THE HERITAGE OF SANKARA
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HERITAGE OF SANKARA

By
S.S. ROY, M.A.
(Reader in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University)

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TO

THE MEMORY

OF

PROFESSORS

R. D. RANADFE

AND

K. C. BHATTACHARYYA
PREFACE

The contents of this book constitute an essay, written in defence of Advaitism as anticipated by Gauḍāpāda, and formulated by Śaṅkara and his followers. So does this essay bear the title given to it.

A defence of a philosophical legacy of this nature has been necessitated by a rather spirited indictment of it by those, who, upon instinct, seem to favour a realistic view of Truth, Reality and Value, and dread the philosophies of Transcendence, in which, as they think, nothing, with which we can claim familiarity and kinship, survives. The Advaitin, whose theoretical base is the principle of Māyā, dissolves in an unmitigated manner, as it were, all objectivity and all subjecthood. For this reason, the Advaitin looks like propagating in a disguised form the Buddhist doctrine of the Void. Therefore, the tradition that dreads Transcendence in every sense, makes little or no difference between the heritage of Śaṅkara and the creed of the Buddha as developed and understood in the Mahāyāna order.

A considerable portion of this essay concerns itself with a refutation of this charge. The argument, embodied in this essay, is therefore an attempt at bringing out the precise nature of the difference between Transcendence as envisaged in the Buddhist tradition, and Transcendence, as understood in the Advaitic tradition. Most of the arguments that could possibly be advanced by the adversary of the Advaitic heritage, have been anticipated, cited and considered. A demarcating line, has therefore, been drawn, in an improvised manner, between the two types of Transcendence. This, however, does not mean a depreciation of the Buddhist view of Transcendence. The adverse critic of Advaitism, we maintain, does not understand the nature and importance of Buddhist Absolutism in the economy of Indian philosophical thought. He is more of a profes-
sional or even mercenary detractor of Transcendentalism than a trained critic, who understands correctly the development of the Indian philosophical thought in its ideological aspect. His condemnation of Śaṅkara and his heritage is rooted in a misunderstanding of a fundamental nature. He acts on the presupposition that the transcendence of the realistic attitude is not the condition of man’s freedom, which has been variously described as mukti, mokṣa, kaivalya and nirvāṇa. The realist insists on the preservation of Reality, Knowledge and Value, as objective in essence, on the perpetuation of subjectivity as personality, and on participation in Freedom, as the enjoyment of one’s being in the midst of objects, supposed to be self-subsistent and more lasting than those encountered in the purely empirical situation. The Realist’s condemnation of the philosophies of Transcendence is motivated by the belief that Transcendence is negation, and that negation in this context negates everything, including the self and its liberation. The Advaitin’s view of Freedom, the Realist would aver, is as negative in import as is the nirvāṇa of the Buddhist.

We have maintained in this essay that Advaitism is not identical with any one of the formulations of the Buddhist Absolutism, in spite of the fact, that there appears to be a family-likeness between the logics employed for elaborating the two points of view.

One more thing in special. Just as we have tried to make a distinction between the seemingly identical views mentioned above, we have also attempted to indicate that between the adverse critic of the Advaita and Advaitism, there is community of purpose, an identity of motifs. And the motif that unites two such antagonists takes its colouring from what, we have, in this essay, described as the morphological structure of the entire Indian philosophical consciousness. The adverse critics of the Advaita, as much as the Advaitins themselves, are oriented to a value, other than the one, found in the attitude that accepts the merely given. This value is Freedom. Metaphysical constructions, and logical and epistemological formulations, in every school of Indian philosophical thought, are grounded in a ‘prefe-
rence' to be that, which outsteps the limitations of being associated with the merely given. The stony limits of empirical being cannot hold out the spirit in man. Freedom, therefore, is central to Indian Philosophy. It has an unmitigated emotive appeal to the Indian philosophical consciousness. Only its conceptual determinations vary. The variations in conceptual determination of Freedom, reflect temperamental differences in the envisagement of this commitment in its metaphysical and logical aspects. Yet, not every school of thought has succeeded in making the meaning of Freedom, free from the haze, that encircles the sense of one's being in bondage. One thing at any rate is certain. An orientation to Freedom necessarily implies a withdrawal from things encountered in the situation of acceptance—more precisely, the acceptance of the given. Reflection takes the place of acquiescence. An awareness seeking satiety, out there, in the world immediately experienced in perception, and other modes of apprehending the given, is made to turn to something other than this one. From gross objects, which, somehow, do not satisfy it, consciousness traverses a bending, as it were, and turns to subtle objects, to a world of eternal objects, essences or ideas. The Realist feels secure in this change, but the Advaitin would take this change only for a feeling of unrest, which cannot be quenched in the object-seeking attitude, at any plane, whatsoever, empirical or non-empirical. To negate empirical objecthood, does not necessarily mean the transcendence of the attitude that seeks the fulfilment of a want in the objective attitude. A desire for something, other than the merely given, may well mark the dawn of a preferential disposition, but just a desire of this description, is not the accomplished fact of transcendence, which alone is Freedom. The Realist's insistence on the replacement of one kind of object by another, the gross and the sensuous, by the subtle and the super-sensuous, entails a process of negation all right, but such a negation is not co-extensive with transcendence. Transcendence is negation, but not a negation that effects the replacement of one object by another. It is the negation of the object-oriented attitude itself. Freedom and infatuation cannot go together.
The objective attitude itself, in its literal nakedness, is the attitude of infatuation. What is cherished in this attitude can at best be merely an apology for freedom, an appearance of freedom, so to say. For effecting a passage from freedom as ignis fatuus to freedom as self-shining light (svayamjyoti), this attitude has to be transcended and negated. But negation in this context is not to be literally understood. A negation of this nature is no plea for the effacement of objects from the stream of experience or from outside it. This is neither possible, nor helpful in effecting the desired transcendence. The objective world, at whatsoever level it is encountered, and prized, has to be commuted into the symbol of a vision, in which the axiological nullity of everything contemplated in the objective attitude takes the place of infatuation. A vision of this kind marks one's transfusion into the Infinite. It is the vision of Freedom, uncircumscribed. This is the Advaitic view of the situation, but Advaitism is no adversary of any system of thought conceived in reflective consciousness, provided, such a system of thought does not falsely swear by Freedom and stoop to adore phantoms and imaginal constructs in its place. A worse thraldom than the worshipping of idols, without understanding the symbolism behind idol-worship, could hardly be conceived. For, what can be more degrading to the spirit in man than running after things, more shadowy and less substantial than those given to him in perception. But if everything conceived in the objective attitude is transmuted into a symbol of the transcendency of all limit and finitude, the grossest image of the Deity could co-exist in peace with the Adavaitin’s Brahman, or figure without inappropriateness, as one of the alternations of this Brahman. The antinomies of the transcendent and the immanent, the personal and the impersonal, of theism and atheism, could all be reconciled in a vision of this nature. Differences in taste and temperament could be allowed to function side by side, and radically differing systems of metaphysics and logic, could like Alps over Alps arise for giving theoretical eminence to an existential commitment, viz., the commitment to be free. So has it been argued that in Saṅkara the extremes
of Indian Philosophy have met, and that his philosophical heritage could be found to provide us with the keystone that gives to Indian Philosophy an architectonical unity.

This prefatory note would, however, remain incomplete without the mention of a digression into the Philosophy of Language, which constitutes an important link in the argument developed in this book. The distinction anticipated by the Advaitins between the literal and the symbolic functions of language, extends, in an ascertainable manner, the employment of language, from communicating the nature of the merely thinkable, to expressing that which is unthinkably knowable. It has, therefore, been contended that what is unknowable in thought, or indeterminable therein, need not be necessarily incommunicable.

A new dimension to language, for instance, has been given by the Advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas (superpropositions), like ‘That thou Art’ (Tat tvam asi). These mahāvākyas, it has been held, are simply indicatory of a situation, which cannot be literally meant. They have been described as akhandārthaka (impartible) in import. They refer to a situation entirely supersensible, namely, that, in which one’s avowed disbelief in the reality of the content of phenomenal subjectivity, leads to an intuitive awareness of the transcendental ground of this content—a content, which in the manner of the illusory snake, is understood as both cancelled and grounded in the rope. What merely appears, unfolds itself to reflective consciousness as illusory. A non-discrimination between belief, the content of which is cancellable in the mode of consciousness that comprehends it, and knowledge, the content of which endures independently of its being known, and is self-shining in essence, sustains the illusion as reality. But the dawn of discrimination, in which the merely believed content is cancelled, establishes the self-shining substratum as the only reality, and all else as merely a limitation of it. Finite subjectivity shorn of its limitations is discovered as identical with Infinite thinghood. The immediacy of the situation, is, of course, not determinable in thought that constitutionally contemplates an other. Yet, language, functioning at the trans-discursive level of its expressivity,
can indicate in a gestural or symbolic fashion, the theoretic details of such a vision. And a possibility of language being dressed to this advantage, does furnish a clue to the solution of the riddles facing the philosophers of our generation. A functioning of language in this key, may be said to vindicate the case for metaphysics, against those, who have dubbed its transactions as nonsensical, because the structure of reality has been unreservedly believed by them as coinciding with the structure of language, and because linguistic expressions, cannot be said to have sense, without referring to the sensible.

In these my reflections on some of the aspects of the Advaitic heritage, I have not said something that could be described as all new and entirely original. Much of what has been said here, must have been said by some one in the past. To all those thinkers and writers, whose ideas have fashioned my own, I owe an unacknowledgeable debt. Some of these ideas have got mixed up so inextricably with my own, that I fail to locate them, even for the purpose of acknowledging them as valuable borrowals. Yet, there are quite a few thinkers, who have so ascertainably influenced the course of my thinking, that I can mention their names, only with a sense of reverence and gratitude inexpresible in words. Foremost among such thinkers is the late Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya. The nucleus of this essay would be found to lie in some of the ideas contained in his cryptic writings. I am afraid I cannot claim to have understood him wholly or even wholly aright. My only consolation in this respect is a similar experience of those, who, in spite of their close affinity to this great thinker, have cried peccavi, and acknowledged their inability to re-think his thoughts with flawless fidelity. A failure at reconstructing his spirit, at any rate, neither dissuades me from making efforts to understand him, as best I can, nor prevents me from acknowledging my indebtedness to him. For this reason I have chosen him as one of the two great teachers of Philosophy in this country, to whose memory this humble work is dedicated.

From among those, at whose adorable feet, I began my study of Philosophy, I feel duty-bound to mention Professor
R. D. Ranade, who is no more in our midst, and Professors A. C. Mukerji and R. N. Kaul, who are U. G. C. Professors of Philosophy at the University of Allahabad.

From Professor Ranade, I learnt my first lessons in the Śāṅkara Vedānta. To be in his presence, for even a few moments, was to experience the Eternity of Bliss. To me he looked like the earthly embodiment of the Beatific Vision. He was a guru in the sense, this word has, in the lexicon of Indian Spirituality. His passion for philosophizing was as great as his love of God. In his intensely religious thought, could be seen the meeting of the Numen inefabile and the Ratio aeterna. I pay my homage to him by dedicating this essay to his holy memory.

To Professor A. C. Mukerji I am thankful for his having encouraged me in my studies in every possible manner.

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From among those, outside India, whose writings have considerably influenced me, are Professor Karl Jaspers and the late Professor Ernst Cassirer. In their writings I find a confirmation of my thesis concerning the symbolic aspect of language and meaning. I acknowledge my indebtedness to them also.

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S. S. R.
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CHAPTER I

THE INDICTMENT OF ŚAṆKARA'S HERITAGE

An inquiry concerning the first principles underlying the heritage of Śaṅkara may among other things be motivated by the fact that between the Advaita of Śaṅkara, and the Absolutism of Mādhyamika Buddhism, there stands something in the manner of a no man's land—a tract, which has not for nothing lent a considerable support to the view that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist. The locus classicus of this view is the statement in the Padma Purāṇa that Śaṅkara, the formulator of the Māyā doctrine is a prachchanna Baudhā. This statement has been commuted into a commonplace diatribe against Śaṅkara, and those, who are averse to finding anything original and new in Śaṅkara, invent all kinds of argument to substantiate this rather vague and sweeping arraignment of Śaṅkara's philosophical heritage.

A considerable controversy among the students of Indian philosophical thought has grown round this condemnatory remark. Though one cannot easily ignore the very important role played by the Buddhist Logic and Metaphysics in the development of Indian Philosophy in general, and of the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara Advaitism in particular, a close examination of the traditions contemplated in this study, does not warrant a voting in favour of the Paurāṇic impeachment of Śaṅkara's Philosophy.

So that I may help in removing the haze that obstructs a clear vision of Advaitism in relation to Buddhist Absolutism, I have undertaken a detailed analysis of the proposition that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist. Whatsoever might be the nature of the similarities between the philosophical position of Śaṅkara and that of the Buddhists in question, I have treated the statement under examination, at the level of an allegation. The
allegation in question has provoked counter-allegations; so that the entire situation comes up before us as a kind of philosophical litigation, in which the contending parties are apt to produce new-fangled evidence in their favour. The details of the case, and the claims and counter-claims made by the contending litigants, curiously enough, are of a tangled texture. In order to dissolve this tangle, we shall first frame the possible issues, in the form of certain alternative standpoints, that can be taken in respect of the proposition, expressing the indictment under examination, and then assess their relative validity.

When one contends that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist, one thereby means that Śaṅkara is really a Buddhist and only apparently some one other than a Buddhist. What he might be looking like, is not what he actually is. Whereas in his philosophical writings he looks like one expounding and propagating the Upaniṣadic doctrine, he is actually transmitting in a subtle manner, as it were, Buddhism, or more precisely a specific type of Buddhism. Śaṅkara, as his adverse critics maintain, has succeeded in creating an illusion about his real philosophical position. He looks like giving a non-dualistic interpretation of the Upaniṣadic philosophy. But what he looks like doing is not what he actually intends to do. His camouflaged heritage is all too deceptive, and one has to take his preachings with some amount of caution.

In respect of the allegation expressed in the proposition that Śaṅkara is crypto-Buddhist, two alternative positions or attitudes can be adopted: one accepting the proposition as it stands, and the other rejecting it forthwith.

We can expand the two attitudes in the form of the following propositions:—

1. (a) That Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist, is a statement whose truth rests on the assumption that there is an aspect of the Upaniṣadic philosophy, which very well shades into a type of Buddhism, and can be described as non-dualistic. So that if the proposition, 'Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist', carries with it a derogatory meaning, it is so, (1) because the non-dualistic
interpretation of the Upaniṣads, has an inferior value in comparison with other interpretations of the Upaniṣads, and (2) because such an interpretation of the Upaniṣadic doctrine is in consonance with the main purport and upshot of the Buddhist Philosophy, which lacks that value, which other than non-dualistic Upaniṣadic philosophies have. The basic presupposition in this case would be, that non-dualism stands condemned as a philosophical creed, because its evil consequences have become explicit in a certain type of Buddhism. So that even while Śaṅkara is expounding the Upaniṣadic doctrine, his philosophical position in its valuational aspect has to be taken as one identical with Buddhism. This attitude contemplates a condemnation of Śaṅkara, even if he claims to be Upaniṣadic in intention, for the very simple reason that such an interpretation of the Upaniṣads, as has been given by Śaṅkara, is not a welcome and correct interpretation. The correctness of an interpretation of the Upaniṣads is not to be judged by the fact that the Upaniṣads literally bear out such an interpretation. There might be statements in the Upaniṣads which make it plausible to say that the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is non-dualistic. But a literal verification of this nature does not and should not count for much. What counts or what should really count in a philosophical doctrine is its larger truth, viz., what implications it has for life and practice. It might be true that non-dualism is also one of the alternative Upaniṣadic standpoints, but this in itself does not constitute a self-complete warrant for accepting it as valuable. If it is so, this standpoint has to be discarded in favour of other alternative standpoints. When one says that Śaṅkara is crypto-Buddhist, one does not condemn him only because he is a Buddhist. Śaṅkara is condemned in this manner for his Buddhism, as also for the Upaniṣadic vogue, which he is supposed to be wearing. If the vogue fits a Buddhist so well, a Buddhist may go about in that vogue, and preach Buddhism undetected. Because a Buddhist could not have camouflaged his real identity by any other type of Upaniṣadic statements than the advaitic (non-dualistic), such statements have to be anathematized and taken as functionally non-different from all such
statements as can be made independently by a Buddhist of the non-dualistic order.\(^3\)

(b) That ‘Saṅkara is crypto-Buddhist’, might mean that Saṅkara’s real philosophical position is Buddhist in essence, though he has made an attempt to give the impression that he is preaching the Upaniṣadic doctrine. The Upaniṣadic non-dualism only superficially resembles the Buddhist Philosophy of the Void. This superficial resemblance was exploited by Saṅkara for showing that his teaching is really Upaniṣadic in import and character, and this has been accomplished in a masterly fashion by frequently referring to the śruti. From this point of view, there is nothing derogatory in the really non-dualistic philosophy of the Upaniṣads. But Saṅkara is only superficially non-dualistic in the Upaniṣadic sense. There is a type of Buddhist philosophy, which superficially resembles the Upaniṣadic non-dualism. Saṅkara’s genuine philosophy is to be identified with this kind of Buddhist Philosophy and not with the Upaniṣadic non-dualism, which is fundamentally distinct from a philosophy of this nature. So, when one says that Saṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist, one intends a condemnation of Saṅkara, not because he is a non-dualist, but because he is a Buddhist. This criticism of Saṅkara does not intend a censure of all non-dualism. There is only one kind of non-dualism which is unreservedly condemnable, and this is the Buddhist non-dualism, and Saṅkara deserves being censured and looked down upon, not because of his non-dualism, but because of his Buddhist non-dualism. Such an attitude contemplates a real difference between Upaniṣadic advaitism and the Buddhist doctrine of the Absolute, and insists upon an identification of Saṅkara’s position with the latter. Saṅkara’s allegiance to the Upaniṣads only helps him in concealing his identity, which, definitely, is non-Upaniṣadic. References to the Upaniṣadic texts only create the illusion in the mind of Saṅkara’s readers that he is not a Buddhist. He who speaks the words, ‘Saṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist’, thinks that he knows the Upaniṣadic non-dualism better than those, who read this doctrine in the really Buddhist Absolutism of Saṅkara.
(2) That ‘Śaṅkara is not a crypto-Buddhist’ means that Śaṅkara only appears to be a Buddhist, and that, one, who knows both Buddhism and Śaṅkara well, will not identify Śaṅkara’s philosophical position with any kind of Buddhism, whatsoever. The identity-relations between the Upaniṣadic non-dualism and the Buddhist doctrine of the Void is only apparent and not real. Śaṅkara’s allegiance to the Upaniṣadic non-dualism is indubitably certain; and this position being radically different from Buddhist Absolutism, one’s proneness to identifying Śaṅkara’s non-dualism with Buddhist Absolutism, must be condemned as an error in principle.

The alternatives 1 (b) and (2) insist upon maintaining a basic difference between the Upaniṣadic non-dualism and the Buddhist non-dualism, with the only difference that 1 (b) intends to take Śaṅkara not as an Upaniṣadic advaitin but as a Buddhist, and (2) categorically identifies Śaṅkara’s philosophical position with the Upaniṣadic advaitism. The alternatives 1 (a) and 1 (b) envisage a similarity between the non-dualistic philosophy of the Upaniṣads and a type of Buddhism, which can be described as non-dualistic, with the only difference that 1 (a) contemplates a more or less indistinguishable identity of the similars, whereas 1 (b) could only affirm a partial identity of similars, which also is just enough to confuse one, who does not know the two doctrines intimately. The truth of the proposition that Śaṅkara is not a crypto-Buddhist, would in a manner largely depend on the falsity of the proposition that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist. So, one who aims at exonerating Śaṅkara from the charge in question, should be in a position to show (a) that Śaṅkara is not at all a Buddhist and, (b) that there is a basic difference between the Upaniṣadic advaitism and a type of Buddhism that only simulates it. In order to establish this thesis, one should have cogent reasons for refuting the evidence and arguments cited in support of the contention that Śaṅkara is a Buddhist, and for showing that a type of Buddhism resembles the Upaniṣadic non-dualism so well, that the difference between the two is almost indiscernible. If however, one fails to do so,
the charge should be allowed to stand as basically sound and inexorable.

We shall, therefore consider the nature of the arguments which have been given or can be given in support of the contentions that, (A) between the Upaniṣadic non-dualism and the Buddhist non-dualism there is no difference, and (B) that Śaṅkara is a Buddhist, in spite of the fact that he tries his level best to conceal his real identity by making frequent references in his writings to the śrutis, by writing commentaries on most of the principal Upaniṣads, or even by openly condemning the Vijñānavāda and the Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

(A) The Identity of Upaniṣadic Non-dualism and Buddhist Non-dualism:

We have already tried to bring out the implications of this view in our explanation of alternative 1 (a) in respect of Śaṅkara’s relation to Buddhism. Some of the adverse critics of Śaṅkara, may claim plausibility for their criticism by disfavouring the advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣads, not because such an interpretation is not borne out by the Upaniṣads, but because other alternative interpretations are axiologically superior. Further, because the Buddhist doctrine of the Void is not basically different from the doctrinal upshot of the non-dualistic Upaniṣadic Philosophy, a philosopher, who claims to be an adherent to the non-dualistic Upaniṣadic Philosophy, is only propagating the Buddhist view, without the chance of his being detected as a Buddhist. If Śaṅkara is the philosopher, who seeks to expound a non-dualistic doctrine, the fact of his being a Buddhist follows from the nature of the Philosophy preached and practised by such preceptors of the advaitic tradition, to whom Śaṅkara is directly related as a disciple in the line of apostolic succession. One such preceptor, whose doctrine has been taken for an Upaniṣadic version of Buddhism or a Buddhist version of the Upaniṣadic Philosophy, is Gauḍapāda, who is generally accepted as the teacher of Govinda, who was the teacher of Śaṅkara.

Gauḍapāda is the author of a work called the Āgamaśāstra, which is an interpretation of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. Append-
ed to the explanatory comments on the text of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is a fairly long treatise in verse, known as the Kārikā. The entire treatise falls into four parts, which constitute its four chapters: the Āgama-prakaraṇa, the Vaitathya-prakaraṇa, the Advaita-prakaraṇa and the Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa. This treatise has more or less an unparalleled importance in the advaitic literature; and this is amply borne out by the fact that Śaṅkara has himself written a full-length commentary on it. There is absolutely no doubt in respect of the Upaniṣadic origins of the doctrine developed and preached in this treatise. The core of the argument remains confined to the purport of the text of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad; but this Upaniṣad itself provides an opportunity for synthesizing, in some manner, the doctrinal upshot of its text, with the view of reality and knowledge taken in the ViṃśaVāda and the Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism. The doctrine preached by Gauḍapāda can be summarized thus: The Ātman is the highest reality in the sense that it is the only reality. It is none other than the Consciousness, which is its own Ground as well as the Ground of everything else. Since it is the only Reality, any form of otherness must be taken as ultimately unreal or fictional in essence. An analysis of experience reveals in the first instance, three aspects to it: those of waking, dreaming and sleeping without a dream. These three aspects have been described as Viśva, Taijas and Prājña. In the waking state of experience we come across two factors: consciousness and gross objects. The dreaming state of experience also has two factors involved in its composition: consciousness and its objects, which are of a subtle nature. In dreamless sleep, however, there are no objects, though its termination marks a return to a state of experience, dualistic in nature, characterized by subject-object relation. What the case of dreamless sleep indicates, is the non-relational nature of consciousness. Such a state of being, though it is objectless, is not bereft of consciousness. The absence of objects does not imply an absence of consciousness. The presence of consciousness is proved by such statements as “I slept undisturbed”. What is identically present in dreamless sleep and in the waking and dreaming states of experience is conscious-
ness. If consciousness can stand objectlessly or by itself, the relation of dependence between consciousness and objects is only an adventitious relation. Whereas, there can be no objects without a subject, subjectivity considered as Pure Consciousness is foundational in character, and therefore so thoroughly non-relational and self-grounded, that for its existence it has no need of objects. Consciousness as foundational and non-relational is original in the sense that its being does not follow from the fact of self-consciousness, which necessarily implies a relational situation, viz., one in which the self is taken as being conscious, through its being aware of an object. It has therefore not a derived essence. In so far as it is original, it is also transcendent in character—transcendental in the sense, that it is the a priori ground of such experience, as is either actually characterised by a relational nature or is potentially capable of lapsing into such an one. Consciousness in its pure transcendental, has been placed by the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad in a fourth category, called Tūrīya,¹⁰ which literally means ‘number four’. The dualistic universe comprehended by the schema of subject-object relation has been described as unreal and ultimately non-existent. Finite individuality and objectivity, both of which are pluralistic in essence, are grounded in this schema. The subjectivity and objectivity of the dreaming as well as waking states of consciousness are equally unreal. They are the products of the imagination.¹¹ They are illusory in nature. So, is every possible traffic between the subject and the object. The notions of bondage and liberation, cessation and origination,¹² are all inspired by ignorance, and are the products of consciousness in a state of vibration. This vibratory consciousness is called mana which is not the same thing as citta.¹³ So Gauḍapāda speaks of the quenching of this disposition in an attitude which has been described as amanībhāva.¹⁴ Immediacy being the nature of undefiled sentience, all mediation has to be strained out of experience. The ratiocinative cognition belies the nature of the ātman, for it can work only by postulating an other of consciousness. It is however, an erroneous postulation because consciousness-as-such, does not admit of any differentia-
tion, either within its constitution or outside. Otherness and the relational nature of consciousness, are illusory in essence, and are therefore, the products of untutored fancy and imagination. The entire process of the externalisation of consciousness, whereby a dualistic situation is created, has been compared to the illusion created by a fire-brand (alāta) in circular movement.\textsuperscript{15} There is actually no circle (cakra) of fire, but the fire-brand seems to externalise itself at several points, which like a cinematographic reel of disjointed snapshots in movement, creates the illusion of circular fire.\textsuperscript{16} While consciousness as unmoved by the imagination neither posits, nor experiences an object, all objectivity and relative subjectivity must be in essence imaginal.\textsuperscript{17}

This metaphysical theory, though originally Upaniṣadic in essence bears such a semblance to the Buddhist doctrine of the Void and to certain tenets of the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhist Philosophy, that an adverse critic of Gauḍapāda might go to the length of identifying the philosophical doctrine propounded in the Āgamaśāstra with Buddhism. The evidence that possibly can be manipulated by such a critic of Gauḍapāda is of a three-fold nature: (a) doctrinal, (b) methodological and (c) textual and terminological. Hereunder we shall consider in detail the nature of such an evidence:--

(a) \textit{The Doctrinal Evidence}:

In the Āgamaśāstra we come across two doctrines which have not only been mentioned but worked out at length. They are the doctrines of (i) Asparśayoga and (ii) Ajātivāda.

(i) Asparśayoga: It refers to that discipline, by practising which, one has to realise the vacuum-like nature of the subject and the object.\textsuperscript{18} Ultimate Reality is of a non-relational nature. It is neither of the nature of the subject, nor of the nature of the object. The world of the subject and the object, as also one resting on a commerce between these two, is unreal. Its vai-tathya (non-reality) is dream-like. The analogies and similes employed for describing the unsubstantiality of the world and the individual are those of māyāhasti\textsuperscript{19} and gandharvanagara.\textsuperscript{20}
In the Āgamaśāstra we find the mention of asparśayoga in the kārikās quoted below:—

(i) Asparaśyogo nāmaiṣa dūrdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ!
    Yogino bibhyati hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśinah!!
    (III. 39)

(ii) Asparaśayogo vai nāma sarvasattvasukho hitaḥ!
    Avivādo 'viruddhaḥ ca deśitas tam namāmy aham!!
    (IV. 2)

Both the kārikās seek to bring out the nature of the yogic discipline described as asparśayoga. Literally it means 'contactless concentration'. Such a concentration is hard of attainment by the yogins. While in such a concentration there is no fear, the yogins shrink from it under the delusion that it may well mean self-annihilation. Instead of inspiring such a fear, the discipline is to be taken as one, that is conducive to the happiness of all. Besides, it has a doctrinal content free from external discord and internal dissipation. In so far as asparśayoga refers to a state of being characterised by unmitigated immediacy, it entails an ‘experience’, which is so thoroughly non-relational and free from all the possible surd of discursivity that there is no possibility of its being confuted in any manner.

The question is not whether the contentual aspect of the doctrine of asparśayoga is to be found or not to be found in the Brahmanical literature. If this were the question, the answer is that the Upaniṣads do speak of a yoga, the experiential content of which does not substantially differ from that of asparśayoga. That there is a dovetailing of the Upaniṣadic and the Buddhist Abolutisms, is not a point that is to be entertained with a sense of doubt. Therefore, there is a contentual identity between the highest yoga taught by the Upaniṣads and the one taught by the Buddha. The only point that matters in this connection is that the expression asparśayoga is not Upaniṣadic. Professor Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya in his annotations on the Āgamaśāstra is of the opinion that in the Kārikā IV. 2 (quoted above), Gauḍapāda is saluting not the doctrine of asparśayoga (as the upholders of the tradition maintain after the manner of
Sañkara) but the exponent of the doctrine, viz., the Buddha. In his opinion, therefore, the doctrine of asparśayoga, has to be associated with the Buddha. The reasons for taking asparśayoga in this manner are: (1) the word asparśa, even while the expression asparśayoga is in meaning equivalent to the asamprajñāta samādhi of the Yogasūtras of Patañjali or the nirvikalpa samādhi of the Pañcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya, has nowhere been used in the Brahmanical literature; (2) the word ‘asparśa’ indicates the absence of sparśa (contact), which heads the train of mental entities such as vedanā. Asparśa, therefore stands for the complete cessation of mental properties or mentality (caitta or caittasika dharmas). Because vedanā and other mental dharmas are grounded in sparśa, which heads them all, a cessation of sparśa alone ensures a perfect cessation of the caittasika dharmas (mental entities). Prof. Bhattacharya refers here to the Visuddhimārga of Buddhaghoṣa, wherein the state of mental nirodha (cessation) is so clearly described. (3) In Kārikā III. 39, quoted above, it has been said that asparśayoga is difficult to realise. The difficulty in question gives a clue to an interpretation of the expression ‘asparśayoga’. In Buddhist Sanskrit works such words as sparśavihāra and sparśavihāratā have been frequently used. Prof. Bhattacharya refers to the commentary of Sthiramati on the Trīṃśikā of Vasubandhu. Sthiramati tells herein that sparśa means ‘sukha’, ‘joy, content, ease, or comfort’. Therefore sparśavihāra is a state one with it, and asparśavihāra is one without it. In Tibetan sparśavihāra is translated by bde. gnas. pa., literally the Sanskrit equivalent of which is sukhasthiti (sukhāvasthitī) meaning ‘pleasant state’. In Pali sparśavihāra is phāsuvihāra in exactly the same meaning. Thus construed asparśayoga is nothing but asukhayoga (a–sukhayoga) which means ‘a yoga that cannot be attained with ease’. In the Kārikā, III. 39, we find it mentioned that ‘yogins shrink from it, seeing fear, though in fact there is no fear’. So that one might not shrink from asparśayoga, because it is asukhayoga, Gauḍapāda in Kārikā IV. 2 makes the statement that asparśayoga is conducive to the happiness of all (sarvasattvasukho hitak). This sort of mention is also found in Buddhist works like the Saṃyutta
Nikāya Vol. IV p. 228–XXXIV. 19.20, wherein it is said that the highest bliss is felt in the saṁnāvedayitanirodha.\textsuperscript{30} (4) That ‘sparśa’ as pointed out by Asaṅga in his Yogācārabhumi\textsuperscript{31} means ‘experience’, known as āniñjya, ākiñcanyya, and ānimitta. The \(√śprṣ\) means ‘to experience’, so sparśa may be taken as standing for the act of experiencing, as also for that which is experienced.\textsuperscript{32} Impliedly sparśa has its association with the subject-object relation, wherein the relational subjectivity or the relational objectivity never gets drowned into the undifferentiated immediacy of pure sentience. Thus the expression asparśayoga should be taken as meaning that discipline which helps the spiritual aspirant to transcend the subject-object limitation of experience. Whereas sparśa is a state describable as vyutthāna (rising up), asparśa should connote nirodhasamāpatti, which describes a state of things, in which the mind has been completely suppressed. Now, because in the yoga called nirodhasamāpatti there is no sparśa of anything whatsoever, it is rightly named asparśayoga.\textsuperscript{33}

(5) That asparśayoga refers to that yoga, which is the most comprehensive of the yogas, being avivāda (undisputed) and aviruddha (uncontradicted). Such a yoga must be other than the yoga, one comes across in the Brahmanical systems of thought.\textsuperscript{34} The all-comprehensive character of such a yoga is evident from the fact that even the Vedantins, whose philosophical thought is rooted in the Brahmanical tradition, do not hesitate to accept it. The reason why this yoga is associated with the Buddha is that the Buddha was dissatisfied with the yoga taught by his two teachers, Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, whose yoga only represents the seventh and the eighth stages of the yoga of Buddha,\textsuperscript{35} whose final stage is one rung higher up in the traditional ladder of yogic discipline. Asparśayoga, therefore, refers to the ninth stage of dhyāna, called anupūrva-vihāra.\textsuperscript{36} This one transcends all the stages of dhyāna, which fall under two categories: rūpa and arūpa.\textsuperscript{37}

The eight stages are described as follows:

1. \textit{Four rūpa dhyānas}, or the meditations of which ‘matter’ is the object: (i) \textit{prathama dhyāna} or the first stage of medita-
tion; (ii) dvitiya dhyāna or the second stage of meditation. (iii) tritiya dhyāna or the third stage of meditation and (iv) caturtha dhyāna or the fourth stage of meditation.

2. Four arūpa dhyānas or meditations, the object of which is not 'matter': (i) Ākāśanantyāyatana (Pali ākāsānāṇ-
cāyatana) or the place of infinity of space; (ii) Vijñānāntyāyatana (Pali viññānacā) or the place of infinity of pure consciousness; (iii) Ākīnaṇāyatana (Pali ākīnaṇṇā) or the place of nothingness, and (iv) Naiva-saṃjñā-nāsamjñāyatana (Pali nevasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā) or the place of neither of consciousness, nor of unconsciousness.

The ninth is saṃjñāveditanirodha (Pali saṃjñāvedayitanirodha) or the cessation or complete suppression of consciousness and sensation. 38

(ii) Ajātivāda: There are two possible interpretations of the Upaniṣads on account of the presence therein of statements substantiating the two points of view of origination (jāti) and non-origination (ajāti). In the Upaniṣads, for instance, we come across such statements: yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. 39 Or for instance, the Brahmasūtras, which claim to expound the Upaniṣadic doctrine, postulate the doctrine of Brahman, to which is to be attributed the birth etc. of the world and the individual (janmādyasyayataḥ). 40 At the same time we come across, more or less explicitly, the view that denies sambhūti or birth: "They who are attached to sambhūti enter even greater darkness". 41 According to Śaṅkara, sambhūti in this passage stands for Hiranyagarbha or Kāryabrahaman, the germ of the cosmic evolution, the first to come into existence. The text discourages meditation on the Hiranyagarbha. 42 When even the highest and the best in creation, namely, the Hiranyagarbha has been denounced, it follows obviously that the rest of creation is rejected. It is absurd to predicate birth (jāti) of the Ātman. So do we find the Bhūdhāraṇyaka asking, 'Who indeed can generate him?' 43 Employing the method of Adhyāropa (super-imposition) and Apavāda (subsequent removal), all attributes have been denied to the Ātman. In the Bhūdhāraṇyaka itself we come
across the statement: ‘It is not this, not this’. Super-imposition is merely to be taken in the aspect of a scaffold, which after the completion of a building has to be dismantled. The saprapāñca view of the Upaniṣads is only a methodological device intended to aid the understanding and to prepare the mind for a firm grasp of the nisprapañca view. The Jātivāda of the Upaniṣads is, therefore, only a caravansary intended to be left behind, while the quest for truth is in progress. The Upaniṣads, therefore, really mean to teach the nisprapañca view, according to which there is no birth of anything whatsoever.

The Āgamaśāstra, it may be maintained by some, in supporting the doctrine of ajāti (anutpatti, non-becoming, and anutpāda, non-origination) is going a step beyond the merely advaitic point of view, which only claims to identify the Jīva with Brahman, by establishing their non-difference. Ajātivāda seeks to go beyond the two contending versions of jātivāda (the doctrine of origination) — the one speaking of the jāti (origination) of the things from the existent, and the other from the non-existent. The Ajātivādins who maintain the doctrine of non-becoming or non-origination, are a step ahead of the advaitins, in the sense that without first postulating a difference between Brahman and Jīva, and then negating it in the notion of their ultimate identity, they prima facie depostulate all ideas concerning creation. Ajātivāda is thus rooted in Advayavāda (non-twow- ism). The two transcended in Ajātivāda, are Sāsvatavāda (Eternalism) and Ucchedavāda (Nihilism). Becoming (jāti), whereby we explain and comprehend the world of generation, has been grounded by some in ‘being’, that is eternal and by others in ‘non-being’, which by its nature is not. Beyond these two reciprocally refuting versions of jāti (birth or becoming) is the view of ajāti (non-birth, non-becoming or non-origination). The contending two, referred to in the kārikā, are those, who believe that the process of origination is a real process. They are the supporters of Causality as a notion, whereby the nature of things in reality can be explained or comprehended. The two are: (1) the Satkāryavādins (the Sāṅkhyaśas and the Vedāntins) and (2) the Asatkāryavādins (the Naiyāyikas
and the Vaiśeṣikas)—the former explaining the origination of
the world of generation from bhūta (the already existent) and
the latter explaining it from abhūta (that which is non-existent).
One who steers clear of the two contending and alternative ver-
sions of Jātivāda is an Advayavādin.46

Those who maintain that Gauḍapāda is a Buddhist derive
strength from the position that Gauḍapāda has deliberately voted
in favour of Ajātivāda, which is entailed by Advayavāda. Prof.
Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, for instance, points to the authority
of Amarakośa (1.1.14), Divyāvadāna, p. 95 (ed. by Cowell and
Nail-Cambridge) and Mahāvyutpatti (ed. Sakaki) 23, and feels
justified in identifying ‘Advayavādin’ with the Buddha, who
takes the middle path—the majjhimā paṭipadā or the madhyamā
pratipad.47 The Buddha does not hold that anything exists, nor
does he maintain that it does not exist. He rejects both of
these views, which represent a kind of philosophical extremism.
According to him, therefore, nothing comes into being nor does
anything disappear; nothing is eternal, nor has anything an end,
nothing is identical, nor is anything differentiated; nothing
moves hither and nothing moves thither. This is the simple
meaning of Nāgārjuna’s statement:48

Aniruddham anutpādam anucchedam aśāvataṁ!
Anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam!!
Yaḥ pratitya-samutpādam prapañcopesamām śivaṁ!
Deśayāmāsa sambuddhas taṁ vande vadatām varam!!

Further, the doctrine of ajāti referred to and expounded anew
by Gauḍapāda, it may be maintained, had its antecedent formation
in the following couplet of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of
Nāgārjuna:

Na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate!
Na svataḥ parataś caiva jāyate jāyate kutaḥ!!
(MK XXI. 18).

‘A thing does not come into being from itself, nor from
other (≠ not itself), nor from both, itself and other. How
can it come into being?’49
Does not Gaṇḍapāda himself say, “svato vā parato vāpi no kiñcid vastu jāyate”. And does not Śāntideva say, “evaṃ ca sarvadharmānām utpattir nāvasiyate” meaning thereby that the origination of all things is not known?’

The question is not, whether Gaṇḍapāda, in subscribing to the ajāti doctrine of the Advayavādin, remains Upaniṣadic in essence. The question also is not, whether the Advaitavāda of the Upaniṣads is in conflict with the Advayavāda of the Buddhists. That the Advayavāda of the Buddhists, which entails Ajātivāda, is not in conflict with the Advaitavāda of the Upaniṣads, is well supported by the following Kārikā of Gaṇḍapāda:

Khyāpyamānām ajātīṁ tair anumodāmahe vayam!
Vivadāmo na taiḥ sārdham avivādaṁ nibodhata!!

(IV. 5).

'We express our approval of ajāti which they declare; we do not dispute with them, and listen how there cannot be any dispute'.

That Gaṇḍapāda is not expounding a view which is non-Upaniṣadic, is clear from the fact that the Kārikās he has written have only one intention, viz., of presenting the Upaniṣadic doctrine. All that Gaṇḍapāda is doing by subscribing to the ajāti view of the Advayavādin, is intended to show that this doctrine instead of coming into conflict either with the view of the dvaitins (dualists) or the advaitins (non-dualists), reconciles their conflict, and in reconciling them, goes beyond the two, by showing their incompleteness. Professing to be an advaitin, Gaṇḍapāda points to the all-comprehensive nature of Ajātivāda, which instead of coming into conflict with any 'ism', whether advaitic or non-advaitic, only reconciles them in a higher harmony, otherwise unknown to them. According to Gaṇḍapāda, advayavāda or its necessary correlate ajātivāda, is a stand-point higher and more comprehensive than that of advaitavāda. Whereas advaitavāda contemplates first the adhyāropa (superimposition) of prapañca on Brahman and then its apavāda (subsequent removal), advayavāda is entirely free from such a barren rehearsal of postulation (acceptance of duality) only for the sake of depositulation (non-acceptance of duality). Advayavāda is more
parsimonious in nature—unaccompanied by the irrelevance that goes along with advaitavāda, which contemplates the negation of an antecedent position that is hypothetically accepted. While advaitism, is of necessity in conflict with dvaitism and dvaitism is in opposition to advaitism, advayavāda is in conflict with none, for it explains the inadequacy of both. So does ajātivāda transcend the schism of śāsvatavāda and ucchedavāda, the two species of jātivāda.

The critics of Gaṇḍapāda may hasten to denounce the advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣads as Buddhistic in essence for the simple reason that Gaṇḍapāda has declared an absence of conflict between the advaitic view and the advayavāda of the Buddhists, by showing that the latter comprehends the former, by completing it, as also by contemplating it. If this is so, the view of the advaitin, speaking in such a concessional mood about advayavāda, should be taken as a Buddhist view appareled in the outfit provided by the Upaniṣads. And, because such a doctrine dovetails into the quiescent philosophy of the Sugata (the Buddha), it has to be shunned and taken as a dangerous doctrine. The advaitavādin in striking down dvaitism is more in consonance with advayism. For this reason the philosophy of Gaṇḍapāda, even while it is grounded in the Upaniṣads, gives a meaning to the Upaniṣads, which cannot be taken as the best that the Upaniṣads are capable of giving. Of the several alternative standpoints implicit in the Upaniṣads, the advaitic standpoint has to be discarded in favour of the non-advaitic standpoint, not because advaitism has no Upaniṣadic warrant, but because advaitism is easily assimilable in advayism, which is very definitely against the doctrinal intention of the Upaniṣads.

(b) The Methodological Evidence:

The doctrine of the Sugata (the Buddha) as expounded in the Mahāyāna tradition is, broadly speaking, absolutistic in its import. Even so is the Upaniṣadic doctrine. The Real is non-relational in nature, and is beyond thought and speech. It is transcendent to the world of many, which, in the last analysis must be taken to be illusory and unreal. The doctrine of the
Sugata, though, in a manner, it presents a very close parallel to Upaniṣadic Absolutism, is not grounded in the śruti. The validity of its tenets rests on criteria other than scriptural. These criteria are those of immediate experience and reasoning. No doubt the Upaniṣads also consider immediate experience (anubhūti) as the highest among the criteria of truth and reality, yet such doctrinal statements as the Upaniṣads make, are to be taken as infallible, without any further support or doubt. Reasoning becomes so much of a secondary criterion, that its function instead of really being criteriological, is only hermeneutic. It only helps in the interpretation of the śrutis. It is, therefore, ancillary to the scripture, and does not constitute an independent method of establishing the real and the true. Not only that; very often the orthodox tradition in the Vedānta, takes ratiocination and logic as disreputable and not quite trustworthy.

In the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, we come across two independent methods, whereby the real and the true have been established: (1) the scriptural and (2) the rational. Like St. Thomas Aquinas, Gauḍapāda inclines both ways, yet there appears to be some pronounced leaning in him towards the method of ratiocination, logic or the dialectic. Except for the first chapter, which is mainly an interpretation of the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad, the rest of the three chapters seek to strengthen the contention of the first chapter by means of various arguments. Śaṅkara, while commenting on the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, points out that in the second chapter the illusory nature of the world, rooted in the schema of subject—object relation, is demonstrated by means of reasoning (hetuṭah); in the third chapter the non-illusoriness of non-duality is established on logical grounds (yuktīṭah); and in the fourth chapter, the pluralistic views, resting on the universal necessity of the principle of causality, are shown to be mutually contradictory on the strength of logic (upapattibhiḥ).

The method of the Dialectic, is essentially a Buddhist method. Atleast the respectability given to it by the Buddhists, is of an uncontested nature; for the Buddhists seek to establish the non-dual truth by means of rational arguments.
Gauḍapāda, after having interpreted the central doctrine of Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad in the Agmaprakaraṇa, seeks to return to the main argument through a process of ratiocination (yukti). In one of the Kārikās, which reads thus: 'Bhūtato bhūtato vāpi sṛjjamāne samā śrutiḥ. Niścitam yuktyuktam ca yat tad bhavati 'netarat'\(^{53}\), it has been clearly indicated that the śruti, while it speaks of creation either from the existent or the non-existent, has to be given up in favour of that which is ascertained and reasonable. As the argument of the treatise progresses from chapter to chapter, one finds the growing independence of the dialectic, which in the last and the final chapter does not remain merely in the office of a device ancillary to the śruti. The dialectic seeks to establish the absolutist argument by itself. Herein Gauḍapāda has given logical reasons for demonstrating the absurdity of the notion of causality.\(^{54}\) Just as the moving fire-brand produces the illusion of a circle of fire (alātačakra), so does the discursive understanding, rooted in the schema of subject-object dualism, produce an illusion in respect of the existential status of the world and the individuals.\(^{55}\) Just as the relationship of ground and consequent between the alāta and alātačakra is illusory in essence,\(^{56}\) so is all causality unreal and fictional in essence. The dialectic demonstrates the absurdity of the two views of causality, the Satkāryavāda of the Śāṅkhya and the Vedāntins and the Asatkāryavāda of the Naiyāyikas. These two views sum up all the possible versions of causality. With the demonstration of the absurdity of the notion of the cause itself, all talk about creation\(^{57}\) and the reality of the world and the individual ceases to have any meaning.

It may be maintained that the methodology of the negative dialectic is not Upaniṣadic. The arguments given by Gauḍapāda were never given by any Vedāntin of the Brahmanical tradition. They are reminiscent of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna and of the Madhyamakāvatāra and Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti. Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, it appears, found an inlet into the Vedānta through Gauḍapāda.
(c) The Textual and the Terminological Evidence:

(i) Textual: The following parallelisms between the statements made by Gauḍāpāda in the Āgamaśāstra and those found in the Buddhist literature, have been taken as the evidence adduced in favour of the view that Gauḍāpāda is a Buddhist in Upaniṣadic disguise:

i. Gauḍāpāda Kārikā II, 32
   na nirodho na cotpattir na baddho na ca sādhakaḥ!
   na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity eṣa paramārthaḥ!!
   "There is no destruction, no birth, no bound, no endeavouring (for release), no desiring release, no released: such is the real truth".
   or again

   IV. 59. yathā māyāmayād bijāj jāyate tanmayo 'nkuraḥ!
            nāsau nityo na cocchedī tadvad dharmesu yojanā!!
   "From a magical seed is born a magical sprout: this sprout is neither permanent nor persisting. Such are things, and for the same reason".

   It is the "śūnyebhya eva śūnyā dharmāḥ prabhavanti dharme-bhyah", from void things, void things are born, each according to its causes, for "illusion is manifold, being produced by manifold causes" (Śāpi nānāvidhā māyā nānāpratyaśasāṃbhavā, Bodhicaryāvatāra, ix, 12).

ii. Gauḍāpāda, II. 38
   tattvam ādhyātmikaṃ dṛṣṭvā tattvam dṛṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ!
   tattvibhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet!!
   almost echoes the following statement of the Madhyamakavr̥tti, p. 348 (Bibliotheca Buddhica):
   śūnyam ādhyātmikaṃ paśya paśya śūnyam bahirgatam!
   na vidyate so' pi kaścid yo bhāvayati śūnyatām!!

iii. Gauḍāpāda IV. 1
   jñānenākāśakalpena dharmāna yo gaganopamān!
   jñeyābhinnena sambuddhas taṃ vande dvipadaṃ varam!!
In this karika, it is quite probable that the excellent biped may be Śākyamuni:

iv. Gauḍapāda IV. 7—
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyatī!
Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka XV. 8
Prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātupapadyate,

v. Gauḍapāda V. 17, 18—
aprasiddhaḥ kathaṁ hetuḥ phalam utpādayisyati!!
yadi hetoḥ phalat siddhiḥ phalasiddhiś ca hetutaḥ!!
katarat pūrvam utpannam yasya siddhir apekṣaya!!
Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka X. 8
yadindhanam apekṣyāgnir apekṣyāgnim yadindhanam!!
katarat pūrvanispannam ya apekṣyāgnir indhanam!!

vi. Gauḍapāda IV. 19—
evaṁ hi sarvathā buddhair ajātiḥ paridīpitā!!
Laṅkāvatāra—
anutpannāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ.
Satyadvayāvatārasūtra (quoted Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 375)—
evam eva devaputra....sāṁsāro' py paramārthato
'tyantānutpādatā yāvan nirvāṇam api paramārthato
'tyantānutpādatā.

vii. Gauḍapāda IV. 22—
Śvato vā parato vāpi na kiṃcid vastu jāyate!
Sad asat sadasad vāpi na kiṃcid vastu jāyate!!
Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka i, 1—
nā svato nāpi parato na dvābhyaṁ nāpy ahetutaḥ!
uppannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana!!

viii. Gauḍapāda IV. 93—
ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva sunirvṛtāḥ!
sarve dharmāḥ samābhinnā ajam śāmyaṁ viśāradam!!

Even the Madhyamikas maintain that nirvāṇa, sānti or mokṣa is not to be acquired as says Bodhisattva Sarvanivaraṇavāsikambhin in the Ratnamegha Sūtra, quoted by Madhyamakavṛtti:—
ādiśāntā hy anutpannāḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvṛtāḥ!
dharmās te vivṛtā nātha dharmacakra-pravarante!!

ix. Gaṇḍapāda IV. 98—
alabdhāvaraṇāḥ sarve dharmāḥ prakṛtinirmalāḥ!
ādau buddhās tathā muktā budhyanta iti nāyakāḥ!!

Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX. 104—
Sattvāḥ prakṛtyā parinirvṛtāḥ

Pañjikā IX. 198—
sarvadharmaḥ... anutpannāniruddhasvabhāvatvāc ca
prakṛtiparinirvṛtā ādiśāntā ity ucyante.

Laṅkāvatāra—
prakṛtiprabhāsvaravīśuddhyādiviśuddha... tathāgatagarbha.
Aṣṭāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā—
ādiśuddhatvād ādipariśuddhatvāt sattvasya.

(ii) Terminological*: The following is the list of words in the Kārikās, used in a particular sense, originally or mainly in Buddhist works:

1. agrayāna, IV. 90 meaning mahāyāna
2. adhvan, IV. 27... time
3. abhilāpa, III. 37... expression
iv. labdhāvaraṇa, IV. 98... without any covering and unsullied in nature
v. asparśayoga, III. 39 &
IV. 2... contactless concentration
vi. ādibuddha, IV. 92... knowledge i.e., advaya jñāna
vii. ādiśānta, IV. 93... quiescent from the outset, non-originated
viii. kṣānti, IV. 92... patience, acquiescence

*These words along with their meanings have been mostly taken from V. Bhattacharya’s The Āgamaśāstra of Gaṇḍapāda.
ix. catuṣkoṭi, IV. 84  
(kotyaś catasraḥ)  
... four points by the adherence to which the glorious one is always covered but in fact is not touched by them

Catuṣkoṭi comprises the ideas of is, is not, both, and not both.  
(It implies four-cornered negation).

x. tāyin, IV. 99  
... he who instructs and leads by showing the way

(BAP, p. 75: "tāyinām iti- svādhigatamārgadesakānām.  
yad uktam tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktiḥ)

xi. deśita, IV. 2, 42  
... taught

xii. dharma, IV. 1, 6, 8, 10,  
21, 33, 39, 41, 46, 53,  
54, 58, 59, 60, 81, 82,  
91-73, 76, 78, 99.

xiii. nāyaka, IV. 98  
... buddha (for which name it stands)

xiv. nirmitaka IV. 70  
... made of illusion of supernatural power

xv. paratantra, IV. 24, 73, 74  
... one of the three characteristics (lakṣaṇa) or natures (svabhāva) of a thing, viz., parikalpita (imagined), paratantra (dependent) and pariniṣṭhapaṇna (perfect).

xvi. paramārtha, IV. 73, 74  
... absolute truth

xvii. paridīpaka, IV. 21  
... elucidator

xviii. paridīpita, IV. 19  
... elucidated

xix. pākya, IV. 90  
... that which is to be matured
xx. āpya, "" that which has to be allowed
xxi. heya, "" that which has to be abandoned
xxii. jñeya, "" that which has to be known
xxiii. prakṛtinimāla, IV. 98 unsullied in nature
xxiv. prajñapti, IV. 24, 25 practical demonstration
xxv. prapañca, I. 17 duality and differentiation
xxvi. upāsama, II. 35 free from
xxvii. buddha, IV. 19, 42, 80, 88, 98, 99 sākyamuni
xxviii. māyāhastin, IV. 44 an elephant called by illusion
xxix. lokottara, IV. 88 supra-mundane
xxx. laukika, IV. 87 mundane
xxxi. viṣārada, IV. 98, 100 scholar, bold
xxxii. vaiśāradya, IV. 94 illumination, intrepidity
xxxiii. saṃvṛta, IV. 33 confined space
xxxiv. saṃvṛti, IV. 57, 58, 74 vyavahāra
xxxv. saṃkleśa, IV. 24 impurity
xxxvi. sunirvṛta, IV. 93 perfectly merged in nirvāṇa
xxxvii. dharmadhātu, IV. 81 the essence of reality
xxxviii. advaya, II. 33, 35; III. 30; IV. 4, 45, 62, 80, 85 from the perceptible object and the percipient
xxxiv. saṅghāta, III. 3, 10 aggregate
xl. kṛtaka, III. 22; IV. 8 artificial
(B) Śaṅkara a Buddhist in spite of his apparent Vedāntism:

The evidence resting on the doctrinal, methodological and terminologico-textual characteristics of the Māndūkyakārikā, seeks to lend support to the view that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist, only in an indirect manner. The argument from tradition is a very weak argument indeed, and even if it be a fact very much on record, that Śaṅkara was the disciple of Gauḍapāda's disciple,\(^6\) it does not conclusively prove the truth of the contention in question. Therefore, we have now to present direct evidence in support of the view that Śaṅkara is a Buddhist in disguise. By direct evidence in the present context, we understand that evidence, which can be found in the writings of Śaṅkara or of those, who ascertainably are the followers of the Advaitic tradition, after the manner of Śaṅkara. If we maintain that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist, we have to say so, on the basis of an internal evidence. We have to show that Śaṅkara's Vedāntism is only a veil that conceals his actual position. This veil is made of the Upaniṣadic yarn. We have already seen how the advaitic texts in the Upaniṣads can easily lend support to the advayavāda of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. If this is so, Śaṅkara might actually be an advayavādin, who can easily pass for an advaitin and a preacher of the Upaniṣadic philosophy. This veil, therefore, not only conceals the actual identity of Śaṅkara, but it also helps to distort it.

The evidence in question may be arranged under the following heads:—

(i) Ontological—concerning the nature and the status of the world and the individual.
(ii) Epistemological—concerning the criterion of knowledge and the explanation of error.
(iii) Axiological—concerning values in a comprehensive sense.
(iv) Institutional—concerning his influence on his disciples and followers.

(i) The Ontological Evidence: The long and short of Śaṅkara's ontology may be stated thus: Brahman is Pure Con-
sciousness, and Brahman alone is real. The world and the individual are ultimately unreal. The unreality of the world and the individual may be (i) of the nature of akāśakusuma—something not to be found in experience—something utterly non-existent (asat = possessing no being), or (ii) of the nature of dreams—products of the imagination (parikalpita). Śaṅkara’s criticism of the schema of subject—object dualism, as the ground of illusion, has been taken as the condemnation of the two terms in relation as unreal, both severally and jointly. This ontological position simulates (a) Śūnyavāda, which is the condemnation of the reality of the subject and the object, as also of the hyphenation of the two, and (b) Vijñānavāda, which considers the world and the individual as the product of the imagination, which is necessarily rooted in finite subjectivity.

The points to be noted in this connection are: (1) that the world and the individual are non-real and (2) that they are fictional in essence, the locus of the fiction being consciousness itself. The advaitic ontology, it may be alleged, is non-realistic in essence. It is so, for two reasons; firstly, because it is nihilistic and secondly because it is idealistic, subjective in character; for all idealism necessarily presupposes the dependence of objectivity on consciousness, which again must not be non-relational consciousness but relational consciousness—finite, limited, personal or individual. The reason why Śaṅkara’s ontology has been identified with that of the Śūnyavādin is that Śaṅkara is really a Śūnyavādin. Some of the critics of Śaṅkara may refer to a passage in Śaṅkara’s Śārīrakabhāṣya: “Śūnyavādipakṣastu sarvāpramāṇa vipratisiddha iti tannirākaraṇāya nādaraḥ kriyate” (S.B. II. II, 31), and point out that Śaṅkara hesitates to do the honour of criticising the Śūnya philosophy, for the very simple reason that he is himself a Śūnyavādin. Others might say that Śaṅkara, in identifying Atman with Pure Consciousness and Pure Consciousness with the ultimate Reality, is simply pounding Vijñānavāda of the Absolutist kind. Dr. Sharma (C.D.) has made a radical distinction between two kinds of Vijñānavāda: the Svaṭantra Vijñānavāda, which is through and through subjective in character, and the Vijñānavāda of the
Laṅkāvatāra tradition, whose Vijñāna is the same as the Ātman or the Brahman of Śaṅkara. Professor Vidhushekha Bhattacharya in his very illuminating article "The Evolution of Vijñānavāda", (Indian Historical Quarterly, 1934) points to such parallelisms in the Advaitic and the Vijñānavāda thought—systems, that an overlapping of the two isms is not impossible. So it makes little or no difference to say that Śaṅkara is a Vijñānavādin, or Śaṅkara is an Upaniṣdic advaitin. If there is an indiscernible identity-relation between the two, it would not be illogical or absurd to say that Śaṅkara is a Buddhist wearing the robes provided by the Upaniṣads. At any rate, those who have identified the position of Śaṅkara with Buddhism, and have called him a praczchava Baudhā, have Śaṅkara's Māyā doctrine in view. This doctrine relates to a determination of the metaphysical nature and status of the world and the individual. Obviously, Śaṅkara does not accord ultimate reality to either. In the last analysis they do not stand. This position is very similar to the advayavāda of the Buddhists, in which also the world and the individual have no reality at all. The two versions of advayavāda are the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavāda systems of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Mādhyamika dialectically proves the self-contradictory nature of all positions and all points of view. The point of view holding a plea for the reality of the objective world is called realism; and the one postulating the self as real is called subjectivism. The Mādhyamika refutes both realism and subjectivism. Neither ever had any jāti (birth): they never existed in any state of time. Nor can it be said that they are non-existent now, for to say so, would mean that they were existent once, and now are not. So the world and the individual under any metaphysical formulation cannot be legitimately the subject of a meaningful discourse. The reality of the world and the individual is such that it cannot be taken as existent or non-existent. Nor can it be described as both existent and non-existent. Nor can it be spoken of as neither existent nor non-existent. If there is any reality at all, it must be beyond these denominations and predicates, constituted by the concepts of existence and non-existence in their
several phases—four in number, the four *kotis* or categories. The ultimate metaphysical status of every position is vacuity or voidness (*śūnyatā*), which itself is no position at all. Prajñā- 

pāramitā, which is the highest knowledge is itself no position. It is no ontological predicament. It is no situation at all. It is just the realisation of the self-contradiction implicit in all situations and all positions. It is an intuition that comprehends in an undivided sentience the void implicit in every situation. So the Brahman of the Advaita Vedānta as a necessary corollary of the Māyā doctrine, is none other than the Śūnya of the Mādhyamikas. And once this identity is established, Śaṅkara can go on substantiating his central thesis by quoting liberally from the *śruti* (the Upaniṣads). This being so, it can be maintained without any impropriety (for it may be even alleged) that Śaṅkara, the Māyāvādin is actually a Buddhist under the garb of the Upaniṣads. Māyāvāda *via* Ajātivāda (acosmism) accounts for the dovetailing of Brahman into the Śūnya of the Mādhyamikas. The Brahman of Śaṅkara is as much (it may be alleged) transcategorial in nature as the catuṣkotivinirmukta Śūnya. Further, an identification even of the Vijñāna of the Vijñānavādins with the Brahman of the Advaita Vedānta, is not impossible. If the world and the individual are of the nature of Māyā—unreal manifestations, as it were, it can very well be said that they are fictional graftings on the Vijñāna, which admits of no dichotomy, no superimposition of any thing on it. Yajñā-valkya’s philosophy of fictions can very well be used as an Upaniṣadic mantle for muffling up the Imaginism of the Vijñāna-vādin. It is on this ground that Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya speaks of the Upaniṣadic or the Vedāntic Vijñānavāda. So it has been alleged that the preacher of Māyāvāda is a Buddhist; and the world and the individual may be taken as fictional superimpositions on Vijñāna or Vijñānaptimātratā, which is not the Void of the Śūnyavādins but the Pure Consciousness of the Vijñānavādins.

(ii) *The Epistemological Evidence*:

Śaṅkara’s theory of knowledge, consisting, as it does, of the
distinction between two kinds of knowledge—Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika, looks like the Upaniṣadic version of the distinction made in the schools of Māhāyana Buddhism between sāṃvṛta-jñāna and parinīspannajñāna. Such knowledge as one has of the really real, as distinguished from the ‘apparently real’, is characterized by immediacy and absence of relations. The ‘really real’ being an other of what is met with at the level of relational consciousness, can only be comprehended in an undifferen-
tiated intuition. The relational consciousness is riddled with contradictions, so it cannot be adequate for revealing the real. The immediacy of such an awareness postulates a unity of the knower and the known. There are no subject-object distin-
tinctions in such a knowledge.

There are two implications of this theory of knowledge: (a) concerning the validity of the pramāṇas and (b) concerning an explanation of error. In both these respects, Śaṅkara’s theory of knowledge bears a close analogue to the Buddhist view. In so far as all objectivity is unreal in the last analysis, all that reveals and establishes the reality of objects must itself be unreal and within Nescience. In the prajñāpāramitā of the Śūnyavādins, in the vijñaptiṁhiţratā of the Vijñānavādins and in the aparokṣānubhūti of Śaṅkara, there is ‘no talk of ‘me’ and ‘thee’—no talk of objects, and no talk of the instruments of cognition called the pramāṇas. The knowledge of the real is intuitive, and therefore trans-pramanic or pramāṇanirapekṣa. The Bud-
dhists of the Mahāyāna tradition, especially the Mādhyamikas have refuted at length the validity of the pramāṇas. We are thus interested in representing the point of view of those, who on the basis of unerring similarities of a criteriological nature between the Mādhyamikas and the Advaitins, have been led to identify Śaṅkara’s philosophical position with that of the Śūnyavādins. So far as the account of Error is concerned, the Advaitin, the Śūnyavādin and the Vijñānavādin, give more or less similar accounts. All of them ascribe error to the relational way of thinking. Whereas the terms and the relations constituting the discursive way of knowing are themselves unreal, they cannot be employed for knowing that, which is neither a term nor a
relation. Such a schema is inadequate for the comprehension and delineation of the real. All that constitutes the relational schema of knowing is \textit{asat}. How can one expect this schema to reveal anything but the \textit{asat}? If, however, the discursive way of knowing, consisting of a subjective factor contemplating objectivity, is the way we seek to know the real, how can it reveal anything other than a dream or an illusion? The \textit{asatkhyāti} of the Mādhyaṃikas, the \textit{atma-khyāti} of the Vijñānavādins, and the \textit{anirvacaniyakhyāti} of Śaṅkara, are homologous in import.\textsuperscript{65} All these accounts of error are rooted in the fact of a transcendental illusion, which necessarily attends all attempts to take the real as revealed in relational experience. These explanations of error, revealing as they do, a uniformity of pattern, are the exemplifications of the self–same methodology, viz., the transcendental.

(iii) \textit{The Axiological Evidence}:

Value necessarily presupposes the desirability of a certain end, and though something can be valuable in itself, yet there is a necessary connexion between value and striving for achieving it, an act whereby it is believed to be realized. The concept of value invariably postulates a state of being, which being more or less bereft of it, can be processive towards a realization of it, partial or total. If in the real, there is no lack of anything, the real is valuable. But the definition of value is incomplete, if it does not mean something which satisfies some aspect of our being. There necessarily goes along with value a sense of practical comfort. The real must satisfy all the aspects of our being. Value, therefore, becomes comprehensible only in terms of its attainability by us. The axiological aspect of reality is grounded in our needs and the possibility of their satisfaction by means of our efforts. If our efforts have no meaning, the case for an axiological approach to the real must be surrendered forthwith. In the philosophy of Śaṅkara the world and the individual, and all efforts and strivings, and all that one believes one achieves, or is likely to achieve, are within Nescience. There is no meaning in either want or in striving after its satisfaction.
Karma, whereof we understand the universe of actions and reactions, strivings in relation to goals and endeavours in relation to ends, postulates the reality of individuals in an environment, in which they toil and merit condemnations and rewards. But in so far as neither individuality is real nor have the individual's strivings any transcendental assertability about them, Karma cannot be productive of a value that is enduring and beyond the possibility of defilement and corruption. So it follows, that Śaṅkara's metaphysic of existence makes all axiological speculations futile and barren in the last analysis. Whенsoever, it may be urged, Śaṅkara appears as holding a brief for a metaphysic of morals, it should not be understood that he believes that moral effort or any effort, for that matter, has any necessary connexion with Brahmahood. Realization of the Self, in which shall be quenched all wants, has nothing to do with anything coming up in the manner of a moral effort. The practice of moral discipline—a schooling, as it were, in Viveka, Vairāgya, Śatasampatti, and Mumukṣatva might be symptomatic of Brahmahood, but a symptom is definitely not the cause of the state it indicates. He who is one with Brahma cannot act immorally, not because he acts morally, but because action has no significant status in his being. If there are any actions done by such a person, they cannot be motivated by a desire for the attainment of an end. The Jīvanamukta is not one, who has really attained something he had not. Understanding delusion and ignorance as delusion and ignorance, he has cast off the illusion of 'being-really-in-need-of-something-to-be-realized'. The illusion of non-realization is ignorance, and because to be in ignorance is to know the real as it is not, the state of ignorance refers to the unreal, whose transformation into reality must on all hands be acknowledged as a futile rehearsal, a meaningless proposition. The account of real existence, as given by Śaṅkara, infallibly contemplates the ideal of amoralism—a position beyond good and evil. The self-contradictory nature of the phenomenal world, whether it is an implicate of the prajñāpāramitā of the Mādhyamikas, the intimation of the yogic trance of the Viśṇānavādins, or a truth revealed by the Advaitic śrūtis, renders all
effort at reaching the land of heart's desire, otiose and meaning-
less. So even from the axiological point of view the Advaita
of Śaṅkara is more in consonance with the cherished ideals of
the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāras. The Advayavāda of the
Mahāyānists implicit in the Advaitavāda of Śaṅkara, leaves no
room for one to argue for a valuational approach to reality. In
so far as there is no egoity left in the Ātman, a moral act which
has a palpable stamp of selflessness on it, looks more of a piece
with ātmanic existence. Yet such a similitude is not to be
taken as entitling the moral being to a fusion with ātmanic
existence. Similitude between the ātmanic existence and the
manifest cast of morality is no warrant for jumping to the con-
clusion that moral action has the power to induce ātmanic being.
Nor should the similitude be taken as a warrant for characteris-
ing the ātmanic being as moral. Such a being is neither moral
nor immoral. It should be colourless, and for that reason, doubly
indifferent. Under the spell of ignorance alone do we speak as
if the real were moral or empty of immorality or characterized
by a striving to keep away from the path of immorality. This
would be the implication of a fusion of the Advaśītic and the
Advayavādin points of view, and those who have a fondness for
reading Mahāyāna Buddhism in Śaṅkara's philosophy, take to
this type of argumentation.

(iv) Institutional:

We have already cited at some considerable length the
nature of the evidence produced by the critics of Śaṅkara in
favour of the view that Śaṅkara's creed has its source in Gauḍa-
pāda's Āgamaśāstra, a work which on various grounds has been
shown as a sustained argument in favour of the advayavāda of the
Buddhists. It has been held by some that this sceptico-dialecti-
cal tendency in Gauḍapāda is an installation of the metaphysics
and the methodology (logic and theory of knowledge) of the
schools of Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.
The dialectic is largely negative in its upshot. The Brahman
of this so-called Vedāntic tradition, is not much different from
the Śūnya of the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñaptimātratā of the
Vijñānavādins. Gauḍapāda’s position, for instance, has been called Vedāntic Vijñānavāda by Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya.66 According to him there is no difference between the Māyā of the Vedāntin and the Vāsanā of the Vijñānavādin. (Āgamaśāstra, p. cxxxi-cxxxiii). Śaṅkara’s philosophy is the point at which the extremes of the Upaniṣadic Advaitism and the Saugata Advayism have met. The affirmative and the negative aspects of Absolutism are so evenly balanced in Śaṅkara’s writings that one can alternately find confirmation of the Upaniṣadic and Saugata saddhāntas in his philosophy. These two tendencies are even better reflected in the followers of Śaṅkara. Though it would be an exaggeration to put the disciples and followers of Śaṅkara into two watertight compartments—the one entirely Upaniṣadic and the other entirely Saugata—yet we can safely point to some disciples and followers of Śaṅkara, whose main interest is the dialectic. Such an interest is clearly reflected in Tarkapāda of the Sāräkabhaṣya. The dialectic in Sureśvara’s Naiśkarmyasiddhi, Mañḍana’s Brahmaśiddhi, Śrī Harṣa’s Khandanśkaṅḍakhaḍyā and Citsukha’s Tattvapradīpikā is reminiscent of Śaṅkara’s Tarkapāda, which, as we have had the occasion to observe, has its source of inspiration in Gauḍapāda’s Agamaśāstra—a work profoundly influenced by the dialecticians of the Mādhyaṃkī tradition, for instance, Nāgārjuna, whose Vigrahavyāvartanī and Mūlamadhyamakakārikā are enduring monuments of skill in dialectical surgery. Prof. A. C. Mukerji writes as follows: “The germ of scepticism, as we have seen above, was not altogether absent from Śaṅkara’s position, though it did not develop into a full-fledged theory at his hands. But the dialectic method of the Buddhist thinkers provided an attractive weapon for the followers of Śaṅkara who lost no time and energy in applying it in the interest of absolute monism. Hence, as early as the beginning of the ninth century, Mañḍana Miśra sought to expose the self-contradictory nature of the concept of difference in his Brahmaśiddhi, and the dialectic was subsequently applied to all the categories of thought by Śrī Harṣa, Citsukha and other distinguished thinkers of the Advaita School. Thus, the inchoate scepticism of Śaṅkara developed into an un-
qualified misology at the hands of his followers; and the Advaita dialecticians, like Śrī Harṣa and Ānandajñāna, instead of limiting the validity of human faculties of knowledge to the phenomenal world, paved the way to universal scepticism by a negative criticism of every category of thought . . . . The result of this negative criticism is that the Dharmakāya of Nāgārjuna, the Brahman of Śrī Harṣa, and the Absolute of Bradley far from being the crowning phase of man’s search for absolute truth, are simply shot out of a pistol”.

It is further contended that the Mādhyamika Absolute, as for example, the Absolute according to Candrakīrti, “repels all predicates, including those of being and not-being; and Candrakīrti complains that his position should not have been taken to be identical with the doctrine of non-being. But the difficulty is that such an Absolute can neither be refuted nor established; and we cannot be said to advance a single step in the way of establishing the truth of the Absolute by raising it entirely above all categories”.

The scepticism implicit in the Absolutism of Śaṅkara might be construed as one of a very mild type indeed, yet it is enough that such a potentiality could fulfil itself through a wholesale fusion of the dialectic in post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta with the Mādhyamika dialectic. The argument, that the latent scepticism of Śaṅkara is none other than the very diluted form of the Buddhist point of view, gains weight from the employment of the negative dialectic by the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. If one says that the affirmative aspect of Śaṅkara’s philosophy is radically different from anything in Buddhism, one is guilty of gross exaggeration. The example of Śāntideva, the Proclus of Buddhist Philosophy, should be enough to show that not only is Śaṅkara a crypto-Buddhist, but Śāntideva is a crypto-Advaitin. Nor is there a lack of such utterances in Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, which clearly indicate that the Advaitic and the Yogācāra ontologies have a tendency to overlap (Trīṃśikā, 29 and 30 quoted in IHQ, 1934, p. 9). Such overlappings are construed to their advantage by those who read Buddhism in Śaṅkara. The crux of their argument lies in the demonstration of the possibility of the development of the Advaitic Absolutism into Saugata Absolutism, without any violence to Advaitism or
to the Creed of the Buddha.

The evidence cited thus far, for supporting the proposition that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist, has been of a multiple nature. In the first place, it rests on an over-weighing prediliction for a non-advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣadic teachings, and the reason in which such a prediliction is rooted, is constituted by the fact that the advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣads, being non-realistic in essence, stands for the negation of all values (puruṣārthaḥ) including mokṣa. If the world and the individual are of the nature of dreams, shadowy things, unsubstantial and self-contradictory, where is the meaning in struggling through an ocean of troubles to reach the haven of heart's desire. An outright denial of realism makes all effort at the betterment of one's estate an illusory project, the chase of a mirage, the quest of a flower, which even while it is perfect in beauty and excelling in fragrance, is to be found no where. The realistic alternatives have to be preferred; the idealistic and the transcendental have to be discarded. Because the vanity of all effort is so plainly demonstrated in Buddhist transcendentalism, anything which is conceived in the image of such a doctrine must be taken either as an incomplete expression of it, or a knavish adaptation of it, exhibited under a disguise. In the second place, the advaitic genealogy, namely, the descent of Śaṅkara from the Creed of Gauḍapāda, is variously interpreted as the ground for branding Śaṅkara as a crypto-Buddhist. Gauḍapāda's Āgamaśāstra exhibits doctrinal, methodological and terminological similarities with the Saugata philosophers of the Transcendental order. The doctrine of ajāti and aparṣayoga, the dialectical criticism of the doctrines of Uccheda and Śāsvata and the superabundance of the Buddhist terms and Buddhist statements in the Āgamaśāstra, point to a tendency on the part of Gauḍapāda to interpret the message of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad in the light of the Buddhist hermeneutics. The inadequacy of the categories of Existence and non-Existence in a fourfold manner for becoming the predicates of Brahman, is essentially an echo of the Mādhyamika Śūnyata as Catuṣkoṭivinirmukta. Further, the sense of approbation with which Gauḍapāda takes
the objective world and its correlated subjectivity as products of a dream, points to the adoption of the Viṣṇūnavāda phenomenology by Gauḍapāda. Even the conception of amanibhāva (de-mentation), whereof is meant a wholesale quenching of the grāhya-grāhaka predicament, is not originally obtainable in the Upaniṣads. In this explicit form it is only to be found in the Laṅkāvatāra tradition, so well expressed in the Trimśikā of Vasubandhu and in the Commentary thereon by Sthirmati. It is for this reason that savants like Professor V. Bhattacharya do not find any difficulty in calling Gauḍapāda’s philosophy Viṣṇūnavāda of the Vedāntic order, as distinguished from the Viṣṇūnavāda of the Saugata order. The distinction, according to him (Āgamaśāstra pp. cxxxii-cxxxiii) appears to be merely verbal. The Vedāntic Māyā and the Buddhist Vāsanā, which are spoken of as the matrix of subject-object polarity, are taken as identical principles. Nor can the methodological and the terminological evidence be taken lightly. Whereas the Upaniṣads and the various Brahmanical traditions had not developed the Dialectic to the extent of bestowing upon it the efficacy of establishing the philosophical conclusions independently, Gauḍapāda has explicitly registered his preference for Yukti (ratiocination) as against a Śruti of doubtful validity. Further evidence in support of the proposition in question, is produced (i) by Śaṅkara’s own trend of philosophizing, and (ii) by the trend observable in the negative dialectic employed so abundantly by the followers of Śaṅkara, viz., Mañḍana, Suresvara, Śri Harṣa, Citsukha, etc. Śaṅkara’s Buddhist leanings might well look like being all too diluted, to merit this serious notice or this unsparing condemnation; yet the argument does not rest so much on the intensity with which the Buddhist point of view has been sponsored by Śaṅkara as on the unmistakable possibility latent in his thought for being developed into the full-fledged Mentalism of the Viṣṇūnavāda, and the Nihilism of the Mādhyamikas. That Śaṅkara himself obvertly refutes these positions in his Śārīrakabhāṣya (II. ii. 28 to 32) does not in any manner constitute an infallible testimony to the fact that he is not a Buddhist at heart. The adverse critic of Śaṅkara might well say that the
verbal utterances of Śaṅkara are not so reliable in this respect as the actual upshot of his doctrinal position, considered on the whole; and, on the whole, the critic might aver that there is not much to distinguish his Absolutism from the Absolutism of the Vijaññānavādin or the Mādhyamika. The three Absolutes have a pronounced similarity, viz., that they are all transcendental to the world of generation, comprising the finite centres of sentience, the pluralistic universe of objects, and these two in a constant relation, epistemologically describable as the schema of subject-object dualism or subject-object relation. And further similarity is to be found in the ontological status given to these. Whether it is māyā or vāsanā or the contradiction inherent in everything categorial that accounts for the ultimate unreality of the world and the individuals, or whether this unreality is established by the scripture (śruti) or realised in yogic trance or demonstrated by the inevitably antinomical character of reason, is not of much consequence, so far as the larger truth about the situation remains the same. The arguments in favour of the apparently three kinds of Absolutism might be seemingly different, but in so far as the notion of difference itself has no final necessity, the three Absolutes are transcendental in nature, and therefore, beyond all disputation and all contradiction (avivāda and aviruddha). Nor can it be ignored, that in all these Absolutes there is not much of a place for a real consideration of values and efforts relating to the realization of these values. Nor can it be very much disputed that the proteplasmic scepticism of Śaṅkara found a fuller expression in the negative conclusions of the great post-Śaṅkara advaitins like Śrī Harṣa. Thus the critic might say that Śaṅkara’s inchoate negativism, represents a middle position between two extreme, and manifestly negative metaphysical arguments, namely, those of the pre-Śaṅkara and the post-Śaṅkara Non-dualists. Between two extremes of negation, there is an illusorily affirmative ground—the ground occupied by Śaṅkara. But one, who has a proper appraisal of the pre-Śaṅkara and the post-Śaṅkara Advaitavāda will not hesitate in accepting the view that Śaṅkara, in spite of his professed allegiance to the Brahmanical tradition, is a Buddhist by implication, and pronouncedly
and largely too.

Such possibly can be the nature of the argument given by Śaṅkara’s adverse critic for validating the allegation in question.

Our examination of these arguments would be concerned with the consideration of the following points:—

(1) Whether, among the alternative interpretations of the Upaniṣads, the non-advaitic interpretation is superior, mainly because it is realistic in its implication?

(2) Whether Gauḍapāda’s alleged Buddhist leanings in doctrine, method and linguistic habits, should be considered sufficient grounds for believing that he who is an inheritor of his pontifical estate is essentially a Buddhist?

(3) Whether Śaṅkara’s metaphysical doctrine can in any manner be said to contain in it a warrant for reading in it the Mādhyamika or the Vijñānavāda positions?

(4) Whether the Negative Dialectic of the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins is a plea for the doctrine of ‘no-position’, as is the case with the Mādhyamikas? In other words, can we say that the Mādhyamika standpoint in Logic is necessarily symptomatic of the metaphysical doctrine of Śūnyatā?

(5) What is to be our attitude in respect of the charge under consideration? Do ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ to the question, ‘Is Śaṅkara a crypto-Buddhist?’, constitute a disjunctive totality of alternative standpoints in relation to the question?
CHAPTER II

THE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UPANIŚADS

There are two forms of the *Philosophia Perennis*: (1) the realistic, according to which the world (jagat) and the individual (jīva) are real in the last analysis, and have an existential status coeternal with God, though in some manner subservient to His Will, and (2) the transcendental, according to which the world and the individual are unreal in an ultimate account, and that which is real is absolutely so, without in any manner being determinable in terms of world-consciousness or ego-consciousness. The transcendental form is apt to express itself in two manners: (a) wherein the real is exclusive of what constitutes the content of the universe conceived realistically, and (b) wherein the real, somehow comprehends the universe of the realist. We shall hereafter call these two kinds of Transcendentalism, rigoristic and synoptic.

In the history of Indian thought these two kinds of Transcendentalism are found in the Advayavāda of the Buddhists and the Advaitavāda of the Vedāntins respectively. Between Advayavāda and Advaitavāda there is one thing in common, viz., the belief in the ultimate reality of that which transcends the universe, the plural mass of sentience and objectivity. They are both Absolutists, yet the one kind of Absolutism makes the real so entirely transcendent to the many, that the essence of reality may be understood as the negation of all otherness. So does the Buddhist Absolutist maintain otherness as unreal (asat), or of the nature of dreams (svapnavat)—a construct of the imagination. The Advaitin, however, accords a pragmatic status to heterogeneity or otherness. Herein the ‘Philosophia Perennis’ is conceived of as not excluding and negating the appearances, but (even while otherness is taken as unreal in the last analysis) as
comprehending this otherness, just for showing, how it is unreal. The Advaitic absolute is the astrolabe of the unreality of the world and the individual. While maintaining that there is no other in the Absolute, the Advaitin speaks of otherness only as an appearance, a seeming otherness, which can have its locus in the Absolute, in which alone it is both sublated and understood. In the Advaitic architectonic of knowledge, the world and the individual are given pragmatic reality. At the pragmatic level they are not to be thought of as the products of the imagination of a finite centre of sentience. As against the transcendentalism of the rigoristic kind, Advaitism is not a species of subjectivism. The Advaitin is a realist and a pragmatist. The world here and now, the objects of experience and the field of one's strivings and moral endeavours, are not the product of some individual's reverie or fancy. They are coextensive with a hard reality, which is only discovered and known by a finite knower, and never constituted or made by him. Yet realism and pragmatism are merely attitudes or standpoints working themselves out under a limitation. For this reason they cannot claim a transcendental validity and status in the architectonic of spiritual experience. Such is the advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣads.

If the advaitic interpretations of the Upaniṣads have been erroneously confused with the transcendentalism of the rigoristic type (the Buddhist, for instance), the fault is not of Advaitism; it lies in a mistaken way of understanding it. Such a misunderstanding has been the root cause of the realistic reaction against Advaitism. In so far as the Upaniṣads do afford the possibility of a realistic interpretation, the transcendental meaning has been pronounced as dangerous and degenerate. For this reason the advaitic view of the Upaniṣads may be condemned as Buddhist in essence. There is no doubt, that there are passages in the Upaniṣads, in which one can find the Negative Transcendentalism of the Buddhists. As for example, the Chhāndogya describes the emergence of Being from Non-Being, which alone was in the beginning.1 The metaphysical doctrine of Sadabhāva (Non-Being), which is found in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad has
been alluded to by Śaṅkara as a Buddhist doctrine. The psychological corollary of this view is found in the Buddhist theory of Anātma (soullessness). The anātma view might be shown as well-anticipated in the Kathopanishad discussion regarding the nature of the self: some maintaining that after death the soul exists, and others that it does not. The disgust for the momentary worldly pleasures, entailing a pessimistic view of things, cannot be missed by one who hears Nachiketas saying that all things are evanescient and fleeting, unsubstantial, dream-like, full of pain and suffering. Herein we find two essentials of Buddhism well illustrated: (i) the doctrine of momentariness, and (ii) the doctrine of universal suffering. Nor can one fail to find an unerring exhortation to ascetic moralism in the Brahadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, wherein one is asked to give up the desire for wealth and progeny and to take to the life of a mendicant. If cessation of suffering is Nirvāṇa, and if this is the bonum consummatum, the way to it lies through the ascetic’s attitude towards life, the morality of self-denial. The pan-mentalistic doctrine of the Vijñānavādin is anticipated in an embryonic form in the Aitareyopaniṣad, which tells us that everything is mental in essence and that the measure of the mysteries of existence is to be found in prajñā, which became the vijñāna of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra.

The realist Vedāntic traditions in spite of their differences have combined together to undermine the advaitic interpretation of the Upaniṣads, not because there are no advaitic utterances in the Upaniṣads, but because the advaitic view on account of its transcendentalist leanings is apt to lend support to the Buddhist doctrine of Non-Being and soullessness, and to the view that objectivity and self-hood are imaginal constructs out of the ever-renewing flux of sentience.

This looks like an unwarranted estimate of both the Buddhist and the Upaniṣadic transcendentalism. The Buddhist transcendentalism has no place in its speculum mentis for a realistic metaphysics and a realistic theory of knowledge. The world and the individual are unreal in the last analysis; it does not make much difference whether their unreality is like the
unreality of a thing non-existent (asat) or like the unreality of a thing which is merely a product of the imagination (parikalpita). The Advaitic transcendentalism is not so negative in its implication. In the Advaitic architectonic of knowledge, the world and the individual are real for all practical purposes. They are neither entirely non-existent, nor are they imaginal constructs. As against the nihilism of the Mādhyaṃnikas and the subjective idealism of the Vijñānāvatins, we have the realistic tradition fully affirmed in the pragmatism of the Advaita Vedānta. Yet pragmatism is transcended in Pure Consciousness, which admits of no relation and no pragmatic trading.

Thus we find that instead of its being negative in its implication, the Advaitic metaphysic of experience is so comprehensive that the realistic position stands liberally affirmed in it. In Advaitism the extremes of realism and idealism have met. Whereas the Transcendentalism of the Buddhists has no patience with either idealism or realism, the Transcendentalism of the Advaitins contemplates realism and idealism as partially true positions. The world is real in its ontological aspect. In its epistemical aspect, it must necessarily be 'my world', so its essence is idealistic. Nor has pessimistic negativism, resulting in an ascetic order of moralism, anything to do with the realization of a state of transcendental finality, which the Buddhists describe as nirvāṇa. The advaitin, generally speaking, is not prepared to accept the argument asserting the transition from moralistic asceticism or any kind of moralistic effort to transcendental finality (mokṣa). Brahman or transcendental finality, being in essence the only ens, cannot be the consequence of any effort. If ascetic morality entails a plea for transcendental finality through its envisaging a negation of phenomenal existence, it sets before itself an ideal, which it can attain only by cancelling itself out. And if this is so, it cannot be said to be the cause of transcendental finality. Morality, so contemplated, points to the cherished goal and yet it has no locus standi outside the world of practice. However, the advaitin takes the world and the individual as real at the level of vyavahāra (pragmatic intercourse). So is morality symptomatic of an ideal end,
which cannot be its consequence.

While the Transcendentalism of the Buddhist militates in an unmitigated manner against all realism, and has a tendency to overestimate the efficacy of moral effort, which it identifies with an activistic attitude of exclusion and negation, the advaitic transcendentalism speaks of realism in a concessional manner, as it were, and without condemning the ethical way as barren of transcendental finality, it accepts it only as a symptom of spiritual awakening, marking an attitude clearly inclined towards a transcendental destiny, which it neither fashions nor brings about. So we see that the advaitic interpretation of the Upanisads is superior to non-advaitic interpretation, because it comprehends the two extremes of non-advaitism—Empty Transcendentalism and Realism. It is more catholic and comprehensive in its outlook than other alternative points of view.
CHAPTER III

THE LEGACY OF GAUḌAPĀDA: A RE-ASSESSMENT

Śaṅkara has not only quoted with approbation two of the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra,¹ and referred to Gauḍapāda, as one well-versed in the tradition,² but has also written a full-length commentary on the Āgama-śāstra of Gauḍapāda. This somehow establishes Śaṅkara’s affinity with the philosophical creed of Gauḍapāda. And if it is accepted, as shown above, that Gauḍapāda is a Buddhist, then there is an overwhelming probability in favour of the contention that Śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist.

In our opinion the contention in question has no element of necessity, so far as its validity is concerned. Even if it is accepted that Śaṅkara was Gauḍapāda’s disciple’s disciple, it cannot be said with an unerring certainty that Śaṅkara’s philosophical position is a carbon-copy or an unmitigated adaptation of Gauḍapāda’s. The proposition that ‘śaṅkara is a crypto-Buddhist’, could be entailed by the proposition that ‘Gaudapada is a crypto-Buddhist’, only when it could be universally acclaimed that a disciple or a disciple’s disciple, could under no circumstance deviate from the position of his master. It appears that there is nothing to prevent a disciple from differing considerably from his master. Even among the disciples of Śaṅkara, we come across two different camps, one represented by the upholders of the Vivaraṇa and the other by the upholders of the Bhāmati tradition.³ A disciple may radically alter the views of his master or may accept them with radical amendments.

This is only one way of arguing about Śaṅkara’s non-Buddhistic Vedāntism. Two other ways may be adopted for affirming the same conclusion: (i) that shows that Gauḍapāda himself was not a Buddhist and (ii) that maintains that Śaṅkara’s philosophical doctrine has to be dealt with on its own grounds.
Hereunder we shall critically examine some of the arguments which are advanced in favour of the proposition that Gauḍapāda is a crypto-Buddhist. An independent treatment of Śaṅkara’s position will be considered separately, lower down.

*Refutation of the Alleged Buddhism of Gauḍapāda:*

The adverse critic of Gauḍapāda has to depend too much on certain similarities between Gauḍapāda and Buddhist philosophers for showing that Gauḍapāda is a Buddhist in the Upaniṣad-ic disguise. The similarities as we have observed are the similarities of doctrine, method and terminology. In our opinion these similarities do not point necessarily and unmistakably to the conclusion that the philosophical position of Gauḍapāda is identical with that of the Buddhists. On the other hand, we have to consider these similarities in a larger context, namely, the context of Gauḍapāda’s entire philosophy, as found in the four prakaraṇas of the Āgamaśāstra. Besides, we have also to find out the motive of Gauḍapāda in adopting a seemingly identical doctrine, methodology and terminology. It is quite possible that in doing so, Gauḍapāda was not preaching the Saugata doctrine so much, as making use of most of the arguments and devices employed by the Buddhists for proving the truth of the Advaitic stand, which is originally and essentially Upaniṣadic.¹

The doctrinal evidence in favour of an imputation of the kind we are considering, consists in showing that Gauḍapāda unreservedly holds a brief for the Asparśayoga of the Vijñānavādins and the Ajātivāda of the Mādhyamikas.⁵ In our opinion such an imputation does not establish the point that Gauḍapāda was a crypto-Buddhist. The question is: Can Vijñānavāda be combined with the Mādhyamika position? For all we know, these two schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism have bitterly criticized each other.⁶ To maintain that Gauḍapāda subscribed to the doctrine of Asparśayoga and also argued in favour of Ajātivāda amounts to ascribing two different types of philosophical positions to him. Even if both the Vijñānavādin and the Mādhyamika are absolutists, they establish their Absolutism in two en-
tirely different ways, and the contents of their Absolutism are radically different. If Gauḍapāda is really an exponent of the Asparśayoga, he must believe in the establishment of the Absolute Reality of Vijñāna not by means of ratiocination and the dialectical procedure, but by means of meditation, which in its final stage points to a position in which nothing except consciousness remains. The Vijñāptimātra of Vasubandhu, which is the expression par excellence of the Vijñānavāda point of view, envisages a bracketing or a phenomenological reduction of all objectivity from the stream of sentience, called Vijñāna. This bracketing or phenomenological reduction is effected by meditation or dhyāna, which has been described as Asparśayoga or contactless concentration. It is a state of consciousness having no contact with objects of any kind whatsoever. The meditation in question abstracts or eliminates an element from the subject-object dualism, and what is left is pure consciousness or pure subjectivity. In so far as objectivity does not establish the reality of this Vijñāpti (Consciousness), it is Vijñāptimātra or non-relational consciousness, which is left in the state of Samādhi, comprising the Asparśayoga. There being no dependence of this consciousness on anything other than itself, consciousness in this aspect attains to its pure transcendentality. If, however, what is left in yogic ecstasy be pure sentience, one does not know, how this ontology can be reconciled with the Mādhyamika position, in which one fails to find anything, even in the semblance of either an object or a subject. The doctrine of ajāti establishes is an unmitigated void, which is neither in the image of an abstracted object, nor in the image of a bracketed subject. The Absolute of the Mādhyamika (if any) is neither like a subject, nor like an object. No position, whatsoever, in the opinion of the Mādhyamika is, free from contradiction. In the Alātaśāntiprakāraṇa of the Āgamaśāstra we find Gauḍapāda mixing up Asparśayoga with Ajātivāda. If one argues in favour of a combination of these positions in Gauḍapāda’s metaphysical doctrine, one is insisting on something which is very much in the nature of an impossibility. The only way in which Asparśayoga and Ajātivāda can coexist in the self-same system of thought,
lies in taking both Asparśayoga and Ajātivāda as alternative methodological devices for establishing the vacuum-like actuality of the world and the individual. The transcendental destiny of these entities lies in their self-refutation. What comprehends the knower and the known is their over-all futility, their self-contradictory actuality, their nothingness in the last analysis. But nothingness itself being nothing, it would be a profitless enterprise to give to nothingness a local habitation and a name, whereby nothingness may be converted into an ens—something really existent. The truth about the situation is that the Mādhya-

mika has no ontology. If Gauḍapāda is taken as a Buddhist, combining in himself the Vijnaptimātratā of the Vijñānavādin and the Ajāti of the Mādhyaṃmika, one is faced with a situation which is absurd and curious, and is irrevocably self-contradictory. So, it seems, that Gauḍapāda’s Absolutism is not to be taken as an amalgam or a compound of the Vijnāna of the Vijñānavādin and the Śūnya of the Śūnyavādin (Mādhyaṃmika). There is no desire on the part of Gauḍapāda to construct a new Absolute by blending these two. He is only showing that both Asparśayoga and Ajātivāda refer to alternative methodologies-meditation (yoga) and dialectic (prasaṅga)—for establishing the unreality of the world and the individual, in every possible situation. What is of interest to Gauḍapāda in Asparśayoga and Ajātivāda is not what these doctrines postulate as their affirmative ground. He is only interested in demonstrating that the world and the individual are not real in the last analysis. In our view, there is a fundamental difference among the Absolutisms of the Vijñānavādin, the Mādhyaṃmika and the Advaita, and yet the extremes for which these doctrines stand have met in respect of the position concerning the ontological status of the world and the individual, variously described as the subject and the object, the ego and the non-ego, finite subjectivity and mundane objectivity. The Vijñānavādin’s contemplation (dhyāna) gives the intimation of unsubsantiality of the world and the individual. The Mādhyaṃmika dialectic proves it. The Advaitic śrutis reveal it. However, to go beyond this point, would amount to a misreading of the larger truth of the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍa-
pāda. Whereas the Absolute of the Vijñānavādin is the universal flux of sentience, and that of the Mādhyamika a void, which stands waiting as the irreversible destiny of all that we know or can possibly know, the Absolute of the Advaitin is neither an abstract sentience of the kind talked of by the Vijñānavādins, nor is it beyond representations, literal and symbolic as the Mādhyamika believes. The Advaitin should not be misunderstood as saying that the Absolute is indescribable (as the Mādhyamika maintains). Nor should there be a misgiving about the symbolic representation of the Brahman in the manner in which the Vijñānamātra has been symbolized by the Vijñānavādin. The Brahman is no doubt indescribable in a sense, for no categories of thought are adequate to a comprehension of it; and in this respect there is a likely similarity between the position of the Advaitin and the Mādhyamika. The Advaitin in the manner of the Mādhyamika believes in the self-contradictory nature of the categories. So does the Advaitin think that neither the world nor the individual is real in an ultimate analysis. All possible ways of contemplating the nature of reality in terms of the categories of thought are the ways in which thought seeks to know an other. There being no otherness in Brahman, such categories as work though the schema of otherness can only be productive of a dissipation of Brahman. Yet the Advaitin does not stop at this point. Though the Brahman is indescribable in terms of the subject-object schema, the Brahman is not a nullity for that reason. The self-contradictory nature of the categories would have no significance in the absence of a criterion which alone can comprehend their inadequacy. Nullity, being the logical consequence of the self-contradictory nature of the categories, cannot be taken as anything substantially different from a full-fledged state of self-contradiction. Absolute nullity might as well be conceived as the most perfect state of self-contradiction. Between the self-contradictory nature of the categories and the absolute nullity the difference is one of potentiality and actuality. While the categories through a process of progressive self-manifestation show their actual nullity, they attain to nullity in the last analysis. But this nullity has no
ontological status in the Mādhyamika philosophy. Perhaps the Mādhyamika thinks that giving an ontological status to nullity would involve an infinite regress. If one thinks of nullity as a position, one is inviting trouble, for in this circumstance nullity would become a category among other categories. The position of the Advaitin is radically different from this deontologizing situation implicit in the Mādhyamika dialectic. The Advaitin would say that if nullity (absolute self-contradiction) is the destiny of all categories, it can only be comprehended and understood in the light of a norm, which does not betray this weakness. Self-contradiction is understandable only in the light of non-contradiction. The nīsus of the categories to absolute self-contradiction is to be understood only as a total deprivation of an absolute non-contradiction. Self-contradiction cannot be self-comprehending. Nullity cannot be the absolute criterion of Reality; much less can it be identified with ultimate Reality. The absolute nullity of the categories itself needs a comprehending norm. At least this one which comprehends universal nullity must be universally existent, and must also be sentient. It must know the nullity of all, and must also be; for the postulation of universal intelligence minus existence is a contradiction in terms.

The Absolute of the Advaitins therefore, is different from the Absolute of the Mādhyamikas. The Absolute of the Vijñānavādin also is not the same as the Absolute of the Advaitin. While maintaining the unreality of the world and the individual the Vijñānavādin manipulates a transcendental situation in trance, and bracketing consciousness from the objects (dharmas), identifies consciousness with absolute reality and describes the Absolute in terms of consciousness-symbolism. To the Advaitin this symbolism is not very inappropriate. Only it gives an all-too incomplete picture of Absolute Reality. Therefore, the symbol of subjectivity or consciousness is misleading and partial. As against the Mādhyamika, the Advaitin would say that Nullity is not, and cannot be identified with the Absolute. With the Vijñānavādin the Advaitin might say that the Absolute should be self-luminous like consciousness, but alongside of this he would also say that it is existent like the object. The Absolute
of the Advaitin is not only a self-comprehending sentence; it is also a self-complete existence. It is intelligibility-cum-existence par-excellence. Even while the Advaitin affirms with the Mādhyamika that the real is neither a subject, nor an object, nor a subject knowing an object, nor an object being known by a subject, he does not affirm that the real cannot be symbolically designated and understood as an Ens that somehow combines in itself the two transcendental functions of unconditioned intelligibility and unconditioned existence. The Vijñaptimātratā of the Yogācāras is only an incomplete symbol of Reality. The Real of the Advaitin, whose historicity is grounded in the śruti, is designated by the symbol AUM, which is intended to give the intimations of the fullness of being as indistinguishable from the fullness of sentence. The Vijñānavādin takes the objective world as the product of the imagination for the very simple reason that unconditioned or transcendental subjectivity (Vijñaptimātratā) is considered as excluding objectivity. This exclusion is patently implied in the reduction of objectivity in the state of Saññāvedayitanirodha of the Yoga described as asparśayoga (contactless concentration). The Ātman of the Advaitin is necessarily implied in the Ajātivāda of the Mādhyamika and the Asparśayoga of the Vijñānavādin, but neither the Mādhyamika nor the Vijñānavādin realized that the Ātman of the Advaitin, which is a self-comprehending (Svaprakāśa) existence (Sattā), alone contemplates in entirety, the truth only realized in a half-hearted manner by the Buddhist Absolutists. The Mādhyamika errs by not realizing the necessity of an absolute criterion for showing the self-contradictory nature of the categories. The Vijñānavādin is mistaken in lifting subjectivity to a transcendental pedestal, without ever taking transcendental subjectivity as the prior of all existence.

Nor can it be said that the Āgamaśāstra is not one continuous treatise or that there is a disparity of motives between the first prakaraṇa and the other three. The first prakaraṇa seeks to establish the reality of the Ātman, which standing as it does for the principle of consciousness, pervades all the states of experience—Viśva (Waking) Taijas (Dreaming), Prājña (Dream-
less sleep) and Turiya (Pure contemplation). This is the affirmative aspect of the Āgama doctrine. The negative aspect consists in proclaiming the unsubstantial nature of the duality expressed in the subject-object relation. The first chapter might show a tendency to Āgama-prādhānya but it does not mean a total avoidance of Yuktī and Tarka. The second chapter is predominantly logical in its import and so is the third. The former proves by means of argument the unreal nature of duality, the latter the reality of the non-dual ens. But so long as the central truth, namely, the reality of the Atman and the unreality of the world and the individual is not ignored, it does not matter whether the truth is merely stated in the words occurring in the Śruti or it is reasoned out by means of argumentation. If it can be shown that there is no lack of consonance between the ἰπσίσιμα verba of the Śruti and the upshot of demonstrative reasoning, any such thesis, according to which the fourth chapter, the Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa, is an independent treatise altogether, can be shown to be absurd. The dialectic employed for proving the absurdity of the notion of cause or for refuting the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas, presents a seeming similarity with the prāsaṅgika procedure of the Mādhyamika argumentation; but this seeming similarity has not to be stretched too far. The dialectic of the Vaitathya-prakaraṇa, the Advaitaprakaraṇa and Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa of the Āgamaśāstra is not like the dialectic of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā or Vigrāhavyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna or like the dialectic of Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvataṁ or his Prasannapadā. The dialectic of Gauḍapāda even while it shares the Mādhyamika zeal for showing the hollowness of the apagogic proof, is not entirely negative in essence and purport. What the dialectic aims at in the last three chapters is a rational vindication of what has been said in the Āgama-prakaraṇa. We have already distinguished at length among the Absolutes of the Mādhyamikas, Vijñānavādins and the Advaitins, so there is no likelihood of our misinterpreting the dialectic of the Āgamaśāstra. What the dialectic aims at showing in case of all the three schools of philosophy is the unreality of the world and the individual. But the Absolute Truth and Reality in all the three...
schools is conceived differently. There may be, and is, a one—one relation between the logical standpoints of the Advaitin on the one hand and the Mādhyaṃika and the Vijñānavādin on the other, atleast in respect of the existential status given to finite individuality and the object-world, but the nomenal presuppositions of such a logic in each case are differently conceived. The Ātman of Gauḍāpāda, the Vijñāna of Vasubandha and Asaṅga, and the Śūnya of Nāgarjuna and Candrakīrti are not only designated in different ways, but have inspired their adherents to live differently and have different religions and principia ethica.

In respect of the doctrinal details, the following points more or less conclusively indicate that in spite of his acceptance of the Buddhist position in respect of the world and the individual, Gauḍāpāda is a representative of the Vedantic tradition:

What has been described by Gauḍāpāda as the illuminating ātmānic experience, is transcendent to the dualism of the subject and the object; yet one must be mistaken in principle, if one takes it for a state that can be induced by abstracting objectivity from the subject-object relations. The Vedāntin that Gauḍāpāda is, no doubt believes with the Buddhist that reality lies beyond the relational schema of subject-object dualism, but a belief of this nature does not imply that Gauḍāpāda acquiesces in the account of reality given by the Vijñānavādin. If Reality is identified with an abstract subjectivity obtained through the yogic process of catharsis, such an identification has verily to be taken as mistaken in essence. Such is not the Ātman or the Brahman of the Advaitin. In the first place it is almost an impossibility to drain objectivity out of the stream of experience; atleast as much of an impossibility, as to make the ocean empty by throwing its water out, drop by drop on the edge of Kuśagrass. Even if it were possible to do so, the remainder left would not be the reality, which transcends subject-object dualism. That which transcends the relational experience, and its schema, cannot be obtained by the draining out of objectivity. What would remain after such an operation would not be the real self, designated by the Advaitin as Ātman or Brahman. It
would be on all hands only an abstract subjectivity, which if at all describable as self, would be the self of the state of stupor—one steeped in utter ignorance, perfectly oblivious—a self standing, as it were, in an intellectual black-out. The Yogis through the discipline of contemplative abstraction are able to get themselves merged in such a state of stupor, trance or coma. This state has been described by Gauḍapāda as the state of laya (tracelessness). This is the extreme opposite of the agitated state of consciousness (vikṣiptam). If the subject-object experience is characterized by the presence of agitation in it, the state of laya is a state of undiluted stupefaction. Instead of being described as a state of higher knowledge, it should be taken as one of unqualified ignorance. So the spiritual aspirant is advised by Gauḍapāda not to remain in this state, even if this state is attended by experience of felicity. He is admonished to return to the state of agitation, and then through discrimination to steer a middle course between the extremes of agitation (vikṣepa) and stupefying trance (laya). Yet in the purity of such a state of consciousness, which occupies the no man’s land lying between the two extremes, there is a tendency to the enjoyment of the blissfulness of the situation. This, however, vitiates the theoria-like uncontaminability of the Atmanic experience, for the enjoyment of blissfulness cannot be possible without a dichotomy of the self into a vicarious dualism of the experimenter and the experienced. This vitiation is described as the Kaṣāya (contaminating after-effects left by the state of agitation). The term which describes Atmanic equanimity is samādhi, which is not to be understood as a state of trance or blissful stupor but as a state of intellectual stability, contemplating all otherness as merely a distortion of its own instinctive simplicity and richness. Even while witnessing the flood of objectivity, the Atman is not swayed by it. Witnessing the seemingly endless pageant of objectivity, it is as unruffled and as unagitated as the self steeped in an objectless trance of self-oblivion. Yet while such a state is akin to trance, it does not mean that it is one in which the procession of events has become non-existent.
This doctrinal situation is a half-way house between the realistic and the subjectively idealistic conceptions of reality.\textsuperscript{18} The real is neither like an object (self-existent in exclusion from the self), nor is it like the subject or sentient abstracted from the object. Still it is like both. It has, as it were, the Činmātratā of sentience and the Sanmāratā\textsuperscript{19} of objectivity. And even then, such a blend of essences can only be a symbolic portrayal of the real. But the symbol, at any rate, is not the Ātman itself. How much different in import is this account from the Vijñānāvādin’s view of reality or the Realist’s account of it, wherein one finds an over-all ontological status given to bracketed objectivity. The Ātman of the Āgamaśāstra is not an object among other objects; nor is it the subject of the subject-object situation, transported through yogic abstraction to a state of aloofness; nor is it to be taken as nothing, the final destiny of every conceivable entity according to the Mādhyamika. The Ātman of the Āgamaśāstra is to be understood by the aid of a composite symbol, which combines in itself the existence of objects, the reason of the subject, and the absolute criterion that comprehends the nothingness of every conceivable entity. In Gauḍapāda’s philosophy of the Ātmanic Experience the extremes of realism, subjectivism and nihilism have met. The Ātmanic Reality of the Āgamaśāstra lies between the extremes of laya and vikṣiptatā. By bracketing ideality from the objects through a process of Yoga known as Asparśayoga, the transcendental reality is neither reached nor posited. What is obtained is a thin and bare abstraction, which is something less than the experiential content of the state of vikṣiptatā—the state of relational awareness. Reality is neither a state of laya, nor of vikṣiptatā. Reality is Ātman or Brahman, which, while it is consciousness, is not less than the content of relational experience; and while it is so, it is the ground of all relational contents. It is the transcendental condition of the intelligibility of the agitated and the quiescent states of being. What is found in these states is the deprivation of this transcendental reality. While it wavers between the two extremes of self-extinction (laya) and self-ramification (vikṣiptatā), it has been understood
as an unconditioned and steady presupposition of every possible experience. As wavering (spandita), it is productive of abstractions. While it wavers, it oscillates between the two extremes of abstracted subjectivity (Vijñānavāda) and abstracted objectivity (Realism), and may variously appear as a subject knowing an object or an object known by a subject.

The Āgamaśāstra seeks to give us the doctrine of Ātmanic Experience as the ultimate Reality. This Ātmanic Experience is steadily transcendental to the relational schema of the Realists, and the abstract non-relationism of the Vijñānavādins. While the state of laya is characterized by the experience of bliss, the state of Ātmanic Experience should have no associates of such a nature. For being associated with bliss, the transcendental self has to think of itself as an entity divested of all object-content. In so doing, it will be rehearsing in a vicarious manner the situation in which the object-content has been eliminated from the subject-object experience. But such a rehearsal necessarily implies a position in which the transcendental subject (free from all relation to an object-content) is again lapsing into a relational mode, the constituent of which is the transcendental subject turned into a knower knowing itself as an object. The entire discussion on this subject as it occurs towards the end of the Advaitapракaraṇa of the Āgamaśāstra is highly instructive, and helps one to understand the distinction between the Advaitic standpoint and the standpoint of the Vijñānavādin. The Yoga of Ātmanic Experience insists on the merging of the individual self in the Brahman, but this merging has not to be effected by some such device as the manipulation of a state of trance (Saṁñāvedayitaniruddha) as spoken of by the Dhyāna tradition of Buddhist thought or even by the Yoga of Patañjali. Even while the efficacy of the method of inducing trance may not be questioned, the Advaitin whose doctrine stands for all that is best in the Upaniṣad, does not mean that any such method can be employed for the attainment of vaisāradya (illumination) which alone is the highest good.

A subtle symbolism lies at the heart of the Āgamaśāstra, and one who misses to understand aright the import of this symbolism
may fall into a whirlpool of misunderstandings, whose eddies are ever transmuting the symbol into a misleading factuality.²¹ The Asparśayoga of the kārikās is not the same as the Asparśayoga of the Buddhists. Asparśa refers not to the reduction of the object-content from the subject-object experience as is done by the Buddhists of the Yogācāra tradition. Asparśa refers to an epistemico-metaphysical re-evaluation of the very schema of the subject-object relation. The Yoga of the Advaitin refers to a fusion of finite subjectivity in its non-relational ground—the unconditioned intelligence, which is the transcendental condition of all dualities, all differentiations and all relations. An understanding of Brahman as the Sarvavikalpāspada ens, is not the same thing as its identification with an abstracted subjectivity induced by manipulating a trance. True Vaiśāradya²² lies not in a bare and unqualified negation of this nature. It lies in an intuitive contemplation, which embraces every discord, and yet points to its incomplete, fragmentary and self-contradictory character. The Ātmanic Experience is an intuition that comprehends all that is less than this experience, and at the same time determines its incompleteness and unreality. The abstract subjectivity of the Vijñānavādins if taken as a literal description of Ultimate Reality (parinīspannasatyam) will be productive of a misleading view. Gauḍapāda, however, goes beyond the Vijñānavādin's view-point in giving an epistemological interpretation of non-relational subjectivity. A literal interpretation of a non-relational subjectivity takes ‘non-relational’ as equivalent to ‘unrelated’, and consequently takes “unrelated” as meaning “separated”, “disjoined”, “abstracted”, “eliminated” and “dehyphenated”. Such an interpretation is apt to extol self-mesmerism and occult esotericism at the cost of a healthy mysticism, which does not literally exclude anything from the content of our everyday experience. A healthy mysticism does not abstract; it only generates an unwavering attitude in which unification takes the place of elimination. The unwary reader of the Āgamaśāstra finds enough to distract his attention and to identify his view with one of the views in which the reality of objects has been denied. In our opinion any such identification
is the consequence of a misreading of the philosophical significance of the Āgamaśāstra. The entire consideration of the strata of experience as postulated in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, should not be given a literal interpretation. At no stage the author of the Kārikā takes the various states of consciousness as having anything more than symbolic significance. The Āgamaśāstra does not take the Jāgrat, Svapna, and Susūpti states as having any other meaning than a symbolic one. The Jāgrat state contemplates existence in objectivity. The Svapna state contemplates sentience in subjectivity. The Susūpti contemplates the inevitable contradiction involved in the two positions described above. The metaphysics of the Āgamaśāstra is neither realistic, nor mentalistic nor nihilistic. The schema of each one of these positions is only to be understood as a cypher, which is not to be identified with reality. The contentual aspect of each one of these points of view has to be transcended, and taken as illuminated only by an ens that comprehends their real import in transcendence. The Āgamaśāstra presents, as it were, a composite symbolism through which alone the architectonic of spiritual experience finds self-expression for the purposes of communication.

The following observations in respect of methodological and terminological similarities between Gauḍapāda and the Buddhists should be enough to set aside the charge that Gauḍapāda is Buddhist:

(i) Methodological Similarities:

Instead of finding Gauḍapāda whole-heartedly supporting the Śruti (Revelation), one finds him all too keen on the dialectic in the second, third and the fourth chapters of the Āgamaśāstra, and the rigour and the tone of the dialectic is not much different from that of the Mādhyamikas, who identify their philosophical capital with the dialectic. Even in Gauḍapāda the dialectic appears like getting the upper hand, and the Śruti looks like going into the background. Our submission in this respect is that the dialectic in Gauḍapāda is not independent of Revelation. Everywhere the dialectic has one clear aim,—that of supporting
the scriptural texts. Not only this. We come across such spots in the Āgamaśāstra which look like adaptations from the Upaniṣads other than the Māṇḍūkya,²⁵ which serves as the main operational base for the metaphysico-mystical flights of Gauḍapāda. In respect of methodology, Gauḍapāda has made it abundantly clear that he is no slavish adherent to the words of the Upaniṣads.²⁶ Absurd scriptural statements have to be discarded in favour of a well-founded argument, and a well-founded reasoning obtaining confirmation in Revelation has to be preferred to both. Some of the rival schools of Vedānta have identified the certitude of Revelation with the certitude of immediate experience. The Śrutis are taken as speaking the self-evident truth, as it were. Such actually is not the correct picture of the situation. The meaning of Revelation may dovetail into the content of immediate experience, and may also be borne out by it, but this does not mean that Revelation and immediate experience are homologous in every aspect. That alternative meanings of a single Upaniṣadic text are possible or that several Upaniṣadic statements are in conflict, should be enough to indicate that if the Upaniṣadic statements are taken as self-warranted, we shall be eio ipso faced with a chaotic mass of self-contradictory opinions, all clamouring to be recognized as the final and unconditional truth.

So the Upaniṣadic statements themselves need the warrant of reason. Unaided by reason and argument, the Upaniṣadic text lacks that certitude and attested assertability which alone could give it an infallibility resembling immediate experience. Schools of Vedāntic Philosophy lacking the self-confidence of the Advaita have decried the method of the dialectic and put extreme faith in the ipse dixit of the Upaniṣads. The Advaitin, however, is neither an anti-scriptualist like the Buddhist nor is he a misologist like the non-advaitic Vedāntins. As the Advaitin would have it, neither Revelation nor Reason is enough to take the place of immediate and integral experience (anubhūti). By the application of the dialectic Gauḍapāda aims at showing the untenability of any position that thought might possibly take; yet the dialectic in pointing to the absolute criterion as that
which is immanent in the sweet reciprocity of being and not-being.\textsuperscript{27} posits the Absolute, which is the finer breath (honey)\textsuperscript{28} of all that is—the essence of essences, the reality of the reals, the spirit of the universe, undiminished, unassuaged, ever-enduring. The Śrutis, however, are also to be taken as only symbolic of a certain meaning, which has to be realized in the folds of one’s innermost being and experience. What is really infallible is immediate experience, self-evident and self-warranted. The immediacy of absolute sentience can neither be bodily given by the dialectic, nor can it be constituted in its living form by all the descriptive skill that can be put into words, whether, Upaniṣadic or non-Upaniṣadic. The real method of Gauḍapāda is neither an exclusive adherence to Revelation (Śruti) nor an unqualified reliance on Reason. Both Reason and Revelation are taken as aids to the reading of the symbolic meaning of experience. The mystic syllable AUM has to be meditated upon in all its varied implications. The statements cited in respect of the delineation of this symbol, are to be taken as the reading of the Cypher-script of a Being, which has to be encountered in transcendence—by going beyond the three states of being-Vaiśva, Taijas and Prājña. The dialectic as the critical procedure of reason has for its aim not an acquiescence in mere negation, which like nemesis must overtake each category. The aim of the dialectic is to point to that Being of which the Upaniṣads talk through a Cypher-script,\textsuperscript{29} as it were. Even the dialectic is not to be taken literally in the manner of the Mādhayamikas. In respect of Methodology, it would be a mistake in principle to say that Gauḍapāda follows either Pure Reason or Pure Revelation exclusively. His is a brief for Madhuvidyā, of which the whole world of experience, including Reason and Revelation, is only a symbol, a cypher, to be read. Every thing, including words (Śruti) and reason (Prasaṅga), points to an Ens that transcends the Cypher and the Symbol, and yet communicates itself through them. The identification of Gauḍapāda’s position with Buddhist Absolutism or with the literal tradition of the Śrutis, is a misreading of his message and his creed. His method of approach to the problem of Being (Brahman) is one of a mystic-
philosopher, who finds in the words of the Śruti and the logical crossfire of arguments, the vision of a spirit that embraces all and yet transcends all, that is everywhere without being exclusively anywhere.

(ii) Terminological Similarities:

Regarding the use that Gauḍapāda has made of the Buddhist philosophical lexicon, we have only to say that words are not the property of any school of thought or person. Their only purpose is to communicate ideas and meanings. In case Buddhistic Philosophy was rich in terminology, any school of Indian thought other than Buddhist had the right to make use of this terminology without losing its identity. Words are organic in nature. They have a tendency to grow differently on different kinds of soil. They have a tendency to travel in all kinds of domains, and are even prone to acquire a fresh domicile in territories, wherein otherwise, they would have been treated as aliens and trespassers. Most of the words which are of Upaniṣadic origin were used and adopted by the Buddhists. It is no wonder that Advaitins like Gauḍapāda found in the Buddhist literature such terms as conveyed the sense of a philosophical situation better than most of the terms in current use. The use of a word, which has its origins in this or that school of thought, should not be restricted to those only who coined it and gave it currency. Just as no Indian student of Philosophy who uses the English or German terms becomes English or German, so the presence of the Buddhist philosophical terms in the Āgamaśāstra does not necessarily point to the conclusion that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist. One has to make a deeper analysis of Gauḍapāda in order to consider the nature of the charge; and a deeper analysis of his philosophical doctrine only shows that Gauḍapāda was a Vedāntin, who was making an extensive use of Buddhist terms and the Buddhist art of disputation.
CHAPTER IV

A RE-EXAMINATION OF ŚAṆKARA’S HERITAGE

From the foregoing argument it should now be absolutely clear, that Gaudapāda’s seeming likeness to the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñānavādins in respect of doctrine, and an actual likeness in respect of methodology and the use of philosophical diction, should not be misconstrued and taken as conclusive clues to the fact of his being a Buddhist in any very proper sense. This argument has given the lie to the contention that Śaṅkara is a Buddhist in disguise, because he is a pontifical successor to the apostolic tradition of Gauḍapāda. What remains to be done now for exonerating Śaṅkara from the charge in question, is an undertaking of a two-fold nature; and it consists (A) in showing that, nowhere in his writings, will a cautious student, find a real ground for identifying his position with any one of the Buddhist schools, and (B) in distinguishing the nature and the aims of the post-Śaṅkara Advaitic dialectic from the nature and the aims of the Buddhist dialectic.

(A) Śaṅkara

We have already noted the line of the argument adopted by the adverse critics of Śaṅkara for demonstrating his alleged linkage with the Buddhist tradition. Our refutation of this position would entail the following items for consideration:

(i) A distinction between the Buddhist view of Reality and Appearance and Śaṅkara’s view.

(ii) A distinction between the Buddhist criteriology and the Śaṅkarite criteriology, comprising the distinction made by Śaṅkara and the Buddhists between Truth and Error.
(iii) A distinction between the Buddhist standpoint in Logic and the Advaitic standpoint, especially in respect of the Logic of the four-cornered negation.

(iv) A distinction between the Concepts of Philosophy in the two traditions: Advaitic and Buddhistic.

(i) Appearance and Reality

At the outset we may note a fundamental difference between the metaphysical position of the Buddhists and Śaṅkara, the Advaitin. All the schools of Buddhism without exception—whether realists or idealists, (phenomenalistic or transcendently noumenistic) have a certain foundational community, which is conspicuously absent from the Advaitism of Śaṅkara. This foundational community consists in the inviolable recognition of the three fundamental principles, which have been described as the three seals (mudrās) of Buddhism: (a) Sarvam anāntmānam (universal non-soul-ness) (b) Sarvam anityam (universal impermanence), and (c) Nirvāṇam śāntam (the quenching of everything in nirvāṇa).¹

Without exception, all the schools of Buddhist Philosophy, whether representing the Hīnayāna tradition or the Mahāyāna tradition consider these truths as a priori, necessary presuppositions,² as it were, of a self-evident nature. Śaṅkara on the other hand maintains (a) that the Ātman is the highest reality,³ (b) that beyond the impermanent, momentary and the fleeting procession of the appearances, there is the Brahman, which in the manner of the Greek Apeiron, is timelessly real,—not subject to the mutations wrought by time and change,⁴ and (c) that in the highest state—the state of absolution, nothing is quenched or annihilated, but everything attains to its real and noumenal form, which is none other than the form of Brahman;⁵ and this state is the very antithesis of the Buddhist nirvāṇa, in which the condition devoutly wished for is one of annihilation without resurrection.⁶ In the Advaitism of Śaṅkara, emancipation from the praṇaṅca of Sāṁsāra, is co-extensive with eternal perpetuation as Brahman, which is the affirmatively real identity of existences
felt as dissolved and reshaped in a discriminative knowledge that entitatively transfigures them. Through a process of self-transcendence differentiations are transmuted into an identity, which is essentially of an affirmative nature. While the Buddhist nirvāṇa envisages a negative ideal and a negative destiny, as it were, Śaṅkara’s view of absolution is a plea for the everlasting ‘Yea’, beyond the everlasting ‘Nay’ of the Sāṁsāra. The Buddhist Absolute is either the negation of objectivity (as is the case with Vijñānavāda) or the negation of every position (as is the case with Śūnyavāda). The Advaitic Absolute is the affirmative and self-asserting background of all negation. An over-all emphasis on negation makes the Buddhist Absolute either abstract (Vijñaptimātratā) or vacuously nihilistic (Śūnyatā). The Brahman of the Advaita Vedānta is not an abstract sentience, obtained by negating objectivity, nor is it merely the actual or possible self-cancellation of every position. The Advaitic Brahman is an all-comprehensive sentience of such a nature, that it lies not in a state of abstraction from universal objectivity. From a sentience of this nature objectivity is not absent. Only the distinction of such an objectivity from the sentience under consideration, has to be eschewed. The Brahman, no doubt is the ground of all differentiations, yet the differentiating predisposition is productive of an illusion, which belies the nature of Brahman, even while it is grounded in it. At the same time, the self-contradictory nature of all entities and positions, necessarily postulates a self-evident criterion of Truth and Reality, free from all contradiction. Without the self-affirming certitude of a criterion of this nature, it would not be possible to talk of the self-contradiction implicit in the constitution of all entities and positions other than the Brahman.

Hereunder, we shall distinguish Śaṅkara’s Absolutism from (a) Vijñānavāda and (b) Śūnyavāda.

(a) Vijñānavāda and Śaṅkara’s Absolutism

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Vedāntasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa has amply distinguished his metaphysical faith and doctri-
nal standpoint from Vijñānavāda, by including Vijñānavāda among the systems of philosophy he has outright rejected. Yet some over-zealous historians of Indian thought inclined, out of all proportions, to an eclectic stand, bring Vijñānavāda closer to the position of Śaṅkara, and are even of the opinion that the Atman or Brahman of Śaṅkara is in a considerable sense nondifferent from the Vijñāna or the Vijñāptimātratā (Pure Consciousness) of the Vijñānavādins.14 Whereas Śaṅkara gives specious reasons for overthrowing the idealistic argument of the Vijñānavādin, a contention, the purport of which is to identify Vijñānavāda with Śaṅkara’s Advaitavāda, can only rest on a distinction between two kinds of Vijñānavāda:15 one refuted by Śaṅkara and the other not refuted by him—the latter being identical with his own philosophical doctrine. Some of the writers on the subject have made a distinction between two kinds of Vijñānavāda—the Svatantra Vijñānavāda of Dignāga and Dharmakīrtti and the Vijñānavāda of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. While the former is essentially subjective in import, the latter it is believed, postulates an absolutism which is non-different from Advaitism. It is implied in a distinction of this nature that Śaṅkara in criticizing Vijñānavāda, has criticised only the subjective version of it, viz. the Vijñānavāda of the Svatantra type. The other version of Vijñānavāda, found especially in the Māhāyanasūtraśāṅkāra of Asaṅga and the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi (Vimśatikā and Trīṃśikhā) of Vasubandhu, could not have been refuted by Śaṅkara, for the simple reason that there is no difference between the Vijñāptimātratā of these philosophers and the Atman or Brahman of Śaṅkara. The Vijñāptimātratā (Pure Consciousness) of these Vijñānavādins and the Atman of the Advaita Vedānta are identical metaphysical principles.16 They are identical with non-relational Consciousness, which exists, in and for itself, and is beyond the prapañca of relational existence, comprising the world and the individual, both of which are unreal in the last analysis. The Vijñānavādin of the shade distinguished from the one refuted by Śaṅkara, has been taken for an absolutist, according to whom anything other than Vijñāna or Vijñāptimātratā is unreal. This position in
respect of (a) the Ultimate Reality, as also, in respect of (b) the metaphysical status of the world and the individual, has been identified with that of Śaṅkara. The Ātmanic Experience of the Advaitin and the Vijñāptimātratā of the Vijñānavādin, both being of the nature of Pure consciousness, non-relational and unmediated, there is no difference between the two metaphysical systems.17 In order to strengthen the contention that the Brahman of the Advaitin and the Vijñāna of the Vijñānavādin are identical, passages have been cited from the writings of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. It has been shown that the Vijñāna of the Vijñānavādin, is one unchanging, non-relational, self-subsistent and identical sentience. And this one is not at all different from the Ātmanic Consciousness of the Advaitin. For this reason the critics and the opponents of Śaṅkara have found a fresh argument in favour of the contention that Śaṅkara is a Buddhist in disguise. The metaphysical kernel of his philosophical doctrine is the Vijñāptimātratā of the school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, parading under the name of the Upaniṣadic Brahman or Ātman. The references and cross-references to the Upaniṣads, made by Śaṅkara in support of the belief that Pure Consciousness is the Ultimate Reality, constitute, as it were, an excellent device for camouflaging the doctrinal identity of Śaṅkara.

In our opinion, a stand of this nature is indefensible. In spite of the superficial similarities between the Vijñānavāda of this kind and the Advaitism of Śaṅkara, differences are of a considerable nature. Even if we concede that the Vijñāptimātratā of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu is similar to the Ātman of the Śaṅkara Vedānta, it remains to be asked—what is the existential status of the objective world in the philosophy of the Vijñānavādin of this order? This point is the Achilles’ heel of the Vijñānavādin’s position in general. Whosoever might be the nature of similarity between Śaṅkara’s Brahman and the Vijñāptimātratā of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and whosoever might be the magnitude of difference between the Vijñāna of the Svatantra School and that of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu,18 an inquiry into the metaphysical status of the objective world reveals a family-likeness between the two Vijñānavādas and a
radical dissimilarity between Vijñānavāda as such, and Advaita-vāda. The question is—Does Śaṅkara's criticism of the Vijñānavāda apply to all kinds of Vijñānavāda or does it apply exclusively to Svaṭantra Vijñānavāda? It amounts to asking, if the Vijñānavāda of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu is as much mentalistic and subjective in essence as is the Vijñānavāda of Dignāga and the like. In this connexion the statements made by Vasubandhu in the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi constitute a conclusive proof of the fact that this Vijñānavāda too is mentalistic in essence. The objective world has been described as one of the nature of dreams.\textsuperscript{19} It has no reality which is not the product of imagination or subjective fancy.\textsuperscript{20} The objective world is not at all to be found in Vijñāptimātratā. It has no substratum in reality. Its existence is rooted in the disposition of the subject to project itself out as an object. The world of objects is as unreal as are the dreams. Just as a man of defective vision sees two moons or a tuft of hair floating before his eyes,\textsuperscript{21} so does subjectivity project itself out as an object. So that an object may come into being, a subject is a necessary postulation, but neither the object, nor its ground, so postulated, has any reality, whatsoever. The object is a product of the imagination or fancy, which has its locus in a subject, equally unreal. In the Vijñāptimātratā (Pure consciousness), the world and the individual are not to be found even in a potential manner. In it there is no trace of an other. The subject-object dualism, or the Ego-non-Ego relation has nothing to do with Vijñāptimātratā.\textsuperscript{22} The Vijñāpatimātratā of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu is more like the Transcendental Unity of Apperception of Kant\textsuperscript{23} than like the Absolute of Fichte.\textsuperscript{24} In it there is no moment of intuition. It is completely empty of any such potentiality as might express itself out in the world and the individuals. But instead of the Vijñānavāda position being entirely like Kant's in this respect, it is most unlike it. Kant found it difficult to derive the manifold of sense (the intuitive mass) from the Unity of Apperception. So does the Vijñānavādin find it plainly absurd to ground the world and the individual in Vijñāptimātratā (Pure Consciousness). But while the Vijñānavādin, does not hesitate in tracing
objectivity to a *feigned subjectivity* or 'I'-sense, Kant refused to derive it from any subjective principle, whatsoever—transcendental or empirical. On the other hand Kant postulated another Unconditioned Reality for deriving the intuitive mass of the objective world. This Unconditioned Reality is the Thing-in-itself. The Thing-in-itself prevents the Kantian position from lapsing into subjective idealism or mentalism. This is not what can be said of Vijñānavāda in any of its forms. There being no Thing-in-itself, and there being no real place for the subject-object world in the *Vijñaptimātratā* (Pure Consciousness), the object-world has its locus only in ignorance, which makes us imagine something that is actually not there, and makes us believe as true what is thus imagined. This aspect of the Vijñānavāda doctrine closely resembles the Radical Empiricism of William James or the Pure Experience of Avenarius. On the neutral flux of consciousness is imposed a false subjectivity productive of an objectivity, equally false. On Pure Experience is stamped the dualism of the subject and the object. Avenarius speaks of this imposition as an erroneous projection and describes this way of looking at Pure Experience as an illustration of the *fallacy of Introjection*. Several statements in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu point to the conclusion that the object-world has an actuality which does not rise in status above that of something purely imaginal in essence. One may point to the figure of speech in which the existential status of the objective world has been compared to the feigned reality of such denizens of Hell, who are there not to suffer the tortures of Hell, but to inflict tortures on others and to exercise the functions of superintendence and surveillance in relation to those condemned. While all those, who are in Hell, should be there only to suffer the tortures of Hell, man's fancy creates classes among the denizens of Hell and assigns to some, functions, which clearly exonerate them from punishment and condemnation. The existence of the objective world is not different from the existence of persons, who while living in Hell, escape the tortures of a hellish existence, and are shown discharging the duty of inflicting punishments on some of the residents of the same place.
Besides this, Vasubandhu makes no distinction among *Vijñāpti*, *Vijñāna*, *Manas* and *Citta*. It is clear, therefore, that these terms mean nothing but the subject, functioning in the subject-object relation—the empirical ego, to wit. It is this kind of *Vijñāpti* or Sentience, which is the ontological locus of the objective world. The existence of such a subjectivity has been postulated in order to demonstrate the unsubstantiality of the objective world. Being purely postulational in essence, the Vijñāpti of the knowledge-situation, has not to be accepted as real in an ultimate sense. Both the self and its object are equally unreal; only the postulational reality of the self helps the Vijñānavādin to declare without hesitation that the objective world is only a construct of the imagination. It seems that by imagination or fancy the Vijñānavādin understands that mode of knowing, which, working on the machinery of relations, belies the nature of *Vijñāpatimātrata*, the absolute reality. In so far as there is no distinction of the knower and the known, of the subject and the object, in such a sentience, it must be of the nature of ‘immediate experience’. If this is so, and if *Vijñāptimātrata* (Pure Consciousness) is the only reality, anything which is revealed by a relational consciousness must not be real. That which relational awareness comprehends must be totally unreal, and if that, which is totally unreal, is believed to be real, such a belief can have its warrant only in unreflecting imagination. For this reason subjectivity along with its product, the objective content, has to be understood as imaginal in essence. Thus the objective world in both the types of Vijñānavāda has the same existential status. In his refutation of Vijñānavāda, in the Commentary on the Brahmasūtras, Śaṅkara makes no distinction between the two kinds of Vijñānavāda. For him Vijñānavāda is Vijñānavāda; it cannot be identified with Advaitism in any one of its forms. The objective world in the metaphysics of Śaṅkara is most definitely not the product of the imagination of either a finite subject or an infinite person. Finite subjectivity, whose mode of knowing, is the schema of subject-object dualism, is not the ontological ground of the objective world. It is not its constitutive condition, as the Vijñānavāda understands it. The
objective world is ontologically independent of the act of knowing, exercised by a finite centre. Knowledge considered as the function of a finite centre of knowing has only an epistemic import. It merely reveals what is already there. The objective world, which is known in knowing, is not the product of such an act. Such a knowing, wherein a subject intends an object and is aware of it, one, which presupposes in an a priori manner, a relational form of consciousness, does not constitute objectivity. It only takes cognizance of a fact as objective. Otherwise, objectivity as a fact has to be taken as existentially grounded in the Atman, which is Pure Consciousness, non-relational and transcendental in essence.\textsuperscript{32} Objectivity as implicit in the Atman is non-different from the Ātman.\textsuperscript{33} As different from the Ātman it is revealed to relational consciousness,\textsuperscript{34} but what is different from the Ātman being unreal in the last analysis, we can only say that relational consciousness, the awareness, that expresses itself in the form of a judgment,\textsuperscript{35} is only cognizant of an object, without being constitutive or productive of it. As undifferentiated from the Ātman, the world is none other than the Ātman itself. As differentiated from it, its locus cannot be said to lie in an ens other than the Ātman. The Ātman, though, through and through non-relational in nature, is the only ens that can be declared to be the ground of prapañca. In this sense it is all (Sarvam) and Sarvavikalpāspada. Yet it would be a fundamental mistake to identify the Ātman with what is Vaikalpika (discursively given). The relation of dependence in this case is of a purely asymmetrical order.\textsuperscript{36} The world is grounded in the Ātman, though it cannot be said that Ātman is the same as the world of duality and differentiations (prapañca). Brahman cannot be known in terms, in which the contents of prapañca are known. The transference of the contents of prapañca to their ground viz., the Ātman, is indeed a legitimate process, but an entitative location of the Ātman in the world of duality and differentiations, would most certainly be an illegitimate practice, unwarranted by any one of the criteria, acknowledged to be valid, in the Advaita Vedānta. In the ratio essendi the world is none other than the Ātman, but in the ratio cognoscendi the
world cannot be identified with the Ātman. The Advaitin very well understands the implication of the two situations so distinguished. He is not prepared to believe that discursive subjectivity can have any other function than the one of revealing an objective world, which it does not constitute. The revelatory function of the *discursus* should not be mistaken for a constitutive one. Only in a fantastic cosmogony can an epistemical principle be distorted into an ontological ground. Herein lies the point of distinction between the Advaitavāda of Śaṅkara and the Vijñānavāda of any order, whatsoever. Therefore, it does not look plausible to identify Vijñānavāda with Advaitavāda. Those, having eclectic predilections, take delight in identifying the two doctrines. Those who share a predilection of this nature, without surrendering their innate timidity and instinctive over-cautiousness, only point to the overwhelming similarities between the two, though not without showing, their acquaintance with such dissimilarities between them, as might plausibly upset all such attempts, as seek to dismantle the wall that divides them into doctrinal distincts.

(b) *Śūnyavāda and Advaitism*

A family likeness between the Mādhyamika Absolutism and the Advaitic Absolutism is sometimes misread as a case of total identity. And it is this erroneous identification of the two, which is responsible for a misunderstanding of Śaṅkara’s philosophical position. We shall hereunder make two kinds of observations: (1) of those grounds on which the Mādhyamika and the Advaitic positions have been identified with each other, and (2) of those grounds, which can be adduced for showing that it is in principle erroneous to take them as one.

(1) The grounds for the identification of the two systems lie in a certain fundamental similarity between the basic positions of the two kinds of Absolutism. For instance, both the Mādhyamika and the Advaitin, are equally aware of the self-contradictory nature of what is given in discursive knowledge, invariably comprehended by the epistemical schema of subject-object relation. Both the Mādhyā-
mika and the Advaitin are the critics of thought—knowledge. The Advaitin thinks that thought, operating as it does, with the apparatus of terms and relations, cannot know the real. The Mādhyamika is equally aware of the antinomical character of thought, for whatsoever, thought gives, must, in the end, turn out to be self-contradictory. A further ground for the identification of the two positions consists in the characterization of the Absolute as intuitive in the aspect of its intelligibility. Both the Prajñāpāramitā of the Mādhyamika and the Aparokṣānu-bhūti of the Advaitins can be described as non-discursive and immediate in essence. The self-transcendence of the finite, whether, of a subject-knowing-an-object, or an object-known-by-a-subject, points to the fact that whatsoever is finite is unreal in the last analysis. The Real (Tattva) of the Mādhyamikas and the Brahman of the Advaitins, are through and through non-relational in essence. They have a character, which the appearances (objects and subjects in the relation of reciprocal determination) fail to exhibit or attain. Besides these doctrinal similarities, one also finds the selfsame dialectic used in both the systems for exposing the innate absurdity of the categories of thought, like those of causality, etc. The appearances are not real; and the real also never appears wholly. These broad similarities should have constituted enough evidence for mistaking the one system of thought for the other.

(2) The grounds on which it is erroneous to identify the two are given hereunder:

The Advaitic Absolute is not the denial of objective reality, as is well implied in the criticism of the Vijñānavāda position by Śaṅkara. The object is not unreal; yet what is to be eschewed in all good faith, is the discursive way of looking at objective reality. The object as taken in terms of the subject-object schema of knowledge, is not the real object. What Advaitism denies is a falsely conceived objectivity and the false way of conceiving it. The false way of conceiving it lies, through a subjectivity, infected with discursivity or a habit or relational awareness. If, however, the subject were understood as one with consciousness (cit), that is, as one of the nature of imme-
diate experience, the objective world (the real world) would be none other than an undifferentiated unity of the object and non-relational consciousness. The Mādhyamika Absolute is entirely incapable of being communicated through these symbolic designations expressible in judgment. That it is not of the nature of an object, is more than well-expressed in the Mādhyamika view that Śūnyata (Voidness), which is the final destiny of every conceivable entity, is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both, nor neither.\(^{41}\) In saying that it is catuskotivinirmuktā (transcendent to the four predicative forms of awareness), the Mādhyamika is making an attempt to deny all possible modes in which objectivity can be conceived. At the same time the Mādhyamika Absolute (Tattva) is not to be identified with the Pure Consciousness (Vijñaptimātratā) of the Vijñānavādin. The Mādhyamika Absolute is no conceivable position.\(^{42}\) It is neither Pure Consciousness (Vijñaptimātratā) existing in a state of empty transcendence, cut off from objectivity (as is the Absolute of the Vijñānavādin), nor is it Pure Objectivity (Sanmātratā) standing as non-different from Pure Consciousness (as is the Brahman of Śaṅkara and the Advaitins). It is Absolute in the sense that it is not likely to turn out self-contradictory, like one of the antinomical positions taken by reason. The reason why self-contradiction does not touch it, is that it cannot be adopted as a position. If it could be adopted as one, it also would not escape this destiny. Because an Absolutism of this description is no position, it is radically different from the Absolutism of the Advaitin. The Absolute of the Mādhyamika is of the nature of a negation, immanent in all positions.\(^{43}\) Yet, because such a negation is indescribable in any manner, in which any position is describable, it transcends all descriptions. For this reason, it could not be identified with the Absolute of the Advaitin, which is All (Sarvam Khalvidam), and yet nothing, which could be conceived of, as existing in abstraction from this concrete totality of integral existence. The Advaitic Absolute is more comprehensive and more communicable than the Saugata Absolute. The Saugata Absolute, if it were to be identified with the Pure Consciousness (Vijñapti) of the Vijñānavādins, it would be ex-
clusive of objectivity, and therefore, less than the Ātman of the Advaita Vedānta, which, as we have already seen, is the inalienable identity of Sattā (Objectivity) and Cit (Consciousness). If, at any rate, it is identified with the Śūnyata of the Mādhyamikas, it would remain incommunicable. The Advaitic Absolute, is therefore, free from two short-comings: (i) the abstraction of the Yogācāra Vijñaptimātratā, and (ii) the incommunicability of Śūnyatā. As against the Vijñānavādin’s Absolute, it is the fulness of Being, which embraces in its integral completeness the two aspects of Existence and Knowledge. As against the Mādhyamika Absolute, which is unmitigatedly trans-rational, the Advaitic Brahman stands in the office of the absolute criterion, necessarily indicated by the self-contradictory nature of objectivity as contemplated by the pramāṇa-riddled intelligence, as also by the dialectic of reason, whose lever must lie in the intuitive simplicity of the real. It is not the aim of the Advaitic metaphysics, to glorify the appearances by identifying them with Brahman. Yet the Advaitic metaphysics is an emphatic protest against the tendency to make reality so insular in character and so impervious in essence to all that we know, as to create yawning abysses between reality and appearance. The appearances no doubt conceal the nature of the real, yet they alone constitute the pathway to it. The Buddhist Absolutism (both Vijñānavādin and the Mādhyamika) is all too prone to recognize the concealing function of the appearances, without taking due notice of their revelatory aspect, viz., the function of unveiling the real. If the Buddhist would have taken notice of this aspect of the appearances, he would not have alienated intelligence from objectivity, and hypostatized it as Vijñaptimātratā (Pure Intelligence). Nor would he have ever declared the impossibility and impropriety of accepting Śūnyata as a legitimate position. The Advaitic Absolute, even while it is non-relational intelligence (Cinmātra), does not exclude objectivity. All that it stands for is not an intelligence which lacks the moment of objectivity, for, if there is a lack in it of any nature, whatsoever, it will fall short of Absoluteness. The Advaitic Absolute is intelligence and existence in one. If by existence were to be understood object-
ivity and by intelligence the noetic aspect symbolized in subjectivity, a certain caution is intended to be observed in respect of these two terms. When objectivity is understood as existent (Sat), the existence under consideration is not to be taken for existence, comprehended by relational consciousness, operating through the mechanism of subject-object dualism. An existence, which comprehends everything else, including the subject and the object of the relational order of knowledge, cannot be identified with one of the entities it comprehends. This objectivity is the ultimate subject of all discursive contentions—the trans-relational ens, which is the background of all assertions claiming to be true. Yet, this objectivity as existent (Sat), should not be confused with the existence, characterizing an object standing in intentional relation to a subject. When the Mādhya-mīka tells us that Śūnyatā neither exists, nor does not exist, he is making use of existence and non-existence in a purely adjectival sense. As used in the adjectival sense, existence and its opposite non-existence, as also the affirmative and negative combinations of these two, which together form the four Kotis (categories of predication), are to be understood as predicates, whose function it is to qualify a subject or a substantive. The Advaitin at any rate is all too prone to identifying pure existence with the Ātman or the Brahman. The anomaly which might be implicit in the two assertions: ‘Śūnyata is Catuskoṭivinirmukta’ and ‘Brahman is Sat’ is thoroughly removable. The resolution of the difficulty or the removal of the anomaly consists in understanding the nature and the metaphysical status of existence (Sattā) as such. The Mādhya-mīka without any reservation interprets existence in the sense of a category of the understanding, and so he has a tendency to put Śūnyatā, beyond such a category or any other variant of it. According to the Advaitin, “existence”, may well be used in a narrow and restricted sense; and in this sense alone it could be understood as a predicate, e.g., in the sentences, ‘Tigers exist’ and ‘Tigers do not exist’. But it should not be forgotten that such a limitation of the expression “exist” is only grammatical in essence. It does not mean
that the grammatical limitation for ever consigns this expression to unredeemed usage as a predicate only. It is only in the grammatical sense that existence, can be used as a predicate, as barely a qualification of a subject in reality. The grammatical meaning of "exists", is not the only meaning that 'existence' as such, can have. In the logical sense, which really matters, in a discussion of this nature, existence (Sattā) has to be understood as the ultimate subject, of which, every possible predicate is a qualification. When the Mādhyamika describes Tattva (Reality) or Śūnyata (Voidness) as Catuskoṭīvinirmukta, forbidding the use of predicates Sat & c. in relation to it, he has narrowed down the meaning of the terms "Sat" & c. to such an extent, that they can not be used to designate the real (Tattva). To the Mādhyamika the meaning of "Sat" & c., is to be understood only in reference to what is an object to a subject. There being no place for non-relational objectivity (Sammātratā) in the Mādhyamika Philosophy, the Mādhyamika cannot imagine that Sat can have a transcendental connotation also, that goes beyond its unqualified synonymity with a predicative import. The Advaitin, in the manner of Kant, would maintain that 'existence' should not be understood as a predicate. This is so, because one cannot go beyond existence. The Advaitic Brahman, even while it transcends all the categories of existence, envisaged in a discursive scheme of knowledge, is not non-existent. On the other hand, it is existence par excellence—one in which the contradiction and short-comings of phenomenal objectivity are made good and transcended. The Sat of the Advaitin is a category and is also not a category. It is a category in the sense that it is a partial predicate of Māyā, which alternates between the two extremes of Sat and Asat and is of an elusive nature (Vilakṣana). The Advaitic use of Sat in relation to Māyā is not the same as it is in respect of Brahman. Brahman is transcendentally sat, whereas māyā is only phenomenally sat; yet when the phenomenal is seen in its real perspective, it cannot but be seen as non-different from Brahman. There is nothing wrong with the term Sat as such. Only there are two ways of interpreting it, one infected with contradiction and the
other free from contradiction. When Brahman is understood as an object known to a subject, Sat is not thought of as a Pure subject, complete in itself, an inseparable unity of being and being known, but as the qualification of what is taken as an object of thought. While the Mādhyamika fully realises the self-contradictory nature of existence so contemplated, the Advaitin pushes the inquiry further and further, till he comes to the notion of an objectivity-in-itself (Sanmātratā), which is none other than the Brahman or the Ātman, the prius of all discursive designations and the ultimate subject of all predicates. The Śūnyatā of the Mādhyamikas, even while it is the absolute reality, has not been conceived of in the manner of the Advaitic Ātman. The Advaitic Ātman is the transcendental synthesis of the realist Objectivism and the Idealist Subjectivism, and because the synthesis is transcendental in essence, it is free from the defects of both the positions it synthesizes. In the Śūnyavāda of the Mādhyamikas there is no place for Cit (Consciousness) or Sattā (existence). In Advaitism, the antagonism of the subject object relation gives way to an immediate experience, to which relational subjectivity and relational objectivity point in the manner of symbols, which have no literal metaphysical status or transcendental necessity. The Ātman of the Advaitin is neither an object of the realist, nor is it the subject of the idealist. Nor is it an amalgam of the two. It is the transcendental synthesis of these two aspects—a synthesis, which in the ratio cognoscendi is to be understood through the metaphor of 'blending', but, which, nevertheless in the ratio essendi, is only to be understood as an existence unpreceded by any other, or even as an essence prior to all essences. And yet the Ātman described in this manner is a res completa, partless, both structurally and functionally. These fragments, viz., the self (Viṣayī) and the not-self (Viṣaya), as they come to us, have not to be identified with ultimate reality. If they are taken as literally real, they would create a metaphysics, which, on account of its native opacity and lack of transcendental suggestibility, is all too gross and unmetaphysical. The Advaitic insistence on the blending of the two, is not the sign of something that might be taken as
showing itself literally in the manner of a composite article. It is really a symbol for reality, the literal portrayal of which is an impossibility. The Atman or the Brahman of the Advaitin is not the literal counterpart of a blend of intelligibility and existence. The Atman, so considered, will only be a word, whose visual and auditory image is only symbolic of a reality in which, there is neither lack of anything whatsoever, nor the presence of any such obscuration and contradiction as invariably attends all our explanations of the object-content-facing-subjectivity.

(ii) Truth and Error: The Logical Point of View:

The relevant question in the context of present discussion is not one concerning the similarities between the Advaitic and the Saugata definitions of Truth and Error, for a discovery of these similarities to the exclusion of valid and relevant differences, is more likely to confuse issues than to clarify them. So one has to ask, what is the status of thought or reasoning in the Advaitic and the Buddhist Philosophies of the Absolute? Does thought merely veil the real, or it has also a revelatory function to perform?

Beneath the refutation of the categories (pramāṇas) which has been done by both the Advaitic and the Saugata Absolutists, there is a radical difference between the two traditions in respect of the assessment of the function of reasoning. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin, for instance, exposes the self-contradictory nature of discursive knowledge by showing that all objectivity is merely a product of the imagination, and that any metaphysical theory, grounded in imagination, does violence to Reality, which is unschematized sentience, constitutionally beyond the grasp of the intellect. Any knowledge which reveals an objective existence—something out there in the non-sentient sphere—is to be eschewed as an illusion. To circumvent an innate difficulty and an inevitable impasse, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is for the necessity of taking recourse to a method akin to the phenomenological reduction of Husserl, and describes reality as Svamvedya (self-sensed) Viśiṣṭāptimātratā. The Śūnyavādin too condemns all
thought—knowledge, by showing that all the categories of thought, in so far as they are relational in essence, have in their constitution an inherent contradiction. Thought, by its very nature, cannot afford to be anything, but discursive and relational in its procedure. Thus, whatsoever, it contends or intends must be self-refutative. The Mādhyamika Logic is a plea for an all-out criticism of every conceivable position that thought can take. Thus the Mādhyamika contends that his is not a position among other positions. The universal self-contradiction of thought-content leaves no room for any conceptual construction on an exceptional plane. The Logic of the Mādhyamikas has no positive implication. It only indicates that thought is so constituted that of itself it develops contradictions, and shows the vacuous character of what it intends. The Mādhyamika Logic is entirely and unexceptionally an attempt to draw one's attention to the antinomies of thought. The Mādhyamika position in Logic is like that of Kant, who even while accepting the Noumenon, pronounced it so much unknowable by thought that he put Logic and Metaphysics in two water-tight compartments. Logic thus aims at indicating that thought of its own accord is self-stultifying. Just as Kant speaks of the Noumenon, so fully transcendent to the appearances, as not to allow thought to know its nature in any ascertainable manner, there should be all silence and no talk in the Nirvāṇa or the Tattva of the Mādhyamika. Kant, however, shifted the centre of metaphysical gravity from knowledge to realization, and found in moral, religious and aesthetic experience the solution of the problem indicated by an analysis of the knowledge-situation. The Mādhyamika believes that in the Nirvāṇa or Tattva, there should be no antinomies, but he is also insistent on the necessity of eschewing every possible alternative to thought-knowing, for reaching the land of heart's desire. The necessity, for doing so, lies in the fact that whatsoever the alternative might be, it becomes a thought-position, and is therefore, an heir to an inherently dwindling estate of thought. Even if the Mādhyamika shows signs of a mystical approach to Reality, it is not a mysticism that can be reconstituted or designated in terms of any category whatsoever.
Thought cannot even indicate its nature in a general way. Between Logic and Metaphysics, there lies a bridgeless gap.

The Advaitin too is an adverse critic of thought and shares the standpoint of the Saugata Absolutist in his criticism of the Pramāṇas, but he is also different in his view of thought or reasoning. The dialectic instead of showing only the contradictory nature of the categories also points to an absolute criterion, which alone gives meaning to the dialectical procedure of reason. This brings us to a fundamental difference between the Advaitin and the Mādhyamika standpoints in Logic. Both the Advaitin and the Mādhyamika maintain that what thought contends or intends is self-contradictory, but while the Advaitin finds such a contention meaningful only in contrast with a hypothetical position, in which thought does not have a self-dissipating aspect, the Mādhyamika rules out the possibility of any such position. The Advaitin maintains that without the awareness of an absolute criterion (as thus intuited), it would be impossible even to understand what it means to say that thought's contentions are self-contradictory. Thought by its very nature performs a two-fold function. It is productive of a contention that is in essence given to self-dissipation and self-contradiction. It is also conscious of the fact that what it contends or what it intends is self-contradictory and is given to self-dissipation. In its latter function, it over-steps its constitutional limitation, and is aware of a possibility in which its limitations are shed away. But a possibility of this nature necessitates an effacement of the native character of thought, viz., its relational nature, its discursive mechanism, its mediational procedure. If, however, such a metamorphosis of thought were to take place, thought would not remain its own self. It would pass into intuition, in which it cannot be recognized as thought. Yet, such an intuition only, can comprehend the ineffectuality of thought in an attempt to construct reality in the medium of an ideal content. In being aware of a state, wherein the disabilities of thought are strangely enough absent, thought has the intimations of a Reality free from contradiction. In so far as this criterion itself has not the mediated necessity of thought-contents,
its awareness in the discursus does not deprive it of its self-evidence. The Advaitin, while fully recognizing the dangers of conceding a transcendental validity to the Pramāṇas, is insistent on giving a more respectable status to reasoning than has been given to it in the system of Buddhist Absolutism. Even if immediacy be pressed forth as the criterion of truth in both the traditions, the main difference between the two points of view would be in the two radically different ways in which immediacy has been understood as related to mediation or discursivity. No doubt an annulment of discursivity is sought for in both the traditions, yet the Advaitin recognizes the fact and the Mādhyamika does not, that thought has the intimations of the ideal in which its limitations could be liquidated. Nor does one come across the recognition of any such redeeming feature of thought in the Vijñānavādin philosophy. Reason is assigned only a negative role in the Buddhist Absolutism. In the Advaitic Absolutism it has at least an instrumental value, viz., the realization of an illuminative consciousness. If integral experience (Anubhūti) gives it, and the scripture (Śruti) expresses it in a symbolic manner, reason builds a bridge between integral experience (anubhūti) and scriptural statements (śruti), by insisting on a symbolic interpretation of the ṣrutis57 and bringing this interpretation in consonance with an over-all non-discursive apprehension in which alone it is fully revealed.

The explanations of Error (Khyāti) too in these seemingly similar traditions are most dissimilar. While Error according to Vijñānavāda is due to the postulation of objectivity in any form, and in the Mādhyamika to any postulation whatsoever, Error in the Advaitic system consists in an attempt to comprehend transcendental objectivity in terms of the categories of the understanding. As against the Vijñānavādin, the Advaitin maintains a doctrine of necessary objectivity. From the Mādhyamika he is different in the sense that he does not believe that every postulation or every position is necessarily infected with error. Objectivity, if not understood in contrast with subjectivity, is the existential aspect of the essence described as self-luminous intelligence. Error does not lie in mere postulation, whether
of objectivity or of subjectivity or of both, but in the postulation of a position in which objectivity is understood as another of subjectivity. Error consists in the attitude of *bheda* (difference).  

(iii) *Negation: Different views in the two traditions.*

Beneath apparent similarity there is a fundamental difference between the Buddhist and the Advaitic ways of looking at the category of Negation (*Abhāva*). The apparent similarity consists in the seemingly unilateral manner in which thought and thought-contents are condemned in the two traditions. We have already given more attention than is ordinarily needed for the discussion of the status given to the appearances in the systems of the *Vijñānavāda* and the *Mādhyamika* philosophies, and had occasions to notice the same in the Advaitic thought. Whatsoever is established or contemplated by thought is described as *prameya*, whereas the ways of contemplating a *prameya* are called the *pramānas*. What thought intends is an object. But, howsoever, it intends, contemplates, or establishes an object, such an intentionality, contemplation or establishment is fraught with contradictions. Both the Buddhist and Advaitic Absolutists condemn thought-forms and thought-contents as ultimately unreal and false. It means that the modes of knowing thought-contents, are the modes of knowing that alone which is ultimately unreal. Another implication of the situation is that there is a relationship of negation between that which is real and that which merely appears, and is unreal in the last analysis. The real cancels the unreal. We could express this relationship in the form of a negative proposition or negative judgment: 'Reality is not appearance' or 'No appearance is really real'. All judgments, in whatever form, refer to Reality, whatsoever, may be the degree and nature of remotesness of Reality to thought. The judgmental activity which seeks to reconstruct Reality in the medium of an idea, would be meaningless, if there were no such reference. Yet the statement 'A is not B' is *prima facie* not descriptive of Reality. It only describes what Reality is not. Judgment being judgment about Reality, is committed to giving a description of it. The negative judgment suffers from a native
disability. Because it is a judgment, it refers to nothing but Reality, but because it is negative, it is descriptive of what Reality is not. If it describes the real, it cannot be negative; if it does not refer to the real it cannot be judgment. It appears that the negative statement or the negative judgment is a paradoxical entity, and presents before us a dilemma, which appears irrefutable. The claim of a negative judgment to be a judgment would be substantiated, only if this dilemma could be refuted. The dilemma in question is called the Paradox of Negation. Bosanquet formulates the paradox thus: "......... in negation the work of positive knowledge appears to be performed by ignorance"69 (Bosanquet: Logic, Vol. I, p. 277). Joseph also expresses the same view by saying that "the real is positive, it exists only by being something, not by being nothing. A negative judgment declares what it is not, and how can this express it as it is?"60 (H. W. B. Joseph: Introduction to Logic, p. 171).

In the main only three attitudes to the problem presented by the Paradox of Negation or the Negative Judgment are possible:61 (1) That the problem admits of no solution, and the difficulty envisaged therein must remain unassuaged, so that the negative judgment has to be taken as one referring to Reality only in this sense that it cannot claim to be descriptive of it. In other words, the Negative judgment only testifies to a categorical unknowability of Reality. An epistemological analysis of the Negative judgment only confirms the case for scepticism. (2) That the Paradox of the Negative Judgment only raises a pseudo-problem, for it is forgotten that a judgment can be considered in its purely formal aspect, namely the logical aspect, to the entire exclusion of the metaphysical aspect, in which alone it can be understood as referring to Reality, or the epistemological aspect, in which alone, it can be questioned whether or not it is descriptive of Reality. Judgment, being one of the items of study falling under Logic, which the Formal Logician considers independent of Metaphysics and Epistemology, it is wholly irrelevant to insist on a solution of the Paradox of the Negative judgment.62 (3) That the Paradox is not without a solution, for it can be shown in a two-fold manner that the Negative judge-
ment not only refers to Reality but is also descriptive of it: (a) by the enlargement of Reality itself, and (b) by a transformation of the negative form of the judgment into an affirmative one. By the enlargement of Reality we understand a widening of Reality in the sense that it is taken to include not only positive facts and positive essences, which are the ostensibly ontological counterparts of the affirmative judgments, but also "negative facts" and "negative essences" which could be the ontological counter-parts of the negative judgments. By the transformation of the negative form of the judgment into affirmative is meant the change of the form 'A is not B' into the form 'A is B'. This is effected in three ways: (i) by the Obversion of the negative judgment (better proposition) (ii) by using such expressions as 'different from' or 'other than' in place of the negative sign 'not' & c. in the Negative Judgment; and (iii) by taking the Negative Judgment as equivalent to a complex of affirmative judgments, e.g. 'A is not B' implies the affirmative statement, "It is false that A is B". Stated otherwise, a Negative Judgment is only the assertion of the discovery of error in some particular affirmative assertion.

The Buddhist Absolutist illustrates the sceptic's attitude to the Paradox of the Negative Judgment, which means that the Negative Judgment refers to Reality only to tell us that the judgment in question by the logic of its nature cannot claim to give us a knowledge of Reality. The Buddhist Absolutist overshoots his target in respect of the condemnation of thought and its objects. Knowledge qua knowledge is thought-knowledge, and, therefore, all knowledge, even if the verbal form through which it expresses itself be apparently affirmative, is really negative in essence. The Asatkhyātivāda of the Mādhyamikas confirms the view that no knowledge is the awareness of that which is real, for the simple reason that all knowledge is the cognition of asat (unreal). In this connexion it should not be forgotten that the terms, Sat and Asat, have largely a predicative use only in the Mādhyamika epistemology. When the Mādhyamika maintains that the transcendental reality (parinīpanna satyam) is beyond the four Koṭis of Sat, Asat, and the conjunctive and
the disjunctive synthesis of Sat and Asat, he means that these Kośis are only the predicates of that which is the contradictory of pariniṣpanna satyam. Because it is so, the judgmental form of awareness is essentially negative in character. By implication, it is its own undoing, if in any manner it pretends to reveal the nature of transcendental Reality (Tattvam). The same logic is operative in the refutation of the awareness of the para-
tantra and parikalpita entities in the system of the Vijñānavādins. The Vijñāptimātrata of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, being the unmitigated negation of an awareness schematized by the subject-
object relation, cannot be described by any judgment whatsoever. Even a judgment in the affirmative form, in respect of the Vijñāptimātrata is negative in nature; and being so, it can never claim to be descriptive of it. The mysticism of the Buddhist
Absolutist, whether the Absolutist is a Mādhyamika or a Vijñāna-
vādin is thoroughly anti-intellectualistic. All that is within
the sphere of Sāmrṛta being illusory in nature, even the reference
to the transcendental Reality in judgment occurs under an illu-
sory scheme of things. The anti-intellectualism of the Mādhyama-
mika and the Vijñānavādin has no bridge to build between that
which is real and that which is not real. It is only the confirma-
tion of an agnostic’s approach to Reality, which crystallizes in a
sceptical epistemology, so far as the validity of the pramāṇas
and the prameyas is concerned.

The Advaitic attitude towards the Paradox of the Negative
Judgment does not favour scepticism. There is, no doubt, a
similar distrust entertained by the Advaitin in respect of judg-
mental knowledge, but judgmental knowledge is not the only
species of knowledge. Judgmental knowledge, which is essen-
tially discursive in character, rests on an assumption. The
assumption is the separateness of thought and the object-content
from their ground, namely, the Brahman. While Brahman
alone is real, the postulation of an other of Brahman, must be
an error in principle. Neither the Jīvas are unreal, nor is Jagat so.
Nothing that we experience and know is ever lost in Brahman.
Error consists only in conceiving them to be real in isolation
from Brahman. Once their indistinguishable identity with
Brahman is really understood, there would be no occasion to know them as isolated and distinguished from Brahman. To understand this implies an understanding of the self-contradictory nature of an awareness which works through a schema of relations. Discursive knowledge, which is necessarily judgmental in character, posits subjectivity distinguished from objectivity, and seeks to elucidate in a manifold manner the nature of what is so posited. Such a practice, however, does violence to the unitary texture of Reality, and is therefore, negative in essence. The Advaitin considers all judgments as much negative in import, as does the Buddhist Absolutist, so far as their metaphysical import, is concerned. But this is not all. Whereas the Advaitin insists on the ultimate and indistinguishable identity of thought and its objects with the Brahman, the Buddhist Absolutist subsists in the ivory towers of his metaphysical incontaminability by excluding thought and its objects from that which is transcendentally real. As the Advaitin would explain the situation, the negative judgment is not a confirmation of agnosticism. He never maintains that the real is in no manner revealed to thought. No doubt there is an inherent defect in thought, that of separating from Brahman that which is in essence one with it. Yet thought itself, through a process of self-criticism, comes to a consciousness of its shortcomings and contradictions. The Advaitin does not think that thought has merely and unqualifiedly a negative role to perform. The negative judgment ‘A is not B’, does not mean that A’s indescribability is its only implication. The negative judgment is a complex of affirmatives. ‘A is not B’ intends that ‘it is erroneous or false to think that A is B’.

What, then, is the nature of the error and falsity against which the Advaitin warns us? In this context, we have only to remind ourselves of the meaning and significance of the hypothesis of Adhyāsa in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. The fallacy or the error, against which we have to warn ourselves, consists in the separation of objectivity from consciousness or of consciousness from objectivity or of both in a conjunctive or disjunctive totality from their prius, the Absolute-unity-of-all. The error is
the error of abstraction. Negation, understood as the consciousness of the error of disjunction is not a case of 'bare negation', which lends support to skepticism and agnosticism. The negative judgment instead of implying a privation of knowledge warns us against the complacency of dogmatism, rooted in an over-credulous faith in the validity of what thought contemplates and constructs. If by 'A' is understood the all-embracing Reality that the Advaitin's Brahman is, and if by 'B' is understood its limitation and finitization as a 'subjective centre', contemplating an 'objectivity' other than itself, error would consist in giving a metaphysical status and ultimate reality to these limitations of 'A'. We can express the same thing by saying that error would consist in asserting that 'A is B'. So long as one is in the situation of error, one is apt to believe that there is no difference between A and B. Error consists in taking 'B' as if it were 'A'. There is no doubt an ultimate identity of the Brahman and 'the world and the individual', but a recognition of the ultimate identity, is not the same thing as the equating of the world and the individual with the Brahman. Identity actually means the impossibility of distinguishing between the identicals. If any two entities are entirely identical, they cannot be two. Even Leibnitz gave an expression to this impossibility in his well-known Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. An obliteration of differences in this sense is not what constitutes error. Error consists in identifying that which cannot be dichotomized with that which in an illusory perspective manifests itself as its other. The fatal flaw of discursivity consists first in abstracting an other from Brahman, and then in claiming an identity-relation between Brahman and all that is obtained from Brahman through a ratiocinative process. There is a superficial similarity between the states of Jñāna and Ajñāna. Both are rooted in the belief that there is no difference between Brahman and 'the world and the individual'. Abheda is the characterizing mark of both knowledge par excellence and ignorance par excellence. Yet the two beliefs do not have an identical content. While Abheda at the level of Jñāna (Knowledge) is an identification of Brahman with 'the world and the individual' without having accorded
separate entitative status to the latter, at the level of Ājñāna (ignorance) Abheda necessarily implies two steps: those of separating 'the world and the individual' from Brahman, and then uniting them. In knowledge there is no difference whatsoever. In ignorance one has only a belief as if there were no difference. The Advaitic doctrine of Adhyāsa clarifies the position in question beyond dispute. While, ignorance insists on an identification of the Brahman with 'the world and the individual', illumination or knowledge insists on differentiating the Brahman from 'the world and the individual'. Further, while ignorance insists on alienating, 'the world and the individual' from Brahman, knowledge necessitates the realization of their indistinguishable identity without the postulation of a prior difference. Thought has the tendency to dig an other out of the one, and then to forget that the other thus obtained, is in any sense different from the one. From this forgetfulness results a process of superimposition of the Brahman on the world and the individuals, and of the world and the individual on Brahman. Not to be aware of this traffic between the one and its other, results in error, and the error consists in an indiscriminate over-lapping of the contents and characteristics of the two orders of existence. Manyness with its myriad attributes is mistakenly identified with the one. This identification when expressed in a statement or judgment takes the form of the proposition, 'A is B'. Whereas 'A' cannot really be 'B', the affirmative proposition 'A is B' claims the identity of 'A' with 'B'. A correction of this position would lie in the recognition of 'A's difference from B'. The correct position, then, would be expressed in the proposition 'A is not B'. Negation, therefore, is not the symbol of the privation of knowledge, and for this reason, the negative judgment neither represents an inevitable failure in knowing Reality, nor does it signify an awareness of Reality at a low plane. Negation is the symbol of the awareness of the erroneous nature of some affirmative attitude or judgment. The negative judgment represents a higher stage in the development of knowledge. It has a synoptic function namely, that of synthesizing two affirmative positions. As far example, the judgment 'A is
not B' is reflexive in its import. It is a judgement about a judg-
ment. It clearly claims that it is false to assert that A is B.
In view of the fact that 'B' is not the same as 'A', or is different
from 'A',—a belief in which A and B are supposed to be identical,
must be a mistaken notion about both A and B. Reality and
the mode of its revelation, are in no way identical with appear-
ance and the mode of its revelation. The mode of the revela-
tion of Reality is describable as intuitive. It is characterized by
immediacy. In the knowledge of Reality there is no distinction
between knowledge and Reality. 'To be known' is the same
thing as 'to be'. The mode of the revelation of the appearances
is describable as discursive. An appearance as known, is a datum
interpreted by thought. Its awareness is through and through
mediated and relational. So long as there is no recognition of
the difference between Appearance and Reality—'the world and
the individual' and 'Brahman',—there is a proneness to identify
them. What is given by thought and determined as its other, is
equated with Reality as it is not so determined. This equation
is symbolically expressed by the purely affirmative judgment, the
primary proposition 'P' (W. E. Johnson: Logic. Vol. 1). The
negative proposition 'not—P', is only a consciousness of the
erroneous character of 'P'.65 The negative statement which is
expressive of the negative judgment, is not symbolic of the priva-
tion of the knowledge of Reality. Nor is it, as the Buddhist
Absolutist believes, a confirmation of agnosticism or skepticism.
It is only expressive of the consciousness of the contradiction
implicit in the barely affirmative judgment, which seeks to identify
Reality with Appearance or the knowledge of Appearance with
the knowledge of Reality. The negative form is a plea for the
recognition of the absurdity of treating discursive knowledge on
a par with immediate experience. The negative judgment in-
volves a consciousness of the ideal in which the limitation of
discursive knowledge would disappear. At the same time, it is
also an awareness of the self-contradictory nature of discursive
knowing. Negative judgment represents thought in its reflexivitiy,
which, even while it is thought, points to a categorical awareness
of its limitations and of the ideal in which these limitations
would disappear.

We may summarize hereunder the salient points of difference between the views of Negation taken by the Buddhist Absolutist and the Advaitin:—

The Buddhist Absolutist ascribes to Negation only a privative function. The negative judgment is only a symbolic expression of the sceptical attitude in respect of the relation between knowledge and Reality. For this reason he insists on the closing down of all traffic between thought and Reality. The Paradox of the Negative Judgment would be taken to be just a figurative confirmation of the skeptic's standpoint. By disallowing the possibility of a negative judgment to be descriptive of Reality, the Buddhist Absolutist condemns reason in an outright manner. What is even more worthy of note is that, not only is the negative judgment, so privative in its existential import. All judgments whatsoever, share the fate of the negative judgment, and this is so, because thought in essence is the negation of Reality. A negative character is ascribed even to affirmative statements. The steps of reasoning in this context would be of this nature. The formally affirmative judgment is really negative in essence, and being so, judgment qua judgment cannot claim to be descriptive of Reality. Its reference to Reality should be understood as merely a verbal claim, which cannot be materially substantiated, on account of the fact that all thought-contents have a tendency to self-falsification; and this feature is assuredly coextensive with the privation of Reality in the knowledge context. The suspension of all judgments in relation to Reality is the net consequence of the situation. The dialectic (prasaṅga) of the Buddhist absolutist does not seek to establish any position. Its sole aim is to demonstrate the absurdity and contradiction implicit in every position. Every position is a truth-claim made by thought, but in so far as this claim is substantially false, thought or reason remains negative in an unmitigated sense. Of the two views concerning the Paradox of Negation, the Buddhist Absolutist would endorse the skeptical one. All attempts made either for pronouncing the problem to be unreal, for solving the problem either by the postulation of
negative facts and negative essences in Reality, or by transform-
ing the negative judgment into an affirmative one, are of no avail; they are no solutions of the problem, for to solve the problem or to claim to solve it, implies the occupation of a position or a point of view, which in the last analysis remains charged with negativity.

The Advaitic view of Negation is a very comprehensive one indeed. In the solution, obtainable in the Advaita, of the Paradox of Negation, the extreme points of view have met. With the skeptics like the Buddhists, the Advaitin admits the self-contradictory nature of thought and thought-contents, and also maintains, as the Buddhist would do, that thought and thought-contents are literally self-condemnatory in nature. While to the Buddhist Absolutist, this assertion implies the negative conclusion that thought and its contents are privative in import, the Advaitin's interpretation of the situation is of an affirmative kind. The negative judgment is symbolic of the self-transcendence of a position taken by thought in respect of what it reveals and establishes. That an identification of the knowledge of Reality with the knowledge of 'the world and the individual' is metaphysically unwarranted and false, is all that the negative form of assertion implies. With the Mādhyamika the Advaitin realizes the self-stultifying nature of thought, and with the Vijñānavādin he realizes the ultimate unreality of a pluralistic universe. But the Advaitin goes beyond the Buddhist Absolutism in recognizing that a realization of thought's self-stultifying nature is within thought itself. Self-consciousness of its own limitation by thought, involves two steps: (1) an awareness of the difference between the 'really real' and that which is only a thought-construct, and this amounts to an identification of 'distincts', namely the real, which can only be revealed in immediate experience, and the seemingly real, which is revealed as an object to a subject—each mediating each; and (2) an awareness of this difference between the 'distincts' and the consequent error exemplified in the coupling of the real and the unreal. Thus the negative statement 'A is not B' is really affirmative in import and is substantially the same as the assertion, 'It is false
that A is B'. The detection of an error in a certain position is not a bare denial of that position. It also points to a position in which this error would disappear. This view of negation gives greater respectability to Reason or thought than has been given to it in the Buddhist Absolutism. The cognition of error in a situation, implies, at least an awareness of the criterion which invalidates the situation under cognition. The statement 'A is not B' implies the consciousness of the criterion in the light of which 'A is B' is false. The Advaitin warns us against the situation in which A is taken as identical with B. Whereas 'B' has been actually derived from its ground A, by discursivizing, the A-content, B as thus derived cannot be identified unreservedly with A. 'The world and the individual' as abstracted from the Brahman, may have their ground in Brahman, and in nothing else, but as so abstracted and so conceived, their identity with the Brahman can only be illustrative of a manipulation or a belief that is profoundly misleading and absurd. In discursivity the two must remain two. Even if 'the world and the individual' as abstracted from the Brahman, are merely the modes of Brahman, their identity with Brahman as modes would be both absurd and impossible. 'The world and the individual' are no doubt identical with Brahman in the sense that Brahman is their ground, but as abstracted from Brahman, they have a tendency to claim, as it were, a domicile in another sphere, and as so domiciled, they may well have an entititative status of a pragmatic order, but it does not mean, that as subsisting in this manner, they are the same as their Ground. Nor is the manner of thus conceiving them the same as the one of conceiving their Ground, as it may be in and for itself. The negative judgment, as such, not only refers to Reality; it is also descriptive of it, for it envisages the consciousness of a false assertion in which two incompatibles are taken as constituting an indistinguishable unity.

(iv) The meaning and purpose of Philosophy in the two traditions: A conceptual Determination:

The question is—Has Philosophy anything to tell us about what is considered in some traditions of reflection as 'unthink-
able' and therefore 'unknowable'? Philosophy, in so far as it claims to be a reasoned discourse about the whole of Being, must provide in some manner an antidote to agnosticism and skepticism. If it fails to do so, it should be taken as incomplete and unsatisfactory. This distinction between complete and incomplete Philosophy is illustrated in the determination of the role and status of reasoning in the Advaitic and the Mādhyamika systems of thought, particularly in the concepts of Philosophy as Madhuvidyā or Brahmavidyā and Prajñāpāramitā.

In what follows we shall first attend to the Mādhyamika view of Philosophy as Prajñāpāramitā, and then in contrast with it, bring out the Advaitic view of Philosophy as Madhuvidyā or Brahmavidyā.

(a) Philosophy as Prajñāpāramitā

In the Mādhyamika tradition, philosophizing consists in the recognition of the self-contradictory and contingent nature of all that can be understood as an object related to a subject. Whatsoever can be known, can be known only as an object contemplated in theoretic consciousness, more precisely in the discursus, fraught with relativity; and that which is not known in this manner is unknowable. If, however, it is believed that the unknowable, is known, any assertion about the unknowable as known, would amount to an identification of such a knowledge with the knowledge expressible in the form of statements, conveying an interpretation of an object in terms of thought. And once there is a return to this form, it can easily be demonstrated by means of the dialectic (prasaṅga) that such a claim is unfounded. No position taken by thought is ever likely to escape contradiction. The summit of philosophizing which has been spoken of by the Mādhyamikas as praṇāpāramitā, would lie in the recognition of the untenability of any position asserted by thought or reason. Reason is antinomical in character; there is an opposition latent in every position. Of the two propositions, one contradicting the other, neither can be accepted, as free from contradiction. If the real be something beyond this antinomical bipolarity of reason, it can neither be known, nor
can its knowledge be expressed in one of the ways in which thought expresses itself. Philosophy, therefore, gives only one kind of knowledge, namely the knowledge that all statements about Reality, and all the ways of knowing it, are precariously inadequate. Philosophy as prajñāpāramitā has no ontological thesis to support. Even while the reality of a transcendental ens has not been denied by the Mādhyamika, it has definitely been denied that one can ever be cognizant of this Reality in theoretic consciousness. Prajñāpāramitā is a criticism of the dogmatic procedure of reason. When reason, without knowing its limitations, embarks upon the task of knowing a reality other than the one revealed in subject-object consciousness, it meets a disaster, a failure, a rebuff, and has to acknowledge its defect, by professing an agnostic attitude. Being a criticism and refutation of the dogmatic stand taken by reason, philosophy in this key insists on the suspension of all judgment, in respect of a transcendent beyond, which must be accepted only as unknowable. If there is a constitutional flaw in reason itself, it cannot be imagined that in any form, whatsoever, reason can bodily grasp the real and reveal it in all its contentual richness or poverty. Philosophy is not to be identified with a conceptual understanding of things. Conceptual understanding of things is an apprehension of what is grasped in the aspect of presentation. Such an apprehension, when made self-conscious, would be found to be self-contradictory. Philosophy designated as prajñāpāramitā is the ‘reflection of knowledge upon itself’. Its essence is dialectical, and dialectic is criticism—the awareness of a limitation unavoidably inherent in reason. In the Prajñāpāramitā tradition, Dialectic itself is Philosophy. It seeks to establish no point of view. It is neither affirmative nor negative, for according to it, both affirmation and negation are assertory in import, and therefore subject to self-dissipation. The Mādhyamika view of Philosophy as Prajñāpāramitā does not encourage in any manner, the identification of knowledge with Reality. Nor does it necessitate the search for an alternative faculty of knowing the real. All alternative points of view are subject to the same fatality. Between knowledge and Reality there must
remain an unbridged and unbridgeable gap. The Dialectic, therefore, is itself no standpoint; for had it been one, it would have merged into a philosophical discipline, which for want of better name, might be called Transcendental Ontology. The Mādhyamika understands by the term knowledge, only such knowledge, as we have of a datum given to us in presentation. Knowledge is unexceptionally discursive in character. In no circumstance, therefore, would the Mādhyamika believe in the communicability of the real. Philosophy as prajñāpāramitā, is not the knowledge of an object. It is only the intuitive realization of an a priori and constitutional flaw in Reason. So irreconcilable is the attitude of the Mādhyamika to the dogmatizing temper71 of reason that he declares himself to be a sworn enemy of all standpoints in Philosophy, actual and possible. Philosophy is not an alternative to Science. If it gives us any knowledge at all, it is not the knowledge of a new kind of entity. It is an exhortation to the realization of the self-undoing nature of knowledge as such. Science progresses by the supplementation and enlargement of its laws and hypotheses. Such a practice may have a warrant in our pragmatic needs, but it does not mean that there is anything like a continuity of method or purpose between Science and Philosophy—the discursus, and a consciousness of its limitation. The Mādhyamika is all too hostile to the employment of the analogical method, which might facilitate an understanding of the real in the cast of discursive apprehension. Not only the Real cannot be known in the manner in which all else is known; it cannot be known at all.72 Even while the Mādhyamika is no nihilist, he is an agnostic in respect of the knowledge of Reality, and a sceptic in respect of the validity and certainty of the alternative standpoints in the knowledge-situation. The aim of the Mādhyamika Dialectic is not the synthesis of opposites in a unity, that overreaches them, and dissolves their angularities and contradictions. It only shows that theoretic consciousness is unexceptionally charged with discursivity. The two complimentary aspects of the prajñāpāramitā are skepticism and agnosticism. What is known is charged with
uncertainty; and what might escape this stigma, cannot be known at all.

(b) Philosophy as Madhuvidyā or Madhujñāna

The Advaitic view of philosophical knowledge as Madhuvidyā or Brahmavidyā is radically different from the Mādhyamika view of philosophical knowledge as Prajñāpāramitā, in the sense that the Brahman of the Advaitin is knowable par excellence. It means that the theoretic consciousness is not so unreservedly repulsed from the threshold of ultimate Reality in the Advaita of Śaṅkara, as it is in the Prajñāpāramitā tradition. The Advaitin too, no doubt, makes a radical distinction between the Vyāvahārika and the Pāramārthika accounts of Reality, but it does not mean that the Pāramārthika account is not communicable. The Pāramārthika delineation of Reality has a determinable continuity with the Vyāvahārika knowledge. The Advaitin is as much conscious of the self-contradictory nature of discursive knowledge and of the antinomies of rational discourse, and is, therefore, as much of a skeptic as is the Mādhyamika. The Advaitic criticism of the pramāṇas is conceived more or less in the fashion of the Mādhyamika. Thought cannot know Brahman. But while the Mādhyamika not only condemns thought but also declares the impossibility of knowing the real, the Advaitin believes that even while thought stands self-condemned, Brahman is eminently knowable. Thus the problem, that the Mādhyamika could not solve at the epistemological level, has been given a convincing solution even on the plane of theoretic consciousness. According to Śaṅkara it is an error to consider the objective world as falling apart from consciousness. Consciousness is its origin, sustaining principle and ultimate goal. The objective world can have its ground only in Brahman, for Brahman alone is all-inclusive (Sarvam). Discursive reason takes the alienated objectivity as self-subsistent and self-sufficing and believes it as non-distinct from its Ground. This non-distinction in belief, generates an attitude, in which the real and non-real are identified unreservedly. Knowledge of facts, asserted and communicated, is an expression of this belief,
and of the equation of the ‘distincts’. The fact as understood in discursive consciousness is an object related to a subject, and the theoretic consciousness in which it is asserted and communicated, is of a relational order, implying the determination of the nature of a fact in and through a context of relations contemplated by thought. Speaking in the idiom of Western Logic, a consciousness of this nature takes the form of judgment, symbolically stated as ‘S is P’. Any determination of ‘S’ (a fact) in terms of ‘P’ (thought or idea) literally depends on an alienation of ‘S’ from ‘P’ or on an otherness of ‘S’ to ‘P’. At this level of consciousness, ‘S is P’, never means the identity of ‘S’ with ‘P’. It only means the determination of ‘S’ through ‘P’—‘P’, implying a contemplation of ‘S’ in a relational context. As thus speakable, and thus schematized, the existence as well as the essence of ‘S’ is relational. But a conception of Reality as thus adumbrated is not the same as spoken about in the Śrūtis, for which the Advaitin has great reverence. When the Śruti speaks of Brahma as ‘neti neti’ (nescio nescio or not-this, not-this) it intends to distinguish Brahma and its knowledge as distinct from the facts of the objective world and their cognition. By saying that the world of objects, as we know them in thought, are merely appearances (māyā), he only means to suggest that objectivity, in reality, is not to be considered as separate from the Atman. There is the relation (if we can use the term figuratively) of unity between the world and its ground, and their separation and sundering from each other, is a process, having only an empirico-pragmatic warrant. The Ground and consequence are so fully one, that even to speak of them as identical smacks of a prior separation or estrangement. Their separation is only false, and is unmistakably generated by ignorance. Even when we stress their inalienable identity, we use some form of words, which we use when we talk about them in their alienated state. But the identity affirmed at the level of discursive awareness, is not the same identity, which is assertable in relation to a level which is transcendent to the discursus. While judgment, relating to the level of empirical consciousness, gives us the knowledge
of abstracted objectivity, falsely appearing as the real, the judgment, whereby we verbally communicate the identity of objectivity with consciousness at the transcendental level, is not expressive of an antecedent separation followed by a union. The judgment form in the latter case has no literal significance. The world and the individual, estranged from their ground, are without any moorings. As so estranged, and believed to be real, without a consciousness of this estrangement, they are referred to in the judgment in its literal aspect. Spoken of in this manner, they have only a modal reality. So does the Advaitin speak of them as the effects of a self-subsisting Ground, which is designated as their cause. In a parlance having literal signification this cause is called Īśvara (God). But as the Śruti speaks of the inalienable identity of the world and the individual with this Ground, they are one with their Ground, and if the function of their being 'spoken about' is understood not literally, but only as a concession to our unmodifiable ratio-linguistic instruments of communication, we shall soon be cognizant of the transcendence of all literal implications of the statements found in the Śruts. 'The world and the individual' will be rolled back into God (Īśvara), and the notion of God itself, will only be symbolic of a transcendental truth, in which the scaffold of language and logic would stand dismantled in the aspect of their literal significance. Logic and language, thus, have been assigned a two-fold purpose in the Advaitic philosophy: the purely literal and the purely symbolic. In their literal aspect, they have a tendency to conceal the real by taking the separation of thought and its object as a case of real estrangement. In their symbolic aspect they reveal the real. The estranged situation in and through which they work, only refers to their native incapacity for fulfilling themselves in another manner. Yet, if language and thought, instead of being construed in a literal manner, are employed as symbols only, we could have through them the intimations of Transcendental Reality and Truth in theoretic consciousness, without the chance of lapsing into such a mode of philosophizing, as is apt to fly at a tangent from
Brahman, in its self-subsistent effulgence and non-sensuous immediacy. The Madhuvidyā of the Advaita Vedānta is coextensive with an intimation of the real in theoretic consciousness. It points to a knowledge of Reality, which is knowledge without being discursive and relational. Madhuvidyā, therefore, envisages as much an awareness of the contradictions inherent in thought as the intimation of a beyond, which transcends all limitation and is yet symbolically communicated through language whose structure is logomorphic. Madhuvidyā, which stands in the manner of a half-way house between vacuous transcendence of mystical ecstasy and hollow phenomenonality of scientific constructions, is a theoretic training in reading the cypher-script of Being; and being so, it loses neither its mystical character nor its scientific temper. This training is a triple process consisting of Śravana (which has linguistic affinities), and Manana, and Nididhyāsana (which refers to thought-transcendence, without the suspension of thought). The unknownability of Brahman does not necessarily imply an acceptance of the agnostic attitude, for the Brahman has been pronounced unknowable, only as an object to a subject. Nor does the advaitic indescribability refer to the suspension of speech in all possible manner. The restriction of thought and language to their literal use, would phenomenalize Brahman, and effect a violent transformation of Brahman into a discursive triviality. Such a limitation would imply, what Śaṅkara aptly describes as a case of the superimposition of the character of the object-content on Brahman. Yet Brahman is knowable in a faith, which does not lose its communicable immediacy, even while its transcendence to phenomenonality and discursivity is symbolically represented in the ratio-linguistic schema of mediated knowledge.

(B) Post-Śaṅkara Dialectic and the Prāsaṅgika Methodology of the Saugata Dialecticians

There is not much of dialectic in the pre-Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara Advaitism. The dialectic in the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara Advaitism seeks to establish through ratiocinative demonstration, the inadequacy of the objective world and thought-modes.
The emphasis in pre-Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara Advaitism is on the realization of the unity of the many with the one, and one with the many.\textsuperscript{79} The original Advaitism is monistic in essence, and this monism seems to be of a pantheistic order. Brahman is understood as immanent in every bit of existence that has emanated from it; nothing is to be treated as other than Brahman\textsuperscript{80}. If this is so, things being what they are, and known as what they are known to be, are identical with Brahman\textsuperscript{81}. The pre-Gauḍapāda Advaitin is an emanationist\textsuperscript{82}, and the relation between the many and the one is understood by him as one of aṁśa and aṁśin, kārya and kāraṇa, avasthā and avasthāvat viśeṣa and sāmānya.\textsuperscript{83} The realistic temper of the original Advaitism overlooked the fact concerning the ‘difference’, between one and the many for two reasons: (1) because it had no intention of sponsoring a really transcendental thesis, which might have made it necessary to demonstrate the self-contradictory nature of ‘difference’, and (2) because the facile monism in which it believed, left no ‘difference’ unliquidated or unresolved. Monism seems to have no quarrel with realism in the earlier Advaitic tradition; and for this reason there is no necessity of proving the hollowness of the realistic hypothesis. Realism stands reconciled to monism; and the śruti ‘vācāram-bhanam vikarōnāmadheyam & c.……’ is an expression of this position of realism in monism. In a monistico-realistic scheme of things, the dialectic is superfluous and pointless. The roots of the dialectic lie in the transcendental conception of Reality. If the real is understood as transcendental in essence, then all that is known as an object to a subject must be different from the transcendental. Any attempt to identify the transcendental with that which is different from it, is determinable in thought through the categories of the understanding. But all such determinations are self-contradictory in nature. The dialectic is a demonstration of this self-contradiction of thought and what it intends. The pre-Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara Advaitism, having no transcendental hypothesis in metaphysics, had no need of the dialectic. If Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara initiated the dialectical
phase in thinking, such a thinking could not be said to have its antecedents in the older Advaitic way of philosophizing. The original Advaitism stands for an unmitigated identity of the differences with unity; so it does not pay any heed to the task of proving the absurdity of the differentiating outlook (bhedadāśṭi). It gives to the differences the entitative essence of the real. The world and the individual, even while they are what they are, are one with the Brahman. Though their individuality is not to be doubted, what really matters is their identity with their cause. The transcendentalist, however, is averse to an unreflecting monism of this kind. He may either (1) believe in a unity that sublates the differences by transcending them, or (2) set out to demonstrate the self-contradictory nature of ‘difference’ itself. In both the cases, the dialectic becomes a methodological necessity. Both the Absolutist traditions, (a) of Gauḍaṇḍa and Śaṅkara and (b) of the Buddhists (esp. the Mādhyamikas) employ the dialectic for refuting the metaphysical validity of the pramāṇas (instruments of cognizing objectivity) and the prameyas (the objects of cognition). The real (Tattva or Brahman) is not an object among other objects, nor can it be equated with the subjectivity-in-the-discursus. Gauḍaṇḍa’s criticism of causality and other categories, and his definition of vaitathya (non-ens-ness) as relational mode of existence, are the illustrations of his transcendental outlook. Śaṅkara’s refutation of the realistic and the subjective points of view in philosophy seeks to lend support to the trans-empirical notion of reality. The refutation of difference becomes so predominantly all-important among the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, that one cannot identify their Advaitism with the Advaitism of the order of Brāhmaṇḍaśāstra and the like. The Buddhist dialecticians of the Mādhyamika school are so similar in their dialectical methodology to the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, that one is tempted to identify the logical standpoint of Maṇḍana, Suresvara, Śrī Harṣa and Gisukha with that of Nāgārjuna, Candraprastha and other dialecticians of the Advaya tradition. In case, such an equation is plausible, it is all so simple to jump to the conclusion that the
Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara tradition, which culminated in the unsparingly negative dialectic of Maṇḍana, Śri Harṣa and Citsukha, is a tradition which is substantially one with that of the Mādhya- 
mika dialecticians\(^90\).

We agree with the view that the post-Śaṅkara Advaitins are the inheritors of the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara tradition. We also agree with the view that so far as the refutation of the realistic hypothesis in metaphysics is concerned, there is no difference between the dialecticians of the Advaitic and the Mādhya- 
mika schools. We further agree with the contention that the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara school of Advaitism is not monistic like that of the pre-dialectical and original Advaitins. We, however, do not agree with the view that the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara Advaitins (Maṇḍana, Suresvara, Śri Harṣa and Citsukha) considered the dialectic to be the summit of philosophical quest\(^91\). Nor do we agree with those, who maintain that the Advaitism (non-dualism) of the followers of the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara tradition, was not at all monistic.

We maintain (1) that the post-Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara Advaitins were non-dualists like the Mādhya- 
mikas, without sharing their unreservedly agnostic zeal and attitude towards the Real, and (2) that the entire Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara tradition in Ad- 
vaitism, was monistic without ceasing to be non-dualistic. With the Mādhya- 
mikas the Advaitic dialectician is an unsparing critic of the categories and all that the categories determine and com- 
prehend. Yet he does not think that Reality is unknowable or incommunicable. A clue to the ascertainment of the difference between the Mādhya- 
mika non-dualism and Advaitic non-dualism, is to be found in the radically different attitudes of the two non-dualists to the status of thought and language. The indes- 
cribability of Transcendental Reality constitutes the central position of both the non-dualistic philosophies, and this indes- 
cribability of the Real is the mainspring of the dialectic in both the traditions. But in our opinion indescribability has not the same philosophical import in the two traditions. Indescribability in the Mādhya- 
mika doctrine means both unspeakability and
indeterminability in thought. But indeterminability in thought does not necessarily mean unspeakability. When one thinks one cannot think something and intend something else. All the same when one speaks (or uses words) one can mean something, which could not have been ordinarily meant. In other words, speech can have a double intentionality and, therefore, two meanings: (1) direct or literal and (2) symbolic, oblique or indirect. In case, one is conscious of the distinction between these two meanings, one can use speech or language in an oblique or figurative sense. In case, one is not conscious of such a distinction, one's speech can have for him only one meaning, namely, the direct or the literal one. Speech or language, in its oblique, figurative or indirect intention, can mean something, which thought can determine, as also something which thought cannot determine. The indescribability of the Advaita of Śaṅkara and his followers does not mean unspeakability. It means only indeterminability in thought. So something may be speakable—may not lack linguistic expressivity, and may yet be indescribable in the ordinary sense. The realistic critics of the Advaita have some times adduced a quibbling argument and said that 'the indescribable is describable at least as indescribable'. This argument does not touch the Advaitic position in any adverse manner, so long as indescribability is taken to mean only indeterminability in thought. So the unknowable in thought may be speakable or communicable without being determinable in thought. Because of a more or less undissociated cooperative parallelism between language and thought, the function and limits of language have been unreservedly identified with the function and limits of thought. The dogmatic procedure of the discursus exemplified in the arrogance of the panlogists in philosophy, is inspired by a failure on the part of thought to distinguish between its function and limits and the function and limits of language. Thus, thought may stand under an illusion and claim to do what language does. Communication, which is the function of language, might well be misunderstood and taken to mean determination in thought. Whatevever is deter-
minable in thought is also describable in language, and can be spoken about. But it does not mean that whatsoever can be spoken has a content invariably or necessarily determinable in thought. Language may overtake thought, even while it goes hand in hand with thought, till thought reaches its limits; but because of this compatible companionship, thought might well claim to be functioning even in a sphere where language becomes functionally trans-discursive. In relation to the sphere of the trans-discursive, the function of language does not cease, but language on account of its undissociated conjunction with thought is prone to using the relational structure of thought. So language may be functionally trans-discursive, even while it is structurally ratio-morphic. Because there is a borrowal of functions (at a certain level—the surface-level, not the depth-level) between thought and language, it is natural that thought should be mistakenly claiming to grasp all that is expressible in language, and language should mistakenly be taking the limits of thought for its own limits. Neither can thought limit language, nor can it have an unrestricted admittance to all the layers of language. The dialectic in Advaitism is not a condemnation of language in its bi-functional aspect; it only seeks to point to an innate flaw in thought, whose function is irreversibly uninentional. While language can claim communicability at two levels, the discursive and the trans-discursive, the knowability of the Real, revealed in language, is wider than knowability, as determinability in thought. Thus, what is indeterminable in thought is not necessarily unknowable. If it is unknowable, its unknowability means only its indeterminability in thought (avikalpa-viṣayatva). What language in its trans-literal aspect intends is knowable par excellence, though not knowable in thought. Language, even while it communicates or reveals the Transcendental Reality, might well retain its ratio-morphic character. Yet this expressivity of the transcendental, in language, should not encourage an unreserved identification of language with thought. Even while thought gives its form to language, and even while this form is not surrendered by language at
any level of its communicative function, it should not mean that if thought can lend its vestige to language, it can also do what language can do. What is indicated by the śrutis is the communicable knowability of Brahman, yet what the śrutis intend should not be taken as describability in the sense in which describability is understood in the context of discursive knowability. The śrutis refer to a content, which might be wholly non-determinable in a discursive manner. But the scope of describability might be extended by widening or deepening the intentionality of language, even while it apparently employs the forms, it does, at the level at which it expresses that, which is determinable in thought. This description, however, can be understood as the trans-literal or the figurative function of language. If language did not lend its communicating apparatus to thought, thought would be dumb, and scientific knowledge would lack communicability. If thought could realize its limitations, and did not delude itself by misconstruing its unseparated conjunction and undissociated parallelism with language, there would be no craze for identifying philosophy with Science or for anathematizing Metaphysics, by pronouncing it as nonsensical and unmeaning. The undissociated parallelism of thought and language does not mean their undissociability. Nor does ‘parallelism’ indicate anything more than their reciprocal functional interchangeability at a certain level only. They are functionally cooperative, in a way, without becoming conjugate in essence.

This analysis of the bi-functional character of language might help us in a considerable manner, (1) to distinguish the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara tradition from the Nāgārjuna-Candrakīrti tradition, and (2) to effect a synthesis of the monism of the older Advaitic school with the non-dualism of the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara Sampradāya. The two Advaitisms are rooted in Revelation (Śruti), and are, therefore not averse to the expressivity of the Transcendental Truth. The older Advaitism shares the Mādhyamika bias of missing the symbolic and the oblique meaning of the śrutis. Both of them identify the function of thought with the function of language. This identification of functions,
makes the older Advaitin oblivious of a trans-literal, trans-discursive level of language, and gives him the warrant to interpret the Śrutis in a naively realistic fashion. Such a grossness in the interpretation of the Śrutis is productive of an unreflecting pantheism and a lazy monism. In the Mādhyamika tradition, the same identification of the functions of thought and language leads to an overzealous transcendentalizing of the Absolute Reality (Tattva), and becomes the ground of the purely negative dialectic (prasañjya-pratisedha), whose only concern is the refutation of all statements and all positions, and a condemnation of all speakability. The neo-Advaitism of Śaṅkara and his followers resembles the Mādhyamika Philosophy in its reiteration of the ultimate Reality as transcendental, and the unsparing refutation of the categories of thought. It, however, shares the faith of the older Advaitins in having a reverence for the Śrutis, which the Mādhyamika does not have. Only the monism of the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara order is not the unreflecting monism of the older Advaitin. It is reflexive in character and critical in essence. The older Advaitin, being uncritical in his interpretation of the Śrutis, ignores 'difference', and takes an unreflecting somersault into a shallow 'all-one-ness'. The Mādhyamika takes 'difference' hyper-critically and locates the Transcendental Reality at an altitude beyond expressivity. The Neo-Advaitin is a dialectician without denying expressivity to Brahman, and yet he is a monist, though not of an unreflecting and dogmatic order. The neo-Advaitin can afford to be a dialectician in the manner of the Mādhyamikas, without surrendering his moorings in Revelation (Śrutī), which, if interpreted in the manner we have suggested, gives expressivity to the Transcendental Truth without making it determinable in thought. This is the reason why the Neo-Advaitin of the Gauḍapāda-Śaṅkara tradition nowhere designates the Brahman as anirvacanīya (unspeakable), and reserves this term only for qualifying the phenomenal and the vaikalpika content of experience.
CHAPTER V

THE CRITERIOLOGICAL REACTION AGAINST REALISM

The Realist position in respect of the pramāṇas finds its characteristic expression at the hands of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas, who believe in the reality of objects, and define knowledge as the cognition of an object. The Realist position rests on the assumption that the pramāṇas have a metaphysical validity, and that no account of knowledge is adequate without the acceptance of the ultimate validity of the pramāṇas. The pramāṇas are the ultimate ways of knowing—modes of apprehending an object. They are those categories, which are invariably presupposed in accounting for our knowledge of objects. The idealist criticism of the pramāṇas aims at showing that the pramāṇas may well have a pragmatic validity, and may be useful in a practical situation, but for this reason, they do not have a metaphysical validity. The metaphysical validity of the categories of knowledge has been challenged by the Śūnyavādin as much as by the Advaitin. In an implied manner the Vijnānavādins of the order of Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu also, would not accept the realist position in respect of the pramāṇas. The very schema of the ‘subject-object’ relation is fraught with contradictions, and is the breeding ground of illusory experiences. In spite of the differences among themselves the transcendentalists exhibit an avowed opposition to the acceptance of the metaphysical validity of the pramāṇas. Whatsoever may be the nature of reality according to these schools, is an irrelevant point in this connexion. What matters is the negative fact that reality is not of the nature of an object, and because it is not so, the nature of an object, and the ways of knowing it, are irrelevant to the knowing of what is ‘really real’.
THE CRITICIOLOGICAL REACTION AGAINST REALISM

We shall illustrate this position by considering the refutation of the pramānas by (a) Nāgārjuna in his Vigrāhavāyūvartanī, (b) Candrakīrti in his Prasannapadā (Commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā), (c) Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Brahmaśūtras, and (d) Śrī Harṣa in his Khaṇḍakhaṇḍyā. Thereafter, we shall attempt to present an appraisal of the issues between the realists and their critics; and more than that employ this reaction against realism for elucidating the heritage under examination in its criteriological aspect.

(a) Nāgārjuna in Vigrāhavāyūvartanī

Prima facie the Realist position is that all things are proved by the pramānas. This, however, is untenable, for in conformity with this demand, it can legitimately be asked as to what is that which proves the pramānas. If this situation arises, the general principle that all things are proved by the pramānas, will have to be recanted. If, at any rate, another position is taken, and the logician maintains that the pramānas have only a mediated necessity, there would arise the flaw of infinite regress, entailed by the demand for validating the validator. The impossibility of arriving at an initial limit would render the entire position untenable.

To yet another position, in which the logician might aver that the case of the validating organs (pramānas) is different from the cognitions validated, the rejoinder will be that the logician is making a discrimination, which is unauthorized. One who takes a position of this nature must give reasons for this discrimination. By taking the pramānas as valid without being validated by further pramānas, the logician is only giving an expression to his dogmatism. If the pramānas can be taken as self-proved, what is there to prevent any cognition, whatsoever, from being so. Else, the general rule that all things are to be validated by the pramānas, has to be surrendered.

As an alternative argument the Realists (logicians) may say, that the pramānas have a unique nature in this, that they prove other things and prove themselves. In support of their contention, they might quote the authority of the ancients in
this manner: "just as fire illumines other things as well as its own self, so the cognitive organs prove the existence of things as well as their own".7

Nāgārjuna refutes the ipse dixit of the ancients, given above, in the following manner:—

The analogy is ill-conceived.8 Fire illumines everything, but it cannot be said with propriety that it illumines itself. For being illumined, the fire must be in darkness and unillumined.9 This is absurd. But the entire assumption of the self-validation of the pramāṇas has its warrant only in this analogy. The statement that fire illumines itself has no literal significance. A previous unillumined condition of fire is a meaningless hypothesis. Further, if one can say that fire illumines itself, why can it not be said that it should also burn itself, just as it burns other things.10 The absurdity of this position consists in overlooking the fact that a thing cannot bring to bear its causal power upon its own self.11 If fire is capable of bringing to bear its act of illumination upon itself, darkness also could cover its own self.12 The fact is that there is no darkness in the being of fire. How, then, can fire illumine itself? In order to save the hypothesis that fire illumines itself, the realist may say that it is so, because the very fact of the existence of fire timelessly implies the destruction of darkness. This would mean that the other hypothesis which postulates that fire illumines darkness, will have to be surrendered. If darkness is not merely a limiting concept, and is a positive entity, it must be taken as coming into contact with fire before being destroyed. But if this is so, the postulation whereby is identified the presence of fire with the destruction of darkness, will have to be given up.13 A real darkness which is a fact in time cannot be destroyed by fire. Fire being nothing but the destruction of darkness, no illumination of darkness would be possible. The contention, then, that fire is the destruction of darkness, without coming in contact with darkness, would imply that fire in the corner of the room in which I am just now sitting, could destroy darkness present elsewhere.14 But nothing could be more fantastic than this logic. In order that fire should remove darkness, the two must
coexist in the same substratum.\textsuperscript{15} It means that they must be congruent.\textsuperscript{16} But if it were to be like this, it would go against the fact of their incongruity, which alone gives meaning to their opposition. This also, however, is certain, that if their incongruity were a fact, there could be no relation possible between them. How could it be said, then, that one of these superseded the other?

Nāgārjuna thus demonstrates the untenability of the Svapraṅkaśatva (self-illuminating character), as well as the Svataḥ-Prāmāṇya (self-validating character) of cognitions.

According to the realist, cognition must necessarily be the cognition of an object. It means that a cognition which cognizes nothing but itself, does not cognize an object; and if this is so, it is not a cognition. But if a cognition necessarily relates itself to an object, it cannot be independent of an object.\textsuperscript{17} This being so, we cannot speak of self-comprehending cognitions. If, however, the organs of cognition (Pramāṇas) have a mediated necessity—a necessity mediated by their relation to objects, a situation would arise, in which objects would have a priority over the Pramāṇas.\textsuperscript{18} But the original position also cannot be surrendered, whereby Pramāṇas are needed for proving the objects. In this circumstance it would be difficult to say what validates and what is validated.\textsuperscript{19} In case the Pramāṇas (organs of cognition) presuppose the cognizables (objects of cognition), the cognizables will take the place of the Pramāṇas, and the Pramāṇas of the cognizables.\textsuperscript{20} But a predicament of this nature would mean theoretical ruin to the realist.

Beyond this, if the realist maintains, that of the organs of cognition (Pramāṇas) and the cognizables (Prameyas), neither is independent, and that they reciprocally determine each other, both will be relational in essence, and therefore, unreal. In a state of reciprocal determination,\textsuperscript{21} the generator and the generated, the cognizer and the cognized, the prover and the proved, will reduce themselves to nothing.\textsuperscript{22} It would be extremely difficult to say which is Pramāṇa and which is not. The entire realistic position becomes precarious. The organs of cognition (Pramāṇas) are neither self-proved, nor are they proved by other
organs, nor by the cognizables, and yet they cannot be supposed to be unconditionally valid.23

(b) Candrakīrti in Prasannapadā:

The contention of Nāgārjuna in the first verse of the Mūlamādhyaṃaka-Kārikā is that no entity can be said to be produced by a cause. To this Candrakīrti poses an opponent, who would maintain that this assertion of Nāgārjuna is either valid or not valid. If valid, he must state the grounds of its validity, viz., the pramāṇas, which he accepts, and takes as validating this contention. If, however, he insists upon maintaining that his contention is valid, without being grounded in anything in the nature of a pramāṇa, he has to produce arguments for establishing that valid cognition can be produced without a cause, i.e., a pramāṇa (organ of cognition).

The objections of the Realist (logician) to the Mādhyamika position are anticipated by Candrakīrti in the following manner:—

(i) If you (the Mādhyamikas) assert the irrationality of causality, and yet do so without a reason or ground (pramāṇa), then any position can be taken—even the one opposite to that of the Mādhyamika. The irrationality of the assertion that causality is irrational can be as much of a valid contention. If you maintain that things are unreal, one can maintain the opposite thesis and yet be true. Against the proposition that things are unproduced, it can be said that they are produced.24

(ii) In the absence of a pramāṇa the assertion of the Mādhyamika that things are not caused, lacks conviction, and if it is so, it would mean that the opposite of it is true. The failure to prove the unreality of the phenomena, withal establishes their reality.25

The following establishes Candrakīrti’s refutation of the realist contention:

(i) If the logician of the realist school avers, that in not supporting his assertion by a pramāṇa, the Mādhyamika lacks conviction, it appears to be an objection which is of no avail,
for conviction is only a relative psychosis, and refers to a pre-existing disbelief, for the removal of which a pramāṇa is needed. Pramāṇa itself, is therefore relative in nature, and because it is so, it contains in itself the conditions of its own contradiction.26 Besides, the Mādhyamika being not disturbed by any doubt, it is superfluous for him to seek a certainty that cancels doubt. "The consequential issues concerning the organs of knowledge, their numbers, their characteristics, their genesis and their objects, are thus only cobwebs of imaginary construction, which do not require any refutation".27

(iii) The contention of the Mādhyamika that ‘things do not have a cause’ refers not so much to his conviction regarding the refutability of the thesis of the opponent that ‘things have a cause’. The statement of the Mādhyamika purports, only to this, that the concept of cause is self-contradictory, and a demonstration of this situation does not need any other ground than the loopholes and inconsistencies inherent in the position owned by the opponent (the logician). In case the logician seeks to prove the absurdity of the Mādhyamika position, he would be required to prove his own thesis concerning the reality of causation. And, evidently enough, this is an impossible task for him. The refutation of the logician, therefore, refers not to the conviction of the Mādhyamika either way;28 it only refers to the self-contradictory nature of Causality. The categorical form of the statement concerning the refutation of Causality refers not to the conviction of the Mādhyamika, but to the conviction of the laity. The average man is under the spell of the superstition that Causality is real. The cult of the Mādhyamika is one of silence; so a talk about his conviction, this way or that, has no relevance.

(iii) To the contention of the logician that the Mādhyamika in criticizing the logician is taking a position, which tacitly assumes the validity of the pramāṇas, the rejoinder is like this. It is no doubt correct that in refuting the logician the Mādhyamika is taking a position. But doing so is necessary for disabusing the mind of the laity. All the same, the stand taken by the Mādhyamika, should not be misconstrued. What the Mādhyamika
mika is actually aiming at, is not the inculcation of a doctrine among other doctrines, nor is it his aim to establish a counterpoint. His aim is merely to demonstrate to the logician the self-contradiction implicit in his own logic. Truly speaking the Mādhyamika has no thesis of his own. He only seeks to show the absurdity and hollowness implicit in the conviction of the logician, viz., the conviction in respect of the validity of the notion of Causality. With this, shown as absurd and untenable, the doctrine that takes pramāṇas to be cause of knowledge falls to the ground.29 It only appears that the Mādhyamika philosopher also is establishing a counterpoint, and accepting tacitly the validity and the need of the pramāṇas. Entities supposed to be caused are unreal, because Causality itself is a self-discrepant notion. The refutation of Causality only proves the self-contradictory nature of the appearances. Further the apparent fact of the Mādhyamika’s taking a position has been explained like this. For dispelling the ignorance of the laity, the Sugata has postulated a hypothetical man,30 who exposes bare the absurdity of their notions (the notion concerning Causality being only one of these notions). The entire explanation offered by Candragupta kirti in this respect sounds like the ‘as-if’ standpoint of Hans Vaihinger.31 Whereas the Mādhyamika is not actually taking a position counter to that of the logician, it appears as if, he is taking a position. The Mādhyamika stand is a fiction, employed for the liquidation of the ignorance of the common man.32

(iv) To the contention that a logical see-saw of arguments cannot strike at the root of Causality, because it is testified by experience,33 the Mādhyamika would say, that even the vision of two moons is testified by experience and is also refutable.34

(v) To the contention of the logician that the Mādhyamika refutation of the categories can be set aside by re-defining the categories and notions, the rejoinder is, that such a re-definition does not very much alter the first principles of the logician’s doctrine—which are as much an object of criticism now as they ever were.35

(vi) The Logical Reformist, Diśnāga, reduces cognitive organs to two: Pratyakṣa (perception) and Anumāṇa (infer-
ence). This point is established by accounting for the way in which an object is known. An object has two and only two aspects to it: (1) svatākṣaṇa (particularity); and (2) sāmānyālakṣaṇa (generality), and these constitute the differentia of the object—the characteristics in terms of which the object can be defined. So far as svatākṣaṇa is concerned, its cognitive organ is perception. The cognitive organ of sāmānyalakṣaṇa is inference. This proves the irrelevance and superfluousness of other pramāṇas. In this respect, Candrakīrti is interested in making two points: (1) that the very notion of definition, as envisaged by Diṅnāga is self-contradictory, and (2) that Diṅnāga’s view of the pramāṇas is an oversimplification of the traditional logic, and therefore not comprehensive enough for explaining cognition from even a pragmatic point of view.

The position, that a thing is to be defined in terms of its two differentia—the svatākṣaṇa and the sāmānyalakṣaṇa, is untenable in the last analysis. The question is—Are these differentia different or not from the entity they seek to define? If they are different, the entity needs being comprehended by other organs. If the entities have no independent reality, the two-fold character mentioned in the argument would have no basis. If the defining character does not belong to an independent entity, the very notion of a ‘definable’ turns out to be a violent abstraction. In the absence of a definable entity there is no reason for definition.36

The pramāṇas, therefore, have no transcendental necessity about them. Their pragmatic and empirical necessity need not be questioned. Yet, when the traditional logic of Aksapāda is more comprehensive and less startling than that of Diṅnāga, what justification is there for accepting an oversimplified scheme of pramāṇas as presented by the latter.37

(c) Saṅkara in the Sārīraka Bhāṣya:

Saṅkara is unlike the Mādhyamika in the sense that he does not present dialectical arguments for refuting the validity of the pramāṇas. All he means to say in respect of the pramāṇas is that they do not have any application in the sphere of ultimate
knowledge. In so far as the knowledge established by the pramāṇas is the knowledge of an object by a subject, such a knowledge presupposes an activity of knowing on the part of some one, and the knowledge of an object is the consequence of such an activity. In other words, the knowledge established by the pramāṇas is relational in nature; and whatsoever is relational refers to the sphere of Nescience. Thus the pramāṇas have a function to perform only within the sphere of Ignorance or Nescience. The following extract from the Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya by Śaṅkara amply brings out the nature and the status of knowledge, validated by the pramāṇas:—

"But how can the means of right knowledge, such as perception, inference etc., and scriptural texts, have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience? Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses and so on, are identical with or belong to the self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, perception and other means of knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e., the body) the senses cannot act. Nor does any body act by means of a body on which the nature of the self is not superimposed. Nor, can, in the absence of all that, the self, which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience".38

(d) Śrī Harṣa in Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā:

The net purport and upshot of Śrī Harṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā is a refutation of the Naiyāyika position in respect of the criterion of knowledge and reality. Such a criticism falls under two heads: (1) a general exposition of the grounds of the untenability of the metaphysical validity of the categories, comprising the organs of cognition (pramāṇa) and the objects of cognition (prameya), and (2) a detailed, point by point,
refutation of the various categories.

A complete treatment of Śrī Harṣa’s criticism of the categories, would be both unmeaning and impossible in the present context. We shall, therefore, consider here, the position taken by Śrī Harṣa in respect of the general doctrine of the Naiyāyika, concerning the metaphysical validity of the categories.

The refutation of the Naiyāyika view of the categories is implied in the Advaitic metaphysical doctrine, and the particular relation in which Metaphysics stands to Logic and Epistemology. According to the Advaita, the metaphysical reality is an Avikalpavāśaya (a non-discursive, non-relational ens). As in Kant, so in the Advaita, a sharp dividing line has been drawn between Metaphysics and Logic-cum-Epistemology. Any identification of the metaphysical position with the logico-epistemological position would be a fault in principle, and therefore productive of an erroneous perspective, in which the unreal appears as real and the real appears as unreal. Nevertheless, the pragmatic character of Logic and Epistemology has not been doubted by the Advaitin. Logical discussions are more or less true, if they conform to certain conventions and covenants, postulated for the purpose of discussion. But this truth, it is firmly maintained, should not be given a metaphysical status.

Śrī Harṣa brings out his views in this context by refuting the objections that the Naiyāyikas can possibly advance against the absolutist position. The absolutist standpoint is prima facie sceptical in nature. It does not believe in the validity of the pramāṇas. And, if this is so, no discussion concerning truth and reality is possible. A discussion of this nature, the Naiyāyika maintains, can be made possible, only if the two parties entering into a discussion, accept the pramāṇas as ultimately valid. Because the Absolutist is a sceptic in the realm of Logic, the possibility of a philosophical discussion on the basis of his first principles is not possible. The belief in the validity of the organs of cognition (pramāṇas) is the sine qua non of the discussion, and because the Absolutist is bereft of any such belief, he cannot participate in discussion.
Śrī Harṣa points out in this context that (i) the absence of belief in the validity of the pramāṇas does not disqualify the Advaitin from engaging himself fruitfully in philosophical discussion and (ii) the bestowal of ultimate validity on the pramāṇas is indefensible in the last analysis.

(i) The Possibility of Philosophical Discussion

If it be maintained, that without belief in the ultimate validity of the pramāṇas, no initiation of debate is possible, it would be an effective rejoinder to point out, that some philosophers, who have not had such a belief, have been found to engage themselves in philosophical disutations. The exponent of the Čārvāka school and Mādhyamikas, have advanced persuasive arguments for refuting the views of their adversaries, as also for establishing their own standpoint.48 The want of such a belief could not prevent Śaṅkara from commenting on the Vedānta-sūtra,44 and thereby establishing his position against the systems of metaphysics, he has so effectively refuted. Further, if mere absence of belief were so much of an unpardonable fault, the Naiyāyika should not have taken so much pains for refuting the Sceptics. The contention that belief in the validity of the pramāṇas, is the essential condition of debate, is frivolous and irrelevant in import, for it confuses a psychological condition with a logical issue.45 The aim of debate is either the refutation of an adversary or the establishment of one’s own position. What makes the fulfilment of these aims possible, is not the belief in the validity of the pramāṇas. The validity of a certain argument consists in its freedom from fallacy and self-contradiction. “The introduction of a psychical question in a matter of logical debate is only calculated to side-track the logical issue and is tantamount to the evasion of an uncomfortable situation by a questionable device”.46 A belief in the ultimate validity of the pramāṇas is not at all essential for judging the upshot of a debate. That which is really essential in this context, is the knowledge and acceptance of certain conventions, which stand in the office of the rules of the game.47 One may enter into a debate and fruitfully too, and may yet do so, without according
any metaphysical validity to the categories. An attitude of non-committal towards the metaphysical validity of the categories, is not at all incompatible with the activity of debating logical and philosophical issues.48

The possible alternatives49 in respect of the nature of the debate can be these: (1) in which both the parties adhere to the validity of the logical canons; (2) in which neither party believes in the validity of the logical canons; and (3) in which one party believes and the other does not believe in the validity of the logical canons.

Śrī Harṣa refutes all these positions, by showing that they are untenable. The first alternative, evidently is not the one to which the Naiyāyika objects, because the parties in question, are in strict conformity with the view of the Naiyāyika. The second alternative also is out of the question, because both the parties are in the same situation. The third alternative also is not in a sound position. For the sake of understanding the absurdity of Naiyāyika's travesty of the Absolutists' position, it would be necessary to understand correctly the attitude of both to the problem concerning the pramāṇas and their validity. The Naiyāyika contends that it is not possible for one to enter into discussion unless one believes in the validity of the pramāṇas. Both the parties in a debate must have a belief of this nature, else the debate cannot even proceed. The actual position is such that the Naiyāyika does have such a belief, whereas the Absolutist has not. Prima facie, then, there should be ab initio no meeting ground for the two parties. But all the same, even in such a situation, the Naiyāyika is found advancing arguments against the Absolutist. If this is so, the Naiyāyika goes beyond the principle advanced by him that no debate or discussion can proceed without belief in the validity of the pramāṇas. In criticizing the Absolutist, the Naiyāyika has entered the ring. This evidently is the violation of a fundamental rule. In criticizing the Absolutist, the Naiyāyika is entirely oblivious of his having broken a rule he has himself laid down. Further, in maintaining that belief in the validity of the pramāṇas is a necessary condition of a successful debate, the Naiyāyika is making
an incomplete statement of the necessary condition in question. A successful debate should terminate either in the refutation of a point of view or its establishment. This can be demonstrated only by showing that the parties engaged in debate have or have not abided by certain conventions and covenants postulated for the purpose of judging the cogency or otherwise of the arguments.\textsuperscript{50} But such a postulation has nothing to do with belief or disbelief in the \textit{pramāṇas}. The matter of belief or disbelief is a purely psychological problem, and it should not be confused with the problem of validity which is entirely a logical problem. If the Naiyāyika confuses issues in this manner, he will be under a twofold obligation: (1) to abide by the covenants and conventions postulated for judging the upshot of the discussion, and (2) to prove that his belief in the ultimate validity of the \textit{pramāṇas} is veridical.\textsuperscript{51} Whereas a mere conformity or non-conformity to the rules incorporated in the covenants and conventions is enough to validate or invalidate a discussion, it is superfluous going about proving the ultimate validity of the \textit{pramāṇas}.\textsuperscript{52} Śrī Harśa, representing the Absolutist standpoint in Logic, maintains that the Naiyāyika's belief in the validity of the \textit{pramāṇas} is entirely irrelevant either to the initiation of a debate or its appraisal. This stand of the Absolutist, however, should not be taken to imply a refutation of the validity of the canons of knowledge. So far as his own position is concerned, it is neither one of belief, nor of disbelief in the validity of the \textit{pramāṇas}. It is a position of non-committal. "It is, therefore, established that belief or want of belief is not the necessary concomitant of discussion, but agreement to abide by a convention which has the sanction of tradition and custom. Acceptance of the tradition is the requisite qualification, and does not involve or presuppose faith—a fact which may only have a subjective interest".\textsuperscript{53} What, then, is the condition of discussion, is not a belief in the metaphysical validity of the canons of knowledge. If it were so, the sceptic who openly flouts the validity of these canons, could not take part in a philosophical discussion. A lack of belief in the ultimate validity of the canons does not render the use of the conventional rules of logic
ineffectual or impossible.

If, however, the Naiyāyika maintains that belief in the validity of the pramāṇas is the condition precedent of debate or discussion, the sceptic has every right to insist upon his being convinced about the Naiyāyika position on rational grounds. If the Naiyāyika gives arguments for the sake of convincing the skeptic about the validity of the pramāṇas, he can do so only by arguing for his case. If this is the situation, the Naiyāyika has lost his case, for the belief in the validity of the pramāṇas being the cause of the discussion has turned out to be the consequence of discussion. In this case it would be absurd to maintain that belief in the validity of the pramāṇas is the invariable antecedent of a philosophical discussion.

The only condition of debate, then, is the acceptance of certain rules concerning the procedure of debate. In the opinion of Śrī Harṣa these rules are not arbitrary constructions. On the other hand, they are known too well, being organs and canons, which have received the sanction of common tradition. Failure to abide by these conventions may result in a disqualifying flaw or fallacy. These defects may express themselves first in the form of a fallacious argument and then in the silence of the opponent. Or such a disqualification might be due to a procedural drawback, such as the surrendering of the original position, shifting of the ground or the amendment of a previous thesis. These extra-logical drawbacks are indicative of a person's incapacity to meet the challenge of the opponent. It is not enough to give only sound reasons. The arguer must justify his stand, when the opposite party challenges its validity. Failure to produce a justification of this nature has been accepted in Indian traditional logic as the ground of defeat in argument. The condition of debate, therefore, is not a belief in the validity of the organs of cognition, but an agreement between the parties in respect of the rules of logical conduct, before they enter into a discussion. This agreement is the condition precedent of debate, irrespective of the metaphysical belief of either party.

To this contention of the Absolutist, the Naiyāyika may make an objection and propose an amendment. He may press on the
Absolutist the necessity of proving the validity of the covenants, for without being proved infallible, they cannot be accepted as the ready-reckoners of the truth or otherwise of discussions. If, however, the Absolutist engages himself in the task of justifying the validity of the canons by means of arguments and discussions, he will be involving himself in a vicious circle (çakraka). Such an enterprise would result in a position in which the proof of the validity of the rules and covenants, would be both the condition and the consequence of philosophical debate. The Absolutist finds no difficulty in refuting the dilemma by distinguishing between the pragmatic validity and the metaphysical validity of the pramāṇas. The kind of criteriological validity which is the ground of logical debate is not the metaphysical validity of the covenants, conventions and organs. The acceptance of the convention is free from all metaphysical commitments.

(ii) Concerning the Ultimate Validity of Pramāṇas

The issue between the Naiyāyika and the Absolutist in respect of the problem concerning the metaphysical validity of the canons of cognition, comes before us in the form of the following arguments and counter-arguments:—

(i) The Naiyāyika may say that the metaphysical validity of the canons and organs of cognitions is established by the universal acceptance of them. To this the counter-reply is, that any such acceptance does not testify to their metaphysical validity. Acceptance of the conventions has only a covenental status. We simply believe, as if these conventions had an unmitigated and unchallengeable validity. The metaphysical status of such a validity is only fictional in essence. It only appears as if they are transcendentally necessary and have a metaphysical validity. The universal acceptance of the categories does not prevent them from becoming self-contradictory, when they are subjected to a close analytical examination. Just as the universal belief in the identity of the soul with the body cannot be taken as an unassailable proof of such a belief, the acceptance of the conventional rules of debate does not give them the status
of metaphysical validity.\textsuperscript{66}

(ii) The Naiyāyika might say that without a belief in the ultimate validity of these canons, nothing can be proved or disproved. To this the reply of the Absolutist is—What decides the case in favour of a point of view is the substantiation of that point of view by means of arguments cited in closest consonance with the conventional rules of logical discussion. Very often the logical issue has been in favour of the Absolutist in spite of the fact that he does not believe in the ultimate validity of the pramāṇas. To abide by the procedural regimen relating to debate is enough for the purpose. Therefore, the Naiyāyika, even while he unreservedly believes in the metaphysical validity of the pramāṇas, may lose a discussion for not conforming to the rules. The criterion of the issue between two contending parties is conformity to the rules of discussion. So the contention of the logician that lack of faith in the metaphysical validity of logical postulates and the epistemic instruments, will disqualify the Absolutist and foredoom his arguments, is only the outcome of a wishful thinking and subjective prepossession.\textsuperscript{67}

(iii) The Naiyāyika may again contend: If the Absolutist concedes the necessity of conventions, comprising the canons and the organs of cognition, as the condition of debate, he also concedes their reality, for a real debate presupposes the reality of the factors conditioning it. To this the Absolutist would reply thus: The entire contention of the Naiyāyika rests on the presupposition that the logical categories have a metaphysical validity. Confusion of such a nature might well be removed by clearly demarcating the sphere of logic from the sphere of metaphysics. When the Absolutist insists on the acceptance of the conventions, he does accept them as the necessary conditions of cognition and its validation. But this, in any case, does not mean that what is accepted as epistemically valid has also a metaphysical validity. The acceptance of the categories is common to the Naiyāyika and the Absolutist. The Absolutist position differs radically from the Naiyāyika in this that it does not identify the logical and the epistemical issues with the metaphysical.
(iv) The Naiyāyika may argue for his point of view in yet another manner. Pointing to the Absolutist's acceptance of the *paramāṇas* as necessary for a successful debate, the Naiyāyika may say that such a contention implies the awareness of the canons and the organs in question. This conclusion follows from the general principle that awareness necessarily implies an object. It may be true, but even when awareness necessarily implies an object, the object implied may not be necessarily real.68 If it were so, the lake-water in the mirage would have an ontological validity which it definitely has not.69 From this it follows that even while the acceptance of the canons and organs of cognition implies their awareness, the mere fact of their awareness does not infallibly endorse their metaphysical validity. The fact of illusion repudiates the certainty of such an argument. But even then, the Naiyāyika may modify his contention and say that the awareness about which he is speaking is not to be taken as unqualified awareness. It is an uncontradicted awareness which establishes a really existing object.70 The Absolutist may very well ask the Naiyāyika to elucidate the conception of uncontradicted awareness. If mere non-emergence of contradiction in respect of a certain awareness be the meaning of 'uncontradicted awareness', such a phenomenon cannot be taken as a guarantee for all time.71 If, at any rate, freedom from contradiction refers to unanimity among a number of persons in respect of the nature of a certain content of knowledge, it might be pointed out that a number of persons might hold an opinion, which, in the light of further evidence, is found to be false and self-contradictory.72 The Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras are unanimous in maintaining the momentary existence of the reals, but other schools of philosophy believe this theory to be wrong.73 The lack of contradiction in respect of a belief or experience for a certain length of time or in respect of one or more persons, does not give any warrant to the reality of the content of such a belief.74 "Truth is no respecter of persons or even a majority".75 So, it follows that non-contradiction must be absolute in order to confer absolute validity on a cognition. Absolute non-contradiction means that the experience or belief
must hold good for all time and all persons. The issue between the contending parties is to be decided in accordance with the accepted rules, by an umpire, who is supposed to be an expert in the application of these rules, and whose verdict is above suspicion.

The Naiyāyika may again object to this position by saying that the acceptance of the umpire's verdict by the Absolutist, postulates the reality of such a verdict. If this is so, the Absolutist accepts a metaphysical position in which the verdict of the umpire comes up as an entity different from Brahman. To this Śrī Harṣa replies by saying that such an objection rests on a fundamental misconception. While the Advaitins and the Buddhist idealists maintain that there is an ultimate identity of awareness and its object, the Naiyāyika postulates a dualistic metaphysic, in which an objective fact is taken as standing against awareness. The Naiyāyika maintains that the existence of a thing is proved by its awareness. But in so far as awareness itself is neither self-evident nor self-validated on the Naiyāyika view, the question must be answered, as to what validates awareness itself, and the process of such a validation involves infinite regress. Whatsoever is taken as valid has only a mediated necessity. The metaphysical validity of the umpire's verdict is only a huge assumption, which can, at best, have only a problematic certainty. The Naiyāyika, in the opinion of the Advaitin, has himself cut the ground from underneath his feet by denying the existence of an awareness or consciousness that is foundational and non-relational. The existence of the object is proved by 'awareness', but the existence of awareness itself not being self-evident, stands to be proved by another awareness. There are, in this connexion, two things which must be noted: (1) that the Naiyāyika believes in the metaphysical validity of the criterion; and (2) that no truth can be ultimately true—all truth being only extrinsically validated (parataḥ prāmāṇya). From a necessity that is through and through mediated, the Naiyāyika expects the certitude of immediacy. If, however, the Naiyāyika does not insist on an infinite regress in respect of the process of the validation of a cognition, and accepts the truth of a cognition by examining
it up to three or four steps, he has gone beyond the first principles of his criteriology. There cannot be an abrupt halt in an inquiry concerning the truth of a cognition. The Advaitin (so well represented in this context by Śrī Harṣa) does not object to a verification of this nature. But in doing so the Advaitin unlike the Mīmāṃsakas (Kumārila esp.) does not identify this truth with anything having a transcendental necessity about it. As against the Naiyāyika, he insists on the necessity of simplifying the chain of the verificatory regressus without doubting or disparaging the pragmatic validity of the judgement of the umpire. Śrī Harṣa is of the opinion that all truths, whatsoever, are only relatively true. So far as the acceptance of the verdict of the umpire by the Absolutist and the Sceptic is concerned, it has two reasons: (1) it is symbolic of the need of taking the logical principles only in a pragmatic sense, and (2) it is impossible to escape the snares of infinite regress, if the Naiyāyika’s view of verification is adopted.

A further objection from the Naiyāyikas has been anticipated. If the metaphysical validity of the pramāṇas is not accepted, a philosophical debate would remain unexplained, because the pramāṇas are the cause of debate, and how, if cause is non-existent (asat), can we explain the effect, viz., the event of a philosophical discussion. To this the Advaitin’s rejoinder may be: The distinction between cause and effect is itself within asat. It only appears, as if, the cause and the effect have an ultimate reality. Why should appearance be confused with reality? That which is metaphysically and transcendentally non-existent (asat) may well be taken as existent (sat) in an empirical sense. The pragmatic and empirical existence of the cause-effect nexus is brought in for initiating a discussion and assessing its value. Where, then, is the difficulty, in explaining the effect as caused by an event, which is empirically real but transcendentally unreal? Thus the pramāṇas, even when they do not have a transcendental necessity, may be taken as necessary fictions, covenants or conventions, which nevertheless have a pragmatic necessity, and give all the meaning that is needed, to a philosophical debate, which results in the defeat of one of the parties.
and the establishment of the thesis of another.

A RECAPITULATION AND APPRAISAL OF ISSUES

Merely an observation of the arguments cited above is not enough. It seems that one has to make a choice between the two alternative standpoints: realism and transcendentalism—between Mīmāṃsā-cum- Nyāya and Mādhyamika-cum-Advaita. What is common to Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya is the acceptance of the metaphysical validity of the pramāṇas and the prameyas. On the other hand, the Mādhyamika and the Advaita are equally insistent on the refutation of these two categories, if any metaphysical validity is given to them. The question, then, that must be answered is: Does the metaphysical untenability of the pramāṇas, and thereby of the prameyas, point to a despair in respect of knowledge, or can there be knowledge, even if these are not accepted as metaphysically valid? The question, by implication, involves a much wider problem—that of the relation of Epistemology to Metaphysics, or of Knowledge to Reality. Can Epistemology dispense with Metaphysics? Is it possible to talk of truth and error, without admitting somehow, an absolute criterion, which has a necessary reference to reality? The realist is of the opinion that knowledge is not possible without accepting the metaphysical validity of the pramāṇas and the prameyas—the instruments of knowledge and the objects revealed by these instruments, for knowledge is invariably the apprehension of an object. Knowledge by its very nature implies a two-termed relation, the relation of a subject and an object; and unless the two terms are real, the question of a relation, which accounts for knowledge, would be unmeaning and superfluous. The epistemic validity of this relation rises and falls with the metaphysical validity of the terms, whose relation is envisaged in knowledge. All knowledge, therefore, is relational in the last analysis, and whatsoever else, may or may not be the determining condition of knowledge, it is certain that without the presupposition of the ultimate validity of the objects and the instruments of knowledge, it is meaningless to entertain the notion of knowledge. This presupposition is of the nature of a necessary belief,
and this belief is necessary because it is the ground or the cause
of knowledge. The contention of the Mādhyamika and the
Advaitin goes counter to the realist view, primarily in the sense,
that in their opinion a belief in the ultimate validity of the
instruments and the objects of knowledge is irrelevant to the
possibility of knowledge. Even without being metaphysically
valid, the instruments of knowledge may acquaint us with objects,
which do not have an infallible metaphysical status. So the
question concerning the metaphysical validity or otherwise of
the instruments and the objects of knowledge might well be
discussed without having the least relevance to the production
or possibility of knowledge. The realist, it appears, erroneously
thinks that a belief in the validity of the instruments and the
objects of knowledge has the force of a metaphysical self-evidence.
The realist seeks to give to a psychological situation, the status
of a metaphysical and transcendental necessity. The validity
or otherwise of knowledge is in no way determined by a belief
of this nature. What makes knowledge valid or invalid is the
exemplification or otherwise of certain rules that are supposed
to underlie all valid reasoning. But if one asks, whether these
rules have or have not any metaphysical validity, the only answer
would be that their application is restricted to such knowledge
alone, as is expressed in the form of judgment (intended to
be literally significant), that is, one which contemplates a rela-
tional schema of cognition. Such a cognition, it may be said, is
true when it corresponds with facts or is coherent with the exist-
ing stock of knowledge, or is verified by reference to a pragmatic
situation. But that it fulfils these conditions, does not endow
it with a certitude of the rank of metaphysical necessity. The
schema of knowledge at the level considered by the realists is
the schema of subject-object relation, and therefore, rests on
the employment of the categories of the understanding, which
are so many ways of relating one object to another, for a com-
prehension of presented objectivity.

The Absolutist and the Skeptic, even though their meta-
physical positions differ considerably, have more or less the
same logical standpoint. They do not stand so much for an
unqualified cancellation of knowledge at the relational level, nor do they maintain that the categories employed for the understanding of the object, are to be ruled out of court. They simply insist that knowledge of such a nature has only a pragmatic or psychological necessity, but on this basis, it cannot claim for itself anything in the nature of a transcendental or metaphysical warrant. The categories are ultimately self-contradictory; so anything conceived through their agency must in the end be self-discrepant. The Mādhyamika criticism of the realist position in epistemology ends in scepticism, for the Mādhyamika unreservedly declares that any position, whatsoever, will be found to contain within it the seeds of self-contradiction. The Advaitic criticism of the realist standpoint, as reflected in Śrī Harṣa's opinion, is without any hesitation an endorsement of the negative attitude of the Mādhyamikas, for Śrī Harṣa has clearly stated in the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍākhaṇḍa that the realist position is riddled with contradictions and is in the last analysis untenable. Does not the negative dialectic of Śrī Harṣa, whose attack is directed against the categories of the Realist Logic and Metaphysic, amount to an implicit endorsement of the entirely negative attitude in metaphysics adopted by such Vedāntins as Gaṇḍapāda, whose conception of objectivity is allegedly a complex of the nihilism of the Śūnyavādins and the subjectivity of Vijñānavādins? Even when Śrī Harṣa speaks of Brahman as the "one" Avikalpaviṣaya, this avikalpaviṣaya, for the simple reason that it is metempirical in essence, cannot be a matter for reflection or ratiocination. If this is so, the only position tenable in respect of the knowledge of this avikalpaviṣaya would be mysticism, in which all is silence—a silence which leaves no scope for reasoning about Brahman. The parinīsāpannaṇāna of the Mādhyamikas and the Vijñānavādins too, is trans-rational, and if one reasons about it, one will be entangled in the meshes of contradictions and antinomies.

The problem is—Can the question regarding the metaphysical validity of the instruments and objects of knowledge be entirely shelved by saying that knowledge at the empirical plane does not rest on any metaphysical presuppositions, and if there
were any, viz., the reality of the instruments (pramāṇas) and
the objects (prameyas), such metaphysical presuppositions are
ultimately invalid and do not rise beyond the level of mere
psychological presuppositions, believed to be ultimately valid,
without really being so? All the same the Mādhyaṃkika and the
Advaitin both, point to the self-contradictory nature of the ac-
count of knowledge and reality that rests on these presupposi-
tions. Unless there were an absolute criterion of reality and
knowledge, the Mādhyaṃkika and the Advaitin could not have
shown the contradictions of the relational scheme of knowledge
and of the categories subsumed under the pramāṇas and the
prameyas. The Mādhyaṃkika, however, is all too negative in
his approach. Even while the negative dialectic presupposes an
absolute criterion implicitly, the Mādhyaṃkika overemphasizes
the self-contradictory nature of all positions, and identifying the
absolute criterion of truth and reality with a position among
other positions, denies metaphysical validity to the Śūnya, if it
is going to be adopted as a position. The Mādhyaṃkika, it
seems, does not understand the implications of his overzealous
statements purporting to the denial of all positions. Unless the
Mādhyaṃkika had an infallible criterion, his dialectical refuta-
tions would be meaningless. It would be hard to believe that
the Mādhyaṃkika is concerned with the refutation of the cate-
gories without having a criterion that is unfailing and absolute.
What then is this absolute criterion? The answer is given
better by the Advaitin. The absolute criterion is the
Principle of Non-contradiction (abādhitva). Brahman is
abādhitṛ, and all that is not Brahman is not abādhitṛ. All that
is not Brahman falls under one of the two heads: (i) empirical
individuality, or (ii) finitized thinghood. The two are invari-
ably found to appear in a relationship of reciprocal determina-
tion. Their essence is relational; and that which is relational
is not self-dependent, and is, therefore, ultimately unreal. The
schema which comprehends them is the relational schema, viz.,
that of subject-object dualism. What this schema gives is self-
contradictory, both in essence and existence. But can the self-
contradiction of these categories, the knower as an implicate of
the known, and vice-versa, have any meaning, while there remains an ignorance about the absolute criterion of Non-contradiction? The answer is an unqualified 'No'; for without the intimation of this criterion, it would be both absurd and impossible to talk of the Vaitathya (non-Ensnness) of the phenomenal entities like the subject and the object. And if it is accepted that there is such an intimation, it is more than proved that the apprehension of the self-contradictory nature of discursive knowledge is also the apprehension in reflective consciousness of the general nature of the criterion. This is amply demonstrated by the success with which Śaṅkara criticizes and refutes the non-advaïtic systems of philosophy in the Tarkapāda of his Commentary on the Brahmasūtras. Grounded in the schema of subject-object dualism, the non-advaïtic systems of philosophy are found wanting in an ideal coherence and comprehensiveness, which in a way is the meaning of non-contradiction. Whether it is a thing or a subject aware of a thing, both are ideal constructions, and are true or false, so far as their contents exhibit the character of ideal coherence and comprehensiveness. But so long as they are abstractions torn from the discursive schema of the subject-object relation, neither is a res completa, and neither is either coherent or comprehensive enough to be considered as self-subsisting. They only appear to be real, whereas they are really unreal. There are degrees of coherence characterizing the object-content and its relation to a subject. This coherence, however, is never self-complete, and the relational configuration in which the subject and the object occur, is never a closed system. Such a contentuality is both coherent and non-coherent. It attains coherence to some extent only. What, then, comprehends this dual character of cognition at the discursive level? This can only be something in which the distinction between coherence and its other sinks.

A digression into Bradley's doctrine of feeling will be a great help in understanding the delicacy of this point. Bradley maintains that judgment, which is the expression of discursivity in cognition, is double-edged; it alternates between the two extremes of truth and falsity. Every judgment, therefore, exhi-
bits in its constitution the presence as well as the privation of coherence. The problem is—Against what unchanging background can the presence as well as the privation of coherence be understood? And the question being there, it is implied that coherence, considered in itself, is not the absolute criterion of truth. The absolute criterion, which comprehends these antinomical qualifications is feeling, which is of the nature of immediate experience—a knowing and being in one—an experience, in which there is no discrepancy between existence and knowledge. Every judgment as a truth-claim, postulates an immediate awareness of this criterion. Bradley identifies this awareness with feeling. If we take this feeling as an object, we shall be missing its real import, for in objectifying it, we are once again drifting into 'the machinery of terms and relations', and substituting one article of lower immediacy for another, open to all the criticism that a dialectician can advance. But if we take feeling in a symbolic sense—as a symbol of the awareness of the absolute criterion, which is entirely self-evident and immediately necessary, we shall be saving the criterion as also its immediacy. The criterion is non-contradiction but non-contradiction itself has not a mediated necessity. Make an attempt to deny its truth, and in this attempt, it must of necessity be re-affirmed. This is the meaning of self-evidence. Immediacy of self-evidence is definitely at a higher level than the immediacy of an object-content. The feeling of a comprehensive sentience is none other than the intimations of the immediacy of absolute experience, and though this is never actually given, it is there as a background to all knowledge and all judgment. Feeling in this context is a purely epistemological schema, and not a psychological content, and the immediacy it typifies is not psychological but epistemological in essence. If, however, it is identified with a psychological content, the content should not be taken literally. It should be understood only as a symbol of something which actually cannot be cast into a psychological mould. When we say that we have a feeling of this immediacy, we do not actually have this feeling. We only think, as if, we have a feeling of this nature. None the less, what this feeling stands for,
is an important epistemico-metaphysical device, without which we cannot account for knowledge. The absolute is one immediate experience shorn of all mediation. Mediation which characterizes our knowledge at the level of relations, itself could have no meaning and validity unless it presupposed a non-relational background to it.94

Śaṅkara's account of Error in the Upodghāta to his Commentary on the Brahmasūtras postulates a criterion of the nature mentioned above. The fact of error is described by Śaṅkara as mithunākhyata—as the mixing up of the real with the unreal, by means of an illusorily conceived two-way traffic95 between the real and the unreal. Whereas the undefiled immediacy of Pure Consciousness does not admit of mediation, it is conceived of as characterizable in terms of mediated cognition. The one cannot take the place of the other, yet on account of a beginningless nescience—original and primeval, there is in our knowledge a superimposition of immediacy on mediation and mediation on immediacy, of the non-relational on the relational, and the relational on the non-relational. What is given to us, thus, is of a mixed order—it is mediation claiming the self-evidence of immediacy and immediacy degenerating into discursivity. Whereas nothing can be said of Pure Consciousness in an objective aspect, we speak of it as if it were this or that. Nor is the case much improved, when we seek to identify the essence of the Absolute with the essence of the world and the individual. Yet the pretension of mediate knowledge to be immediate and the degeneration of immediacy into the machinery of terms and relations, can be so understood only against a background, which is free from such self-contradictions, and is necessarily presupposed as something whereby alone discursivity measures its own strength and weakness. This something is the absolute criterion of knowledge and reality. Though itself, it is of the nature of pure immediate experience, it is none the less the inalienable presupposition of all mediation and discursivity. It proves the truth as well as the untruth of all cognitions, whatsoever; yet its truth and reality are neither conditioned nor measured by the various pramāṇas talked about by the realist schools of logic.
If a distinction is made between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, and such a distinction is believed to have a metaphysical validity, the Advaitin would refrain from talking about the Absolute (Pure Consciousness) as a prameya. There is in fact nothing other than this one, so a *prameya*, as distinct from it, would introduce an alien element into Pure Consciousness and defile its absoluteness. For this reason, it would not be improper to say that this one is *pramāṇa-nirapekṣa*, and its validation is unmediated by any *pramāṇa*, as generally understood. It is itself the *pramāṇa* of everything else—a *pramāṇa* that is self-validating, and is not validated by an other. All cognition on the plane of relations is infected with contradictions. A self-consciousness of its contradictory nature, points to the self-evident truth of the absolute criterion. But pointing to it only amounts to a consciousness of it. It does not mean that the criterion in its existential aspect depends on its discovery by us. That we discover it as the lever of the *discursus*, does not imply that it is an invention of the *discursus* itself. While all discursive knowledge is within nescience (avidyā), a comprehension of its inadequacy is a pointer to the absolute truth which transcends nescience (avidyā).

What, then, is the metaphysical status of the *pramāṇas*? Without entering into the details or once again discussing the issues at some considerable length, we shall conclude our review by making the following observations:—

(1) As against the Naiyāyika, the Mīmāṃsaka and other logicians of the realist tradition, we endorse the criticism of the Absolutist (Śrī Harṣa) and the Skeptic (Nāgārjuna and Candragīrti), and maintain that the *pramāṇas* and the *prameyas* have no transcendental validity about them.

(2) As against the Mādhyamika standpoint in Logic, according to which, all categories, whatsoever, are self-contradictory, and there is no position which is not thus infected, we shall reiterate the Advaitic view that self-contradiction can be understood only against a self-affirming evidence—an absolute criterion, which is truth-in-and-for-itself—a sentience or awareness that is *pramāṇa-nirapekṣa* in essence.
(3) As against those who condemn all reasoning and ratiocination, we have only to say that reasoning may be self-stultifying, but a discovery of the fact that it has a nature of this kind, puts one in contact with the awareness of the general nature of metaphysical truth and reality, which acts as a self-valid and self-validating criterion.

We, therefore, do not dispute the view that there is an overwhelming similarity between the attitudes that the Mādhyamika and the Advaitin have in respect of the validity and the metaphysical status of the pramāṇas. A critique of the pramāṇas no doubt points to a Reality that cannot be known by means of the pramāṇas—a Reality, whose character is immediacy, which the pramāṇas destroy in the act of comprehending the real. But there is a radical difference between the Mādhyamikas and the Advaitin concerning the actualisation of the Real in the aspect of immediacy. To the Mādhyamika the Tattva (Reality), to which the criticism of the categories points, cannot itself be made an object of knowledge; and because, it is so, the Tattva is both unknowable and unspeakable—avācyam, anabhilāpyam. The Dialectic of the Mādhyamikas ends in a wholesale extirpation of ontology. That the Logic of the Mādhyamikas is a deontologizing Logic is what we want to stress here. As in the case of Bradley, so in the case of the Mādhyamikās, this situation arises for the simple reason that the Dialectic has no anchorage anywhere. Whatever is conceived of as an actuality, as something being there, is an object, and an object, necessarily turns out to be self-contradictory. The restriction of knowability to knowability as an object, and the restriction of communicability and expressivity to what is thus known, keep the Mādhyamikās insulated in the attitude of negativity—an agnostic attitude, to wit. The Mādhyamikas in insisting upon the definition of knowability as the knowability of an object, think that the Tattva is unknowable as an actuality, and incommunicable through any signs whatsoever, including the signs that constitute the linguistic apparatus. Śaṅkara and his followers, without exception, do assert that knowability does not necessarily mean knowability as an object, and that the knowable as a non-objec-
tive content, is also communicable through signs, including the signs that constitute the linguistic apparatus. Immediacy, as non-contradiction, must be the nature of the Absolute, whether it is named as Tattva (by the Mādhyamikas) or as Brahman (by the Advaitins). But as nothing actual can ever have the qualification of immediacy, the immediacy of the Mādhyamika fails to be anything other than a floating adjective that frowns at all substantives, and decides the case against them in an a priori manner, as it were. What is known, being known as an object, only exhibits a lack of immediacy. If, however, immediacy could be conceived of as the qualification of a substantive, this substantive would never progress from the status of a possibility to the status of an actuality. The fusion of the that and the what in the Mādhyamika Absolute is simply the case of a transcendent Idealty; and once this transcendental Idealty is taken as known, it has of necessity to be an object, and, therefore, self-contradictory. The Mādhyamika criticism of the pramāṇas is a reiteration of the unknowability of the Tattva, and the self-contradictory nature of all that is knowable. The Advaitic critique of the pramāṇas, however, reiterates, the unknowability of the Brahman (Absolute) as an object, but in so far as something may be knowable without being an object—a critique of the pramāṇas only furnishes the jijñāsu with an incentive to amend the definition of knowledge itself. A critique of the pramāṇas amounts to an analysis in reflective consciousness of the fact of illusion itself. The Mādhyamika pursues this analysis till he has found out that discursivity or relational awareness is at the root of this illusion. It means that he has pursued the analysis only to the extent of finding out an intellectual criterion of Reality. But a mere theoretical envisagement of this criterion amounts merely to having the intimations of a quenching ideality, which might well be the qualification of a possible being, but cannot, from the nature of the case, be actual, without losing its ideal fulness. The Mādhyamika critique of the pramāṇas is only an attestation of the agnostic's Empyrean, which refuses to be knowable or communicable, even while it clearly suggests that in it alone, there should be an utter cancellation of all the short-
comings of a being manifest in actuality. The Advaitin’s refutation of the pramāṇas only warns the inquirer into truth, against the tendency of identifying the avidyā-vṛtti, with the pramātr-vṛtti—the unconscious and unreflecting confusion of the real with the apparent. Such an identification of the pramātra and the avidyā vṛttis has been discribed by the Advaitin as illusion. What is known as an object is actually the Brahman, but the Brahman is neither so knowable nor so existent. Thus what is not so knowable (viz., as an object related to a subject) and not so existent (viz., as an object contemplated by a subject), is understood as so knowable, and so existent. What is really existent is identified with what is not really existent, and what cannot be a real content of knowledge appears to be so. The non-existent ‘snake’ is known and is also known as existent; and there is an utter unawareness of what is actually existent and ought to be known, namely, the rope. The example of the rope and the snake may well be illustrative of the knowledge-situation in question, without being really enunciative of it. It does explain with the aid of an analogy, the nature of illusion, as analyzed by the Advaitin, but in so far as both the ‘rope’ and the ‘snake’ belong to the self-same plane of empirical factuality, we have to see to it that a metaphor is not hardened into a dogma. Yet, the truth that comes up before us on an analysis of the fact of illusion, is of a patent nature. It points to the necessity of curing the datum by analyzing it into elements, which have got mixed up in such a manner that their amalgam looks like a unitary datum—simple, unanalyzable, self-evident, and therefore indubitable. In so far as the analysandum is a curious compound of the real and the unreal, an analysis of the analysandum into the real and the unreal elements, along with the modes of consciousness relating to them, will turn the opacity of the analysandum into a transparent intuition, in which there would remain no difference between the content of awareness and the mode of such an awareness. The analysandum, so understood, instead of presenting itself as an unanalyzable datum, would be transmuted into the symbol of an awareness, which is an existence and sentience in one, an immediacy, which no longer remains adjectival only,
conceived in noetic consciousness as a floating ideality, too sacrosanct to be given any actuality, but has become the very stuff of that, which is the un cancellable substratum of the misleading simplicity of the unanalyzed datum, and the illuminating residue of essential experience. The Advaitic critique of the pramāṇas is no barren insight into the self-dissipating texture of noetic consciousness and its content. It not only points to an ideality, whose immediacy is a norm for judging the nothingness of all objectivity, but also indicates the manner in which the ideality so discovered, could be made to fuse into an actuality, which is known without its being an object, and is communicable par excellence. The Advaitic critique of the pramāṇas, reveals the illusory nature of the seemingly simple but actually complex texture of the datum. The illusion consists in the simple appearing as complex, and the complex passing for the simple. Understood in its chastest barest simplicity, the complex datum, consisting of an object contemplated by a subject, presents itself to philosophic consciousness in three alternative perspectives: (1) visualized as the Transcendental Object, self-revealing and self-revealed, in the sense that such objectivity for its being known is under no necessity of being yoked to a contemplating subjectivity; and this is the self-revelation of the Real in the alternative perspective of knowing, (2) visualized as Transcendental Conativity, self-fulfilled and self-fulfilling, though not as an other of an accomplished and alien objectivity; and this is freed subjectivity in the perspectival alternative of willing; or (3) visualized as Transcendental Satiety, i.e., as a feeling of fulness, in which the distinction, between a wanted feeling, considered as a cherished value, and what induces this feeling (an object cherished), fuses into one impersonal beatific completeness, indifferent to the distinction between the feeler and the felt. These three alternations are the alternations of the self-same Absolute, described as sat, cit and ānanda, each understood as a reflected actuality of an identical immediacy, in the three dimensional mirror of human consciousness. The self-same immediacy descends as an actual in reflective consciousness, not as an adjectival adjunct of a possible ens, but as the very being of
human sentience, considered as freed in its diverse functionality. In each one of its alternations immediacy reveals itself as denotational in essence as distinguished from connotational, which evinces a relational structure, and therefore an adumbration of immediacy as mediated, and of the real as merely the apparent. Sat, Cit, and Ananda, Truth, Reality and Value are genuine immediates, not conceptual constructions. They are known, and yet not known as an object-content (determined in discursive awareness and communicable in any literal sense). All the same they are readable in the cypher, devised by reflective consciousness through a commutation of the commerce between the subject and the object into a symbol of tri-lateral Freedom, the alternative implications of which we have already discussed.

We may conclude our discussions concerning the criteriological reaction against Realism in the following manner:

A critique of the pramāṇas by the Advaitin, shares the Mādhyamika predilection for a Transcendental situation in which the realistic approach to knowledge and reality is understood as self-refutative. But while the Mādhyamika clearly indicates an unmistakable inclination towards a bare negation of the objective attitude in the Tattva, the Advaitin's view of 'negation' as explanatory of the relation between the objective fact (conceived in the mode of relational awareness) and the Absolute (Brahman), is an instructively complex one in its texture. What the pramāṇas reveal, has not to be cancelled but only re-evaluated, and the subsequent re-evaluation, instead of barely negating it, has only to recognize it as false. We have already dealt at length with the nature of the difference between the Mādhyamika view of negation and the Advaitic view of negation. We can only restate our standpoint in the present context by saying that the Advaitic critique of the pramāṇas is expressible in the proposition, that it is false, that the real is an object revealed to discursive consciousness. A critique of this nature at once implies an awareness of the criterion in its transcendental ireproachability. But this is what the Mādhyamika critique also does. The Advaitin goes a step beyond this, by suggesting in reflective consciousness the three alternatives of
the Absolute. A critique of the āpramāṇas in the Advaita Vēdanta cannot be understood in its deeper aspects, without being interpreted in the light of Śaṅkara’s doctrine of the Adhyāsa. Understood in this manner, the Advaitic critique of the āpramāṇas, becomes not only the central doctrine of a Transcendental Logic, but also of a Logic of Concrete Existence. And here one need only point out that a transition from the Transcendental Logic to the Logic of Concrete Existence, is effected through a valua-
tional approach—the axiological attitude, which not merely neces-
sitates the generating of an insight that distinguishes between the real and the false, but is co-extensive with an evaluating consciousness in which the real is preferred to the false.⁹⁹
CHAPTER VI

THE HERITAGE OF ŚAṆKARA: A MEETING OF EXTREMES

An essay concerning the heritage of Śaṅkara would remain incomplete without certain general observations of some consequence, not only for a critical appraisal of Śaṅkara in the context of Indian philosophical thought, but also for showing the contemporary philosophical fly a way out of the fly-bottle, and for indicating a cure of the present distempered state of philosophy consequent on the Kantian critique of metaphysic, which has lent a moral support, as it were, to the reign of anti-metaphysics in contemporary philosophy.

In naming this chapter as ‘A Meeting of Extremes’, the present author feels that not only the extremes of the Indian philosophical thought have met in the heritage of Śaṅkara, but all extremes, whatsoever, irrespective of their nativity. With the help of the schema provided by the Advaita of Śaṅkara, one could rehearse in one’s thought the form of the entire development of philosophical consciousness, from its nascent stage to the one highly complex, abstruse and subtle. And a procedure of this nature may well help to evaluate philosophical points of view in contrast. Kant wrote a Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, to point out among other things, the inherent limitations of the human mind in re-constructing metaphysics in reflective or theoretic consciousness; and vastly differing dispositions, given to philosophizing, have either taken inspiration from Kant for giving ‘a killing blow’ to metaphysics, or found in Kant an unerring warrant for deserting the high a priori road of metaphysical thinking. In this context, it would not be too much to say that Śaṅkara’s heritage restores theoretic consciousness to its prestige, by suggesting that Kant’s Prolegomena, in spite of its sweeping range and seemingly unaging claims, suffers from
something in the nature of a corrigeble incompleteness, and that a restoration of Metaphysics is possible even in theoretic consciousness, only if Kant's epistemology were to be re-evaluated in the light of the Advaitic critique of spiritual experience.

We shall put this concluding post-script in the form of two propositions:

(1) That in the heritage of Śaṅkara the extremes of Indian philosophy have met.

(2) That in the heritage of Śaṅkara one finds a valuable appraisal of Kant's *Prolegomena*, and also a clue to the liquidation of the reign of anti-metaphysics in contemporary philosophy.

Hereunder we shall analyze the contents and implications of these two propositions:

(1) *The Heritage of Śaṅkara: A Meeting of Extremes.*

The question is—What are the extremes in the Indian philosophical thought? And what do we actually mean by saying that these extremes have met in the heritage of Śaṅkara? For answering the first question, we need a *fundamentum divisionis*, whereby we could indicate the extreme points of view. In the last chapter we discussed at some length the transcendental reaction against Realism as exemplified in a critique of the *pramāṇas* by the Absolutists of both the traditions, namely, the Advaitic and the Buddhist. The two extremes of Indian philosophical thought, then, are represented by the Realists and the Transcendentalists. According to the Realist, the objective world, including all that can be an object to a subject, actually or possibly, is real. The real as an object-content to a mode of consciousness, is not made by the act of knowing. Yet that which is an object of knowledge is real. Whatsoever can be established by means of a *pramāṇa* (an instrument of cognition) is real, even though the process of its establishment is not a condition of its existence. Howsoever varied may be the ways of knowing an object, one thing is certain, that the object in question 'ante-dates and post-dates' knowledge, and that knowing makes no difference to facts. It has no constitutive function.
Realism is not a species of Mentalistic Cosmology. Whatsoever is revealed as an object of cognition by one of the accredited and accepted *pramāṇas* is real. Under this epistemico-ontological scheme would come almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy, except those that pronounce the *pramāṇas* as self-refutative and self-stultifying in the last analysis. Those schools that refute the validity of the *pramāṇas* are transcendental in their inclination. For them the very schema of subject-object dualism belies the nature of the real. The real cannot be known through anyone of the alternative ways of knowing an object. Pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, śabda, upamāṇa, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi, which have been accepted as the valid means of knowing reality, have been proved to be subjective in import and therefore the means only of falsifying the real. So the real is not an object revealed in one of the modes of knowing as described above. The dialectician of the transcendental disposition has given specious arguments for demonstrating (i) the self-contradictory nature of these ways of knowing, and (ii) the self-contradictory nature of what these ways of knowing reveal. The two extremes of Indian Philosophy are exemplified in doctrines of two kinds: (i) maintaining knowability as knowability of an object presented to consciousness—it does not matter whether this knowability is perceptual or non-perceptual; and (ii) maintaining that knowability in the last analysis is not the awareness of an object to a subject. The latter, however is prone to understanding knowability as an object, as not the very best, among the alternative formulations of the knowledge-situation, that reveals the real. On the other hand, they press for the unknowability of the real, if knowability necessarily means knowability as an object related to a subject. The extreme form of a doctrine of the latter type is illustrated in the view that refutes ‘objectivity’ as the ‘essence’ of reality and unqualifiedly pronounces the unknowability of the real. The real is not an ‘object’ to a ‘subject’ and therefore the real is unknowable. Not only this. The ‘real’ is not only ‘unknowable’ but also ‘unspeakable’. Its ‘meaning’ cannot be conveyed through a statement of any kind, for every statement states the nature of an objective content related to con-
sciousness, in one of the ways specified as pramānic (veridical). The two extremes are instantiated in the following traditions of Indian philosophical thought: (1) the Realist extreme, in the Čārvāka, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṁsā and the non-Advaitic Vedānta (among the āstika dārsanas) and the Jaina and the Sarvāstivāda (among the nāstika dārsanas); and (2) the Transcendentalism of the Advaitins (among the āstikas) and the Vijnānavādins and the Mādhyamikas (among the nāstikas).

In the above mentioned dichotomy of Indian thought, we have classified Advaitism as one of the extreme positions; at least as a position that shares the Mādhyamika and the Vijnānavādin view in respect of the metaphysical status of the object-content and the epistemic validity of ‘the ways of knowing’ an object-content. But our contention in this chapter is not that the Advaitin’s is one of the two extreme positions of Indian philosophical thought. We have already made our standpoint clear in this context by saying that in the Advaitic heritage, more precisely the heritage of Śaṅkara, the extremes of Indian Philosophy have met. How can the Advaitic position in philosophy be an extreme position among extremes, and be yet a meeting point of extremes? This can be demonstrated only in two ways: (a) by showing that the polemical attitude shared by Advaitism with other transcendentalists in refuting the validity of the pramāṇas, is not the whole of the Advaitic attitude; and that the larger truth of Advaitism lies neither in an unqualified refutation of the Realist point of view, nor in an unmitigated acquiescence in the negative attitude of the Vijnānavādins and the Mādhyamikas, envisaging, in the first instance the unreality of ‘objectivity’, and next, the unknowability of the real, but in an affirmative view of the knowability of the real in reflective consciousness along with its communicability; and (b) by showing the architectonical character of the Indian philosophical consciousness, of which the Advaitic view is the key-stone. In the latter aspect, it can be maintained that the whole of Indian philosophical thought presents, as it were, a morphological unity, and that a key to this morphological unity is to be found neither in the Realistic schools, nor in
the points of view which exclusively devote themselves to a refutation of the realistic hypothesis, but in Advaitism, which neither accepts the unreflecting 'objectivism' of the former, nor does submit to the agnostic and the skeptical conclusions of the latter. We shall, in this aspect have to indicate that Realism and Negative Transcendentalism (the unqualified refutation of Realism) merely state the problem,—a problem, which philosophy must solve in theoretic consciousness, without acknowledging defeat, without retiring in favour of a supposedly more adequate, but generically different way of annexing the Real, viz., the way of aesthetic, moral or devotional consciousness.

(a) The Larger Truth of Advaitism:

The larger truth of Advaitism consists in presenting a view of Reality and knowledge that synthesizes the two extremes of shallow pantheism and empty transcendence. The Absolute that Brahman is, is neither altogether unrelated to the pluralistic universe comprehended in empirical consciousness, nor is it of a nature that is lost in this relation. It transcends the universe of empirical consciousness, not by pronouncing it as non-existent, but by recognizing it as symbolic of the privation of a value, which finds its fulfilment not in the symbol, but in the symbolized, not in the objective manifold lacking the certitude of self-attestation, but in the unitive experience, self-fulfilled (sat), self-fulfilling (cit) and all-embracing (ānanda). The Advaitic point of view is a rational vindication of two seemingly antagonistic ontologies, describable in the words, 'it is not this, it is not this', and the words, 'the Brahman is all this'. The Advaitic view is synthetical in nature. The philosophy of the atmanic consciousness is no plea for a negation of plurality, nor is it one for the unreflecting vindication of it. It transcends both literal affirmation and literal negation by commuting their constitutional opacity into a transcending symbolism. This transcendence is effected in three steps: (1) disillusionment brought about by an experience of the anityatā of the phenomenal plurality, (2) the indication of a beyond, which furnishes the disillusioned consciousness with a theoretical norm—a general crite-
rion, an *ab extra* definition of the *nitya*, the enduring; and (3) the synthesis of these two steps in an experience that cancels the sense of otherness, that necessarily attends the attitudes of being bewilderingly in the world and being necessarily transcendent to it. The first step is the postulation of plurality in an attitude of despair, and the second is only an incomplete communication of this despair. Neither static disillusionment, nor the dynamic perpetuation of this attitude in the consciousness of a criterion that is intellectually satisfying, comprehends the fullness of the Advaitic position. Disillusionment with the pluralistic universe given in empirical consciousness only poses a question. It is only the starting point of the inquiry into the nature of the real. It marks the dawn of reflective consciousness in which questions and counter-questions arise, concerning what is enduring, if it is not this mass of phenomenal diversity. And this 'reflection' is deepened in a certitude born of ratiocination, a ratiocination which points unmistakably to a beyond, uninformed by the contradictions of what merely appears. Intimations of this beyond furnish the consciousness with a general idea of a 'that' in which could be quenched the inadequacy of the bewildering mass of empirical diversity. The 'realistic' attitude in its unreflecting aspect represents one extreme. The other extreme is represented by the dawn of an understanding, which cancels phenomenality, by pointing to an *ens*, which, even while it explains the inadequacy of phenomenality, is not ostensibly amenable to comprehension in all its richness of content. The two extremes are exemplified in the naively realistic and the transcendentalist attitudes. Of the Transcendentalist attitude there are two versions: (1) the abstract, illustrated in the metaphysic of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhist Absolutism, and (2) the concrete, illustrated in the Advaitic metaphysic.

The Mādhyamika transcendentalism is abstract because it does no more than merely point to an ideal in which the limitations of the object-content-appearing-to-thought can be made good. But the awareness of the ideal does not get beyond the mere intimation of an *ens*, that is not of the nature of the universe revealed in thought. But what is the content of this *ens* is
unknowable. Whatsoever may be the alternative ways of envisaging this *ens*, it is certain, that theoretic consciousness has no approach to it. The phenomenal content of consciousness is not free from contradiction, but that which is free from contradiction (the tattva) is in no sense graspable in theoretic consciousness. The Mādhyamika position in Logic and Metaphysics presents an all-out contrast to the Logic and Metaphysics of common sense. In suggesting the definition of this *ens* and the criterion which adumbrates the cancellation of a discursively contemplated universe, the Mādhyamika is simply presenting to us the two un-meetable extremes of Naive Realism and Transcendental Negativism. How often must we repeat that the Mādhyamika in insisting upon the unspeakability of the Tattva is simply acquainting us with the nature two extreme situations—one determinable in thought and speakable, and yet self-contradictory, and the other indeterminable in thought and unspeakable though free from contradiction? Phenomenality is comprehended by that alone which negates it. Negation of phenomenality is the essence of philosophical wisdom. Reflective consciousness, consequent on disillusionment respecting the pluralistic content of consciousness can go no further. Its sole aim is to display the contrast between the two universes. The Mādhyamika and the Realist are extreme positions in Indian philosophical thought. The Advaita Vedanta reconciles the two extremes by negating the negative view-point of the Mādhyamika. The negation of negation is an affirmation in reflective consciousness of the objective world and finite subjectivity in the aspect of their transcendental incorruptibility. What is actually negated in reflective consciousness according to the Advaitin is the literal entitative character of the objective world and empirical individuality, but that in which they are negated is their Transcendental Ground (Brahman). But the negation of the content in question does not mean their existential effacement. It only means their re-evaluation—a re-evaluation, which is communicable and stateable. The point of difference, which marks out Advaitism in contrast with the Mādhyamika position, may be stated by saying that the Mādhyamika merely points to
a *that*, in which possibly could be quenched the inadequacy of the content of empirical consciousness, but he is all too averse to the idea of saying what it is. Its contentuality remaining unascertainable, and if ascertainable, being likely to turn out self-contradictory, the Mādhyamika discovers a hiatus between the *this* (the content of empirical consciousness) and the *that* (the Tattva). The Tattva and the content of empirical consciousness represent two extremes for the simple reason that the Tattva being indeterminable in thought, is understood as indeterminate, one without a *what*. Being not contradictible like the pluralistic content of phenomenality, it is understood as a 'what-less' *that*; and this is so, because *whatfulness* is considered as necessarily self-dissipating and riddled with contradictions. The Mādhyamika, thus, goes to the extent of suggesting a *tātāstha lakṣana* of a *that* in which phenomenal diversity could be comprehended as quenched and cancelled. And in doing so, he only shows that his position is an extreme other of the Realist standpoint, and that there is no meeting-ground for the two. The one cancels the other. The discovery of the Tattva by the Mādhyamikas is not a re-evaluation of the *this* and the *mine*, the pluralistic content of phenomenality. It is only an outright devaluation of it. Devaluation of phenomenality turns out to be a wholesale occupation of the Mādhyamika philosopher. He takes the negative dialectic to be the essence of reflective consciousness, the be-all and end-all of the philosophical venture. His system lacks a transcendental ontology. The Advaitin, however, goes beyond the unreflecting Realism of common-sense, and the unqualified and de-ontologizing negativism of the Mādhyamikas. His is a synthesis of these extremes. From the Mādhyamika he takes the negative dialectic; but the use which he makes of the negative dialectic consists in the deepening of the reflective consciousness, which at its core is constructive without becoming tawdry and self-contradictory. The Advaitin’s Brahman is the Tattva of the Mādhyamikas, and even while it is not determinable in terms of the categories of the understanding, it is understood. Even while it is unthinkable as an object, it is known. Even while, it cannot be spoken of, its speakability is not to be
doubted. Once it is realized that there is a *that*, in which all the lack encountered in empirical consciousness is made good, it becomes incumbent to ask, what after all is the nature of the *that* in question. Disillusionment, in which, alone, philosophical consciousness is rooted is an axiological predicament. It points to a situational thinking, a thinking, which is characterized by a striving towards a better destiny than the one ordinarily known and experienced. It indicates a lack of satiety—a discomfort, a dissatisfaction with what merely is. It also indicates, as it were, an uncanny awareness of a state of things, which ‘ought to be’, which ought to transform what ‘merely is’. Realizing this situation as axiological, alone, can indicate what *that* ‘is’, which ‘ought to be’, which is the lever of the dialectic of reflective consciousness. And this also must not be forgotten that the dialectic of reflective consciousness is nothing, if not a spiritual adventure—a proneness *to be* what *ought to be*, not a mere awareness of the hollowness of what is, and the unknowability of a depth that swallows this hollowness. The Mādhyamika takes the situation in question as purely epistemological in essence. He is all too hesitant in proceeding beyond the argument *a contingenta mundi*. Even if he has an axiology and a transcendental ontology, these are cut off from theoretic consciousness.

The Advaitin goes beyond the unreflective complacency of the layman as also the reflective pessimism of the Mādhyamika. The Mādhyamika philosophy is an organon of a *that*, which only points to the limitations of the ‘this’ and the ‘mine’. ‘That is not This’: this is the long and short of the Mādhyamika position. The axiological attitude as a key to the unravelling of the mystery of Being, contemplated in the mode of a disillusioned consciousness, not merely indicates a *That*,—a situation, which ought to be, but also *indicates* the nature of its *What*. The content of a consciousness under disillusionment reveals its incompleteness under the three aspects of knowing, willing and feeling. Disillusionment is consequent on the discovery of an object that is not self-luminous, a will that is obstructed by an other, and a feeling of restiveness rooted in the differentiating
attitude—namely, an attitude that endures through a dichotomy of the ego and the non-ego. The Brahman of the Advaitin is the Ground that comprehends this disillusionment. The discovery of an object that is not self-luminous implies a self-luminous object. The discovery of an obstructed will, implies a will that cancels otherness. The discovery of the feeling of restiveness implies a situation, in which feeling would be emptied of restiveness, by a transcendence of the differentiating attitude. But this Brahman, which may be described as the norm for measuring the incompleteness of the content of empirical consciousness, is itself not in the last analysis an other of consciousness. The Mādhyamika is not able to formulate this norm in its contentual richness, in the aspect of its whatness, for this reason only that this norm, if made determinate would lose its absoluteness. By becoming an object related to consciousness, which might determine it in categorial thinking, it would lapse into an actuality, whose incompleteness it is supposed to measure. And once a situation of this nature occurs, the norm would degenerate into a fact, placed in a predicament, which on account of its poverty evokes disillusionment. The Mādhyamika like Kant fails in indicating the knowability of the norm, for factuality alone is knowable, and factuality implies an otherness of contentuality to consciousness. The Advaitin insists not on the cancellation of empirical contentuality in Brahman or Brahman in empirical contentuality, but on a transformation of outlook, coextensive with a transfiguration of existence. This transformation of outlook envisages a whole-sale transition from the ‘differentiating point of view’ to the ‘non-differentiating point of view’—from knowing characterized by relations and experience schematized by subject-object dualism, to knowing characterized by immediacy, and to experience that has sunk all otherness. In the non-differentiating attitude, the contents of a differential epistemic situation gain a new meaning and acquire a transfigured factuality—a transvaluation, as it were. In the transformed attitude, the factuality of the contents of empirical consciousness only loses its incompleteness and contradictions; and the Brahman instead of being understood as a transcendent norm, the slayer
of factuality, brings about its resurrection, through its becoming indistinguishably immanent in the factuality it resurrects by transfiguring. The vacuous transcendentality of the Absolute (the Mādhyamika position) and the disappointing factuality of unreflecting Realism, are the two extremes which meet in the transmuting vision of the Advaitic Brahman. As against the realistic metaphysics of the commonsense philosopher, the Advaitin would go with the Mādhyamika in showing the incompleteness of such a metaphysics of existence and experience. As against the Mādhyamika he would not insist on erecting impassable barriers between the Absolute and the apparent mass of empirical factuality. He would not condemn the realist position outright. He would only insist on its inconceivability in the last analysis. The Advaitic philosophy is not the revelation of something unknown and unknowable. It is only the deepening of the consciousness, of what is already known; it is the reflection of consciousness upon itself in its mixed up functionality (vṛtti) of knowledge and Ignorance.

(b) The Architectonical Character of Indian Philosophy:

Our purpose in speaking about the architectonical character of the Indian philosophical thought is not to divest it of its richness and variety. Nor can it be to support the view that the development of Indian Philosophical thought in its chronological or doctrinal aspect is consciously and deliberately disposed to approximate to an unchanging norm. In saying that the Indian philosophical thought has an architectonical unity, and that the Advaita is the keystone of this unity, we do not mean either to minimise the importance and uniqueness of the non-advaitic philosophies or to show that the non-advaitic philosophies are really advaitic in purport. All that we mean is this, that the Advaitic philosophy does present a schema of thought, which can well be employed for grouping up the scattered threads of Indian philosophical speculation into a yarn of unitary texture. From the Advaitic Belvedere, we can have an over-all view of Indian systems of Philosophy—a view, which is as revealing in its character as it is unifying. The various shades of philosophical speculation, with all their antagonisms and seem-
ingly irreconcilable differences do not remain in an unconnected and rhapsodistic state. To the Advaitin, who is not their rival, in any but the best sense, these systems, appear, as it were, interknitted in a graded series—all exhibiting in varying degrees of clarity and distinctness, the self-same tendency to a state of being, shorn of incompleteness in all its aspectual details.

The essential unity of the Indian philosophies consists in their common axiological moorings—a striving for something that is somehow lost and is yet there, waiting to be recovered and reclaimed. A re-orientation of being, a changed attitude towards life and things, is the theme of them all. This re-orientation, largely and predominantly axiological in essence, means a re-orientation in the metaphysical and epistemological aspects also. The Advaita of Śaṅkara gives us the quintessence of this attitude, and one, who has understood aright the philosophical message of Śaṅkara, will have no difficulty in placing other speculations in a unitive perspective. We are therefore, of the opinion, that the Advaita of Śaṅkara corrects the astigmatism of other systems of thought, and indicates a point of view, which unifies conflicting dogmas by transforming them into a kind of reflective awareness.

Before, we tell, how the Advaita Vedānta can be made to present to us the keystone of the architectonical unity of Indian philosophical thought, it would be proper to take into account the differing components of it. This means an attempt of a two-fold nature; first we shall have to classify Indian philosophical systems in respect of their differences, and secondly we shall have to show, how their differences are reconciled in a higher unity, envisaged by the Advaita Vedānta.

We have in the first instance two main divisions of Indian philosophical thought. On the one hand, we have the unreflecting attitude of the Cārvāka, who is not prepared to go beyond the perceptually available datum of experience, and to whom nothing is lost in a world so given, if one only cares to make the most of it by extracting from it, in all manner possible, all that would be productive of a feeling of pleasure in him. A philosophy of this nature is clearly positivistic in its methodology
and doctrine, and if it has an ethics too, the ethics is unmistakably hedonistic in substance. At this level of thinking there occurs nothing considerable in respect of a radical distinction between the objective and the subjective. Subjectivity is recognised only in an implicatory manner, namely, as the locus of a pleasurable or painful experience. Else the essential destiny of this locus of enjoyment is the dust to which it returns after being consigned to the flames.\^1 A philosophy of this nature is anything but metaphysical. And, no wonder, one comes across in such a philosophy an obvert arraignment of all speculations in the metaphysical key. As against this unqualifiedly objective attitude, sustained by an unmixedly positivistic logic, we have the philosophical speculations in the two traditions of Indian thought, the Upaniṣadic, swearing by the ‘permanent’ and the ‘unchanging’, and the Saugata, whose enduring feature is ‘change’ and ‘modification’.\^2 The various systems of Indian philosophical thought, other than the Cāravāka, would be found to exemplify one of the two traditions, or some curious amalgam of these two.

Our aim here, not being, a detailed analysis of the special doctrines of the traditions or the schools, we shall only indicate certain general features of these traditions and schools. Our aim shall be to point out their dovetailing character, in spite of their chartered antagonism. We have simply to demonstrate the plausibility of our contention that the advaitic attitude reconciles the sharp antagonism of the traditions and the schools by transmuting their contents into elements of an all-embracing, all-harmonizing vision. In this vision the seemingly irreconcilable dogmas find a new meaning—a meaning, which dissolves their differences, without effacing their literal identity. The process of this unification, marks a gradual and steady transition from the objective attitude of a purely positivistic kind to an objective attitude of a metaphysical nature, and then to the subjective and the transcendental attitudes.

The question is—What is ultimately real? And the question takes its rise in a sense of disillusionment caused by what is experienced at the merely perceptual and unreflecting level of
consciousness. In a disillusioned mode of consciousness the
datum consisting of a perceptually given objective content, may
alternatively present itself as irremediably changeful and shift-
ing, or as enduring and unchangingly entitative. One dis-
illusioned by it, seeks something other than what it is, something
other than what it is taken for, something hidden from our sight,
which encounters only an appearance and not the real. Alter-
atively, therefore, we may envisage the real as something
enduring and permanent behind the changeful and shifting mass
of the perceptual datum, or as something inherently evanescent
and fleeting behind the perceptual content, illusorily believed as
enduring. The two alternatives which come before us as correc-
tives to the naively objective attitude of the positivist, are repre-
sented in the two traditions of the Indian philosophical thought,
the Upaniṣadic and the Buddhist. The philosophical substance
of these two traditions is essentially metaphysical in so far as
they seek to contemplate a reality beyond the merely empirical
and the given. But the metaphysical conception of reality is
variously conceived in the two traditions. The metaphysic in
question may be realistic or idealistic or it may be of a texture,
which literally speaking looks like being both realistic and ideal-
istic, and is yet of a complexion that transcends literal description.
The realistic temper in the tradition that swears by an unchang-
ing real, is exemplified in the metaphysical speculations of the
Sāṇkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Purva Mīmāṁsā, and all those
systems of thought, which define knowledge as the apprehension
of an object (prameya) by means of an instrument of valid
cognition (pramāṇa). In the other tradition, the most outstand-
ing examples of the realist trend in metaphysical thinking are
the Vaibhāsika and the Sautarāntika schools of Buddhist Philoso-
phy. The idealistic view, in the former tradition is adopted by
the Advaitins of almost all shades. In the latter tradition it is
exemplified in the Yogocāra epistemology and metaphysics.
The reaction against the purely objective attitude, grounded in
the logic of unmixed positivism, has been a developing sort of
reaction, and it has a morphological character. The course of
development has been like this. In the first instance, the reac-
tion comes in the form of a need to go beyond the merely given. So all the systems of Indian philosophical thought qua philosophical, are metaphysical in import. This that confronts us in the presentational mode of consciousness does not satisfy. So a turning away from it is the first step that one has to take. 'Away from it' necessarily implies 'towards something else'. This 'something else' being supra-presentational, is essentially metaphysical. Whether it is, the atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas, or the Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya, the bhūtas and the skandhas of the Sarvāstivādins, the vijñānas of the Yagaśāras, the Śūnya of the Madhyamikas or the Ātman of the Advaitins, we have something trans-sensuous, and metaphysical. The metaphysical attitude, then is to be understood as a turning away from the merely given and a turning towards something that is not so given. The question is, what are the alternative modes of this 'turning away' and its complimentary 'turning towards'? What is the nature of the content attended to as a consequence of this re-orientation? And why after all, this radical transformation in attitude? To the last question, the answer that Indian philosophy has to give is this. We have, as discriminating individuals, to turn from darkness to light, from the falsely existent to the truly existent, from death to immortality. A change in attitude is necessitated by an awareness which is preferential in character—a mode of consciousness, which is valuational in essence. Philosophy elsewhere might have its origin in wonder, but in India, its origin lies in a perplexity which is axiological, in the sense of disillusionment in respect of being—in—the—world—as—it—is. Philosophical consciousness takes its rise in a dissatisfaction with the merely given. It is a plea for the re-evaluation of one's being—in—the—world, consequent on its devaluation, and on the consciousness of its being tuccha (trivial and as such worthy only of being relinquished). Except for the Cārvāka, whose attitude is characteristically one of dashing acceptance, all other systems of Indian Philosophy take the opposite stand, and some kind of withdrawal from being—in—the—world—as—it—is, constitutes a necessary step towards emancipation from this puzzling existence. But in addition to a psychological pathway to a 'turning away' from
being—in—the—world—as—it—is, there is the epistemological examination of the content of experience, or a dialectical scrutiny of what is treasured in the attitude of mere acceptance, the attitude of commonsense, supported on grounds of so-called empirical unassailability. Disillusionment with the world—as—it—is, takes its rise in a valuational attitude, which has a dispositional foundation, but which, nevertheless can be made firm and stable through a ratiocinative process of argumentation. All the schools of Indian philosophy with the exception of the Čārvāka, point to the necessity of a preferential attitude. So a ‘turning away’ from what is disappointing and self-contradictory, means turning towards something else. This something else, in spite of the fact that it is metaphysical in essence, may or may not be conceivable as an object—to—a—subject in the empirical situation. It may be understood as an object of trans-empirical order, self-subsistent in nature, and not presentable as a fact given in the perceptual mode of consciousness. Or, it may not be conceivable in the image of an objectifiable nature, even while to deny reality to it may be a transcendental impossibility. We have in this case another stratum of metaphysics—the stratum of the trans-objective, which is essentially subjective and transcendent. This layer of metaphysical thinking is the layer of ideal necessity. If we attempt a stratification of the Indian philosophical consciousness, this schema, would help us to arrange the vast array of schools and dogmas in an architectonic configuration. The entire content of India’s philosophical heritage, would be found to oscillate between the two extremes of naïve objectivism and transcendental spiritualism. The Čārvāka represents the former extreme, and the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara and his followers the latter. The development of thought is from mere acceptance at the level of empirical objectivity to transcendental ideality. And in between these two poles, we have the metaphysics of the non-perceptible objectivities and a falsely conceived subjectivity, both of which have to be commuted into a transcendental ideality, which is metaphysical without being objective, and subjective without being phenomenalized and literally meant. There is a seemingly
inextricable telescoping of the objective and the literally meant. We have a natural tendency to take the knowable as something meant. An apparently unavoidable intentionality accompanies our speech, which translates our modes of awareness. The acme of philosophizing consists in going beyond this seeming limit of human speech and human consciousness. To philosophize is to rise systematically and steadily above the limitations constructed by reasoning and language, and to know the truth concerning the contents of our consciousness in their unlimited aspect. To be aware of such a truth, is to be aware of one's freedom, to shake of one's limitations, to transcend one's imprisoned consciousness, to cast off the sheaths, which seem to give it an insulated countenance, a muffled being. To be transfused into such an awareness is to taste of the intimations of the numinous, in which nothing around us, above us or within us is ever lost entitatively, but in which everything around us, above us and within us sheds off its literal import and withal becomes a symbol of an essential freedom, that is known as one literally unintendable and indicated without being meant. Such is the nature of the Atmanic illumination as envisaged in the Advaita Vedânta of Śaṅkara and his followers. Without standing in a situation antagonistic to other systems of Indian philosophical thought, the Advaita only helps to invest them with a transparency, which they lack in a false perspective. The Advaitic critique of other metaphysical systems has not for its aim the establishment of a rival system of metaphysics, as much likely to be subverted as the systems it refutes. Its aim has largely been misunderstood and misrepresented, and the result has been a counter-attack on the Advaita by the non-Advaitins. Any two metaphysical doctrines conceived in the objective attitude, can engage in an interminable crossfire of arguments, without ever coming to a categorically necessary conclusion. What is an object of thought, is in an a priori sense indeterminable, and is therefore neither wholly unassailable, nor wholly condemnable. The philosophies refuted by the Advaitin are for this reason not on the same conceptual level as the Advaita itself. For this reason, they can well refute each other, with more or less plausibility. The
Naiyāyika’s criticism, for instance, of any non-Advaitic system of philosophy can be as plausible as the criticism of the Nyāya doctrine by such an one. And such would have been the case with the Advaita too, had there not been a fundamental disparity of levels between Advaitism and the points of view it criticises.

It is our contention that almost all the schools of Indian philosophy, except the Advaita, exemplify the objective attitude in various manners. The Cārvāka, being empirically objective, need not be considered here as one of the metaphysical systems. The Vaiśeṣika, the Jaina, the Sāṅkhya, and the Sarvāstivādins are manifestly objective at the metaphysical level. The Vijñānavāda, in spite of its literal claim to be subjective, contemplates subjectivity in an impliedly objective manner. The Mādhyāmika, even while it recognises more than others, the futility of speculation in the objective key, succumbs to the objectivistic fallacy, by insisting upon the unknowablity of the tatvā in theoretic consciousness. By knowledge the Mādhyāmika necessarily understands the awareness of an object, and because all cognition of an object is fraught with contradiction, that which is really real, can never be known. The Mādhyāmika realises the falsity of a cognition in the objective attitude. Yet, the objective attitude clings on to the Mādhyāmika way of philosophizing, in its insistence on defining knowledge in the manner in which it has been defined by those, who are plainly objectivistic in their philosophizing attitude. The Advaita Vedānta completely transcends the objective attitude by commuting each one of these positions into a symbol of the non-objective truth and non-objective reality. It would not be inappropriate to speak of the non-objective truth and reality as subjective, but non-objective subjectivity is not be understood as the literal counter-part of negated objectivity. Neither the objective in the affirmative situation, nor the negation of it, understood as a position in a literal sense, can be said to give a clue to the understanding of the real. The objective in the affirmative situation is an object to a subject. Even so is its negation, if understood or meant in a literal sense. The negation of objecti-
vity is not intended to bring back objectivity by investing negation itself with the status of an object. The negation of something understood in the objective attitude is not so much a negation of a thing or a content, as the negation of the attitude itself. Negation of objectivity has only to be understood as symbolic of a transfigured attitude. Both position and opposition stand as symbols of their own transcendence. But transcendence does not mean the postulation of a fresh position. If we understood aright this transcendence of the objective, we could protect ourselves against the mistake of postulating the truly real as a subject, which the negation of objectivity would give us as a matter of consequence. We are of the opinion that sentience or subjectivity, which remains as a precipitate of the negation in question, is only an abstract subjectivity, a false sentience. Through a process of filtering out the objective content of experience, one can never come to real subjectivity. Such a subjectivity would not differ in description from Bradley’s ‘psychological monster’ and ‘metaphysical chimera’. The advaitic Ātman is definitely not the objective content of the relational mode of consciousness. Nor is it the subject scissored off from its base in such a mode. Both the objective content and its corresponding subject are conceived in the objective attitude. Terminological innovations or devices of naming, do not mitigate the situation. The real subject is not the one conceived as obtainable by draining out the objective content from the knowledge situation. The process of draining out is a process of negation, but if the negation of an object is understood in its literal meaning, we would again be facing something that is not a non-object. A situation of this nature may well imply a claim to giving a ‘persuasive definition’ of subjectivity, but this does not mean much on the plane of metaphysics. Postulation of a subjectivity that completely disowns all objectivity is a questionable metaphysical procedure. It makes a false claim, for it simply disowns objectivity without ever transcending the objective attitude. This is the substance of the Advaitic critique of Vijñānāvāda. But it does not mean that the truly subjective attitude is impossible of attainment. A clue to the attainment
of such an attitude is found in the Mādhyamika refutation of
discursivity, and its implicate, the objective attitude. Nothing
that is known and understood as an object, can ever be free
from contradiction. The Mādhyamika dialectic stands for a
negation of all positions, including the negation itself, if it is
owned as a position. The Mādhyamika clearly insists on a
rejection of all acceptance, of all positions. Even while the
tattva is a necessary implicate of self-cancelling discursivity, it is
kept out of the reach of theoretic consciousness. Because it is
unthinkable as an object, it is understood as being unknowable.
To invest it with knowability would mean its devaluation, its
degeneration. So the avowed predilection of the Mādhyamika
is for a view of no position. Thus, there are two implications
of the Mādhyamika critique of the objective attitude. The nega-
tion of the objective attitude may be taken as pointing to an
affirmation of the non-objective, in two radically different senses.
The two radically different senses in which negation is to be
understood are the literal and the symbolic. In the literal sense
the negation of the objective attitude is understood simply as
the negation of the object, and the affirmation of its counter-part
in the epistemic situation, namely of the subject, functionally
named as vijñāptimātratā, or being—as—nothing—but—ideality.
The literal upshot of the negation of the objective attitude is
employed for hypostatising the sentient aspect of the epistemic
situation into a sole reality. So we have in the Yogacāra tradi-
tion of the Saugata siddhānta, an all-out cancellation of the
objective world. The external world is negated for affirming
the interminable flux of sentience. In the symbolic sense, the
negation in question, is not so much a negation of objects or
objective existence as of the objective attitude itself. Negation
thus becomes the symbol of the self-transcendence of all positions,
and it is asserted that the tattva (ens realissimum) is not to be
identified with a content encountered in the objective attitude.
The negative element in the dialectic of reason is only symbolic
of a noetic situation, which has to be understood as trans-
objective. As against the relational and mediated mode of
consciousness, it is a plea for immediacy and the transcendence
of the relational. There is in the architectonic of Atmanic experience a process of progressive transcendences. The objective attitude is transcended in the subjective, and acceptance gives way to negation. Yet neither subjectivity nor negation has a literal import. They have only a symbolic function. They merely point to a reality and truth, which is comprehended as known without being intended, and stated without being meant as an other of consciousness. The objective contents of the jāgrta and svapna states of consciousness, as also the muffled subjectivity of the suṣupti state, are not to be equated with the Ātman or Pure Consciousness. They are only the symbols of the ātmanic experience. We could simply make an assertion about the Ātman in an as-if strain. The Ātman is neither the muffled subjectivity of the suṣupti state of consciousness, nor is it the object of the jāgrta and svapna states of experience. Yet the contents of these awarenesses could be understood, as-if they were ātmanic in character. Of course, they are the symbols of such a consciousness. Only their significance has to be read aright. And their significance can be read aright, only when we resolve to look at them in their mutual relatedness. What holds these strata of experience together is their self-transcending character, and every successive step in this aspect, only brings the jijñāsu closer to the Ātman, which can be indicated without being understood as an object, and known without being made thinkable. The Advaitic truth and reality are only symbolised at the objective, the dialectical and the subjective levels of thought. To know the Ātman, it is necessary to turn away from the given in its literal aspect to its symbolic implication. The Ātman is not one of the entities given—the object and the subject, as literally understood; yet the Ātman embraces both, if we are prepared to take them as symbols of the limitless and the infinite. Each arrested breath, each fragmentary theoretic construction, is the symbol of that, which is freedom itself. Each step in the philosophical morphology of the Indian consciousness, can be seen in two aspects: (1) the dogmatic and (2) the critical. In the dogmatic aspect each step becomes a closed system of thought, subject to refutation, and fit enough to be disbelieved and dis-
owned and to be understood as literally false. In the critical aspect, each content understood as literally false, can be commuted into a symbol, which brings home to us, the awareness of something known, without being objectivised.

(2) *An Advaitic Appraisal of Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics.*

Kant is a metaphysician *par excellence,* and yet the net purport of his philosophical argument is anti-metaphysical. It seems that his earnestness in respect of the restriction of knowledge was all too great to admit of a possibility of encountering the noumenal in theoretic consciousness, or in an awareness, about which one could be descriptive, without becoming absurd and meaningless. Such an earnestness has been productive of two things: (1) it has created a chasm between the noumenal and the theoretic consciousness—a chasm that is unbridgeable except in the moral and the religious attitudes, the attitudes of willing and feeling, as radically distinguished from the attitude of knowing, and (2) it has been responsible for boosting up the morale of the philosophers, who have consecrated their efforts to an elimination of metaphysics.

We propose a re-examination of Kant’s criticism of Metaphysics, not because we are apathetic to Kant’s moralism and religious fervour. Our proposed re-examination has been motivated by the fact that the anti-metaphysical argument of Kant so completely cuts off the noumenal from the phenomenal, and restricts reasoning to the realm of experience, that the only legitimate occupation for the philosopher seems to be one of keeping himself self-consciously well confined to the sphere of empirical cognition. We do not feel sorry for a considerable bulk of philosophizing adventurers engaged in the execution of an anti-metaphysical scheme, for philosophizing is in a considerable sense a matter of taste. Just as we cannot prevent someone from becoming an idealist and someone else from becoming a pragmatist or an existentialist, we also cannot impose a ban on anti-metaphysics. But we do feel sorry for a situation, which justifies in an unequivocal manner a wholesale expulsion of
metaphysics from the province of philosophy. And the keener is our resentment, when we find Kant's arguments being employed for the undoing of his own 'Critical Philosophy', which was never intended to limit philosophical thinking merely to objects located within the insulated ring of perceptual consciousness. Our aim is to stop philosophy from engaging itself in re-doing what is being done by the men of natural science. Pinning down the philosopher to the duty of examining statements and concepts in the field of science, with a view to sorting out of metaphysical statements and sorting in of protocol statements, would mean expecting the philosopher to be wiser than what he actually is. When the natural scientist in his specific field is more qualified than the philosopher to scrutinize his concepts and statements, the philosopher looks like a redundant entity, fit enough to be yoked to some really more useful business than philosophizing in this manner. Only to indicate that it could never have been Kant's intention to limit philosophy to the narrow pursuit of the Logical Positivist, we shall take up an examination of Kant's view of metaphysical cognition, and see what can be done to amend it, and with what consequences. We, however, hope that an advaitic appraisal of Kant's criticism of metaphysics can be made to extend the frontiers of philosophical consciousness from the narrow limits of knowing at the phenomenal level to an awareness of the noumenal, the numinous and the unconditioned in reflective consciousness, which, in our view, presents itself not as something infra-metaphysical, something below the moral and religious consciousness, but something absolutely co-ordinate to them in status and function. With the Advaitin we maintain that the unconditioned is not unknowable. On the other hand, it is our belief that it is eminently knowable, and that if such a knowledge is metaphysical, it is not meaningless or nonsensical. Before we actually take up a reformulation of the Kantian attitude towards metaphysics in the image of the advaitic thinking, we shall undertake an exposition of Kant's theory of knowledge in relation to Metaphysics, a delineation of what Kant understands by metaphysical cognition and metaphysical proposition, and what he means when he says
that metaphysical propositions are no expressions of knowledge.

A type of cognition, as Kant tells us in his preamble to the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, is distinct from another type in three respects. The three respects are: (1) kind, (2) source and (3) the object referred to or intended. There are fundamental differences between metaphysical knowledge and non-metaphysical knowledge, as reckoned under these three aspects. And this difference gives us two types of propositions: the non-metaphysical, exemplified in the propositions of natural or empirical sciences, and mathematics, and the metaphysical, which are neither empirical in import, nor are the same as the mathematical. Empirical propositions may be those of Physics, which has its basis in external experience, or those concerning Empirical Psychology, which has its basis in internal experience. Metaphysical propositions have their basis not in experience; they are trans-empirical in nature. But they are distinguished by Kant from mathematical propositions in the following manner. "Philosophical Knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts, mathematical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from the construction of concepts." "... To construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition which corresponds to the concept." We can see when we look at the latter way of putting the issue that the basis of the distinction is that mathematical statements are grounded on intuition, i.e., on the awareness of a particular, whereas, philosophical statements are not. Kant wants to contrast metaphysics with mathematics, with respect to two distinctions: (1) with respect to the distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*, and (2) with respect to the distinction between thinking which is purely so, and thinking which involves intuition as a basis. He wants to impress upon us that both mathematics and metaphysics are *a priori* in contradistinction to the empirical sciences, which are *a posteriori*, but that, with respect to the second distinction, both mathematics and the empirical sciences are grounded on intuition in contradistinction to metaphysics, which is purely rational, i.e., which is not grounded on intuition. In respect of the kind of cognition, therefore, by which we also
mean the form of cognition, it can be said that metaphysical knowledge is universal in character, and that metaphysical propositions are synthetic a priori, in the sense that even while they are universal and a priori, they aim at extending the frontiers of our knowledge. They are propositions about entities, which have to be entertained as real without being either empirically given or exhibited in intuition. Regarding the source of such a knowledge one thing is definite. It is not a generalization from experience. Nor does its source, in all certainty, lie in the understanding and the forms of intuition in their transcendentality. No doubt the source of such a cognition cannot be other than transcendental. But such a transcendental source is different from the transcendentental source of our knowledge of phenomena. It should be trans-discursive and trans-intuitive. Kant identifies this one with the faculty of Reason. Concerning the kind of object or objects to which metaphysical knowledge refers, or to which the ideal content of a metaphysical proposition can be said to refer, Kant tells us that such an object is to be understood as unconditioned in nature, as distinguished from conditioned objects, which are all determined by objects outside themselves or other than themselves. A conditioned object is relational both in respect of its existence and its character. It lacks self-evidence. An unconditied object, on the other hand, emphasizes two things: (1) it is non-relational both in the aspect of its existence and its intelligibility, and (2) if it is known, then we know the ultimate condition, which the knowledge of all conditioned objects must fulfil. In being known, it gives us the knowledge of all those conditions, which determine that some given conditioned object or all class of objects shall exist and come to have the properties they do have. Knowledge of the unconditioned is an absolutely sufficient explanation for other existent objects.

This is how metaphysical cognition has been defined by Kant and distinguished from non-metaphysical cognition, and this is how a metaphysical proposition should stand, if metaphysical cognition can be expressed in the propositional form. But what Kant seems to give by way defining metaphysical cognition, he withdraws when he comes to assess the value of such a
cognition under the two aspects of meaning and proof. Cognition qua cognition cannot be without a meaning. Nor can it be non-provable. Thus, propositions, which are the expressions of knowledge must fulfil two conditions. These conditions are those of intelligibility and capability of being proved or disproved. By intelligibility Kant understands an intentionality which is comprehensible in terms of one or more of the categories of the understanding. A meaningful proposition should refer to objects that exemplify or embody the structure of one or more of the twelve categories of the understanding. To be capable of proof or disproof, a proposition must be about an object or objects of possible experience. The possibility of being experienced is the criterion of the truth or otherwise of propositions; and no proposition, which claims to be an expression of knowledge, can afford to bypass this test. The test, as conceived by Kant, is of a two-fold nature. True propositions are true, in view of the fact that their meaning corresponds to an object, actually perceived or possibly perceivable. Else, its meaning should refer to an object, that coheres with such objects as are perceptually experienceable. A proposition that does not fulfil these conditions is not provable. It is neither capable of being proved nor disproved. Even disproof envisages the possibility of such a reference. A meaning in this circumstance intends a wrong object, but nevertheless an object experienced or experienceable in the perceptual situation. A proposition, instead of referring to nacre, may refer to silver, which it could mean only in a state of cognitive distemper. Silver as the object meant may be a case of false reference, but even while it is so, it is a fact, which is neither non-existent, nor inexperienceable. A certain datum, even while its triviality and elusive character have well been understood, cannot be said to be no experiential content. The falsity of a datum does not mean its contentual deprivation; it only means its contextual misplacing. A misplaced content is a content all the same; it only goes ill with a certain claim—the claim that it refers to a certain object in a specific context.

We have already seen that Kant takes pains to elaborate the
concept of metaphysical cognition, as distinguished from non-metaphysical cognition, and following this, the distinction between a metaphysical proposition and a non-metaphysical proposition. But as we come to the question concerning the intelligibility and provability of such propositions, we find Kant almost in distress, in a state of mind that looks like hopelessly alternating between the instinct to accept metaphysical knowledge as a genuine piece of knowledge and the reason for rejecting it as dubious in character and profoundly enigmatic. If intelligibility and capability of being proved or disproved constitute the essential conditions of knowledge, then metaphysical cognition should fail to be one. And if a proposition is necessarily an expression of knowledge, a metaphysical proposition cannot be called a proposition at all. Instead of being intelligible, it is confounding. Besides, the object it means, is not one which can be perceived, either actually or possibly. As Kant would have it, one cannot, without being absurd maintain that a metaphysical proposition means something that can really cohere with such things as are referred to by propositions that are literally capable of proof or disproof. God, the source of all being and all possibility, the pure Ego in its transcendental effulgence, and the world of space and time as a whole, are meant by metaphysical propositions, even while they are unmeanable. If then, a metaphysical proposition has an unmeanable meaning, and if meaning means intelligibility, which is the necessary condition of propositionality, it follows without any doubt that a metaphysical proposition is really no proposition. What it intends by virtue of being metaphysical, it fails to intend as a proposition. A metaphysical proposition looks like a self-contradictory concept. An awareness propositionally expressible cannot be metaphysical, and an awareness that claims to be metaphysical can be anything but not one that is expressible in the form of a proposition. What a metaphysical proposition means, cannot be given in perception, and so a metaphysical proposition parades under the disguise of a proposition, without being capable of having a meaning. Further, Kant's analysis of the notion of intelligibility in relation to metaphysical cogni-
cognition suffers from want of clarity. If intelligibility of cognition generally means referability to an object that is exemplifiable in one or more of the twelve categories of the understanding, metaphysical cognition can in no sense be intelligible. The metaphysical object being beyond the categories, can be said to be exemplifiable in the categories in some mysterious sense only. For the sake of admitting metaphysical cognition as cognition, Kant extends the sphere of the application of the category of Totality to the Noumenon. In his opinion, the category of Totality comprehends the world as a whole. But this concession, which Kant gives to the understanding, fits only loosely in the scheme of Kant's epistemology. How, one may ask, can the understanding be both limited and unlimited in its application? If the category of Totality exemplifies the unconditioned object, either the unconditioned object is not unconditioned, or the category of totality is not a category at all. Kant is aware of the weakness of his argument, so he thinks of a transcendental synthesis other than that of the understanding. Transcendental synthesis, in respect of the metaphysical objects, is to be met with not at the level of the understanding, but at the level of Reason. So does he maintain that the source of metaphysical cognition is the faculty of Reason, which has been distinguished from the understanding and intuition both. If the source of metaphysical cognition is Reason, it would be difficult to believe that such a cognition points to an object that embodies the structure of one or more of the categories of the understanding. And the difficulty being there, it would be patently absurd to maintain that such a cognition is intelligible, even according to Kant's definition of 'intelligibility'. If, however, it be argued that understanding only points to the metaphysical object without knowing it, what would this 'pointing to' mean, except an utter despair in respect of the knowledge of the metaphysical object? We are faced with a dilemma. If the metaphysical object that is unconditioned, is somehow intelligible, it does not remain metaphysical. If it is unknowable, then all that Kant has said about the nature of metaphysical cognition and metaphysical proposition is a lie. In vain has Kant taken pains to
elaborate the concept of metaphysical cognition that can be no cognition, and the nature of the metaphysical proposition that can be no proposition. Evidently, therefore, Kant's analysis of metaphysics in relation to his epistemology, lands him up in an agnostic situation. The agnostic implications of Kant's epistemology have been productive of two different attitudes in the post-Kantian philosophy. Either philosophers have accepted the unconditioned and the metaphysical and proposed non-cognitive methods of assimilating it to experience, or they have got rid of the unconditioned and the metaphysical by dubbing it as redundant and nonsensical, and reduced philosophy to the status of a care-taker science, whose only legitimate function can be to check up the propositions of all fields of knowledge in the light of the positivistic criterion. Instead of a metaphysics at the cognitive level, we have either metaphysics in the irrational key or we have no metaphysics at all. The idealistic reaction against science or thought has assumed several shapes. Whether it makes itself felt in an urge for 'Pure Experience' or the Intuitionism of Henri Bergson, or the Personal Idealism of Josiah Royce, James Ward and Pringle-Pattison, or the Voluntarism of William James, we come across a plea for the irrational. On the other hand, Kant's criticism of metaphysics has meant a dissolution of all meta-scientific philosophy. Science has come to determine the nature of philosophical thinking. The concepts of the natural sciences have been employed for solving philosophical problems. For some time in the recent past, the concept of evolution reigned supreme in the field of philosophy. Of late Physics has become the ideal and norm of philosophical thinking. Linked to Linguistics in certain aspects, it has given to our generation a new philosophical method, namely, the method of linguistic analysis. In the midst of the contending claims of science and metaphysics, Kant's system of thought has underestimated the ability of theoretic consciousness to know the unconditioned. Sandwiched between these two extremes, it looks either way, now losing itself in an irrational vindication of metaphysics, now reducing itself to the status of an appendicular discipline, dedicated to the implementation of the method
of the natural sciences in all spheres of knowledge. A situation of this nature presupposes that thought would function clumsily without being reminded of the necessity of working in the spirit of the natural or empirical sciences, and that it is constitutionally inadequate to reveal or comprehend the unconditioned. This means that theoretic consciousness has no place of its own in the map of knowledge. The realm of faith has no need of it; and the realm of knowledge cannot own it, without trimming it into the cast of empirical consciousness. Even while Kant is fully aware of the sublime status of metaphysics in the architectonic of Reason, he fails to reconstruct the nature of the unconditioned in theoretic consciousness. And though, he never thinks disrespectfully of metaphysics, his definition of knowledge intends a position, that by implication has to be construed as antimetaphysical.

Our aim in this context is not merely to point to the gap in Kant's analysis of the knowledge-situation. We would wish to inquire into the 'why' of Kant's imperfect and inadequate formulation of metaphysical cognition. We would further wish to reformulate, if we can, the Kantian point of view in a certain manner suggested by the Advaitic notion of metaphysical cognition.

Metaphysical cognition is cognition and is yet not so; and metaphysical proposition is proposition and is yet not so. Kant's deep-rooted metaphysical proclivity demands the accommodating of metaphysics in his scheme of philosophical knowledge, so he attempts to describe what possibly a discipline of this nature would be or could be, and so does he bring it under the genus cognition, and also distinguish it from mathematical cognition, on the one hand, and, on the other, from cognition relating to the sphere of the natural sciences. But such a formulation is merely definitional. Only a likely definition of metaphysical cognition has been given; for when Kant comes to the testing of it in its criteriological aspect, he finds that such a cognition fails to fulfil the conditions it should, namely, those of intelligibility and capability of being proved or disproved. The reference to the unconditioned object is a purely definitional device,
for nothing like an object of this nature is ever presented to consciousness in its theoretic or objective attitude. It seems that Kant is speaking of metaphysical cognition only in a concessional way, and the concession in question is necessitated by the recognition of a certain innate flaw in the constitution and functioning of language. If all propositions refer to an object, metaphysical propositions, which should be the expression of metaphysical cognition, must refer to an object. The unconditioned entities are spoken of as objects referred to by metaphysical propositions. But when it comes to a verification of the genuineness of such an object, we are made to acquaint ourselves with the absurdity of entertaining the notion of an object that is not given in perception. To say that an object, not given in perception, nor likely to be given in perception, is known, is to contradict the very definition of knowledge. So a metaphysical proposition should be no proposition in reality. It is only verbally speaking a proposition. No inferential transition is possible from the perceptible to that which is not perceptible. We cannot say that we know the unconditioned object. The mere thinkability of the transcendental ego, of the world as a whole, and of God, does not mean their knowability. But a restriction of knowability to perceptibility does not amount to a cancellation of the unconditioned in all its possible aspects. The unconditioned, even as unknowable, is nevertheless a norm meant to be approximated in willing the rational will, which is the good will or the free will. The metaphysical, without being known, is merely indicated, and because it is unobjectifiable, it is only ideal in essence, and its ideality, without ever being assimilable in theoretic consciousness, is nevertheless, the ground of morality. We, however, do not object to taking the unconditioned as the ideal of morality, its backbone and its ground. We only take exception to the agnostic formulation of the unconditioned. We maintain, therefore, that the unconditioned is a knowable par excellence, even when it cannot be known as an object; and that such a knowledge of it, can be communicated through speech in the propositional form. We also maintain that morality, in absence of such a knowledge, would be merely
an imitation morality, merely a formal morality—a willing of the moral will in the vacuum. Real morality flows spontaneously from one's being established in the knowledge of the unconditioned.\textsuperscript{12} He who really knows cannot act immorally.\textsuperscript{13} There is no moral staircase leading on to the unconditioned. Ethical conduct may be symptomatic of an unconditioned excellence, but it cannot be understood as something in the nature of a ladder or a means for obtaining absolution.\textsuperscript{14} Though the Absolute cannot be immoral, its attainment cannot be the consequence of a moral effort. To think of absolution as a consequence of moral effort is to persist in the same attitude, which made Kant think that the unconditioned is unknowable. The unknowability of the unconditioned is a necessary corollary of the objective attitude.\textsuperscript{15} To think that all that is known and is knowable, is an object to a subject, is to insist on the phenomenalization of the noumenal. To maintain that the unconditioned is realizable through moral effort, amounts to a phenomenalization of an 'idea of reason', if not in cognitive consciousness, in volitional consciousness at least. The very notion of realizing something deferred, has on it a touch of the space-time metaphor.

Kant is throughout aware of the unconditioned as the ideal self-fulfilment of the actual and the phenomenal, but his philosophical thinking also, is throughout riddled with an indissoluble tendency towards objectifying what is not objectifiable. In Kant's philosophy, the schema of subject-object relation, seems to persist in the manner of an ineffacable disposition. This is the reason why Kant comes to an agnostic position in respect of the knowledge of the unconditioned, and is not able to bridge the gulf between metaphysics and morality. The moral goal remains an ideal, which is always in the process of being reached, but is never entirely reached. Kant no doubt claims to have created a Copernican Revolution in philosophy by shifting the centre of gravity of knowledge from the object to the subject, but the revolution in question remained incomplete, in so far as Kant lapsed into the objective attitude, and forgot that the subject is essentially free, and even while it is unobjectifiable it
is really knowable. Only if Kant would have realized the essential knowability of the self as freedom from objectivity, he would have given to the unconditioned a better status in the knowledge-situation than he has, and would not have connected it with a moral volition that negates the cognitive mode of consciousness.

A comparative estimate of Kant and the Advaita brings the following issues before us:—

1. Why should Kant insist on the knowability of the unconditioned as an object, when he fully realizes, that by its very nature it defies such a categorization? The unconditioned in the Advaita Vedānta is none other than the Ātman, which being identical with Pure Consciousness is literally unobjectifiable. Perhaps because of its literally unobjectifiable essence, Kant has pronounced it as unknowable and therefore lacking all meaning. The literally unobjectifiable cannot be known as an object, but it does not mean that object-consciousness cannot be employed for giving a philosophically satisfying analysis of the nature of that knowledge, in which the unconditioned and the transcendental is revealed. What is literally unobjectifiable can be symbolically represented by the content of object-consciousness. The consciousness of the object can be made to stand as the symbol of its own negation—a constant and unerring reminder of the necessity and desirability of its own transcendence. To the Advaitin neither the object nor object-consciousness are non-existent and unreal. They only acquire different meanings in different attitudes. The attitudes in question are only two: the unreflective and the reflective. In the unreflective attitude, everything, including the subject, is sought to be known as an object. In the reflective attitude, there is necessarily the consciousness of a reality other than the one that is objective. The 'I' is understood as having a status different from what it contemplates as this object or that, or even as the subject as 'he' and 'you'. Not only does reflective consciousness envisage a discrimination of this nature. It also evinces the dawn of an appreciative attitude in which the objective and the objectifiable are understood as unenduring (anitya). This is contrasted with the enduring (nitya). In reflective consciousness, there is neces-
sarily an awareness of lost horizons, of a saddening disillusion-
ment, in the presence of the world as it is. If this is so, know-
ledge, in the Advaitic sense, is not to be understood as noetic
consciousness merely. It is an awareness, replete with a preferen-
tial attitude. It necessarily means a turning away from the
unenduring. The unenduring is neither non-existent nor is it
enduringly existent. It is non-existent as enduring, and existent
as non-enduring. So it has been described in the Advaitic
literature, as being elusive in character, like the mirage in a
desert or the castle in the clouds. What is thus known in the
preferential attitude is the object in its axiological nullity. But
a consciousness of the axiological nullity of the object-world is
at the same time the consciousness of what lies beyond the
object. The dawn of the preferential consciousness is the meet-
ing-point of two types of awareness: the objective and the
trans-objective. The objective one is characterized by having a
limit. The limit of the object is the subject. But if the attitude
persists, the subject also is limited by the object. The subject
understood as a centre of sentience can be seen as limited by the
object in three aspects: the conative, the affective and the cogni-
tive, or in other words, those of willing, feeling and knowing.
The trans-objective one is without a limit. There is in this
attitude not an annulment of the limit, but a transcendence of
it. The limit gets transformed into a symbol of its own trans-
cendence. What is present in the objective attitude does not
literally disappear. Only it does not look like being what it
was believed to be. Being there, it is all the same, not what it
was taken for. At this stage its enigmatic and deluding character
is known, and so it is understood as indescribable (anirvacanīya).
A further clarification of the nature of its contents brings to
consciousness its triviality and actual nothingness. The flashing
realization of a self-contradiction, implicit in the very frame of
the appearances, points to the principle of non-contradiction as
the essence of the real, as it is in-and-for-itself. The world of
appearances, in reflective consciousness, therefore, necessarily
implies non-contradiction as the criterion of truth. The Advaitin
does not find in the idea of non-contradiction a merely formal
criterion. It is not merely an 'Idea of Reason', waiting to be real, without its ability to be so. The Advaitic Brahman which is the fulness of being in the three aspects of existence, knowledge and value is non-contradiction incarnate. The Atman itself is the world in its totality. The Atman itself is the cause of the world, both in its manifest and unmanifest forms. The Atman itself is the supreme consciousness or foundational knowledge. He who has known the Atman has known all that is knowable. 'Knowability' here should not mean an unqualified cognition of something in the literally objective situation. 'Knowable' here means 'worth knowing', because of its valuational excellence. What is not worth knowing is trivial (tuccha), but what is trivial is not non-existent. Its trivial character does not affect one who knows it as such. Not to be aware of its triviality means to accept it, as it is presented, and believe that, as true and real, what is so presented. The attitude of acceptance is the matrix of ignorance. Only in the attitude of acceptance does verification, by reference to perceptually warranted goods, constitute the criterion of the validity of cognition.

Kant’s non-advaitic heritage is responsible for all the treatment he has given to metaphysics. What he believes on instinct to be transcendentally necessary, he has no proper reason to justify. Kant has an unerrring disposition for metaphysical thinking, but a very erring disposition indeed, for justifying the contents of such a thought. Had Kant already understood the triviality of existence and knowledge in the objective attitude, he would not have insisted on the verification of the truth-claim of the 'Ideas of Reason' in a perceptually given situation. He alone can seek perceptual verification of the truth of metaphysical propositions, who is too deeply immersed in the objective attitude.

We need only consider here the structure of the philosophical argument in Śaṅkara and most of the Advaitins, and indicate how radically different from it is the structure of the philosophical argument in Kant. The entire philosophical argument in Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras is prefixed by a discussion of Illusion and Error; and such a prologue clearly
indicates what knowledge ought to mean. The problem for Śaṅkara is not the problem concerning the possibility of scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and religion, on the other. His problem is a purely spiritual one. His inquiry is essentially an inquiry into the nature of Illusion, which results in the deprivation of an innately blissful existence. His interest lies not in discovering the principles which underlie valid thinking in the objective attitude. His aim is to regain for man his true destiny, by unsheathing it, by removing the opaque crust of ignorance that covers it, by dissipating the noetic conditions that distort its true vision. The central problem of Śaṅkara's philosophy is the problem of Man's Freedom or the Freedom of the Spirit in Man. Freedom, however, in the Advaitin's philosophy, is not a deferred goal, a distant destiny. It is the essential nature of the spirit. Nothing has actually to be attained. Only the illusion of non-attainment has to be dispelled. Kant, on the other hand, has a different motive for philosophizing. The central problem of Kant's philosophy is to determine the conditions of the possibility of scientific knowledge. How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? What can we know and what remains for ever outside the reach of knowledge? Kant answers these questions for the sake of arguing for the possibility of knowledge and for making room for faith. So Kant's philosophical argument begins not with an analysis of illusion and error, but with an analysis of knowledge, not exclusively, or even primarily, metaphysical, but scientific and mathematical. Kant's adverse pronouncements in respect of the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, are motivated in a two fold manner. Such pronouncements intend to keep the field of science uncontaminated by the uncouth introduction of all kinds of obscure material. Further, they do not allow any skeptical interference in matters concerning faith. The entire trend of the Kantian argument looks like one designed to boost certain pre-conceived programmes relating to knowledge and faith. Even the notion of spirituality in Kant's philosophy is different from that of the Advaitins. Spiritual life, instead of its being the transcendence of bondage and determination by a coexisting other, comes
to be understood as the life of morality, wherein the voice of Reason is the voice of God— an unconditional imperative, obedience to which, introduces definiteness and order in the life of the individual by subordinating sensibility to Reason. The direction of spiritual progress in Kant's view of the matter is from the indefinite to the definite. For this reason Kant combats scepticism in the field of knowledge, and in the sphere of faith, shows not much of a taste for mysticism. His epistemology aims at removing the indefinite character of knowledge in the two competing traditions of Empiricism and Rationalism. He introduces definiteness into the empiricist's notion of knowledge by showing the transcendental necessity of the a priori element in it. The unlimited expanse of Reason in the rationalist tradition has been circumscribed by intuition. Kant is neither for the scepticism of Hume, nor for the dogmatism of Leibnitz and Wolff. The indeterminate, the indefinite and the limitless have no place in Kant's speculum mentis. The constitution of his mind is scientific; his thinking is not mystical. Even while Kant talks at length about the Ideas of Reason as necessary articles of his philosophical thought, they have only a regulative use therein, not a constitutive one. Had they been constitutive of the world we know, such a world would itself have been indeterminate, limitless, unconditioned, and indefinite. The transcendental apparatus of Kant's metaphysics of experience has only one function to discharge in the main. It annuls contingency from scientific knowledge. In the realm of faith also, the predilection for the definite and determinate is not mitigated. Kant's faith is the faith of a moralist. Faith, in Kant's system of thought, does not envisage an ideal fulfilment of human existence in the annulment of its mundane commitments. It does not mean a mystical transcendence of one's limitation. Its cherished goal is not 'the flight of the alone to the alone'. Its avowed aim is to introduce harmony and order into life by placing sensibility, desires and passions, under the paramountcy of Reason. Moral life is life planned in favour of Reason. The Kantian kingdom of ends is no other-worldly kingdom. unlimited in its dimensions. Its composition is through and through human. The Kantian
scheme of morality is no charter outlined in the interest of an other-worldly existence. Its essence is overwhelmingly social. The categorical imperative is intended to engender the growth of a society free from malignant egoism. Moral perfection, if at all attainable, does not mean a dissipation of relational existence. It does not mean the attainment of a trans-social, trans-relational being. Freedom of will only means individual’s freedom to will the rational will, or in other words, not to will the non-rational. Such a willing has no other-worldly goal. It has no intention of freeing the individual from the vexatious commitments involved in one’s being in the world. To be one with the infinite and the indefinite is not the cherished destination of free willing. That free-willing ensures virtuous life only, and that virtuous life alone is not the *summum bonum*, is shown by Kant’s insistence on happiness as a necessary element in a morally fulfilled life. The existence of God is another postulate of morality; for God alone can unite virtue to happiness. The necessity of a third postulate, namely, that of the Immortality of the Soul, makes it further clear that morality is a process in time—a *progressus ad infinitum*. Man might be having the intimations of the excellence and the value of the unconditioned in free-willing, complimented by God’s grace and assured by the immortality of the soul, but such intimations only help him to remain rationally well-adjusted within the limits of his individual and social existence. The vague indefiniteness of a life of directionless sensibility has to be surrendered in favour of an ordered life, exemplifying the rationality of free will. But free will alone is not sufficient. Immortality of the Soul, postulated in the interest of an uninterrupted practice of virtue, and God’s existence improvised for the sake of uniting happiness to virtue, clearly indicate that morality contemplates no timeless state of being, in which there is no need of progress. Morality in the Kantian Philosophy, is a plea for ordered existence. Herein there is no question concerning the transcendence of the given. The given has only to be fashioned according to a plan. Its insistence is on the actualization of greater and still greater coherence in the confused mass of our basic, though
controllable and modifiable irrationality. So the unconditioned is sought to be made definite and concrete in moral practice. But in being made so, it again remains merely a "floating ideality", which is only falsely claimed to be attained in moral life. Perhaps Kant's agnostic pronouncement, in respect of the knowledge of the unconditioned, was more in consonance with his philosophical heritage than his claim that the unconditioned is realizable in moral practice. Even moral practice is a matter concerning the conditioned aspect of existence. If a claim is made on behalf of Kant that in moral life one is on way to the realization of the unconditioned, such a claim cannot be substantiated. The clinging on to the definite, the determinate and the coherent, is so great in Kant's metaphysic of existence, that any claim purporting to an actualization of the unconditioned, either at the level of knowledge, or at the level of moral practice, must remain a pseudo-claim only, for the simple reason that Kant's thinking, having in its make-up, the entire cultural heritage of the limit-riddled thinking of the West, makes it impossible for him to turn towards the indefinite and the limitless as the land of heart's desire. The indefinite is axiologically inferior to the definite in a cultural consciousness of this nature. How and why, then, does he at all talk of the unconditioned? Not because the unconditioned is, in any vital sense, the goal of either knowledge or moral practice, but because the unconditioned helps better to systematize knowledge and moral life. Metaphysics in Kant remains at best only a means to an end. Such an end, in the aspect of cognition, consists in the attainment of a consciousness that extends our knowledge, without losing the character of necessity. In the aspect of morality, it is the attainment of virtue wedded to happiness. And if this is so, the Kantian criticism of metaphysics stands more than well-explained. A reformulation of the Kantian critique of metaphysics would, therefore, need a reformulation of the entire motive for philosophizing. So long as philosophical thinking persists in what we have described as the objective attitude, there will be an irresistible or even a logically inevitable tendency towards the cherishing and adoring of the definite and the limit-
ed. So long, indeed, metaphysics will only have a status, ancillary to science. Only in a consciousness, that has transcended the objective attitude, does metaphysics come to its own. In the Advaita, however, we come across an initial turning away from the limited and the determined. The preferential attitude, in which Advaitism is conceived, is disinclined towards an adoring of the limited and the relational. No amount of systematization of the content of relational awareness, either in the cognitive or the conative situation, can reconstruct the fulness of the atmanic experience. How can the limited and the determined be made to look like the limitless and the indefinite? And even if it is made to look like it, we should not forget that the mere fact of 'looking like it' is not enough. It is not yet that which, in its unlimited visage, absorbs and cancels all limits. It makes unerring sense to say that the limited implies the limitless as its basis, but it is puzzling indeed to think how the limitless could ever lapse into limit. Such a puzzlement is the ground of the metaphysical attitude, and in a really metaphysical attitude, there is no place for ever entertaining the notion of the meaninglessness of the metaphysical truth.

2. Why should Kant maintain that every meaningful proposition should be capable of being proved or disproved? The necessity that Kant imposes on a proposition in the context of its validation is a mediated necessity. It means that an apparently categorical proposition, in order to be proved or disproved, must really be hypothetical. It is not self-evident or self-luminous. It is expected to have a meaning that is borne out by reference to a perceptual experience. Else, it should be harmoniously adjustable in a configuration of propositions, having a meaning validated by perceptual experience. Even the propositions of mathematics are validated on the ground that their conceptual content is constructable in intuition. Metaphysical propositions fail to fulfil these conditions, and so they lack meaning. This is the Kantian contention. Such an analysis of knowledge-propositions lacks two things. First, it unduly restricts the sphere of knowledge. Secondly, it underrates the capacity of language, and would not allow language to function
significantly at a level of experience above the purely and the literally discursive one. The Advaitin's definition of knowledge is, indeed, very comprehensive, and his view of language in respect of its capacities goes beyond the essentially naturalistic hypothesis concerning the functions and limits of language. Knowledge, according to the Advaitin, is not necessarily an awareness of something literally meant. The Ātman being not an object, can never be meant. Yet it cannot be said that the Ātman is unknowable. Who can deny that the Ātman is the undeniable implicate of all experience in the reflective consciousness? In reflective consciousness, we come to have the awareness of the illusory nature of all that is contemplated in the objective attitude. But such an awareness presupposes an unerring belief in something non-illusory, something non-apparent, something really real. Because this something is non-illusory, non-apparent, really real, it cannot be meant, it cannot be intended as an object. And because an awareness of it also cannot be denied, it cannot be said that it is not known. So it is to be understood as known, but not known as an other of consciousness. For how can the knower itself be an object, or ultimate existence be made to function in the office of a predicate or that which is the ground of all dualities and differentiations be itself one of its own consequences? The objective attitude in knowledge insists on these transformations of Pure Consciousness. But if it is realized that the objective attitude is the ground of illusory experience, knowledge has to be understood in another key. It has to be understood as an unmeant and unmeanable content. Yet it is not a content, whose character is incommunicable. To say that no significant statements can be made about it, is to miss the import of the mahāvākyas like Tat Tvam Asi (That thou art). While such statements bear a total semblance in form to the propositions which mean an object, they should not be understood as such in every other respect. Propositional statements bearing the same form may have different implications. We can distinguish here between two kinds of implication, at least. A statement may imply the awareness or the cognition of an object, given to experience, as an other of consciousness, in one of its
modes. The other implication may not warrant such a dichotomy. Propositions, having the former implication, are called samsargātmaka (relational or empirical) propositions. Those of the latter variety are called akhaṇḍārthaka (non-relational). Metaphysical propositions are of the latter type. The mahāvākyas like "That thou art", are really identity-propositions. An identity of the 'that' (Brahman) and the 'thou' (Jīva) is affirmed herein. But even identity may have an implied reference to two things, which are identical. To tide over this possible difficulty, we may interpret the identity-relation as a metaphor, devised for helping the understanding. So the proposition understood in its real implication in this situation, has to be grasped only as a symbol of what literally speaking is unspeakable. It symbolises (i) the inadequacy of speech in its literal phase to communicate the immediacy of a suprasensuous experience, and (ii) the necessity of employing the entire paraphernalia of experience in the objective situation as a symbol for denoting that which defies connotative determination. Some of the Advaitins have written at length on the possibility of expressing the literally inexpressible in the propositional form of statements. Only one has to heed their warning that such statements are to be entertained as only indicative of a situation, which cannot be literally meant. And here we need another logic altogether.

A proposition like 'Tattvamasi' is a situational proposition, and should not be interpreted in terms of the logic of ordinary propositions, which express an awareness of facts in the objective attitude. What is indicated by it is literally beyond representation. It refers to nothing which can be stretched out in the spatio-temporal frame. Nor is this proposition a merely verbal one, barely tautologous in import. Nor does it reveal a state of things amenable to verification in sensuous experience. Yet it is not a nonsensical statement. It has a gestural significance. It prescribes in a determinably preferential mood, a turning away from 'this' to 'that'—a rehearsal in one's consciousness of a mode of being completely inwardised. It only points to a situation in which the fulness of immediate experience is not
lived through (erlebt) by going out in quest of the land of heart's desire. Nothing has to be annexed or hooked up; nothing has to be known as an other and possessed.

What is signified by this proposition is an illumination that sublates ignorance, accepted as knowledge, and error believed not as error, but as truth. So does the content of the proposition mark an advancement in knowledge—a broadening of the demesne of theoretic consciousness. If the revelation of something concealed and misrepresented thus far, is a new step—an over-all change in perspective and outlook, it would be no exaggeration to say that the proposition in question symbolizes a synthetic function. But the function of synthesis exhibited by this proposition is only a figure of speech, conveying the inclusion in consciousness of something literally unmeanable and incommunicable. Nor can it be said that the proposition under discussion lacks an a priori function. What after all could an equation of the 'that' and the 'thou' mean? In the situation contemplated, these terms become conjugate. No subject-predicate logic, except in its purely figurative employment, can unravel the mystery locked in these words.

But what we have said here is no indictment of Kant. We could never have meant to class him with the positivists. All we have tried to show here, is the possibility of bringing the unconditioned within the field of theoretic consciousness. Why Kant failed to enlarge the scope of such a consciousness cannot be attributed to a disinclination on his part to do so. We have only pointed out why Kant could have said only that about metaphysics, which he has already said. And, if a position of this nature smacks of a failure, somehow, the entire motive for philosophizing in the Kantian strain, is to be held responsible. But an awareness of this limitation is no condemnation of Kant. It is only a forward step in the direction of vindicating metaphysics, by pointing out the manner in which a metaphysical statement symbolizes a theoretic function.
REFERENCES AND NOTES

CHAPTER 1

THE INDICTMENT OF ŠĀNKARA’S HERITAGE

1Manasaivedamāptavyaiṁ neha nānāsti kīncana |
mṛtyoh sa mṛtyum gacchati ya iha nāneva paśyati ||

(Kaṭhopaniṣad, II. 4. 11.)

Tāṁ ha pitovāca śvetako yannu somya idaṁ mahāmanā anūcānāmāṁ stadbhō syuta tamādesama-prākṣyaḥ || Yenaśrutaṁ svatam bhavati amaṁvat matamavijñātaṁ vijnātaṁ kathāṁ nu bhagavaṁ sa ādeo bhavatiṁ || yathā somyaikena mṛtpindena sarvaṁ mṛṇmayaṁ vijjñātaṁ syādvacārāmbhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛtiketyeva satyam || Yathā somya lohamanīṁ sarvaṁ lohamayaṁ vijjñātaṁ syādvacārāmbhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ lohamityeva satyam || yathā somyaikena nakhanikṛntanena sarvaṁ kṛṣṇāyasaṁ vijjñātaṁ syādvacārāmbhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ kṛṣṇāyasyasmitva satyamevaṁ somya sa ādeo bhavatiṁ || navai nānaṁ bhagavantaṁ etadaṃvedisūryaddhyetadāvediṣyāṁ kathāṁ me nāvakṣyāntita bhagavamstveva tadbravaitviti tathā somyeta hovāca ||

(Chāndogopaniṣad, VI, I. 2-7).

Idaṁbrahma idam kṣatram ime lokāḥ ime devāḥ imāṁ bhūtāṁ idaṁ sarvaṁ yadayamātmā |

(Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, II. 4. 6-9).

Sā hovāca maitreyaśastraiva mā bhagavaṁ amūmuhat na pṛety sanjñāstiti sa hovāca yājñavalkyo na vā are 'haṁ mohāṁ bravimī || Yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taiditara itaraṁ jighrati taiditara itaraṁ paśyati taiditara itaraṁ śṛṇoti taiditara itaraṁ abhivadati taiditara itaraṁ manute taiditara itaraṁ vijnātī yatra vā asya sarvaṁātmāvabhūt tatkena kaṁ jighret tatkena kaṁ paśyet tatkena kaṁ śṛṇuyāt tatkena kaṁ abhivadet tatkena
kaṁ manvita tatkena kaṁ vijānīyāt yenedam sarvain vijānāti tam kena vijānīyāt | vijñātāramare kena vijānīyāditi ||

(Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, II. 4. 13, 14).

Yatra vā anyadiva syāt tatra anyo anyatpaśyet jihṛet rasayet vadet śṛṇuyāt manvita śṛṣṣet vijānīyat |


Athātādesaḥ neti neti | “na” hi etasmāditi “na” iti anyatparamasti (Ibid, 3. 6).

Tejomayōtejomayaḥ kāmamayōkāmamayaḥ, krodhamayōkrodhamayaḥ, dharmamayōdharmanmayaḥ, sarvamaya tadyadetat idam-mayōdomayaḥ || (Ibid, IV, 4.5).

Among' other alternative standpoints which are somehow believed to be more satisfying than the Advaita, are the Dvaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaīta, and their central doctrine is more than well-confirmed by the Upaniṣads. The choice between the Advaitic and the non-Advaitic doctrines reminds one of the battle between the homo-ousians (who held the persons of the Trinity to be of the same substance), and the homoi-ousians (who held that Father and Son in the Godhead were of like substance). Cf. “The furious contests which the difference of a single dip-thong excited between the Homoousians and Homoiousians” Decline and Fall (Bury’s Edition) Vol. I, p. 23.


For the Viṣiṣṭādvaita standpoint refer to: Śvetāsvatra, I, 9., I, 12., Bṛhadāraṇyaka, III, 7., Taittiriya, II, 6., Bṛhadāraṇyaka, II, 5.15., II. I. 20., II. 3. 1-6; Mundaka, III. 1.3 and III. 2.6.

As in the following statements which look like being Sau-gata in essence: Chāndogya VI, 2. I, Kaṭha, I. 1.20, & I, 26, 28; Bṛhadāraṇyaka IV, 4.22; Aitareya, III. 3; and Kaṭha, II. 5.7.

An admirable example of this stand in this context is Prof. A. C. Mukerji’s paper, “Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara” in the University of Allahabad Studies, 1938. Cf. “In spite of these similarities between the “advaita” and the nihilistic systems, there are very important points of divergence, which would make
it inconceivable that Saṅkara’s teachings were nothing more than what was taught by Nāgārjuna.”

5 The Chāndogya, the Brhadāraṇyaka, the Taittirīya, the Aitareya, the Śvetāṣvatara, the Kenā, the Kaṭha, the Īśa, the Praśna, the Munḍaka and the Māndūkya. It is believed that he also wrote commentaries on the Atharvaśikhā, Atharvāśiras and Nṛsimhatāpanīya Upaniṣads. Nor can it be ignored that he also wrote a commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, or the Gītōpaniṣad. The camouflaging of his real identity becomes complete with his masterly commentary on the Brahmasūtras, which present the Upaniṣadic doctrine in a synthetic unity, as it were.

6 Saṅkara’s Commentary on the Brahmasūtras, Adhyāya II, Pada II, sutras 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32.

From his Commentary on sūtra, 31, Adhyāya II, Pāda II, the following statement is worthy of note:

“Evametau dvāvapī vaināśikapakṣau nirākṛtau bāhyārthavādipakṣo vijñānavādipakṣasca | śūnyavādipakṣastu sarvapramāṇavipratisiddha iti tannirākaharanāya nādaraḥ kryate |

7 It is now authentically believed that in his youth Saṅkara went to a Vedic School kept by Govinda, the pupil of Gauḍapāda. In most of his works Saṅkara mentions himself as the pupil of Govinda who evidently initiated him into the first principles of the Advaitic Philosophy.

8 That Gauḍapāda is the guru’s guru (teacher’s teacher) of Saṅkara is substantiated by the writings of Saṅkara, as also by those of some of his very prominent disciples: See Saṅkara’s Bhāṣya on the Āgamaśāstra:

“Yastaṅ puṇyābhipuṇyāṃ paramagurumamum pādapātair natōsmī”; also, Brahmasūtra Saṅkarabhāṣya, II, I, 9, and I, 4, 14. Besides, Saṅkara in the Brahmasūtragbhāṣya refers to the Kārikā of the Āgamaśāstra, e.g., “anādi māyayā” is quoted in II, 1, 9 and “myloha visphulinga” in II, IV, 14.

Sureśvarācārya in his Naṅkarmyasiddhi, 4/44, attests the truth concerning Saṅkara’s lineage.

9 In his Commentary on the Āgamaśāstra, Saṅkara speaks of the Turiya as sarvavikalpāspada (Māndūkya Upaniṣad, Saṅkara’s introduction to the 7th Mantra).
10 Nāntahprajñāṁ na bahispriyāṁ nobhaya家住praṇāṁ
na prajñānānaghanānam na praṇāṁ nāpraṇāṁ | adṛṣṭamavyava-
hāryamagrāhyamalakṣaṇamacintyamavyapadeśyamekātmpraty-
yasāraṁ praṇāpoṣpaśaṁ saṁtaṁ śivamadvaitāṁ caturthām
manyate sa ātmā sa vijñeyah (Mantra 7, Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad).

This mantra has been explained in Kārikās 10 to 14 of the
Āgama-prakaraṇa, (Āgamaśāstra).

11 Yathā svapna dvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manah |
Tathā jāgrad dvayābhāsaṁ spandate māyayā manah ||
Advayaṁ ca dvayābhāsaṁ manah svapne na saṁśayah |
Advayaṁ ca dvayā-
bhāsaṁ tathā jāgranna saṁśayah ||

(Āgamaśāstra, III, 29 & 30).

12 Na nirodho na cotpattern baddho na ca sādhakaḥ |
Na mumukṣurna vai mukta ityeśa paramārthatā ||

(Ibid, II, 32).

13 Mano ṛṣyamidaṁ dvaitaṁ yatkiṇcitsacarācaram |
Manaso hyamanibhāve dvaitaṁ naivopabalbhate ||

(Ibid, III, 31).

Nigṛhitasya manaso nirvikalpasya dhāmataḥ |
Pracāraḥ sa tu vijñeyah susuptenyō na tatsamaḥ ||

(Ibid, III, 34).


15 Rjuvakraḍikābhāsamlātaspaṇditaṁ yathā |
Grahāṇ-
agrāhakābhāsaṁ vijñānaspaṇditaṁ tathā ||

(Ibid, IV, 47).

16 Ibid, IV, 48, 49 & 50.

17 Vijnāne spaṇdamāne vai nābhāsā anyatobhuvah |
Na tato 'nyatra nispaṇdānaṁ vijñānaṁ viṣānti te ||
Na nirgatāste vijñānāddyavyatvābhāvayogataḥ |
Kāryakāraṇatābhāvād yato 'cintyāḥ sadaiva te ||

(Ibid, IV, 51 & 52).

Compare Gaṇḍapāda's view of Imagination with the view of
Imagination developed by E. D. Fawcett in his The
World as Imagination, Divine Imagining, "Imaginism" in

Fawcett gives to imagination the central role, making it not only the specifically philosophical faculty but also the ground of reality itself. It is his primary metaphysical principle. "The world is not will or presentation or reason but creative imagining."

As against Fawcett, Imagination in the philosophy of Gauḍa pāda is not the Principle of Reality but only the principle of its falsification.

Also compare these views with the opinions of the Neo-Thomist Frohschammer in his Die Phantasie als Grundprinzip des Weltprozesses.

18 Jñānenākāśakalpena dharmānyo gaganopamān |
    Jñeyābhinnena sambudhastāṃvande dvipadām varam ||
    (Āgamaśāstra, IV, 1).

19 Upalambhātatsamācārān māyāhasti yathocyate |
    Upalambhātatsamācārād asti vastu tathocyate ||
    (Ibid, IV. 44).

20 Swapnamāye yathā dṛṣṭe gandharvanagaranaḥ yathā |
    Tathā viśvamidām dṛṣṭaṁ vedānteśu vicaksanaiḥ ||
    (Ibid, IV, 31).

21 Cf. Agamasstra, IV. 1.

22 *Vidushekhara Bhattacharya*: The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, p. 100.

23 Ibid., p. 95.

24 Ibid., p. 96.

25 Ibid., p. 97.

26 Ibid., p. 97.

27 Ibid., p. 97.

28 Ibid., p. 97.

29 Ibid., p. 97.

30 Ibid., p. 97.

31 Ibid, p. 98, where we are told that the best interpretation of Asparsayoga is to be found in Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi. *The following quotation as given by Prof. Bhattacharya is very rele-
vant in this context: "Katham nirodham samāpadyamānasya
naivam bhavati aham nirodham samāpadye vā vyuttiṣṭhe vā.
Samāpattikāle nivabhīṣasāṃskāreta cittanirodhāt. Katham niro-
dhād vyutthitas trīn sparsān spṛṣṭi aṇiṇīyam akiścanyam āni-
mittam, yad bhūyasā tasyāḥ samāpatter vyuttiṣṭamānas trivi-
dhenālambanena vyuttiṣṭhate bhavālambanena viṣayālambanena
nirodhaṅlambanena ca. tais ca vyuttiṣṭhamāno yathākramam eva
trīn sparsān spṛṣṭi, tatra bhavālambena vyuttiṣṭhamānasya na
bhavati cetasa iniṣṭavam asmity ayam asmīti bhavisyāmīti vis-
tarāḥ. ata aṇiṇīyam sparsām spṛṣṭity ucye vāśayālambanena
vyuttiṣṭhamānasya na rāgaviścanaṃ bhavati na dveṣaviścanaṃ
bhavati na mohaviścanaṃ. tasmādākiścanyam sparsam spṛṣṭity
ucye, nirodhaṅlambanena vyuttiṣṭhamānaḥ sarvanimittanāṃ
amanasikārād ānimittam dhātum avalambate. tasmād ānimittam
sparsam spṛṣṭity ucye."

34 Ibid, p. 100.
36 Ibid, p. 100.

On the notion of Anupūrvavihāra, Prof. V. Bhattacharya's
article 'The Gauḍapāda Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad' in
The Proceedings of the Oriental Conference, 1922, may be pro-
fitably consulted.

37 The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda : V. Bhattacharya, p. 95.
38 Ibid, p. 96.
39 Taśtrītiśya, 3, 1.
40 Brahmāśutra Śaṅkarabhāṣya, I. 2.
41 Iṣa, 12:
42 Gauḍapāda-Kārikā=GK, III. 25, as commented upon by
Śaṅkara.

43 Brahdāraṇyaka, III, ix, 28.
44 Ibid, II. 3. 6.
45 GK. IV. 4.
46 GK. IV. 4.
47 Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍa-
apāda, p. 102.
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48 Ibid, p. 103, where he quotes these couplets from Nāg-ārjuna’s Madhyamakavṛtti, ed. Louis de La Vallée Boussin, BB, IV, p. 11.


50 GK. IV. 22.

51 Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX. 106.

52 Taittiriya Upaniṣad, IX. 1.

53 GK, III. 23.

The śrutis under the indictment are the following:

(a) sa deve somyedamagra āsīt, Ch. U, VI, 2.1-4.

(b) asadvā idamagra āsīt, tato vai sadañāya. TU, II, 7.

54 GK. IV. 3 & 4.

55 GK. IV. 47.

56 GK. IV. 48.

57 GK. II. 32.

58 The parallelisms given hereunder are citations from La Vallée Boussin’s Buddhist Notes on Vedanta and Buddhism, in The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, for 1910, pp. 136-139.

59 For most of the words contained in this list I am indebted to Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya’s “Index of Words in the Kārikās used in Particular senses originally or mainly in Buddhist Works” in the The Āgamaśātra of Gauḍapāda.

60 “Pūjyābhipe jyam paramagurumamum pāda pātair nato’ smi: These words of the Vandanā of the Bhāsyakāra of the Āgamaśātra of Gauḍapāda are addressed to Gauḍapāda, the guru of Govinda, who was Śaṅkara’s guru. (Māndūkya Upaniṣad, Gita Press, Gorakhpur, p. 276).


62 See R. D. Ranade’s “Yājnāvalkya and the Philosophy of Fictions” in Philosophical and Other Essays.

63 “There are thus two schools of Vijnanavadin, (1) the Vedāntists headed by Gauḍapāda and (2) Buddhist with Maitreya at the head. In both the schools the external world is the creation or transformation of the mind. But while in the first the cause for that transformation is māyā (III. 29; IV. 61)
it is vāsanā (LA. X. 150) in the second, both of them being without beginning (anādi). This māyā and vāsanā—may, however, be regarded as the same thing.” Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya: The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, p. cxxxii-iii.

64 A detailed analysis of the Advaitic and the Mādhyamika critique of the Pramāṇas has been given in Chapter V, viz., “The Criteriologial Reaction against Realism.”

65 C. Sharma: A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, pp. 231-32. Herein we come across one of the most daring attempts to identify the positions of Vijñānavāda, Śūnyavāda and Advaitavāda, in respect of their explanation of Error. One has the feeling that Prof. Sharma’s views have more of intrepidity in them than a persuasive plausibility.

66 Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya: The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, p. cxxxii.


69 Trīṃṣikā, 29 & 30, quoted in the Indian Historical Quarterly, 1934, by Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, p. 9.

70 GK. III, 23.

CHAPTER II

THE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UPANIŚADS

1 Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI. 2.1.


3 Kaṭhopaniṣad, I. 1.20.

4 Ibid., I. 1.26, 28.

5 Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, IV. 4.22.

6 Aitareyopaniṣad, III. 3.

CHAPTER III

THE LEGACY OF GAUḌAPĀḍA

1 Śaṅkarabhāṣya on B.S. II, 1.9: GK. I. 16: Anādīmāyā supto yādā jīvaḥ prabudhyate | Ajam anidram asvāpnam advaitam budhyate tadā || & on I–4.15: GK. III 15:
Mrlohavisphuliṅgādaiḥ srīstīr yā coditānyathā | Upāyaḥ
so'vatārāya nāsti bhedah kathaṅcana ||

2 Śāṅkarabhāṣya on B.S. II. 1.9.

3 An excellent survey of the doctrinal differences among the followers of Śaṅkara is to be found in Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya’s “Post-Śaṅkara Advaita” in The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III, pp. 255-80.


5 We have already quoted at length some considerable statements from the Gaudapāda-Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad for indicating the alleged similarity.

6 T. R. V. Murti: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 319-20 and pp. 317-18. (Here we get a rather brief indication of the doctrinal antagonism of the Vijñānavāda to the Mādhyaṃmika system of thought. For a criticism of Śūnyavāda by the Vijñānavādin one need consult only Sthiramati’s Madhyānta-Vibhāga Sūtra Bhāṣya Tīkā, Ed. by Prof. V. Bhattacharya and G. Tucci (Luzac & Co.), p. 9, pp. 12-13 & p. 40, as also the Trimśikā of Vasubandhu, and for a criticism of the Vijñānavāda by the Mādhyaṃmika one is asked to consult Mādhyaṃmika Kārikā Vṛtti (Prasannapadā) by Candrakīrti (Bib. Budd. IV), pp. 61, pp. 274-5, Madhyamaka Avatāra of Candrakīrti, VI, 45 ff. (pp. 40-64), and Sāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (Bib. Ind.), pp. 389 ff, 408 ff, 525 ff.

7 Yamakami Sogen in Systems of Buddhistic Thought, pp. 213-214, refers to the Yogācāras as ‘Practitioners of Yoga’

8 Vidhushekharā Bhattacharya: Āgamaśāstra, p. 95.

9 Ibid., p. 96.

10 “Prasanga is not to be understood as an apagogic proof in which we prove an assertion indirectly by disproving the opposite. Prasanga is disproof simply, without the least intention to prove any thesis.” (T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 131).
Also refer to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (pp. 626 ff) in this connexion. (E. T., N. K. Smith).

11 Gauḍapāda: Āgamaśāstra, III. 41.

12 Ibid., III. 42.

13 Ibid., III. 44.

14 Ibid., III. 45.

15 Ibid., III. 44.

16 Ibid., III. 44.

17 Ibid., III. 46.

18 A very instructive account of the Advaitic position is to be found in an acute analysis of the knowledge-reality situation in "The Objective Attitude and Idealism Proper" contributed by Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharya to The K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume (Amalner).

19 See K. C. Bhattacharyya: "The Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms" (Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II., pp. 141 ff.).

20 Gauḍapāda: Āgamaśāstra, IV. 72. Also see Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa, III. 67, 6-8.

21 For how a symbol can be made to degenerate into misleading factuality, see Karl Jaspers' Truth and Symbol.

22 Vaiśārdyā means 'illumination' in this context. This word has been used by Gauḍapāda himself in the Āgamaśāstra, IV. 94.

23 For the term 'Cypher' I am much indebted to Karl Jaspers' Truth and Symbol.

24 "Only in the Mādhyamika is the dialectic not a means but an end." (T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 213).

25 Gauḍapāda: Āgamaśāstra, III. 11, referring to Taittirīya, II. 3, looks like an echoing of Bhādhāranyaka Upaniṣad, IV. 3.10. II. 5 refers to the same Upaniṣad, IV. 3.14, and IV. 3.9. Further, it can be said that in a large sense the Āgamaśāstra transcribes in some form the major ideas and utterances in the Bhādhārānyaka Upaniṣad, e.g. Book I of the Āgamaśāstra may be described as a Summary of the Bhādhārānyaka Upaniṣad, IV, 2-3, or the division of the One (i.e., Purusa) into Viśva, Taijasa
and Prājña is an adaptation from The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV. 2-3.

26 Āgamaśāstra, III. 23.
27 Ibid., III. 12.
28 Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II. 5.1.
29 For further insight into the hypothesis concerning the reading of the cypher-script, Karl Jaspers’ Truth and Symbol may be consulted.

CHAPTER IV
A RE-EXAMINATION OF ŚAṅKARA’S HERITAGE

1 Yamakami Sogen in his Systems of Buddhistic Thought, p. 7, makes the following statement:

“All is impermanence, there is no Ego, and Nirvāṇa is the only calm.” Such is the three-fold corner-stone upon which rests the entire fabric of Buddhism, be it Hinayānism or Buddhism of the lesser Vehicle or be it Mahāyānism or Buddhism, that of the Greater. . . . . . . We shall not therefore err, if we were to lay down that the above three principles are the fundamental tenets which distinguish Buddhism from all other religious systems in the history of the world.”

2 Ibid., p. 7 ff.
3 Śaṅkara, Bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras, I, 3, 18 & I, 3, 28.
4 Ibid., I 4, 22; I, 1, 11; II, 2, 28; II, 1, 9; I, 2, 18 & II, 3, 17.
5 Ibid., III, 4, 52.
6 Between the Vedāntic Mukti and the Buddhist Nirvāṇa, considered precisely in its Mahāyāna aspect, the difference is of a radical nature. The Buddhist Nirvāṇa is a mere ‘that’ to which the contradiction-riddled world of thought points. It is a ‘that’ in which the ‘this’ is quenched and annihilated. Because of the denial of the Ātman, the Buddhist has no saving situation left for him. The Nirvāṇa of the Buddhist is contentless or even meaningless. It is indefinable in terms of any essence whatsoever. Just as the Buddhist Dialectic remains in purport through and through negative, so does remain the Buddhist
conception of Nirvāṇa. 'Resurrection' in the present context does not mean the perpetuation of subjectivity in its finitude. It means the transformation of subjectivity from its phenomenal ineffectuality to its sublimation in Bliss, Truth and Reality. By saying that the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa is the antithesis of the Advaitic Mokṣa, I do not point to a relation of irreconcilable antagonism between them. I only point to the incomplete formulation of the doctrine of redemption—an incompleteness which is grounded in complete negativity and a total proclivity to envisaging Nirvāṇa as unassuaged indeterminacy.

7 Loc cit., I, 1,4; I, 1,19; I, 1,24; II, 1,1; II, 1, 4, II, 1,12; II, 1,14; II, 3,40; III, 1,1; III, 2,21; III, 3,32; IV, 1,14; IV, 2,9 and IV, 3,14.

8 The Buddhist Absolutism especially of the Mādhyaṃkikas is negative in the sense that the Tattva to which the failings of phenomenality point, is itself put on a par with failing phenomenality, if it is understood as something actually there. Being indeterminable in the ratio, the Mādhyaṃkika consigns it to the realm of the unspeakable, and thus divests it of all contentuality or whatness. The triumph of the Advaitic Absolutism consists in the affirmative formulation of the Absolute, through an identification of it with Self, as comprehended in a transfigured perspective, namely a mode of consciousness, which is other than a ratiocinative awareness—a mode free from bhedavāsanā. The Advaitic Absolutism is a conquest of otherness, by a transfiguration of the content of experience through an over-all change in the mode of consciousness. The Advaitic Brahman is not a mere that, a criterion, bodily outside the mass of what it judges as fragmentary and self-contradictory. It is a criterion, made one with the highest actuality of our being. The Advaitic Mukti, is neither unattainable by a spiritual aspirant, nor is it self-cancelling. Attainability of Brahmānhood, implying no otherness, is not self-effacing. It is only self-elevating or self-transforming. It is not at all the attainment of a deferred goal. It is only the removal of the delusion of otherness.

9 Sarvasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha, III, 2-4 & Vasubandhu: Vīṁśatikā, Kārikā I, wherein we are told that the external ob-
ject is illusory like the hair seen floating in the air or like
the perception of the two moons.

The same view is reiterated in Vīmaśatikā, Kārikās 6-7.


11 An extended discussion concerning the nature and the
status of negation occurs in this very chapter.

12 Sāṅkarabhaṣya on the Brahmasūtra: III, 2, 22, wherein
Brahman had been described as sarvakalpanāmūlātvāt or in Sāṅ-
kara’s commentary on the Māndūkya Upaniṣad with Gauḍā-
ḍādiya Kārikā, I, 9, as sarvavikalpaśpadatvātturiyasya.

13 Sāṅkarabhaṣya on the Brahmasūtra, II, 2, 28-32.

14 An outstanding example of this view is to be found in
Dr. Chandradhar Sharma’s A Critical survey of Indian Philo-

sophy, pp. 322-323. The following statement is worth-noting:

“The Tathāgatagarbha or the Ālayavijñāna of the Laṅkā-
vatāra, the Viṣuddhātman or the Mahātman or the Paramātman
or the Dharmadhātu of Asaṅga, the Vijñāptimātra or the
Dharmakāya of Vāsudānanda, and the Ātman or the Brahman of
the Vedānta are essentially the same pure and permanent self-
luminous Consciousness” (p. 322).

15 Ibid., p. 323, “The criticism of the so-called ‘Vijñānavāda’
by Saṅkara is really the criticism of the ‘Svatantra Vijñānavāda’
school.”

16 Ibid., p. 322.

17 The following statement equating Vijñānavāda with
Saṅkara Vedānta may be noted:

“The Vijñāptimātra of Vāsudānanda corresponds to the
Ātman or the Brahman of Vedānta, his Ālayavijñāna to the
Vedāntic Ishvara, his kliṣṭa-manovijñāna to the Vedāntic jīva,
his viṣayavijñāpati to the Vedāntic jagat and his pariṇāma to the
Vedāntic vivarta.” (Ibid., p. 322).

Dr. Chandradhar Sharma contradicts himself in the follow-
ing statement that he makes in favour of his better reason:

“When the Laṅkāvatāra tries to distinguish its Tathā-
gatagarbha or Ālayavijñāna from the non-Buddhistic Ātman,
the essential difference which it points out is that while the
former transcends all categories of intellect (nirvikalpa) and is
directly realized through Spiritual Experience (nirabhāsaprajñā-
gochara), the latter clings to the category of affirmation. But
this distinction is superficial.” (Ibid., p. 322, Italics mine).

Concerning the differentiation contemplated by the Laṅkā-
vatāra the statement made by Dr. Sharma has an ad verbatim
reference to Laṅkāvatāra, pp. 77-79, as he himself admits. Even
then an equation of the Vedāntic Atman with the Vijñāptimātra of Vasubandhu has a foundation nowhere except in
the very liberal instinct which Dr. Sharma has for observing
similarities between distincts to the extent of forgetting their
dissimilarities.

Dr. Chandradhar Sharma’s statement in this connexion
is as follows:

“The only fundamental and most vital difference between
this school and Vijñānavāda is that this school degrades the
permanent Consciousness of Vijñānavāda to momentary vijñānas.
Reality, according to it, is a momentary vijñāna only. Under
the name of Vijñānavāda, Śaṅkara really criticizes this school
and we have noticed that Śaṅkara’s criticism of it is perfectly
valid” (Ibid., pp. 323-324, Roman mine).

This statement of Dr. Sharma indicates that Śaṅkara’s
criticism of Svatantra Vijñānavāda is a criticism of Pluralistic
Mentalism. The degradation of permanent Consciousness to
momentary vijñānas’ looks like attributing Pluralistic Mentalism
to the Svatantra School. The sentence cited above: “Reality
according to it, is a momentary vijñāna only”, coming as it does
just after the one attributing Mentalistic Pluralism to this school,
gives the impression that Dr. Sharma has either an extra-ordinary
sense for finding several metaphysical positions in the doctrine
of this school, or that he has been so completely bewildered
that he considers it safe to blow hot and cold in the same breath
by pointing to ‘momentary vijñānas’ and ‘a momentary vijñāna’
simultaneously. For all one gathers from Śaṅkara’s critique
of the Vijñānavāda, it is not the Pluralistic or Monistic Mental-
ism that Śaṅkara is criticizing. What he is actually criticizing
is a specific attitude to objectivity.
REFERENCES AND NOTES

19 Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi, Vimśatikā, Kārikā, 3: deśādi-niyamaḥ siddhaḥ svapnavat pretavat punah | Santānāniyamaḥ sarvaiḥ pūyanadīyādīdarśane ||, and its following exposition clearly point to an explanation of objectivity on the analogy of dream-experience:

“Svaṁne vināpyarthena kvacideva deśe kincid bhramara-rāmastrīpuruṣādikāṁ dṛṣṭye, na sarvatra, tatraiva ca deśe kadācid dṛṣṭye, na sarvakālamiti siddhaḥ vināpyarthena deśakāla-niyamaḥ.”

20 Ibid., Kārikā 1.
21 Ibid., Kārikā 1.
22 Ibid., Vṛtti on Kārikā 10.
23 “It is beyond our power to form the least conception a priori of the possibility of dynamical connection among phenomena; and the category of the pure understanding will not enable us to excogitate any such connection, but merely helps us to understand it, when we meet it in experience. For this reason we cannot, in accordance with the categories imagine or invent any object or any property of an object not given, or that may not be given in experience, and employ it in a hypothesis; otherwise we should be basing our chain of reasoning upon mere chimerical fancies, and not upon conceptions of things. Thus, we have no right to assume the existence of new powers not existing in nature—for example, an understanding with a nonsensuous intuition, a force of attraction without contact, or some new kind of substances occupying space, and yet without the property of impenetrability, and consequently we cannot assume that there is any other kind of community among substances than that observable in experience, any kind of presence, than that in space, or any kind of duration than that in time. In one word, the conditions of possible experience are for reason the only conditions of the possibility of things; reason cannot venture to form, independently of these conditions, any conceptions of things, because such conceptions, although not self-contradictory, are without object and without application.” Critique of Pure Reason (E. T. Meiklejohn), p. 439.
24 The Absolute of Fichte combines in itself the functions of
the Kantian Unity of Apperception and the Kantian Thing-in-itself. The Fichtean Absolute is nothing if not Intellectual Intuition par excellence—the Self-conscious Unity of Intelligence and its other. It is the ground of objectivity in an ontological sense.

"Imagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason, to invent suppositions; but, these must be based on something that is perfectly certain—and that is the possibility of the object." (Loc cit. p. 438).

"If we leave this ground of experience, they become mere fictions of thought, the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable; and they cannot consequently be employed, as hypotheses, in the explanation of real phenomena." (Ibid., p. 439).

Regarding the Thing-in-itself, Kant says:

"Appearances are themselves nothing but sensuous representations which must not be taken as capable of existing in themselves (an sich) with exactly the same character (in ebenderselben Art) outside our power of representation." (Critique of Pure Reason, A 104).

"They have their object, but an object which can never be intuited by us, and which may therefore be named the non-empirical, i.e., transcendental object—x" (Ibid., A 109).

27 See Aliotta: The Idealistic Reaction Against Science, pp. 78-81.

28 Aliotta: The Idealistic Reaction Against Science, pp. 80-81.

29 Vṛtti on Kārikā 5, Vasubandhu: Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi:


Kathāṁ tāvat tiraścāṁ svargaṁ sambhavaḥ? Evaṁ naraṁśu-tiryakpravīśeṣaṇāṁ narakaṁpāḷādināṁ sambhavaḥ syāt. Ye hi tiryācaḥ svargaṁ sambhavanti, te tadbhājanaloka-sukhasamvart-taniyena karaṇāṁ tatra sambhūtāstajjāṁ sukham pratyanu-
References and Notes

bhavanti. Na caivaṁ narakapālādayo nārakaṁ duḥkkhāṁ pratyunabhavanti. Tasmānna tiraścāṁ sambhavo yukto nāpi pretānām.

30 citaṁ mano vijñānaṁ vijñāptisceti paryāyāḥ (Ibid., Vṛtti Kārikā 2).
31 Ibid., Vṛtti on Kārikā 2.
32 Sāṇkarabhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra:
I, 1,2; I, 3,28; II, 1,6; II, 1,14; II, 2,11; II, 2,44; II, 3,7 and II, 3,10.
33 Ibid., II, 3, 6.
34 Ibid., II, 1, 4.
35 We may here distinguish with advantage between two kinds of judgment: the sansargātmaka (the empirical) and the akhaṇḍārthaka (which is only apparently a judgment, bearing the same linguistic form, but which actually has not to be understood in its literal aspect). We shall have occasions to make a considerable use of this distinction. But in the present context we are not referring to the judgment of the latter type, viz., the akhaṇḍārthaka.

36 "To be real is not necessarily to appear. We can pass from the world to Brahman, but cannot pass back to the world. Formally expressed: the real is the implicate and not implicatory, of appearance; the appearance is implicatory of the real and not its implicate."

(T. R. V. Murty: Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume, pp. 139-40).

37 Of a view of this nature we find a bold and very outstanding illustration in Dr. Chandradhar Sharma's A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, which largely incorporates the contents of his unpublished D. Litt. thesis accepted by the Allahabad University: The Reign of Dialectic in Philosophy, Indian and Western (1951).

38 V. Bhattacharya: The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, pp. cxxxii-cxxxiii.

The overwhelming similarity in the arguments of the Advaitic dialecticians and the Mādhyamika dialecticians forms the subject-matter of a separate chapter of this monograph, viz., Chapter V, entitled “The Criteriological Reaction Against Realism.”

All things which can be known by the intellect have no reality of their own. These are, therefore, said to be indescribable and unreal. Knowledge itself is not such.

Astināsti anubhaya iti catuṣkoṭivinirmuktam tu kathyate, Mādhava, Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha. Sarvasiddhāntasāṅgraha, Chapter IV, 7,9, presents the position in question, thus: What is non-existent cannot be produced by any cause, such as a square circle; if origination is admitted to be desirable in the case of what is existent, then it produces only that which has already been produced. One and the same thing cannot be both existent and non-existent. Nor can we say that one and the same thing is distinct from both existence and non-existence.”

Vigrahavyāvartanā, Kārikās 63 and 69 and their explanations, unmistakably point to the conclusion that the Mādhyamika critique of all positions is itself no position.

Ibid., Kārikā, 69.


Kant also is thoroughly averse to taking existence a predicate. (Critique of Pure Reason, A 598, B 626 to A 602, B 630).

T. R. V. Murti: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, wherein the author has made a very clear-cut distinction among the Mādhyamika, the Vijñānavāda and the Advaitic Absolutes. cf. ‘The Advaita Vedānta is that consistent discipline by which we realise the Thing-in-itself, the Pure Object (Sanmātra) immediately.’ (Ibid., p. 327).

Critique of Pure Reason, A 598, B 626.

Chāndogya, VI. 2.1-4: ‘Sadeva Somyedamagra āsideka- mevdviṇyāṁ.’
48 Adjectively it is a category, but substantively it is not a category.

49 By objectivity-in-itself, I understand self-evident contextuality, without such a contextuality ever standing in the need of being known. It is knowledge and being in one, and is yet not of the nature of knowledge, as known by some one. The notion of the Absolute in this aspect has been developed by Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya in his "The Absolute and its Alternative Forms", p. 141, Studies in Philosophy, Second Volume.

50 Cf. Karl Jaspers’ Truth and Symbol, ‘If we call cyphers a form of communication then the listening to the language of the cypher is itself a metaphor for something merely analogous but in itself quite different compared with our mode of listening to Being in the cyphers. The signification of the cyphers is not such that something present signifies something absent, a here signifies a beyond, but it lies simply in a presentness which is no longer translatable into knowledge of something........ Signification is itself only a metaphor for being-a-cypher. Language is a metaphor only when it is articulated by a cypher-status”. (p. 41-42).

51 “The subject-object dichotomy is overcome only in an encounter with the world as cypher. The world of phenomena becomes the cypher—script of Being. The world-as-cypher is the mediation between the Being that I am (my Existenz) and the absolute Objectivity of the Being that is Being or Other for me (Transcendence)”. (Ibid, p. 12).

52 This question has been considered at length in the chapter entitled The Criteriological Reaction Against Realism.

53 See Vasubandhu: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.

54 We have a separate chapter on the “The Criteriological Reaction Against Realism”, wherein we have considered the nature and implication of the criticism of the criticism of the Pramāṇas in the two traditions.

55 In this context Prof. T. R. V. Murti’s “The Two Definitions of Brahman” in the K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume (Amalner) will be found to be instructive and full of ideas, in
the light of which, the entire Vedântic epistemology can be reconstructed.

56 The intimations of this ideal express themselves in the Taṭastha-lakṣana of Brahmaṇa (accidental or modal definition).

57 Regarding the symbolic interpretation of the śrutis, more especially the Mahâvâkyas, like Tattvamasi, see Sureśvara’s Nâîśkarmyasiddhi, Chapter III.

58 A very adequate and inspiring account of Error in the Advaitic and the Buddhist Absolutist traditions has been given by Prof. T. R. V. Murti in his The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 322-325.


62 The Formal Logician makes a radical distinction among three philosophical disciplines: Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics, and believes that Judgment qua Judgment (better Proposition) can be considered in isolation from Reality (which is a metaphysical concept), or its Knowledge (which is epistemological in essence). A negative judgment in its purely logical aspect is entirely a formal entity, which is not necessarily connected with Reality or with the knowledge of Reality. In the judgment ‘A is not B’ it is immaterial whether ‘A’ is ‘sky’ and ‘B’ any colour other than ‘blue’. The Formal Logician contrives to arrive at a solution of the Paradox of the Negative Judgment by evading the problem, and this evasion is effected by a device, whose prima facie validity can well be questioned, viz., the device of segregating Logic from Epistemology and Metaphysics.

63 One of the ways in which the Realist circumvents the impasse relating to the Negative Judgement is to allow the form of the Negative Judgment to remain unchanged, and to conceive of Reality in another key. The subject in Reality to which the negative judgment refers is either a negative fact or a negative essence. As for example, the statement, ‘Devadatta is not in the room’ refers to a negative fact, viz., ‘the absence of
Devadatta from the room' or the statement '2 + 2 is not 7' refers to the inequality of '2 + 2' with '7'. The only difference between a negative fact and a negative essence consists in this that the opposite of a negative fact is capable of being experienced, whereas the opposite of a negative essence is only an entity in the realm of possibilities.

64 The Philosophical Review, Vol XLII, p. 422.

This view of Negation is exemplified in Aristotle and Kant, as also in Bradley, W. E. Johnson and Raphael Demos:

"Again 'being' and 'is' mean that a statement is true, 'not being' that it is not true, but false,—and this alike in the case of affirmation and negation; e.g., 'Socrates is musical' means that this is true,........but the 'diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side' means that 'it is false to say that it is'"


"As far as logical form is concerned, we can make negative any proposition we like; but in respect to the content of our knowledge in general........the task peculiar to the negative judgments is that of rejecting error". (Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. K. Smith, A 709 B 787).

Also see Bradley: Principles of Logic, Second Edition, I, 115; W. E. Johnson, Logic, I, p. 50; and Raphael Demos. 'A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition', Mind XXVI, p. 190.

65 W. E. Johnson: Logic I, p. 53.


67 Saṅkarācārya, Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya, Upodgāṭa.

68 Prof. T. R. V. Murti's discussions, regarding the Prajñā-pāramitā Tradition in Philosophy in his The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, inspired me to distinguish it from the Vedāntic Madhuvidyā, which is the theme of the Brāhmaṇa Section of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II.5, and has also been spoken of by Gauḍapāda in the following Karika:

dvayor dvayor madhujñāne paraṁ brahma prakāśītam |
prthivyāṁ udare caiva yathākāśaḥ prakāśitaḥ || (III, 12).
"The Mādhyamika method is to deconceptualise the mind and to disburden it of all notions, empirical as well as a priori. The dialectic is not an avenue for the acquisition of information, but a catharsis; it is primarily a path of purification of the intellect. . . . . . . The method is negative. Universality and certitude are reached not by the summation of particular points of view, but by rigidly excluding them; for, a view is always particular. . . . . . . The dialectic is rejection of all views including the nihilistic", (T. R. V. Murti: *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 212).


Ibid., p. 209.

The Mādhyamika Conception of Philosophy as Prajñāpāramitā reminds one of the definition of Knowledge in Kant's Transcendental Epistemology.

"Whether philosophy is knowledge or embodies literal thinking may be open to dispute. But in any case it presents beliefs that are speakable or systematically communicable and is like science an expression of the theoretic consciousness. . . . . . . It is believed content that is spoken and it is the understanding of what can be spoken that constitutes the theoretic consciousness. . . . . . . Such understanding may not be knowledge, but it involves belief in something as known or to be known". (K. C. Bhattacharyya, "The Concept of Philosophy" in Contemporary Indian Philosophy, pp. 106-7).

See Kalidas Bhattacharyya, "The Objective Attitude and Idealism Proper" in K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume, pp. 9-24. Herein one finds one of the most illuminating reconstructions of Advaitism in its methodological aspect.


K. C. Bhattacharyya: "The Concept of Philosophy" in Contemporary Indian Philosophy, pp. 113 and 120.

"Without such a symbolism, the subject would be enjoyed but not enjoyingly understood". (Ibid., p. 120).

Yato vāco nivartantē apāpya manasā saha (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II. 4).
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An excellent account of pre-Gaudapāda-Śaṅkara Monism is given by MM. Pt. Gopinatha Kaviraj in the Hindi Bhūmikā, which has written in Brahmāsūtra Śaṅkarabhāṣya-Ratnaprabhā, translated by Yatipravara Śri Bhole Babā (Acyutagranthamāla-Karyālaya, Kāshi), pp. 8-19. Most notable among the ācāryas, who, can somehow be made to stand among the forerunners of the monistic point of view, are Bhaṭṭapraṇica, Brahmaḍatta, and Sundaraśānta.

Prof. M. Hiriyanna has given an illuminating account of Bhāṭṭapraṇica in Indian Philosophical Studies I, pp. 79-94.

The pre-Gaudapāda-Śaṅkara Monism cannot be exactly described as advaitic, but we have used the term advaita here in a rather wide sense. We may say, we have given here what may be called a "persuasive definition" of the term. In this context, therefore, advaitism, has been understood as that doctrine, which in so many manners stresses the identity of 'the world and the individual' with the Brahman. The present writer, therefore, does not feel hesitant in taking even some of the otherwise labelled philosophies (e.g., bhedābheda) as implicatory of a very important aspect of the officially labelled Advaitism.

"Ekāḥ Brahmaiva nityam taditarradakhilam tatra janmādibhag ityāyataṁ, tena jīvō'pi acidiva janimāṁ" (Quoted by MM. Pt. Gopinatha Kaviraj in his Hindi Bhūmikā to Brahmaśūtra-Śaṅkarabhāṣya of Bhole Bābabā, p. 13).

That this monistic view is one of Brahmadatta has been established by Vedāntadesikācārya in his Tattvamuktākālāpa Tikā, Sarvārtha Siddhi (2-16).

Maṇimancari, which is a philosophical text, of the Madhva Sampradāya tells us that Śaṅkara had met Brahmadatta. (6/2-3). Though it is difficult to establish the authenticity of this statement, it might well be understood as assertory of a more or less essential similarity between the Vedānta of Śaṅkara and the Vedānta of Brahmadatta.

M. Hiriyanna, "Indian Philosophical Studies I", p. 81.
Ibid., p. 81.
Ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., p. 81.
Manḍana’s Brahmaśidhī is a long-drawn out critique of the notion of difference. Abheda is incompatible with bheda. Hence the necessity of the dialectic and the refutation of bheda. To the Vedāntin of the Gauḍapāda-Saṅkara tradition a coupling of abheda with bheda (as is illustrated in the views of Bhartṛ-prapāṇa and Brahmadatta) would be unmeaning and self-contradictory.

A full-fledged account of the critique of the pramāṇas in the two traditions is given in the next chapter of this book.

Gauḍapāda: Agamsāstra, Chapter II & IV.
Saṅkara: Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Adhyāya II, pāda II, (sūtras 1 to 32).

One might even be inclined to question the validity of applying the same epithet to Saṅkara and these monists of the unreflecting order.

“And in transplanting the Buddhistic dialectic method on the advaita soil,—which process really began as early as the beginning of the ninth century with Manḍana Miśra, and was completed by Anandajīna, Śrīharṣa and Gitsukha—the advaita dialecticians have put Saṅkara’s position in an extremely misleading light”. (A. C. Mukerji, Nature of Self, p. 316).

I simply refer here to a temptation to identify the two positions, and only respectfully differ from Prof. A. C. Mukerji, who in addition to his being one of the greatest teachers of Comparative Metaphysics, has been my teacher also.

“If then Śrīharṣa fell a prey to the allurements of the negative dialectic, he really did a great disservice to Saṅkara’s position by ignoring the fact that the latter had great respect for reasoned knowledge”. (Ibid., p. 317).

I am of the opinion that Śrīharṣa and Gitsukha have done an invaluable service to the tradition of Saṅkara by turning the content of mere faith, entertained in the objective attitude, into a reflective consciousness of the Absolute. Prof. Mukerji’s instinctive dislike of the Mādhyamikas may be responsible for giving a bad name to the post-Saṅkara Advaitin, who makes use of the same arguments for refuting the validity of the objective attitude as does the Mādhyamika. The author of the Advaitasiddhi is
perhaps more refutative in essence than any other dialectician. Yet one cannot say that he is a Madhyamika.

I may stand to learn a good deal from Prof. Mukerji. All I say here is that Prof. Mukerji does not convince me on this point.

It seems Prof. Mukerji has read more in “the silence of Saṅkara over his indebtedness to the Buddhist thought” than he should. Else how could he have made the following statement:

“It is a pity that many modern interpreters of Saṅkara have the tendency to make him consistent by reading into his position the thoughts of his followers, who made the mistake of thinking that the position of Saṅkara could be developed by the Buddhistic method of criticism”. (Ibid, p. 317).

My contention is that the method in question is neither Buddhist nor non-Buddhist, it is Dialectical. Who made use of it first and who afterwards, is not a fact that could link up two different traditions in an identity-relation.

91 Ibid., pp. 315-316.

Dr. Haldar is another Indian thinker, whose adverse criticism of the Buddhist dialectic is as considerable as that of Prof. Mukerji. The Buddhist Absolute for him is ‘shot out of a pistol’. Perhaps he means that the Buddhist dialectic is constitutionally unfit for being employed for constructive purposes. Advaitins like Gitsukha and Madhusūdana have given the lie to this view.

92 In making a distinction between the literal and symbolic uses of language one is reminded of the very significant distinction made by Ernst Cassirer in his “Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”. Cassirer contemplates three stages of the development of language: (1) the imitative, (2) the analogical, and (3) the symbolic.

Cassirer’s approach to Language may be described as critical idealistic philosophy of Language instead of a realistic or naturalistic philosophy of Language.

The function of Language according to Cassirer is not to copy reality, but to symbolize it.
"The philosophy of symbolic forms includes the study of the symbolizing function in all forms of the objectification of the human spirit." (W. M. Urban: The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, p. 422).

This trans-discursive function of language, even while it is structurally ratio-morphic, is the theme of the rather long-drawn-out criticism of Mandana’s view that the propositions ‘Aham brahmāsmi’ and ‘Tat tvam asi’ are relational (sansar-gātmaka), and therefore, cannot have a non-relational (akhaṇḍ-ārthaka) implication.

Sureśvara is of the opinion that, “When the mind is made clear of all distracting ideas, we may get the true knowledge from the proposition itself.” (Naïśkarmyasiddhi, I, 67).

Regarding Sureśvara’s view concerning the distinction between the literal and symbolic meanings of vākyas, and the symbolic meaning (lakṣyārtha) of the śruti “Tat tvam asi”, the following references to Naïśakarmyasiddhi will clarify the nature of the stand of the author in respect of the trans-literal implication of certain propositions: III. 9, III. 27, III. 73-75, III. 76-80, and III. 100-104.

CHAPTER V

THE CRITERIOLOGICAL REACTION AGAINST REALISM

1 Vīgrahavyāvartani, 31.
2 Ibid., 32.
3 Ibid., 32.
4 Ibid., 33.
5 Ibid., 33.
6 Ibid., 33.
7 Ibid., 33.
8 Ibid., 34.
9 Ibid., 34.
10 Ibid., 35.
11 Ibid., 35.
12 Ibid., 36.
13 Ibid., 37-38.
41 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
42 Ibid., p. 60.
43 Ibid., p. 60.
44 Ibid., p. 61.
46 Ibid., p. 63.
47 Ibid., p. 64.
48 Ibid., p. 64.
49 Ibid., p. 64.
50 Ibid., p. 65.
51 Ibid., p. 65.
52 Ibid., p. 65.
53 Ibid., p. 67.
54 Ibid., p. 68.
55 Ibid., p. 68.
56 Ibid., p. 68.
57 Ibid., p. 69.
58 Ibid., p. 69.
59 Ibid., p. 69.
60 Ibid., p. 69.
61 Ibid., p. 69.
62 Ibid., p. 69.
63 Ibid., p. 69.
64 Ibid., p. 69-70.
65 Ibid., p. 70.
66 Ibid., p. 72.
67 Ibid., p. 73.
68 Ibid., p. 75.
69 Ibid., p. 75.
70 Ibid., p. 75.
71 Ibid., p. 76.
72 Ibid., p. 76.
73 Ibid., p. 76.
74 Ibid., p. 76.
75 Ibid., p. 76.
76 Ibid., p. 76.
77 Ibid., p. 77.
Ibid., 39.

Ibid., 39.

Ibid., 39.

Ibid., 40.

Ibid., 41.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid., 50, 51.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid., 51.

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Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid., p. 45.

Ibid., p. 44.

Hans Vaihinger: The Philosophy of As If.

"Yathaiva hi vidyamāṇāmapi śarirāśucitāṁ viparyā-
sānugatā rāginor napalabhante subhākāraṁcābhūtamadhyāropya
parikliṣyante, teṣāṁ vairagyārthau tathāgatanirmito devo vā
subhasanjñayā prāk pracchāditāṁ kāyadosāṇupavarnayet, santya-
asmin kāye klesā (ityā) dīnā".

Sanskrit Texts: Navanalanda Mahavihara Research Publica-

Navanalanda Mahavihara Research Publication Vol. I,
p. 44.

Ibid., p. 44.

Ibid., p. 45.

Ibid., p. 46.

Ibid., p. 56.


Dr. Satkari Mookerjee: Navanalanda Mahavihara Re-

Ibid., p. 81.
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78 Ibid., p. 78.
79 Ibid., p. 78.
80 Ibid., p. 78.
81 Ibid., p. 78.
82 Ibid., p. 78.
83 Ibid., p. 78.
84 Ibid., p. 79.
85 Ibid., p. 79.
86 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
87 Ibid., p. 83.
88 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī: Advaita Siddhi, pp. 652 ff.

The reference here is to the identification in noetic consciousness of the Pramāṇavṛtti and the Avidyāvṛttti of the Sākṣī.

89 This something is none other than the Nityasākṣicaitanya of the Advaitin—the eternal spiritual principle, the foundational consciousness.


91 For the distinction among the various meanings of Immediacy, the reader is advised to consult the following:

(a) “Immediate Experience” (Symposium, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1929, Supplementary Vol. IX).
(b) “Is there an element of Immediacy in knowledge?” (Symposium, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1934, Supplementary Vol. XIII).
(c) A. C. Mukerji, Nature of Self, pp. 252-255 and pp. 265 ff.

Here a contrast is indicated between ‘lower immediacy’ and supra-sensuous immediacy.

92 A very instructive discussion on the nature of necessity constitutes the content of “The Svayamsiddha Principles of Knowledge” in the Review of Philosophy and Religion (1943) by A. C. Mukerji.

93 See K. C. Bhattacharyya’s superb monograph on Spiritual Psychology, entitled The Subject as Freedom. ‘Psychology' in
this context is only a ‘figure of speech’, and should not be confused with what this term literally connotes.

Also see T. S. Eliots' Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, p. 16.

*Inmediacy as an implicate of mediation is the infallible criterion, whereby is comprehended the self-contradictory nature of the appearances. Yet its being a necessary implicate of it, does not make it relational in essence. That which is implied is not exhausted either in what implies it, or in this implication considered as a relation. Its dissipation in these aspects is not possible for the simple reason that its foundationality, even though it is epistemically other-illuminating, is ontologically incapable of degeneration through reproduction. There is no passage from immediacy to mediation. Our knowledge of Immediate Experience then cannot be expressed in a literal manner. That we speak about it only means that the propositions in which we speak about it, have neither an imitative, nor an analogical but a symbolic Darstellungsfunktion, as Ernst Cassirer would have it.*


*See T. R. V. Murti on Saṅkara’s Adhyāsa, and the illusorily conceived two-way traffic between the real and the apparent, in “The two Definitions of Brahman in the Advaita” (K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume, pp. 137-40).*

*T. R. V. Murti: “The two Definitions of Brahman in the Advaita” (K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume p. 150).*

*For the notion of the Alternative Forms of the Absolute, I can only refer to the originator of this view-point, Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya. See “The Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms” in his Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 125-143.*

*Writing on the logical implications of the Svarūpalakṣana, Prof. T. R. V. Murti makes a statement that gives the present-writer a warrant for making a distinction between the denotational and the connotational meanings of immediacy, understood as the essence of the absolute criterion. Cf. “...... the denota-
tation of a term is prior to its connotation or even that the denotation is the true meaning of a term; the connotation is its appearance, a mental replica or symbolic substitute for it. Subject or substance is never a predicate (dravya is the prātipadikārtha)”. (K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume: The Two Definitions of Brahman in the Advaita, p. 147).

99 Ibid., p. 139.

CHAPTER VI
THE HERITAGE OF ŚĀNKARA: A MEETING OF EXTREMES

1 Radhakrishnan and Moore: A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, pp. 228-29.
2 See Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III, p. 28, concerning the distinction between the Dravyārthikanaṇa (The Substance, view) and the Paryāyārthikanaṇa (the Modal view) in Indian Philosophy.

3 Of the psychological pathway to a turning-away-from-the-world-as-it-is, one finds illustrations in the statements made by the philosopher-saints of India like Kabīr, Śūra, Dādu, Gorakha and others.

4 “Theoretic consciousness at its minimum is a speakable ……….It is believed content that is spoken and it is the understanding of what can be spoken that constitutes the theoretic consciousness”. (Contemporary Indian Philosophy, pp. 106-7, in the article entitled ‘The Concept of Philosophy’ by K. C. Bhattacharyya).

6 Ibid., p. 13.
7 Ibid., p. 13.
9 Ibid., A 714/B 742.
10 Ibid., p. 54 (A 11).
11 Ibid., A 321 ff./B 378 ff.
12 Suresvara: Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, IV. 69.
13 Sāṅkaracārya: Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā, IV. 21.
14 Sureśvara: Naiśkarmyasiddhi, I. 53.
15 The objective attitude is the attitude of ignorance. Therefore, to expect that morality, which is the extension of the objective attitude in the aspect of willing, will effect absolution is to believe that action cancels ignorance. Sureśvara tells us that action cannot remove ignorance directly like knowledge, because there is no opposition between action and ignorance. (Naiśkarmyasiddhi, I. 52).
16 The Western Philosophy in general illustrates the Pythagorean preference for the Peras (the limit) as against the Anaximandrian Apeiron (the limitless, the indefinite and the unbounded). Even Albert Camus laments the occasional deflection from the Limit in European life and thought. (See his 'Helen's Exile' in The Myth of Sisyphus.
17 A very illuminating analysis of the notions of the Indefinite and the Definite has been given by G. B. Burch in his 'The Definite and the Indefinite' in K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume (Amalner). In addition, K. C. Bhattacharyya's own views bring out in a suggestive manner the different treatment given to the Indefinite in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel on the one hand and the Advaita on the other. (See K. C. Bhattacharyya: Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 238).
Jaeger in his Gifford Lectures, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, confirms the view that the reign of the limitless (Apeiron) in Greek Philosophy was rather a short-lived one, and that the subsequent development of Greek Philosophy favoured the notion of the limit (Peras). This is an important point, in view of the fact that the later European thought generally indicates a grounding in the notion of the Limit (Peras). The reaction against the Milesian Apeiron began with Pythagoras. Parmenides, who inspired Plato and Aristotle in a considerable sense showed a pronounced disinclination towards accepting the Anaximandrian doctrine of the Apeiron. Jaeger writes, "The comparison of the Existent with the sphere is also relevant here; and we must remember that in the Pythagorean tables of opposites both light and the "limit" (Peras) are placed
in the same column.... When Parmenides, who generally combats any such dualism, puts so much weight on the limitedness of the Existent, and of its affinity to light, it is clear that he is striking out his own peculiar course between the monism of the Milesian apeiron theory and the Pythagorean dualism of peras and apeiron: on the one hand, he refuses to agree with the Milesian that true being is unlimited, and describes it rather as 'limited; on the other he declares that the world in which limit and limitless combine is a mere appearance. At this time the strongest religious motive for viewing the world philosophically still lies in the concept of unity. But Parmenides gives it a new strength by endowing this unity with the property of completeness, immobility and limitation." (p. 108).

Martin Heidegger also has written at length on 'The Limitation of Being' in his An Introduction to Metaphysics. The following pointers have a contextual relevance for us:

1. Being is delimited from something else; in this delimitation it already has determinateness.

2. It is delimited in four interrelated aspects. Accordingly the determinateness of being must either become ramified and heightened or else diminish.

3. These distinctions are by no means accidental.......
The distinctions therefore have an inner necessity.

4. Consequently the oppositions, which look at first sight like formulas, did not arise fortuitously and find their way into the language as figures of speech. They arose in close connection with the development of the concept of being, a process crucial for the history of the West.

5. These distinctions have remained dominant not only in Western Philosophy. They permeate all knowledge, action and discourse even when they are not specifically mentioned or not in these words." (p. 94).

The distinctions meant are those of being and becoming, being and appearance, being and thinking, and being and the ought.

Even more noteworthy are the statements:

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"We have shown that contrary to the current opinion, the word "being" has a strictly circumscribed meaning. This implies that being itself is understood in a definite way. Thus understood, it is manifest to us. But all understanding, as a fundamental mode of disclosure, must move in a definite line of sight. . . . . . . The line of sight must be laid down in advance. We call it the "perspective", the track of foresight (Vorblickbahn). Thus we shall see not only that being is not understood in an indeterminate way but that all understanding of being moves in a predetermined perspective." (p. 117).

"The being which we took at the start as an empty word must therefore, contrary to this appearance, have a determinate meaning.

The determinateness of being was shown by the discussion of the four distinctions.

Over against becoming being is permanence.
Over against appearance being is the enduring prototype, the always identical.
Over against thought it is the underlying, the already-there.
Over against the ought it is the datum, the ought that is not yet realized or already realized.

Permanent, always identical, already-there, given-all mean fundamentally the same: enduring presence, on as ousia.

This definition of being is not accidental. It has grown out of the determination which dominates our historical being-there by virtue of its great beginning among the Greeks. If being has determinateness it is not because we have delimited a mere word meaning. The determinateness of being is the power which still sustains and dominates all our relations to the essent as a whole, to becoming, to appearance, to thinking, and to the ought." (Ibid., p. 202).

18 Suresvara: Naiskarmyasiddhi, III. 75-90.
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