself was the agent of nuclear feeling, and it was presumed that this was due entirely to the fact that the fetus sensed its uterine ambience in terms of an 'all-over' stimulation of its skin. Later it was found, however, that the fetal heart is the prime instrument of the evocation of the nuclear sense, and the fetal skin is a transformer of that pattern into neural terms. It is natural to reflect that the heart, which is said to be the most highly innervated organ after the brain itself, might play a neural role in the evocation of uterine feeling, but although later research may well reveal something of this kind, this has not yet appeared in the terms of our own researches. The indications so far are that the primary instrumentation for the configuration of the uterine feelings is the umbilical cord, the pattern of which is persistently represented as significant both in dream and myth symbolism. Since the umbilical cord is the one organ completely without nerves, it seems obvious that the neural system is not involved directly in the evocation of the configurational resonance between the uterine organism and the cosmos, and hence in the making of mind.

There are several respects in which the uterine organism is suited to play an electrovascular role. In the first place, as already mentioned, the fetal heart is a source of electrical energy. In the second place, the skin of the fetus is covered for much of its term with a satisfactory insulating
varnish, the *vernix caseosa*. In the third place, the umbilical cord is constructed in a manner which bears a similarity to the configuration of an electrical solenoid. In the fourth place, it is a matter of common knowledge that there is a marked electrolytic activity in the blood, whereby the action currents of the heart are conveyed to the skin, where normally they are dissipated, as the use of the electrocardiogram makes familiar to us all. It is precisely this dermal dissipation which the *vernix caseosa* inhibits, presumably thus compelling the electrical charges to follow the arterial blood down the twin helix of the umbilical cord to the placenta. That the fetal skin is equipped to act as a transformer from electrovascular to (electro) neural impulses seems evident from the fact that the corium is highly endowed both with capillaries and with nerve-endings.

The conclusion to which we have been driven is that the electrovascular beat of blood afore-outlined acts as a configurational resonator with the basic pattern of the cosmos, so that what is anatomically a fetal heart becomes in feeling a representative of the configurational nuclear essence of the cosmos. Similarly, that which was evolved to be a feeding-tube and a sewer becomes in feeling the representative of the two-way link between the nucleus and the periphery, which latter role the placenta is felt to play. In other words, the little flesh-and-blood uterine organism becomes involved in a cosmic configurational drama. We do not need to pursue elaborate teleological considerations on this point. Nobody supposes that the fetus is *originally* anything but a mammal being sheltered from the reptilian menace of fifty million years ago. Nobody supposes that the placenta is *physically* anything but the supplier and detoxifier of that refugee’s blood, the umbilical cord being an automatic accessory to the resultant situation. But this does not prevent the total said situation from becoming a configurational resonator. The digestive organ in our mouths has become the resonator for the poetic configurations of Shakespeare and Goethe!

Any new discovery, especially one so radical as is here outlined, throws a great strain not only upon orthodox thought but also upon language. You will observe that I have had to refer to configurational *feelings* of the uterine organism. Quite obviously this must be an approximation, since there can be no *feelings* associated with the umbilical cord, using the term ‘feelings’ in the conventional sense. For so far as experience goes, there are no physical feelings without nerves. Yet the indications and relics of uterine life are always plainly stated as if they were feelings, and appear in the symbolic language of dreams pari passu with ordinary neural feelings.

**IV**

The importance of the configurational elements of the uterine organism is made clear by the ingenuity and persistence with which they are accommodated by the postnatal organism. To give one example which will have to do duty here for the many instances we have uncovered, the feet
take on the feelings of the lost placenta, the legs being felt as the umbilical cord. This strange and anatomically absurd identity apparently is formed because the femoral arteries are so intimately related to the umbilical arteries. Indeed, it is a fact that the legs of the fetus are supplied with nothing more than a spillover from the blood which goes to the placenta. This is thought by embryologists to be at least one reason why the legs of the fetus are relatively undeveloped. It has been found that a number of childhood emotional problems are the direct outcome of this primary confusion of the legs and feet with the umbilical cord and the placenta, and we have good reason to suspect that certain adult emotional and even physical problems have their kernel in this universal accommodation of the uterine elements in the legs and feet.

V

The evidence clearly indicates that the specifically human qualities of mind, which in degree the higher mammals appear also to show, are due to the configurational aspects of cerebral structure and function, and not to any super development of their purely neural aspects. The problem as to how nerve-impulses ‘turn into’ mind is revealed as wrongly conceived. Mind is the outcome of the configurational resonance of the structure and function of the brain. It is significant that this structure and function are configurationally akin to those of the uterine organism. It will be remembered that the basic cosmic pattern was stated to be that of a nucleus lying within a supportive periphery and linked to it by a two-way flow of energy. Such a pattern found a ready “configurational homomorph” in the structure and function of the uterine organism, and it also finds it in the structure and function of the brain. For in the brain the thalamus plays a nuclear or focal neural role, to which the cortex acts as a periphery, the two being linked together by the two-way flow of the thalamocortical circulation of neural energy. It is generally recognized today by neurologists that this energy-circulation is the physical instrument of the thinking process, but no idea is generally offered in explanation of this. We assert that the link between brain and mind is purely configurational. The brain evokes consciousness as the uterine organism does, by the resonance of its electrical configurations.

This conclusion is by no means speculative, but is drawn from the demonstrable fact that the aforesaid neural configurations of the brain carry a strong uterine undertone. It is, of course, a matter of common knowledge that the skull is often felt to be the maternal womb, a condition which is probably reflected in the use of the word ‘hystera’ for a mental disease, the word meaning something akin to ‘wandering of the womb’. But to these very loose and general indications we add the specific facts that the thalamus is felt to be the fetal heart, or the fetal body; that the cerebral cortex is felt to be the placenta, and that the
thalamocortical circulation of neural energy is felt to be the electrovascular circulation of umbilical blood.

These uterine undertones upon the brain's processes are clearly reflected in the symbolic forms of dreams, but there are indications also of an effort on the part of the brain to establish a new configurational resonance with the cosmos. That is to say, it is as if the brain were not content with the secondhand resonance via the uterine organism, but sought to make a fresh direct resonance with the cosmos. This is believed to be the significance of the urge to prayer, and there is a great deal of evidence to support it. However, especially in our present civilization, there is such a demand upon the brain to act as the observer and translator of external events that its function as a cosmic resonator is gravely inhibited, and the idea of prayer is correspondingly degenerate. These, however, are considerations which lead us too far afield for discussion here.

VI

Nothing more than a hint can be given here as to the way in which myths and *märchen* reflect the discoveries outlined above. It has taken a book of nearly half a million words to describe in outline the evolution of the technique of dream analysis and the resultant discoveries,* and it would take another of five times the size to make adequate representation of the manner in which these discoveries are reflected in the *représentations collectifs* of ancient symbolism.

It has been observed that the myths contain very marked astronomical elements, and from this the conclusion has been made that this is their sole significance. A learned man engaged upon the study of the myths states categorically in a letter that they are "simply a technique long ago evolved by archaic astronomers". More precise study of the myths will show that their astronomical elements are always accompanied by markedly uterine symbolism: We believe this to be the outward sign that the myths record the resonance between the uterine organism and the cosmos.

It might be objected that I have changed the meaning of the term 'cosmic' by applying it first to a universal pattern of relations, and then to the universe in its more obvious astronomical sense. But I do not think that I have been guilty of any such error. The astronomical elements which appear in the myths are naturally essentially solar in character, by which I mean that they are concerned with the solar system as it was intuited at the time the myths were fashioned. And it is precisely the solar system which offers one of the most majestic direct representations of the universal pattern of creation. The sun makes a prime representation of the nuclear or focal element, while the planetary orbits weave an orderly series of repetitive peripheral lines about it. There can be no doubt

* This is being published as soon as possible under the title of *The Universal Design of Creation*. Owing to the novelty of the work it finds no publisher, and will be published privately. Publication is believed to be out shortly.
in our experience that the fetal body (the fetal heart as focal electrical source, or the fetal skin as transformer) is felt to be resonant with the sun, because it is represented in these terms again and again in dreams and the analytical matter derived from them. Nor can there be the slightest doubt that the placenta is felt to be resonant with the earth itself.

There is no space here to refer to more than two examples of the symbolism in which the myths reflect the discoveries outlined above. The first is that of Adam and Eve. The man and the woman living in a garden occupied by a tree and a serpent offer even superficially a very simple representation of the fetus and the placenta living in the womb, linked together by the ‘tree’ of the umbilical vein upon which is curled the Twin serpentine helix of the umbilical arteries. The deeper one goes into the myth of Eden the more persuasive it appears as a symbol of the uterine organism which achieves cosmic resonance. This resonance with the cosmos is neatly represented by the way in which the exercise of the copulative link (inspired by the umbilical serpent and tree!) between the couple brings God into the Garden, and causes God to declare: “Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil.”* In a word, the configurational resonance of the cord which brought the fetal Adam and the placental Eve together, evokes mind and its godlike powers.

Allied with the Edenic myth is that of the mysterious twins named Jacob and Esau. These struggled together in the womb of Rebekah, and it was stated of them that they were not ordinary children, but ‘two nations’ and ‘two manner of people’, phrases which might well hide the significance of ‘two principles’. The manner of their birth, with the second holding the heel of the firstborn, plainly reflects the fact, noted in section IV above, that the sense of the placenta is at birth transferred to the feet. Plainly, this strange perversion of feeling might be poetically described by having the placental symbol (Jacob) cling at birth to the heel or foot of the fetal symbol (Esau).

Esau’s symbolic status as a representation of the fetus [or of the fetal skin feeling] is heightened by the fact that he was born “red, all over like an hairy garment”, for a red skin and a hairy skin are both frequently found in contexts where a representation of the fetal skin is absolutely appropriate to the narrative.** Esau had another name, Edom, which is the same name as Adam, so that the two myths can be regarded as supplementing one another, thus adding to the value of their testimony to the uterine condition. In the light of our discovery that the fetal skin seems to act as a transformer between blood and nerve, it may appear significant that the name Adam or Edom is said to derive from a Hebrew word that describes a flush of blood in the skin.

The second myth which I shall mention here is that of Prometheus, whose name has been interpreted to mean ‘the forethinker’. It was said of Prometheus that he stole the fire from heaven in a hollow reed, and

* Genesis 3:22.
** I refer here to the symbolism of dreams and their analytical derivatives.
this can be seen as a persuasive symbol of the fact that the fetus, through the operation of the umbilical cord (the hollow reed!) draws the essence of the cosmic nature to itself through configurational resonance. Dissimilar as the two sets of images superficially appear, I think that the drawing of fire from heaven in a hollow reed is in essence the same act as what might be described as the 'drawing of God into Eden' through the behavior of Adam and Eve with the umbilical tree-serpent. If Prometheus may be seen as the symbol of the fetus (or more precisely of the uterine organism), then we can see the justification for his name, since he would be properly regarded as the agent of the first evocation of consciousness, and thus might be called the 'foresigner' in the sense that he represents the 'thinker who thought before the brain', that more obvious (and epimethean!) 'after thinker'. One could also understand that Jung's effort to link him with 'pramantha', the fire-stick in the Hindu fire-making ritual, might be justified on other than etymological grounds, since he would represent the sense of light or fire upon the skin, a matter to which I shall presently revert.

The binding of Prometheus to a rock in the high Caucases strongly reflects images seen again and again in dreams and their associations which represent the transfer of the uterine elements to the skull. Again and again one finds the skull represented as a high place, and also as a fearful prison or tomb, and the most terrifying feelings are found to be related to this imagery. It seems therefore significant that the reason for Prometheus's fate was that he 'knew too much about the womb' that should bear Zeus a patricidal son. Surely this imagery can be plausibly seen as expressing the idea 'If you did not remember so much about the secrets of the womb (your mother's womb), then you would not feel that your own skull was that same womb (turned hard) with you incarcerated in it.'

Reverting to Jung's effort to link Prometheus with the Hindu male fire-stick, it is a fact that wherever one finds in myth or in dream indications of light, of color, of fire or even of eyes, then there are found indications of the fetal skin feeling. The Promethean myth offers a very good instance of this, and I give it here purely as an illustration. Prometheus is visited in his agony by Io, the heifer of Zeus, and a very slight examination of her mythology reveals a strong relation with the skin and with a sense of fire and eyes on the skin. It will be remembered that Hera, in order to keep Io from Zeus, set a guard upon her in the shape of a man who had a hundred eyes on his skin. Moreover, when that guard was slain, he was replaced by a gadfly, which chased Io about the earth and stung her endlessly upon her skin—which must have resulted in a species of 'fiery skin'. The uterine character of the whole imagery is accentuated by the fact that Prometheus had another visitor, Hermes, who carried the kerykeion, which is simply a formalized version of the umbilical cord.
In a few paragraphs I have sketched the outlines of a series of discoveries which provide the basis of the new factual psychology, from which dogma and opinion are excluded. Yet it must be pointed out that this achievement is really in principle secondary to the fact that the discoveries validated a prediction as to the structure of the cosmos, and this opens up so many avenues of advance as to defy even brief mention here. I use the term psychology, yet what is implied in the discoveries here adumbrated is far wider and deeper than anything usually considered under that head. For here we have indications which transcend all clinical considerations (though potentially capable of revolutionizing them!) and inevitably raise philosophical and theological questions of a far-reaching order.

The sort of mankind that has captured the public imagination of our times may be summed up in the astronaut and those who create the instruments of his probe into the skies. Is this the prototype of the future mankind? Or is he an epiphenomenon who will give way to those who are pioneering the probe into the deepest nature of man and his relations with the cosmos, not through rockets, but through quite other means which shall transform man himself into something far more advanced than he now is. I feel that the work briefly described in this article may have more than a passing relevance to this subject.
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PAINTED WOMEN

Good taste in art, Sir," as Dr. Samuel Johnson might have said, "is like good manners in society, in that both are better achieved through disciplined love than through polemic or preaching".

Had he said this, Dr. Johnson would have betrayed, as he so often did, sensitivity and a gift for the taciturn and trenchant communication of insight. Paintings are like people, in interesting and often unsuspected ways. When we are puzzled in trying to understand paintings and our attitudes toward them, it is often interesting to compare them with people. There is an importantly personal element in our responses to paintings... and, sometimes, an aesthetic and impersonal element in our responses to people.

But paintings are not people; in many of their most important and interesting characteristics, they are impersonal or even anti-personal. To extend the comparison beyond the level of suggestion—to confuse paintings with people—is to sentimentalize the fine art of painting and to dehumanize our fellow man.

Here we explore the parallel between women who live in space and time, and those who live in paintings. Naturally, ours will be a limited exploration, and many of the most urgent questions we may raise about art—those about value-judgments, for example—will have to remain unconsidered. My hope is simply that we may come closer to an understanding of what a painting is, if we push as far as we can the suggestion that paintings are like people, and that we respond appropriately to a painting when we respond to it as we do (or should) respond to a person. We shall come to a point where the parallel collapses; but at that point we

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can, I think, see something peculiarly important about what makes a picture as picture.

Suppose, first, that we envisage a boor, introduced into an evening party. Suppose our boor to behave toward human beings as offensively as many people behave toward paintings. Successively, ruthlessly, he erases every person he meets, by reducing him to tokens of someone else he has met before, or to cartoon reflections of real people. No one makes a difference to him or in him; he suffices unto his pathetic self.

In contrast to our boor, we can envisage another guest confident enough to be himself and adult enough to learn willingly. He meets men and women on their own terms and his. He respects humanity and cherishes the differences that distinguish us. In the best traditional sense of that presently dishonored word, he discriminates. Indeed, the boor is a boor and vulgar principally because he fails to discriminate, because his self-satisfaction closes his little mind to what makes one woman precisely different from another.

So, too, when we came to a gallery. We may here, as we may in the drawing room, be boors. We may impertinently inquire the ancestry of the painting ("And who painted you?") as we peer nervously at the label, to see whether the picture deserves our approbation. We may fancy resemblances and snobbishly discern influences: "Doesn't that design seem rather suggestive of Matisse?" or "See the Picassoid line along the nose!" Or, even easier and more dangerously, we may stereotype pictures as we do people, calling signals: "German Expressionism!" "Futurism!" "Italian Primitivism!": these are all familiar symptoms of the ism-syndrome Stephen Potter calls "Artsmanship."

Descriptive words like "red" and "blue," "tall" and "short," "scrawny" and "voluptuous"—in general, all our common adjectives and nouns—may serve us well enough when our concern is classificatory, and, confronted as we continually are with competing, chaotic fields of experience, we often have no alternative but to generalize and thus to blur uniqueness. Through such abstract designation and generalization, language gains most of its power. We inevitably group women, or any other subjects or objects, by the use of terms that apply indifferently because vaguely to many individuals. Some women are caucasoid, some negroid, some politically conservative, some liberal. What we remember with difficulty and forget with ease is that every such descriptive term exposes only an extra-human or infra-human area of convenient concern. The breathing woman may well breathe on as a person, oblivious to the labels we paste upon her.

Some painted women are convoluted and cubistic, some luminous, blurry ones are impressionistic, some wistfully dreamy women are rococo, and some gentle, this-but-almost-other-worldly ones are Byzantine. As we near our own day, classification becomes more agonizing—and more obviously inappropriate. What of this Munch? Is it "expressionistic?"
Very well. What of that Tamayo? I call it "Tamayo," and good painting, and see it, and let it go.

Categories count, and cannot be done without. But here, as with humans, they have a dangerous tendency to petrify, and then to putrefy, tempting us to suppose that by correctly classifying a painted woman, we account for her being. The history, psychology and philosophy of art no more comprise art than the history, psychology and philosophy of human beings comprise human beings. We shall never know Raphael's Alba Madonna in terms alone of Umbrian painting of the early sixteenth century; we shall know her only through seeing her.

Consider the stolid citizen we know as the wife of Paul Cézanne. Yet, even in saying this, we speak shorthand, because this isn't Cézanne's wife, any more than that other painting is Mont Ste. Victoire. This, as we say, is a transformation of Mont Ste. Victoire. It is a transformation of that particular mountain in southern France, and of no other. It is indeed remotely like that mountain, but if we ask not, "What is it like?" but the more important and interesting question, "What is it?" we must answer that this is a magic mountain made for seeing instead of climbing. It is a mountain carved not by geologic upthrusts and eroding rain and wind, but by the tough eye and subtle brush of a master painter. This mountain we see weighs precisely nothing on physically human scales. All its mass is visual mass, all its solidity visual solidity, all its shape visual shape. Of the pictorial Mme. Cézanne—the painted woman, if you please—it has been said often enough and correctly that she is herself mountainous. Not that the historic Mme. Cézanne is (or rather was) an unusually large woman; she isn't (or rather wasn't). Nor that this picture-woman really looks like a mountain; she doesn't. She looks much more like a woman than she looks like Mont Ste. Victoire.

When we say that this woman is mountainous, we are saying that she is Cézanne-mountainous; that is, that what counts in what we see here is, basically, just the sort of thing that counts when we see his Mont Ste. Victoire: the constructive delineation of an image in paint, the visual presentation of ordered mass, the forging of a full, important space for seeing.

A woman, remotely like her portrait, may indeed be lovely to behold. But unlike her portrait—if indeed she be a woman—she may be even lovelier to hold than to behold. She is, after all, human in many dimensions; she can and does play many roles in our lives. Most crucially, she is a living human being and does respond to us. She never is merely what she seems to be, nor does she even seem with any constancy. As any woman will, she seems now one thing, now another. She promises this, and offers that...and gives us something else. So long as she continues to live as woman, she continually becomes from instant to instant, responding and adapting herself consciously and unconsciously to what merely is, and altering what merely is, in the interests of what it may become.
This mercurial character of living womanhood is forever denied to the woman in the painting. Our Mme. Cézanne is lumpish, plain and prim. So she is, was, and ever will be. So, too, at some times and from some points of view, may Paul Cézanne's actual wife have appeared. Jane Avril, on the contrary, may well have been a vibrant, imaginative off-beat dancer when Toulouse-Lautrec painted her; but these, her dynamic qualities, have all been transmuted in the making of the picture... not by freezing her dancing step into a strained and a stroboscopic photograph, but pictorially, by inviting our eyes to dance as we see her.

Static characters—the color of an eye, the curve of a motionless lip—are never really shared by two women. Quite strictly, even the very precise curve of the lip as seen from here and in this particular light cannot be shared except through learned visual translation-equivalents. What we call a "speaking likeness" (known more vigorously as a "spittin' image") is simply a related iconic complex of these static characters. But were the likeness to speak a single syllable (or the image to spit). Pygmalion's Galatea would have descended into life, and pictorial art would have vanished.

For the rest, women in paintings can have any static visual character (or, through expressive representation, any psychological character) any other woman can have, save only one: the woman in the painting cannot be (as a woman in a novel, for example, might be) invisible, because then by definition she wouldn't be in the painting, but only suggested by it. It is hardly too paradoxical to say that the historic Mme. Cézanne was invisible until she was painted by her husband. In recreating her in paint Cézanne rendered his wife visual and thus, for the first time, wholly visible.

Consider now Sandro Botticelli's famous portrait of Simonetta Vespucci, said to be the darling of fifteenth century Florence: pampered, an heiress, and possibly a mistress of Giuliano de' Medici, or even of Botticelli himself. Subject of duels and object of love poetry, when she died of consumption, all Florence went into mourning and enjoyed a splendid funeral. Is this historical Simonetta I describe the one we see before us here?

Our honest answer must be No, and not merely because we breathe the air of the twentieth century as she did that of the fifteenth. Our proper answer must be grounded on the given fact, the fact given for seeing. It is not that this Simonetta we see has survived that other Simonetta we know, but more basically, that this Simonetta is a radically different kind of being from that other one.

And here we come to a crucial parting of the ways between the woman who lives in our lives and the woman we see in art...between Browning's last Duchess of Ferrara and her painting there upon the wall. The painted woman, unlike the merely "real" one (or, better, the merely historic one, for the painted woman is in her way no less real than the other)
literally is no more than she seems to be. Her wonder, as a piece of painting, is all the world different from the wonder of a woman. No woman is ever really “pretty as a picture”, any more than any picture is ever really pretty or beautiful as a woman is pretty or beautiful. Each may be lovely in her own way, but these ways are worlds apart.

And, curiously, the most evident differences are not the most important ones. Of course Giuliano’s historic Simonetta breathed and Botticelli’s pictorial Simonetta does not; but what of that? It is as if Botticelli’s could breathe. Of course Giuliano’s Simonetta inherited lead mines in Piombino, while Botticelli’s did not, but what of that, too? Had we been noblemen in Florence in 1475, we too might have dreamed of loving that exquisite, consumptive darling—but what of all of that?

This Simonetta—the Simonetta we see here—like Shakespeare’s Macduff, was not of woman born; she was not born at all, but immaculately conceived and made, created by the heart and mind and disciplined hand of one Sandro Botticelli, Pittore, Via Nuova, Buon’ Ognissanti, Florence. It was not to celebrate this Simonetta that Poliziano sang his lyric Stanze, but to salute another, who died long ago. The merely historic fact that the same merely historic woman also posed as the newborn Spring is neither here nor anywhere; each of these pictorial women is the distinctly created image she is.

This Simonetta was created for vision, as a thing to be seen and adored in ways in which that other Simonetta could never be seen and never adored. Here we can know with no faintest pang of regret that our adoration will never be answered, because we do not really adore her at all. Only sentimental Hokinsonian ladies really adore paintings: men see them, as we simply see our Simonetta here. No—not quite this either. For, as she is far from simple, being an object of artistic vision, so also is our seeing of her far from a simple act.

We see our Simonetta here as a vision precisely because she is a vision. In the seeing of a work of art, vision is no longer a dull psychological category, a name for a bare and banal channel of sense perception; “vision” almost partakes of its mystical sense of insight. It can become almost holy in its intensity.

Yet insistently—so long as we remain within the realm of art—we must stop short of revelation. Nothing need be revealed through our Simonetta. There is nothing in her or behind her or beyond her to reveal. She is, for us, all there, and all all there is, and all there needs to be, our last as well as our first world. “Good looks,” we say, are never enough in historic women. But a painted woman is all “looks,” all seeming; in this lies her very pictorial glory. We do not really “see into” a painted woman; we look at her. Thus “insight” will not do, after all, to characterize our Simonetta-vision. We do better to use the German “atsight”, and to wonder that we can be fulfilled by looking at her.

A condition of this looking not often noticed is this: We know that she will not look back. The existential category of the human encounter
has no place here. In seeing this purified, created, transformed Simonetta, I truly am subject, she truly is object; I am, momentarily, wholly pour sol, she is forever en soi. Yet her curious “en soi-hood” is vastly more to me than is that of material objects I merely see. This object, unlike those, is one by which I myself am in some strange sense changed. I reach up toward her and change in her light, even as I know and perhaps partly because I know that she will never and can never change in mine. I am, paradoxically if you will, subjectively fulfilled in becoming other than I was before I saw her. Her Sartrian “materiality” is no materiality at all, for I intend her not as matter but as person, and not as an historical person, but as a purely pictorial one. As Sartre says of Richelieu, of Louis XV and of his own grandfather, so may we say of our Simonetta; that she is not merely the sum of our memories of her, nor even the sum of the memories or awarenesses of all who have ever heard of her; she is an objective and opaque being, simply reduced to the sole dimension of exteriority. In the happy phrase of Mikel Dufrenne, Simonetta is neither en soi nor pour sol; she is pour autre. This, our Simonetta, will never rebuke our stares. She will never accept us and never reject us. Nothing you and I do or say will ever touch her.

Thus in art we meet a woman utterly given to vision. This woman hides nothing, precisely because she has nothing to hide, because she is exactly what she appears to be: not a mere woman upon whose face paint has been applied, but a woman who had been created in paint. These our eyes are possessed, and not the eyes in our heads; only, but the eyes of our minds.

A picture, like a person, may quietly command and reward us. The picture or person which shrieks at us may gain our momentary attention, only to frustrate it, just as the picture or person which bleeds or laughs out loud may shock, offend, and then soon enough bore us. But the picture or person to which we return need utter nothing aloud, but simply be. We see and know and feel enriched. This, by the way, is why so very much of what has been written about the so-called “aesthetic attitude” is nonsense. You and I do not enter a museum in any kind of trance. We do not cast aside every extra-aesthetic concern when we approach a painting. We are all too human, visually stained with quite unoriginal sin, and we look as humans, without sacking our selves up into any vacuous aesthetic purity. It is, as Susanne Langer once put it, the painting which sets the condition for its seeing. The painting can invite us into itself or smash its image upon us. It evokes the requisite attitude, subject only to our educated readiness and our humble, interested, attentive acquiescence.

Our “readiness” may of course depend upon a fund of learning on our part. No painting can be seen by a wholly innocent eye (nor is any human eye wholly innocent) and many paintings are invisible except to highly sophisticated eyes. Yet the sophistication here is of an unusual
sort, as is the learning. It is not an easy sophistication betrayed by the casual use of jargon, but the genuine wisdom of the educated eye that, through study and experience, has learned to see the substance of a painting. This means learning not to make irrelevant demands upon paintings, though it may mean much more as well, even to Panofsky iconological analysis.

Not that this eye of ours, however educated, becomes a decoding machine or a cryptanalytical device to see art. It must remain an eye for art. But if the art for which it is an eye is a rich art, the eye must be rich indeed to see it.

Becoming rich, however, is a very different thing from becoming technically proficient. Not every mode of learning in living can be reduced to conceptual formulas without distortion; some can be generalized only vaguely. Because in our culture concepts are so widely idolized and communication is so admired, we all tend to underestimate the complexity, the significance and the value of non-conceptual behavior. Worse yet, we tend to carry over into these realms of behavior the same formula rigidity which works in other realms.

There are, of course, skills which can be learned by following preplanned procedures. Hi-fi kits can be assembled, step by step, and puddings can be baked, step by step. Here is the diagram or recipe: Do this, then do that and by and by you will have an FM tuner, or an apple brown Betty.

But there are other ways of living which do not lend themselves so simply to diagrams, patterns or recipes, and when we seek to impose diagrams upon them, they are transformed into caricatures of human action. Teaching, I think, is one of these. When a student once asked me how to teach, I had to confess ignorance. I have taught for many years, but I have never studied how to teach. Honestly, I don’t know how to teach. I just teach, sharing ideas with young people. What would you tell me, if I were to ask you how to make friends? To read Dale Carnegie? Or would you answer, “Just be friendly, that’s all. There isn’t any formula to follow, and if there were and you followed it, it wouldn’t work, just because it would be a formula. Open up, relax, don’t expect too much of yourself or of others. Be willing to grow. You’ll make a lot more friends without ‘knowing how’ than you would if you did.”

In all these realms learning goes on, of course. We all change as we live. But this kind of learning is not a selfconscious spelling out of procedures, with goals specifiable and successes definable in advance. It’s rather more like growing up. We have all more or less grown up, without ever having consciously learned exactly how to do so.

And so, again, with seeing paintings. Of course, learning is involved—sometimes tough old-fashioned, formula learning, for which we should have no disrespect. But even broader and deeper and much more flexible is the learning that comes not by the imposition in advance of any rigid
categories of any textbooks on How to Look at Paintings (Watch for triangles! Large objects near center balance small ones far from center!). The learning that counts most comes better from deeply seeing a few paintings, and allowing one's self to grow responsively in their light. This is the unself-conscious way we learn to make friends and, even, to select among them those few who, in the long, long run, will mean the most to us, and we to them.

My case here must not be understood as one more plea for mysticism or sentimentality or unreason in human or aesthetic relationships. On the contrary, it is reason itself which enriches and makes meaningful those of our experiences which are otherwise merely undergone. Hypnotized mechanics of the mind may believe themselves to be highly rational in imposing canons and concepts upon our every human act, but they are surely humanly unreasonable in trying to do so. The parallel must now be plain: neither I nor any other man can give you a key to unlock the secret of every painting, any more than I can give you a device for opening every human heart. All I can really do is to point out that the barriers we find between paintings and ourselves, like those between ourselves and other people, are very often of our own making.

The autonomy of the pictorial woman is almost complete. She is, to speak metaphysically, of a different order of being from our merely historic counterpart. She may have two eyes or four or twelve or none at all, one breast or a thousand: she is the woman she is created to be and no other.

Two important questions remain here, one easy and one difficult. The easy question simply asks the grounds of calling her a woman. If she is defined as thus radically distinct from all real women, why do we see her as a woman at all? If the painted Mme. Cézanne is not related to the historic Mme. Cézanne, and if she is, as I have proposed, pictorially mountainous, what sets her apart from the created Mont Ste. Victoire?

The answer is that these two Mesdames Cézanne are of course related, but the relation between them is itself wholly historical and extra-pictorial. We need not criticize the picture in the light of the woman, or the woman in the light of the picture, in order to posit a resemblance. When we see naively, the painting does, after all, look more like the real Mme. Cézanne than it looks like the real mountain; were this not so, we should never have thought of calling her a pictorial woman at all. Plainly, we should never be able to see her as a woman had we not long since learned, from looking at women, how women look. Nor can we, need we, or do we totally forget our history and our world when we look at a painting; for example, we recognize a pictorial woman as distorted only because we bring to our perception implicit images of undistorted women, both in and out of painting. Yet all this does not destroy the artistic autonomy of the painted woman. or blur the crucial distinction between her and her space-time sister, for these are only some of the
psychological conditions for perceiving the painted woman; they do not impugn her independence. Pictorially speaking—in terms alone, that is, of what really counts for vision—the painted woman is far more importantly like the painted mountain than she is like the breathing woman, because the painted mountain also purely rewards contemplation, and is wholly exhausted in our contemplation of it.

The more difficult question concerns the nature of the connection between these two women. Here we must say, with Bradley, that there is a connection, but it is all underground. The connection is a matter of history, not of art. Cézanne may well have looked at his wife while he was painting this painting, as Simonetta may well have posed for Botticelli's portrait. But in each case the making of the picture, the actual creation, involved far more than the simple substitution of one visible object for another. Cézanne, whatever his intentions, could not simply have taken "the form" of his wife's face and naively recorded it on canvas, any more than Botticelli could have done this with Simonetta's. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as "the form" of Mme. Cézanne's face, or of anybody else's. There are rather ways of seeing her face, ways of construing or taking it. These ways are differentially appropriate and of relevance in differing circumstances. Our perceptual process in seeing a human face or anything else to which we genuinely attend is dynamic, an ordered series of fittings of expectation-patterns upon the partly formless given. We try now these categories, now those, tentatively accepting and rejecting until we find some kind of perceptual atomehness or sense-makingness, which will allow us to order how our world looks and feels.

Even when the picture-making is as studiously "literal" and "faithful to (our) reality" as it is in Jan van Eyck's Betrothal of the Arnolfini—in which, as Gombrich reads it, the painter seems to be notarizing or witnessing a legal act, with all loving fidelity to palpable atmosphere and shape and texture and color—even here, we have a pictorial presentation that, as art, far transcends the Arnolfini themselves. For these Arnolfini are forever being betrothed, and never will actually marry as their fifteenth-century "ancestors" presumably did.

Van Eyck painted in terms of "holding the mirror up to nature" and presumably reflecting it. But looking at nature, or looking at a picture, or at anything else, is never simply reflecting a stimulus upon a retina. Looking is a complex, learned activity of expecting, sorting, experimenting, succeeding, failing, achieving fulfillment and suffering frustration. Real looking (as distinct from mere noticing) involves our very selves with that at which we look. Looking is a process of growth.

The television camera, in contrast, is a quasi-eye. It rapidly and repeatedly scans the field at which it "looks" (or, better, the target at which it is aimed, for the camera doesn't really "look" at all). It ticks off "light-dark-light-light-light-dark" and so on and on, transforming these impulses into units on the screen-tubes in our homes, so that our
eyes and minds can reconstruct an image. Like the television camera, our eye is of course subject to physical limitations. Unlike it, the character of what we finally see is always a function of very much more than the plus-minus charges before us. It is a function of how we have learned to construe our visual world, and of how we hope to be able to orient ourselves within that world, and to respond to it—of what we have learned to love and fear, as well as of which of our rods and cones are triggered.

Now, the world of painting is a precious part of our visual world, and almost the only uniquely visual part of it. Every new painting we see, we see through eyes excited or jaded by all the other seeing we have done.

All this was true of Cézanne, too, of course, when he perceived his wife. But his dynamic was not merely an ordering-to-what-is-given. It was an ordering-of-the-being-made, a genuinely creative transformation or transmutation, the building of a new thing, formally radiant in its own right, to be seen in its own pictorial terms.

What, then, of all these similarities and these distinctions we so painfully draw? Are they not painful also in their obviousness? Perhaps they are, but three less obvious consequences, all of them important, flow from our comparisons.

First, serious paintings deserve the unique respect every human being seriously deserves. A woman worth knowing at all is worth studying for her individual character: not merely for what she is to me, or for what she can do for or to me, but for what she herself most personally and humanly is, and perhaps, even though only implicitly for what I can humanly be for and to her. She is not to be reduced to her ancestry, or caricatured into supposed resemblances with any other person, or translated into “influences.” She is to be known and, perhaps, to be loved. (Remember that the wise old Hebrews used the same word for know and love). So, too, with a painting: if it is worth seeing at all, it is to be examined in its own responsible terms, not primarily to be pigeonholed, classified, criticized, or compared.

Second, we disserve the world of painting when we impose upon it demands universally appropriate to the world of persons. The women we know, most of them, have two eyes, and those who don’t have only one or none at all. But some of the women we meet in Picasso’s paintings may normally and “naturally” (“natural” in painting means “artificial,” of course, because art, as we must never forget, is artifice and not nature) have four eyes, or six. The beginner who challenges Picasso’s woman for having a misplaced nose on the irrelevant ground that the women of his acquaintance have noses above their mouths says nothing about art, but only betrays the narrowness of the range of his acquaintance; he just hasn’t met enough women. In the most important sense, Picasso’s created pictorial woman cannot even in principle have a “mis-
placed nose," any more than an Indian Siva can in artistic terms have "too many breasts" or "too many arms" (though, in religious terms, she may for all I know be oversupplied). Each really has exactly as many of each as she was created to have, and in the exact place she was created to have them, no more and no less. This pictorial nose is related to this pictorial mouth in this pictorial way. The shock we feel is no doubt a function of our conventional habits; but it is antipodally different from the shock we should feel were we to see a woman who "actually" looked like this; for such a "real" woman horrified embarrassment, an averted eye, and perhaps radical cosmetic surgery would be appropriate. For this woman we see here, we have only attention and vivid contemplation.

In nature, we might say in horror of a newborn baby, "But she has three eyes!" and mean, naturally enough, to compare our infants with certain biological norms of expectation which we have learned and which we uncritically impose on every newborn babe. The new, we suppose, must be just like the old, else something is "wrong," "freakish" "monstrous," "unnatural." Interestingly, when the girl baby has grown to young womanhood, we reverse our expectations, imposing a rigid conformity of expectation only if we ourselves have spiritually calcified. If we have not, we actually come to disvalue identity with every other specimen, just as we earlier disvalued uniqueness. We now say, in disparagement, "But she is so typical, stereotyped. She never exhibits any insight of her own!"

In art, I suggest, we ought to apply neither of these demands: neither the infantile demand for conformity, nor the quasi-adult demand for disconformity or novelty for novelty's sake. We ought instead to assume from the outset that in undertaking to look at a painting as a painting we are undertaking to see with all our might what is there before us to be seen, and nothing else. We undertake not to impose upon what we see demands which would be perfectly appropriate in other realms. The sensitivity that counts in art is almost but not quite strictly a visual sensitivity; it is a sensitivity through vision to everything that can be transformed into visual terms. This everything, as painters show us every day, though infinite in its own dimensions, is less than all the world, but no less valuable. Not all the world is ever expressed in painting, because not all the world can be seen and; through our eyes, felt, touched and tested and loved and feared and hated.

To adopt this point of view toward paintings and people is not, of course, to answer all possible questions about art; it simply indicates some directions in which interesting answers might be sought. If, for instance, we were asked "Where is the painted woman?", we could never answer in terms of any earthly survey; she does not lie so many degrees west of Greenwich and so many north of the equator. The correct answer to such a question, I believe, would have to be something like this; "The painted woman is on the painted divan, beside the painted table on which stands the painted lamp." And if anyone goes on to ask where these things are,
we shall have to tell him that each has its painted place only in relation to the others, in a painted or pictorial space, and that this pictorial space is wholly incommensurable with physical space. If you were to ask me, "Where is the Alba Madonna?" I should, of course, answer naturally, "The canvas hangs in the National Gallery in Washington," but this, however helpful, would be only one possible answer. We could construe the question pictorially and reply, "She is (pictorially) sitting on a (pictorial) rock, in front of a (pictorial) landscape."

It is almost too easy for us, buffeted as we are by today's abstractly expressionistic winds, to forget the simple fact that there are, after all, images in most of our paintings, and images to be seen, at that. Plastic languages of texture and geometry fit some paintings so conveniently that we have come to suppose that there is somehow something naughty in seeing the woman there at all; it is as if the woman-picture were so only accidentally, and that the only thing we "ought" to see—or, to be quite honest, the only thing we ought to admit that we see—is the same fanciful kind of plastic map.

This is simply an extravagance born of too much sophistication and too much obedience to the dogmas of too many twentieth century critics. The woman in this painting—her artist-son to the contrary—is at least as much "there" to be seen as is the arrangement in gray and black, and the latter-day Clive Bell who pretends that every painting is non-representational exhibits heroic ignorance. So anxious is he to avoid admitting extra-pictorial canons into his criticism, and so concerned to preserve the painting's precious "autonomy," that he falsifies the basic pictorial fact.

In insisting upon my distinction between painted women and women who are painted I too insist upon pictorial autonomy. With Bell and Fry and their descendants I share a horror of the antipictorial irrelevance of much nineteenth century criticism. But I refuse to allow myself to be bewitched into supposing that every painting of a woman is by some critical legerdemain to be turned into a catalog of cones and cylinders, of masses and spaces and curving, colored lines. That is a woman I see before me in the painting. To her may go every pictorial quality any pictorial woman may ever claim...and not another single one, not one any historic woman, in her own right as human, may claim.

Finally, we deserve the world of humanity if we become so habitually aesthetic in our perceptions that we impose upon people demands for constancy and perfection which can be met only in art. And, strange perversion though it may seem, we do indeed sometimes do this. The precious souls of the late 'nineties—the Wildes and the Beardsleys and the Whistlers—did it perhaps most egregiously, but we do it too whenever we berate a friend for doing the unexpected, for changing his ways, for failing to live up to our private notions of him: as if a real woman can
or should be as genuine, as pure, as calm, as objective, as visual as a painted woman like our Simonetta.

There are, then, basic differences between painted women and women who are painted, just as there are similarities. We may be grateful for the differences, but we ought not too hastily and exclusively to decide our every need and inclination in favor of our transient Jezebels of flesh and blood, and against the honestly visionary world of painting. After all a woman is only a woman, but a good portrait is art.
Gustav E. Mueller

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CREATION, EVOLUTION AND EMANATION

A philosophical interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis

INTRODUCTION

I would like to translate the language of the biblical myth about the creation of the world into the language of logical reflection or philosophy. Myth is, philosophically speaking, a necessary medium of religious thought. It uses personifying imagination in order to refer to essential truths that are not found in factual experiences.

I heard a scientist say that, God is dreadfully embarrassing to science. God should have called in committees of experts, before acting so rashly—or at least he should have let scientifically trained observers verify his account of creation. Now he has to suffer from such thoughtless neglect of scientific principles and methods. Science cannot give him much credit for factual accuracy.

Science knows how to engender light; but to “create light out of nothing” is a trick God should make plausible on scientific grounds. How can anything come from nothing? And how can God have light on “the second day”, when the source of light, the sun, is established only on the “fifth day”? What scientific-empirical meaning have such statements? Are they consistent among themselves? Where are the protocol sentences, on which we could agree? Let God’s spirit go on “brooding over the waters”, which were not even created, when such brooding was said to have occurred. We prefer scientific clarity to God’s “brooding”.

Philosophy fully understands this scientific embarrassment; philosophy, however, also understands and comprehends the meaning of religious myths, because philosophy reflects reality as a whole, which contains the religious dimension of existence as one of its essential values within itself. This comprehensive reality, allembacing concrete and absolute, is the beginning as well as the end of philosophy. If it would not comprehend the religious dimension of reality within itself, it would not be true to the whole which is allembacing, concrete and absolute. Religion worships the same Absolute in mythical language. There is only One truth, but it can be expressed in the different media of logical reflection or in personifying or mythical imagination.

Our myth is based on Babylonian sources. Its world-view, therefore, differs from the beginning chapter of the Jewish Bible, the myth of paradise and the "fall" of "the first man".

**THE FIRST DAY:**

In the beginning God created...

"In the beginning" does not refer to any moment in time, or "before" time, because "before" also is a temporal moment; time, as the sequential order of perceived processes in the world has not been created as yet. The beginning of creation is expressly opposed to the void, the dark, the formless: poetic expressions for Non-Being or Nothing. The beginning is the beginning of Being; this Being sets itself off from and thus contains or creates non-being. The beginning begins something that is to be but is not. Or, this beginning of Being itself is the origin or ground of all finite, definite shapes and characters in the world, all of which it is not. None of them is the beginning or first principle of all finite, definite things. Only Being itself as its own beginning can be this principle; and it is also their Non-being, because none of them is Being itself. Being eternally begins; beginning eternally is. This Being, beginning out of itself, is the depth-dimension of all things, none of which can identify itself with it. Philosophy of Being or ontology begins with the question: What is meant by saying that something is? What is reality as such? What is the one Being in all beings? What is world as a comprehensive whole? All such formulations refer to the Absolute, which is logically prior to any particular experience given to some particular experiencer. The absolute whole is never given, but always presupposed by all that which is given in it. What is given, the data, the visible, tangible, fugitive and mortal experiences of innumerable individual centers of activity and reactivity, all those presuppose a non-visible, eternal activity, which creates itself out of itself. It is the beginning, the founding ground, the absolute principle and priority. This world-ground, Being as unconditional activity, begins to appear. It is not conditioned by anything outside of itself, having no other being or otherness over-against itself. Being itself appears, not Nothing appears; although it also appears as the Nothing or as the
annihilation of any conditional and finite being that would substitute itself for the unconditional Absolute. The Absolute indirectly appears in the non-absolute and relative appearances of the world, not apart from them; this ontological truth is expressed in the mythical language of religion: it posits them, it cancels them and it preserves or 'remembers' them in its eternal activity. The 'creator' would be nothing apart from creating that which he is not—the creature; just as the 'father' is not 'father' without his 'son'.

"In the beginning God created"...is a superb mythical expression of religious metaphysics. By metaphysics I mean a statement, which affirms that which is of ultimate value or importance to man. Religious metaphysics relates man to the unconditional, transcendent or absolute aspect of reality or Being. The mythical term 'God', means or intends Being grasped in worshipping perspective. Ontological philosophy understands and comprehends this religious metaphysics as one aspect of its own totality. Negatively, a philosophy that does not understand and comprehend the meaning of religious metaphysics is a deficient philosophy; it is ontologically blind. It misses the ontological category of transcendence, the eternal beginning of Being out of itself, not understandable by or derivable from any definite being in it. This not is equivalent to Being as Nothing, the annihilation of all things finites which would claim to be absolute or eternal; Being itself negates all false or pseudo-absolute "fixed ideas".

In the scholastic philosophy of the Christian-Germanic period of European history, usually called the 'Middle-Ages', the problem of this first day of creation is compressed in the technical term *ens a se*, the Being that is out of itself. They even coined the abstract noun *aseitas* (aseity), out-of-it-selfness. Being eternally begins together with the Non-being of all that is not it; and Beginning eternally is nevertheless in all finite or temporal beginnings. *Ens a se*, Being out of itself is contrasted to the *ens ab alio*, that being which presupposes a Being other than itself, in order to be. And this is the step taken on the second day of creation, to which we now turn.

**THE SECOND DAY:**

**God separated**

God separated heaven and earth, light and darkness; and there was the temporal rhythm of night and day, of morning and evening—the second day. The second day makes it clear, that Being is that which begins and is present in the beginnings of even the most abstract finite opposites: "Let there be light, and there was light."

This world of the second day of creation consists of two pairs of vast, general impersonal abstractions. They are opposites which condition each the other. We would not know what light is without its opposition to darkness and vice versa.
These inner-worldly opposites are quite different from the ontological Beginning of Being which is also the Non-being of and in all created beings. Or: the creative, absolute world-ground is not found among the relative opposites that characterize all experience; the Absolute whole is not one of the opposites within it.

This world of abstract elementary opposites, consequently, is a godless world. The sciences, which study them, must therefore be godless sciences. There can be no science, which does not build up its world-view out of opposites, such as positive and negative electricity, cause and effect, stimulus and response, motivation and the resulting action, ends and means. What characterizes them all is, that in the world, each of the opposites does not exist without its partner; each conditions the other. They are relative to one another. They are ordered in quantitative and qualitative rhythms, patterns of alternative succession in time and of juxtaposition in the all-encompassing space of "heaven and earth". Since all empirical sciences stay within the secular or worldly relativity, none can refer to the unconditional whole of reality, which is never present in those relative polarities, tensions, opposites of experience. Positivism tries to make of this ontological deficiency and blindness of physical sciences a virtue by declaring them to know the only true reality, the "positive fact". Empirical sciences must, indeed, be godless; they cannot use 'God' as a useful hypothesis. But then they should remember that the whole of reality, which is that to which to refer is forbidden by them, is not their problem, they can say nothing about it; let them stick to their given and relative polarities.

There is still another thought in this our second day of creation. "God said: Let there be light, and there was light. And God saw that the light was good". An ontological command, imperative, act—the beginning of Being—is followed by a stepping back, by reflection, by judgment and evaluation.

Light not only is, but it stands for something else, the good. It not only is but is also means something for a subject beholding or contemplating its meaning or significance. 'God' fails to mention here, that if 'light' is a symbol for a good, darkness would be a symbol for evil. We shall come back to this on the seventh day.

The same symbolism also would hold for the mythical term 'heaven'. Seen within the one dimension of physical separation, 'heaven' may be the outer space, the makrokosmos, as over against this individual earth, the mikrokosmos.

But religion has always understood 'heaven' in a spiritual sense. 'God' separated the natural, physical, elemental world and that which it may mean. In Greek philosophy this distinction or separation is the distinction of the sensuous world (kosmos aisthetos) and the intelligible or spiritual world (kosmos noetos).

Let me illustrate: write the word 'God' with white chalk on a black board. The empirical opposites of white and black make the word visible.
It is a temporal and spatial movement, a scribble. Now I wipe it off again, it disappears from sight.

Explain this process physically. A mechanical pressure of muscic against a resisting surface distributes particles or molecules of chalk. Does this explain the meaning of the word 'God'? Has 'God' been created by a mechanical and accidental motion? Is the real meaning of the word gone, when its physical appearance in one of a thousand possible sounds or signs has disappeared? This holds true for every word, because every word symbolizes or means something beyond its own physical appearance. This is also true when that which is meant is a physical thing. The word 'chalk' both is chalk on the blackboard and means the class or concept 'chalk', any chalk anywhere at any time.

To sum up the second day; A world of abstract opposites is created, ordered in relative rhythms of qualitative and quantitative patterns; and this abstract and purely physical frame not only or simply is, but is capable of becoming the medium or vehicle of meaning or value.

This second day gives rise to a metaphysical temptation. The materialist or physicalist may try to deny meaning and value and keep to the one physical side of the world as if it were the whole. It may treat the physical appearance of the world as if it could be formulated in abstraction from all meaning. 'God separated', yes, but his opposites or separations of physical appearance and spiritual meaning were also and at the same time kept in a concrete unity. When man separates, as materialism separates, then this is done abstractly, the other side denied, suppressed, and forgotten.

The materialist, made possible by the separation of the opposites of physical elements and spiritual meanings on the second day of creation, lives not only in a godless, but also in a meaningless world.

THE THIRD DAY:

"And God Said: Let the waters under the heavens be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear...Let the earth put forth vegetation, plants yielding seeds, and fruit trees bearing fruit in which is their seed, each according to its kind."

The second day had created the world as a world of partitions, opposites, dialectical contradictions; earth and heaven, sensuous reality and spiritual meaning fall apart and occur together; the time in this world is a cyclical recurrence of opposite qualities.

The third day leaves heaven and earth, light and darkness and tells story of a cosmic evolution. Its time is a chronological succession of forms first of inorganic and then of organic nature. The later, the more complex or higher forms depend on the earlier, simpler forms. Night and day, water and earth are the necessary preconditions of vegetation.

This is the law of innerworldly, natural causality, moving in opposite
directions: forward to more complex organizations; backwards to their preconditions.

Further there is the logical order of classes, kinds, sorts of things. Each organism reproduces itself in a cycle, each according to its kind. Individual organisms and their classes or kinds are both opposites and in unity. Individuals are impossible, if they do not belong to their kind, to an organic plan which they unfold, or actualize; and the kinds or classes are empty forms if they are not carried and reproduced by unique and living individuals. Logical classifications are carried by unique individuals.

Existential time of evolving forms of nature, causal dependencies and logical classification characterize the reality of the third day of creation.

This world gives rise to two conflicting worldviews or metaphysical convictions with regard to this experience of nature.

One of them is rationalization or scientism; the other is evolutionism or vitalism.

The first keeps its eyes and its mind on the inorganic elements and tries to reduce the living and evolved organisms of nature to the inorganic or physical elements conditioning them. Its leading thought is a backward-looking causality: the inorganic elements are the conditions without which the organic forms of life would not be possible. The qualitative manifold of individuals must be explained away in terms of quantitative equations of elements, molecules and atoms. The practical, technical success of this approach has concealed its metaphysical one-sidedness and insufficiency.

The causal sciences of nature are engaged in an endless battle with the qualitative and unique individuation of life; which on the one hand they must accept or presuppose, but on the other hand must reduce to causal relations or equations of matter, force or energy. The concrete phenomena of life must be explained, dissolved in terms of their material preconditions.

To illustrate: I once heard the lecture of a famous organic chemist, who had chemically analyzed wings of butterflies and fins of fishes. His result was, that both were, chemically speaking, the same arrangement of chemical elements: The difference between a butterfly and a fish had evaporated; and worse than that, once you got the formula, this difference between butterfly and fish could not be restored, you would never even guess which was which.

Causal science is thus a dialectical battle to impose abstract laws upon a nonlogical, irrational life.

If its goal could be accomplished, which it cannot, then we would end in a chance-constellation or a chaos of atoms, molecules and chemical elements formulated by necessary and universal relations or laws. A negation of the natural and formed infinity of individual creatures is at work here. Abstractness is to triumph over concreteness, formal logic over the irrational unpredictability of life.
Indirectly, however, those reductionistic sciences know that their causal equations are not the final answer to the metaphysical question: what is ultimately true and real and important? If they know themselves in their limitation, they know themselves philosophically. If they recognize their limit, they also indirectly affirm the unlimited Being, within which they have cut out those abstractions, which are technically or practically so successful.

The metaphysics of the sciences is thus a negative theology. The second law of thermodynamics, working out the consequences of the preservation of energy, is the best illustration of the scientific reductionism, which abstracts from all qualitative differences. It proves, that the quantitatively measurable transformations of energy tend towards an equilibrium of death, when all energy will be equally distributed and no new and disturbing individual differences will be possible.

As the materialist of the second day of creation contradicted himself with every word, with every proposition, which was meaningful to him, when he denied the reality of meaning and only clung to the reality of the physical vehicle of meaning; so the rationalist of the third day of creation tends towards that void and shapeless chaos, that was mentioned on the first day, when he tries to reduce all living forms of an infinite variety of organic life to their inorganic preconditions. All he does is to notice the patterns of behavior of elements, molecules, atoms, observed from the outside or externally.

This is the reason why Goethe hated Newton, because the latter reduced the infinitely rich spectacle and expressive language of colors to angles of refraction, wave lengths or motion of corpuscles.

Goethe is the most important representative of an organic world-view, the second alternative of the third day of creation; Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Bergson come to mind as formulating Goethe's organic contemplation of nature in philosophy.

They all refuse to think of so-called dead matter, as if it could be studied and thought in abstraction from a cosmic, organic life whose product and expression it is. There is nothing dead in living nature. What we call so, is the appearance of life as it is given to individual agents of perception externally, or in the form of alienation. Since every individual agent of life is indivisible—I cannot share any of my psychical functions with you, except in the logical form of talking about them—and since, secondly, every individual agent of life is unique, never repeated or duplicated, every other agent must appear to me in the external form and shape of its physical qualities; so many pounds, such a temperature, shape and movement and so forth. Now the power of abstract reason is such, that it can abstract physical patterns of behavior from the individuated life, whose external, given or visible expression it is. This lifeless abstraction is the pride and triumph of physical sciences. But it is and remains an abstraction from life and should be remembered as that. In reality,
the nature of the third day of creation is a living and continuous whole, in which every individuated agent—whether organic or inorganic, whether personal or non-personal, whether conscious or subconscious—is and stands in an active-reactive contact with its neighbors, which form, in the language of physics a "field". How I see my world and how I react to it, depends on the organization of my sensibility; depends on the spatial environment and on my location in time. This nature is infinitely relative—every agent depending on others—new and unpredictable at each moment. It is irrational or non-scientific. Rationalism is either blind to this fact of the infinitely individuated irrationality of life, or is deliberately ignoring it. The rationalist nevertheless conducts a vigorous campaign against it; he postulates that the non-rational life be made rational and intelligible in terms of causal laws, general abstract classes or concepts linked in dissolving organisms into their inorganic preconditions.

The rationalist does not know that he is engaged in such a dialectical struggle; he lacks self-knowledge. If he had it, he would see the limit of rationalism and thus become a philosopher.

The third day of creation, like the second, thus carries a dialectic of its own, unity of the opposites of life and death, of mechanical causal abstractions from life versus an interpretation of physical appearance as appearance of living monads or souls, "each according to its kind''.

THE FOURTH DAY:

And God said, "Let there be lights in the firmament...and let them be for signs and for seasons and for days and years...to rule."

The third day of creation was the day of logical dependencies, of grounds and consequences, of preconditioning causes and calculable effects; locked in dialectical conflict with the emergent evolution of individuated life. The fourth day adds a new dimension of idealism versus realism. The Babylonians were pioneers in astronomy and time-measuring or chronology.

'God puts the stars in the firmament, but not simply, in themselves, but expressly as signs, which "rule" the sequences and rhythms of time, and the distances in the firmament.

This is in close analogy with the Pythagorean conception of number as a harmony of an irrational movement or continuum, and of discrete units; by means of which the continuum can be counted, numbered, brought under control. The fourth day also refers to this bringing phenomena under control. The mathematical laws are "to rule". They are both objective laws, operating in astronomical reality, as well as "signs", laws of and for the mathematicians' mind.

This harmony of an objective system of laws and a subjective projection and creative invention of the mind evokes that admiration, which is expressed by the 'God' of the fourth day: "and God saw that it was good."
One may describe mathematical sciences from purely subjective or psychological point of view, as some empiricists or logical positivists have tried to do. Instead of laws of nature we then have habits of the human mind. Instead of stars we then have only the “signs”, light signals received by the retina of our eyes. This subjectivistic or idealistic abstraction thus would understand mathematical science as a branch of psychology.

But this separation from intentional objects of measuring is not and has never been the meaning of the mathematical sciences of nature. They always wanted reliable information about the behavior-patterns of their objects. One does not build machines on habits of human minds, but on laws, exact equations, which permit no exceptions. When I measure the pulse-beat or bloodpressure, I do not merely form a subjective opinion, but I know whether pulse-beats themselves are accelerated or slowing down. Otherwise there would be no sense in measuring them.

But the realistic abstraction from the sign-character of mathematical language is equally unsound. What is measured is not independent of the units of measuring, which are agreed-upon signs of the mind. It makes no sense to say that the temperature is sixty, without agreeing first whether we use Fahrenheit or Centigrade.

Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* is profoundly concerned with this fourth day of creation. He rejects both the realism and idealism of the fourth, as well as the rationalism and empiricism of the third day. All things that appear in space and time to perceptions of innumerable individual agents of perception, are real things, not merely subjective images, as idealism imagines. Space and time are *a priori*, they are prior to any one singular experience. They are universal and necessary conditions, through which all outer or physical and inner or psychological experience, become possible and perceivable. Space and time are the subject matter of pure mathematics. Since on the one hand, space and time are non-logical pure forms of sensibility or perception, they are the necessary conditions to locate perceived things; since, on the other hand, they are pure reason and not empirical-space itself is not located in space, time is not located at a certain moment—they can combine with logical concepts. This is Kant’s threefold “synthesis apriori”, harmonizing empirical and logical reality, harmonizing things and thoughts, the ever-fluid continuum of movement, change, becoming, with the stability and discreteness of laws, spelled out and made articulate in mathematical equations of numbers and geometrical magnitudes.

But Kant also knows and is keenly aware, that this is only one day of creation. The world-view of mathematical sciences is limited to this one day. There are other dimensions of creation surrounding this one day, like, as Kant puts it, an island is surrounded by the ocean. Reality in the form of being mathematically calculated is not identical with reality itself. Being as such is infinitely more than a being mathematically measured.
In our Biblical myth, 'God' appoints a law 'to rule'. Laws that do not rule and are unreliable are no laws. The phenomena 'obey' this rule. But the appointed ruler of the fourth day is, of course, no substitute for the absolute Creator.

This is the mythical equivalent for Kant's saying, that mathematical sciences do not disclose reality as a whole, but only measure one appearing aspect of it.

THE FIFTH DAY

And God said, "Let the waters bring forth swarms of living creatures, and let birds fly above the earth...and every living creature that moves...be fruitful and multiply."

The mathematical order of nature is older than life; but in order to know it, the mathematician must be born and live; he also is one of the living creatures that moves. And because man has this natural life as one side and precondition of his cultural activities and purposes, it is a wrong ethics that suppresses it. But it is equally wrong to think that man is nothing but another animal or nothing but natural; we cannot stop creation on its fifth day.

Greek philosophy begins with the thought that the dry earth and all of life originated in water; and modern science has confirmed this. The same tale is told in the fifth day of the Biblical myth. Life is not put on earth as a stranger from somewhere else, but water brings forth swarms of living creatures. Out of the water they swarm, some taking to live on earth, some to live in the air.

It is, in this account, not 'God', who creates them, but they come out or emerge from inorganic elements. Life organizes inorganic, elemental forms of living nature into specialized organisms. And they are enabled to adjust themselves to various conditions and to preserve and maintain their life.

There is no life in general, as there was light in general on the first day of creation. There is a new form of causality, which is opposed to the mechanical forms of causation with which the third day was concerned. When burning gasoline sets wheels in motion, or when frost kills blossoms, the cause and the effect, the condition and the conditioned, are external to one another, they don't resemble each other in the least. But here, on the fifth day, in distinction from causal mechanisms, the effect and the cause are the same: both are organized life; each organism reproduces itself "according to its kind." On the third day the earth brought forth vegetation; this now becomes the condition of animal or animated life. Animated life is the natural soul.

Animal life, capable of moving around in order to find food and to protect itself, adjusting and recreating itself, is a kind of *causa sui*, a cause in and out of its own resources. Every function of this organized life depends internally on all the other functions. They support one
another and serve the whole organism, as its overall mode of life serves and sustains them. Purposiveness appears in the organization of interdependent functions, serving a particular plan or mode of life.

Each animal form is an expression and embodiment of this purposive life. To reduce its way of life, of which its body is the visible, external expression, to chemistry or physics is to kill it. This is one of the paradoxes of organic chemistry and biology, that they slaughter millions of animals in order to study their lives. There is an infinite and unpredictable qualitative newness or individuation in all those living creatures. Their movements from moment to moment can never be predicted by exact mathematical science. They simply “swarm and move”, as the Biblical author puts it.

This idea of the fifth day, that organisms chose different environments and adapt themselves to those changing circumstances; some changing themselves with them and surviving, other not being able to cope with changing conditions and perishing, is the main thought of Darwin’s natural selection and the survival of the fittest.

Darwin’s theory of evolution in his *Origin of Species* is amply provided for by the fifth day of creation.

Human existence emerges out of and differentiates itself from the life of nature, as soon as it is locked in a dialectical battle with it; that is, as soon as man tries to understand and care for life foreign to his own. The animal, organic life transcends itself and becomes conscious history. And with this thought we wake up on the morning of the sixth day of creation; it tells about the creation of man.

THE SIXTH DAY:

Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness and let them have dominion...male and female he created them.”

On this sixth day God himself interferes or intervenes. In the Platonic and Neo-Platonic tradition this self-manifestation of the Absolute is known as participation or emanation.

Man participates in the life of the Absolute. He does this by sacrificing his finitude without hostile suppression of it. Limited wholes, such as family, professional life or the state, become symbols of the unconditional whole which they represent. In giving his self, man receives it back enriched; in losing his life, he gains it.

Participation is the subjective aspect of emanation; emanation means that the Absolute “flows out” into its own opposite, into its own self-alienation: it becomes that which it is not; it is fully present in the infinite variety of individuation, but nevertheless retains its eternal fullness of life through the mortal fugitivity, its own negativity.

While evolution proceeds “upwards” from “lower” to “higher” forms of life, emanation proceeds from the fullness and concreteness of the Absolute to its fragile analogy in the conscious subject trying to re-integrate
Leibniz states emanation as follows: "Thus God alone is the primitive unity or the original simple substance; of which all created or derived monads are the products, and are generated, so to speak, by continual fulgurations of the Divinity, from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the creature, to whom limitation is essential."

We now return to our text and to the sixth day of creation:

God does not say: "Let the elements or the waters or the earth bring forth man, as he had done on previous days. Man is not only the product of natural evolution but also of emanation. In other words, man cannot find himself, his true self, among the natural elements, things, organisms or natural laws. They are for him. He is to have "dominion" over them. On the other hand, since he can observe himself from the outside, in the mirror, in the form of self-alienation or self-estrangement, he may reduce himself into a composition of chemical element without meaning or value or to a physical body in abstraction from life or soul; he can dissolve himself into a meeting point of causal conditions and mathematical laws. He can thus theoretically and practically annihilate himself. But man as such an object among objects, as an organism among other organisms, as a case illustrating general natural laws, is not the man of this sixth day of creation.

This man is rather the unobjectifiable subject without whom the preceding days of creation would be as nothing. They would mean nothing for him; they would only be. It is only for a thinking subject that a meaningful world exists. In him it becomes for itself, what it is in itself. Nature discloses its secret for itself; it becomes conscious of its character in the human subject thinking and evaluating his world.

Man as this subject of all his essential evaluations, functions and projects, man as philosopher, is open to all sides and levels of creation. He bursts his immediate environment and becomes citizen of the world. He is not taken captive by any one of the innumerable environments. He honors nature and takes cognisance of what is below himself; he recognizes his own being in his other, his partner—"male and female he created them"—; and he participates in the divine Being, the whole, the Absolute. And in its light he also knows his limitation; this his own finitude is also an essential feature of the whole. The whole contains the opposite of itself, the finite or fragmentary within itself.

The Absolute is, as we have seen on the first day, absolute creativity or activity; and by 'absolute' we mean that there is nothing outside of itself to condition it. Against this sovereign freedom to be and to enact itself, nothing finite, posited, created can hold out. There is nothing final, eternal or absolute in experience. This absoluteness is reflected in the critical reason of man, which may doubt any position, assertion or dogmatic fixation; he exists and expands in this restless critical and revolutionary movement of the spirit. When Socrates said, that he knew that he

1 Leibniz: Monadology. P.47.
did not know, he discovered and practiced the infinite judgment of reason, the logical question: Who are you? What is this? It is this infinite question, the search for truth, the love of wisdom, that is the lever which unhinges all finite certainties and ushers in the progress of all knowledge.

The Absolute is not exhausted in any one of its manifestations and appearances; it therefore may appear as their Nothing, as their annihilation, if they falsely absolutize themselves. Analogically, the subject can never be identified with any one of its functions, in all of which it appears. Without my senses, I would have no sense-data and would have no contact with the psycho-physical world; but the subject or soul is never among those data; and it is non-sensuous, invisible activity, which cannot be seen, because it does all the seeing. Likewise without logical thinking there would be no identical classes, logical orders in the object. But the subject cannot be found in any logically classified object or causal relation, because it is for it, for the thinking subject that such logical realities are evident. Without its logical activity they would be as nothing, as they are nothing for one who has lost his mind. Logical laws are valid if we think; "if" is their existential presupposition.

Neither the Absolute nor the subject-thinking are things, objects, data of observation. Their existence is their activity. This actuality, Hegel says, is all-comprehensive, and only that which is comprehensive is actual.

Anselms' ontological argument defined God as a being greater than which nothing can be conceived. But since this rational definition, which have—among other functions—in my mind, it, this abstraction, is not the being greater than which nothing can be conceived. The Absolute proves itself in the breakdown or the insufficiency of any rational definition and finite attempt to have or to be it.

Descartes, and following him, Kant and Hegel, transferred the ontological argument to man. Man also is a being greater than which nothing can be conceived, because he does all the conceiving and evaluating. But again, this conceiving is basically doubting or questioning. There is not a single conception of himself, that would be a sufficient account of what man, the subject of all conceptions and evaluations, really is. Man is thus a crirical movement, an existential bridge, a passage between finitude and infinity, between relativism and truth, between misery and happiness. And so constituted—"after our likeness"—God blessed them." Man is like God, because the Absolute also is both eternal and temporal, infinite and finite, itself and its own contradictory "other", the created creature, his emanation.

THE SEVENTH DAY

And God saw everything he had made, and behold, it was very good... So God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it, because on it God rested from all his work which he had done in creation.

To many thinkers this seventh day has been either aesthetically comical or morally revolting. What shall we think of a "God" who, like a
tired craftsman, takes a day off to "rest"; and who, like a vainglorious artist, congratulates himself on a dubious achievement. "Very good", he calls this world, where everybody feeds on everybody; this brutal world of physical and moral evils; this bloody world of pains and anguish, misery and suffering; this indecent world in which incompatibilities and injustices abound.

What stares us in the face here is the problem of the so-called *theodicee*, which takes 'God' to court in order that he may justify his creation of a world of evils. Either he cannot do anything about evil, as Epicurus put it, in which case he is not almighty or omnipotent; or he will not do anything about it, in which case he is malevolent or satanic.

The mythical language of the seventh day is strained to the breaking point; its intended sublimity comes indeed close to be absurd.

An ontological interpretation of this seventh day is nevertheless possible and makes sense.

The word "rest" need not be understood as a momentary cessation or a minimal degree of activity, like an afternoon nap. "Rest" may have the ontological meaning of eternal identity. Whatever is, is; and it is, that which it is, and nothing else. Reality as a whole cannot possibly be other than it is. Logically speaking, reality or Being as such is eternally in order, every most fugitive flicker is eternally what it is. And this includes, we must remember at this point, that every day of creation was loaded with opposites, separations, temptations to go off in one direction at the expense of the opposite direction; and also filled with the struggle of disunited opposites to become one, to seek their unity in their struggle together.

How could reality be declared unconditionally good, if every experience in it were nothing but good? Good is a value only in relation to its opposite, which it, the good, declares evil in order to combat it. If life were interminable and never in danger, it would not be precious. And only if we assume our finite existence to be a good, is sickness and death evil for us. In nature laws are sought, because man is not satisfied with the irrational and lawless sequence of events; and in the human sphere moral or legal laws are made in order to combat the everpresent possibility of crime and lawlessness. And both crime and legal disorder are created, i.e., decreed, postulated, as evil by the very laws which are directed against them. Only if I declare that I should be respected as a person in my property, can theft be an evil; only if I proclaim that life be sacred, can killing be murder; there is killing in nature, but no murder.

This battle between good and evil is our lot, our existence; it is quite beyond our power to exist in a world, that would not be such a unity or opposites. And it is this ontological unity of opposites which "God saw ...and behold, it was very good." Reality itself, as a whole is itself such a concrete unity of opposites; 'God' is the religious mythical term for it.

The same thought could be stated in reverse. Since man can only impose his finite values, purposes, plans on reality, it is impossible for him
to find this reality good. He must find it disappointing, because reality as a whole eludes his grasp and his imposition. Man has no standard by which to judge the whole. The whole itself is the absolute standard, the absolute Good in the light of which the insufficiency or incompetence of human standard is seen. And since for man good can only make sense, insofar as he has a standard, the goodness of the whole is radically transcending his finite standards, but not his ontological comprehension. For him, reality is never wholly as he wishes it to be, and if it would conform completely to his wishes it would be a hell of a place; a ridiculous caricature of reality. We need the variety, the oppositions, the separations, different tastes in order to enjoy the pleasure of being morally indignant. If we could not be morally indignant about something or other, we would not be happy.

There is, finally, another thought on this seventh day of ontological contemplation: “he hallowed it”. “Hallowing” means to declare it holy. And holiness is the inseparable unity of being and of value, which otherwise are opposites. No man is holy in the sense that he cannot be but good; it is not possible for man not to be good and evil.

On the seventh day ‘God’ takes back into his contemplative eternity all that which he has distinguished from himself, his temporal, relative, finite, suffering and never holy creation. He thereby confirms it and claims it as his own. Our relative life is eternally reconciled in the absolute life of the whole to which it eternally belongs.

Analogously, if we look back on a painful history, which we would not like to repeat, we never the less find our contemplation of it without purpose, but satisfactory as contemplation. I thus claim my self estrangement, my otherness, my objective embodiment as my own.

The ontological subject is the center of reality. It is both that which it is in itself as well as that which it is for itself. If I respect you as an end in itself, or as a being-in-and for-itself, and not merely as a means to my pleasure or my profit, I respect in your being the analogy to the absolute Being, the one ground and ontological unity of Being in all finite, mortal and relative beings.

The Sixth Day: Let us create man in our likeness is ontologically justified or “hallowed” on the seventh day. The Absolute, Being as totality, is unconditionally good, because it has no temptation to overcome: it has no condition outside itself; all resistances are internal, they are its own, eternally posited, cancelled and preserved in its eternal life.

To sum up: ‘Rest’ means the eternal, ontological unity or concrete unity of all opposites of which reality is composed; and ‘good’ does not mean a finite, moral or human good, which is always conditional and relative; but it means the unconditional acceptance or contemplation of life as a whole as a dialectical situation and struggle, which is beyond our power to change; we can only change relative situations in it. It is impossible not to accept it, as it eternally is; and this acceptance includes our moral insufficiency and incompetence, implying suffering and evil.
IN CONCLUSION

Let me return to the beginning:

The myth of creation is not a factual report. It is equally false to accept it as such, as it is to reject it as such. It simply does not belong to that dimension of reality, which can be approached through factual or scientific propositions. There are truths that are factual and unessential, and truths that are non-factual but essential. Let me illustrate this with an anecdote: “I hear, comrade, says a Russian communist to his friend, that you are going to be purged from the party.” “Why?” “You are known to believe in baptism.” “Why shouldn’t I? I have seen it myself!”

Our myth contains such essential, non-factual truths that can be stated in non-mythical language. The mythical language of religion and the logical reflection of philosophy may disclose the same essential, non-factual truth, without therefore replacing each other or substituting one for the other.

If my philosophical interpretation has succeeded to convince you that the myth contains germinally or potentially truths, which can be unfolded and actualized in and for the logical reflection of philosophy, then it has also succeeded to deepen our respect for the myth itself.

And this should be the intention and the effect of a critical philosophy of religion.
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PHILOSOPHY
AND SOCIAL CHANGE

From Parmenides and Heraclitus come two categories of thought, namely, permanence and change or being and becoming. Parmenides' thesis, by denying change, implies historical nihilism while that of Heraclitus Social Change. In this regard history of philosophy broadly reflects three major orientations and preoccupations. One posits the unchanging and the eternal as the Reality and change as an illusion, resulting in lack of interest in the phenomenal and in consequence, in the social. The other swears by change, denying or, at the least, ignoring the eternal and the transcendental, and as such concentrating on the social. The third maintains the transcendental as the source-reality from which the human existence and social process derive and acquire meaning. Each of these perspectives with their variety of shades has theoretical and practical consequences for social philosophy and social process.

Social change is an incontestable cultural reality. It may be slow as in stone age or accelerated as in technological age. Intellectual and manipulative stupidity, fear, quest for security or vested interests may check it as the creative and the experimental in man may accelerate it. Social change is sought through values, social institutions and social movements. If values and institutions are cast in the rigid mould of authority whether of super-man or gods, and if the people slavishly follow those, the change in social ways is likely to be slow. In such cases tradition gets hardened and fails by its social purpose of consolidating the gains of previous social changes and of facilitating further progress.

Man makes two-pronged adaptation: one to the physical forces and the other to the society. In both cases the action is essentially creative although the level and dispersal of creativity differ from culture to culture and from
individual to individual. As "Animal Symbolicum" man creates symbols and values and communicates them to fellow-beings and in the process establishes rounds of changes in inter-personal and inter-groupal relations. Even by acting on nature he changes his own nature as Hegel would have it and there by the nature of society. As a dynamic and creative being seeking fulfilment, at one level at any rate, through interpersonal and groupal communication and sharing, he advances social change. In fact in terms of value-judgement a culture would be moral in the broadest sense of the term only if it succeeds in cultivating the twin virtues of freedom and creativity within the framework of social justice.

All such theses as explain social change in terms of a single factor are one-sided over simplifications whether it is pure Reason or any of the biological, psychological, economic and geographical determinisms they offer at least unilateral account of social dynamics. Many social systems suffer from this fault while they claim to rest four-square on whole truth. This lack of analysis of social change in cultural perspectives has always cost decadence and damaging accidents to society besides building-in the mental pose of helplessness in the face of growing or sudden complications in culture. Unless some puffed-up philosophy is preferred as a compensation for intellectual integrity it is not possible to see how philosophy as such can take one-eyed view of social reality.

As in nature and in living organisms so in social dynamics it is the plurality of causes that produce an effect. "Social changes" as Morris Ginsberg rightly maintains, "are often due to a confluence or collocation of elements derived from different sources but converging at a given point." Although it is not always possible to exactly apportion the weight to different causes or to be able to trace the exact "sources", yet it is legitimate goal of knowledge to do that. This is a great intellectual responsibility and matching epistemological humility the want of which may leave the social process ever more fitful and eccentric rather than well-guided and well controlled.

In our technological age, particularly when ever-multiplying innovations are changing the structure of human relations and of basic social institutions and through them eventually changing social values, it is imperative that the role and limit of technology be clearly defined and social planning and education so geared as to harmonise technology with worthy human ends. The consequences of technology in human control and out of control, respectively are bound to differ. Those factors, conditions and programmes of action which are calculated to bring about the aforesaid harmony need be continuously discovered. Or flight-from-technology philosophy, through psychological displacement, is bound to continue in her otherwise exaggerated right in going to the extreme of illegitimising all technology.

No less is the need to be able to tell the rational from the irrational forces of mind and to be able to recognise their respective pulls on social process. One of the failures of purely rationalistic philosophy and matching education has been the neglect of emotions and the irrational in their calculus. It has been considered sufficient enough that given Reason, moral progress is for the asking, inevitable. This does not stand the test of either logic or historical experience. In action human mind is a commingling of rational and elemental forces. As such rational in action in society is not the same as rational as abstracted in some philosophies. One of the qualifications of the rational in culture is “to make rational use of irrational forces”, as Julian Huxley puts it.

Different philosophical constructions are put on social change by adherents of different systems. The explanations tend to become partial and dogmatic when a system hardens into orthodoxy as most of the systems generally do when they are no longer receptive to and assimilative of new finds in knowledge. Such rigid systems as over emphasise unproportionably only one factor blissfully ignore other equally valid factors that enter into the totality of causes making for change. Different philosophies of history show how often a system is constructed on one or two elements isolated from the rest in culture, and then turned into an absolute. But an individual, because of his inexhaustible potentialities and unpredictable creativity flowing into the stream of social life causing conflict and co-operation, love and hate and so on, is any time more than a system. That is why there is need to revise the image of man and society from age to age for social change implies the possibility of growth both personality-wise and knowledge-wise. Even on the assumption that the fundamental stuff of the universe is of a piece, material, spiritual, material-spiritual respectively, yet its manifold manifestations in organic and inorganic life cannot be ignored without loss to our understanding of the whole and to our capacity for calculated action.

While it is the legitimate province of social sciences to study empirically the processes of society including that of social change, philosophy would be failing in its moral responsibility and “historic mission” if it ignores the study and evaluation of the ongoing in society. The traditional problem of ends and means with which philosophy has always been vitally concerned is thrown in bolder relief when an aforesaid approach is made. As such ends and means can be better understood and formulated.

Historically, philosophy originated in man’s biological and existential needs to understand, to adjust and to create. But the domination of logico-mathematical pattern and that of the model of natural sciences over philosophic thinking gradually removed philosophy away from the existential pole into the limbo of abstracted, pale categories, culminating in logical positivism or logical empiricism. This is not to say that logical empiricism has done no good to philosophy. It surely has to the extent
it has made philosophy conscious of its responsibility in analysing and checking the categories against empirical data and correcting its excesses in imagination, its routinised thinking and its absolutes. But in refusing to consider the subjective and the qualitative in its one-track pursuit of the quantitative and the objective it leaves out considerably great area of what is truly significant for humans and consequently for their values.

Bertrand Russell, in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle maintains that the "business of a philosopher is not to change the world but to understand it" in contrast to Marx's view that the essential business of philosophy is to change the world. The understanding part is common to both Russell and Marx as to any philosopher but the difference lies in Russell's disinterested love of enquiry and Marx's passionate philosophy dying to change the world. But even Russell cannot claim that in practice he has stuck to his own definition of a philosopher. He has been driven, by the exigencies of contemporary civilization at the brink of catastrophe, to play active role in human affairs as is his won't in challenging situations. He cannot claim doing that in the capacity of a pure citizen or as a simple human being because his social action from time to time derives from his world-view, from his philosophic image of man and his destiny. Besides, his profuse writings on education, morals, happiness, power, social order and so on are not mere analysis towards understanding but also proscriptions for social change. Distinguishing three types of power, he says, "...I only want one sort of power. I want power over opinions." Now, what is this "power over opinion" if not the urge to effect change in the opinion of others and through that to make for changes in social environments?

Philosophy cannot be absolutely or purely theoretical for as world-view or society-view it has a way of altering the beliefs and actions of humans. This is what Karl Mannheim calls "the Activistic Element in knowledge". His contention is that "after knowledge has been freed from the elements of propaganda and evaluation, it still contains an activist element which, for the most part, has not become explicit, and which cannot be eliminated, but which at least can and should be raised into the sphere of the controllable".

"The activist element in knowledge" can be the more "controllable" if philosophy becomes conscious of its own unconscious as it were. Philosophy is both a creature and creator of culture. To the extent it owes its complexion to social impulsion it must endeavour to understand them i.e. to understand those historical forces that have shaped it. Besides, it

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3 Ibid p. 61.
6 Ibid p. 266.
becomes essential for it to come down from its high-caste pedestal to enter into communication with the categories of social sciences. In the process of evaluating those categories it can enrich its own heritage and insights not only in regard to the nature of means but also that of ends.

Existential elements enter into philosophy as philosophy enters into existence. But gradual estrangement of philosophy from man and of man from life through abstractionism and formalistic logic is the source of the anemic dialectic of most of contemporary epistemology. Any philosophy to be philosophy must reckon with the potentialities and ongoings of a culture. On the other hand no study of culture amounts to anything unless it is philosophically tested. Albert Schweitzer rightly laments the triumph of pure reason leading to "the collapse of world view" and to the utter incapacity of philosophy to reckon with man, society and civilization. Making ethics central to civilization and "reverence for life" basic to Ethics, he restores to the "will-to-live" its lost spiritual dimensions. For him "world view is a product of life-view" and not the other way round. Another strong attack on pure reason is to be found in Kierkegaard who charges philosophy for having failed to take decisions.

The dichotomy of ends and means, in itself an unjustifiable division, has led to a queer logic. The end having been exalted to the neglect of the means, the philosopher, the high caste in knowledge is therefore concerned with the end and not with the means. And in concerning himself merely with the end he has suffered insight into the nature of end itself as well as lost grip over the means. The ends and means are continuous and interlocked by mutual pulls. Both belong to the "Community of causation" in Kant's language, and together enter into the process of discovery of Natural Law. The understanding of natural law may change, as indeed it does, from time to time, yet there is no denying that re-discovery of natural law is regulative of social change, whether the natural law is Schweitzer's, 'Reverence for life' or Gandhi's "Non-violence" and so on.

The discovery of natural law is not to be arbitrary philosophic speculation pondering to the unconscious sentimental bias of a philosopher but subject to empirical verification. Distinguishing between "normative social theory" and "factual social theory" F. S. C. Northrop emphasises that normative social theory cannot be entirely based on factual social theory and indeed it is constructed so as to be incompatible with social facts as they are. He advances a criterion of the true philosophy of culture which may be quoted at length:

"The verification of a normative social theory is to be obtained not by checking its basic philosophical postulates, either directly or indirectly.

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against the facts of society either in the present or in the future but by checking them with the postulates of the philosophy of natural science prescribed by the facts of nature. When the relation between the postulates of the philosophy of culture and the postulates of the philosophy of nature is that of identity the philosophy of culture is true. When the relation is not that of identity, the philosophy of culture is false or incomplete.”

While the aforesaid criterion suggested by Northrop has the merit of harmonising the normative social theory with the philosophy of natural science based on the facts of nature, the harmony is neither given nor static. Both the normative theory and the philosophy of natural science are subject to growth and to correction and as such the harmony between the two is necessarily evolutionary. The inescapable charge of philosophy is, therefore, to understand the extent and nature of this harmony in changing context. However, what is important to note is that normative theory, since it is idealised and formalised, is comparatively less fluctuating in meaning and interpretation than the philosophy of natural science. For facts by themselves amount to nothing. It is the selection of facts from myriads of them and the casting of them into a system is what matters. And in this construction and system-building the self-same facts, because of the very selective principle, shifts in emphasis, intellectual commitments, psychological predispositions and a host of similar factors, lead to different conclusions. Nevertheless, this precisely is the function of philosophy to keep the conclusions of natural science under constant criticism. It must become “Criticism of criticisms”, to use Dewey’s telling phrase.

Of the significant questions in social philosophy are those of progress and values with which social change is vitally linked up. It is necessary to reconsider these problems from time to time and this philosophy can do if it sheds its absolutistic complexion. Since biological and social sciences have entered into the field to interpret the concepts of progress and values, surely new light has been shed on their nature which make it necessary to recast our notions of progress and values. To continue to define progress and values in absolutistic and finalistic terminology without making reference to empirical data is not only not to understand the teleology of social process but to fail to understand the nature of social change and consequently be at sea in not being able to evolve the right means for the realization of values.

Examination of political ideologies is another important area of the “Criticism of criticisms”. The subtle dialectic of ideologies need be analysed down to impulsations and rationalizations lurking in the guise of logic and truth. A psycho-sociological study of different ideologies can surely be revealing and useful to any philosophic construction. As such philosophy must emerge as a critic of culture so that the vested interests

of varied descriptions do not stand in the way of progress, nor social change is accepted simply because it cannot be helped or it is sought compulsively for the monotony of present life is just unbearable and so on.

As a critic of culture it must re-interpret the past to lay bare the factors that have stood in the way of a particular culture thus retarding its growth. Both the idealised values and functional values would have to be studied in comparison and the nature and extent of the gap between the two explained. Also, it can be revealing to philosophic understanding of values if an attempt is made to explain why different people have developed different values and to grasp the framework of thought in which we can locate the universal social values, if any.

Philosophy of History is another significant area, the study of which can be fruitful in it formulates from the raw experience the principles, impulse, reasons, motives, artifacts etc; which have been the regulative forces of change in society. But any philosophy of history becomes deceitful when it imposes over bearingly its own scheme and demands the facts to fit to it. A critical study of philosophy of history should be able to explain to what extent is social process controllable by human effort and the major factors—such as individual leadership, co-operative techniques etc.—responsible for it. Until the teleological in history is properly grasped and in full relationship to the present and the past, no headway can be made in our insight of the dynamics of society. Yet another question of significance it must ask is: how far is history objective? In coming to grips with this problem a great help can be rendered to history by suggesting it the means to the improvement of its tools and to those who deal with the social ongoing more articulately on the recommendation of historians. Any worthwhile philosophy of history should be able to reckon with the various turns and social changes in its corridors of time. Above all, philosophy must ask a fundamental question whether or not a philosophy of history is possible? A constant debate on this point is necessary lest philosophy of history assuming such philosophy as granted join the community of formalistic systems making no appeal to historical experience.

Dewey has rightly emphasised the role of philosophy as a tool of action and has wrongly earned the accusation by Bertrand Russell that thereby his philosophy amounts to “philosophy of power”. I have examined Russell’s criticism in detail elsewhere. The long drawn-out divorce between thought and action is philosophically and socially untenable and has already caused a good deal of misery to philosophy and society. A reconstructed philosophy should evolve the tools and criteria for examining the interrelations between thought and action and for bridging the gulf between the two. Then alone social theory can escape the stigma of “idle luxury” and become “a guiding method of inquiry and planning.”

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11 Inter-play of values in America (not yet published).
Until the hitherto neglected study of the interrelations of means and ends is seriously pursued, the ends would remain absolute ghosts. To be sure, ends and means inform each other. A logic for the philosophy of social change can be formulated on the basis of the reciprocity of ends and means.

In the chain of philosophic approaches to social change philosophy of education has an important role. Within the broad framework of the philosophy of culture, the school becomes a miniature society and agency through which the social problems are attacked and traditions and values examined tried in practice, consolidated and advanced. To allow one of the most important media of social change i.e. school to remain outside the criticism and techniques of philosophy and to leave it only to chance factors, to the whims of politicians in power or even to that psychological expertise which thrives on quantitative and statistical tests alone, is to fail by education as well as by culture. As such the emphasis of progressive education movement on the school as laboratory of human relations and values is in place.

Undoubtedly, the capacity to contribute to social change is rather marked in some individuals, be they scientists, philosophers, artists or social reformers. Nevertheless social change cannot be conceived in individualistic terminology. It is the end product of interaction conflicting or co-operative, between individual and groups. In a fundamental sense each individual has potentialities of being an agent of change. He only needs the philosophic feed to be able to give direction to change. In our age of mass education and mass freedom, both education and freedom are likely to remain pseudo possessions if they are not nurtured by philosophic reflection and commensurate action. There is already so much overwhelming sense of a crisis in our civilization. This crisis goes with the decline of philosophic reflection on existential situation of man. The lack of philosophic reflection on the one hand and uncontrolled impulses and uncontrolled technology on the other aggravate each other. If culture is to come alive out of the crisis, philosophic reflection must be won back to play its vital role in restoring the lost sense of direction. As a part of university education and that of general education it must be liberally introduced and creatively reconstructed for basically the crisis in our civilization is a crisis in philosophic reflection.
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A RE-EXAMINATION
OF ETHICAL REALISM

Describing the impact of Moore’s ethical realism upon himself and other young philosophers shortly after the turn of the century, Keynes writes in 1938: “...It was exciting, exhilarating, the beginning of a renaissance, the opening of a new heaven on a new earth, we were the forerunners of a new dispensation.”¹ These great expectations, Dr. Radhakrishnan will remember, expired almost at once under the press of events (World War I), intemperate philosophies (Marxism, Freudianism, Logical Positivism), and the sort of practical failures that Keynes summarizes in his concluding remarks on the Bloomsbury Club:

If, therefore, I altogether ignore our merits—our charm, our intelligence, our unworldliness, our affection—I can see as water spiders, gracefully skimming, as light and reasonable as air, the surface of the stream without any contact at all with the eddies and currents underneath.²

But if these were the de facto causes of the theory’s demise, the de jure cause was a barrage of criticisms, commencing with the general assault upon realism after World War One and continuing to the present time. This barrage of criticisms has effectively discredited ethical realism: so effectively, indeed, that today the doctrine, along with Meinong’s Golden Mountain and Victorian Agnosticism, is little more than a historical curiosity.

The plain fact that ethical realism is presently a dead issue cannot be argued away. What is arguable, however, is that precisely as ethical realism once evoked a too ready assent, the criticisms that ushered in its passing evoked a too ready assent also: they were not half so conclusive

¹ J. M. Keynes, Two Memoirs, London, 1949, p. 82. The second memoir, from which I quote, was composed late in 1938.
² Ibid., p. 103.
as commonly supposed. But if this is arguable—and this is what I am mainly concerned to show—then it is important for us to re-examine the theory and re-weigh its claims and merits.

For one thing, it can hardly be denied that if an objective science of ethics is possible, the world stands in need of such a science. But what seems also to be true is that no such science can possibly exist unless the general claims of ethical realism are well-founded. If values are, in fact, sorts of ideal entities existing independently of valuation and discernible through some kind of perception or intuition (as theories of ethical realism typically maintain), then it is easy to see how an objective science of ethics might be established. We should have only to direct our intuitions to the realm of these independently existing values and describe their character and relations as we might chart the skies in astronomy. And having done this, we could claim with the same sort of impartial authority that the astronomer can muster, “Such-and-such is a true value,” or “Such-and-such is a higher value than so-and-so,” or “Between these two alternatives that confront us, X is the better one.” On the other hand, if we have to reject the basic principles of ethical realism, we shall have to rest the possibility of scientific ethics upon the foundation of some other science—presumably, psychology. But this foreign entanglement is undesirable on at least two counts. First, psychology has not as yet established its claim to be called a science in the very areas that would have a bearing upon a science of ethics, namely, volitions. If, for instance, men do possess metaphysically free wills the analysis of human nature and voluntary behavior that most psychologists present falls to the ground. But has it been demonstrated that men do not possess free wills? Assuredly it has not. This and most other fundamental questions concerning human nature and voluntary behavior remain the battleground of conflicting theories. However, even if psychology (say) did provide us with a scientific knowledge of the fundamental laws or principles of human nature, we should still be confronted with enormous problems. How would we establish scientifically the relation existing between the psychological principles or laws of human nature and values? Any attempt to establish the connection definitionally by asserting that good

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3 Cf. Keynes, *op. cit.* pp. 83 ff.; Moore, *Principia Ethica*, chapter one; Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, Three Volumes, Trans. S. Coit, N. Y. 1932. The following quotations from Hartmann’s *Ethics*, vol. I, provide a representative picture of the basic ontology and epistemology of ethical realism: p. 218, “Whatever in its mode of being is not related to a subject, whatever confronts a thinking subject as independent and immovable...that has for him the character of self-existence. Values have self-existence;” p. 93, “This means that values have actually an existence in themselves; independent of all imagination and longing;” p. 104, “The mode of Being peculiar to values is evidently that of an ideal self-existence;” pp. 101-102, “The primary consciousness of values, that is, the the sensing of values...is...a direct witness of the value itself.”

4 See Keynes, *op. cit.* pp. 86-7: “Let me give you a few examples of the sort of things we used to discuss. If A was in love with B and believed that B reciprocated his feelings, whereas in fact B did not, but was in love with C, the state of affairs was certainly not so good as it would have been if A had been right, but was it worse or better than it would become if A discovered his mistake.”
means such-and-such must come face to face with the objections that Moore cites in his discussions of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, and even though these objections may not be conclusive, they are substantial and hard to answer. Yet, any other kind of connection we posit would seem to presuppose the validity of ethical realism. If we suppose that the connection between the psychological principles of human nature and values is synthetic, we imply that the two fields of psychology and values must be independently explored and their contents ascertained before connections are drawn between them. Thus, we presuppose an independent science of ethics, and seemingly such a science presupposes the validity of ethical realism.

I should also like to maintain—at least as a plausible prejudice—that in contradistinction to some theories of ethics, realism possesses the virtue of being aesthetically beautiful, and that while it is not the primary aim of philosophy or science to produce beautiful theories, everything else being equal it is reasonable to choose a beautiful or aesthetically pleasing theory over an aesthetically repugnant theory. Nor should such considerations be a priori dismissed as irrelevant because they seem to have no other basis but our feelings. We simply do not know how deeply our feelings penetrate to the truth. It is, for instance, arguable that men have survived as long as they have only because their feelings have in some measure matched objective states of affairs.

There exist, then, two reasons for our wanting, if possible, to accept ethical realism: (a) the theory seems to be scientifically necessitated—that is, it seems that if there is to exist a science of ethics, then ethical realism shall have to be valid; and (b) the theory is aesthetically pleasing. These, however, are minor considerations in comparison to the question whether the theory is true. And this question brings us to the criticisms that have generally been leveled against ethical realism and that have been taken to be conclusive or severely damaging.

These criticisms fall, broadly, into four categories: (1) those that claim that the epistemology implied by ethical realism cannot be squared with the facts of moral reasoning; (2) those that claim that the epistemology implied by ethical realism can be ascertained to only at a moral loss; (3) those that claim that the ontology implied by ethical realism cannot be squared with certain aspects of moral valuation, e.g. moral obligation; and (4) those that claim that an acceptance of the ontology implied by ethical realism must result in some moral loss.

Before treating these criticisms in any detail, I should like to make it clear that I am maintaining no more than that they have been influential; that is, they have counted as motives for rejecting ethical realism. I do not maintain that they all, or that even any of them, are logically pertinent criticisms. There are philosophers, for instance, who will want to deny the relevance of (2) and (4) on the ground that philosophical

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theories of ethics have no actual moral consequences. And other philosophers, I imagine, will want to deny that (1) and (3) have any bearing on the present question on the ground that it is not the primary aim of a moral theory to describe what is the case but to engender what ought to be the case (much as a moral reformer is not concerned to assert merely what people think but to convert their thoughts). On this last view, it might even be thought a virtue if a moral theory did not square with the actual practices of men. As I said, I shall not attempt to make any decision between these two schools of thought. For the purposes of our present argument, I shall treat (1), (2), (3) and (4) above as equally pertinent criticisms.

(1) Representatives of this sort of criticism is Sidney Hook’s charge that ethical realism “refuses criticism.” The gist of Professor Hook’s reasoning is this. In actual fact, it makes sense to ask a person who presents a certain valuation what his reasons are; and it makes sense to suppose that we can alter his valuations by appealing to reasons. But according to the epistemology implied by ethical realism reasons cannot be asked for in connection with genuine valuations nor can genuine valuations be altered on the basis of reasons. For if we maintain (as ethical realism seems to require) that valuations consist in our beholding a certain set of ideal objects (i.e., values) through a prioristic intuitions, then the only ground we can give for a valuation is simply that we perceive the value in question. Any further giving reasons will be impossible, and so will any attempt on the part of others to rebut our valuations.

Suppose that we grant that ethical realism does, in fact, “refuse criticism”—does this concession, if valid, amount to a disconfirmation of the theory? It does, only if it is also true that genuine valuations do not refuse criticism. Do, then, genuine valuations ‘accept’ criticism? Professor Hook seems to think they do. But is it not possible, as Stevenson, Ayer, and others would contend, that he has confounded the controversies that arise concerning factual circumstances with disagreements concerning valuations per se? Take the case where I judge that a certain deed is wicked and you judge that it is noble. We argue back and forth. May it not turn out, on inspection, that our argument has merely to do with our conceptions of the facts of the case and not with our valuations? You, for example, want to say that the deed was done for the sake of helping someone and I want to say that it was done for the sake of hurting someone. If we can both agree on our descriptions of the circumstances or facts, do we find any arguable disagreement in our valuations left over? It may seem that we do not.8

7 Here by ‘a prioristic’ would be meant (consonant with Hartmann’s use of the term) “transcending sensory experience.” A philosopher like Ayer who held that a priori = analytic would want to say ‘synthetic’ intuitions. See Ayer, op. cit., p. 106.
8 For a sympathetic presentation of this point of views, see C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, Yale Univ. Press, 1944, pp. 136 ff.
In addition (the defender of ethical realism might point out), we do commonly suppose that our valuations are indefeasible.⁹ We do not, for example, think that murder can deserve praise in Rome even though in fact it may be praised there or charity deserve condemnation in London, even though it may in fact be condemned there. In short, there is a good amount of evidence for maintaining that to the very extent that an ethical theory “refuses criticism,” it squares with the facts rather than disagrees with them.

However, even if it is true that valuations do in fact permit criticism and can be justified by reasons or altered because of reasons given, this does not constitute, as seems to be thought, an insuperable difficulty for ethical realism. The ethical realist can maintain that when a person asserts a valuation, he may be reporting only a partial intuition of some value. He may see just a segment of the realm of values as when I look hastily at a landscape and erroneously report that there are only some grazing sheep on the hill before us, I may only be observing part of what there is. But just as in the last case you might present evidence contradicting my assertion by pointing out features of the landscape that I had missed, or as you might compel me to alter my description by getting me to see those features, so in the case of valuations we can point out features of the realm of value that have been overlooked and compel revaluations by doing so. Just this, we might want to claim, is what giving reasons for valuations and rebutting valuations actually consists in, if and where these critical activities do not consist in pointing out non-valuational facts. For example, if I say, “Self-reliance is the only good,” you may cause me to alter my assertion by commenting, “But certainly justice is a good.” Does it not seem, in such a case, that I am forced to rescind my original judgment because, as the ethical realist would maintain, I have had pointed out to me values that I had overlooked? Can any more plausible explanation be conceived?

If it is asked, “But what can we do according to ethical realism if we fail to get another person to see the values or dis-values that we see?” our reply must be: “What in fact can we do? We can only suppose that he is willful or morally blind; and this is precisely what we do suppose, and it is precisely what we may suppose according to the principles of ethical realism.”⁺

It must, however, be granted, I think, that if we can provide no method for eliminating ethical disagreement of this last sort the claim that ethical realism provides the theoretical basis for a science of ethics must

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⁹ Cf. N. Hartmann, op. cit., vol. I, p. 225: “...the conviction...accompanies every genuine judgment of values that everyone else must judge in the same way and the same impression.”

⁰ Cf. Keynes, op. cit., pp. 84-5: “There were two possible explanations. It might be that the two parties were not really talking about the same thing, that they were not bringing their intuitions to bear on precisely the same object...Or it might be that some people had an acuter sense of judgment, just as some people can judge a vintage port and others cannot. On the whole...this explanation prevailed [in the Bloomsbury Club].”
be abandoned. The possibility of any science would appear to involve the possibility of getting universal or almost universal agreement at some point; in physics, for instance, agreement regarding pointer readings, weight measurements, happenings, etc. Moreover, this agreement must be "honestly" obtained: not by force, or drugs, or persuasion of some kind. The common occurrence of fundamental ethical disagreements, the very frequency with which we would want to say that others are morally blind, may mean that neither ethical realism or any other theory can provide a theoretical basis for a science of ethics. But this failure on the part of ethical realism (if it is one) can therefore constitute no reason for rejecting the theory. On the other hand, it is possible, it seems to me, that most fundamental ethical disagreements arise not so much from a difference in valuations but differences in interests and passions, which induce us to unconsciously lie or misrepresent what we really think. Sincerely say, for instance, that lying is a good, because I am emotionally or self-interestedly committed to certain aims or practices; you say that it is an evil. But perhaps if my testimony were subjected to a lie-detector it could be shown that I also evaluated lying to be an evil. Now if by the use of lie-detectors (say) it was discovered that persons universally or almost universally agreed on their basic valuations, then there would exist, I think, no impossibility in carrying out a science of ethics along the lines projected by ethical realists.¹¹

2. The criticism that the epistemology implied by ethical realism can be asserted to only at a real moral loss rests largely on the assumptions which I have disputed above, namely, (1) that the theory can permit only indefeasible valuations and (2) that men in fact do not generally agree in their basic valuations. Accepting this interpretation of ethical realism and the facts, Nowell-Smith argues, for instance:

If... intuitions are infallible, then the disputes cannot be genuine. If I disagree with you, you must charge me either with insincerity or with moral blindness... in practice, the objectivist is, as we should expect, in a far worse position for solving moral conflicts. He necessarily attributes his opponent's denial of the truth to wilful perversity; and, holding as he does that in spite of his denials his opponent must really see the truth all the time, he realizes that what his opponent needs is not argument but castigation. For arguments cannot convince a man who already sees the light. The objective theory, so far from minimizing the use of force to settle moral conflicts, can be, and constantly has been used, to justify it... It is hardly necessary to add that this theory has had the most tragic consequences in international affairs. To suppose that people whose professed moral principles differ from ours do not really hold them is to invite disaster.¹²

Now if what we said previously is correct—if valuations on a realist basis can lend themselves to partial corrections and rebuttals, or if,

¹¹ See G. E. Moore, op. cit., chapters five and six.
¹² P. H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, Penguin Books, 1954, pp. 45-7. Nowell-Smith's references to 'objective theory' are to what we have been terming 'ethical realism'.
by the use of lie detectors or some such thing it could be determined that
there was really universal or almost universal agreement in valuations—
Nowell-Smith’s argument obviously fails to implicate ethical realism in
the ‘tragic consequences’ he describes. It is also interesting to note that
in his very argument against objective or realist ethical theories Nowell-
Smith appears to appeal to ‘objective’ valuations. The tragic conse-
quences he refers to are obviously meant to be really tragic consequences.

But even supposing that the ‘intuitions’ of ethical realism do not per-
mit criticism and that there are widespread and irresolvable differences
in persons’ evaluations, it is still questionable that Nowellsmith’s argu-
ment possesses any force or soundness. Have the ‘tragic international
consequences’ that he refers to actually arisen from a stubborn insistence
on valuations and differences of valuation or from other causes, such as
differences of material interest, doctrinal differences in religion, differences
in the descriptions of nonethical fact, and so on? It is certainly arguable
that they have arisen from these ‘other’ sources. But no theory of ethics
pretends to settle religious doctrinal controversies, descriptions of non-
ethical fact, or differences of material interest.

But again, even supposing that persons’ holding tenaciously to valua-
tions has been the source of some suffering (e.g. the criminal being hanged
doubtlessly suffers), there comes a point where a person must stand
his ground for the valuations that he makes, no matter what. Because
someone thinks that murder is good, we cannot let him murder; we must
prevent him from carrying out his valuations, even though we have to
use force and bloodshed in order to do so. Would Nowell-Smith main-
tain that it would be morally better to be tolerant here: to say, “Well,
that is your valuation but not mine.” and leave the matter at that?
Presumably not. But then what can his objection to ethical realism really
amount to? At most, it can only amount to the claim that ethical realism
may tempt some of its adherents to be intolerant where they ought
not to be intolerant, and willing to use force where they ought not to.
However, any theory can be misapplied, and it is no just objection to a
theory to point out that it may be.

3. Nowell-Smith argues that if valuation consists in the perception
of various entities or qualities termed ‘good’ or ‘right’ then it remains
inexplicable how “Action X is the most right or best action” implies
immediately (as it does) “I ought to do X.” “But why,” he asks, “should
I do anything about these newly-revealed objects? Some things, I have
now learnt, are right and others wrong; but why should I do what is right
and eschew what is wrong?”

4. It may be argued that if values are independently existing objects
or properties which (to paraphrase Socrates in the Euthyphro) we love
because they are values (as opposed to the thesis that they are values
because we love them), then values must remain the same for all men at all

13 Newell-Smith, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
times and in all places. But suppose that values are actually of man's making. Then it should be possible for men to create new and better values if they tried. Accepting the principles of ethical realism they would not, however, try; and thus the acceptance of ethical realism may represent a real moral loss to men.

Now I think the objection lodged in (3) above is dreadfully hard to find an answer to. The only answer that seems at all plausible is that values naturally inspire in us compulsions to actualize them; much as we react to sweet things by wanting them and sour things by shunning them. But this answer is psychological in character and so must fail to do complete justice to the logical status of obligation, which prohibits a psychological appeal. However, the main point that I wish to make here concerning (3) and (4) above is that there is, so far as any conclusive demonstration goes, no reason for thinking that with study and sufficient insight some suitable answer cannot be made to them, just as (I believe) some real start has already been made in this paper in answering the objections lodged in (1) and (2). But let me repeat: my intention in this essay has not been to demonstrate that ethical realism is unquestionably correct in its claims. It has been to point out that the objections customarily taken to be conclusive against it are not, or may not be, conclusive; and that therefore a more searching review of these objections and the principles of ethical realism itself is now indicated. In support of the last conclusion I should like to append this further piece of evidence. When Keynes says in his last years, after a life of the most varied intellectual and practical experiences,"I see no reason to shift from the fundamental intuitions of Principia Ethica," 14 his testimony should be thought to carry some weight.

14 Keynes, op. cit., p. 94.
ORDINARILY language is thought of in terms of vocabulary and syntax. Thus, a popular dictionary defines language as a body of words and methods of combining words, used and understood by a considerable community. The definition of language is then extended to include other ways of expression, but the stress remains on symbolism. It is my contention that the stress is misplaced. Symbols, to be sure, are proper to language; but it is not the use of words or other symbols that is the essence of language. To the contrary, essentially language is the ability to make our knowing known.* As we shall show later in the case of the use of words, symbols get their significance according to the kind of knowing we are making known.

In this paper it is argued that there are two kinds of knowing we can make known, and hence two kinds of language. The first kind, in which the knowing of meanings is made known, is in accord with what is generally taken to be the function of language. It is the second kind of language, the kind that makes meaninglessness knowable, that is likely to arouse opposition. It is my thesis that the use of the language whereby the meaningless is made known alone can open the way to ontological inquiry; and moreover, that the kind of language which makes meanings known cannot be used in ontological inquiry without misrepresenting the very being under investigation.

The argument that follows establishes this linguistic distinction and indicates its bearing on ontological inquiry. The distinction is established in terms of two kinds of relations in which a human subject finds himself, namely, subjective relations and subjectional relations. The signi-

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* This notion of language is used, rather than established, in the discussion that follows. A linguistic theory very close to the one herein used is skillfully developed in Arturo Failliso’s new book, *Art and Existence* (Englewood, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962). Cf. pages 91 ff.; 102.
ficance of these terms will become apparent as the argument develops, but since they indicate a key distinction, a brief remark about them may be in order. Both terms refer to a subject, but whereas in the term "subjective," a relation that depends upon the subject for its being is intended, in the term "subjectional," the relation does not depend on the subject for its being. Rather, the subject is subjected to, or is somehow forced to recognize, a relation that is neither made nor initiated by him. The argument of the paper consists of an elaboration of the distinction between subjective relations and subjectional relations. Subjective relations are elaborated in terms of situations that depend upon a subject for their existence, and subjectional relations are elaborated in terms of confrontations upon which a subject depends for his existence. The argument begins with a discussion of subjective situations, of which at least three may be distinguished, namely: sensory situations, ego situations and ideational situations. Meaning is present as each of these situations. We shall first consider the presence of meaning as sensory situations.

SENSORY, EGO AND IDEATIONAL SITUATIONS

When meanings are present in conjunction with sensations, sensory situations are present. A picture which is hanging crooked on the wall is an illustration of a sensory situation. In this situation certain colors and configurations are sensed. If these sensations had not appeared as the consciousness of a subject in conjunction with such meanings as 'picture', 'skewed' and 'wall,' there would be no object "out there." Hence, a situation in which there are sensory objects depends upon a conscious subject for its being. Of course, the same complex of meanings need not occur if another subject is presumably sensing the same colors and configurations. Another subject might, for example, have 'the stolen Rembrandt' rather than 'skewed' conjoined with the sensory appearance. In both the 'skewed' and 'the stolen Rembrandt' cases, the object would be "out there," but since the meanings were different for each subject, their respective sensory situations would be differently presented as objects to the subjects. Hence, sensory situations are subjective not only in the sense that they are present as the consciousness of subjects, but also in the sense that they vary with the subjects upon whom they depend for their being.

Meanings are not only present as sensory situations, but they are also present as ego situations. Ego situations involve desires and emotions. To desire is to want to have things one's own way. Emotion is the name we give to our consciousness of whether or not desires are being realized or threatened. Conjoined with emotion are meanings which express the success or failure of the subject with respect to his desires. As marked by these meanings, the subject can be reflected upon as an ego. That is, he can look at himself as defined by emotional meanings. The self that
is looked at is the ego. In emoting, the subject is present as an ego situation.

The emotional presence of such meanings as satisfaction or dissatisfaction, or pleasure or displeasure, for example, mark a situation as an ego situation. To continue to use our illustration, let us say that a person who saw the skewed picture had repeatedly admonished his wife to straighten out the picture after she finished cleaning the house. and that she had repeatedly defied his desire. To him, an unpleasant emotion is present with the sight of the picture, unpleasant because his ego-centric desire to have things the way he wants them is thwarted. Whatever the picture may mean as an object situation, the emotional presence of the meaning ‘unpleasant’ marks it as an ego situation. Hence, ego situations, like sensory situations, are the consciousness of the subject upon whom they depend for their being. Again, similar to sensory situations, it is not impossible that the skewed picture might have other emotional meanings to other subjects. To a detective the discovery of a stolen Rembrandt could mean, for example, the emotional presence of the meaning ‘success.’ Since the meanings that are emotionally present in ego situations depend upon the desires of the subject whose ego is at stake; ego situations, like sensory situations, express a subjective relation.

The third kind of situation to be distinguished is the ideational situation, in which meanings are considered as ideas, that is, meanings are considered in relation to each other and apart from their occurrence in sensory and affective life. Let us, for example, consider the skewedness of the picture as a meaning to be joined to other meanings, let us say ‘carpenter’s level’ and ‘shadow.’ We might then say. “Let’s try the level on the picture; maybe the shadow just makes it look skewed.” A proper response to this suggestion would be, “That’s a good idea.” In this response the word “idea” is used in the sense here intended for it. Since meanings are being considered in relation to each other—i.e., ‘level,’ ‘shadow,’ ‘picture,’ ‘skewed,’ etc. are related to each other in the suggestion about trying the level on the picture—their consideration constitutes an ideational situation.

The example of an ideational situation just offered was derived from a sensory situation. Meanings of ego situations may also be abstracted and related to other meanings to constitute an ideational situation. We might, for example, consider the meaning ‘displeasure’ which was emotionally present for the defied husband, apart from that presence. We might relate this meaning to other meanings, such as ‘spoiled,’ ‘brat,’ ‘mother,’ etc., and come up with a psychiatric proposition like, “He’s that way because his mother made a spoiled brat out of him.” As considered in relation to each other, these meanings constitute an ideational situation.

Like sensory and ego situations, ideational situations depend upon subjects for their being. There can be as many ideational situations as subjects from time to time create. Moreover, like sensory and ego situations, ideational situations seem to be detachable from the subjects to
whom they owe their being. This detachment is metaphorically acknowledged when ideational situations are referred to as "bodies of knowledge." Thus, even though they are subjectively generated, ideational situations, like ego and sensory situations, not only appear to the subject as though they were other than him, but are ordinarily so accepted.

According to the position we have thus far developed, situations exist as expressions of the physical, effective and intellectual living of the subject's life. As dependent upon subjects, situations are subjective. But the subjects upon whom situations depend for their being are not themselves independent with respect to their being subjects. Their dependence upon being-not-themselves may be exhibited in at least three ways: by the presence of obligation, of I-Thou co-existence and of finitude. We shall first consider obligation and I-Thou co-existence, and then finitude, as demands that hold the being of subjects in question.

OBLIGATION AND CO-EXISTENCE

Let us suppose that a person, seeing a picture hanging crooked upon the wall, just has to straighten it out. We shall call the referent to "just has to straighten in out" an obligation. We do so with etymological warrant, for the stem of the word obligation comes from the Latin ligare, to bind. When a person is under obligation, he is under bondage. As the picture illustration indicates, situational meanings may indeed be the way in which the presence of obligation is communicated. But when a person is under obligation, his bondage is not to a situation, for obligations refer not to situations, which subjects create, but to the subjects themselves. But obligations are not essentially activities of subjects, for if they were they would bind a subject to himself and hence merely be acts of self-fulfillment, or values. To be sure, obligations can (as we shall have occasion to note later in our discussion of duty) be valued; but their binding power is not derived from being appreciated or depreciated. Moreover, obligations may also be explained. We might, for example, explain the summons to straighten out the picture psychologically, in terms of compulsion mechanism; or axiologically, in terms of the rational character of reality. But an explanation of an obligation is not an obligation.

None of the foregoing considerations can get at obligation itself because they are offered on the wrong assumption that obligation is a subjective affair. Rather, obligations are subjectional, for they subject a subject to being-not-himself. A person is not free to "hear" or not to "hear" a summons. "Hearing" an obligatory call, he may obey it, or he may rebel against it; or he may disobey through default. But, having heard, he is held accountable without ever having given consent to his bondage. He is required to respond to a demand for which he has not assumed responsibility. Without his permission or conspiracy, a person
under obligation finds himself irrevocably bound to a world he does not control. Such accountability exhibits the fact that subjects are not independent in their being. The subjective situation with its demand, "Straighten out the picture," refers not to the situation but to the subject who has been obligated. A summons to which a subject has been thus subjected establishes the subjunctive relation of obligation.

Such relations are not, of course, associated only with sensory situation. A common ego situation out of which obligation arises is the making of a promise, for example. In promises not only is one's ego at stake with respect to honoring them, but frequently there is also a "no matter what" demand which obligates us to obey our promise not for our own sakes, or for some other person's sake, but for its sake. We fulfill it simply because we obey it. An ideational situation can also carry a summons. Consider, for example, the commonplace demand that a conclusion be drawn when two "A" propositions, one of whose subject term and the other of whose predicate term is the selfsame term, are juxtaposed. Like the obligation to straighten out the picture, the obligation to honor a promise or to draw a conclusion might be explained, let us say, in terms of a moral, or of a rational, universe. But again, the explanation of an obligation is not an obligation. No matter what the situation in which an obligation occurs may be, no explanation of the obligation can replace the fact that the subject has found, not a subjective situation, but himself as subject, called to obey or disobey.

To be held accountable willy-nilly is likewise a mark of I-Thou co-existence. Such co-existence is unlike friendship as Aristotle defines it, for Aristotelian friendship, however noble, is nevertheless dependent for its being upon the mutual advantages of its participants. Rather, a paradigm of all I-Thou co-existence might well be the central cross on Calvary, at least if we accept certain New Testament records. For it is written that the son of Man must give his life for many. But the "many" were not "its;" they were, taken severally, each a "Thou." There are many theological explanations of Calvary, but no explanation is a substitute for a crucified "I" who gave himself because he was unrequitably bound to his many "Thous."

As thus bound to another, a subject does not merely exist; he co-exists in dependence upon a "Thou." For if the other were an "it," the other would essentially be a meaning in some subjective situation. As a "Thou," the other is a being other-than-oneself to whom one is beholden. Any situational action that a beholden person takes, like going to Calvary for example, he takes not to bind the other, but because he is already bound to him. The bondage can, of course, be reciprocated, for an "I" can become a "Thou" to his Thou; or at least we are so informed by such scriptural testimony as, "We love because he first loved us."

But the bond of co-existence need not be one of agape love. Hatred as well as love can be a bond of co-existence, for there are devils as well as
lovers in the world, just as love is the accepting of another as oneself with respect to his being a subject rather than with respect to what he can mean to one in one's ego situation, so hatred is a rejecting of another with respect to his being as a subject, and not merely the maneuvering of another to his disadvantage, and to one's own advantage, in an ego situation. In maneuvering another, whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous to him, one treats him instrumentally as an object; in loving and hating, another is confronted as a subject who co-exists as a beloved or as an enemy.

In both obligation and co-existence the subject acts out of constraint, for he is held accountable by demands of which he is not the author. But the subjectional relations of summons and of co-existence have definite poles—on the one hand, a subject; on the other hand, a picture, a promise, an unfinished syllogism, a Thou. The third subjectional relation, which we shall discuss next, lacks such definiteness. In the subjectional relation of finitude, the subject pole of the relation is equally definite, but that to which the subject is subjected is not. Ordinarily the word "anxiety" is used to refer to this absence of definiteness when a subject is gripped by his own finitude. There are at least two areas of such gripping, namely, death and purpose. We shall remark upon each.

**HUMAN FINITUDE**

It is not death that we know that makes us anxious, for such death is definite, situational and meaningful. It means a stopped pulse, a call to the undertaker, an empty place at the table, insurance policy proceeds, etc. As long as death is meaningful in one way or another, it remains a part of our lives. It is not the death that we know, but the death that we never can know, namely, the death that we die, that confronts us with our finitude. The death we die is unthinkable and unimaginable, for in order to think or to imagine it, we have to be surreptitiously peeking in on our own demise; and hence we are still very much alive. The death that we die, if God permits us to die, is sheer meaninglessness.

But not only are men meaningless in their mortality; they are also meaningless with respect to the purpose of their being here at all. For no more than we ask that we die do we ask that we be born. If any given individual had never been born, no one would ever ask why not. Moreover, all of the explanations a person may offer to account for his being he himself has contrived; hence there is always the risk that they are merely modes of his being here and not a part of any contrivance that brought him into being. Unless a person is God, any justification of his being must be derived from the very finitude that baffles him. However, if he be God, the case is different, for then he can say without being absurd words such as these: "To this end I was born and for this purpose came I forth" (John 18:37).

The religious allusion is deliberate, for when a man is gripped by his
finitude, the utter meaninglessness, worthlessness, helplessness and hopelessness of his very being is pressed upon him as a threatening silence which can be broken only by God's disclosure—an intervention, it might be added, that is quite beyond human control. For the attempt of rationalistic theologians, for example, to clarify the silence by declaring it to be God, and by this clarification to dissolve anxiety, turns out to be a humanistic boomerang. For such claims are projections of the very human beings whose finitude is supposed to be dissolved—by their own finite efforts! Whether finitude finds expression in the meaninglessness of death or the meaninglessness of birth, a subject finds himself subjectionally related to that which eludes meaning. Whereas summons and coexistence subject a man's being to other being, finitude subjects a man's being to nothing.

In the subjectional relations that we have called obligation, co-existence and finitude, the subject is related to a world not himself, but upon which he depends for his being. For convenience sake, we shall call this world the ontic world (from the Greek on, being). In contrast to subjectional relations, in subjective relations the subject relates himself to his own sensory, ego and ideational situations. These situations we shall refer to as the situational world. Both the situational and the ontic worlds have a language that is proper to one but not to the other. The language that expresses a subject's relation to the situational world we shall call ideational language because it traffics in ideas. The other language, which expresses a subject's relation to the ontic world, we shall call ontic language because it opens the very being of a subject to communication. We turn next to a consideration of these two languages, starting with ideational language.

IDEATIONAL AND ONTIC LANGUAGES

The occurrence of sensations, emotions and desires is absolutely private to their owners. But the meanings conjoined with them are not. As we commented earlier, meanings that are present as sensory and ego situations may, when abstracted from these situations, also be present as ideational situations. To use again the skewed picture example, the report of this incident consisted not of meanings conjoined with sensations and emotions, but of meanings conjoined with other meanings. It is thus meanings that are linguistically pertinent, and not sensations and emotions. Unlike meanings that are conjoined with sensations, or emotions and desires, meanings that are conjoined with other meanings in ideational situations can transcend any given subject and any given situation. Hence, in ideational situations the subject knows with a knowing that can be known. Such knowing is language; and since, in ideational situations, it

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*Sensory activity for communicating meanings is, of course, not essentially a part of the ideational situation being communicated.*
is ideas that are made known, the language proper to the situational world may be referred to as ideational language.

For some thinkers ideational language is the only kind of language. To these thinkers the notion of an ontic language which relates a subject to an ontic world in terms of a content which is misrepresented if it is made meaningful, must seem like the hocus-pocus word-juggling of charlatans. To these partisans of ideational language, discourse that purports to disclose ‘obligation,’ ‘co-existence’ and ‘finitude’ is either meaningful or it is unintelligible. To be sure, intelligibility does not require that words be used literally. It is possible, they grant, for language to be a continuum that includes expressive poetic and religious discourse as well as explanatory scientific discourse. The continuum is possible because of the metaphorical elasticity of language. We are, for example, able to describe a ship in terms of its “plowing” the sea, or to describe a vulgar, loud loquacious fellow in terms of “shooting off his mouth” with a “volley of oaths.” Either the elasticity of metaphorical expressions makes it possible to describe subjectional relations in ideational language, or such relations are unintelligible. If the latter should be the case, then that whereof one cannot speak, let one remain silent.

So argue those who hold that language, to be language, must be meaningful. And if they should be right, then the admonition to silence is incontrovertible, for the unspeakable cannot be told without becoming speakable, and hence no longer unspeakable. However, they may not be right, for their protest against making the ineffable may simply be an expression of at least two confusions.

The first confusion is a failure to recognize that communication about the meaning of subjectional relations (such as we are now undertaking) is made, not in language, but in ideational language. Discourse about subjectional relations is not communication of the subject as such and of the ontic world. In discoursing about subjectional relations, one knows very well that he is telling what subjection means to him—the italicized to indicating that the situation’s meaning is subjective and not subjectional.

A second and more serious confusion arises because the function of vocabulary is misunderstood. An illustration from ontic discourse may be helpful at this point. Consider a lover who tells his beloved that he loves her “a bushel and a peck and a hug around the neck.” Obviously he is not referring to cubic measures and wrestling grips. The lover’s words refer to I-Thou co-existence in a way that lovers themselves, directly and literally and not indirectly and metaphorically, get the message. Compare, for example, the metaphors we used as illustrations with the lover’s confession to his beloved. The metaphors stretch language because they trade on similitude. A bombastic release of explosives and a volley of shots are aurally similar, and a ship separating the sea into a

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wake and the plow separating the soil into furrows are visually similar. But the subjunctive relation of being beholden to another for one’s own existence is not like a quantity of dry measure of the compression of a wrestling grip. Lacking the similitude by which metaphors are constituted, the lover’s language is hardly metaphorical. It is, however, ontic, for it exposes the very being of the lover to his beloved.

The attempt to reduce ontic language to ideational language arises because vocabulary is confused with language. Although the vocabulary the lover used signifies his being, the vocabulary per se belongs to neither language. Rather, it belongs to whatever language it is being used to signify. In the lover’s case, it belongs to ontic language; but if the muscular activity of a wrestler were being described, it would belong to ideational language. The ideational language of measuring and describing and the ontic language of co-existence are not the same languages just because they may happen to use the same words. Vocabulary is not language. In contrast to ideational language, which reports on how a subject puts meanings together, ontic language reports on the subject himself.

But ontic language, like ideational, is discursive. Ontic discourse frequently takes the literary form of parables. For example, although Jesus may appear to be telling about sheep and goats (Mt. 25:31ff.), we are not deceived into thinking that he is merely composing poetry about animal husbandry with the metaphors of ideational language. His intention is to lead us to confess to ourselves our own I-Thou biography. Or again, Jesus obviously is not talking about warehouse construction in Luke 12:13ff.; he is, rather, intending to lead us to confess our helpless finitude. Not only does ontic discourse take the form of parables, but it can function in direct address as well. For example, the young man who turned away sorrowfully (Mt. 19:16ff.) knew right well that his conversation with Jesus was not a legal recitation, but concerned his response to an obligation. Unlike ideational language, which carries on the communicable business of the situational worlds in which we live out our sensations, egos and ideas, ontic language reports on relations that belong to a world that holds our being in question.

Subjunctional relations, reported in ontic language, are the links that bind human beings to being-not-themselves which is the ontic world. Philosophers who accredit ideational language as the only way of communication, even though they recognize it as a continuum that ranges from scientific to poetic and religious meanings, shut themselves off from inquiry into the ontic world. A classic illustration of this shutting-off may be found in a passage from Hume. This passage indicates what happens when something outside the scope of ideational language is investigated by ideational language. In this passage Hume reports on his futile attempt to cognize the subject pole of subjunctional relations. He writes that he cannot find a subject that is not conjoined with hot or cold, light or dark, lovely or hateful, pained or pleased. These sensations and
emotions, according to Hume, are present as meaning a subject. Hence he concludes that in their absence, there is no subject: “When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long I am insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.”⁴ In looking for a meaningful subject, Hume found not a subject, but meanings that were situationally present. If the subject itself—the one reflectively referred to by the personal pronouns which we, and not Hume, italicized—is meaningless, the ‘subject’ that Hume has grasped in conjunction with heat, cold, pain, etc. is the presence of ‘subject’ meaning, and not the subject itself. As idea, a subject is indeed apprehensible in ideational language. Moreover, this meaning of subject can be elaborated postivistically by those who accept Hume's notion or elaborated metaphysically by those who do not; but either elaboration constitutes an ideational world, and not an ontic world. Such elaborations are intended to be ontic in their bearing, they are comparable to the efforts of a man who, wanting to clean his hands, puts on a pair of rubber gloves and then proceeds with skillful lathering. But, no matter how skillful the lathering, the skill is misplaced. As Hume’s effort illustrates, a philosopher who tries to get at the ontic world by way of ideational language is, like the rubber-gloved hand-washer, absurdly separating himself from the very being he proposes to investigate.

It is not our present intention to offer an ontology; but we do want to indicate wherein the subjectional relations we have called obligation, co-existence and finitude expose several ontological categories. We shall, then, suggest a derivation of ontological categories from the subjectional relations we have been considering: the category of risk, from the ontic world of finitude; the category of obedience, from the ontic world of obligation; and the category of grace, from the ontic world of co-existences. We shall begin with the category of risk.

**ONTLOGICAL CATEGORIES**

The category of risk is derived from uncertainty about meanings. One type of such uncertainty was discussed in the remarks about finitude. In that connection we observed that any explanation of man’s being here by birth and his not being here by death is the very work of the explainer and shares in the very finitude whose anxiety it is supposed to dispel. The meaning human beings askings to their own being may indeed be the truth. But who can be sure? For when we pursue meanings, we cannot get to them without meaning the meanings we want to get to. Hence, although the meanings we arrive at may indeed be the truth, we shall never know that we know the truth.⁵ This predicament, however, is not

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⁴ *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section 6, Paragraph 3.
⁵ This position is developed in my monograph, “The Intellectual Enterprise.” See the *Pacific Philosophy Forum*, Vol. I, No. 1, September 1962 (Stockton: University of the Pacific Philosophy Institute Publications), pp. 4-83.
just a philosopher's toy for we must remember that the situational world in which we live our lives is a meaningful world. Hence, to say that there is no certainty as to whether or not we truly mean the meanings we mean is equivalent to saying that we live meaningfully at a risk that the ontic meaningfulness disclosed by our finitude is the truth of our very being. In this case, the meaningfulness of life is ontically meaningless, and life is absurd because it means meaningfulness. Ideational language, which traffics in meanings, can do little more than exhibit the bankruptcy of meanings when it is used to account for the ontic world. With respect to our finitude, the ontic world confronts us as a risk whose bearing upon our being can be explored, if at all, perhaps only by ontic language.

We turn next to a consideration of the ontological category of obedience. The category of obedience is derived from the bondage under which we are placed when we are obligated. The category of obedience must not be confused with the situational category of duty. For obligations, as they are worked out in the situational world, are readily translated into duty. In doing our duty we implement a decision we ourselves make and can justify. Suppose, for example, that I am a lawyer who, in a trial, needs to call upon a friend as a witness. Suppose, moreover, that the testimony I must elicit from my friend will ruin his reputation. Suppose, further, that I find myself beholden to an obligation to uphold my professional responsibility to my client and also to an obligation to be loyal to my friend. My duty in this conflict may be determined by value considerations. Thus, I might decide that since I value friendship more than my profession, it is my duty to give up the case; or, if I value my profession more to give up my friend. But in thus doing my duty, I am not acting according to the obligations to which I am beholden, but with respect to my own subjective adjudication of a conflict in accordance with some value scheme that owes its sanction to my acceptance of it. Moreover, by ideational language we can, without too much cleverness, express meaningful accounts of the obligations, accounts that are ideational situations we ourselves have created. The conflicts among obligations, and their resolution in terms of duty, can likewise be neatly expressed.

But looking away from the untidy ontic world which permits conflicting obligations, to a meaningful situational world that has been tidied up by its own housekeeping, does not make unicity untidiness go away. Although in our situational world we properly resolve conflicts according to "our station and its duties," from the standpoint of subjunctive relations, no matter how the conflict has been resolved, the conflicting summons are still there. For just as a question is no less a question because it has become an answered question, so an obligation is no less demanding simply because it has been dutifully accepted or rejected. In obeying the one obligation, I have disobeyed the other. The continuing presence of the obligation that has been disobeyed shows in the reproach that is mine when the person to whom I have been disloyal confronts me with the
betrayal he has received at my hands. Reproach calls for ontic language, for no amount of explaining in ideational language dissolves my disobedience to the obligation to which I am beholden. Perhaps forgiveness might, but forgiveness, unlike explaining, is not mine to give. An obligation which binds us to an ontic world which is independent of our deeds can be explored, if at all, only by ontic language, and then in terms of the category of obedience.

The category of grace is the last to be considered. This category does not belong to the subjective world of our life situations, for in this world, for example, I properly maneuver others in terms of their meaning for my own intentions. I change barbers, get another business partner, or team up with another civic leader, if it is to my advantage or to the advantage of some cause that is my cause. Situationaly, no man loves or hates another, for if he did he would merely be approving or disapproving some facet of his own subjective existence. Unlike situational friends and rascals, who merely exist as a subjective relation as far as friendship and skullduggery go, the love of the lover for the beloved and the hatred of the devil for the accursed are unmerited and are independent of the lover's or devil's subjective interests. Love and hatred are confrontations of subjects, and hence in love and hatred another exists with one, and not for one. As independent of what the other does for one, and as unmerited, the subjessional relation of co-existence that we call love is a matter of grace; and likewise, the subjessional relation of co-existence that we call hatred is a matter of disgrace. Hence, it is the category of grace (or disgrace) that leads us from the subject to the ontic world populated by other subjects with whom he co-exists. An investigator who thinks he is probing the ontic world with ideational language will not end up with subjects themselves, but with meanings that the subjects mean. Only ontic language can disclose, if at all, the bearing of grace and disgrace upon being itself.

From the foregoing derivation of the categories of risk, obedience and grace it would seem that ontological inquiry is not open to all investigators, but only to investigators who are responsive to ontic language. But then, too, neither is orchestra conducting open to those who are tone-deaf. That some men are deaf does not mean that there are no orchestras to be conducted; nor from the fact that not all are responsive to ontic language does it follow that there is no ontological inquiry to be made.
Troy Wilson Organ

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Radhakrishnan and Teleology

An American philosopher, Charles Hartshorne, has reported that while he discovers Radhakrishnan rejects two types of idealism—which Hartshorne identifies as panpsychism and subjectivism—he is not able to discern any third possibility for idealism.¹ Radhakrishnan has replied, "I thought I had made my position clear"² and has quoted his statement of the third possibility from his volume, An Idealist View of Life. I agree with Radhakrishnan that he does present in this volume a third type of idealism, but I cannot agree that the presentation is clear. I wish to begin this study of Radhakrishnan by attempting to restate the distinctions which Radhakrishnan makes in An Idealist View of Life of three fundamental types of idealism. This restatement contains some additional explanatory material which I believe may help clarify Radhakrishnan’s idealism.

According to Radhakrishnan there are three types of idealism which emerge from the three approaches which philosophers take toward their subject matter: the epistemological, the ontological, and the axiological. The idealism which grows out of the epistemological approach may be called subjective idealism, or mentalism, or subjectivism. The idealism which grows out of the ontological approach may be called objective idealism or spiritualism; this type may appear either in pluralistic forms such as panpsychism or personalism, or in monistic or absolutistic forms. The idealism which grows out of the axiological approach is the type which may most appropriately be called idealism; the other two should properly be called idealisms. However, the broader use of the term has been fixed, so the three may be designated as three types of idealism: subjective, objective, and valuational.

² PSR, p. 795.
Subjective idealism emphasizes the subjective aspect of the knowing relationship. “Whatever is real in the universe is such stuff as ideas are made of.... An ‘idea’ is taken as a particular mental image peculiar to each individual.” A thing is “a particular image”. The danger peculiar to this type of idealism is solipsism, that is, the elimination of any shareable realities.

Objective idealism emphasizes the spiritual character of reality. In this form of idealism also, whatever is real in the universe is such stuff as ideas are made of; but here an idea is “a quality of the existent which is shareable by other existents and knowable by other minds.” The world “extends beyond the given datum” which is presented to individual minds. “Mind is immanent in all cognitive experience as an active process which gives objective form to knowledge. It does not stand in a transcendent relation to an extraneous object which it passively contemplates.” A thing is “a general relation.” The danger peculiar to this type of idealism is illusionism, that is, the elimination of all material reality.

Valuational idealism emphasizes the worth of things rather than the knowability of things or the nature of things; indeed in this type of idealism a thing is a “meaning” or a “purpose”. An idea in valuational idealism is an “operative creative force,” “the principle involved” in a thing, and the “purpose” of the being of a thing. This metaphysical system is an idealism because it finds the world to be teleological: “The world is intelligible only as a system of ends.” An idealist of this type is one who holds that universe is purposive. The rejections of this idealism mark it off from the subjective and objective forms: “Such a view has little to do with the problem whether a thing is only a particular image or a general relation. The question of the independence of the knower and the known is hardly relevant to it. Nor is it committed to the doctrine that the world is made of mind, an infinite mind or a society of minds. Idealism in the sense indicated concerns the ultimate nature of reality, whatever may be its relationship to the knowing mind. It is an answer to the problem of the idea, the meaning or the purpose of it all. It has nothing in common with the view that makes reality an irrational blind striving or an irredeemably miserable blunder. It finds life significant and purposeful. It endows men with a destiny that is not limited to the sensible world.” The danger peculiar to this type of idealism is utopianism, that is, the elimination of “an ultimate connection of value and reality.”

The reason for much of the confusion regarding Radhakrishnan’s idealism is that whereas idealists—at least in the West—have generally regarded the core of idealism to be either the mind-dependent nature of reality or the internality of relations, Radhakrishnan holds that he who interprets ideas as ideals or values is an idealist. An idealist in Radhakrishnan’s sense asks, “What’s the idea?” (i.e., what is the purpose of

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This book will be hereafter designated as IVL. Quotations in the next two paragraphs are taken from pp. 13-15 of IVL unless otherwise indicated.

4 IVL, p. 16.
5 IVL, p. 17.

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its being or its acting?) rather than "Is reality idea-like?" or "Does reality depend on minds?" Radhakrishnan reveals his own form of idealism—and confuses the Westerner—by including S. Alexander among the idealists⁶ and by confessing that "in a sense......all philosophy is idealistic."⁷

Bernard Phillips in his study of Radhakrishnan's critique of naturalism accurately identifies both the core and the weakness of Radhakrishnan's metaphysical system in a single sentence: "The basic claim is merely that the universe is not a blind process, but a teleological one, and that the course of evolution is not accidental, but in some way the expression of purpose." The core is the teleological character—the world is "a system of ends"—and the weakness is the difficulty in identifying and explaining the purposiveness of the world. Once one grasps the teleological character of Radhakrishnan's idealism, many of the problems of his metaphysical system vanish—but others take their places: (1) What is the relation of teleology and causation?; (2) In what manner is the universe teleological?

CAUSALITY AND TELEOELOGY

Teleology is a topic upon which most twentieth century philosophers prefer to remain silent. It is more often assumed than established by the theist. In the words of Radhakrishnan, "The case for theism from the moral side is questioned. If we argue from our moral aspirations to their ultimate fulfilment, we assume as a premise what requires to be proved, viz. that the world is reasonable, that it is teleologically ordered and that is the very proposition we wish to prove." The scientist usually gives teleology no more consideration than an observation that it is a primitive anthropomorphism. Some have ridiculed the conception, e.g., Francis Bacon compared final causes to vestal virgins, "dedicated to God, and... barren" and Nicolai Hartmann regarded the greatest achievement of modern thought to be the deliverance from "the nightmare of teleology." Whitehead is one of the few philosophers who has had the wit to reply in kind to those who ridicule teleology: "Scientists animated by the purpose of proving that they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study."¹⁰

Radhakrishnan is not opposed to scientific methodology. He believes that scientific knowledge can be trusted within limits, but he believes that the limits are defined too loosely by most scientists. Such knowledge is "inadequate, partial, fragmentary, but not false.......It is, however, an essential stage in the evolution of human consciousness."¹¹ The trouble

⁶ IVL, p. 16.
⁷ IVL, p. 16.
⁸ PSR, p. 138.
⁹ IVL, p. 27.
¹¹ PSR, p. 792.
arises when scientists assume that the physical world is a closed system in which everything is determined. The physical world according to Radhakrishnan has two striking features: continuity and change. Events have references both to the past and the future, and the “prospective reference” or the “creative advance into the future” may be anticipated, but it cannot be predicted. “No event is complete. It seeks for its completion in an undetermined future. Throughout the process of nature we have creativity, or the coming into being of the new, which is not reducible to or reducible from the old. We cannot forecast the future on the basis of our knowledge of the present.” Radhakrishnan has an open-ended universe. Something new is always happening, and each innovation is unpredictable. Events have caused and creative aspects. Determinism as a methodology is especially inadequate in the area of living organisms and conscious processes. Radhakrishnan ridicules those who regard man as an “assembled organic machine ready to run” and thought as “talking with concealed musculature.” In particular, causality is unsatisfactory when dealing with living organisms since it is incapable of dealing with the controlling aims which are the essential feature of organisms. “Life is a dynamic equilibrium which tends to maintain itself.” But an “atom can neither mend itself nor reproduce itself.” An amoeba advances to food and retreats from acid. It selects the response it makes to stimuli. Litmus paper does not choose to react to acid. If materialism is the answer to the question “What is the ultimate stuff?” and if mechanism is the answer to the question “What is the relationship of parts within bodies?” then living bodies are very odd mechanisms. They are the only mechanisms which avoid their own destruction. A dog that dodges the rock thrown at it is not acting like the runaway car which slips down the hill and over the embankment. The self-repair which takes place in a living body in the healing of a wound is a very different sort of mechanical action than the self-destruction of the combustion engine which has lost an important bolt. To call entities that engage in self-repair and self-preservation mechanisms and also to call entities that do not engage in self-repair and self-preservation mechanisms does not seem to give much meaning to the word mechanism. To call the former teleological objects at least points out that they are bodies in which the end of survival is a determining factor in their activities.

Science, claims Radhakrishnan, is “a system of second causes which cannot describe the world adequately, much less account for it.” The naturalist, insofar as he bases his metaphysical system on scientific determinism, confuses a descriptive method for the creative cause.”

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12 IVL, p. 240.
13 IVL, pp. 28, 29.
14 IVL, p. 249.
15 IVL, p. 250.
16 IVL, p. 316.
17 PSR, p. 32.
because they have used non-teleological methods to study the world. But methodology must not determine metaphysics; rather methodology should be determined both by the nature of the subject matter and the nature of the results which the scientist wishes to secure. Since the scientist wishes to get knowledge which is inter-subjectively verifiable, quantitatively measurable, and linguistically expressible, he selects methods of knowing which will give him these results. But when he contends that reality is exactly as he grasps it through his methods, he forgets that his methods were determined by the subject matter as well as by the sort of knowledge he seeks. For example, if one were handed a sealed box and asked to determine its contents without using visual sensations, one’s method could not establish whether the contents were colored. Only a simpleton would declare that the contents are not colored because he cannot discover whether or not the contents are colored. Yet does not the scientist reject teleology because he is not able to handle such a subject matter with his scientific methods?

That which scientific causality cannot handle is an end. And the world is “a system of ends.” However, I think we should add to Radhakrishnan’s treatment of teleology the observation that causality is not contradictory to teleology. Indeed, teleology implies causality in the sense that teleology is dependent upon causality. Causality is an asymmetrical or one-way relationship between two events. If A is the cause of B, B cannot also be the cause of A. Teleology is a symmetrical relationship. At least there is a sense in which events teleologically related may be reversible. The teleological relationship is best described as a means-end relationship, rather than a cause-effect relationship, but if there were no cause-effect relationships there could be no means-end relationships. Let us consider an example. We are standing on the corner of Fifth and Main of a strange city. We are trying to find an address marked Sixth and Main. Our end, i.e., reaching Sixth and Main, causes us to walk one block up Main until we have accomplished our end. Thus the end determines the means, and the means determines the end. Or more precisely the end in view (the finding of the address) causes the means (walking up Main Street), and walking up Main Street causes us to realize the end accomplished. Teleology may be defined as any means-end situation in which the end partially determines the means.

TYPES OF TELEOLOGY

In spite of Radhakrishnan’s confidence that the world is “a system of ends,” I do not find him very explicit as to what sort of ends there are in the universe. That is, are these ends of the whole or of the part? Are they immanent or transcendent? Are they purposive or non-purposive? Statements like the following reveal the teleological nature of his world view, but they are tantalizingly frustrating as clues to the nature of his teleology: “The physical world is not a futile play of senseless atoms engaged
in a deadly conflict. ...The earth and its contents prepared for life...In spite of the little ups and downs of change, there seems to be a compelling drift towards better things...There is a universal tendency discernible in every state from its origin to its present condition."

No wonder Phillips concludes that according to Radhakrishnan "the course of evolution is...in some way the expression of purpose." The problem is: in just what way is the development of the world the expression of purpose?

A teleologically motivated process may be either of the whole, e.g., the Psalmist's conception of the universe as the handwork of Yahweh, or of the parts. The latter type of teleology may be of the parts within the individual, e.g., the process by which parts of an organism fight an infection, or of the individual, e.g., the process by which the salmon deserts the salt water of the ocean and returns to its fresh water spawning grounds.

A distinction can also be made between immanent teleology and transcendent teleology. In the former the end is internal to the process. Aristotle’s teleology is clearly immanent. For him the end of each individual within a species is to actualize fully the potentiality of the species. The end of an acorn is to become all that an acorn is supposed to become, viz., a good specimen of oak tree. Teleology is transcendent when the end is external to the process. For example, the Calvinist says that the end of man is to glorify God—not to actualize the fullness of the form of man. When considering transcendent teleology of the whole, we have to make a further distinction, that is, between an external agent which uses the world as means to the realization of its own ends, e.g., St. Augustine said God created the world in order to repopulate heaven after the revolt of Lucifer, and the world process as striving to an end which transcends the process itself, e.g., Tennyson’s "one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves."

A third distinction is that between purposive and non-purposive teleology. Teleology is purposive when the end is consciously chosen by a mind. A man picks up a hammer because he intends to drive a nail; he reads a book in order to learn about a certain subject. There are some philosophers who claim that the notion of a teleology which is not the purpose of any mind is unsatisfactory, but others recognize the possibility of an end which is not consciously chosen by a mind. Aristotle’s teleology was non-purposive. According to Aristotle the acorn does not consciously purpose to become an oak tree, yet the form of the oak tree does act as an end in the process by which acorns become oak trees.

When these dichotomous divisions are thrown together we have eight theoretically possible types of teleology:

1 Whole, immanent, purposive.
2 Whole, immanent, non-purposive.

18 IVL, p. 313.
19 PSR, p. 138. Antics are mine.
3. Whole, transcendent, purposive.
4. Whole, transcendent, non-purposive.
5. Parts, immanent, purposive.
6. Parts, immanent, non-purposive.
7. Parts, transcendent, purposive.
8. Parts, transcendent, non-purposive.

Which type of teleology does Radhakrishnan present in his idealism? In his Hibbert Lectures of 1929 Radhakrishnan stated his belief in cosmic teleology and denied that the end of the cosmic process could be life: “Life, which is such a merely local and superficial peculiarity, cannot be the end of the universe, as some are inclined to believe. There must be a relevant relation between purpose and output, end and means. The stars in their courses are plainly about some other business.” In the volume in The Library of Living Philosophers series he writes in the autobiographical introduction, called “Fragments of a Confession”, that the meaning of cosmic history is “to make all men prophets, to establish a kingdom of free spirits.” Spiritual freedom is both the “highest product” and the “hidden principle.” Spirit works in complementary opposition to matter. Matter is a relative non-being which when guided by Spirit has the potentiality of becoming revelatory of being. The work of the Spirit is not a purposing. In another connection Radhakrishnan says that the living organisms engage in self-repair, nutrition, and reproduction without intelligence, that is, they engage in actions which when engaged in by humans are described as due to foresight. Radhakrishnan will not accept a vital force in his system. He does refer to teleology of the parts but he constantly comes back to the Upanisadic view of Spirit which is at work at all levels of existence. The “prospective adaptations” of individual organisms are in the final analysis manifestations of Spirit. So we may conclude that Radhakrishnan’s teleology is of the whole, and that it is non-purposive. It is immanent or transcendent? The answer seems to be that it is neither—or both. In his open-ended view of cosmic history the emphasis is on specific forms not yet realized. Spirit is both the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem: “Spirit is working in matter that matter may serve the Spirit.” Yet the Spirit is not a fixed telos. What is of the Spirit is always in evolution: “The process of the world

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20 It is outside the scope of this paper to present and defend examples of each of the eight types of teleology, but I think it is possible to illustrate each type by reference to historical philosophers, e.g., (1) Hegel, (2) Aristotle, (3) Epictetus, (4) S. Alexander, (5) Ramanuja, (6) Aquinas with respect to individuals, (7) even in a Watsonian behaviorist!, and (8) Driesch with respect to embryos.
22 PSR, p. 30.
23 PSR, p. 31.
24 PSR, p. 28.
25 PSR, p. 31.
26 PSR, p. 31.
is not a mere unfolding of what is contained in the beginning. It is not a question of mere preformation. The end of the world is not contained in the beginning, such that God might retire from the process altogether."  

Herein is the joy, the ænanda, of Radhakrishnan’s professional philosophy and personal faith: the Spirit is at work in the world for the ever richer manifestation of itself. Self-realization of the Spirit is the end of the cosmic evolution—and that art thou. 

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187 IVL, p. 339.
PEACE ON EARTH

The world at large is called upon to accept the value of the "will to peace." Peace is awaiting at the portals of our human personality; we have only to open the door of our will and let it in. The possibility of peace is placed in our hands; we have only to will it, and will it efficaciously.

Unfortunately, peace, the fairest of God's gifts to mankind is being threatened. During the past two world wars mankind has passed through an ocean of blood and tears. On the one hand, the deadly weapons of war have reached such a point of extinction as never known before; on the other hand, the hunger and thirst for peace too is swelling from the recesses of men's hearts with such pitiable appeal as never known before. All the recent Popes of the Catholic Church, have given vent to this human cry of anguish, and have worked unceasingly for the cause of peace. But for a long time their voice remained almost unheeded. Pope John XXIII of immortal memory, just before his death, took up this strain once more, and appealed to all men of good will to leave no stone unturned to establish peace on earth. For the first time, all the governments of the world turned their radios to the Vatican to listen to the peace message of the Pontiff in his encyclical letter "Pacem in Terris"—Peace on Earth. In the following pages some of the points of this famous encyclical are explained.

How shall we begin to work for peace? First we need to accept the cosmic order. Men speak in terms of the universe now a days. The Weltanschauung, the world-outlook to which man is accustomed today will provide us with the principles of peace. There is an order coming from the Eternal Ordainer and so "peace on earth, which men of every era have most eagerly yearned for, can be firmly established only if the order laid down by God be dutifully observed." From this it follows
that peace on earth is to be established in Truth, Justice, Charity and Liberty.

**PEACE IN TRUTH**

Human society is a union of persons, and human person is made up of spirit and matter, body and soul. Therefore “human society ought to be regarded above all a spiritual reality, in which men communicate to each other in the light of truth.” In speaking of peace in society, this is one of the important truths which we should accept; You and I and human beings are persons. What is a person? “When we say that man is a person we do not mean merely that he is an individual, in the sense that an atom, a blade of grass, a fly, an elephant is an individual. Man is an individual who holds himself in hand by intelligence and will. He does not exist only in a physical manner, he has spiritual super-existence through knowledge and love; he is in a way universe in himself, a microcosm in which the great universe in its entirety can be encompassed through knowledge and through love; he can give himself completely to beings who are to him, as it were other selves, a relation for which no equivalent can be found in the physical world.”

Because man is a person, he is subject of rights and duties. He is master of his own actions and of his own destiny. Therefore certain things must belong to him as his own. These are what are called the Fundamental Rights in our Constitution. These rights are universal, inviolable and inalienable. Man has a right to live. Therefore he has the moral right to his bodily integrity, security and to his property. He has the right to share in the cultural and technical values. He has the right to worship, right to choose his state of life, right to marry, to bring up a family: man has right to work, right to living wages, right for meetings and associations. He has civic, political, and economic rights.

Correspondingly man has duties also. Rights reach their completion in the discharge of corresponding duties. It is a regrettable fact that man often forgets that he has duties to fulfill. Mr. Nehru also sadly bemoans this fact. “The law of life should not be competition or acquisitiveness, but cooperation, the good of each contributing to the good of all. In such a society the emphasis will be on duties, not on rights; the rights will follow the performance of the duties. We have to give a new direction to education and evolve a new type of humanity.” We are always ready to defend our rights. By defending rights alone we cannot establish peace.

A well organized society means a society where mutual rights and duties are progressively and effectively acknowledged and fulfilled. This is one of the fundamental principles of lasting peace.

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PEACE IN JUSTICE

The second principle of world peace is justice. The motto of Pope Pius XII was "Opus Justitiae pax", Peace is the work of justice. This is a national conclusion from what we have said above. Man is a human person with rights and duties. These rights and duties must be acknowledged in society, and this is done by the virtue of justice. Justice is a virtue that acknowledges the person as person, and renders to each one his dues. In other words justice reduces truth to action.

Justice performs a double function. (a) It vindicates the rights of all (b) it establishes a right social order where each one can clearly say "this is mine and that is thine." It situates man in this "mine and thine" relationship. This rights-duties relationship is called the juridical order which is the backbone of every social organism, in which each one has his proper place.

Justice acknowledges all men as equal in dignity. By nature, no man is superior, nor inferior. There is no superior or inferior race. There are no political or social inequalities. "It is not true that some human beings are by nature superior and others inferior. All men are equal in their natural dignity. Consequently there are no political communities which are superior by nature and none which are inferior by nature."

The sphere of justice has a juridical as well as a moral aspect. The juridical aspect refers more to a thing, while the moral aspect refers more to the right reason. The juridical order equalizes the rights of men to certain things according to the juridical titles, where as, the moral order establishes right order in man as a rational being. Reason tells me that I must respect the rights of the other person, that I must not steal his property, that I should not kill him and so on.

That is why justice is called a moral virtue. What is a virtue? A virtue is not a simple ability to give to each one his dues, neither is it a general disposition to render to each one his rights. A general temperamental habit to pay the debts of others, lest one should be psychologically disturbed, is not the virtue of justice. The so called justice in buying and selling and keeping accounts, just in order to draw more creditors for the success of the commercial profession, cannot be called the virtue of justice. A good amount of the so called "just" dealings in business organization now a days has become a technique of efficient management and furthering production, rather than the virtue of justice.

What then is a virtue? A virtue is "a supra-actual value response victoriously pervading the entire personality,"9 The value here is the value of the human person, accepting the other as having the dignity of the person, as deserving of love, respect, and thus, as worthy of maintaining his rights inviolable. When the "due" relation has victoriously pervaded my very personality, then only I can be called a just man. In this connection

9 Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, p. 362.
how consoling it is to recall to mind the motto engraved on Asoka’s pillar “Satyameva Jayathe”. Truth should be victorious, and truth will not be victorious unless it is victorious in each one of us. If truth gains victory in us, then we will render to each one his dues with great ease, facility, and joy; we will rejoice when ever justice is meted to others, and we will suffer pain when justice is violated. Such a virtuous man will have overcome the greed for aquisitiveness so much so the virtue of justice will reflect upon his countenance, his speech and his whole demeanour. Let our education then prepare such men, and we will have the assurance of lasting peace.

Time was when the jurists, moralists and theologians were speaking in terms of commutative, distributive and legal justice. But now a days all are speaking in terms of “Social Justice”. When exactly this term began its wonderful career no one knows. The earliest reference to it is found in Tapparelli’s work on Natural Law. Pope Pius XI gave official recognition to it in his Encyclical on Social Justice, “Quadragesimo Anno” in the year 1931.4 and now Pope John XXIII spoke in terms of international social justice. Scholars are still discussing as to the nature of Social Justice. The recent studies however define Social Justice as that “which requires that material goods, even privately owned, shall serve the common use of all men”.5 Social justice aims at restoring to material goods, their natural destiny, that is, the service of all men; its operations concern any organization or regime which engages in the distribution of goods and services for the satisfaction of human needs. In the whole complicated net work of economic order—wages, labour, capital, institutions like banking, business corporation etc.—social justice demands the placing of the common good in the forefront of every type of economic activity.6

PEACE IN CHARITY

There is another truth about the human person; he is made to love. Man as a person is great for two perfections: knowledge and love. By knowledge he receives truth, by love he gives himself to truth. Knowledge consists more in possessing, while love consists more in giving. This is the paradox of love that the more the human person gives himself to others the more he finds his full stature in love.

Human love is holy, sacred and divine. When we love with the pure love, the divine love becomes the beatings of our heart, and then we make a gift of ourselves to others. On account of this love—mystery in man, he is capable of kindness, generosity, self-sacrifice, benignity, pity, mercy and of all other virtues belong to our nobler self. Thus love becomes the driving force of moral life, so much so, great thinkers like St. Augustine have reduced all moral virtues to love: “Courage...is love cheerfully enduring all things for the sake of God; self-control is love keeping

4 Cf. Christus Rex, 1951, p. 132.
5 W. F. Drummond, Social Justice, p. 55.
6 Cf. Social Action, 1959, p. 149.
itself entire and inviolate for God; justice is love serving God only and therefore controlling all else that is subject to man; wisdom is love discriminating between those things which assist and those things which retard its approach to God".  

From this we can conclude that all the material things of this world exist to show our love to our fellow beings. Property is given to us to work upon it and place its fruits at the disposal of our neighbours; work is to be undertaken out of love for the community; the social, economic, political organizations are there to show our devotion to mankind. The impelling force of all our social organizations ought to be universal brotherhood.

All the recent Popes have made charity and love as the inner principle of social order and peace. Pope Leo XIII wrote “For the happy results we all long for must be chiefly brought about by the plenteous outpouring of charity...which is always ready to sacrifice itself for others' sake...”. Pope Pius XI made Justice and Social Charity the principle of Social reconstruction. In like manner Pope Pius XII again and again appealed to justice and charity to solve international divergences. So too Pope John XXIII writes, “...if they are moved by such fervour of charity as to make their own the needs of others and share with others their own goods, if finally they work for a progressively closer fellowship in the world of spiritual values” there will be sure peace.

**PEACE IN LIBERTY**

Man is a free being. Hence the guarantee of the human liberty in a society is a necessary condition for lasting peace. “Human society is realized in freedom, that is to say, in ways and means in keeping with the dignity of its citizens, who accept the responsibility of their actions, precisely because they are by nature rational beings.”

There is in us freedom of autonomy and freedom of choice. The freedom of autonomy is the freedom of self-determination by which we exercise our spiritual spontaneity and give a new form, a new figure to ourselves. Say, for example, I want to be honest, just, I want to be a musician. All these are free exercises of the will by which I give myself a new orientation; I make myself honest, just, a musician, I am not made honest or true or just by external agents. I am the cause of my own perfection. It is my own act of the will that makes me have such and such a perfection. This shows that man is master over himself and over his actions.

Secondly there is also in man the freedom of choice, which is also called free will. By this man freely makes choice according to right reasonableness. It is by my own choice that I become a just citizen or unjust, charitable or uncharitable. It is by my free decision I am what I

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7 Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World, p. 50.
It is by my free decision that I cause within me a chain of actions. Therefore, I am not determined by external circumstances. It is true that there is a certain amount of determination imposed on me externally either by education, custom, society, circumstances etc. They are all conditions of my acting. They do not cause my act of the will. The internal act of the will is my own. I have the capacity to will freely independently of any antecedent causes. Therefore, as far as the act of the will is concerned I am not a moment in the physical evolution. From this it follows that I am responsible for all my actions. The "yes" or "no" which I say to my actions is my own, I answer for my willing and for all that follows.

Man is internally free; but he requires certain external conditions to exercise his internal freedom. This is what we call civil liberty, political liberty and economic liberty. Peace demands that human conditions are so organized that man gets the opportunity of exercising his internal liberty. That is why the Pacem in Terris says: "The dignity of the human person also requires that every man enjoy the right to act freely and responsibly... In social relations man should act chiefly on his own responsibility and initiative. This is to be done in such a way that each one acts on his own decision of set purpose and from a consciousness of his obligations, without being moved by force or pressure brought to bear on him externally. For any human society that is established on relation of force must be regarded as inhuman, inasmuch as the personality of its members is repressed and restricted, when in fact they should be provided with appropriate incentives and means for developing and perfecting themselves."

Conclusion: A heavy task is incumbent on all of us, the task of establishing peace in truth, justice, charity and liberty. The individuals, families, economic and cultural institutions and nations should endeavour in the light of truth and in the strength of brotherly love to promote peace, or at least not to create obstacles in the way of peace. What we have attained so far is not much; what remains to be achieved is still great. The whole economic order with all its organs of production, trade unions, professional institutions, insurance and legal systems, political organizations, all centers for cultural, health, recreational or sporting purposes must be so adjusted "to an order whose foundation is truth, whose measure and objective is justice, whose driving force is love and whose method of attainment is freedom", that all of them contribute their share towards the conquest of peace.
MAN
EAST AND WEST

MAN’S NATURE

Exchanging. We (our experiences and the identities holding our successive experiences together) are fundamentally defined by relations of exchange that our bodies have with themselves and with other bodies.¹ The body is a locus and source of driving power.² It is energy, a vague vector movement, in exchange with other energies. To be sure, we begin our existence inside the body of our mother, parasitically dependent on it. But we are still other than that body. And our existence is defined and sustained by the relations of exchange our body has with it. We move about in the uterus, respond to stimuli, suck our thumbs, kick and punch the walls that encloses us, absorb the oxygen, glucose, calcium, iron, fatty acids, etc. available through the umbilical cord, and eliminate waste products. On the other side, our mother reacts to us.

At birth, we dramatically move from an aquatic existence to the life of an aeric creature, with new relations to the manifold surrounding us. We breathe. We obtain our food through our mouths. We draw from our mother’s breast milk, and in the process get oxygen and love.³

¹ The materialists are correct in stressing the role of man’s body and the idealists are correct in stressing his relations to others and his activities. Marx summed up this false dichotomy: “Hence in opposition to materialism the active side was developed abstractly by idealism—which of course does not know real sensuous activity as such.” Theses on Feuerbach, I. Appendix to F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. Moscow; Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950.

² Brahman means “energy, force, power, potency.” Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of India, New York: Meridian Books, 1956, p. 77. Te (in Taoism has a similar connotation, like vir in virtue. The category of power is common in the West, especially in modern times.

³ Margaret A. Ribble, The Rights of Infants. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. The mouth is also essential to speech, and in it we can see the linkage between physical love and thought. The large areas of the brain controlling the impulses from the pharynx, tongue, lips, etc. have now been demonstrated. See Wilder Penfield and Theodore Rasmussen, The Cerebral Cortex in Man. New York: the Macmillian Co., 1950.
We digest our food. Thus we evolve those exchanges necessary to our new mode of existence: respiration, digestion, and innovative adaptation to environment.

Still a new step is to be taken in this progression toward human individuality. At first the baby interacts with and adjusts to its mother’s body. It kicks and pushes against its mother, crib, and other objects. It discovers the parts of its own body, sucking its thumb, fingering its fingers, touching its face, chewing its toes. Within the first year, in the intimacies of the touches, tastes, sounds, and sights developed in interaction with things and persons, the baby begins to acquire the skill of using symbols. This skill becomes the means by which it participates in the culture of its society. The meanings of symbols are truly the “means” of achieving our human nature. As the forms by which meanings are produced, carried, made objective, and communicated, symbols emerge in, and direct us toward, interactions with others and the world. These interactions are of a different order from biophysical interactions. Symbolic interactions are tools by which individuals exchange stimuli and responses and so progressively create—innovate, integrate, and control—a common world. The creative production and exchange of meanings via symbols is a defining characteristic of human beings.

Exchange means, first, duality. This duality is dynamic and moves from difference, to opposition, to negation. Each element in the exchange is changed by the other and eventually negated (by some opposite). Likewise, there is alternation in exchange: first one actor gives and the other receives, then the other gives and the first receives. Thus negation and alternation define exchange. They are the “primitive ideas” of exchange, as in logic. And from them can be derived implication (\(I \supset\) the other), conjunction (I the other), and equivalence (I = the other) or the unity of opposites.

Exchanging means mutuality or symmetry of relation. Exchanging between two persons requires giving and receiving on the part of each: \(aRb = bRa\). Now one person gives and the other receives; and then the roles are reversed. But perfect symmetry is impossible, because exchange takes time and time is asymmetrical. Exchange is, in a spatial world, necessary to change. It elicits and directs change, and gives definition to change. Thus the human person is a series of successive changes, cumulative and growing. He executes changes successfully as his relations of exchange contribute to his unitary direction and integral fulfillment.

A variety of features distinguishes the human species: internal fertilization, foetalization, prolonged dependency of the infant, acute sensitivity, absence of over-specialization, upright posture, brain, hand, the mechanism of language. But to understand the nature of man, we must see these characteristics in a functional whole. Together they represent a unique capacity of the individual and the group for effective, creative
exchange with its human and non-human environments. Through that exchange man displays his capacity for variation and integration, i.e., for growth in experiences. Thus in his method of exchange with other persons and things, man shows a distinctive combination of variability and stability. His method of effecting viable exchanges (creative, symbolic intelligence) remains more or less constant. At the same time it enables him to cope with a wide variety of circumstances, to live in a wide variety of habitats, and to undergo and integrate a wide variety of experiences. His abiding habit is his power to change and create new habits.

Man’s exchanging, mediative power is rooted in a unique sensitivity and responsiveness. This originates in the infant’s mammalian dependency on the parents and is reinforced by the long infantile period and the intense, linguistic sociality of the species. “Empathy” (which is a highly specialized and unitary functioning of the sensitivities) relates the infant directly and internally to its parents. It does so particularly as it reinforces the infant’s primary drives of survival and its dumb sense of dependency. In turn the parents empathically respond to the infant, driven not only by a maternal or nurturing impulse but by the same sense of organic connectedness, developed in their own human career. Likewise the parents are sensitized and respond to one another as they are driven by the power of sex, another form of human sociality.

The concept of the autonomous individual—usually defined in Western philosophy as an isolated material body or an isolated empty body (i.e., soul)—is an abstraction. Every man’s body is the consequence of the union of two gametes. That the body is not a be-all and end-all, separable from other bodies and processes—that it is relational, transitional, transitory—is evidenced in the process of meiosis. This sets aside the somatic, individualized body, or uses it as a convenient way station. By a process which reduces the number of chromosomes in the cell, it produces a sperm or egg, incomplete until it meets up with its opposite.

The individual body is the genes’ bridge between generations—a bridge that is soon discarded (or can be) ones the new generation has

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4 The generic characteristic of creative exchange is central to the Yang-Yin School, Taoism, and Confucianism (jen, or human-heartedness, is represented by a character that means both “man” and “two”). But Taoism tended to diffuse and make static the concept and Confucianism narrowed and restricted it to familial and imperial relations. In India the idea appears in the Gita, the gunas of the Sankhya, the Brahmanic unity of opposites in the Divine Being, Siva and sakti (Tantra) and the Mahayana Mahasukha or “great delight” of male-female union. The Jewish mishpat (justice), Greek vike (order), Stoic politicum systems, and Christian love express a similar idea. For an explicit metaphysics of “espousal!” see the work of Corinne Chisholm Frost.

5 More than any other ancient philosopher, Mencius saw the importance of this and built his philosophy upon it.

6 Sex as a fact of life has been by philosophers in the West ignored (Descartes, Kant, Leibniz); taken account of but discounted or subordinated (Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas); acknowledged but considered evil (Gnostics, Manicheists, Augustine, Calvin, Schopenhauer); or viewed as central (Empedocles, Lucretius, Rousseau, and certain quasi-philosophers such as Whitman and Freud). Sex figures prominently in Tantra and Tantric Mahayana (see Zimmer, op. cit. (and in Taoism (see Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China. Vol. 2. History of Scientific Thought. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp. 146-152).
been built into a Bridge. The act of sex—an exchanging—is a major mechanism by which this bridge begins. Furthermore, the individual body collapses; the genes go on indefinitely. Thus the human being, at the biological level, may be defined as a linking relation between past bodies and future bodies. It is a knot in a moving strand, weaving itself into the evolving texture of the universe. An analogous function is filled by the psychosomatic personality, as it becomes an inheritor and learner of culture and, later, a transmitter and teacher in the same culture. All cultures recognize and ritualize the fact that the individual person dies. At the same time most religions and philosophies have affirmed that while the individual survives after death certain realities and values outlast the individual: memories, ideals, principles, society, nature, gods. The individual is precious, but only as he incarnates what transcends his passage.

Most persons are born and reared in a family; work (exert energy) in order to live; and become parents of children. Hence it has been said by Freud that man has two needs, lieben und arbeiten. It is surprising not that men have proclaimed so many ideal ways to live but that sages have often missed the concrete nature of themselves and their fellows in favor of some abstraction. An example is "brotherhood." This is a partial and derivative value—even if extended to its farthest equalitarian lengths, so as to ignore differences of sex, age, nationality, race, religion, condition, time, and place. The idea of brotherhood (or siblinghood) presupposes a more inclusive reality, namely, a family. And it is this that we are most familiar with—those relations of exchange in which we are cared for and care for others, either as children or parents. Siblinghood is important and for celibates takes on special significance. But it tends to flatten out into horizontal, contemporary relations. It undervalues the temporal processes of history by which we inherit the values of the past directly from our parents and pass them on, responsibly, to our children and unborn generations.

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7 To this extent absolute idealism, or pantheism, has been correct in viewing the individual person as an organic part or manifestation of a larger system (Sankara, Spinoza, Hegel, Royce). Materialism which allows for internal relations between ultimate particles comes to the same thing. Here Spinoza may be taken either way. At the same time the individual has a separate reality so far as it is an independent, free relator itself, adding, as James says, its flat to the flat of the creator (Pragmatism. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907, p. 291). Ramanuja seems correct, Sankara incorrect, on this point. Particularity is real, as Vaisesika holds, and is not, as Sankara says, the criterion of the unreal. Here S. Radhakrishnan, in the tradition of Ramanuja, is correct.

8 The importance of tradition in Indian and Chinese philosophies, as contrasted with its relative unimportance in Western philosophies, will be obvious to students.


10 Compare Stoicism, Christianity, and the Neo-Confucianism of Chang Tasi, who said: "Heaven may be said to be my Father, and earth may be said to be my Mother... All men are my brothers; all things are my kin. The ruler is the eldest son of my parents and the ministers are his stewards..." The figure of the Mother Goddess has been prominent in India since primitive times.
2. Changing. We are conceived, we develop as embryos, we are born, we grow as bodies, our bio-social selves emerge and grow, we pass from childhood to adolescence to maturity to senility; and we eventually die. So we are in continuous passage from one state to another.11 Our present differs from our past. It is spread apart from it. This passage through and into states of being we call time. Our becoming, our concrete growing nature, is compounded out of such states of being. To this extent we are not entirely and forever fixed, decided, or certain. It is in fact a linguistic error to say "We grow." For in the beginning there is no substantial "I," though the self is latent and genetic. Always the concrete "I" is the result of growth through exchange, an accumulation of experiences mnemonically bound together and unified by a genetic identity of form.12 More accurately we should say: "There occurs an x (changing) such that if it has the characteristic of (creative exchange) it also has the characteristic g (identity through time)."

In conflicts of men and nations, the facts of change, uncertainty, and probability—in reality, value, and knowledge—are ignored at men's peril. Every living person, every social system, is continuously changing, sometimes slowly, sometimes rapidly. Of course not all change is good. A young person who changes into a destructive delinquent ought to be checked in such a change. But the corrective is not to check all or most change in him but to direct his changing nature into constructive activities of exchange. To check his changing will result only in impoverishment of his capacities for good. For a capacity is a potential for action and hence for change. To this impoverishment he may react by apathetic acquiescence, indifferent detachment, or violent defiance—all of them healthy reactions to an unhealthful condition. Similarly, the imposition of a pattern of fixity upon the individuals in a social system or upon a society as a whole will arrest change and hence development. It will produce the resentful unrest that when physically expressed, results in revolution.

Hence it is that efforts to fix things and values in a changing human world, by the coercion of some final form, are doomed to tyranny, loss of value, tragedy, and death. Hence it is that efforts to absolutize some idea are doomed to blind and distort man's grasp of the world and his

11 Some philosophers who have taken change seriously and viewed it as a basic category include Heraclitus, Buddha, the Taoists ("Reversal is the movement of the Tao"), the Yang-Yin School, Chu Hsi (Ch'i), Zen masters, Bacon, the British empiricists, the French materialists, Marx, Nietzsche, existentialists, and process philosophers. So far as Brahmanism interpreted rebirth, the evolution of prakrti (maya), and the ceaseless play and alternation of the "day" and "night" of Brahman as genuinely real, it correctly grasped the ultimacy of change. Often change has been either subordinated to some more basic category (as in Plato, Aristotle, Philo, Plotinus, matter-spirit dualism, supernaturalism, absolute idealism, or mechanistic materialism) or interpreted as illusory (nondualistic Vedanta and idealism generally). An illuminating study of the relation of change to God is given in Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

action toward it.¹³ For the individual person is many, and lives in a
world of many. The unity each person achieves is an outcome of in-
teraction; his unity is successive and developmental, pursuing its own ex-
ploratory path. Hence the wisdom of Mencius, that the cultivation of
the Great Morale requires constant effort but no forcing of growth.¹⁴

Why is it that men attempt to impose upon themselves, others, and
whole social systems value patterns of fixity and certainty that are harm-
ful? (The pattern of armaments expenditures is an example.) Why do
men exalt one perspective and damn others? (Nationalism is an exam-
ple.) Unfulfilled and hence anxious about their existence, men seek an
apparent security in an ideal condition that lies opposite their own,
namely, fixity. If men possess the power to enforce a value pattern of
fixity on others, then their anxiety is deepened by their personal identifi-
cation with the pattern of oppression. If, on the other side, they are
oppressed, they will cling to that same pattern for reasons of security,
unless convinced that change is possible. So anxiety makes great dem-
ands on the system of oppression, particularly in the face of threats with
respect to the system.¹⁶ Thus in the conflicts of the great political powers
we may observe how the mutually aggravating anxieties of the leaders
increase rigidities in understanding and dealing with changes both at home
and abroad. But the basic fact of human life is that change continues
and that we must take and use change for advance—or decline and die.

The great novelists show the truth of sociology: how character is
wrought out of the interweaving of individual temperament and family,
other persons, modes of work, physical surroundings, customs and cul-
tural values. The bodies and processes of the world affect my body and
its processes. And as an internal part of my “I” my body in turn initi-
ates changes within that system of exchanges which I have with the
external world. Thus as the world changes me I change it as I internal-
ize it and as I externalize a response which forms a portion of the en-
vironments for the things in the world. This continuous commerce of things,
this mutual creation, constitutes the rhythm of the universe. Hence to
draw a sharp line between the “self” and the “non-self” is arbitrary.¹⁷

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¹³ What the Jains call “the fallacy of exclusive predication.” Satish Chandra Chatter-
jee and Dhirendra Mohan Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. 4th edition.
Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1950, p. 184. Cf. Whitehead’s “fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness.”

¹⁴ The Book of Mencius II.

¹⁵ One of the most profound analyses of this problem is that of Buddha.


¹⁷ The wisdom of the Upanisads and of the Lao-tzu is now evident in biology and
ecology. “The species may be looked upon as an organism with literal protoplasmic
continuity in the space-time of the physicist, through the continual union of
lines of germ cells....the evolution of such species is merely an aspect in the evol-
ving pattern of life as a whole and indeed of the world as a whole.” Sewall
Toronto; Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1959. For the suggestions of a meta-
galactic philosophy, see Harlow Shapley, Of Stars and Men. New York: Washing-
ton Square Press, 1959. No adequate philosophy can, ignore the problem of plan-
etary ecology—for purposes of man’s economy, his esthetic needs, his recreation,
and because we have an obligation to nature.
As reality is social, so is knowledge. The paradigm case of knowledge, which is science, shows the power of cooperative thought. Not only must knowledge be tested, refined, corroborated, and revised in the interaction of persons. It originates in that interaction.

...scientific ideas are usually born in a conversation, rather than in the mind of one man. The rigorous thinking needed to nurse a new-born idea into a useful hypothesis must almost always be done in private. But the fresh in sights, the new associations between previously unrelated phenomena, often come from the interplay of two or three minds clashing in conversation.18

The idea that knowledge can be spun out of the innards of the individual mind is untrue and pernicious. It afflicts many an expert and layman alike. It is the reflection of a static caste or class society, in which groups and individuals are divided off from one another and from the conditions of their common life. How can the philosopher learn the rough and multiple edges of reality when he retreats from the common people into his cloister? He might take a lesson from Gandhi, Mao Tse-tung, and all thoughtful leaders who have linked their efforts successfully to the common people. The live-and-let-live policy of laissez-faire economies—alternating with the most ruthless kind of coercion in recent years, exercised through oligopolic control of the mass media—has produced a sense of self-sufficiency (alongside a sense of impotence) that is stifling to development. Men proclaim that they are “masters of their fate” in “the free world.” The fact is that they more and more feel themselves as slaves and victims of fate. In the U. S. A., men shun debate on vital issues, are alternately polite and repressive, penalize spontaneity, unorthodox dissent, and freedom, and conspire to produce in one another a compliant timidity. Such an attitude is also cool toward international exchange (e.g., trade with China the U. N., negotiation of international differences). But it impairs the very process of human growth and improvement, the cross-fertilization of perspectives.

What has always been true of associated individuals has now become true of societies. Societies, now interacting with one another increasingly, depend on one another for maintenance and improvement. Imperialism, Colonialism, and the exploitation of one nation, class, race, or sex by another are fast disappearing. The advance of technology has been a great equalizer, for it has laid down avenues of exchange. The old insular attitudes resist the intercultural openness, the mutual respect for the rights of the individual person or society, required by a world economy built on exchange of material and spiritual goods and services. The critical problem is whether human attitudes can be transformed to support and guide the technological revolution now under way. Creative exchange is called for.

The fact that our lives are defined by change does not mean that we have no identity, knowledge, or value. The unity and direction of

18 Roger Revelle: Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations, Columbia University pp. 5-6
personality are developed in exchange—at first unconsciously, then deliberately. The ordering mechanisms that we inherit—the metabolic processes, the autonomic and central nervous systems and functioning, homeostatic mechanisms, perceptual Gestalten, and the unifying rhythms peculiar to the body’s somatotype—provide the aboriginal basis for an identical order persisting throughout changes and exchanges. To this degree the self is a priori and genetic, and the possibilities for all selves reside in part of the gene pool of the race. To this degree the self, as the Upaniṣads say, is “unborn.” To this degree, too, the first determinate act in the creation of the self is conception. And while every combination of genes is unique, the Kantian “necessary” and “universal” character of the a priori judgments of persons is grounded in this common genetic makeup of all men. But the mature unity of the psychosomatic self is an emergent, specifically and symbolically formed in experience. Thus culture, plus the gene pool of the race, provide the general and a priori potentials for selfhood. These are actualized only via some particular culture and some particular genetic combination carried in the individual body. The self that emerges is the function of these two factors; it is bio-social.

Further, we acquire knowledge, and as acquired it is always mediated, relative, and limited. It is relative to the individual’s sensitivities and responsiveness (his somatotype), to his character as a species member, to his acquired experiences and meanings, to his non-human circumstances, and to his culture. The relativity of knowledge does not bar its objectivity. Our relations of exchange with things and persons take place as objective processes. The procedures for controlling the subjective elements in such relations are essentially twofold: to observe the object

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20 All dna molecules in living organisms are, in current theory, presumed to be the same. But in detail they must be different, for, according to Schrödinger, no two subatomic events are identical: it is only the temporal structure of the events that gives them “identity.” (See: *Science and Humanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1951.) The differences of species are due to the arrangements of the levels of the helices, and the differences of the individuals within the human species are of course due to the reduction division in the germ cells, the random association of genes in a daughter cell, the random union of egg and sperm, and the breaking and crossing over of the homologous filaments of chromosomes. See H. J. Muller, “Gene,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Vol. 10. Chicago, London, Toronto: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1959.

21 The chance of a particular individual being born (figured just before conception) is 1/300,000,000 (the latter number being the number of sperms deposited in the female at any given time). The chance of a particular individual being duplicated has been estimated to be 1/70 million million. The chance of a person’s existence has been put at 1/5 millions of billions. (J. S. Bixler, *Immortality and the Present Mood*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931) Garrett Hardin modestly estimates that there are 10,000 possible gene combinations for living things. *Nature and Man’s Fate*. New York: The New American Library of Word Literature, 1961, p. 247. Serious contemplation of these figures should convince a man of just how lucky he is.

22 Human “posibility”—from posse, to be able, plus esse, to be—means a capacity inherent in what is. Only what is capable of further being. Possibility is not a Platonic “essence.” It is what a concrete thing will do in another context.

23 Aristotle and Chu Hsi are thus partially correct in attributing individuality to the physical body.
in question from different perspectives and to repeat such observations; and to integrate these with the observations of other persons. Subjective error is then corrected and corroborated by subject-object and subject-subject tests. Our relational knowledge, acquired in interaction with things and persons, is guided, checked, and revised by further relations, and by a consideration, comparison, and collation of data observed, communicated, and calculated. The social, relational character of knowledge is illustrated by such words as correct, corroborate, communicate, conscious, consensual, content, convince, conclude. Similarly, value is a contextual affair, a matter of effecting commerce with things, events, and persons so as to fulfill (or help fulfill) dispositions in a satisfying, unitary way. Again, value is consolidated or increased by certain processes of exchange with things and other persons.

When men do not communicate freely with those who differ, their opinions and values become rigidly non-adaptive. The secret of institutional creativity is an open channel of communication between leaders and led.24 But either because of caste or class interest, or routine, or lack of imagination, or sloth, leaders tend to become isolated from the perspectives of the led. That this can occur under socialism as well as feudalism and capitalism has been recently illustrated. Leaders tend to screen out of their awareness perspectives that clash with their own, resisting communication more and more. Thus does pride overtake individuals and bureaucracy destroys institutions. The cure is open exchanges between leaders and led. The same cure applies to the hardening effects of isolation an enmity among peoples, and among national leaders.

3. Unifying of differences.25 We are large and complex organisms. We have—each of us—some hundred million million cells.26 All the dna molecules in one human body if laid end to end would reach to the sun and beyond. Our body cells each contains twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, each of which contains or consists of many hundreds of genes; we probably have at least 10,000.27 Within this large and differentiated body, structures and processes oppose and balance one another: dominant and recessive genes; endomorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy; catabolic and anabolic forces; muscular activation and inhibition, afferent and efferent nerves; acid and alkali; positive and negative valences and charges; and so on. The mechanism of negative feedback, where the response counteracts the unbalancing effect of the stimulus, is an example of the process by which the conflict is maintained and controlled.

25 The metaphysics of "the unity of opposites" is well established (Brähmanism, Sāṅkhya, Taoism, Heraclitus, Plato, Stoicism, Nicholas of Cusa, Hegel, Schelling, Marx). It has been restated by Morris Cohen as the "Law of Polarity." For an application of the dioplar principle to God, see Hartshorne and Reese, op. cit.
27 Garrett Hardin, op. cit., p. 244.
through unifying processes.  

At the psychic level dispositions (energies formed and guided by symbols) the principle of unity of differences is evident: ego and alter, will and conscience, independence and dependence, expression and inhibition, unconscious and conscious, release and restraint, adventure and stability, emotion and intellect, individual differentiation and collective integration, construction and destruction, relativity and universality, means and ends, specificity and diffuseness, short-run interest and long-run interest.  

Man is a plurality, a mixture, a *tempera* of processes. His nature is not a homogeneous, necessary, completed, continuous, everlasting harmony of parts. Whatever harmony he has is generated in and among and between processes, real in their own right. And that harmony is pluralized, contingent, partial, broken, and sporadic. But while on the one hand the self of man is not uncompounded or unchanging, neither on the other hand is the self a mere aggregation of elements devoid of any internal unity among those elements. But man’s oneness is an emergent, unifying process in and among other processes, an *e pluribus unum*. For apart from such diverse parts there would we no unity. Such unity is called forth by the inescapable exchanges of diverse processes. Contrary to Kant, there is no transcendental unity of apperception prior to the act of synthesizing actual experiences. True, the possibility of synthesis and hence of an emergent self exists prior to the creation of the self. The possibility lies in the genetic structure and ordering mechanisms of the body to which we have already referred. But that possibility is conditioned and realized only as a certain kind of event stimulates the body, elicits certain responses, and in relations of exchange with the body issues in the emergent unification called personality. That emergence of unified personality is contingent is evidenced by (1) its impairment in mental illness and (2) its impairment or absence in the cases of defective bodies or bodies reared apart from all culture (feral children).

By decisive selection and integration the infant builds its self out of the materials (food, oxygen, qualities, relations, etc.) of its world. We never are removed from such exchange. As the *Gītā* says (in Chapter III), action is inescapable. I assimilate and change the world into that growing (or declining) unity that is my self. The others (things and persons) reciprocally do so. In this mutual creative assimilation things maintain their self-identity through time. This relation of mutually creative unity

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29 Cf. the Śāṅkhya guṇas, Plato’s tripartite soul in the *Republic*, and those views which hold that man is a unity of opposites (Brāhmaṇa, Tantra, Heraclitus, Taoism, Stoicism, Marxism, and Sheldon, *op. cit.*).

30 Uncompounded, static views of the self may be illustrated by Plato, *Phaedo*, Steph. 78 (but not altogether in the *Republic* or Symposium), and Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, VI.

31 For example, repression, isolation, and rationalization as means of coping with conflicting elements of experience.
persists so long as one participant does not exclude the other. Eventually, however, imbalance occurs, as a result of internal or external changes. The relation moves from differences-in-unity, to opposition, to partial or complete destruction of one or both of the things related. But the interaction of processes continues, and evolves new unities. "The unity of opposites is conditional, temporary, and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute." 32

4. Creating. To create is to bring forth a new unifying relation between elements otherwise separate or antagonistic to unification. It is to integrate diverse parts into a whole, in a way that preserves the parts, enhances the vivid diverseness of each part, and introduces new relations between the parts in virtue of which the preservation and enhancement take place. 33 (Destruction may occur in the process.) Examples of man's creative acts are: the mixing of chemical compounds and electrical discharges (as in the Urey-Miller experiments) to produce many of the amino acids, the building blocks of protein; the breeding of plants and animals to obtain new stocks; the invention of tools, machines, and machines to make machines, the formation of languages and mathematics (a word or a number is a powerful unifying instrument); the development of social institutions, like the family, agriculture, and industry; the organization of diverse and even antagonistic perspectives into an ordered whole, as in creative love, friendship, religious intuition, diplomacy, art, science, and synoptic philosophy.

The major instrument for man's creativity is his languages—his mother tongue, mathematics, esthetic symbols, religious symbols, etc. While every organism, as temporal process with negative feedback, has some capacity to predict or prepare itself for the future, man does so pre-eminently through the use of sign-systems which he produces and controls. (When signs are produced and communicated by men, they are here called "symbols.") A sign is a stimulus of future action. Such action may be checked or modified as other signs—perhaps self-produced—are introduced into behavior. Thus by means of his symbols man can foresee a plurality of possible actions and experiences in a short span of time. He can experience conflicting perspectives on a scale not possible to any other known creature. Further, this conflict is often inter-individual, for

33 Some philosopher have a theory as to the creation of the universe but do not deal with—or consider significant—the creativity within the universe. Deterministic philosophies (Augustine, orthodox Islam, Calvin, Spinoza, Edwards)—indeed all forms of classical supernatural theism and pan-theism—implicitly exclude the creativity of finite creatures. On the other side, some have taken creativity as a basic category: the Carvākās (consciousness and other qualities are emergents of atomic interaction); the Buddhists and Nyāya-Vaisesikas (the efforts do not pre-exist in the cause); Rāmānuja (māyā is God's creativity); the Confucianists (ho is an emergent harmony arising out of the proportioned reconciling of differences); Hsiang-Kuo (tu hua or "self-transformation"); Tantra; and modern philosophers, such as Ravaisson, Lequier, Renouvier, Marx, Peirce, James, Boutroux, Bergson, Whitehead, and Vasconcelos. See Hartshorne and Reese, op. cit., Ch. VII, "Modern Panentheism." S. Radhakrishnan is cited as an example of this position.
his use of symbols enables him to "take the role of the other" by interpreting the other person's symbols as that person does. But symbols, while engendering the problem of conflict, may also provide the solution. Symbolic systems are organizational and in principle provide a way of ordering particular symbolic processes in a unifying way. Moreover, where conflict of meanings is inter-individual destructive conflict can be fore-stalled. The way can be opened for creative conflict. As meanings are communicated, each party, internalizing the meanings guiding the behavior of the other, searches for ways of integrating his own symbolic meanings with the meanings of the other. In this way the two may evolve an inter-personal system of meanings that is new, that is common to both, that is systematically related to the personal systems of each, and that governs their inter-personal behavior. Because symbolic conflict is not overt conflict but only the signal or portent of overt, physical conflict, symbols are the primary means by which conflict can be rendered creative among men.

In the very process of his creative activity man realizes his true character. His reality is creative realization. Caught in the processes of exchange, change, uncertainty, and opposition, man's inchoate self struggles toward unification and identity. His creative activity, guided by symbols and consummated in his exchanges with things and persons, is the means by which he achieves that unification. For his symbolic power enables him to resolve his conflicts with others, to form ideals and plans of action for himself and others, to discover the conditions for fulfilling those ideals and plans, and to appraise his actions once they have been taken.

Symbolic power must first be power. The use of symbols presupposes a formative drive—a disposition to unify the variety of processes, qualities, and relations into which the incipient self is thrown. The history of the species of man has been contingent, long, arduous, and imperfect. It has evolved potent drives in the individual infant, drives directed toward the protective and creative care of others. The symbiotic instinctual sensitivities of infant, mother, and father have evolved together. Watch an infant perceiving things or learning to speak and to adjust its behavior to others. It persistently drives toward the formation of "we-experiences," endeavoring to shape its responses and actions in accordance with its yearning for a unitary relation with others. Buber is correct in speaking of "the

36 Mary Parker Follett, op. cit. The use of dialogue in philosophy (especially in Western and Indian philosophy) is illustrative of the creative use of symbolic exchange. O that statesmen might be philosophical in this way! Or that philosophers—like S. Radhakrishnan—might become statesmen!
a priori of relation.38 At this point the accumulated linguistic materials and skills of culture come to man’s aid. As his drive to relate himself creatively and securely to others intersects the linguistic responses of others, that drive becomes linguallized. His behavior becomes communicative, socialized, and humanized.

At this point too man’s career and destiny are defined. Symbols are projective. They refer to the absent, the distant, the yet-to-be. They are the mapping of man’s journey and territory as he moves en route. They presuppose a prior movement and disposition toward some destiny or des- tinies. But to seek a complete map of the future, or to suppose that man’s destiny is arrival at a particular destination—such are illusions. Man’s only destination as man is his fulfillment as man. This task is constituted by a ceaseless struggle toward the creation of a self in growing unity with other creative selves and with the world. The way of man’s fulfillment is not escape from the processes of his experience (asceticism; modern anomie) or submergence into them (mysticism; “adjustment” to society, tradition, or the state) or defiant conquest over them (the effort to be God). The way is creative transaction with those experiences.

Since we change and live in a field of changing forces, our knowledge must include knowledge of both relative permanencies and relative changes. When we grow a crop or bake a loaf of bread or catch a flying ball or converse with another person, we have knowledge of that other as we adjust our activity to its changes. We remember and predict. We infer. We take one sense datum to be a sign of another. In our exchange with this sequence of changes, we develop insight into its character and course of behavior. This insight is subject to correction by subsequent observation, experiment, and control. It is a hypothesis, a postulate to be tested. Such insights are creative syntheses of observations arising out of our exchanges. They are summaries of past tendencies and projections of future behavior. As insights into the course of a given change, they go beyond what is given to the senses: they integrate and extrapolate. In this sense they are creative.

As all knowledge is predictive, it imports planning. To survive in a world of change, man must respond to changes in the present in such a way as to anticipate future changes (induced by himself or another cause) and to adjust to them accordingly. This capacity to respond to the future is the seat of man’s responsibility. Because he can rehearse now possible responses in the future, man can control his future. He is free—free from the determination of uncontrolled events, and free for the creation of values, or disvalues. At the present stage of human history, individual planning does not suffice to solve men’s problems. For those problems

38 I and Thou. 2nd edition. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958, p. 27. Infants possess innate dispositions to respond to certain visual patterns and these may be elicited and developed with experience. Since these are adaptive, we may presume they evolved through natural selection. See Robert L. Frantz, “The Origin of Form Perception,” Scientific American, Vol. 204, No. 5 (May, 1961), pp. 66-72.
are social—national and international—in scope. Therefore large-scale, democratic planning is necessitated. Men must exercise their responsibility (freedom) collectively and creatively, if men are to be fulfilled.

5. Individualizing. The term "man" refers not only to the generic characteristics which any individual must possess in order to be called a man. It refers also to each and every actual individual who possesses these characteristics. Further, every man is not just a duplicate of a certain archetype of the pattern "man." Nor does he derive his humanity in virtue of "imitating" or "actualizing" some prior ideal form of humanity. Human individuals are real in their own right; they are not just appearances or copies. They are created. They emerge into being as unique, creative syntheses.

Individuality emerges when there is 1. control of behavior in relation to others and the world by means of a system of signs that is corrected by it self and by the systems of signs of enquiring persons; 2. the persistence and elaboration of this system of symbols from place to place and time; 3. the production of signs signifying relatively inclusive values (preferred personal states and contexts) taken as ideals or guides of conduct; and 4. the more or less successful pursuit of such values. The strong individual displays these activities consistently and effectively. The weak individual displays them sporadically and ineffectively.

Ordinarily, no person is preoccupied with becoming "human." Every one of us is confronted by particular need—drives, obstacle, conflicts, changes, uncertainties. We are driven to plan our day, to get along with others, to manage our affairs in an orderly way, to attain our goals or progress toward them, to find footholds of permanence in precarious situations, to become something worth-while, to discover enjoyment in participation, to attain some summit of significance. Such creative, unitary becoming is a highly particularized, individual task. The achievement of significance, order, and purpose is inseparable from the achievement of individuality. There is no significance, order, or purpose apart from the doings and undergoings of particular individuals as they individualize their experiences through creative acts.

Individualization is our human way of becoming social. We define our identities as we choose to relate ourselves to others. We may choose relations of dependence, dominance, or detachment. But in no case do we

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89 The sense of individuality, and of individuality as self-creative, has been throughout the history of philosophy, weak and sporadic until the modern period, when in fact the processes of the political, industrial, and scientific revolutions commenced to liberate the individual into an awareness of himself and his possibilities. Although at times they perceived the "equality" of individuals, the philosophies of India, China, the Greco-Roman world, and Western Europe did not fully grasp the dynamic, interactional character of the life of individuals. They tended to picture a preordained harmony between individuals and other individuals and the ultimate (God, nature, history). Their sense of possibility, of becoming, of progress, was hazy. Thus, in accordance with status-determined societies, we find dharma and Brahman, Te and Tao, yi and li, justice in the individual and justice in the state, the good and the right, man and God. At the other extreme, individualism in Western philosophy—Renaissance, Naturalism and humanism, English empiricism and analysis, American pragmatism, continental existentialism, and revived Japanese Zen—has tended to go to anarchic excesses.
escape social definition. The crucial measure of personality is how it relates it self to differences. A weak and thin personality is one who dissociates the differences and screens them out of consciousness. He pushes down opposition, challenge, and hence the possibility of growth and enrichment. The strong personality not only tolerates but actively searches for disorder, asymmetry, complexity, ambiguity, and tension. In a planetry community of precisely this kind, can we—leaders and laymen alike—muster the courage to be ourselves i.e., genuine individuals? Can we engage in vigorous, genuine interaction with other persons and societies, who possess diverse political, social, economic, and religious viewpoints? While this spells danger and risk, it also holds the promise of human enrichment. It is the only way to save the nations from the destruction of war and the individuals from the annihilation of anonymity.

SOLUTION: THE FULFILLMENT OF MAN’S NATURE

Once we are gripped by the conviction that all that we are and might be is here and now, as we are thrown forward with others in our efforts to live and live well—then all the philosophical problems begins to fall into place. Those problems become, in principle susceptible of clarification and resolution. For it is the practice, the practical values of man, that become ultimately determinative. Thus the generic reality of exchange does away with the erroneous idea of atomic individualism of the “self-made man, of superior races, classes, nations, and religions. And the superior social and political system becomes that which most effectively produces creative exchange among men and systems of men. The reality of change shows that the dream of absolute, unqualified permanence is the prejudice of the privileged or apprehensive mind, that we can and ought to change human nature (since its nature is to change), and that the enemies of human progress are special privilege, private habit intellectual inertia and institutional idolatry. The unifying of differences teaches us the necessity of dialectical thinking and action and the folly of segregations and dichotomies, in thought and practice. Truth and falsity, good and evil, growing and dying away, are always tendencies mixed and changing. And the man mindful of this changing mixture will seek through it to assimilate opposition and enrich human advance. He will seek to discriminate between his friends and his enemies. In either case he will realize that the reality of his self and his society is a dynamic order that must be wrested and won day by day from a situation where differences constantly contest. Creativity gives the lie to the doctrine that man is impotent, unconcerned, or incompetent to change his destiny. It opposes all forms of fatalism—religious, economic, social. Man creates himself and his world. Finally, the reality of individualizing is a rejection of the ideas that the personal soul entirely pre-exists and post-exists, that

the individual soul is a copy of a prototype; that the individual person "has infinite worth", and that the individual person counts for nothing.

Such static and pessimistic "myths" as are here opposed are reflections and perpetuations of the backward social orders in the world. They must be dissolved if the new order, dynamic and optimistic, in which man is to be fulfilled, is to come to pass.

The concrete problem of man, is how he can fulfill his nature, i. e., realize his potentialities as a human being. Man's nature is not a fully determinate from antecedent to his experience or a goal toward which experience moves but an emergent patterned behavior. Therefore the solution to the problem lies in finding ways to release and maximize this kind of behavior. Man's fulfillment is a way in which the person enters into creative exchange with other persons, thinks, and events, so as to vivify and enrich individuality and at the same time unify his differences with other persons.

42 This is not a tautology, because some will say that the problem of man is how to nullify or escape from his nature.
ETHICS
AND EXISTENCE:
A Kierkegaardian Theme

Soren Kierkegaard (hereafter SK) led the way to modern existential philosophy by his acute analysis of human existence. That his stages on life's way culminated in an "irrational" and paradoxical interpretation of Christianity is now a commonplace. Much has been said already about this final movement of his stages, but the ethical stage has been commented on to a considerably lesser extent. However, the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of his ethical philosophy are legion. Some of the more common criticisms have been noticed in an article to be published in the Papers of the XIII International Congress of Philosophy. But our purpose here is to analyze the central problem of the ethical stage: does it exist at all?

This question may seem unnecessary yet it is obviously the basic question. Certainly one cannot say what X is unless actually X is. George Brandes put his finger on the difficulty:

There are, he maintains, three stages of existence; the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. By the aesthetic he understands that in a man whereby he immediately is what he is; by the ethical that by which he becomes what he becomes; by the religious the thorough transformation of existence (by renunciation, suffering, faith) with the object of winning an eternal salvation. As one may see, the moral is merely a transition stage, and the whole of morality approaches its climax in repentance, which brings the transition to the religious. ...If Kierkegaard were really to hold the three spheres of existence separated from each other, even simply for the understanding, then
the moral sphere would have to be strictly distinguished from the
religious, and ultimately from the Christian or paradoxical.¹

Thus according to Brandes, there is actually no independent ethical
stage in SK’s writings. Brandes is, of course, speaking of ethics in the
sense of a secular, rational and humanistic discipline. If an ethical phi-
losophy “approaches its climax in repentance,” it is then obviously not sec-
cular or rational or humanistic. This question of an independent ethical
stage will occupy the center of our research.

An analysis of select texts from Fear and Trembling will be used to
ascertain exactly how SK conceived of ethics to determine whether or
not the ethical stage has a separate existence. The contradiction be-
 tween this and the above statement about X is more apparent than real.
We can determine if X is only by looking for something we can distin-
guish from W and Y. Nothing is added to the concept of X if we say
X actually is or is not, at least according to the usual view. What then
are the characteristics of X or the ethical as SK preferred to call it?

In Fear and Trembling the ethical is delineated by several characteris-
tics which have obvious Kantian and Hegelian overtones. The first two
characteristics of the ethical are stated in Kantian terms and explained
in Hegelian terms.

The first characteristic is that the ethical is the universal, that is, it
applies to everyone at every moment.² As is well known Kant employed
the notion of universalizability as the fundamental characteristic of the
moral law. All five formulations of the categorical imperative in the
Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals employ this notion.³ Kant con-
ceives of the reason not only as pure but also as practical. The individual
can will according to the dictates of reason or can be subordinate
to the inclinations. Reason is an instrument employed to discipline the
inclinations in order to create a rational and a good will. Kant’s philos-
ophy is made dramatic and is laden with tension by this conflict within
the person. The reason creates a will that will act according to the prin-
ciple of the universal. The drama, tension and individuality inherent in
Kant’s position is relevant to SK’s view of the structure of personality.

On the other hand, Hegel thought that universality could be expressed
best in the ethical and social context by following not so much the indi-
vidualistic and rational discipline of reason as by conforming to the
mores and institutional structure of one’s own social context. Acting ac-
 cording to the universal in Hegel is less a matter of reason’s dominance
of inclination and more a matter of one’s recognition that the social structure
is essentially rational and that the way of virtue would be to seek or
accept one’s place in it. Hegel’s criticisms of individualism in the second

¹ Brandes, Georg, Samlede Skrifter, II p. 347. Cited by Hugo Thompson, Ethics and
Religion in the Philosophy of Kierkegaard. Ph. D. thesis (Yale University, 1935),
p. 129.
² Kierkegaard, Soren, Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, 1941)p 79
³ Kant, Immanuel, Grundlagen Zur Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. Paul Menzer (Berlin,

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part of his *Philosophy of Right* and his ascription of supreme rights to the social order in the third part of the same book indeed leave little room for Kant's or Kierkegaard's view of the individual however different the views of the last two are.⁴

Further, Hegel's and Kant's views of the universal deny implicitly and explicitly any untoward circumstance which would place the individual in a position incommensurable with the universal whether defined by Kant or Hegel.

Kierkegaard's views of the universal are very complex. The objects of his polemic are both Kant and Hegel. Whatever is said of SK's ultimate view of ethics and the existence of the ethical stage, it is clear that the primary characteristic of ethics for SK is universalizability.

In the same place that he develops the notion of ethics as the universal, SK mentions a second characteristic of the ethical. He says that ethics, or the ethical, is an end in itself. The famous argument of Kant lies at the background of SK's exposition. Kant said that actions must not only be done in accord with duty to have moral worth. An action is not justifiable in terms of its consequences but is justifiable or unjustifiable solely in terms of the maxim which prompted it. Respect for the moral law is the sole definition of duty.⁵ Kant asserts that the will should not be dominated by instinct, inclinations, considerations of one's own personal happiness and concern for foreseen or unforeseen circumstances. Any of these heteronomous concerns introduce distractions and discord into ethical theory and moral practice which are ideally at least autonomous ⁶

Hegel, no less than Kant, conceived of ethics as autonomous and also as an end in itself in relation to religion which is the crucial issue for SK. Precise texts are difficult to locate, but his development of "Spirit" and his treatment of the relation of church and state in the *Philosophy of Right* indicate his position.

In the notion of Spirit, Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit and Absolute Spirit complement each other. These three aspects must not be considered simply as parts as one divides a pie into three parts. They are each Spirit and each repeats the same fundamental moves from immediacy to abstraction (or formalism) and finally to concretion. The last aspect, the concrete, assumes within itself the fundamental factors of all preceding stages harmonizing them into a coherent whole with all contradictions overcome.

Further, these three aspects of Spirit are not to be understood as exclusive of each other. Just as the pattern of movement or structure mentioned above is relevant to each of the aspects, so the three aspects themselves complement each other. Man is not just merely "free mind" at one time and at another time a member of a state and at another a thinking

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⁵ Kant, *op. cit.*, pp. 397-400.
philosopher (using the final phase of the three aspects of spirit), but he is at one and the same time all three. These aspects of Spirit coalesce in the individual.

Having characterized the doctrine of Idea as in and for itself, let us return to the problem at hand: the analysis of ethics as an end in itself. Considered as an aspect of Spirit itself, ethics or more generally the philosophy of right is autonomous with respect to religion for two reasons. The first is that right and religion belong to different aspects of Spirit. The second reason is that religion in Absolute Spirit being immediate presentation is of a different epistemological order from ethics which is at the of reason in Objective Spirit. Thus for Hegel, one would no more learn social theory from a religious institution than one would learn personal virtue from the example of a saint. Both the religious institution and the saint are immediate in relation to the state and civil society. The completely mediated position, the state and civil society, stand as judge over all previous states. Actually then for Hegel, the ethical is not only autonomous with respect to religion, but it is also judge. The whole notion of Spirit in Hegel indicates for religion a place subordinate to rational ethics.

This subordination of religion to ethics so characteristic of the idea of Spirit in Hegel finds its application to social structure in the Philosophy of Right after some vacillation on the point. The ambiguity in Hegel is caused, as usual, by his trying to be all things to all men. Hegel considers religion as both means and end. As an end religion is the condition in which state, laws, and duties find their corroboration, justification and verification. This sounds orthodox enough. Yet, religion is also a means. Religion is first "a means to education and (a higher) mentality." Social usefulness is the means whereby one decides the truth of religion. True religion upholds the state and this is the second function of religion in the state. False religion will assert itself against the state, but the process of reason combined with prodigious effort has changed government from submission to authoritarian religion into a reasonable structure of law and government.7

We can conclude then that on two counts Hegel has expressed himself to the effect that religion is subordinate to ethics and that in human relations religion is judged by ethical and social concerns and not vice versa. Kant is in explicit agreement because of his views of the autonomous nature of the moral law. SK has these very central notions of Kant and Hegel in view when he asserts that the ethical is an end in itself. This characteristic of the ethical is one of the principal factors of his conception of ethics and is the object of his polemic.

The second problem raised by SK in Fear and Trembling is "Is there an absolute duty toward God?"8 Here SK interprets the two notions

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7 Hegel, op. cit., paragraph 270.
8 Kierkegaard, op. cit., pp. 102ff.
developed above—ethics as the universal and ethics as an end in itselt—to show how these militate against any notion of transcendent duties. Duty is defined by Kant and Hegel in the sphere of the immanent or in terms of the neighbor. We note that Kant rejected the traditional divisions of duties into those toward God, others and self by retaining only the last two. We look in vain in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of Religion for some note about duty to God. These considerations are not conclusive since they are only arguments from silence.

SK himself approaches the problem in a purely logical fashion. He suggests that if the interpretation of ethics as offered by Kant and Hegel be true, then the ethical is the divine and man’s whole existence is rounded off within this ethical. Ethics becomes a mere substitute for God and God becomes a mere vanishing point in ethics. In loving our neighbor according to the commands of duty we come into relation with our neighbor and with God. All duties to God are such only by being first of all duties to man.

SK, of course, explicitly rejects such an interpretation. His rejection rests on the notion of tautology which he developed in his earlier work after reading and reflecting on a controversy over this principle in Danish philosophy in the 1830’s. Without summarizing that dispute or the thought of SK on tautology here, it is apparent that the theological defenders of Kant’s and Hegel’s ethics are using two sentences as meaning the same thing. (A) I come into relation with God by loving my neighbor according to the commands of duty. (B) I come into relation with my neighbor by loving my neighbor according to the commands of duty. SK’s point is that if one accepts the notions of ethics enunciated by Kant and Hegel in a theological context, then these two sentences must have the same meaning, or be tautologous. If we read the sentences more logically they mean: (C) I come into relation with God and no other by loving my neighbor and no other according to the command of duty. (D) I come into relation with my neighbor and no other by loving my neighbor according to the commands of duty. Adopting C and D as a logical translation of A and B respectively we find that C is obviously false while A was not. The error in A was caused by mixing categories or by a leap into another classification, to use an old Aristotelian term. B and D have the same logical force, and therefore D is a logical translation of B. After this analysis SK’s point is clear, for God certainly becomes a vanishing point in the ethics of German idealism. The absence of God or any other type of transcendence is taken by SK to be the third important criteria of modern ethics.

A fourth criteria of modern ethics mentioned by SK is the elimination of private language from ethics. SK attacks this characterization by developing Hegel’s notion of “the inner” and “the outer” though he could have as easily reapplied the notion of universalizability to the

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9 Kuhr, Victor, Modsigelens Grundsaetning (Kjobenhavn og Kristiania, 1915)pp.5-41.
10 Kierkegaard, op. cit., pp. 163-104.
problem of language. There are apparently two applications of this last criteria. The first application suggests the comparison of "the inner" to faith and "the outer" to reason, or ethics or the universal. Following this line of thought Hegel, of course, assigned faith its position as immediacy.\(^{11}\) SK agrees that faith is an immediacy but it is a new immediacy utterly unlike Hegel's for it is itself a product of a process of mediation. Faith in *Fear and Trembling* is the result of a movement that has familiar overtones. Faith emerges only on the basis of the incommensurable (Hegel's negative) and only after the rejection of ordinary morality (thesis) in favor of a more absolute obligation (antithesis) which is chosen (as opposed to Hegel's mediation) freely (as opposed to Hegel's loose sense of dialectical necessity). The exception to morality or universality which can be required by faith is not a reversion to romantic immediacy, but is rather an intensification of immediacy to an infinite degree involving a completely intellectual recognition of the rights of the ethical which must be rejected in favor of responsible singularity, paradox, risk, and the possibility of the demonic. Faith as here characterized is immediate for through it one comes into absolute relationship with the Absolute. But this immediacy certainly is not the same faith that Hegel is talking about as immediacy.

The second interpretation of "the inner" and "the outer" as SK treats this familiar though confusing notion of Hegel is in the third problem of *Fear and Trembling*: Was Abraham ethically defensible in keeping silent about his purpose before Sarah, Eleazar and Isaac?\(^{12}\) It will be recalled that Kant wrote an essay called "On the supposed right to lie from altruistic motives." By this point in the exposition, one suspects that the answer to SK's problem given by ethics will be about the same as Kant's answer to his problem.

SK's approach, however, to his problem is utterly unlike Kant's. Kant approaches the problem of altruistic lying by means of rational arguments which, though, often difficult, are understandable. Abraham, SK's example, cannot utter a sentence that would be comprehensible in the context of ethics from which all religious content had vanished and the sense of God as lawgiver had evaporated. Again it appears that there is no sense or meaning to a "religious" duty so far as German idealism is concerned.

In conclusion, the ethical stage in the philosophy of SK can be conceived as having four characteristics. These are (1) universalizability (2) ethics as an end in itself (3) ethics as immanent (4) ethics characterized by public language. Certainly the ethical stage is conceptually possible. But on the other hand to return to Brandes question, does the ethical stage exist?


\(^{12}\) Kierkegaard, *op. cit.*, pp. 124ff.
In answer to this question, it is obvious that the ethical stage does not exist as acorns exist, for the latter are observable. Neither does it exist as Plato’s idea of justice, for Plato insisted on the real existence of his ideas and would not settle for mere conceptual existence. Neither can the ethical stage exist as Anselm’s God is supposed to exist, for existence is not a predicate. The problem is not how the ethical stage exists, but how can we enunciate the problem of its existence? The question of the existence of a separate ethical stage raised by Brandes is misleading. The question is not about the existence of an ethical stage, but rather, how can one exist ethically?

To elucidate this distinction, SK offered a criticism of some types of conceptual structures in his slogan against intellectual abstractions; A logical system is possible; an existential system is impossible. Conceptually, an ethical system or stage is possible, but existentially its existence is impossible. Perhaps SK’s point could by expressed by saying that systems are but do not exist. The only thing that exists is the individual in his singularity. The vital question is whether the individual can exist ethically.

What does it mean to exist ethically? It means to exist rationally by making one’s criteria of ethical decision the universal, to be freely subject to ethics as an end in itself and not be subject to any passion or desire and to be able to give good reasons for your action to any man. This is what it means to live ethically but can one actually do so?

To answer this question we must refer to a notion that moves in and out of Fear and Trembling. This notion is that of “the incommensurable” and represents that which cannot be explained in terms of the ethical. It is similar to Hegel’s negative but since the incommensurable negates the ethical, it is a far more radical negation than Hegel’s. But what can negate the ethical?

SK’s answers to this question are as simple as they are profound. The first and fundamental thing incommensurable with the ethical is God’s command. This is the major subject of Fear and Trembling. This argument against the inclusiveness of the ethical view seeks only to show one case, the case of Abraham, which by being an exception to moral philosophy refutes the latter’s claim to universal validity. Abraham’s case is incommensurable with Kantian and Hegelian ethics—therefore, one living under God’s command may or may not be living ethically.

A second answer to the question “what can negate the ethical” is given in The Concept of Dread. The very ideality of ethics condemns every man who takes the task of ethics seriously to disappointment and failure. Ethics by suggesting that it is a task for every man, i.e. is universal, condemns every man who fails in his ethical tasks to despair and dread. Ethics commands but it does not furnish the power to accomplish

what it commands. This failure brings a man to repentance but repentance being the result of moral failure finds neither forgiveness nor meaning from ethics. Ethics cannot forgive; it can only command. Forgiveness for moral failure and relief from dread and despair must have a different source from ethics. In conclusion, we have argued that the ethical stage in SK's philosophy is definable in terms derived from Kant and Hegel, that the ethical stage conceptually is but that it never exists concretely. Ethics is confuted by the exceptional and by moral failure. An ethical system can conceptually be, but existence negates it in favor of another view which is inclusive enough to contain the exceptional and to forgive moral failure.
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AN ARCHETYPE FOR A WORLD PHILOSOPHY

"It will be one of the major tasks of the Philosophy Division of UNESCO to stimulate, in conjunction with the natural and the social scientists, the quest for a restatement of morality that shall be in harmony with modern knowledge and adapted to the fresh functions imposed on ethics by the world today."

"......UNESCO's philosophy will therefore have to be a type of world-wide humanism......a universal scientific humanism, inspired by evolution and unifying the various aspects of human life."


1. THE SOURCES OF PROGRESS

In man's long history, two currents are intertwined like the serpents of the caduceus: one is the current of fear that expresses itself in the principle of religious and political authoritarianism that works to prevent change, while the other is the current of freedom-seeking impulses powered by the desire for the truth that makes man free.

The great crises in history have been those in which societies of men free from fear have struggled against attempts at tyranny by men who rule by fear. Fear of the forces of nature, fear of change, fear of failure, are only a few of the overpowering fears that prevent men, as individuals or as groups, from moving out of stagnant worlds into adventure and the life more abundant. Evasion, escapism, expediency, all devitalize those who should be seeking new roads to freedom.

The greatest of all freedoms is freedom from fear. When men have attained freedom from fear, the other freedoms will follow in the wake of the great freedom. This begins with individuals and becomes a group characteristic. Throughout all our history, the freedoms we have gained,
the new levels of social organization we have attained, have been due to those individuals who have had the courage to be free.

We should never forget that it requires more than ordinary valor to accept the implications of freedom. There are many writers and teachers living in our world today who have not this courage and who achieve their celebrity by evading the issues of freedom, taking refuge in the fear-raid shelters of outworn formulas. Recognizing this possibility, our greatest teachers of all ages—men like Socrates, Jesus, Buddha, Confucious and others—have stressed the need of moral strength as a background for those who would be free. Instinctive man fears the unknown, wherever he comes upon it, and it is only the strength of a higher nature that endows man with the courage to explore the unknown; especially is this true when the unknown is within himself, when it is the mystery of his own being that he seeks to solve.

It is this element of fear that is largely responsible for what one writer calls a "tradition of misery." Man's unhappiness, degradation, frustration have been accepted as inevitable, an essential part of human existence. Only rarely has an original thinker rebelled against the tradition and set out to achieve reforms which would in some way ameliorate some of the misery. This tradition of misery, until recently at any rate, had the support of our religions. In this oriental world human life was regarded as the greatest of evils, something from which to escape by the most severe disciplines. And in the west, as we know, man became a miserable worm. Original sin and the utter unworthiness of the human person were the heritage of us all.

How and when did we establish this tradition of misery? Why has the sense of misery—forlornness as the French existentialists term it—become so universally prevalent in human life, in all ages and on all continents?

The answer, we believe, is that the sense of misery and sin grows out of the frustration of human evolution, the presence, always, of a "stop man" movement. There is no human condition so powerfully charged with misery as the state of futility which comes with frustration. The hopelessness that submerges the individual in a state of futility is the cause of much of our widespread psychological sickness and insanity. Futility is the mood that seizes the person who cannot cope with the circumstances of life. In the worst cases suicide or insanity is the nearest door of escape.

And what is futility? It is the polar opposite of creativity. It is the sense of impotence, of the complete incapacity to mold the circumstances of life to the pattern devised by the individual out of the materials of his environment. It is an admission of impotence, of inability to create. It is the inhibition of the most powerful single impulse to create. Man is not by nature a passive agent in the world into which he is born. The normal child looks out upon the world as something he can model to
meet his demands. Unfortunately, children have that instinct curbed by the time they learn to walk, and they soon discover that others have been here before them and have modeled a world into which they expect the child to fit. It is a rare person who preserves sufficient vestiges of creativity through childhood and adolescence to be able upon maturity to set out with hope and faith to create his little fragment of the world into some semblance of his inner vision.

II. TRIUMPH OVER FRUSTRATION

Futility is rooted in fear; creativity is rooted in hope. Every act of creation, no matter how small or how great, begins in the hope of producing something better than existed before. Faith, hope, and creativity are the factors in human social evolution; fear, hopelessness, and futility are the earmarks of obstructed evolutionary trend in man’s progress.

There have always been elements in society, ever since man created a tribal society, that deliberately obstructed the evolutionary trend in humanity and created the sense of futility in order to rule through fear. Men condemned to futility are men full of fear and therefore weak. In such a state, mental and social, humans can be ruled by those who play upon weakness. In our modern mechanized society, the effects of poverty have been to create a sense of futility on the part large masses of people. Labor leaders know better than anyone else the great difficulty that arises in rousing men and women suffering from this sense of futility to the point of participating in the creative work of changing the conditions under which they live. For that reason labor has had to resort to enormous educational schemes and cultural programs to break down the inertia that paralyzes the factory worker and the slum dweller.

The task of creating personal qualities, skills, codes of values, objectives and disciplines, by means of which the good life can be designed and constructed, has become the task of education. In a general way liberal education has been far more loyal to the concept of the evolutionary spirit in man than have been the religions of the world. Modern education, at any rate, has never subscribed to the concept of man as a miserable sinner, but has upheld the idea of man as an evolutionary being capable of tremendous growth. This type of education—progressive education—has developed into one of the great buttresses of modern democracy.

The fact is that authoritarian religion has failed to keep alive the creative spirit in man. It has substituted for the creative attitude toward life here and now the soporific vision of a sort of Cosmic Santa Claus who will some day give humanity the perfect world, the “City of God,” all ready to move into, but in a world beyond death; and the passport to that dream world is the grateful acceptance of sufficient misery in this world to guarantee admission to the Heaven in which all who get there will be eternally idle Peter Pans.
The symbols of this religious misconception are the states of Heaven and Hell. Hell is the eternal pit of Futility, where men are frustrated, tormented, condemned to endless life in a condition of hopelessness. Heaven, on the other hand, is the state into which the soul passes after death wherein it can create whatever it desires merely by an effort of the imagination. Heaven is the state of illusion in which man’s frustrations are removed and without effort he creates everything he desires, just as he desires it.

Heaven and Hell are poor substitutes for the school of this world in which the human individual learns his strength and courage, his visions and skills, by actual creative effort, taking his failures with his successes, and manifesting in the flesh, by the potencies of head and heart and hand, the divinity which endows man with the cosmic energy of evolution and with insights into future paths of progress.

The scientific humanist holds that the greatest need of our world today is a creative morality which will free men from fear and frustration. Aside from sheer laziness, fear of change, and the restraints of vested interests in business and politics, the greatest obstacle to human progress is the illusion engendered in people who “go to church” and then come away filled with the comforting certitude that because they “have religion,” they are moral individuals.

By instilling a kind of negative morality—for example, obedience to the Ten Commandments—traditional religions have discouraged men from thinking creatively about social issues. Puritanism in morals, “legions of decency,” and the like, have made it difficult to think about such fundamental questions as the proper biological and social relations between the sexes. Prohibitions and censorship and repressions—these have been the substance of a negative code of morality. Orthodox religions and established churches and temples have stifled man’s urges toward a rebuilt world. But morality at its best is positive; it is creative; it consists in doing, not in being. “Spirituality” in the negative sense says, “be good sweet maid and let those who will be wise”; but creative morality asks, “how in the world can the sweet maid be good if she isn’t wise!”

III. ETHICS VERSUS AUTHORITARIAN RELIGION

A scientific humanism rests its argument on the fundamental proposition that reason (human intelligence) is the only tool, and imaginative synthesis the only method, for building up the bodies of knowledge we need for finding solutions to our problems. This view, therefore is openly and decisively opposed to the following conceptions: (a) the theological doctrine of the verbal inspiration of religious literature (the scriptures); (b) the belief in revelation, intuition, or any other non-rational method of validating beliefs: and (c) the idea that any institutional authority, or tradition, or person has the right to tell people what to think. We can only set up a democratic method—scientific method and imagi-
nation—and then ask human beings to arrive at whatever conclusions they will arrive at.

Such an approach has several consequences for morality or ethics. In the first place, this means that the science of ethics must be freed from its traditional theological background, so that moral problems can be considered without reference to such debatable matters as the existence of God, immortality of the soul, heaven and hell, and so forth. "Sin" as violation of the "laws of God" has no place in ethics as a secular, social science concerned with right human relations in this world. A corollary of this is that no institution which incorporates such beliefs in its dogma or creed has any moral right to prescribe what attitude human beings shall take toward such social questions as planned parenthood, child labor, military service, censorship, prohibitions, and the like.

In the second place, this statement of scientific humanism condemns any society which makes impossible the free discussion of all issues. In its program of social reform humanism favors a democratic government which progressively refashions itself through the legislative procedures of representative government.

A common criticism of such a secular or non-religious system of ethics is that it won’t work because it lacks the "dynamic" of religious motivation. Furthermore, it will be argued, you have here no basis for moral obligation, because only God can provide the source and sanction of moral principles. Let us consider this argument.

IV. THE STARTING POINT FOR ETHICS

What should be the starting point for ethics? Shall we start with religion as the basis? We have already indicated the answer we give to this question. When you start with religion, you must start with some particular religion. But what religion should be honored in this manner? In a cosmopolitan community—a university, for example—we have members of all kinds of religious groups: Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Hindus, Moslems, and so on. Would the representatives of these respective religions agree to start with the teachings of some religion other than their own as the basis for morality? There is reason to doubt it!

Does this approach completely rule out religion? From the present point of view, authoritarian religions and the institutions through which they function are as conservative as they are powerful. The average person gets his ideas of right and wrong from two sources: (a) from the folkways, customs, and codified laws of his society, a knowledge of which is passed on from one generation to the next through the media of secular education, and (b) from religions instruction in the church and the home. Up to now, religion and secular morals, however they may be divorced in theory through the "separation of church and the state," are in actual fact closely related. The time has come to sever this alliance in fact as well as in theory.
It will be noted that in the present view God is not posited as the basis of authority for man's moral obligations. If one asks, "why should I be good?" and the answer is given, "Because God commands it!" one may well raise the question: "Who knows what God commands?" Thus we rule out dictatorship from the field of morals. There must be a naturalistic-democratic basis for morality. Morality needs no supernaturalistic sanctions. It is not heaven-sent; it is man-evolved. In the coming planetary civilization of a world-embracing humanism those religions that obstruct social advance must be declared obsolete.

This means that as time goes on ethics must increasingly be taken out of the field of tradition, authority, and revelation, and put more and more into the field of human intelligence. Today we are moving toward a planetary civilization for which a universal ethics must be evolved. In the past morality has been a matter of latitude, longitude, and even altitude; but in the future we shall need to establish relationships through techniques of international living expressing universal values. Fragmentation in society must give way to integration.

It is true that some of the selfish people in this world today are asking, "Why should I cooperate, why sacrifice myself, why 'behave myself,' if the opposite is easier and more profitable to me?" One may reply to this, even on the level of fact and not in terms of ethical principles, that the highest human satisfactions come from the cooperative quest for a better society, and that human mutual aid, which seems to be the basis for the moral sentiment, really pays in terms of self-interest. But in terms of principles it can only be said that the possibility of any kind of society ultimately depends upon "fair play" or "good sportsmanship." If you are willing to accept the benefits of social life, and voluntarily live in a community of fellow human beings, you accept an obligation to recognize the rights and interests of others in that community. In a democratic society "every right implies a corresponding duty"—that is the only basis for ethics. Some have asserted that we have stressed too much the "rights" of the individual—the "right" of labor to strike, the "right" of the farmer to subsidies, the "right" of free speech, and so forth—and have not emphasized sufficiently the "duties" of all of us in society.

The earlier theory of the basis of moral obligation, known as the social contract theory, is no longer accepted by scholars, but I think there is a kernel of ethical truth in it: we ought to act as if society had originated in a contract. In any case, we are born into a society, simple or complex, and the socializing and moralizing process begins with the smaller units and progressively extends to the more inclusive. Historically and genetically we humans have been socialized from the family through the tribe, the city-state, the nation-state, to the coming world community. Psychologically one merges one's self with humanity through the immediate community; therefore a world federation of friendly cultures is merely the globalized projection of the smaller circle of good will.
It is not possible here to analyze fully all the problems involved in the development of an evolutionary or scientific humanism. Suffice it to say that every complete system of ethics implies at least two things: (a) a theory of the nature of the human organism—a theory of man, in short—and (b) a theory of social progress—a theory of the better society we desire to create. Let us now examine how a scientific humanism may deal with these problems.

V. THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM

An evolutionary humanism takes its point of departure from the fact of an evolving organism in a changing society. These two complex variables provide us with the twin objectives of:

(1) creative self-evolution—subjective planning:
(2) progressive social evolution—objective planning.

These two types of planning are complementary—when one studies them, it is almost as if one were seeing double. The first, subjective planning, must be guided by some conception of archetypal man. The existentialists tell us that existence precedes essence—meaning that in this case there is no antecedent essence or type that provides the eternal pattern for what man is. For an evolutionist, to be human is to use man’s intelligence for the purpose of rising above what man has been and still is. This, for us, means that man is “on his own” and must next form an image of himself—the model of a reality to be created. Man’s vision of himself is the only archetype for what man will develop into. That is what we mean by “subjective planning.”

On the political-economic side, objective planning will provide the social model of reality—the image of what the more perfect society will be. Such a theory obviously emphasizes man’s freedom and self-evolution. It cannot be harmonized with the older materialistic and behavioristic theories of personality. But this is no surprise, for new biological and psychological theories (especially field theories) call for such departures. Let us therefore glance at the implications of the older materialisms in terms of consequences for psychological and social theories.

SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM:
FROM ATOMS TO MEN

The 19th century was an era of atomism. Every atom of matter and every particle of the social system was an individual and absolute entity. The physical atom and the social atom were the indivisible particles of our thinking then. In social theory the 19th century glorified the individual—the successful individual. Like the ultimate particle of physics, every man was a self-existent atom of society. Professor F. S. C. Northrop attributes this idea to the influence of John Locke’s philosophy; but the
writer has tried to show that it is the consequence of Greek logic and metaphysics.

When science discovered that the atom is not self-existent, not an ultimate particle, but an organism dependent upon a field of space-time for its character and functions, the scientific and philosophical basis for atomic absoluteness and privacy was dissolved. Now, in the same way but on a higher level, we have come to realize that man is not an ultimate particle of society, that he does not create de novo the values he enjoys, but in part owes his nature and his values to his relationships—to his fellow men as well as to the outer nature which is the vast cosmic continuum in which humanity lives and moves and has its being.

Scientific humanism has no use for either a mechanistic science or a supernaturalistic religion. Analysis and dualism belong to the older order of thought: synthesis and correlativity to the new order of thought which finds a place in nature for spirit (guiding fields), and in spirit for matter (particles). Science no longer finds the dualism of “mind” and “body” tenable: philosophy no longer requires the dualism of “matter” and “spirit.” Body and mind are two poles of one organism; matter and spirit the two poles of one universe.

This progress in knowledge owes nothing to orthodox religion. If men turn to science today rather than to traditional religions for guidance, for the symbols of hope and contemplation, it is because they feel that in science, not in institutionalized religion, are the springs of new truth. Science has been abundantly productive of fresh, upsurging ideas, theories, applied methods, and promises of a richer life. Science, in a word, is capable of continuous inspiration. In the last century, which has been one of uninterrupted inspiration in science, institutionalized religion has been static and inert. Authoritarian religion has no seers to offset the scientific knowledge of the mechanism of the material world with any dynamic proof of the intelligible nature of the universe. Religion stood aside, adapting itself as best it could to scientific knowledge until the sciences contradicted their own materialism by penetrating through matter and moving into a hitherto unknown world of field plenum dynamics.

It is not the religious institutions that we have to thank for the restoration of man from the status of a machine to the status of a self-directing being. It is science, in the pursuit of truth, that has instituted its own revolution of liberation. Scientific materialism bequeathed to us the machine, which is the keynote of our new civilization. But while technology instituted the ideal of the machine and while men bowed to the religion of mechanism, the machine was the master of man. Fascism is the apotheosis of social mechanism, just as authoritarian religion worships the idols of theological domination. Fascism—theological and social—is passing with the disintegration of authoritarianism. Man is the master, and the machine is his tool—that is the faith of a scientific humanism.
DEMOCRACY THROUGH SELF-CULTIVATION
AND SOCIAL PLANNING

Scientific humanism regards the universe as still in process of creation and man as an evolving creature only part way along the road to some as yet undetermined goal, and man's present phase of development as an aspect of the emergence of new psychological faculties with accompanying changes in biological and social adjustments. To escape the influences of an ancient and dreary materialism, we must create a new vision of the possibilities of man and fire the imagination of multitudes into the conviction that the future of man must be created by man. Once man thinks for himself, his future is in his own hands.

Just as self-cultivation is the key to man's personal problems, so social planning is the key to man's social destiny. On the one hand, we must produce the economy of abundance which is made possible by our resources and technology, and on the other we must design a creative and personal way of life within that social structure. The guide to the one is social planning by the technologist, and the guide to the other is the self-cultivation illustrated by the creative life of the artist.

We have a chance to create a new kind of revolution. Will we take it? Can we re-orient ourselves so that our code of human values will be shifted from a preoccupation with possessions, wealth and private power, to the idea of cooperative living in a world community based on the principles of social planning and self-cultivation? If a code of values, ideals, and ethics can be formulated in time and with sufficient clarity to become generally recognized before the final social cataclysm is reached, then we will save ourselves from chaos and destruction. That code must be based on the nature of man.

Even in a “scientific” society we must have those teachers of the race whose vigilance will discover and ensure the unfoldment of sensitivity and the enrichment of out-going personalities without which democracy would be fruitless. It is not alone the full lunch pail and universal suffrage that symbolize democracy, but also the release within the social unit of one's own natural resources. The feeling of psychological insecurity that comes to men who are malnourished with the husks from which all inspiration has long been threshed drives them into a stampede for wealth, for possessions, to bolster them against their sense of poverty and give them a temporary fullness. Possessiveness then replaces the natural creativity within each man. No truly creative person is ever possessive.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

Man, we have said, is an evolving creature part-way along the road to some still-emerging destiny. Having reached the place where he is able to devise technical and speculative means for achieving a panoramic view
of his own long past, he is beginning to peer into his future evolution. In this drama of evolution man sees that changes in consciousness have marked his transmutation from primitive forms of mentality to the present self-conscious state of man to day.

In spite of this obvious fact that as he ascends the ladder of evolution man experiences climatic changes in consciousness, no comprehensive social theory has yet been developed based on this evolutionary change in human life. Man cannot dissociate himself from the character of the universe of which he is so much a part, concentrating within himself as he does the electrical substance, qualities, and laws which express the universe. Yet by the nature of his own consciousness man transcends the "nature" of the wider universe in which he lives and consciously, voluntarily, morally, controls and directs the course of nature in conformity with selected ends of his own choosing. Conceding all the facts of the physical world, of biological evolution, and of behavioristic psychology—all the imposing array of evidence to prove that man has a physical make-up in common with the sub-human animals, that he shares his emotions and instincts with them, that he is so related to the vegetable kingdom that chlorophyll may become a substitute for blood—nevertheless in consciousness he may transcend all that has combined to provide him with the structure of his humanity: in function he is MAN, creative, moral, self-transcendent!

At the level of intelligent consciousness, man has no rival. Rivalries within the human kingdom are rivalries between groups personifying differing levels of human consciousness. In a sense, fascism is a state of consciousness, imperialism is a state of consciousness, globalism is a state of consciousness. But humanity as the planetary species has no rival in biological evolution.

The most remarkable fact in all our accumulations of human knowledge is this fact of the evolutionary capacity in man, the possible unfoldment of new forms of consciousness. Julian Huxley, one of the wisest scientific thinkers, concedes that man's physical evolution is complete and that his future unfoldment is subjective, that the tides of evolutionary energy are focused in man's psychic nature. But even if this should not be true, if new biological structures were to be evolved—possibly changes in brain structure—it would still be the case that we can develop new states of consciousness. It is not too late. We must begin now the creation of a new mentality, a new way of thinking—global thinking—as the inescapable prelude to planetary planning and world community. Action now—yes—but action in the mental world and the ethical world as well as in the physical world.

The universe is an energy-continuum, a powerhouse, and man is an evolutionary outlet for power. Man cannot separate himself from the cosmic powerhouse though he may limit or extent his capacity as an outlet, and in doing this the effects of his actions as an individual impinge
upon others. What he does is a part of the social whole. Democracy is inherent in that fact. On the human level individuation takes on a new dimension; it implies not selfish rights, but consciousness of universal relations; it is the individual that realises these relationships. It is through the fulfillment of individualization that man evolves from the sub-person, enmeshed in mass instincts, into the individual capable of choice and direction, and at last into the super-person whose relationships are consciously creative. The methods and goals of such a creative self-evolution were set forth by the writer in an article, “Cosmecology: A Theory of Evolution” (Later expanded as Chapter XXI of The Promise of Scientific Humanism), and in the last section of this paper I shall return to this line of speculation.

ARCHETYPAL MAN: AVATAR OF SYNTHESIS

The one thing that existentialism can contribute to a scientific humanism is the idea that man can be free, if he earns and exercises that freedom; that is, we must utilize the measure of indetermination there is in the universe to create a new humanity. This brings us to what may well be the supreme problem of modern culture: what image of man shall man make of himself to provide the morphogenetic forces for tomorrow's world?

Human evolution may occur on three levels: physical, mental, and moral. So far as neuro-anatomy can discern, there has been little change in the human brain for tens of thousands of years. But this does not rule out the possibility of further changes in the future. It may be that even in the brain as now constructed there are “silent areas” yet to be heard from, so to speak, and once these sleeping areas are awakened, the creatures of tomorrow may begin to function. Perhaps the extra sensory powers that Dr. J. B. Rhine has been investigating have their seat in such areas.

The best hope for the creation of a new humanity seems to lie in the improved integration of aspects of personality which are now at war with each other. If reason and emotion, intellect and feeling, the head and the heart, could be brought into synergetic relation, we might intensify consciousness and bring about what the general semanticists have called a corticothalamic integration.

Here we have, then, the reply of scientific humanism to the appeal and challenge of existentialism and neo-scholasticism: scientific or evolutionary humanism responds by offering its own concept of man—archetypal man as the avatar of synthesis! At present such characteristics as courage, imagination, love, and understanding, are infrequent traits in exceptional individuals. These traits need to be intensified, integrated and universalized. Perhaps it is not new qualities that we require: we need to invent “mass-production” techniques for evoking the talents that are latent in mankind. This is a matter of taking rare personal qualities
like sensitivity, love, insight into the formal patterns of existence (this is our substitute for "intuition"), and universalizing these characteristics. The task of an evolutionary humanism would indeed be difficult if we had to begin all over again: but hope lies in the fact that there isn't a human being living who doesn't have some of these qualities in some degree. To that extent every individual is potentially a member of the new humanity.

Obviously our image of archetypal man—the avatar of synthesis—is quite different from the "superman" of Nietzsche. The German philosopher's übermensch was a tough, masculine creature free from what he regarded as the effeminate traits of pity and sympathy. Our own conception of the individual of the new society would combine traits that are masculine and feminine, within the same individual, not, however, in the form of bi-sexualism, but more along the lines of the androgynous type of personality. The bisexual individual cannot really become androgynous, because he is in a sense crippled. Mature creative people are not crippled. We find such persons in highly developed man who acquire the qualities that Nietzsche regarded as feminine, and in well advanced women who have what men flatteringly term a "male intellect." This is the kind of development that makes possible deep friendship among creative people who find a common ground of understanding that transcends ordinary sex relationships.

The development we have projected is probably based on the fact that on higher levels of understanding the dualities of psychological fragmentation disappear and no longer control one's attitudes: the total individual sees things in their universal relationships. Insight, humor, love, and the rest, have a universal character when they are "de-sexed." Perhaps the restoration of the unity of personality which Plato pictured in his myth of the separation of the sexes is what the poet William Blake had in mind in his conception of that resynthesis of human nature, and which Northrop Frye describes by the term "fearful symmetry." The evils of the "fall of man" are then finally undone when man returns on a higher level of evolution to that psychological "Garden of Eden" which we have variously designated as the head-heart synthesis or the cortico-thalamic integration. This sets a worthy goal for man to strive for. The achievement of such synthesis would unify the sciences, the arts, and the humanities. It would give education over all vision and objectives. In the production of such a unity each person would help to shape the world into the form of peace and happiness. Subjective planning and objective planning would converge and coalesce. Is that not a consummation devoutly to be sought?

THE WORLD'S NEED FOR AN IDEOLOGY

In the foregoing pages the broad outlines of a general ideology are presented. The urgent need for such a comprehensive world-view was
outlined in my book, *The Integration of Human Knowledge*. But some thoughtful students of the human scene do not agree upon the need for an inclusive world ideology. For example, Professor Arthur Schlesinger Jr., one of President J. F. Kennedy’s “new frontiersmen,” speaking at the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi, stated that one important factor in the explanation of the speed of the American development, has been the national rejection of dogmatic preconceptions about the nature of the social and economic order. Defining “ideology” as a systematic and rigid dogma by which people seek to understand, preserve, and transform the world, Professor Schlesinger argues that America has had the good fortune not to be an ideological society.

For my part, I am not impressed by this argument. It ignores the fact that the founders of the United States of America did build upon the political philosophy of John Locke and the theology of John Calvin as these were modified by the eighteenth century Deism of Jefferson, Franklin, Paine, and others who came later.

Fundamentally, however, Professor Schlesinger suffers from a narrow conception of ideology. It seems to me that a deeper understanding of the role of ideology in the structuring and evolution of society is provided by the psychiatrist, Erik H. Erikson, in his book, *Young Man Luther*. He states that “...ideology will mean an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific as well political thought: the tendency at any given time to take facts amenable to ideas and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and individual sense of identity...”

“In some periods of history...can needs a new ideological orientation as surely and as sorely as he must have air and food.”

Here we have a deeper understanding of the psychology of man and of nations than Professor Schlesinger exhibits. The historian must yield to the psychiatrist. Perhaps the “search for identity” which thoughtful students now discuss is a manifestation of the “new image” of man which even now is seeking manifestation.

The new image (ideology) must be a result of a binocular vision—a depth perception—which will bring the Oriental and the Occidental components of our knowledge of man into the common focus of univision. Perhaps a means for achieving this synthesis is provided by the project outlined in my “Radiation Belts of Thought” article in *Darshana*, October, (1962). Here we sketch the plan for the embryogenesis of a world organism by way of analogy with the DNA molecule. The double-helix of the genetic code of life DNA molecule) has its cosmic analogue in a spiral chain of human individuals (mutant personalities) who are cause and effect manifestations of the mental-social radiation belts that spiral around the globe and unify it into an emerging world brain. Among these creative figures are Occidentals as well as Orientals—not the least of whom is the man whom we honor in this volume—Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.

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1 Published by Porter Sargent, Boston, 1958.
The visual representations which illustrate this awesome hypothesis are given in the diagrams which accompany this article. Here the macrocosm microcosm symmetry is seen at work, thus confirming an ancient insight of East and West.

THE EAST—WEST RADIATION BELTS OF THOUGHT

West

Thales
Pythagoras
Anaximander
Empedocles
Democritus
Socrates
Plato
Aristotle
Euclid
Archimedes
Ptolemy
Galileo
Kepler
Copernicus
Newton
Darwin
Marx
Freud
Einstein

East (far & near)

Krishna
Akhenaton
Moses
Zoroaster
Buddha
Mahavira
Confucius
Shankara
Ramananda
Lao Tze
Patanjali
Jesus Christ
Mohammed
Baha‘u’llah
Tagore
Gandhi
Bhave
Sri Aurobindo
Radhakrishnan

(By William Caldwell)
P. Nagaraja Rao

SHRI VENKATESWARA UNIVERSITY, TIRUPATI, INDIA.

RADHAKRISHNAN:
THE MAN AND HIS MESSAGE

Dr. Radhakrishnan is the finest product of the powerful movement of the contemporary Indian Renaissance. His popularity is second only to Gandhiji and Tagore among our great savants. He is the most renowned representative philosopher of India. He combines in himself different roles all of them integrated and grounded in his philosophy of life. His undying title to fame rests on his diligent and enormous work in two fields of interpretation of religion and philosophy, educational reconstruction, and the quest for peace and world unity. He has grown old with grace and success, in the service of his country’s cultural interpretation.

Radhakrishnan, the man, is the greatest element to reckon with in the assessment of his complex and rich personality. He is essentially shy, and a man of few words, specially in the company of persons not familiar to him. He is the jeest donnish of dons. His inremitting diligence is only equalled by his great tolerance. The twin passions that animated his life and underlined his mission are education and spiritual religion. As an orator, who weilds the English language with perfect ease, and astounding selectivity, he is the hero of a thousand platforms and can speak on the most intricate subjects abstruse concepts, in limpid prose without reference to notes. His memory is phenomenal and is the despair of many and the wonder of all. He has been an active University Professor, for over four decades. It will be difficult for him to recount, without errors, the list of academic distinctions, conferred on him, there is hardly a university in India and abroad, which has not conferred an honorary doctorate upon him. He has been the Vice-chancellor of two Universities and Professor of a half a dozen, which includes the World Platform of Cultures, Oxford. His was the first unprecedented appointment of an Asiatic to the Chair of Eastern Religions and Western Thought. He has served as a member of Intellectual Co-operation Committees, the Chairman of the Unesco, the Chairman of the University Education Commission, etc.
He occupies today an eminent position of the President of the Indian Union, after serving ten years as India's Vice-President. In all, he has some 30 volumes to his credit, his genius is partly interpretative and partly constructive. His two volumes on Indian Philosophy have come to stay as permanent books in our Universities. The massive erudition, the brilliant style, the cogent array of quotations, the authentic documentation, the insightful asides, the instructive comparisons with Western thought, have all made the book a permanent classic, and it will continue for long to be the standard work on the subject.

Radhakrishnan, like the traditional acāryās of India, set his hand to translating and commenting upon the triple texts of Vedānta, i.e., the Upanishads, the Gītā and the Brahma-Sūtras. His catholicity of outlook has made him translate the Dhamma Pāda also. In all these translations and commentaries his stand has been refreshingly original; he is of the opinion that the religious classics of the contemplative seers were the results of their spiritual experience. Being the expression of experience, they cannot be entombed in the frame work of neat, philosophical systems for ever. He claims that he has a right to interpret them and disclose the flexibility of eternal ideas. What is wrong with the traditional systems is that they have given an undue fixity to the eternal truths and ignored their flexibility. Radhakrishnan's faith is that the eternal ideas and central truths of Hinduism are neither old nor new, but eternal; they have a terrific topicality to our nuclear age. He also believes that the Upanishadic doctrines, the unity of existence, the conceptually indeterminate nature of ultimate reality, the catholic view that it is capable of multi-personal manifestations, the view that each intellectual formulation of the nature of ultimate reality is an alternative approach, equally true, with the others, the belief in the fellowships of faiths and tolerance (sarva darsana samata) the faith in the dignity and constancy of man and God, and above all the impregnable faith in the unconquerable will of man and the affirmation of his freedom, coupled with the denial of any kind of determinism, physical, biological, psychological, social, dialectical, of the Marxian or the theological variety, the belief that religious experience is the ultimate test of the existence of the spirit, the faith that spiritual realization is essentially the strength necessary for individual integration and the fostering of world unity. Besides these tenets, Radhakrishnan has upheld that education of an integrated type alone can save society from destruction. He has upheld the supremacy of moral and spiritual values and abjured the faith in the nation-state and war as an instrument for settling inter-national disputes.

The only solution that can bring about the spiritual regeneration of men and order in the international world, is spiritual religion. Religion, for Radhakrishnan, is not credal, it is not belief, but behaviour; it is not blind faith, nor blank acceptance; it is not magic nor escapism; it is not an opium of the mind; it is not a return to the infantile state of the mind
into the womb of the unconscious; it is not the stupid fanaticism of the
dogmatic theologian who believes he is in the exclusive possession of
the entire truth, and that all others are in absolute error. Religion is not
sectarianism, or surrendering the intellect to saving ourselves. It is not that
which makes for division in the name of God, which enforces its doctrines
by violence on others; it is not proselytization or an art of competitive in-
doctrination; it is not the love of one's land, one's clan, or of one's prophet,
or of one's scriptures; it is not simple emotional feeling of dependence.

Religion is essentially a transforming experience; it is the reaction of
the entire man, of his total personality, it is scientific, humanistic, based
on self-certifying experience; it is the most perfect instrument of social
regeneration; it fosters world unity and out lasts war, satisfies the dem-
ands of reason and the needs of humanity. True religion stands for the
fellowship of all faiths; religion helps man to integrate himself; religion
is morality lived; a man may subscribe to all the tenets of his theology,
he can perform scrupulously the elaborate rituals ordained, he can also
experience the most edifying emotions—with all this, if he is consistently
dishonest, completely selfish and wholly unrepentent, his religion is a
sham. It is education of an integrated type that can foster such a religion.

Dr. Radhakrishnan’s views on religion are developed in different ways
in a series of books. His conception of Spiritual Religion and its wide-
spread presence at the core of all religions is brought out in his Oxford
Lectures, “Eastern Religions and Western Thought” This book is the
harvest of his invaluable study of comparative religions. He brings out
the wide area of agreement between the different religions. With massive
erudition, he throws light on the tenets of Spiritual Religion, by tracing
the history of mysticism in Greece, Christendom, Palestine and India.
He elaborates “the meetings of religion” in a memorable chapter.

The case for the need for Spiritual Religion of the non-dogmatic type
is convincingly argued by him in his “Recovery of Faith”. Recovery of
Faith is the popular version of the technical work, “Eastern Religions and
Western Thought”. The application of the tenets of Spiritual Religion for
the reconstruction of society, in the economic, political and social spheres
is described by Radhakrishnan in his Kamala Lectures “Religion and
Society” and in a simpler and eminently readable book three decades
ago, in his “Hindu View of Life”. Radhakrishnan does not make a
fetish of the past; the past is only an inspiring ideal and not a prison-
house. “We look backwards and live forwards”. From the past altars,
we should carry not the ashes and the smoke, but the fire. His reflections
on religion are once again expressed in their historical settings in his
Belly Memorial Lectures. “East and West—some reflections” He is our
modern prophet of Spiritual Religion.

The personality of Dr. Radhakrishnan is inspired by its immense
humanity. He has impressed the great men of our age, who are thorough
contrasts, in their temperaments and outlook. At a leave-taking ceremony
from his ambassadorial job in Russia, on 5th April, 1952, Radhakrishnan met Stalin. After talk, as interpreted by Pavlov, Radhakrishnan writes about it: “I met Stalin. I told him we had an emperor who after a bloody victory renounced war and became a monk. You have waded your way to power through force. Who knows that might happen to you also.” Stalin said, “Yes, miracles do happen sometimes. I was in a theological seminary for five years.” Radhakrishnan continues, “I patted him on the cheek and on the back. I passed my hand over his head. Stalin said, “You are the first person to treat me as a human being and not as a monster. You are leaving us and I am sad. I want you to live long. I have not long to live.” Six months afterwards, he died.

Here again, is the effect produced by Radhakrishnan on another type of greatness. In 1957, Radhakrishnan, a few weeks before Gandhiji’s assassination, asked his permission to dedicate his translation of the Bhagavad-Gītā to him. Sri Pyarelal records Gandhiji’s remarks: “I know Radhakrishnan will not write anything unworthy.” Gandhiji called in Radhakrishnan and said, “I am your Arjuna; you are my Krishna. I am like Arjuna confused”. Radhakrishnan made a terrible impact on all who met him. His affability and kindly love have endeared him to all, irrespective of political parties and ideological differences. All go to him alike and he meets each according to their measure and needs.

Radhakrishnan’s contribution towards the cause of world-peace and efforts to outlaw war and the promotion of a new socialistic democratic order, are strewn in all his addresses and writings. He illustrated the life of Gandhiji as the supreme example and perfect practitioner of the Spiritual Religion.
Reflections on Comparative Philosophy

Today my two young daughters are looking at The National Geographic magazine, a wonderful collection of what might be called comparative humane and animal geography. They begin to giggle as they see the incredibly extended lips of the Suya Indians of South America. It occurs to me that perhaps we adults, and even comparative philosophers, giggle over the beliefs of those whom we believe to have grotesque systems of thought. Worse yet, we might sneer at them: some of us because they are so "primitive" and others because they are so new and substantially lacking in the patina of the familiar spiritualism. Perhaps we should expect no human being to be completely immune to these lapses.

What qualities of mind should one expect to find among those who claim to be comparative philosophers? Perhaps a central reason for examining different systems of thought, the claims of alien ideas, is a peculiar kind of curiosity brought about by conflicting views and shocking confrontations. My own appetite was whetted by my growing up in the seaport city of Seattle which in the 1920's still had remnants of the aboriginal coastal Indians, and besides, communities of Chinese, Japanese, Norwegen, Fishermen, and Filipino cannery workers. This conglomeration of souls saw the world differently from my parents and family, yet what they saw seemed to indicate perspectives that revealed facets of reality that I could also see after they were pointed out.

Other qualities besides curiosity might be listed, such as modesty, open-mindedness, skepticism, independence, and perhaps even love of adventure, the ability to listen, and a drive towards integration of information.

Like curiosity, absence of fanaticism is crucial, for without it no one would be impelled to seek for the understanding of other ideas and systems of thought, if he already possessed the truth. Fanaticism, child of
fear and hostility, inhibits curiosity. Just as a Hillary loves the sensory and intuitive (in Jung’s sense) understanding of the macroscopic physical mountains, so the comparative philosopher loves the pursuit of thoughts in the mental hills of curiosia. Modesty is required for this, as one can discern among those philosophers who, having examined briefly an alien system, quickly turn away from it as being scarcely worthy of further examination. By modesty here one means lack of presumption that one is somehow in the know through some fortunate gifts endowed by the Creator or more indirectly through the agency of karma.

Open-mindedness is never complete, but it is a necessary ingredient for the comparative philosopher. He must always be on guard lest he allow some insight to be buried in the backwash of his slothful mind. Part of this comes with being genuinely alert, a quality that one always anticipates in the comparative thinker. He is not a giant slug creeping along the safe roads of orthodoxy, but always alert like a terrier to new movements in the nearby shrubbery.

And the comparative philosopher is skeptical not only about other people’s having the final truth, but about his having it. He is able to shrug his shoulders and admit that the last word has obviously not been said by St. Thomas, Kant, Marx, Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo, or Nishida. His skepticism is not only deep, but as he grows older, it becomes engrained to such an extent that it must be dealt with carefully lest he frighten away the young comparative philosophers who are overcome by their mission of discovery and are panting for the revelations which they believe about to be delivered to them. Skepticism arises with the knowledge gained through experience that there are limits. Whether skepticism is optimistic, as in Bertrand Russell, pessimistic, as in Unamuno, or neutral, as in S. Dasgupta, is an individual matter. If it becomes excessively pessimistic, however, the philosopher will lack the incentive to carry on a task which he believes to be highly unprofitable.

Independence is a quality we associate with philosophers generally. Edwin R. Guthrie, psychologist, philosopher, and administrator, expressed it well in explaining the relationship of a university president to his faculty members. A president was, Guthrie, said, like a dockman standing on the edge of the pier gazing up at the seagulls as they sailed overhead. Philosophers are the seagulls farthest away, and the comparative philosopher can barely be outlined. He may have spotted a fish that another seagull dropped or may have noticed one unseen by the flock.

Love of adventure we now associate with Whitehead’s memorable book. Talking with Whitehead a few months before he died, I realized that at his advanced age, adventure was so ingrained that he could still exclaim with pleasure to hear something with which he was unfamiliar. To listen to him was not so much a feast of reason as a feast of hypothesiating. Adventuring in ideas is only part of comparative philosophy,
however, for it frequently leads to adventuring in a geographical sense as one longs to visit the physical scenes of great ideas. And just as we have had our evolutionary oriented philosophers in the past one hundred years, so we shall have our space-oriented ones in the future.

The sheer joy of listening and learning is an indispensable part of comparative philosophy. A listener is gratifying to the talkers, many of whom are fanatics expounding their pet systems. But while the fanatics are left in various postures of arrested development, the comparative philosophers continue to grow as they listen to the wisdom of others—some of whom are fanatics: As a matter of fact, one sure way of becoming a comparative philosopher is to be fixed by the glaring eye of the fanatic. While the fanatic speaks the anti-fanatic is thinking of all the exceptions to the generalizations and truths mouthed with such vigor. Masson-Oursel says of this, "Nothing then, for positive philosophy, is so important as to contrast, the one with the other, various markedly differentiated mental structures." Recommended as the guiding principle for philosophy, and Masson-Oursel holds that philosophy is comparative philosophy, is analogy which requires the ability to listen and compare.

A final quality distinguishes the comparative philosopher: namely, the drive towards integration, a desire to see as much of the picture as possible since its scope is universal history and the cosmos. At the same time one wishes to avoid destroying the integrity of the picture. Doubtless this cannot be done adequately until we have another universal history on another planet to compare with our own. J. Kwee Swan Liat has expressed this approach, which is not easily characterized, as "a conscious and repeated effort aimed at merging of supplementary phases into an ever richer totality where specific characteristics are not neglected but maintained and yet coherently connected." Perhaps this is the ultimate abstraction, yet no amount of specialization will be useless to it or resolve it. As in man’s drive towards outer space, so in man’s drive for a comprehension of the universe within as well as without, he must use the tools at hand. These are the tools employed by comparative philosophy—the total integrative approach.

The noblest aim of comparative philosophy is to understand in the sense recommended by the Buddha and by Spinoza. Yet we find even the Buddha and Spinoza lapsing in this respect. Spinoza probably had fewer aberrant moments than the Buddha because he was not under such constant scrutiny and hence not so frequently jarred into giving an undigested opinion. In making fun of the analytic philosophers of his day, the Buddha speaking of those who suspend judgment on what they are not sure of, refers to them as eel-wrigglers, recommending that profitable questions beget profitable answers. But after all, whereas the Buddha was not, strictly speaking a comparative philosopher, Spinoza was one of its early-enlightenment (17th century) founders in Europe.

Understanding is not only one noble aim of comparative philosophy,
but in an important sense, it is the final aim of comparative philosophy. And if activists claim that understanding is not enough, we may answer that, to understand also means to act, for action flows from thought just as it may flounder without thought. We hope to derive understanding from the devotion to comparative philosophy. When we fail at this, we do not blame the incorrigible systems. No, we blame ourselves.

The ultimate paradigm for comparative philosophy is the understanding-of-all, which implies the-forgiveness-of-all. Solution of the epistemological problem implies solution of the moral problem. Understanding implies forgiveness and forgiveness implies rectification. For the atheist and agnostic, forgiveness is the essence of humaneness—of humanity which understands. In understanding all, the theist, pantheist, deist, naturalist, and materialist views merge. Is not this the insight of the Buddha, Jesus, Sâmkara, and Spinoza? Ultimate union with Brahman is understanding. Forgiveness follows from this. This is the ultimate morality going beyond the requirements of positive law.

I know men engaged in doing comparative philosophy who will not seriously examine the claims of Vedânta because they suspect that it is weird, being couched in the language of Jung instead of the language of scientific method. And I also know other men doing comparative philosophy who will not examine the claims of Marxism because they know that Marxism is related to some forms of communism, and since communism is evil (unless it is their kind), therefore Marxism is evil. Besides committing the fallacy of undistributed middle, a worse fallacy is committed against both Marxism and Vedânta: the fallacy of unexamined premises. Attacks upon mysticism, esotericism, exotericism, existentialism, scientism, naturalism, idealism, materialism, yoga, psycho-analysis have at their base lack of understanding, and in attacking some of them myself, I have grossly neglected my duty in failing to understand them. What the comparative philosopher wishes to know is not: which is the true philosophy? but rather what is true in each philosophy? What is useful to the development of understanding in each philosophy?

Understanding is by no means limited to the intellectual sphere. Just as important to it is the anthropological in its broadest sense of including anything we can know about man, and in the narrowest sense of including what we can know about a particular man. The following conversation, written by a television comedian, exemplifies what comparative philosophy can do for us by our meeting of persons as well as systems of thought.

A: "I thought he was your friend."

B: "Oh, he is. If he weren't I couldn't stand him:" This kind of insight, so frequently shown in Freudian psycho-pathology of everyday life (or better, psychonormality), shows that above else, friendship is based upon understanding rather than upon agreement. Some of our greatest friendships, some of our most precious memories, depend upon
mutual respect in the center of disagreement.

One of the most charming men I have met was visiting New Delhi in 1951 at the same time I was staying there. He was, as he is, an animist. I must have looked at him with an incredulity worthy of a child at his first magic show when he told me what he believed. "Do you really believe in an animistic universe?" I exclaimed. Out of deference to him I tried the mental experiment of imagining an animistic world. It was hard to get my well-grooved imagination to work in this realm, although it proved more congenial than I had first thought. What little I knew of Leibniz also helped.

From this it does not follow that everything or anything goes, or that everything is relative, or that there is no certain knowledge. What does follow is that what goes must be recognized as going. Just because a belief is not going with us doesn't mean that it is not held, nor does it mean that nobody should hold it, nor does it mean that we cannot persuade him who holds that belief that he should not hold it. Re-education, reappraisal, persuasion, re-definition, and brainwashing are all open to us. As one genially brainwashed by Western Christianity, Judaism, American pragmatism, and the presuppositions of what is euphemistically called, People's Capitalism, other brainwashes in other places, whether in Banaras, Mecca, Kyōtō, Moscow, or Rome don't frighten me very much anymore. Comparative philosophy has changed my All x is y to Some x might possibly be y; and my No x is y to Some x may not be y.
Nicholas Rescher

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GENERALIZATION IN
HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
AND PREDICTION IN HISTORY

Perhaps the most famous thesis regarding the role of generalization in history is the doctrine which holds that there is one single grand law governing the fate of nations, empires, civilizations or cultures. On such a view, all of the really major and large-scale transactions of history fall inevitably into one and the same basic pattern. The principal and characteristic function of the historian is to discern and then articulate this supreme generalization which pervades the regularity inherent in the historical process, a procedure familiar to readers, in the present century, through the work of Spengler and Toynbee. On a view of this nature, uniqueness has at best a very restricted role in history, being limited to points of detail, in virtue of the predominant status of the basic pattern of regularity.

In reaction against this kind of thesis, various theorists have taken their position at the very opposite extreme, and have espoused the view that generalization has no place whatever in history. This view may be characterized as "historical nihilism". On this conception, the supreme fact of historical study is the total absence of generalizations from the historical domain. Pervasive uniqueness becomes the order of the day. The historian, it is argued, inevitably deals with non-repeatable particulars. Generalization is not only unwarranted, it drastically impedes all understanding of the data of history.

Our own view lies squarely between these two contrasting positions. The plain fact is that no grand generalization of the "pattern of history" has ever been formulated which is both(1) sufficiently specific to be susceptible to a critical test against the data(2) sufficiently adequate to survive such a test. Thus it is not, in our judgment, to such a thesis that one can
look for an acceptable account of the place of generalization in history. On the other hand, it is demonstrable that failure of the grand generalization approach to history in no way justifies ruling generalizations out of the historical pale. To see why this is so requires a closer look at the role of laws and generalizations in history.

To begin with, it is clear that the historian must make use of the general laws of the sciences. He cannot perform his job heedless of the information provided by science regarding the behavior of his human materials. The teachings of human biology, of medicine, or of psychology can be ignored by the historian only at his own peril. The facts offered by these sciences regarding the mortality and morbidity of men, their biological needs for nourishment, sleep, etc., their psychological make-up, and the like represent essentially unchanging constants in the functioning of the human materials with which history deals. Nor can the physical sciences which describe the behavior of man's environment, again by means of general laws, be ignored by the historian. History must ever be rewritten if only because the progress of science leads inescapably to a deepening in our understanding our natural universe which is the inevitable setting of historical events.

Going beyond this, it is important to recognize that the general laws of the natural sciences do not constitute the only basis of generalization in history. These sciences give us the characterization of the physical, biological and psychological boundary conditions within which man must inevitably operate. But there are also sets of boundary conditions which stem from man's cultural rather than his physical environment. These bring to the scene of historical explanation the general laws of the social sciences.

Nor is this the whole story. We must now consider another mode of generalization that has pivotal importance in historical explanation, namely generalizations which represent not the strictly universal laws to which we are accustomed from the sciences, but limited generalizations. Such limited generalizations are rooted in transitory regularities, deriving from the existence of temporally restricted technological or institutional patterns.

Such purely historical generalizations as relate to questions of technology are not unrestricted or universal in the manner in which the laws of the physical sciences are, i. e., they are not valid for all times and places. An historical generalization is limited, either tacitly or expressly, to applicability within specific geographic and temporal bounds. Usually, historical generalizations are formulated by explicit use of proper names: names of places, of groups of persons, of periods of time, of customs or institutions, of systems of technology, of culture, or the like. The restriction of application in such cases is overt in the formulation of the law. Sometimes, however, such limited generalizations are formulated as unconditionally universal statements. But in such cases the statement properly interpreted takes on a conditional form of such a kind that its
applicability is de facto tightly restricted. If sailing ships and contemporary naval technology and ordnance were reinstated, the tactical principles developed from the time of Tromp and de Ruyter to that of Rodney and Nelson would prove valid guidance. But the applicability of these tactical principles is conditional upon the fulfillment of conditions which cannot reasonably be expected to recur. It is clear that analogous examples of limited generalizations can be drawn from every field of technology: production, agriculture, communication, resource exploitation, medical practice, etc. And such technology-based generalizations will inevitably be of limited scope, being valid for only a particular period and era.

A second major source of limited generalizations is constituted by the entire sphere of institutional practices. Social customs, legal and political institutions, economic organization, and other institutional areas, all constitute sources of such limited generalizations. Thus a limited generalization can be based, for example, upon the U.S. practices of holding a presidential election every four years, and a population census every ten. Here again we have regularities which are limited, in temporal (and of course geographic) scope to an era during which certain fundamental institutional practices are relatively constant. Such institutional patterns will of course be of immense value to the historian in providing an explanation for the relevant events. He will seek to discover such institutional regularities precisely because they afford him the means to an explanation of occurrences. Events within a particular limited period need to be understood and explained in terms of the limited generalizations which capture the particular institutional structure of this era.

It should be noted, however, that the utilization in historical explanations of limited generalizations based upon reference to temporary technological and institutional eras does not provide the basis for a fundamental separation between history and the natural sciences. Such reliance upon transitory regularities does not make a place for uniqueness in history in any absolute sense. After all, the past stages of biological and cosmological evolution are also non-repetitive. And thus the "historical" departments of the natural sciences must also deal with non-recurring eras. And in these domains, limited generalizations can—and sometimes are—also formulated. But as a rule the scientist is concerned with such limited regularities only as a way-station en route to the universal laws which are the main focus of his interest, and therefore tends, by and large, to be relatively aloof to the peculiarly limited generalizations which also could be formulated for his domain. But the historian, whose interest must focus upon the understanding of particular events and not the formulation of universal generalizations, has a much larger stake in limited generalizations.

The upshot of the present analysis of the role of generalizations in history can thus be summarized as follows. History must and does use
generalizations: first as a consumer of scientific laws, secondly as a producer of limited generalizations formulated in the interests of its explanatory mission and its focus upon specific particulars. The use of all of these types of generalizations in history is indispensable for the historian's discharge of his explanatory mission. Explanation demands that he be able to spell out the linkages of causation and of influence between events, and this can only be done in the light of connecting generalizations.

To say without qualification that history cannot predict is plainly false. Historical predictions are actually a commonplace of modern life, and it is a matter of common knowledge that many historical important developments can be foretold with great accuracy on the basis of an historical analysis of past trends (e.g. demographic facts regarding life expectancies, population densities of cities and countries, or even such cultural phenomena as the number of books to be published in a given country in a given subject-matter field). What is meant by the dictum that "history cannot predict" is this: it cannot forecast those major critical developments on the world scene in which we are most interested and in which our curiosity is the keenest (in part precisely because they are so difficult to foretell). The situation is similar in the field of medicine which can predict both the very near future (no change) and the very distant (we'll all be dead), but usually cannot answer the really "interesting" questions about our state of health a matter of months or even years ahead.

Now if it be conceded that history cannot predict the future in the sense we have specified, wherein does the value of historical understanding lie? If history cannot predict, is not its interest purely antiquarian because the study of historical explanation cannot now serve any practical need?

To ask the question in this way seems to me to insist upon looking right past what is the one valid pragmatic justification of historical studies. This, we maintain has nothing to do with knowledge about the future. It is not the task of history to furnish some crystal ball in which the shape of things to come may be discerned. The value of history in relation to the future lies in its providing not knowledge, but wisdom. Historical understanding does not tell us what will happen. Rather, by providing us with a background of understanding of the behavior of human individuals, societies, and institutions in their reactions to challenges and opportunities under the most diverse circumstances, history places us in a better position to react with intelligence, and balanced perspective good sense, to whatever may happen, no matter what this may be.

388
Fearsome

Justice

There is no doubt that those in the past and in the present who have argued for the most severe punishment as retaliation to offenses are in the right.

Fear of harsh or cruel consequences will deter many from stepping out of the regulative.

But: Do we want such a world, a fear-ridden world?

We know that laborers will work harder and stay on the job almost endlessly if in terror of the slavers lash.

We know that soldiers have been terrorized into reckless attacks frantic over the scourging officers behind the lines.

We know that whole populations have tremulously embraced the most vile idolatry in order to escape being skinned alive or burned alive.

We know that fear can grasp in its claws the frail soul of man.

But: Do we want a society in which workers are held to their tasks by terror, or soldiers by threats or worshipers by anguish?

Why retain the methods of feudalism in a society of free men?

Our workers, our farmers, our soldiers, our worshipers, our students and teachers are certainly not less effective than those in Red China, Russia or Poland, where the lash has replaced persuasion and understanding.

Let our law be equally freed from narrow, suppressive and property-directed tradition and transformed into a code of new values and new considerations.

Let not property and property protection hold sway over the courts, as in Russia or China, where the masters of property hang you or shoot you over a bag of wheat, a bartered ten-dollar bill, a privately produced bottle of ink, a clandestinely baked holy bread or even a mistake on your job.
Let not death or the dungeon be the retaliation for human weakness or protest, as in the realms of Henry VIII or Mao Tse-tung.

Let rehabilitation be our motto, not revenge—and foremost rehabilita-
tion not merely of the offender but more so of the law. Our laws are in
far greater need of repair than our offenders.

Some of our laws are weak and nauseam, others are grim and pointless.

Our law permits a man like Rockwell or Hitler to surround himself
with a group of blackjack-swinging henchmen and use our public places
to harangue our youth and the never-expiring army of gullibles into acts
of blood-spilling violence. Bookshelf judges interpret such calls to murder
as "within" the law because these Fagins of pogrom do not themselves
kill and since the actual killing or burning is done by the inflamed lis-
teners, it is they who offended the law and not the culprits on top of the
soapbox.

I say the law is dumfoundered and dumfingered, and if the assassins of
the tongue do not fall within the grip of the law, it is time to endow the
feeble code with an iron hand so it may deal with the greatest criminals
of our era, the schemers for power who sow the seed of hate behind the
curtain of legality and have the rest of the world reap disaster.

Men like Rockwell and Hitler, Stalin, Barnett and Faubus are the
great criminals of our time, and not the poor devils in Warsaw or Czer-
nowitz, Peking or Shanghai who smuggled an extra pair of boots, or the
drug addict in New York or the alcoholic in London who knifed a grocery
man or raped a waitress.

The merchants of hate can still peddle their poison from one end of
the globe to the other. With the law standing its ground that none inter-
ference with their Mephistophelean sermons, they sit in decorated mansions
and at governors' desks surrounded by insolent bodyguards.

They know the law. The law is on their side and will not notice the
victims of this devilish oratory until they are stretched out on bloody
streets or crisp in a Nazi stove.

The law so swift in its arrest of a dowdy scrubwoman who sneaks a
pair of stockings into her shopping bag this same law sees no murder
when an arrogant demagogue belches out his obscene demands to burn
the Jews or stone the niggers.

All the great jurists of England could not find enough law around to
arrest Rockwell pleading nostalgically to the assembled mob to apprehend
the Jews and shove them into a gas chamber. All the great jurists of
England could not find enough law. Well, if there isn't enough law, it is
time to put a patch in.

There is a hole in the world of law if such crass crimes as the call for
pogroms indeed must remain unpunished.

And this is a poor patch if these monsters of calumny are detained
in a police cell for a week or two for failing to comply with some obscure
city regulations.
The law should be a powerful thing and not a toy for paragraph-tired jurists. The law should be taken out of the hands of the book-tied and tradition-bound and given over to the people to make it stick, to make it count, to make it matter.

The man who calls for the murder of races or religions is a prime offender against the first law designed to safeguard the welfare of the people.

The man who sets the young or the old against fellow citizens of different faith or race, his deeds are evil in themselves, *male in se*. He is to be disassociated from society into complete isolation for the duration of his natural life.

What sense or fairness lies in the petty prosecutions of petty misdemeanors if the great criminals, the Nazis, the professional hate peddlers are permitted to carry on their nefarious enterprises? The law is awkwardly silent over them, but the drunk calling a broad a bad name—that case is put on the big bell.

Every citizen is entitled to civil rights, but such rights are meant to be civil, not criminal.

A law that protects a man in racism, a criminal abuse of society, such a law is not civil.

In a free society the fundamental purpose of law lies in the safeguarding of public welfare, and wherever and whenever the law fails to do so, it is either evil itself or inadequate. The state laws in Mississippi, precepts of segregation and humiliation of the Negro, are evil. The Federal laws permitting men like Rockwell to go about inciting to riot, strife and massacre are woefully inadequate.
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INDIVIDUALITY
AND REALITY

It was Rudyard Kipling who proclaimed with considerable plausibility for a certain level of thought that 'East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet'. More recently the fact and the prophecy are coming to be somewhat doubted; and the change is largely due to the efforts of Indian thinkers like Atreya and Radhakrishnan. It is doubtful if many or indeed any of us Westerners have become so familiar with Eastern philosophy and psychology as have these been with the thought of the West and Western civilization and culture in general, represented in the two disciplines involved. Our Western thought has been emphatically analytical in its methodology or darshana, whereas Indian thinking has emphasized, emphatically and profoundly synthetism.

In a paper published in the Journal of General Psychology in 1939 entitled 'Are there any Individuals', the present writer called attention to the fact that (contrary to a rather general assumption,) there are no abstract individuals and no abstract universals. The extraordinary emphasis in the West on individuality and freedom has resulted largely in delinquency in thought and action (adult as well as juvenile), expressed (by a recent immigrant) by 'in America everybody is as good as everybody else and perhaps a little better.'

With the universals of Plato, relegated to the heaven of the Ontoson, and the universals of Darwin to some prehistoric realm satirized by Hegel as removed to the darkness of the past for the sake of clarity, it seems that if anything exists it must be the individual. The cause or this effect or rather defect of the darshana or methodology, is illustrated in the statement of the farmer that the snake that bit him 'did it on purpose'. Professor Atreya has pointed out that the mistake of the West
has been due to just such misapplied abstract *darshana*¹...Dingler in his methodological philosophy has arrived at similar conclusions. There are in Kantian terms no *Dinge an sich* either abstract individuals or abstract universals in absolute reality. When East and West come together in the realm where the essences of their common cultures reach their ultimate and fundamental expression. The danger comes from on the one hand not considering adequately the “Look before you leap” and on the other of such extreme withdrawal in contemplation from practise “sicklied o’er by the pale cast of thought”.

The extreme result of analysis in the freedom from duty or law above mentioned which on the contrary as Aristotle emphasized are related as the convexity and concavity of the circle or in the abstract reliance on intellect and will in abstraction from feeling or intuition, as forms of communication, revealed in various forms of art, which have been recently recognized in Lippur,Einfühlung, possibly by extra-sensory perception, theosophy, et alia, and seriously considered, as they were by William James in “Varieties of Religious Experience” and passim indicate the dissatisfaction with the chaos of intellectual systems at their best.

Hume’s approach to something like Buddhism in his reduction of causality to regular concomitance of associations of sensations, due to his ignorance or ignoring of the principle of Einfühlung as the factor responsible for the anthropomorphic projection of “will”, stripped from its freedom for the purpose of mechanical exact calculation or illustrates the inadequacy which the great Huxley supplied by his assertion that the only “force” we know anything about is “will”; but neither Hume nor Huxley recognized what the Indian philosophers did in their mystical doctrine that Existence is neither subjective nor objective in the usual sense by themselves of these terms but are mutually fused in true unity.

In addition to these difficulties and failures of the West there emerge that various acknowledgements such as “Inteligo quia ineptum est” Perry’s formula “peace without victory” for the clash of independent “systems have their day and cease to be”, the mysticism of Catholicism, revealed vividly and acutely in the struggle of English history in Shorthouse’s noteworthy and profound novel, “John Inglesant.” The man in the street and the man in the laboratory are regularly as astonished to learn that they have been using and misusing Kant’s categories without knowing it, as, in parallel instances, the Bourgeois Gentilhomme with prose,and the prize fighter in his heated denial that he had ever used his biceps on any opponent; and thus it is with mysticism et alia for for many of us in many important aspects of life. The experience of Mother India is described poetically

by Edwin Arnold in one of its more popular forms in his "Light of Asia" which is resolved in its poetical conclusion:

    I Take my refuge in Thy name and Thee!
    I take my refuge in Thy law of good!
    I take my refuge in Thy order! Om!
    The Dew is on the lotus! Rise Great sun!
    And lift my leaf and mix me with the wave!
    Om Mani Padme Hum! The sunrise comes!
    The dewdrop slips into the shining sea.
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NĀGĀRJUNA:
ON CAUSATION AND NIRVĀṆA

Nāgārjuna, the great exponent of the Mādhyamika Buddhism in the 2nd century A.D., did not accept the causal interpretation of the presented universe (pratītya-samutpāda) as held by the Vaibhāṣikas of the Hinayāna Buddhism; he also differed from the Vaibhāṣika interpretation of nirvāṇa which is associated with a novel notion of causality to be explained later. In this connection I want to examine Nāgārjuna's reflections on causality and nirvāṇa in his Mādhyamika-Śāstra (Chs. I & XXV) and their commentary entitled Prasannapadā (The Clearworded) by Candrakīrti, an eminent Buddhist thinker of the 7th century A.D. Here Nāgārjuna's views on causality and nirvāṇa have been considered in the background of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas who preceded Nāgārjuna, and Candrakīrti's commentary is examined chiefly in connection with Dignāga's new logical school of Buddhist thought following Nāgārjuna and the Yogācāras. It may be noted as a preliminary discipline that the transcendent experience (nirvāṇa) entertained by the Buddha, meant a total separation from all logico-empirical-metaphysical modes of reflection. If the transcendent experience realised by the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic thinkers is beyond the reach of thought and speech, then obviously discursive method entertained for either clarification or indication of that aspect, is not necessary according to the Buddha. Separating himself from any propensity to discuss, the Buddha indicates directly two orders of experience—the apparent and the transcendent; the apparent order is the non-substantial (anātma), transient (anitya) and the twelve-fold process (dvādaśabhervacakra) involving the process of birth, death and rebirth in continuous cycles ending with suffering and sorrow (duḥkha); the transcendent experience (nirvāṇa) is the freedom from the apparent transient.

1 Štcherbatsky: The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Leningrad, 1927, pp. 65-212.
order by following a triadic discipline of sīla (conduct), samādhi (concentration) and prajñā (insight)—a practical method of purification.

The Vaibhāṣikas strictly follow the tradition of the Theravādins who flourished after the Buddha’s great demise (parinirvāṇa). They admitted the Buddha’s two orders of experience, but modified the understanding of the two orders by introducing a psycho-moral mode of reflection, which can to some extent, dispense with the ordinary notion of existence; the ordinary notion of existence is interpersed with the substance-attribute mode of reflection. With regard to the two orders of experience, the Vaibhāṣikas postulated the particulars or discrete elements (dhammas), not to suggest that they exist exhibiting a substance-attribute character, but to suggest that they form the background to account for experience in two orders—apparent and transcendent; the apparent order exhibits the manifesting characters of the elements in association with the causal process, the root of which can be discerned in the psycho-moral propensities which can be expressed as ideation (bhāvanā), desire (vāsanā), will (cetanā) or forces (saṅskāras). The manifestation of the elements (dhammas) in union with the causal process is found in a ground—consequent manner or in the form of ‘if...then’, excluding all notion of actual production or existential relation. The transcendent order is rather a negative condition, viz., the dissociation of the elements from the causal process; this is effected by disciplining the psycho-moral propensities in the triadic manner as noted above. This condition which is a freedom from process is one of nirvāṇa (extinction), nirodha (supression) or sānta (calmness). Stecherbatsky aptly describes the two orders, not in terms suggesting ‘existentiality’, but in terms of two distinguishable conditions, viz., an order of commotion (defilement) and extinction (purification). The whole mode of reflection is not logico-metaphysical but psycho-moral.

The Sautrāntikas, who carry forward the principle of the Mahāsamghikas, the contemporaries of the Theravādins, objected to the basic postulates of the particulars (dhammas); they argue that ‘if the presented universe be wholly relational, phenomenal or temporal’, how can one be justified in postulating discrete entities or particulars? In the interlinked universe only the temporal expression of the particulars can be discerned; that experience, again, is not in the form of discontinuities, i.e., in the form of ‘if...then’, but in the form of unbroken continuity. If the apparent universe is relational all-through, how can nirvāṇa be conceived in total separation from the continuous temporal sequence? The Sautrā-

2 Banerjee, A.C. Principal Schools and Sects of Buddhism in 2500 Years of Buddhism, ed. by Bapat, Govt. of India, 1956, Ch. VI
3 Stecherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, Royal Asiatic Society, 1923, pp. I-53, also The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Ch. VIII, and writer’s paper: Changing Phases of Buddhist Thought in the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1954
4 Banerjee, A.C. : Principal Schools and Sects of Buddhism in 2500 Years of Buddhism, Ch. VI
ntikas thus develop a phenomenal or sceptical attitude with regard to the particulars (dharmas) nirvāṇa.  

Nāgarjuna places himself into the currents of the Sautrāntika thought of the ‘relational universe’, and protests against the postulation of the discrete entities (dharmas) and the causal process (pratītya-samutpāda) of in the sense of ‘if...then’ of the Vaibhāsikas; he however does not want to dispense with the notion of nirvāṇa as suggested in the Sautrāntika thought; he only reinterprets the nirvāṇa by suggesting that the real understanding of relative existence lies in the understanding of nirvāṇa, which is a quiescence of all plurality; to Nāgarjuna, the relative existence is also not a ‘temporal sequence’, which implies a perpetuity of temporal process; he, therefore, gives an interpretation of the temporal sequence also.  

Nāgarjuna attacks the problem of ‘discrete entities’, for the ‘discrete entities’ cannot originate in a universe where everything is ‘interlinked’. Originality rests on the notion of causality, but the notion of causality is infested with endless speculations. Causality is interlinked with the notions of existence and possessing energies. In a relational existence,—existence, cause, energy, temporal sequence, cannot be treated apart from one another. Hence all such notions are to be abandoned.  

If there is no discrete entity in ‘relative existence’ the nirvāṇa, which is a character of this universe, cannot be treated as a discrete entity. To treat it as a discrete entity (ens) would be to subject it to causal process—decay and death, in that case, the nirvāṇa will lose its significance which is usually attached to it in Buddhist thought, where the nirvāṇa is untouched by causal process. If it is not an entity (ens), how can it be treated as a non-entity (non ens)? This mode of reflection is wrong, for it is an attempt to interpret the nirvāṇa by a dependent intellectual form. If it is admitted as not ens, it can never be non-ens, both or neither. Nāgarjuna discards similarly the speculations regarding the Buddha’s existence, non-existence, both and neither, before and after the nirvāṇa, for these are discrete or abstract questions in a realm where everything is ‘interlinked’. Discarding the notion of discrete entities, causal and temporal processes and also the four categorical forms, Nāgarjuna discards the discrete way of determining the nirvāṇa and the Buddha. His suggestion is that in the interlinked universe there is no discrete existence (dharma-nairātmya) or discrete mode of understanding. The interlinked universe suggests undifferentiated existence and experience (dharma-kaya). The relative existence is borrowed

5 Scherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, specially, Appendix I, also *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Ch. IX.
6 Scherbatsky: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Ch. XI
8 Ibid., pp. 342-5, Vide H. Sastri (edited with an Introduction by) *Advayavajraśrāṅgṛaha*, Gaekward’s Oriental Series, 1927, pp. xxiii-iv, refers to Nāgarjuna’s four categorical forms as existence (sat), non-existence (asat), combination of existence and non-existence (tadabhaya) and negation of existence and non-existence (anubhaya).
existence it is not real existence, just as the borrowed money is not real money. The world of relativity invariably suggests undifferentiated existence or experience. The nirvāṇa stands for that undifferentiated experience or existence: it is a cessation of all thought, quiescence of all plurality. That order is not positively determinable as there is no place for thought and speech, subject or object of knowledge; it is a realm of undifferentiated or continuous experience, not dissected or analysed into thought-forms or language-forms, existential, temporal or causal forms. As positive determination is not possible, Nāgārjuna suggests, only for guidance, eight modes of determining its characteristics, not that they are its characteristics, but that they offer only opportunities for excluding all positive discussions. The indications are: "There nothing disappears, nor anything appears, nothing has an end, nor is there anything eternal; nothing is identical with itself, nor is there anything differentiated, nothing moves neither hither nor thither."10 (aniruddham-anupitōdham-anacchedam-asasvakat, anekārtham-anānār tham anāgamam-anirgamani).

If Nāgārjuna is interpreted in this complex background, he cannot be associated with any form of idealistic or mystic thought of the West. He comes close to the realistic thought of Whitehead, one of the prominent thinkers of this century. The affinity between Nāgārjuna and Whitehead is very close because both have totally separated themselves from any specific empirical or conceptual modes of reflection. In Western philosophy, the expression realism is associated with almost all schools of thought. In the case of Plato (an idealist), it stands for the transcendent reality of the ideas, in the case of the Scholastics (theists), for the reality of the Universals, in the case of the later Scholastics (nominalists) for the particulars, in modern philosophy—in the case of the Empiricists—for the sensuous experience or impression, in the case of contemporary realists like Moore and Russell, for sense-data and finally, in the case of Whitehead, the expression, realism, stands for the reality of the 'relational process'. In this mode of reflection of Whitehead, there is a total abandonment of the discrete realities as the ideas, universals, particulars, impressions and sense-data. Whitehead's term for the relative universe as presented to perceptual experience, is relatedness, connectedness, concern, feeling or prehension;11 the presented sensuous experience, to Whitehead, is never separated from the basic non-sensuous experience; he discards the notion of discrete or isolated existence or 'simple location'.12 Even the spatio-temporal processes, to Whitehead, are not merely spatio-temporal relations cut off from the non-temporal possibilities. Whitehead refers to the non-temporal possibilities in a series of transcendent orders as the eternal objects, God and Creativity, but all these transcendent orders are in and

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8 Stcherbatsky: The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 41.
10 Radhakrishnan & Moore: A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, p. 341.
* H. Sastri: Advayānajraśaṁgraha, Introduction, p. XXIV
11 Process and Reality, Macmillan & Co., 1929, p. 53
12 Adventures of Ideas, Pelican, 1942, pp. 154-5
through the spatio-temporal processes; the passage beyond the spatio-temporal world is towards an order of peace beyond all turmoils and tragedies.\textsuperscript{13} Whitehead's expressions are almost Buddhistic, though the background of his reflection is entirely Western. He meets Nāgārjuna in many points; both find reality in a 'relational universe', and both crave for a possibility in the quiescence of plurality, or peace. Whitehead explains peace both from the personal and from the cosmic socio-cultural process in various ways,\textsuperscript{14} but Nāgārjuna ends up by referring it to undifferentiated existence or experience\textsuperscript{1}. It is non-different from the relational order, but it is not as the relational order; its understanding lies in the negation of all 'particularising conscious-ness'—self, dharmas (particulars), causal or temporal process, and nirvāṇa or Buddha, if taken as discrete entities.

Thus interpreted, no one will like to compare Nāgārjuna's critical standpoint by associating him with an empiricist and sceptic as Hume, or a critic like Kant, in the logico-empirical-metaphysical mode of the west. Even to compare him with Bradley of the present century, who tries to detach himself from all categorical modes, would lead one to innumerable difficulties. Nāgārjuna's 'undifferentiated whole'\textsuperscript{1} is not Bradley's Absolute, because it is neither supra-relational non non-relational, if one attends to Bradley's mode of reflection; it is one with the relational experience, without which the relational experience is a vacuity (śānya). Because it is a 'full' experience, its relational aspect is also the same. The question of exclusion and inclusion does not arise in Nāgārjuna's undifferentiated existence. Bradley is haunted by the idea, viz., how to place the world of appearance into the world of reality, but, for Nāgārjuna, the appearance is already placed in reality, and hence no transmutation of appearance is necessary.\textsuperscript{16} Nāgārjuna's relativism is not for the denial of relativity, but it is a pointer to its 'undifferentiated whole' in which it has its significance Candrakīrti aptly declares that Nāgārjuna is a relativist and not a negativist.\textsuperscript{16} Candrakīrti, therefore, does not hesitate to defend Nāgārjuna in the background of the reflections of Dignāga, a master-mind in Buddhist thought following his great masters, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism. In the Yogācāra school there is no direct assumption of the discrete entities (dharmas) as postulates and their external association with a causal process (pratityasamutpāda), but there is an attempt to interpret the presented universe with the discrete entities and the causal process by the efficient psychomoral ideational store or cosmic-psyche collective consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) which has a reference to a further experiential principle, viz., non-dual or undifferentiated experience (advaya-jñāna). In the Yogācāra thought one can clearly discern a relational interpretation of the 'discrete

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 273
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., Part IV, Ch. XX (Peace), also writer's Nāgārjuna and Whitehead in the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1953.
\textsuperscript{1} & 6 Appearance and Reality, Macmillan & Co. 1908.

\textsuperscript{t} cherbatsky : The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 43.
entities', causal process, and psycho-moral consciousness by the final efficient principle of non-dual experience,\textsuperscript{17} but, Nāgārjuna, we know, would cut short this long-drawn process by suggesting that the relationality of the presented or external universe and of the inner universe, has always a reference to a transcendent experience, which may not be construed as having an efficiency as the Yogācāras suggest. Nāgārjuna perhaps fully understands the suggestions of Āvaghoṣa (1st century A. D.), who in his, Mahāyanasradhodhotpada-sūtra,\textsuperscript{18} had already prepared the ground for an 'undifferentiated experience' which is untouched by any particularising consciousness or causality or efficiency; it is pure suchness or thusness (tathatā).

In the case of the Logical School of Buddhism sponsored by Dignāga,\textsuperscript{19} the presented perceptual experience manifests the efficient transcendent non-dual experience (as understood by the Yogācāras) is the point of pure sensation; it is untouched by dichotomous intellectual activity, which introduces extraneous images into the transcendent point of pure sensation, by thought and language; the perceptual experience has always a reference to the point of pure sensation, directly or indirectly through a sign. Chandrakīrti objects to this dualistic theory of perceptual experience\textsuperscript{20} by pointing out that if the transcendent experience is presented in the point of pure sensation, that point cannot be untouched by the intellectual activity. So, according to him, there cannot be any experience of the point—discrete efficient moment of experience or a thing-in-itself, completely cut off from intellectual constructions, but only a 'relational experience', which Nāgārjuna suggested.\textsuperscript{21} Referring to Dignāga's presented perceptual experience of a jar, Chandrakīrti says that if it is already presented, it has its......efficiency to be what it is, there is no need to inquire into its efficient...extraneous causal basis. The notion of causality conflicts with the notion of existence and efficiency; it is a problem to decide which of these are prior or posterior to the other; the real reason is not their priority or posteriority, but their essential relativity. From this relativist standpoint, which is nothing but Nāgārjuna's standpoint, Chandrakīrti argues that it is difficult to establish the view of a discrete introspection, sensation, or consciousness,\textsuperscript{22} his conclusion is almost the same as that of the contemporary western psychologists; Chandrakīrti's denouncement of the discrete entities etc., is not a repetition of Nāgārjuna's thought, but it is an understanding of Nāgārjuna in the background of

\textsuperscript{17} Takakusu: Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness in Philosophy East & West ed., by Moore, Princeton University Press, 1944, pp. 79-82, for a short resume of the four Buddhist schools vide, H. Sastri: Advayavajra-samgraha, Introduction, pp. xxv-xxvi.


\textsuperscript{20} Stecherbatsky: The Conception of Nirvāṇa, pp. 141-2.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., pp. 141-4.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., pp. 145-6, 157-8.
Dignāga’s efficient reflection. In this context, Chandrakīrtī forcefully points out that Nāgārjuna did not want to establish a view, logic or a dialectic, in place of other views, logic or dialectic, his main motive was to show that in an ‘interlinked presented universe’, there can be no place for a specific view, logic or dialectic, and, if the interlinked universe has always a reference to an undifferentiated experience, in that transcendent sphere also there can be no view, logic or dialectic; but Candrakīrtī was sure that Nāgārjuna will not denounce the place of views, logic or dialectic in the ordinary sphere of experience.23 Murti seems to understand all these aspects of Nāgārjuna’s reflections, but still he presents Nāgārjuna’s thought as exhibiting a ‘dialectic’; Murti interprets the dialectic in a special sense as a consciousness of a conflict in Reason, and suggests that the aim of philosophic consciousness is to resolve this conflict by proceeding through the three moments of the dialectic—dogmatism (d̄ṣṭi), criticism (śūnyata or prasāṅga) and intuition (prajñā).24 Accordingly he shapes the entire Buddhist thought from the Buddha to Nāgārjuna, and suggests that Nāgārjuna’s is the culminating stage realising the philosophic fruition of the prajñā beyond the two earlier stages. This paper suggests that this novel dialectic has some significance in the development of philosophic consciousness in general, but it has not much value in the case of Nāgārjuna if one follows Candrakīrti’s commentary.

From an aspect, Nāgārjuna’s logic, if at all he had a logic, will appear as ‘fierce’25 or even as ‘sceptical’, but if his statements are examined within the shadow of and with the special reference to the Buddhist views of the Vaibhāṣikas, it will be evident that his ‘interlinked or relative existence’ can only support a denial of ‘discrete existence or entities’—of self, of discrete particulars (dharmaś), of causal and temporal processes, nay even of nirvāṇa and Buddha, if they are construed as ‘discrete entities’. Thus his conclusion may be shocking to those who adhere to the Vaibhāṣika tradition, but it is certainly liberating to those who would like to go beyond this tradition to other developments in Buddhist thought, passing through the intermediate stage of the Sautrāntikas: the Sautrāntikas interpret the ‘relative existence’ as purely relative or phenomenal, thus fostering a view and a logic. To Nāgārjuna, the ‘relative existence’ invariably refers to a real existence which is undifferentiated, if so, he puts a stop to all ‘discrete entities’, hence to a ‘view’ or ‘logic’ which centres round the ‘discret entities’; he draws attention at once to the non-dual experience of Mahāyāna Buddhism already established by AŚvaghosa. The prospect of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is not in the line of the Yogācāraś or the Logical School of Dignāga, for they entertain in some form the relative reality of the entities and causal

23 Ibid., p. 155.
processes; they foster a view or a logic; but Nāgārjuna's is a direct way of understanding the relative existence as undifferentiated existence, excluding any view or logic both in the relative and transcendent spheres; in the relative sphere, there is no place for view or logic as it always has a reference to undifferentiated existence which alone is real, and in the transcendent sphere, because the existence is undifferentiated, all views and logic are automatically excluded. This novel view of relative existence which is non-different from the undifferentiated existence, but yet not as the undifferentiated existence, can be found in a posterior development of Indian thought after the Logical School of Dignāga and Dharmakirti, viz., in the Vedāntic revival of Śaṅkara. In bringing out this aspect of Nāgārjuna's philosophy, this paper agrees with Radhakrishnan's suggestion that Nāgārjuna's 'negative logic' 'prepares the ground for the Advaita philosophy,' and, in another aspect, it urges that Nāgārjuna's philosophy provides a basis for a novel realistic philosophy in the line of Whitehead, opening an avenue for research in East-West philosophy.

26 Ibid; p. 669.
As I sit down to write these few lines, at the Editor's urgent invitation, Mrs. Schilpp and I have just returned from half an hour's personal visit with the President of India during his official visit to the United States and at the President's own, most kind invitation.

India's great Philosopher-king had changed neither in appearance nor in attitude since our previous meetings, before he had been elevated to the highest office in the giving of his people. He was the same, kind, courteous, sympathetic and friendly philosopher who, despite his pressing obligations of State, yes, and of the world, began our conversation with questions concerning our and our family's personal well-being.

When we managed to shift our discussion to problems of State and of the world, it became obvious at once that India's great President was imbued, above everything else, with the sincere and profound care for actual world-peace which we had always noted even in our other encounters with him down through the years. He expressed an honest regret at not being able, under the pressure of his present duties, to find time for writing philosophy. But every word and every thought he expressed gave evidence that, instead of writing philosophy, he was hard at work trying to translate his philosophical convictions and ideas as much as humanly possible into living reality.

There was nothing of nationalistic aggrandizement in any of his remarks. Rather, everything he said seemed to demonstrate the fact that the spirit of rampant nationalisms was, in the midst of today's world, one of the major and most dangerous obstacles to world-peace; emphasizing, as it does, those aspects which divide nations rather than those which would tend to unite them. He unhesitatingly admitted that—especially for former colonized peoples—the only path to true internationalism lay through initial national independence. But he regretted that this natural step all too often, instead of leading towards international unity, had succeeded
in provoking such intense nationalistic tendencies that the individual trees of the separate nations were unable to see the forest of mankind; and thereby further exaggerating international problems and difficulties. Humanity, he insisted, is "above all nations." Although he did not happen to mention the word, it seemed clear that, like his Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, Dr. Radhakrishnan stands committed to the ideal of actual world government as the only feasible way of establishing world-law and, by means of it, guaranteeing world-peace.

He expressed his conviction, moreover, that both, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Krushechev, honestly and sincerely desired peace; but that each found himself under the obligation to "save face" with his respective people. Thus face-saving, Dr. Radhakrishnan pointed out, was by no means limited as a necessity for Orientals! We must help both of them, therefore, to be able to "save face."

Here was the insight of the philosophical and religious idealist matched by that of the hard-headed, pragmatic political realist.

It was an inspiring half hour not soon to be forgotten. India's philosopher-statesman proved himself to be as much statesman as philosopher. And India is certainly to be congratulated upon her good sense in selecting him as their President. On the occasion of this his 76th Birthday everyone who cares for not merely India or the Orient, but for the fate of all mankind, can only wish him good health, strong vigor, long life, and the fulfilment of his greatest hope and dream: World-Peace!
Since the time of Hume and Kant, at least, it has been a standard though by no means universal practice among philosophers to distinguish between two radically different types of meaning. Although the two types of meaning have been variously designated, the distinction may be characterized as that between natural and assigned meaning. In its most familiar guise it appears as the distinction between sense data and conceptual form. The former is generally construed as constituting the 'given' and, hence, as 'natural', and the latter as that meaning which is imposed upon the 'given'—thus an 'assigned' meaning. Although there has been considerable discussion and some controversy as to the character and status of both types of meaning, the dichotomy itself has been largely unchallenged. In many quarters to espouse the dichotomy has been regarded as a necessary requirement for any genuine empiricist philosophy. So close has been the logical association between the two doctrines that the one has seemed logically to entail or to require the other. I propose to examine the question whether (a) the dichotomy is correctly assumed and (b) whether it is a requirement for an empiricist philosophy. To put the latter question we must, of course, refuse to credit the distinction as an a priori criterion of empiricism. That it is definitive of some forms of empiricism cannot be denied; but that it is required for every legitimate form of empiricism is open to question. It would be strange indeed if the final criteria of an empirical philosophy were wholly a priori. We may, I think, safely assume that such is not the case.

Before proceeding to examine some of the more important assumptions and consequences of this dichotomous theory of meaning it is
important to note that it has played as large a role in ethics as in epistemology. If, for example, we take Kant as a typical exponent of this form of empiricism, we find a fairly exact parallel between his theory of sensation and his theory of inclination. In both cases Kant appeals to a natural/empirical factor which is what it is in relative independence of the reflective intellect. Even as the understanding organizes and structures the raw data of empirical intuition, so, too, does practical reason constrain and inform the raw material of empirical desire. Kant assumed that our empirical desires (inclinations) are simply what they are as ‘given’. We may have been favorably or unfavorably endowed by nature and must accept the empirical nature we have been given. The moral task is to bring our empirical desires into conformity with the demands of the moral law. I do not propose here to consider the merits of Kant’s ethical formulations. I wish only to point out that Kant operated with precisely the same theory of meaning in his ethics as in his epistemology. It is at least possible that if Kant was in any fundamental respect mistaken in the original separation between ‘sense meaning’ and ‘conceptual meaning’, this error may have been carried over into his ethics. I say ‘may have been’ since we cannot assume that if invalid epistemologically the distinction is not warranted in the realm of morals. I hope to show, however, that it is one and the same issue that is involved and that if the dichotomy is mistaken in epistemology it is necessarily mistaken in ethics—and vice versa.

In ethics the dichotomy is as old as Plato and as new as Freud. Moreover, it lies at the foundation of a great deal of contemporary discussion of attitudes, beliefs, and moral action. In some of the Dialogues, Plato represented the appetites as having their own motive power and direction independently of the will and reason. We need not concern ourselves here as to Plato’s final statement on the matter. Suffice it to note that we have inherited from Plato a radical distinction between the appetitive and the rational. The fact that the will stands somewhere in between does not affect the distinction. Whether we call them ‘appetites’, ‘inclinations’, ‘impulses’, ‘instincts’, ‘natural affections’, or what you will, in each case the originally given empirical nature of man is held to be a self-contained system following its own empirical laws. It was not regarded as fully independent of the will and reason by Plato anymore than by Kant. It was, however, regarded as relatively autonomous and, most importantly, external to the higher faculties. For Plato, reason could curb the appetites and subject them to its own aspirations. But the relationship remained external and coercive. In spite of the fact that there is a strong tendency in Kant’s anthropology away form any such dualism, Kant, too, often spoke of practical reason as having to impose its maxims upon the inclinations. In Civilization and Its Discontents Freud echoed the same dualistic view in holding that instinct and culture are in irremediable and tragic conflict with one another. If to be an empiricist in ethics is to
acknowledge a self-contained system of natural meaning, dualism in some form is a necessary tenet of any empirically oriented ethical theory. The question about experience is basically the same whether we are speaking of sense data or of impulses.

Parochial as we all tend to be in philosophy, it is tempting for us to identify our own version of empiricism with absolute truth. Anglo-American philosophers thus tend to forget or simply fail to notice that there are basic differences between empiricism in the West and in the East, or even that Continental European empiricism is basically at odds with the dominant form of empiricism in England and America. And the difference turns, I believe, primarily on the issue with respect to meaning. Phenomenology, for example, which professes to be a form of empiricism, vehemently rejects the dichotomous theory of meaning and the anthropology on which it is based. Although the question as to the validity of the dichotomy of natural and assigned meaning inevitably arises as a problem internal to any theory which espouses it, the issue has now been joined in external form between phenomenology and other self-avowed empirical philosophies. Crucial in the dispute is the relation of empirically given materials to reflective principles of whatever sort. The two fundamental questions are: (1) how is the ‘given’ given? and (2) what is the relation of the ‘given’ to the interpretive or governing principles assigned to it? Of particular importance is the subsidiary question whether the relation between the ‘given’ and interpretive or governing principles is purely external.

Another way of posing the fundamental issue at stake here is to ask how the reflective consciousness is related to that consciousness on which it reflects. Those empiricist theories which embrace a dichotomous theory of meaning hold that sensation and appetite are phenomena of consciousness. The seeing of a red sense datum, for example, is universally considered to be a token of awareness, even as impulses and inclinations are generally construed as conscious processes. Whether or not that is true without qualification, it is certainly the case that sensations and inclinations become materials for interpretation and manipulation only in so far as they enter the threshold of consciousness. We need not concern ourselves here with the question whether sensation and inclination have or can have a pre-or non-conscious aspect which may be causally related to conscious manifestations. Experience is by definition a conscious process; to talk of a non-conscious or, in the literal sense, of an ‘unconscious’ experience is a contradiction in terms. If, then, sensation and empirical desire are both experienced and only as such provide the matter of fact foundation for empirical theories of perception and appetite, how is this primary sort of experience related to the allegedly secondary variety in which the former is judged, interpreted, ordered, etc.? Or, put in different terms, how is the primary consciousness of initial awareness related to the reflective consciousness?
It is crucially important not to lose sight of the fact that it is two moments of consciousness which are presupposed in the dichotomy. Since natural meaning (the meaning of sensation and inclination) is a component of experience, it stands within rather than beyond consciousness. Moreover, when either sensation or inclination is brought to reflective awareness in the form of perceptual judgment or the choice of ends, it is a transformation of consciousness that takes place. What needs to be explained, among other things, is the possibility of this transition from primary to secondary awareness. On virtually all theories of perception, the perceptual judgment is secondary to and presupposes the original intuitive awareness. Moreover, the primary awareness serves as a component within the perceptual judgment. The question is whether this fact can be accounted for on the assumption that the two moments of consciousness are related only in external fashion. Or, to put the matter in other terms, is it possible to sustain the necessary unity of consciousness while maintaining the dichotomy between natural and assigned meaning? The latter problem is acute because to regard the two types of meaning as externally related requires that the two moments of consciousness be related only in an external way.

The nature of the dichotomy is now, we may hope, sufficiently clear that we may proceed to consider its tenability and, if necessary, its revision. The dominant motivation in assuming it is apparently to provide a firm basis for an empirical principle. We shall have to consider whether the dichotomy is either necessary for or compatible with a genuine empiricism.

We may start, perhaps, with the phenomenon of seeing which has been such a favored topic for philosophical theories of perception. If, as we have noted above, seeing is construed as an item of experience, it must be counted as a conscious act. To see is, thus, necessarily to be conscious of something, an object or, at least, of a sense datum. If we assume that it is possible to be aware of an isolated sense datum, e.g. a patch of red, we can inquire what is involved in this consciousness. We must grant, in the first place, that the consciousness of such a datum need not be reflective. That is, the person having the awareness need not be reflectively aware of this fact and, hence, not in a position to affirm or assert it in the form of a judgment or proposition. Sensing is, we are tempted to say, just a natural fact on which perceptual judgments may be based. The sensation as a ‘matter of fact’ is just what it is in full independence of interpretation. To deny such matters of fact would thus appear tantamount to denying that perception has an empirical foundation. This much surely must be granted to the empirical realist, namely that sensation occurs as a natural fact and, further, that it serves as a limit on all perceptual judgments. A problem arises only when we attempt to analyze this ‘fact’ of primary awareness.

Sensing is by hypothesis a fact of awareness and, further, of individual
awareness. If, for example, I say that 'I am seeing red' I am presumably reporting something about my own elementary awareness. For the assertion 'I am seeing red' to be true, it must have been the case that before making the judgment I was in fact seeing red. The 'I am seeing' in other words can and often does include a time span which extends beyond the moment of judgment itself. I may well mean to report that I was seeing red at a time when I was not making the judgment and not reflective at all about my own awareness. The judgment thus professes to iterate the individual's consciousness of a sensible quality; it does not establish self-consciousness de novo. For the reflective or judging consciousness to be possible, a transition must occur within consciousness such that the primary consciousness is transformed.

It was one of Kant's most fundamental and important theses in his Deduction of Categories to show that all empirical awareness pertains to what Kant termed the 'Transcendental Unity of Apperception'. In less imposing terms, Kant's assertion is the relatively simple and altogether straight-forwarded claim that sensing is as much an item of 'my' awareness as is judgment itself. If that were not so, we would be unable to account for the possibility of empirical judgment. In other words, it would be misleading for me to say that 'I was seeing red' where I made this claim for a non-reflective moment of sensible awareness. To acknowledge that sensation is a conscious process and to deny that it pertains to a conscious subject is to bifurcate consciousness. (There remains in Kant's thought a residue of dualism in spite of his own powerful arguments against it.) The fact that there might be in some altogether general and impersonal way the consciousness of seeing red would be of no use whatever in supporting or accounting for an empirical judgment. For the empirical principle to work it must be possible for the person having a sensation to make use of that sensation in reflective judgment. One may, of course, accept the claimed judgments of others and, hence, their reports as to their primary sense impressions. But the warrant for this trust must surely depend upon the connection which is experienced in one's own consciousness between the primary experience and the reflective judgment.

If I were incapable of having sense impressions or impulses I would have no reason whatever to credit others with an empirical foundation for their assertions. The point to be made here is essentially Kant's thesis with respect to the necessary unity of consciousness. Can anyone reasonably argue that anything can pass for an item of experience which does not enter into some consciousness? And can this consciousness be anything other than that of the judging subject? Without recapitulating Kant's elaborate argument, we can summarize the matter by noting that no item of experience is directly available for judgment or interpretation that has not been originally included within the consciousness of the subject which judges. The judging consciousness must therefore be
one and the same consciousness as that which enjoys sensation or impulse. And this entails that it must be in both instances a self-consciousness. It must, in other words, be the consciousness of one and the same self within which the two types of awareness occur and are related. Natural meaning cannot, then, be assigned to an animal or neutral consciousness in general and conceptual or assigned meaning to a reflective and personal consciousness. To do so would be to render them irrelevant to one another. In both instances the awareness is and must be reflective in that it pertains to self. It is with two distinguishable moments of self-consciousness that we are confronted, the one pre-reflective and the other reflective and judgmental. The pre-reflective consciousness may be designated as an immediate self-awareness; the reflective as an explicit and developed self-awareness. The total self is involved in both moments of awareness; through reflection it comes to the awareness of its own prior state. It is the original ‘seeing self’ which becomes conscious of itself as seeing in the reflective judgment. It was of course a ‘seeing’ self all the while.

If our analysis, following Kant’s argument in the Deduction, is correct, the radical dichotomy between sense meaning and conceptual meaning is mistaken. To regard sense meaning as purely natural is by implication to assign it to a natural mode of consciousness. However contingent it may be, sensation necessarily falls under the general conditions of awareness and, more particularly, the awareness of a human self. To avoid confusion it is important to distinguish here between the initial moment of awareness which we have termed ‘immediate’ and the second or ‘reflective’ moment. The first is an act of self-consciousness in the elementary sense that it is the consciousness of a self. As immediate there is no reflective distance between the conscious subject and its own awareness. Still, there are features peculiar to this immediate awareness which make it impossible to classify it as a mere animal consciousness. Sensing is not and can never be fully self-contained and in that sense ‘empirical.’ Those concerns, interests, and capacities which may be subsequently exhibited in all their complexity are necessarily operative in sensation. Although sensing cannot be construed as mere ‘confused’ or indistinct thought neither can it be divorced from thought. The ideas of ‘pure sensation’ and ‘pure conception’ are at best limiting notions. They are extremely useful for distinguishing important features of our experience, but they can be seriously misleading when construed as autonomous and independent processes.

It is impossible in short compass to trace out all of the implications of the view which has been sketched above. We must content ourselves to suggest only a few of the more important consequences. It should be obvious, in the first place, that if the dichotomy is rejected the data of sensation cannot be regarded as constituting a pure realm of natural ‘matter of fact’. If the meaning of any sensed item of our experience depends in part at least upon our interests and our manner of consciousness,
the meaning of a sense datum is never merely natural. Only by an act of abstractive analysis can we ‘freeze’ the datum so as to regard it as altogether independent of our mode of apprehending it. Pure natural meaning is a limit which we approach in our awareness when our passivity is maximal, but can never attain. In so far as empiricist theories depend upon the notion of pure natural matters of fact they operate with a fiction. And in the ethical domain, the notion of pure impulsive or instinctual behaviour is equally misleading. It is impossible to bifurcate action or conation into a pure natural component and a conscious or reflective component. Again, we are confronted with limits at two ends of a scale rather than with realms which are substantively different. On the positive side, the view we have sketched entails that conceptual themes are present to our primary experience. It is precisely these themes which present much if not all the content for our reflective endeavour. It is romantic nonsense to talk of an instinctual system which remains untouched by personal and cultural development. It is equally foolish to set attitudes and actions in opposition to beliefs. A reexamination of such basic anthropological questions would require serious revisions in the formulation of many ethical problems.

Finally, we may return to our earlier question about meaning and experience. So far is the dichotomy between natural and assigned meaning from being a requirement for empiricism that it is incompatible with the latter. The concept of experience requires that we retain the reference to the experiencing subject. This is no less true of sensation and inclination than of judgment and choice. We may speak of experience in general terms, as some philosophers have done. But it is only from the perspective of our own experience that philosophical claims can be validated. When this connection is lost, anything whatever may be claimed without fear of contradiction or refutation. For human experience, at least, the dichotomy between natural and assigned meaning is untenable. And, yet, it is on the foundation of just this dichotomy that a goodly number of self-styled ‘empiricist’ theories of knowledge and ethics have been formulated. To speak so sharply is not to offer a wholesale indictment of such theories, for there is something in the dichotomy that must be saved. Immediate awareness must be distinguished from reflective awareness, intuition and impulse from perceptual judgment and deliberate choice. The correction we wish to urge is simply that primary awareness in no realm can be reduced to a mere natural phenomenon.
Although religious concerns are prominent throughout nearly all Indian metaphysics, the agnostic and atheistic character of much Indian religion—e. g. Jainism and Theravāda Buddhism, and the Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā schools—has meant that there has been much discussion both about the existence of a Creator and about the validity of the arguments adduced for his existence.

The doubtfulness of such proofs has not, however, always been taken in an anti-theistic sense: for the truth of śruti or *revelation¹ may still be affirmed, and any emphasis upon divine grace can be taken to imply that it is through God’s revealing activity, rather than through the intellectual efforts of men, that the truth is known. In this connection, a variety of positions is adopted. First, there is the rationalistic approach of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school: *revelation is valid, because it is the work of an omniscient Being, and the existence of the latter can be established by inference². Thus the trustworthiness of scripture is not intrinsic, but is based upon the proofs. Second, at the other extreme, Rāmānuja argues that the proofs are doubtful, because of the serious counter-arguments that can be brought against them, and belief in God rests solely upon *revelation³. Madhva, thirdly, represents an intermediate

¹ Asterisks indicate that the English words stand for certain key Sanskrit expressions and are not necessarily precise equivalents: e. g. śruti or “what is heard” does not in all particulars correspond to the Judaeo-Christian concept of revelation, which has a visual rather than auditory analogy built into it, and is necessarily connected with the concept God.

² Nyāya Sūtra II. i. 68; cp. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (4th impression, 1958), p. 258.

position: namely, that the proofs by themselves are doubtful, if the
truth of *revelation is in question; but given the truth of the latter, the proofs
become convincing*. But even acceptance of the truth of *revelation does
not settle matters, since an atheistic interpretation of it is possible, as in
Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṁsā; and since also Yoga, though accepting an Īśvara
or divine *Lord, does not accept a Creator. Thus the appeal to *revela-
tion, in connection with God’s existence, needs to be backed by showing
that a theistic interpretation of the words of scripture is correct. But
since the truth of *revelation is one main support for theism, it is useful
to consider the grounds which have been advanced for it.

It is true, however, that in a way no grounds need be advanced: that
is, one position is simply that *revelation is self-established (svatahsiddha)*
or self-authenticated (svatohprāmāṇya)*. Nevertheless, not only is there
a wide range of interpretation as to the nature of *revelation, but also
subsidiary grounds for the validity of the texts have been adduced. Un-
der the first head, though Indian religious thought has frequently con-
sidered *revelation in a quite straightforward way, as consisting in certain
words, viz. the Vedic writings, etc., there are other interpretations which
radically affect the status of the texts, and thereby shift the locus of
arguments about *revelation. Thus, for example, Śaṅkara’s division be-
 tween higher and lower knowledge is taken to imply that *revelation be-
longs to the latter, save only the identity-texts, i.e. those passages which
affirm the identity of Brahman and ātman. (*Absolute and *self). Yet
even these disappear in the state of realization and emancipation. In
other words, the scriptures are valid in so far as they point towards a
certain, supreme, experience—so that their truth in the last resort is prag-
matic and provisional. What confirms them is experience (anubhava);
and by then they are useless. This, clearly, modifies considerably the
concept of their being self-authenticated. Here Śaṅkara’s view is not so
very far from that of Yoga, namely that scriptures originate from the
supreme intuition in (pratibhā) of yogins. Hence, the issue about the vali-
dity of *revelation is shifted to that of the trustworthiness of yogic ex-
perience. Thus Kumārila raises the central problem: the experience of
an individual yogin may be delusory, and so has to be checked by other
evidence*. Likewise, the Jains argued that in so far as spiritual insight
or intuition is appealed to in establishing the existence of a *Lord, it is
as well to ask whether the belief in a *Lord arises from the intuition or

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conversely. Kumārila went on to affirm that the other evidence required to check the intuition was provided by scripture, which is itself accepted by the mahājana or general consensus. It may be noted that the Yoga and Advaita positions, as might on other grounds have been expected, have analogies to the scriptural attitudes of Buddhism. Thus the authority of the Buddhist writings derives from that of the great Teacher; and the content of their teachings in turn originate from his supreme spiritual knowledge. Hence, with the growth of Mahāyāna ideals, and the notion that the adept himself can achieve Buddhahood, it was not surprising that the ultimate significance or reference (artha) of the scriptures became the non-dual experience. Yet in so far as, in both Jainism and Theravāda Buddhism, the authority of scripture derives from the omniscience (differently interpreted) of the Teacher, there is an analogy with the Nyāya position. This generated a wry problem for Vaiṣṇavite theology when the Buddha came to be regarded as an avatāra of Viṣṇu. Vyāsatīrtha used the situation to argue for the inherent validity of scripture, as opposed to its deriving its authority from God’s omniscience—the Buddha is divine, and yet deceived people by false teachings.

Regarding subsidiary grounds for holding that revelation is true, it was often argued that its self-authentication implied its eternity—on the ground that if ever it comes into existence, this must be through some agent and then the authentication would belong to the agent. Hence, not only its being eternal was thought necessary but also its being without personal authorship or apaurusṛeya. This was peculiarly important for Mīmāṃsā, since it denied God and was distrustful of intuition. Thus arguments were adduced against the human authorship of the Veda: for example, that tradition asserts this, that revelation teaches the everlasting law (sanātana dharma) which necessarily precedes human beings; that revelation introduces extra, supernatural knowledge not given in human experience. The eternity of the scriptures was, indeed, so important for Mīmāṃsā that it denied—what otherwise is universal in Indian religion—the ‘pulsating’ universe, i.e. the successive emergence and quiescence of the cosmos or (in theistic terms) the successive creation and destruction of the universe. On the other hand, Sāṅkhya argued, more naturalistically, that the Veda was of the nature of an effect, being sounds, etc., which are not eternal. Yet even those who would deny this could not always be described as fundamentalistic, because the theory that revelation is the content of the scriptures as seen in successive ages by rṣis or seers, or communicated by God to them, left the way open to

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9 See Dale Riepe, The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought (1961), 104.
10 See Ślokavārttika, 90; cp. Kusumāñjali, ii. 3.
13 See Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 309.
14 See Raghavendrachar, op. cit., p. 172.
an interpretation of religion in terms of religious experience, and once again the locus of discussion is shifted to the nature of religious experience. It may be remarked finally that arguments for the authorlessness of *revelation were apologetically important, since they tended to assign to the Veda a superiority over Buddhist and Jain writings, which admittedly owed their origin and authority to persons.

We can now move from *revelation to inferences which are held to be independent of scripture. One or two of the arguments depend fairly directly upon features of one or other of the darśanas or *viewpoints expressed in the traditional Hindu schools. For instance, there is an interesting Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argument which relates to anus or *atoms. It is this. The macroscopic entities in the cosmos are built up out of everlasting *atoms, which are of infinitesimal magnitude; when two atoms combine in a dyad, there is a jump in magnitude to what can be dubbed a "minute quantum" (hrasva); three dyads combine into a triad, and there is jump to a "gross quantum" (mahat parināma); it is by the addition of such *gross quanta that the magnitudes of larger bodies are generated. Thus, there is a distinction between the initial and the *gross combinations; addition of one infinitesimal to another does not yield a finite magnitude. Strictly, a single jump would have been enough: the double move to dyad and to triad is unnecessary (reminiscent of interposition of intermediaries in Gnostic doctrines of Creation). Now, the problem remains as to what it is that causes the jump from the infinitesimal to the minute. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika answer is that it is number. However it is further held in the Vaiśeṣika school (and, despite Dasgupta, by Udayana) that only unity is intrinsic to substances. Duality and plurality are due to "connective understanding" (apekṣābuddhi), i.e. they are mind-dependent. However, at the beginning of a world-process when *atoms begin to combine in dyads, there are so far no rational beings in the cosmos, since their existence requires atomic complexity. It follows, then, that there must be an extra cosmic mind at the time of śrṣṭi or *creation. This is God.

It may be noted that the non-theistic Vaiśeṣika discussed by Rāma-nuja is criticized for the inexplicability of the quantum jump. The introduction of number as the cause, to patch up the theory, raised the epistemological problem solved by the postulation of the *Lord as the perceiver of number: but it can always be replied that here, as sometimes elsewhere with theistic arguments, the introduction of God is a sign of theoretical inadequacy.

Another type of argument which closely depends on idiosyncratic

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17 op. cit., vol. i, p. 314 n. 1.
18 Kusumāñjali, v. 1.
19 On Brahma Sūtra ii. 2 10/11.
features of a particular viewpoint concerns the Advaitin thesis that there is only one eternal *self, identified with the *Absolute: it follows from this that any proof of the existence of the *self becomes a kind of theistic argument. In so far, however, as the Brahman-atman identification depends upon *revelation, or upon a particular interpretation thereof, an essential link in the argument is theological rather than metaphysical. Further, the *Absolute, though it is the supreme reality according to Advaita, is different in concept from the creative *Lord. In the last resort, the latter, like the empirical world, is part of māyā or *illusion. Thus the proof of the *Lord's existence via the proofs of an eternal *self is indirect; and the proofs of a *self, whether single or plural, represent too extensive a topic to enter into now.

In addition to arguments which depend closely on features of a given viewpoint, there is one, prominent in Indian thought, which presupposes a characteristic Indian religious concept, viz. that of karma. Thus in Śaiva Siddhānta, two connected considerations are advanced. First the doctrine of karma involves that there is an apportionment of good and evil in accordance with a person's deeds. But this apportionment presupposes a perfect knowledge of the moral law, and therefore only the *Lord can regulate karma. Second, karma is non-intelligent, and so cannot operate on its own. Nor can disembodied *selves, who are therefore without causal power, appropriate to themselves their karma. Consequently some further regulator of karma is required, and this must be God. A similar point is made by Yoga, in rejecting the completely adequate teleology of prakṛti or *nature. However, the notion that karma is self-operative is too deeply entrenched in Indian religious thought for such arguments to meet with much agreement, and it is commonly urged that karma as an unseen force suffices to explain what would otherwise require an intelligent Creator. Moreover, theism and analogous beliefs (such as belief in celestial Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in the Mahāyāna), by making mokṣa or *release depend, in some degree at least, upon God, and by therefore considerably modifying the operation of karma, were often held to weaken the sense of individual effort: and this is a main reason for the rejection of theism in Jainism and Theravāda Buddhism (likewise it cut at the roots of ritualism as defended by Mīmāṃsā). Nevertheless, the fact that, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and elsewhere, the operation of karma has been subsumed under the head of an unseen force (adṛśa) indicates some of the difficulty there has been in conceiving its mechanism. But, given, the truth of rebirth, for which

21 See further below.
22 Paranjoti, ibid.
25 Hiriyanā, Popular Essays, p. 47.
independent arguments were advanced, it has not been felt implausible to consider karma as a (happy ethical) law of nature.

We now come to arguments which are more general, i.e. they do not too closely depend upon features of particular *viewpoints nor upon any specific religious assumption. The most important of these is a version of the Teleological Argument, and it occasioned a comprehensive critique by Rāmānuja. The argument is stated in Udayana’s *Kusumāṇjali* and elsewhere. The cosmos is of the nature of an effect (*kārya*), being made up of parts; thus, having an analogy to artifacts, it requires an intelligent author. A secondary argument is that the cosmos has an analogy to a complex organic body, whose functioning is dependent upon an intelligent principle. Rāmānuja criticizes these points on anumber of grounds, the chief of which are as follows. (1) Experience shows that pots, etc., are produced by intelligent agents; but as the material causes of the earth, oceans, etc., are not known, and as we have not observed their being produced, we have no right to infer an intelligent agent. (2) The existence of a body made up of a complex of parts only requires the combination of those parts in a specially intimate relation. (3) In any event, intelligence is not the only condition of the continued existence of an organic body. (4) There is no strong analogy between organic bodies and nature: e.g. animated bodies characteristically have the property of breathing, but this is not true of the earth, sea, mountains, etc. (5) Even if the argument were valid, there is no reason why the world should not have been produced by more than one agent, e.g. by finite *selves. Though it can be objected that such *selves are ignorant of the material causes, etc., required for the production of the world, yet craftsmen are quite capable of performing their work without a full insight into the nature of their materials. (6) Is the cosmos supposed to have been produced all at one time, or in succession? The former supposition is unwarranted, since we have no evidence that the cosmos was created at one time, the second supposition would support the wrong conclusion—for experience shows that effects produced at different times are produced by different agents. (7) We only have experience of inferring a finite agent from certain kinds of artifacts: but no experience upon which to base an inference to an omniscient, omnipotent Spirit. Thus we could only legitimately infer a finite *self, and this conflicts with the definition of God. (8) Finite agents operate through their bodies; but if we ascribe a body to the *Lord we are allowing that something made up of parts can be eternal; but in this case the cosmos can be so regarded and there is no need to infer a Creator. But if God is bodiless, this destroys the basis of the inference, since we only experience effects produced by embodied agents. (9) The stronger the argument, the greater the

26 On *Brahma Sūtra*, I. i. 3.
27 v. 1.
28 Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 152.
supposed similarity between finite beings and God; but God is infinitely good, possessing all excellences, and it is thus repugnant to religious feeling that God should be compared with the imperfect beings of this world.

Rāmānuja also notes certain counter-objections to these arguments: e.g. that there is nothing intrinsically impossible in the production of an effect by a pure volition; and thus God bodilessly could create the cosmos. Again, though the cosmos is greater in scale than pots, etc., objection to teleological inferences on this ground would rule out, e.g., the inference of a person who for the first time sees a palace that this is the work of an intelligent agent.

The Teleological Argument is also found in the Śaiva Siddhānta: the world as a single complex whole requires one mind to focus the work towards a unified product. Finite souls and matter are inadequate for this task (we may note that, as with the karma argument, disembodied selves are regarded as causally inert). Madhva provided another variant, viz. that the orderly interrelation of selves in the world requires a Lord as coordinator, since if any one self had control over the others, others would have this power also, and the result would be chaos.

We have already discussed the atomic argument of the Nyāya-Vaisēśika, which depends upon a particular view of number and quanta. But there is a more general argument from movement, namely that the paradigm case of causation is volitional—e.g. when I raise my arm. Consequently, movement in general needs to be interpreted in the light of this model. Now, atoms, beings material entities, are in themselves inert. Hence, their combination, after a period of pralaya, or cosmic destruction, can only be explained by reference to an intelligence. But as with the former argument, finite selves as agents require bodies, and these are complexes of atoms. Hence the initial combinations of atoms presuppose God's existence. However the Vaiśēśika of the early period was not theistic, and such concepts as gravity, to explain the falling of objects, adhyās as an unseen force governing the circulation of fluids in plants, etc., indicated that no intrinsic difficulty was felt in assigning motion to inanimate objects quite independently of volitions, and this forms the substance of the Mimāṃsaka reply to the argument.

The sharp antithesis between soul and body, or more accurately between self and psychophysical organism, in so much of traditional Indian thought provided an argument which might seem paradoxically opposed to that above. The Śaiva Siddhānta argued that God is required to ex-

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31 M. Hiriyanna, Essentials of Indian Philosophy (1951), p. 92; cp. Kusumānjali, v. I. etc.
plain the bringing together of *selves and organisms. The *self is incapable of action without a body, and so cannot clothe itself, as it were, in a body. But it must be remembered that the real distinction comes between *self and organism, not between mind and body: that is, volitional activity is a phenomenon of the material world and so can more easily serve as a paradigm of other kinds of material causation. But this puts the difficulty in another place; and it is therefore a stock reply to these theistic arguments that the *Lord cannot be effective unless he is embodied, and then the inference ought to be repeated to account for his body, and so on ad infinitum.

We have already adverted briefly to a Yoga argument. Two others are of interest. Yoga-bhāṣya i. 24 has sometimes been seen as reminiscent of the Ontological Argument, namely "God's preeminence is altogether without anything equal to it or excelling it. For... it cannot be excelled by any other preeminence, since whatever might seem to excel it would itself prove to be that very preeminence. Therefore that is the Iśvara wherein we reach this uppermost limit of preeminence." Further, two equals are impossible, for when they simultaneously desire the same thing, one will necessarily be frustrated and thus is inferior. However, all this differs from the classical Ontological Argument in a number of ways: chiefly because it is an argument to show that the most perfect being is God, and is unique; and because existence as such is not treated as a perfection. The other interesting argument is more conclusive, since it does not merely attempt to show that the most perfect being is God but that this being is omniscient. It is argued that there are grades of knowledge and there must be a perfect limit to the series, viz. omniscience. and this must belong to a distinct soul, namely the *Lord. However, Mīmāṁsā found difficulty in this concept. Ordinary preception could not give the *Lord knowledge of all things past and present, etc.; thus some suprasensible mode of knowledge must be employed. But if this is possible for a *self, what is the use of the senses?

There are a few further counter arguments to theistic belief used in Indian traditional thought. Notably, the problem of evil weighed heavily with the Buddha and others. Again, there was difficulty in conceiving God's motive in creating, as he is totally self-sufficient and perfect. Again, if the existence of the world requires a Creator, the existence of a Creator requires a meta-Creator and so on. But if you can stop at any stage, why not stop at the first, and affirm that the cosmos is uncreated?

33 Paranjoti, op. cit., p. 35.
34 Cp. the argument used by Rāmānuja on Brahma Sūtra, I. i. 3.
36 Yoga Bhāṣya, i. 25.
37 Dasgupta, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 152.
38 Cp. the comments of S. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 454 f.
40 Dasgupta, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 152.
41 See also above n. 34.
Finally, the theistic arguments raised questions about the nature of inference. Early Indian materialism rejected inference, and in particular inductive inference, on the ground that a generalization would always be liable to perceptual falsification. Even if one could observe all positive instances of a concomitance, furthermore, it would be impossible to observe all negative instances, i.e., the invariable concomitance of non-A with non-B. However, Purandara (7th Century A.D.) allowed inference from what is perceptible to what is perceptible, but not—and here we can see one of the main Cārvāka motives for questioning the validity of inference—inferences to the imperceptible, which orthodox theologians used to establish truths about the transcendent realm. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika gave such analogical inference the name of sāmānyatadṛṣṭa it was of course a necessary form of reasoning if atomism were to be supported by argument. Likewise, Sāṅkhya had to use this type of inference to establish the existence of a creative and underlying *nature and eternal souls. But the disallowing of analogical inference to the unobservable imposed too drastic a limitation on physical speculations, and so the Cārvākas were in the position of banning both proto-science and theology, and it was ironic that they should have had as allies who were likewise sceptical about analogical inference the highly conservative Mīmāṁsakas.

Such then were the main issues and arguments clustering round the theistic proofs in the Indian tradition. The fact that different viewpoints and systems of religious belief lived together from a very early period meant that there was plenty of opportunity for debate about disagreements. This accounts for the fact that there is more discussion of the existence of God, about which the schools disagreed, than about karma and rebirth, about which they virtually all agreed. However, it became fairly clear that arguments for God’s existence could at best be a subsidiary means of persuasion, as Madhva held. Of greater importance has been the appeal to, and interpretation of, religious experience. This is central to modern Hindu and Buddhist arguments and apologetic.

42 Riepe, op. cit., p. 61.
43 ibid., pp. 61-62.
44 Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 152.
45 Naturally, a fair number of minor points have been omitted: e.g., Udayana’s arguments (Kusumāṇḍali, v. 2) that traditional arts, such as weaving, presuppose an intelligent author, because none knows of their human authorship, and that the world requires support, or it would fall. Such arguments are, obviously nugatory in the light of modern knowledge.
Madhu Sudan Saraswati, a great Advaita scholar is the author of the booklet entitled “Advaita ratna rakṣaṇam”. This small book has so far drawn the attention of a very limited section of oriental scholars. In this important work, the author has made a special attempt to establish of nondualism of Śaṅkara after refuting the objections raised against advaitavāda by the supporters of the bheda sat vāda. He has referred to a number of śruti and smṛti texts showing how these are interpreted by the supporters of the bheda sat vāda. Madhu Sudan has also made an attempt to show the defects inherent in the interpretations of the opponent group thereby proving that all śruti and smṛti texts should be interpreted from the advaita point of view.

I have written this special article with a view to placing before the scholarly world the main solution of some of the important objections of the veda sat vāda by Madhu Sudan Saraswati. The Ādvaita ratna rakṣaṇam has been written in the Nyaya-Nyāya style and perhaps for this reason the book is not very popular with us. I have, therefore, made an attempt to present the views of this great scholar in a popular style. I am particularly referring to his views expressed in “Śrutināṁ bhedaparavabhanga”.

The following are the śruti and smṛti texts considered in this article:
1. Āʾmā vā are draṣṭavyah, śrotavyo mantavyo nādiḥyāśītavyah.
2. Āimano vā are darśanena śrutiḥ maṭyā vijñānenedaṁ sarvaṁ vijñātaṁ bhavati.
3. Dehādestāttvikādbhedaṁ satyaṁ cātmānayajāntaṁ, mumukṣunāṁ na mokṣoṣti ............
4. Asthūlaṁ anarūniṁ etc.
5. Dve brahmaṇāḥ vidūtaṁ pariṁ cāparameva ceti...........
6. Dvā sūparṇaḥ sayujā sakhāya samānaṁ vṛksaṁ pariṣativaithe etc.
7. Puruṣa śūkta of the Rgveda.
8. Ajñānenaśvāṁ jagat tenera muhyaṁti jantalaḥ.
According to the supporters of the reality of difference, all sorts of differences such as the difference between matter and the soul: the difference between the soul and the soul: the difference between one material body and the other: the difference between the soul and the highest reality—are metaphysically real. One who fails to accept this metaphysically real difference, moves round the cycle of birth and death. Non-acceptance of the metaphysical reality of difference is the root cause of the worldly existence. In the opinion of these thinkers, the meaning of the statement dehādest-āttvikādbhedaṁ is that liberation can never be obtained by those who do not realise the distinction between the metaphysically real mater and the soul. Every jīva possesses knowledge of difference. There is no human being who does not feel the presence of difference. So, all the śrutī and the śruti texts should be interpreted in such a manner as to prove the reality of difference.

The śrutī text “asthūlam anamah” etc. declare nothing but the reality of difference. The use of “a” in asthūlam etc. confirms nothing but the reality of difference. Brahman has been distinguished from the material body which is gross. Brahman has been distinguished from the mind which is atomic in size. So, knowledge of difference is the true metaphysical knowledge. One who possesses this knowledge attains liberation.

Again, the śrutī text “Dve brahmaṇi veditaye” also teaches the reality of difference. Here a distinction has been made between para brahma and aparabrahma. “Dvā śūparṇā” similarly teaches that difference is the metaphysical truth. This is because in all these texts dvitva has been used and dual number is used only where there is difference. Dvitva is bheda vyūpta and so on the basis of dvitva, difference can legitimately be inferred.

The puruṣa-sūkta of the Rgveda should also be understood to imply difference, because there also we find mention of a thousand heads etc. In tadviṣṇoh paramampadam the sixth case ending has been used and this proves nothing but the reality of difference.

The questions put by Mātrṛyī and the answers given by Yajñavalkya also prove the reality of difference, because questions and answers can be made only if difference is admitted as real. Where there is absolute non-difference there is nobody to ask question and nobody to give a reply.
Further the Śruti-text ātmā vā are draṣṭavyah etc teaches that the soul can be realised by four forms of knowledge acquired through hearing, through vision, through reflection and through meditation.

According to bheda sat vādi nyāva, the mind is eternal. So, the mind can never become non-existent or false. How can then a non-dualist say that all things except Brahman are false? The Śruti text that teaches “etasmāt ātmano ākāśa sambhūtah” should be understood in two ways. The word sambhūtah means prakāśa (manifestation) in the case of eternal categories and pūrṇam (production) in the case of non-eternal things.

Even the mehāvākya tattvamasi śvetaketoh shows distinction between addressee, address and the addressee. The text “Natu tāt divīfyamasti” does not declare that there is no other thing except Brahman. On the contrary, it says that there is no second Brahman. Ekamecaiva vyātra, too, does not establish the falsity of everything except Brahman. What it asserts is that God is one and not more than one. When we say that the king of this maṇḍala is advitiya or the kiṃśuka tree of this forest is advitiya, we mean to assert simply that there is not more than one king in that particular maṇḍala and that there is not more than one kiṃśuka tree in that forest. We do not mean to negate the existence of elephants, horses and other trees by uttering these sentences.

Although the Śruti texts like mṛtyoh sa mṛtyumāṇuṣi etc. or neha nā nāsti kiṃcana declare the falsity of manyness: still these are contradicted by the perceptual knowledge of difference. Where perception establishes duality and difference, Śruti cannot negate that knowledge by preaching non-duality and non-difference.

MADHU SUDAN’S SOLUTION FROM THE ADVAITA POINT OF VIEW:

According to Madhu Sudan, there is no pramāṇa to establish that liberation can be attained only through knowledge of difference. Had there been any proof in favour of difference, then the Śruti too would have been declared the reality of difference. All Śruti texts such as ātmanaḥ vā are darśanena śrutyaḥ, mātyaḥ viṣṇunēdaḥ sarvam viṣṇuḥ bhavati or tvameva viditva aṁśtam iṣṭyumeti etc declare in one voice that liberation can be attained only by the realisation of non-dual ātman. According to the supporters of difference, liberation is effected only when the soul is differentiated from the metaphysically real body. This is not really the true teaching of the scripture. From the point of view of non-dualism, it can be asserted that one who has not been able to realise the false difference of the soul from the false body and sense-organs, should be given instructions in the subject of non-dualism. There is really no intellect which does not perceive non-difference in one form or another, and there is no source of knowledge that does not establish non-difference. In fact the use of “a” in asthūlaḥ ananumaḥ does not establish difference. This Śruti text makes
us familiar with the quality-less nature of Brahman and does not suggest that an aspirant should try to gain the knowledge of difference between Brahman and other things of the world. Nor is it logical to say that this asthālam śruti is to be understood as giving us knowledge of both difference and Brahman, because a difference in significance can be admitted when there is a difference in the sentences used. One and the same text cannot have opposite purport such as difference and non-difference.

Further the śruti never says that it is because Brahman is different from the body that it is called asthālam. There is no hetu hetumā relation between the two. So declaration of difference cannot be the real significance of this Śruti text. It is also not proper to hold that admission of tādātmya between the two radically different metaphysical reals like matter and soul is the cause of the worldly life. According to śruti and śruti, the ignorance of the true nature of Brahman is the root cause of this universe: "Ajñaṇenāavatān jagat tena mührunti jantavah. All of us possess such knowledge of difference as is manifested in the cognition of ‘my body’. Still we are going through pains and sufferings of life. We have not been liberated. Even the śruti text, namely dve brahmāni veditaye etc. does not establish difference. If the bheda vādi says that the use of dvitva proves difference, then the reply from the advaita point of view will be that this inferential knowledge of difference is contradicted by the adheda śruti texts like Tattvomāsi, ayamatmā brahma etc. In fact, no metaphysical difference is suggested by the Śruti text "dve Brahmāni etc." Knowledge of aparā brahman is necessary for acquiring the knowledge of para brahman. This ānusoṇiṅka bheda jñāna between parabrahma and aparā brahma is due to avidyā.

In the same manner, the śruti text Dvā sūparṇa, indicates apparent difference only and not real difference between jīvātmā and paramātmā. Just as one and the same tree may be both kapisamyogī and non-kapisamyogī when looked at from the point of view of avacchina and anavacchina, in the same way, brahman can be viewed as jīvātmā and paramātmā when considered from different standpoints.

In the puruṣa sūkta, too, there is no word that signifies difference. The apparent sense in which the Bheda vādi has tried to interpret it proves difference in respect of body only and not in respect of spirit. The expression like “thousand heads etc.” does not describe the real metaphysical form of the great puruṣa. This expression simply describes the imaginary form of puruṣa suitable for upāsanā. It is only when the satva guya of the mind is purified by upāsanā, that the aspirant reaches the stage in which Brahman can be realised immediately.

Further, the use of the sixth case ending in tadvijnoh paramanī padam does not prove difference. Sixth case ending can be used in those cases also where there is no difference. As for example in the case of the head of the Rāhu. (Rāhoḥ...)

The conversation that took place between Maitreyī and Yājñavalkya...
also centered round the imaginary difference of the empirical world. The self is to be seen, to be heard of etc, too, has been spoken of on the basis of the false difference of the false world. When the non-dual metaphysical truth is realised, all questions and all queries cease immediately. Question-answer in respect of the Highest Truth is useful so long as the aspirant has not reached the highest goal. The nyāya contention that the mind is eternal and so the non-dualist cannot assert the falsity of everything except Brahman, is also not logically acceptable. The śrutis clearly states the non-eternity of the mind by calling it a product. It is not proper to interpret the word “sambhūta” in two senses—manifestation and production. The adhikaraṇa namely yāvadvikāramtu vibhāga iti proves the falsity of everything except Brahman.

The difference between the addressee, address and the addressor supposed to be implied by Tattvamāsī Śvetaketoh, is also the difference of the empirical world. This vyavahārika bheda is also recognised by the supporters of the Advaita Vedānta. The jīvas are distinguished from one another by means of their different limiting adjuncts in the forms of the body, antahkaraṇa etc. But texts like āyamātmbrahma, kṣetrajñānā cāpi mām viddhi etc. point out nothing but non-dualism.

It is indeed true that texts like nātutadvitīyam, ekamevādvitīyam etc. negate the existence of everything except Brahman. In the conversation between Maitreyī and Yājñavalkya we find Maitreyī asking the following question:

"Why is it that one does not see the other in the final stage? Is it because no consciousness exists in the highest stage? While giving an answer to this question, Yājñavalkya has clearly stated that in the final stage there is only Brahman and nothing else. So the question of seeing the other does not arise at all. This reply of the great sage proves beyond doubt that the Śruti texts teach nothing but advaita."

The advaita śruti ekamevādvitīyam, too, proves the truth of non-dualism. The word “ekam” eliminates the possibility of sajātiya-bheda. When a man says “there is one jar” he means to suggest the absence of all other jars except that one. The word advitīyam negates vihātiya bheda (na vidyate dvitīyam yasya). Although the word advitīyam possesses the potency of establishing the reality of Brahman only, after falsifying the world of multiplicity, still with a view to preventing a less intelligent person from wrongly ascribing the distinction between dharma and dharmā to brahman on the plea of ekatva, eva too has been used along with ekam and advitīyam. The examples selected by the supporters of difference from the practical life such as “there is a secondless king in this mandal” are not suitable from the philosophical point of view. When a king is described as “secondless” the intention of the speaker is to praise the king who has no rival. The speaker does not mean to suggest the falsity of all other things because in practical life other things are as much perceived objects as the king.
The contention of the bheda vādī that the non-dualistic significance of śruti texts like "mṛtyoh sa mṛtyumāpnoti..." or "neha nānāsti kiścica" etc. is contradicted by the fact of duality perceived in this world, is also not justifiable. The question of negating one source of knowledge by another arises only when they convey contradictory cognitions regarding the same subject-matter. Here the subject of Śruti is different from that of perception. Perception gives us knowledge of that object only which is immediately present before us. It cannot give us knowledge regarding the being of an object which exists beyond the present. So perception is not competent to reveal the non-contradicted being of an object in past, present and future. While the śruti declares that the multiplicity and difference cannot claim non-contradicted existence in past, present and future; perception reveals that multiplicity and difference are not contradicted on the empirical level. Since the śruti and perception give different declarations, the śruti cannot be contradicted by perceptual knowledge.

Difference is proved by experience. The aim of the scripture is to enlighten man on such subjects which cannot be otherwise established. So, difference which is established by our everyday experience cannot be the purport of the scripture. Hence, both introduction and conclusion of the Śruti should be understood as teaching and preaching non-difference.

Brahman, the highest reality is non-attached, without a second, of the form of pure consciousness and is also the only metaphysically real category. The world is false like a dream and is a product of illusion. There can never be a real relation between the truth and the untruth, between the changeable and the unchangeable, between the soul and the non-soul: so the śruti declares the existence of Brahman which is derived of all false relation and which is also the substratum of all illusory cognition.

CONCLUSION

Reality or non-reality of multiplicity and difference is a very important controversial issue in ancient Indian philosophy. Sense-organs of the individual are so constituted that they are always directed to external diversity, whereas the tendency of reason is to discover unity in variety. Those who cannot deny wholly the reality of perceptual knowledge obtained through external organs, are naturally inclined to admit the reality of difference. The knowledge of difference as a fact of our empirical life is not, however, denied by anybody. Whether this difference is metaphysically admissible or not is the real issue of philosophical discussion. The vāsanā or saṃskāra that originates from our daily experiences naturally becomes very firmly rooted in us. So we do not readily agree to disbelieve the reports of our various sense-organs. Since difference is a fact of perceptual experience, it receives our approval easily; but if we seriously reflect on the power and potency of perception to prove the reality of difference, we become apprehensive, because we find that the external
object cannot fully be known through perception. In the perception of
the whole (avayavī for example, our sense-organ does not get related to
all the parts; hence the sautrāntikas maintain that the external objects can-
not be known through perception. They are to be established only through
inference. Indeed, we find that it is difficult for us to assess the value of
perception as a source of knowledge and unless that can be done, the
reality of difference cannot be established.

When the jar is perceived, is it a fact that we also perceive its diffe-
rence from the cloth? If the difference is perceived, do we perceive the
difference of the jar all other objects or from one particular object only?
The opponent of the advaita vāda—may reply that when he perceives the
jar, he perceives its difference from all the objects known to him. If this
be so, then again a further question will arise: “Will the objects unknown
to the opponent be perceived as non-different from the jar?” If so, then
the opponent will have to admit non-difference at least in regard to un-
known things. If the opponent refutes this by saying that in respect of
unknown objects, there is not even the perception of non-difference, then
from the advaita point of view, he may be requested to hold that in res-
pect of known objects, too, there does not occur perception of difference.
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DR. RADHAKRISHNAN,

MAN, AND THE UNIVERSE

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan appeared on my widening horizon in 1923 when, as a youth at Harvard, I was exploring Indian philosophy for signs of relativity. Professors William Ernest Hocking and Alfred North Whitehead directed me toward this great mind. I actually saw him, I believe, the first time at the Congress of Philosophy held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1926, and last talked with him at the 1959 East-West Philosophers Conference at the University of Hawaii.

In the years between, 1954 to 1958, Dr. Radhakrishnan gave Mrs. Shimer and me invaluable advice as we introduced the World Brotherhood movement into 26 cities or communities of India. To him I owe the precious recollection of an unhurried conversation with Mr. Nehru, sitting in his New Delhi garden as dusk gathered one evening in 1954.

Dr. Radhakrishnan gave advice and support to the World Brotherhood organization, now called the Council on World Tensions, with Asian headquarters in Bombay. He likewise encouraged the study of the great religions and many other programs that sought to enrich life with greater insight into eternal truths and with wider cooperation in the incorporation of these truths into the life of individuals and nations.

Many scholars disdain association with religious and "do-good" activities. They feel superior to the so-called "practical" person. Practice somehow corrupts disinterested research, they think, Plato and Dr. Radhakrishnan to the contrary. Dr. Radhakrishnan's life would seem to demonstrate, however, that true greatness is a prerequisite to fearless movement in all the many and various corridors and chambers of life. The relation of the Atman and the Brahman should teach all thinkers to avoid the unreal lines between the ideal and the practical, between the religious and the secular, between the intellectual and the emotional. These aspects
exist, no doubt, but they are aspects of a gestalt, universal in its inclusiveness. Dr. Radhakrishnan's mind and sympathies and achievements clearly show that his Atman is the Brahman.

Many philosophers and theologians, who do not consider the working-out of their ideas in human culture, fear the unity they see in the concept of the Brahman. Pantheism is a word often spoken as final condemnation of such a world-view. But that word may now be discarded. Contemporary physics shows us that individuality and unity are not inconsistent, and that the former is no less real or significant than the latter. In fact, it is individuality that saves unity from being nothingness. Relativity is now generally recognized as being essential to reality. The Brahman is the summation of change and not its total absence.

Man needs to understand this in order properly to evaluate his own finite existence and the reality of the particulars of his environment. Man must do more than discover God's will for himself. He must function as a real and significant determinant of that will. For man cannot return to the Brahman—he never left it. He lives, and moves, and has his being in it and of it.

Physics shows us that relationship in the atom. The electrons of protons or other units within the atom are particular things, and yet, at the same time, they are constituent parts of the atom as a whole. They are not lost in the atom. No more is man swallowed up in the absolute or universal reality—in God or the Brahman. Man is, to some extent, a free and creative violinst in the grand orchestra of nature and God.

God is not a totalitarian dictator, an absolute monarch, with a complete chart for every soul. Rather, He is a democratic God, the divine result of the cooperation of all His parts, including mankind. Man is co-creator with God. There is no set design for a man. Each man is an architect, to some degree, of his own personality and life. Living is, or can be, a creative art, with contributions from all the sciences. And both art and science are stimulated and guided by man's intimacy with God, by man's fortunate ability to see himself in his universal and eternal context. In other words, God's grace can enable man to harmonize his will with the divine purpose in the universe, at the same time that God is using man to help determine and realize this will. God must place a high value on a creative spirit such as Dr. Radhakrishnan. His words should be added to our sacred scriptures as revealing much of eternal truth.

This way of thinking is consistent with the revelations of science concerning the almost infinite complexity of reality, the successive discoveries of ever smaller units of energy playing upon one another in the cosmic ocean of reality. Or one may say, in less materialistic terms, that God or the Brahman embraces an infinity of vital, creative parts in hierarchies of creative individuals or personalities.

A frequent error is to regard the changing and temporary entities or events as less real or significant than an unchanging and eternal reality.
There is no evidence or logical necessity for the existence of such a reality. Change can as easily be eternal as the lack of change, and promises to be much more interesting, creative, and valuable. It needs no first cause or beginning. Even if there is a fixed substance, as there probably is, it never is without change, and would be meaningless and tantamount to nothingness apart from change.

This substance in which change inheres is neither material nor spiritual. These are characteristics of reality. Spirit is meaningless apart from space-time, and vice-versa. Reality is a living, conscious, creative substance eternally in motion in every part.

In this activity is to be found what seems to me to be the only satisfactory explanation for the existence of imperfection or evil. Reality in its development is limited by its own eternal nature. It can do only what can be done by the vital electro-magnetic energy or whatever the universal substance is. It cannot create a new pattern of motion without destroying another pattern—trees must be cut down if chairs are to be made. To create plants and animals nature is obliged gradually to remodel energy constituting earth, water, air and sunlight. Since all these are various forms of the same vital substance, the vitality comes to manifest itself biologically. But in the long evolutionary process, earthquakes, floods, and fires, weeds and poison ivy, mosquitoes and poisonous snakes, morons and cancer cells, murders and world wars come into being. The universal mind, no doubt, does not welcome such developments but cannot prevent their arising. Nature is at work, however, especially through that part called mankind, to minimize and eventually perhaps eliminate such evils. No doubt this interpretation denies magic powers to God but it does leave the divine consciousness morally perfect. It is doing its best, we can believe. However, by its very nature it cannot create without the chance of evils appearing here and there along the evolutionary way.

Accordingly, man’s ultimate meaning and challenge is found in his freedom and creative capability while living and moving and having his being in God. The immanent spirit of the universe is in man but does not dominate him. Man is a co-creator with God. Creativity is the essence of divinity, and man is divine in proportion to his creativeness in the sight of God. Surely Dr. Radhakrishnan shares this divinity of the universal reality.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF COLLEGE ADMINISTRATION:
A Commentary

In current literature may well be found various analyses of college administration and administrators. In recent times, John Ciardi (in the Saturday Review, issue of March 24, 1962, Volume 45, Number 12), vented his ideas fluently and directly in his “To the Damnation of Deans”. In the Quarterly of the Carnegie Corporation of New York (issue of January, 1960, Volume VIII, Number 1), an article on “Are Graduate Schools Slighting a Major Function?” deals with the matter of the meaning of education and its mission in America.

Not to be overlooked in terms of the purposes of research, Dr. James Shannon’s influence in medical research (in terms of education) is probed in “Where Is U.S. Research Heading?” (in Medical World News, issue of April 27, 1962, Volume 3, Number 9). In 1959 appeared an expository summary report in monograph format titled “Better Utilization of College Teaching Resources” by the Fund for the Advancement of Education in New York City, with certain fundamental conclusions relevant to the resistance of change and experimentation on the part of colleges and their administrators. “The Nature of Professional Authority”, by H. Thomas James, from Phi Delta Kappan (issue of November, 1959) points out in strong terms that the administrator’s authority “is a privilege, never a vested right. It must be earned, not once but many times.”

Pertinent to this area is “The Crowe Case: Its History and Implications”, by L. M. Read, in School and Society (issue of Summer, 1960, Volume 88, Number 2176); and tangentially is the Research Bulletin’s article, “Does It Pay to Teach in College?” (issue of may, 1960, Volume 38, Number 2), in which the need for more competent teachers in our colleges is firmly reiterated. The entire field of school administration is rather comprehensively covered in the November 1959 issue of Phi Delta
Kappan (Volume XLI, Number 2), and particularly of interest to administrators is John A. Brownell's article in that issue titled "The Infirmities of Administrators", which is "a diagnosis and prescription for school leaders afflicted with such pernicious occupational diseases as pervasive activity, artless simplism, organizational tinkering, and infallible paternalism." And, finally, the matters of academic freedom, tenure, and faculty authority are also dealt with in the article "Academic Freedom in American Law" by David Fellman, in Wisconsin Law Review (Volume 1961, Number 1, January 1961), and in the major part of the Bulletin (Winter issue, December 1961, Volume 47, Number 4) of the American Association of University Professors.

All of the above are referred to, then, with the intention of scanning the field, and its tangents, of college administration, the theme of this article. On invitation from the editor of this volume, the writer is pleased after having indicated the broad scope of Administration—to express his views for general consideration. To be sure, the theme, approach and presentation of this article are controversial; but the author feels sufficiently qualified to deal with the area, based on extensive experience as both teacher and administrator for over twenty years. (In fact, for six years he served as a school administrator in a large metropolitan district; for over four years he was a department chairman in two separate colleges; for about a year and a half he served as Assistant to the Dean in a graduate division of a university; for some four years, in addition to his work as psychologist, he was an administrative Intelligence Officer in World War II; and has taught at colleges and universities on the professorial level since 1939.)

Psychology as a science or psychologists as educational commentators or critics, is not the answer to the science of the problems in college administration. As an art, however, as a functioning discipline, there are psychological viewpoints of significance in making the administration of college personnel more harmonious and effective. The psychologist in the field of Education is not particularly unique because he pushes forward the boundaries of human knowledge, or because he educates and inspires students in his work, or helps others go forth and revolutionize our understanding and our technology, or sets examples for the multitude on the relationship between puny man, God, and the infinite universe of which we are transient inhabitants. The educational psychologist serves when he suggests ways and delineates means to effectuate and implement better attitudes in people—in teachers, parents, pupils, everyone, as well as in the field of college administration.

The world of Education is a committed world, a consecrated ideal; yet it is a nervous world, argumentative, preoccupied, insecure, a grievous world, furtive, suspicious, and often lacking in understanding. Unhappily administrators have come to use only signal phrases in dealing with educational personnel, a vocabulary which leaps spontaneously
into their minds suspending reason often and eliminating the need for individual thought and judgment. The administrator on the college level often uses words lavishly, loosely and often erringly in referring to individual teachers, and thereby conjures awesome and even unrealistic images in the minds of colleagues.

Educational administrators must begin at long last to think straight and clearly and simply, and to express their meanings understandably. They must not continue to use and hide behind mere emotional or academic words, convenient because they cause reason to fly and emotion to conquer—whether it be about academic freedom, or tenure, or salary increments, or extra-curricular activities. Too often the words of some of our administrators stifle the mind and make our educational system fearful. (In fact, some of our administrators are even guilty of being obsessed with their own unimportance.)

A genuine, functioning democracy in college administration cannot come from wishful thinking on the part of educators; instead it is the result of education and experience in democratic living. Colleges on all levels must help develop values that will guide teachers—as well as students—toward high standards of moral conduct and ethical living, and must provide for the development of creative abilities and afford avenues for expression in constructive activities. The college administrator, in terms of his personality, who himself has developed creative outlets and has achieved emotional stability, is more likely to react maturely to situations and to exhibit the qualities of democratic behavior.

The factor of “administrative peace” is too significant to omit in our analysis. The problem of peace is the problem of making possible the peaceable and orderly readjustment of power relationship between and among teachers and administrators. This in turn is a problem not of mechanisms, but of values, attitudes, ideologies, sentiments, emotions, loyalties, and allegiances. Not “war”, but the quest for petty power, the emphasis on mere favoritism, the demand for expanding “empire” must be renounced if administrative peace is to be assured. College administrators have yet to develop a partiality which is not characterized by belligerency, self-assertiveness, and all the attributes of primitive tribalism.

In the following ways, then, and through psychological and educational implementation will truly democratic conditions enhance effective functioning administratively by contrasting very concretely in our colleges the philosophy and practices of democracy with those of “dictatorship”; by giving teachers a clearer understanding of the essential elements of the democratic way of life; by giving students and teachers appreciation of the ethical values, as well as the material benefits, of democracy as a way of life; and by giving teachers everywhere a vision of the possibilities of a future world of freedom, justice, and peace. These ideals of democracy, if psychologically encouraged to live and grow in our colleges,
would provide the elements of purposefulness, interdependence, and challenge by which administration becomes effective.

Such effective democracy in administration can be accomplished in the hands of college presidents and deans who are not themselves ruthless, bullet-headed, exhibitionistic, inconsiderate, callous, mercurial, conspiratorial, one-sided, inept, unpredictable, hypercritical, and tactless. College administration instead needs men who are with established experience administratively and with effective teaching on the graduate level, plus proven maturity as a person, as a supervisor, and as an educational leader; and who, supplementarily, as an administrator honor commitments made in good faith, in honesty, and in professionalism. For a good dean or a good college president is not a boss; he must be an educational leader.

II

Not a psychological basis, but basic psychology must be utilized then in the administration of college personnel—in giving them opportunity without fear and smear to express themselves with careful regard to the democratic principles of fair play and justice; in experimenting in the classroom wisely without often blind and stupid anti-intellectualism and unwarranted criticism; in affording teaching the status of an honest-to-goodness profession by ridding the educational atmosphere of the heaviest tabooism, and not stifle honest inquiry and discussion which only is indicative of a lack of faith, a fear of ideas; in constantly practicing democracy in the treatment of our teachers by judicious praise, and not by making them the target of abuse and reckless charges; in honestly accepting others in a college community who are “different”, either mentally, socially, professionally, nationally, racially, or religiously, without branding them with a dehumanizing label.

The psychological basis of administering college personnel amounts to giving all professors opportunity to bring their ideas democratically to the attention of a dean without prejudice for the ultimate welfare of all in the college. Today we are controlled by mechanical maelstroms: We speed academically from classroom to classroom; from one so-called specialist in educational practice to another, with hardly a pause for consideration by any one of the problems inherent in the situation in terms of the human beings involved. In our day more departments, more equipment and more specialists have become the symbol of educational progress in a college system. We have failed when we value the substance of Education above its spirit, when we permit some administrators with a persecution complex to vent their temperamental and emotional unsuitability in ways rude, contemptuous, explosive, dictatorial, and with double standard-reasoning argumentativeness.

Again as to false notions in the colleges, some administrators believe that the secret of teacher happiness, security and safety is often more salary; and as administrators they sometimes feel that the only thing that
counts in college matters is immediate results and research. Also, cer-
tain administrators seemingly tell their educational personnel in sub-
tance: Be practical, prostitute even your ideals when necessary, and
don’t be too noble in performing your job in the classroom—or you may
invite friction or conflict. Instead, apply for research grants; get govern-
ment money; insure your salary, and regardless of decreasing enrollments
or sometimes less than effective teaching, you will be “in” with the Ad-
ministration. We no longer insist that our teachers think for themselves,
examine for themselves, test truth as they see it and dare to live life truth-
fully—as men alive and as teachers in the classroom.

Further, unequivocal educational administration will unremittingly
prove directly to the community through college personnel that in the
lives of students there is a home before there is a college, and society and
the culture engulf both; that everything which the college tries to teach
is with an eye to what the students are, how they “grow” and develop,
as well as what we as educators hope the future will bring; that a college
climate in which teachers, staff and other educational personnel are happy
as individuals, when they are judiciously and appropriately administered,
is the best place for students of all ages to learn; that curricula as such
are not printed course outlines but what teachers and students actually
do together and converse about and learn in the college situation: that
Education is truly what students do now and later in their homes and in
the world outside, in their jobs and careers, in their dealings with people
of all kinds, in their subconscious thinking and overtly expressed attitu-
des about life and living.

Administrators of a college or university must give their teachers more
than remuneration financially to help them grow to healthy educational
and professional maturity. A tradition-bound society that has no desire
for true progress has a relatively easy job in administering teachers; but
the greater liberality of spirit today—to develop personalities and indivi-
dualities—brings with it obligations and difficulties. Administrators too
often give lip service to the idea that good things do not come easily; but
they fall into the “either-or” trap of believing they have to be either to-
tally permissive or strongly disciplinary. Teachers in a college system
even as adults with sound intelligence need “guidance”; and guidance by
administrators involves permitting, tolerating, and intervening when
necessary, plus preventive planning but without personal pettiness or
vindictiveness.

To be sure, administrators must come to learn that teaching involves
individuals, and individuals are people who become teachers; and teachers
have feelings and react. College deans must also come to be skeptical of
themselves as well because they truly have not found all the answers. In
the past, administrators have been too involved in the attempt to adapt
teachers to administration, rather than administration to the teachers.
Psychology emphasizes the therapeutic values of recognition of an honest
teacher’s efforts.
A "good" administrator of a college or university, be he a president, dean, or department head, must not like to keep people guessing, which (however useful at times) is hardly an endearing characteristic. He must not be ambiguous, a master of the calculated imprecision, a mere writer of memoranda whose statements may be interesting but whose purport is not entirely clear. Too often, to be sure, an administrator finds himself in a position where saving face is important and where sparring for time is often obligatory because his failure or failures cannot be openly admitted. But it may be asked why cannot failure, or wrong judgment on his part, be admitted and remedied? Certainly it does require, and definitely involves, moral responsibility to admit and rectify previous prejudiced errors administratively and judgementally that may well have been predicated in some part on the personal pettiness possibly of some colleague or based on a diluted and meaningless statement.

III

Understanding reality for the administrator is the most difficult form of thinking (and the one which disappears most rapidly and most frequently in all conditions of a person’s mental depression). Teachers and school officials must try to remain "normal people" without undue mental setbacks; for only normal individuals give unity to their experiences by reflection. Under democracy, the personality of such normal, people relativistically speaking, is affected constantly by the learning processes and by their correcting perceptions and conclusions all the time. When individuals act under social constraint and develop symptoms of obsession or prejudice or discrimination, they no longer serve as persons in democracy. They lose their ability of reflective thinking, which truly demands the systematic arrangement or rearrangement of knowledge in the light of experience.

Social thinking brings us now to a consideration of the role of religion and ethics and their effect on personality of students. The further the spiritual evolution of mankind advances, the more certain it appears that the path to genuine religiosity does not lie through the fear of life and the fear of death, but through striving after rational ethics in living. Democracy is essentially the workings of moral philosophy. One cannot, as an administrator, have reasons for affirming democracy and, at the same time, deny the truths of philosophy, psychology and religion. The ground of unity in democracy is a faith expressed in a system of doctrines. It lies in solidarity of sentiment, springing from common living, interdependence, interchange, tradition, the habits of every day. This abiding ethical and religious group requires two conditions: one, that students are free to follow their differences; the other, that they are not balked and embittered by frustrations and miseries of any kind imposed upon them administratively. Total personality in democracy is also affected by consideration for others; the attitudes of people as regards ownership of property; their actions in the movies, on buses, in trains, among children, with adults in public places—and with themselves, their families,
and friends in their homes. For Man's destiny is determined ultimately not by changes in the map of the world, but by what happens to the souls of individuals.

Even in our colleges, prejudice is one of the most sinister elements in the life of people today and threatens to destroy the essential values of our educational patterns. Our elementary moral judgments are governed by prejudices. The effect on total personality is great. There must be an end in administration to a ridiculous temper, with a cleansing of the democratic conscience of man, a purification of judgment, and a recovery of honest vision. And no less are education and educators guilty of such feelings and actions, by actions that are mean and low, departmentally and administratively, by fiat and by memorandum and by unilateral "conferences."

In regard to prejudice of any kind, we must be as harsh as truth and as uncompromising as justice. Prejudice knows no boundaries, no viewpoint. Democracy's offensive against it again affects the total personality of the individual, wherever he may live or teach. Prejudice is unfortunately a fashionable disease; but it fills the minds of those who suffer from it with suspicion and distrust, narrows the minds, contracts the sympathies, and is responsible for irrational behavior, even in our democracy that boasts of educated administrators. It not only wastes the life of its victim, but also corrodes by contagion the lives of those who come under its influence.

The truly democratic condition of rights enhances the effective functioning of human personality by its insistence on leadership, and guidance. If our democratic way of life is to appeal to the peoples of the world everywhere, we must secure for all time our civil rights to all in the schools. Our age is unfortunately marked by an enormous increase in the source of various powers in Education useful for bullying teachers whether through "memo" communication, "research grant", force or "economic" contracts. It is as if administrators have forgotten that the only reason for the existence of schools and colleges is to help each of us to develop his intrinsic powers to the fullest extent in a free and educated community, professionally, intelligently, wisely, humanely.

But so much depends on the advancement and spread of real knowledge through Education if our form of society and way of life are to affect most advantageously the total personality in the students in our colleges. Our students have certain basic rights—the right to the benefits of guidance and training; the right to a college program which offers sound academic training, plus maximum opportunity for individual development and preparation for living; the right to receive constructive discipline for the proper development of good character, conduct, and habits; the right to intelligent direction with understanding by teachers; the right to be secure in his or her community against influences detrimental to proper and wholesome development. To be sure, total personality of our students in college will be influenced rightly if (1) the world's
education system is truly democratic in its organization and practices; (2) the colleges and the community develop an interacting relationship of mutual value; and (3) personnel policies are improved in order to strengthen the profession and build a stronger morale among teachers.

I urge colleges to help close the gap between scientific advance and social retardation through sound convictional thinking and planning. Scientific benefits would then be extended to the world more rapidly. Colleges must prepare individuals to create and live effectively in a cooperative interdependent society. The colleges—by example—must teach students the meaning and techniques of working together. Men must progress beyond mere knowledge and tolerance to that wisdom that combines intelligent understanding and appreciation of the cultural and social values held by others. The colleges must help secure acceptance of the ideals of democracy through example, practice, and viewpoint.

IV

The psychological basis of administration of educational personnel involves, to be sure, a basic factor of fashioning in time an atom bomb of character which can rebuild our faith in mankind, with elements of honesty, humainty, humility and humor. This requires of the administrator a sensitivity to the incongruous, a sense of proper balance, with a social conscience. The administrator must not engage in, and himself must discourage, cynicism, sarcasm, skepticism, and deprecating comments.

Teachers must come to know for all time that the College is the guardian of freedom and the dwelling place of the free mind. And the teacher's individual moral integrity, as well as sound administrative integrity, is the key to the survival of democracy. Our laws can provide safeguards, but basically it is the simple and ancient precept of the integrity of the individual upon which a democracy depends.

If we are to help rid society of delinquency of whatever kind, we have to learn to maintain a feeling of responsibility toward ourselves. Teachers and administrators must learn to fulfill themselves within their capabilities and try to find genuine values in life. By example administratively, character must be stressed in Education and in teaching—not the ephemeral things we call blandly "research" seemingly all wrapped up in cellophane attractiveness, and security being taught so glibly and needlessly in graduate schools of education and teacher training institutions in our colleges and universities. Administrators must be intelligent and scholarly and dedicated to the cause of scholarship in others, academic statesmen who value personality improvement in their teachers, unselfish people who appreciate the values of insight, individuals with common sense who have mastered the art of compromise, and persons who exercise curiosity, courage and conscience and examine problems and people objectively.

Educational administrators have a responsibility to protect their teachers and personnel from overwork. Their attitude toward them should
be the same as that for the protection of any other valuable college property from misuse and abuse. Perhaps no administrator has ever really assessed the value of a good teacher to a college, and salary alone cannot give the true worth. Certainly a lifetime of character and understanding contributes to morale and progress an amount immeasurable.

Educational administrators must come to know that without democratic freedom no search for truth is possible, no truth is even useful; and men and nations are then without justice, ethics and religion. There are scientific grounds for man's faith in the possibility and probability of a better human world for individuals everywhere, in the realization of freedom, justice, and love in human relations. Such faith in the triumph of right in human society receives its impetus very largely from a dynamic functioning of democracy, especially in its effectiveness in our schools and colleges.

We know that democracy is that way of life and the societal form, or pattern, which is inspired above every other with the consciousness of the dignity of man. But democracy involves Education; and community participation must become an integral part of learning if liberal education is to be released from its ivory tower and if we are to create a "living" democracy able to meet the challenges of racial and religious tensions, delinquency, poverty, and crime. Democracy calls for a community of souls—it is essential to make democracy understandable and workable through right relationships with our fellowmen and through actual participation in their group living.

Still another psychological basis of administration, finally, involves the whole matter of attitudes. Teachers in a college must be instilled with a sense of responsibility to one another in their roles as professionals in a community, and not "back-bite" each other in envy and in jealousy. They must be given sufficient reason to believe that they can always adjust to change without fear, if they are to communicate through their actions this security-feeling to their students. They must have, in fact, a proper balance of academics and attitudes.

Thus may we come to have true "peace" on the college level, not as a mechanical or legal thing but as a human thing; not merely as the absence of overt hostility on an individual level or on a departmental plane, but rather as an attitude of human beings toward one another. For human peace—of mind and body—is made up not of mandates and prescriptions, but of hope and trust. The very desire to give of one's substance and of one's self, in the field of Education is the expression of an unconscious understanding that if we, as teachers and as administrators, are to have inner and outer peace we must have it through our relations to others.
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ŚĀṆKARA AND RADHAKRISHNAN

I. RADHAKRISHNAN’S REORIENTATION

The Vedānta in the recent past has seen a reorientation which marks it as a philosophy of culture. Radhakrishnan in modern India has been a major force in giving this new direction to the Vedānta. He appears before us as a philosopher of a new East-West cultural synthesis and Vedānta is the soil into which the roots of this synthesis are struck. This reorientation has also meant a reconstruction of the Vedānta. The history of this process of reconstruction has been the history of the Neo-Vedāntic Movement in Contemporary Indian Philosophy. The Vedānta which Radhakrishnan reconstructs and develops into a world-faith and world-culture is the Advaita Vedānta of which Śāṅkara was the most powerful exponent.

In the history of this reconstruction of the Vedānta Radhakrishnan occupies a position similar to the one occupied by Śāṅkara in mediaeval times. Both appear at a critical time in the history of human thought and culture when divergent trends were struggling for supremacy. Both were faced with the stupendous task of resolving the conflicting cultural tendencies and achieving a unified view of life and its meaning. Both overcame the crisis not so much by driving away the rival tendencies of thought and culture as by achieving an integrated harmony. The method of both is the method of harmony, of samanvaya, alike of texts, views, tendencies and perspectives. Both give us a system which is the meeting-place of divergent currents of thought. Both develop their system of thought in their commentaries on the Upanishads, the Brahma-sūtra, and the Bhagavadgītā, the triple foundation of the Vedānta, and also in independent works. Both regard the Catuṣṭrī, the first four sūtras, "to be the essence of the teaching of the Brahma-sūtra". While professing to
belong to the Vedāntic tradition, both mean their teachings to be universal in character.

But the Neo-Vedāntic Movement of which Radhakrishnan is the leader as well as the product has been far more pervasive in its influence and much more potent in its working. Radhakrishnan has worked for the emergence of a new civilization and a new culture founded "on the truths of spirit and the unity of mankind." In adopting these truths as basic to the new world-perspective Radhakrishnan undertakes to fulfill in the modern age the task which Śaṅkara essayed with the help of his doctrine of oneness of Ātman and of identity with all. "Even as our political problem is to bring East and West together in a common brotherhood which transcends racial differences, so in the world of philosophy we have to bring about a cross-fertilization of ideas." This "free interchange of ideas" will, according to him, prepare for the "world's yet unborn soul."  

His statement of his philosophic position of "the truths of spirit and the unity of mankind" which will prepare for the world's unborn soul is contained in his commentaries on the classics of the Vedānta and his other independent works which are meant by him to provide the basis of a reasoned faith which deals justly with the old Indian tradition and the demand of modern thought. He has "in mind the problems of our age" while he interprets the past to us. In this respect also he reminds us of Śaṅkara and like him explains the classics and writes independent treatises "in relation to the religious milieu he represents," not only to "re-establish it in the minds and hearts of the people" but also to "restore the unity of religion and philosophy."  

The philosopher and the philosophical commentator are a product of their times and they cannot step out of them. Each of them has to look at the past from his own point of view and thus re-create it for men of his generation. This is the case with both Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan. Even when they agree on the fundamentals, their reactions to their age and environment and their re-creation of the past are different and bear the stamp of their personality and their age. The physical and social world which constituted the environment of Śaṅkara was of a different make from that of Radhakrishnan. The world of thought and culture to which Śaṅkara's philosophy constituted a reaction was also different. Radhakrishnan's world is a truly one world socially, politically, economically and culturally. The global changes in our social and political ideals and in the structure of our social, political and economic institutions which have taken place in the centuries that intervene between Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan have compelled him to rethink the philosophical problem in a new and wider context. The reconciliation which

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2 Ibid, p. 7.  
3 Ibid, p. 11.
satisfied the age of Śaṅkara would not meet the demands of the present age unless it was formulated in a different way in accordance with the changed context. Radhakrishnan is aware of the demand for "the creation of a new awareness of oneself and the world," which will bring in its wake the consciousness of a "world community," of "a community of ideals," and fashion a "new type of man." He gives us this new awareness of oneself and the world which is the nerve of his Neo-Vedāntic Movement and turns his Vedāntic Idealism into a Cultural Idealism which is ready to take the place of a world-religion and a world-culture. This need has been rendered all the more urgent because the ancient answers are not able to meet the challenge of the times. Radhakrishnan is sensitively alive to this need of the times and meets the "modern challenge" not by providing "substitutes" or asking people "to find precarious refuges in the emergency camps of Arts and Science, of Fascism and Nazism, of Humanism and Communism"; the people he has in mind are the millions of religiously displaced persons, who "in the absence of of any definite direction from the leaders are taking to crude and amazing cults."

Philosophy is treated by Radhakrishnan as an organic part of human culture, as at once its condition and its highest sublimation. He reinforces the traditional view, which is the view of *philosophia perennis*. Consequently he is not able to confine philosophy to Logic and Epistemology. Philosophy is called upon to face the problem of what has been described above as "the creation of a new awareness of oneself and the world." The world which he has in mind is to be "an international community," a "fellowship of man" sustained by a "community of ideals" and a new type of man. The foundations of these are to be laid not in political and economic arrangements but what is the best in man, the spirit in him. The solution involves the resolution of ultimate issues which are spiritual in a very deep sense and highly significant. Spirit, according to Radhakrishnan, is the symbol of the unity of man both as an individual and as a national and international community. It is in the spirit that the world with all its multiplicity is unified and feels itself as one. Radhakrishnan sets before himself the task of outlining the Philosophy of Spirit which is at once a Philosophy of Religion and a religious Philosophy, a world-faith and a world-perspective. His insistence on Philosophy being an insight into the meaning of life defines the religious character of his philosophical speculation and determines the nature of his approach to the philosophical problem which is an approach from the angle of religion as distinct from that of science or history.

Though Philosophy is a persistent and consistent effort of reflection

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4 *Brahmasūtra* (George Allen & Unwin Ltd.) 1960, p. 250. (hereafter—BS).
5 BS. p. 250.
7 *An Idealist View of Life* (1947), p. 52. (hereafter IVL).
8 Ibid.
it rests, according to him, on an assumption which is an act of faith, an assumption woven into the very texture of Radhakrishnan’s philosophical theory. It is an act of acknowledgment. The assumption is: “This universe makes sense. The world has a pattern and it is intelligible. The task of philosophy is to seek this pattern.”

Radhakrishnan aligns himself with the Great Tradition in Philosophy both in the East and the West which is characterized by the notion of an intelligible world which is in a deep sense beyond the sensible and the phenomenal. Radhakrishnan calls it the world of Spirit. Śaṅkara called it the Ātmaloka and distinguished it from other worlds which fall within the pale of Sāṁsāra, namely the sensible world of Man, Manas and Gods. Inasmuch as philosophy grows out of life and is a reflection on its meaning, according to Radhakrishnan “it is not possible with indulgence in ways of life which show back of restraint. A life dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom must be an ethical life.”

Here he is at one with Śaṅkara according to whom a four-fold moral and spiritual acquisition is the necessary preliminary to the undertaking of the philosophic quest. He is traditional to the very core. But he gives a new turn to the tradition inasmuch as he develops Vedānta not only as a philosophy of personal salvation but also as the foundation for the fellowship of man in a world-community, for the solidarity of the human race. A liberated life acquires for him a much more enlarged connotation than it had in Śaṅkara. It can be lived at every level of human existence. The rigour of asceticism which had an other-worldly flavour in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara is replaced by a moral discipline which means restraint. Withdrawal is not the whole of spiritual life according to Radhakrishnan. History has not been a mere repetition of the past. It would be doing less than justice to Radhakrishnan to say, as M. N. Roy has done, that his Vedānta “is the pantheistic monism of the scholastic theology of Śaṅkarāchārya expounded in the language of modern Academic philosophy” and that philosophy in him is mere theology.

III. PROLEGOMENA TO RECONSTRUCTION

A. The Rational Note in Vedānta

The first thing which strikes a close student of Radhakrishnan’s neo-vedāntic Idealism is the rational note which he has struck in his attempt to reconstruct the Vedānta. Existence, according to Radhakrishnan, has a rational aspect and the great mystics have always been sensitive to it. He emphasises the predominantly rational character of religious insight.

As the experience has a cognitive quality about it, the judgments based

9 BS, p. 235.
10 BS, p. 234.
11 PSR, p. 545.
12 PSR, p. 545.
13 BS, p. 246.
on it should be subjected to logical scrutiny. The great mystics, according to him, rise to the mystical elevation not only through intuition but through the strictly logical sequence of rational thought. The result is that for him the second sūtra, Janmādyasya Yatatḥ, gives us by natural theology, an ascent to the knowledge of God by the natural light of reason, and not revealed theology as Śaṅkara thinks. It sums up the essence of the cosmological and teleological arguments. Therein we exclude the appeal to religious experience. The temporal world, says Radhakrishnan, suggests a cosmic meaning and he holds that this meaning, this logical movement of the spiritual quest, this logic of religion, is embodied in the texts of the Vedānta itself and any one who goes behind the words of the Scripture can discover this.

Śaṅkara, no doubt, recognized the value of reason for the construction, and not only for the defence, of the Vedānta. But for Śaṅkara there could be no such thing as natural theology, an ascent to the knowledge of God by the natural light of reason. Brahman cannot be known by means of inference or reasoning and a knowledge of the true nature of reality cannot even be guessed except with the help of the scripture. He himself defines the nature of the cause on the strength of the scripture. The Vedāntic thought in Śaṅkara had not attained that freedom of movement where it could evolve the conception of “natural theology” which supplemented revealed theology and which could, as we find in Radhakrishnan, emphasize the connection and continuity of reason, intuition, and revelation. For Śaṅkara the second Sūtra, Janmādyasya Yatatḥ, excludes a rational approach to the reality of God and the foundations of belief are laid not in reason but in authority, the authority of the word. While recognizing the value of reasoning for the establishment of the truths of the Advaita system Śaṅkara does not subscribe to Radhakrishnan’s view that reason, like experience, is a response “of the human soul to God’s self-disclosure through nature and history and spiritual experience.” The times in which Śaṅkara lived were not ripe for taking the steps which Radhakrishnan took. The age of Śaṅkara was a period of minority for the Vedānta philosophy. Even when he rises above the times he lived in and makes the point that the word Upaniṣad primarily means knowledge and it is only secondarily that it denotes the book, the grantha, the mere assemblage of words, upanishad-sabdarāśiḥ he does not rise above enough and ultimately reasoning is said to be auxiliary to scripture and has to fall in line with it. For Radhakrishnan the life of reason and the life of religion form one life which is the life of the spirit.

B. Revised Conception of Scripture

Radhakrishnan introduces a revised conception of Scripture. Scripture

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14 Ibid.
15 Mandūkyakārikā with Śaṅkara’s Commentary, III. 1: Śakyate tarkenaḥbhijñātum (hereafter Māṇḍ. S.B.)
is not a written text, it is eternal truth. "We do not accept scriptural
documents as books apart from other books; unquestionable in their
accuracy and advice. The view that they are the inherent word of God
does not carry conviction." Scripture cannot be accepted on trust.
Accordingly "faith is not blind acquiescence in external authority"; "it
is the response of the whole man which includes assent of intellect and
energy of will." Radhakrishnan speaks of this approach to scripture
as a "new approach today" which is in line with his recognition of the
predominantly rational character of religious insight and the continuity
of reason and intuition. This marks a further development of the view
of Śaṅkara, an emancipation from the yoke of authority and coming to
its own of the spiritual intellect oriented towards the good. Experience
is registered in the religious Scriptures. Faith in the Scriptures gives us
knowledge of God. Medieval philosophic thought as developed by the
Vedāntic ācāryas had not attained that freedom of movement which
could work with the conception that Scripture is not a written text but
eternal truth interpreted with the doctrine of samanvaya. This conception
of Scripture adopted and outlined by Radhakrishnan marks a turning
point in the history of the vedāntic movement. This "new approach",
as he describes it, di-countenances the old conception of scriptures which
regarded them as the work of God and God as their author.

C. New Conception of Samanvaya: Knowledge an ordered whole.

This new conception of Scripture and scriptural knowledge gives,
according to Radhakrishnan, a new meaning to the ancient concept of
Samanvaya with which Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara worked. For the latter
the concept of Samanvaya was the basic concept which gave unity to the
vedāntic thought; it embodied the method of reconciliation of the differ-
ent and divergent texts of the Upaniṣads which constituted for them
the body of scriptural knowledge. What lent life to this concept was the
thought that the scriptural texts were revealed texts and being revelations
they could not be at variance. The thought which governed the entire
working of the religious mind of the vedāntic ācāryas was the ultimacy
of the fundamental law of non-contradiction. It was the principle that
truth is the whole. But it was not allowed a fully autonomous play and
was hedged in by the limitations imposed by a scholastic theology. In
the Vedānta of Radhakrishnan the principle comes to its own. Know-
ledge becomes self-conscious; and this self-consciousness of knowledge
appears as the logic of his Vedānta. Its ruling thought is: "Even as
there are order and harmony in the universe so in knowledge." What
was implicit in Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara becomes explicit in Radha-
krishnan for whom scripture "is eternal truth interpreted with the help
of the doctrine of samanvaya."
Radhakrishnan takes a much bolder step when, in working out this concept of samanvaya and drawing its logical conclusion, lays down that "today the samanvaya or harmonization has to be extended to the living faiths of mankind." Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara had extended the principle to the living thoughts of the individual sages of the Upaniṣads only. Radhakrishnan for whom "religion concerns man as man and not man as Jew or Christian, Hindu or Buddhist, Sikh or Muslim," extends it universally, for he believes that the "spiritual community of the future needs for its foundation no geographically limited writings." Samanvaya or reconciliation is the need of our age according to him, as it was the need of the age of Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara. But now as the religious environment has been world-wide and the living faiths are encountering one another, the idea of fellowship among religions is gaining ground and are conciliation is taking place. The philosopher of religion is called upon to take up this new task of reconciliation and evolve a coherent picture like the author of the Brahmaসūtra. Śaṅkara himself had done the same thing and had announced his Advaita as providing the unity among the living faith in his time. Through Samanvaya Radhakrishnan is in search of a faith which is "the heart of all faith." This faith is what he describes indifferently as the Religion of Spirit or the Philosophy of Spirit.

In giving this enlarged meaning to the concept and making it the vehicle of a much deeper and more fruitful line of thought, Radhakrishnan is not reversing the vedāntic tradition but simply enriching it and making it more vital so as to be ready to meet the growing needs of a growing humanity which is in search of one world, one international community, one fellowship of man. The Indian tradition did not believe that revelation was a closed book. It subscribed to the doctrine of the infinite character of the Veda: anantā vai vedāḥ. Radhakrishnan keeps alive this spirit and carries aloft the torch of knowledge which was lit by the seers of the Vedānta. "As the author of the B. S. tried to reconcile the different doctrines prevalent in his time, we have to take into account the present state of our knowledge and evolve a coherent picture." In his commentary on the fourth Sūtra Radhakrishnan appears as the philosopher of a new East-West philosophical synthesis and his Vedānta is made the basis of this development of a world-perspective in philosophy. His Spiritual Idealism represents this world-perspective and world-culture.

II. THE DUAL VISION OF THE SUPREME

For Radhakrishnan, as for Śaṅkara, Spirit is the symbol of the unity of all existence. This Spirit has been the central theme of philosophy

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20 BS, p. 249.
21 BS, p. 117.
22 BS, p. 251.
23 BS, p. 249.
as well as religion. For both the thinkers the religious problem has been the fundamental problem of philosophy, the form of thinking about God being the same as the form of thinking about the ultimate reality. Both stand for an ultimate connection of value and reality. Spirit is the supreme reality and supreme value. This is the deliverance of the valutational consciousness of man of which the religious as the philosophic consciousness are forms. Both Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan acknowledge the reality of the spiritual intuition of the ultimate fact of Spirit and for both the certainty of the primacy of Being, Spirit, or Self is an intuited certainty. Spirit is all that there is, all being and all value. The universe is essentially Spirit.

Here arises a problem which is the key-problem of philosophy of religion and which is at the centre of the systems of Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan. The problem concerns the dual vision of the Supreme. The religious experience in which the validity of divine existence is founded discloses to us these two aspects of divine existence which correspond to the two types of experience in relation to the Supreme. According to Śaṅkara the dual vision is (i) the vision of the Supreme as transcending all duality and distinction, devoid of any differentiation, owning no differences, nor confronted by any, the vision of oneness of all existence, of a pure advaita, and (ii) its vision as owning all differences, supporting them and qualified by them, manifesting them and maintaining them by its creative power which is its eternal and unlimited knowledge and which functions as its upādhi, its associative-cum-limitative adjunct. The first is the vision of the Supreme as nirupādhi, devoid of all adjuncts and non-dual; the second its vision as sopādhi, associated with adjuncts and cosmic.

The highest spiritual experience, according to Radhakrishnan also, makes us aware of both these aspects of the Supreme, its supracosmic transcendence and its cosmic universality. This is the divine mystery which is inexpressible. The first is the experience of rest and fulfilment which discloses to us the character of the Absolute as pure and passionless being, transcending the restless turmoil of cosmic life. The other is the experience of the Supreme as cosmic power supporting the whole cosmic play and involved in the restless turmoil of that ceaseless activity.

The Supreme, in its transcendent and non-relational aspect is called the Absolute by Radhakrishnan and, in its cosmic aspect, it is God. Śaṅkara describes these two aspects as Brahman and Īśvara respectively. For neither of them are these two realities exclusive of each other. It is one reality, the Absolute-God of Radhakrishnan, the Parmātmeśvara of Śaṅkara. The problem which both these thinkers face is the problem of a fundamental synthesis—the synthesis of unity and plurality, of the monistic and personalistic concepts of God, of being and becoming, of perfect activity and perfect repose, of the one and the Good, of the ens realissimun and the ens perfectissimun. Above all, it is the problem, in
the words of W.M. Urban, of the fusion of the Good or Value with Being. How does Radhakrishnan solve this problem?

IV. THE DUAL VISION AND THE PROBLEM OF SYNTHESIS

Radhakrishnan is impressed by the dual vision of the Supreme, but his reaction to the creative side of the Supreme life is different from that of Śaṅkara. The difference is the difference between the religious romanticist and the religious ascetic, Śaṅkara has no interest in what Radhakrishnan describes as the creative outpouring of the conscious delight of Īśvara. The picture which Śaṅkara paints of the created world is a horrid picture, a picture of the terrible contingencies of life to which man is at every turn exposed. In this terrible ocean of existence one can have restful stay only at the shore and not in the midst of the stream. Liberation is the shore of this worldly sea. The world is not a fit place to find one’s home in. For Radhakrishnan Pure Being is not locked up in its own transcendence and God had freely willed to realize this possibility. What happens is real and significant not only for us but for the world-spirit. God is working in history and reveals himself in it which is “neither a chapter of accidents, nor a determined drift” but a pattern of absolute significance. Śaṅkara’s experience of the pure realm of being, of the timeless calm and peace wherein Brahma and the World fuse in one, has generated in him an indifference towards the empirical order of existence, even when he recognizes the creative side of the Supreme. The realm of reality disclosed by the creative side of the Supreme and the Good connected with it constitute, according to Śaṅkara, the realm of Avidyā or Nescience and on this is founded his philosophy of life whose dominant note is renunciation and through it emancipation from the cycle of worldly existence. Radhakrishnan, while fully alive to the supracosmic transcendence of the Supreme and to the reality of that pure realm of being, joins issue with Śaṅkara. He says, “It is not true to contend that the experience of the pure realm of being, timeless and perfect, breeds in us contempt for the more familiar world of existence which is unhappily full of imperfection.” Neither for Radhakrishnan nor for Śaṅkara are reality and existence to be set against each other as metaphysical contraries. Existence is rooted in reality. But for Śaṅkara existence is a vicious existence and one who seeks the Supreme should turn his back on it. According to Radhakrishnan “for one who has the vision of the Supreme, life, personality and history become important” and the full meaning of the Divine Life is brought out as

24 PSR, p. 39.
25 PSR, p. 41.
26 PSR, p. 42.
27 PSR, p. 30.
28 Eastern Religions and Western Thought (hereafter—ER), p. 31.
29 ER, p. 31.
30 ER, p. 31.
much by play and its concomitant as by rest and fulfilment. The one reveals itself in the many”.31

Radhakrishnan has Śaṅkara in mind when he speaks of the “common temptation to which Indian thinkers have fallen more than once victims, spirit that is all that counts while life is an indifferent illusion, and all efforts directed to the improvement of man’s outer life and society are sheer folly.”32 The world-process which has resulted in the formation of human personalities has significance and the structure of things is spiritual.”33 While the cosmic processes have no interest for Śaṅkara except in so far as they mark a passage to the Supreme, Radhakrishnan is deeply impressed by the riches of the cosmic evolution and the values achieved in its course and pleads for an organization of human life, for an ‘interactive union’ which “is life more abundant” and which “is possible only with the perfection of the world, its growth into the higher state of being.”34 We can, he says, rise into the scale of being only by drawing all into ourself,35 “The world is our garden we cannot become self-sufficient until the world is so”.36 Radhakrishnan notes in the world “a compelling drift towards better things” which is making for “a profound and co-operative spiritual commonwealth with freedom and harmony as its marks”.37 He discovers a “rationality” in the universe which suggests a spiritual creative power. The temporal world suggests a cosmic meaning38 and offers its own suggestions.39 In Radhakrishnan’s world-view there is a passage from the Supreme to the cosmos and from the cosmos to the Supreme, but in Śaṅkara while there is one from the Supreme to the cosmos, there is none from the latter to the former. There is no room for natural theology in his thought. While Śaṅkara recognizes the element of order and definiteness in the created universe and is impressed by its unfathomable depths which defy analysis,40 it is ultimately “transcendent, impure, flimsy and comparable to foam, illusion, a mirage, a dream”.41 It carries no good with it.42 This difference in their attitude to the world of existence determines the temper of their philosophical outlook. In Śaṅkara the Vedānta developed more as a philosophy of personal salvation with a dominant ascetic note about it. In Radhakrishnan it developed into a world-culture providing the spiritual foundations of “an international community” and a “fellowship of man”.

31 IVL, p. 110.
32 East and West in Religion (hereafter—EWR), p. 137.
33 IVL, p. 71.
34 IVL, p. 211.
35 IVL, p. 211.
36 IVL, p. 211.
37 IVL, p. 313.
38 BS, p. 236.
39 BS, p. 238.
40 SB, I. 1. 2, p. 7.
41 Brhad, S. B., I. 5. 2.
V. THE STATUS OF THE EMPIRICAL WORLD

The specific problems concerning the empirical world which are uppermost in the minds of Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan are different. Every line written by Śaṅkara reveals his anxiety “to save the Supreme Brahman” from distintegration and loss of its authentic being. The philosophical world of Śaṅkara’s time caused anxiety to his mind. Unity and plurality were viewed as equally real and equally significant. Both Brahman and the World were assigned a real status by the Bhdābhedaśādīn. In this view Brahman was not saved. Nor was it safe. The task which Śaṅkara assigned to himself was the task of saving Brahman, saving its integral unity of Existence, while recognizing the factual character of the many-sidedness of the cosmic order. This was the mission of his māyāvāda. The world enjoyed an instrumental, not an authentic, character. The One became many through māyā. The diversity was not a self-sustaining truth. By the time Radhakrishnan took up the task of reconstruction of the Vedānta, Śaṅkara had been interpreted as sanctioning the illusory character of the world. This seemed to be a mockery of the oneness and absoluteness of Brahman. Radhakrishnan’s principal problem became the formulation of a conception of Māyā “so as to save the world and give to it a real meaning.” The affirmation of the reality of the empirical world, even when it had a derived being, became the dominant note of his Vedānta. The problem how it came to be a limited being, how it appeared as non-spirit even when it was essentially spirit, which was the principal problem before Śaṅkara, did not engage Radhakrishnan’s attention. Though he raises this question he does not concentrate on explaining the role of Avidyā in the scheme of reality as Śaṅkara does. His reaction to the dominant note of the illusory character of the world of ordinary experience simply assumes the form of a concerted repudiation of the view that the world is an illusion and affirmation of a thoroughgoing evolutionary realism to which the creative genius of God is germane with the three stages of plan, process and perfection marking the evolutionary advance.

The reality of the world is grounded, according to Radhakrishnan, in its being willed by God, though it has a dependent created reality. It is real, because it is willed by God. This is the significance of the doctrine of māyā. Radhakrishnan is so anxious to “save the world and give to it a real meaning” that his accounts of the world “has in it the

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43 SB, II, 1. 14. ekatvam nānatvam cobbhayamapi satyameva.
44 SB, II, 1. 28. ekasminnapi brahmani svarūpānupamardenaiva anekākārāh srṣṭīḥ bhavisyati; Bhāmati on II, 1. 28. anena sphūrito māyāvādaḥ.
45 PSR, p. 800.
46 Ibid.
47 IVL, p. 110.
48 IVL, p. 338.
49 PSR, p. 41.
promise” not of a “spiritual idealism”⁵⁰ but of a spiritual realism. The world is an act of worship. The spirit has entered into the world of non-spirit to realize one of the infinite possibilities that exist potentially in Spirit.⁵¹ What happens is real and significant not only for us but for the World-Spirit and as such the temporal process is not a tragedy or an aberration.⁵² He offers a conception of history as “a pattern of absolute significance”, and not “a chapter of accidents, nor a determined drift”.⁵³ It is full of new things because God works in it and reveals himself in it⁵⁴ and “it is wrong to think that the universe exists for us only to escape from it”.⁵⁵ God is so intensely concerned with this history that He actively intervenes in it. Śaṅkara does not clothe the cosmic process itself with any other progressively realized meaning except the one which consists in the catastrophic realization of the oneness of Brahman and Ātman and of Brahman and the world. Radhakrishnan also says, like Śaṅkara, that “the aim of the cosmic evolution is to reveal the Spirit” which “lives in the world”.⁵⁶ But he, unlike Śaṅkara, likes us to believe that the cosmic process progressively reveals the richness of the Supreme life and the passage to the Supreme is not a flight to it but an ascent for which “life, personality and history become important”.⁵⁷ Reality gives value to “empirical objects and earthly desires”. The world is a passage from existence to reality. We have, therefore, not to neglect worldly welfare or despise body and mind. The body is viewed not so much as a limitation (upādhi) as a necessity for the soul. We have not to despise bodily life. Nor are we to repress personal life in order to gain the end of religion.⁵⁸ He, unlike Śaṅkara, is interested in the descending movement of the divine also, and not only in the ascending movement in which alone Śaṅkara discovers the significance of the world-process. The descending movement of the divine discloses to him “the central drive of the universe”. “The central drive of the universe”—this brings out the peculiarity of Radhakrishnan’s view about the place of the universe in the scheme of reality. The cosmic process itself is clothed with meaning even when “God’s will is the meaning of the world”.⁵⁹ For him the world is not a completed act, it is still in the process of completion.⁶⁰ Radhakrishnan here raises a question which is relevant to the philosophy of cosmic history. The cosmic evolution has a cosmic meaning for him. Radhakrishnan

⁵⁰ IVL, p. 87.
⁵¹ PSR, p. 40.
⁵² PSR, p. 41.
⁵³ PSR, p. 30.
⁵⁴ PSR, p. 42.
⁵⁵ PSR, p. 44.
⁵⁷ ER, p. 31.
⁵⁸ ER, p. 32.
⁵⁹ BS, p. 142.
⁶⁰ BS, p. 143.
represents, in the history of Neo-Vedāntism, the dominantly realistic trend of thought which is a fusion of the Advaitism of Śaṅkara, modern evolutionist thought and contemporary value thinking. He reconstructs reality as one with many planes and does away with the conception of spiritual and material worlds as separate and hostile.\(^{61}\) One is not to be discarded and the other accepted.\(^{62}\) "The material looks upward to the spiritual and finds in it its true meaning. Similarly the spiritual leans to the physical in order to find itself".\(^{63}\) This vein of thought is foreign to Śaṅkara who would never subscribe to Radhakrishnan's faith that "the complete self-finding of Spirit in the cosmic life is the terminus."\(^{64}\) For Śaṅkara the cosmic life represents a dialectical antinomy which is finally and fully resolved in the total integration of the transcendent and the cosmic aspect of the Supreme life. For the Absolute taken as pure being there is no antinomy according to Śaṅkara, because there is no problem of relating the world to the Absolute. The services of the doctrine of Māyā are utilized by Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan in different ways in connection with the problem of the status of the world in their scheme of reality, Śaṅkara tries "to save Brahman" with the help of the doctrine of Māyā. Radhakrishnan tries "to save the world" with its help.

\(^{61}\) BS, p. 149.
\(^{62}\) Ibid.
\(^{63}\) BS, p. 149.
\(^{64}\) BS, p. 150.
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PHILOSOPHY
AND THE PEACE PROBLEM

Today there is really only one problem worth talking about: the problem of peace. Though its solution may be difficult to find, its urgency is impossible to escape. If we cannot solve this problem, what is the use of talking about anything else? There will simply be nothing left to talk about.

This is for mankind a new situation, brought about, as we all know, by the utterly unprecedented development of military weapons which has taken place during the last two decades. Everyone agrees that the new weapons have made the old patterns of international relations supremely dangerous. There were two world wars between 1914 and 1945; and everyone realizes, when he thinks of it, that if there are two more world wars in the foreseeable future—or, perhaps, even one more—no living thing may survive.

A few years ago I listened to a round-table discussion participated in by some of the most eminent atomic scientists in the world. One of them said there was at that time in the “drawing board stage” the technical possibility of initiating an atomic chain reaction capable of removing, in a very short time, the entire envelope of oxygen which surrounds the globe, thereby rendering impossible the continuation of life—plant, animal, or human—on the planet earth. One participant raised the question whether anyone, knowing of such consequences in advance, would actually use such power. Two German scientists immediately expressed the conviction that Hitler and his cohorts, in the closing stages of World War II, when it became clear that they must go down to total defeat, would not have hesitated to use such power had they possessed it. Nor would others. This example is, of course, but one of the dozens of technical possibilities of global destruction now in existence.
If we possessed genuine intelligence we would, considering the content and urgency of the peace problem, organize our intellectual life as a whole around it, until we could feel confident that it was basically solved. We would make it a leading theme of our educational effort at every level; we would make it a central focus of research projects on the largest scale; we would place it in the forefront of religious duty; we would allocate to it the major portion of public funds. When everything, literally everything, is at stake, an intelligent person or group of persons will not hesitate to make every effort and every sacrifice.

However, there are probably very few who would need to be reminded that at present we are very far from doing any one of these things we so desperately need to do. Today the largest, and in the strict sense the only, world organization operating at the cultural rather than the political level, and focussed directly on the strengthening of peace, is Unesco. But Unesco is pitifully small, and shamefully deprived of resources by the major powers. It has been in existence for more than fifteen years, but its average annual budget is less than fifteen million dollars (n. b., not billion).

This can be characterized as nothing short of disgraceful treatment of a vitally important world organ by the states-members concerned. A single country like my own has an annual military budget which in recent years has been well in excess of forty billions of dollars (n. b., not millions), while the total world budget for war purposes is a truly staggering sum, compared with which even ten times the amount of Unesco’s present budget would be utterly insignificant. If actions speak louder than words, most governments of the world at present place more reliance for their future well being upon developing means of waging war than upon developing means of preventing it, in a mathematical ratio of the order of several thousands to one. Not one one-thousandth of the money, energy, time, brains and resources that are devoted to strengthening the sinews of war do we devote to strengthening the sinews of peace. A mole-hill for peace;a mountain for war. This, in the age of nuclear weapons, is clearly the philosophy of death and the politics of suicide.

It this a proper problem for philosophers? Besides the fact that it is everyone’s problem, since the question of everyone’s survival (including the philosopher’s) is involved, it is clear that the attitudes and patterns of behavior which predominate in the world today in relation to war and peace involve value choices; and the problem of values falls squarely within the field of philosophy. Moreover, that which is involved in these momentous value choices, that which conditions them in their living context for weal or woe, includes a whole train of concepts such as freedom, democracy, communism, socialism, capitalism, fascism, dictatorship, aggression, imperialism, human rights, subversion, peaceful co-existence, peaceful competition, all of which, and many more, demand analysis. They analysis demand not simply in the sense of dictionary
definitions, and not primarily in the sense of partisan advocacy, though it is natural that there should be such advocacy, but analysis in relation to their bearing, actual and potential, on the problem of strengthening peace. And analysis, logical and linguistic, falls squarely within the field of philosophy.

Furthermore, the problem of war as a whole is peculiarly a problem of social philosophy. What is war? It is not, properly speaking, an action of individuals, though individual action must be part of it if it is to be carried on. War is declared by governments, not by individuals as individuals. Only governments have armies, navies, air forces and stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Only governments have the physical and legal power to use them. Now, why do governments declare war, and put such weapons into use? Obviously, because conflicts arise between them which they are unable or unwilling to settle peacefully. The conflicts may be economic, territorial, political, ideological, and, in fact usually possess all these aspects and others besides.

Here a general question of theory, of principle, presents itself: Is it possible to conceive of some set of international institutions, international norms, rules and principles which might be acceptable to the competing parties, and at the same time act as an alternative to war in the settlement of whatever disputes and conflicts might arise? All the classic problems of social and political philosophy—sovereignty, freedom, rights of man, powers of government, relations of groups, formation of institutions, must now be posed in the new context of a world system of closely interconnected states in addition to their classic context of a single sovereign state. Even the term “one world” gives way; in some respects it is now more like one neighborhood. In fact, measured by the amount of time it takes to communicate with each other, travel between each other’s capitals, or feel the impact of each other’s events, any two countries today, however widely separated geographically, are actually closer to each other than the capitals of the thirteen colonies which formed the United States of America in 1776.

The present writer has, for a number of years, tried to bring certain aspects of this whole area within philosophic focus. While the scope of this paper does not permit detailed elaboration a few generalized comments with the aim of summing up some aspects of these investigations might serve a constructive purpose. Perhaps the most important point of all is the fact that the central problem of social philosophy has suddenly changed from the question which social system, which set of social institutions is best for a given nation or for the world at large, to the question, what international framework will best maintain peaceful relationships between existing and competing systems, such as the capitalist and the communist.

There is, as everyone knows, a vast body of literature concerning each of the competing systems, its merits, demerits, content, laws of development
ment, its past, present and future prospects. Included are many productions of first-rate genius on either side. However, while all this intellectual work was being done, little or no attention was paid to the problem of international peace as between such competing systems if both were to become simultaneously possessed of state power. Now, that this has in fact come about, and it is but a few decades since the establishment of the first state power representing the socialist-communist order, it is psychologically very difficult for advocates on either side to realize that a more basic and important problem than the one to which they have given so much effort, and over which so much blood has been spilled, has taken the center of the stage. Yet if this is not realized, and realized in time, the very bone of contention over which the parties are struggling will have vanished. This is a strange and unprecedented bond which has suddenly appeared, uniting the conflicting parties in spite of their conflict, uniting them by the common interest they share in preserving in existence the very prize of victory, so that the ultimate victor will still have something to which to lay claim, something that has not vanished into mushroom mist. But failure on the part of either antagonist to act in the light of this deepest of all mutual interests would deprive their very conflict of every iota of significance. Failure to cooperate at this level would eliminate totally the possibility of competing at any level. A portentous instance, is it not, of the dialectical interpenetration of contradictory forces?

An analogous play of contradictory forces may be seen, and must be brought to successful fruition in the psychology of the individual, whether he is Marxist, anti-Marxist or non-Marxist. This is not an easy thing to do, yet it must be done. It is often referred to as "taking a global viewpoint," though precisely what is involved in such a viewpoint is seldom realized. It is easy to make the whole thing seem either too easy or altogether impossible. The elusive essence of the matter consists in the fact that each person is, and must remain, strongly bound to a number of partisan and less-than-global loyalties, and at the same time must learn to act and think in a context and by a standard which does not negate them, but must transcend them.

Something similar to this process took place and was successfully consummated in the distant past in order to effect the transition from community life based on patterns of blood relationship and family authority to patterns based on the concept of citizen and the authority of the state. The individual could neither cease biologically and psychologically to be a member of a family grouping, nor could he cease morally and socially to respond to the norms and values of that membership. Yet these norms and values, and the authority accompanying them, had now to be fitted into a new and unprecedented framework, wider than any that had theretofore functioned in the life of man. In the course of time that new framework in many ways dispossessed the older authorities with which it came into certain inevitable conflicts. Something of this kind
must happen again, in the transition from the perspective and orientation of unqualified national sovereignty to the perspective and orientation of international interdependence, as a pre-condition of human survival.

I say interdependence rather than world government because it should be clear that before there could be anything like one sovereign government over the whole world we must either solve the problem of maintaining peace between the competing and individually sovereign giants who now hold divided and conflicting power, or these giants will fight out their conflicts in the old way, but with the new weapons, which would annihilate everything.

The naiveté which accompanies many discussions of world government proceeds from the fact that the discussants are thinking chiefly in political terms while failing to face the stubborn economic realities which underlie and motivate so much of Realpolitik. It is impossible to explain the behavior of large and powerful states, especially when they are acting in terms of their conflicts and problems with other such states, except on the premise that they will usually do whatever they are convinced is necessary to preserve and protect their basic power interests. All experience demonstrates that when they conceive these interests to be really jeopardized there are few if any norms of law or morality which will not be violated if their violation is deemed necessary to remove the threat to these basic interests. Thus the problem is not whether one world government holding a preponderance of sovereignty and of military force could keep the peace better than an arrangement in which a number of individually sovereign capitalist giants are faced by a number of individually sovereign communist giants. Of course it could.

The point rather is this. Once it is realized that in the present context and for the foreseeable future it will do no good either politely to ask or forcibly to try to compel the capitalist giants to cease being capitalist, or the communist giants to cease being communist, it will then be seen that the real problem is getting them to live without war while each remains master in his own house and the two houses compete with each other. If peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition can be maintained in the relatively short run, then in the relatively long run it is at least conceivable either that the world may become politically unified on the basis of a peaceful victory by one or the other competitor, or that the competitors may have so firmly accepted the rules and norms of peaceful competition that their coexistence without military conflict could be prolonged indefinitely into the future.

In either case the present problem, if global war, which would bring an end to all problems, is to be avoided, consists in the effort to gain acceptance of the rules and norms of peaceful competition. Difficult as this problem may be, one can readily appreciate that it is much less difficult than gaining acceptance of the proposal that all systems give up their final sovereignty to one world body. In the latter case any given system
runs the risk of being liquidated by due process of law, possibly before it has had a chance to demonstrate its strength and show what it can do. No system that really believes in itself will ever voluntarily take that risk. Systems which really possess a great deal of strength—and it is these we are dealing with—will much more readily accept the norms of competition, even though such competition carries with it the risk that in the end the other party may emerge victorious. But the possessor of great strength seldom feels he will be the loser in an equal contest. Above all, he wants a chance to show what he can do. We must also remember that mankind has a great deal to gain from the peaceful competition of different social systems. At this stage of historical development such competition may not only provide the least difficult alternative but the most valuable outcome.

The problem which has now come to occupy the center of the stage has two sides, which may be formulated in the following terms. First, what are the rules and norms of peaceful competition? Second, what are at present the chief obstacles to the acceptance of these rules and norms? Let us try to throw some light on each of these questions.

Actually, it is not very difficult to answer the first, for the rules and norms of peaceful competition are not only readily identifiable in more or less explicit formulation, they even have the status of agreed international conventions, with an existing institutional framework on a world scale for their implementation. I am referring of course to the United Nations Organization and the whole idea underlying it. That whole idea takes its point of departure from the fact that there are in the world at one and the same time conflicting governments, conflicting social systems, each with its own constitutional principles and its own ideology. With that situation in view as an actually existing fact, the U.N. idea includes a number of cardinal aspects, among which we may list at this point the following, which have a bearing on the problem of peaceful competition:

1. All states, whatever their differences, have a common interest in maintaining peace, because of the extreme destructiveness of war to all parties concerned, even to the so-called victors.

2. It is highly useful for all states, whatever their form of government and social system, to be members of a world organization centered on the peace problem, so that whatever disputes may arise can be discussed and settled by negotiation and agreement rather than military conflict.

3. In the principles of operation of the organization, laid down in its Charter, and particularly in the whole approach to the peaceful settlement of disputes between the states-members of the organization, equal rights are recognized for the different state systems, that is, for the different social systems and ideologies represented among the membership.

4. In further development of the preceding point, it is recognized that no state operating on the basis of a given system such as capitalism, socialism or communism, or within any given political or constitutional
framework, or any religious or non-religious framework shall, in its relations with other states-members, claim special privileges for itself because of its particular social system or ideology; nor shall any member-state try to deny to any other member-state equal rights and privileges because of the social system or ideology of that other.

With respect especially to points 3 and 4 it is necessary to notice that what is in question—and the only thing that is in question—is international relations, that is, the behavior of sovereign states, the actions of sovereign governments towards one another in the international arena, not the domestic policies of any government towards its own people. The domestic policies of a given government are of course very important. They may even constitute the gravest sort of moral offense. But a world organization at present must draw a line between what it can do as a world organization, and what must be left to the decision and action of the individual state and its own people.

It is also especially important to make explicit, in regard to these points 3 and 4 what one might think sufficiently clear in any case, that they signify that the various social and ideological system represented in the membership of the organization have equal rights and privileges not only to exist, but, if they so desire, to proselytize, to try to convert others, to try to expand. To put it bluntly, under the U. N. idea neither the capitalist nor the communist can say to the other: Since my system and ideology are superior, and yours inferior, I naturally have a right to expand, to extend my influence, to convert others, but you do not. Again, this equality of right to exist, and equality of right to expand are taken as relative to the actions of sovereign states in the international arena, not as relative to the domestic policy of a given government. The U. N. takes no stand on whether a given government should, within its own territory, give equal right to exist and equal right to expand, to different ideological viewpoints. That is a matter of domestic policy which must be settled between the government concerned and its own people. Only when the domestic policy of a given government violates some international agreement entered into by that government does such a policy become the concern of the international organization.

If we apply the content of the points we have listed to the problem of peaceful competition of different social systems in the international arena we may formulate, directly and briefly, the following as the principal rules or norms of such competition:

A. The different systems have equal right to exist.
B. The different systems have equal right to proselytize.
C. The different systems have equal right to expand.

If followed, these rules and norms would assure peaceful competition between the contending giants whose relations now cast such a heavy cloud over the future of man. If this be the case, and it be also the case that the rules and norms under discussion are officially accepted by all, why is
there any grave problem? The problem consists in the fact that official acceptance is not accompanied by sufficiently consistent practice.

Let us direct attention to some factors, an understanding of which might facilitate efforts to bring practice closer to accepted principles. The immediate dangers of war are of course most directly and most sensitively connected with what is known as the area of foreign policy. In this whole field there is a peculiarly philosophical and logical task of analysis to which very little attention has been paid. I mean the task of identifying on the conceptual level which basic ideas or patterns of foreign policy are by their nature compatible or incompatible with the continuance, or the likelihood of continuance, of peace, in the framework of conditions given since the end of World War II.

Yet it would not seem especially difficult to carry through such an analysis. Looking back over the years since 1945, and reflecting upon situations which have again and again arisen to threaten the peace with immediate rupture—situations every one will recall by association with such terms as the Iranian crisis, the Korean crisis, the Formosa crisis, the Hungarian crisis, the Berlin crisis, the Cuban crisis—something logically significant which may also be practically useful becomes evident. That is, it is possible to identify at least two basic ideas, neither of which would seem classifiable as utopian, and either of which would be capable of preventing the kind of situation referred to.

One is essentially the same idea as that which in an earlier day, and under different conditions, was known as "spheres of influence." In terms of this idea (similar to a series of mutually acceptable "Monroe Doctrines") the major powers agree not to try to penetrate one another's accepted geographical zones of predominant influence except in certain specified ways. Roughly speaking, this would mean that the Communist bloc would "stay out" of Cuba, for example, in the sense of not supplying Cuba with arms, bases and military supervisory personnel, while the anti-Communist or free enterprise bloc would in the same sense "stay out" of a place like Turkey or Formosa. Such an idea would certainly not eliminate all possible causes of war, but it would just as certainly eliminate some of the most immediate and dangerous of them.

We are all familiar with the kind of objections customarily raised against this sort of idea. It smacks of immorality or amorality; it suggests a possibly callous disregard of the rights of small or relatively underdeveloped nations; it may promote a form of imperialism. Indeed it has these risks; but one cannot fail to take account of the fact that absence of the "spheres of influence" principle carries the very same risks without providing any compensatory value relative to the prevention of war. That is to say, under the present framework of conditions the absence of the "spheres of influence" principle means something like a universal scramble for penetration and counter-penetration by military threat, in which each giant tries to set up bases as close as possible to the actual borders
and vital centers of the other giant. It may well be said that there is no less danger of immorality, domination or imperialism in this state of affairs, and far more danger of war, than under the “spheres of influence” concept. The logic, as well as the value principle embodied in this latter concept was well brought out by Bertrand Russell in his book “Why Men Fight,” where he pointed out that when powerful sovereign states have differences, the function of statesmanship and diplomacy must be first of all to render force unnecessary by reaching through negotiation the same settlement that would have been reached in a contest of force if the contending parties had applied their respective measures of military strength—a thought which recalls force, the rugged pragmatism of a Hobbes. But I am not here concerned to argue for or against any one thesis so much as to reveal constructive potentialities of approach and method in whatever quarter found.

A second basic foreign policy idea possessed of mutuality and capable of preventing the extremely dangerous kind of situation mentioned would be the actual acceptance of equal rights all around for all powers to establish bases in any country, so long as they are invited by the existing government; or, alternatively, a ban on foreign bases of a military character anywhere. This would mean that we Americans would accept without threat of reprisal a Soviet military base in Cuba, while the Soviet Communists would accept ours in Turkey and the Chinese Communists ours in Formosa in the same way; or, alternatively, that neither side would have them. Great practical difficulties would of course attend negotiations to secure these results; but at least it might be said that these difficulties would not be as great as those attendant upon an effort to bring about something like a full world government at the present stage. There are other ideas which relate to foreign policy, like the idea of progressive disarmament, including cessation of nuclear testing, which are far from utopian and yet embody significant contributions to the prevention or war.

The important point is that ideas on this level are seldom thought through. One finds a pervasive absence of logically defensible perspectives, of responsible criticism in short of functions and values which the philosopher should be capable of supplying. For example, in respect to the alternatives posed, what one finds, both among our public and in our official leadership, is acceptance neither of the implications of the principle of spheres of influence nor of the principle of equal rights. There is little sign of any policy conceptions going beyond the limits of such notions as “positions of strength,” “liberation,” and “containment,” which are either devoid of mutuality or extremely limited in preventive value, since it is well known that each side has already enough strength to destroy the other several times over.

In addition, one may point to examples of general philosophic ideas which have tremendous bearing on this problem, though that bearing would
not seem to be immediate. Who could fail to be impressed and moved by Mahatma Gandhi’s conception of Satyagraha, non-violent resistance? If either side could find the moral courage to practice it, we would not fear for the future of the human race and the planet earth. The same could be said of the Quaker principle of pacifism: there never was a good war or a bad peace, which is perhaps another way of phrasing the commandment in the Judeo-Christian scripture which says, “Thou shalt not kill.” But an appeal to these ideas seems to produce as little effect in the Judeo-Christian as in the “non-religious” world, though the moral grandeur of such conceptions is self-evident.

There is in “The Republic” of Plato one of these flashes of devastating worldly wisdom, all the more telling because projected from a covering of superb dramatic irony, so different from the simple sincerity of a Gandhi or a Christ. I refer to the second Book where Socrates rallsies his young interlocuters after he has described a simple, healthy life in a simple, healthy society, and they have scornfully rejected it. “Now,” he says, “I understand: the question which you would have me consider is not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish also to a State at fever heat I have no objection. For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. “And he goes on: “And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?”

Glaucón: “Quite true.”

Socrates: “Then a slice of our neighbors’ land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited acquisition of wealth?”

Glaucón: “That, Socrates, will be inevitable.”

Socrates: “And so we shall go to war, Glaucón, shall we not?”

Glaucón: “Most certainly.”

Does this mean that war represents an inalienable dynamic of human nature, or simply that there was a wrong choice of values? Is this conception similar to the Freudian, or what is taken as the Freudian, thesis that man is inherently aggressive, and that therefore international warfare is inevitable? But it is just this illicit, question-begging “therefore” which is the logical weakness in these weeping attempts to apply some all embracing conception of human nature to the specific problem of global nuclear conflict. The question which now haunts us as no question ever did before is not whether man is in some sense “inherently aggressive,” or inherently incapable of being satisfied with a simple and modest life. Let the Platonic, or the Freudian picture, or both be assumed to be true. That still would not settle the question which is now destined to settle
everything else, for this ultimate question is a narrower, more precise one, to wit: Must man's inherent aggressiveness, or power-seeking, take the specific form of nuclear war? It is true that man must eat. But it is not logical to say that therefore he must eat something which will kill him.

I want to recommend again what I have called the Unesco approach, which while not infallible, is still the most hopeful: Understand the idea of the United Nations; grant equal rights; compete in peace.
In concrete scientific inquiries, the Pragmatist, the Naturalist and the Materialist have, at times, to deal with the tenet that there are fundamentals in Science, viz., (i) that certain aspects of scientific inquiry have precedence over the others, and (ii) that this precedence relieves the scientist of the obligation to investigate them.

The criteria of a rigidly formulated methodology, in certain cases, compel the fundamentalist to close off certain questions from investigation. Thus, in scientific inquiry, the fundamentals may be, say, direct observation, or concrete operations: the fundamentalist will, then, call a question meaning-less, if it is so phrased as to exclude its ever being reduced to the terms of direct observation. Thus, in Ethical and Psychological inquiries, in questions concerning "purely" subjective states of mind and the like, the fundamentalist method limits the meaning-fulness of the investigation.

Similarly, in the Physical Sciences, the fundamentalist imposes the principle of consistency (or non-contradiction). He, further, believes in the existence of a (so-called) "exact physical, or mathematical science", takes pride in its precision and insists on fundamental measurements and fundamental magnitudes, viz., magnitudes, "the measurement of which does not depend on any other magnitude".

It may be noted in passing that such Logical Positivists as call a question meaningless, if it is so phrased as to exclude its ever being reduced to the terms of direct observation, will fall under the category of methodological fundamentalists.

This fundamentalism in Scientific Method is a legacy from the past. In Medieval Physics, the categories, in terms of which the world of nature was interpreted, were not those of time, space, mass, energy, and the
like; but substance, essence, matter, form, quality, quantity—categories developed in the attempt to throw into scientific form the facts and relations observed in man's un-aided sense-experience of the world and the main uses, which he made it to serve. But, at the beginning of the Modern Period, under the influence of thinkers like Descartes, Newton and others, there was a change in the assumptions and categories of Physical Science. First, the world of nature is, no longer, regarded as a world of substances, having as many qualities as can be experienced in them, but it becomes "a world of atoms, equipped with none but mathematical characteristics and moving according to laws fully statable in mathematical form. Second, explanations in terms of forms and final causes of events, both in this world and in the less independent realm of mind" are "set aside in favour of explanations in terms of their simplest elements, the latter related temporally as efficient causes, and being mechanically treatable motions of bodies, wherever it is possible so to regard them". 

Prof. E. A. Burtt notes that, partly, owing to the growth to a commanding position in modern thought of the chemical, biological, and social sciences and, partly, owing to new discoveries within mechanical physics itself, the world of external facts is conceived as much more fertile and plastic than the earlier mechanist supposed it to be. The fundamental motives and values influencing scientific research have also begun to acquire a new significance. As regards the problem of causation, in place of the medieval view that the cause must be at least as perfect as the effect and the earlier modern view, viz., the mechanical position, in which the task of explanation becomes that of analyzing events into the motions of the elementary mass-units of which they are composed and stating the behaviour of any correlated group of events in the form of an equation, the more recent position is the evolutionary one: its central assumption is that the cause may be simpler than the effect, while, genetically, responsible for it. In this causal assumption, we may notice the method of analysing an event to be explained into its simpler (and often pre-existent) components along with the predictability and control of the effect by means of the cause. The causal relation also involves, to a greater or less extent, the element of mathematical exactitude. As regards the problem of Mind, it may, in the words of B. Russell, be observed that "while physics has been making matter less material, psychology has been making mind less mental." 

In the earlier part of the modern period, fundamentalism in scientific method appeared in the form of metaphysical assumptions and categories. Later on, however, an attempt was made to free scientific method from every vestige of metaphysics and to evolve logic without ontology. Logic, however, was, still supposed to have its own laws,—laws which, as necessary truths or inherent necessities of thought, acted as regulating;

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2 Russell, B.—*History of Western Phil.* p. 891.
principles of scientific method. But, gradually, certain forms of naturalism held these principles, e.g., the principle of non-contradiction to be contingent, but highly reliable conclusions, based on an empirical study of nature. And, more recently, certain types of naturalism regard these principles to be void of factual content and arbitrary specifications for the construction of symbolic systems. Instead of regarding the laws of thought as inherent necessities or even as empirical (inductive) generalizations, some naturalists hold that the laws of thought "formulate an ideal to be achieved—an ideal, which is capable of being attained, at least approximately—and they indicate the direction in which the maximum of desired precision may be obtained." Ernest Nagel recognizes that various norms or ideals—such as the desire for a certain degree of precision, for intellectual economy and notational convenience, or for a certain type of comprehensiveness also control the direction of inquiry and the articulation of theories.

Nagel, however, recognizes that every physicist employs arithmetical truths in performing measurements of volume as well as in calculating with his experimentally obtained readings, as if these truths were indeed not subject to experimental control. If, for example, the process of measurement is examined in some detail, it will be found that physical measurement of a property is possible only if a set of standard measures are first instituted. Accordingly, a physicist takes for granted a formal science of arithmetic, but uses it as a system of postulates for constructing physical standards of measurement. The propositions of "pure" arithmetic such as $2+2=4$ may not, then, be regarded as either (i) necessary truths, or even as (ii) inductive generalizations (empirical truths). But as a system of postulates or, say, as norms of enquiry, the formal rules or formulas of arithmetic have a logical value for isolating certain properties or relations of bodies and for instituting further operations upon them. Writers like N.R. Campbell even go further and hold that there are fundamental magnitudes; that fundamental magnitudes are magnitudes, the measurement of which does not depend on any other magnitude and, further, that they involve the simplest kind of operation in their determination.

Some scientific materialists regard the above theory, viz., fundamentalism in methodology, as a serious threat to materialism. C.W. Churchman, consequently, seeks to refute the above fundamentalism in Methodology on the ground that questions come out of human demands and not out of methodology itself. To put methodology to impose limitations on question—raising is, according to him, to "glorify means and make our ends subservient to them". He challenges the methodological principle of consistency and asks, "why cannot Science live meaningfully with contradictions?" for the maintenance of a contradiction, or violent disagreement is often the basis of our most fruitful progress. He doubts if

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5 Ibid, Article on "A Materialist Theory of Measurement" by C.W. Churchman.
there is any exact science, in the fundamentalist sense of the term, "Exact". He points out that different observers do perceive "instinctively" in different ways, even when the operations are very carefully specified. Further, different observers get significantly different results on different days, in different laboratories, etc.—As against operationists like Bridgman, he observes that we, simply, have not found a way of setting up verbal instructions, no matter how simple they may appear in form, which will be carried through in the same way by most if not all observers.

Scientific materialism, then, in opposition to scientific fundamentalism, is prepared to absorb the valuable elements in traditional rationalism as well as empiricism. The value of traditional rationalism lay on its insistence on a rational or formal process in making a turn of the scientific spiral; while empiricism was valid in insisting on the like necessity of observations. Both, however, were wrong in attempting to make these functions sufficient, i.e., in not showing how these functions were to be substantiated by other processes in science. If, therefore, the individual, who is, often, a fundamentalist, viz., one, who, usually, begins by assuming certain things to be known and certain propositions and meanings to be self-evident (i.e., evident to himself), is enlarged enough to include a representation from the major divisions of Science, then, on the basis of true co-operative effort in the sciences, the spirit of fundamentalism begins to disappear.

Similarly, according to this view, the legitimacy of a question is prescribed, not by the criteria of a rigidly formulated methodology, but by human needs or by the historical demand that there may be for an answer. Thus ethical questions and questions concerning "purely" subjective states of mind will not be meaningless even if they are so phrased as to exclude their ever being reduced to the terms of direct observation.

Thus the rise to a dominating position of the human need to control nature's processes and to do so as exactly as possible accounts for the modern man's preferences and selection of the problems and methods of scientific investigation. In this way, science reveals the presence and functioning of values in the basic as well as operational categories which it selects and in the way it applies them.

This brings Scientific Materialism perilously close to Idealism. The materialist may, indeed, still subscribe to the objective value theory; he may, with G.E. Moore, reject subjectivism and, perhaps, even relativism in the sphere of values. But he has, today, to recognise that there is overwhelming valutational evidence in support of the view that the valutational realm is more multifarious and more multifarious than his theory would suggest: not only is he confronted with social and aesthetic values but also with intellectual, moral and religious ones. Hence antifundamentalism, naturally, leads to subjectivism or relativism in the sphere of values.
This new spirit of anti-fundamentalism in scientific inquiry is capable of enlarging the frontiers of empiricism. One turn of the scientific spiral is concerned with the relating of perceptions with other perceptions; this process is not accomplished by the senses, but is the work of reason, and is guided by principles, that are never fully verified by immediate experience. This necessitates the combination of empiricism with rationalism.

Similarly, full-fledged anti-fundamentalism should be prepared to treat the insights of the mystic, not as entirely illusory, but, at least, as tentative hypotheses. The direct intuitions of super-sensible reality, the inner experiences of gifted men and the data, furnished by introspection of their inner attitudes or states by several mystics and systematized by, at least, a few of them, should, certainly, be welcome to an expanding anti-fundamentalist inquiry. To an earnest anti-fundamentalist, then, Metaphysics cannot be a mass schizophrenia, but, at any rate, a type of intellectual poetry, which even when it has no cognitive meaning-fulness, has its own sense and significance; for logic, the propositions of science and the cognitive statements of common sense support metaphysics. Such inquiries are more capable of enlarging the horizon of empiricism than the dissection of living criminals, embarked on by the Nazis or the medieval Chinese, or the sadistic study of the aesthetics of horror, carried on by a medieval prince, by means of over-turning a boat, full of living men and women, into a turbulent river.

Anti-fundamentalism, however, can only be a process or a method and not an endproduct of inquiry. The discourse or the business of man requires provisional certainties, even if, in strict theory, they are termed only as probabilities (rather than certainties): in practical affairs, the logical principle of non-contradiction can not be, altogether, abolished. But anti-fundamentalism can give us, at best, only a wavering, neutral cognition rather than a judgment or conclusion. And a cluster of probabilities, in which every probability hangs on the rest, dissolves every thing, substantial and actual, into something relative and transitional. Such a set of probabilities as this cannot be a valid form of knowledge.
Infancy and adolescence are two stages in human development which have been studied in the most intensive way. The interest for infancy is motivated for many research workers in this field by findings which show that experiences of the child in this time will be decisive for the formation of his attitudes and behaviors during the whole life-course. The time of adolescence calls for attention far more by its own problems and qualities. The conflict between the expectations of society and the attitudes, plans, and actions of the adolescents are the background for the lasting interest in this field.

Although there have been done many studies in the most different aspects of adolescence, parents and teachers may wonder how they can use this huge amount of information. The contributions of the different nations, scientific branches, and institutes to this problem even may have a confusing instead of a enlightening effect. At first the educationist looking for information may be taught that adolescence is just a biological affair. The maturation of certain glands leads to a ‘temporary intoxication of the human brain’ (KRETSCCHMER) and this intoxication produces the originality as well as the incongruity of the adolescent mind. There is not very much that can be done about this. According to this point of view parents and adolescents have to stand it through until the physical balance is maintained again.

This biological theory of adolescence has many effects to present-day approaches of the study of adolescence. But it scarcely has been verbalized in any systematic way. This verbalisation of the underlying theory scarcely has been neglected by the cultural-anthropological and socio-psychological theory of adolescence. Cultural anthropologists like M. Mead, R. Benedict, and R. Kluckhohn, educationists like R. J. Havighurst, sociologists like Devereux and H. Schelsky and psychologists like M. Whiting
and A. Davis have cumulated a vast body of knowledge on the impact of society on adolescence. According to these findings the theory of a ‘genuine’ stage of development which ‘nature’ or mental dispositions marked by ‘typical’ adolescent traits like ‘emotional instability’, ‘feeling of inferiority’ ‘aggressiveness’, ‘conflict proneness’ could not be verified. The comparison of adolescent behavior in different cultures and social classes shows that any ‘syndrome’ of adolescence is an effect of a culture and society and a special socio-economic situation. Apparently there are no ‘universe’ adolescent traits. The only ‘global’ fact in human life seems to be that of the continuous social conditioning of the individual.

Nobody today will neglect this ever growing knowledge on the relationship between society and individual development. Especially in this country the insight into the cultural influences on adolescence brought a reorientation of research on adolescence and of educational thinking on dealing with adolescents.

The great social, economic, and political changes in Europe since World War I have brought changes in juvenile behavior which apparently cannot be covered by ‘eternal’ developmental laws of adolescence. Some writers believe that between 1910 and 1960 there existed 3–6 kinds of ‘adolescence’ in the different generations.

Today a smooth, ‘matter-of-fact-minded’ rather controlled than emotional type seems to be representative for German adolescents. No real break between childhood and adulthood is found by Schelsky for this young post-war generation—only a gradual transition from the soft and rosy realism of childhood to a more and more sceptical realism of adolescence and adulthood. But this streamlined design of adolescence sometimes seems to be rather a projection of grown up sociologists to younger people than a summary of empirical findings. Applying the methods of controlled psychological research my own team found amazing similarities in the reactions of adolescents of 1930 and of 1950-1960.

We have repeated so far 3 major studies which had been conducted in the time between 1929-1932. The first of these studies deals with the adolescent identification with a person or an ideal. Using the same kind of questions and a complete parallel sample Glöckel found almost no differences between the attitudes of Berlin adolescents of 1932 and Nuremberg adolescents of 1956. The model the adolescent identifies with is most often a person of his neighbourhood or family next to this one out of history, sport, and science. The names of these persons are different of course but not the categories. Political leaders were not very much represented either in 1932 or in 1956. Movie stars formed the model for identification in 6 per cent of the cases (appr. 1400) in 1932 as well as in 1956. Albert Schweitzer was the person who has been mentioned for the most time in 1956. These findings were supported in the late fifties by a study of Bertlein (from Teachers College—Frankfurt) who in 2300 adolescents of all social levels found the same general patterns for
the process of the 'search of self' (Jersild) by identification with another person. A second study conducted 1929 in the Ruhr industrial area and repeated there twice (in 1952 and 1961) was concerned with the attitude of adolescents toward their job. These studies only included boys who had left school at the 8th grade (in most parts of Germany still the time of leaving school for most children) and started a career as apprentice or semi-skilled worker in a shop or factory. The different kinds, how these adolescents viewed their job after 1-2 years of training, could be ordered into 5 groups (v. job. 1)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job is seen as</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) just pressure and strain</td>
<td>5, 6</td>
<td>2, 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) mean to make one's living</td>
<td>42, 3</td>
<td>40, 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) stage within a career</td>
<td>27, 2</td>
<td>22, 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) expression of own need for activity</td>
<td>3, 4</td>
<td>7, 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) moral or personal task</td>
<td>21, 5</td>
<td>26, 7</td>
<td></td>
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(*) numbers indicate percentages of boys who show indicated attitude.

It very easily can be seen from these table that almost no changes in the distribution of the main attitudes toward the own job can be observed between 1952 and 1929. Neither was there a more 'idealistic' way of comprehending the own job before 1930 nor is there a trend to greater 'materialism' or 'matter-of-fact-mindedness' in 1952. There is a major shift observable in 1961 when less adolescents work to get ahead (No. 3) and more, because it would be boring or unsensible not to work (No. 4). The group of 'idealistic' motivations remains almost unchanged again in 1961. The observable shift between 1961 and the previous studies can be interpreted as a symptom of 'prosperity' and 'full employment'. In this situation 'getting ahead' does not look so much of a problem than in the years 1952 and 1929 characterized by economic stress and a shortage of vacant job.

A third series of our studies followed the procedure and topic chosen by KELCHNER in 1929 again. It referred to the attitudes of adolescents towards guilt, crime, and punishment. Content analysis of free
compositions on the topic 'why guilt (crime) is punished', were used. In a first repetition of this study in the Bonn area in 1949/50 we found a type of reaction Kelchner in her very thorough book did not mention at all; They pointed to experiences during and after the war when the criteria of 'guilty and criminal' behavior changed. They asked if there are not limitations and social, economic, as well as political conditions for whatever you may call 'guilt' and 'crime'. In 28 per cent of the 1100 documents we found this kind of doubts which are not found in the original study. Another repetition of the same experiment done in 1956 showed a decrease of these reactions to 6 percent, within another sample to 0 percent of the compositions. I think these findings demonstrate very well that the instruments we used was very sensitive in measuring attitudinal changes. But these changes were dependent on the immediate experiences of the generations we tested. The abnormal experiences during and immediately after the war resulted in attitudes which referred the criteria of 'guilt' or 'crime' to the dominant political system. The adolescents who did not know so much of these devastating experiences as of the reconstruction of order and morale (after 1948) reacted again in a conservative way for which 'guilt' is not a dependent variable of any political system. As a matter of fact, there were many minor changes between 1922 and 1956. Within the many motivations for 'guilt' or 'criminal behaviour' mentioned in the studies there could be observed in 1956 an increase in statements like 'people get bad because of bad education at home'—reflecting some mental health slogans distributed by newspaper and other channels. In 1929 there prevailed explanations of crime and guilt by economic deprivation and need which seemed to be quite unimportant to the adolescent in 1956.

Another group of studies—conducted especially by Undeutsch and his staff at Cologne in 1957/58—repeated experiments done by Kroh in 1926 on the awareness of mental and character qualities in perceptual processes. The children and adolescents were shown a silent movie (e.g. the story of a mountain-climber: his farewell to the family; the dangerous climbing; the despair and fatal accident of the climbing man). After the show the children had to write down what they had seen before. Now children of 12 years usually state facts referring to the external events. With increasing age mention is made more and more of the psychological background of these events, of the characters of the persons etc. The studies of 1925 and 1957/58 show the same reaction patterns of adolescents to this situation. This growing awareness of the psychological background of man's behavior can be regarded as one of the best symptoms of the adolescent introversion and 'search for self' (KROH, SPRANGER, THOMAE). Therefore we may state again that the behavioral and mental structure of adolescents show a similar pattern during different decades of this century.

Findings like these would not be too surprising within a country which
remained untouched by the crises and revolutions of this century. As they are referring to the adolescents of a country which faced the greatest changes in family, school, state, and general social life, these comparisons point to the fact that there does exist a typical pattern of development—at least in a culture which by its diversities offers different ways of behavior and of identifications. This pattern includes a certain (internal) segregation of the adolescent from family, educational authorities, and traditional social codes. It can show, too, a search for independency in attitude and behavior and a new more conscious subtle identification with society.

Terms of personality maturation and expansion may delineate this pattern in a better way than the vocabulary of adjustment theory. On the other hand adjustment processes are involved in the whole process. Therefore this ‘pattern’ of development in adolescence has not to be explained by an internal ‘drive’ or ‘tendency’. It can be referred, too, to the fact that the developmental ‘tasks’ remains similar to the adolescent even in different social conditions. This task may be defined in social or psychological terms.

In any case we should look for similarities in the reactions of different generations before making statements on radical changes between today’s and yesterday’s adolescents. There certainly are differences between the adolescent of 1930 and the adolescent of 1961. These changes scarcely are symptoms of a biological decline due to the ongoing industrial revolution. On the other hand many studies show that the acceleration of somatic development does not result in a decline of mental development as some psychiatrists and educationist in this country believed.

The best way one can refer to these developmental changes is the comparison of the adolescent situation with a problem situation defined in our pluralistic cultures always in a similar way. So far there is no proof for an increasing tendency to ‘problem avoidance’. But unfortunately we, too, have no basis for any statements on the decrease or increase of ‘successful’ solutions of this problem within different generations. However great the social forces may be which determine the trials for a solution, we never should stop to think of the activity of the ‘problem solver’ at least to a minimum extent as an independent variable.
A PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOK IN LIFE
(Statement of a Personal Philosophical Credo)

OBJECT OF THIS PAPER

It has often been said that an enlightened life or a wise one is a life which is lived with a philosophic outlook on it, or that a philosophical outlook on it is probably life's best and most valuable equipment, so that the acquisition and assimilation of that outlook becomes obligatory on every one who wants to make the best of the opportunity of his life. It is the object of this Paper to seek to clarify the meaning and content of the phrase and concept of 'the philosophic outlook on life.'

MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY

The term 'philosophy' has gone through many historical vicissitudes of shifting emphases in respect of its connotation and significance. Signifying its original etymological meaning, viz. 'love of wisdom', in the days of Pythagoras and Socrates, it came to mean, generally, a reasoned view of the world in the hands of Plato and Aristotle, and an art and way of life in the days of the Stoics and the Epicureans. In the Middle ages, it came to be looked upon as an ally and advocate of religion, charged with the rational representation and defence of the divinely revealed dogma. Philosophy then was given and it accepted its material conclusions re man, world and god by and from religion, which had derived them from divine-revelation, and was called on to formulate and justify them on the methodological basis of the natural light of reason. This methodological bifurcation between philosophy and religion, in modern times, came to be
extended to their material conclusions themselves, philosophy being transformed in the process into an independent and free-thinking, rational criticism and construction yielding a theory of the world and human life. This process, broadly speaking, may be said to have begun with Bacon and Descartes, and found, in our own times, a most articulate expression in Spencer’s conception of philosophy as ‘completely unified knowledge’ which he sought to work out in his ‘synthetic philosophy’. Such a conception, which views philosophy as a reflective synthesis of all knowledge yielding, from the standpoint of reason, a coherent account of the world and of man’s place in it, can be taken as a representative modern conception of philosophy for our present purposes.

(The average classical Indian conception of Philosophy, as typified in the famous first verse of the Śaṅkhya-Kārikā, as knowledge of the conditions of life and the world (which is the means and the basis of overcoming life’s miseries) may be said to agree, in substance, with this conception (except, of course, for its practical orientation). But the contemporary conception of it (as it has developed in the hands of our logical positivists and analysts), as mere clarification of the meanings of statements, or as mere conceptual or linguistic analysis, does not fit in and cannot be accepted in the present context, as it eliminates all reference to reality. Such reference is the inalienable assumption of life and its activities, of which one need not be ashamed in spite of these our contemporaries :)

WHAT OUTLOOK MEANS

The connotation of the term ‘outlook’ must also be carefully fixed up in our present context. Broadly, it means a complex of beliefs and attitudes, which lie at the basis of and colour our life’s activities, which may be described to be in the nature of its overt expression. Outlook is the life’s implicit spiritual basis and assumption: life is its explicit form and expression. The two are the obverse and reverse of the same identical fact, the entity of the individual, the outlook being the individual’s potentiality and living his actuality.

PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOK

Philosophical outlook in life, therefore, means a complex of individual’s crystallised beliefs and attitudes in life born of, or arising out of, his synthetic reflection on the nature of the universe and his own place in it. It is a perpetual and sustained attempt to base life on the knowledge of the universe. It is an attempt to live an enlightened life, a life of enlightened action, or jñānottara karma. A person with a philosophical outlook in or on life is one who has, by deliberate reflection, arrived at a reasoned view of the universe and has, consequently, come to realise
the nature of his own place or situation in it and seeking perpetually to conform his concrete living to it.

PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOK - SOME MISCONCEPTIONS

It is important to realise that philosophical outlook means just this, nothing more, nothing less. In particular, it is necessary to see that any insistence on the necessity or desirability of having a philosophical outlook on life is no insistence on holding any one particular view of the universe, though this has not always been recognised. Accordingly, it is desirable to set down below the views and viewpoints with which philosophical outlook is often confused and identified and from which it must be, by itself, kept clear, though, again it will be possible for a particular thinker to accept any one or more of those as the concrete content of his philosophical outlook on life. Thus philosophical outlook has often been confused and identified with (1) otherworldliness, (2) asceticism, (3) mysticism, and/or (4) theism. Philosophical outlook need not necessarily be otherworldly, though for a thinker, who holds this world to be a mere sham or appearance, it may be so. And what is here said of otherworldliness also applies to the other viewpoints. Philosophical outlook need not be ascetic, mystic or theistic, though it may be any one, or the other, or more of these, in accordance with the relevant view of the universe from which these attitudes or viewpoints (viz. ascetic, mystic or theistic) are seen to follow as consequences.

POSITIVE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOK

What, then, positively, is philosophical outlook in life? Or, more concretely, what, according to the writer's persuasion, are the positive configurations and contents of the philosophical outlook in life? According to the writer, the philosophic outlook in life consists of the following four life's configurational constituents: (1) a metaphysical foundation, (2) a psychological basis, (3) an ethical orientation, and (4) a religious coping. Whosoever has provided for his life a metaphysical foundation, a psychological basis, an ethical orientation and a religious coping has a philosophical outlook on life, which, when it deepens into a palpable belief and conviction, percolates to and expresses itself through attitudes and activities of his actual concrete living, rendering it philosophic in the true sense of that term. The rest of this Paper, accordingly, will consist of an attempt, necessarily brief and somewhat dogmatic, to elucidate these four formal or configurational constituents of a philosophic life and their material contents, according to the writer's persuasion.

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION

Life's metaphysical foundation lies in the individual's deliberate views,
beliefs and attitudes, regarding the nature of the universe and the place of human life in it. The main metaphysical questions are: Is the universe a blind, mechanical interplay of material atoms, or the natural energies or forces into which they have been resolved by modern physics? Or, is it the manifestation of some kind of purpose implying some kind of agency behind the process? Is the universe, as we see it, the manifestation of dead physico-chemical processes, or of the operation of a spirit or spirits? Again, what is the human self or personality,—a conglomeration of material units or a spiritual unity? Is the life of this Self, again, a mere resultant of its component forces, or a process at least partly determined by its own spontaneous freedom and initiative? These questions are far too large for any adequate discussion of them in the present context: and it is also clear that there can be and have been given a variety of answers to them by thinkers of different ages and persuasions. I can only briefly and dogmatically state here what my own broad position in the matter is.

(A). Nature of the Universe:

I consider that evolutionary, teleological and monistic-pluralistic idealism or spiritualism would be, on the whole, the less mistaken and more probable metaphysical truth about the nature of the universe than any other plausible theory in that behalf. Rank mechanistic materialism is simply out of the question, being ruled out by the developments which we have seen in the field of modern science during the last three or four centuries. This universe has evolved; and this evolutionary process does not appear to have been a random melee of pure chance occurrences or miracles. Even in the sphere of inanimate nature, the broad fact of a patterned existence appears significantly to emerge, so as to render the idea of a blind or contingent mechanism an unsuitable metaphysical concept. Even the conception of law in the physical universe implies a pattern; and though one need not go so far, as with Jeans, as to read "the foot-prints of consciousness" in the immense primitive, astronomical universe, it is at least clear, at least to my mind, that if 'miracle' and 'law' are the only two alternatives in the interpretation of the universe (as they really are), 'law' can only mean a pattern, of which 'miracle' is a direct negation, and that 'pattern' implies a purpose in howsoever diluted and implicit a sense you take it. The patterned character of the universe becomes increasingly explicit and crystallised, the higher you arise in the scale of cosmic evolution, from matter to life and from life to mind and from mind to society—a theme on which it is both impossible and unnecessary to enlarge in the present context. Life is an implicit and unconscious (shall we call it preconscious?), but purposive, process of adjustment, adjustment of means to ends and of ends to means; and organisms are nature's instruments or vehicles or organs of that adjuitive process. And when one rises to the level of mind, that adjustiveness becomes more and
more conscious and deliberate or self-conscious. *Pari passu* with this growing self-consciousness, adjustment becomes more and more effective, and liberates from the yoke of the vital needs of the organisms, increasing quantities of their energies for their canalisation into the more constructive and creative directions—those of the growth of a more socialised life and the creation of higher and more intrinsic values, which is human life, ultimately, come to be recognised as truth, beauty and goodness (or holiness?). Mind, at this level, is more properly called the "spirit", in recognition of its self-conscious and purposeful (as distinguished from mere purposive, as at the biological level) entity, initiative and freedom. It is this spirit, or rather spirits, that forge, in the course of evolution, forms of over-individual cooperative endeavour in the pursuit of values, giving rise to patterns of social behaviour and unity, the nature of which can become clearer only as the process, which is still in progress, advances from stage to stage—the process of which we can have only vague, anticipatory glimpses from its present phenomenology. Such is the upshot of what I have called above the evolutionary, teleological and monistic-pluralistic spiritualism.

This entire evolutionary process of the universe can hardly be adequately explained on the hypothesis of random chance or miracle, or that of dead or blind mechanism. The most unmistakable indication of this is that we have to posit a primordial evolutionary urge, impulse or impetus at its beginning (which can only be arbitrarily determined, since there is no such thing, in respect of the cosmic process, as an absolute beginning or end). Bergson, the celebrated French philosopher of evolutionary biology, posited such an impetus, which he called the *elan vital*, at the beginning of the evolution of life; and Mc. Dougall, the penetrating British psychologist, posited a similar impetus, which he called the *horme*, (shall we call it the *elan psychique*) on the psychical level of evolution. But it is clear that this conception of the initial urge or impetus must be extended both backwards and forwards so as to cover both the pre-biological and post-psychical stages of the evolutionary process. The ultimate result of these assumptions would be that the cosmic evolution in general would have ultimately to be traced back to a primordial urge behind the universe, the *elan universel* or the *elan cosmique*, which at the succeeding stages or landmarks of the process would assume different nomenclature and significance. At the back of the inorganic or pre-animate stage of the process, there would be the *elan physique* or the *elan matériel*, which would develop into the *elan vital* (Bergson) and *elan psychique* or the *elan spirituel* (Mc. Dougall's *horme*) and bring about the manifestation of the organic and mental stages of the cosmic evolutionary process, the still later stage of which would be the stage of social evolution brought about by the *elan social* which would have to be posited behind it. The universe, therefore, ultimately, is a creative or emergent working out of the *elan universel* or (as we might call it, in view of its ultimate goal in
the sequel, viz, the production of the highest values known to man culminating in holiness) the *elan divin* or the *elan sacre* or *elan saint* (the divine or the holy urge), the God’s urge, the ultimate motive force behind cosmic evolution. This specific standpoint re the nature of the universe, suggested here, may well be designated as *Graduated Emergent Energism.*

(B) Man in the Universe

Such is the outline view of the universe which is provided by our modern knowledge as the metaphysical foundation of our life. The description of this foundation, however, will not be complete unless the nature of the place of man *vis-a-vis* the universe, so viewed, is clearly brought out. It is evident, in view of the above, that the universe is, ultimately, a society or community of spirits, which has been eternally and continually evolving newer and newer forms and patterns of their lives, through which the *elan cosmique* or the *elan universel* is perpetually manifesting itself. This urge is the ultimate spearhead behind this cosmic evolution; and the spirits are the vehicles or instruments or organs of the cosmic purpose behind that process. These spirits, again, are not mere parcels of the so-called particles or atoms, or mere duplicates of each other like factory articles with no individuality about them. They are integral, individualised and unique entities, none of which could really replace the other. Leibnitz’s ‘principle of the identity of the indiscernibles’ in just a speculative recognition of this uniqueness of the individual spirits. Men are thus members of the universe, the carriers of its increasing purpose and the agents of its progressive realisation. They are selves or spirits, who are truly the sparks of the divine urge, and thus are not the mere resultants of the dead mechanical forces, but are the participators, in their own rights and in their own ways, but within their own limits, in the spontaneous freedom and initiative of that urge. They are integral persons, who, however, are the constituent members of, not an impersonal, but an inter-personal or over-personal, community. In them the universe becomes self-conscious and curious and solicitous about itself. Through them the universe looks at itself and may be said to be trying to know itself and realise and enjoy the nature of its own being and to direct its course, to what ultimate grand end the sequel alone can indicate. Let not men pretend to be able to read the nature of this far-off end as they read their manuscripts. It is necessarily, for us, shrouded in a mystery, which can at best allow us only momentary and broad hints and glimpses in moments of fortunate illumination or intuition. Men cannot probe deep either into the far-off past or the far-off future. Their lives are just spells of the sunshine of knowledge hemmed in on either side by the mist of the unknown. Yet that sun-shine is enough to brighten up their narrow corners and to enable them to see enough of the universe so as to derive guidance for their lives.
Such, then, is our life’s metaphysical foundation, the first constituent of a philosophical outlook in life, of course according to the writer’s persuasion.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS**

The second constituent of the philosophical outlook in life is the psychological basis of life. If life must have a metaphysical foundation in the form of reasoned beliefs about and attitudes towards the universe, it must also have a psychological basis in the form of beliefs attitudes as to the nature and functions of the mind that, directly or indirectly, as McDougall used to say, shapes all human life and behaviour. Man must understand himself, to be able to conduct himself properly in life; and understanding oneself means understanding one’s mind. Psychology, properly defined, is a study of mind and of behaviour as the expression of mind. What, then, is mind? And what is its nature and function in life? And what is the practical bearing of all this on the conduct of human life? All these questions, again, have found a variety of answers at the hands of psychologists; and controversies in that behalf have not altogether ended yet. I shall state here what appears to me to be the broad upshot of our modern knowledge on the subject, without entering into those controversies.

(A) **Nature and Phenomenology of the mind**

Mind appears to be almost conterminous or co-extensive with life. Evidence of comparative psychology has abundantly brought out the fact that even the amoeba, and the paramecium, two of the lowest typical unicellular organisms, have the capacity to profit by experience, the surest indication of mind. Mind, in fact, is the organism’s gift of nature enabling it to effect adjustment—adjustment of means to ends and of ends to means—which is the whole content of its life-process. The need for adjustment arises as a consequence of the operation of the life-urge which finds fulfilment in that adjustment. Life is a vital urge, an *elan*; and living is or consists of the operation of that urge. This urge, in the course of evolution, gradually assumes the distinctly mental aspect in virtue of its developing capacity for finer and finer adjustment. Life develops into and becomes mind, so that mind itself must be said to be of the nature of an intelligent urge—the *elan psychique*. This original stem-urge, however, soon ceases to be unitary and differentiates into a system of what must now be called motives. Modern psychology is mainly a psychology of motivation, and has done much to unravel the mystery of the motivational foundations of human life. Especially the work of McDougall and Freud has, on the whole, and despite the controversies which have raged round it and appear now to have left a quiescent situation in the field, left its mark in securing a more or less
stable recognition for the general truth that mind, as evolved, is a system of directed or oriented motives, whether you call them 'reflexes' 'innate habits', 'needs', 'drives', 'instincts', or 'propensities'. McDougall, unfortunately, identified his 'hormicism' with the 'instinct theory', and again and again made efforts to arrive at a considered list of 'instincts' or, as he later called them, 'propensities'. But the living upshot of his work probably is that, whereas his meticulous 'instinctivism' is now almost a dead thing of the past, his 'hormism' has come, directly or indirectly, to stay. Freud's is a more instructive story; his primitive libido-urge, which was, to begin with, an unitary and hypersexy conception (though his 'sex', even then, was so sparsely conceived as to be equivalent almost with the general pleasure of living), he, later revised and re-revised, so as to cover two broad motives, called by him the life and death instincts, Eros and Thanatos. And his tripartite topographical analysis of the psycho into the id, the ego and the super ego is virtually an analytical classification of motives operative in the life of the organisms. The genius and vision of these two psychologists, which they brought to bear upon their observation and studies in the nature of the human mind from two different approaches—the study of animal and social life in one case and the study of the abnormal and the unconscious in the other—have now established, beyond any legitimate doubt, the fundamental motivated and motivational character of the human mind.

It is important to realise, however, that even though life is motives, these motives, according to the dialectic of life and the universe, are not all uni-directional or harmonious with each other. They pull and impel the organism in different directions, rendering its life into a scene of their multi-directional activities and their possible co-operation and conflict. And thus arise the phenomenon of frustration and repression, and neuroses or psycho-neuroses. With the growth of civilization, mind becomes a transfigured unity of diverse, often conflicting, motives.

From this arises, however, a fresh problem for life: the problem of the organisation and integration of these diverse motives. For, unless these are properly canalised and integrated and rendered harmonious, there can be no perfect adjustment in life, no fulfilment of the primordial elan, which is the one condition of a perfected life. Modern psychology, as taught by its representative masters, has, therefore, also studied the phenomenology of this integrative process which has thus a deep significance for the conduct of our human life. It has investigated not only the original or innate motivational bases of the mind's life, but has also studied the very important process of their conditioning and modification. Original and acquired motives together, thus, make the content of the life of the mind. These motives come to be organised around the mind's diverse objects, and, when so organized, come to be called the sentiments. Sentiments, in fact, are constellations of motives, original and acquired, attaching themselves to all kinds of objects in life and are the ultimate
constituents of an organised mind, which, as such, is now better called personality. But the formation of sentiments achieves only a partial integration and harmonisation of motives, for, even though sentiments, by canalising, as they do, our motives towards definite objects, partly bring about their integration and adjustment to each other, there still remains the contingency of a disharmony and conflict of the sentiments themselves. And the problem of their integration and harmonisation, which arises and presses itself as a consequence of their disharmony and conflict in the face of life's finer and subtler importunities and necessities, compels, again, their re-orientation and re-valuation. A distinction between the lower and higher sentiments, thus, emerges, giving rise to their hierarchic systematisation; and the sentiments, which are the constituents of personality, thus become organised under the aegis of a master-sentiment, the personality, thus, becomes finally an integrated and harmonious personality. Achievement of such an integrated and harmonised personality is the ultimate function and goal of our psychical life.

(B) Cultivation of Conscientiousness

Mere possession of this psychological wisdom (consisting of some such beliefs and attitudes about the nature and function of mind in life), however is not enough. That wisdom must be, in practice, implemented; and this implementation consists in man's cultivation of a constant and conscious habit and attitude of a genuine self-exploration and of a critical scrutiny of his own motivations, with a view to their revelation and reorientation, canalisation and sublimation, towards the highest values reflectively accepted as such and pursued as the goals of life. This is the true meaning of "conscientiousness" which is the real operative essence of the psychological basis of human life, which is our second constituent of the philosophical outlook on life.

A most important ingredient of conscientiousness is a genuine and scrupulous or solicitous regard for and adhesion to truth,—truth about oneself and truth re the universe, which are the basic conditions of life. For, the universe itself is structured and operates on the foundations of truth (not untruth or error), and this fact is the metaphysical basis of truth as a foundational value in life. Ends in life, whatever they are, can only be attained by basing our activities and efforts towards their realisation on truth.

ETHICAL ORIENTATION

The third ingredient of the philosophical outlook in life is the ethical orientation of life. If life must have a metaphysical foundation and a psychological basis, it must, further, also have an ethical orientation in the form of appropriate beliefs and attitudes re the ultimate goal of human life and about the nature and modes of life conducive to that
goal. Ethics is a study, primarily, of this goal of human life, which is or ought to be the ultimate object of all our life's aspirations. This study has occupied the human mind from the dawn of reflection; and, again, a variety of answers have been given to the questions raised in it. Broadly speaking, there have been two types of theories proposed in this behalf: (1) theories according to which good life consists in conformity to some kind of law (variously conceived as the law of the tribe, the law of god, the law of reason, conscience, moral sense, etc.) and (2) theories according to which good life consists in the pursuit of some kind of well-defined or definite end (such as the greatest pleasure of the individual, or the greatest pleasure of the greatest number, perfection of personality, etc.). It is necessary, however, to realise that the nature of the ethical goal of human life can only be ascertained after having due regard to the nature of human existence and human nature. The ethical end of human life cannot be formulated in abstraction from the nature of human existence and human nature. Several ethical theorists have committed this fallacy of false abstraction consisting in the formulation of the ethical end in direct or indirect disregard of concrete human existence and nature. Rationalists like Kant and hedonists like Mill are alike worthy of this blame. A sound theory of ethics must be based on a sound theory of human existence and human nature. What man ought to be, or do, naturally depends on what man is. And it is sound metaphysics and sound psychology that can elucidate the nature of human existence and of human nature. We have already covered both of these bases of ethics, though necessarily very cursorily. Their relevant upshot is that man is a member of the universe (metaphysics) and is an active, motivated and oriented being (psychology). The only supplement to our account of human nature (psychology) previously given that we must now add is that man's nature also includes, besides the element of activity and motivation (conation) and as subordinate to or subsumed under that main element, the elements of knowledge (cognition) and feeling (affection). The consequence is that man's total personality is a synthesis of knowing, feeling and willing. Man's ethical end, therefore, must be worthy of this his membership of the universe and this his complex personality. What, then, is this ethical end of man?

(A) Self-realisation as the Ethical End

This ethical end of man, obviously, consists in his adequately discharging the functions and obligations that devolve on him as a consequence of his metaphysical and psychological status. The function devolving on him as a metaphysical being is to be a willing vehicle and instrument or organ of the universe including himself, so far, of course, as he can understand that universe in the process and the ends of that process. And the function devolving on him as a complex psychological personality is the harmonious development and fulfilment of the main
elements of his own nature, his total well-being. These too—‘metaphysical’ and ‘psychological’—functions, however, do not remain, and need not be treated as, distinct and separate; they converge and even coalesce. For, after all, the psychological personality of man is a product and an emergent of the universe itself and its process, which courses and shoots through his entire being. The consequence is that man’s proper discharge of his functions as a ‘psychological’ personality is, ipso facto, his discharge of his ‘metaphysical’ function also. The proper ethical end of man, therefore, is the harmonious development and fulfilment of his complex personality,—in other and more familiar words, self-realisation, the realisation of his potentialities and capacities.

(B) Content of Self-realisation

The content of this self-realisation may be analysed from two different points of view. In the first place, it must provide for the development and fulfilment of all the knowing, feeling and doing elements of man’s personality. These three must operate together and harmoniously, of course with due regard to the necessity of differential emphases on them to be determined in close relation to the inevitable differences of individual make-up. All knowledge is ultimately the ground of action, and all feeling the driving force behind it. (a) In the ideal man’s life, action therefore, must be lit up and oriented by knowledge and reinforced by feeling, though these elements will appear there in differential proportions and emphases. This ideal will undergo variations in the lives of persons in whom either knowledge or feeling receives a greater constitutional emphasis, rather than acting or doing, so that in them (b) feeling will press for knowledge and acting will forge towards it, or (c) knowledge will create feeling and acting will satisfy it. This tri-faceted conception of the fulfilment of personality is the real point of significance underlying the Gītā doctrine of the three paths (mārgas)—the karmayoga, the jñāna-yoga and the bhakti-yoga, though these have been couched in the Gītā in quasi-theological terms.

Secondly, self-realisation would also mean the harmonious functioning of personality in the social organism and the milieu offered by it for the life of personality. Personality is a product of society and comes to occupy specific stations and serve specific functions in its life. Bradley, Green and Muirhead, following the cue and lead of Hegel, have, in modern times, well brought out this point and its significance for ethics, as Plato and Aristotle had done in ancient times; and modern social psychology has put forth abundant evidence in their support. The consequence of it all for ethics is that self-realisation comes, in that light, to mean man’s fulfilment of the obligations devolving on him as a member with a station in the social organism,—the obligations of ‘swadharma’ in the terms of the Gītā, or the obligations of ‘justice’, in the terms of Plato, or the obligations of ‘eudaimonia’, as Aristotle would have put it, or again the
obligations of 'my station and its duties', as Bradley would put it.

(C) Pursuit of Swadharma

Realisation, by way of the formation of appropriate beliefs and attitudes, of the nature of self-realisation, as so understood, is an important ingredient of the ethical orientation of life; but that again, is not all of it. These beliefs and attitudes must be concretely lived by the individual aspirant. And that living consists of a resolute and earnest pursuit of swadharma or justice, which constitutes the very breath and finer spirit of self-realisation as man's ethical goal, in the concrete, day-to-day life. Such a life would be a happy synthesis of asceticism and enjoyment, where the lower motives, as such, would be transfigured and canalised so as to merge with the higher,—that synthesis yielding a beautiful blend of a perfected personality integrated and adjusted with the society and the universe; This is life's ethical orientation, which constitutes the third constituent of the philosophic outlook on life.

RELIGIOUS COPING

Finally, there remains the religious coping to be added to this edifice of the spiritual architecture of man's life. If man's life must have a metaphysical foundation, a psychological basis and an ethical orientation, it must have also the finishing touch and grace of a religious coping, in the form of appropriate beliefs and attitudes re the nature of the ultimate ground and sanction of the moral obligations that devolve on him in his life. Human life, at the ethical level, is essentially a socially conditioned and socially interpreted life. It is a life of obligations which essentially flow from man's membership of the social organism and his consciousness of that membership. But these obligations, sooner or later, must be understood to have a further and a deeper ground, since the society is only the proximate milieu of man's life, whereas its ultimate milieu is the universe itself. Man's membership of this universe must, accordingly, be the deeper, ultimate ground of his life's obligations. Moral obligations are not merely the demands of society, but are at bottom, and must be understood to be, the demands of the universe itself. It is not merely the society around me that expects me to be moral, but even the universe beyond it also ordains me to do the same. To be moral is to be in tune not only with society, but also with the universe. I can be immoral only on pain of being out of tune with the society and, ultimately, with the universe. The universe, thus, is the ultimate ground and sanction of man's moral life and obligations. And, since religion at bottom is man's relationship with the "ultimate beyond" (which may well be equated and identified with the God of natural theology or even of revealed religion), it is this deepened sense and consciousness of this ultimate ground of our life's obligations, together with the unique and consuming moral fervour issuing from it, with which it fills and invests our life in the fulfilment of
those our ‘universal’ or indeed ‘divine’ obligations, that constitutes the essence of what is called here our life’s religious coping, the fourth constituent of the philosophical outlook in life. On this, the highest, level of our life’s development, man develops the sense, as Plato said in his Laws, of being the “chattel” or the “plaything” of God or the universe; and this necessarily issues into an attitude of humility in concrete life, which is rightly considered to be the essence of religious spirit and the apex of man’s philosophic-spiritual development.

But this religious coping includes, in addition to the element of humility, also an element of a feeling of love for the universe which is the ultimate source and consummation of our being and existence, and is now felt to be the harmonious embodiment and synthesis of all our life’s ultimate values, not only of truth and goodness, but also of beauty, and ultimately of sublimity and divinity, and thus to be the object, not only of surrender and resignation, but also of love and devotion.

Thus, in our search for the meaning of philosophical outlook on life, we have to begin with a search into the universe, and have to end with a conscious and conscientious attitude of harmony with it, submission and surrender to it, love and devotion to it. As Marcus Aurelius would have said, “Thou art the Ultimate, the Ultimate of my being and the Ultimate of my end, O Universe! Everything is harmonious to me that is harmonious to Thee, O Universe! Thy will is mine and be done, O Universe!”

CONCLUSION

The philosophical outlook in life, then, has, according to the writer, the following configurations and contents:

1. Metaphysical Foundations
   Realisation, through the formation of beliefs and attitudes, of the purposive, spiritual character of the universe as evolving from a divine, elan, and of man’s integral and organic membership of it:

2. Psychological Basis
   Realisation of the motivated character of the mind; and cultivation of a conscientious habit of truthful self-exploration of motives with a view to integration and harmonisation of personality;

3. Ethical Orientation
   Realisation of the nature of swadharma; and an earnest and resolute pursuit of it through concrete living by adequate discharge of its obligations; and

4. Religious Coping
   Realisation of the ultimate ‘universal’ or ‘divine’ ground of life’s obligations, and the consequent development of a consuming fervour, coupled with humility, love and devotion in meeting them.

Such is the writer’s conception of the configurations and contents of the philosophic outlook in life.
THE MEANING
OF PHILOSOPHY
IN AN AGE OF CRISIS

That we are involved in a crisis and that this crisis is a universal manifestation which is affecting every aspect of culture and life has become clear to every thinking man. But where as the common man has a vague feeling that there is something wrong with the world philosophers are developing anxious interest in the possibility of Man's continued existence on earth. Whatever their ultimate concern may be their immediate concern is now man and his earthly prospects. Eminent philosophers like Bertrand Russell, Karl Jaspers and our own Philosopher-President Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan have come out into the open to warn man of the dangers that lie ahead of him and the risks that his own ingenuity has created for him. Dr. Radhakrishnan has pleaded fervently for the development of World-Patriotism as a Virtue without which human civilization is bound to come to a close and without which the last great achievement of man will be his own tragic end.

The function of a cultural activity cannot remain indifferent to the demands of the times indeed. Philosophy, Science and Art have to answer to the call of the times in their distinctive way and to develop and cultivate a sense of responsibility in the hour of crisis. It is philosophy above all which has served as a guide to mankind in periods of transition in history and which has now and again assumed a pedagogical role. In the context of the Western thought the Greeks had the distinction of assigning to the philosopher the role of the educator. Thus to take a great example we find in the person of Socrates the fusion of the philosopher's quest with an educational zeal which is almost unparalleled in history. In Plato the
philosophy of education is an integral part of his system and the Plato-
monic tradition continued with varying fortunes down the ages. When the
speculative urge of the antiquity was exhausted, and the need for the
practical regulation of life became insistent the concept of the philosopher
as the sage who by precept and example can show the way to right living
became the vital element of the teaching of the Epicureans and the Stoics.
But the association of the practice with theoretical insight is not peculiar
to the Greeks. In fact the idea of an armchair philosopher who considers
every strife as ignoble and who leads his life indifferent to what happens
around him is not the dominant trend of the Chinese and the Indian
thought. Chinese philosophy though not lacking in mystic overtones is
replete with practical observations and is informed with an uncanny in-
sight into the working of the human psyche. Indian philosophy presup-
sposes moral discipline as a necessary prelude to philosophic activity
and is seriously concerned to determine the goal of human life. If the
Greeks had reflected on the political and the practical life, on the mean-
ing of the State and the Government and had decided through their most
eminent thinker to make philosopher their ruler an almost analogous
development occurred long before in India. While Plato's vision remained
a philosopher's dream only to provoke laughter and ridicule the associa-
tion of philosophy with practical affairs has gone deep in the Indian
mind. If the ruler could not be the philosopher he at least sought the
counsel of the wise and led himself be guided by him. The idea of a police
State without any link with wisdom is purely a product of modern indus-
trial civilization. The situation has not changed fundamentally with the
appearance of the welfare State. This concept of a welfare state is no
less a product of an industrial society and as such considers the problem
of inner satisfaction and mental equilibrium as completely outside its
purview. Man has dimensions other than the economical and while eco-
nomic amelioration is a necessity in the countries of the East an over-
concentration on the economic values leads to an idea of a welfare which
is inane and vacant. Paradoxically enough we discover to our horror that
a welfare state which is created by economic planning without any refe-
rence to higher values is a state where no one fares well. The same holds
good for our objective in relation to the establishment of a socialistic
pattern of society. It is true that we have to outgrow the colonial and the
feudal legacy of the past. Nevertheless the national development does
not consist in outgrowing what is old but in growing into something new.
Hence the social justice that we are earnestly seeking can not be effected by
the introduction of a socialistic pattern but by the orientation in our per-
spective of values. Our fight against the tendency to disintegration which
our undue emphasis on linguistic and parochial interests has brought about
cannot succeed if we do not re-establish the link between philosophy and
the state, between wisdom and practice, between action and contempla-
tion. The question that perturbed an earlier generation was the relation of
Philosophy to Theology. Theologians naturally considered Philosophy to be the handmaid to Theology. Kant's was the last word in the controversy when he said that it made no difference whether Philosophy was the handmaid or not but the question really to answer must be to know was whether she was the one to follow the Queen holding her aprons or the one who preceded her showing the light. The problem which is now baffling the modern mind to-day is to determine the role of philosophy in relation to the State. Must philosophy be a free pursuit as it principally is or a means by which an ideology is created and sustained? But philosophy is a revolt against all regimentation in thought. Whether it is orthodox rigidity of the right or the left the function of philosophy is to work against all artificial inhibitions and restraints and to work for an open world of intellectual quest. In their zeal to construct an all comprehensive system the great thinkers of the past fell into dogmatism and allowed no room for future readjustments. But philosophy though systematic in thought must not build a system which is absolutely closed. Especially at a time when reason has lost confidence in its power philosophy has no other alternative but to make itself a persistent quest, an inquiry which cannot conclude and every conclusion which is arrived at is not conclusive and final but a prelude to new reflection. It progresses in an inquiry which cannot close.

The fact that we are passing through a crisis means that the foundations on which our civilization in theory and practice have rested are tottering. As a result man has lost his bearing on earth and has become a victim of dread and anxiety. Psychiatrists have discovered that the problems with which their patients are troubled are more of a religious and philosophical nature than that of medical revelance. C. G. Jung emphasized the fact that mental ailments often arise when one loses one's religion without another to replace it. While philosophical minded analysts like Binswanger have developed their own ideas about the basic forms of human existence, Frankl and Farnsworth have explained the genesis of the modern ailments of the soul in the need to fill in the existential vacuum with a meaning or purpose. Thus it seems that the 'health' of man demands a philosophy with singular urgency and philosophers are required to help the physician in his work of rescue. But when the health of a whole period is affected even philosophy begins to suffer. If philosophy becomes obsessed only with definitions and clarifications it can only contribute to heighten the feeling of frustration and vacuum from which our epoch is ailing. Fichte complained in his famous Lectures on the salient Features of the Present Epoch that a period of history might be so blinded as to lose contact with the higher world and to consider only the sensible world and its pleasures to have any meaning. Philosophy then as decadent and moribund instead of helping man to rise above the crisis becomes itself the voice of the crisis and its major symptom.

Existentialists have seen better. They have not decried the philosophical
heritage having no more than an evocative import but have emphasized the existential meaning of such fleeting processes as moods and made a new appraisal of the human situations rooted in dread and anxiety. But existentialism in its origin and in its early development is itself an attitude born of a crisis and has developed in man’s experience of suffering during the two great Conflagrations. It has been sometimes alleged, and perhaps not without some justice, that the philosophical discipline in the East is distinguished from the West in its origins. Whereas the Western thought begins in doubt or wonder the Eastern speculation begins in man’s encounter with suffering. If this view is accepted then the development of Existentialism has certainly imparted an Eastern note to Western thought. It does not follow that contemporary existentialism is directly influenced by the East but that it has been led to existentialist revolution through Christian influences, through the idea of a suffering God it has moved to the idea of a suffering Man. But in its transition from God to Man it has lost the transcendent. The transcendent that may crop up in the thought of an existentialist is nothing more than an idea in the Kantin sense showing only the limitations of the human perspective. However in spite of its neglect of the transcendent it takes into full cognizance the emotional roots of the human situations and their existential implications. It recognises a fact which is sadly neglected by the positivist that even emotional situations may have a significant cognitive reference and our highest aspirations must needs be steeped in emotions and feelings. In its recent developments and corrections it has gone beyond dread and anxiety to the positive emotional situations of joy and love. But in any case the critics of existentialism have persistently tried to ‘overcome’ it and to make it wider in scope and deeper in content. But existentialism as it is, is itself positivist in orientation and does not go beyond the phenomenon.

If philosophy is to serve any purpose today it is to go back to the past and beyond its present preoccupations with experience or existence in its narrow and arbitrary limitation. Only then will it be possible to recover completely from the maladies which are affecting humanity to-day. As for the present we can lay finger at least on one major affection of our generation. Individual and national troubles and troubles among nations arise from the fact that man is given to think piecemeal and to confine himself in an ideology. Many of us lead a divided life, divided between conflicting loyalties. We have become, to use a pregnant expression of Hegel, abstract. Now philosophy as a revolt against all abstractions can help us to overcome this pernicious and abstract way of life, the life of onesidedness. Philosophy is to counteract all ideologies and develop an attitude which works for reconciliation and to assign to every negation a respectable place in the life of the spirit. Our civilization is struggling to grapple with the problem of conflicting claims and if it fails to recognize every claim for what it is worth it will bring disaster. It is not the
function of the philosopher to reduce religion into philosophy or philosophy into art but to give each its place in the scheme of things and to maintain the autonomy of every aspect of culture. Only then can it pave the way for the birth of a universal man who can appreciate Beauty, contemplate the Holy and fight for Truth. Philosophy and Religion have this much in common that for both the conflict is not final. But whereas religion can claim to have been vouchsafed the vision of the final reconciliation here and now philosophy has to go on its weary way without any assurance of success in its struggle to gain at least some partial realization of its ideal. World history is a story of unresolved Conflicts. But conflict in itself is of course no evil. It is woven in the texture of historical reality. History is a moving dialectic where it is difficult to locate the thesis and the anti-thesis and where they constantly shift their role. What philosophical reflection can do is to give us the courage to face the challenge of the conflict and to work out a way of life which does not allow the conflict to grow into self-annihilation but to find in it the possibility to evolve a higher form of expression. Thus philosophy helps in the development of that virtue which Plato called Justice and which in relation to the State is the power to assign to each individual or group its place, and which in relation to the person is the ability to develop harmony within and to strike a balance between the claims of conflicting Values and tendencies of our self.

Philosophy then means much in an age which is ridden with doubts, which has lost the peace which religion can give and which has no more the artist's delight in the beauty of his creation. While the advancement in Science has made the Space to shrink the divisions of ideologies have created new distances. If philosophy is not to betray itself it should help us to fight the official ideologies and not fall into the temptation of creating an ideology itself. It should help us to rise above the bias of the times and perversions of history, above the exclusiveness of the ideologist and the indifference of the one who has no ideology. If love is a necessary constituent of philosophic activity it should help us to break through the barriers created of hatred and to give man the courage to build on the insecurity of the present, the security of the future.
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN INDIA DURING THE PERIOD OF CRISIS:

The spectacle of philosophic march during the past fifty years present certain definite outlines at this distance. We have in turn witnessed the growth of the spiritual movements of Ramkrishna—Vedânta which has spread itself all over the globe and has influenced deeply the minds of young men yearning for meaning of life in terms of that which is transcendent. In fact if we consider that explanation is always in terms of causes and grounds, the ground and causal origin of man and his inner essence has been shewn to be the transcendent All. A wide humanity has entailed the service of that humanity labouring towards its meaning. Neither Man nor humanity have any meaning apart from this Transcendent One Spirit. That this ancient doctrine of Advaita or Oneness (Ekatva of the Self or God or Brahman) has found a verifiable medium in Sri Ramkrishna-Vivekananda has a meaning for the development of Indian philosophy.

This is the Ramakrishna Darśana which almost swept South Indian scene. Men turned to Philosophy not for a career but for an illumination. Dark though the atmosphere was, fully clouded by the activities of the foreign missionaries and in a sense encouraged by them to study for ourselves their great literature, this spiritual light handed to us by this Darśana had helped a better appreciation of the West as well as the East, and though at the beginning patriotic it has finally become universalistic, belonging to no nation or peoples or countries as such.
Philosophical thought rightly depending upon the universal realistic mystic realisation attained a force—but it had tended to become idealistic—something to be achieved rather than something attained. One can almost hazard a statement that true mysticism is realistic universalism whereas philosophy is idealistic universalism in so far as such philosophy depends on mystic truths.

No wonder the growth of Philosophy in the Academies has been idealistic. The most important thinker of this is certainly our President, Dr. Radhakrishnan. He has shewn that philosophy is idealistic and cannot remain however merely limited to explaining all by means of ideas, those products of thought, but must yearn towards the ideal of being. Brahmapid must become or strain towards the attainment or becoming of Brahman (Brahmaiva bhavati). But this lag between being and becoming is most difficult to surmount. Philosophy may find its hunt very satisfying and stimulating but its non-attainment of the ideal, qua ideal, becomes rather a source of dissatisfaction. It is true that man as man and trying to remain human will find it difficult indeed to seek that which goes beyond the human or to a level of de-humanisation or super-humanisation. However a gradualness in the march would almost extinguish the difference between the human and the super-human to be. The transitions from jiva to atman, and from atman to brahman have to be achieved through gradual culture of values and value-seeking in terms of the human world. The Humanism that Dr. Radhakrishnan counsels is not remote from the trans-humanism towards which he leads the thoughts and hearts of men. It is not a merely epistemological humanism or social humanism that tries to justify the non-valuational human; it is precisely the integration of the higher and superior than human which the human seeks and yearns after as his ideals with the life of the world and all that it means, that would lead to the appreciation of the human as a seeker after the eternal, the unborn, and the universal. The characteristic practicality of this human idealism lies in its yearning after universal values already envisioned by its seers all over the globe and all through time and history. That is why the secret of Radhakrishnan lies in its innate homeliness to human being, yearning for the realisation of the eternal in one’s life. But the vast labour of comparative philosophical research and mystical experience has gone into this prodigious work of transforming mere man into a universalised human being seeking the values that count for all and for harmony. So near has this humanistic idealism been to that of the ethical idealism of Gandhiji that it has been not very difficult for Dr. Radhakrishnan to join the forces of ethical idealism, that paves the way for a dynamic participation in life’s global efforts to solve the problems of survival not of men only but of values mainly. This humanist approach whilst it had seized the minds of the common man, has unfortunately the tendency to give up the emotional stimulation which has been the strong point in the Vivekananda
Darśana. The Vision of the ascetic has the strong suggestions of courage and adventure, whilst the vision of the humanist has rather a mellow attraction. When however the philosophers of the colleges had settled down to make philosophy just a pastime and a game, it became clear that other disciplines like economics and other sciences and history gain an advantage. For though 'ideas have legs' and they do travel, it is clear that only those ideas which also ensoul an ideal and are dynamic travel at all. Ideas may not be blind but they are lame almost remembering the Samkhyan analogy—_andha-pangu-nyaya_. But an ideal is not blind to carry an idea and there this analogy breaks. A greater light and power to creativity is in the ideal that is Real, whereas in the human world there are certain ideals which have an illusive nature. Through man's history one could see how illusory ideals have side-stepped and arrested his movement and evolution. But it is precisely these ideals that have come under the fire of philosophical dialectics. The great seers of all times have seen that man must firstly be trained towards seizing the real and permanent universal ideals, ideals that can unceasingly inspire man towards the realizations of harmony and peace.

The ideals of the human race on the whole to which Dr. Radhakrishnan contributed not a little to unravel through his philosophic approach of comparative appraisal and appreciation have been Peace and Harmony and goodwill and understanding that makes for mutual cooperation and sympathy. It has become clear also that as in the relationships between individuals and individuals so too between nations and nations, communities and communities, the values of truth, non-injury, non-passion and non-possession and in a word restraint in thought and word and deed is necessary. A life that is not based on the twin principles of truth and ahimsa cannot hope to attain freedom from fear and sorrow. It is not necessary for this purpose to think even of an eternal life but _yama_ is necessary. The philosophical development outside was political and Gandhian, the philosophical development inside the academies were Radhakrishnan; and comparative Indian Philosophy gained much incentive and inspiration from him. A whole school of thought developed under its wings, though there has unfortunately been a lack of interest in philosophical study and since 1930 it has been very difficult in South India to get students to take interest in its study. In fact people began to feel that philosophers were a useless lot for the political work before the nation and this inference though unjustified has worked adversely to philosophical studies. It is true that owing to other factors as well philosophical studies have suffered. These factors are individual and social, deterioration of standards, and employment-possibilities so called had led to its becoming an unwelcome and uninspiring study at college and universities. However it appears that it is not by providing employment possibility that its studies could be improved, but by making the philosophic mind itself a necessary cultural attitude whatever discipline one
opts for his employment or hobby. It should be the part of one's general education for it is that that would finally make one live a human life. It appears almost an irony that other humanities which concern man but which dehumanize him—I refer mainly to the commercial humanities like economics—have been encouraged by Governments and other cultural bodies for promoting humanities and not philosophy. A robust philosophy needs a robust philosophical approach in terms of science and thought disciplines which are generally needed for all, and also a strict ethical conscience has to be cultivated. As Sri Krishna long ago stated, it is abhyāsa that helps the control of asocial and contra-ideal conduct and helps the appreciation of the Universal Good that is achieved by devotion to its attainment. Today we have a cynical set of philosophers and educationists who consider that merely adumbrating or repeating slogans achieve the inward discipline in students. Student indiscipline comes for a deep sore in social conscience—the regard for the basic values of life and disinclination to achieve ideals based on the largest universal experience of sages. Men are making themselves meaningless—they yearn towards nihilism—and call it search for happiness: in their search for materialism.

This is the present im passe in philosophical studies. No great galvanizing force in academies has risen and modern western brands of linguistic analysis and so on boredoms are sure to be incapable of rousing any deep interest in it. But Philosophy cannot die, though philosophers may fail.

We have in the meanwhile had a new darśana—the Aurobindo darśana—the philosophy of integral realisation and evolution.—This darśana indeed original, though it is based on the most ancient thought. If the Ramakrishna Vivekananda philosophy or Vision more correctly erected itself on the Vedānta of Śankara which of course it had to interpret on the lines of reconciliation of the phenomenal world to the Noumenal,—at least in respect of such work or service as would help transform it into the noumenal or help individuals caught up in the world of ignorance to escape it or cross over it, the darśana of Sri Aurobindo erects itself on the basic realisations of the Vedic seers and Ṛsis of the Upaniṣads going behind the commentators of the Vedānta darśana. This difference has made for the reaction against the Śankara tradition fostered and accepted by the first. The darśana of Sri Aurobindo calls itself Purna-yoga or Purna darśana—an integral Vision and integral Union with the Ultimate Reality. The word ‘Integral’ is more meaningful than the word ‘full’, for ‘full’ may be homogeneous One but the integral is the unity of the many, a unity that reveals identity in and through the many. His integral Reality is all-embracing Vision and Intelligence and Delight of Being. But it is in his exploitation of the notion of evolution, an ascent of all existence through the terms of matter (inconscience), life (sub-conscient), mind (conscient) and supraconscient (sub-liminal) as evolutionary
integrative unity of planes and laws and movements that has given his philosophy the distinctive note of Real Idealism. It is not an utopian idealism of the philosophers but the Real Idealism of divine Evolution that makes his darśana a fulfilment of the mystical realism of the Vedic seers. Today, it is clear that to those who see that the human is not the ideal realised, that the ideal for man is far ahead and beyond him, Sri Aurobindo’s darśana has a strong appeal. It does not content itself to perceive truth through the many-coloured glass of comparative religion and philosophy, for after all it is a human seeing that has not transcended the darkening effect of its limitations. Though the yearning and faith in the possibility of discovering the universal insight is strong in philosophic idealism of Sri Dr. Radhakrishnan, in Sri Aurobindo the reality of it is attained and the darkness and cloudiness of idealism passes leaving the Reality without veil of waveringness. The approach to the Reality and its nearness to realisational condition marks a great step in philosophic understanding in Sri Aurobindo. The ideal is pitched beyond man, but it does not negate man but fulfils him and its appeal to the heart is firmer and not merely brainy and intellectual.

The purna-darśana is a recovery of a great dynamic truth veiled in the most ancient world literature. Sri Aurobindo finds that it is also the most comprehensive spiritual document of all eternity which the rest of the universe has profitted by unwittingly. It is no longer through inductive generalisations and probabilities that the mind of man has to move. It does not of course mean that authoritarianism has come back to philosophy and the heavy hand of Vedic thought-rite and being would settle on man’s mind which Buddha and Mahavira and other lesser lights have thrown off. Indeed the phenomena of J. Krishnamurti almost suggests this fear of tradition slipping back to arrest man and his freedom through the garbled interpretations of Theosophy and renascent Hinduism including those of Sri Aurobindo. His constant emphasis on the need to liberate thought, not only includes a liberation of thought from the confines of philosophic systems and jargon (which has been quite Vrtra of the Vedic symbolism) but also from the political and social and other equally binding forces of social life and being. It is liberation of the very being from all thought that is achieved at that exquisite point of tension that dialectical thought imposes in some queer form or other. The philosophic attitude of dialectical analysis is indeed helpful in so far as it leads one to that point when it transcends itself in experience. In other words, thought’s transition to being is achieved by intense vigilant awareness of its own being: it leads to its own expiry and transcendence. The method of purposive doubt is precisely to arrive at that self-conscious or trans-thought being at the moment of extraordinary vigilance. To such a darśana it is clear that all traditional thought and myth and system is alien and obstructive of Vision or existence-awareness. Whilst some may think this ought to lead to nihilism or Absolute Nihil that is mystical
transcendence of Being itself, it does not appear to be just another version of either Zen or Ouspensky.

All trends of thought and existence have had a resurgence during the past fifty years. Great movements of thought and religion and mysticism have influenced deeply the moulds of philosophic understanding. However one does not see any real reorientation of human minds to the larger dynamic possibilities open to the spirit of man or the spirit of God immanent in man. South Indian philosophers have indeed to be grateful to Dr. Radhakrishnan and J. Krishnamurti for their work of incubation of the philosophic eggs so to speak but much warming has also been done by the great work of Sri Aurobindo and Gandhiji. These are in a profound sense not regional men but universal men, on a universal mission, human and divine, for the separation of the two is impossible. We are already passing to a stage when we can say that there can be only one philosophy for mankind—the spiritual universal integral—neither Indian or Eastern nor Western.

It is true that all the thinkers or philosophers or seers we have mentioned above are deeply conscious of the influence that Western religious thought and philosophy had on them. It is also clear that their recognition of the stimulating nature of the Western might well have been cathartic and produced profound heart-searchings and led to some compromises which do not touch the deep core of individuality of the East or India. Philosophic and religious thought had to undergo deep and powerful scrutiny, and discoveries of certain trends of thought suppressed or slurred over were taken up for development and expensive treatment.

Thus the service of mankind as the purification of the soul preparing for it liberation has been the most important note taken from Christianity: the demand for going beyond the icon and the rite for the experience of the divine in the heart, and the realization that political freedom as well as economic freedom expressed in basic individualism not contrary to social equality or egalitarianism is another contributory much-needed emphasis that western political theory has given to Indian ethical idealism and humanism; the acceptance of the truth of evolutionism propounded by Darwin and Lamarck has led to the great generalisation and insight into creative process as adumbrated in the Vedic theories of creation and sacrifice by Sri Aurobindo's philosophy. The need to develop that consciousness to awareness in Work and not abridge it or negate it in a quest for a pseudo-peace is a contribution that has been forgotten in India revived by the Modern Gurdeiff-Ouspensky and J. Krishnamurti. However, all these show that Indian philosophy through its seers and thinkers and to a little extent through its philosophers of the academies has been trying to recover its attractiveness and emotional force that will make man strive for the integration of all science and arts through a dynamic integral Yoga that is the culmination of philosophising and meditation and Work—what Patanjali long ago called Kriyā-yoga.
The interest in anubhava or experience is waxing and all persons want experience but it is not known however that this experience or anubhava is yet an external factor needing all the disciplines of aspiration, yama and niyama as well. When one begins to move towards the Being then anubhava begins and culminates in the realisation which is Being (bhāva). Anubhava is a bhāva derivative exteriorising of the being—in which it is transcended. Philosophical thought must gain this directional idealism in order to be living inspiration and aspiration to all men. Philosophers must themselves be inspired by this and all cultural bodies should encourage this attitude rather than become substitutes for it, as most literature and teachers of literature are doing:—indeed the greatest disservice that the latter are doing lies in precisely this that they are trying to be substitutes for philosophy and ill indeed!

I have surveyed the general trends that have been moving our philosophic world both within and without the Academies. But the luminous light that had done so much to awaken the minds of the usually cloistered academicians is yet with us and occupying the highest place that a country could offer any one and this is admittedly the most significant of all. Whilst a nation could bring itself to offer this to a philosopher it speaks of its innate disposition—to honour wisdom and peace and charity. India has been noted for its philosophic and mystical attitude; and amidst all the travails of its history it has stood for these ready ever to shed light and lustre on all. Whilst in the modern world it would be sheer arrogance to claim that India has a message for mankind, it can be fully and confidently stated that India has a service for mankind—a service that she alone can render remarkably by her philosophy and mystic realism.

May Dr. S. Radhakrishnan may live with us for ever more and carry the banner of spirituality and enlightenment to all the peoples of the world.
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DOES PROF. RADHAKRISHNAN PROPOUNDER ANY PHILOSOPHY?

The above question is often asked of any student who has studied or taught Prof. Radhakrishnan's philosophy. Every Indian somehow claims to be a philosopher; so whether he is a layman or educated feels, he can judge any system of philosophy. One may neglect opinions from a layman, but when such a question comes from a student of philosophy, who is already biased in his mind that Prof. Radhakrishnan has no philosophical thought to propound, one can take it that it is hard to convince him about it. In the course of discussion, one may easily perceive shifting of standpoints, from eastern to western and in some cases one may find that the questioner has no standpoint himself about what philosophy is.

It must be stated at the outset that Radhakrishnan is an Indian, steeped in its traditional spiritual lore, coming from a Brahmin family in the South as he does. Though he is equally brilliant student of Western philosophy and religion, he is a traditionally Indian writer on philosophical works. Naturally we should appraise Radhakrishnan's writings from that angle and no other.

It would not be out of place, if we clarify eastern and western standpoint in philosophy. The two traditions differ widely and in a sense are opposed to each other. The Western tradition has been influenced by Aristotle and later by Science. (Perhaps, it would have been different had it followed Plato.) Western standpoint is objective, it studies everything as an object, even the subject. The eastern tradition has been subjective, its first interest is Self, the object is secondary and explained in terms of Self. It is because of this that Experience is the basis of West and Revelation that of East. Western tradition discovers different aspects of what it studies, whereas, for the eastern mind, there is nothing new to
be discovered in the matter of Spirit; it has only to experience it afresh. In the west, the progress of philosophy is marked by growth of different ‘isms’, which are works of individuals. In India, the case has been different: there is no possibility of ‘isms’, if one goes the traditional way, because there is nothing to be discovered anew. Individuals do not count as such because each one either is indebted to a guru or to the Śruti. Whatever has been written so far,—It is an abundant growth comparable to individuals in west—has been either clarification of what has been already said or statements of self-discovery and self-experience supported by Śruti or the experience of a guru in the light of needs of time. If we accept the philosophical standpoint of west, we can not claim to have philosophies as west has; what we have and claim, and which has been criticised by a few western thinkers in past for that same reason, is religious philosophies or religious experiences. Knowledge of Self has been our tradition. For that reason, for as, philosophies in the western sense has been secondary, always with a view to clarify doubts of the individual mind at various levels of development so that he may see and experience the Thing. Not understanding alone, but experiencing and living by it has been our tradition. India, therefore, produced wide variety of paths leading to experience of self, without claiming to state anything original about the experience itself. This has been the kind of contribution of east. There is thus, wide variety of literature and yet the sameness without originality; or rather, originality consists in discovering the individual path but not in the content of Truth.

Having stated this, we might take up our original question. Radhakrishnan does not propound any philosophy in the western sense, because he has adhered to our tradition. He does not place any new standpoint before us, he does not profess any systematic ‘ism’ in the sense I have explained. He does not give you any chance of bite at criticism from that angle. If one still criticises him, there is no end to it, but then one is not called upon to notice it.

One can perceive two very obvious aims in Radhakrishnan’s writings; to make Indian thought intelligible to west and interpret our own thought to us in light of the need of the time. In both of these aims Radhakrishnan has been very successful.

Attempts were made by many before him to explain our thought to west. Vivekanand, Ramteerth and others were, though, successful but not to the same extent as Radhakrishnan has been. Radhakrishnan has the advantage of wide knowledge of western philosophy and phenomenal command over their language, due to which he could place our thoughts in a suitable manner which went home to every educated person. It is to the credit of Radhakrishnan that he has cleared the veil of mystery from Indian philosophy with which it was always associated in the western mind. That there is a rational basis to what appears mystical and magical, that there is adequate appeal to reason also in Indian
philosophy and that Indian thought does not ask for blind faith and acceptance—but correct and awakened insight—all this has been ably done by Radhakrishnan in writings and his lectures. In all this Radhakrishnan has not only done service to India but also to west, in so far as he enabled the western mind to discover their similar spiritual roots in their own tradition by citing proper parallels from their history. Radhakrishnan’s wide and profound knowledge in western religion, philosophy and science placed him in the position of authority before them to say all this before western people.

There is yet another contribution of Radhakrishnan to west. Mystical religious tradition is almost lost to west due to rational, scientific outlook and dogmatic attitude of the church. Radhakrishnan in bridging the gulf between Science and Religion has provided the opportunity for fresh religious experience undogmatically. Revelation is not opposed to reason. Reason serves to treasure spiritual experience in a systematic form. Reason brings order into what intuition reveals. This has been in Science as well as in Religion. Greatest discoveries in science have been due to the same process of struggle and travails as in religion. There is no mystery in mysticism. It is as open and empirical as any scientific experience. Only a very one-sided, prejudiced and dogmatic mind can find mystical experience unscientific. Radhakrishnan, in this sphere, has said and done the same as Dr. Jung has done for west.

Looking at from this angle, it will not be an exaggeration if we call Radhakrishnan the man of the time. In emphasising—Return to Spirit—he is true to his tradition and at the same time he voices the need of the time. Radhakrishnan has definitely played a great role in bringing east and west to understand each other.

Let us now turn to works of Radhakrishnan. One might say that most of the earlier works are concerned with comparative understanding of eastern and western thought. Even the two volumes on Indian Philosophy is an attempt to relate the two wherever possible, over and above the exposition of systems. One may say that the best result of this attempt is his book, Eastern Religion and Western Thought.

The major works of later part of Radhakrishnan’s writings are concerned with commentary on Sanskrit texts. In all this one finds following the way of great Acaryas.

Here, one may jump at criticising Radhakrishnan. Each of the great Acaryas are associated with different schools of Vedânta. What is the new and original interpretation of Radhakrishnan in this field? If we review the writings of great Acaryas, we find that they have substantiated the Upanisadic truth and made the mystic experience available for seekers at all levels and served the need of the time, by freeing people from unnecessary quarrels of logic and restrictive influence of social set up which prevented some to the approach of revealed texts and its experience. The works of great Acaryas after Samkara could be understood
as efforts in the direction of broadening the social outlook, which was so necessary for the progress of our culture. No man could be prevented from attaining the highest experience merely on account of his birth. The Truth has many faces; in itself it is timeless and beyond all divisions of view-points. It is because of this basic understanding that our spiritual tradition has survived the onslaught of time and has been able to accommodate all viewpoints within its fold, within reasonable limits.

One may, therefore, say that different interpretations of revealed texts by Acaryas are attempts at understanding Truth in the light of time and accommodating the changing outlook on life, without giving up the essentials.

Radhakrishnan has done the same in commenting upon the three basic works. The great impact of Science and western thought had shaken us from our roots, outgrown social set up had made us idle and unimaginative; we have been in confusion due to the wide variety of influences which opened up before us as the boundaries between nations were broken. Radhakrishnan has brought us the staying power by reinterpreting our texts and by citing parallels from different cultures and religions to bear upon our own. He has tried to bridge the gulf between the Transcendental and the Empirical, and made us shake off our spiritual arrogance and stressed the need of respecting the spirit of Science and humanistic outlook.

One can perceive two trends in Radhakrishnan’s writings in Indian philosophy. His attempts to cure us of the inhibiting influence of our social set up and to broaden our outlook to include the spirit of Science and understanding of other cultures and religions.

He performs the first task by solving the controversy between Nirguna and Saguna aspect of Brahman as represented by Šāṅkara and Ramanuja. One of the factor that gave rise to Ramanuja’s philosophy was the hardened inhibiting social set up which was undermining our all round progress. Ramanuja’s philosophy brought a great social change, yet the controversy between Saguna and Nirguna did not end and still divides people. Probably, Radhakrishnan experienced this in his early days in South... Radhakrishnan took the reconciliation and harmonising of the two views as symbolic of harmonising the social division. All the great and awakened leaders of our nation have felt it and tried to solve it. Gandhi did it through action, Radhakrishnan, the thinker-philosopher did it intellectually by showing how the two, Saguna and Nirguna are aspects of the same reality. Radhakrishnan has tried to lift us up from our conflict and enabled us to hold a bold perspective by opening before us a world view in the present context. His commentaries on The Gita and Upaniṣads and other systems are full of parallels from different cultures. Very few of us have been able to relate our thoughts to others in such a wide context as he has done. This all is due to his wide and profound scholarship.

Many critics are dissatisfied because they do not find any systematic
'ism' in Radhakrishnan's writings. This is an unwarranted criticism. One need not project into other what one wants to find and criticise for what is not there. Such people often shift their stand and ask, 'what is comparable to different Vedāntic philosophies in Radhakrishnan's writings?' To me these critics do not understand their own philosophy. There is no 'ism' in the philosophies of Acaryas in the same sense as west has. The works of Acaryas are reinterpretations of texts and assertions of their own personal spiritual experiences. Radhakrishnan has done exactly the same. One who understands the progress of philosophy in India in its social context cannot overlook the great contribution of Radhakrishnan in this field. He is a unique personality, product of modern age, steeped in Indian spiritual lore and widely awakened to existential situation of the world. In truth, the son of the soil, he has carried the torch of the great Acarya of the past.
WHY IS PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGICALLY NEEDED?

In the past philosophy was looked upon as the paramount kind of human thinking. Philosophers, according to Plato, were enabled to see everlasting values—the Absolute—thus philosophers were the only minds among the other people who could see the way man had to choose toward his future and proper destiny. Thus, philosophers were naturally predestined to be leaders of mankind.

This position of philosophy was renewed during the Renaissance and was continued in a moderate degree till the modern ages. Till last two centuries, the philosophy was considered as one of the indispensable components of general education. Continental universities called one of their schools the Philosophical Faculty, besides medicine, laws, theology, and science. The term of Ph. D., doctor of philosophy, is till today used for the top academic degrees in theoretical knowledge. Each candidate of Ph. D. was subjected to a rigorous examination of philosophy as a discipline summarizing knowledge and dealing with techniques of thinking. Also public secondary education placed into the final year "philosophical propedeutics" as an introduction to overall views on the world, the man, and his thinking. After a brief survey of philosophy, psychology and logic were treated more extensively. The 17th, 18th, and the first half of the 19th centuries were theater not only of revolutionary advancements of sciences but also of feverish activities in philosophy.

The end of the 19th and the 20th century are witnesses of a certain decline in philosophical creativeness and in evaluating its importance. Although sciences took part in it, we cannot make responsible for that the extraordinary expansion of sciences, since their advancement started and continued since the 17th century.
One of the sharpest critics of the contemporary philosophy is Albert Schweitzer. He summarizes his comments in the book: "The Decay and Restauration of Civilization" (Black, London 1932, p. 8-12). He emphasizes that philosophy was originally actively "producing universal convictions about civilization". But at present philosophy tries to be a science by imitating methods of sciences, especially those of history and becomes today only "a history of philosophy". "The creative spirit had left her", complains Schweitzer. He reproaches that she contains "no real thoughts" and has "lost the power of elemental thought". She degraded herself to "a pedantic philosophy of degenerates"; "she has no longer any message for the great world". Philosophy does not care for providing adequate food for the "spiritual hunger" of the present man and dwells at her illusions that are no true "help to the progress of civilization". Similarly Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishan reproaches to Indian philosophy that "creative spirit left her" and she "ceased to be guide and the guardian of the general reason", due to her extreme historicism. (Indian Philosophy, vol. II, Allen & Unwin, London 1931, p. 772 f.)

This is a very serious objection to philosophy. If she does not fulfill her proper function, her importance becomes questionable. Are Schweitzer's charges founded? Too many college catalogues offer rather clear proofs of this unhappy situation in our culture. It is unhappy also from the psychological point of view, since it weakens also the integrity and stability of the structure of human personality. Obviously "musealism" and "l'art pour l'artisme" of many philosophers do not give to man the longed for guidance he needs. This shortcoming is not helped by Wilhelm Dilthey's identification of philosophical problems with those of psychology, since the realm of philosophy is to his identical with the field of Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie. (Ideen ueber eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie—Ges. Schrifte, vol. V, erste Haeftte, p. 139—240, Leipzig1924.) The decay of the prestige of philosophy became prominent especially in between the wars period. Sciences started a campaign of seclusion and rejection of philosophy. On the one hand, totalilarian and irrational ideologies rejected rationalizing philosophy; on the other hand, science did not see in philosophy an aid compatible with scientific objectivism and the tendency for exactness. Thus, many schools of liberal arts at traditional universities separated schools of sciences from schools of humanistic and social subjects where philosophy was playing prim, and even a special academic degree of RNDr. (Rerum naturalium Doctor) was introduced. Philosophy was looked upon as being not dign of a true scientist and of his experimental method. Consequently also psychology tried to separate herself from philosophy after experimenting was proved possible in her field. Behaviorism is a striking example of this separation and even of a certain contempt for philosophy. Separation of the Department of Psychology from that of philosophy was usually celebrated as a triumph of psychology.
After forty years of longed for independence, many psychologists feel that cooperation would be better than the "splendid isolation", and, what is more curious, all sciences realize that philosophical approaches are not ineffective and futile but may be rather useful. Speculation was never so much flourishing in sciences than just in recent days, sometimes even assuming forms of not much adequate reliability and caution, regularly required from sciences.

It is symptomatic to see many interdisciplinary studies of problems in all fields of human knowledge. Cooperation substitutes competition. This is not dictated by a vogue new in sciences. There are practical reasons for that. Problems arise in psychology in connection with reliability of cognition offered by recent methods of psychological testing. The practical significance of tests imposes upon psychologists a new obligation and responsibility not only of academic, but also of practical and legal character. Influences of prejudices on interpretation of scores, significance of deviations and of probable errors are steadily referring to epistemology. Problems of integration of consciousness and of personality, problems of ideals and values are treated with reference to philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, and ontology. Building valid hypotheses, overcoming gaps in observations, and conscious materials supplied by experience brings us closely to logic, intuition, extrapolations, and speculative methods proper to philosophy.

All these instances would call for cooperation of psychology and philosophy. We do not expect immediate effects of this relationship of both disciplines on the professional preparation of psychologists, in particular in the United States where this preparation is in the hands of the old behavioristic generation. But there are even in the United States voices calling for more such cooperation.

The responsibility for this kind of separation is partially on philosophers and their attitudes mentioned by Schweitzer. They did not feel the need to stretch their helping hand toward psychologists, and people in general. A "noble" austerity and self-imposed aloofness dominated philosophers and alienated them from vital tasks.

The group of far sighted psychologists feel rather keenly the need for cooperation and mutuality of both disciplines not only for theoretical and academic reasons but also to a large degree for helping the needs of non-psychologists, non-specialists, and in particular of the simple men who are even not aware of specialized disciplines that can handle certain kinds of needs of the modern man.

In psychology of personality we have come to the conclusion that philosophy is needed to watch man in the form of his personal conception of the world and of life, and that this system of beliefs, values, ideals, and guideposts is the key-stone of each personality, the structure of which stands or falls with the individual's personal philosophy. Thus, the latter
is indispensable to each man in a certain form that may vary from man to man.

As a cultural requirement, philosophy was looked upon as obligatory for ancient Greeks, Hindu or Chinese. Mediaeval centuries brought to the foreground rather irrational components of cultural ideologies and that sometimes screened off the philosophical rationalism. Consequently, we meet not infrequently controversies between partisans of rationalistic and irrationalistic approaches to conceiving of life and world. Rationalists try to master human and cosmic problems by clear conceptions enmeshed logically where abstractions of general relationships play prim. Irrationalists emphasize frequently with fanaticism the irrational components of man as more basic and original components of the world and life, and thus as more important for understanding their problems.

Philosophy promoted originally the endeavor for rational conceiving of the world. Logical formulations were mostly underlying philosophical systematics. Since in the course of cultural development philosophy as well as sciences show also some periods when irrational factors are put into foreground, the question seems justified: whether rationalistic clarifications are so unavoidably needed and so doubtlessly useful to man’s mind and personality structure?

Just the recent psychological experiences with mental deviations supply us with material that favors the rational approach to all kinds of problems. Even if some therapeutical schools apply some irrational means, such as emotions, the majority of cases is handled as a rule by ways that might be characterized as rational, also in such a case which originated by irrational factors. It is clear today that consciousness that is man’s tool for progress—as sciences prove steadily since three centuries, works logically, by orderly patterns, by systematic regularities, rather than by illogical jumps. Clarifications are eagerly needed when any personal or interpersonal problem has to be solved. Clear mental actions are the required conditions of mental health. All psychotherapeutic schools document that more or less all irrational tendencies and impulses are deduced from non-conscious or sub-conscious motives that, when isolated from other mental life, may shift the mind out of balance into abnormality. As long as such automatisms remain active out of control of other parts of the mind, the deviation lasts. When those automatisms become connected with other coherent structure of mental life they become part of consciousness, they start to be clarified by consciousness especially in their relationship to several systems of social and cultural values, and by that they start to acquire meaning. So they are brought under control of consciousness and that is the way to renewing the mental balance. Irrational obscurities are able to disturb inner balance of the mind; rational clarifications may settle mental agitations and restore equilibrium.
Unanswered philosophical questions, obscured by sophisticated ideological additions, may under strenuous conditions cause disturbances. This are not only fictions such as was the case of Ivan in Dostoievski's "Brothers Karamazov". Such cases appear in fact at our mental health clinics. Lack of confidence in one's cognition's reliability may be generalized and may result in rejecting all-human knowledge and may produce in the course of time a subjective spiritual vacuum. This then may provoke mental disturbances reaching even suicidal attempts. The meaning of the world and of life, the structure of Cosmos and its duration, its future development and man's role in it, the valid form of our spiritual life, its aspects and functions, all that are components of our mental superstructure that is not only a mental decoration of the "king of living beings", but they all are active powers in our life. They all belong to spiritual powers of man. Their effectiveness is as real as that of religious tendencies. The latter produced in history vehement movements such as the reformation that brought with itself the guaranty of freedom of opinion and convictions, reorganizations of collective beliefs, rituals, conceptions and even changes in constellations of political powers. Broadly shaped spiritual superstructure pushes man to more cognition, to better knowledge and understanding by proving their validity, to bridging gaps between ideologies, to developing effort for seeing better forwards, etc. However all these manifestations of spiritual endeavor assume philosophical forms, they are not only imaginary speculations, but are real psychological powers acting daily in each individual as well as in society.

Different forms of counseling practice prove that philosophy is psychologically needed to each individual and by that to mankind. She contributes to their mental health. Thus both disciplines are interrelated.

Philosophy as the bearer of wisdom of life has a socio-psychological importance by providing adequate mental conditions for such social organization that would allow such form and degree of satisfaction of various human needs that would promote the fulfilling of the mission of man in the Universe. The indispensable condition of this is the widening of knowledge of the Universe in all its fields. Although this is the immediate job of specialized sciences, philosophy is needed in addition, since specialists do not have time and such an overall view over all fields to (1) integrate knowledge to the effect of finding its central tendency relevant for guiding man in investing his energies toward goals of everlasting value, and (2) to control articulated knowledge and research to the effect of spreading the creative effort of research over those fields that are more relevant for human ascendance and that are neglected by ordinary research workers. Since this is indispensable foundation for a secure progress of mankind, its social organization must be wisely shaped in order to provide favorable conditions to a steady human ascendance to higher levels of man's participation in creative functions of the Universe.

The first task of each individual's philosophy is to integrate knowledge
that in individuals cannot be pansophic but necessarily must be only eclectic. Thus it will show gaps and uncertainties. Man's mind needs to fill the gaps by logical structures into an integrated and completed picture of the world and life. Many gaps in this picture cannot be cleared by experience, such as are the perennial problems of man's origin, present role, and future mission or destiny. Man needs to be properly oriented in the Universe to be able to act in harmony with the Cosmic Order as a guarantee of man's ascendance. Philosophy offers to man her guidance that was tested by centuries of philosophical coping with ultimate problems man's curiosity could not give up. Since the replies of past generations were not satisfactory, next generations search for new solutions. Human curiosity is an undefatigable and importunate searcher which cannot be stopped.

The history of philosophy shows that man cannot be satisfied by any reply patterned by chance. Man's mission in the Universe is definite and highly responsible. Man must act planfully in the telikinetic way, with distant future in mind. Seeing into darkness of the future needs "light" that would help man decide his steps into future after straightening collisions of motives and tendencies. He needs criteria for evaluation—a sense of values. Philosophy can help considerably by elucidating subtleties of criteria of evaluation, especially the problematicas of everlasting values. In that is involved clarification of ends and means, what is again the psychological realm. Any darkening in these fields means a cultural and spiritual loss or damage.

After seeing that philosophy is really needed to man's mind, that there are tasks for her constructive contribution and that her cooperation is expected, we can return to criticism of Albert Schweitzer with the question; why does not philosophy satisfy her mission? or Is present philosophy ever able to fulfill these expectations with success?

Since there are so many problems waiting for philosophical help, it does not appear likely that the last question might be answered in a positive way. There are several hindrances or better to say seductions to which philosophers are yielding easily that they are responsible for the present decline of philosophy as a vital power in modern man's mind.

Although we cannot generalize fully, and although there are clear exceptions, yet there are certain patterns of work in present philosophical journals that raise worries about the importance of such studies for guiding purposes of the practical life.

A considerable number of articles deals with "technical philosophical questions", as philosophers use to call them. Great deal of articles are only of historical importance. Recently a new category of articles filled with formulas of algebraic type appears. Some philosophers introduce new terms symbolizing irrational factors the meaning of which is difficult to grasp, since nothing concrete corresponds to them.

Technical problems require certain attention in each discipline, and
history of philosophy has a considerable pedagogical usefulness. Yet, too much of both means abandoning the vital mission of philosophy.

If a philosophy asserts: "Freedom in fact is strictly identified with nihilation"..."we can never choose evil"..."there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom"..."Man is always the same"... (as existentialism states), does this mean any clarification of the Man-Universe relationships?

When a philosopher is asked how he thinks that the transcendent may have influence on this world and one's life, and he states that it is done through "transconditions", does it become clearer how the world's happenings are governed to regularity?

Attempts at using formulas occurred more than a hundred years ago when Herbart tried to express by them relationships among images and their getting into man's consciousness. But all his formulas were found ineffective and were abandoned by later scientific generations.

It is, of course a recognized task of mathematics to use formulas and by its own method of symbol substitution to express quantitative relationships among events. Even mathematicians, however, try to elucidate their complex symbolic relationship and to bring them into the logical order comprehensible to a non-expert mind.

Clarification is the proper task of logic and philosophy. Since its beginning, philosophy tried to find a logically conceived order under the variety and accidentalities of things occurring in the world. Since the structure of the world appeared complex, and today its complexity is proved still more complicated than before, philosophy tried and tries to make that structure comprehensible to man by elucidating relationships of entities on all levels of their complexity. The endeavor of Socrates, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Comte, etc. was the clarification and approaching the world order to man.

Clarification is needed not only to the cultured man, but first of all to the simple man. It would be a great merit of philosophy, if she might clarify interrelationships among the entities in such a way that the Cosmic Order would become comprehensible even to the plain man of the people. Any kind of "cryptograms" is rather obscuring the understanding and makes grappling the Cosmic Order and man's mission in it less possible. Such impossibility averts people from philosophy when her symbols cannot be deciphered.

If a simple man cannot grasp the meaning of newly introduced terms and if it is expected from him that he will simply adopt them even without understanding, then this would mean the same way of acceptance which became proverbial as expressed by Tertullianus: *Credo quia absursum*. But this is not the way of philosophy and of psychology either. This is not the scientific attitude. Philosophy and psychology try to promote understanding by conscious effort of building meaningful relationships, by logical capacities of man. This excludes absurdities as unfit
for rational acceptance and hostile to any order humanly conceivable and compatible with modern cognitive attitudes.

Even if we cannot expect that philosophy would explain fully all relationships and would offer at present only approximate elucidations, we feel that with more knowledge after more research the future may procure us with better concepts and we shall be able to reach better understanding. This hope is deduced from history of culture that shows steady improvements in conceiving of the world and life.

This service to mankind has an everlasting value. We feel just at present how the whole world goes through a period of crises that are shaking all world structures in their foundations. It is natural that voices start to be heard calling for leadership to new spiritual values. This is the call for exodus from unsecurities of the crisis, for salvation from drawing in doubts, for spiritual deepening and clarification of many relationships between subjective and objective worlds that become more and more complex and by that are getting beyond our understanding. Many mental reconstructions, reformulations, reshapings are needed. This need is the most frequent remedy administered by our mental health clinic, as the present author’s experience as psychologist at such a clinic fully proves.

Who is called for help in these problems threatening the superstructure of human personality? The combined effort of philosophers and psychologists. This cooperation is very urgent indeed.

Is it any kind of philosophy that would fit in this cooperation? Positively not. It must be a philosophy with vital orientation, interested in guidance of different kinds of men. What is expected from such a philosophy?

1. She must be interested in life problems of men living in present conditions. In particular she must be interested in guiding men in numberless problems and actual conflicts due to variations of conditions of life. Men need guideposts that would facilitate decisions. This need is relevant especially to man who does not think too deeply or who is not fit to it by nature. Such guidance concerns mostly our social and spiritual sphere of life, just the spheres that are responsible for our complexities since they raise man to his cultural level. Harmonizing the physical and mental with social and spiritual so that higher aspects would win without sacrificing the lower ones, without threatening human existence, that is the job of this guidance.

Obviously the job is not easy and we must ask whether it is feasible and whether there is enough free space for philosophical creativeness? Older thinkers always tried to guide man practically, such as Socrates, Plato, Confucius, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Bergson, and others did. There is always enough space for advancing in philosophy. New knowledge is forcing us to try new systems as we have made an attempt at it in "The Cosmic Order And Our Mental Health". (Interpress, 12 Montagu Street, London—W. 1, England, 1962).
2. This leads us to another interest in producing new syntheses of steadily progressing research in all scientific fields. The present time witnesses enormous progress in nature study and in history of mankind (cultural and physical anthropology). All that progress calls for a new integration, for building a new conception of the world and of life in it. Such new syntheses and reconstructions of old concepts and doctrines will be always needed. Just the concept of spirituality itself calls for a thorough reconstruction as a very urgent need.

3. Interest in helping people to reply questions concerning gaps in our knowledge. Man’s curiosity cannot be silenced and raises questions of any kind. Sciences do not have always complete material to meet all possible questions. Filling such gaps is the mind’s burning need. Philosophical speculation was helpful in it since ancient times. The trained imagination of an educated man can help itself so that the material used for filling the gaps is brought into harmony with facts proved by sciences. So the conflicts between adopted conceptions and the progressed scientific knowledge is avoided. The simple man is helpless in this task. He may fill the gaps by fantastic material, like primitives do, and by that run into superstitions or mythology and become victim of unfounded emotions of an arbitrary provenance. That this was and is useless and even dangerous was proved by ancient history and due to that men tried to get rid of that kind of thinking by replacing it by more efficient scientific methods. Therefore the expert help by philosophers would be useful to each simple man, for security, national efficiency, and mental health reasons.

4. The present world situation requires especially spiritual leadership toward the future of mankind and of the Universe in general. Man, crushed by the present lasting crises, desires eagerly to find the way out of uncertainties to the further ascendance. It is the man’s own responsibility to make the next step toward his destiny a step which would lead to more satisfaction, more security, more improvements, and which would prove to be of lasting value so that man’s further ascendance would be enabled by that. Many symptoms show today that man needs a new kind of spirituality, broadened by progress of knowledge in all fields, and widened so that it would embrace the whole world and would help to create the true mankind.

Thus, such philosophy is needed that would be oriented toward vital problems of man of today and tomorrow, a forward-minded philosophy. Its need is potentialized by the enormous changes of human knowledge during historical times. And history documents man’s proceeding from uncritical mythological animism (practiced by primitive tribes) to critical scientific rationalism (in civilized man).

Is this change inevitable? Is it useful? The inner dynamics of our conscious life, externally shaped as curiosity that pushes man for more and better knowledge, makes that change
inevitable. There were attempts in man’s history to keep his curiosity down. They did not succeed. They were found harmful to mankind. New knowledge prevents man to hold old concepts and beliefs, sometimes products of mere fantasy without any foundation except man’s wishful thinking. Modern man more and more is fond of proved facts about which he may be sure and is less inclined to accept arbitrary combinations of images and ideas. Human curiosity is a spontaneous power that cannot be stopped. Man wants to know more and strive higher. That is his destiny. Does more knowledge threaten spirituality? Not necessarily. The free man will be more inclined to spirituality the more he will know. There is a very deep mysticism even behind all scientific facts, since mysteries of the Universe are mysteries of human future. Therefore the new concept of spirituality embraces sciences also.

The usefulness of changes of conceptions and beliefs cannot be proved by pointing to other nations only. There is an intrinsic reason for grasping the proper meaning of the usefulness of such changes. Animism was dominating man by many fears at any step. Man was and still is terrorized by unfounded beliefs in mysterious significance of many uncivilized, superstitious, futile, and even damaging patterns of behavior. Fear hinders the free movement of creativeness to innovations and progress. The horizons are narrowed by fear to immediate neighborhood and to animality. But the fulfillment of human destiny needs to see freely, clearly, and as far as possible. Only clear vision can show the way to his further ascendance. Releasing man from imagery fears and freeing him brings for him a great psychological profit. Hence we understand the radical statement of A. R. Wadia that: “India must break loose from the shackles of the past, retain all the good that we can and mercilessly discard the rest.” (Pragmatic Idealism, in S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead: Contemporary Indian Philosophy. Macmillan, New York, 1936, p. 355-71.) This is fully valid for all countries and nations of the world.

There is also a considerable economic usefulness of changes in conceptions and beliefs. Since animistic mythologies lead to self deceptions, even if not wanted and unconsciously accepted, which evoked many forms of rituals. The latter proved themselves as ineffective and even damaging such as in deficiencies of health, epidemics, economic disasters, weather catastrophes, etc. Magical rituals result from ignorance and technical helplessness of man. Sciences disregard rituals, try to find causes of defects, and by handling them properly they try to find improvements that would work. Practical tests prove that this way is efficient. Better medical, economic, technological and other cares are natural consequence of it. International competition adds only the momentum to these advantages.

It is today universally recognized that knowledge is a power that opens the gate to economic and technological improvements. Historical
development of the Western countries prove this so far clearly that the majority of other nations tries to follow that example. It is obvious today that such changes might be only gradual and with thorough understanding local conditions. Each onesidedness or learning toward extremes may be damaging, as anthropological studies of the acculturation process prove. In general even in the West we have to watch the progress with caution, since we feel that its balance is too lopsided to the benefit of the nature sciences and to the unfavor of the social sciences and of promoting spiritual participation in public life.

If we would accept with Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan the quotation of Mahābhārata: "there is nothing higher than man", then we must lay great emphasis on man's spiritual aspect as the highest achievement of the ascending process of the Universe. Spirituality is man's specific system of tendencies, it is man's most proper creation and his contribution to the Universal happenings. Spiritual tendencies are helping man in his responsibility for his next step onwards in the Cosmic ascendency. In this task he may be supported by one condition pointed out by Radhakrishnan (in his book The Concept of Man—a study in comparative philosophy, Johnson, Lincoln, Neb. 1960): "Democracy requires us to respect and develop the free spirit of man, which is responsible for all progress in human history." Since we have in mind the all-human progress, the spirituality, of which philosophy is a part, must be shaped so that it would fit each human mind. In this respect the comparative philosophical studies, promoted by Radhakrishnan, might contribute enormously and enhance the advancement of cultural changes toward rapprochement of nations to a unified mankind.

Since all these are philosophical and psychological tasks, both these disciplines would profit from closer cooperation. Psychology can designate the components of personality where philosophy plays prim and philosophy can find all-human values that might serve as guideposts in man's decisions.
It is a sad commentary on Indian universities sixty years ago that I took my B. A. degree without knowing an iota of Indian Philosophy. When the University of Mysore came to be established in 1916 I had the good fortune to be the first professor of philosophy to be appointed and I had a chance to organise the philosophy courses in a way that would give due prominence to Indian Philosophy. Naturally in the M.A. course apart from the usual paper on Ethics on western lines we included a paper on Indian Ethics. But when we had to recommend books for study we were confronted with the difficulty that there were no books on Indian Ethics, and we had to begin practically from the scratch. In subsequent years a goodly number of books on the subject have appeared in English, among the earliest being John McKenzie's *Hindu Ethics* in the well-known The Religious Quest of India series; in 1922, E. Washburn Hopkins'—*Ethics of India* in 1924, Sushil Kumar Maitra's *The Ethics of the Hindus* in 1925, Babu Govind Das' *Hindu Ethics* in 1927. In 1935 followed Sir P.S. Sivaswamy Aiyer's Kamala Lectures in the University of Calcutta on *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals*. A year earlier Kenneth Saunders' fascinating volume on *The Ideals of East and West* contained an illuminating chapter on The Ethics of India. Other volumes have followed on the subject so that any one who has to teach Indian or more precisely Hindu Ethics has good working tools apart from the original classics themselves. Even so it still remains a question whether there is such a thing as Indian Ethics in the sense that Western Philosophy has a clear cut subject like Ethics. In fact one is tempted to emulate the classic parody of a book on the snakes in Iceland with the single sentence that there are no snakes in Iceland. Paradoxical as it would sound would it not be justifiable to say that there is no Ethics in India?
In western philosophy ethics has its place as a systematic study of morality. It is markedly different from a descriptive study of morals as found in works like Westermarck's *Development of the Moral Ideas* and Lecky's *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*. Ethics as such involves a search for the moral ideal and a study of the virtues as the means to reach that ideal. Rich though the moral teachings of Socrates and Plato were, it was in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* that we have the first text-book on Ethics. The moral traditions or the ancient Hindus were as rich as any to be found in any other country of culture. The Vedas and the Upanishads and more particularly the epics of Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa are replete with high moral principles. It was further enriched by the teachings of Buddha and Jaina. But India inspite of her rich moral inheritance did not produce an Aristotle to weave out a consistent system of morality out of the many and at times conflicting moral practices as found in different castes and communities. That the Hindus developed in the Gītā high moral precepts as courage and justice and truth is a matter of history. That Buddha went a step further in preaching mercy any love and tolerance and put India in the forefront of the world at the time is equally a matter of history. But it would be a vain search to find any scientific treatment of the problems of morality among the ancient Indian rishis. That is what gives an edge to the statement that there is no such thing as Indian Ethics. This is perhaps a part of the larger question whether there is any Indian Philosophy. There have been European scholars who have repudiated the claims of Indian Philosophy to be considered as philosophy. It is looked upon as mere dogmatism by Professor Brehier in his Preface to Masson Oursel's *History of History Philosophy in the Orient*, and even by so profound a scholar as Dr. Albert Schweitzer. Even in India there have been Indian scholars who refuse to look upon Indian Philosophy as philosophy. I am not prepared to go so far as this for too much emphasis on mere definition of philosophy as a rational search for truth is not justifiable. There may be other methods of seeking truth as for example intuition and inspiration. These methods though more characteristic of India are not unknown in the history of European philosophy. The case of ethics is some what different. It has a specific meaning, a specific emphasis on a systematic study of moral principles.

There is another reason why there is no specific ethics in Indian thought. There is no recognition of an independent existence of morality. It is rooted in religion or metaphysics and its detailed manifestation in social life is worked out in *Dharma Sastras*. Hence a study of morals in India necessarily implies a study of Indian religion and Indian metaphysics and Indian *Dharma Sastras* or legal systems. Just as Christian morality is rooted in the teachings of the Bible, both old and New Testaments, and Muslim morality is rooted in the teachings of the Quran, the background of Indian morality is to be sought for in the Vedas and the Gītā.
Apart from the general principles of morality the Vedas tend to be ritualistic as a means to attain all the good things of life: cows and food and children. On the whole the attitude to life is a joyous one. In the Gītā consistently with the atmosphere of war there is a greater emphasis on the duty of fulfilling one's dharma. Thus Krishna exhorts Arjun to cast aside his gentle feelings for his kinsmen and solicitude for their life and to be a soldier, a true Kshatriya. The greatest merit of the Gītā is that it rises above mere ritualism and enunciates the principle of universalism generated by faith in Krishna, in whom all can find refuge and peace. Women and Sudras alike can have the benefit of this faith. Thus the basis of morality in the Gītā has a clear theistic significance. Like faith in Christ or in Mahomed faith in Krishna as the godhead does not admit of any argument or speculation. It involves implicit devotion and has inspired the Vaishnava mystics like Chaitanya in Bengal, Mirabai in Rajasthan, Narasimha Mehta in Gujarat, Tukaram in Maharashtra, not to mention a host of others. Faith in God inspires a man to be moral and he will duly get his reward in this life and after death.

In the Upanishads we enter a different realm, though they are taken to be a part of the Vedas. In the lapse of several centuries that divide the Vedas from the Upanishads the Aryan soul had matured and completely risen above ritualism. It had risen above even a blind acceptance of a belief in God. They mark the restless search after Truth that is the hallmark of the generation that produced Janaka, the Kshatriya jñānī, and the rishi Yajñaavalkya. The concept of Karma and reincarnation emerged as basic to Hindu life and thought for all times to come. “Verily, one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action” we find written in Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad.

This simple statement becomes involved in all the complexities of Upanishadic metaphysics. The Upanishads as a philosophy suffer from one great handicap: They were composed in the course of some centuries and they represent the thoughts of different minds. Naturally inconsistencies abound and attempts to reconcile them necessarily lead to different interpretations. While there is no dispute that the ultimate concept is Brahman, there has been an endless discussion whether this ultimate concept is an It as in Advaita of Śaṅkara or as He in Vaishnavism. Similarly it has been a matter of dispute as to the place of morality in a man’s life. Mundaka Upanishad has it that “He, verily, who knows that supreme Brahma, becomes very Brahma” (Hume p.377). Thus the realisation of Brahman becomes the aim of life. Katha Upanishad (Hume p. 350) says:

“Not he who has not ceased from bad conduct,
Not he who is not tranquil, not he who is not composed,
Not he, who is not of peaceful mind
Can obtain Him by intelligence (prajña)

This implies that none who is not morally fit can hope to attain the Brahmahood. But there is a passage in Chāndogya (Hume p. 223)
which has a dangerous implication, : “As water adheres not to the leaf of a lotus flower, so evil action adheres not to him who knows this”, i.e. has the knowledge of Brahma (n). Unfortunately for India there have been pseudo-sadhus and blackguards who claim that in their state of highest development they cannot be sullied by evil. Such a claim makes a mockery of all morality.

The metaphysical basis of morality as found in the Upanishads teaches that as the individual atman is identical—according to Advaita with Brahma, or emanates from Brahma according to Vaishnavism, an individual has to behave to another individual as identical with himself or as sharing in the qualities which belong to the source from which all individuals emanate. Thus a human society is made up of inter-dependent individuals and all morality governs the mutual relationships of individuals.

It has been a peculiarity of Hindu society that it has developed its organisation on caste lines. As in ancient Iran so in ancient India the castes were only three: Brahmins, Kshatriyas and the Vaisyas. But the conquest of the original inhabitants of India by the Aryans and the gradual absorption of them within the Aryan fold necessitated the addition of a fourth caste, Sudras, very much inferior, fit only for the lower kinds of work, menials at first gradually they included even the agriculturists and the craftsmen. Shri Krishna claims in the Gītā that he created the fourfold castes on the basis of guṇas. Though every individual is a mixture of all the guṇas of satva, rajas and tamas, they mix in different proportions. Those who have satva predominant in them are the Brahmins. Those who have rajas predominant are the Kshatriyas. Vaisyas have a little more of tamas, but where we have tamas predominant we have Sudras. There is a Psychological and moral justification for such a classification. But it breaks down when the classification is rigidly conceived in terms of birth so that a son of Brahmin parents alone is a Brahmin and a son of Sudra parents is ipso facto a Sudra. Such an exclusive emphasis on birth would be justifiable if every son of Brahmin parents has satva predominant in him, but unfortunately there are children of Brahmin parents who show anything but satva in their life and conduct. It has to be said in fairness that there are children of Sudra parents who are in their behaviour worthy of being characterised as Brahmins. But Hindu orthodoxy in practice does not recognise such a contingency except as a theoretical possibility and so a Sudra, however good he be remains a Sudra, and a Brahmin, however evil he be, continues to be looked upon as a Brahmin. It would be vain to deny that Shri Krishna’s teaching is not borne out in practice.

The evil of caste comes out all the more glaringly in the logical corollary of the fourfold castes. This applies only to Hindus and so all non-Hindus are outside the caste, including the Muslims and the Europeans. But since they came to be the conquerors of India they naturally came to be exempted from all the insignia of untouchability which has come to be confined to the people who from times immemorial were not
absorbed in the Hindu fold even as Sudras and were literally outcasts. They came to be untouchables ostensibly because of their vocations as sweepers and cobbler similar occupations. They were kept apart as despicables whose touch would defile the caste Hindus and in parts Malabar they were even unapproachable. In the course of centuries Hindu did produce a string of reformers who saw the absurdity and the unholliness of the orthodox Hindu attitude to millions of their fellow countrymen. They were the mystic saints who in different parts of India rose above caste. But even they did not succeed except to the extent that they had a certain following who themselves came to be looked upon as a caste and they too fell victims to the usual caste prejudices in the course of time. It is only in the British regime that the heinousness of untouchability came to touch the hearts of the ordinary people monks to the educated reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Keshab Chandra Sen, Dayanand Saraswati, Ranada and a host of others. In 1906 V.R. Shinde started the Depressed Classes Mission. In the same year Gopal Krishna Gokhale founded the Servants of India Society. These organisations as well as the other reforming bodies which had been brought into existence in different parts of India took up the cause of the untouchables. The changing life in India also played its part. Travelling by railway trains and buses without any reservation for higher castes naturally led to a mixing of the touchables and untouchables alike. Irani shops and Coffee shops catering to the needs of the office-going classes in large cities like Bombay also played their part in increasing the chances of contacts. Above all the doors of educational institutions had been thrown open to the untouchables and there arose a class of new leaders like Ambedkar who were no more content to let old prejudices continue unchallenged. Finally the political demands of the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Gandhi necessarily involved the repudiation of untouchability. With Independence came the abolition of untouchability. This figures in our Constitution. It is now dead so far as law can kill it. But old prejudices and customs die hard. A great leader like Ambedkar found a Brahmin lady bold enough to marry him, but such courage is not commonly found in the ranks of Hindus whether men or women. Any way a prejudice which made a mockery of Hindu claims to cosmopolitanism and universalism in the moral sphere is on the way to dying and with the spread of education and the lapse of time this blot on Hindu morality will disappear.

It is quite usual to speak of the different stages of life: childhood, youth, manhood, old age ending in death. It stands justified on biological and psychological grounds. The Hindu thinkers must be given the credit of having a clear-cut philosophy of the stages of life. They have worked out in detail the functions of each stage. The Hindu doctrine of ashramas recognises four stages: Brahmacharya, Gṛhaśṭha, Vanprastha and Sanyas. The Brahmacharya stage is one of preparation for life: study under a guru. It implies full devotion to study and service of the guru as a part of his
education. It involves no social responsibilities and so makes chastity the rule of that stage of life. Marriage is thus automatically eschewed. Even when infant marriages became the fashion, the fiction of exhorting the bridegroom not to go to Varanasi for his studies is kept up. The second stage of grihastha implies the shouldering of the normal duties of life: marriage and rearing of children. It implies the following of a vocation or profession as a means of earning money. It extends from about the age of 18, which marks the end of the Brahmacharya stage to about fifty. Then follows the stage of retirement to a forest as a means of preparing for the end. By that time children are supposed to have grown up so that they could take up the responsibility of looking after themselves or their younger brothers and sisters if need be. Wife is allowed to accompany her husband as a companion.

The final stage of sanyas or renunciation is something so peculiar to Hindus as to require a little fuller discussion. The concept of sanyas has become the ideal of Hindu life. More than what a monk is in the Catholic Church or a knight was in the days of medieval chivalry in Europe, a sanyasin is to a Hindu. The sanctity of a half-naked sadhu or of a man in saffron robes as a symbol of purity is taken for granted. He is welcome to every Hindu home. The Maharaja in all his pomp and glory condescends to bow to him with as much reverence as does the rich merchant rolling in wealth. The institution which stood for a complete negation of all the luxuries and even comforts of life in the course of time came to attract the idle to sanyas as an easy means to get all the needs of life met without any trouble. Even to-day in India the number of such sadhus comes to a few millions and constitutes a huge drain on the resources of the people who on the whole are none too rich. In the scheme of Hindu ashramas sanyas comes at the very end of life after a man has fulfilled all his duties and many would not go beyond the stage of vanprastha. A genius like Śaṅkara, who died young, took sanyas at a very early age, and set an example which has not been all for the good of Hinduism or of the country. Life is hard and has to be lived with the sweat of toil. It involves duties which bring out the best in man. At its best sanyas represents a developed soul. At its worst it is the refuge of the idle and all who wish to shirk the responsibilities of life. But even Śaṅkara and Buddha long before him were not idlers. They lived to serve mankind. To put it paradoxically they died to all the comforts of life to live a life of service. But the ideal of service has been lost under the cloak of piety which involves both an economic drain and a moral waste. This side of sanyas has been beautifully brought out by Tagore in his priceless title book Sadhana. It embodies his philosophy of life, though with characteristic modesty he repudiates all claim to philosophic treatment or scholarship. With a genuine philosophical insight in an impassioned passage of great literary beauty and philosophic truth he has penned lines which bear on the line of thought presented in this paper.
“O thou distraught wanderer, thou Sanyasin, drunk in the wine of self-intoxication, dost thou not already hear the progress of the human soul along the highway traversing the wide fields of humanity—the thunder of its progress in the car of its achievements, which is destined to overpass the bounds that prevent its expansion into the universe?...Pain, disease, and disorder are at every step receding before its onset; the obstructions are being thrust aside; the darkness of blindness is being pierced through; and behold, the promised land of wealth and health, of poetry and art, of knowledge and righteousness is gradually being revealed to view...Who is there who refuses to respond to his call to join in this triumphal progress? Who so foolish as to run away from the gladsome throng and seek the listlessness of inaction? Who so steeped in untruth as to dare to call all this untrue—this great world of man, this civilisation of expanding humanity, this eternal effort of man, through depths of sorrow, through heights of gladness, through innumerable impediments within and without, to win victory for his powers?...He who thinks to reach God by running away from the world, when and where does he expect to meet him? How far can he fly—can he fly and fly, till he flies into nothingness itself? No, the coward who would fly can nowhere find him...we must be able to say, ‘In my work is my joy, and in that joy does the joy of my joy abide’

In this passage we find the key to the greatness that is Hinduism and the weakness that is Hinduism. It is easy enough to don the robe of the sanyasin, but not so easy to fulfill the aim behind all renunciation: the service of mankind. It is because India has produced generation after generation a stream of sanyasins who have sacrificed their comforts to bring joy to the hearts of others, that India can lay claim to be spiritually great. It is because India has produced an army of idlers masquerading as sanyasins that India is economically poor and morally and spiritually poor.

There may be no Hindu Ethics in the modern western sense of the term but there is a Hindu way of life great in many respects, but it has come to a stage when it has to meet the challenge of the times. Hindu society has been reared on the basis of aristocracy. Prima facie the original fourfold castes represent a mere division of labour, each essential to a happy functioning of society. On this basis Gandhiji tried to justify caste. But history belies this claim. The unquestioned supremacy of the Brahmins and the taken-for-granted inferiority of the Sudras has now brought the reaction that goes as the non-Brahmin revolt in South India and in parts of Western India. The generations of Kshatriyas that claimed equality with the Brahmins of the Vedic and Upanishadic eras died long ago when the pressure of the Muslims and the Europeans gave a new importance to Brahmins as the keepers and the saviours of Hindu culture and Hindu life. To-day with the spread of education and the birth of political democracy in India and the socialist ideas which go with modern industrialism the supremacy of the Brahmins has become a fiction with the upsurge of the dumb masses into vocal democrats and socialists. Caste as an institution is crumbling, though it is by no means dead.
Hindu philosophy has been described by many western thinkers like Dr. Schweitzer as life-denying. A core of pessimism with an emphasis on sansar as a vale of tears led to a search for moksha as a way out of this life. Buddhism was more explicitly pessimistic and the concept of nirvāṇa as nothingness was an expression of it. But Buddha’s love and mercy made life bearable and even joyous as Buddhist art goes to show all over Asia. Under foreign domination Hinduism shrank into a shell, closing all the windows all around. But even in the worst periods of Hindu history the spirit of man rose above all orthodoxy and was prepared to learn from others. To-day we are living in an age when the world has shrunk and it has become impossible for any country or nation to repudiate its contacts with the rest of the world. The virile culture of the West has shaken not merely India, but the whole of Asia and the whole of Africa, out of the sleep and despondency of centuries. Never before in human history has the verse of Burns “A man’s a man for a’ that” conquered the world of the whites and the browns and the blacks as it has to-day. In spite of the anger which rages in the world to-day and seeks to perpetuate the distinctions which have divided man from man, the world to-day is in a mood to listen to the sage counsel of Burns, the poet of the masses par excellence;

“Then gently scan your brother man,
Still gentler sister woman”.

If Hindu morality is to respond to the currents of modern life, it will have to change in two material directions. Firstly life may never be free from its ills, it may not cease to dukha, be pain and suffering, yet it is open to them to develop a sense of joy. The Greeks cultivated beauty and culled it from the worst tragedies of life, as Shelley so wisely taught:

“Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought”. The will to master sorrow and look calm without being perturbed was the hallmark of the Indian sage. We have learned from the West the precious gift of laughter which makes us see the comedy of life that is so closely intertwined with the tragedies of life. The philosopher in India was never expected to laugh at himself any more than at others. But we have begun to learn that the capacity to laugh at one’s own self is the beginning of wisdom.

Secondly we need to change in another direction. Our fatalism has brought us contentment, but it has brought us defeat after defeat at every level. It has sapped our capacity and will to fight evil. Fifty years ago in one of his impassioned addresses Gopal Krishna Gokhale bemoaned the fact that we Indians lacked in righteous indignation. It is this lack of indignation which made them callous to the sufferings which went with sati, child marriages and prohibition of widow remarriage. The pace of social reform was distressingly slow. If things are better to-day, it is mainly because of the pressure of political ideologies, which have shattered the very foundations of caste and the pressure of the ballot box
which has brought equality to women as well as to the Sudras and the Harijans.

These changes have begun to come and will come more and more under the pressure of the Zeitgeist. But western ethos is not without its dangers. Its excessive individualism has affected the sanctity of family life and this will ultimately affect the very foundations of social life. The strong family feeling engendered and fostered by the Hindu joint family in the course of centuries may help to save us from the naked evils of extreme individualism. It is the privilege of human beings to profit from the errors of others at least to the extent of avoiding them.

Political democracy, whether of the parliamentary or the communist pattern, and the forces of industrialisation have served to level up the different strata of human society whether in the east or west, and it will be impossible for Hindu society to resist this movement. The Hindu joint family was perhaps the finest creation of Hindu social genius, but even this institution has felt the pressure of changing life. Thirty three years ago the Committee appointed by the Mysore Government to report on the rights of women under the Hindu Law in a pregnant sentence said: “Under the impact of modern conditions and the consequent growth of the individualistic spirit—with its sense of legal rights and personal interests—it (the joint family) is visibly breaking up, a phenomenon which cannot be arrested and need not be regretted”. Whatever the legal effects of these changes we should strive to keep up the spirit of the Hindu joint family.

Some three centuries ago even so great a soul as Kabir suffered from the evil effects of caste. Sitting on the banks of the Ganges at Banaras he overheard some Brahmin wanting some water to drink. Kabir went up and offered a cup of water which was indignantly refused as involving bodily pollution. Kabir had sufficient sense of humour to retort: “If Ganga water from my hands cannot cleanse your body how can it cleanse all the evils of your soul?” After his death the same Kabir must have laughed at the wrangles of the Hindus and the Muslims to claim his body. But the Kabir Panthis just became another sect and another sub-caste. To-day the spirit of Kabir can well rejoice that what he struggled against has yielded to new currents of thought. Morals may change from age to age but the principles which govern morality are eternal and make for a humanity one and undivided by human prejudices. The ideals which the Upanishadic seers had in mind may now come to be realised in their fullness in the twentieth century. Rudyard Kipling misquoted and misinterpreted was right in his vision that East and West can be different and yet meet “when two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth.”
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THE IMPORTANCE
OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL
APPROACH TO RELIGION
AND PARAPSYCHOLOGY

Short time ago turning up my radio I chanced to come across a lecture on “Mysticism and Rationalism.” The beginning was good enough as it contained quotations from mystics of all times and countries: the Bhagavadgita, Dionysius the Areopagite, Hugo of St. Victor, Master Eckhart etc. right up to Aldous Huxley. Then the lecturer proceeded to describe the stammering, apparently paradox manner in which mystics in ecstasy try do describe the undescribable they experience, which, he said, was a contradiction in itself. This stammering he compared with the babble of infants, and lo and behold! suddenly mysticism was defined as a “regression to infantility” by persons unable to comply with “the pressure of reality,” an “escape” into phantastic imaginations, even hallucinations.

What a mental somersault indeed! Based on eventual insignificant, superficial similarities in the behavior (the ejaculations) of babies and mystics the lecturer falsified these associations of his into an essential analogy from which he derived a strange explanation. Apparently he had quite lost sight of the original phenomenon of mysticism (if ever he really understood it?), otherwise how could he explain it away by such behaviorist and genetic hypotheses as “nothing but” a “regression into infantility,” an “escape from the pressure of reality?”

Dr. Radhakrishnan says1: “It seems to me that in mystic tradition

1 S. Radhakrishnan “Eastern Religions and Western Thought,” 2nd ed. London 1940, pp. VIII/IX.
we have a remarkable unity of spirit. Whatever religions they may profess, the mystics are spiritual kinsmen....As the religion of spirit mysticism avoids the two extremes of dogmatic affirmation and dogmatic denial.. All signs indicate that it is likely to be the religion of the future."

In spite of the "varieties of religious experience" W. James described in his famous book thus it can't be regarded as an exaggeration to say mysticism is one of the basic phenomena of all religion. (Even in religions defining themselves as being based upon revelations, at least with their founders (and probably some of their most outstanding followers) surely mystical experiences can be assumed to have played an important part. As interesting as they may be in themselves accordingly it will never do to "explain" mystical experiences by describing the alleged "needs" they are supposed to satisfy, especially as these "needs" very often can only be assumed to be found in modern individuals in modern civilisations. Nor can biographic items, interesting as they may be, suffice as an explanation of "nothing but......" As it were Leibniz discovered the differential and integral calculus, yet to understand them it is not necessary to know who Leibniz was, how he came to find them, to study his biography etc. interesting as all this may be in itself.

Dealing with religion, especially mysticism, as well as with parapsychological phenomena however very often all this takes the place of a careful study of what is really given. That however is exactly what phenomenology demands. What must be examined first of all is the essence of what is given, it's meaning, how it is given in the most adequate and original way. Of course such scrutinizing inquiries take time, they don't permit a jump at premature conclusions, they want patience and emancipation from all perconceptions, habitual but unproven patterns of thought. 2

Only when the phenomenological side has been effectively explored so that one can be ascertained investigators won't be induced to lose sight of the original phenomena, the genetic, historical, psychological, psycho-physics (including psychodelics) aspects of the same problems can safely be taken up.

Phenomenology of mysticism and other religious phenomena, 3 as well as parapsychological phenomena, 4 thus must be the starting point.


3 Cf. e.g. Friedrich Heller "Erscheinungsformen und Wesen der Religionen" (first introductory volume, C. M. Schroder's collection "Die Religionen der Menschheit") W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1961.

One has to begin with the facts, the direct, immediate experience. Mr. G. L. Proctor’s able criticism of "The Concept of Fact in Recent Empiricism" does not interfere with this, because in phenomenology there is not "a tacit identification of 'experience' with 'sense experience', and sense data. On the contrary, it is strictly opposed to what Spiegelberg calls the "sense-organ bias," to overdoing simplifying abstractions (terribly simplifications) with their far too narrow vocabularies and Concepts, and demands a return to the "pristine innocence of first seeing" (Spiegelberg), especially in connection with phenomena which have been blocked from sight by theoretical patterns in front of them, or, as William James called it, "a certain blindness in human beings." Probably Eastern, especially Indian thought is less susceptible to such aberrations than some Western investigators, as here the stream of original religious, even mystical experiences coming down from ancient times has not been interrupted by "Enlightenment", sensualism, positivism etc. as in the West. It is to be hoped that with the increasing import of Western natural sciences and technics it will remain immune to such infections. Even Kant was fascinated by this sense-organ bias, though he saw that we are given more than sense-data in outer experience, unfortunately he succumbed to the unproven concept, that no more could be given and therefore brought forward the hypothesis—it really isn't more!—that everything else according to the given nature of the human mind is projected into experience in correspondence with the "categories" and then taken up again formed by their schemes. Sharpminded as this theory is actually it is not more than an assumption the truth of which was never proven in spite of it’s being widely accepted and having influenced Western epistemology right down to psychoanalysis (with its theories of regression, projections etc.) for more than one and a half century.

Once more, Husserl the founder of modern phenomenology says, we have to go back to the very beginning, which Descartes expressed in his famous "cogito, ergo sum": I think (or rather: experience) thus I am, exist. (R. Powell’s translation in "Darshana" vol. 2, no. 3 rendering it with "I think therefore thought exists" apparently is too narrow.) But this "I" is only the "center of consciousness", of knowing, the "Nullpunkt der Erkenntnis", not an empirical human subject, Mr. Smith, Mr. Miller or anybody else. As it were both must be strictly distinguished, as must be descriptive and other psychologies and phenomenology. The empirical or psychological subject indeed "constitutes itself" in consciousness the same as any other object, how and in what manner is the topic of special investigations.

As Husserl pointed out, the objects of consciousness are not

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6 Cf. Spiegelberg I. C., pp. 149-152.
7 Cf. Spiegelberg I. C. especially vol. I pp. 73-167 passim and the literature given there. Concerning some similarities to William James’s "Principles of Psychology" see pp. 111-117.
“contained” in it as bricks in a box, it is essentially directed, always consciousness of something, apart from the question whether the “object” possess “outer” reality, which is suspended in phenomenology. (It may be a mathematical formula, a phantasy beside an alleged outer object supposed to have autonomous existence. That is a question of epistemology, eventually metaphysics. This directedness of consciousness is what Husserl called intentionality. It would lead too far to go further into all problems connected with intentionality here. It is sufficient to say, that each kind of object (in the widest sense of anything given in consciousness) demands a corresponding kind of consciousness, especially concerning its most adequate and original givenness. (You can’t hear colours and see sounds, you can’t touch mathematical or logical symbols etc.). This seems easy to understand yet it is often forgotten as soon as objects of an higher order, of complicated structure are concerned. (E.g. all connected with “gestalt”, or social communities, values.) Then owing to a lack of experience and understanding things are reduced to something else, explained away as we have seen regarding mystical experiences in the beginning of this article.

What a careful and conscientious study of mystical experiences and their phenomenological analysis can achieve is shown in the excellent books of Carl Albrecht MD, a medical doctor in Bremen. Nobody interested in mysticism ought to pass by these studies. They are based as well upon the observation of persons in ecstasy as on the historical material. As demanded in phenomenology from a case description Albrecht proceeds to find the essential aspects of mystical experience, carefully distinguishing them not only from all kinds of ordinary psychological phenomena (as outer and inner perceptions, phantasies, hallucinations) but also from parapsychological (clairvoyance, telepathy etc.) and other religious experiences (e.g. visions, especially of images). Indeed he has to coin new words and conceptions to clarify what is “given” and what essentially belongs to a mystical experience. He analyzes what he calls, inner “Versunkenheit”—which may perhaps be translated with inner absorption into the depth of the self; the “arrival” (Ankommen of something evidently coming from elsewhere, not belonging to the subject itself; which however envelops, encloses, encompasses (“umfassen”) the subject; a specific spiritual “light”; a structure of personality (or rather superpersonality) of all this, distinguishing it e.g. from “cosmic consciousness” in the sense of R.M. Bucke. This is but a short enumeration of the very complicated and minute descriptions and definitions of Albrecht. It is easy to understand you can not simply explain all this away

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as similar to the babble of babies, hallucinations, regression to infantality, as an escape from the pressure of reality!

Phenomenology always has to do with the essential features of objects and experiences. Some investigators mostly analyze the essence of the intended objects, the meaning of the intention (cogitata or noemata) and don’t go further. This has led to the wrong impression phenomenology is a kind of semantics. It indeed has one aspect in that direction, Husserl sometimes called it “ontology”, but besides as we have seen it essentially has to do with the experiences, givenness in which the objects present themselves to consciousness. Accordingly several aspects, or if you like: steps in the phenomenological method must be distinguished. Spiegelberg here enumerates: 11 investigation (analysis and description of)

1. particular phenomena,
2. general essences,
3. essential relationships among essences,
4. modes of appearing,
5. constitution of phenomena in consciousness,
6. suspending belief in the existence of the phenomena (epoché),
7. interpreting the meaning of phenomena.

It will be understood, that phenomenology is a kind of propedeutic to other sciences. Before the genesis of a thing is investigated, or what needs it supplies, its meaning, its givenness ought to be established. Otherwise there is always the danger of loosing sight of it, confounding it with something else, explaining it away.

Great hopes have recently been connected with psychodelics, it is expected that with their help mystical, psychic etc. phenomena can be produced, so that their origin and essential meaning can be found. 12 However it must be remembered, that the opening to such experiences need not produce them: a door opening to something behind it doesn’t necessarily mean the door or the opening produces it. Another question is, whether phenomena observed in connection with drugs, with psychodelics (especially LSD and mescaline) are identical with what may be regarded as genuine, original religious experiences. 13 It is easy to see how important phenomenological analyzes are for the solution of these questions.

All this applies to parapsychology the same as to the psychology of religion and many other sciences. Indeed without being acquainted with phenomenology as such many scientists in these fields have already worked in its direction without knowing it, E.g. G.N.M. Tyrrell’s classical description of apparitions 14 can’t be praised enough in that connection as

11 Cf. 1. c. vol. II, pp. 653-701.
12 Aldous Huxley’s “The Door of Perception”, London 1954 indeed caused quite a sensation in that direction.
excellent ontological-noematical analyzes. The publications of the "modus operandi" of trance communications in various "Proceedings" of the British SPR also include the givenness and states of consciousness concerned to some extent in their studies.

With explicit reference to Husserl's phenomenological method for years I have tried to investigate religious as well as psychic phenomena in introspective analyses. I tried to solve the question how in spontaneous telepathy the telepathist knows who is the sender of the experience, I found that a specific feeling of the foreign personality (using an occult expression one might call it the "aura") accompanies many of these experiences, if it does the sender can be recognized by it without any visual representation being given. Concerning visions I tried to distinguish them from other visual givennesses, especially eidetic "pictures" phantasies and imaginations, memories. Probably hallucinations are different too. The often expressed identification of hallucinations with visions and other religious and psychic experiences yet needs careful re-examination with the help of the phenomenological method. It would be desirable that somebody being psychologically and phenomenologically trained, having experienced both should closely examine his (or her) findings. As far as I know this has not yet been done.

As will be seen there are many important investigations still ahead as well of phenomenology as of the other sciences dealing with the same problems from other aspects, with other approaches. It is to be hoped their combined efforts will yield many new and fruitful results in future. No method excludes others, they must all work together if the difficult problems confronting us are to be solved.

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ONE SOURCE
OF RELIGION

"Religion, if authentic, means an illumined, mind
a changed heart, and a transformed will".
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan,
in the Vedanta Kesari, May, 1946.

I

Xenophanes, one of the great sages of antiquity, once said, "The
Africans make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs
have blue eyes and red hair," meaning that people have never seen any
gods, but merely imagine them, taking their own experience for the start-
ing point of their theistic interpretation of nature. Thinking of the divine,
reflected Xenophanes, men cannot help but remain human. Then, fearing
that he might be misunderstood, the Greek sage added, "Yes, and if
oxen and horses had hands, and could paint with their hands, and pro-
duce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of their gods
like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of
their several kinds". So it appears that man thinks and believes in a way
reflecting his nature, that is, anthropomorphically, and each tribe or
nationality gives to its collective creed a specific slant of its own.

Thus the questions arise: have men been created in the image of
God, or have the gods as we visualize them been created in the image
of Man? Do men carefully search for the ultimate truth in religion, or
do they build their creeds to suit their tastes and aspirations? The agree-
ment of a doctrine with facts of nature is a question of knowledge; yet it
is doctrine, not knowledge, that invariably proclaims the validity of any
theology. Religions have originated in many lands, and people of these
or other lands chose them for reasons of their own. But the questions
still remain: Which of them is the true faith? Which is false? Or are
they all partly true and partly false? How can men decide? It appears
to be a hopeless task to do justice to, or to reconcile, the thousand and one human creeds.

How deep is this diversity of spirit? Are religions as countless in essence as they seem to be in form? Or do they represent but one and the same pursuit, interpreted in many ways, obscured by many forms? Nations with distinct histories and cultures will not, of course, behave and think and feel in an identical fashion. It is not so much in distinctions, then, as in similarities that the basic meaning of faith is to be sought.

Indeed, exactly what have all creeds in common? Why do we identify under one and the same name, "religion," such dissimilar bodies of belief as Christianity and Hellenism, Buddhism, and Voodooism, Bahaism and Theosophy?

All attempts to give a general definition of religion, according to form, are destined to failure. For forms—as characterized by rites and ceremonies, myths and doctrines—are almost as varied as birds' plumage or as popular fashions in dress. They are as numerous as human cultures and are likely to be, to a considerable degree effects of those cultural distinctions.

We are accustomed to describe various religions in terms of teachings and practices. Dances and songs, dogmas and superstitions, customs of marriage and funeral, the hierarchy of priests, and other cultural arrangements play a prominent role in these descriptions. All such ways and manners of conduct concern, it is true, some of the vital phases of life. Yet we do not see why, in our study of the universal phenomenon of worship, we must concentrate on these facts, primary to culture, but only secondary to religion. If religion be a phenomenon independent of, and prior to, the peculiarities and accidents of any historical environment, then the traits of the latter would tend only to obscure our minds as regards the origin and nature of religious faith. As a matter of fact, they definitely do. The very diverse character of religions throughout the world testifies to the probability that their essence lies elsewhere.

If, however, we give up our traditional attachment to superficialities of our creed, if some of us overlook the unjustified pride in the "supremacy" of our respective "only true" faith, if we stop despising "ignorant" pagans and "evil" heretics—but comprehend that, underneath the external accoutrements of form, there lies a single motive for worship, common to all creeds, then perhaps a genuine insight into the nature of religion will become finally possible. In that case, what could it be?

II

It is difficult to disagree with the contention that both the immediate values called interests (in safety, in happiness, in harvest, in home) and the ultimate values called ideals (such as Truth, Goodness and Beauty) have a profound bearing upon one's personal beliefs. Regarded as
problems of knowledge, interests and ideals seldom leave the thinker's study. As living forces, they occupy every mind.

Mass valuations and the social environment causing and reflecting them are not without effect upon the history of mankind. Historical headlines may have been written in terms of conspicuous deeds and outstanding personalities. But, obviously, a man can seldom lead without first winning public approval. The role of the public has thus been consistently underestimated in the past, even overlooked. Now we begin to take notice of it. Statesmen as well as scholars are compelled to acknowledge that it is uncertain who determines the lines of change and progress of human beliefs, great individuals or the masses; most likely it is a combination of both. There are reasons to believe that the influence of the public is often important if not decisive, at least in the long run. It is in the thoughts and attitudes of the public, after all, that both the merits and demerits of a social organization find their most sensitive judge. For a book or a speech may have its insincerities and contradictions unrevealed, but the defects of a social system—or of any one of its component parts—reverberate continually in the stomach or the pocket-book of most people. It cannot be denied, therefore, that each creed succeeds and spreads more or less in proportion to its power not only to satisfy human needs, desires and aspirations, but also in proportion to its fitness to integrate these forces of body and mind.

Each nation—and each age—coordinates human motivation in its own fashion because values, in their manifestation and experience, vary considerably: they do not appear the same to all people and at all times.

For instance, the natives of many South Seas islands used to depend, before they were absorbed into the civilized world, in a hundred different ways on their environment for maintenance of life; as a result, they interpreted values in terms of their surroundings. Being simple in mind and limited in knowledge, these children of nature could not help giving a concrete and somewhat crude embodiment to their religious judgments. Sea became the home of the god of the sea, wind was thought to obey orders from the god of the winds, and rains came or stayed away as the god of the rains happened to decide.

Throughout the ancient world the forces of nature were deified, not only in small primitive creeds, but even in big and highly organized ones. The gods of the sun and light—Ra of the Ancient Egypt, Dyeus (Zeus) of the Aryans, Ahura Mazda of the Persians, Perun of the Slavs, Amaterasu of the Japanese—symbolized human dependence on agriculture since the earliest days of civilized existence.

Naive and crude (in our eyes) as such beliefs may have been, the worship of deities, and of idols representing the divine powers in tangible shapes, served the primitive world not only as an adequate platform of explanation, justification and consolation, but also as a sound foundation for social standards of moral conduct. Such an approach to
religion was comparatively simple and possibly crude; yet as it invariably grew out of human needs and desires, it was surely a permissible response to central problems of existence and a way of conveniently integrating values of life, the familiar values of life.

Modern religions are, of course, more profound and abstract. They steadily replace all types of polytheism. Whereas primitive creeds make definite differentiation among the deities according to the locality they rule and the function they exercise, religions of today tend to break down these limitations and to extend Divine authority to all places, all times, all powers, even to regions controlled by people of other faiths. Multiplicity of gods is no longer required. One God suffices for every value of human concern. For God is, we say, ubiquitous, omnipotent, omniscient, all-wise, all-good, and the source of goodness, beauty and truth. Nor does he need any tangible representation.

Thus have arisen monotheistic religions capable of drawing upon a high civilization and the cumulative experience of many generations of men and women. Yet these new faiths, too, being as ever ways of integrating values of life, of life which has become rich in the extent and complexity of its social heritage, still retain fundamentally their old meaning; and this meaning will endure, we believe, as long as human beings inhabit our little planet. Astounding as the mastery of men over nature has become, human nature remains essentially the same. People’s valuations, individual and collective, changing though they are, still underlie every human faith.

All creeds and religions, “high” and “low,” ancient and modern, primitive and civilized, have a similar if not identical psychological core ever suggesting, urging, driving men to value, to praise and condemn, to admire and despise, to aspire and shun. And insofar as it is socially adequate for the integration of the values of life, this core underlies all religions. In its place and time, a creed grown spontaneously is definitely superior to a borrowed or imposed one, for it is an expression of the people’s own culture; otherwise religion and life will not cohere. Conditions of life and human beliefs have really one and the same root. The former cannot be changed apart from the latter, without doing harm. The two are, in fact, inseparable. When a social structure disintegrates, popular faith follows. And when a new strong system of unified beliefs comes into being, human attitudes as well as social institutions are bound to change accordingly.

III

There is a widespread contention that religious faith and the recognition of the supernatural go hand in hand. Some scholars, in fact, maintain that this is the only feature common to all religions and, therefore, their necessary foundation. They say, in effect, that “religions have always been based on the belief in the supernatural; hence they necessarily
imply it." In reply, we could point out that a similar argument could be constructed, at the time of Copernicus, stating that "science, having always been based on the belief in the centrality of the earth—with the sun and the planets and stars revolving round it—necessarily presupposes or implies the belief." But we can do better than that and cite instances of religions, such as Confucianism, as well as many philosophical systems including those of Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, which do not clearly assert any belief in the supernatural, as such. As the point is obviously debatable, however, it may be preferable to take a critical rather than a dogmatic approach to the problem and to ask: How true is this traditional opinion? Is a creed thinkable which discards everything supernatural and postulates that God, too, is an aspect of reality and, consequently, is committed to upholding the laws of nature?

Early religions were not, strictly speaking, doctrines, nor even statements of mystical faith: they were ways of life itself. They certainly were not confined to the worship of deities. They included morality, politics, science, art, entertainment, education, and economic interests, all blended into a code of customs. Crude and simple as it was, human existence was whole and meaningful. Economic life was in close contact with nature. Art expressed popular beliefs. Politics stood for conflict of interests within the community. Morality favored socially useful deeds and condemned socially harmful ones, even though the interpretation of what constituted usefulness and harmfulness must have been rather superficial. And science was magic.

Long before such concepts as the scientific method, a law of nature, or abstraction and generalization were comprehended or even considered, man read his fears and hopes into his surroundings; habits and occasional rationalizations controlled his thoughts. He was superstitious and, from the present-day point of view, highly ignorant. Far from being a materialist or mechanist, he felt that nature was alive—watching, plotting, threatening, revenging, rewarding. Everywhere he saw the manifestation of her animated forces. Science, as we understand it today, had no place at all in the mentality of the primitive man, while magic played an important role in it. And religion was, of course, inseparably bound with the supernatural.

Much water has flowed since those early days of mankind. Art has accumulated treasures of beauty and results of courageous experimentation in taste. Philosophy has opened a vista of reasoned out knowledge and potentiality of rationally organized society. Science has paved the way to technological wonders of power, efficiency and speed. The realm of the supernatural, on the other hand, so vast to the primitive mind, has been steadily losing ground. Not much of it still remains, yet men do not seem to dare to acknowledge the simple truth—that faith does not really presuppose the existence of the supernatural. There is no conceivable need for God to exclude Himself from nature, to defy His
own creation, or to contradict the established order of things. But the Church clings to the mysterious—to the “magic” of God—in the mistaken belief that faith transcends reality.

Let this simple truth be well understood: that the belief in the supernatural is neither lofty in itself nor essential to religion. It is merely a remnant of magic. It is an inheritance from the time when knowledge did not go much beyond primitive skills, when people relegated the meaning of natural phenomena to mystery and animism. What other account were they, mere savages, able to offer of thunderstorms, floods, earthquakes, or even of birth and death, change of seasons and weather?

Though the supernatural be but the remnant of magic, it is not likely to leave our minds without a desperate struggle. Traditions of faith are strong among men, after all. The day is perhaps gone when a thinker of Giordano Bruno’s magnitude could be put to death for no greater crime than loyalty to truth as against loyalty to prejudice. Nevertheless, much courage is needed even today to say openly and frankly that angels and devils belong properly with the fairies, elves, ogres, and dragons. In retrospect, some religious contentions seem naïve, almost incredible to a man of science. He has gained insight into many fallacious beliefs of the past. He knows, for instance, that heaven, in its imaginative sense, was nothing but a persistent myth according to which stars were holes in the sky, and light shone through them from the realm of bliss surrounding the gods. Saints and prophets could thus “ascend” to heaven alive. Similarly, “miracle” cures dated from the times when hysteria, with its false paralyses, anaesthesias, and fits, was not understood at all.

When superstition and magic are given up, faith will be seen to thrive on the natural, not on the supernatural. To be fully adapted to modern civilized conditions, it will have to become earthly, not heavenly. It will have to assume responsibility for promoting happiness in this life, not in the hereafter. It will have to teach peace and cooperation among human beings, not among ghosts.

We no longer believe in nature as the playground of the spirits. We no longer see her acting according to the whims of the gods and magicians. We have lost the habit of putting side by side both natural facts and supernatural events. Reality, we feel, has no duality: it is one. The arbitrary powers of magic have been supplanted, in the minds of educated persons at least, by strict laws of nature, and ordinary as well as extraordinary happenings are now regarded as similarly caused by changes and forces of the external world.

Thus, there exist no two kinds of varities, one discovered by close observation and reasoning, the other revealed by inspired faith: there is but one Truth. There are no two standards of good taste, ecclesiastic and secular; but only one Beauty. There are no two codes of ethics, sacred and profane; but only one ultimate morality for all.

Though it is inseparable from life, religion has a special function to
perform. It does not deal primarily with sensory phenomena, nor with intellectual notions. Rather, it deals with ultimate values, from the simplest interests in pleasure and personal health to the highest ideals of Goodness, Truth and Beauty. And availing itself of some basic principle—Love, Peace, Law, Cooperation, and, of course, Service to God—religion fulfills its earthly purpose by bringing unity into the variegated phases of daily existence.

Note this fact: in the years of its youthfulness and vigor each religion is likely to fill its adherents with the sense of intense meaning and unity. Thus early Christians thought their faith, felt their faith, acted their faith—in spite of many dangers and privations. The Hebrews, in the ages of prophets and again in the years of the worst persecutions of Judaism, were people intensely aware of their historical mission. And Arabs, originally obscure and ignorant nomads, rose to greatness and might when Mahomet and the Koran gave them something definite and lofty to live by and to strive for.

This is, then, the natural function of faith: to integrate human values—men’s knowledge, social hygiene, public conduct, ideals and hopes, aesthetic judgments, and whatever else people are justified to desire, individually and as a community. The liberating power of religion has always lain in realism, not in obscurantism. Worship of mystery, of anything unintelligible, can only enslave the human spirit.

IV

There once existed among tribes more religions than could possibly be enumerated. They differed in form, immediate purpose, and detail. There were serious reasons, to be sure, for these differences, for each creed had arisen as a result of unique conditions of life and a particular kind and level of culture. The main problem for each tribe was to survive. Religion, too, served that purpose.

As long as the tribes obeyed the law of natural selection and fought one another, their mode of living had to be largely competitive, built on the distinction between friend and enemy. But within each group, the principle of cooperation was always strictly enforced.

Life never stood still, however, whether one counted it in centuries or in years. As mankind began to emerge victorious over the animal world, population grew, except when an epidemic disease or some other natural disaster cut it down. Tribes extended their territory whenever they could. The rule of competition among smaller units steadily lost ground. Group success was increasingly turned to cooperation among neighbors. They spoke an identical or at least similar tongue, exchanged goods, intermarried, and possibly banded together in case of trouble. They became more and more mutually dependent. And so it went on and on. Tribes became nations, and some nations began to cultivate advancement and
application of learning, until finally there emerged what we know as the Civilization.

Now at last we face conditions in which ferocious rivalry is no longer imperative for the possession of sources of nourishment and other necessities of life. Only old habits of mind stand in the way of lasting peace. No matter how powerful, rich and enterprising we become, still there seems to be little serious appreciation of the advantages of peaceful and coordinated action on the part of mankind as a whole.

Although we are not yet sufficiently prepared, psychologically and socially, to abandon the ancient patterns of defensive or predatory organization, nevertheless the historical alternatives before us have become fairly clear: either humanity destroys itself or wins happiness and security on earth through the practice of rational co-operation. In the last analysis, mankind is truly one and, for its own sake, should act as one. Obstacles and trends dividing people into antagonistic groups must be effectively removed; among them, the blight of religious differences.

And why not? Religions may be many even today, but they all have sprung from one and the same source, the human urge to strive after what is considered as the better things of life. Each new creed, imperfect though it be, is but one more attempt to bring unity into existence. It is a step forward, a contribution.

Just as they have but one source, the religions of the world have but a single ultimate end: to achieve harmony in the minds of men and in the standards of social behavior. To that extent, all the multitude of creeds constitutes a single phenomenon.

Analogies may often be deceptive; but they are sometimes significant too. Thus, there are many sciences, each devoted to the study of a special field of knowledge; yet Science is but one search and achievement. There are many arts, differing according to the medium of expression; but they are all Art. Philosophy includes several areas of rational investigation, among them ethics and metaphysics, and also various systems of thoughts; yet it is on the whole but a single undertaking. Similarly, while its froms are many, Religion is essentially one. Let us then realize that all creeds, small and big, move along one and the same road; let us comprehend that all devout people are brethren in the same pursuit; let us acknowledge that it may be impossible to attain perpetual peace until the nations of the world learn to regard religion as unity in variety.

The function of religion among primitive as well as civilized people is simple enough: it is a question of mores and folkways. Social organization of any tribe or nation needs some definite means of control over the relations of man among themselves. Customs and taboos served that purpose among the primitives; government, laws, and various institutions serve the same purpose among ourselves. But all these familiar arrangements do not quite suffice. The outer social organization must be paralleled by an inner one—from within the human minds. That is where
religion comes in. To be influential at all, however, it must be able to satisfy people’s emotional needs: to give them a plausible and illuminating account of birth, life and death; to provide adequate rules of moral conduct; to determine the extent of personal rights and obligations; and, above all, to create a sense of belonging to the family, to the tribe or nation, to one’s own Church. And since such satisfactions are normally conditioned among people since early childhood, one learns to feel that apart from such ties one is truly an outcast.

An impious man is, consequently, lost in the world the meaning of which he is unable to share or even to estimate. Torn by discontent, he feels no peace: immersed in doubt, he knows no faith. Even science is of little avail to him, for whenever it comes across joy or anger, hope or despair, love or hatred, it has hardly anything to suggest by way of a simple and suitable explanation: it seeks and finds mainly bare facts, such as secretion of hormones and change of blood pressure, but leaves most value judgments utterly disregarded. Besides, the great majority of people are not intelligent enough, not enlightened enough, not informed enough to understand reality around them in scientific terms. Yet they are surely entitled to some meaningful interpretation of it as a condition of peace of mind, reasonable happiness, and choice of right action.

A pious man, on the other hand, feels a solid ground under his feet as far as his beliefs and behavior are concerned. No matter how learned or ignorant, he finds relief and consolation for sadness and misery: he keeps courage in adversity; he gains confidence from living among like-minded people. A religious life is, indeed, preferable to an irreligious life, insofar as valuations organized are better than valuations chaotic.

V

Today religion is on trial throughout the world. A superficial observer may even think that the ages of piety are passing, never to come back. If he identifies religion with superstition and blind dogma, he is probably right; at least we think so. The worship of the Divine is deeper, however, than superstition and stronger than dogma.

The truth is that religion, though in a temporary distress, has really nothing to worry about: the Churches have. All too frequently, the clergy behave as if religious verities have been established once and for all, never to be modified. They cling to the past as if all wisdom is to be found there and nowhere else; they minimize life by speaking of death as “eternal life.” But actually they are afraid of change, especially of change urged from without; they want living people to conform to the ancient authority of the Church, in its original teachings, while refusing to consider any change in the old ways.

Men are confused and depressed by the disunity of present-day social relations and by the disharmony within themselves; many of them feel utterly lost among the complexities of our modern civilization. Apart from
reason and faith they are unable to find any adequate unifying principle; all too frequently they live without any clear purpose, except perhaps for passing pleasures and excitements.

What do the Churches do to meet these vexing problems? The clergy seldom manifest an urge to alter their ways. Rather, they insist on pointing backward. They call for "obedient" faith willing to believe what one is unable to comprehend, and asking no embarrassing questions. And they secure such faith mainly from two kinds of people: from the "respectable citizens" and their families who feel that it pays to get along with the religious authorities, and from the simple-minded individuals seeking refuge from distress and helplessness in submission to what is respectable.

In the meantime most other folks just live their individual lives. Professional people, artists and technicians, businessmen and salesmen, laborers and farmers may be rather clear as to the specific aims of their own work; yet in following different roads and reaching after different, somewhat isolated goals, they are seldom able to understand and appreciate one another, to share interests, or to grasp the total meaning of events taking place all around them: they are preoccupied with their own affairs. And faith grows weak under these conditions.

Life cannot be made whole for anybody except when all kinds of value—happiness, security, health, truth, beauty, goodness, social order, to whatever degree they are attained—are bound together; except when life is organized in the light of some higher agency, abstract in itself or incorporated in a concrete medium.

Faith is this agency, regardless of what realistic principle it employs. Underneath its various appearances, it is neither the doctrine of a Church, nor an attitude of mind assumed temporarily in a house of worship. It is much more than a mere belief. Indeed, we can believe in all kinds of things; in omens and charms, in the evil eye and lucky personalities, in hard work and "taking it easy," in the importance or non-importance of education, in the merits of social connections and demerits of divorce. Beliefs are merely persistent opinions concerning something. But religious faith (faith as we interpret it here) gives us a much broader outlook on life, a "philosophy of life:" it provides us with a source and foundation of morality and a criterion of punishment and reward. It is something to uphold, something by which to be inspired. In other words, one's faith is truly the light of life: it is the sun of the inner world, shedding its rays on all things, things of wisdom as well as of pleasure, things private as well as common, things of work as well as of leisure.

Is it really surprising, then, that the religious organizations and doctrines which do not keep in step with social advancement, which become detached from reality, tend to weaken and eventually to die? As human interests, gain in strength, and multiply, religion, too, should grow and extend its influence. Its teachings are not, after all, just a set of traditions to be preserved in a casket, to be transplanted into foreign soils, to be
distorted by human selfishness and greed. To be fit, religion must be characterized by steady spiritual growth. For human devotion is connected by a vital bond, not so much with the past and future as with the ever-changing present.

VI

What is the distinction between two closely connected terms, "religion" and "faith"? It is clear, of course, that faith is, in each instance, private, personal. Religion, on the other hand, is a social phenomenon, a historical entity, with a name and a doctrine, of which individuals and generations of individuals partake.

But how can faith be private and at the same time constitute the core of a religion? It is certainly true that there is no religion, in an honorable sense of the word, without underlying faith. A man adhering to a creed for reasons of mere advantage or gain is a hypocrite; while men adhering to it by virtue of a long habit, personally developed or transmitted by family connections, are blind; and as such they constitute mere ballast, of no conspicuous advantage to their Church except perhaps for numbers and sheer weight of public opinion it controls. Profession of belief without sincerity is indeed of small benefit to any creed.

However, faith does not arise in a vacuum though perfectly private. It is also an expression of human nature, human needs, and human mores. Taken in thousands and millions, it reflects the period and the land, it is a cumulative shared reaction to a kind of life numerous people lead and a by-product of their typical yearnings and heartbreaks. Thus it becomes a significant social integration of the contemporaneous values of life. And that is what stimulates so many individuals to feel faith, each one somewhat differently. In this manner faith, as common experience, becomes the core of religion.

The core and the form of religion should always stand facing each other, reacting to each other, calling for mutual adjustment. Unfortunately, however, people are overwhelmingly passive. As a result, the form compels the core, though it ought to be the other way around.

Insofar as faith is personal, it belongs to living people actually exchanging thoughts, feelings and experience in general; faith is, at any time an expression of life as one sees it. But religion is considerably less flexible. In its doctrines and ritual, it is a heritage. It belongs more to the past than to the present, for it expresses beliefs formulated by earlier generations, sometimes centuries back, when people believed quite differently, when suitable assumptions passed for knowledge.

That is why most religions, even today, call for belief without question and complaint, for something distantly resembling the "voodoo" we elsewhere despise. Blind belief, with its occasional ecstasy and visions, was probably normal in the days of our distant forefathers. But we are
no longer ignorant or naively credulous as they unavoidably had to be, not to the same extent at least. Today we are increasingly groping toward a realistic, enlightened faith, a faith without delusions, with a minimum of assumptions, and compatible with the wealth of factual information and understanding our civilization has fruitfully assembled. Such faith, for all we know, can fulfill the demands of any age. If faith could endow religious people of the simpler and cruder times with considerable vitality and even with heroism, why should it not enable religious people of today to do at least as well?

As long as faith and religion are constructed on an endless pursuit of high ideals rather than on historical memories and dreams, as long as change for the better is welcomed rather than feared and shunned, nothing prevents them from working harmoniously together.
INDIAN THOUGHT AND
HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

There is a movement in the U.S. today whose members share a common set of convictions and concepts which, in many respects, parallel remarkably certain ideas found in Indian philosophy. Although this movement embraces a loose federation of thinkers, chiefly psychologists, it also includes philosophers, specialists in the field of religion, philosophical anthropologists, social and behavioral scientists other than psychologists, existential psychiatrists and educators and humanists of every vintage. It is frequently referred to as The Third Force in psychology and its posture has generally been described as that of a humanistic psychology. On the negative side it rejects or perhaps we should say, plays down three approaches to the study of man, which it regards as too limited to provide a full range of understanding of his behavior. The Third Force rejects (1) any overconfidence in the degree of understanding which can be supplied by the use of statistical methods applied to the study of man; (2) any type of behaviorism which hopes to give an account of man strictly in terms of stimulus-response theory when such theory proposes to neglect the rich and significant central processes which mediate human behavior; and (3) orthodox psychoanalysis and neo-Freudian innovations which (a) interpret human behavior strictly in terms of man’s animal-like and ego-centric impulses and (b) interpret all forms of self-transcendence and altruism in terms of such clinical mechanisms as sublimation or anti-cathexes of the superego. There are many parallelisms between the outlook of The Third Force and some of the basic postures in Indian thought, but because of limitations of space only a few of these will be taken up here.

1 Its official journal is called the Journal of Humanistic Psychology.
It would be equally difficult to enumerate all the concerns of The Third Force. However, let me furnish a reasonably substantial list of these here. Humanistic psychology is concerned with such phenomena as the following: the phenomenon of self-actualization where this refers to behavior whose aim is the fulfillment of one’s own potentialities and basic, human nature; the concept of self and the quest for personal identity; the phenomenon of alienation which, in the words of Taylor, refers to the fact that in a mechanical and depersonalized world man has an indefinable sense of loss; a sense that life...has become impoverished that men are somehow ‘deracinate and dispossessed,’ that society and human nature alike have been atomized, and hence mutilated, above all that men have been separated from whatever might give meaning to their work and their lives; and ego-extension which refers to the process by which the individual identifies with his fellow man, so as to enrich the quality and range of his consciousness. In addition humanistic psychologists are deeply concerned with the problem of values as these stem from man’s preoccupation with his role in Nature and Society; the phenomenon of autonomous rather than conditioned behavior in self-conscious man; the nature of Being to the degree that problems of ontology are relevant to an understanding of human behavior; and the many expressions of the religious impulse and the concept of love as Agape, as both of these are manifested in interpersonal relationships and with the objective of recalling to men the diverse forms of human love in much the same manner as Ortega y Gasset did. Finally there are also a series of concerns which have become the focus of attention for humanistic psychologists with which behavioral scientists in general are less familiar. Among these are investigations into the variety of expressions to which the creative impulse gives rise in human behavior; the meaning of cognitive and spiritual growth over and above the mere, passive accumulation of patterns of social conditioning; the ways in which psychological health can be defined so that the concept will have universal applicability; the notion of self-transcendence as behavior aimed at meeting the basic needs of others rather than one’s own needs; and the role of intuition in man’s ability to grasp unities in experience which have not been mediated by controlled, rational processes.

A number of figures have achieved prominence in connection with work along one or more of the lines just mentioned. Maslow has done considerable experimental work and theory construction with reference to the concept of self-actualization. The Josephsons have edited an outstanding volume on alienation. Fromm has done extensive research of his own on the effects of alienation on personal maladjustment, social pathology and the human drive to reduce alienation by group experiments with intentional communities. Dunn has devoted himself to the theory and measurement of high-level wellness or psychological health. May has performed a meritorious editing function on two volumes both of
which make succinct and clear the relationship of existentialism as a philosophical and literary movement to both psychology and psychiatry. Bruner has focussed attention on the relationship between the work of intuition and controlled, regulatory thought. In general a large volume of literature has been appearing in recent years—some from behavioral and social scientists, some from social philosophers, some from theologians and humanists—dealing with the concerns of a humanistic psychology and an existential psychology and psychiatry. It would take a bibliography of several hundred pages to begin to list the books and periodical literature along the lines of humanistic psychology, which reflect the varied concerns of The Third Force.

We shall, of course, make no attempt to describe the whole canvas of concerns of this group of thinkers. Instead we shall try to emphasize the similarity between certain central ideas in Indian thought and in general the first group of concerns of The Third Force, which were mentioned above. We shall begin by entering upon a brief discussion of the contrast between certain central concepts in Indian philosophy and some of the pathology of our Western way of life. Next we shall discuss those concepts and phenomena in the field of humanistic psychology, which, in our estimation, are similar in content and intent to those central concepts of Indian thought on which we choose to concentrate. Finally we shall try to point out the significance for each other, of these two groups of concepts and concerns.

II. SOME CENTRAL CONCEPTS OF INDIAN THOUGHT AS A CONTRAST TO THE WESTERN WAY OF LIFE

Indian philosophy can be credited with a cluster of concepts which are bound up with the achievement of personal unity and direction, the creation of a spiritual sense of balance, and the capacity for depth of identification with others. Central to these are such concepts as ahimsā which, though usually translated as love or non-violence, in the present context I prefer to translate as fellow feeling for all living things, embracing in its intent even an identification at times with the flow of life in inferior living forms. Also pertinent in this connection is the harmony which may be established between mind and body and between hands and brain. It is frequently argued in Indian philosophy that the achievement of these types of harmony is the concrete expression of a genuine religious impulse which, itself, is the manifestation of abhaya or freedom from fear. The achievement of ahimsā is the fruit of a conscious effort to achieve abhaya or the spiritual life. The achievement of abhaya, itself, demands first of all the rejection of all forms of māyā or secular illusion. There are many forms of the world’s illusions. However, one is not overcome by these when one has a great deal of awareness and sympathy and freedom and love, which are the fruits of abhaya and ahimsā. The individual who is
free in this sense does not suffer from inner conflicts and the resulting equanimity of soul frees him from mood swings between anger and depression. Under the sway of abhaya and ahimsā that individual is protected against what the West calls alienation. The most pathological form of alienation is alienation from one's true self atman or vital center. When the subject devotes his energies to the pursuit of the world's illusions he tends to identify his empirical self with his universal or true self. This universal self or atman can be hidden in from consciousness but it cannot be suppressed. According to Saṅkara this universal self is unaware of birth or death and is the basis of all knowledge, dreams and ecstasies. The atman, like the Freudian id, is pre-natal but not the source of the passions. Instead it is the source of the three major elements of spiritual experience, namely, the sense of the real, the presence of awareness and the extension of freedom. It is the unity of being, truth and freedom or sat-cit-ananda.

The alienated person, however, mistakes his empirical self for his true self. The former is the self which is the aggregate of his customary roles, the habits, aspirations, values, ideas, ideals, attitudes and sentiments which are the deposits of his culture, and those biogenic traits which are reinforced by the mutable and the accidental. This empirical self is incorporated into the trait profile of the psychologist and the role-playing behavior described by the sociologist. Speaking of this empirical self, Radhakrishnan says

"...It is a sort of psychological being that answers to our name, is reflected in the looking-glass (namarūpa), a number in statistical tables. It is subject to pleasure and pain, expands when praised, contracts when criticized, admires itself, and is lost in the masquerade....."

Curiously enough Western social psychology has recognized the same considerations which Radhakrishnan stresses but has done so favorably rather than critically. I am referring to Cooley's concept of the "looking-glass self." Cooley puts it this way

"In a very large and interesting class of cases the social reference takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one's self.....appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined by the attitude toward this attributed to that other mind. A social self of this sort might be called the reflected or looking-glass self.

"Each to each a looking-glass
Reflects the other that doth pass."

The self that is most important is a reflection, largely, from the minds of others.....We live on, cheerful, self-confident.....until in some rude hour we learn that we do not stand as well as we thought we did, that the image of us is tarnished. Perhaps we do something, quite naturally, that we find the social order is set against, or perhaps it is the ordinary course of our life that is not so well regarded as we supposed. At any rate, we find with a chill of terror that the world is cold and strange, and our self-esteem, self-confidence, and hope, being chiefly founded upon the opinions attributed to others, go down in the crash....."
Thus the looking-glass self turns out to be nothing more than the subject’s self-image which has been formed on the basis of perceiving how others react toward him.

The alienated subject, of course, is afflicted with māya when he mistakes the empirical self for atman. It is the equivalent of exiling ourselves from that spiritual consciousness which confers clarity and certainty of vision. In a sense it results from pride of intellect and the overemphasis on the cognitive functions in man. It results in error of all sorts, that is in a deformation of true knowledge or avidyā. This naturally leads to selfishness and selfishness in turn must be buoyed up by hundreds of other secular illusions. These myriad forms of māya deepen the sense of alienation from self and make it harder and harder as time goes on, for the subject to achieve self-definition or what existentialist philosophers call “authenticity.”

In the West the forms of māya which, resting on avidyā, produce alienation and inauthenticity are many. Certain expressions of these secular illusions must be emphasized at this point. There is the conviction that money is the mainspring of human motivation and that when the individual has enough of it with which to buy life’s playthings, the authentic self will have more and more opportunity to come forth. There are, of course, few follies and errors as great as this one. It is saddening in the industrial West to note the amount of effort which has gone into the development of wage-incentive systems which aim at increasing the motivation to work and earn money on the presupposition that this will free the individual for fuller, authentic self-development. This is the conviction that the pursuit of power is the most satisfying of all social goals, so that one’s energies are turned outward rather than inward and one prefers power over others to power over oneself. A deepening illusion of Western life is that our middle-class pursuit of “gracious living” is the most fruitful use which we can make of our leisure. Alienation of self is promoted daily by the common conviction that in work-situations and in stressful social contacts, role-playing is the best way to relate to others and a sure-fire guarantee to dissolve conflict. On the educational level our middlebrow culture prefers superficiality to meditation, flippancy to seriousness, and plausible commentary to the habit of taxing oneself intellectually. It is not through convictions such as this that self-identity will be achieved and alienation avoided.

The gift of life in the West is circumscribed for the average man and woman by these illusory themes. As a result it becomes increasingly difficult to establish a vital center, a source from which may spring our own capacity to create values and pour meaning into life. Such a source is needed as a psychological compass from which directions may be taken as crises in spiritual growth necessitate them. The absence of such a vital center makes one average person interchangeable with another, so that there is no genuine sense in which one can speak of the individual as a
vortex of psychic and social influence for others. Role-playing makes one the victim of social happenstance in which both one's values and one's behavior are the products of such accidents as the particular groups with which one happens to be affiliated.

Contrast these considerations with the Vedantic teaching that everything in life acquires its value only when it aids man to achieve spiritual perfection. Instead of the Western forms maya or illusion, the Vedantic ideal recognizes that human living has four fundamental forms of motivation, namely, artha, kama, dharma and moksha (moksha), concerned with man's vital interests and needs, his desires, his ethical and religious quests which are always self-transcending and his ultimate spiritual aim and destiny. This last motive, in a sense, simply and forthrightly recognized the need for an eschatology which was created by man, himself, and for himself as well as his fellow man. India's ancient thinkers sought to connect this theme with the conduct of life, itself. A bridge was therefore built from this quadripartite, Vedantic ideal to the conduct of life by means of an educational philosophy which stressed, as a corollary to the four fundamental motives of life, that life possessed four stages. The first of these stages set itself the task of preparing men for the Vedantic doctrine of motivation, itself. The second stressed a period of normal living to satisfy human desires and interests, in which the activities meant to satisfy these would be subject to tempering influences from ethics and religion. In the third stage men were to welcome a period of withdrawal, contemplation and spiritual purification. The final stage was concerned with readying the individual for the renunciation of life, for release into the spirit, all without regret and bitterness. In the West this would be described as "growing old gracefully."

Apart from the contrast of the Vedantic ideal with the materialistic concerns of the West, our Western forms of illusion directly violate this derivative, educational ideal in every way. In the West, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries like the U.S., children receive no education which would make them constantly preoccupied with the Socratic question "What is the good life?"—a question which would be bound up with the task of trying to furnish an answer, preferably one similar to the Vedantic ideal. The average, Western man behaves in a manner which suggests the complete reversal of Socrates, famous dictum "The unexamined life is not fit for human living." Western standards of behavior (it would be more accurate to say "the absence of Western standards of behavior") suggest that we firmly believe the examined life is not worth living. Anti-intellectualism and anti-educationism are certainly prominent attitudes in the makeup of many Americans. Our own best critical literature and social philosophy attest to this over and over again.

The second stage of the Vedantic, derivative educational ideal is violated continually in Western life. It is honored more in the breach than in the observance. There is no tempering of the selfishness which results
from avidyā. The quest for power is insatiable. The pursuit of sexual novelty and sexual themes is obsessive. The programs of our mass media uninteruptedly stress violence ad nauseam. The relation of man to man, whether that of employer and employee, contending political parties, or groups with conflicting economic, social and religious interests, are utterly untouched by even the mildest degree of satyāgraha. Ethical considerations and the religious impulse, as expressed in behavior, hardly exist at all. The precepts of morality tend to be verbal rather than discernible patterns of behavior. Religious ritual is mimetic rather than invested with emotional meaning for the participant. Western man, convinced that he must look after “number one”—since no one else will, he avers—becomes a monstrous vortex of egocentricity in which Hobbesian convictions come true and the passing scene convinces the thoughtful that it is, indeed, true that homo homini lupus.

In a country like the U. S. there is literally no consciousness of the importance for one’s growth of the third stage in the educational philosophy of Vedanta. In our accent on youth, in our chronic effort to deny that we grow old and that therefore our interests must change, we create our own unhappiness. We grow bitter when we are at last officially forced to recognize the fact that we are old. This bitterness is inescapable because in America this means a forced retirement and a forced idleness and consignment to the scrap heap insofar as social influence is concerned. There is a mehowness, or at least a widening of horizons, which come to many as they grow older and benefit from their experiences. Parochialism of vision is reduced by such an expansion of horizons; passions and egocentric concerns come to seem less important than they originally did. In many cultures age has meant a time of greater wisdom and this wisdom has been sought by the young. In the U. S. age indicates only that you are a “has been,” that you must make way for the more active young, that a newer generation must be allowed to pursue in untrammeled fashion, but perhaps in new ways, the goals which the older person can now recognize in many cases to have been illusions that were not worth a tinker’s damn.

As a result of this accent on youth, there is never a stage in which Western man seeks withdrawal, spiritual preparation and contemplation. These are not understood culturally and would be seen as evidences of unsociability and quirks of character. In this sense the themes of the aged are the themes of youth, although pursued at a slower tempo and with flagging energies. For this reason one cannot speak of the third stage at all, in the cultural-educational ideals of the West. The fact that men who hold political power in the West are older men, does not contradict this observation. They are older because they have worked longer to obtain and hold political power and community leadership. When it finally arrived, after patient apprenticeship, their best years were behind them. It takes time and organization to consolidate one’s power holdings and in
the process one grows old. But when one’s community leadership berth is secure, it is not because one has displayed greater wisdom than one’s fellow men. It is rather because of the time it took to reach the heights.

Finally, let us point out that the last stage is also a non-existent one in the West. People may wait for death but they do not prepare for it. They are, in fact, afraid to think about it. Recent existentialist studies of Western attitudes towards death, brought together in a volume edited by Feisel, show again and again how unprepared for it is Western man. The willingness to remember for substantial periods of time that death must come to all, would probably reduce or temper the follies we perpetrate in the quest for the world’s illusions. Renunciation, however, the willingness to let go old pursuits and interests for new ones, is utterly out of bounds for the psychological themes of Western man. So here too, in this fourth and final stage, spiritual stultification is the order of the day.

What then are some of the concerns of a humanistic psychology which essentially seeks to restore some of the wisdom of Indian thought and seeks to emphasize in part that educational philosophy which stems from the Vedanta ideals? Precisely what are the concerns of a humanistic psychology, which may result in teaching men how to cultivate the spiritual life and how to reduce the degree to which their behavior is motivated by the myriad expressions of māyā? Let us then turn to the answers to these questions.

III. SOME PARALLELS BETWEEN A HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY AND INDIAN THOUGHT

In the U. S. humanistic psychologists are preoccupied with the formulation of a body of descriptive theory, concepts, formulations, analyses and experimental studies all of which recognize the importance of abhaya in man’s estate. Their interest in the life of the spirit, however, is manifested without prejudice to their interest in his secular, behavioral repertoire which is, as academic psychologists would put it stimulus bound. In addition, they recognize that socially conditioned behavioral repertoires which work against the possibility of self-identity and self-fulfillment are aspects of māyā or illusion. In individual development it is recognized that there can be little which is as important as the quest for self-identity. In man’s social relations there can be nothing more important than a proper concern for the human condition. In large measure this involves an existentialist concern over and involvement with the plight of our fellow man. It involves a commitment to emphasize those conditions which produce for man justice, mercy, freedom, well-being, enlightenment, elimination of unnecessary anxiety, peace and the realization of many other cherished ideals which have been part of the Western humanistic heritage for over 2000 years. As a result humanistic psychologists are producing a body of literature which, in a sense, reflects the Western conceptual analogues of Indian thought and ideals. It will be of value
to deal briefly with some of these conceptual analogues as they are related to the four *ashramas* or stages of life. The material below will bring out, I believe, the degree to which the matters emphasized by the Third Force encourage the quest for *vidyā* or wisdom, *Buddhi* or enlightenment and the unity of these in *saccidananda*.

The Buddha taught that the empirical self is a composite of *samjñā* or perception, *vedāṇā* or feeling, *saṃskarās* or the thrusts of will, *vijñāna* or intelligence and *rūpa* or form. These are impermanent and when overwhelmed by *avidyā* or ignorance and *tanhnā* or selfish craving, a contact with one’s true self is impossible. Where the sense of self as firm and clear, action will follow which will help to unfold the self’s potentialities. When self-actualization is being successfully achieved the individual attains *prajñā* or wisdom and *karunā* or compassion. We shall see that the qualities of heart, mind and soul which define the self-actualizing person below, relate rather closely to some of these traditional concepts in Indian thought.

The concept of self-actualization is, of course, one of the central concepts of a humanistic psychology. Maslow 9 who has pioneered in research along these lines, has spelled out some of the characteristics of the self-actualizing person. This is the individual who is psychologically healthy, is well integrated, and who seeks to attain what most people would call good values—serenity, kindness, courage, knowledge, honesty, love, unselfishness and goodness. On the basis of his research, Maslow has isolated many of the objectively describable and measurable characteristics of the self-actualizing individual. These individuals are said to possess:

1. Clearer, more efficient perception of reality.
2. More openness to experience.
3. Increased integration, wholeness, and unity of the person.
4. Increased spontaneity, expressiveness; full functioning; aliveness.
5. A real self; a firm identity; autonomy; uniqueness.
6. Increased objectivity, detachment, transcendent of self.
8. Ability to fuse concreteness and abstractness, primary and secondary process cognition, etc.
10. Ability to love, etc.

These are also the individuals who report a feeling of *joie de vivre*, of happiness and euphoria, of serenity, joy and calmness, of responsibility and of confidence in their ability to handle stress, anxiety and personal problems. These are the people who are free from the negative reactions of *bhāva* and *himsā*—reactions which, in the language of psychology involve self-betrayal, fixation, regression, living by fear rather than by growth so as to be bogged down with anxiety, despair, boredom, inability to enjoy, intrinsic guilt, intrinsic shame, aimlessness, feelings of emptiness, of lack of identity, etc.

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Maslow finds that in fact most people tend towards self-actualization and that in principle, at least, all people are capable of it. All religions are expressions of human aspiration towards self-actualization. The characteristics of self-actualizing persons parallel at many points traditional religious ideals, e.g., the transcendence of self, the fusion of the true, the good and the beautiful, contributions to others, honesty and naturalness, the sacrificing of lower desires for higher ones, the easy differentiation between ends and means, the decrease of hostility, cruelty and destructiveness and the increase of friendliness, gentleness and kindness, etc.

Maslow finds that certain antinomies are resolved in self-actualizing people. They can unify impulses of Apollonian and Dionysian origins, they can strike a balance between the spirit of classicism, and romanticism, between the values of poetry and those of science, between reason and impulse, work and play, the verbal and the preverbal, the mature and the child-like, the masculine and feminine components of our natures and between growth and regression. Self-actualizing people find no contradictions between the needs and desires of the individual and those of society. They simply define a healthy collectivity as one in which all individuals are premitted to achieve self-actualization. In self-actualizing people the enjoyment of an experience, the impulse to achieve it and the desire for it, run together. These three are never at loggerheads in such people either in terms of an academic psychology of cognition, conation and sensation or in terms of a Freudian war between id, ego and superego. It is this unity, this concurrence which disintegrates when people become psychologically sick. Self-actualizing people are those who, on the whole, exhibit a drive to realize their potentialities for health, integration and growth.

There are other characteristics of self-actualizing people. They show resistance to enculturation, that is, they are their own decision-makers and they will make autonomous choices even if this leads to unpopularity. In spite of the fact that much of their time is devoted to self-development, self-actualizing persons possess a great deal of feeling for their fellow men. This is gemeinschaftsgfühl or a sense of responsibility concerning the needs of community. This is an unmistakable part of their motivation. Gemeinschaftsgfühl is promoted by what the psychologist, Allport, calls “ego-extension.” This is the capacity to identify with the values, attitudes, interests, sentiments, ideas and ideals, and levels of aspiration of other peoples separated in space and time from oneself. Being separated in time includes not only the capacity for identification with the greatness of mind and largeness of soul of figures long since dead. It also includes the capacity to identify with the ideas, ideals, values and goals of fictional characters who have been projected on the time line of the future as, for instance, the central characters of an imaginary, Utopian society. This latter type of identification in time is
equivalent to introjecting what an existentialist might be willing to describe as a social Becoming. The capacity for identification in future time is highly marked among self-actualizers. Gemeinschaftsgefühl, then, represents that type of social interest closest to the idea of universal fellowship and love which India's great historical figure, Asoka, sought.

Maslow also finds that more self-actualizers report "peak experiences" in their lives than do normal people. These are experiences closely akin to mystic experiences as described in the literature. Such experiences may occur in what Freud called the "oceanic experience" of sex, or they may occur in listening to music, reading poetry, looking at a landscape, in religious ecstasy, in the sense of having achieved deep communion with another, in the transports that sweep people together who have shared a moral victory of self-transcendence and in similar situations.

The concept of self-actualization, however, is not the only concern of a humanistic psychology. Third Force psychologists are deeply concerned with the phenomenon of alienation in all its forms. When men do not have a sure sense of the nature of their vital center, they are alienated from self. When men lose sight of their common needs, heritage and destiny, when they cease to be able to understand one another due to constricted ego-extension, when they have irrevocably lost the capacity to establish what Buber calls the "I and Thou" relationship, we then have the alienation of man from man. When the sexes lack any deep understanding of one another's psychology, we have another form of alienation. When the individual finds that he is unhappy over the themes with which his culture or society is preoccupied, then he can be said to be alienated from society. If one feels that the work one does yields no satisfaction, that the commodity produced is without meaning to the individual and without social worth, and if one feels that he cannot see the contribution that his labor makes to a commodity which is finally offered for exchange, then one is alienated from work. Where the individual has lost the sense of unity with other living forms, where he has lost what Schweitzer calls "reverence for life," where he has lost the capacity to be awed by the sights and sounds and processess of Nature and the ability to be swept up in a feeling of communion with all that is, then he may be said to be alienated from Nature. This sense of communion may come from a variety of experiences. It may, for instance, be the product of a moment of solitude on a mountain-top or may come as the result of the senses sweeping in everything which transpires about one in the atmosphere of a dense jungle in which one is alone. It is this sense of communion and continity with Nature, however, which is essential. Finally when one ceases to wonder how anything came to be, when one feels no nagging perplexity over the phenomenon of Becoming, one is alienated from God—from the mystery of Being. When one forgets the significance of the scholastic injunction Ex nihilo nihil fit," when one ceases to ask questions concerning the possible, moral evolution of man
and his destiny in the universe, and when one experiences no anguish
over human egocentricity and no impatience over the slow, human drive
towards transcendence of self, then the sense of alienation from God has
deepened beyond measure.

In the West there is a growing literature on the subject of alienation,
its forms, its courses and some suggestions as to its possible cure. A
variety of figures are deeply concerned with alienation. These include
humanistic psychologists, many sociologists concerned with the amel-
ioration of the human condition, with social justice and with institutional
reform, a large sprinkling of social philosophers, social critics, sensitive
literary representatives, existential philosophers, religious leaders con-
cerned with social action and innumerable others. All of these are con-
cerned with exploring the causes of alienation and describing its effects upon
individual motivation and social behavior. It can reasonably be said at
this time that there is common agreement on the causes of alienation.
Among these are the following.

The increasing bureaucratization of community effort, aided and
abetted by the growing impact of science and technology on our lives,
is destroying all the traditional values which cluster about the face-to-face
relationship, thereby promoting alienation between man and man. The
development in Western civilization, particularly in the quest for mobi-
licity within the framework of our industrial complexes, of what Fromm7
calls “the marketing orientation,” also makes its contribution to aliena-
tion. This is the posture which prompts one to sell one’s empirical self
or “personality” as derived from role-playing artifices, thus deepening
alienation from self. A chronic tendency to sell oneself in this sense
results in depersonalization in which people glory in making themselves
interchangeable with one another as a result of cultivating the same roles,
postures, habits, attitudes, sentiments, rituals and religious mimesis.
Dehumanization also contributes to alienation, where by this term we
refer to the effects on ourselves of egocentric impulses such as overween-
ing ambition, pride, material cupidity, lust, the pursuit of power, etc.
Dehumanization sets in when we conspire to obtain these by wounding
others, depriving them of their rights as human beings, ruthlessly destro-
ying their reputations, frustrating their needs and preventing them from
realizing their own potentialities. Dehumanization is also reflected when
individuals try to manipulate others as objects to serve one’s own ends,
when they chronically fail to assess the consequences of their imperious
behavior for others, when they remain indifferent to suffering which does
not touch them immediately, etc. Also contributing to alienation is what
the sociologist calls anomie, a sense of rootlessness in relation to all
groups with which one could conceivably be affiliated, a feeling that one
lacks any perspective by which to guide personal conduct, a sense of not
being involved with the age and its concerns and a deep ennui with the
themes which the Zeitgeist emphasizes. As a result of anomie the
individual is without standards of conduct, without guides to the relationship of man to man, confused as to one’s roles and functions, uncertain of what one wants to do.

There is a phenomenon which the mediaeval scholastics called accidie or spiritual sloth, which also contributes to alienation. This is the inability to close the gap between our professed altruistic ideals and our behavior. Accidie sometimes takes the form of being unable to galvanize enough energy and concern to carry out a resolve intended to promote our own welfare or that of others. Alienation in the West is also greatly enhanced by the phenomenon of “mass culture.” Perhaps the chief characteristic of mass culture is its abolition of standards of merit concerning matters of interest to sensitive men with a deep sense of the relative value of things. Popular American periodicals display this failing intensely. Life, will devote five of its pages to the love-life of a “sex kitten” and an equal number of pages to the nuclear discoveries of a famous physicist, leaving one with the impression that research on the structure of matter is almost as significant as the amours of an immature, self-centered girl. The same magazine will devote several pages to the accomplishments of a roller-skating horse and an equal number to a discussion of Renoir and his work—reproductions of which are spread out before the reader—leaving one with the distinct impression that Renoir was almost as intelligent as the horse. This inability to discriminate relative worth we call homogenization and homogenization deepens and widens the effects of alienation throughout all expressions of popular culture.

Finally alienation tends to be produced by the degradation of genuine and deeply felt aesthetic experience into a phenomenon known as kitsch—a phenomenon in which the mass media of communication specialize. This term has several meanings but the one which I have in mind in the present connection is one of the most important. Great art, that is, High Culture, has always conveyed its message and emotional impact by demanding that the reader, spectator or auditor work through for himself the emotional meanings, the messages and the sense of value intended by the artist. In High Culture the recipient has to assure himself that the artist’s symbolization, theme and purpose have been firmly grasped. Only in this way is catharsis achieved through irony or pity. In popular or denatured art, that is to say, in kitsch, all the aesthetic work is done for the reader, spectator or listener. The message is built into, rather than drawn out of, the product. The recipient is told what he is supposed to feel and think. The sweep of symbol and allegory are replaced by the visually concrete image. Intellectual depth is eliminated for an artificial simplicity of problem and confrontation to which social life is nowhere tangent. The consumer of mass culture must never be emotionally taxed, swept up in nuances and conflicts beyond his limited spiritual attention. He must be rendered unaware of complexity. If a classic is to be brought to his
attention via stage or screen or via a printed popularization, its meaning must be either explained in a corrupted and distorted fashion or it must be explained away entirely.

The means employed to reach a large audience require that the lowest common, human denominator be receptive and satisfied. To risk complex symbolization is to risk losing the audience. As a result many forms of mass or popular culture in the West banish the verbal symbol for the concrete illustration ("a picture is worth a thousand words" is the famous dictum of the Western tabloid), the interpretive gesture is supplanted by the obvious movement which avoids nuances of emotional significance and the speaker's racy phrase displaces description and understanding in depth. We are faced with a sort of Gresham's Law in aesthetics in which bad art drives out good art. The rapport between those who seek to convey a message in depth to an audience intent on receiving it via symbol, gesture and psychological subtlety, as in the Japanese Kabuki theatre, is rapidly disappearing from all forms of mass culture in the West. In mass culture artistic experience becomes effortless but as a result it also becomes denatured and meaningless. All of these unhappy forms of aesthetic degeneration are generically described as kitsch and kitsch provides popular culture with the means for deepening and widening alienation in all its forms.

Humanistic psychologists and their confreres are not only trying to analyze Western forms of alienation but they are also trying to determine the psychological processes by which such alienation succeeds in taking root. Above all they are greatly interested in the determination of methods by which the fund of alienation in our midst can be reversed, particularly as a result of the personal and social illusions which the Western way of life has increasingly added to human activities. In particular, many humanistic psychologists would like to see a revision of the educational processes by means of which one could look forward to more genuine self-actualization and the diminution of alienation. Such a revision will apparently have to be along the existentialist lines suggested by Vandenbergh. 17

Criticisms of those Western modes of life and thought which interfere with self-actualization and which promote alienation, involve concepts and themes which, in another terminology, constantly recur in Indian philosophy. Many of the roads to personal and social salvation, to be found among the eclectic sources of Indian philosophy, involve a stress on concepts and modes of existence which are analogous to some of the concepts and proposed revisions in the postures which men are urged to take in their fundamental personal and social relationships, that are stressed in a humanistic psychology. The Vedantic ideals and the educational stages which are their corollary, resemble in many ways the proposals for social reformation and the recommendations for psychological health which are among the major objectives to which The Third Force
is committed. The intentional and subjective bent of Indian philosophy is, of course, infinitely richer conceptually than that of humanistic psychology which is of relatively recent vintage. This is in part because Indian thought has dwelt on these matters for thousands of years and in part because it is the genius of the peoples of India to be more richly sensitive to the values of the inner life than peoples in the West. Among intellectuals in the West, the excessive emphasis on the logico-empirical tradition creates and organismic imbalance—an imbalance which is the precise opposite of what Radhakrishnan calls that "harmony, balance, perfect agreement between body and soul, between the hands and the brain, and *ahimsā* or love" which is the expression of *Abhaya* or the genuine religious impulse.

In my own humble opinion, the future of a humanistic psychology lies in its capacity to concern itself with two basic tasks. The first of these is to adopt all the nuances of the subjective life in which Indian thought has excelled, to adumbrate the needs for these in the West, and to translate this conceptual plethora from Indian philosophy, where possible, into concepts which will be appropriate for the type research which is conducted within the framework of the Western logico-empirical tradition. The second task will be to show that there are major areas of humanistic and spiritual concern which, precisely because they are subjective and untranslatable into logico-empirical forms, must be emphasized and justified because of the role these continue to play in human behavior and because of the significance which these inner processes and concerns have for the destiny of man. A humanistic psychology which undertakes such goals will automatically establish a reciprocity of influence which will be of profit to both lines of thought and endeavor. Indian philosophy will, no doubt, live to see much of its content validated by future events. Some of these events may prove to be confirmations of certain basic ideas, in scientific terms. Other validations may prove to be of a different nature—"pragmatic" in William James' original sense of the term as applied to the justification of religious experience—in which moral renovations in human behavior will have given substance to the main stream of Indian philosophical thought. At the same time we may yet live to see a science of psychology sufficiently modified to accommodate some of the insights of Indian philosophy. One such beneficial accommodation may prove to be the concession that there are subjective components of behavior—"centrally mediating factors in behavior," to use the jargon of the academicians—which are coequal in significance with the more publicly observable components with which academic research is engaged. By striking such a balance and admitting the necessity of both subjectivistic and objectivistic emphases, both modes of thought will stand to make some gain. At the same time—and more importantly—our understanding of man and the human condition will be enlarged. The major need today, in the world of ideas, is not so much the blending of what
C.P. Snow calls the two cultures but rather the recognition that they both are aspects of man which reflect a more basic ground of Being, namely, the religious impulse, itself, as manifested in history and social change as well as the development of science, itself. To the establishment of such a unity. Indian thought is a living monument, while a humanistic psychology still hopes to make a significant and lasting contribution.

REFERENCES

THE MYSTICAL HORIZONS
OF PERSONALITY

I

One of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan’s inestimable services to comparative religion has been his patient, fearless, and continued insistence on the value of mystical experiences. Many Occidental approaches to mysticism in the past seem to have had no warrant other than the presumption of the psychologist who could claim no mystical experiences as his own. Charbonier attributed mysticism to the derangement of the digestive apparatus. Murisier traced it to “simplification” and “monolideism” brought about by hypnotic and quasi-hypnotic states. Janet committed the clinician’s sin of going beyond his samples when he studied an ecstatic at the Salpetriere and concluded that she was a scrupuleuse who tended towards hysterical states and that, therefore, this may be true of all mystics. Henri Delacroix regarded the “subconscious” as the only acceptable scientific key to the study of great mystics without bothering to inquire whether this may be a case of explaining obscurum per obscurius. He claimed: "Une force que la Sainte appelle l’action divine, la grâce divine, et que la psychologie remène à l’activité subconsciente, règle désormais l’afflux imprévu et involontaire d’états riches et féconds qui lui apparaissent comme la réalisation progressive de la vie divine en elle." (Les Grands Mystiques Chrétiens, Paris, 1908, p. 10).

The analogy of mystical ecstasy to certain artificially induced mental states has become a commonplace of textbooks on the psychology of religion. William Brown described three such states. There is, in the first place, the indefinable exultation accompanying some sensory experiences, for example, listening to certain bars of music or stanzas of poetry.

* In this article I have tried to bring into focus what I have said elsewhere about the mystical experience and its ramifications. Some of my published papers on the subject are listed at the end of the article. I felt that I could not honour the distinguished President of India more than by taking up the challenge of mysticism.
Rhythmic muscular activity may induce a feeling of “at-one-ness” with nature. In the second place, we have the mental states produced by certain drugs and anaesthetics: alcohol, ether, chloroform, nitrous oxide, LSD–25, mescaline, hashish, etc., contributing, in suitably disposed subjects, to a conviction of having achieved a deeper insight into the universe. A not dissimilar condition, in the third place, can be excited by hypnosis or auto-hypnosis: consciousness seems to fade away into a “twilight state” where one’s individuality is no longer etched sharply against the background of familiar objects.

Recent research has concentrated on the possible correlation between the chemical structure of the hallucinogens and their pharmacological action. Mescal, d-lysergic acid, hashish, ibogaine, amanita pantherina, peyote (or anhelonium lewinir) and ololuqui have all been studied from this angle. Emphasis has been laid by some workers on the indole ring as a basic structure in serotonin, LSD–25, psilocybin, psilocin. Mescaline, however, does not have the indole ring. There is the obvious danger of over-simplification in these studies. A close analogue of LSD–25, 2-bromo lysergic acid, although physiologically potent, has no characteristic psychological effects. It is becoming evident that, in all hallucinogen-produced experiences, it is never the drug alone that is at work. The psychological effects vary according to the subject, his social and cultural setting. It has been even found that a person who is present when somebody is experiencing the effects of a hallucinogen behaves as if he too were swayed by the same influence. Dr. Humphry Osmond, sometime Superintendent of the Saskatchewan Hospital, after numerous experiments with hallucinogens, wrote: “Mr. Huxley believes, as I do, that what is disclosed when the brain is temporarily in abeyance, yet when awareness is still present, is means of learning more of our nature, at a time when we need desperately a scientific understanding of these matters”. The common denominator in various quasi-mystical states seems to be an altered set of relations to what we ordinarily regard as our solidly extended world in space and time. The title of Aldous Huxley’s well-known book was inspired by the poet, Black: “If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear to man as it is, infinite.”

Swami Vivekananda, one of the outstanding Indian religious teachers of modern times, noticed the slipperines of the term “mysticism” and warned against cheaper substitutes for the genuine experience. The lower neurotic or psychotic involvement in a quasi-mystical state may have its occasional therapeutic value. One of Flourney’s psychopathic patients achieved a quasi-mystical condition which comforted and strengthened her. There was an absolute certainty (certitude absolue de la réalité du Divin); ineffability or incommunicability (Les Mots ne sont pas faits pour décrire ce que j’ai éprouvé, ou subli, ou expériencé); an imperative character (conscience d’une autre réalité essentielle et immuable); and heightened personality (C’était à la fois une immensité et une intimité). Flourney showed that the subject’s “interior vision” (une voix tout intérieure) was
composite and built up from the idealized images of the parent, the suggestions of strength she received from the therapist, the shining examples of virtue absorbed by reading religious literature and faith in Jesus. The "presence" could not be summed up at will and, when it came, it was located generally on the left side and accompanied by a sense of well-being. Present day psychosomatic medicine points to the preponderance, in certain cases, of psychosomatic pains on the left side associated with a primitive unconscious symbolism of magic and feeling.

Although "anaesthetic" and "mescal" states may bear some resemblance to mystical states, it must be doubted whether the latter can be wholly assimilated to the former. The analogy of artistic production to schizophrenic drawing does not establish the identity of the two. The lives of Plotinus, Ghazâli and Sri Ramakrishna show abundantly that mystical experiences have wrought profound changes in human personality, notably in the ethico-social ends pursued by the subject. There seems to be no complete or convincing parallel to these changes in the history of hypnotism and drugs. With an authority like R. H. Thouless, one is inclined to coin some word like "deoverion" in speaking of the spiritually regenerating inner experiences of the mystics as distinguished from the progressive "introversion" of dementia praecox and allied states. "Deoverion" culminates in a sense of solidarity (loka-sangraha) for many great mystics, an unceasing toiling and labouring for others.

Silberer, in his Problems of Mysticism and Its Symbolism, pointed out how easy it is to confuse the mystic with the schizophrenic, on the one hand, and the self-seeking magician, on the other. The mystic cooperates with the Infinite; the magician tries to bend it to his selfish aims; the schizophrenic crumbles under its weight.

II

I suggest that, in any competent survey of mysticism, the significant role of "symbol" and "analogy" must be considered. When the mystics of the East and the West tell us that they have "seen" the Glory of God, "heard" the Celestial harmonies, "tasted" the Heavenly Manna, and "Thrilled" under the Divine Touch, it is easy to see that their language should not be taken literally. As Mgr. Albert Farges said: "Ce que nous avons, c'est une intuition immédiate, expérimentale de la présence du Dieu, qui a permis aux saints de dire que Dieu est vu, entendu, goûté, respiré et saisi dans une douce étreinte." The symbolism of "Divine Light" is subtle. As Landry pointed out, "La lumière divine... n'est pas l'objet que nous contemplons, mais le force qui pénétrant notre esprit, le transforme et le rend capable de voir." And of the symbol of "Flame", Gaston Etchegoyen said that it expresses the "most delicate nuances" as well as the "most violent effects" (Il en exprime les nuances les plus délicates et les effets les plus violents.)

I have written elsewhere on the profound mystical convergence in the symbolism of the "Divine Ocean". Sri Ramakrishna's experience of the
waves of the Divine Ocean which rolled over him and engulfed him is matched by the precept of St. Simeon in the Russian Dobrotolubie (Philokalia, translated by Kaldoubovsky and Palmer). The "New Theologian" testified: "When a man standing on sea-shore is on dry land, he can see and know and even encompass with his eyes the expanse of the sea. But if he begins to wade into the waters and plunge into them, the more deeply he enters, the less he sees what is outside." St. Catherine of Sienna declared that the soul has no being other than God. It is "like one who dives into the sea and is swimming under its waters. He neither sees nor touches anything save the waters of the sea..." The "Sea Pacific" was the Saint's favourite expression for the Godhead. "The soul is then in God, and God is in the soul as the fish is in the sea and the sea in the fish." The great Rumi taught: "Whoever has seen God is divine, whoever has seen that sea is a fish."

Devoted scholars have made important contributions to our understanding of mystical symbolism. The languages of "pilgrimage", "romance" and "transubstantiation" were disentangled by Evelyn Underhill. The "literal", "allegorical", "tropical" and "anagogic" approaches were unfolded by H. F. Dunbar. The studies of Celtic myths and Arthurian romances by R. S. Loomis, J. L. Weston, L. A. Fisher, A. E. Waite, and V. D. Scudder, have shown how complex the Grail legends really are, how the pagan anacna were gradually overlaid with nuances derived from the Christian tradition investing the veiled symbolism of initiation in the Grail castle with a deeper significance. Expounding the theory of Sinumbild, Jung wrote: "In itself any scientific theory, no matter how subtle, has, I think, less value from the standpoint of psychological truth than the religious dogma, for the simple reason that a theory is necessarily highly abstract and exclusively rational, whereas the dogma expresses an irrationality entirely through the image. The method guarantees a much better understanding of an irrational fact such as the psyche." Even psychoanalysts who have censured Jung for his over-estimation of religion and mysticism show signs of thawing. Jan Ehrenwald, in his New Dimensions of Deep Analysis, has said: "Lao-tse, the Chinese mystic of the seventh century B. C., raises his voice in favour of 'Wu Wei of 'deeds without action' while the Hindu philosopher of the same period praises the virtue of full renunciation of worldly desires, a doctrine which is still reflected in Gandhi's precept of non-violence....Clearly, the resemblance to Freud's precept of asking for the passivity of the analyst cannot be accidental."

III

On numerous occasions elsewhere, I have pleaded for a sympathetic consideration of various "paranormal" or "parapsychological" episodes interwoven with the lives of great mystics. It is usual, even in India, to pontificate on the mystical disparagement of "supernormal powers" or siddhis. The apologist tends to forget that he is not himself a mystic. Roger Bastide, in an otherwise admirable treatment of mysticism, opined
that the "mystical graces" (locutions, visions, etc.) have no practical or religious value and probably have a "neuropathic origin". E. Herman seemed unable to achieve anything more than a tolerance of the "paranormal" in the lives of mystics. Evelyn Underhill magnified the "discord between the occult and the mystical ideals." The great mystic does not, of course, advertise the "supernormal" but subordinates it to a mission of service and healing. St. Catherine of Siena was often aware of the thoughts and deeds of her "absent children". When the wayward aristocratic Francesco di Vanni Malavolti lapsed into a secret sin, she called him to penitence: "Dost thou think to hide from me that thou hast just now done so and so?" St. John of the Cross, who had an absolute aversion for all exterior phenomena like levitations and stigmata, is said to have had an insight into the unconfessed sins of others and with his advice often saved them from temptation and turned them to the right path. St. Seraphim of Sarov would receive a number of letters from persons needing spiritual consolation and advice and often answered them without opening and reading the letters. When the sixteen-year old Rakhal was brought before Sri Ramakrishna for the first time, the Master recognized the boy from a vision he had a few minutes before the physical encounter. The Sadhu Sundar Singh, in an ecstatic state, "saw" the phantom of a man with a radiant face approaching him. The phantom seemed to speak: "I was in a Leper Asylum which you visited. I left that body and entered into this life on February 22, 1908." The Sadhu instantly recognized the man and later verified the fact. The man had died on the day and at the place mentioned in the "vision."

Gardner Murphy has suggested that the mystical and the paranormal may be alternative ways of communication appearing together in some persons and tending to be mutually exclusive in other persons. Even so, the references to the paranormal in all mystical literature are unmistakable. R. A. Nicholson, in his Studies in Islamic Mysticism, refers not only to clairvoyance (firâsa) in the lives of Muslim saints, but numerous telepathic incidents. Says he: "That Mohammedan saints have often been thought-readers seems to me beyond question, whatever doubts one may entertain as to a great part of the evidence present in their legends." Dr. Radhakrishnan, in his Indian Philosophy, dwelt on the Jaina avadhî (clairvoyance) and manahparyâya (telepathy). It is encouraging to find that Jaina psychology is studied by recent workers from this angle. Even for the austere student of mysticism who disdains the miraculous, the study of the "paranormal" has a heuristic value in a highly mechanized world. Gardner Murphy wrote: "The moral effect of psychical research in breaking down classical dogmatism regarding the limitations of the human personality to the world of its senses is beginning to be glimpsed here and there." I have remarked elsewhere that Indian philosophical psychology which looks at the psyche from within and reports on various introspectable and super-introspectable states finds its counterpart in the
classical (pre-communist) Russian ontologism. S. L. Frank, writing from this standpoint, said that Russian psychology finds in man "a universe, a cosmos in itself, which has unfathomable depths and lives according to its own laws, impossible and meaningless in the empirical outer world, but here obviously dominant."

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Papers by: C. T. K. Chari
Actualite de la
Declaration des droits de l'homme

Lors de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, le 10 décembre 1948, un grand nombre d’hommes publics et de chefs ouvriers prétendaient que ce document procédait d’un geste caractéristique de notre époque. Ils tentèrent de l’expliquer par le degré de maturité auquel était parvenue la conscience humaine, par l’élargissement de ses horizons matériels et spirituels, par son souci de franchir du regard les frontières géographiques et culturelles et d’envisager les événements et les choses sous l’angle planétaire.

Pour faire la part de vérité et d’erreur contenue dans ces vues, il convient de noter qu’il y a dans la Déclaration deux aspects très distincts: on y trouve, premièrement, la reconnaissance à l’homme considéré comme tel, c’est-a-dire comme être pensant et libre, de droits inviolables, inaliénables; on y trouve, en second lieu, l’universalité, de cette reconnaissance, c’est-a-dire l’adhésion générale, commune, des groupements humains aux principes et aux doctrines philosophiques qui sous-tendent cette déclaration, qui lui confèrent signification et vigueur, qui l’élèvent même au rang de norme impériale et universelle. C’est à l’examen de ces deux aspects que sera consacrée cette brève étude.

Les droits de l’homme, il va sans dire, portent sur ce qui lui est du à son titre même d’homme, en raison de sa dignité, en raison de l’excellence de sa nature, en raison aussi du destin personnel qui lui est dévolu. Ils sont déterminables et adaptables par le droit positif, cependant que, considérés dans leur généralité, ils soient partout et toujours identiques a eux-mêmes, sans égards au milieu et aux circonstances historiques. Apanages de la nature humaine, ils ont la même origine qu’elle; et c’est cet
aspect qui a tout d’abord retenu l’attention des philosophes et des écrivains. C’est ainsi que Platon attribue une origine divine non seulement à la nature de l’homme, mais aussi à la loi qui le régit. De même, le drame d’Antigone résulte du conflit qu’elle découvre entre les lois écrites et celles que Dieu a gravées au coeur de l’homme. Sophocle lui fait répliquer à Créon: “Je ne croyais pas que ton édit eut assez de force pour donner à un être mortel le pouvoir d’enfreindre les droits divins, qui n’ont jamais été écrits et qui sont immuables: ce n’est pas d’aujourd’hui ni d’hier qu’ils existent; ils sont éternels et personne ne sait a quel passé ils remontent” (453-458). Et qui dira jamais depuis quand flottait dans l’air cette croyance en des lois non écrites et supérieures à celles que promulgent les hommes?

Aristote, dans ses Ethiques, a canalisé cette croyance et l’a élevée au rang d’un principe philosophique et juridique. Antérieurement au droit institué par les hommes, pense-t-il, il y a une justice et un droit qui sont naturels; et il les caractérise par le fait qu’ils ont partout la même force et qu’ils ne doivent pas leur existence à ce que les hommes pensent a un endroit ou à l’autre”, vu que ce qui est par nature est immuable et accuse partout la même vigueur. (1134 b 18 et ss.). Ce qui revient à dire qu’il y a des droits qui échoient à l’homme par naissance, en vertu des exigences de sa nature et que, dans leur impassibilité sereine, ils sont indépendants des constitutions politiques et des systèmes juridiques qui en découlent. Ce qui n’autorise pas toutefois a penser qu’il sous-estime le droit positif.

Tel ne fut cependant pas le cas de ces grands champions des droits de l’homme que furent les Stoïciens. Exception faite de Cicéron, qui, sur ce point, déploya toutes les ressources de son art pour renforcer, amplifier et magnifier la pensée d’Aristote, ils ne manifestèrent que mépris pour les institutions juridiques humaines. Se proclamant, comme Socrate, citoyens du monde, ils enseignaient que toutes les démarcations politiques, que toutes les frontières géographiques, que toutes les formes de pouvoir, que tous les clivages sociaux, étaient des produits de l’arbitraire, étaient des échafaudages artificiels: autant vaut dire des créations contre nature. Au nom de la dignité de l’homme, au nom de ses droits imprescriptibles, au nom de l’ordre éternel qu’il porte en reflets dans son esprit et son coeur, ils condamnaient les régimes politiques, les classes sociales et le règne de l’esclavage. L’idéal dont ils rêvaient était que toute entrave a l’exercice et au rayonnement des droits de l’homme fut bannie de la communauté humaine. Ce qui donnait a leur philosophie, si inconsistante par ailleurs, une certaine allure de grandeur.

Les Pères de l’Église des premiers siècles dont la pensée fut plus ou moins teintée par les écrits des moralistes stociens, en particulier par ceux de Sénèque, de Marc-Aurèle, de Macrobre et d’Épicuré, furent impressionnés par les correspondances qu’ils découvraient entre leur enseignement sur les manifestations de l’ordre éternel et ceux de la Sainte
Ecriture, notamment le signatum est super nos lunem vultus tu Domine : Seigneur, nous portons en nous le scellé de ton visage, notamment encore le contenu du passage de saint Paul ou il est dit que les païens "montrèrent par les jugements qu’ils portent la réalité de la loi inscrite en leur cœur" (Rom., 2, 15). Aussi n’enseignaient-ils pas seulement l’universalité de l’Évangile, mais encore celle des lois qui éclairent la conscience de tout homme venant en ce monde. Sans partager le mépris des Stoïciens pour les institutions humaines, ils les considéraient comme issues de la coutume et de la convention et en condamnèrent quelques-unes comme injustes, celle en particulier de l’esclavage.

Mais l’écrivain païen dont l’influence a été incontestablement la plus décisive sur la pensée de certains Pères de l’Église et sur celle de tout le moyen âge fut, hors doute, Cicéron. Le premier, il a intégré le droit naturel au droit romain et a la civilisation occidentale. Son autorité est invoquée peut-être plus souvent que celle de Varron dans la Cité de Dieu de saint Augustin et, quelques siècles plus tard, les formules lourdes d’expérience et de sagesse dont il possédait le secret, servirent à émailler les longs traités de la justice et ed la loi de Thomas d’Aquin. Par conséquent, dès lors qu’on est au fait de l’admiration qu’avait l’Aquinate pour Aristote, Cicéron et saint Augustin, on n’est pas étonné de rencontrer en sa personne le maitre surpassé des droits de l’homme. Le premier, il construit un ton et systématique traité des droits qui appartiennent à l’être pensant en vertu même de son essence, en raison des attributs spirituels de sa nature, en raison surtout des fins transcendantes dont il s’accuse capable. Ce n’est ni une déclaration ni une charte, mais mieux qu’une déclaration et une charte : un vaste édifice solidement assis sur des principes humanistes, un édifice dont les lignes maitresses ont été inspirées par une intuition de la grandeur de l’homme une intuition dont on ignore, comme le déclarait ingénument Antigone, a quel passé elle remonte.

Ce ne sont pas toutefois les philosophes et les théologiens qui ont le plus contribué à la diffusion du droit naturel ; ce sont surtout des hommes de loi : les civilistes et les canonistes ; ce sont aussi, mais plus tard, les théoriciens de la politique. Cette diffusion se fit sous les auspices du droit romain, lequel était, depuis Cicéron, axé tout entier sur le droit naturel.

Après sa codification par Justinien, le droit romain connut en effet, tant en orient qu’en occident, une expansion quasi universelle. Il contribua tout d’abord à établir la renommée des universités d’Italie, de celles de Padoue et de Bologne en particulier, et par le truchement des grands maîtres qui allèrent chez celles ci chercher leur formation, il gagna toute l’Europe. Il pénétra dans les universités et les tribunaux d’Espagne, de France, d’Allemagne, et même d’Angleterre. "It is no exaggeration to say, écrit A.P. d’Entrèves, that, next to the Bible, no book has left a deeper mark upon the history of mankind than Corpus juris civilis" (Natural Law, London, 1951, p. 17. Publié en 534, le Corpus juris civilis comprend : 1° les Institutes, 2° le Digeste, 3° le Code, 4° les Novelles.
Pour ce qui est de l’Angleterre, elle fut loin d’échapper, en dépit de son isolement géographique, à la puissance de rayonnement du droit romain. Les recherches historiques récentes ont tendance à corriger sous ce rapport celles du passé; on découvre sans cesse de nouvelles sources d’influence. Comme toutes les parties de l’Europe continentale, ce pays fut évangelisé par des moines dont la science avait été tirée du fond de culture commun aux chrétiens d’Occident. Au surplus, cette immigration s’est prolongée; elle s’est même étendue aux juristes et aux hommes de loi. François Acquise, fils, qui enseigna à Oxford (1273), eut une grande influence sur la jeunesse étudiante; et il n’est pas téméraire de penser que les œuvres de son père servirent d’instrument à la formation de ses disciples. (1)On trouvera dans notre ouvrage Le Droit et les droits de l’homme (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1960) une documentation assez abondante sur l’expansion du droit naturel en Occident.

Plus tot, Hubert Walter, auteur présumé de cette compilation publiée autour de 1188 et universellement connu sous le nom de Glanvil, avait, lui aussi, subi l’empreinte du droit romain. De plus en plus, l’on croit, ainsi que quelques-uns le prétendent, qu’il était un clerc; de toute façon, il avait certainement pris connaissance du Jus Civile et des lois ecclésiastiques. Presque un siècle plus tard, Bracton, dont l’influence fut si décisive sur ce vaste et original système que représente la Common Law qu’on n’a pas hésité à reconnaître qu’il en fut davantage le créateur que le commentateur, était, dit-on, un personnage ecclésiastique. Il avait étudié le droit canonique après les réformes préconisées par le Décret de Gratien et il possédait une connaissance plus que commune du Corpus Juris Civilis. Il s’était aussi pénétré des discussions contenues dans la Summa Codicis du professeur de Bologne et de Montpellier, Azon. Et il va sans dire qu’une telle formation lui a permis d’introduire dans le système juridique de l’Angleterre d’alors plusieurs éléments nouveaux. Il le dota d’une terminologie empruntée au droit romain; il en renforça l’unité et la logique en comblant les lacunes qu’il accusait; surtout, il l’enrichit de nombreuses définitions provenant de jurisconsultes romains et se trouva par la même a l’assoir sur les principes traditionnels impliqués en ces définitions. Et, sitot qu’on a admis, ne fut-ce qu’implicite-ment, les principes d’un droit, il est bien illusoire de penser qu’on s’est dérobé complètement a son influence.


En 1461, Sir John Fortescue, qui se complaisait dans les parallélies entre le droit romain et la Common Law, écrivait sur le droit naturel un

Un autre professeur bien connu fut l’Italien Alberico Gentili (1552-1608). Ses principaux ouvrages, édités dans *The Classics of International Law*, nous permettent de constater qu’il appartenait à l’École des Commentateurs; il a même dans plusieurs de ses écrits, pris ouvertement parti pour la conception idéaliste des Bartolistes ou Commentateurs. A partir de 1587, il enseigna le droit civil à Oxford. Comme internationaliste, il fut l’un des continuateurs de François de Victoria et de Suarez. Ses deux principaux ouvrages, le *De Jure Belli* (1588-1589) et *le Hispanceae Advocationis* (notes rédigées entre 1605 et 1608 et éditées en 1613) renvoient souvent à de Vitoria, qu’ils qualifient de grand savant; *Doctissimus Victoria*.

Gentili fut aussi l’un des précurseurs de Grotius et il est probable qu’il fut l’un de ses inspirateurs. Les deux ont au moins de commun qu’ils confondent la loi éternelle avec la loi divine, laquelle, on le sait, est révélée, positive et temporelle. Ce qui entraîne comme conséquence la difficulté, pour ne pas dire l’impossibilité, de distinguer le plan philosophique du domaine théologique.

Pour ce qui est des idées mises en œuvre par Gentili, il est superflu de faire observer qu’il contribua, lui aussi, à titre de civiliste, à répandre en Angleterre la connaissance du droit romain. Même dans le *De Jure Belli*, il ne manque pas une occasion d’y faire appel: *erunt justinianei civilis nec paucu, quae optari valebunt*.

Il faut surtout mentionner qu’il fut imbu de l’idéologie philosophique intégrée à ce droit. Par exemple, il était persuadé que dans le domaine juridique, la seule base qui soit valable est celle qu’offre le droit naturel. Il ne se soucia cependant pas de le définir autrement que par des formules empruntées des auteurs anciens et de ses fondateurs: *nobilis praebeat multum luminis definitiones. quas unanimiter tradunt ad jus hoc, quod quaerimus gentium, auctores illi legum nostrarum, et conditores. Aiunt autem, jus esse gentium, quo gentes humanae utuntur; quod rationalis ratio inter homines constituit, et apud omnes paraeque custoditur. Hoc jus naturae est, "Jure consensio omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est"* (Cic., *I Tusci*). Il ne se préoccupa pas davantage d’en établir les fondements métaphysiques; il s’engagea plutôt dans une longue et savante preuve d’autorité et il mit à la bâtir une erudition et une patience qui trahissent l’importance primordiale qu’il accordait à ce droit dans l’édification de son oeuvre. A
peu près tous les textes connus du Digeste, des Institutes, du Code, de Platon, d’Aristote, de Cicéron, de Sénèque et de combien d’autres auteurs anciens y passent. Non seulement il veut montrer la valeur inaltérable du droit naturel, mais il apporte a lever les objections qu’on a soulevée s contre lui une ingéniosité et un a-propos remarquables.

Enfin, comme a son époque les incidents dans les relations internationales étaient devenus très nombreux il en discute longuement, soulignant les torts et les droits de chacun. C’est ainsi qu’il se prononce sur les positions prises par Jean Bodin, Pierre Fabre, François de Vitoria, Hugues Doneau et une multitude d’autres. Il justifie toujours les sènes par le recours a la doctrine du droit naturel. De sorte que l’œuvre d’Alberico Gentili prend dans son ensemble le caractère d’un apport fortement conditionné par le droit romain et par la philosophie du droit naturel.

Faut-il ajouter que le droit romain avait réussi a pénétrer en Angleterre par plusieurs autres intermédiaires. Ainsi, les techniciens anglais reconnaissent volontiers que leurs doctrines sur le droit corporatif renferment des emprunts appréciables aux enseignements de l’Italien Bartole. Et combien d’autres traces dont il nous est impossible de mesurer la profondeur et l’importance, un romaniste attentif pourrait relever ! Il est donc vraisemblable que Jacques Ier rencontrait l’opinion accréditée dans son royaume lorsque, dans un discours prononcé au Parlement le 20 mars 1609, il proclamait ouvertement sa grande admiration du droit romain et affirmait le considérer comme l’authentique loi des nations : lex gentium.

Bien que, d’une part, les juristes anglais du passé aient été peu enclins a la spéculation philosophique (C’est le reproche que leur souvent Holdsworth dans History of English Law.), bien qu’ils n’aient pas été tout a fait séduits par le droit civil romain, bien que, d’autre part, les historiens du droit anglais aient mis en général davantage l’accent sur l’originalité et sur le caractère indigène de leur système juridique que sur ses emprunts, il semble qu’il serait possible, en s’appuyant sur les historiens du dernier quart de siècle, de faire voir que leur systématisation a été marquée plus qu’on ne le pense communément par la spéculation juridique des universités continentales. Il semble qu’il est inévitable qu’un enseignement si constant et si prolongé de la lex civilis dans des universités de l’importance de celles d’Oxford et de Cambridge même si ce ne fut souvent qu’a titre d’instrumentation intellectuelle, n’ait pas laissé des traces nombreuses dans le contenu de la pensée.

l'intermédiaire de Barthole, de Jacques du Moulin et de Jean Bodin, jusqu'au XVIIe siècle. Cette Ecole, s'inspirant de Thomas d'Aquin, s'est en quelque sorte donné comme mission d'intégrer les grands principes du droit naturel à l'énorme capital de spéculations savantes accumulées depuis plus d'un millénaire par les juristes romanistes, publicistes et civilistes.

D'autre part, si l'on considère que, en marge de ce courant de pensée issu du moyen âge, il en existait un autre, tirant celui-la ses origines de la Renaissance et dont l'intention première était de situer en l'homme le pole de l'existence, on ne sera pas surpris d'apprendre que les XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles aient eu, eux aussi, leur école de droit naturel école assez philosophiquement pauvre, mais féconde, s'il en fut une, des prêrogatives et des libertés de l'homme. Des noms comme ceux de Grotius, de Puffendorff, de Thomasius et de Montesquieu donnent une idée de l'influence considérable qu'elle connut dans les milieux juridiques et politiques du temps. Elle contribua à répandre une notion individualiste et libérale du droit.

Il n'y eut pas que les juristes, il y eut aussi les théoriciens de la politique qui contribuèrent à propager l'idée de droit naturel. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, par exemple, alla jusqu'à rédiger une charte des droits de l'homme. Elle fut, en substance, intégrée, a titre de préambule, dans un grand nombre de constitutions : celle de la France, celle des États-Unis et celles de plusieurs autres pays. Ce sont probablement ces exemples qui donnèrent à l'assemblée générale des Nations-Unies, alors qu'elle se préoccupait de chercher une base à l'unité humaine, l'idée de rédiger et de faire accepter par tous les pays membres une Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme.

Ces considérations, a la fois trop sommaires et trop longues, suffisent à démontrer que l'idée de reconnaître à l'homme, en vertu même de son statut d'homme, des droits inaliénables, n'est pas nouvelle. Pour employer de nouveau l'expression de Sophocle, "on ne sait a quel passé elle remonte". Il nous reste donc à répondre à la seconde question, à savoir si la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme rencontre l'assentiment de tous les hommes. Est-elle un symbole de ralliement ou un signe de contradiction ?

Dans sa propre "Déclaration" du 12 octobre 1929, l'Institute du droit international affirme entre autres choses "que les déclarations des droits, inscrites dans un grand nombre de constitutions et notamment dans la constitution américaine et française de la fin du XVIIIe siècle, n'ont pas seulement statué pour le citoyen, mais pour l'homme", et que, par conséquent, elles s'appliquent "à toute personne sans distinction de race, de couleur et de nationalité". Et je pense que tel est le sentiment commun des peuples, pour ne pas dire des masses, en regard de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme. Il paraît indubitable que l'homme moyen, "l'homme de la rue", l'homme de peine, a quelque pays
qu'il appartienne, croit a la possibilité de la liberté, de la justice, de l'ordre et de la paix et qu'il aspire sincèrement a leur avènement. En conséquence, il voit dans la charte des droits de l'homme un nouveau pas vers la réalisation d'un idéal qu'il hérité secrètement.

Quant aux Etats et aux hommes politiques qui les représentent, il ne semble pas téméraire de penser qu'une bonne proportion d'entre eux ont accordé une adhésion sincère aux principes de la Déclaration. Il demeure toutefois que pour un certain nombre, cette adhésion ne fut que politique. Se souciant moins de respecter les principes que de faire monter d'esprit de collaboration, ils ont feint de l'accepter, quitte a s'en prévaloir contre les autres quand cela ferait leur affaire. Toutefois, la charte est dressée devant eux et, grâce au prestige de l'autorité dont elle est investie, elle barre, du moins en principe, la route a l'arbitraire et a la tyrannie.

C'est surtout pour les intellectuels et les philosophes que la Déclaration des droits de l'homme constituait un véritable signe de contradiction. Un grand nombre d'entre eux se résignèrent difficilement a l'accepter. On peut ranger en trois catégories ceux qui tentèrent, souvent avec la meilleure intention, d'en ruiner la base. Les premiers seraient ce que j'appellerai les intransigeants ou les absolutistes; les seconds seraient les utopistes et les troisièmes, les positivistes.

Dans notre ère de science, où le langage est la mathématique, il ne manque pas d'esprits géométriques, il ne manque pas de gens qui voudraient juger de tout avec la rigueur qui caractérise l'univers des nombres et des figures. Ils pensent qu'il leur suffit de pouvoir dépister quelques cas d'exception a une règle ou a une loi, pour en infirmer la validité et pour se déclarer justifiés de la répudier. Ils oublient que l'ordre moral et l'ordre politique ne s'accomodent pas de tant de rigidité, qu'ils exigent au contraire d'être traités avec flexibilité et esprit de finesse, les lois qui y président n'étant que des lois de fréquence, des lois ne s'appliquant qu'a la plupart des cas.

Cette confusion des ordres n'est pas nouvelle : déjà Aristote fustigeait ceux de ses contemporains qui s'en rendaient coupables en déclarant que c'est la marque d'un esprit peu cultivé que d'exiger d'un savoir une certitude que ne permet pas la matière sur laquelle il travaille. Il faut donc préciser que lorsqu'il est question de loi et de droit naturels, il ne s'agit pas de règles absolument infaillibles et invariables. On peut relever dans la conduite des individus et des groupes un grand nombre de cas qui y font exception. Toutefois, les dérogations conscientes ou inconscientes à une règle n'en détruisent pas le caractère naturel et rationnel.

Les droits mentionnés dans la Déclaration sont de cette sorte. On ne peut inférer du fait qu'ils sont en maints cas pratiquement méconnus et violés, qu'ils ne sauraient constituer une norme valable pour tous les hommes, sans considération de leur race, de leur milieu et de leur époque. Ils s'appuient sur des facteurs stables, constants; mais pas exempts d'une certaine mutabilité.
Soit par l’enquête sociologique, soit par la réflexion personnelle, l’on constate en effet que l’homme a des besoins humains, qu’il obéit à des tendances ou à des inclinations qui sont partout et toujours identiques à elles-mêmes. On constate également que ces besoins et ces inclinations sont non seulement des impulsions, mais encore des impératifs au sens rigoureux du mot. C’est en quelque sorte en deux moments que ces besoins et ces inclinations de l’individu se métamorphosent en impératifs ou en principes universels d’action. Tout d’abord et quoi qu’en pense Sartre, l’homme reçoit—per le truchement de la génération,—son être et les inclinations qui le caractérisent. De sorte que la signification et l’orientation que ces inclinations impliquent et déclèlent doivent leur origine à la nature et à son Auteur : elles sont l’expression tout ensemble de l’ordre naturel et de l’ordre éternel. Et il suffit à l’individu de pouvoir réfléchir pour prendre une conscience au moins obscure que ses impulsions natives, ses impulsions premières viennent d’un Autre que lui-même et qu’il ne saurait y résister sans transgresser, sans violer l’ordre naturel et éternel. En d’autres termes, dès que l’individu a pris obscurément conscience de ce qu’il est ainsi que de ses inclinations originelles, cette conscience l’éclaire sur son destin; au surplus, elle exerce sur lui une contrainte intérieure. Ainsi, il n’apprend pas seulement ce qu’est le bien, mais il apprend encore qu’il faut le faire; il ne sait pas seulement ce qu’est l’homicide, mais encore qu’il doit s’en abstenir. Il y a la des impératifs auxquels il ne peut se soustraire sans éprouver un sentiment de culpabilité.

D’autre part, un peu d’expérience et un peu de réflexion permettent encore à l’individu de se rendre compte que, sans conservation, son développement physique, intellectuel, moral et religieux sont conditionnés à la satisfaction des besoins inscrits dans ses inclinations natives. Il se rend vite compte qu’il ne peut progresser dans la ligne de l’authenticité sans l’intériorisation des biens qui correspondent à ses besoins naturels. Il ne peut donc pas ne pas découvrir que, pour autant qu’il est obligé de devenir pleinement home, il est tenu de rechercher ces biens. Il finit également par voir en toute lucidité qu’aucune législation ne saurait, sans abus de pouvoir, empiéter sur ces droits de l’homme qui sont la vie, sa conservation, son intégrité, son épanouissement dans la famille; la liberté, son exercice et sa rectitude; la vérité, sa recherche et sa conquête. Il sait sans équivoque que la nature a chez lui devancé les législations humaines et que les impératifs qu’elle a fait naître dans sa conscience, s’ils limitent ceux des hommes, ont aussi le pouvoir de les rendre possibles et agissants.

En bref, la loi naturelle consiste dans la prise de conscience par l’individu humain des dynamismes profonds de sa nature et dans leur transposition, sous la rampe lumineuse de la conscience, en impératifs ou en principes universels de conduite. C’est en ce sens que nous disions que le droit naturel est invariable et qu’il est l’apanage de l’homme comme tel, de l’homme de toujours.
La loi et le droit naturels souffrent pourtant exception; ils peuvent être enfreints et violés. Ils ne produisent pas, dans l'articulation de tous les ressorts de l'action, un déterminisme irrépressible.

Dans son *Périt Herménias*, Aristote, qui pensait que l'homme pouvait sans trop d'inconvenance avoir un corps, professait qu'on trouve réunies en lui les deux grandes réalités responsables de la contingence dans la nature, à savoir la matière et la liberté. Ces deux facteurs introduisent dans notre monde sublunaire deux éléments d'imprévisibilité. Chacun sait a quels flottements, a quelles indécision et a quelles défaillances l'une et l'autre exposent, même si on est déjà parvenu à une certaine maîtrise de soi-même. Il va sans dire que la loi et le droit naturels, qui ne précèdent pas la nature en nous, mais lui font suite, nous aident, grâce à la lumière qu'ils rayonnent et à l'autorité qu'ils exercent, à surmonter nos faiblesses et à acquérir une certaine stabilité dans nos mouvements intérieurs ainsi que dans nos comportements extérieurs, mais ils ne sauraient corriger nos déficiences de structure, c'est-a-dire l'imperfection, la contiguence et la mobilité relative de notre nature. Ce qui est faible peut tôt ou tard défaillir.

Si l'on ajoute à ces considérations que les individus et les groupes peuvent être influencés dans leurs options par une infinité de circonstances objectives et subjectives,—circonstances qui ne sont toutefois pas déterminantes,—on comprendra que les raisons avancées par une multitude de pseudo-sociologues et de pseudo-anthropologues pour invalider les droits proclamés dans la Déclaration des droits de l'homme, ne sont pas pertinentes, qu'elles sont même des porte-a-faux. Les violations du droit ne l'annulent pas; les contraventions a la loi ne l'abrogent pas. Les lois humaines, même naturelles, ne sont ni des mécanismes, ni des déterminismes; elles sont tout simplement des impératifs que l'individu formule spontanément au fur et à mesure qu'il prend conscience de ses inclinations et des aspirations qu'elles renferment implicitement; et ces impératifs sont universels; ils s'adressent a l'homme comme tel; ils ont pour objet des biens ou des droits que toute législation humaine doit, sous peine d'être injuste, respecter et protéger.

Le second groupe d'intellectuels qui a contribué a discréditer les droits contenus dans la Déclaration se rencontre chez les disciples de ces deux types d'utopistes que furent Montesquieu et Rousseau. Leur conception du droit naturel ou des droits de l'homme paraît tellement bizarre qu'elle a produit des réactions et a amené, a un certain moment, une répudiation presque universelle du droit naturel.

Un peu comme Wolf, dans sa métaphysique, qui croyait palper des essences, alors qu'il jonglait avec des possibles, Montesquieu croyait avoir affaire a des droits naturels alors qu'il dissertait sur de simples possibles. Tout ce qu'on recontre dans les systèmes de droit, professait-il, a été de toute éternité possible et, partant, prévu par l'ordre éternel. En conséquence, il n’est aucun droit qui ne soit le reflet d’une possibilité
éternelle; tout droit est sous un certain rapport naturel. Et de là l’on a déduit la théorie du droit naturel préfabriqué, le meilleur système de droit étant celui qui ne serait que la codification pure et simple des droits naturels. En d’autres termes, la nature préparerait à l’homme ses lois et les lui transmettrait parfaitement apprêchées. Comme conséquence, tout droit serait naturel, tout serait de droit naturel.

Cette conception du droit naturel, dont on a beaucoup abusé, a entraîné que celui-ci fut très longtemps tenu pour inacceptable et à raison, puisqu’elle n’était que du byzantisme, qu’une contrafacon. Il appert en effet que si la nature dote les animaux d’instincts qui sont des montages assez précis, des mécanismes qui ne demandent que peu d’ajustage, elle ne se comporte pas ainsi à l’endroit de l’homme. Tout d’abord, elle ne lui donne pas les techniques, les habitudes et toutes les formes d’apprentissage; elle limite sa générosité à lui léguer tout un éventail d’inclinations. En second lieu, celles de ces dernières qui sont proprement humaines, a savoir l’intelligence et la volonté, elle les lui livre sous une forme tout a fait universelle. Comme la main, qui deviendra l’instrument de tous les instruments, l’intelligence et la volonté renferment à la fois tout et rien. Elles sont des aptitudes tout à fait générales, universelles et indéterminées. De sorte que les biens qui sont dus à l’individu per la société en vertu des exigences même de sa nature d’être pensant et libre, sont eux-mêmes tout a fait généraux et ont besoin d’être déterminés par une législation positive en rapport avec le milieu historique.

On aurait donc tort de rejeter le droit naturel et les droits de l’homme parce qu’on n’a d’audre idée de l’un et de l’autre que celle que l’on a empruntée à Montesquieu et a ses disciples. Le droit naturel n’est pas un droit préfabriqué, mais se traduit sous forme de dus généraux, indéterminés,—telles la vie, la vérité, l’intégrité physique et morale, la liberté, etc., mais de dus qu’aucune société ne saurait récuser sans se mettre du coup an banc de l’humanité.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, lui, bien qu’il fut, ainsi que nous l’avons mentionné, l’un des premiers a proclamer les droits de l’homme, contribua toutefois, per son individualisme et son libéralisme a les démouvrir de leur valeur et de leur prestige.

Depuis les Romains, l’on pensait que *ubi est jus, ibi est societas* et que *ubi est societas, ibi est jus*. C’est que l’on se représentait l’homme comme un animal qui est par nature social et qui ne peut vivre en société que grâce à la médiation du droit. Rousseau, au contraire, définit l’homme un animal solitaire, un animal qui est naturellement bon, et que la société rend mauvais. Les droits naturels qu’il reconnaît a l’individu ne sont donc pas a finalité sociale, mais a finalité individuelle; ils ne sont pas ordonnés a sauvegarder un patrimoine commun, mais des valeurs individuelles et en particulier la liberté. Au surplus, celle-ci n’est pas seulement un attribut de l’homme, mais le premier de ses droits, celui auquel tous les autres se ramènent. Ce qui conduit pratiquement a l’abolition du droit.
Il y aurait plusieurs réserves à faire sur la manière dont Rousseau concevoit la liberté; mais limitons-nous, pour les fins que nous poursuivons, a mentionner qu’il ne voit pas l’opposition relative qu’il y a entre liberté et droit. La liberté n’est jamais le droit : elle est la matière a mesurer tandis que le droit, lui, est ce qui en est la mesure. L’une est la source de l’action; l’autre en détermine la forme. L’une est subjective, l’autre est objective. Dans l’usage de sa liberté, l’individu doit se conformer aux règles objectives du droit, sans quoi il glisse dans la licence, l’arbitraire et les abus de toutes sortes. De sorte que confondre le droit avec la liberté pure équivaut a le méconnaître, équivaut aussi a méconnaître qu’il constitue le critère permettant de discerner l’usage honnête de la liberté des abus qu’on en peut faire. Grâce au droit, auquel elle se soumet, la liberté ne peut dégénérer en licence.

Au surplus, le droit ne limite et ne dirige pas seulement les libertés individuelles, il constitue encore la régulation de la liberté des groupes; il ne protège pas seulement les avoirs des particuliers, il protège encore et principalement ceux des collectivités. Et la signification qu’il convient d’attacher a la Déclaration des droits de l’homme serait, d’après nous et contrairement aux vues de Rousseau, qu’elle impose aux gouvernants de tous les peuples des limites dans l’exercice de leur liberté. Ces limites seraient dictées par l’existence de droits antérieurs a ceux que définissent et promulguent les législateurs humains, per des droits qu’on désigne tantôt sous le nom de droits naturels et tantôt sous celui de droits de l’homme.

Enfin, les adversaires les plus obstinés des droits de l’homme, et ils sont légion, se rencontrent chez les positivistes.

Leur père, Auguste Comte, qui ouvrit l’ère du relativisme universel, tenait qu’il n’y a pas de droits. Et il était loin d’être illogique : s’il n’y a que des faits, il ne saurait y avoir de droits. Il ne fut cependant pas suivi sur ce point par ses disciples, aux yeux desquels les faits peuvent être érigés en droits. En principe, pensent-ils, il n’y a pas de droits dictés par la nature de l’homme; il n’y a que ceux que suggèrent les circonstances de toutes sortes; et il suffit que celles-ci changent pour que celui-la soit automatiquement abrogé. A les entendre, il faudrait croire qu’il puisse y avoir tout un réseau de relations et toute une constellation de circonstances sans qu’il y ait des personnes concrètes qui entrent en relation les unes avec les autres et dans un ensemble donné de circonstances. Prétendre ainsi qu’on puisse laisser tomber les personnes et ne retenir que les relations et les circonstances, c’est verser dans la fiction pure et simple, c’est rejeter des données métaphysiques qui semblent de toute évidence pour leur en substituer d’autres qu’ils n’ont d’existence que par elles. En effet, sans des sujets qui établissent entre eux tout un système de communications, il ne saurait y avoir de relations ni de circonstances. Les communications des personnes sont le fondement de leurs relations sociales et des circonstances qui les entourent; elles constituent précisé-
ment les faits sociaux auxquels donne lieu la vie communautaire et que le droit a comme mission de tenir dans l'égalité, l'équilibre et l'ordre. Aussi, les droits de l'homme ont-ils proprement comme fonction d'imposer au commerce humain la forme qui lui convient, étant donné qu'il se passe entre êtres raisonnables et libres.

A ces quelques opinions philosophiques, nous pourrions en ajouter beaucoup d'autres, mais celles que nous avons relevées suffisent à illustrer la diversité des optiques et des interprétations que l'on peut rencontrer au sujet des droits de l'homme. Vu que l'on s'inspire de philosophies qui n'ont pas le même esprit, l'on parle le même langage, mais pas des mêmes choses. Le document donne constamment lieu à des ambiguïtés et à des équivoques. Il continue toutefois à faire du chemin et à gagner la faveur des élites, même des élites intellectuelles. Cela ne tient pas seulement a ce qu'il fournit une réponse aux appels de la conscience humaine, aux appels éternels de l'être pensant, mais aussi au fait que depuis quinze ans il s'est produit comme une reviviscence du droit naturel de même qu'une modification assez profonde de la philosophie que l'on se faisait de l'homme.

Il serait trop long de faire l'inventaire des ouvrages et des articles qui ont, au cours des dernières années, été publiés en vue d'attirer l'attention du public et des spécialistes sur la fécondité de la philosophie du droit naturel. Notons pourtant que le retour à cette philosophie s'est effectué sous les auspices de Thomas d'Aquin et qu'il se produisit surtout en France, en Italie, en Espagne, en Belgique, en Allemagne et aux États-Unis (cf. Le Droit et les Droits de l'Homme, p. 61, 62, 73, 74). Et il va sans dire que toutes ces études n'ont pas peu contribué à souligner l'importance et à fortifier le prestige de la Déclaration.

La philosophie aussi a évolué. Sous l'influence des sciences et en particulier des sciences de l'homme, elle s'est efforcée de se faire plus réaliste. Elle a tenté de faire sauter les "parenthèses" entre lesquelles elle avait mis l'homme et son milieu physique et social. Ce qui lui permet de s'accorder davantage a celle qui sert de support à la Déclaration des droits de l'homme.

L'individu humain ne correspond pas a ce que les philosophies ont imaginé qu'il était. Il n'est ni une liberté pure, ni une conscience close sur elle-même, ni une simple relation. Il est une personne et se définit comme tel. En effet, transcendant les étapes de l'histoire, les circonscriptions politiques et les frontières géographiques, il y a ce noyau de lumière et d'énergies spirituelles qui a nom l'homme. On peut, par la magie d'une idéologie, le faire disparaître temporairement, mais on ne saurait le subtiliser a jamais. Tôt ou tard, on le retrouve avec son statut ontologique, avec sa dignité propre, avec sa grandeur magistrale, avec ses dimensions incommensurables, avec ses aspirations marquées au coin de l'infini. Le fondement de tous ses attributs réside en ce qu'il est par
naissance et depuis toujours un être pensant, un être doué de la lumière prestigieuse de la raison. Avec son avènement est apparue l'aptitude à saisir l'universel et l'absolu, la capacité de l'abstraction et de la réflexion, celle de la définition, de la clarification des idées et de leur enchaînement, celle de la perception des rapports de causalité, celle de l'étirement presque à l'infini des liens logiques, celle des préférences, des choix, des décisions, des constructions de régimes de vie, et que d'autres encore. C'est un geste qui peut affecter la grandeur, affecter l'héroïsme, que de se dresser contre le bon sens et la science et que décréter que l'homme n'a pas d'essence, qu'il n'est pas un être rationnel, mais ce geste n'a pas l'effet de persuader ceux-la même qui le posent de se laisser traiter comme des mouches.

Il faut retenir de ces considérations que l'homme ne se définit pas seulement par ses relations, il se définit avant tout en lui-même, a savoir par ses composantes natives et essentielles. Il est un être raisonnable, et il y a des biens qui lui reviennent a ce titre même. C'est pourquoi il est indéniable qu'il y a des droits de l'homme. Et si l'on objecte que l'homme, l'individu a toujours aspiré à vivre en société, nous répondons que ça n'a pas été pour les perdre, mais pour en avoir une meilleure jouissance.

Nous pensons que la Déclaration des droits de l'homme marque une étape importante dans l'évolution vers l'unité de l'univers humain. Elle contient un grand nombre d'idées saines, d'idées justes, d'idées propres a éveiller le sens de la responsabilité et a promouvoir la paix. Mais qui dira quand elle réussira a obtenir l'adhésion de la grande majorité des intellectuels?
DR. RADHAKRISHNAN'S
SERVICE TO HINDUISM

Hinduism is called Sanätana Dharma, which means a religion that endures for all times. Nothing, however, can endure for all times unless it retains its identity throughout and changes only its names and forms as time passes. An American philosopher, J. B. Pratt, has observed in his learned, interesting and thoughtful article, "Why Religions Die", published in Philosophy, some years ago, that of all the religions in the world Vedic religion (Hinduism) is the only one which tends to survive while all others have either died or are on their death beds in this age of science and reason. The reason he has given for the immortality of the Vedic religion or Hinduism is that while retaining its spiritual identity it has been changing its outward form in accordance with the demands of the times through which it has passed and particularly because it is the only religion which has been able to meet the new challenge of Science which governs the thought and life of the people of the modern age.

Hinduism has met several such challenges in the past: Materialistic outlook of the Chārvākas, Atheism of the Jainas, Annata Doctrine (Non-soul theory) of the Buddhists, Despotic Monotheism and forcible conversion of Islam, Virulent attacks and tempting proselytization of Christianity, and in its struggle for existence it has emerged triumphant. Thanks to the great defenders and propagators of Hinduism who were timely born in the Hindu fold, it has met all the challenges quite successfully in the past. It has had its Seers (Rishis) like Yajñavalkya and Vyasa and Patanjali, its Acharyas like Shankara and Ramanuja, its saints like Kapirā, Nanak and Tulsī, and its reformers and regenerators like Raja Ram Mohan Ray, Swami Dayananda Saraswati, Swami Rama-krishna Paramahamsa, and its preachers like Swami Vivekananda and Rama Tirtha, who have kept Hinduism alive and healthy throughout
its epochs of crises. They have kept the spirit of Hinduism intact, yet all of them have given new forms and names to the religion of the Vedas.

Now we are living in another and a quite new type of age, the age of reason and science and an age in which humanity has become one with a demand for a universal human religion, a rational religion, based on empirical data. It is an age of free thinking and living, an age of freedom from dogma and racial prejudices, and an age of pragmatism. Hinduism, in order to meet the challenge of rationalism, and of modern science and philosophy and to suit the needs of modern times needed such expounders, defenders and propagators who would be fully acquainted not only with the real, immortal, and underlying spirit of Hinduism but would also be able to express their ideas in the language and terminology of the western and powerful and influential world which is today in the vanguard of civilization, and which is not only influencing the life and culture of all the nations and people of the world but also controlling the political and social life of the entire humanity. Among few such unique defenders, expounders, propagators, supporters and moulders of Hinduism who have put Hinduism on the map of the world-thought is Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. He has attracted the attention of the world to the sublimity, depth and rationality of Hinduism. Dr. Radhakrishnan combines in himself the essential characteristics of a Rishi, an Acharya, a Saint, a Reformer and also a brilliant expounder and interpreter of Hinduism. He has an instinctive and deep insight in the basic truths of Hinduism, a comprehensive outlook in which all the various and apparently contradictory aspects of Hinduism are reconciled. He has commented on the Prasthânatraya-Upanishads, Brahmasûtra, and Bhagavadgîtâ. He has mastery over the thought and language of the West—which is at present leading the world in science and philosophy. He is perhaps the only Indian who has been able to meet the lions of the Western thought in their own dens and who has, with a unique superiority of his own, been able to show to the world how scientific, rational and philosophical Hinduism (Hindu religion, philosophy, ethics, sociology and art etc.) is and how for it is the religion the world needs today, though not in a way in which religious missionaries do. He has, in his writings and speeches shown that the best that is in any religion is an aspect of Hinduism, which is essentially a religion of the Spirit.

With the knowledge of all that Dr. Radhakrishnan has said and written about Hinduism and India, a follower of and believer in Hinduism, no matter with what name he is called, and to what nationality he belongs, can be quite confident that he holds a religion that is sanâtana, ever alive, dynamic, progressive, rational and scientific, and which has a bright future. We Hindus, and Indians, and particularly I who have spent most of my earnings in the service of Hinduism, feel very grateful to Dr. Radhakrishnan and offer our felicitation to him and pray that he may continue to serve Hinduism and India for many more years as he has done in the past. May God bless him.
J. P. Atreyata

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THE CONCEPT OF MIND
IN INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

As in the West until recently, Psychology has never been a separate and independent science. Nevertheless a great deal of rational and empirical psychology existed in India. It formed the basis of metaphysical thought, ethical doctrines, literary criticisms and yogic practices. It was believed that the only and the proper gateway to the understanding of the Universe was man, a part and product of the realities and forces operating in the universe. While man could not peep into Nature behind the sense-impressions of it, he could probe more deeply into himself by way of introspection and meditation. Indians, in all ages, therefore, tried to know reality and understand the secrets of the cosmos through the inner knowledge of man. Human personality being very deep, complex and many-sided in its nature, structure and functions, it was but natural that different aspects of it were noticed by different observers, and different theories and doctrines grew on the basis of them. Even contemporary psychology of the West is not free from controversies about the nature and functions of mind.

A negligible minority of Indian thinkers called the Chārvākās, the materialists, did not believe in the reality and existence of mind as apart from the physical body. They thought that all the activities and functions commonly attributed to mind or soul are the activities and functions of the organised matter, in the form of the physical body. Consciousness and other so called mental activities emerge in the material organism and vanish with the disintegration of the organism. These thinkers were the forerunners of the behaviourists of today.

The followers of the Buddha, although differing widely among themselves about the nature and function of mind, hold that mental activities are sui generis and do not emerge from bodily structure. Human personality
is much more complex and much finer in structure than the physical one. It comprises of five structures (skandhas), namely, Sensations and feelings (Vedanā), awareness (vijñāna), concepts (samjñā), past impressions (samskāras), and physical organism (rūpa), which, functioning in unison constitute the personality. Neither the mental nor the physical aspect of man is stable or static. Everything in human personality is in flux, constant change. There is nothing like a static entity called mind or a permanent and lasting soul (Ātman). Buddhist psychology is very similar to that of William James according to whom every passing thought is the thinker and mental life consists of ever-changing thoughts and feelings. Not mind or soul but mental processes are the data of psychological observation, according to the Buddhist thinkers.

With the exception of these two schools of Indian psychology, most of the Indian psychologists hold that human personality comprises of three different factors; (i) The physical body (the sthūlasharīra), which is made of gross material particles, which grow and multiply on the basis of food taken, and which are subject to decay and death (ii) The mind (manas), which enlivens, directs and controls the activities of the physical body. According to some thinkers (the Naiyāyikas—the followers of the Nyāya school of thought) mind (manas) is an eternal substantial entity and is atomic in structure. Almost all other thinkers take it to be made of finer (sūkshama) matter and lasting much longer than the gross physical body does. It is called by various names by various thinkers, e.g. Manas (mind), Sukshma Sharīra (the subtle body), Antahkaranā (the inner organ), Chitta (the empirical consciousness), etc. Mind like the physical body, is also subject to change and decay, growth and development, but as a structure it lasts much longer than the physical body, and is associated with several physical bodies in succession. Both the mind and the physical body are made of the same prakriti or matter, which has both gross and refined aspects and an inner urge to organise itself into forms. (iii) Ātman is the third aspect of human personality which endures throughout all the changes of the two bodies (mentioned above), physical and mental, which is not composite in structure, which feels always to be identically the same, and which continues to exist even when the body and the mind have undergone decay and death. In ordinary parlance it is called the soul.

Many arguments are given in Indian psychological literature for the existence of the Ātman or soul. The best of them are found in Vedanta works. The thinkers of the Vedanta school make a comprehensive survey of the various types and levels of human experience and by a penetrative analysis of them come to the conclusion that there must be a common, enduring, and spiritual subject to witness all the various states of human experience, namely, waking, dream, deep sleep (including swoon), and samādhi (mystic trance in which the mind is completely stilled). The Self continues to function as pure consciousness and bliss.
during all the states of experience and also during their absence. It functions even when the body, the senses, and the mind are inactive. According to Indian psychologists of the Vedanta school all mental and bodily functions are unconscious. They are conscious only when illuminated or revealed by the self-illuminated Self. According to the philosophers of the Nyāya school consciousness in the Self arises when it comes in contact with the manas (mind). In themselves both the Self and the manas (mind) are unconscious. Most of the Indian thinkers who believe in the existence of Ātman or Self, do not attribute any mental functions to it except awareness or consciousness in general. Some say that it is characterised by joy or bliss also, which is its very nature. The realistic thinkers of the Nyāya school (also those of the Vaisheshika and Mīmāṃsā schools) attribute desire, attachment, aversion, effort, virtue and vice to the soul (Ātman), of course, when it is in conjunction with the mind (manas). Without a contact with the mind the Self, according to these thinkers is not even capable of awareness. Nevertheless it exists as a unifying agency of all our activities. The awareness or consciousness which is attributed to the Self by the Vedantists, however, is not any particular awareness. So also the bliss that is experienced by the Self is not any particular pleasure or joy of life. Consciousness and bliss which are the very nature of the Self are the foundations of knowledge and pleasure which are experienced in the activities of the manas (mind).

Leaving aside the metaphysical foundations of what is called the mental life in the West, all the mental functions of the human personality are regarded to be performed by the Antahkaraṇa (the inner organ or instrument) which is intermediary between the Self and the physical body. Antahkaraṇa is both a structure and a function. It gets modified as it functions. All the mental activities are the functions (vrittis) of this subtle organ. The Buddhists who believe only in change and modification, do not accept any substantial reality of the inner organ (antahkaraṇa) or mind (manas). Others also differ in their views with regard to the various aspects and functions of the Antahkaraṇa. The generally accepted aspects, parts and functions of the antahkaraṇa or the mental structure are (i) Indriyas*, the sensory and motor powers of the mind which interpret and react to the external world, and which connect the mind with the objects of the world through their physical structures of the body, namely, the ears, the eyes, the nose, the tongue and the skin (the sense organs of knowledge—Jñānendriyas); and the hands, the feet, the vocal organs, the reproductive organs, and the excretory organs (the organs of action—karmendriyas). (ii) the Manas (power of attention and direction) which is not always correctly translated as mind. The word manas (in Hindi mana) is used in two senses; namely, a general sense, in which it is translated as mind, and a specific sense in which it is translated as one function of the

* Vide Charakasamhita.
mind—attention to the reports of the senses (cognitive) and direction of the motor commands of the Self to the motor organs. Manas is both sensory and motor, in its function. On the one hand it attends, unifies and tries to interpret the reports of the organs of knowledge (jñānendriyas) about the nature of the various objects which stimulate them, on the other it controls and directs the movements of the motor organs (karmendriyas). The manas submits its sensory reports to another part or aspect of the antahkarana (inner organ), namely, the Buddha (intellect), and waits for its orders for execution through the motor organs. (iii) The Buddha (intellect) judges and determines what the particular object reported by the senses through the manas is and decides what reaction or response should be made to it through the motor organs of the body and the mind which controls them. Some times the response is not made through the physical motor organs. It is made internally through the activities of the manas alone, as in dreams, hallucinations and illusion. Manas has the power of all the sensory and motor organs and can experience and create a world of its own, which perfectly duplicates the objective world existing outside. It happens so in dream, delusion, and hypnotic trance. All the mental activities (sensory and motor) are carried on with a reference to the ego, self or individual. This aspect of mind is called (iv) Ahamkāra (ego-ing). The ahamkāra aspect of mind apperceives, appreciates, owns and evaluates the whole cognitive situation, and in view of its purposes and ideals, commands the aforesaid aspects of organs—Buddhi, Manas and Karmendriyas to perform some activities. Here we have to note the difference made and a subtle distinction drawn in Indian psychology between the Self (Ātman) and the Ego (Ahāmkāra). It is very similar to the distinction made in western psychology (particularly by William James) between the transcendent Self and the Empirical Ego, or the I and the me. The word Ātman (Self) is used for the deepest, unchanging, and permanent unity felt within ourself which stands behind all our experience as its subject, whereas the Ego (Ahāmkāra) is the changing and growing empirical self which is constituted by our knowledge, attitudes, feelings, emotions and sentiments, interests and activities as determined by our environment and bodily conditions. It is expressed in statements like “I am so and so”. (v) A fifth part or aspect of mind (Antahkarana) is Chitta which retains the past experiences and tendencies to action in the form of dispositions of memory images (sanskāras). The word chitta is also used in more senses than one in Indian psychology. The Vedantists used it in the above mentioned sense. The Buddhists use it in the sense of ever-changing mental activity. Patanjali, the author of the famous Yoga-sūtras, makes use of the term Chitta for the whole mind and regards all mental functions and activities as modifications (vrittis) of Chitta. The aim of all yogic practices according to Patanjali is control of the modification of mind (Chitta-vritti-nirodhi).
The Buddhist psychologists, unlike the Upanishadic thinkers and the school of Vedanta following them, did not pay any attention to that aspect of human personality which is indicated by the word Ātman—an enduring, permanent, and unchanging unity, but devoted considerably to the study of the empirical, changing and composite mind. They made very keen observation of the various gross and fine states and modes of mind and described them with preciseness. As pointed out above, the Buddhist psychologists do not admit the existence of Ātman. They regard the personality of man to be an ever changing composite structure made of five functional organizations (Skandhas), namely, Rūpa (the physical body), Vijnāna, the mechanism of knowledge, Vedanā, the mechanism of feeling, Samjñā, the organization of concepts and names, and the structure of previous memory traces and tendencies and dispositions (Samskāras). The organization of the personality and of the skandhas that constitute it gets modified and changed every moment, and its unity is a mere name. Yet the non-physical aspects of the personality survive and continue beyond the death of the physical body. It functioned before the birth of this physical body with which it was connected and will continue to function beyond its death in association with another physical body until the very will to live and desire to enjoy pleasures of objects are negated and annihilated.

According to Patanjali, the author of the Yogasūtras there are four types of mind (Chitta) : (1) Kshipta. The mind which is apt to change quickly in its attention and interest from one object to another, and is never at rest and attentive is called Kshipta. It is like quicksilver. (2) Mūḍha. When a mind loses the power of discrimination between true and false, good and evil, and ‘ought’ and ‘is’ on account of prejudices, emotions and passions overpowering it, it is called Mūḍha. (3) Vikshipta. When a mind is too much engrossed in enjoyment of pleasures and does not care for anything else, it is called Vikshipta. (4) Ekāgra. When the mind is brought under control and is voluntarily fixed on any particular object or topic or idea, without fluctuations and wandering to other object, topic or idea, it is called ekāgra, onepointed. The aim of all yoga practices is to bring mind to ekāgratā, onepointedness, which is the secret of all achievements. Beyond this state of mind there is a rare state of mind called Niruddha—in which the mind is so concentrated and controlled that it ceases to be active and functioning, leaving the Ātman or Self shining in its own effulgence. The word type is not really proper in this connection for every mind is at times characterised by these states. Hence the yoga psychologists call them the five states of mind (avasthās). There are many other details given in connection with the states and functions of Mind in Buddhist and Hindu psychological literature, into which we cannot go here for want of time and space. They should, however, be studied in order to understand the nature and function of mind, as understood in India.
A very scientific and rational view of mind, which deserves attention of modern psychology, is found in a monumental Sanskrit work, the Yogavāsiṣṭha, which was composed long before the advent of the great psychologist and philosopher Shankaracharya. It is curious that this great work, which has not unfortunately yet been properly translated into English, presents a view of mind and its functions which finds support in most recent researches in the fields of Psychoanalysis, Psychical Research, Parapsychology, Psychotherapy, and Psycho-somatic Medicine etc. Professor Dr. B. L. Atreya, has tried in his monumental work, The Philosophy of Yogavāsiṣṭha, to present to the modern English reader the teachings of this great work in a manner intelligible to modern man. I shall draw upon his work for a brief statement of the concept of mind and its functions according to Yogavāsiṣṭha which is traditionally believed to describe the philosophy of the ancient sage Vasistha who was the teacher of Sri Ramachandra the famous king of Ayodhya.

The Yogavāsiṣṭha does not make distinctions between the various parts or aspects of human personality as other systems of thought in India have done. For it, the entire personality of man is mental. The Self, mind, and body all are made of the same stuff. The reality of mind and all its organs is functional. One and same spiritual reality is the Self, the mind, the various aspects of the mind—buddhi (intellect), ahamkāra (ego), chitta (memory), manas (attention and direction), the senses, and the body, and also the objective world, in accordance with the function it performs.

"It is one and the same mind which assumes within an individual various names and forms, in accordance with the role it plays. The various faculties of the internal world are nothing but one and the same mind functioning in different ways and so, called by different names. Mind, Intellect, Chitta, Ego, Activity, Imagination, Memory, Desire, Ignorance, Mâyā, Prakriti, Jiva (individual), Creator, Preserver, etc., the subtle body, the sense organs, the physical body and the objects of knowledge—all are merely the names and forms of the mind in accordance with the different functions it performs." (B. L. Atreya: The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha p. 200). In the same way the mind itself is a functional form of the Ātman or the Self, which is the same as the Ultimate and Absolute Reality underlying and manifesting Itself in the world. The Yogavāsiṣṭha says: “The Mind is a definite form of the all-powerful Absolute Consciousness assumed by It through Its own Will-power. (III. 96. 3). It is, as it were, the thinking aspect of the Absolute Consciousness” (V. 13. 56). Whereas the Mind is a form or modification of the Absolute Reality, all the objects of the world owe their existence to the mind. In fact, all the objects of the world are functional modifications of the mind. Apparently physical, all objects are mental and have a mental activity behind them.

Thus the mind, according to the Yogavāsiṣṭha, assumes a very important roll. It has potentially within all the powers, potentialities and
possibilities of the entire universe. The powers of mind, which is nothing but thought, are unimaginable. The Mind is omnipotent. "It is capable of accomplishing everything (III. 91. 16). As it imagines within itself, so things happen forthwith". (III. 91. 52). Whatever is intensely thought of by the mind, that comes to be materialised and effected". (III.91.17). The role of thought, will and imagination is very great in our life. We become what we desire to become. "The nature of things around us is as we think it to be. Our lives are what we make them by our thought. All that we are is how we have thought. Thoughts are the bricks with which we build the mansion of our personality. Thought determines our destiny. We become what we wish, desire and imagine to become. The world around us is the reflex of our thought. It changes its appearance as we change. The extent of space and the duration of time are relative to our thoughts and emotions". (B. L. Atreya: The Philosophy of the Yogavāśiṣṭha, p. 222).

The physical body is also a modification and creation of the mind and can be changed by it into any condition. Most of the diseases of the body originate in the disturbances of the mind, and can be cured by right thinking according to the Yogavāśiṣṭha. "The body is created by the mind for its own use, as a silk-worm forms a cocoon round itself." (IV. 45. 7). It creates the body from the material of its own thought (IV. 11. 19). The body changes in accordance with the thoughts in which the mind is engaged. (IV. 21. 16). Mental inharmony or conflict is the cause of all bodily diseases which can be cured only by removing the cause" (VIIa. 81. 38). The secret of a long and healthy life lies in right thinking and right living, according to Yogavāśiṣṭha. Extra-ordinary powers of knowledge and action can be attained by proper control and cultivation of mind, according to both Vasistha and Patanjali.

Patanjali in his Yoga-sūtras mentions the following extra-ordinary powers which a yogi adept in Samyama (concentration, meditation and fixation) can and does attain:—‘Knowledge of the past and the future’ (psychometry and premonition) (Y.S. Chapter III. Sutra 16), ‘Comprehension of the cries of all living beings’ (17), ‘Knowledge or remembrance of one’s previous births’ (18), ‘Understanding of other people’s minds’ (telepathy and thought-reading) (19), ‘Disappearance’ (invisibility of the body) (21) ‘Premonition of death’ (22), ‘the abnormal strength of elephant and other animals’ (24), ‘Knowledge of minute, hidden and remote things’ (clairvoyance) (25), ‘Knowledge of the regions of Space’ (26), ‘Knowledge of the position of stars’ (27), ‘Knowledge of the Movements of Stars’ (28), ‘Knowledge of the inner constitution of the body’ (X-ray clairvoyance) (29), ‘The cessation of hunger and thirst’ (30), ‘Steadiness’ (31), ‘Vision of the Perfect Ones (Masters)’ (32), ‘Capacity to enter the body of another person’ (38), ‘Non-obstruction by water, mud and thorns etc., and Ascension (levitation)’ (39), ‘Effulgence’ (40), ‘Supernormal audition’ (clairaudience) (41), ‘Capacity to fly through..."
\textit{Alaukika} (supernormal) or \textit{Yogic} perception (Extrasmory perception) is recognised by several other schools of Indian psychology. \textit{Avadhi} (Clairvoyance) and \textit{Manahparyāya} (Telepathy) and \textit{Sarvajñātā} (omniscience are various kinds of extraordinary knowledge admitted to be attainable by Jain psychologists.

It is very interesting to note that the central ideas of Freudian psychology were long ago known to Indian psychologists. That many of the mental activities and functions are unconscious is accepted by most Indian psychologists. Manas is essentially \textit{jada} (unconscious). It becomes conscious only when illuminated by the light of the Self. It is said in the \textit{Yogavāśiṣṭha} that desires when repressed become unconscious (\textit{supta}-sleeping), and as such, persist in the unconscious region of the mind, as seeds to fructify again. Unconscious desires cause greater trouble than the conscious ones which can be faced and modified by thinking. The unconscious desires have to be taken out and made conscious in consultation with expert teachers and dealt with properly. Conflict causes not only mental but also many bodily troubles. In fact according to the \textit{Yogavāśiṣṭha} all the bodily troubles arise in the unconscious region of the mind. (Vide: B. L. Atreya: Sri \textit{Vāśiṣṭhadarśanam} p. 187–188—dealing with unconscious desires and the way in which they should be handled). Sex is regarded as one of the three most forceful of human drives—\textit{Kama} (Sex), \textit{Krodha} (Anger) and \textit{Lobha} (Possessive Instinct). All these drives work almost unconsciously.
There are different types of energy we can measure and some we can not. We can see easily there are interpenetrating magnetic fields, even in non-conductors. There are "trigger-fields" which create change and "steering fields" that bring the embryo to fruition the same as they have brought Man here today. Trigger-fields give birth to organismic forms which are built up to the full potential power of manifestation by the steering fields. The trigger is the male positive, the creative power. In cycles of world human affairs, it is very rarely shown. In smaller life cycles every day all living things have it. The "steering field" is the mysterious mother principle, the mother earth field, the downward inner-world of form and completion. It is forever contracting and imitating what the creative has done by throwing its charm and grace upon all people. But deep inside the female, in the womb of the earth, there is recognition of the creative force and her yearning goes outwards to meet it. The creative force, the originating identity, the primal relationship, is descending downwards to meet it. This creative force is approaching the belly of life, the great synthesis of the center. Nothing can stop it. When they meet, the transmutation will come and a new cycle will be born. The "creative" acts in the world of the invisible, with spirit and time as its energy. The receptive mother act upon matter in space. It brings all material things to a completion.

How can we use these two forces in the study of creative imagination and the way it communicates, sometimes long after the event. It seems that some kind of energy can be locked up in an image, or perhaps it is the "image" which is only a key which unlocks some door in our own thought energies. The strongest doors have no locks or bolts, they are in our own minds.

It is a basic premise in our work that energy follows thought, but this does not mean that if one thinks of something long enough, one will "become" that thought. This is a truism which is only half true. A thought pattern that is not supplied with energy manifests nothing. All diagrams in science are static, their dynamic has to be supplied with energy. It is the same with the diagrams and images we call our thoughts. They must be specific thoughts if we want a specific effect. General thoughts only produce general and often useless results, for example:

1. General thoughts about being an artist never produce anything, and are valueless until paintings are actually produced.
2. General thoughts of faith, are quite useless without works.
3. General thoughts of greatness, to be of value must be accompanied with great doings.
4. General thoughts of goodness, are useless until you "become" good.
5. General thoughts of truth, are worthless until you live the truth in every detail.

So we must ask ourselves right questions so that we are forced to become specific. In working on new research it is no use to ask "What is imagination"—it is too general. Because imagination comes into every human activity. Living cells respond to what we see in our imaginations however truthful or false it may be. So we can see that in a sense we do become externally what we imagine. But not internally. We can see that every man builds a temple in his own body. You can look at the muscles and lines in faces and read sorrow or joy, you can look at a man's pounds and see where his treasure is.

Christ said a man's treasure is where his heart is, and that his thoughts were always what was in his heart. This is much truer than saying that a man becomes what he thinks, because thought patterns without the passion of the heart behind them are powerless.

What does this have to do with new research into machines? Well we can state here a law. "Thought without a physical stimulus cannot manifest. Spirit without body cannot manifest. Content without form cannot manifest, The Creative without Mother cannot manifest". Similarly instruments without thought energy are worthless. When a yogi learns the sound of AUM in his inner ear, he cannot manifest it, he can only copy it with his voice. The background noise of the Universe, the energies which pour down upon us can only manifest through us as instruments. An artist who paints the sunset makes a poor copy of the original. A yogi who sings OM is making a poor copy of the original. And if we can make a poor mechanical copy of that sound we can bring it to those who cannot hope to hear anything but a poor copy of it. But once they hear it and know its pitch and harmonic wavelength in the auditory register it is possible to channel psychological energies along it to the higher self.

It act as a carrier of thought energy. This depends on the concept of
the high self and the image or diagram or mental picture of what we think it is. General concepts are no good because general results are dissipated over wide areas whereas specific thoughts act as channels for emotional energy which produce a physical and definite result.

For instance, if you have a thought pattern of clarity and listen to the special wavelength of Intellect which has been tuned in "resonance" with the pre-physical world for this condition, one will definitely get the feeling of clear thinking. Instruments which reveal image patterns are being invented. It is no use saying instruments cannot do what humans can do. Neither can humans do what instruments can do. You can't bore holes with your fingers. You can't bore half inch holes even if you have a one inch drill. If we expect a tool to do more than it is meant to do we are being foolish. On the whole machines can perform certain tasks more intelligently and effectively than human beings can perform those tasks. Especially the new thinking machines; which are teaching the men who made the machines, things that they never knew before. Now that it is possible to fix a machine up with circular causality we have duplicated the human brain which only thinks mechanistically. Very few brains think for themselves or originate anything.

What we know today is mostly the result of the re-ordering of the mass of knowledge of past concepts. We are living in the past. In the world of the concept itself, however, will come a new breakthrough. This will start with a new concept of what is a concept and how it is formed. When this is used as a tool with words like "spirit" and concepts like "ether", we will find that religion and science have been talking about the same thing, except science deals with a space time continuum and the religions deal with its complement—the aesthetic continuum.

The new breakthrough will transcend these dualities. It is two sides of the same coin. The duality is only created in our own minds by the inability of the mind to grasp its own nature. Mind cannot grasp mind anymore than water can give form to water. Even a fish who has known water all his life does not really know what water is, until he is on someone's hook and looks back at it. Then he knows what water is! This is why all the greats have said to know "life" one must lose it, look back at its manifested side. For we cannot know it when we are continually immersed in it and dependent upon it. It is even so with our own imagination and creativity. It is the same with the world of the spirit. We can think we know, but unless we can manifest it in our works we don't know it. When we know how the spirit feeds off the body and the body receives its intelligence from the spirit, we can learn how this universal engine works. But not everyone can understand Ohms law when they switch on the light, not every woman who drives a car knows what goes on under the bonnet. Yet electric light and cars have transformed the physical and mental lives of the people and changed the basic fabric of society itself. The printing press is another example. The telephone and
many other tools of civilization were all dreams once. The contacting of
the "high self" energies of the organism, that special "self" we call the
individual Being, as if he really were a piece of independent mental subs-
tance, will become so far advanced by the channelling of thought energy,
that we shall be amazed at the height of spiritual intelligence we can
reach. After all, everything is easy to the man who knows how! The
spirit is no different: it is easy to live the truth once you know how, and
then do it. Those who know how, will show each individual how to
apply those new tools. Those who know are always ridiculed by those
who have not fully understood them, because of their conflicting con-
cepts of the dualities in their present life on earth. This ignorance will
not matter.

The natural machine cannot work anymore than a railway engine can
work, without fuel. Everything in nature needs the sun’s fuel. Every
spiritual entity needs fuel. The fuel for these machines is our own emocio-
nal energy. Our body is like an engine, if we stoke up enough fuel in it we
can pull a whole train. So likewise these machines, being spiritually
conceived, will only measure out according to your own measuring.

In our creative research we are not looking for any syntheses of what
is known or what is supposed to be known. We are looking for the miss-
ing links which no man yet in history has ever found and if he had done,
the world would be changed almost over-night. We are digging in the
past as well as looking into the future.

We know what the ancient wisdom said about the spiritual nature of
man—we know what he thought about spirits and energies of a much
subtler kind—those psychic energies and then there are the psychological
energies we have to deal with. We are always anxious to learn about
them from someone, but if you cannot demonstrate them objectively and
can only point to books, then our philosophy is, "don't bother". We
can point to books too, and furthermore we can demonstrate in real life,
that the energies we talk of and use, can be used by anyone; so unless
your answers involve some objective manifestation, which we can observe
in real life situations, we say keep up the good work! Creativity involves
working with creative people, it means the transduction of inner states
of mind into objective and observable results. It is no use generalising
about light or spirit, or colours, when they all interpenetrate each other.
"What is light" is a very general question. We would get a thousand
answers. Let's break it down—Hydrogen C14, H2O, radiation of protons,
Ionosphere filter, atmosphere, eye enzymes, electrical impulse, prism, 7
colours of the spectrum. Our eye sees white light and reflections of white
light which have struck some surface and been partly absorbed, and so
we then see colour. We know that inter-penetrating this white light are
vibrating radiations we cannot see. In white light our eye does not see
the 7 colours or layers of energy which have their own individual wave-
lengths. Everyone knows all colour is a matter of wavelength. The
pigments that an artist uses will only absorb light according to its wavelength. An artist does not really paint with light, he paints with wave-lengths.

So we have a progression from the ancients who used dark colours and did not know the nature of light, to the impressionist who used and painted with light, to the artist of tomorrow who paints with a vibration or a wave-length. This artist has not been born yet, and he can only be born when science and art become one.

The cosmic energies which are pouring into the earth, as well as the solar rays which feed and sustain the earth, have to be understood in earthly terms before they can be properly understood in heavenly terms. You cannot understand Heaven unless you first understand earth. One cannot know the creative without knowing the mother which yearns for it, and man cannot become superman before he has become man. So bringing heaven down to earth is a job that only a few can do and understand! Our commission is not here to convince anybody, we are here to bring it about. Getting converts is for religion, we are concerned only with the belief aspects of religion—what makes people believe, and why is faith necessary in great works? What do the studies of cosmic and solar energies have to do with all this?

In our work to duplicate the sound along which spirit energy or thought travels we will have to work out a complex frequency of vibrations which correspond with the superconscious. This is what creates a bridge between the heart and mind, the body and the universal spirit. Bridging the lower unconscious with the “high self” means passing through super-consciousness. There are things beyond super-consciousness which we need to go into as far as creativity is concerned. What matters is our concept of this super-conscious “self”. If our concept is specific, we get a specific result, if it is woolly and indefinite it takes years. It depends how firmly you can fix this image in your imagination and use it for directing your spiritual forces along a prefixed sound.

The Individual weaves his personal melody around the prefixed sound. In Indian music the background note is the AUM of the Ancients and the artist weaves his spontaneous and personal character around it.

There is the absolute—the Man who fixes what this fundamental note is, must be able to obtain it from somewhere else, another domain perhaps, but he can only do this by “becoming” this sound. There can be no earthly authority for it.
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