ESSAYS IN

East-West Philosophy
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EAST-WEST
PHILOSOPHY

An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis

EDITED AND WITH AN
INTRODUCTION BY

CHARLES A. MOORE

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1951
Dedicated to . . .

JUNE 20 TO JULY 28, 1949—the cordial, intellectually stimulating, and philosophically significant six weeks of the Second East-West Philosophers' Conference, with the highly gratifying meeting of minds that was its major goal and achievement,

and to . . .

all who made possible the remarkable culminating success which was so clearly attained and realized at the end of those six weeks.
PREFACE

This volume is the report of the second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii from June 20 to July 28, 1949. Like the first East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii in 1939, this second Conference was dedicated to the search for greater mutual understanding between the Eastern and Western philosophical traditions and to the effort to discover avenues of progress toward a significant synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the Orient and the Occident.

The Conference brought together for a six-week period forty-seven professional philosophers from East and West.* The work of the Conference consisted of formal meetings, lectures, formal and informal discussions, undergraduate courses, and graduate seminars. The Conference was based upon the thesis that, as one member said, "It takes philosophers to make philosophy," and the results of the Conference work, as described in the Introduction and Chapter XXIII of this volume, are a clear vindication of the conference method.

In addition to an introductory chapter written by the editor and a final chapter presenting in brief and sometimes in outline form the major results of the Conference, the substance of this volume consists of the formal papers presented to the Conference. In general, the volume contains the papers essentially in the form in which they were read to the Conference. In some instances, however, the papers have been revised and enlarged, especially in view of specific questions.

* The membership of the Conference consisted of 22 members and 25 associate members, the members being those who presented papers to the Conference and the members of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Hawaii, who organized and conducted the Conference. (Both members and associate members took active part in the discussion.) Conference participants represented primarily America (with one representative from England) for the West, and the major philosophical areas of Asia—India, China, Japan, and Ceylon—for the East. Not all philosophical traditions

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or discussion following the reading of the paper at the Conference. The discussion as such is not contained in this volume except as reflected in post-Conference revision of the papers and in an occasional editor’s note where it was considered imperative that the substance of the discussion should be mentioned.

As far as possible, the Conference limited its work to the study of East-West philosophy, and did not give extensive attention to the strictly religious aspects of any philosophical tradition. The members of the Conference, with one exception, were professional philosophers. Swami Nikhilananda, a monk of the Ramakrishna Order and an outstanding Vedāntic scholar, was especially invited to present papers on the role of intuition in Indian philosophy and on Advaita Vedānta.

The problems of editing a work of this kind, in which chapters are written by representatives of so many differing traditions, are numerous. Chief among these in the present case has been the effort to have consistency in capitalization, italics, transliteration, spelling, and documentation. While uniformity in these matters has been achieved as far as practicable, consistency throughout the volume—and sometimes within a single paper—has not been insisted upon in any absolute fashion, either because of the strong preferences of the writers or because of the difficulties entailed in the particular subject-matter or type of documentation involved. (Complete and uniform documentation has been included whenever possible.) In all these matters the editor has felt that it was essential to insist only upon clarity and accuracy, not upon academic and rigid uniformity in cases in which the author felt that his particular style made for greater clarity or for greater technical accuracy.

were represented, partly because of budgetary limitations, partly because of unsuccessful efforts to arrange for the presence of other representatives, and partly because the second Conference was specifically designed as a continuation of the first Conference, at which the philosophies of Asia constituted the main subject of study.

In addition to those who have written chapters in this volume, Conference participants were: Harold E. McCarthy, University of Hawaii; William A. Shimer, University of Hawaii; Robert W. Browning, Northwestern University; Lyman V. Cady, Fisk University; Mary E. Clarke, Smith College; Hector Estades, University of Puerto Rico; William F. Goodwin, University of Wisconsin; Abraham Kaplan, University of California at Los Angeles; Neal W. Klauser, Grinnell College; Henry E. Kolbe, DePauw University; Edward J. Machle, University of Colorado; James A. Martin, Jr.; Amherst College; Wallace Matson, Pomona College; Omar K. Moore, Washington University, St. Louis; Winfield E. Nagley, Lewis and Clark College; Troy Organ, Pennsylvania College for Women; Bernard Phillips, University of Delaware; Robert L. Reinl, Louisiana State University; Dale Riepe, Carleton College; Patrick Romanell, Wells College; James Ward Smith, Princeton University; Thomas Storer, University of Nebraska; Ethel Tilley, Brenau College; Harold H. Titus, Denison University; Robert J. Trayhern, University of Rochester; William S. Weedon, University of Virginia; and Elizabeth R. Woods, Cambridge, Mass.
PREFACE

It has been impossible to maintain uniformity of style in italics, not only because of varying styles preferred by the individual writers but also because of the occasional conflict between technical, literal consistency of style and accepted usage. Words of common usage in English texts have not been italicized, for example, Brahman, Tao, Nirvāṇa, and personal names and names of schools.

It would be impossible to thank individually all of the people who were instrumental in making the Conference a success. Special mention, however, must be made of Dr. Gregg M. Sinclair, President of the University of Hawaii. Without his extreme cordiality and his constant cooperation and assistance the Conference would have been impossible. He, more than any other individual, has made the University of Hawaii a major center of East-West understanding. President Sinclair was elected an Honorary Member of the Conference—the only one so honored.

Special appreciation is due also to the Rockefeller Foundation, the Watumull Foundation, and the McInerny Foundation, which made the Conference possible by generous financial assistance. Other persons too numerous to mention contributed greatly and generously to the Conference. Deep appreciation is hereby expressed to all who helped to make the Conference a success and to all who on that last night realized that they had contributed to a significant achievement in the realm of world philosophy and East-West personal relations.

Needless to say, much help in the preparation of this volume was rendered by persons too numerous to be thanked individually. This help is greatly appreciated.

The dedication of this volume to a period of time—that of the Conference—rather than to an individual or a group of individuals may seem peculiar. Nevertheless, to those who participated in the Conference, the period of time from June 20 to July 28 was truly one of the most exciting and valuable intellectual and personal experiences in their lives, as expressed in many personal remarks and letters commenting upon the time spent together in cooperative study. It is, therefore, the period of time spent together—and the climaxing memorable date of July 28—that calls for special recognition in the dedication of this report of the Conference.

CHARLES A. MOORE

University of Hawaii
July 28, 1950
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At long last the demand for a world philosophy—whatever form it may take—has been realized by philosophers, and the challenge entailed by that demand has been accepted. Philosophy, to be philosophy, must be universal. It must be the study of all time and all existence, and its data must include the experiences and the insights of all mankind. The total truth is the very lifeblood of philosophy as well as the essential need of the world. Total perspective is the essence of the philosophical method in distinction from all other methods. The failure of past philosophy and philosophers—East and West—to meet this requirement is now recognized. Furthermore, it has now been demonstrated in practice that progress toward this imperative ideal can be achieved by the realization of this inescapable demand and by a willingness to transcend narrow provincial prejudices in the quest for the total truth. This conviction, the conviction that philosophy must be universal, is, in my personal opinion, the intellectual and philosophical revolution brought about by the second East-West Philosophers' Conference held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1949.

"In the modern world, provincialism in reflective thinking is dangerous, possibly tragic. If progress in philosophical reflection is to keep pace with that in the natural and social sciences, philosophy, like science, must become internationally cooperative in spirit and in scope. Moreover, if philosophy is to serve one of its main functions—namely, that of guiding the leaders of mankind toward a better world—its perspective must become world-wide and comprehensive in fact as well as in theory." This was the motivating spirit and theme of the Conference.

The purpose of the Conference was to study the possibility of a world philosophy through a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the
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East and the West. Neither those who planned the Conference nor those who participated in it really expected that this purpose would be fully realized in the sense of achieving a single world philosophy suitable for, and acceptable to, all peoples and all philosophical traditions. The purpose was to study the possibility of a synthesis and a world philosophy.

Some members of the Conference may have hoped that their deliberations would eventually produce a single homogeneous world philosophy, but such hopes were destined to be unfulfilled—and this very early in the Conference when it was realized that such a one-world philosophy was neither altogether possible nor actually desirable. In place of this ideal, two other attitudes occupied the attention of the Conference. One was the advisability of adopting the attitude of one world in philosophy rather than seeking a one-world philosophy; differently expressed, this became the ideal of total perspective in philosophizing, with a demand for adequate consideration of the experiences and the insights of all philosophical traditions and the elimination of unphilosophical provincialism. The second was the idea of seeking an "orchestrated unity" providing a synthesis which would be broad enough and flexible enough to include the rich manifold of the variegated perspectives of the several philosophical traditions without doing violence to any, all of them being considered aspects or parts of the comprehensive total truth. While this concept seemed to dominate the spirit of the Conference, some members feared that an orchestrated unity would not be significant unity but merely an open-minded tolerance and an acceptance of all views, without adequate critical examination, thus producing not philosophical unity but an eclectic combination of possibly incompatible, if not inconsistent, ideas. They expressed the view that, although the ideal of a single rigorous homogeneous world philosophy was probably impossible of achievement, nevertheless, the goal of the Conference should be a significant degree of agreement on fundamental issues in metaphysics, methodology, and ethics and social philosophy. These differences of opinion concerning the goal of the Conference were never fully reconciled, but progress was made toward both ideals—an orchestrated unity of diversified doctrines and significant agreement on basic issues.

The problem of the Conference—the study of the possibility of a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of East and West—was obviously too general in nature to serve as the framework for detailed inquiry. Therefore, it was reformulated as the study of Eastern and Western conceptions of ultimate reality in their relations to the empirical world and human values—and a consideration of the methods used
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in East and West to reach the respective conceptions of ultimate reality found in those two traditions.

This comprehensive problem was attacked from three specific angles: metaphysics, methodology, and ethics and social philosophy; and by three procedures: the Conference meetings themselves, seminars in comparative metaphysics, methodology, and ethics and social philosophy, and survey courses in Indian, Chinese, and Buddhist philosophy. This threefold approach was designed to provide informational data about the philosophies of the East, detailed seminar discussion, and the formulation of definite theses concerning the ways in which East and West might be brought closer together. By these methods, the Conference achieved certain notable results:

(1) The removal of numerous misunderstandings concerning the philosophies of both East and West.

(2) The recognition of a great area of agreement in East and West on matters of fundamental metaphysical theory, methodological procedures, and ethical and social theories and practice.

(3) The development of open-mindedness and cordiality with respect to ideas, doctrines, and practices advocated by philosophies of other traditions.

(4) Numerous proposals for specific syntheses of East and West—in methodology, metaphysics, and ethics and social philosophy.

(5) A recognition and formulation of fundamental conflicts which were found still to be relatively irreconcilable.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND MISINTERPRETATIONS

While the Conference was intended to work primarily at levels of discussion beyond the informational, nevertheless, some of the papers consisted largely of description and explanation of major points of view and systems in East and West. Nearly all these papers offered suggestions for the synthesis of Eastern and Western attitudes, but they also served the very useful purpose of clarifying many of the largely misunderstood Oriental as well as Occidental doctrines. In these ways one of the major obstacles to a synthesis was removed, for many of the difficulties standing in the way of a meeting of the minds of East and West can be traced to misunderstandings or misinterpretations, either of general attitudes or of specific doctrines. As Mr. Krusé says in his paper, technical understanding of the different points of view is indeed "extremely important and indispensably
necessary," although it "is not yet enough for the mutual enrichment of our philosophical outlook." He continues, "I am sure that we will all agree that at least one gain of this Conference has been the removal of much initial misunderstanding." He then corrects two of the outstanding misinterpretations of Oriental thought which were called to the attention of the Conference repeatedly, stating (1) that the philosophy of China must not be overlooked in a study of Oriental philosophy, nor must it be considered similar to or identical with the philosophy of India simply because both are Oriental; and (2) that philosophy in India (and the culture of India), in emphasizing the life of the spirit, has not overlooked the everyday life of the ordinary man, the "householder."

It is also Mr. Krusé who stresses a point made in many of the papers read by Oriental members, that there is great complexity of philosophical doctrines and methods in the East, and it may be added that this complexity exists, not only among the various countries of the East, but also within each of the several countries, and frequently within particular systems of one given country or philosophy. Progressively, the Conference realized with Radhakrishnan that "All immense simplifications of the complicated pattern of reality are misleading," and one is forced to say that all facile simplifications of the complicated pattern of Oriental philosophy are equally misleading. The papers in this volume are filled with clarification of attitudes—both Eastern and Western—and correction of misinterpretations of these attitudes. Perhaps special mention should be made of the point stressed in Mr. Raju's paper, not only that there are many systems of thought in India, but also—striking at one of the most common misunderstandings and distortions of Indian philosophy—that the Advaita Vedânta of Šaṅkara is only one of the numerous systems of Indian thought. Advaita Vedânta is not the whole or even the essence of the widely variegated panorama of Indian philosophical speculation, as is so often thought in the West.

The report of the ethics seminar makes the point clearly: "It was soon discovered that complexity characterized all the systems discussed; many misunderstandings had to be removed; and stereotypes had to be rejected."

**POINTS OF AGREEMENT**

Both at the formal meetings and in the seminars, it was discovered that there are not only numerous points of agreement between East and West in all aspects of philosophy, but that there are some really surprising areas of significant agreement between philosophies which
are frequently thought of as not only different but fundamentally opposed in spirit and in detail. Many who participated in the Conference came to the subject of East-West philosophy with the "assumption of difference" between the two. This assumption almost inevitably entails misunderstanding and conflict by preparing the mind to look for differences rather than identities or similarities. To be sure, there are major differences between some philosophies in the East and some philosophies in the West, and to some members it was these differences, rather than similarities, which were significant, because they form the basis of the synthesis (and the basis of the enriching synthesis) of the philosophies of the East and the West. There can be no orchestrated unity, of course, of identical principles.

One of the discoveries of the Conference—expressed in the seminar reports—was that some doctrines and methods which at first glance appeared to be strongly contrasted or diametrically opposed were not actually opposed at the level of fundamental meaning. For example, the ethics seminar noted that "the ethics of love is central in most schools, East and West." This "solid ethical and social achievement" was reached despite the fact that the major philosophical traditions have called this virtue by different names and have described it in varying ways, such as love in the Christian-influenced Western tradition, *ahimsā* in the Hindu and Jain tradition, compassion in Buddhist philosophy, and *jên* in the Confucian tradition of China. Furthermore, especially in the methodology seminar, it was found that many doctrines or methods which were thought to be strongly conflicting in character could be better understood as supplementing each other, thus providing, not a basis of antagonism and isolation of East and West, but rather a basis for a richer synthesis including both supplementary perspectives. The report of the methodology seminar refers to several such pairs of complementary attitudes, and perhaps special mention should be made of Mr. Northrop's interpretation of the basic attitudes of East and West and his proposal of a synthesis by virtue of the supplementary nature of "concepts by postulation," which characterize the West, and "concepts by intuition," which characterize the East. It was found both in the seminars and in the formal meetings that the effort to see all such apparent contrasts in the perspective of complementary principles is a very fruitful procedure in comparative philosophy.

The most surprising and revealing result of the Conference was brought to light in the report of the metaphysics seminar, which cited ten areas of fundamental doctrines on which representatives of Western philosophy joined minds with representatives of Hinduism,
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Buddhism, and Chinese philosophy in unanimous agreement on basic principles. Some of these points of agreement are extremely provocative, because they seem to be considerably out of accord with the usual interpretation of some of the philosophies involved. It is to be noted, however, that Conference members who participated in the seminar were able to accept these ten areas of agreement in metaphysics by virtue of six weeks of cooperative study consisting of exposition, comparison, and the effort to reach agreement.

Certain major tendencies or emphases in all philosophical traditions, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and possibly even in all of Chinese philosophy (see especially the papers by Mr. Chan and Mr. Mei), were duly noted, but it was pointed out repeatedly that these should be recognized for what they are, namely, tendencies, rather than absolute or exclusive attitudes which serve to isolate East from West or West from East. For example (although Mr. Northrop in his paper on methodology replies to this contention), Asiatic representatives called attention to the fact that, while intuition plays a major role in some Eastern philosophies, nevertheless, concepts by postulation are employed in both India and China to a significant degree. A similar point, made in several other papers, notably in Mr. Datta's, is that reason is the common method of philosophy in India as it is in the West. It was stressed that admittedly different tendencies are not exclusive of "minority" ideas and methods which, in turn, are emphases in other traditions. As the report of the methodology seminar states, in indicating certain contrasting tendencies in Eastern and Western methodologies, "The general consensus seems to be that there is something in each of these suggested contrasts if they are not pressed too far or regarded as more than dominant tendencies." The report goes on to say that these tendencies "should be analyzed on the supposition that East and West can be found in the main to complement rather than to contradict each other's methodologies. . . ."

ATTITUDE OF OPEN-MINDEDNESS

It was the conviction of most participants in the Conference, as well as visitors who attended the meetings, that the most significant general result of the Conference consisted in a highly developed attitude of open-mindedness and cordiality, without which no synthesis of East and West will ever be possible and without which work in the field is destined to be fruitless and insignificant. As one Conference member has written, there was no attempt during the Conference to score debating points; rather, there was a universal spirit of willingness to learn from representatives of the other traditions, a positive will-
ingness to understand the other person's point of view, and a sincere effort to search for perspectives which would permit the acceptance of ideas from other traditions as well as from one's own. While it was often almost impossible to understand how specific ideas from other traditions could be assimilated with those of one's own, nevertheless, there was no evidence whatsoever of the closed mind with which many thinkers in the past have approached the question of Oriental and comparative East-West philosophy. There was distinctly what Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar in his paper calls "a lively desire to achieve concord."

Dr. E. H. Hume once wrote, "Only those can enter effectively into her life who approach China's citadel by the way of friendship." All participants in the Conference recognized this truth with reference to each other's citadel of thought and adopted this essential "way of friendship" in trying to enter effectively into the thought-life of all traditions represented at the Conference.

Mr. Dennes opens his paper with a significant statement made by Mr. Conger in his chapter in Philosophy--East and West (the report of the first East-West Philosophers' Conference) which states the *sine quanon* of effectiveness in this field and reflects the intellectual tone which this second Conference also achieved. Mr. Conger suggested that the question is not so much whether the East can contribute, as whether the West is ready to receive.

Several Conference members, both during the Conference and in statements made in retrospect, gave unmistakable evidence of the spirit of cordiality and open-mindedness. One Oriental representative said, "I have learned to interpret the other person's point of view at its best, not at its worst." Another representative from Asia commented, "I personally go away greatly encouraged and greatly chastened because I have seen how, in spite of apparently wide divergences, there are very large areas of agreement in our philosophies, and chastened because I have realized that many things we have regarded as self-evident, axiomatic truths are not so accepted by others, without questioning and deep searching...." A Western representative stated, "The individual point of view tends to become conscious of itself as a mere point of view." Such was the spirit that grew as the Conference progressed, the attitude which made it possible for participants to reach the high level of agreement on basic issues evidenced by the reports of the three seminars in the final chapter of this volume. Without this spirit, it seems very unlikely that the ten areas of agreement previously cited as representing the results of the metaphysics seminar could have been accepted by representa-
tives of such diverse philosophies as Western idealism, Western naturalism, Advaita Vedānta, Mahāyāna Buddhism, and Neo-Confucianism. This spirit of cordiality, when joined with detailed clarification and explanation of contrasting ideas so as to indicate their lack of incompatibility, provided the basis and the possibility of the agreement on fundamental doctrines which was reached at the conclusion of the Conference.

Another phase of this attitude may be called the spirit of optimism, which, in the light of obvious and great difficulties, made it possible for the members to approach the various problems positively and confidently in quest of synthesis. In his paper, Mr. Burtt expresses the attitude clearly when he says, with reference to his particular problem, “I shall be assuming, first, that philosophical understanding between East and West and some measure of harmonizing synthesis are possible and that the intelligent problem is simply how to achieve this goal as rapidly and as fully as is feasible.” While many Conference members felt that complete synthesis or harmonization of the philosophies of East and West was next to impossible, there was no initial attitude of defeatism. And during the progress of the Conference an optimistic tone pervaded the meetings more and more clearly as it was realized that East and West were not speaking foreign languages in philosophy but were seeking the same truth, were more often than not using the same methods to reach or to explain that truth, and were arriving at conclusions that were sufficiently akin to make synthesis possible.

This spirit is expressed by Mr. Burtt in his paper also when he lays down two principles of procedure—fundamentally principles of attitude—with which progress in comparative philosophy toward world synthesis will be possible. These two principles are inclusiveness and impartiality. The breaking down of prejudices, provincialisms, and dogmatism in the name of impartiality was characteristic of the entire Conference. And, as the Conference progressed, the necessity of adopting the attitude of inclusiveness, in the sense of not being free to exclude any aspect of reality or any human experience simply out of prejudice and without adequate consideration, became increasingly recognized and increasingly important. Mr. Dennes, speaking from the point of view of Western naturalism, expresses these two aspects of the spirit of the Conference when, in the first place, he insists that naturalism, which is so widely considered the archenemy of the supernaturalistic-minded East, no longer excludes (if it ever did) any aspects of experience from what it considers to be real, and when, in the second place, he asks “whether the causes of our malady lie in our attachment
to the methods of explanation characteristic of Western empiricism and Western logic, or whether they lie largely in emotional confusions and frustrations involved in such matters as our technological development and in the conflicts between our ideals and some of our habits and interests"—in other words, prejudice, provincialism, or partiality.

**PROPOSED SYNTHESSES**

The great single result of the Conference—and its chief contribution to world philosophy—consists of the numerous provocative and highly significant proposed syntheses, or avenues toward synthesis, of Eastern and Western philosophy. A specific proposal for synthesis is stated in—or a synthesis is implied or suggested in the argument or the content of—almost every paper in this volume. These proposed syntheses are many in number and various in type. The interesting point is that in many instances the proposed synthesis consists of a merging of significantly differing perspectives; and occasionally this came as the result of a compromise on the part of the writer in the direction of moderating the extreme views which his own tradition considers closest to the truth in the interest of bringing it into greater harmony with the perspective of the other tradition.

In other instances, it is not a synthesis of different ideas or attitudes which is proposed, so much as it is the recognition of points of identity or similarity which provide a common denominator of the reputedly conflicting philosophies, such that synthesis is not necessary because basic similarity of perspective is already present. For example, Mr. Datta suggests at the end of his paper—in presenting an idea and a fact very often overlooked or ignored—that there is no necessity for reconciling the reason of the West with some other method of the East (specifically, intuition), since "Reason and argument ... find their full place here as in Western philosophy." He continues, "... there is ample similarity and identity of thought ... between the Indian and the Westerner. This is no wonder, but is what it should be if man is human and reason is his chief instrument for understanding things and convincing his fellow creatures."

In these syntheses and in their variety lie the full richness of the Conference and the great value of its result. These proposals should constitute the starting point or the working material for future research in the field of comparative philosophy, directed toward the achievement of a significant and comprehensive synthesis of the philosophy of the East and the philosophy of the West. Progress will be inevitable if the suggestions provided by these proposed syntheses are
followed and critically and thoroughly examined, not for their weaknesses but for their potential positive value.

An interesting avenue toward synthesis which was brought to light in post-Conference retrospect lies in the recognition of China as the possible mediator between the attitudes of India and those of the West. In evaluating the work of the Conference, Mr. Mahadevan said: "To us . . . from India it came as a revelation that Chinese philosophy, especially in its Confucian form, could serve as the middle ground between Western thought and Indian philosophy. With its insistence on filial piety and this-worldly values, it makes a ready appeal to the Westerner. But the Chinese had their contacts with us; and the transition from Chinese philosophy to Indian thought ought not to be difficult. The possibility of a Sino-Indian rapprochement in the field of philosophy must be explored. . . ." In this connection it is worth while to note another development, also illustrated by Mr. Mahadevan, who goes on to say, " . . . a sufficient number of Indian scholars must interest themselves in the study of Chinese thought. It is a pity that we in India, who know so much of Western philosophy, should know so little of the culture of our neighbors in the East—a culture which was profoundly influenced by our own country in the past." It can be safely said that Chinese philosophy as a significant part of world philosophy was apparently underestimated both by Westerners and by Indians prior to the Conference—and in some of the papers read to the Conference—but gained its rightful recognition during the Conference by virtue of the richness of Chinese thought revealed in the papers and discussions—and by repeated insistence by Chinese members and others that hasty generalizations about "Eastern" philosophy were too often made without any justification for the exclusion of the entire rich and varied Chinese philosophical tradition.

It would be presumptuous to select certain proposed syntheses for special mention, and it would be out of place even to cite, let alone elaborate upon, all of the numerous proposed syntheses in the several papers. The point to be made is simply that the papers contain a rich variety of proposals for bringing about a meeting of the minds, Eastern and Western, and reveal that many avenues may lead toward the goal of world unity in philosophy. These proposed syntheses are all encouraging signs from the past and hopeful signs for the future. In all of them the noteworthy fact is that, conflicting as the tendencies of East and West may appear to be, in the minds of nearly every Conference member there is a way to bring them together, chiefly by recognizing them as tendencies only, and as tendencies which, in
their extreme form, require the leavening influence of opposing tendencies. By this method the contrasts of intuition and reason, this-worldliness and other-worldliness, naturalism and supernaturalism, inwardness and interest in external progress and prosperity, and the various other supposedly irreconcilable contrasts between East and West not only failed to lessen the philosophical courage of Conference members but were found to be significantly amenable to harmonization from a wider and higher perspective.

REMAINING PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES

While all the foregoing results of the Conference point to significant progress in comparative philosophy and in the over-all effort to achieve world unity in philosophy, and while, to all intents and purposes, some of the major problems of comparative philosophy and of the traditional opposition between East and West were satisfactorily resolved, nevertheless, many problems remained unresolved and some of these unfortunately are among the most significant problems in the entire field. Perhaps the most important were: the exact relationship between religion and philosophy—a problem inevitably brought to the forefront by the religious motivation and culmination of much of Indian philosophy (and also by criticisms brought against the Conference on the ground that it did not do justice to the religious aspect of Western philosophy); the relationship between intuition and reason, and the related question as to the admissibility of intuition as a philosophical method; the status of such values as the ethical in relation to the spiritual values emphasized so strongly in some Indian systems—a problem the difficulty of which was enhanced for Westerners by the fact that in much of Indian philosophy and in some of Chinese philosophy (some phases of Taoism) all ethical rules and standards and values are to be transcended; the exact status of the pluralistic empirical world, especially in reference to those systems which are most absolutistic, such as Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, some schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and Taoism; and the acceptability to the West of the concept of an utterly ineffable and indescribable ultimate reality.

In addition to these major problems, numerous detailed difficulties were left unresolved, not only in the formal meetings of the Conference but also in the seminars. Many of these are specifically cited in the reports of the seminars as persisting problems rather than as conclusions of the Conference.

While these problems constitute difficulties yet to be overcome, members of the Conference felt that their recognition and the precise
statement of the difficulties involved—as noted in the seminar reports—constituted a major achievement of the Conference. For example, the report of the ethics seminar seems to pose more problems which remain to be resolved than solutions. It is suggested, however, that much of the value in the report of this seminar consists in the formulation of these problems and in the noting of the fact that they must be resolved before any significant synthesis can be achieved on the level of ethics and social philosophy. In the light of the material presented in the papers of this volume, it is highly probable that concentrated attention given to these problems can make significant progress possible, progress toward their solution and toward a reconciliation of what now appear to be irreconcilable contrasts of East and West.

The similarity and agreement of Eastern and Western philosophies must not blind us to differences—even sharp contrasts and at times irreconcilable assumptions and conclusions. Nor should the fact of similarity of attitude on certain basic matters be permitted to exclude from consideration in any world synthesis that might be developed the rich, fruitful, and important varieties of insights and experiences which are contributed by the various philosophical traditions to the total view without which philosophy is hardly worthy of the name.

Mr. Northrop writes, "Certainly it would hardly be worth while to have had this East-West Philosophers' Conference, nor would it be significantly rewarding to have similar conferences, if all that Oriental and Western philosophers could learn from one another is that their philosophical doctrines and the respective ethical applications of these doctrines are identical... We are the richer because the East is not identical with West and the relation between them is East plus West." The ideal of an "orchestrated unity" recognized not only the fact of differences but also their significance in the total—and richer and more balanced—truth.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONFERENCE

Mr. Northrop says in his paper on ethics, "... the main characteristic of the contemporary domestic politics of any people or culture is the conflict of ideologies, normative social theories, and values which it exhibits." Consequently, ideological unity is essential. It is in this sense that Mr. Northrop said—in his commencement address at the University of Hawaii just prior to the Conference—that the problem of the Conference is everybody's problem because ideological conflict or ideological unity will have a direct bearing upon the course of
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world history and therefore upon the lives of all living human beings.8

Be this as it may, no one connected with the Conference expected
that it would result in immediate practical benefits to mankind,
bringing East and West closer together in cultural and practical
matters. President Gregg M. Sinclair of the University of Hawaii, an
honorary member of the Conference, said, in commenting upon the
Conference, "... it is hoped that a meeting of minds in philosophy
will hasten the day of greater international understanding on economic,
political, and social levels. For it must be borne in mind that philosophy
is the basis of individual and social behavior. Just as pure science
precedes applied science, so pure thought precedes applied thought.
Herein lies the importance of philosophy."9 In a similar vein, Pandit
Nehru recently said, "Politicians have to deal with day-to-day prob-
lems and they seek immediate remedies. Philosophers think of ultimate
objectives and are apt to lose touch with the day-to-day world and its
problems. Neither approach appears to be adequate by itself. ... In
this world of incessant and feverish activity men have little time to
think, much less to consider ideals and objectives. Yet how are we to
act even in the present unless we know which way we are going and
what our objectives are."10

Members and associate members of the Conference were so stirred
by the rich potentialities brought to light at the Conference that they
intend to institute courses in Oriental and comparative philosophy
at their colleges and universities; and, as mentioned above, it has been
suggested that Indian philosophers give more care to the study of
Chinese philosophy and its significance. Such developments will not
show results in the immediate future, but in time the effect of the
Conference is sure to make itself felt through the medium of increased
study, research, and teaching in the field, activities which will reach
not only the technical philosopher, but also the educated man in all
cultures, and through him the political and economic leaders who
guide the destinies of the world.

At long last, then, philosophers have come face to face with the es-

csential problems, methods, and perspectives of philosophy. Whatever
else it is, philosophy must be dominated by the attitude of total
perspective—call it one-world perspective or the study of all time and
all existence. Up to the present time, philosophy in each of the several
great cultures and traditions has been so dominated by its own back-
ground and perspective that it has not been truly philosophical, for
provincialism, prejudice, and narrow perspectives are anathema to
philosophy. Thus, the attitude of world perspective—one way of
expressing the entire spirit of the Conference—must, if the Conference
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is to be really effective, at last become recognized as the only proper perspective for philosophy. If the Conference should succeed in making philosophy truly philosophical in its perspective—eliminating provincialism and prejudice and adopting the attitude of inclusiveness and impartiality—then it will have succeeded indeed. This, more than any other result of the Conference, has the potentiality of being of tremendous significance not only in philosophy but in world thought in general, and eventually in the lives and actions of the people of the world—and the hope of the Conference was exactly that.

NOTES

1Quotation is taken from the brochure issued by the University of Hawaii in making the original announcement of the Conference.
2A fourth important and effective phase of the Conference was a series of ten public lectures at which aspects of the work not considered at the formal meetings or in the seminars were discussed. Mr. Northrop restated and developed the social, legal, and political implications of his analysis of the characteristics of Eastern and Western thought, and indicated the need for, and the way to, synthesis in five lectures on "The Scientific and Philosophical Foundations of Western Culture." The other lectures were given by representatives of Eastern thought and culture as follows:
Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar: Modern Developments in Hinduism.
Wing-tsit Chan: Neo-Confucianism and the Modern Chinese Mind.
Dhirendra Mohan Datta: The Philosophical Basis of Indian Democracy.
Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki: The Buddhist Conception of Reality.
6Not included here—or at the Conference in any detail—are the obvious and important problems of language differences, translation, and related matters.
7Some of the Conference papers and the reports of the seminars not only cite these difficulties and problems but also make a special point of insisting that they be recognized and faced squarely. The spirit of rapport must not be permitted to lead serious students in the field to gloss over significant disagreements and contrasts.
9"Open Letter from the President (University of Hawaii), No. 1—East-West Philosophy," July 21, 1949.
Part I

METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER I

Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy

DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI

For "intuition," Buddhists generally use "prajñā" and for reason or discursive understanding, "vijñāna." Vijñāna and prajñā are always contrasted.

The terminology we have in philosophy does not seem to be sufficient to express what I have in mind, but I will try my best to explain what the Buddhist idea of "intuition" is and, in connection with it, that of reason.

Prajñā goes beyond vijñāna. We make use of vijñāna in our world of the senses and intellect, which is characterized by dualism in the sense that there is one who sees and there is the other that is seen—the two standing in opposition. In prajñā this differentiation does not take place: what is seen and the one who sees are identical; the seer is the seen and the seen is the seer. Prajñā ceases to be prajñā when it is analyzed into two factors as is done in the case of vijñāna. Prajñā is content with itself. To divide is characteristic of vijñāna, while with prajñā it is just the opposite. Prajñā is the self-knowledge of the whole in contrast to vijñāna, which busies itself with parts. Prajñā is an integrating principle while vijñāna always analyzes. Vijñāna cannot work without having prajñā behind it; parts are parts of the whole; parts never exist by themselves, for if they did they would not be parts—they would even cease to exist. Mere aggregates have no significance, and this is why in Buddhist philosophy all dharmas (elements), when they are regarded as individual existences, are declared to have no atman. The atman is a unifying principle, and the idea is that, as long as all dharmas are conceived without any reference to that which unifies them, they are just disconnected parts, that is, they are nonexistent. Prajñā is needed to make them coherent, articulate, and significant. The Buddhist conception of impermanence and suffering is not to be explained merely from the moral and phe-
nomenological point of view. It has an epistemological background. Vijñāna without prajñā kills; it works for individualization and, by making each individual disconnected with others, vijñāna makes them all impermanent and subject to the law of karma. It is by prajñā that all dharmas are observable from a unitive point of view and acquire a new life and significance.

Prajñā is ever seeking unity on the grandest possible scale, so that there could be no further unity in any sense; whatever expressions or statements it makes are thus naturally beyond the order of vijñāna. Vijñāna subjects them to intellectual analysis, trying to find something comprehensible according to its own measure. But vijñāna cannot do this for the obvious reason that prajñā starts from where vijñāna cannot penetrate. Vijñāna, being the principle of differentiation, can never see prajñā in its oneness, and it is because of the nature of vijñāna that prajñā proves utterly baffling to it.

To illustrate this point let us see what kind of statements prajñā will make when it is left to itself without the interference of vijñāna. One statement which is very common is: “I am not I, therefore I am I.” This is the thread of thought running through the Buddhist sūtras known as the “Prajñāpāramitā,” consisting of six hundred “volumes” in Chinese translation. In the Diamond Sūtra, belonging to the Prajñāpāramitā class, we have this: “What is known as prajñā is not prajñā, therefore it is known as prajñā.” When this is rendered into popular language it takes this form: “I am empty-handed and, behold, the spade is in my hands.” “When a man walks on the bridge, the bridge flows while the water does not.”

In still another way, “the logic of prajñā” may demand this of us: “Do not call this a staff,” if you do, it is an affirmation; if you do not, it is a negation. Apart from affirmation and negation say a word, quick, quick!” It is important to note here that prajñā wants to see its diction “quickly” apprehended, giving us no intervening moment for reflection or analysis or interpretation. Prajñā for this reason is frequently likened to a flash of lightning or to a spark from two striking pieces of flint. “Quickness” does not refer to progress of time; it means immediacy, absence of deliberation, no allowance for an intervening proposition, no passing from premises to conclusion. Prajñā is pure act, pure experience. But we must remember that here is a distinctly noetic quality which really characterizes prajñā, and this is the sense in which prajñā is often regarded as an intuitive act—which interpretation, however, remains to be more fully examined.

Going back to the “staff” paradox, when the master of Buddhist philosophy produced the staff and demanded its definition, not by
means of intellection, not by an objective method, the following happened: Someone came forward from the assembled group, took the staff, broke it in two, and without saying a word left the room. On another occasion, the answer came in this form: “I call it a staff.” A third answer was possible: “I do not call it a staff.”

The staff is one of the things carried by the masters when they appear at the “Dharma Hall,” and naturally they make use of it frequently while engaged in a discourse. Let me give some more examples in which the staff is very much in evidence.

When a monk asked a master as to the universality of bodhi (enlightenment), the master took up his staff and chased him. The monk, surprised, ran away. The master said, “What is the use? When you see another master sometime later you may argue the point again.” This story is not really to find a prajñā definition of the staff, but incidentally the staff comes out and gives its own definition. The same master had another occasion to refer to the staff. One day he produced it before the disciples and said, “For the last thirty years, while living in this mountain retreat, how much of my life I owe to this staff!” A monk asked, “What power could it be that you owe to it?” The master said, “While walking along the mountain trails, while crossing the mountain streams, it has supported me in every possible way.”

When another master heard of this later, he said, “If I were he, I would not say that.” A monk asked, “What would you say?” The master, without saying a word, came down from the seat and walked away with the staff supporting him.

Ummon, of the tenth century, was one of the great staff-wielders, and let me cite a few of his demonstrations. His discourse once ran thus: “Vasubandhu, the bodhisattva, was unexpectedly turned into a rough-hewn staff.” Then he drew a line on the ground with his staff and said, “All the Buddhas as numberless as the sands of the Ganges are here engaged in heated discussion over the Buddhist truth.”

At another time, after the same gesture, the master said, “All is here!” Then, repeating the gesture, he said, “All is gone out of here! Take good care of yourselves!” At still another time he produced the staff before the congregation and said, “The staff has transformed itself into a dragon and the dragon has swallowed up the whole universe. Where are the mountains and rivers and the great earth?” Another master made this remark on the staff: “When you understand the staff, your study of Buddhist philosophy is completed.”

The staff has been quite a useful and effective weapon in the hands of the masters. Though the following remark by Ummon has no direct
reference to the staff itself, it may be found interesting to understand how the masters flourish it. Says Ummon, "Do you want to know how the ancient masters dealt with the matter for you? Tokusan chased a monk away with the staff the very moment the monk was approaching him. Bokuju, seeing a monk enter the gate, lost no time in saying, "Be gone, quick! Thirty blows are coming upon you!""

"The matter" referred to here by Ummon is prajñā-intuition, and he has the following to say about it, though his discourse is indirect from the rationalistic point of view. "O disciples, do not act like this: For instance, when you hear people talk about the teaching of Buddhas and patriarchs, you ask what this teaching is. But do you know who the Buddha is, who the patriarch is? Can you tell me what makes them talk as they do? You ask again how to escape the bondage set by the triple world. But let me see what this so-called triple world is. Is there anything that will obstruct your way in any sense? Does your hearing do this? Does your sight do this? Where is the world of differentiation which you imagine to be obstructing your freedom? Where is the bondage you want to escape from?

"The wise men of old, seeing you so troubled with illusions and hypotheses, threw their whole being before you and exclaimed, 'Here is the whole truth! Here is the ultimate reality!' But I will say, 'Here! Is there anything you can mark as this or that? If you tarry even for a moment you have already lost its trail!'"

"Not to tarry even for a moment," "Say a word quick, quick!" "Thirty blows on your head!"—all these admonitions on the part of the master point to the nature of prajñā-intuition, and, as this immediacy characterizes prajñā-intuition, it is mistakenly identified with ordinary intuition. This being the case, I should like to have prajñā classified as a very special form of intuition—that which may be termed "prajñā-intuition" in distinction from the kind of intuition we have generally in philosophical and religious discourses. In the latter case there is an object of intuition known as God or reality or truth or the absolute, and the act of intuition is considered complete when a state of identification takes place between the object and the subject.

But in the case of prajñā-intuition there is no definable object to be intuited. If there is one, it can be anything from an insignificant blade of grass growing on the roadside to the golden-colored Buddha-body ten feet six in height. In prajñā-intuition the object of intuition is never a concept postulated by an elaborate process of reasoning; it is never "this" or "that"; it does not want to attach itself to any one particular object. The master of Buddhist philosophy takes up
the staff because it is always available, but he is ever ready to make use of anything that comes his way. If a dog is near, he does not hesitate to kick it and make it cry out, in order to demonstrate the universality of the Buddha-nature. He cuts off the fingertip of a little boy-monk to let him realize what is the meaning of the finger-lifting—the favorite method used by a certain master in teaching his inquirers. As for breaking a dish or a cup or a mirror, or upsetting a fully prepared dinner table, or refusing to feed a hungry traveling monk, the masters think nothing of such incidents as much as they help the truth-seekers come to an understanding of Buddhist philosophy.

As the methods of demonstrating praśānta-intuition permit of an infinite variety, so the answers given to a problem set by the master also vary infinitely; they are never stereotyped. This we have already seen in the case of the staff. To understand the staff in the viśeṣa way of thinking will allow only one of the two, negation or affirmation, and not both at the same time. It is different with praśānta-intuition. It will declare the staff not to be a staff and at the same time declare it to be one, and the master’s demand to go beyond affirmation and negation is, we can say, in one sense altogether ignored and in another not at all ignored. And yet either answer is correct; it all depends upon whether you have an instance of praśānta-intuition or not. If you have it, you can establish your case in whatever way suits you best at the moment. You may even break the staff in two; you may take it away from the master and throw it down on the ground; you may walk away with it; you may swing it in the way of a skilled sword-player. There are many more ways to manifest the “mysteries” of the staff. Viśeṣa cannot do this unless it is dissolved in praśānta-intuition. There is a key-point in all this and to comprehend it constitutes praśānta-intuition.

This key-point cannot be expressed as a concept, as something distinct to be placed before the mind. All is veiled in obscurity, as it was. Something seems to be hinted at, but it is impossible to put one’s finger on it. It is alluring enough, but viśeṣa finds it beyond its grasp. Viśeṣa wants everything to be clear-cut and well defined, with no mixing of two contradictory statements, which, however, praśānta nonchalantly overrides.

The difficulty in defining the “object” of praśānta-intuition can also be seen from the following mondō (question and answer), in one of which it is disposed of as acintya, i.e., as beyond human understanding. As long as the understanding is based upon the principle of bifurcation, where “you” and “I” are to be set apart as standing against each other, there cannot be any praśānta-intuition. At the same
time, if there were no bifurcation, such intuition could not take place. Prajñā and viññāna may thus be said to be in a sense correlated from the point of view of viññāna-discrimination, but this is really where the root of misinterpreting the nature of prajñā grows.

Yikwan, the master of Közenji, of the T'ang dynasty, was asked by a monk, "Has the dog Buddha-nature?" The master said, "Yes, it has." The monk asked, "Have you the Buddha-nature?" "No, I have not." "When it is said that all beings are endowed with the Buddha-nature, how is it that you have it not?" "It is because I am not what you call 'all beings.'" "If you are not, are you a Buddha?" "No, I am neither." "What are you then, after all?" "I am not a 'what.'" The monk finally said, "Can it be seen or thought of?" The master replied, "It is beyond thought or argument, and therefore it is called the unthinkable (acintya)."

At another time he asked, "What is the way (tao)?" The master answered, "It is right before you." "Why do I not see it?" Said the master: "Because you have an 'I,' you do not see it. So long as there are 'you' and 'I,' there is a mutual conditioning, and there can be no 'seeing' in its real sense." "This being the case, if there is neither 'you' nor 'I,' can there be any 'seeing'?" The master gave the final verdict, "If there is neither 'you' nor 'I,' who wants to 'see'?"

Thus we can see that prajñā-intuition is an intuition all by itself and cannot be classified with other forms of intuition as we ordinarily understand the term. When we see a flower, we say it is a flower, and this is an act of intuition, for perception is a form of intuition. But when prajñā takes the flower, it wants us to take not only the flower but at the same time what is not the flower, in other words, to see the flower before it came into existence—and this not by way of postulation but "immediately." To present this idea in a more metaphysical fashion: Prajñā will ask, "Even prior to the creation of the world, where is God?" Or, more personally, "When you are dead and cremated and the ashes scattered to the winds, where is your self?" To these questions, prajñā demands a "quick" answer or response, and will not allow a moment's delay for reflection or ratiocination.

Philosophers will naturally try to solve these questions in some logically methodical manner worthy of their profession and may pronounce them absurd because they do not yield to intellectual treatment. Or they might say that they would have to write a book to give the subject an intelligent solution if there were any. But the prajñā method is different. If the demand is to see the flower before it blooms, prajñā will respond without a moment of delay, saying, "What a beautiful flower it is!" If it is about God prior to the creation
of the world, prajñā will, as it were, violently shake you up by taking hold of your collar and perhaps remark, "This stupid, good-for-nothing fellow!" If it is about your cremation and the scattering of the ashes, the prajñā teacher may loudly call your name, and when you reply, "Yes, what is it?" he may retort, "Where are you?" Prajñā-intuition settles such grave questions instantly, while philosophers or dialecticians spend hours, nay, years, searching for "objective evidence" or "experimental demonstration."

II

The fact is that prajñā methodology is diametrically opposed to that of vijnāna, or the intellect, and it is for this reason that what prajñā states always looks so absurd and nonsensical to the latter and is likely to be rejected without being taken up for examination. Vijnāna is the principle of bifurcation and conceptualization, and for this reason it is the most efficient weapon in handling affairs of our daily life. We have thus come to regard it as the most essential means of dealing with the world of relativities, forgetting that this world is the creation of something that lies far deeper than the intellect—indeed, the intellect itself owes its existence and all-round utility to this mysterious something. While this way of vijnāna appraisal is a tragedy because it causes to our hearts or to our spirits unspeakable anguish and makes this life a burden full of miseries, we must remember that it is because of this tragedy that we are awakened to the truth of prajñā experience.

Prajñā thus is always tolerant toward vijnāna though outwardly it may seem to be abusive and unreasonably harsh toward it. The idea is to recall it to its proper and original office whereby it can work in harmony with prajñā, thus giving to both the heart and the mind what each has been looking for ever since the awakening of human consciousness. When, therefore, prajñā violently breaks all the rules of ratiocination, we must take it as giving the intellect a sign of grave danger. When vijnāna sees this, vijnāna ought to heed it and try to examine itself thoroughly. It ought not go on with its "rationalistic" way.

That prajñā underlies vijnāna, that it is what enables vijnāna to function as the principle of differentiation, is not difficult to realize when we see that differentiation is impossible without something that works for integration or unification. The dichotomy of subject and object cannot obtain unless there is something that lies behind them, something that is neither subject nor object; this is a kind of field where
they can operate, where subject can be separated from object, object from subject. If the two are not related in any way, we cannot even speak of their separation or antithesis. There must be something of subject in object and something of object in subject, which makes their separation as well as their relationship possible. And, as this something cannot be made the theme of intellectualization, there must be another method of reaching this most fundamental principle. The fact that it is so utterly fundamental excludes the application of the bifurcating instrument. We must appeal to prajñā-intuition.

When we state that prajñā underlies or permeates or penetrates viññāna we are apt to think that there is a special faculty called prajñā and that this does all kinds of work of penetration or permeation in relation to viññāna. This way of thinking is to make prajñā an aspect of viññāna. Prajñā, however, is not the principle of judgment whereby subject becomes related to object. Prajñā transcends all forms of judgment and is not at all predicable.

Another mistake we often make about prajñā is that somehow it tends toward pantheism. For this reason Buddhist philosophy is known among scholars as pantheistic. But that this is an incorrect view is evident from the fact that prajñā does not belong in the category of viññāna and that whatever judgment we derive from the exercise of viññāna cannot apply to prajñā. In pantheism there is still an antithesis of subject and object, and the idea of an all-permeating God in the world of plurality is the work of postulation. Prajñā-intuition precludes this. No distinction is allowed here between the one and the many, the whole and the parts. When a blade of grass is lifted the whole universe is revealed there; in every pore of the skin there pulsates the life of the triple world, and this is intuited by prajñā, not by way of reasoning but "immediately." The characteristic of prajñā is this "immediacy." If we have reasoning to do here, it comes too late; as the Zen masters would say, "a speck of white cloud ten thousand miles away."

Paradoxical statements are therefore characteristic of prajñā-intuition. As it transcends viññāna or logic it does not mind contradicting itself; it knows that a contradiction is the outcome of differentiation, which is the work of viññāna. Prajñā negates what it asserted before, and conversely; it has its own way of dealing with this world of dualities. The flower is red and not-red; the bridge flows and not the river; the wooden horse neighs; the stone maiden dances.

To speak more logically, if this is allowable with prajñā-intuition, everthing connected with viññāna also belongs to prajñā; prajñā is there in its wholeness; it is never divided even when it reveals itself
in each assertion or negation made by vijñāna. To be itself vijñāna polarizes itself, but prajñā never loses its unitive totality. The Buddhist's favorite illustration of the nature of prajñā-intuition is given by the analogy of the moon reflecting in infinitely changing forms of water, from a mere drop of rain to the vast expanse of the ocean, and these with infinitely varied degrees of purity. The analogy is, however, likely to be misunderstood. From the fact that the body of the moon is one in spite of its unlimited divisibilities, prajñā-intuition may be taken as suggesting oneness abstracted from the many. But to qualify prajñā in this way is to destroy it. The oneness or completeness or self-sufficiency of it, if it is necessary to picture it to our differentiating minds, is not after all to be logically or mathematically interpreted. But as our minds always demand an interpretation, we may say this: not unity in multiplicity, nor multiplicity in unity; but unity is multiplicity and multiplicity is unity. In other words, prajñā is vijñāna and vijñāna is prajñā, only this is to be "immediately" apprehended and not after a tedious and elaborate and complicated process of dialectic.

III

To illustrate the significance of prajñā in relation to vijñāna, let me cite some cases from the history of Zen (or Ch'an) Buddhism in China.

(1) When a Zen student called Shuzan-shu came to Hōgen, one of the great masters of the Five Dynasties era, Hōgen said, "There is a saying that an inch's difference makes it as widely apart as heaven from the earth. How do you understand this?" Shuzan-shu merely repeated it, saying, "An inch's difference makes it as widely apart as heaven from the earth." Hōgen said, "If your understanding does not go any farther than that, you have not got the point." Shu then asked, "What, then, is your understanding?" Hōgen said, "An inch's difference makes it as widely apart as heaven from the earth." Shu then understood and bowed.31

Someone later added the comment: "Why was Shu wrong with his repetition? When he asked Hōgen for instruction, Hōgen merely repeated it and that made Shu realize his fault. Where was the trouble? If you understand the point, I will say you know a thing or two." (I wish to remark here that the Chinese original is terse and forceful but altogether loses its weight when translated. The original runs: "An inch's difference, heaven-and-earth's separation.")

(2) When Gensoku first saw Seiho,32 Gensoku asked, "Who is the Buddha?" Seiho answered, "The god of fire comes and asks for
fire." When Gensoku heard this it touched his heart deeply. When later he came to see Jōye, and Jōye asked about his understanding, Gensoku answered, "The god of fire is fire itself and asks for fire, which is like my asking about the Buddha when I am he." Jōye said, "There! I thought you understood, but now I know you do not!"

This worried Gensoku greatly and he spent much time pondering Jōye's words. As he could not come to any conclusion, he finally came to Jōye again and asked for instruction. Jōye said, "You ask and I will answer." Thereupon Gensoku said, "Who is the Buddha?" Jōye replied: "The god of fire comes and asks for fire!" This at once opened Gensoku's spiritual eye.

(3) Tokusho (890–971), one of the great masters of Kegon (Hua-yen) philosophy and Zen Buddhism, before he came to a final understanding of the ārya ājñā way, saw many teachers and thought he had thoroughly mastered it. When he saw Ryūge he asked, "I am told that the greatest of the honored ones is unapproachable. Why is that so?" Ryūge said, "It is like fire against fire." Tokusho said, "When it suddenly meets with water, what happens?" Ryūge did not give him any further explanation but simply said, "You do not understand." At another time he asked, "Heaven cannot cover it; the earth cannot hold it. What does this mean?" Said Ryūge, "That should be so." Tokusho failed to get the meaning and asked for further instruction. Ryūge said, "Sometime later you will come to understand it by yourself." When Tokusho interviewed Sozan, Tokusho said, "Tell me, please, that which transcends time." Sozan said, "No, I will not." "Why will you not?" Tokusho argued. "Because the category of being and non-being cannot be applied here." Tokusho said, "O master, how well you explain!"

After interviewing fifty-four masters, like Sudhana in the Kegon Sūtra, Tokusho thought he knew everything well that was to be known in Buddhist philosophy. When he came to Jōye, he simply attended his sermons and did not ask him anything. One day a monk appeared before Jōye and asked, "What is the one drop of water that has come down from the Sokei source?" Now, Sokei refers to the monastery where Yeno (Hui-nêng in Chinese) used to reside and Yeno is considered the real founder of the Chinese Zen school of Buddhism. To ask about the drop of water coming down from the Sokei source is to be enlightened in the truth of ārya ājñā-intuition. Jōye gave this answer, "The one drop of water that has come down from the Sokei source." The inquiring monk was nonplussed and did not know what to make of it. Tokusho, who was merely present there without any desire to increase his own knowledge in Buddhist teaching, was thus
most unexpectedly awakened to the truth of *praññā*-intuition. He then felt as if everything that was accumulating in his mind in the way of intellectual acquisition had suddenly dissolved into nothingness.

After this experience Tokusho was a thoroughly equipped master in the philosophy of *praññā*-intuition, and the way he handled all the baffling problems of philosophy was truly remarkable. To cite a few instances:28

A monk asked, "Where does the dead one go?"
Tokusho: "After all, I will not tell you."
Monk: "Why not, master?"
Tokusho: "Because you may not understand."

Monk: "All these mountains and rivers and the great earth—where do they come from?"
Tokusho: "Where does this question of yours come from?"

Monk: "What does the eye of the great seer look like?"
Tokusho: "As black as lacquer."

Monk: "When no tidings are available, what about it?"28
Tokusho: "Thank you for your tidings."

Monk: "I am told that when one transcends the objective world,27 one is identified with the Tathāgata. What does this mean?"
Tokusho: "What do you mean by the objective world?" [Is there any such thing?]
Monk: "If so, one is indeed identified with the Tathāgata."
Tokusho: "Do not whine like a yakan."

Monk: "It is said that Prince Naṭa returns his flesh to the mother and his bones to the father, and then, showing himself on the lotus-seat, preaches for his parents. What is the body of the Prince?"
Tokusho: "All the brethren see you standing here."
Monk: "If so, all the worlds partake equally of the nature of suchness."
Tokusho: "Appearances are deceptive."

This is perhaps enough to show Tokusho’s attainment in *praññā*-intuition. In one way the Chinese language has a great advantage in demonstrating *praññā* because it can express much with its characteristic brevity and forcefulness. *Praññā* does not elaborate, does not indulge in wordiness, does not go into details, for all these are features peculiar to *vijñāna* or intellection. Reasoning requires many words; indeed, wordiness is the spirit of philosophy. The Chinese language, or rather its use of ideographic signs, evokes concrete images full of undifferentiated implications—a very fitting tool for *praññā*. *Praññā* is never analytical and abhors abstractions. It lets one particle of dust reveal the whole truth underlying all existences. But this does not mean that the ideographs are suitable for discussing abstract subjects.

Tokusho’s *mondō* were not always such short ones as cited above, and he often indulged in argumentation.
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A monk asked, "According to the saying of an ancient sage, if a man sees prajñā he is bound by it; if he does not he is bound by it all the same. How is it that prajñā binds him?"

Tokusho said, "You tell me what prajñā sees."

Monk: "How is it that one's not seeing prajñā binds one?"

Tokusho: "You tell me if there is anything prajñā does not see." He then continued, "If a man sees prajñā, it is not prajñā; if he does not see prajñā, it is not prajñā. Tell me, if you can, how it is that there are seeing and not-seeing in prajñā. Therefore, it is said that if one thing (dharma—concrete reality) is lacking, the Dharmakāya (universal concrete) is not complete, that if one thing (dharma) is too much it is not complete either.

"But I would say: 'If there is one dharma the Dharmakāya is not complete; if there is no dharma the Dharmakāya is not complete either. For here lies the whole truth of prajñā-intuition.'"

I have digressed somewhat, but as we are deeply concerned with prajñā let me quote another master.

A monk asked, "What is mahāprajñā (great or absolute prajñā)?"

Sesabo, the master, said, "The snow is falling fast and all is enveloped in mist."

The monk remained silent.

The master asked, "Do you understand?"

"No, master, I do not."

Thereupon the master composed a verse for him:

"Mahāprajñā—
It is neither taking in nor giving up.
If one understands it not,
The wind is cold, the snow falling."

I have said enough already without going back to the three instances cited above to show what is the essential characteristic of prajñā-intuition. If it should appeal to the viññāna point of view or the intellect, the repetition of the statement that was quoted before would make no sense whatever. The one says, "An inch's difference and heaven-and-earth's separation," and the other repeats it; or the one says, "Sogen's one-drop-water," and the other repeats, "Sogen's one-drop-water." There is here no exchange of intellectually analyzable ideas. A parrot-like mechanical imitation of the one by the other is not what logically minded people expect of any intelligible demonstration of thought. It is, therefore, evident that prajñā does not belong to the same order as viññāna. Prajñā must be a superior principle, going beyond the limits of viññāna, when we see how Tokusho, master of Kegon philosophy, demonstrated his originality in handling problems of philosophy and religion. He could never get this originality and facility so long as he remained in the viññāna way of thinking.

IV

Prajñā is the ultimate reality itself, and prajñā-intuition is its becoming conscious of itself. Prajñā is therefore dynamic and not
static; it is not mere activity-feeling but activity itself; it is not a state of samādhi (concentration), not a state of passivity, not just looking at an object; it knows no object; it is the activity itself. Prajñā has no premeditated methods; it creates them out of itself as they are needed. The idea of methodology is not applicable to it, nor is teleology, although this does not mean that it is erratic and recognizes no laws. In a sense, however, this disregarding of laws is true of prajñā because it is its own creator out of its own free will.

Thus vijñāna is evolved out of prajñā, and prajñā works its way through it. From the vijñāna point of view, prajñā is certainly teleological and methodological, but we must remember that prajñā is not governed by vijñāna, i.e., by something foreign to it, and that, being its own creator, prajñā’s world is always new and fresh and never a repetition. The world was not created so many millions and millions of years ago, but it is being created every moment, and it is prajñā’s work. Reality is not a corpse to be dissected by the surgical knife of vijñāna. If this were the case, when “the god of fire comes for fire” was repeated, the understanding would be said to have been final and conclusive, but the fact is that it was far from it and “the god of fire” had to wait for prajñā to recognize himself in the most ultimate sense. Epistemologically interpreted, reality is prajñā; metaphysically interpreted, reality is śūnyatā. Śūnyatā, then, is prajñā, and prajñā is śūnyatā.

Psychologically, prajñā is an experience, but it is not to be confused with other experiences of our daily life, which may be classified as intellectual, emotional, or sensuous. Prajñā is indeed the most fundamental experience. On it all other experiences are based, but we ought not regard it as something separate from the latter which can be picked out and pointed to as a specifically qualifiable experience. It is pure experience beyond differentiation. It is the awakening of śūnyatā to self-consciousness, without which we can say that we cannot have any mental life and that whatever thoughts and feelings we may have are like a boat that has lost its moorings, for they do not have any coordinating center. Prajñā is the principle of unification and coordination. We must not think it is an abstract idea, for it is decidedly not, but most concrete in every sense of the term. Because of its concreteness prajñā is the most dynamic thing we can have in the world. For this reason even the “one drop leaking out of the Sokei spring” is enough to vivify not only one’s whole life but the entire triple world filling the boundlessness of space.

This miracle-working power of prajñā is illustrated in almost all the Mahāyāna sūtras, and I give an instance from the Kegon Sūtra.
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When the Buddha attained enlightenment, the whole universe appeared in an entirely changed aspect.

It is evident that when prajñā asserts itself the whole aspect of the world undergoes change beyond the comprehension of vijñāna. This may be called performing a miracle on the grandest possible scale. But as long as the performance stays within the limits of vijñāna, however grand it may be, it cannot be anything more than a petty juggler's artifice, for it does not mean the revolution of our vijñāna point of view at its basis—called pāraḥśaya (about-face). Some think that what is described in most of the Mahāyāna sūtras is poetic imaginings or spiritual symbolizations, but this is to miss altogether the main issue in the activity and significance of prajñā-intuition.

When prajñā-intuition takes place it annihilates space and time relationships, and all existence is reduced to a point-instant. It is like the action of a great fire at the end of the kalpa (era) which razes everything to the ground and prepares a new world to evolve. In this new prajñā-world there is no three-dimensional space, no time divisible into the past, present, and future. At the tip of my finger Mount Sumeru rises; before I utter a word and you hear it, the whole history of the universe is enacted. This is no play of poetic imagination, but the Primary Man manifesting himself in his spontaneous, free-creating, non-teleological activities. The Primary Man is Prince Naṭa, and, in fact, every one of us, when the flesh is returned to the mother and the bones to the father. This Man, now stripped of everything that he thought belonged to him, is engaged in his anabhoga-cārya (purposeless activity), which constitutes the bodhisattva-cārya—a life really constituting bodhisattva-hood.

It is interesting to note that the Primary Man is everywhere the same but his expressions are not alike, showing marked differentiation in accordance with local limitations. In India the Primary Man acts dramatically, wonderfully rich in images and figures. But in China he is practical and in a sense prosaic and direct and matter-of-fact; there are no dialectical subtleties in his way of dealing with prajñā; he does not indulge in calling up brilliantly colored imageries. Let me give an example. To the monk who asks about Prince Naṭa's Primary Man, a Chinese master of Buddhist philosophy answers, "No mistaking about this robust existence six feet high." The monk now asks, "Is it up to the Primary Man, or not, to assume this form?" The master retorts, "What do you call the Primary Man?" Not understanding, the monk wishes to be instructed. The master, instead of giving him instructions as the monk probably desired, proposes the question "Who is to instruct you?"
While the \textit{mondō} (question and answer) selected here carries in it something of ratiocination, I am afraid it is still unintelligible to modern man. Keisho, the master alluded to here, was not so direct as some other masters might be, for they are sometimes apt to give a kick to such a questioner, or push him away with a remark like this, "I do not know,"\textsuperscript{44} or "He is right under your nose,"\textsuperscript{44} or "Carry this lunatic out of my sight!"\textsuperscript{44} Let me try to make Keisho more intelligible by adding "legs to the snake."

By the Primary Man is meant ultimate reality or \textit{prajñā}, as the case may be. The monk-questioner knew that his individual self was subject sooner or later to disintegration; he wanted to find, if possible, something which was untouchable by birth-and-death. Hence the question "What is the Primary Man?" Keisho was a past master in the art of teaching which developed in China side by side with the rationalistic interpretation of Buddhist thought. He knew full well how futile it was to resort to the latter method when the aspirant after the truth was really earnest in his endeavor to attain the final enlightenment. Such aspirants could never be satisfied with the logical handling of the subject. What they wanted was not a mere intellectual understanding, which would never give full satisfaction to the aspiring soul. The master, therefore, would not waste time and energy by entering into arguments with the monk who, he knew, would never be convinced by this method. The master was short in his remark, and the Chinese language is remarkably fitted to the purpose. He simply said, "There can be no doubt about this robust existence six feet high." He might easily have said, "this body of yours," but he did not go into detail; he simply referred to "this robust existence," well built and of some height. As to the relationship between this physical body and the Primary Man, he gave no hints whatsoever. If there were any, the discovery was left to the monk's own devices, for the idea here, as everywhere else, is to come to an understanding by means of the inner light, by the awakening of \textit{prajñā}.

The monk in question, however, did not come up to the master's expectation; he was still on the level of intellection. Hence his inquiry, "Is it up to the Primary Man, or not, to assume this form?" This is tantamount to saying, "Is this self, then, the Primary Man?" The monk's apparent inference was that the highest being, the Primary Man, incorporates himself in this bodily existence in order to make himself approachable to the human senses. The inference may not have been incorrect as far as ratiocination was concerned, but the master's idea was not to stop there. If he had, and had given his approval, the monk would never be saved, for the point of the whole
discussion would have been utterly lost. The monk was not to be left with mere intellectualization.

The master fully knew where the monk’s weakness lay, hence the question “What do you call the Primary Man?” The Primary Man was not to be identified with this individual corporeal existence, nor was he to be regarded as a separate being outside of it, as if the Man were another entity like the monk or like the master. The Man and the individual could not be considered wholly one, nothing else remaining, but at the same time they were not to be looked upon as altogether separate and dualistic. The one was not to be merged into the other; they were two and at the same time one. This undifferentiated differentiation was the point to be grasped by praṣṭa-intuition.

The Primary Man is not a kind of general concept abstracted from individual existences. The Man is not an outcome of generalization. If he were, he would be a dead man, a corpse as cold as inorganic matter, and as contentless as mere negation. On the contrary, he is very much alive and full of vitality not only in the physical sense but intellectually, morally, aesthetically, and spiritually. He lives in the monk’s robust body six feet high and also in the master’s body, probably not so robust, not so high, but full of vitality and sensibility. The monk’s task was to realize this and not to argue about it. The master then put the questions, “What do you call the Primary Man? Are you the Man himself? No, you are to all appearances and in full reality a monk miserably troubled with the question as to the whatness of the Man. If so, you cannot be he. Where, then, is he?” So long as no satisfactory answer was forthcoming from this exchange of questions, the monk’s intelligence could not go beyond the limits of vijñāna, or sheer rationality.

The monk was helpless here and asked humbly for instruction. But from the master’s point of view it was not a matter of just transmitting information. It was from the beginning beyond the sphere of possible instruction. If there could be any instruction, it was to evolve out of one’s own prajñā. If the monk were at all able to ask a question about the Primary Man, something of his nature must reside in the monk, and the best way to know the Man would be to have an “interview” with him by awakening prajñā in the monk, for prajñā is the Man. The master’s role could not go beyond pointing the way to it, and to awaken it was the monk’s. Hence, “Who is to instruct you?”

In spite of all these interpretations of the mondō, we do not seem to be any wiser than we were at the beginning. To make the matter more intelligible to the Western mind, I shall add a few words before we proceed to further mondō.
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The body is the expression of the will, and what unites the will and the body as an individual self is the inner creative life. The body, the will, and the individual self are concepts worked out by the analytical viññāna, but the inner creative life as it creates all these concepts through viññāna is immediately apprehended only by prajñā. When Prince Naṭa returns his body to his father and mother as its progenitors, he gives up his individual self, which, according to his viññāna, he thinks he has, and which may be interpreted as reduced to total annihilation, but Buddhist philosophy tells us that it is then for the first time that he can reveal his Primary Man or Primary Body, in which he preaches to his parents, which means the whole world. This Primary Body seated on the lotus-seat is God's creative activity. The analyzing viññāna stops here and cannot go any further; God is its postulate; it must wait for prajñā-intuition to transform this cold postulate-corpse into a creative life-principle.

Let me give a bit of logic here, hoping it will help clarify the nature of prajñā in this field. When we say that "A is A" and that this law of identity is fundamental, we forget that there is a living synthesizing activity whereby the subject "A" is linked to the object "A." It is viññāna that analyzes the one "A" into the subject "A" and the object "A"; and without prajñā this bifurcation cannot be replaced by the original unity or identity; without prajñā the divided "A" remains isolated; however much the subject may desire to be united with the object, the desire can never be fulfilled without prajñā. It is prajñā, indeed, that makes the law of identity work as an established self-evident truth requiring no objective evidence. The foundation of our thinking thus owes its functioning to prajñā. Buddhist philosophy is a system of the self-evolving and self-identifying prajñā.

This consideration will shed light on the repetitive mondo cited above in regard to "The one drop of water streaming from the Sōkei spring" and "An inch's difference and heaven-and-earth's separation." In the case of "the god of fire seeks fire," Tokusho could not have an insight into its secret as long as his viññāna kept the concept "the god of fire" disjoined from the concept "fire." He had to wait for his prajñā to come to its self-awakening in order to make the logically fundamental law of identity a living principle of experience. Our viññāna is always analytical and pays no attention to the underlying synthetic principle. The one "A" is divided into the subject "A" and the object "A," and by connecting the one with the other by a copula viññāna establishes the law of identity, but it neglects to account for this connection. Hence viññāna's utter incapacity for becoming a living experience. This is supplied by prajñā-intuition.
The problem of praśnā, which constitutes the essence of Buddhist philosophy, is really inexhaustible, and no amount of talk seems to suffice. I will give some more mondō here and indicate the trend of thought underlying them. Until the relation between vijñāna and praśnā, or that between praśnā-intuition and vijñāna-reasoning, is thoroughly understood, such ideas as śūnyatā (emptiness), tathatā (suchness), mokṣa (emancipation), Nirvāṇa, and others will not be fully absorbed as living ideas.

One important thing to remember before we proceed is that, if we think that there is a thing denoted as praśnā and another denoted as vijñāna and that they are forever separated and not to be brought to a state of unification, we shall be completely on the wrong track. The fact is that this world of ours, as reflected in our senses and intellect, is that of vijñāna, and that this vijñāna cannot function in its full capacity until it is securely moored in praśnā, and, further, that though praśnā does not belong to the order of vijñāna we have to denote praśnā in distinction from vijñāna as if there were such an entity as praśnā which is to be subsumed under the category of vijñāna. Words are useful as the culminating point in the progress of thinking, but for that reason they are also misleading. We have to guide carefully our every step in this field.

In the following tabulation those items listed on the praśnā side must be understood as such only when vijñāna is enlightened by praśnā; praśnā in itself has nothing to be discriminated. For instance, śūnyatā (emptiness) or tathatā (suchness) is not to be taken as objectively denoted. They are the ideas whereby our consciousness locates its points of reference. Whenever praśnā expresses itself it has to share the limitations of vijñāna either in agreement with it or otherwise. Even when praśnā flatly denies what vijñāna asserts it cannot go outside the vijñāna area. To think it does is also the doing of vijñāna, and in this sense praśnā cannot escape vijñāna. Even when the role of praśnā is emphatically uphold in the drama of human activities, it must not be understood as ignoring the claims of vijñāna. Praśnā-intuition and vijñāna-discrimination are equally important and indispensable in the establishment of a synthetic philosophy. In the mondō to be cited later, this relationship of praśnā and vijñāna will be noticed.

On the praśnā side we may list the following:
Śūnyatā (emptiness) .................................. A world of beings and non-beings
Tathatā (suchness) .................................... A world of clear-cut definitions
Praśnā-Intuition ...................................... Vijñāna-discrimination

On the vijñāna side we may have these counterbalancing:
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Nirvāṇa ........................................... Samsāra (birth-and-death)
Bodhi (enlightenment) ......................... Avidyā (ignorance)
Purity ............................................. Defilement
The mind (citta) ............................... The senses (vijñāna)
The Dharma (ultimate reality) ............... Sarvadharma (individual entities)
Pure experience ................................ Experiences of multitudes
Pure act (akarma) ............................ A world of causation
Undifferentiated ............................... Differentiated
Non-discrimination .......................... Discrimination
No-mind, or no-thought ..................... Individual consciousness
Eternal now, or absolute present .......... Time relations
Non-duality ..................................... Duality
Etc. ................................................. Etc.

The reason so many mondō are given below is that by going over them one after another the readers are likely to feel something glimmering between the questions and answers; thereby I can strengthen my position in regard to the interpretation of prajñā-intuition as presented in this paper. Furthermore, in these mondō, the relationship of vijñāna to prajñā is brought out in a more practical way, whereby the readers may draw their own conclusions from the mondō. Besides, the literature recording these mondō is generally inaccessible to Western readers, and it seems appropriate to make use of this opportunity to quote them for the benefit of those who are interested in the subject. There is an almost inexhaustible mine of mondō in China and Japan, and there is no reason for it to remain unexplored.

The subjects of the mondō are varied; they appear sometimes not at all concerned with topics of Buddhist philosophy because they deal with such subjects as "one standing at the head of a ridge ten thousand feet high," "the master of a monastery," "the place where a monk comes from," "a tombstone showing no seams," "the moon on a cloudless night," "playing on a stringless harp," and so on. As to the answers given even to the highest ideas of philosophy and religion, they are treated with the utmost indifference, as we can see in many of the mondō that follow. To those who have never been initiated into this mysterious world of Buddhist philosophy, the mondō will surely be a cache of absurdities. But from the Buddhist point of view there are no methods more effective than the mondō for demonstrating the specific character of prajñā-intuition.

Let us start, then, with the problem of the Self.

Sekito (700–790) was one of the greatest figures in the Buddhism of the T'ang dynasty. A monk called Shiri once asked him, "What is that which makes up this
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Self?" To this the master answered, in the form of a counter-question, "What do you want from me?"
The monk said, "If I do not ask you, where can I get the solution?"
"Did you ever lose it?" concluded the master.

Bunsui of Hōji monastery in Kinryō gave this discourse to his monks:
"O monks, you have been here for some time, the winter session is over and the summer is come. Have you had an insight into your Self, or not? If you have, let me be your witness, so that you will have a right view and not be led by wrong views."
A monk came forward and asked, "What is my Self?"
The master answered, "What a fine specimen of manhood with a pair of bright eyes!"

Yentoku of Yentsu-in monastery:
Q. "What is my Self?"
A. "What makes you specifically ask this question?"

Ki of Unryu-in monastery:
Q. "What is my Self?"
A. "It is like you and me."
Q. "In this case there is no duality."
A. "Eighteen thousand miles off!"

Yō of Kōrō monastery:
Q. "When I lack clear insight into my own Self, what shall I do?"
A. "No clear insight."
Q. "Why not?"
A. "Don't you know that it's one's own business?"

Kaitotsu of Tōzen monastery:
Q. "I have not yet clearly seen into my own nature. May I be instructed by you?"
A. "Why are you not thankful for it?"

Tokuichi of Ryūgeji monastery:
Q. "What is my Self?"
A. "You are putting frost on top of snow."

Various answers are given to this question, "What is the Self?"
They are so various, indeed, that one fails to find a common denominator whereby they yield a uniform solution. The answer requires certain insight into what constitutes the Self, and this cannot be attained by merely thinking it over intellectually. While thinking is needed, what solves the question is not, after all, the intellect but the will power. It is solved by an existential method, and not by abstraction or by postulation. Buddhist philosophy is built upon the most fundamental, pre-rationalistic prajñā-intuition. When this is reached, such problems as the Self, ultimate reality, the Buddha-dharma, the Tao, the Source, the Mind, etc., are all solved. However infinitely variable the master's ways of handling them may be, there is always one line of approach whereby they become intelligible.

Tō of Kokutai monastery:
Q. "When the old mirror is not yet polished, what would you say of it?"

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"The old mirror."
Q. "When it is polished, what of it?"
A. "The old mirror."

The "old mirror" is another name for the Self in a state of undifferentiation. "Polished" means differentiation. The "old mirror" remains the same whether or not it is differentiated.

A monk asked Chikaku of Yōmyō monastery:
"What is the great perfect mirror?"
"An old broken tray!" was the answer.

In this "the mirror" is not even an "old one"; it is an old broken tray, altogether useless. Zen philosophers of Buddhism often use this kind of expression when they wish to show the utter worthlessness of a concept where prajñā-intuition is concerned.

Dōke of Byakuryū-in monastery:
Q. "What is the Tao?"
A. "The rider on the donkey seeks the donkey."

Ryōkū of Tōzen-in monastery:
Q. "What is the Tao?"
A. "This, right here!"

Jūten of Hofuku-in monastery:
Q. "I am told that when one wishes to attain the way of the Unborn, one must see into the Source. What is the Source?"
The master remained silent for a while, and then asked the attendant, "What did that monk ask me just now?" The monk thereupon repeated the question, which made the master scoff at him, saying, "I am not deaf!"

Jūten, the master, once asked a monk, "Where do you come from?"
The monk answered, "I come from a monastery on the western side of the River where Kwannon is enshrined."
The master said, "Did you see Kwannon?"
"Yes, I did."
"Did you see it on the right side or the left side?"
The monk replied, "When seeing there is neither right nor left."

In a mondō like this, one can readily see that the question at issue is not Kwannon, which is used merely as a symbol for the Self, or the Tao, or ultimate reality, and the seeing of it means prajñā-intuition. There is no differentiation in it of right and left; it is complete in itself; it is a unity itself; it is "pure" seeing. This monk apparently understood what prajñā-intuition was, and this form of question on the part of the master is known as a "trial" question.

Jūten, the master, saw the head cook and asked, "How large is your cooking pan?"
The monk-cook said, "You measure it yourself and see."
The master assumed the position of measuring it with his hands.
The monk remarked, "Do not make a fool of me."
The master retorted, "It is you who are making a fool of me."
The master, once seeing a monk, remarked, "How did you manage to be so tall as that?"
The monk answered, "How short are you?"
The master crouched as if making himself shorter.
The monk said, "Do not make a fool of me, O master!"
The master retorted, "It is you who are making a fool of me!"

Goshin of Saikōji monastery:48
Q. "What is the maṇi-jewel that takes colors?"
A. "Blue, yellow, red, and white."
Q. "What is the maṇi-jewel that does not take colors?"
A. "Blue, yellow, red, and white."

The maṇi-jewel is also symbolic, as is evident. The maṇi-jewel that takes colors refers to reality, or śūnyatā, conceived as subject to differentiation, while the maṇi-jewel that does not take colors is reality itself. The master’s answers, however, are the same to both questions; apparently he makes no distinction between the two. Intellectually or conceptually, there is decidedly a distinction, which is ignored by prajñā-intuition. Another master, who may wish to make his inquirers see another phase of prajñā-intuition, is likely to give his answers quite a different color. This is instanced by the mondō of the "old mirror."

Shutotsu of Jaran monastery:48
Q. "Who is the Buddha?"
A. "Whom are you asking?"

Fukusen:44
Q. "Who is the Buddha?"
A. "I do not know."

Reikan of Korea:41
Q. "Who is the Buddha?"
A. "Carry this lunatic away from here."

Kin of Koken monastery:48
Q. "Who is the Buddha?"
A. "Right under your nose."

Kyōyu of Hōju monastery:48
Q. "What is the ultimate principle of Buddhism?"
A. "Come nearer."
The monk moved forward, and the master said, "Do you understand?"
The monk said, "I do not, master."
The master remarked, "It is like a flash of lightning, and it went eons ago!"

Chikaku of Yōmyōji:44
A monk said, "I am told that all Buddhas and all the Buddha-śūtras issue from one śūtra. What could this śūtra be?"
The master replied, "Revolving on forever; no checking it, and no arguing, no talking can catch it."48
Q. "How shall I then receive and hold it?"
A. "If you wish to receive and hold it, you should hear it with your eyes."
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Sōton of Dairin monastery: A monk asked, "How do we discourse on the highest truth of Buddhist philosophy?"
To this, Gensha, the master, answered, "Few hear it."
The monk later came to Sōton and asked, "What did Gensha mean?"
Sōton said, "When you have finished removing Mt. Sekiiji, I will tell you."
Jyu of Kisu monastery later commented on this:
"Speak low, please."

This interjection of comment by the later masters on a mondō, which took place between the predecessors and the questioners, is quite common. It is not necessarily a criticism, but is directed toward bringing out what is implied in the mondō. Gensha said, "Few hear it," and Jyu, referring to it, said, "Speak low!" The masters are generally off the track of "logic," and they frequently indulge in making fun of one another. They are witty and sportive. Followers of prajñā-intuition naturally avoid getting into a philosophical discussion of abstract ideas; they are partial to figures, imageries, facts of daily experience. The following, picked at random from numerous such examples, will show what I mean here.

A monk asked Zembī of Shurei monastery: "I understand that all the rivers, however different their sources, pour into the great ocean. How many drops of water could there be in the ocean?"
The master asked, "Have you ever been to the ocean?"
Monk: "What then, after we have been to the ocean?"
The master replied, "You come tomorrow and I will tell you."

The monk who asked about the ocean evidently knows something about Buddhist philosophy; hence his second question, "What after having been there?" Seeing this, the master retorts, "Come tomorrow." They both understand, and the mondō serves to give us insight into the nature of prajñā-intuition. One may ask, "What has the ocean to do with prajñā?" But the ocean here referred to is the ocean of śūnyatā, in which all the phenomenal world is absorbed, and the counting of drops of water in it is to understand what becomes of the multiplicity absorbed therein. The monk wants to find out what the master will say concerning the relationship between the one and the many, between prajñā and vijnāna. To apprehend this no amount of philosophical argument helps, leading only to further confusion, and the expected "tomorrow" will never come. Instead of indulging in epistemological methodology, "I do not know" sums up the essence of prajñā-intuition.

Seishū of Rinninji monastery: He once asked a monk: "Do you understand the Buddha-dharma (the truth or ultimate reality)?"
The monk said, "No, I do not, master."
"You honestly do not?"
"That is right, master."
"You leave me now and come tomorrow."
The monk bowed saying, "Fare thee well."
The master then said, "No, that is not the point."

This "come tomorrow" was taken by the monk in its literal or intellectual sense, and to remind him of his misunderstanding the master softly states, "That is not the point." The point is to understand what is not understandable, to know what is unknowable, wherein prajñā-intuition really consists.

A monk asked Yōmyō, "I have been with you for a long time, and yet I am unable to understand your way. How is this?"
The master said, "Where you do not understand, there is the point for your understanding."
"How is any understanding possible where it is impossible?"
The master said, "The cow gives birth to a baby elephant; clouds of dust rise over the ocean."

When Seisshū was still in his novitiate stage under Jōye, the latter, pointing at the rain, remarked, "Every drop of it fills your eyes."

Seisshū at the time failed to understand this, but afterward, while studying the Avatārasākāra Sūtra, the meaning dawned upon him. Later, in one of his discourses, he said: "All the Buddhas in the ten quarters of the world are ever facing you. Do you see them? If you say you see, do you see them with the mind or with the eye?"

On another occasion this was his discourse: "It is said that when one sees form (rūpa) one sees mind (citta). Let me ask you, what do you call the mind? The mountains and rivers and the great earth extending before you—this world of pluralities—blue and yellow, red and white, men and women, etc., infinitely varying in forms—are they mind, or are they not mind? If they are the mind, how does it transform itself into an infinite number of things? If they are not the mind, why is it said that when you see form you see the mind? Do you understand?

"Just because you fail to grasp this point and go on cherishing your confused views in manifold ways, you erroneously see differences and unities where there are really no differences and no unities.

"Just at this very moment your immediate apprehension of the mind is imperative, and then you will realize that it is vast emptiness and there is nothing to see, nothing to hear...."

This idea of "vast emptiness" is quite puzzling and baffling and always tends to be understood from the relativistic point of view. Buddhist philosophy has sat for "being," asat for "non-being," and śūnyatā for "emptiness," showing that "emptiness" has a positive connotation and is not a mere negation. Śūnyatā transcends being and non-being; that is, both presuppose the idea of śūnyatā. Therefore, when a Buddhist philosopher declares that there is nothing to see, nothing to hear, etc., we must understand it not as denying the experiences of our daily life but as indeed confirming them in every way. Hence the following:

Keijyu of Hannyū monastery came to the "Dharma-Hall," and the monks congregated, hearing the board struck three times, which was the signal for them to
come together. The master then recited an impromptu verse:

"Strange indeed—the board thrice struck,
And you monks are all gathered here.
As you already know well how to tell the time,
I need not repeat it over again."

He left the hall without saying anything further.

Buddhist philosophers, including every one of us ordinary sentient beings, not only hear sounds and see flowers, but also offer flowers to the Buddha, burn incense before him, and perform all kinds of acts of religious piety. We may not all claim to be Buddhists; we may even protest against being called religious; but the deeds here mentioned are what we are performing every day. It does not make any difference whether we are Buddhists or Christians or communists.

Mugaku of Suibi monastery was a disciple of Tanka. When he was found one day offering food to the arhats a monk remarked, "Tanka burned the wooden image of the Buddha, and you offer food to the wooden arhats. How is that?"

Suibi said, "Let him burn the Buddha if he wants to, but he can never burn the Buddha to ashes. As for myself, I just offer this to the arhats."

There was another monk, who said this: "As to offering food to the arhats, do they come to partake it?"

Suibi said, "Do you eat every day, O monk?"

The monk made no answer. The master's comment was, "Few indeed are the intelligent!"

To conclude this section, let me add a word in regard to the distinction between prajñā and vijñāna in the understanding of the mondo. Vijñāna has a methodology, but prajñā has none because it always demands immediacy and never allows hesitation or reflection in any form. When you see a flower, you know at once that it is a flower. When you dip your hand in cold water, you realize that it is cold, and this immediately, not after a moment of reflection. In this respect prajñā-intuition is like perception. The difference between the two is that perception does not go beyond the senses whereas intuition is far more deeply seated. When perception touches this foundation, it becomes prajñā-intuition. For perception to develop into prajñā, something must be added to it. This added something, however, is not something added from outside; it is the perception itself, and to realize this is the function of prajñā-intuition. In other words, this is prajñā intuiting itself; prajñā is its own methodology.

When I draw a line on paper, it is not at all straight, but I can use it geometrically as such and demonstrate all the properties belonging to it. As far as visual perception is concerned the line is limited, but, when our geometrical conception of a straight line is added to it, we can make it function as such. In a similar way, prajñā-intuition in one
case makes the "rock nod even before the master uttered a word," and in another case keeps the master very much alive even after he is cremated and his bones sound like copper. "How?" one may ask, in this second case. The master would say, "Does not the boy-attendant reply to my call, saying, 'Yes, master?'" One may still insist that the boy is not the master. If I were the master I might strike you down, saying, "No such nonsense, O this stupid fellow!" But as I am not, I will say instead: "Your vision is still beclouded by viññāna. You see the master on one side and the boy on the other, keeping them separate according to our so-called objective method of interpreting an experience. You do not see them living in each other, and you fail to perceive that death 'objectively' comes to the master but has no power over 'that' which makes the boy respond to the master's call. To see this 'that' is prajñā-intuition."

VI.

This "that" is what is primarily and immediately given to our consciousness. It may be called "undifferentiated continuum," to use Mr. Northrop's term. To the Western mind, "continuum" may be better than sānyāsa, though it is likely to be misinterpreted as something "objectively" existing and apprehensible by viññāna. In the "continuum" immediately given, however, there is no differentiation of subject and object, of the seer and the seen. It is the "old mirror" that has not yet been polished, and therefore no world of multiplicities is reflected in "the mirror." It is the Primary Man, in whom neither flesh nor bones are left and yet who can reveal himself not only to his parents but to all his brothers, non-sentient as well as sentient. It is "the father" whose age is not calculable by means of numbers and therefore to whom everything is a "grandchild" of conceptualization. It lives with prajñā in the absolute state of quiescence, in which no polarization has taken place. It therefore eludes our efforts to bring it out to the discriminable surface of consciousness. We cannot speak of it as "being" or as "non-being." The categories created by ratiocination are not at all applicable here. If we attempt to wake it from the eternal silence of "neti, neti" (not this, not this) we "murder" it, and what viññāna perceives is a most mercilessly mutilated corpse.

Prajñā abides here, but it is never awakened by itself. When it is awakened it is always by viññāna. Viññāna, however, does not realize this fact, for viññāna always imagines that without viññāna there is no experienceable world, that if prajñā belongs in this world it must be of the same order as viññāna, and therefore that prajñā can well be dis-
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pensed with. But the fact is that viññāna is never viññāna without prajñā; prajñā is the necessary postulate of viññāna; it is what makes the law of identity workable, and this law is the foundation of viññāna. Viññāna is not the creator of the logical law, but it works by means of the law. Viññāna takes it as something given and not provable by any means devised by viññāna, for viññāna itself is conditioned by it. The eye cannot see itself; to do this a mirror is needed, but what it sees is not itself, only its reflection. Viññāna may devise some means to recognize itself, but the recognition turns out to be conceptual, as something postulated.

Prajñā, however, is the eye that can turn itself within and see itself, because it is the law of identity itself. It is due to prajñā that subject and object become identifiable, and this is done without mediation of any kind. Viññāna always needs mediation as it moves on from one concept to another—this is in the very nature of viññāna. But prajñā, being the law of identity itself, demands no transferring from subject to object. Therefore, it swings the staff; sometimes it asserts; sometimes it negates, and declares that "A is not-A and therefore A is A." This is the "logic" of prajñā-intuition. The "undifferentiated continuum" is to be understood in this light.

When the "undifferentiated continuum" is the outcome of viññāna dialectics, it remains a concept and never an experience. Buddhist philosophy, on the contrary, starts from pure experience, from self-identity, as self-evolving and self-discriminating activity, and viññāna comes into existence. In viññāna, therefore, there is always the potentiality of prajñā-intuition. When a flower is perceived as an object in the world of multiplicity, we recognize viññāna functioning and along with it prajñā-intuition. But, as most of us stop at viññāna and fail to reach prajñā, our vision becomes limited and does not penetrate deeply enough to reach ultimate reality or śūnyatā. So, it is declared that the unenlightened do not see the real flower in the light of suchness (lathatā).

From viññāna to prajñā is not a continuous process or progress. If it were, prajñā would cease to be prajñā; it would become another form of viññāna. There is a gap between the two; no transition is possible; hence there is a leap, "an existential leap." From viññāna-thinking to prajñā-seeing there is no mediating concept, no room for intellection, no time for deliberation. So, the Buddhist master urges us to "speak, quick, quick!" Immediacy, no interpretation, no explanatory apology—this is what constitutes prajñā-intuition.

I stated at the beginning that prajñā takes in the whole, while viññāna is concerned with parts. This needs to be explained in more de-
tail. If parts are mere aggregates, unconnected and incoherent masses, viññāna cannot make them the subject of intellectual analysis. The reason viññāna can deal with parts is that these parts are related to the whole, individually and collectively, and as such they present themselves to viññāna. Each unit (or monad) is associated with another unit singly and with all other units collectively in a net-like fashion. When one is taken up all the rest follow it. Viññāna understands this and can trace the intricacy of relationship existing among them and state that there must be an integrating principle underlying them. Not only this, but viññāna can also formulate what such principles are, as is done by philosophy and science. But viññāna cannot do this over the entire field of realities; its vision is limited to limited areas, which cannot be extended indefinitely. They have to halt somewhere.

Prajñā's vision, however, knows no bounds; it includes the totality of things, not as a limited continuum, but as going beyond the boundlessness of space and the endlessness of time. Prajñā is a unifying principle. It does this not by going over each individual unit as belonging to an integrated whole but by apprehending the latter at one glance, as it were. While the whole is thus apprehended, the parts do not escape from entering into this vision by prajñā. We can better describe this experience as the self-evolution of prajñā whereby the whole is conceived dynamically and not statically.

The continuum is not to be interpreted as merely an accumulation of units or monads; it is not a notion reached by adding one unit to another and repeating this process indefinitely. It is a concrete, indivisible, undefinable whole. In it there is no differentiation of parts and whole. It is, as Zen Buddhist philosophers would say, "an iron bar of ten thousand miles"; it has no "hole" by which it can be grasped. It is "dark"; no colors are discernible here. It is like a bottomless abyss where there is nothing discriminable as subject and object. These statements, we may say, are figurative and do not give much information regarding prajñā-intuition. But to those who have gone through the actual experience of prajñā-intuition these figurative, symbolic descriptions are really significant. What is asked of the professional philosopher is to translate them into his terminology according to the technique he uses.

It is evident that the continuum is not the whole attained by the accumulation of units; to be the whole, then, there must be something added to it, and this is what is done by prajñā-intuition. Therefore, prajñā must be considered a value-giving principle. When prajñā goes through the continuum the whole thing acquires a value and every part of it becomes significant and pulsates with lifeblood. Each unit,
even the most insignificant part, now appears in a new situation, full of meaning. A blade of grass is not something to be trodden under one's feet as standing in no relationship to the whole. A grain of rice inadvertently dropped off the washing pail is truly the root from which the ten thousand things germinate. This is why it is said that prajñā vivifies while vijñāna kills. Parts are to be united in the whole to become significant, and this kind of unification, not mechanical or arithmetical, is the doing of prajñā-intuition. Vijñāna realizes this only when it is infused with prajñā.

When we speak of the prajñā-continuum as undifferentiated or differentiated, we must not think that this process of differentiation is a function given to the continuum from an outside source. The differentiation is evolved from within the continuum, for it is not the nature of the prajñā-continuum to remain in a state of sūnyatā, absolutely motionless. It demands of itself that it differentiate itself unlimitedly, and at the same time it desires to remain itself. Prajñā is always trying to preserve its self-identity and yet subjects itself to infinite diversification. This is why sūnyatā is said to be a reservoir of infinite possibilities and not just a state of mere emptiness. Differentiating itself and yet remaining in itself undifferentiated, and thus to go on eternally engaged in the work of creation—this is sūnyatā, the prajñā-continuum. It is not a concept reached by intellection, but what is given as pure act, as pure experience; it is a point fully charged with creative blan vital, which can transform itself into a straight line, into a plane, into a tridimensional body.

Now we can understand what is meant by this saying: Creation is contemplation and contemplation is creation. When sūnyatā remains in itself and with itself, it is contemplation; when it subjects itself to differentiation it creates. As this act of differentiation is not something imposed upon it but an act of self-generation, it is creation; we can say it is a creation out of nothing. Sūnyatā is not to be conceived statically but dynamically, or, better, as at once static and dynamic. The prajñā-continuum thus creates through contemplation and contemplates through creation.

In prajñā, therefore, there is an eternal progression and at the same time a never-changing state of unification. Eternally evolving, endlessly limiting itself, prajñā never loses its identity in vijñāna. Logically speaking, prajñā-creativity involves an interminable series of contradictions: prajñā in vijñāna and vijñāna in prajñā in every possible form and in every possible manner. There thus takes place a state of infinitely complicated interpenetration of prajñā and vijñāna. But we must not understand this spatially. For this most thoroughgoing
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interpenetration, indefinably complicated and yet subject to systematization, is the self-weaving net of praṣāda, and viṣṇāna takes no active part in it. When, therefore, there is praṣāda-intuition, all this "mystery" yields its secrets, whereas, as long as our vision does not go beyond viṣṇāna, we cannot penetrate to its very foundation and will naturally fail to perceive how praṣāda works into viṣṇāna.

NOTES

1 Praṣāda, pra-ṣāda, is the fundamental noetic principle whereby a synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes possible.

2 Viṣṇāna, vi-ṣā-ṇa, is the principle of differentiation.


4 Ātman is "self," "the free-will," "one who is master of self." When Buddhist philosophy denies the existence of the self it means that there is no self-governing free-willing agent in the individual as long as it is a conditioned being, for the individual owes its birth to a combination of conditions which are always subject to dissolution, and anything liable to birth-and-death cannot be thought of as a free-willing, self-governing agent. A free-willing agent means a unifying principle.

5 Praṣāda-pāramitā is one of the six perfections (pāramitās): giving (dāna), moral precepts (Śīla), humility (kuṭiṣṭa), diligence (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna), and transcendental wisdom or absolute knowledge (praṣāda). "Pāramitā" is generally translated "going over to the other shore"—meaning that when these items are practiced one will finally cross the stream of birth-and-death. The sūtras classified under the general title of "Praṣāda-pāramitā" expound the philosophy of praṣāda-intuition or śūnyatā.

6 The Diamond Sūtra is one of the "Praṣāda-pāramitā" sūtras and contains the gist of praṣāda philosophy. Being short, it is quite popularly read by Buddhists. There are several translations in English.

7 The verse is by Zenne Daishi, popularly known as Fu Daishi (497–569), a contemporary of Bodhidharma. The verse in full runs thus:

Empty-handed, I hold the spade;
Walking, I ride on an ox;
A man passes over the bridge;
The bridge flows and the water does not.

8 Masters of praṣāda philosophy make use of any object near their person to demonstrate the logic of praṣāda-intuition. The staff or shippe (a stick shorter than the staff) is frequently used for the purpose. Sometimes the question takes this form: "I do not call this a staff; what do you call it?"

9 The idea of being quick is well illustrated by Tokusan (790–865), who displayed his staff lavishly and refused to listen to any talk. Once he announced that "you commit a fault when you ask a question; you also commit a fault when you do not ask." A monk came forward and bowed to him, preparing to say something. Tokusan struck him. The monk protested, "I have just been bowing to you, and why do you strike me?" The master said, "If I wait for you to open your mouth, nothing avail!"


This edition is used throughout this paper. Hereafter, RTL.

10 Ummon (?–949) once raised his staff forward and said, "When you see the staff call it a staff; when you see the post call it a post; and what fault could there be?" At another time he said, "What do you call this? If you say it is a staff, you go

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to hell; if it is not, what is it?" At still another time he brought the staff forward and said, "Common people would call this a reality; the Hinayana Buddhists would analyze it and declare that it is nonexistent; the pratyekabuddhas would call it a visionary existence; the bodhisattvas would say that the staff is śūnya (empty), as it is. As for Zen monks, they just call the staff a staff; if they want to walk they walk, if they want to sit they sit; no wavering in any circumstances!" "Sayings of Ummon (Gotoyegen, 1861), fasc. xv, pp. 1-7.

1) "RTL, xxi, 38b.
2) "RTL, xix, 23a; Sayings of Ummon.
3) "RTL, xix, 22b.
4) "RTL, xix, 23a.
5) "RTL, v, 80.
6) "RTL, xix, 25a.
7) Hekigan-shu (Ning-po, 1876), case xix.
8) "RTL, xi, 86b. Isan sent a mirror to his disciple Kyōzan. Kyōzan, producing it before the congregation, said, "Is this Isan's mirror or is it Kyōzan's? If you can say a word about it, I will not break it." The whole brotherhood did not say a word, and Kyōzan smashed it.
9) "Sayings of Rinzai (Kyoto, 1648). Once when Fuké and Rinzai were invited out to dinner, Rinzai remarked, "A hair swallows the great ocean and the seed of a poppy holds Mt. Sumeru in it: What does this mean?" Fuké, without saying a word, upset the whole table. The following day they were again invited out. Rinzai said, "How much is today's dinner like yesterday's?" Fuké again upset the table. Rinzai said, "What a rude fellow you are!" Fuké retorted at once, "In Buddhism there is neither rudeness nor politeness. What a blind fellow you are!"

As Tokusan, on his way to Taisan, felt hungry and tired and stopped at a roadside teashop and asked for refreshments. The old woman who kept the house, finding that Tokusan was a great student of the Diamond Sutra, said, "I have a question to ask you; if you can answer it I will serve you refreshments for nothing, but if you fail you have to go somewhere else for them." As Tokusan agreed, the woman proposed this: "In the Diamond Sutra we read that 'The past mind is unattainable; the present mind is unattainable; the future mind is unattainable'; and so, with what mind do you wish to punctuate?" (Refreshments are known in Chinese as ten-jiu [tien-ksiin], meaning "punctuating the mind," hence the question.) Tokusan was altogether nonplused, and did not know how to answer. He had to go without anything to eat. "The past mind" and so on require a somewhat detailed explanation which I omit here.

10) "RTL, xxiv, 65b.
11) "RTL, xxv, 78b.
12) "RTL, xxv, 73b.
13) "RTL, xxv, under "Tokusho."
14) "This refers to the Absolute (Śānyatā).
15) Literally, "to turn things," or "to transform things."
16) "When a lion roars the yakṣa's head splits. The yakṣa is an insignificant creature.
17) "RTL, xxv, 74b.
18) "RTL, xxv, 78b.
19) "Samādhi means a state of intense concentration, in which the subject becomes identified with the object. This is often mistaken for prajñā-intuition. So long as there is no prajñā awakening, samādhi is merely a psychological phenomenon.

20) "RTL, xxvi, 93a.
21) "RTL, xxvi, 85b.
22) "RTL, xxiv, 114b.
23) "RTL, xxii, 45b.
24) "RTL, xxii, 40a.
25) "RTL, xxvi, 38b.
26) "RTL, xviii, 16b.
27) "RTL, xxvi, 85b.
28) "RTL, xxiv, 72a.
29) "RTL, xxvi, 87b.
30) "Revolving" refers to the reading of the sūtra. When certain sūtras are read
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they are simply unrolled and folded back, and this is repeated several times. The śūtras being too long for a regular reading, the priesta resort to this simplified method. Thus śūtra-reading came to be known as "śūtra-revolving," though in this case the actual śūtra-revolving has nothing to do with the master's enigmatic statement.

**RTL, xxvi, 86b.**

**As is already well known to the reader, the masters frequently make such factually impossible statements. The idea is to make the questioners, that is, all objectively-minded people, reverse their way of thinking. Ultimately, this means to re-examine our ordinary "logical" way of reasoning.**

**RTL, xxvi, 86b.**

**RTL, xxv, 78b.**

**RTL, xxv, 78a.**

**RTL, xxiii, 55a.**

**RTL, xiv, 117b.**

**RTL, xiv, 115a.** Tanka was a great master of Zen philosophy in the T'ang dynasty. One winter night when he was staying at a certain monastery, he felt very cold, and so he took down the wooden image of Buddha from the shrine and burned it to make a fire. When he was blamed for this sacrilegious deed, he simply said that he just wanted to collect the śārīra of the Buddha-image. When he was told that no śārīra could be obtained from the wood, he said, "Why, then, do you blame me?" (The śārīra is some mineral matter which is sometimes found in the ashes when the body is cremated. The holier the man, the more and brighter the śārīra, it is said.) I may add an encounter Tanka had with the daughter of his friend Hōkoji. Both Hōkoji and his daughter were advanced in their understanding of Zen. When Tanka called one day on Hōkoji, he met his daughter picking vegetables in the garden. Asked Tanka, "Is your father home?" The girl did not say anything in answer, but, throwing down the basket she carried, she stood up with her hands folded over her chest. Tanka asked again, "Is he home?" The girl took up the basket and walked away.

**In Buddhism food and other offerings, such as flowers, incense, and candles, are placed before the Buddha-image and other holy images as tokens of gratitude for what they have done.**

**This refers to the story of an old Buddhist philosopher. He made the stones nod when he talked earnestly about the dharma to the stones as he had no human audience.**
Epistemo logical Methods
in Chinese Philosophy

E. R. Hughes

No one who listened to Mr. Suzuki's paper could have failed to be impressed by the scrupulous accuracy and integrity with which he defined his position. From the point of view of an outsider Mr. Suzuki's train of thought was comparable to the feat of tight-rope walking. He preserved an assured balance, although every new paradox that he enunciated seemed bound to bring him crashing to the ground. To some it might seem that there was no rope at all for him to walk on. Yet the fact remained that he went on walking, preserving his precision of balance. Speaking for myself, Mr. Suzuki brought home to me with new force what is to me a plain fact of history, that man cannot dispense with philosophy, and philosophy's first concern is criticism, criticism of appearance, criticism of thought, criticism of language; and, that being so, the philosopher from first to last is dealing with paradoxes, some of which may be humanly irresolvable. But the final paradox is that the philosopher is also a man, a man amongst men. He goes on living, eating and drinking, wearing his clothes, performing his daily duties. There, if I may venture a criticism which is not a criticism since that side of Zen Buddhism was outside the subject of his paper, Mr. Suzuki did not make the situation quite clear. Zen Buddhists from the very beginning of Zen Buddhism have always been paradoxically engaged in ordinary living, the less deliberatively the better. That, for them, was a necessary concomitant to enlightenment. They have maintained that there is no other way of arriving at enlightenment.

I make this preface to my paper on Chinese epistemology because Ch'anism and Zenism are, I submit, highly significant Chinese and Japanese reactions to Indian and Western Asian Buddhism. The Chinese Ch'an movement started with a simple unlearned monk who revolted against all the deliberate refinements and elaborations of
thought, ritual, yoga, and the like which he saw in his fellow monks. He discovered that enlightenment was the one thing he needed, and that it was the one thing he could not get for himself: the more he tried to achieve it, the more sophisticated he became, and the less possible it was for him to be enlightened. Therefore he went on living as a man on the simplest possible basis of living. There the Taoist and to a certain extent the Confucianist spoke in him.

If knowing in the fullest sense be considered dependent on living in the simplest sense, the natural inference is that a man with that kind of outlook will not be likely to evolve a very elaborate system of epistemology. True! I doubt whether the Chinese indigenous tradition, along its own line of conscious reasoning, achieved anything so intrinsically subtle and elaborate as the Indian tradition achieved. Thus the material presented here may be disappointing because of its simplicity. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that of all paradoxical writing in Chinese literature—and there is a good deal—the most paradoxical is the Ch'an Buddhist; and, when I say "paradoxical," I mean consciously and deliberately paradoxical, even with the intention to cause laughter, to make evident the incongruities in the human situation. In this respect a Chinese critic is never so philosophically Chinese as when he appears "dumb." So, in regard to epistemological theorizing, the facts may appear simple, but they are by no means as simple as they look.

For instance, examine the writings of Chinese thinkers from the late fourth century B.C. (the first date of really consecutive dialectical composition) down to the eleventh century A.D. (the time when the Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianist epistemology emerged): one constant recurrent characteristic is an appeal to history. In other words, one indispensable method of achieving reliable knowledge was the historical method. It was as if a man's contemporaries said to him, "Speculate, theorize, as much as you like, but check up on your speculations by finding out what has happened in the past." Now, such an attitude may easily reveal intellectual naivete. As we know so well today, anybody can quote history to suit any theory he wants to put across. True, but, although in the earlier days the appeal to history was made in very simple unreflecting fashion, as time went on, the citation of history became one of the severe tests of a scholar's integrity of mind and breadth of learning. He was expected to cite groups of relevant facts which shed light on each other. In other words, there came to be an empirical critique of history, one built on a fine sense of historical perspective: a division of the past into shang ku, chung ku, hsia ku (high antiquity, middle antiquity, low, i.e., later, antiquity), chin shih
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(recent times), this last being split up into Western Han, Eastern Han, Three Kingdoms period, and so on. Each epoch stood in its own right on its own ground, had its high spots and low spots. Woe betide the scholar who had a confused perspective. According to this approach the object of knowledge was not abstract and changeless, not a logical entity. It was shot through and through with a sense of the particular.

On the other hand, it would be disastrously erroneous to assume, for those same centuries in which the "Great Tradition" of the Chinese people was being slowly smelted and forged, that those thinkers were not interested in metaphysical problems and were incapable of realizing the questions which emerge in relation to categorical knowledge. As I shall show in a minute, they went on from crude experiments in reasoning to more and more refined and systematic inquiries. But the point I have to emphasize at the outset is that, as they refined their sense of reason in these abstract fields, they became more and more conscious that thought is conditioned by language and that language as communication fails unless it be disciplined and controlled. They were intrigued by the nature of thought and its relation to emotion. They were highly conscious of that mysterious monitor of the mind, reason (li); but to them the chief factor in the two-way traffic between thought, language, and logic was language. So simple as that, and yet so curiously profound! R. G. Collingwood described philosophy as "thought of the second degree, thought about thought." The distinctively Chinese epistemological reply to that would be to say, "Yes, more or less, but we do not know what your thinking is until it is expressed in language." From this angle, philosophy becomes (a) a critique of language, of communicated meaning, and (b) a checking of this critique by a critique of history.

I submit to the Conference that this is the basic approach to Chinese epistemology. For this reason I would urge that in our study of these matters we should learn to walk before we try to run. If we do not, as we run from Confucianism to Taoism, from Taoism to the Tsin transcendentalists, and from them to Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming, and try to appraise this system as against that, we are ignoring the prime factor in the situation, the thinking man and the language into which he got his thought, the language which was for him the molder of his thoughts, the language which objectified that essentially subjective thing, thinking.

The Distinction Between 500 B.C. and A.D. 500

The first of these dates stands for Confucius' lifetime, the second for the first collection of literary masterpieces, poetry, prose, state
papers, dialectal essays, letters, inscriptions, etc., all put together under the one all-embracing title of wen, ordered artistic composition, writings which conveyed meaning in ordered fashion, in clear-cut patterned sentences and clear-cut patterned paragraphs. We have no term in English which covers the meaning of wen. It is significant that in this collection 98 per cent of the selected compositions are taken from writers not earlier than the second century B.C. The man who made the collection was Hsiao T'ung (died A.D. 531), son of Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty. From this foreword we learn that the invention of writing was to him the most momentous invention of all history, and that in the development of literary composition he found evidence of both evolution and revolution. To give as nearly a first-hand impression as is possible of a very typical double approach to knowledge, I have translated the first two paragraphs of the foreword, marking by a special use of colons the coupling of the sentences, and so elucidating the actual movement of the author's mind.

**Paragraph 1**

Let us make observation of primordial beginnings, strain our eyes to penetrate the cloud of [primitive] custom.

In the days when men lived in caves in the winter and [slept] perched on trees in the summer, when they ate their meat uncooked and drank the blood: that era was one of raw material (chih); its people were simple-minded; and this literature (wen) of ours had not been invented.

Coming down to the time of Fu Hsi's ruling over our world of men, he was the first to trace out the Eight Trigrams and invent the written language: this he did with a view to their being a substitute for government by string knots.

From this came the birth of books.

In *The Book of Changes* it is written:

"We make observation of the patterns (wen) in the heavens with a view to understanding the seasonal changes:

We make observation of man's patterns (wen) with a view to transforming and completing the society of man."

How far back the historical significance of pattern (wen? literature? pattern) goes!

**Paragraph 2**

With regard to the [primitive] hammered-out wheel being the beginning of the imperial carriage, the imperial carriage actually has the raw material (chih) of the primitive wheel:

With regard to a block of ice being the product of a quantity of water: the water does not have the iciness of the ice.

How about this? (How do I make this out?)

It would appear [in the one case] that with the toe-and-heel succession of events there comes the accretion of ornamentation:

[in the other case] with the subserval of the original condition there comes the addition of whet-stone hardness.
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Since ordinary material objects have this [double tendency], it is [logically] right that literature also should have it. [And since] the movement of time ever brings revolution and evolution, it is practically impossible to identify changes in full detail.

PARAGRAPH 3

I make the experiment of discussing this as follows . . .

In Paragraph 1 the appeal to history appears—an appeal, I might add, couched in conventional language, assuming the factual truth that the First Sage-Emperor was the inventor of the trigrams and the script. In Paragraph 2 the following points should be noted: (1) Hsiao T'ung selects two relevant data from his field of empirical observation. (2) Although the imperial carriage is a man-made thing and ice is what we call the result of natural process, the two phenomena are treated as on the same level. That, to the Chinese, is logical. The idea of natural process for them applies equally to man-made products. (3) Process led to two directly opposite results; thus the author draws two separate conclusions. (4) From those he goes on to urge that what applies to carriages and blocks of ice applies to that infinitely multi-form and ever-changing product of the human mind, wén. (5) His final reflection, in a vein common since the Taoist fathers, is that our knowledge cannot but be limited, since every process in nature consists of an infinite number of steps, so minute that no one can discern them. All we can do is to mark such effects as are discernible to our limited powers of observation.

To these five points should be added the following three in relation to the presentation, the manner, and the style of the argument. (1) Discursive thought is packed into pairs of sentences related to each other, sentences of equal length so that contrasted meaning may stand out clearly. (2) The two trains of thought are presented in paragraphs of equal length. (3) The author does not dogmatize. He uses the form of words which we find in thinker after thinker in that and later ages: "Let us make observation," "It would appear that," "How about that?" and "I make the experiment of discussing this."

It would be interesting to know what your several reactions are to this kind of reasoning. I suggest that it is epistemologically simple in certain respects, e.g., accepting sense data at their face value, and arguing from analogy; and yet as a continuous piece of ratiocination it is highly impressive, pointing to premeditation, a drastic discipline of the mind, involving also a language structure of considerable syntactical refinement. This leads me to make a comparison with the Confucius whom we find in The Analects, not the Confucius of Han State Confucianism four hundred years after his death—a very dif-

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ferent person, or rather set of persons, produced by the hagiographical instinct. The real Confucius, as far as we can envisage him, had a much simpler and ruder language as the tool for cutting out his thoughts. Also, in his day no one had ever thought of taking a stylus and a set of bamboo slips and scratching down a consecutive account of his personal ideas. Nor did it occur to Confucius. The written documents he read could have been little more than various collections of folk songs, elegiac laments, and congratulatory and sacrificial odes; and, in addition to these, at most, the annals of his home state and those of one or two others, some notes on ritual procedure by liturgists, and maybe some records in the archives at the Chou capital and some lists of divining oracles. I am not trying to "debunk" Confucius or sow any suspicion as to his essential greatness. On the contrary, the more historical criticism deals with his story, the more truly great he appears. But he was not a philosopher, except in the most rudimentary sense, namely, asking probing but disconnected questions about accepted ideas and accepted institutions, and then discovering the individual in society and making his great affirmation that a man is a man in the full sense only if he treats his fellow man as equally a man. From that affirmation sprang the Confucian logic of human relationship and the categorical imperative. Confucius himself clearly was no metaphysician, no logician. It is not until Mencius' time, 150 years later, that we get clear evidence of the language of hypothesis and conclusion, and get also such basic revelation of a philosophic consciousness as "yu tz'ü kuan chih" (looking at the matter from this angle) and "wu l'a" (for no other reason than).

It is well known what Plato and Aristotle did to the Greek language, carrying it, for example, from the simple ἐνα (to be) to that exquisite abstraction τὸ ἐν (being), and from that to τὸ ἐν ἐν (that which makes being what it is, the nature of being). In this connection I would draw your serious attention to Dr. Richard Robinson in his *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*: "It often takes more than a lifetime for humanity to advance from the more concrete 'A rose cannot be both red and not red' to the more abstract 'X cannot be both Y and not Y,' and it may take as many years again to get from the latter to some established label such as the phrase 'The Law of Contradiction.'" I think Dr. Robinson is a little on the short side when he says "one lifetime" and "as many years again." It may take several lifetimes. Thus it would appear that Confucius first made the suggestion that names should correspond to facts in the moral realm, but it was not until some four lifetimes later that a new group of "name specialists" began to ask searching questions on that and kindred matters. These men, Teng
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Hsi, Hui Shih, and Kung-sun Lung, threw out the logician's challenge on accepted notions about classification, about the relation of sense impressions, about similarity and dissimilarity, and about universals; but they strained current language to the breaking point to convey their meaning. Chuang Chou, the Neo-Mohists, and Hsün Ch'ing took up the challenge from various angles. But then the impulse went dead for four hundred years, until Wang Pi and his fellow transcendentalists set the logical ball rolling again. This they could do more effectively, for the language was by then refined to the pitch of expressing these recondite notions.

Further, I submit that there was no real consciousness of empirical reasoning as such until there was a canon of sacred writings, a bible to which the ordinary man could appeal for an authoritative statement on what was true and what was false. When did that time come in China? Not in Confucius' time: there was no ching then. The character ching meant in that age the warp set up on a loom. But after Confucius' time there came the practice of recording a teacher's noteworthy dicta, and these records came to be called ching, i.e., warp teaching on which disciples could weave the woof of their amplifications. Finally, in mid-Han times (second century B.C.), came the establishment of State Confucianism and with it the colleges for expounding the Five Ching. Unless we understand this movement in history and its effect on thought and language, we cannot understand the emergence of higher levels of consciousness in regard to knowledge. In the beginning, when Confucius urged his disciples to study and get knowledge, he meant knowledge of the ancestral Tao, the ways of their fathers. When a good Eastern Han conservative, in the first and second centuries A.D., urged the duty of study, he meant knowledge as found in the sacred canon; and there is no lack of evidence of that dogmatic attitude toward the objects of knowledge. But that is not the whole of the matter. The Han mind was by no means all of one pattern. There were the po shih on the one hand, the exegetes, authoritarians, bibliolaters. There were the wen shih on the other hand, the litterateurs, critics of popular beliefs, satirists, men with an eye for paradox: the men whom Hsiao T'ung commemorated in his ever-famous collection, and whose language and empirical attitude toward knowledge his foreword so admirably exemplifies. A wen shih could be as much of a sycophant of the court as a po shih, but when the Han Confucianist (so-called) State collapsed in shame and confusion and long years of civil disorder ensued, it was the wen shih empirical mind which alone was sufficiently resilient to face facts. It was their influence which enabled thinking men to look beyond the accepted
Confucianist and Taoist ideas of knowledge, and search afresh for a system of abstract categories.

**Chinese Thinking in Terms of Abstract Categories**

I want here to ask a very simple, even stupid, historical question. As I have said, let us learn to walk before we try to run. Is there any known case of a culture which entered on the self-conscious philosophizing stage and yet failed to proceed, on the ruins of its old animistic myth-abstractions, to erect new and more essentially abstract categories for the mind? If it be true that there is no such case, we can move confidently on to a generalization, namely, that the envisaging of such categories is more than a strait-jacketing of the mind. To men playing with the newly discovered tool of individual self-conscious reasoning these apparently restrictive concepts actually have a liberating effect, at any rate temporarily. They constitute acts of imagination, an envisagement of order, of pattern, in the universe.

In regard to China it is advisable to make this cautious approach, for it looks as if the development of systematic categorical thinking came a little slowly and was hampered by the Confucianists' tendency toward authoritarianism and by the Taoists' tendency toward a denial that any categorical statement can be more than relatively true. Nonetheless, the search for abstract categories began, and continued, and even in Confucius, the first of the individual thinkers, instinctive as the temper of his mind was, we can find evidence of this. In its beginnings the movement was along simple enough lines, one of reason coping with a three-dimensional universe and using the idea of exact measurement for things of the mind. Also, men followed Mo Ti's [Mo Tzu's] lead in tracing the nexus of cause and effect. Also, they developed a sense of the relativity of the large and the small, and so arrived at the abstractions, infinity at one end of the scale and nothingness at the other end. There was much daring exploration, particularly as the fourth century B.C. went over into the third century: the discovery of metaphysical abstractions as well as cosmological. Then, in the second century B.C., with the coming of the syncretism, which we speak of as "State Confucianism," the attempt was made to be inclusive with results that were not coherently systematic. Thus, we do not find in Han philosophy anything comparable to Aristotle's analysis of the Greek language and its underlying categorical abstractions, nor do we find a parallel to the syllogistic logic which he built on his categories.

On the other hand, if we compare the categories within the four walls of which the third and fourth century transcendental logicians
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(Hsüan Hsüeh Chia) carried out their speculations, we find that they go further. For example, compare Kant's categories of quantity, categories of quality, categories of relation, and categories of modality. We find clear evidence of a consciousness of all these categories in the Chinese mind at that time. That, however, is not all that has to be said on this score. There was, in addition, from mid-Han times on, the category of the Yin and Yang and alongside it, more or less dovetailed into it, the five hsing, i.e., the five physical forces operating in the universe. As if that were not enough, a school of so-called Confucianist thought took the diviners' cabbalistic figures of divided and undivided lines and linked them by a sort of science of symbolism to the Yin and the Yang and the five hsing. For many minds this symbolism was the key to the march of history. For others it was an epistemological method, a sure guide to all possible forms of knowledge. The correlation of these abstract categories with the other more universally recognized abstractions was never, as far as I have been able to discover, successfully made. Today they are, rightly or wrongly, despised by the intelligentsia as having had a crippling influence on Chinese philosophy.

Nevertheless, when all is said on this point and all due weight given to certain Sung philosophers and their mathematical schematizations of the hexagrams and the five hsing and the Yin and Yang, I have still to be convinced that this line of abstraction had only a crippling influence on Chinese powers of ratiocination. The significant thing is that these symbols, i.e., the lines in the hexagrams and the trigrams, were regarded as centers of energy continually acting and reacting on each other according to their relative positions. We find, also, the correlative notions of ti (substance) and yung (function) used in connection with them; but the impression I get is that greater importance was attached to the functional side. The center of interest lay there, so that the logic at work in these thinkers' minds led them to concentrate more on categories of relationship than on categories of substance. In my judgment, that fact is worthy of serious consideration. So also, although to a lesser degree, is the fact that the idea of a macrocosm's being paralleled by a microcosm in the human body was worked out in a kind of precise scientific spirit. Clearly, however, the main attraction of this line of systematic thinking lay for the Chinese in the direct clue it gave to the dualistic nature of the universe with its correlation of phenomena in the heavens and phenomena on earth, e.g., in connection with the farmer's year, cycles of prosperity and disaster, etc. In this way, also, a satisfactory explanation was found for the fact of male and female, and of life and death; and
this explanation was on the basis that no entity in the universe could be static or self-contained. One triumph of the system was what can only be called its ecological good sense. The plumage of birds and the pigmentation of animals' skins were guessed at as deriving from the nature of the terrain in which the birds and animals lived.¹⁰

In the light of the above it would appear that the cogency of late classical and early medieval philosophy did not in the final upshot suffer from a failure to appreciate the necessity for abstract categories, but from the promulgation of too many such categories. No amount of fitting them together could produce a coherent system. Here, however, we have to beware of assuming that every thinker accepted these categories equally at their face value. That would manifestly be an unwarranted assumption, although a tendency in that direction is traceable in foreign circles through the influence of Alfred Forke's excellently informative but highly generalized work, *The World Conception of the Chinese.*¹¹ In this connection it must always be borne in mind that the Chinese way, apart from a few exceptions such as the iconoclast Wang Ch'ung (A.D. 27–ca. 100), was for writers just to leave out of their philosophic pictures those categories about which they had their doubts. They would not denounce unless there were some very compelling reason. We have, therefore, to use the argument from silence more often than we are naturally predisposed to do. Thus, in the notable case of Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.–A.D. 18), we find a thinker much given to speculation on the nature of knowledge but having a profound sense of the inscrutability of the natural order. It is to be taken as significant that he produced two books, one the *T'ai Hsüan [The Supreme Mystery],* the other the *Fa Yen [Regulatory Measures],* two books which bear very little, indeed no obvious, relation to each other. Since the author was silent on this matter, we can only assume that he was content that the two sides of his mind should so appear, each for what it was worth, no more and no less.

I submit that the above is evidence of an empirical mind at work in these writers, an empirical mind applied in the field of abstract categories as well as in the field of historical attestation. From that we must go on to envisage a continual process of pro-motion and de-motion in thinkers' attitudes toward generalizations on the one hand and abstract categories on the other: a process which, I suggest, can be found in other cultures as well as the Chinese. Thus, thinkers in the third and fourth centuries A.D., men like Kuo Hsiang and Ko Hung, subjected the generally accepted absolutes to fresh scrutiny and by no means accepted them all as being as certain as the stars in their courses. The point is that they did not discard these absolutes outright
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but relegated them to the lower position of being tentative generalizations.

My theory is that the empirical mind, once it has discovered itself and has been enshrined in cogent literary form, can never be denied its right of way. Yet that same mind cannot work without categories, and therefore makes choice of such as it finds best suited to its purposes. This may be a dangerous philosophical path to tread, but even philosophers have to think, perhaps not perfectly, but as best they may. That this kind of thing happened in China may be taken as part of the abiding influence of the greatest of the Taoist thinkers, Chuang Chou [Chuang Tzu]. He sowed in Chinese thinkers' minds the unceasing suspicion that all categorical thinking, by very reason of its being categorical, was in the very nature of a tentative experiment into the mysterious hinterland of knowledge. What is true today may easily be untrue tomorrow.

The Evidence for Controlled Experiment in Language in Eastern Han Times and Thereafter

I have given in the quotation from Hsiao T'ung's foreword a typical instance of what is sometimes called parallelistic prose, but to which the Chi'ing scholars gave the title "double-harness writing." This designation seems to me more illuminating. The word p'ien, which they used, meant originally driving horses in double harness. The importance of this style of writing lies in the fact that it came into existence when the language was first pulled together after the unification (ca. 220 B.C.), and that it remained in one form and another as a continual influence right down to the twentieth century. Epistemologically, it is significant because it presupposes that all clear thinking moves forward in pairs of complementary propositions, one pair releasing the mind for the next pair. Further, it was definitely laid down by the expositors of this style that the only sound approach to inward experience, or alternatively to any object of outward attention, was from a double angle of vision, and that these two angles must be strictly correlated in the syntactical structure of the sentences. We are reminded of Aristotle's sweating over the problem of getting the bare bones of syl-logizing clear, and in consequence setting up two propositions, relating them, and getting a third: in other words, making a constructional language experiment, and doing so with a strong sense of the importance of grammar; not worrying over concepts so much, but getting down to the living molecule of thought, the sentence. It is commonly supposed that the Chinese failed to do anything commen-
surate along this line. That idea is not true. Not only was there the great experiment of double-harness writing; there was also in Eastern Han times (first and second centuries A.D.) and for some centuries afterward, the practice among scholars of making what they called "linked pearls." Since these are the nearest Chinese approach to the Aristotelian syllogism, I will deal with them before treating the major experiment in detail.

A "linked pearl" consisted, first, of two general propositions introduced by the words, "Your servant has heard." These propositions expressed matters of common knowledge or common, accepted principles. A third and final proposition was then enunciated, introduced by the logical connective "therefore" (shih yi), in the logical sense, not the factual. That, plainly, is a conclusion, so that here we have an alternative method of syllogizing. The interesting thing is that conclusions in many cases were statements which did not correspond to hard facts. One is driven to suspect that the author's intention was to indicate the wide difference there is between theory and fact. The conclusion, therefore, was not in the nature of a new item of assured knowledge, but a point d'appui from which the auditors of the "linked pearl" were expected to be driven on to reconsider the nexus of the two initial propositions and the conclusions from them. In a word, here in these "linked pearls" is a methodological device for stirring criticism of accepted knowledge. In that respect their objective is fundamentally different from that of the Aristotelian syllogism, or at any rate the objective as discerned in the European traditional use of it. Thus, by comparing the two ways of syllogizing, it is arguable that the Westerner gets new light on his ancestral mode of formal reasoning. To me it becomes clear that the conclusion of a syllogism is not final in any sound epistemological sense but is merely a concrete hypothesis, clear-cut and evidential in its own way but requiring examination in the light of all the other available evidence. In other words, the proper use of the syllogism is in connection with empirical reasoning, and there its value lies in its being an experiment in which the language is under strict control.

I go on to the problems connected with empirical reasoning. We speak a great deal about empiricism, empiricism here, empiricism there, empiricism everywhere; but, in the last analysis, I submit, empirical reasoning does not produce results unless the mind be driven to make some form or other of controlled experiment. This is quite clear from the history of the natural sciences down to the present day. This seems to me the gist of what the logical positivists have been trying to emphasize, namely, that a reliable philosophical method of empirical
reason requires controlled experiments in language. Now, the particular ways in which some of these neo-logicians deal with their theses may be obnoxious to some of us, but the main contention as I have ventured to describe it is surely incontestable. It is in that connection that the Chinese attempts at controlled language experiment are worth consideration, the more so because they have been couched in a language which at first sight is so alien to the Indo-European languages.  

The nature of double-harness rational discourse is especially exemplified in Hsiao T'ung's two empirical observations as expressed in the opening words of paragraph 2 of his foreword. What we have to realize is that the correlation of the imperial-chariot-cum-primitive-wheel observation with the block-of-ice-cum-quantity-of-water observation is effected by an exact parallelism in the syntactical structure of the sentences. Thus, "with regard to the [primitive] hammered-out wheel's being the beginning of the imperial carriage," in the Chinese the clause consists of seven words. So, also, does the phrase "with regard to a block of ice's being the product of a quantity of water." The same principle operates in regard to the other two clauses: "the imperial carriage has the raw material of the primitive wheel" and "the water has not got the iciness of the ice"—each clause is eight words long. What you will certainly have noticed is that these two statements are in contrast, the one being positively affirmative, the other negatively affirmative. What you should also have noticed is that in the two introductory clauses you have two complementary approaches to the two subjects of discourse: the one approach from the angle of the beginning, the other approach from the angle of the final product. Thus the two sets of observations are brought into exactly comparable form so that the mind can deal with them. The result is immediately apparent. First, the two contrasted data provoke the question, "How about this?" Second, the mind is impelled to comparative analysis of the two situations (or should I call them "events"?) "It would appear" (k'ai) introduces these two analyses, and after "k'ai" we find two six-word sentences of exactly parallel syntactical structure, which the translation faithfully reproduces. The final stage in the argument consists of two couplets of four-word sentences. Here the syntactical structure is not precisely parallel, but the relation of the two sets of meanings is sufficiently obvious.

I have chosen this passage of Hsiao T'ung's partly for the reason that, although the insistence on parallelism in grammatical structure was a strong insistence, it was not carried to insane lengths. The exact comparison of meaning was the object, and, so long as that was obtained, variations in syntax were permissible. These variations were
more common in the simple four-word sentences, less common in the more complicated, longer sentences.

In regard to paragraph 1, it is more a piece of historical description than a piece of dialectical reasoning, so that the parallelism is not quite so close at all points. Yet the first parts of the description are conducted in three consecutive couplets, respectively, 4+4, 6+6, 4+4. In the second half of the description there appear to be two complementary final statements separated from each other: (a) "From this came the birth of patterned books," and (b) "How far back the historical significance of wên goes."

The final emphasis with regard to this double-harness thinking and writing is to be laid on the consciousness, which lies behind it, of wandering, discursive thinking being necessarily disciplined by language into clearly comparable meanings. From the impact of one meaning on its fellow meaning, the mind, as I say, is impelled along a straight course of comparable meanings until the author arrives at what he regards as a conclusion, or a complementary pair of conclusions. This, I would submit, is ratiocination, disciplined, directed, formalized, but yet embodying the basic freedom of empirical investigation.

The question for the Indian and Western minds is whether this is reasoning in the strict sense of the term. As I see it, it is; but, then, I must confess my heretical predilection for regarding poets as conducting controlled experiments in language through the medium of prosodic form. I would also maintain that a painter, particularly a landscape painter, conducts an experiment controlled by the size of the canvas or piece of silk within the compass of which he tries out an idea. Moreover, I suspect that a physicist, a biologist, or a behavioristic psychologist, does something which is basically of the same sort. Imagination comes into every one of these experiments, but imagination which is subjected to control. So, also, with regard to philosophy and the latest experiments in logic: I venture to suggest that such a book as Professor Ayer’s The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge is distinguished above all by the acuteness of his imaginative powers and the pertinacity with which he works to control language.

Desiderata

Finally, I offer a brief survey of desiderata, outlining work needing to be done before Chinese epistemology can be in a fit state to make its contribution to the new science of comparative epistemology.

1. That the various critically historical studies of Chinese key
philosophical terms should be evaluated in the light of modern semantic techniques, and that after that evaluation further studies should be undertaken with a view to clarifying the blurred meanings which now so hamper the advancement of scientific knowledge in the field of epistemology. (The work must be done by a group of scholars, Chinese and Western, and if at the same time the Hellenists and Latinists would put their learning into better and more systematic semantic shape, we should really be able to compare.)

2. That the epistemological significance of "double-harness" writing generally and "double-harness" dialectic in particular should be made the subject of intensive study.

3. That the influence of "double-harness" thinking and writing on Chu Hsi's mind should be carefully explored; e.g., li (organic principle) and ch'i (constitutive ethers) are obviously complementary abstractions.

4. That the interplay of the scholar-mind and the artist-mind should be made the subject of exhaustive study, particularly for the Six Dynasties when the idea of graded perspective in landscape painting began to emerge, and that this should be followed by similar studies in the minds of men like Su Shih in the Sung era.

5. That the texts of the Kung-sun Lung dialogues and the Neo-Mohist chapters in the Mo Ts'ao should be subjected to severe critical examination.

6. That much more intensive study of the Chinese particles should be made, especially the logical connectives, and this by scholars with good philosophical training.

II

Strategic Reasons for the Above Specialized Approach to the Study of Chinese Epistemology and Methodology

The foregoing approach to Chinese epistemology and methodology may cause surprise since it refers only incidentally to the great age of Sung (A.D. 960-1279) and centers attention on what has been generally regarded as an off-time in Chinese philosophical history. Since the Sung era produced among its various methodologies one clear and, along its own line, cogent methodology, namely, that of the Ch'eng-Chu school, and, since this became dominant and remained so for some seven centuries, why this one-sided treatment? There are a number of reasons, three of them of strategic force in relation to this Conference in which distinguished Western and Indian philosophers are anxious to take Chinese philosophy into due account, no more and
no less. That being so, in the first place, the Ch'êng-Chu synthesis, for all the signs of Buddhist influence on the minds of its makers, was nonetheless a great token of revulsion against the Buddhist thesis of a higher knowledge, which stood in complete contrast to the knowledge of this world. Chu Hsi went back to the ancient Confucian tradition, as did most of the Sung philosophers; and there they found this element and that which expressed for them the truth about the universe and man and about the way to achieve knowledge which is truth. It is arguable, therefore, that the Ch'êng-Chu synthesis was only a rehash of the old dogmas, and, since the doctrines of the school became the pattern of orthodoxy, the inference stares the foreign student in the face that we have here the final culminating evidence of a damning Chinese proclivity for bibliolatry and its attendant epistemological authoritarianism. The question is whether such an inference can stand, and the answer in my considered opinion is that it is only very partially true; and when I say that, I am keenly aware that Chu Hsi's emphasis on kē wu (examination of things, i.e., objects of attention) became sidetracked, as the modern scientist would allege, first by Chu Hsi himself to the examination of the li (something akin to the Platonic ideal pattern) of things, and afterward by the Ming and Ch'ing devotees of the school to what they could find in the authoritative books about things and their li. The evidence against the truth of the accusation of authoritarianism lies, first of all, in the kind of empirical and categorical thinking the growth of which has been pictured in Part I, and, last of all, in the fact that when modern Western mathematics and science came to the attention of the sons of the li doctrine devotees, some of them took to the new learning like ducks to water. Moreover, in the writings of Han Yü and Li Ao (T'ang dynasty), whom Dr. Fung calls the forerunners of the Ch'êng brothers and Chu Hsi, the studied language and ideation are double-harness throughout, and this in spite of the fact that these two writers revolted against the euphuistic excesses of the double-harness art in their day.

In the second place, it is as well that foreign students of Chinese cultural history should understand a recent trend in historical research in China, namely, the realization of the intrinsic importance of the Six Dynasties (third to sixth centuries A.D.). Thus, now that the fury of the revulsion against the past and all its works, which characterized the period following the 1911 Revolution, has had time to subside, the new driving force in critical historical studies is showing itself in (a) a more impartial appreciation of Chinese Buddhism, and (b) in discovering that "ex nihilo nihil fit" applies to the great flowering ages of T'ang and Sung. Had it not been for the "smelting and forging"
of the language done by the later Han and Six Dynasties scholars, had it not been for the close scrutiny of abstract thinking conducted by the transcendental logicians, how could T'ang poetry and Sung philosophy have come into being?

In the third place, this 1949 Conference is the heir of the 1939 Conference and cannot but take into serious consideration the main thesis of The Meeting of East and West. It is undoubtedly the main contribution which has come from the East-West movement in comparative philosophy, and we are all indebted to Mr. Northrop for his trenchant defining of problems in this particularly blurred field. His distinctions of "concepts by intuition" and "concepts by postulation" will be with us for some time to come. Yet—to confine myself to the Chinese side—there has been an unfavorable reaction amongst some Chinese scholars and most Sinologists to the lumping of China and India and Japan all in the same philosophical boat. Speaking personally, the more I have examined this matter from Mr. Northrop's angle of approach, the more I have appreciated his challenge to certain well-intrenched ways of thinking, and the more I have come to doubt whether his over-all classification of the "Oriental" traditions and their methodologies is in line with the historical facts. For that reason, therefore, as well as the other two, it became my business to draw the attention of the Conference to those, methodologically speaking, highly formative centuries between the collapse of Chou (third century B.C.) and the rise of T'ang and Sung, the centuries in which empirical thinking became associated with controlled language experimentation, the centuries in which the categories necessary to deductive reasoning were explored consciously and deliberately.

With Regard to Concepts by Intuition
and Concepts by Postulation

"The clarification of the distinction between 'mathematicals' and 'ideas' must await the further development, in the sequel, of our technical terminology for comparative philosophy, and in particular the clarification of the different possible types of concepts by postulation." The crux lies there: what kinds of concepts by postulation are we to allow as valid? Are only those which are expressed in mathematical and physical terms valid for "deductively formulated theories," and, if so, are cosmogonical as well as cosmological hypotheses of the same logical genus or not? Further, if—as seems to me legitimate and necessary—we are to allow valid postulation in relation to the fields of biology and physiology, of psychology and social science, is there not also a case to be made for valid postulates concerning ethical values?
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I do not want to whittle at Mr. Northrop's distinctions. Obviously his emphasis on Plato the mathematician is extremely important, and the Greek consciousness of "incommensurable magnitude" did put mathematics on a very different footing from that on which it is for the man who is only conscious of it as the rule of thumb 2+2 and 2X2. So, then, I do not minimize the fact that the ancient Greeks got as far as that and that the Chinese of classical China did not get so far. On the other hand, as I note that "concepts by postulation" were first introduced into Western philosophy because of the need for them in Greek physics and mathematics, so I note also that Aristotle, for two reasons, one of them his concern for biology, was forced to reject all postulated scientific objects such as the physical atoms of Democritus. The interesting thing is that Epicurus a few years later went back to the Democritean atom but changed the postulate to one in which the deductive movement of his mind seems to have been that men are of the same basic stuff as the atoms in nature, that some freedom of movement is characteristic of men, that therefore some freedom of movement is characteristic of atoms (cf., Leibniz on his monads). Now, it is not required of a concept by postulation that it should be true but that it should give birth to a deductively formulated theory and should not spring from one or more direct sense apprehensions. But does the use of analogy come into the postulatory picture, for Epicurus plainly intuited (or postulated) an intrinsic affinity between the basic stuff of man and the basic stuff of nature?

The significance of these questions is, of course, in relation to China, where there came to be a vivid and even subtle consciousness of the biological-cum-physiological side of nature, and where a basic affinity was assumed between men and things. The level of mathematical interest seems to have remained low, although in the Neo-Mohist books (third century B.C.) a number of geometrical definitions are given. A sort of Pythagorean playing with numbers is found in the Hsi Tzu (sometime between the third century B.C. and the first century A.D.) and elsewhere, but it is not until early Sung times that we can find such high-level calculations as produce an abstract theory of numbers. At first sight, therefore, the whole range of scientific thinking seems to be at the natural-history stage, sometimes a little childish but also often enough maturely so. E.g., as early as the third century B.C. we find one Ho Kuan Tzu, a Taoist-minded philosopher, noting that between an object and its shadow there is no interstice of space, but between a sound and its echo there is an interval of time. What is more, he noted that the direct unbroken connection is necessary if the shadow is to be there at all, and assumes, infers, postu-
lates (?) that the interval of time is necessary if the echo is to come. There, however, he stopped. He was not driven, as were William Derham and the French Academy in the eighteenth century, to image the existence of sound waves and to experiment accordingly.

Thus, in China there was controlled experimentation all the time, but, apart from alchemy, it was in the direction of control of the language of discourse, of the language of poetry, as of the language of prose. The line of demarcation which the West has come to draw between the two ways of thinking and writing does not work out the same way in China. Most of China's philosophical history is to be found in essays and not in ponderous treatises, and in those essays there is generally attention to form as well as to matter. This at first sight would seem to give Mr. Northrop all that he claims, namely, a highly developed sense of art and a poorly developed sense of logic, the employment of the artistic genius militating against the employment of the scientific minds working by intuitive imagination and not by the cold light of reason. To a certain extent I agree. I am the first person to acknowledge that he has some justification for his theories in relation to China. Nonetheless, I do not agree when he rules out concepts by postulation and deductively formed theories. It is not a case of "either-or" in the China field but of "both-and." And this "both-and" state of affairs surely applies to Western philosophy as well as to Chinese. The only thing is that in the Chinese philosophizing tradition there is probably rather more of the artistic power of discourse than there is in the Western philosophizing tradition.

If Mr. Northrop can grant me, as certain utterances of his lead me to suppose he can, that not all valid postulations are directly connected with physics and mathematics, then I think we can start getting a little further in our common explorations. In order to define the comparative situation, I submit, by way of example, that the two concepts jên and yin yang, concepts which have exercised so profound an influence on Chinese ways of thinking, are concepts by postulation, not concepts by intuition in Mr. Northrop's sense. In the one case, in very early days, when, as Hsiao T'ung might have said, philosophical thinking was in the stage of primitive simplicity, one Confucius made a practical syllogism: man can only live well in society; we men of Lu State and its neighbors are men; therefore, we must be socially minded, i.e., man-to-man-ly (jên). In this way, by postulation, he revolutionized the current meaning of jên and gave the Chinese a deductively formulated theory which the disciples of Confucius have been trying to prove experimentally ever since. In the second case, at a time when philosophical thinking as such was beginning to take shape in Chinese
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minds, by direct apprehension some thinkers saw the heavens and the earth, two different entities sharply distinguishable yet self-evidently related, since life on the earth depended on the regular day-and-night, spring-summer-autumn-winter, rain-and-sunshine cycle of movement in the skies. They analyzed this cosmic situation in their minds, and—I would say—arrived at a hypothesis that there were two theoretic forces behind this range of phenomena viewed as a whole: a constructive force and a destructive force working in conjunction, the one the logical antithesis of the other, but the two working as one indivisible existential process. They then proceeded to try out this hypothesis in relation to the various departments of life in nature and life in man. In the light of this \textit{yin-yang} postulation (as I would call it) they discovered all sorts of relationships, some of them ludicrous from Wang Ch’ung’s point of view in the second century A.D., others unsound from Chu Hsi’s point of view in the twelfth century, and still others merely naively commonsensical and not true to fact from our scientific point of view today.

Yet, its main presuppositions, that the positive must entail the negative, that movement must entail stillness, that what we see as life must entail death (although, as Chuang Tzü maintained, we do not know what death is), stand today. Along with these, yet sanely enough not differentiated as \textit{yin} on the one hand and \textit{yang} on the other, went the two presuppositions that the idea of limited space carries with it its complement, unlimited space, as also the idea of time carries with it the idea of eternity. These, surely, were not intuitions or hunches but inferences. And now we come to Chu Hsi again, with \textit{his} concepts by postulation (as I would say), \textit{li} and \textit{ch’i}, the one metaphysical, the other physical, or perhaps paraphysical, together constituting the current coin of later methodological theorizing, and in their basic complementality furnishing an incontrovertible instance of the double-harness mind at work, since by their means Chu Hsi made observation of all phenomena. We have to bear in mind: (a) that the Sung scholars had inherited a strong sense of the importance of history, and to them we owe those massive tomes the \textit{Tzü Chih T’ung Chien} and the \textit{T’ai P’ing Yü Lan}, both of them monuments of historical discrimination, and the latter documenting every citation it makes under its fifty-five main headings, whilst Chu Hsi himself set his disciples to work on making a shortened version of the former; and (b) that, although later ages read and revised these vast works with painstaking care, yet the actual tendency inherent in Chu Hsi’s line of reasoning was to view things \textit{sub specie aeternitatis} rather than \textit{sub specie temporis}. That being so, the practical moral for both Mr. Northrop and me is that the
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historian’s sense of impartiality demands that we should do justice, no more and no less, to China’s epistemological devil and saint, “Chu Wên Kung” (prince of wên, patterned thinking), China’s arch-deductive theorist, Chu Hsi.

Conclusion

Since our main desideratum in this Conference must be a more denotative examination of epistemological method, may I plead for the exercise of not only more studied care but also a more imaginative mind in comparing East and West on a historical basis. For instance, no illumination of the comparative field can be gained by treating The Analects of Confucius and the Metaphysics of Aristotle pari passu as typical examples of the methodological approach to knowledge in the respective cultures. The one book came into existence before there was any conscious, much less consecutive, philosophical thinking, and was not written by Confucius, whilst Aristotle was stimulated by a Plato and had the philosophical reflections of two centuries on which to draw. The more legitimate comparison is with the ordered and more competent literary mind of Hsîn Ch’îng, two centuries after Confucius. And even then the comparison cannot have much weight unless we are able to preface it with a comparison of the relative philosophical maturity of the Greek and Chinese languages at those two particular times. This procedure would come nearer to the basic principle of comparison, namely, comparing like with like.

A second instance may be cited in relation to the era of the Six Dynasties. Because the collapse of Rome and the overrunning of the Mediterranean world by barbarians brought a period commonly known as “the Dark Ages,” it is rather generally taken for granted that the collapse of the Han order in the third century, followed by the barbarian rule of North China in the fourth to sixth centuries, produced a very similar dark age. The history of civilization is by no means as tidy as that. A comparison of Lu Chi, the literary critic, who died in A.D. 303, with Longinus, who died in A.D. 273, and a comparison of the respective achievements in the writing of history and the creation of new art motifs would show how different the two eras were. Not that they should not be compared, for they should. The rise of the Holy Roman Empire and the rise of the T’ang dynasty are essentially comparable historical phenomena, and our task of comparing philosophies goes haltingly until competent work has been done in this matter. This reflection is closely linked with another reflection, namely, one in connection with the growing practice of using the European historians’ terminology, such as “Early Medieval” and “Late Medieval.” I do not
see how this is to be avoided in Western learned circles, but it is obviously attended by great dangers. The crux of the problem lies in the unconscious assumption by Western students that the uneven levels of intellectual acumen to be found in the Western Middle Ages are roughly a criterion as to what Chinese learning and philosophy could have achieved, i.e., presumably did actually achieve, in their Middle Ages. That does not follow in the least. The attainments of new levels of rational consciousness do not come pari passu in the different cultures, just as the Mediterranean time schedule of advance and pause is not necessarily that of other cultures. Thus, for example, the Chinese had their major attack of religious utilitarianism followed (may we say, inevitably?) by non-religious utilitarianism twenty-one to twenty-three centuries back, whilst Europe got its major attack and aftermath one to three centuries ago. On the other hand, Greek mathematics was what it was—and later was forgotten for several hundred years—whilst even eleventh-century Chinese mathematics did not produce a Euclid or a Democritus. Here are pitfalls for the unwary philosopher in the new field of culture comparison.

In this connection note should also be taken of Fung Yu-lan's pithy statement that all post-classical Chinese philosophy is in the medieval stage. We know what he means by that and we need not quarrel with it, until we come to consider what is called "The Renaissance" in textbooks of European culture. It is then apt to be assumed that not only did "The Renaissance" take place in Europe, but that no renaissance could have taken place in China in the twelfth century. No true historian, of course, would soil his historian's tongue with so gross a non sequitur. That stands. On the other hand, there have been these four last centuries of the advance of natural science in the West and not in China. What are we to assume? That the Chinese intelligentsia are incurably artistic and unscientific? We cannot do that when before our eyes stands the evidence of the nineteenth-century mathematicians, Li Shan-ian and Hua Hêng-fang, of the brilliant geodesist of this generation, Li Ssu-kuang, and many others, including the younger men working in the Princeton Institute of Advanced Studies after gaining mathematical doctorates at Oxford. Can we assume a time lag of a few negligible centuries which the Chinese will quickly overtake? No one can know for a generation or two.

Meanwhile, there is the little matter of the historical imagination, that indispensable tool of the historian's science and art, which is even more needed in intercultural comparison. I submit that there would be great virtue in learned experiments in the imaginative depicting by Chinese scholars of various key periods transplanted by a magic carpet
into some American or European mise en scène: Yang Hsiung dining with Seneca or Marcus Aurelius, Han Yü in the Rome of Gregory the Great, and Chu Hsi coming into the England of James I and Donne and Milton. What would these critics of the thought of their times have made of the philosophic foundations of the culture they saw in process of evolving? My impression is that the Sung visitor to England would have felt that the Protestant reform in England had produced but a rehash of the old classics and that both the new Protestant and the Trentine Catholic were sunk in authoritarianism. But then he could have met Francis Bacon or read his Novum Organum and said, "Ah, yes, that is what I was thinking of when I said kē wu (investigating things), but he does not realize the necessity of having a kang chi (over-all binding principle)." But, then, if Chu Hsi had seen Shakespeare played and had mastered Shakespeare's Hamlet with its immortal picture of filial piety torn two ways, if he had gone over to Holland and studied the Dutch painters, being a little too early to talk with Benedict Spinoza, he might, yes, he might have said to himself, "How muddled and inconclusive the philosophy of this people is, and how great their poetry and art." And then he would have gone back to China muttering something about the aesthetic, intuitive approach to the problems of the universe and man and would have thanked Heaven that his China knew how to combine the scientific and the artistic approach and make sense of it all. How wrong he would have been, and yet how excusably wrong, how even illuminatingly wrong!

NOTES

1Cf., e.g., Wên Hsüan (chüan 15), the long prose poem on "Ssū Hsian" [Thought the Transcender] by Chang Heng (A.D. 78–139). Cf. also the chapter by Liu Hsieh (sixth century) on the same subject in his famous book Wen Hsin Tiao Lung [The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons].


3See the Hsi Tʻuʻ Amplification of the I Ching, early in Part II; cf. English version, Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XVI, p. 382. That is the main reference, but Hsiao Tʻung's quotation includes phrases from other parts of the I Ching.


5Authoritarian-minded Confucianists of the Han era regarded these speculations as casuistical and morally subversive. Nevertheless, the Kung-sun Lung dialogues and the Neo-Mohist texts (the Ching Shuo and Chʻu) survived and are extant today.

6The number of works recognized as canonical was gradually extended until in Sung times the total was thirteen.

7Cf. Tung Chung-shu, Chʻun Chʻiu Fan Lu. Cf. also Edward VI's and Queen Elizabeth's efforts to find a middle way of agreement for the English religious mind of the sixteenth century.

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Chinese speculation along this line definitely started with Nature as the type to which men on the smaller scale must surely conform. In this respect thinking started from the opposite end to what it did in some Greek thinking.

Cf. Part II, init., of the Hsi Ts'au of the I Ching (dating probably from Former Han times). A popular name for the Hsi Ts'au is Ta Chuan. This is used by Richard Wilhelm in The I Ching by R. Wilhelm and C. F. Baynes ("Bollingen Series," XIX, New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1950). Wilhelm also uses the Hsi Ts'au name which, with its meaning of "Appended Judgments," is in my judgment preferable. The reference to birds and beasts is op. cit., Vol. I, p. 353.

London: Arthur Probsthain, 1925.

1I strongly suspect satirical intention in this naming of them. The evidence points to the practice being a form of court amusement.

2In recent years the "hypothetical syllogism" has, of course, been the subject of close study.

3A loose-grammared language in contrast to Greek and Latin. But, then, the English language is also a loose-grammared language.


That epistemology was personal illumination following on a long period of arduous study plus tommensurate ethical practice plus concentrated meditation.

Ch'en (Tschen) Yin-ch'iao, T'ang Yung-tung, Fung Yu-lan, and Lo Kên-tse are the men behind this, four of the best critical historians in China today.


4The term wu (commonly translated "things") was accepted by Han times, if not before, to denote the animate and the inanimate. Within the scope of the term distinctions were drawn between birds, beasts and fishes, and insects, between plants and trees (though not very clearly), between rocks, metals, and soils, between rivers and dry land, mountains, valleys, and marshes. Wu wu, literally, "myriad things," was the generic term for the discrete in nature.

Cf. Chu Ch'ien-chih, Chung Kuo Shihliang tui yu On Chou Wen Hua Chih Ying Hsiang [The Influence of Chinese Thought on European Culture] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1940). The author gives a number of diagrams in connection with the theory of numbers. His view is that Leibnitz was stimulated by receiving these Sung diagrams and the explanation of them from his Jesuit friends in Peking.

For notes on these two works, see Alex. Wylie, Notes on Chinese Literature (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1922), pp. 25, 183. The latter work is not strictly a historical work at all and is rightly listed as a "cyclopaedia"; yet its contents from the point of view of later ages are all historical data. Quotations are made in it from 1690 works of different ages.

For him "science" (scientia) would mean primarily the applied sciences of government and of behavior in the family and the community. Chu Hsi wrote a book on family behavior, the Chia Li.
CHAPTER III

Epistemological Methods in Indian Philosophy

DHIRENDR A MOHAN DATTA

The subject of this paper raises two questions which are very closely connected but are not identical. They are: (1) What, according to Indian philosophy, are the methods or sources through which men in general acquire knowledge? (2) What are the methods which Indian philosophers employ for solving their problems and acquiring knowledge? I shall discuss the subject in its first aspect (i.e., general epistemology) in some detail, and in its second aspect very briefly.

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOURCES

In Sanskrit the word for cognition in general is jñāna. The word for valid cognition is pramā, and that for the source of valid knowledge is pramāya. The problems of pramā and pramāya are discussed threadbare by the different schools of philosophy, because nearly all of them believe that human suffering is rooted in ignorance, the removal of which is the chief object of philosophy, and also because they believe that without a critical discussion of the theory of knowledge truth cannot be attained.¹

As Indian philosophy has developed from the days of the Vedas in the midst of a series of changing racial, social, political, and religious influences over a period of at least five thousand years, there have arisen innumerable schools of thought, and consequently there has also been a large variety of epistemological theories. So, while in Western philosophy we are generally told of two sources of knowledge, perception and inference, which are treated as synonymous with immediate and mediate knowledge, respectively, Indian philosophy, in its different major schools, recognizes up to six sources of knowledge, and some minor schools even add two or three more. Elaborate arguments are adduced to show the necessity of recognizing each as a separate source."
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The Many Sources of Knowledge

The Cārvāka materialist admits perception as the only source of knowledge. Kaṇāda (the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school) and the Buddhist admit two, perception and inference. Sāṅkhya admits three, perception, inference, and authority. Gautama (the founder of the Nyāya school) admits upamāna (knowledge by similarity) in addition to these three. The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā admits five, the four sources mentioned before and arthāpatti (postulation). The Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā and Śaṅkara’s monistic (ādvaita) school of Vedānta admit also a sixth source, namely, non-cognition, in addition to these five. Some others recognize instinctive or intuitive knowledge (pratibhā); some, unbroken tradition (itiḥa); and some, possible inclusion (sambhava) as other kinds of knowledge—but these three are not recognized by the major schools. Before we discuss these different sources of knowledge it will be useful to know a few important things about knowledge and validity in general.

Validity

Valid cognition, which is obtained by any of these methods, is generally regarded as cognition which is free from doubt (saṃśaya), indefiniteness (anadhyavasāya), and error (bhrama), and which, therefore, reveals things as they are (yathārtha), furnishes the basis of successful activity (saṁvādi-praśīt-yanukūla), and is not contradicted (abādhita) by any other experience. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists regard agreement with reality as the essence of truth. Bauddha (Buddhist) thinkers, like Dharmakīrti, regard practical efficiency as the distinguishing mark that differentiates a valid cognition from an invalid one, whereas the Advaitins (non-dualistic Vedāntins) emphasize more the uncontradicted nature of valid cognition.

Most thinkers hold that novelty should also be regarded as a necessary character of knowledge worthy of the name. So, memory (which is a reproduction of knowledge acquired in the past through perception or any other source) is not regarded as a separate kind of valid cognition. Some others point out, however, that memory should be regarded as a substantive source of knowledge at least in so far as it yields valuable information about the pastness of an experience or its object—information which could not be obtained from any other source without its aid.

Two other important questions regarding validity are: (1) Whether conditions that generate the validity of a perception or any other knowledge are intrinsic to the conditions that generate that knowledge,
and (2) Whether the validity of that knowledge is known by the knowledge itself. Opinions are sharply divided on these matters. Roughly speaking, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta hold that validity should be regarded as the natural or normal character of knowledge and invalidity as an exceptional phenomenon which arises when there are some accidental vitiating factors. So, they hold that the conditions of validity lie within the very conditions that generate the knowledge, and they also hold that validity of knowledge is known from the knowledge itself, as it arises. For example, if the relation of the visual sense to the object is regarded as the condition of visual perception, then the validity of this cognition is also due to this very condition; and, moreover, as soon as such a perception arises we believe it to be true, and, therefore, we act upon it without hesitation and without waiting for its confirmation by any other knowledge. This position regarding the two questions of validity is called the theory of self-validity (svatah-prāmāṇya-vāda).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers hold the opposite view, namely, that of external validity (paratah-prāmāṇya-vāda). They believe that there are some special conditions (other than those of the knowledge itself) which generate its validity. For example, whereas the mere sense-object relation may be said to generate visual perception in general, the soundness of the visual organ, sufficiency of light, etc., may be regarded as the special conditions generating its validity (the absence of which may cause perceptual error). Again, the validity of this knowledge is not self-manifest. It is inferred from these special conditions or from some other data.

From this brief discussion it would appear that, whereas the attitude of some Indian thinkers toward knowledge is one of belief, that of others is one of neutrality or open-mindedness. But in addition to these two attitudes there is also a third, that of disbelief, held by the skeptical Buddhists, according to whom invalidity is the self-manifest character of every cognition, and validity (which is nothing other than the practical efficiency of it) can be established only indirectly (by its successful practical consequences).

Regarding the knowledge of knowledge itself there are also different views. Sāṅkhya, Vedānta, Prabhākara, and Jaina hold that knowledge is self-manifest; Nyāya holds that it is known as an object of subsequent introspection (anuvyavasāya). But Bhāṭṭas hold that knowledge is known by inference from the knowmess of its object.

**Objects**

In Indian epistemology, we also have different views regarding the status of the object of knowledge. Within the same system of Buddhism,
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for example, we have what may be called, in terms of modern Western epistemology, direct realism (held by the Vaibhāṣikas), critical realism (held by the Sautrāntikas), subjective idealism (held by the Yogācāras), and a fourth variety, which has no Western analogue, indeterminism (Śāntayāna, held by the Mādhyamikas), according to which the object of knowledge (as well as any other thing) is not describable either as “is” or as “is not” or as “both is and is not” or as “neither is nor is not.” Here is an example of subtle distinctions—even much subtler in some respects than most up-to-date Western epistemology—and a complete scheme of possible epistemological positions which evolved in India at least a thousand years ago. Except for Buddhism, most of the schools are realistic. Sāṅkhya, which holds that all objects are the products of intellect, can also be called realistic, if it is admitted that this intellect is cosmic and not personal. Though there are among the later followers of Śaṅkara some extreme subjectivists who hold the theory that creation is only perception (dṛṣṭi-ṣṛṣṭi-vāda), yet Śaṅkara, in spite of his metaphysical idealism, was an epistemological realist as is clear from his emphatic refutation of the subjective idealism of the Yogācāra Buddhists. It is interesting to note that even an illusory perception is regarded by most Advaitins as having a corresponding object momentarily created.

But, though Sāṅkhya, Vedānta, and Jaina thinkers believe, like realists, in the presence of objects independent of knowledge, they do not think that consciousness is the product of the relation of the object to the knower. They hold that the knower is the self, which is intrinsically conscious, and knowledge of objects is like the illumination of objects by the pre-existing light of a lamp. Consciousness, in itself, is eternal and original, but its relation to a particular object is conditional and accidental. But ranged against this position there is a group of influential thinkers of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṁsā schools who, like Locke, think that the self is primarily unconscious and that consciousness arises in it when it is properly related to objects. With this general idea about knowledge, let us have a bird’s-eye view of its different sources.

Perception (Pratyakṣa)

Perception is generally described as knowledge arising from the relation of the object to some sense. Five external senses (namely, those of hearing, sight, touch, taste, and smell) and at least one internal sense (manas or mind) are commonly postulated for explaining external perception and internal perception (of pleasure, pain, etc.). A peculiarity of Indian thought worth notice here is that a distinction is made
by most thinkers between mind as knower and mind as the internal sense and organ of attention—the first being called ātmā or puruṣa and the second manas or antahkarana. These two are considered to be two different substances by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. It holds that to perceive an object the self must attend to the object through its manas, and must also be related to it, if it is external, through the appropriate sense.

Is any immediate knowledge possible without the help of sense? This question is variously answered. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika5 thinks that immediate knowledge ordinarily involves the direct relation of the object, so known, to some sense. But it recognizes certain exceptions which may be classed under two categories. First, there are those cases where the sense is related indirectly to the object, yet the object can be said to be immediately known. For example, when the table is directly related to the skin of the hand, not only the table is perceived, but also the quality of touch, which is in the table, the hardness which inheres in the touch, the absence of an inkpot which characterizes the table—all these are immediately perceptible, though these latter cannot be said to be directly related to the sense, but only indirectly through the substance in which they are. The second class of exceptional cases includes those in which even no such indirect relation can be traced between the object and sense, and yet the object is felt to be immediately known. These cases are called extra-ordinary perceptions (alaukika pratyakṣa) and are of three kinds. When we see a piece of sandal as fragrant (or cotton as soft, or stone as hard), the smell and touch are felt as immediate though really we cannot trace the relation of these to the sense of smell or touch. Erroneous perception of a rope as a snake, of heated air in the desert as water, etc., also belongs to this class. In all such cases some memory-idea vividly aroused by similarity, etc., functions like a sense relation and causes immediate perception. Whether such immediate perception is true or false depends, as in all other cases, on whether it represents the object as it is or not. There is a second kind of extra-ordinary perception in which an entire class of objects can be said to be immediately known when a particular member of it is immediately known. When a man sees his first tiger, and sees in it the general character of tigerhood, he can be said to see thereby all tigers, not of course as possessed of their respective individual properties but as possessed of the general character of tigerhood, because, except tigerhood, there is no other attribute of tigers as a class which remains to be perceived. Such knowledge of a class helps induction. The third kind of extra-ordinary perception, admitted on the basis of the experience of the yogins, is perception through success-
ful complete mental concentration on any object too small, too far away, or too much concealed to be related to sense.

It may be remarked in this connection that as Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Advaita Vedānta believe the self to be really infinite, the question of the possibility of the relation of the self to the rest of the universe without the medium of sense or body does not raise any theoretical difficulty. On the contrary, the fettering of the soul to the body is, for them, the reason for its limited knowledge. Even the Jainas, who do not admit the infinity of self, but admit only its power of expansion, hold that the self can the more directly know other minds and other things unconnected with sense, the more it can free itself from the forces of attachment that fetter it to the body. So, they hold that knowledge through sense, being through some medium, cannot be called truly immediate. Only the liberated saint can obtain full and immediate knowledge directly without the help of any sense. Patañjali, the founder of the Yoga system, holds that one can know the mind of another person and also imperceptible objects by complete concentration of the mind on them. The Advaitins view immediacy as the basic character of the Absolute Consciousness, of which the knower, the known, and the process or mechanism of knowledge are apparent differentiations due to ignorance. So, for them immediacy is not generated by the knowing process. The self’s knowledge of an external object is empirically describable, of course, in terms of the function of the mind, or internal organ, and the sense concerned. In the light of this, the Advaitins say that in every perception the mind flows out to the object through the sense and assumes the form of the object and establishes thereby a sort of identity between the mind and the object. But this process does not generate consciousness or immediacy. It only destroys the imagined barrier between the knower (which is nothing but the basic consciousness delimited by the mind) and the object (which is also the same consciousness delimited by the objective form) by a kind of identity established between the two delimiting and differentiating factors.

So, for the Advaitin every sense perception is really the restoration of the basic identity between the knower and the known, and the allowing of the basic reality, i.e., consciousness, to reveal itself immediately. But such immediate knowledge is an extremely limited expression of the basic consciousness. When a person can altogether overcome his sense of identification with the body (including mind, senses, vitality, and, other individuating conditions) by realizing his identity with the basic consciousness, there is revelation of this self-shining basic existence. This is pure and absolute immediate consciousness.
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Direct Realization of Philosophical Truths

In this connection we may briefly mention the characteristic Indian notion of the direct realization (sākṣātkāra) of truth. This is common to all the schools, except the materialist, though truth or truths are differently conceived. The process of realization (sādhana), though differing in detail from school to school, has also a common pattern. This consists in learning the truth (from scriptures, preceptors, or other sources), reasoning critically about its pros and cons, and, if thus found acceptable, meditating on it intensely and repeatedly. This vigorous intellectual culture must be accompanied by moral reformation, that is, reorganization of all emotion and behavior by changing all old habits based on previous ignorance or misconception of the truth.

But how can such intellectual and moral exercise lead to direct or immediate knowledge? The matter is not so mysterious as it may seem to be. By repeated thought and behavior based thereon, we feel that we directly see a material body existing in all dimensions though only a color-patch forming a part of its front surface is present to sense. We see time on looking at the dial of a watch. On receipt of a piece of paper called a bank note we feel that we are receiving real money; we see danger in a frown or a red signal; we see thoughts in printed letters. Similarly, I directly feel as though I am the body and separated from the rest of the world by the outer skin, limited and helpless. I feel that I am a man, a teacher, a Hindu, and so on. The objects of my ordinary desire—food, dress, house, and money—all directly appear as values, relatively stable and worth while.

Is it not possible to think that by a similar but more consciously, rationally, and intently initiated process of repeated thinking, willing, and feeling, truths about the self, the world, and its values, different from these ordinarily accepted ones, can also be felt and realized at least as directly as these are in life?

In such realization the intellect rather than sense experience takes the lead, and reinterprets and re-evaluates the latter. It is the "theoretic component" which rules here over the "aesthetic" and even reveals itself through the latter.

Inference (Anumāna)

Inference is generally regarded by Indian thinkers as knowledge from a sign (say, smoke) to the signified (say, fire) on the basis of previous knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyūpta) between the two. Though all systems discuss inference, Nyāya treats it very
elaborately. According to Nyāya, a universal relation or induction is based on repeated observation in the light of the method of agreement in presence (anwāya, e.g., "All cases of smoke are cases of fire") and also (where possible) the method of agreement in absence (nyatīreka, e.g., "Where there is no fire, there is no smoke"). It is realized that induction may be vitiated by non-observation of hidden essential conditions (upādhi) responsible for the apparent invariability between the two phenomena. Such a defect can be removed only by repeated and varied observation (bhūyo-darśana). The truth of an inductive generalization may also be deductively tested by indirect hypothetical argument (tarka) leading to a reductio ad absurdum, e.g., "If smoke were not accompanied by fire, then it would be without a cause, which is absurd." But, if the doubt is still raised, "What if events are without a cause?" it is silenced by the contradiction (ryāghātu) it would have with practical behavior, where we always seek a cause for producing an effect.

The Buddhists employ the method of five steps (pañca-kāraṇī) in order to discover a causal connection, and thereby an invariable relation, between phenomena: (1) non-observation of the cause as well as the effect; (2) observation of the cause; (3) observation of the effect; (4) observation of the disappearance of the cause; and (5) observation of the disappearance of the effect. Thus, with the help of this double method of difference (as Dr. Seal calls it), a causal connection may be established between fire and smoke. Buddhists also lay down identity of essence (tādātmya) as another ground on which a universal proposition (e.g., "All oaks are trees") can be based.

But Nyāya says of the first method that it cannot be applied when other circumstances vary and the suspicion of a plurality of causes cannot be removed. Moreover, there are many cases of non-causal uniformity (established by the Nyāya methods previously described), e.g., "All animals having horns have tails," on which inference also can be based. Regarding the second method, identity of essence, Nyāya points out that it is not really a ground of inference. To say, "This is a tree, because it is an oak," is really no inference at all if an oak is already known to be identical with a tree.

An important distinction is made between the psychological process of inference (not necessarily expressed in language), which takes place in the mind of one who infers for his own self (svārthānumāna), and the demonstrative form of inference, which is used for convincing others (parārthānumāna). In the former, one argues: "This hill has smoke; whatever has smoke has fire; so, the hill has fire." But the demonstrative form, as Gautama conceives it, must have five steps:
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(1) Clear enunciation of the proposition to be proved—This hill has fire.
(2) Statement of reason—This hill has smoke.
(3) Statement of universal relation, supported by concrete instances—Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g., the fire-place. Whatever has no fire has no smoke, e.g., the lake.
(4) Application of the universal relation to the present case—The hill has such smoke (which is invariably accompanied by fire).
(5) Conclusion—Therefore, the hill has fire.

There are some important points to note about this five-membered argument (pañcavaya-nyāya).

First, it is the form in which debate and discussion should be conducted for the ascertainment of truth and establishment of theories. In order that there may be no ambiguity, digression, and shifting of ground, there is an explicit statement of the probandum and the checking of it by its restatement at the end—as in Euclid’s geometrical proof.

Second, we do not have here a mere formal syllogism, but also an attempt to establish its material validity by the citation of concrete instances supporting the universal major premise. It is, as Dr. Seal says, an inductive-deductive, formal-material process.

Third, (because of this) it does not always assume the form of finality. Sometimes (to start a discussion and invite criticism) it lays down a tentative proposition with a provisional induction, supported by an example, waiting to see what the opponent can say against it. It then becomes a process of tentative discovery and provisional proof.

The fallacies which may vitiate the conclusion of such a process are mentioned by Gautama and treated by his followers very elaborately. The more important of these arise from (1) assigning a reason (middle term) which has no invariable relation to what is to be proved (major term), e.g., “The hill has smoke, because it has fire”; (2) assigning a reason which has no relation to (and, therefore, contradicts) what is sought to be proved, e.g., “Sound is eternal, because it is produced”; (3) assigning a reason which is not really present in the case in hand, e.g., “Sound is eternal, because it is not produced”; (4) assigning a reason which leads to a conclusion that is contradicted by an opposite and stronger inference, e.g., “Sound is eternal, because it is invisible, like the atoms” (this is contradictable by the valid counter-inference, “Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced, like a pot”); and (5) assigning a reason which leads to a conclusion contradicted by direct perception, e.g., “Fire is cold, because it is a substance, like water.”
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Knowledge by Similarity (Upamāna)

This is differently conceived by different schools and writers. The earlier version, that of Gautama, describes it as knowledge of something, previously unknown, on the basis of its similarity to a familiar thing, e.g., "The gavaya (a wild deer) is like the cow." In later Nyāya it is more explicitly defined as the process by which we know the denotation of a new word on the basis of its similarity to a familiar object. In the same example, a man knows from an authority that a gavaya is a wild animal like the cow; then he happens to see that animal in the forest and comes to know, from that knowledge of similarity, that an animal of that kind is a gavaya.

The claim of this process to a status different from perception and inference is that the relation between the name and the object is not perceived, nor is it inferred, because no invariable concomitance (a universal premise) is used for reaching the knowledge.

Śabara, the commentator on the Mīmaṃsā-sūtra, describes this knowledge as a kind of analogical argument, as would appear from his example that we know the existence of souls in other bodies on the analogy of our knowledge of our own bodies' having souls.

But later Mīmaṃsā and Advaita Vedānta conceive upamāna in a different way. About the Nyāya conception they point out that it is a mixture of knowledge from authority and an inference based on it. According to them, upamāna is a process like this: When a man perceives a cow, and afterward perceives a gavaya, he judges, "This gavaya is like that cow." From this knowledge of similarity he passes to the knowledge "That cow (perceived in the past) is like the gavaya." This last knowledge is peculiar. It is not perceptual, for the subject "cow" is not now present, and when it was perceived in the past it was not known to be similar to the gavaya (which was not known then). It is not an inference, since no universal premise is used to reach the conclusion. So, it is classed apart and called knowledge from similarity (upamāna).

Testimony (Śabda)

Words of an authority (a reliable person or book) are recognized as a source of knowledge. Vaiśeṣika holds that this is inferential knowledge based on the reliability of the authority. But against this Nyāya points out that even though this is admitted it only shows that the truth of the knowledge is established by inference, but not the content of the knowledge. If a patient says that he has a headache and you accept his statement because he is truthful, you first know about the headache from his words and then know the truth of his
statement by inference from his truthfulness. Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, which believe that the validity of every knowledge is inherent in it, go a step further to hold that as soon as you learn from the person about his headache you know and believe his statement. It is only in exceptional circumstances when there are reasons for doubt that you use inference to remove the doubt. Inference thus does only the negative work of removing obstacles to knowledge, and, as soon as this is done, knowledge arises and claims self-evident validity.

Moreover, it is pointed out by all the supporters of authority that the conditions that generate such knowledge are very different from those which are necessary for inference. Such knowledge arises from the synthetic understanding of the meanings of the different words of a sentence. Four conditions are needed for this. The meaning of each word must raise a sense of incompleteness; this must be removed by the meanings of the other words which must be compatible with it; the words must be sufficiently close together so that they may be construed together; and, lastly, the purpose of the speaker (or the universe of discourse) must be understood.

Postulation (Arthāpatti)

This fifth source of knowledge, admitted by Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, is illustrated by the following stock examples: A man is known to fast during the day and yet grow fat. To explain this it is postulated that he must be eating during the night. Again, seeing that a man who is believed to be alive is not at home, it is known that he is outside his home. Similarly, finding that in the sentence “The chair ruled” the literal meaning of “chair” does not suit, we take the figuraiive meaning, “chairman.” In all such cases we explain given conflicting phenomena by supposing the only thing that can resolve the conflict. It looks like an explanatory hypothesis, but it is not provisional and uncertain like an hypothesis. Nyāya and other schools try to reduce it to inference drawn from a negative major. The first example is reduced thus: No one who does not eat at night while fasting during the day grows fat. This man grows fat. So, he is not such as does not eat at night, etc., i.e., he eats at night. Against this explanation it is pointed out that the very knowledge put in the major premise is not obtainable without a postulation. So, the explanation really begs the very question. Moreover, if we consult introspection (anuvyavasāya), we find that we do not feel here like inferring from any premise, but rather like supposing or postulating something unknown to explain a conflict.
DHIKENDRA MOHAN DATTA

Non-cognition (Anupalabdhi)

Non-cognition is the source of our primary knowledge of non-existence. It is generally believed that we can perceive non-existence just as we can existence. For, looking at the table, we can say that there is no cat there, just as we can say that there is a book there. But the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta point out that perception requires the relation of sense to its objects; but how can the sense be thought to be related to non-existence? Nyāya says that sense is related to the positive locus of nonexistence (in this case, the table) and through that to the nonexistence which is a character of the locus. But this explanation is not accepted, because any and every character that is in something is not perceived by the relation of the thing to sense. (Seeing the table we do not know its weight.) The character itself must be perceptible. But how can nonexistence be perceptible? Thus, we come back to the old problem.

To explain this difficulty Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that non-existence is known through non-cognition, just as existence is known through positive cognition. Of course, only appropriate non-cognition can yield such knowledge. If a thing should have been known under some circumstances had it been existing there, then the want of knowledge under the circumstances becomes the source of the knowledge of its nonexistence.

Theories of Error

Like knowledge, error also has been discussed threadbare by the different schools. Seven chief theories have been held and mutually criticized. We can give only the gist of them here. The nihilistic Buddhists hold that error is the appearance of the unreal as real (asat-khyāti). The idealistic Buddhists hold that the illusory object is nothing but the external appearance of what is really a subjective idea (ātma-khyāti). Sāṅkhya holds that the illusory appearance is a mixture of the appearance of the real and the unreal (sat-asat-khyāti)—an unreal character attributed to a real substratum. Advaita Vedānta holds that erroneous appearance is the temporary creation of ignorance, of a temporary object which can be described neither as wholly real nor as wholly unreal (anirvacanīyakhyāti). Nyāya and Bhaṭṭa realists hold that an illusion occurs by the dislocated appearance of a real object (perceived in the past) in another place and time (anyathā-khyāti). Rāmānuja (Vedāntin) holds that the so-called illusory object is really not unreal; it is the appearance of the real element (sat-khyāti) which is common to the present reality and what it is apprehended as. The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, like Rāmānuja, holds that all
knowledge is valid, and that what is called an illusion is really a mixture of two valid mental states, the perception of the presented reality and the vividly revived memory of a similar thing perceived in the past.

We see here again the wide variety of standpoints and theories ranging from extreme nihilism to extreme realism.

**THE METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY**

We shall now try to give a very brief idea of the different methods adopted by Indian thinkers for reaching philosophical truths.

The earliest philosophical treatises of India are the Upaniṣads, which are many in number. The earliest of them go back to about two thousand years before Christ. Some of these are written in verse and contain inspired utterances of truths which come with the force of direct realization and, therefore, are not supported by any reasoning. But some are written in prose and in the form of dialogues between the student and the teacher. We find in them the beginnings of attempts at removing doubts by examples and arguments. But still the art of reasoning with mere words (called in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, vākavākya), without the backing of spiritual insight and experience, was not at all encouraged. But later on in the Mahābhārata, in Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra (Treatise on Political Economy), and in Manu-saṁhitā we find much appreciation of the science of reasoning (variously referred to as anvīkṣikī, hetu-vidyā, etc.).

In Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra we find an elaborate treatment of the methods which should be adopted for carrying on arguments and establishing philosophical theories. There is also an elaborate account of the many defects and errors which should be avoided. Vātsyāyana, the commentator on the Nyāya-sūtra, gives a hint that Gautama is not the first propounder of this branch of knowledge, and the detailed nature of the treatise also strongly suggests that the work must have been preceded by long discussion, analysis, and practice of the art of debate, the results of which were available to Gautama. The followers of Gautama develop this branch, particularly the theory of inference, in the course of about two thousand years. The Nyāya method and the technical language for carrying on arguments come to be adopted to a large extent by all the other schools, with occasional addition and alteration. So, we should briefly discuss this method in the light of Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra.

Doubt (saṃśaya) is regarded by Gautama as the chief incentive to philosophical inquiry. For the removal of doubt one must consider carefully the pros and cons (pakṣa-pratīpakṣa) and ascertain the true nature of things. For this purpose one is advised to take the help of all
valid sources of knowledge, use (and avoid conflict with) previously established theories (siddhânta), use examples (dršṭânta) which are acceptable to all, employ the five-step method of discovery and proof (pañcâvayava-nyâya), use the indirect hypothetical or postulational method of strengthening the conclusion (tarka), and also take care to avoid five kinds of material fallacies (hetvâbhâsa), three kinds of quibbles (chala), twenty-four kinds of false analogies (jâti), and twenty-two kinds of self-stultifying steps which would cause defeat in debates. This elaborate method of critical inquiry was regarded as the light for all branches of knowledge, as the means of all (rational) activity, and as the basis of all virtues (dharma).

It is only when such a rigorous method is employed that the solution of any problem can claim to be a vâda, that is, a full-fledged theory.

In further clarification of this standard method, let us observe a few important points from Gautama, Vâtsyâyana, and other general writers. Every philosophical discussion starts with an explicit statement of its utility (prayojana) for human good (puruṣârtha).

The ultimate purpose of philosophical knowledge is the avoidance of evil, pursuit of desirable ends, and remaining indifferent to other things. Philosophical discussion arises from the desire to know (jñâna) and from doubt (samaâya). It aims at the elimination of doubt. It is based on the assumption that argument and the arguer have the capacity of attaining truth. Though doubt is necessary for philosophy, it must be given up when it leads to contradiction.

The material basis of philosophical discussion is the individual's own direct experience (pratiti or anubhava), including introspection and knowledge obtained from other valid sources. Not only normal waking experience, but also sleep, dream, and other kinds of experience should be explained and utilized. Current linguistic usage (vyavahâra), implying socially accepted experience, is often taken as the material basis of philosophical theories (cf. Socrates). Knowledge of previously established theories (siddhânta) is a source of new theories and helps one also to avoid errors. Distinction must be made, however, among (1) universally accepted theories, (2) sectarian theories, (3) implied theories, and (4) theories admitted for argument's sake.

Philosophical discussion should proceed by accurate definition of terms (lakṣaṇa) and indication of their denotation (uddeśa).

One should not believe that what cannot be perceived does not exist. For, failure to perceive may be due to the object's being too distant, too near, too subtle, too much mixed up with other things, to the senses' being damaged, or to lack of concentration. Knowledge of the unperceived may be obtained from inference based on analogy.
and general observation or from postulation (i.e., necessary supposition), or, in some cases, from reliable authority possessed of superior knowledge of the unperceived.

One of the important criteria of a good supposition adopted by all is its lightness, that is, simplicity, as opposed to its undue heaviness, i.e., redundancy. Again, so long as the perceived is sufficient, nothing unperceived should be supposed. The supposition of an unperceived cause is justified only if it can explain the perceived effect. When many alternative suppositions are possible, either (1) the acceptable alternative is retained by the method of residues (puriṣṭya) by eliminating the defective ones, or (2) all the alternatives may be examined and found defective, and nothing can be ascertained. In the latter case the very basic presupposition underlying the many alternatives is shown to be wrong.

The validity of a theory is also indirectly established by tarka, which consists in showing that the supposition of its contradictory leads to undesirable consequences. These latter are enumerated by Gautama as the defects of (1) self-dependence (ātmāśraya), (2) mutual dependence (ananyāśraya), (3) circular reasoning (cakraka), and (4) infinite regress (anavasthā)—all these errors may be either in respect of origination or existence or knowledge of the thing or things about which discussion is held. In addition to these four there is a residual class of general defects, the chief of which is contradiction (virodha), i.e., conflict with either itself (sva-virodha) or with other established facts, ideas, and theories. Non-contradiction (abādhiṣṭava), coherence (samādha), agreement with facts (yāthārthya), practical utility (arthakriyā-kārīva), self-evidence (svapratkāśatva), etc., are recognized by different thinkers as the criteria of truth. The laws of contradiction and excluded middle are explicitly formulated by Udayana in the following way: If two terms are contradictory, they cannot be identical, nor can there be any other alternative besides these.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that even this very meager account of Indian epistemology will not fail to point out the following important facts. In epistemology, as elsewhere, the Indian mind has regarded philosophical discussion as a means to a better life, and consequently great emphasis is laid on living and realizing in life the truths obtained in philosophy. Not in spite of this, but because of this, there is a rigorous and sincere attempt to ascertain all possible avenues of knowledge and to evolve the different rational methods of checking and correcting knowledge and ascertaining truth in such a way that bad philosophy may not
ruin life. Reason and argument, therefore, find their full place here as in Western philosophy. If there are differences between certain Indian and Western ideas and beliefs, we have only to bear in mind that there have been greater differences between Indians and Indians, as well as Westerners and Westerners. So, these differences may not be all racial but mostly individual. On the other hand, there is ample similarity and identity of thought as well between the Indian and the Westerner. This is no wonder, but is what it should be if man is human and reason is his chief instrument for understanding things and convincing his fellow creatures.

NOTES


3See Dharmakirti, Nyâya-bindu, with commentary of Dharmottarâcharya, P. Peterson, ed. (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1929), Ch. I.

4For a detailed discussion, see D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, Ch. VI.


7See Vedânta-parâhârâ (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1930), and D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing, on perception.

8For an excellent account of scientific methods, see B. N. Seal, The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915).

9Nyâya-sûtras, I, i, 6.


11The word "knowledge" seems peculiar in this and the following paragraphs, but Mr. Datta has requested that no change be made. His explanation is as follows: "I understand it [the word 'knowledge'] is not used in this sense, but that is because European philosophy does not recognize more than two kinds of knowledge (perception and inference). Indian philosophy makes a strong case for the extension of this limited view and hence the strain put on 'knowledge.' I would, therefore, keep it, for want of a better substitute. Moreover, a change here would require many other changes in other parts of the paper." [Editor's note.]

12See Vâtsyâyana, commentary on Nyâya-sûtras, I, i, 32.


14Nyâya-sûtras, I, i, 26–31.


16Debjî le na aďeštam, Puruśârthânusásanam.

17Kusumânjali, III, 8: "Paraâpara-virodhe hi na prâkaârântaratâthiti, Naikatâpi viruddhânâm uktimââvirodhabhâtāh."

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I propose to discuss the subject of concentration and meditation from three standpoints of Hindu philosophical thought, namely, rāja-yoga, bhakti-yoga, and jñāna-yoga. The word "yoga," much misunderstood in the West, really means union with ultimate reality and also the disciplines necessary to realize that union.

Rāja-yoga, the "kingly yoga," was systematized by the ancient Hindu seer Patañjali. It deals mostly with concentration as a means to the attainment of the knowledge of the self. Bhakti-yoga, the path of religious devotion, and jñāna-yoga, the path of philosophical discrimination, both regard concentration as an effective discipline for the realization, respectively, of God and of the identity of the individual self and the universal Self. All schools of thought in India have emphasized concentration and meditation for attaining knowledge of reality. Without them, philosophy remains on the level of academic discussion, and religion degenerates into dogmatic belief.

According to Hindu philosophy, a genuine philosopher must have direct knowledge of reality. Ultimate reality, or the first principle, differs from scientific reality. It belongs to a supramental realm and is known through direct and immediate experience. The knowledge acquired through the senses is colored by the condition of the sense organs and the mind. But ultimate reality belongs to the universal experience of humanity. It is not confined to any person or time.

Rāja-yoga is a discipline by which the direct experience of ultimate reality is made possible. It is a practical and rational method, tested
time and again by Indian philosophers. Every science—physics, chemistry, and botany, for instance—has formulated its own discipline. No man can be called a true philosopher if he only believes in a theory but has not directly experienced the object of knowledge. Untested philosophical beliefs are no more trustworthy than untested scientific hypotheses.

All knowledge is based upon the observation of facts. First, a generalization is made from these facts, and then a final conclusion is arrived at. It is much easier to observe the facts of the outer world than to understand such states of the mind as passion, love, and hate. In the latter instance the observer, the object, and the instrument are all different states of the mind itself. The mind must be directed toward itself. The powers of the mind, scattered in the average man, become, when concentrated, a powerful searchlight to illumine its different states. To use another illustration, through concentration the mind acquires the quality of a lens and can penetrate deeply into any object, external or internal. But this is an extremely difficult task, for most of us have been trained from childhood to observe and analyze only the outer world and not the inner world of the mind. In the West, the systematic study of physics and astronomy began much earlier than that of psychology, embodying the study of the emotions and passions.

Concentration is the sole method by which to learn the secrets both of the outer and of the inner world. Chemists, physicists, and astronomers direct their attention to the objects of their inquiry. But the mere observation of facts does not constitute the scientific method. Before one can arrive at scientific truth, these facts must be properly studied. The falling of apples had been observed since the beginning of creation, but the reflection of Sir Isaac Newton on this fact resulted in the formulation of the law of gravitation. So it is with the observer of mental states. All creative scientists must cultivate concentration to succeed in their research.

Yoga develops the innate powers of the mind through concentration, focuses them on the mind itself, and then analyzes its true nature. One can be a yogi (one who practices yoga) whether or not one accepts any form of religious belief. By means of yoga an atheist, no less than a Christian, a Hindu, or a Jew, can discover the ultimate nature of things. Again, through yoga it can be demonstrated that genuine religious experiences are as valid as scientific truths.

Yoga has been defined by Patanjali as “restraining the mind from taking various forms (yādittis)." How does one perceive an object? The sense organs carry the impressions to the brain-centers and present them to the mind, which, through its different aspects, functions in
different ways. One aspect of the mind creates doubt regarding the object it is observing; a second, called intellect (buddhi), comes to a conclusion by comparing the impression with the stored-up impressions of the past; a third part, called ego (aham), flashes I-consciousness. Thus it is that one says: "I perceive a cow." But according to rāja-yoga the entire mind is a subtle material substance and cannot function unless activated by intelligence or consciousness. This consciousness, called ātman, acts also like the screen in a cinema, which enables the spectator to obtain a coherent story from the separate pictures of the film. With the help of consciousness, the separate impressions or suggestions coming from the outside world are formed into mental states. These mental states constitute our everyday universe.

The nature of these mental states is influenced by certain characteristics of the mind. According to Hindu psychologists, matter, like a twisted rope, consists of three elements, called guṇas. These elements are present in all material objects, gross and subtle. The mind, being a subtle form of matter, is also made up of the three elements, which are called tāmas, rājas, and sattva. Tāmas is the darkening element, whose chief characteristic is inertia and indolence, and is generally found in animals and men of undeveloped mind. Rājas, which functions in the energetic man, is the active element, whose chief characteristics are love of power and enjoyment. Sattva is found among highly developed souls and is characterized by calmness and a balance between extremes. The impressions of the outer world presented to the mind are influenced by sattva, rājas, and tāmas. Thus the same object creates different emotions in different minds. A beautiful woman, for instance, is regarded by her disappointed lover with bitter pain, by her successful suitor with great joy, and by a saint with complete indifference.

The surface of the mind is constantly agitated by impressions from the outside world. Hence one does not see what lies beyond the mind. If the water of a lake is muddy or disturbed, one does not see the bottom. But when the mud settles and the ripples subside, an object lying on the bottom can be clearly seen. As water is clear by nature, mud being extraneous to it, so the mind itself is translucent and capable of revealing the true nature of things. But the uncontrolled sense organs constantly draw the mind outward and create waves. It is the aim of yoga to detach the mind from the sense organs and check its outward tendency. Only then can it reflect the true nature of any object it contemplates.

The ordinary mind is "darkened" or "scattered." The darkened mind is characterized by dullness and passivity. The scattered mind is restless. In neither of these states is it capable of higher perceptions.
Through the disciplines of yoga the darkened or scattered mind can be “gathered” and made “one-pointed.” When this has been accomplished, it attains total absorption, or samādhi, in which a man realizes the true nature of his self. When the waves cease and the lake quiets down, one sees the bottom. But an unillumined person identifies himself with one or another of the states of the mind, and thus experiences grief, fear, or happiness.

Rāja-yoga declares that by practice and non-attachment the mental states may be controlled. Practice means an unceasing struggle to keep the mental states perfectly restrained. It becomes easy through protracted effort accompanied by intense longing for the goal. Non-attachment means the control of yearning for any object unrelated to the goal one has set out to realize. For a yogi, who aspires to realize supramental reality, non-attachment means the repression of yearning for all material objects, either tangible or intangible. The intangible objects are those which, it is said, can be enjoyed in the heavenly world. But these are as impermanent as tangible objects, because they too, like the latter, are subject to the laws of time, space, and causation. A non-attached person renounces the desire for everything that belongs to nature, or matter, including mind. He is as detached from exclusive love as from earthly possessions.

There are different kinds of concentration. One can concentrate on the external, gross elements and thus learn their true nature. Certain yogis, by means of such concentration, acquire psychic, or so-called “occult,” knowledge, which is really a kind of subtle knowledge of material objects. Knowledge is power. Through this knowledge these yogis acquire what is generally known as supernatural power. The concentration practiced by scientists may be said to belong to this category. Without deep concentration they could not have understood the inner nature of the atom and released the energy locked in it. According to Patañjali, the power acquired through such concentration enables one to obtain mastery over material objects and enjoy material happiness. But such mastery over nature, unless controlled by ethical and spiritual laws, can produce evil results. Therefore, before taking up concentration, every yogi is required to eradicate evil tendencies by the practice of ethical disciplines. Further, the happiness obtained from impermanent, material objects is transitory; it ultimately brings suffering.

Other forms of concentration, directed toward different material objects, produce corresponding results; but they do not give one knowledge of reality, which alone makes one free.

In the higher concentration the mind concentrates on itself. Every
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thought that appears is struck down. The mind is made a vacuum.
But there is danger in this form of concentration. Without proper
discipline and guidance, it may make the mind negative or morbid.
Rightly practiced, however, it enables the mind to become "seedless,"
which means that all the latent tendencies of the mind are destroyed.
No more is it disturbed by the outer world or by impressions from
the past. Thus one attains knowledge of one's true nature and achieves
freedom from the bondage of matter.

Patañjali suggests various methods of concentration, success de-
pending upon the intensity of the seeker's desire. One of these is
devotion to the personal God. God is conceived of as omniscient
and all-powerful. In Him knowledge, which in others is found only
as a germ, reaches perfection. Every minimum must have its maximum.
God is unconditioned by time and is the transmitter of spiritual
knowledge through human teachers. Patañjali suggests the mystic
word Om as an effective symbol of God, both personal and impersonal.
Through repetition of this word and meditation on its meaning, the
mind acquires the power of introspection and at the same time frees
itself from many obstacles. Some of these obstacles are as follows:
disease, mental laziness, doubt, lethargy, clinging to sense enjoyment,
and non-retention of concentration once it has been acquired. Without
proper guidance, the aspirant, while practicing concentration, experi-
ences grief, mental distress, tremor of the body, and irregular breath-
ing. Meditation on a fixed object removes these obstacles.

Other disciplines are prescribed by Patañjali to quiet the mind.
For instance, one should cultivate an attitude of friendship toward
those who are happy, mercy toward those who are unhappy, gladness
toward the good, and indifference toward the evil. The regulation of
breathing, through certain definite exercises, is also a method. Again,
one can concentrate on light or on a pleasant dream or on any delect-
able object.

With the help of such concentration the mind acquires the power
to contemplate all objects, whether as minute as an atom or as huge as
the sun. It can then function either like a heavy scale in a warehouse
or like a delicate balance in a chemical laboratory.

When the yogi becomes proficient in concentration, he can with-
draw his mind from all extraneous things and identify himself solely
with the object of his thought. His mind then becomes like a crystal.
When a crystal is placed near a flower, the crystal identifies itself, as
it were, with the flower. The mind has now acquired one-pointedness
and can penetrate deeply into the nature of things. Thus it can obtain
knowledge which is far more profound than that acquired through the
senses, inference, or the testimony of others. This is what is meant by
direct experience. Scientists, philosophers, artists, statesmen, and all
creative thinkers should find the practice of yogic concentration an
invaluable help in their various fields of work.

The greatest of the obstacles to concentration is the distraction
caused by latent tendencies of the mind. Every action leaves behind it
a subtle impression. These impressions remain hidden in the deeper
layers of the mind. Ordinarily a man is hardly aware of them. But, as
he tries to concentrate his mind, they come to the surface and cause
distraction. Like waves on the surface of a lake, they hide a man’s true
nature. But if, with undaunted mind, one practices concentration, they
gradually become attenuated. Intense concentration on one object
creates a strong wave, which gradually swells up, as it were, the
other waves created by past impressions. Finally, by a supreme act of
will, the last wave also is destroyed and the mind becomes free of all
impressions. Then a man’s true and complete nature is revealed. He
realizes the soul to be non-material, completely separate from the body
and mind, and untouched by time, space, and causation. It is the
essence of consciousness, immortal and indestructible. This state of
realization is called kaitalya, isolation, when the yogi realizes his utter
non-attachment to material objects, which include, as has already
been noted, the various states of the mind—such as doubt, intellect,
and the ego—and all possessions and possessiveness.

Rāja-yoga consists of eight “limbs,” or parts. The first two are
called yama and niyama. Both denote, in a general way, control or re-
straint. Niyama, which refers to lesser vows, is not as obligatory as
yama. According to Patañjali, yama includes non-killing, truthfulness,
non-stealing, continence, and non-receiving of gifts. These are great
vows and should be undertaken by yogis irrespective of time, place, or
caste rules. Morality is the steel-frame foundation of the spiritual life.
Without it the practice of concentration can bring harmful results, not
only to the seeker but also to others. The power released by concen-
tration may be used for destructive purposes. A Sanskrit proverb says:
“To feed a cobra with milk without first taking out its poison fangs
is only to increase its venom.”

The third limb of yoga is posture. The yogi sits in the posture that
comes easiest to him. Eighty-four postures are described in yoga. But
the general principle is to hold free the spinal column, through which
nerve-currents rise in the course of meditation. The yogi sits erect,
holding his back, neck, and head in a straight line. The whole weight
of the upper body rests on the ribs. With the chest out, he finds it easy
to relax and think high thoughts.
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The fourth limb is control of the breath. According to rāja-yoga, our breathing is part of the cosmic energy. The breath is like the fly-wheel of a machine. In a large engine, first the fly-wheel moves, and then that motion is conveyed to the finer parts of the machine, until the most delicate mechanism is set in motion. The breath is the fly-wheel supplying motive power to all parts of the body. When breathing is regulated, the whole physical system functions rhythmically.

The fifth limb of yoga consists in training the mind to detach itself, at will, from a particular sense organ. The perception of an object arises only when the mind joins itself to a sense organ. Through the practice of this discipline the yogi can check the outward inclination of the mind and free it from the thralldom of the senses. At the beginning of this discipline the yogi relaxes his mind and lets it move in any way it likes. He does not interfere with his thoughts or try to suppress them. He remains their witness. Gradually, as the mind grows tired, the thoughts become fewer. At last, the mind comes completely under his control. The mind of the average person may be compared to a monkey. Both are restless by nature. The monkey has taken a deep draft of liquor. Its restlessness is aggravated. Likewise, the mind, after a deep dose of worldly pleasures, becomes intensely restless. And finally, the intoxicated monkey is bitten by a scorpion. The worldly man is also bitten by the scorpion of egotism, jealousy, etc. How is one to calm the monkey? Allow it to jump about. At last it will become tired. Likewise, allow the mind to indulge in its fancies. Do not try to suppress them or it will be stubborn. Be a witness to its restless movements. At last, when the mind becomes tired, you can bring it under control by the power of will.

The sixth limb of yoga consists in holding the mind to a certain point in the body. It is trained to feel that part only, to the exclusion of all others. For instance, the yogi may remain aware only of the hand or the tip of the nose, not feeling the existence of any other part.

The seventh limb is called dhyāna, meditation. In this stage the mind acquires the power to think of an object uninterruptedly. The flow of the yogi’s mind to the object on which he is meditating is unbroken, like the flow of oil when it is poured from one vessel to another.

The eighth and last limb is called samādhi, a state of mind in which the yogi rejects the external part—the name and the form—of the object of meditation, and contemplates only its essence. He thus comes face to face with the true nature of the object, which ordinarily remains hidden behind the outer form. He is no longer deceived by appearances. He knows the reality that lies behind the body and the senses. Samādhi can be attained by all human beings. Each one of the steps leading to
it has been reasoned out and scientifically tested. When properly practiced, under a competent guide, these steps lead the seeker to the desired end, namely, the realization of his utter isolation from and independence of matter and mental states, which are, by their very nature, transitory.

II

Concentration is discussed in the Bhagavadgītā from the standpoint of the personal God, who is defined as the possessor of infinite blessed attributes. It is He who is the object of meditation. In this process of meditation, love of God plays an important part. It enables the mind to become one-pointed. The follower of this path is also a yogi. He must practice certain disciplines before he can achieve success in meditation.

As his spiritual discipline, the aspirant performs his daily obligatory duties toward others, regarding himself as an instrument in God's hands and renouncing the results of his actions. Thus he cultivates inner serenity, remaining unruffled by pain and pleasure, success and failure, and the other pairs of opposites. Further, he practices non-attachment to sense objects and thus brings the turbulent mind under control. An unbounded faith in himself is necessary: "Let a man be lifted up by his own self, and let him not lower himself; for he himself is his friend and he himself is his enemy." He who has brought the body, the senses, and the mind under control is his own friend. But he who has no such control does injury to himself, like an external enemy. The aspirant maintains an attitude of sameness toward friends and foes, the righteous and the sinful. While practicing concentration, he remains serene and fearless. Observing chastity of body and thought, he renounces "all desires born of the mind," draws back the senses from every direction by strength of will, and subdues the turbulent passions. He follows the middle path, avoiding extremes in matters of food, sleep, play, and work.

The aspirant concentrates his mind on God, regarding Him as the supreme goal of life and the embodiment of peace, blessedness, and freedom. God is to him not only the power that creates and sustains the universe, but also the one who dwells in all beings as their inner controller. He is both transcendent and immanent. Love of God, if genuine, leads to love for all human beings, because all human beings, in essence, are God. As the aspirant's contemplation deepens, he realizes greater and greater tranquillity. At last he sees God in his own self and himself in God. He experiences the boundless joy that comes from the knowledge of reality and thereafter remains unmoved by the heaviest of sorrows. His mind remains fixed in the Lord alone, like a
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"lamp, which, when kept in a windless place, does not flicker." Every time the mind, by nature fickle and unquiet, wanders away from the goal, he brings it back under his control.

As the culmination of his contemplation, the yogi on the path of devotion comes to view all things alike, beholding himself in all beings and all beings in himself. He sees God in all things, and all things in God. Established in this oneness, he worships God, who dwells in all beings. He devotes his life to the service of humanity; for he now regards the pleasure and pain of all beings as he regards them in himself. Infinite compassion flows from his heart, and infinite love from his soul. This is the fruit of the concentration attained through devotion to the personal God.

III

Finally, we shall consider, in brief, concentration from the standpoint of the non-dualistic (advaita) Vedānta philosophy. The essence of non-dualism is that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality; the phenomenal universe is unreal; and the individual creature is none other than Brahman itself. The goal of the non-dualist is to realize, in the depths of meditation, the unity of existence. This is a supersensuous and supramental experience in which the illusory notions of name and form, and subject and object, completely disappear.

According to non-dualistic Vedānta, it is through māya, metaphysical ignorance, inscrutable to the finite mind, that the infinite Brahman appears as the finite universe. Vedānta states, further, that there are two orders of experience. From the transcendental standpoint, the illumined soul experiences unity, which includes his own self. From the empirical standpoint, the ordinary man experiences multiplicity and sees himself as its perceiver. No relationship exists between the Infinite and the finite, the One and the many, because they belong to two entirely different levels of experience. If anyone seeks to establish such a relationship, the Vedāntist calls it the result of māya. One can find a relationship between two things perceived to exist at the same time. But when the One is perceived to exist, the many is nonexistent, and vice versa. According to non-dualistic Vedānta, it is the One that appears as the many, the Absolute that appears as the relative. And this is māya. The doctrine of māya is simply a statement of fact regarding the phenomenal universe.

There are two powers of māya. First, through its veiling power, reality is concealed. Second, through its projecting power, the manifold universe comes into existence. Individuality is also a product of māya. Under the spell of metaphysical ignorance, man forgets the
knowledge of his identity with the Absolute and superimposes upon himself the illusory notions of mind and body, caste and sex, color and social position. Though the innate nature of his true self is not affected in the slightest degree by māyā, yet he regards the illusory superimposition as real. A mirage is regarded by an ignorant person as real, though even then the true nature of the desert remains unaffected. According to Vedānta, man has hypnotized himself into the belief that he is a finite being subject to time, space, and causation. It is this self-forgetfulness, followed by the perception of multiplicity, that creates friction and fear and becomes the cause of suffering. The goal of Vedānta is to dehypnotize man and help him to rediscover his eternal but hidden spiritual nature. In the achieving of this goal, concentration and meditation play an important part.

The follower of Vedānta practices a number of definite disciplines. He cultivates discrimination between what is real and what is unreal. He renounces the unreal. He feels an unwavering zeal to realize the absolute truth. Like the follower of rāja-yoga and of bhakti-yoga, he practices all the moral virtues, for these form the basis of any higher life. Special emphasis is given to chastity of body and thought, austerity, and self-control. As the mind becomes purified, the spiritual nature of the soul reveals itself to the seeker, and the knowledge of his identity with Brahman, or ultimate reality, becomes clear.

Students of self-knowledge, while practicing concentration, meet with four obstacles. The first is a sleep-like state, when the mind, detached from worldly objects and unable to rest on the ideal, falls into a state of passivity. The way to overcome this obstacle is to stimulate the mind by healthy spiritual exercises, such as music or the reading of an inspirational book. The second obstacle, often experienced, is called “distractions”—the “little imbecilities of the mind,” as they have been aptly described. These are caused by the student’s vain talk or actions in the past, whose latent impressions rise to the surface of the mind at the time of concentration. Such distractions are to be overcome by forcibly fixing the mind on the ideal. The third obstacle is the sudden awakening of a deep-seated attachment to a material object experienced long before but meanwhile suppressed. The way to overcome it is to exercise discrimination and realize the transitory and painful nature of all material attachments. The last obstacle, known as the “taste of bliss,” is caused by the acquisition of various supernatural powers during the different stages of concentration. It also includes the enjoyment of ecstasy resulting from communion with the personal God. This is the final obstacle in the path of the realization of the unity of existence and can be overcome by the austere discrimination of the
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aspirant. The student should remove all these obstacles with iron will, directing his mind to the realization of the ultimate oneness of God, the soul, and the universe.

The treatises on Vedānta emphasize that the qualified student should be instructed by an illumined teacher, to whom the utmost reverence must be shown. The teacher instructs him regarding the oneness of the individual self and Brahman. Next, the student constantly contemplates Brahman and strengthens his conviction by means of careful reasoning. In this way his illusory notions regarding the self are removed. Finally, he meditates on Brahman with one-pointed attention.

Meditation is defined, in Vedānta philosophy, as the direction of attention on a stream of ideas consonant with the non-dual Brahman, to the exclusion of such foreign ideas as body, senses, mind, and ego. Meditation practiced uninterruptedly, for a long time, with intense devotion to the ideal, and with unflagging determination, leads to the knowledge of the seeker’s complete identity with Brahman.

The teacher instructs the student on the precise meaning of the Vedic dictum: “That thou art.” The word “That,” he teaches, refers to pure consciousness, which, in association with māyā, is associated with omnipotence and omniscience and becomes the creator and preserver of the universe. The word “thou” refers to the same pure consciousness, which, through māyā, appears also to have become the finite created being, endowed with limited power and limited knowledge. Then, by a subtle process of dialectics, the Vedāntic philosopher eliminates the extraneous ideas superimposed, through māyā, upon “That” and “thou,” and points out that the Vedic dictum actually refers to pure and indivisible consciousness, unaffected by time, space, and causation. As the student meditates on this consciousness, or Brahman, there arises in his mind a state which makes him feel that he is Brahman, pure by nature, eternal, self-illumined, free, infinite, supremely blissful, and non-dual. This mental state, illumined by pure consciousness, destroys his ignorance with regard to his identity with Brahman. But even now the idea of Brahman is only a state, or wave, of the mind. With the destruction of the student’s ignorance, its effect, namely, the various mental states, is also destroyed—just as when a cloth is burned, the warp and woof are also burned. When the mental states are destroyed, there remains only pure consciousness, which now becomes overpowering, as it were, by the effulgence of Brahman itself. Thus the subject and the object, the perceiving consciousness and the pure consciousness, become one, and there remains only the supreme Brahman, one and without a second. This experience cannot be de-
scribed in words; it is known only to him who has attained it. The experiencer becomes a new being, the Absolute Brahman. The illusion of name and form is destroyed. The knower is no longer a victim of the false expectation and false fear that plague the life of an unillumined person at every step.

A person endowed with the knowledge of Brahman is called a jīvanmukta, one who enjoys freedom though still living in a human body. To become free while living on earth is the goal of the Vedāntist. He demonstrates by his life and action the reality of Brahman and the illusoriness of the relative world. It is such men who keep true philosophy and religion alive, and not merely erudite scholars or subtle theologians. Whether absorbed in the ecstasy of communion or engaged in action in the outer world, the free soul's knowledge is steady and his joy constant. Though sometimes he appears to act like an unillumined person in respect to hunger, thirst, or sleep, he is never oblivious of his true nature. Though outwardly active, yet he is free from the notion of being a doer. He does not dwell on the experiences of the past, takes no thought for the future, and is indifferent to the present. Aware of his identity with all beings, he feels through all hearts, walks with all feet, eats through all mouths, and thinks through all minds. Physical death and birth have no meaning for him, a change of body appearing to him like a change of garments or like passing from one room to another.

Though a free soul lives in a world of diversity, yet he is unaffected by the pairs of opposites. Whether tormented by the wicked or worshiped by the good, he remains undisturbed. The outside world cannot produce any change in his self, just as the rivers flowing into the ocean cannot disturb its bottomless depths. He regards all things without prejudice or passion. His charity for others is without bounds.

An illumined person transcends the scriptures and the conventions of society. He is beyond the imperatives of ethics; yet he cannot do anything that is not conducive to the welfare of others. He is free but not whimsical, spontaneous but not given to license. The great ethical virtues—compassion, humility, unselfishness, chastity, fellow feeling—which, prior to the attainment of knowledge, he practiced assiduously as spiritual disciplines, now adorn him like so many jewels. He no longer seeks them. They cling to him.

Though without riches, yet he is ever content; though helpless, yet endowed with exceeding power; though detached from sense objects, yet always satisfied; though active, yet immersed in inner peace; though possessed of a body, yet unidentified with it; though apparently limited by time and space, yet omnipresent and omniscient. He neither
directs the senses to their objects nor withdraws them from them, but
looks on everything as an unconcerned spectator. While dwelling in the
physical body he may experience disease, old age, and decay, which are
characteristics of all material forms. He may be blind, or deaf, or de-
formed in other ways. Or he may feel hunger and thirst, or may appear
to be a victim of grief and fear. Nevertheless, though experiencing all
these momentarily—the characteristics of the body, the senses, and
the mind—he is never overwhelmed by them. Having once realized
their unsubstantiality, he never imagines them to be real.

One who witnesses the performance of a magician, and who knows
that what he is seeing is magic, does not take it to be real. He is not
deceived by appearances. Yet he enjoys the performance to his heart’s
content. Accordingly, it is said: "He who sees nothing in the waking
state, even as in dreamless sleep; who, though seeing duality, does not
really see it, since he beholds only the Absolute; who, though engaged
in work, is really inactive—he, and no other, is the knower of the
Self."

A free soul, while in the body, devotes himself to others’ welfare,
physical or spiritual, but he works under the spell of the soul’s eternity,
immortality, and non-duality. With the exhaustion of the momentum
of his past actions, which are responsible for his present embodiment
and which sustain his body, the illumined soul is ready to depart from
the world. His death is not like the death of others. The Upaniṣad de-
clares that he comes out of the body purer and brighter, like a snake
that has cast off its slough. His soul does not go out to be reborn, but
is absorbed into Brahman, leaving behind no trace of its separate
existence. As milk poured into milk becomes one with the milk, as
water poured into water becomes one with the water, as oil poured into
oil become one with the oil—so the illumined soul, absorbed into Bra-
man, becomes one with Brahman. As, when dwelling in the body, the
illumined person does not lose the knowledge of his identity with
Brahman, so also, after discarding it, he attains supreme freedom in
Brahman and merges in light, peace, knowledge, and reality.

Thus did the ancient Indo-Aryan philosophers of various schools,
by means of detachment, self-control, and concentration, seek to solve
the riddle of the universe and of the self, leaving the legacy of their
thought for the enrichment of human culture.

NOTES

1Rāja-yoga is concerned mainly with analysis, control, and concentration of the
mind. Hence it will be helpful to obtain a general idea of the mind according to
Hindu philosophers and psychologists. The five elements of matter, as originally
evolved, were in a subtle and rudimentary state. They combined with one another
to form the gross elements, which constitute the visible universe. The mind (manas)
is made of subtle elements. There are two organs of perception, namely, the inner
and the outer. By means of the outer organs, such as ears, eyes, nose, tongue, and skin,
one perceives external objects. The mind is the inner organ, by which one analyzes
sense data and also perceives inner states, such as doubt, passion, anger, hate,
happiness, and unhappiness. The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (1, v, 3) gives the follow-
ing functions of the mind: desire (kama), cognition of the individuality of objects
(sarikalpa), doubt (vicikitsa), faith (śraddhā), disbelief (āśraddhā), fortitude (dheiti),
unsteadiness (adhiti), intelligence (dhi), and fear (bhee). According to Hindu psycholo-
gists, the ego, the mind, and the intellect are not different from external material
objects, such as trees or stones, as far as their essential nature is concerned. Endowed
with a beginning and an end, they are objects of consciousness or ātman. Ātman
is the unrelated witness of the activity of the senses and the mind during the waking
and dream states, and of their non-activity in deep sleep. Consciousness, which is
the very stuff of ātman, can never be nonexistent.

According to Vedānta, the ultimate reality is Brahma, or pure consciousness.
Its highest manifestation in time and space is Saguna Brahman, or Brahma en-
dowed with attributes. According to its different functions, it is the creator, the
preserver, and the redeemer or savior. When personified, Saguna Brahman is re-
garded as the personal God of different religions, and is worshiped as the Father in
heaven, Jehovah, Allah, Siva, Viṣṇu, and Kāli. Another manifestation is the divine
incarnations, such as Christ, Buddha, and Kṛṣṇa. Whenever virtue declines and vice
prevails in the world, Saguna Brahman is incarnated for the protection of the
righteous and the destruction of the wicked. God becomes man so that man may
become God. A third manifestation is the inner guide (antarāyamin), who dwells in
the hearts of all living beings and controls their activities from within.

This description of liberation applies to illumined persons who have attained
perfection following the discipline of any path.

Śaṅkarācārya, Upadesasāhasrī, II, x, 13.
Basic Problems of Method in Harmonizing Eastern and Western Philosophy

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The preceding papers in this Conference program have all been presented by men who are expert in some phase of Eastern thought as well as in the history of Western thought. If I am an expert in anything, it is certainly not in any aspect of Eastern philosophy. But I offer no apology for appearing on the platform at this juncture of our Conference work. I shall indeed extend my neck to a precarious distance, but the extension will be tentative rather than dogmatic; I shall be conscious at every moment that what I am propounding is not a thesis claiming truth, but a set of suggestions to be developed, revised, corrected, in whatever ways the subsequent discussion shows to be needed.

In this spirit I shall attempt an analysis of the problem: What method is it wise to employ in pursuing our quest for a mutual understanding between Eastern and Western philosophers and, so far as possible, a harmonious reconciliation of their viewpoints? Whatever constructive contribution I can make toward our joint endeavor lies, I am sure, in this field; in my effort to see what sort of thing philosophizing in a world perspective should be, on the basis of what meager knowledge I have of Eastern and Western ways of thinking, I have found myself coming back over and over again to this question of method as a fundamental and crucial one.

To save time I shall try in what follows to take for granted everything that might be taken for granted in a group like ourselves, but not, I hope, much more. I do not mean to take for granted, for example, any dubious assumptions about method itself—such as, that a rigid logical framework can be set up in advance to which any results if they are to be sound must conform, that a wise method must be empirical

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in any partisan meaning of that term, that methodology can be profitably considered in abstraction from spadework in dealing with detailed problems, even that very much can be said about any method before it is put to work to see what is actually accomplished by using it. I hope it will be evident that all such matters are not prejudged but are left open for consideration in the course of my analysis.

Certain assumptions about other matters I propose to make, however, and it might help if I mention briefly the most important ones of which I am conscious. I shall be assuming, first, that philosophical understanding between East and West and some measure of harmonizing synthesis are possible, and that the intelligent problem is simply how to achieve this goal as rapidly and as fully as is feasible. I shall be assuming, second, that the problem of harmonizing Eastern and Western philosophies is of the same general type as the problem of harmonizing widely divergent philosophies within the same regional tradition—exhibiting only such distinctive characteristics as are due to the factors which give unique quality to a region or a nation. It is my experience that an idealist and a positivist in the West find it just as difficult (perhaps more so) to understand what each other is saying and to move toward a comprehensive reconciliation of their viewpoints as it is for a typical Indian and a typical Western philosopher to do so. Many of the principles of method that give relevant guidance in the one case give, I am sure, relevant guidance in the other. I shall be assuming, third, a principle that I may term that of "valuational relativism." By this principle I mean, briefly, that one of the most important factors which explain why one philosophy differs from another is the ultimate value commitment which is reflected in its presuppositions—that is, its ultimate sense as to what is of crucial significance in life and experience. Every philosophy reveals on analysis such a dominating value commitment, which is often unrecognized by those who hold it. But no understanding between divergent philosophies— not to say reconciliation of their viewpoints—is possible, I am convinced, without explicitly taking it into account; it underlies and largely determines their very criteria of logical consistency, of fact, of truth, and of reality. When one philosopher argues with another without taking the two value commitments into account we have a situation in which a man is trying to convince another man by appealing to facts not all of which the latter recognizes as facts, to logical principles not all of which the latter accepts, to a theory of truth which is not in every respect admitted as true. Philosophical thinking is radically contextual, and the most decisive factor determining the context of any philosophy is its value commitment.
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This factor confronts us when we face the task of reconciling two philosophies which have arisen in the same cultural tradition, and it confronts us when we face the task of reconciling two philosophies which have arisen in different cultural traditions; but it assumes in the second case a more complicated form. It means that in that case we will need to recognize that what I have called the value commitment of each philosophy must be profoundly affected by the dominant values expressed in the entire national or regional life out of which it has arisen, in addition to certain more specific values which vary within that culture. It means, for example, that when we are considering how to synthesize Western positivism with Advaita Vedānta or with the Neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi we shall have to take into account not only the differing sense of what is significant and important that is reflected in positivism as compared with Western idealism, but also the differing sense of what is significant and important as between Occidental cultural life on the one hand and Indian or Chinese patterns of living on the other.

After these lengthy preliminaries, I proceed to certain specific questions which have a vital bearing on the problem of what method we should follow in pursuing our intriguing and difficult goal. I shall begin with the more elementary and less technical ones, and advance to those that are more puzzling. In the case of some of these questions I am rather confident of the correct answer; in the case of others my hope is that you will steer me aright in what is as yet to me a very baffling labyrinth. In this analysis I shall mention four questions; but do not take this number as implying either that there are no others of equal importance or that I think you would be unable to remember more than four.

I

The first of these questions is one that is frequently raised when I discuss the problem of the meeting of East and West with people eager for the achievement of world understanding but who are not philosophers. "How can you expect," they ask, "to accomplish anything significant by discussing philosophic ideas with Eastern thinkers without possessing detailed familiarity with and without constant reference to the cultural background out of which these ideas have emerged? Are not the ideas when considered apart from those details mere empty abstractions, capable of any kind of fruitless speculative manipulation you please? In order for an East-West Philosophers' Conference to be worth while would it not have to function as part of a wider conference devoted to the same ends—but comprising artists, religious prophets,
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statesmen, sociologists, economists, and educational leaders as well as philosophers?"

The right answer to this question helps to reveal, I think, the distinctive role and proper method of philosophy in the quest for world understanding; in its light both the limitations of our intellectual pursuit and its indispensable contribution to international harmony are disclosed. My answer is as follows:

Yes, conferences of the kind you suggest would be very valuable too—perhaps much more valuable than a conference of philosophers alone. Let us seize every opportunity to participate in them, whether they are sponsored by UNESCO or under other auspices. Moreover, let us constantly recognize that our philosophic efforts in the direction of world understanding are likely to be thin, abstract, and unreal unless they are accompanied by a continuing effort to penetrate the concrete meaning of each of the great cultures of the world and to appreciate philosophic ideas in their relation to their social, historical, and geographical context.

But, while expanding this familiarity with cultural activities and institutions, philosophers can do something which no one else can do and which is very important. What that is may be seen when we realize that the total experience of a people—the world in which it lives—has two major dimensions in terms of which it must be understood. When we attempt to understand it in terms of one we are led to these concrete details in all their political, economic, religious, and sociological diversity; when we attempt to understand it in terms of the other we are led to the most respected ideals, the dominant valuations, the comprehensive aspirations which give unity to the details and apart from which their significance cannot be grasped. Following the one dimension, the distinctive thing discovered about any people is its characteristic ways of acting and feeling; following the other, the distinctive thing discovered is what we have now come to call its "ideology"—the system of general terms in which is expressed its unique sense of the purpose of life in relation to the most comprehensive universe which its leaders can envision. Now, philosophical ideas (especially those technically called "categories") constitute a major part of this ideology; perhaps if we understood philosophy more realistically than academic philosophers usually do they would be identical with it. We are most aware of this role of ideological values so far as they affect the most general ethical and social ideals of a people. We are not so aware of their influence on epistemological and metaphysical ideas, but I believe they can be shown to have a vital impact on the latter as well. Such ideas are not merely universal principles of
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explanation, of knowledge, of reality; they disclose controlling commitments as to what sort of thing an explanation should be, what kind of knowledge it is worth while to seek, what sort of thing it is wise to take as real.

Consider, for example, the historical variations of meaning in the category of "causality" in Western thought. Throughout the ancient and medieval periods this category gave clear intellectual expression to the mystic idea that all things come into being from a source which imparts to them something of the perfection which it eternally possesses. In the modern period this category is abandoned by all Occidental thinkers except steadfast adherents to the so-called "great tradition"; in its place a new concept of causality appears, expressing the idea that all events can be so understood that through knowledge of the past and the present their future occurrence can be exactly predicted and effectively controlled. In both Indian and Chinese thought there is a category somewhat similar to, though not identical with, the first of these concepts; in neither, so far as I am aware, has any category closely analogous to the second been seriously employed, for, while the ideal of careful prediction has played a vital role in Eastern thought, that of external, manipulative control of nature has remained essentially foreign to dominant Indian and Chinese ways of philosophizing. The same is the case with other philosophic categories. To take a second example, the category of "substance" in the ancient West expresses both the individualism and the static orientation which were characteristic of the Greek mind in its approach to nature; in modern thought it is more and more boldly replaced by some concept which retains the individualism while abandoning the static ideal. I refer, for example, to Whitehead's category of "event." India has had no synonymous concept because to the most influential strain in her history the separate individual is ultimately illusory rather than real; and China has likewise had none because Chinese philosophy from the very beginning has assumed a dynamic rather than a static cosmology.

When we realize that similar considerations apply to all other general concepts, it becomes clear that appreciative understanding between nations and regions must be achieved at the philosophic level if solid foundations of mutual trust and cooperative tolerance are to be established. When there is no sharing of ideas at this level, the highest values to which one people is committed remain foreign, opaque, and therefore unreasonable to those who have grown up in other cultures. In any crisis which appears to threaten them their champions will see no alternative to an uncompromising defense of these sacred commitments against the perilous pressure: by war, if
they are accustomed to settling crucial issues thus; if not, at least by shrinking inward to a more inflexible and dogmatic attachment to them. From this viewpoint, world-philosophizing places an essential stone in the arch of international understanding.

Now, such value commitments as are expressed in these categories can be comprehended, not merely through appreciative understanding of the cultural activities which they permeate, but also directly. Of course, increasing familiarity with those activities helps. But it is possible for a Westerner to grasp, in some valid measure, the meaning of "karma" or of "tao" by immediate sympathetic responsiveness to the characteristic Indian or Chinese way of using those terms. The present Conference is giving constant exemplification of this truth. It is possible because, despite our national and regional diversities, we are all human beings with certain properties and needs in common, and these include not merely the physiological demands for food and shelter but also the moral and intellectual feelings for order, for responsibility, for growth, for freedom, for unity with the whole. We are not rigidly tied down to any special way of structuring these feelings, but can respond directly to other ways than those with which we are familiar. Yet only persons of philosophic caliber can readily express this kind of responsiveness, for it requires power to deal with general ideas and not get lost in them when they are handled in abstraction from the concrete material in which they are culturally embodied.

From this point of view the unique contribution of philosophy toward world harmony consists in its ability to realize a comprehensive unity in this second dimension and to break down the barriers to the mutual comprehension among peoples which exist at this level. If it is the case that what philosophers call "categories" constitute the form in which each major epoch in the history of each culture-area has expressed its over-arching ideas and ideals, then it is clear that an inclusive harmonization of these ideas requires a philosophical synthesis, responsibly worked out by philosophic minds.

II

The second question is one raised by philosophers who are interested in the ways and ideas of cultures other than their own, but who are fearful that if they adopt a method that is really adequate for world-philosophizing they will lose the logical foundations which now give them intellectual security. It seems clear to many Western minds, for example, on the basis of a preliminary survey, that while there is much in common between the logical methods of the East and those of the
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West there are disturbing differences also. They note that Indian thought gives the crucial role in method, not to logical analysis, which they trust, but to superrational intuition, which they distrust; they find that when the Indian thinker appeals to experiential confirmation of his ideas he wants to include as valid evidence data derived from dreams, dreamless sleep, and mystic rapture along with the data of ordinary waking experience. Happily, not many are acquainted as yet with the distinctive methods of Zen Buddhism; if they were their fears would be greatly intensified. Now they realize that there is no more reason to expect that Eastern thinkers will be converted to specifically Western canons of method than there is that Western logicians will be converted to the methods of intuitive realization emphasized in the East. Therefore, it seems clear that any real step toward an East-West synthesis would require them to place in jeopardy the standards of consistency and of empirical responsibility that have taken form through long centuries of intellectual struggle and to plunge into the dark and wild sea that lies beyond. "How can we do this," they ask, "without losing the only stable footing that we now have? The quest for a world philosophy seems to place us in an intolerable dilemma: If we are to think in ways that our minds can accept as clear and valid, we must adhere rigorously to our present Western logical principles; but the quest for a world philosophy demands that we throw these in the melting pot with no assurance that any part of them will be left intact when the new method has taken form."

My answer to this will, I hope, not only meet the difficulty thus expressed but also reveal certain characteristics of Western logic and scientific method which are likely to emerge only when they are seen in the light of this question, but which are exceedingly illuminating. If these characteristics are not considered frankly and fully our logical consciences are likely to betray us into a mistaken form of loyalty to the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of empirical verifiability. Just as a scientist is not violating the principle of non-contradiction when he holds together in his mind different hypotheses, which cannot all be true, while he is seeking decisive evidence bearing on them, so a philosopher is not violating it when he holds together in his mind different postulates, which are not in every respect compatible, about the structure of the universe, while he seeks the most comprehensive harmony between them. To be sure, in each of these cases the principle of consistency must be respected in that part of the inquiry which endeavors to clarify the systematic implications of a hypothesis —no responsible thinker, East or West, wishes any confusion there—but one is not at all restricted on this account to a single hypothesis,
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with its single set of consistent implications. This would be a quite intolerable limitation.

The answer in general terms is this: Logic and scientific method, even in the West, have no absolute status. They exhibit a certain inevitable and fortunate relativity. One crucial indication of this fact is that they have had a history. No matter how coercive their present principles seem to us now, there was a time when those principles were not yet accepted, and nothing is more certain than that there will come a time when they will be replaced by something different. When we contemplate this fact realistically, I believe that the way out of the above dilemma becomes clear. The essence of that dilemma, to state it now in its broadest form, is this: Every honest thinker must be faithful to the logical and empirical obligations which at any given time express his conception of how truth must be sincerely pursued; while on the other hand it is evident that if both we and Eastern thinkers discover no way of transcending our present conceptions on this matter no progress toward a significant unity between East and West will be possible. But such transcendence becomes feasible if we realize fully that our present idea of consistency and of experience, and how to respect them, expresses a culturally limited slant on the universe rather than an absolute one, and that it has emerged out of somewhat different ideas even in the course of our own cultural history. While, then, it is our duty to avoid violating the logical and factual conscience that we now possess, it is also imperative that we move toward the realization of a more adequate logical and factual conscience—one which, through critical awareness of the limitations of our present criterion on these matters, puts itself in a position to replace it by a more inclusive and discriminating standard. And readiness for such growth, through appreciative understanding of the contrasting contexts of ways of philosophizing in the East, is, indeed, the only attitude by which we can gradually learn what in our present criterion is dependably sound and what is merely an expression of some limited valuation of the Occident.

We can find our way, then, out of the otherwise baffling dilemma by proceeding pari passu under the guidance of two principles, which in the light of the above considerations are not inconsistent with each other (as otherwise they would inevitably seem to be) but are instead equally essential to sound philosophic progress. One is the principle of respect for truth and experience; the other is the principle of continued growth beyond the limitations of our present modes of thought—about truth and experience as about everything else. In dealing with the present lessons that nature teaches us we cannot do other than
respect the scruples whose flouting would leave us no way of distinguishing between fantasy and reality, but, knowing that those scruples are not absolute, we and the Orientals alike can advance, through appreciative sharing of our different contexts, to a notion of fact and truth that will retain whatever honesty requires us to retain while embracing whatever that impartial sharing leads us to include. No present thinker, Western or Eastern, can anticipate with any assurance what form that notion will take, but when it appears it will present itself as a fulfillment of the partial standards which on both sides now obtain.

I would expect that when this appreciative sharing progresses further it will become evident that the contextual differences between Eastern and Western philosophy are far deeper than has been generally realized, even by those who have made a determined effort to understand them. In my judgment they affect the very meaning of "knowledge" as philosophers and scientists seek it. Both Eastern and Western thinkers aim at the acquisition of knowledge, and both are aware that in view of the many forces that can lead our reasoning astray this aim must be guided by a responsible method. But the West takes it for granted that knowledge is essentially and merely information about something, and every feature of its logic and methodology is affected by this circumstance. To the East, mere information, by itself, is of minor import and hardly deserves to be called knowledge. Knowledge is the intellectual aspect of the process of self-realization, as pursued by one's whole personality. In India this process is a quest for identity with the Absolute Whole; in China, among Confucianists at least, it is a quest for fulfillment in one's social relationships. But in each of these two countries the methodology practiced is likewise profoundly determined by the accepted idea of what knowledge is.

I trust this answer will convince our Western logician that he cannot remain indifferent to thought-forms other than those to which he is accustomed. If it does not, there are further considerations which I hope will bring conviction, and which will also lead to the next question and its solution. Did it ever occur to us that certain essential characteristics of our Western logic and inductive method might be what they are just because they express the successful search for what we may call a "method of cooperation" between minds in disagreement—a method of equalitarian sharing of syntactic meanings and factual evidence so that they may lead us toward uncoerced agreement? Just consider a few interesting facts which strongly suggest that our accepted rules of deduction and of induction constitute at bottom simply a cooperative method of this sort.
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What is a concept? What are its differences from a case of sense perception? Well, one of the most obvious differences is surely this: A concept is a meaning that is universal in the sense of being shared in common by all individuals using it, while a percept varies from one individual to another. Now, one of the main uses of words is to serve a sociable purpose—to be the medium of intercommunication in the form of inquiry, argument, discussion, debate. But if a word is to fill this role successfully its syntactic meaning must be the same both to the one who employs it and to his contemplated audience; its valid implications must be common to all of them. This circumstance is recognized in what we regard as the very nature of a concept, the very nature of an implicative relation. And the fact that it is so recognized reflects the demand on our part for conditions of discourse which make possible discussion with others on a basis of mutual understanding, which permit demonstration of inferences so that their validity will be apparent to any other normal mind in the same way as to our own. If we did not prize such community of meaning, if each of us were satisfied with merely subjective associations in the workings of his mind, I do not see that we would need to employ concepts at all, with the objective validation of inference which their implications permit. Syntactic meaning is thus an essentially cooperative affair; it is a linguistic instrument whereby a group of people can reason in common about a problem that concerns all of them and reach results that are coercive to each.

As for inductive logic, the history of scientific method makes it clear that what we are prepared to accept as factual evidence confirming or disconfirming a hypothesis is not evidence that appears such to this or that individual merely; it is evidence that can approve itself as compelling to the entire body of competent inquirers. Science recognizes that what we call the "personal equation" may obtrude itself at any time, and that when a certain set of data appears to some particular thinker or thinkers to justify a given conclusion it may do so because of the distorting influence of this subjective factor. But it recognizes also that a part of its responsibility is to find ways of overcoming such idiosyncracies and of reaching results capable of winning the assent of all who understand the problem. Now, such insistence on the attainment of this sort of agreement in factual matters witnesses to the circumstance that we want a method that will not merely reflect personal vagaries in our interpretation of facts but will be capable of leading us toward evidence whose probative force can be clearly seen by anyone sincerely interested in the subject. And it attests the further vital point that this agreement with other competent inquirers is to be achieved
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without compulsion by any social authority but by free assent in the presence of the relevant facts. The inductive method of science is thus also an essentially cooperative method; it is a way of discovering and interpreting factual evidence which every honest thinker finds himself compelled to accept as such on the same terms as every other honest thinker. I draw the conclusion, then, that sound logical reasoning, as an affair distinct from subjectively variable mental processes, is essentially a form of free and equalitarian cooperation; it is always socially responsible thinking, guiding those who employ it toward voluntarily accepted agreement. It may be that Walt Whitman was not far wrong about what constitutes the essence of truth when he said: "Only what proves itself to every man and woman is so; only what nobody denies is so." It may be that Mencius was correct as to what constitutes the true sage when he said: "The sages only apprehended ahead of us what our minds mutually approve of."

From this point of view, when we dare to move beyond the confines of our present logic in the cooperative quest for a method of world philosophy, we are but applying on a more inclusive level the same considerations that have in large measure determined our present logical conscience to be the thing that it is. We are but extending the area of cooperative inquiry. Why, then, hesitate to do so? He who refuses, out of loyalty to the logical responsibilities that he now envisions, is misconceiving his loyalty. He is allowing the limited cooperative methodology which we now possess and which is embodied in the techniques now taken for granted to stand in the way of a methodology that would carry the attitude and principle of cooperation to their complete fulfillment.

III

The third question is this: How much, and what, can we decide about the appropriate method of building a world philosophy in advance of proceeding with the building itself? If we are not to impose any hampering a priori strait-jacket on ourselves, do we not just have to blunder ahead without any method at all, gradually learning from experience as we go? There are analogies to our problem in the past, of course, but in view of the great differences between them it would be easy to press them too far. They might mislead us more than help us. Now, to a large extent I think this is our actual situation. But not entirely. Surely one mode of blundering is preferable to another, even in our vast methodological ignorance. Even in commencing the building it is well that our action be guided by such intelligent judgment as can
be mustered; it is wise to reduce sheer blundering, sheer trial-and-error fumbling, to the minimum. How shall we do so? What valid general principles of method can be laid down at the beginning? Doubtless even such principles may need to be revised in the light of their subsequent use, but unless some can be formulated in advance we would lack any methodological postulates capable of being corrected by later experience.

My answer to this question is that some such principles can be formulated with the confidence that while they may need clarification and revision in detail they are definitely pointed in the right direction. They can be so formulated because they are derivable from the very idea of open-minded cooperation in world-philosophizing—they are the rules of a logic of cooperative inquiry, conceived as operating on a world-wide scale. I see two valid rules of this sort, which I shall call those of impartiality and inclusiveness. Whether there are others that are equally important I am not sure.

By the rule of "impartiality" I mean simply the maxim that each way of thinking that is a candidate for inclusion in a world philosophy has a right to be considered on what merits it can show, with no advance prejudice either for or against it. That is, before systematic comparative analysis has taken place no such way of thinking has any greater initial probability than any other. This means that idealism has no greater initial probability than realism, positivism than pragmatism, the distinctive assumptions of the West than those of China or India. Though simply stated, this principle is very searching in its requirements.

By the rule of "inclusiveness" I mean the maxim that the kind of harmonizing synthesis we are looking for is an orchestral rather than a single-instrument harmony. It should include all that it possibly can, and exclude only what it inescapably must. This is for the reason that no sensible man wants to miss any constructive insight that anybody anywhere in the world has discovered; he wants, therefore, to make a place for it in his way of thinking unless it proves incurably incompatible with something else that has a better claim to being preserved. In fact, I am inclined to believe that the only ideas that a world philosophy will find it necessary to exclude permanently are ideas which are inconsistent with these principles of impartiality and inclusiveness themselves—such, for instance, as the racial doctrines of the Nazis and the claims of certain ecclesiastics to exercise authority over the beliefs and conduct of other men. All ideas not thus intrinsically partisan or narrow will be able, I believe, to find some constructive place in world philosophy if it is rightly conceived.
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It is especially important to emphasize this point, I think, because of the serious misinterpretations to which the phrase "world philosophy" is subject. Many people seem to think that such a perspective would necessarily take the form of a single philosophic system, driving all rivals from the field and reigning in uncontested splendor. That idea is as far as it could well be from my conception of world philosophy. There is need of philosophic progress as well as philosophic harmony, of the constant challenge of new perspectives as well as a dependable method of reconciling those which have already appeared. World philosophy is not a system; it is a cooperative enterprise, always in process of seeking the wisest balance between the conditions which make for peaceful unity in the realm of speculative ideas and the conditions which make for creative freedom. In fact, I wonder whether you would not go even farther with me on this point. Just as a great individual is not one who dominates other individuals but rather one in whose presence they are stimulated to realize their finest possibilities; just as a great nation is not one that enslaves other nations but rather one whose international policies encourage them to make the fullest contribution they can toward the political experience of mankind; just as a great religion is not one that tries to convert all people to its own gospel but rather one whose tolerant insight leads all other religions to realize the deepest spiritual achievement of which they are capable; so the greatest philosophy would not be one which seeks to monopolize the speculative field but rather one whose critical and creative challenge elicits from all other philosophies, so far as they are not prevented by narrow partisanship, the richest wisdom that their presuppositions permit.

Before more spadework in comparative philosophy has been done, it seems to me foolish to attempt to work out a method of reconciling synthesis in any further way than by drawing guiding corollaries from these rules of impartiality and inclusiveness. Otherwise there is too much likelihood that the principles adopted will be upset by subsequent experience. On the part of Westerners, at least, a long period of sympathetic absorption and assimilation of basic material is necessary before we will know how to contribute toward the application of a truly synthetic method. And it may well be that in the case of all interested participants, as Mr. Hughes has recently intimated, a number of specific studies of rather limited problems need to be carried out before we will be in a position to formulate hypotheses of significant comparative relationships that will have any chance of proving more than premature and superficial. To realize this bears hard upon our sense of urgency in the presence of the deepening world crisis, but
difficult tasks do take time. A quick solution, however desirable it might be, cannot save the world if it is essentially inadequate.

Now, it might easily seem that these maxims are so very vague that they would have no definite implications with respect to methodological procedure in detail, and that therefore their recognition gives us no practical help. Unless I am in serious error this is not the case, and I should like to discuss and illustrate what to my mind is the outstanding corollary of this kind. I shall first state it in general terms and then exemplify it. It is a corollary of the above maxims in the sense that it presents itself as the obvious thing to do when one confronts in their light the central problem with which philosophizing from a world perspective must deal. That problem is posed by the apparent contradictions between two or more philosophic positions with respect to the meaning and validity of this or that key idea. In such a situation the appropriate thing to do is to adopt a neutral "generic" definition of that idea, which is inclusive enough to cover the whole area of meaning that the contending parties are concerned about—in terms of which, therefore, all the problems that each of them finds challenging can be stated and in which possible solutions can be expressed. Then the previous partisan definitions that had been assumed by the disputing philosophers will become species under this genus, differentiated from each other by nonpartisan adjectives or descriptive phrases.

It seems to me tolerably clear that the most constructive advances in the past history of thought have been made possible by this procedure. Consider what Aristotle did with the category of causality. In his time there were various schools disputing hotly about the nature of the causal relation. Some insisted that the only real causality lies in the matter out of which an effect appears; some, in the form that comes to be exemplified; some, in the end that is realized through the process; some, in the productive agent. Aristotle rescued the category from this futile wrangling by giving it a generic meaning under which the possible truth in each of these contentions could be given a peaceful place as species. We have a right to look, he said, for what each of the disputants was looking for: the material cause, the formal cause, the efficient cause, or the final cause; in each case we will be seeking something different, though valuable for explanation, and when we look for them in this ieremic rather than partisan framework of assumptions we can begin to tell under what conditions it is appropriate to seek one sort of causal explanation, under what conditions another. Leibniz' accomplishment with the concept of truth was similar. In his day the extreme rationalists were contending that all real truth is truth of reason; the extreme empiricists were insisting that all truth is ultimately truth of
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fact. Leibniz saw that each contention had something valid in it but that it claimed too much; what was important was to define truth broadly enough so that the whole field of considerations contemplated by both sides would be covered and then to find out by impartial examination, guided by that definition, under what conditions one of the partisan contentions is sound, under what conditions the other. Thus the distinction, vital to contemporary thought, between analytic and nonanalytic truth was established.

In our own day something of the same kind has been occurring in the new use made of the concept of "value," especially in the ethical field. The utilitarians had been asserting that the major problems of ethics can be adequately analyzed only in terms of an ultimate end; the followers of Kant had contended that this is possible only in terms of a universal law; and other theories were appearing in addition to these. By taking over the concept of value, which had already been filling a quasi-impartial role in the science of economics, and giving it an ultimate place in their debates, ethical philosophers have put themselves in a position where this impasse can be ended. When a utilitarian and a Kantian state their positions in terms of this neutral and more inclusive category, the theories become objectively comparable; it is now possible to clarify in a nonpartisan manner the kind of value that is realized by pursuing the end of general happiness and the kind that is realized by applying a universal rule to human acts. Instead of being condemned to viewing both theories through the hopelessly partisan eyes of one or the other, they can be seen in terms of a common and cooperative focus. Many other illustrations of this procedure might be drawn from the history of science as well as philosophy, but these will perhaps suffice.

I propose this as a valid general methodological principle, although many problems might be raised about it which I shall not attempt here to discuss. It is the key, I would suggest, to a definitive resolution of the issues on which philosophic schools divide and, so far as it can be applied, to a resolution of the divergences between East and West. In fact, when anyone accepts the responsibility to state his position in terms of some cooperative generic concept in this way, he thereby indicates his willingness to view it impartially along with its alternatives instead of dogmatically assuming finality for it in its partisan form and demanding implicitly that every other thinker's position be considered in its terms. Much dogmatism of this kind still obtains in philosophic discussions, at least in the West, although the dogmatism is usually unconscious. Especially is this the case in connection with the central Western concept of "experience" and its derivatives. Empiricists of
the positivist school still seem inclined to insist that nothing is properly called "experience" unless it can be presented as an aggregate or construction of sense data, thus rejecting in advance all other conceptions of experience; and Deweyan pragmatists wish to use their favorite adjective "experimental" in such a way as to blur rather than clarify the important differences between inquiry about values and inquiry about facts. There is, of course, nothing to prevent anyone from defining "experience" or "experiment" as he pleases, but so far as concerns methodological fertility there is all the difference in the world between a definition whose covert aim is to protect some partisan prejudice and a definition which provides a nonpartisan foundation on which an inclusive reconciliation of competing positions can be worked out. So far as I can see, only the latter kind of definition has constructive promise in world-philosophizing, just as it is the only kind which can hope to harmonize cooperatively philosophies belonging to the same cultural tradition.

IV

But when we apply these maxims of impartiality and inclusiveness to the problem of establishing an understanding and reconciliation between East and West, we confront a special and serious difficulty that does not baffle us in the same way when we are concerned with different schools within the same regional tradition. The difficulty is this. When our task is to synthesize divergent positions that have arisen in a common cultural background, it is always possible to find some usable cooperative concept of the kind just illustrated, even though ingenuity may be required to discover it. Our linguistic resources always do provide some neutral generic term under which the rival contentions can be plausibly conceived as falling. They can then become limited aspects of it or specific functions within it, and as such can be systematically compared and coherently reconciled. A further important result is that that neutral term itself gains a synthetic richness of significance at the end of the process which it did not possess at the beginning.

The outstanding illustration of this situation in modern Western philosophy is found in Kant. At the commencement of his labors, what he called the "critical" method served as an abstract methodological term capable of bringing together the previously competing empiricism and rationalism on a common base, so that the nature and limits of validity in each could be systematically probed. At the end of his inquiry this bare general concept had acquired the concrete richness of the "transcendental" method, which assigned a determinate role to the
two previous methodologies within the novel whole of his own developed philosophy.

But when sets of categories belonging to the philosophies of different cultural traditions are in question, where shall we find the generic concept needed to perform this role? Those categories themselves are difficult enough to handle in this situation; there is no precise equivalent in the language (or languages) of one culture for any philosophic category which has acquired its meaning in another. There is always a puzzling problem as to how to render such English terms as "spirit," "experience," "truth," into an Eastern language, and a similar problem in endeavoring to translate "mokṣa," "karma," "li," "tao," into English. Apparently the meaning of such words embodies and depends upon the distinctive genius of the Anglo-American or the Indian or the Chinese philosophic tradition as a whole; and that distinctive genius in each case is radically different from what it is in the others. What, then, can be done? How can these concepts be compared?

We might, of course, within any one of the languages involved, find more neutral terms which might plausibly serve the purpose of their comparative analysis in that language—Mr. Northrop does this not entirely unsuccessfully with his concepts of the "theoretic and aesthetic components of knowledge." But such concepts as these would be even more impossible to translate helpfully into an Eastern language than the categories which they are supposed to adjudicate on a common ground. I do not agree with Mr. Northrop in his contention that theoretic concepts are generally speaking alien to the East, but it is obvious that if he is right there would be no adequate way of translating this kind of idea into Eastern languages, nor the idea of "epistemic correlation" through which, in his view, the theoretic and aesthetic components are to lie down in peaceful harmony. It would appear that in order even to commence any fruitful comparative analysis in this situation we need what is as yet nonexistent—namely, a universal and nonpartisan language shared by all peoples, in terms of which the unique social and philosophic genius of each and hence the precise meaning of its categories could be impartially stated. Is it perhaps the initial task of world-philosophizing to create such a language? And how can it be done?

I think I can see the main principle by which the development of such a language would have to be guided if the ideal of impartial and inclusive cooperation is to be respected. One of the main reasons why the translation of philosophic categories is difficult lies in the fact that each culture, in dealing with certain problems, makes distinctions that other cultures do not and fails to make some that the others do. Take
the Western category of "experience," for example, to which I have already referred, and compare the basic distinctions drawn by its closest correlate in Indian thought. In the former case the major subcategories are experience through the external senses, or sense perception, and experience through the internal sense, or introspection. Now, this distinction is recognized in Indian thought, but there it is relatively unimportant. What is of major importance in its case is that the notion of experience is extended to include not only waking experience (alone recognized in the West, except for the recent influence of Freudianism) but also experience in dreams, dreamless sleep, and mystic realization. It seems to me clear that the guiding principle of a truly universal language would be that terms should be provided by which, initially at least, all these distinctions could be recognized and adequately stated, so that hypotheses dealing with any or all of them could be linguistically formulated and rendered capable of confirmation, rejection, or revision.

But what, then, could serve as the inclusive genus under which all these distinctions would fall as species? From the point of view of Indian philosophy there would be in this case no problem; its category of avasthā (mental state, with its contents) would presumably suffice. But from the point of view of the West a serious difficulty would arise, since certain of these species of experience—at least, that of dreamless sleep—are inconsistent with its very conception of experience. A more general category would seem to be required, in terms of which any problems arising in this field could be initially formulated in a way which would be impartial to both the Indian and the Western standpoints. Where will it be found? Of course, a new term could be arbitrarily invented. But while this expedient is often satisfactory in science it would seem to be (so unnatural as to be) seriously objectionable in philosophy; I doubt whether, except in rare cases, it could perform the role desired, or whether many interested thinkers would be willing to use it. Will the needed category gradually emerge from the sustained effort at impartial cooperative comparison of these ideas? Very likely; but can we envision and clarify how it would do so, and thus find ways for wisely hastening that emergence?

It is my guess that so far as concerns the linguistic resources that will be drawn upon in this process interested thinkers would insist upon a pretty rich field. By this I mean that we shall be satisfied to translate (for instance, into Western languages) relatively few of the basic Indian or Chinese concepts; the others we shall take over and domesticate in our thinking as they are. This will mean that we Westerners will have to become sufficiently familiar with them in their native con-
text so that we can absorb their significant associations and be able to use them as an Oriental thinker would. As we then relate them constructively to Western concepts it will gradually become clear which terms in this linguistic hodgepodge will best be able to serve in a neutral generic sense and which will be best demoted to the role of less inclusive species. In short, the language that will be required in which to state problems, formulate hypotheses, and pursue solutions, will be the sum total of the major categories in Western, Arabic, Indian, Japanese, and Chinese philosophy combined, as employed in their progressively clarified analytic and synthetic relationships. We will then pick from this rich language the happiest way of expressing each important idea that world-philosophizing proves to need, and will progressively discover the happiest integrative pattern into which all of them can fall.

This principle has already been operating on a limited scale. How could an English-speaking person philosophize without making use of the many philosophic terms that have been transliterated into English from Greek and Latin? Who would think of translating into English such phrases as *noblesse oblige* and *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, when the meaning is conveyed in such pat and intriguing form by the French and the Latin? While still belonging to those languages these phrases have now become good English. But I suppose the most instructive lesson on this matter from the past history of thought is provided by the assimilation of Buddhist concepts in Chinese philosophy. Many important terms from Pali and Sanskrit were translated into what seemed to the Chinese satisfactory equivalents, including some which it is impossible to render accurately into modern Western languages, such as "*karma*," "*mokṣa*," and "*dharma*." Many, however, were simply transliterated in the best fashion permitted by Chinese phonetics; "*bodhi-sattva*" and "*nirvāṇa*" fall in this group. But all alike, in their Buddhist context of meaning, became henceforth part of the linguistic resources of the Chinese mind, and entered into various constructive relationships with Confucian, Taoist, and other concepts.

According to Professor Y. T. Tang, a specialist in this field, it is possible to distinguish five different stages in the mastery by Chinese thinkers of the best method for making Buddhist concepts intelligible to the Chinese mind, and the process of learning them took something like five or six hundred years. One would hope that, with their experience to profit by, these stages might be short-circuited in our attempt to render Eastern concepts intelligible to the West and Western concepts to the East, and that the process might be hastened.

So far as I can see, only a philosophical language built up in this way can possess the varied resources required for our cooperative pur-
pose. Only in it would it be possible to make the analytic distinctions required for stating and handling all the problems which seem to any thinker anywhere in the world to be genuine ones. Only in it could those problems be viewed in all possible fertile and flexible relations with each other. Only in it could the promising hypotheses emerge in terms of which an orchestral balance between philosophic harmony and creative progress might be realized in the indefinitely varied data of experience which it would enable us to bring intelligibly together.

What would be going on in the minds of those who pursue systematically the method I have sketched? It would be, I should think, something like this: They would attain sufficient sympathetic comprehension of other types of philosophy—in their own and in other cultural traditions—so that they could embrace them all as comprehensive world hypotheses, consciously realizing how each breaks up the material confronting philosophic reflection in its own characteristic way and in terms of its own distinctive assumptions. Such a philosopher would be able to think about the world as each of these systems would think about it, using its own logic, its own standard of value, its own criterion of reality, its own chosen way of distinguishing and relating facts. He would be master of all and limited to none. Like Leibniz’ God, he would have all composable universes to live in instead of only one. Then, in the cooperative thinking of many such minds, the most fruitful way of structuring this total would gradually be discovered and so far as possible articulated in words, with appropriate selection of the generic neutral terms and appropriate hierarchical ordering of the terms which would fill a more specific role. In relation to the rest of mankind their task would be to help people replace infertile, cramped, inhospitable, and generally poverty-stricken visions of the universe by richer, freer, more generous, and more creative ones—opening before science, art, religion, statesmanship, and the life of the common man more magnificent opportunities for fulfillment than could ever have been glimpsed in the narrower cosmos that had previously been their home and had thus far marked the limits of their intellectual reach.

For our distant heirs there is reserved a still more intriguing task than any we confront today. When they make contact with the philosophers of Mars and face the challenge of developing a super-world philosophy—a way of thinking that could be shared by all minds inhabiting our solar system—they will doubtless find themselves in the presence of methodological and linguistic difficulties beside which those I have just discussed will fade into insignificance. And when their distant heirs in turn establish communication with rational beings
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beyond our solar system a yet more breath-taking opportunity will open up—to build a galactic philosophy, harmoniously synthesizing the ideas and ideals which have emerged throughout the entire precinct of stellar space which we inhabit. I forbear pursuing this line of thought to the even more exciting possibilities which might loom upon the horizon at a still later date. It is enough for us today to share the more modest challenge and thrill of meeting this problem on a planet-wide scale and of discovering a philosophic language adequate to express all the logical frames and all the criteria of fact and value that sincere inquiry on the surface of our little earth might need to employ.

NOTES

1New, that is, so far as the intellectual leaders as a class are concerned.
2Song of Myself, 30, C. F. Peirce gives a familiar similar definition of truth.
3The Works of Mencius, Bk. VI, Pt. 1, Ch. 7.
4The most important virtues, in my judgment, in Northrop’s methodology for achieving a “meeting of East and West” lie in this clear realization of the importance of a neutral terminology in which to analyze the similarities and differences of Occidental and Oriental philosophies, together with his conviction that the analysis can and should emphasize the ways in which they complement rather than contradict each other. Its most serious defects are his failure to realize that knowledge, in the East, is more than an intellectual affair, his belief that Chinese and Indian philosophies exemplify a single type, and his apparent assumption that a valid reconciliation between East and West can be worked out in advance of active methodological cooperation on the part of thinkers representing these diverse cultures.
CHAPTER VI

Empirico-Naturalism and World Understanding

WILLIAM RAY DENNES

TEN YEARS AGO Mr. Conger suggested that the question is not so much whether the East can contribute, as whether the West is ready to receive the insights which it might derive from Oriental philosophy, a body—or rather many bodies—of thought which most members of this Conference have learned to recognize as even richer in variety of doctrines and of opponent emphases than they had realized before.

Do those ways of explaining and evaluating which are characteristic of Western empiricism and naturalism constitute special obstacles to the understanding and appreciation of other ways of thinking? Or has the work of reasonably careful empiricists and naturalists during the last fifty years in the West removed, for those who take the trouble to understand it, whatever theoretical barriers may have stood in the way of an equal hospitality to any and all experience, to any and all evidence, to any and all insights? Are the results thus favorable to broader understanding and to the resolution of theoretical conflicts, both within cultures and between cultures? Or have the results of such work, if acceptable, simply eliminated naturalism and empiricism as philosophies? Do they force us to the conclusion that these philosophies cannot, as *philosophies*, exclude any event or any experience from the range of possible or of actual occurrences, or pretend, as philosophies, to establish the actuality of any event or of any experience except by evidence which is not generated or entailed by these or by any other philosophies—by evidence which is also not exclusively available to those who hold a particular philosophy, but is equally accessible to any inquirer whatever his philosophy or his innocence of philosophy?

But, let us ask at once, what are the *meanings* of the events and experiences which may thus be theoretically accessible to all inquirers? Has the philosophical work of recent empiricists, like Charles Morris, in distinguishing various dimensions of meaning, and in distinguishing
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factors that *induce belief* from factors that may be said in one way or other to *justify belief*—has this work in any way restricted meaning or what may be meant? Or has it in any way pretended, as philosophy, to rule out the claims of any feeling (or of any other experience) to be regarded as evidence? Or has it pretended to establish any sort of experience as the one proper and authoritative kind of evidence? Further: Has the work of empiricists and naturalists resulted in dogmatism with respect to the nature of value? Or has it brought home to us afresh the insight of Spinoza that there is no possibility that philosophy, as a theoretical enterprise, could establish any determinate realm as actually containing and monopolizing all possible values?

If, as some believe, the recent work of logicians and philosophical naturalists has justified the conclusion that neither logic nor philosophy can establish or exclude any non-truistic principle, or can establish or exclude any belief about the world or ourselves as having greater or less probability than it has on the evidence regardless of naturalistic or of any other philosophy; if such recent work justifies the conclusion that philosophy cannot theoretically establish convictions about values, although empiricists and naturalists may certainly express such convictions and also serve them with as much zeal, as much sincerity, and as much justification as anybody else—if the recent work of naturalistic philosophers has led to such conclusions, *must the same conclusions be reached within any of the so-called systems of Western philosophy*, provided the system's assumptions and implications are carefully thought out? And do such conclusions reveal the bankruptcy of Western philosophy? Or do they reveal only the bankruptcy of its various dogmatisms? Do they constitute the theoretic conditions of the opening and the freeing of the Western mind? A freeing of that mind from the notion that commitment to any philosophical "ism" could theoretically justify the exclusion, or the assertion as actual, of any occurrence or of any experience, or of any context or evidential relation of such occurrences or such experiences? Of course, as we all know, commitment to an "ism," while it may not justify, may actually simply amount to such exclusion or such assertion, as it so generally and so arbitrarily and so unphilosophically has done. Finally, do such conclusions supply the theoretic conditions for an opening of the mind to areas characteristically neglected in the West, but such an opening as should also be reasonably secure against the risks of surrender to new dogmatisms, or to new *a priori* exclusions or entailments?

If the recent work of people (called in the West naturalists, empiricists, and logicians) has actually moved in the directions just suggested, and whether much or little (or even nothing) of that movement
should be judged acceptable, you will in any case, I know, recognize that this development is by no means original. For the principles involved were, I suppose, all expressed in one connection or another by Spinoza or by Leibniz or by Hume. But most of us in the West lost sight of such principles during the long nineteenth century interlude of romanticism. Whether the pragmatisms, intuitionisms, and idealisms of the early decades of this century (some of them supposedly supported by notions of relativity, of energy quanta, and of indeterminacy in physics, by notions of Gestalt in psychology, and so on)—whether these "isms" constituted a genuinely second wave of nineteenth century romanticism, or only the delayed and deliberate flight proper to Minerva's owl, it would be difficult to determine.

But even if one should conclude that empiricism, naturalism, or any other "ism," if it proceeds carefully and intelligibly, must return to some of the principles enunciated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (if not also by Aristotle and the late Stoics), there is little doubt that our appreciation—and perhaps in some respects even our understanding—of those principles has been considerably enriched by the enthusiasms, and even by some of the vagaries, of our romantic interlude. We may not have found better grounds for beliefs than materials (including emotions) directly cognized, but we have certainly turned our attention to areas which we might have failed to notice or to appreciate had it not been for what I can only regard as our recent sowing of wild oats.

If we had not tried so hard during that romantic relapse to derive norms of value from one metaphysic or another; if we had not tried so hard to establish the truth or probability of opinions by deriving them from the postulates or even from the basic categories of one so-called philosophy or another, and to alter such truth or probability by changing our choice of philosophical postulates or categories (we must never forget the arguments of the Nazis to precisely this effect); if, recognizing that our best knowledge is inadequate to reality in the sense of not being identical with its objects (an alienation we feel the more poignantly when those objects are emotional or aesthetic), we had not tried so hard (with Bergson and many others) to construe and to achieve genuine knowledge as an intuitive comprehension which (so far as successful) would be one with the reality that was its object, so that the verbs "to be" and "to know" would become synonyms; if, having recognized the importance of the practical auspices, conditions, stimuli, and consequences of meanings and beliefs, we had not tried so hard as pragmatists to identify the meaning and the truth of statements with such practical operations (or with quiescence in them)—if we and our
teachers had not thus wandered so long, so honestly, and so strenuously in the wilderness, I for one doubt that we should ever have been able to appreciate the issues involved in current attitudes which are not merely cultivated by a few philosophers, but which, for good or evil, are more or less endemic among mankind in the West.

But many will feel that what I have been talking about does not sound like empiricism or naturalism at all! For is not "empiricism" the name for sensationalism, a doctrine that accepts some physiological or psychological account of what data the various senses can transmit to attention, and then proceeds as a philosophy to limit our knowledge to such data, and to inferences from them? And is not "naturalism" the name for a philosophy built on the principle that only bodies and their motions, or only electric charges and their fields, or only something else of that ilk can be really real, and then proceeds either to reduce qualities, emotions, moral judgments, and logical necessities to these, or else to deny their reality altogether?

While such was what the more or less Hegelian and melodramatic textbooks current in our student days represented empiricism and naturalism to be, certainly such was not the empiricism or the naturalism of, say, David Hume. Indeed, it is hard to find a writer who has seen more clearly than he did that a theory of the senses can be only a set of reports of, and inferences from, perceptions (that is, data present to attention), and hence that we could by no possible logic pretend that a theory of the senses could restrict objects (in or out of attention) to such as had ordinarily been found to be associated with the supposed processes of sensing. Indeed, as readers of Whitehead's *Process and Reality,* if not of Hume's *Treatise,* will remember, Hume not only admitted, but insisted that we may have as *ideas,* perceptions (or objects) which we have never enjoyed as impressions. Not only was Hume not a sensationalist, but the principles he enunciated ruled out and still rule out any doctrine (sensationalist or other) which pretends in any way to restrict what qualities, emotions, or other entities may occur in the world, or may be present to attention. And if, in passing, we should turn our consideration from sensationalism to subjectivism, we should do well to remember that Hume's principle of the separability of the distinguishable makes it quite impossible (as he himself saw) to deny that any object ever in attention—sensed, imagined, or thought about—may have existed, and may persist, out of attention and independent of attention, i.e., without being part of any complex Hume would call a mind.

The only limit to the realism of Hume (or of any empiricist who follows Hume) is that no claim can be made to demonstrate what
Hume and his followers all believe in, namely, the persistence of objects out of attention. And while we are on this subject, has anyone demonstrated such persistence, or any finite probability of it, except finally simply by postulating one or the other? And what is that but to accept the conviction, unproved, just as Hume did? Surely we cannot claim, with straight faces, to make any belief true, or more probable, by assuming it to be true or probable.

The question: What materials have probably in fact occupied the attention of Western empiricists (Hume or others), and what materials have they neglected or ignored? cannot be seriously answered by applying any philosophical principle, but only by exploring the work of the people in question. In any such exploration it is of extreme importance that we recognize that all words mean whatever they are used to mean, and that what look like the same words may (and often do) have wider, narrower, or totally different meanings from generation to generation, and in one body of literature as compared with others. We accomplish nothing instructive if we look at words like "idea" and "perception" and try to infer from them the extent of subjective factors in Locke (who wrote of ideas in mirrors, but never called a mirror a mind) and Hume (who, when it was needed to avoid misunderstanding of his intent, inserted the phrase "[or objects]" in apposition to the term "perceptions").

However, even if his philosophy imposes no restrictions as to what may exist or be experienced, there is certainly little reason to expect that we shall ever find grounds for believing that the scope of any man's attention and appreciation—whether he be empiricist, naturalist, Platonist, or Hegelian—is, or has ever been, infinite, although nothing could be easier than to use the words and to develop the dialectic that asserts such infinite comprehension and appreciation. But if any man asserts of any sort of entity either that it could not exist, or that it could not be cognized, he does so by violating principles plainly expressed and defended by Hume, and not by applying such principles.

If we attempt to take exception and say that some things—such as the universe, or the whole of Nature or God or Substance—could not be cognized, but could only be immediately present to themselves (which on most accounts is to be identical with themselves), we are likely to find that what we are saying is that the whole of Nature includes absolutely all modes, and hence by definition there could be no mode, beside it and distinct from it, that should be either the cognition of it, or anything else. A Spinozist might add that a man also blasphemes if he restricts existence and experience in any way whatever,
even by calling it essentially spiritual; for he would thus be denying the infinity of God or Nature or Substance, and of each of the infinite attributes thereof. And whereas few of us may find more than the illustration of Spinoza’s definitions of certain terms in his theorems that assert that all possibilities are actually realized in God or Nature or Substance, I have not yet found anybody who could seriously defend the rejection of Spinoza’s principle that nothing (no evidence or anything else) could justify us in altogether excluding any possibility from existence. It is quite another thing, of course, to say that besides not being excluded from existence an entity actually does exist, Nor have I found anyone who could justify us in saying of anything, however unlikely we may suppose its ever being cognized, that it could not fall under the attribute of cognition, that it could not be noted.

The movement I have mentioned in recent Western naturalism and empiricism is very scantily expressed in published books and articles. Why, I do not know. Some find the insights in question already adequately developed in Leibniz and Hume and Spinoza—not to mention the late Stoics and some of the writings of other philosophers, even Descartes. A good many are, in one way or another, Socratics, who feel that such insights are best reactivated in the living discussion of issues as they actually rise in the processes of explaining and evaluating specific areas of process and structure, whether in everyday discourse, or in the refinements of it that are science and history and careful moral and aesthetic judgment. The two best ways to judge such recent philosophical work are, I think, (1) by detailed analysis of key conceptions typically employed in explanation and evaluation: fact, event, quality, relation, continuity and constituents or differentiations, meaning, truth, evidence, cause, law, probability, reason, purpose, value, right, duty, obligation; and (2) by detailed sympathetic scrutiny of some of the most admired examples of explanation and of moral and aesthetic evaluation which we can find in the literatures accessible to us, in order to discover whether such works employ or require, under whatever names and forms of statement, notions other than those consonant with empirical procedures. The second way involves months and years of careful work—so far as we are philosophers, we shall be at it, in one way or another, all our lives. I regret that such a paper as this can attempt neither of these sorts of work, but only pretty general considerations.

Let us look, in this connection, at a few aspects of the work of such thinkers as John Dewey and George Santayana. Dewey’s intellectual activity during the last sixty years has been as prodigious in its variety as in its scope. It has consequently exasperated from time to time even
those who appreciate it most. Readers who have found Dewey’s treat-
ment of some one issue exceedingly enlightening have often found his
discussion of other issues not only unacceptable, but even such as to
darken the light they felt he threw upon the first. But Dewey is, never-
theless, an instructive example of an empiricist who has been driven to
recognize (what Hume saw so plainly) that any pretense to restrict, by
applying a philosophical principle, what may be or be experienced is
wholly arbitrary and unintelligent. In the empiricist tradition of many
of the Greeks, of Galileo, and of Hume, Dewey has insisted that, so far
as our intellectual work is to be serious (however much of it may pro-
perly be playful), we must ground even our loftiest beliefs in, and
confirm them by, what we have in experience, and also that we must
have in experience the meanings of our speculative statements if those
are to be more than exercises in verbal dialectic. Like most Western
thinkers known to me—including idealist metaphysicians, except for
one rather narrow and egoistic or even solipsistic sect—Dewey also
expresses the feeling and belief that, of the immense ocean of existence,
extremely little comes into human experience. In most of that ocean
we have indeed traced no differentiations. But it does not follow from
that fact that, except as we have made or recognized the differentia-
tions, existence is undifferentiated.

And again, like most intellectually temperate people, Dewey be-
lieves that we actually live through, that we enact, awake as well as in
dreamless sleep, much that we do not have in experience; and he be-
lieves such living and enacting to be both temporally and causally
prior to most experience. Dewey has also, of course, tried at times to
construe experience and its objects as nothing but operational trans-
formations and to confine all meaning to these latter. But unless one
means literally everything by the phrase “operational transformations,”
it is quite impossible to defend the view that only operational trans-
formations can be meant. For anything whatever, actual or possible,
can be meant. But nothing is in fact meant unless someone is cogni-
tively aware of it as meant. It is therefore foolish, is it not, to speak as
if it were an advance over Hume (and other empiricists) to say with
the pragmatists that we really confirm a hypothesis by practical
operations, or by the convergence of behavior in a social context,
rather than by observing the states of affairs that would occur, or that
would be related in specified ways to those that would occur, if the
hypothesis were true? For when we shift our attention from pineapples
as confirming a belief that pineapples are ripe to our operations upon
pineapples, or to the convergences of various peoples’ behaviors
(linguistic and other), we are not shifting to something which is not,
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and could not be, had in cognition. And, more important, what way have we to confirm opinions about convergences of behavior, except precisely by observing such convergences? And what opinions do such observations confirm or refute? Directly, only opinions about the convergences in behavior. If indirectly they also confirm or refute opinions about the ripeness of pineapples, then it is because we have observed correlations between such ripeness and the convergent behavior (convergent in more senses than one) of certain kinds of people with respect to one another and to certain kinds of delectable inanimate objects. When he has dealt with this problem explicitly, as in the revised first chapter of the second edition of his Experience and Nature, Dewey recognizes as clearly as did Hume or Spinoza that we can set no limits to the content of direct experience.

But if they cannot say in advance what will, and what will not, count as direct experience, are the empiricists saying anything at all when they assert that opinions must be grounded in, and confirmed by, experience? Hume was frank enough to admit that he could find no infallible criterion of distinction between what is noticed and what is only imagined or supposed. But unless we follow Dewey and Hume (and, if I understand him, also Mr. Northrop) in selecting for serious belief those of our hypotheses that are confirmed by something other than further hypotheses, our imaginings by something other than further imaginings—namely, by observation, by immediate experience, of some of the states of affairs implied by the hypotheses or the imagining (and those states of affairs may certainly include emotions and intuitions)—we have literally no alternative but to attach the same degree of belief to absolutely every statement that states anything (that is not, for example, a self-contradiction which retracts precisely what it asserts and all that it asserts); for it has long been well known that, except for such control by observation, we may construct as extensive a system of coherent statements or hypotheses to support any statement whatever as we can to support any other.

Hume and Dewey are probably right in holding (Hume explicitly, Dewey by implication) that their failure—everybody's failure—to define "experience of something" so as to distinguish unequivocally what that phrase means from what is meant by "the-experience-of-supposing-something" does not preclude them from relying on the distinction. For the distinction would itself be employed in any serious definition of the difference between, or the reference of, terms like "finding" (or "noting") and "supposing." No term, of course, is as such undefinable syntactically, and none is undefinable ostensively except a term whose connotation and denotation are both unlimited
(although there is, of course, extremely little likelihood that most terms in actual use will ever be successfully defined ostensively). But although no term is thus undefinable, some terms will in fact have to be left undefined unless the defining process is to be either strictly infinite, or else circular in the sense that the content of some *definienda* (and not merely their terms) is to be included as a constituent of the *definientes*. If we mean, as most of us do, by the term "minds" processes that include at least what we ordinarily call noting, feeling, remembering, expecting, then, although we may analyze noting, feeling, remembering, and expecting to our hearts' content, and also study their causal conditions and consequences, inner and outer, as long as patience and ingenuity may hold out—still such analyses and such studies will themselves be exemplifications or structures or fusions of notings, feelings, rememberings, expectings, and not the reduction of these to, or the grounding of these in, or the transformation of these into, something else. Spinoza's warning that theory of cognition, *ideas of ideas*, can itself only be cognition, and no whit more certain or more fundamental than that of which it is the theory—still less justify that of which it is the theory—this warning, as well as Hume's work, should help us to appreciate Mr. Sheldon's robust skepticism with respect to theory of knowledge, if regarded as more than an analytic discipline and yet as distinct from what is simply knowledge of the world and of ourselves.

One may perfectly well, of course, prefer to select for belief, from an infinite array of possible hypotheses, not those confirmed by observation (as recommended by the empiricists), but those that delight, inspire, reassure, or pacify us, or some one of us, or many of our fellow men. But if we should make this choice, would not the epistemological situation remain precisely the same as we have already described it? For what serious way have we of answering the question: Which of many hypotheses (or beliefs or attitudes or intuitions) is most inspiring or reassuring or pacifying? Systems of further hypotheses which support the statement that any particular hypothesis is inspiring or enriching may be constructed, as everybody knows, absolutely *ad lib.* What way, then, of answering the question, except by observing or feeling the reassurance or delight or inspiration or peace yielded by belief in one or in the other, or by practice or achievement of one or the other? And what opinion does such observation or feeling confirm? Only the opinion that such and such a hypothesis or intuition is edifying or reassuring or pacifying; not the opinion that it is either true or probable. There is nothing to prevent an empiricist from valuing peace, reassurance, edification—not to mention beauty and love—
more highly than truth or probability. But if any one of us should choose to mean by "true" or "probable" what is ordinarily meant, and only what is ordinarily meant, by "reassuring" or by "inspiring" or by "pacifying," then we should always make clear when we say that such and such a hypothesis is true (or confirmed), such and such an intuition justified, that what we mean is that we have either experienced belief in the hypothesis or enactment of the intuition as reassuring or as inspiring or as pacifying, or else have evidence that indirectly supports the belief that the effects of one or the other (for some people, or for many people) have been such.

Similar questions arise when we consider whether to use the term "knowledge" to mean any and all direct experience and not just the opinions which are finally supported by such experience (as is rather commonly done in the West). We may perfectly well mean by "knowledge" all immediate experience—feelings, longings, reveries, imagery, sense of undifferentiated continua, ecstasy. And, what is more important, we may have confidence of one kind or another in these. But if the confidence is not merely the confidence that experiences, such as longings, feelings, ecstasy, occur and are what they are—if the confidence is that these experiences are clues to the nature of a range of being wider than themselves, or are ennobling or freeing to those who achieve them, then what way have we to justify such confidence except by exploring further the reality to which we hope the experiences are clues, or to observe the effects (ennobling or other) of the achievement of such experiences by other people? Mr. Suzuki described the experience of Ultimate Emptiness as rich, not only with all possibilities, but with those possibilities as on the threshold of being concretely realized. How may we confirm a belief that possibilities thus grasped in intuition are on the verge of being realized, except by later observing whatever is meant by their concrete realization? If an intuition, for example, is taken as meaning only itself and nothing else, then, however restricted or however vast and overwhelming, the intuition makes no claim that needs to be confirmed. But if it, or any other experience, is taken as grounds for believing in or hoping for something other than itself as an occurrence in the biography of the individual experient (and the something other may perfectly well be such as the experiences of others, or of the same man at another time), then how shall we confirm (or reject) that belief or that hope except by observing whether what is believed in or hoped for (on the experience as grounds) actually transpires?

The contemporary so-called "logical positivists" were designated by themselves as a sect of empiricists—indeed, they sometimes rather
amusingly called themselves "consistent empiricists." A few of the less
careful of these distinguished (or pretended to distinguish) by means of
general philosophical principles those statements that have meaning
from those that are meaningless—that are nonsense. And many in and
out of the sect whiled away a good deal of what must surely have been
spare time by asserting or denying, often with considerable emotion,
the general proposition that metaphysical statements are meaningless,
or are nonsense—are sinnlos, or perhaps only sinnfrei! If we examine
the writings of able men among the positivists, or question them, we
find that they rely on only two so-called criteria of meaninglessness in
statements: one, self-contradiction; the other, empirical unverifi-
bility. But if a statement is strictly self-contradictory—if it does not
merely have the form of contradiction but is meant simultaneously to
retract precisely what it asserts, no less and no more, then clearly (as
Aristotle saw) it asserts nothing. It could not be either false or true;
and it could no more be false than true. Of course, uttering the state-
ment might perfectly well have any number of an infinite range of
effects on him who utters it or on those who hear it, and we may call
these effects meanings if we like, and with plenty of literary and philo-
sophical precedent. Indeed, such meanings may often be much more
precious to us than is the theoretic content of beliefs asserted, or the
truth or falsity or probability of such beliefs. The careful positivists did
not deny that self-contradictory utterances have causes and effects, or
that these may be precious, but only that they have meaning in the
sense of asserting something. They thus opposed the dominant tradi-
tion in logic textbooks according to which self-contradictory proposi-
tions do indeed assert something, but are always false in what they
assert. However, if utterances self-contradictory in form actually
assert nothing and are in that sense meaningless, we discover this, not
by applying a positivist (or even a logical) criterion, but only by dis-
covering, by whatever methods we can, that he who utters what is in
form a contradiction in fact asserts nothing.

Consider next the notion that if an utterance is unverifiable it must
lack theoretical meaning. Unless a positivist has neither studied ele-
mental logic nor read Spinoza or Hume, he is not likely to say of any
quality, of any emotion, of any structure, of any state of affairs, actual
or possible, that it is such that it could not be present to cognition—
that is, that there is some actual or possible entity, E, such that "E is
in attention" could not be true (that is, is always self-contradictory).
To be sure, an object defined as not noticed could not be noticed, for
if it were it would not be the object thus defined. Hence, statements
to the effect that we cannot directly observe external objects are
necessary truths only if part of the definition of the phrase "external objects" is: "objects not directly observed." Statements to the effect that a man's belief in his own immortality is unverifiable are correct only if part of what we mean by "dying" is the permanent elimination of all cognition for the individual, in which case we could by definition not be dead and yet cognize our own persistence after death. If, again, we should mean by immortality interminable endurance, we cannot, of course, by any finite set of observations rule out or establish the truth of the statement that denies that there is such interminable persistence. If statements are unverifiable because they are self-contradictory, then they are unverifiable and also, as we have seen, meaningless as assertions simply because in fact they assert nothing. If in fact the man who employs expressions contradictory in form thereby refers to anything whatever (imagined or noted), or asserts anything whatever, then that which he refers to could exist, and that which he asserts could be the case. If that which he asserts is the case, his assertion is thereby made true, thereby in the strict Latin sense verified, whether or not he or anybody else observes it. Verifiability is thus no independent criterion of meaning. Any statement that is used to mean (or to assert) anything is inevitably verifiable (i.e., the occurrences which would make it true are not such that the assertion of them would be self-contradictory); but such a statement has meaning because it is used to mean or to assert, and not by virtue of any genuinely other factor (e.g., verifiability) from which its having meaning could be deduced.

To careful positivists we owe much of our understanding, if not the establishment, of the logical principle that there can be no general way to determine of propositions whether or not they are members of a particular logical system. It would be surprising indeed if these same persons thought there was a general way of determining, of all statements whatever, whether or not they belonged in the domain of significant discourse überhaupt, which would be precisely accomplished if, and only if, we could by a philosophical principle distinguish sense from nonsense.

Many have been tempted to say that empiricists and positivists exclude at least one kind of statement from the class of meaningful statements—namely, those that state eternal truths such as the truths of logic and mathematics. These are not susceptible of empirical verification and also do not require it for their certainty.

Since some positivists have been outstanding mathematicians, one is somewhat surprised at the assurance with which this criticism is made. In book Gamma of the Metaphysics, Aristotle offered as part of
his explanation of the necessity of the law of excluded middle the fact that if we want to say anything (and to this no man is compelled, even by Aristotle's last resort in philosophical instruction: a beating with a walking stick!), then neither saying nor denying it (or both saying and denying it) is not saying anything at all. And in books \textit{Mu} and \textit{Nu}, in struggling with the troubles of both the Platonic conception of geometrical objects as eternal essences independent of process, and his own previous notion of them as either physical substances or the characters of physical substances, he approached the view that geometrical truths were consequences of definitions of terms, but definitions which were such that, of physical objects that approached the characters named by the defined terms, the resultant consequences would be approximately true.

If we mean by an eternal and necessary truth a statement whose meaning is such that its denial is self-contradictory, then the realm of eternal and necessary truths is indeed (as Hume and Santayana and Husserl and many others have observed) altogether infinite. For of anything considered, imagined, or supposed, it is a necessary truth that it is what it is and not its opposite; and there are well-known methods of combining any two such necessary truths and their combinations to form infinite sets of infinite families of necessary and eternal truths. Unless we mean by the term "four" in certain respects what we mean by "two plus two," $2 + 2 = 4$ could in no respect be a necessary truth, for there might perfectly well be exceptions to the statement. If in any respect we do mean the same, then in that respect the truth is logically necessary, no matter how often two gallons of water and two gallons of alcohol may be mixed to make less than four gallons of the mixture, or two rabbits with two other rabbits (of appropriate sexes) to make more than four rabbits.

I think empiricists who happen to be good mathematicians or logicians may be as much at home in the realm of eternal truths as anybody could be. But do such truths entail the reality of anything except our symbols, our definitions, and our operations upon these? The necessary truths with respect to every character, every trait, every Santayanan essence, quite as much as every selected Platonic form, that it is self-identical, that it is what it is regardless of its embodiment, or lack of embodiment, in process—are these necessary truths anything more than illustrations (some of them ingenious, enlightening, and highly useful) of the tautology that is the law of identity, its variables given specific values? In the course of logical and mathematical thinking we recognize, as Mr. Northrop has reminded us, that no date enters into and qualifies the necessity that two plus two equals
four, or that if x is a square its sides are equal, even though our recog-
nition of this certainty occurs only on various datable occasions, just
as our procedures of setting up and maintaining definitions are them-
selves in no sense eternal entities but are datable transactions in our
lives. Of course, if the synthetic statement were ever true that on
July 2, 1949, Jones meant by "square" what was usually meant in his
society by "equilateral rectangle," then that statement is eternally
true, since no matter what Jones or others may mean or not mean, or
may have meant or not have meant, before or after the transaction in
question, these could never undo the truth of the statement.

Some leading "positivists" have argued vigorously (and to many
of us convincingly) that Western mathematics, or logico-mathematical
thinking, employing terms ultimately undefined, can certainly not be
said to restrict (or to imply a restriction of) the meanings of those
terms (and of others defined as functions of them) to quantities—or,
indeed, to restrict the meaning of them at all. Still less could it be said
to imply the existence or the nonexistence of anything in the world—
secondary qualities, emotions, or the infinity of possibilities which
some tell us constitutes the Ultimate Emptiness (or Fullness).
Whether preoccupation with logical and mathematical procedures
is in fact associated with neglect of emotional and aesthetic experience,
even though it does not theoretically entail such neglect, is quite
another question. In trying to answer it, we need to remember that
the depth and richness of a man's emotional and aesthetic insight are
certainly not safely determined by how much he claims for them (it is
more probably the reverse). And there have been and are a few geniuses
of Western mathematical thinking whose aesthetic and emotional
sensitivity and insight would probably make most of the rest of us
Occidentals seem like pygmies in these respects!

But, alas, even if this should all be true, I don't think it would re-
lieve Mr. Northrop's anxiety (which I fully share) lest continued and
compulsive preoccupation of peoples in the West with certain limited
kinds of theoretical construction, and with certain limited dimensions
of practical effort, should starve us (even more than it has done) of the
pervasive personal affections, the many-sided affiliations, the well-
integrated emotional life without which—I believe Mr. Northrop is
quite right in thinking— not only our moral health in the West, but
even our psychological and physiological health, is likely to break
down. It concerns Mr. Northrop (and all the rest of us) to determine
whether the causes of our malady lie in our attachment to the methods
of explanation characteristic of Western empiricism and Western logic,
or whether they lie largely in emotional confusions and frustrations
involved in such matters as our technological development and in the conflicts between our ideals and some of our habits and interests. For we shall not be likely to contribute much to the alleviation of our troubles unless we are as sure about their causes as we are able to make ourselves.

Such positivists and logicians as have preferred to say of tautologies that they are logically valid rather than true have not thereby denied one iota of the necessity or of the beauty, interest, and theoretic use of the formulations of mathematics, of logic, or of certain themes of Platonism. They have merely reserved the name "true" for that part of the class of synthetic propositions which, so far as their logical form goes, might be either true or false, but are in fact made true contingently by the occurrence of the states of affairs which they assert, and qualified and related as they assert them to be qualified and related.

Even before Plato's work there was in the West some notion that eternal truths are much more appropriate objects than any others to occupy men's minds and spirits. Although we may perfectly well experience and enjoy in many modes, we cannot talk, and probably cannot even think (if we mean by thinking holding opinions and not merely feeling) about anything, unless we use something—shapes, sounds, images, feelings, along with their likes—to refer to entities other than those we thus employ to refer to entities other than those we thus use as symbols. And whenever we do this, a symbol with some limits of meaning, however elastic, is generated. From this meaning-situation, together with some repeatable indicators, we may derive as many necessary truths as we have time for. It would be difficult to persuade intellectually healthy people that there is a categorical imperative "Think!" or a categorical imperative "Feel!" or a categorical imperative "Relax!" or a categorical imperative "Live!" But for those who do as a matter of fact approve thinking, and desire to think as well as to feel and to live (and such approving and desiring are probably correctly regarded, as Hume regarded them, as feelings rather than as any sort of theoretical insights or assertions)—for such people is it in any intelligible sense best to think the eternals as such? The truths of mathematics, although certifiable without reference to process, are no more eternal in any other sense than are the myriad truths (few, if any, known to us) about the relative positions of grains of sand on Waikiki Beach last night.

For those who mean by the phrase "a decent man" what is meant by "a tolerant, open-minded, cooperative, sympathetic, and honest person" and by the phrase "a scoundrel," "an intolerant, dogmatic, destructive, and deceitful person," the truths are equally eternal that
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for every x, y, z, etc., x, if decent, is necessarily so and so, whereas y, if a scoundrel, is necessarily such and such. No generally acceptable argument to support the thesis that there must be eternal realities that are the objects described by such eternal truths (or any others) seems to have been developed in the West. But even if there were such an argument, would it in any way follow that men ought to think about eternal realities as against the non-eternal—that men ought to contemplate the eternal natures of scoundrels and of decent men as against trying to discover, let us say, the fallible likelihood that one sort of education or another, or one sort of social structure or another, would people the world with fewer scoundrels and a larger number of decent and cooperative men?

For thousands of years some great voices in the West have promised us that to think the eternals is in some sense to transcend process and time. But if thinking the eternals is itself an event in human history, then it is temporal and it no more transcends time than does thinking about the changing, except that a date may be an appropriate ingredient in any synthetic judgment but not in certain sections of a tautology. If thinking the eternals is to be one with the eternals, then such thinking could never be an event in history and would seem to be nothing more than the self-identity of the eternals as in the case of Aristotle’s God. If thinking eternal truths seems to lend dignity, equanimity—even spirituality—to human life, does not the evidence indicate that such improvement, if actual, is a function of our relinquishing, at the same time, wasteful and unproductive struggles, turmoil, and confusion, rather than a function of our contemplation of truths eternal as such. If, in the junctures of our lives and work, our predicaments are not altogether hopeless, we shall probably earn even more peace of mind and dignity of spirit by laboring to prevent war, disease, starvation, misunderstanding, and exclusive national pride, than by turning to contemplate the eternals, even though we should do this on the advice of Plato that those who kill us and the pestilences that maim our children cannot alter eternal truths, or on the advice of Kṛṣṇa (available to me only through translation) that to dread war too much to be able to slay one’s enemies is treachery to the insight that all that is real is imperishable.

On all these issues, is empiricism just one point of view contrasting in Western thought, perhaps, with rationalism? Are there truths other than tautologies that may be known by an activity called reason—that may be known otherwise than by exploring the materials whose natures the alleged truths set forth, or samples or parts of those materials, or materials evidentially related to them? And what grounds have we for
saying that any entity or occurrence or epoch of actuality, such as A, is evidence for some other entity or occurrence, B? What grounds, indeed, except that the likes, or the constituents, or the correlatives of A have—not been demonstrated, but—been found to be associated in the way asserted with the likes or the constituents or the correlatives of B? We all have in mind the extravagances of Descartes writing in his unpublished Le Monde of his project to demonstrate by what we have come to call analytical geometry the whole truth about the existence and career of every living thing and every particle not only on the earth but in the total universe. But we must not forget the soberer Descartes writing in the great Regulae (which he did publish) that the truth of one "idea" cannot establish or deductively entail the truth of any other; that the one thing that could make an idea true is its being true, and the one way to recognize that truth is by the natural light playing upon that idea, and not upon some other; that deductive development of ideas is only a convenience for memory and exposition. If the conclusion of a deductive sequence is true, it is true because it is true and not because it is deduced from the truth of another idea—that is, of an idea genuinely other. It has first to be true before it can be appropriately placed in the deductive sequence. We have also Spinoza's austere instruction that if any belief is false, that must be either because it is self-contradictory, or because it is not an idea at all—because it is not one of God's modifications falling under the attribute of cognition. He thought God's modifications infinite, but also that the way to determine which were in any area and how they were related was not by deductive inference, but by clear direct attention to the mode in question and to the modes which might be its boundaries.

For Leibniz the essence of a monad necessarily entails all the constituents of the monad's career, but nothing else in the world. However, the essence of the monad is the pattern of the monad's whole history, not something behind it and enforcing it, nor yet an abstract outline of it. That the pattern or essence entails all its constituents is, Leibniz insisted, an analytic judgment. Any synthetic judgment that passes from one mere part of a monad's activity to another part, or that passes from one monad's activity to another monad's activity, is for Leibniz contingent and could not be certified by reason. If we believe it, we accept it on faith in one version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason—a faith expressed in different terminology and associated with some theologies (although, when understood, anathema to most of them), but still not greatly different from Hume's undemonstrable but firm belief—much firmer than any Western scientist would share or defend today—in various continuities and causal regularities in nature.
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If Dewey's writings reflect at times an insight which other empiricists, ancient and modern, have regarded as properly reminding all inquirers that empirical procedure excludes no reality and no possible experience, entails none, and pretends as a philosophy to raise none to a dominant position (whatever that might mean), but leaves to our explorations the answer to the questions, what sorts of entities exist, how they are distributed, what their qualities and relations are, and what their meaning (in various interesting and well-justified senses of that term) and their values, then the writings of George Santayana reflect at times a similar chastening of naturalistic doctrine. So far as anybody might wish to define naturalism so that materialism would be one of its essential theses, Santayana has shown us (inadvertently or otherwise) the way in which we may be materialists philosophically and categorically. In The Realm of Matter he wrote: "By the word matter I do not understand any human idea of matter [presumably not even any idea of his own as to what matter is] popular or scientific, ancient or recent. Matter is properly a name for the actual substance of the natural world, whatever that substance may be." If that is what a philosopher chooses to mean by "matter," then "whatever exists is matter" is certainly an irrefutable thesis; but it is also strictly empty, since so far as it is irrefutable it means precisely what would be meant by saying that whatever exists is whatever exists. Most naturalists have lost all interest in reciting such truisms, no matter how elegantly formulated. Yet most of them acknowledge a certain continuity with classical materialism. When they ask whether the events going on, and supposed to have gone on, in the world with all their qualities and relations, and within us as well as outside us, require for their occurrence anything but their occurrence, and for their explanation reference to anything but their relations to further ranges of events internal to them as well as external to them—whether, for example, they require reference to laws, causes, orders, purposes which are other than patterns in events (including the events of planning, and of laboring to realize plans)—when they ask such questions they reach answers similar in negative respects to those of the classical materialists, who could see no reason why bodies could not exist and move in whatever ways they do, without any dependence upon factors other than their occurrence and their motions. As we all know, few materialists held to this insight consistently—Leucippus and Democritus probably more nearly than most of their successors, certainly more nearly than those who posited heaviness in order to explain why atoms move down, and then posited swerve in order to explain why they deviate from a parallel downward rain to unite into humanly observable bodies, or
than those who, in more recent times, posited gravitational forces distinct from, and explanatory of, *de facto* motions.

On these points naturalists owe much to the so-called empiricists of the eighteenth century and of our own time, if they have not learned the needed lessons from the ancient skeptics. If by the term "matter" we mean *any* particular sort of thing, and not just whatever exists, then if we speak responsibly we cannot possibly say that nothing but matter could exist or be real, no matter how widespread in existence we might find instances of the sort of thing we mean by "matter." Furthermore, if we should mean by "matter," as Hobbes did, something like hard bodies which we define by their differences from pains, pleasures, reds, greens, fits of remorse, and the like (with which we are also acquainted), then we could find no justification for saying that either one of these—the bodies or the feelings—was more real than the other. If we found one kind of thing more widespread than the other or the generative cause of the other, then the other would have to be equally real with the first in order to stand in a relation of lesser frequency, or in the relation of causal effect, to the first.

Contemporary naturalism is likely to use, not body and motion, but some such terms (or what is named by some such terms) as event, quality, and relation as its basic categories. But what kinds of events—if any—are occurring or have occurred or will occur in the world, what their relations and qualities may be or may have been, the naturalist knows no serious way (does anybody else?) of determining, except by the exploration of what areas he can reach and penetrate. Certainly the categories he employs cannot be regarded as themselves establishing even the thesis that there are events.

In the process of exploration no method of approach and no evidence are, or could be, barred in principle. If a naturalist barred feelings, intuitions, imaginative hypotheses, he would simply show that he needed to get acquainted with the elements of logic or with a little of the history of science—or to read Hume. But for what beliefs will his findings, will anybody's findings, be evidence? One's imagination may leap with hope or delight or terror (but never with logical necessity) from findings to beliefs about areas not yet explored. Indeed, it is only by such imaginative leaps that we advance in our theoretic work to doing more than merely recording what we have observed. But of the infinity of possible imagined hypotheses, what serious way have we of choosing one or another as more credible than its rivals, except by exploring the areas to which the hypotheses refer and seeing whether, and to what extent, those areas exhibit or do not exhibit the characteristics supposed by the various hypotheses in question?
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Western epistemology could, at this point, invite us into endless labyrinths of questions about the reliability of findings, their dependence upon habits, interests, points of view, philosophical commitments, and so on. People love to ask the Western philosopher, as they seem to love to ask his Eastern cousins: Is any immediate awareness infallible? May not immediate awareness be always illusory? The answer is found—or the question dissolved—in recognizing that the most we can do with any materials given in awareness (besides having them and enjoying them) is to note and to infer (by methods so far confirmed or by methods we may later find confirmed) their relations to other materials found or supposed, and their dynamic transitions out of and into such further materials. Some of these relations as so far experienced are of types often repeated; others are quite eccentric; some may even prove unique (and not merely in the truistic sense in which everything that is at all distinguishable is unique). In one of his last poems, William Butler Yeats reported: “Thirty apparitions have I seen; The worst, a coat upon a coat hanger.” What he thus experienced was quite as real as anything else which Yeats or anybody else has ever experienced—unless we choose to mean by “real” only what is meant by such phrases as “usual,” “reliable as a sample,” and “relevant in certain ways to some of our practical concerns.” And if such should be what we choose to mean by “real,” it would be far better to use those phrases, far better simply to say so. I trust I am in agreement with my friends in both hemispheres when I say that everything that is realized has the reality that it has—is intrinsically as real as anything else.

If epistemological criticism of immediate awareness employs as the norm against which it measures our errors the notion of certain knowledge of how and what things are when they are not cognized, then it has been abundantly shown that the talk of such knowledge is a bundle of self-contradictions. (This does not mean, of course, that belief in the existence of entities not cognized need be self-contradictory.) We seem to have no serious grounds whatever for opinions about the influence of expectations, hopes, theoretical commitments, philosophical perspectives upon men’s findings—no serious grounds except simply further findings. To suggest that all findings are determined or generated by attitudes would be to use evidence to support hypotheses, which hypotheses then discard the very evidence upon which they depend. Or else the suggestion would pretend to convey, itself, the very kind of knowledge it asserts it is impossible to compass.

These considerations lead us to questions which every student of Spinoza must have asked himself when he read the theorems in which Spinoza purports to establish that any pretense to limit or restrict the
attributes and modes of Nature is indefensible—or even blasphemous. But contemporary naturalists have asked themselves these questions in a somewhat different context. There appear to be opposed systems of metaphysics in the West—systems opposed not merely as reflections of different hopes or different temperaments, but as different theories, probable or true, of the orders of being and values in the universe. These different systems characteristically employ different sets of basic categories or different root-metaphors (as my colleague, Stephen Pepper, likes to say). But do such differences of basic categories or of root-metaphors justify one iota of difference in beliefs as between the partisans of the various systems? Can we find one single statement of which we can say seriously—with really straight faces—that it is true or probable for the monist but not for the pluralist, or for the mechanist but not for the organicist, or more nearly true or more probable for one of these than for some other? I am forced to deal briefly and crudely with this problem, but basically is it not closely analogous to the question whether "the homeopathic philosophy of medicine" makes it true or probable that a smaller dose of aureomycin is as effective in pneumonia as a larger dose would be for a physician (or a patient) whose philosophy of medicine was allopathy? I exclude here, of course, the purely psychological and biographical rendering of such questions, which would make them equivalent to: "Have certain specified monists hoped or believed that there were more similarities in the world than did certain specified pluralists?" "Have certain specified Pueblo dancers hoped or believed there was more efficacy in their rain-dance than have certain specified meteorologists?" "Have certain homeopathsists hoped and believed that small doses were more effective than certain allopathsists believed them to be?" And so on. Our question is not what men in fact have hoped or believed, but rather what has justified their beliefs and, more specifically, whether adopting a metaphysical position legitimately justifies any belief that would not be quite as well justified by the evidence that supports it, without reference to the metaphysical position.

If, as some believe (or at least write and talk as if they believed), the basic categories of a philosophy are really masked assumptions—masked postulates as to the proportion and configurations in which various factors are distributed in nature, history, and experience—then, as soon as those categories are understood for what they are, nearly everybody recognizes that they can make no legitimate difference to the truth or probability of any belief. For, if they could, we could then make any belief we liked either more probable, or altogether true, simply by adopting the postulates upon which it would be
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thus more probable or true. Some of the plainest recent examples of this kind of thinking are to be found in the arguments of the Nazis, who construed the truth or probability of propositions in physics and biology, as well as in politics, as functions of one's Jewish, or one's German, or one's pluto-democratic perspective and premises. In the end, statements entail only what they state, although, of course, they may generate (though not thereby render probable) any belief which they may in fact prompt in anybody. Cultural relativism or perspectivism is immensely important anthropologically and psychologically; but so far as it is philosophically understood, I am confident that it can be, and is, transcended. And, if we are to understand and appreciate each other's differing opinions and values, it must be so transcended.

The early pragmatists' argument that by believing a man honest, for example, we may make the belief that he is honest true, or more nearly true, offers no real exception to the above analysis. For on their own account it is the treatment of the man with humane respect and appreciation, which treatment may be associated with the belief that he is honest (but may also be associated with the belief that he is not honest), that tends to make him behave more honestly. Such treatment could just as well, and perhaps generally much better, be carried out by his friends, by his parents, or by a psychiatrist, all of whom believed that the man was under strains which prompted him to dishonesty—a dishonesty which they in no sense glossed over or denied, but which they set out by friendship and understanding, or by analytic treatment, to correct by balancing some of the man's insecurities and reducing some of the strains upon him.

If the basic categories of a philosophy are not masked postulates—are not names, or traits named, masquerading as statements or as arguments—what else may they be? They may be the kinds of traits or factors, or the names of the kinds of traits or factors, which a given philosophy uses as basic so-called referents—the names as functions of which (together perhaps with certain so-called logical constants) other names will be defined, or the traits by reference to specific values, intensities, and structures of which, whatever may interest and puzzle us, will be described and explained. In every system of discourse formulated by finite human beings, some undefined terms are unavoidable. There is probably no logical or theoretical limitation upon our choice of terms to be left undefined. But it is certainly best to recognize the status of these as clearly as we can. And it is highly convenient (in terms of economy of nomenclature and of psychological effort) if such terms are chosen from among those that name aspects of being with which we are acquainted (although they could name,
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without entailing the slightest difference in the beliefs which will be formulated in terms of them, any conceived deviation from such) and aspects whose distribution and whose differences from one another have been important in the juncture of human knowledge at which we are operating.

But if any philosopher will indicate (well enough for others to recognize them and for himself to remember them) what sorts of factors he means by his basic categories—and if he will not or cannot do this, others can scarcely understand what he says—then how can he seriously defend opinions about the configuration of factors in the universe different in content and in probability from those reached by persons who employ different basic categories? If to employ monistic or pluralistic categories is actually to assume in the one case more similarities, in the other more differences, in the world, then it is just that, and such an assumption cannot increase the probability of what is assumed. Actually what differences and what similarities are found in the world may well depend upon which areas one chooses to explore. But if different philosophers should choose to examine different areas, and consequently report different conclusions, they would thus be in conflict no more than are astronomers who say one thing about a nebula while biochemists are saying something else about a virus colony. It is hard to see how using a set of categories could in itself, except for people exceptionally susceptible to verbal hypnosis, render an area of materials or feelings accessible to one investigator but inaccessible to another. However, if the choice of categories does actually have such an effect, then we can be quite sure that the two investigators could not know that they differed, for ex hypothesi neither could be acquainted with what the other would be talking about.

Western naturalists, in the course of learning that they cannot defend dogmatic materialism and yet remain philosophers (or intelligent men), have some of them learned—or at least they think they have learned—a lesson of rather general relevance. There is no reason to think that the actual distribution of so-called organic and mechanistic traits in the world is determined by a man’s being a mechanist or an organicist. Is there any more reason to suppose that the truth or probability of any opinion about the distribution and relations of such traits, or of any others, is in any way legitimately altered by a man’s shifting his philosophical categories or the postulates of his metaphysic from those characteristic of mechanism to those characteristic of organicism, or vice versa? If the serious ground for opinions on these matters is evidence, then does the choice of a categorial system alter the evidence or make it more or less accessible to an intelligent inquirer?
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But what is the evidence evidence for? If one categorial system is one set of postulates (masked or frankly admitted), while another is another such set, then to say that the evidence will in one case be evidence for hypothesis A, while in the other case it will be evidence for hypothesis B, is simply another way of saying, as we have seen, that we can render hypotheses probable by supposing they are probable. Although widely criticized, such wishful thinking, when given a sufficiently complicated formulation and a sufficiently rich range, has generated some of the most fashionable of Western philosophies. Among them, I think, are most of the pragmatisms and the various doctrines that go to make up what is often called the sociology of knowledge.

If, in philosophical work, we employ diverse basic categories, then either we understand what our co-workers and we mean by those basic categories or we do not. If we do not understand, we have no more grounds for believing that we differ than we have for believing that our opinions are different from those that may be expressed by a Basque, whose language we do not understand. If any B differs in any expressible or namable way from any A (and there could be nothing that is not namable), then the expression of that difference by some function R in the sentence $b \ R \ a$ can always be translated into an expression of that difference, equivalent in theoretic content, by some other function $R'$ in a sentence $a \ R' \ b$. Such expressions, identical in content, may differ only in the notation used. And no variable is intrinsically free. For various purposes, some choices of which variables to call free, which bound, are considerably more convenient than others; but no choice is necessitated by the variables themselves, or makes any difference to the content of anything said about them.

If we and our friends—and I wonder if this may not apply between traditions as well as within them—know what is meant by the diverse categories we and they employ, and, if every statement in one set of categories (or employing one set of traits as basic referents) may be translated into a statement equivalent in theoretic content employing the other set, then the question remains, what traits are found in the world and in human experience, in what configurations, and for what are the findings evidence? Too often inquirers have explored different areas—too often Western thinkers have explored areas different from those explored by Easterners—and supposing their results to stand in some kind of conflict. If, in exploring the same areas, inquirers should make systematically different findings (and any differences would be to some degree systematic), then, as C. I. Lewis has, I think, shown, neither could know he differed from the other. One of the versions of
dogmatic infallibilism, now most fashionable in Western thinking, is the doctrine that those who do not accept our opinions must therefore be crippled as observers—must therefore be unable to penetrate to the evidence which is accessible to us. In other words, agreeing with us upon conclusions is taken as the test of competence to find and handle the evidence relevant to the conclusions.

But if we reach an area of agreement in our findings, can we justify different opinions as to what the findings are evidence for by relying, one of us on one categorial system, the other on another? Only if such reliance is, at bottom, simply the bald assumption in one case of the opinion one would justify, in the other case of some other. Feelings, intuitions, noted differences and relations—all these are real, but for what are they evidence? Guesses—convictions—may differ widely. Is there any serious way of determining which guess, which conviction, is more acceptable than some other except by exploring the context further so as to find which is the more generally confirmed? And in this exploration, are some findings actually generated by one philosophy and ruled out by others? This query simply reiterates the question with which we have already dealt.

Systems of metaphysics are sometimes said to be nothing other than systems of science except that it is claimed by their devotees that they are more extended and more thorough than what is ordinarily called science. Conflicts between scientific theories are then offered as illustrations (exact or analogous) of significant theoretical conflicts between opposed systems of metaphysics or types of philosophy.

This kind of argument demands and deserves very careful analysis. Many types of so-called conflict (of which the conflict between geocentric and heliocentric "theories" of the solar system is a favorite example) turn out to be mere confusions—every opinion justified in one system is equally justified in the other, although the nomenclature may be different.

In other types of "conflicts," like that between the so-called wave and corpuscular theories of light, the hypotheses really differ, and, as overgeneralized, conflict; but all the evidence and all the justified hypotheses in either are wholly compatible with all the evidence and all the justified hypotheses in the other.

Some hold that people are so conditioned, or even so constituted, that they need to dispute in order to engage vigorously in intellectual work. That would, if true, be an important fact for psychology and biography, but hardly a justification for any serious opposition to the truth or probability of the theories over which they dispute.
When we pass beyond explanation to evaluation we confront a different set of problems. If we find differences, but if each inquirer will make clear to the other what he means by his value terms, then the inquirers should be able to reach agreement as to the promise, or the threat, of any area of phenomena for the values (probably different) cherished by the different inquirers. But, of course, we are generally interested not just in making clear to others what we value, and in finding what factors favor and what threaten the things we value. We are usually equally interested—or more interested—in recommending to others what we value, if not in trying to force it on them. To the understanding of this situation, and to the abating of dogmatism and aggression, I believe the suggestions I have made have useful relevance. But the adequate development of them would be a long story. In most respects, it is another story.

To conclude: The naturalists and empiricists who have reached views such as I have outlined recognize that what I have here called empiricism or naturalism cannot as such entail or exclude any existent or any experience or any opinion—hence that these are not philosophies if such entailment or exclusion is what a philosophy is supposed to accomplish. But (so far as they can see) the same result is reached when any categorial system (or postulate set)—idealism, organicism, mechanism, et al.—is thought through. Yet philosophy, as the activity of analyzing and understanding issues involved in our intellectual, cultural, and political enterprises, and particularly as analysis and understanding of central notions (such as meaning, fact, evidence, probability, cause, law, value, purpose, duty, right) employed in explanation and evaluation, remains. And philosophy thus conceived remains to correct or to rebuke any mind that would exclude a priori (or on so-called philosophical principles) any existence, any experience, or any evidence—or would dogmatize a priori as to what any experience is evidence for. Philosophical work, in this sense, seems to me to have indisputable and continuing value, not as a source of controversies and dispute, but as such a maker and guardian of understanding and of peace as the early Pythagoreans thought philosophy properly to be, and also, if I have understood them, most of our colleagues from Asia and the historic teachers whose work they have been so patiently interpreting to us.

So far as I can see, competent empiricism and naturalism in the West have completely lost any individual identity as "isms" in the common enterprise of extending knowledge and philosophical understanding. I am even bold enough to believe that all "isms" (if they are not sheer dogmas) must, once they are thoroughly and critically
understood, similarly lose themselves—like milk poured into milk, to use Swami Nikhilananda’s simile—in the common enterprises of science and philosophy, which shall not know “isms” or geography or national boundaries or race.

NOTES

3A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 120.
4Bk. I, Pt. I, Sec. I.
5Ibid., Bk. I, Pt. I, Sec. III; Pt. II, Sec. III; Pt. IV, Sec. II.
CHAPTER VII

Methodology and Epistemology, Oriental and Occidental

FILMER S. C. NORTHRUP

There is a unique factor common to the most influential Oriental philosophical systems. There are also doctrines which distinguish some Oriental systems from others. In comparing the methodology and epistemology of Oriental and Western philosophy, therefore, it is necessary to consider both the unique factor and the differentiating factors in Oriental philosophical systems. It will be assumed that the different Western philosophies are well known.

I

The unique factor common to the most influential Oriental systems has the following characteristics: (1) It is immediately apprehended, not given by thought or inference, hence known by acquaintance, and therefore denoted by a concept by intuition; (2) Although usually apprehended as in considerable part differentiated, it in itself is indeterminate and undifferentiated. Since language is designed to convey the determinate and the differentiated, it in itself is, therefore, indescribable. (3) It embraces the equally immediate differentiations which come and go within it. Hence, it is aptly designated as a continuum. (4) Summary: it may be expressed in Western language, therefore, as "the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum," where "aesthetic" is taken in its root meaning of immediacy but not (unless we refer solely to the differentiations) in its usual meaning of sensed immediacy. (5) Consequences: The undifferentiated aesthetic continuum is equivalent to a nominalistic unity of apperception which is known by acquaintance rather than by description or a priori. It is also a necessary assumption of any empirical naturalism which would keep the

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knower in nature and would regard ancient and contemporary knowers
as abstractions from one empirical nature. Without the undifferentiated
aesthetic continuum there is no purely empirical meaning for one
nature or for a nature which embraces both the differentiated empiri-
cal knower and the differentiated empirical object.

II

The factors which differentiate the many Oriental systems from
one another rise from three sources: (1) Different ways of arriving
at immediate acquaintance with the undifferentiated aesthetic con-
tinuum. (2) Different ways of using knowledge of the undifferentiated
aesthetic continuum. (3) Different views as to what else is valid knowl-
edge in addition to the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.

Different Approaches to the Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum

(1) By immediate apprehension, with the sensed and introspected
differentiations neglected. (a) Zen and non-dualistic Vedānta con-
centration and intuition. (b) Yoga practices, which eliminate from
immediacy all sensed, introspected, and theoretically conceived factors,
leaving only undifferentiated and hence non-dualistic immediacy.

(2) Indirect methods: Since the undifferentiated aesthetic con-
tinuum, being undifferentiated, cannot be positively described, systems
using language must proceed negatively. This negative linguistic pro-
cedure takes at least three forms: (a) Direct negation, as illustrated by
the "It is not this, it is not this" (Neti-neti) method common to
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. (b) The dialectic-of-negation
method, as illustrated in the Buddhist transition from realistic
Hinayāṇa through nihilistic Hinayāṇa and ideational Mahāyāṇa to
nihilistic Mahāyāṇa where nothing remains but the Suchness or Void,
which is the undifferentiated immediacy. In this dialectical negative
method, the three earlier systems represent differing positive beliefs
in addition to the belief in the immediacy of the undifferentiated
Nirvāṇa Suchness. (c) The paradoxical linguistic method, as illustrated
in the Zen Buddhist statement, "I am not I; therefore, I am I."
This seems to involve, as Mr. Burtt has noted, a flouting of the law of
contradiction and a "jeopardization of logical responsibility," which
Western philosophy cannot tolerate. This is, however, a mere seeming.
Logical irresponsibility would be present if the word "I" had the same
meaning throughout the two aforementioned statements. The whole
point, however, of the paradoxical formulation is to preserve logical
responsibility and to use it to establish the point that there are two

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different selves—the indeterminate, non-dualistic self and the introspected, determinate, transitory self. It is because I (the indeterminate, undifferentiated, non-dualistic self) am not I (the introspected, determinate, transitory self) that I (the indeterminate, undifferentiated, non-dualistic self) am I (the indeterminate, undifferentiated, non-dualistic self).

**Different Uses of the Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum**

Since this source of the differences among Oriental systems has to do with application, it falls under ethics. It may be noted here, however, that this common factor (i.e., the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum) may be pursued in and for itself. This pursuit leads to Zen mysticism, non-dualistic Vedānta absorption, and Taoist non-action. It may be used, on the other hand, to infuse social relations with a common man-to-manness or fellow feeling for all creatures. This gives rise to the jēn of Confucianism and to Buddhist sympathy for the inescapable suffering of all determinate transitory creatures.

**Factors in Addition to the Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum, Admitted as Valid Knowledge in Some Systems**

Three such systems have already been noted in connection with the Buddhist dialectic of negation. Realistic Hinayāna Buddhism, for example, admits the reality of external, determinate material objects in addition to Nirvāṇa or the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum. However, even in Oriental systems such as these, in which factors in addition to the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum are admitted to be real, these factors are defined in terms of, and hence involve only, concepts by intuition. The crucial cases, seemingly to the contrary, are Cārvāka materialism and Va✐šeṣika Hinduism, because of their affirmation of physical atoms; realistic Hinayāna Buddhism, because of its belief in external objects; and Mimāṃsā Hinduism, because of its admission of arthāpattī, or what Professors Chatterjee and Datta called “postulation,” as a method of knowledge.

Examination of all these systems shows that the atomic, commonsense, and postulated objects of knowledge are not constructed or designated syntactically in terms of non-immediately apprehendable properties and relations as specified by an explicit set of postulates of a deductively formulated, indirectly verified theory, as must be the case if they are concepts by postulation in the meaning of my *The Meeting of East and West,* but are defined instead in terms of qualities given through the senses, such as hot, cold, sweet, sour, etc. Since
sensed qualities are immediately apprehended, the concepts denoting them are concepts by intuition. Consequently, any objects defined in terms of such qualities, whether they be atoms, common-sense objects, or "postulated" (in the sense of Professors Chatterjee and Datta) objects, entail only concepts by intuition.

A concept by postulation is one the meaning of which in whole or part is not derived from something immediately apprehendable but is constructed or posed for it by the specific postulates of some deductively formulated theory. Precisely because postulates formulated of such concepts designate factors in knowledge which are not at any time capable of direct inspection, verification of such theory must be indirect by way of the deduced theorems, and even then only by recourse to two-termed epistemic correlations which connect the deduced concepts by postulation with directly inspectable data denoted by concepts by intuition.

Once this is noted, confirming evidence that Oriental philosophical systems, even those which admit factors in addition to the undifferentiated continuum, contain no concepts by postulation is to be found in Mr. Datta's statement before the Conference that Indian philosophy has no interest in the hypothetical syllogism but always reasons syllogistically from premises which are empirically true. This can be the case only if all the concepts in the premises are concepts by intuition and hence such as to permit direct verification of the premises. In short, the deductive syllogistic reasoning when it occurs is always of the form: A is immediately apprehended to be the case. If A, then B. Therefore, B is the case.

A problem arises for Indian philosophy when the deductively inferred conclusion B is perceivable and hence completely describable by concepts by intuition, but is actually unperceived, i.e., the inferred concept-by-intuition meaning is not directly verified in the case of the inference in question. A case in point is the example, used by the Mīmāṃsā school, of the man who "we find . . . does not eat anything in the day, but increases in weight." The problem is: Are we entitled to admit as valid the inferred conclusion, "He must be eating at night"? Professors Chatterjee and Datta inform us that but "one school of the Mīmāṃsā" of all the anti- and pro-Vedic schools of Indian philosophy answers this question in the affirmative, calling the particular method of such knowledge arthāpatti, which Professors Chatterjee and Datta translate as "postulation."

It is to be emphasized that the admission of "postulation" in this meaning is no evidence whatever for the thesis that even this one of the many systems of Vedic Indian philosophy uses concepts by postu-
oration in the sense specified in my chapter in *Philosophy—East and West* (Chapter VIII), in my *The Meeting of East and West*, and in my *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*. A concept by postulation is one the meaning of which in whole or part is not given inductively or by syllogistic deduction from the inductively given, after the manner of the syllogistic conclusion "He must be eating at night," illustrated by the Mīmāṃsā meaning noted above. Instead, it is a concept the meaning of which in whole or part is proposed for it syntactically and systematically by the determinate postulates of some specific deductively formulated theory. Only when concepts by postulation in this latter sense are used must verification be indirect, since what is postulated appears not in the conclusion, after the manner of the Mīmāṃsā illustration above, but in the premises from which the testable conclusion is deduced. Since premises constructed of concepts by postulation refer to factors not directly perceived and hence not denoted by concepts by intuition, the verification of such deductive reasoning cannot be by the verification of the premises. Verification must consequently have the form of the hypothetical rather than the categorical syllogism, as follows: If A as specified by the postulates, then B; B is the case; therefore, A is confirmed. The Mīmāṃsā case is, therefore, not an exception to the general rule that Oriental philosophy uses only concepts by intuition and reasons deductively only from such concepts, whereas the novel factor in Western civilization is that, beginning with deductively formulated Greek science, Western science and philosophy introduced and, except in its positivistic periods, has reasoned deductively from concepts by postulation.

This conclusion is confirmed by two characteristics of *arthāpatti* ("postulation") in Mīmāṃsā. First, the postulation refers to the conclusion of the inference rather than to its initial premises. Where concepts by postulation in the unique Western meaning and usage are present, the premises, not merely the conclusion, designate what is postulated, as has been noted above. Second, the syllogistic conclusion, "He must be eating at night," which the one school of Mīmāṃsā admits as valid, denotes what is perceivable even though actually at the time of the deduction it is unperceived. But for the proposition to refer to the perceivable, its concepts must denote what is knowable by immediate apprehension. Such concepts are by definition concepts by intuition. Thus, even in the rare Mīmāṃsā example, the meaning of the *arthāpatti* knowledge is not "postulated" in the sense of a concept by postulation which is constructed by postulational technique in a specific deductively formulated theory. It is only the verification of the deduced concept-by-intuition meaning which has to be "postu-
lated" in the Mimāṃsā example, due to the circumstance that, while both perceivable and reasonably inferable from what is perceived, its immediate presence at the time of the inference is not perceived.

III

The method of knowing unique to Western science and philosophy is by concepts by postulation, which are given meanings by postulational technique in an explicit set of postulates which are verified indirectly through their rigorously proved theorems or deductive consequences. These postulates are checked indirectly by way of their deduced theorems against local, rigorously controlled observational or experimental data. As Mr. Burtt said: "Experimental manipulation of nature is rare in India and China." Even when it occurs it is piecemeal—not envisaged as the testing of a deductively formulated theory.

Furthermore, a Democritean atom has little in common with the atoms of Cārvāka materialism or Vaiśeṣika, since the Democritean atom is not defined in terms of sensed qualities. It is, instead, an entity satisfying the theorems and assumed axioms of Book Seven of Euclid and of the deductively formulated mathematical acoustics of Democritus and Archytus. Similarly, a Platonic atomic triangle or regular solid is not the image given to the imagination, nor is it defined by any property given through the senses. It is, instead, an entity satisfying the proved theorems and assumed postulates of Books Five and Thirteen of Euclid. Likewise a physical object for Newton is not the concept-by-intuition object which is the association of sensed qualities relative to the perceiver given through the senses; it is, instead, an entity satisfying the postulates of Newton's deductively formulated physics as specified in his Princípio. In short, the atoms of Cārvāka materialism and Vaiśeṣika Hinduism, being defined in terms of sensed qualities or introspected images which are relative to perceivers, are esse-est-percipi, concept-by-intuition objects, whereas the veridical scientific objects of Democritus, Plato, and Newton are non-esse-est-percipi, concept-by-postulation objects.

This distinction is precisely what Leibniz had in mind when he wrote in the New Essays: "That we have the angles of the triangle in the imagination does not mean that we, therefore, have clear ideas of them [i.e., that we have the concept-by-intuition meaning of the symbol does not mean that we, therefore, have the concept-by-postulation meaning] ... thus this idea [of angle in Western mathematical physics] does not consist in the images, and it is not as easy as one might think fundamentally to understand the angles of the triangle." The point is that to carry through the deductions of mathematical physics,
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which involve the use of the concept of angle and which make its tremendous predictive power and quantitative verification possible, the concept-by-intuition angle given with immediacy is quite incapable of providing the meaning sufficient to permit the deductive proof of the experimentally verified theorems. Before a concept of angle sufficient for mathematical physics is achieved, postulates concerning the character of the lines in geometry going far beyond anything given in sensuous experience or the operations of measuring must be specified. One of these postulates must prescribe whether parallel lines, if extended without limit, intersect or not. Such postulates going far beyond the data of sense awareness are as necessary for the physical objects of physics as for the angles of geometry, since the very formulation of the laws of physics entails all the concepts of some specific deductively formulated geometry or chrono-geometry.

This existence of concepts by postulation in Western science is as important for Western philosophy as it is for Western mathematical physics. Leibniz’ New Essays was written as a result of his reading of Locke’s famous Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Leibniz agreed with Locke’s emphasis upon those concepts in human knowledge which are concepts by intuition deriving their meaning from what can be known with immediacy through the senses. It was precisely, however, because of the concepts by postulation which Leibniz knew to be present also in mathematical physics that Leibniz affirmed there are concepts which are universals in addition to the nominalistic concept-by-intuition ideas of Locke’s epistemology. In fact, it has been by means of these concepts by postulation discovered first by Greek science that Western science, philosophy, ethics, law, and theology have escaped the predominant Oriental thesis that all determinate things, including the determinate perceiver, are transitory.

Certainly this predominant Oriental thesis is correct for all determinate things known with immediacy. As Locke and Hume emphasized, immediately apprehended introspected and sensed data are “perpetually perishing,” and, as St. Paul said long before Locke and Hume, “The things that are seen are temporal.” If knowledge is restricted after the manner of the Orient and of radical Western empiricism to what is immediately apprehended, then only one bit of knowledge is non-transitory, the same for all men, holding under all circumstances—namely, the all-embracing otherwise indeterminate, undifferentiated and hence non-dualistic immediacy within which the transitory determinate differentiations come and go.

To this predominant Oriental philosophical thesis that all determinate things are transitory, the Greek scientists, who created the

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concepts by postulation, which are the universals of subsequent Western philosophy, had an answer: There is a way of knowing other than direct intuition or immediate apprehension with its nominalistic concepts by intuition. There is also an indirect way of knowing which makes use of postulationally and theoretically constructed primitive or basic meanings designating factors in nature and man not immediately apprehended and hence not defined in terms of transitory, perpetually perishing esse-est-percipi sensed qualities.

Moreover, this indirect way of knowing, with its postulationally constructed basic concepts, gives knowledge of determinate factors in man and nature, such as Democritus’ timeless mathematically designated atoms and Eudoxus’ mathematically designated determinate astronomical principles, which escape the esse-est-percipi relativity and perpetual perishing of immediately apprehended determinate things. Furthermore, by deducing theorems from the postulationally constructed meanings designating determinate factors in man and nature which obey conservative laws and hence are invariant and timeless, and by relating these deduced concept-by-postulation consequences of the theoretically constructed basic meanings to directly inspectable concept-by-intuition data, the existence or nonexistence of the postulationally and solely theoretically designated determinate factors in man and nature can be verified indirectly.

Hence, notwithstanding the fact that this novel concept-by-postulation way of knowing designates determinate factors in, and principles applying to, man and nature which are not directly apprehendable, it nonetheless gives determinate knowledge valid for all men which is verifiable by anyone. In fact, unless the deduced consequences of the postulationally constructed theory are such that they refer to directly inspectable data which anyone who takes the trouble can find and verify, the criteria of truth for this way of knowing are not satisfied.

These postulationally constructed basic concepts of Western science and philosophy differ from the concepts of Oriental philosophy not only because they do not refer to what is directly apprehendable but also because they are non-nominalistic universals rather than nominalistic particulars. Concepts by postulation are universals because the postulates which they satisfy are universal propositions. To be an atom in the Democritean or Newtonian sense of the word “atom” is not to be a denotatively known particular, since Democritean and Newtonian atoms have no sensuous properties and hence cannot even be thought of in sensuous terms, to say nothing about being sensed; instead, Democritean or Newtonian atoms are entities satisfying certain universal mathematical laws; in other words, they are individual
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entities, the essential nature (i.e., the scientific definition) of which is to be an instance of a determinate universal law.

It is from this concept-by-postulation universal derived from Greek science that Zeno, Plato, Aristotle, and the Roman Stoics, who created Western ethics and Western law with its theoretically constructed technical terminology, arrived at their concept of a moral and just man as an individual who is an instance of a determinate universal law. It is from this same source also that the great Roman Catholic theologians like St. Augustine and St. Thomas acquired the concept of the determinate universal necessary to put the Christian faith in a theistic religious object which is immortal and determinate on a philosophically meaningful and verifiable basis. Such a morality, law, or religion rooted in the concept-by-postulation meaning of the moral, legal, and religious person as an instance of universal determinate laws or principles is something poles apart from the concept-by-intuition moral, legal, and religious person of the Orient, who, restricted in his knowledge of man and nature to the immediately apprehended, finds nothing universal, the same for all men and all circumstances, except the pushing aside of relativistic, perpetually perishing introspections and sensations to achieve the indeterminate, undifferentiated, and hence indescribable non-dualistic immediacy which is Brahman, Ālman, Nirvāṇa, Tao, and the source of jñā.

To be sure, as noted above, there are Oriental systems such as realistic Hinayāna Buddhism and Vaiśeṣika or Mīmāṃsā Hinduism, which affirm external objects to be real (i.e., existent apart from the perceiver, or in other words non-esse-est-percipi), as there are Hindu systems which affirm the existence of a theistic (i.e., with determinate properties) religious object. The point is, however, that because these purportedly real determinate objects were defined in terms of directly inspected qualities (i.e., concepts by intuition) which by their very nature are esse-est-percipi, other more careful Oriental thinkers had no difficulty in showing such theories to be self-contradictory. For certainly a determinate object which purports to be non-esse-est-percipi cannot be defined consistently in terms of esse-est-percipi determinate properties.

Not having concepts by postulation, by which alone determinate common-sense, scientific, or theistic religious objects can be given consistent non-esse-est-percipi meaning, epistemological realism and religious theism were not able to be established even as meaningful (i.e., self-consistent) theoretical possibilities, and Oriental philosophy and religion when developed self-critically and consistently were left with nothing but an indeterminate real epistemological and religious
object, as occurs in nihilistic Mahāyāna Buddhism and in nondualistic Vedānta. This is the reason undoubtedly why the dialectic of negation in Buddhism and the development of Hindu thought culminate in these two systems.

We have no alternative but to conclude, therefore, that not only are the predominant ways of knowing natural man and nature different in the Orient from what they are in the Occident, but that the ethical, legal, and religious values which flow from the application of the knowledge obtained by the different ways of knowing are different also. Recent investigations of the relation between the two ways of knowing with their differing types of concepts and their respective diverse moral, legal, and religious aims and values indicate that both ways of knowing are valid and compatible. It appears, therefore, that the predominant epistemology, methodology, and values of the Occident need to be enlarged and enriched by the inclusion of the epistemology, methodology, and values of the Orient, and conversely.

NOTES

1A concept by intuition is a concept the complete meaning of which is given by something immediately apprehendable. See my "Complementary Emphases of Oriental Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore, ed., Philosophy—East and West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), Ch. VIII; also The Meeting of East and West (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946), p. 447; and The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), Ch. V.

2See E. R. Hughes’ meticulous commentary on the meaning and translation of jén in his Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times, Everyman’s Library, p. xxxvii. Note also the definite rooting of jén and a “sense of honour” in the all-embracing indeterminate Tao, ibid., p. 20. See also my chapter in Philosophy—East and West for further evidence that Confucianism rests upon and derives its vitality and effectiveness from the common undifferentiated immediate man-to-manness, which is Tao, as much as does Taoism or Buddhism. It is merely pursuing this immediately experienced Tao with respect to its effectiveness in fostering warm family and social relations.


4New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946, pp. 447-454; see also Philosophy—East and West, pp. 168-234; and The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, Chs. III-VIII.

5Ibid.

6Ibid. See especially The Meeting of East and West, Ch. XII; and The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, Chs. VII-VIII.

7S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, op. cit., p. 54. 8Ibid., p. 53.


10The Meeting of East and West, Ch. XII; see also Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1950), Chs. IV-VI.

Part II

METAPHYSICS
Syntheses in
Chinese Metaphysics

WING-TSIT CHAN

Chinese philosophers, both ancient and modern, have been interested primarily in ethical, social, and political problems. Metaphysics developed only after Buddhism from India had presented a strong challenge to Confucianists. Even then, basic metaphysical problems, such as God, universals, space and time, matter and spirit, were either not discussed, except in Buddhism, or discussed only occasionally, and then always for the sake of ethics. Discussions have been unsystematic, seldom based on hypothesis and logical analysis, for Chinese philosophers have always shunned abstraction and generalities and have always been interested more in a good life and a good society than in organized knowledge. If in our search for a world perspective in philosophy we rely chiefly on theoretical foundations and logical subtlety, I am afraid Chinese philosophy has little to offer.

But if we are interested in a synthesis of philosophies, it will be worth while to look into what has taken place in Chinese philosophy, for one of the outstanding facts in the history of Chinese philosophy has been its tendency and ability to synthesize. The history of Chinese philosophy is usually divided into four periods, and each period ended in some sort of synthesis.

In the Han dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 220), even before Confucianism was made a State cult and became supreme, the metaphysical doctrines of Taoism, of the Yin Yang school, and of the Chung Yung (The Doctrine of the Mean) were in the process of merger. The result was the philosophy of change, accepted by Confucianism, Taoism, and all other schools. The Taoist ideal of the Great Unit, the Yin Yang theory of the interaction of the positive and negative cosmic principles, and the Confucian philosophy of ch'eng,¹ or truth, in The Doctrine of the Mean were synthesized into one philosophy that was to dominate Chinese thought for centuries and form a firm basis for Neo-Confucianism.

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The second synthesis took place within the sphere of Buddhism. Buddhism as such lies outside the scope of this paper. But the significant thing for us is that in metaphysics the various Buddhist schools of nihilism, realism, idealism, and negativism were synthesized into the philosophy of Hua-yen totalism (Avatamsaka, Kegon) which was distinctly Chinese in spirit. In this philosophy, the "Realm of Principles" and the "Realm of Facts" are so harmonized that the theoretical and the practical, the one and the many, and noumenon and phenomenon are interwoven, so that all things "arise simultaneously," coexist, are complementary, mutually penetrating, mutually identifying, and involve and reflect one another.

The third synthesis took place in Neo-Confucianism, in which Buddhism and Taoism were assimilated into traditional Confucianism, as we shall see. The fourth synthesis is going on in our own day. Modern Chinese philosophy is still in its infancy. The few philosophers who are building up systems of their own are all attempting to combine Western philosophy with traditional Chinese thought.

I shall not go into the various historical factors in these four stages of synthesis. What interests us more is the synthesis of ideas. This will be briefly discussed under six topics which represent the most important problems in Chinese metaphysics.

BEING AND NON-BEING

The first is the problem of being and non-being, in which Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism radically disagreed. They were denied in Buddhism, reduced to non-being in Taoism, and synthesized in Neo-Confucianism.

According to Buddhism, to be is impossible because, in order to be, a thing has to be produced. But, in order to be produced, a thing has to come either from itself or from another, both of which are absurd. Furthermore, to be means to have self-nature. But a thing is nothing but an aggregate and as such has no self-nature. Consequently, being is an illusion. By the same token, non-being is also an illusion. Both may be granted "dependent reality" and "secondary truth," but the Void transcends them all. It is true that Buddhist philosophers like Sêng Chao (d.414) interpreted the Void as "not true Void," since everything involves the entire universe. In the middle of the first millennium, Buddhist schools north of the Yangtze, such as Hua-yen, exhibited realistic tendencies and were called "Schools of Being." But those south of the river, especially the Meditation School (Ch'an, Zen), were labeled "Schools of Non-being." They were so-called because they insisted on the "highest truth," that "all matter and form are identical.
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with the Void, and the Void is identical with all matter and form." In the end, both being and non-being are negated in the Void.

Instead of denying both being and non-being, Taoism reduced all to non-being, or \( \text{wu} \). "Heaven and Earth and all things come from being," says the \( \text{Tao} \ \text{Tê Ching}, \) "and being comes from non-being." Early Taoists understood \( \text{wu} \) to mean "having no name," that is, that Tao cannot be described. Later Taoists, especially Kuo Hsiang (d. ca. 310), went a step further and definitely identified \( \text{wu} \) with nothingness. They argued that Tao is nowhere and has no activity. To say that a thing comes from Tao is merely to say that it comes from nowhere or from nothing. In truth, it comes from itself.

It should be noted that Taoists were not arguing for nihilism. Rather, they were arguing for the doctrine of "self-transformation," that a thing comes from itself. This is Tao. Nevertheless, the negativistic character is unmistakable. After all, the emphasis is on non-being, and Taoism, whether in ethics or government, has been the champion of the negative spirit.

Neo-Confucianists did not deny being or non-being, but affirmed both. To them the nature of a thing or man consists in production. It is interesting to note that the Chinese word for the nature of things or man, \( \text{hsing} \), has the word \( \text{shang} \), birth, life, or production, as its chief component. And production is the very essence of change.

It has been pointed out that the philosophy of change laid the foundation for Neo-Confucianism. In a nutshell, its metaphysics is stated in these words:

The \( \text{T'ai Chi} \) (Great Ultimate), at the beginning of time, engenders the Two Primary Modes of \( \text{yin} \) and \( \text{yang} \), which in turn engender the Four Secondary Modes or Forms, which in their turn give rise to the Eight Elements, and the Eight Elements determine all good and evil and the great complexity of life.

Thus, reality is a continuous process of production and reproduction. This is possible only because there is the interplay of inactivity, decrease, etc., which constitute \( \text{yin} \), and activity, increase, etc., which constitute \( \text{yang} \). Now, \( \text{yang} \) is being, and \( \text{yin} \) is non-being. Reality, then, is possible only because of the interaction of being and non-being. In other words, in the fact of change, being and non-being are synthesized.

Several consequences follow this synthesis. In the first place, of the three systems, Confucianism alone accepts change, not only as natural but also as desirable. Not that Buddhism and Taoism are blind to the fact. The Buddhists look upon the universe as a "sea of waves"; the Taoists, as "a great transformation"; and Confucianists, as "a great current." On the fact of change they agree. Their attitudes toward the
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changing universe, however, differ vastly. Buddhists devote all their
effort to crossing the sea of waves to arrive at the "Other Shore" where
the perpetual becoming will cease. Taoists, comparing the universe to
a "galloping horse," view the drama fatalistically, often with a sense
of humor, always in the spirit of indifference. Confucianists, on the
contrary, intend to take a leading role in the drama and to like it. This
is the meaning of the little incident, much cited by Neo-Confucianists
—when a Confucian pupil, Tien, declared that it was his ambition to
go with a group of grown-ups and children, bathe in the river, enjoy
the breeze, and come home singing, Confucius said, "You are after
my own heart."9 For, to Confucianists, change is good. Significantly,
all the Confucian terms for reality have the meanings of both process
and good. In The Doctrine of the Mean, reality is chêng, or truth, mean-
ing, on the one hand, sincerity, and, on the other, "the end and the
beginning of things," which "leads to activity . . . change . . . and trans-
formation."10 In the philosophy of the Great Ultimate, "The alterna-
tion of yin and yang is the Way; that which follows is good."11 In Neo-
Confucianism, the Great Ultimate is equated with li (reason, law),
which means both a principle and what is proper.

Another consequence of the Neo-Confucian synthesis of being and
non-being is that Confucianism alone looks upon time as traveling
forward. Absolute time was hardly touched upon in Chinese philos-
ophy. With Chinese philosophers, time has always been associated
with events. In Buddhism, since events are illusory, time is illusory.
As such it moves on but will come to an end in Nirvāṇa. In Taoism,
time travels in a circle, since a thing comes from non-being and returns
to non-being. In the Confucian process of production and reproduction,
however, time never comes to an end or repeats itself. Every production
has an element of novelty, since it requires a new relationship of yin
and yang. When Confucius urged people to "be a new person every
day,"12 he meant a daily development of personality. Neo-Confucian-
ists, however, gave the phrase a metaphysical flavor, that everything
is new.

There is another consequence which is quite serious. The synthesis
of being and non-being, in making change possible, also makes it
natural. The Great Ultimate, reality (chêng), change, and reason or
law (li) are not caused. In this respect, Taoism fully agrees, for the very
concept of Tao as the Way of self-transformation precludes any possi-
bility of a creator or a supernatural director. It is true that Lao Tzu
spoke of Ti or the Lord, and Chuang Tzu mentioned the "maker of
things" (tsao wu chê). But, if there is any idea of God, it is completely
overshadowed by the cardinal Taoist doctrine of "self-transformation."
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Heaven in ancient Confucianism did have an anthropomorphic character, but Hsün Tzŭ (ca. 335–286 B.C.) clearly equated it with Nature, and Neo-Confucianists identified it with 仁. The kuei shên in Neo-Confucianism are no longer the heavenly and earthly spirits of popular religion that interfere with human events, but are "traces of the operation of yin and yang," and Shang-ti, instead of being the personal God that Bruce supposed it to be, is but the "greatest mystery in the process of creation and re-creation."

The great difference between Confucianism and Taoism is that the latter allows no room for teleology, unless it is the ultimate realization of Tao. Although Taoism is not mechanistic, it is difficult to conceive the Taoist universe as a moral one. "Heaven and Earth are not benevolent," declares the Tao Tê Ching. "And not non-benevolent," we must add.

To Confucianists, what proceeds from production is good. This conviction runs through the entire Confucian tradition. In a more rational frame of mind, Neo-Confucianists argued that the universe is good because it is a process of production and reproduction, and production and reproduction are the greatest acts of love. Furthermore, in the oscillation of yin and yang there is harmony, and harmony is good. Thirdly, the universe embraces all, and what moral act can be greater than identification with all? Finally, in the production and reproduction of things, Mother Nature is impartial to all. God is just, as we say.

LI AND CH'I

We now pass on to the second problem, that of 仁 and ch'i. In synthesizing being and non-being, early Neo-Confucianists created a dichotomy of their own, namely, the bifurcation of 仁 and ch'i. The concept of 仁 was borrowed from Hua-yen Buddhism. In borrowing it, Neo-Confucianists also borrowed the Hua-yen bifurcation of the realm of principles (仁) and the realm of facts.

Briefly stated, 仁 is the universal principle underlying all things, the universal law governing all things, the reason behind all things. It is at once the cause, the form, the essence, the sufficient reason for being, the highest standard of all things, that is, their Great Ultimate, or T'ai Chi. It is self-caused, indestructible, eternal. There is nothing without it. It combines all things as one. It is manifest everywhere. It is fully embodied in the mind. Ch'i, on the other hand, is the material, particularizing principle, the concretion, expression, and operation of 仁. It provides the conditions for the production, evolution, and destruction of things. It gives them substantiality and individuality. It differentiates them.
Such being the characteristics of "ch'i", obviously it is inadequate to translate it as matter. The concept of "ch'i" goes back to ancient times and was shared by practically all schools, but was promoted by Taoists, who inspired the Neo-Confucianists in this regard. It has always meant force, energy, breath, power. When Chu Hsi (1130-1200) considered it as matter and described it as corporeal, he was unorthodox indeed.

Neo-Confucianists differed greatly in their interpretation of "li" and "ch'i". The two Ch'eng brothers (Ming-tao, 1032-1086; I-ch'üan, 1033-1107), for example, did not see eye to eye with respect to "li". The former looked upon it as merely the natural tendency in things, whereas the latter considered it as transcendental. For convenience, we may summarize the three main Neo-Confucian movements in propositions. As the representatives of the philosophy of the Sung period (960-1279), philosophers Ch'eng I-ch'üan and Chu Hsi postulated that:

1. All things have "li".
2. "Li", in contrast to "ch'i", is a priori, incorporeal, and transcendental.
3. Existence is not necessary to "li" but is necessary to "ch'i".
4. Actually there is no "li" without "ch'i", "for without "ch'i", "li" would have nothing to adhere to."
5. The mind embraces all "li".
6. "Li" can be, but need not be, known.
7. Knowledge consists in "extending" the mind to all things. Hence all things must be "investigated." (Here Ch'eng and Chu differed, the former emphasizing intensive study of one thing, Chu advocating the extensive study of all things.)

The Ch'eng-Chu philosophy aroused opposition in the Sung dynasty itself, especially by Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-1192). But the opposition did not reach its height until the Ming dynasty (1388-1644), in the person of Wang Yang-ming (1473-1529). The Lu-Wang philosophy may be summed up in these propositions:

1. Mind is "li".
2. The universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe.
3. Every person has this mind, and every mind has "li".
4. To understand the mind is to understand "li".

The main effort of this school was to remove the bifurcation of "li" and "ch'i" in the Ch'eng-Chu philosophy by identifying "li" and mind. But, in doing so, the Ming philosophers went to the extreme of idealism. To this, philosophers of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911) were vigorously opposed. Roughly, the metaphysical views of the outstand-
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ing Ch’ing philosophers, notably Yen Yüan (1635-1704) and Tai Tung-yüan (1723-1777), are:

(1) *Li* is the principle of a thing, and *ch’i* its substance.
(2) Wherever there is *li*, there is *ch’i*; wherever there is no *ch’i*, there can be no *li*.
(3) *Li* is immanent in things.
(4) To know *li*, it is necessary to observe and analyze things.

It is important to note that, while the three schools held different views on *li* and *ch’i*, none held that only one of them was real. Ming philosophers seldom talked about *ch’i*. But to them *ch’i* was the operation or function of *li* and as such it was fully real. While Chu Hsi claimed that *li* was prior to and independent of *ch’i*, he quickly added that in fact no *li* exists apart from *ch’i*. Ch’ing philosophers denied that *li* was a *a priori* or transcendental, but they did not go so far as to say that *li* was only an abstraction. One is justified, I think, in saying that the general Chinese position is that *li* and *ch’i* exist in each other. Once more, the Chinese tendency to synthesize asserts itself.

**THE ONE AND THE MANY**

Such a mutual relationship between *li* and *ch’i* rules out the contrast between the one and the many. Historically, the problem of the one and the many was first and most thoroughly discussed in Buddhism. The most famous treatise on this question is the essay "The Golden Lion," by Fa-tsang (d. ca. 712). According to him, in the golden lion, the gold and the lion are inseparable. The gold penetrates every part of the lion, and the lion penetrates every part of the gold. Furthermore, since every part of the lion penetrates the gold and since the gold penetrates the whole lion, every part of the lion penetrates the whole lion. In short, the one is the many, and the many is the one.

On the surface, the one and the many are synthesized. But Buddhists still insisted that the one was the True Norm or the True Mind. If everything is a manifestation of the entire universe, it is the entirety that is important. In Taoism, too, there has always been emphasis on the Great One, or Great Unit. These emphases have resulted in the Buddhist doctrine of non-discrimination and the Taoist doctrine of the equality of things. In ethics, these doctrines have promoted such virtues as tolerance, love, unselfishness. But in metaphysics they raise the serious question as to whether a thing has any specific character, determinate nature, independence, or individuality at all.

Neo-Confucianists would have no quarrel with Buddhists and Taoists on the view that reality is one. Incidentally, it is interesting
to note that no Chinese philosopher has rejected the one in favor of the many. Pluralism has been conspicuously absent in Chinese metaphysics. Even dualism has been weak. The dualism of Chu Hsi is not complete, since the T'\'ai Chi includes both \( i \) and ch'i.

This does not mean, however, that Chinese metaphysics has tended toward monism. Here the Neo-Confucian synthesis is that both the one and the many are real. "The many and the one are each rectified," said philosopher Chou Lien-hsi (1017–1073), "and the small and the great are both determinate."\(^{17}\) As Chang Héng-ch'ü (1021–1077) put it, the pervasiveness of ch'i makes the universe an infinite harmony. At the same time, because the effect of ch'i on everything is different, no two things are alike.\(^{19}\) In fact, since ch'i operates through concentration and dissipation and through increase and decrease, and since increase in one thing means decrease in another, everything necessarily has its opposite. This does not mean, however, that a thing can stand in isolation, for all things are combined as one in the infinite harmony. Or, as other Neo-Confucianists would say, all things are combined as one by \( i \). Thus, the one and the many coexist. As has been suggested, this idea was borrowed from Hua-yen Buddhism. The important difference is that in Buddhism the harmony is achieved by the non-discrimination or even the denial of the one and the many, whereas in Neo-Confucianism the harmony is achieved by affirming both. Furthermore, in Buddhism the harmony is to be achieved in a transcendental world, whereas in Neo-Confucianism the harmony is to be achieved here and now.

**MAN AND THE UNIVERSE**

From the foregoing, the position of man as an individual in relation to the universe is clear. While every man, as an individual, has his place, he can also be identified with the universe. This idea of the unity of man and the universe runs through virtually the entire history of Chinese philosophy. In Taoism, identification with Nature has always been held as an ideal. Both Taoist and Confucian philosophers of the Han period (202 B.C.–220 A.D.) saw man and the universe in a macrocosm-microcosm relationship. In both *The Works of Mencius* and *The Doctrine of the Mean*, the theory is propounded that, since the nature of man and that of the universe are the same, one who fully develops his nature will develop the nature of others, that one who develops the nature of others will develop the nature of things, and that one who develops the nature of things will develop the nature of the whole universe.\(^{19}\) This is the basis of the Neo-Confucian theory. To this central point of the common nature of man and the universe
they added that, since the mind is the full embodiment of li, a fully developed mind will embrace all li, which amounts to saying that it will embrace the whole universe. Also, one who is jên²⁰ (good, true manhood, love) "will form one body with Heaven and Earth."

GOOD AND EVIL

It follows that, since man is one with the universe, and, since the universe is good, man by nature must be good. This has been an unflinching conviction among the Chinese ever since Mencius. But opinions have not been unanimous on this question. Before the Han dynasty, theories fell into five groups: (1) that human nature is good; (2) that human nature is evil; (3) that human nature is both good and evil; (4) that human nature is neither good nor evil; and (5) that some people are born good and others evil.

This problem has been the most important one in Chinese metaphysics. It was the earliest metaphysical question to be debated and it has been most extensively discussed. It has engaged the attention of practically every Chinese philosopher worthy of the name. Taoists discussed it because they were keenly interested in nourishing, preserving, and restoring the original nature of man. Confucianists discussed it because it formed the logical basis for their entire social and ethical philosophy. In Buddhism it even created a crisis, which eventually led to a radical transformation of Buddhism from Hinayâna to Mahâyâna.

In the first part of the Parinirvâna Sûtra, there is the idea that a class of people called icchantikas were so depraved as to be beyond the hope of salvation. Such a concept was repulsive to the monk Tao-shang (d. 434). Evidently influenced by the traditional doctrine that human nature was originally good, he argued that, since Buddha-nature is all-pervasive, even the most depraved has Buddha-nature in him and therefore can be saved. He was first excommunicated by conservative Buddhists, but later reinstated when the entire Parinirvâna Sûtra, which confirmed his theory, was introduced from India. The result was the gospel of universal salvation, which turned Buddhism into Mahâyâna, or the great vehicle for the salvation of all.

As has been indicated, the main argument for the original goodness of human nature is that man is part of the universe, which is morally good. If so, how is evil, at least moral evil, to be explained? Opinions differ as to its emergence. Buddhism ascribes it to ignorance. Taoism ascribes it to desire. Among Neo-Confucianists like Chu Hsi, there was a strong tendency to hold desire responsible. Chu Hsi even contrasted li as the source of good and ch'i as the source of evil,
although he by no means implied that ch'i is by nature evil. In him the climax of the controversy over the contrast between the li of Heaven and the desire of man was reached. This question had been debated for centuries and continued for a long time after Chu Hsi. As time went on, more and more Neo-Confucianists held that desires are good simply because they are a part of nature. In the end, whatever the theory of the origin of evil, evil means deviation from the golden mean. This is not just moderation or compromise. It means the harmony of li and ch'i, or the harmony of reason and desire. The fall of man is due to selfish desires, external influence, lack of education, lack of self-control, failure to develop one's moral capacity, wrong judgment, etc. Thus evil is unnatural, incidental, and temporary, due primarily to one's own defects. Salvation obviously lies in fully developing one's originally good nature. In so doing, one "fulfills" and "establishes" one's own fate. This being the case, one must work out his own salvation. Since his nature is originally good, this is not only possible but imperative. Furthermore, since everyone shares to the fullest extent the goodness of the universe, everyone can become a sage.

**KNOWLEDGE AND CONDUCT**

Developing one’s nature requires education, and education involves both conduct and knowledge. These topics, as such, lie beyond the province of our discussion. However, we must not by-pass the important fact that knowledge and conduct were identified by most Chinese philosophers. Actually, in this respect, there has been a series of syntheses.

First of all, there is the identification of the knower and the known. Influenced by the Buddhist distinction between the "higher truth" and the "lower truth," and by the Taoist distinction between "great knowledge" and "small knowledge," Neo-Confucianists distinguished between "knowledge through information" and "knowledge through one's moral nature." The difference between Buddhism and Taoism on the one hand and Neo-Confucianism on the other is that, whereas in Buddhism and Taoism the "lower truth" and "small knowledge" are considered untrustworthy, in Neo-Confucianism "knowledge through information" is acceptable. It is, however, "knowledge through moral nature" that leads to the true understanding of li and to the fulfillment of one's nature. The emphasis throughout the last eight hundred years has been on this type of knowledge. Philosophers refused to direct the effort of knowledge to a transcendental Absolute or to a self which dissolves itself into nothingness, as in Taoism and Buddhism, respectively.
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The only worth-while knowledge is that of \( li \). Now, the \( li \) of a thing is the same as the \( li \) of the universe. Therefore, to know a thing, the mind must first of all be its true self, that is, realize its own \( li \), and then extend it to the \( li \) of things. This "extension" is possible because \( li \) is one. By virtue of this common nature of the knower and the known, the two can establish rapport. In other words, to know a thing truly, the knower must approach it with "sympathetic intelligence" and a feeling of unity. To make this possible, not only must the mind be clear, calm, concentrated, and unselfish, but the entire personality must be morally sound.

Similarly, knowledge requires both intellectual activity and actual practice, as is indicated by the term \( ko chi\h \). The term really defies definition. One writer listed sixty-two different interpretations, ranging from "the extending of the mind to things," through "investigating things to the limit," "finding out the form of things," etc., to "studying the causes of peace and chaos in history" and "handling human affairs." The Lu-Wang school advocated "the extension of inborn (or intuitive) knowledge" by manifesting the good nature of one's own mind. Rebelling against this doctrine, Yen Yüan and other Ch'ing philosophers demanded actual practice, declaring that the only way to learn to play a musical instrument, for instance, is to play it and not just to read the musical score. The most generally accepted interpretation of \( ko chi\h \), however, is that of the Ch'êng-Chu school, which combines the intuitive, rational, and empirical methods. Chu Hsi said:

The meaning of the expression, "The perfecting of knowledge depends on the investigation of things," is this: If we wish to carry our knowledge to the utmost, we must investigate the \( li \) of all things we come in contact with, for the intelligent mind of man is certainly formed to know, and there is not a single thing in which \( li \) does not inhere. But so long as \( li \) is not investigated, man's knowledge is incomplete. For this reason . . . [man should], in regard to all things in the world, proceed from what knowledge he has of their \( li \), and pursue his investigation of them until he reaches the limit. After exerting himself in this way for a long time, he will suddenly find himself possessed of wide and far-reaching penetration. Then, the qualities of things, whether external or internal, subtle or coarse, will all be apprehended, and the mind, in its entire substance and its relations to things, will be perfectly intelligent.\(^{21}\)

This "wide and far-reaching penetration" has often been interpreted as intuition. If so, it is different from the Buddhist variety, for here intuition is rationally arrived at, and there is no leap and no necessity for meditation. In fact, Chu Hsi condemned meditation as based upon the fallacious assumption that reality reveals itself only when thought is cut off. He even condemned introspection, for, according to him, that would mean splitting the mind in two, one to observe and one to be observed. The "extension of inborn or intuitive knowledge" in the Lu-Wang school is not self-introspection or medit-
tion, but rather the extension of one's mind to embrace the whole universe. This is the true meaning of Lu Hsiang-shan's dictum, "The universe is my mind and my mind is the universe." True, many Neo-Confucianists of the Sung and Ming dynasties practiced quiet sitting, but they adopted meditation only as an aid to mental hygiene, not as a way of knowledge.

Two important things are to be stressed in this method of discovering  brethren. First, both the deductive and the inductive methods are employed. One may study a thing intensively or study many things extensivley, one by one and day by day, or one may do both. The result will be the same. This is not to suggest that Neo-Confucianists knew the scientific method. Although most of them were learned in astronomy, phonetics, mineralogy, etc., they never dreamed of the spirit or the technique of experiment. One must remember, however, that the nature of brethren is rational, and there is no reason why the scientific method cannot be fully applied to it.

Another point to stress is that knowledge must be obtained by oneself. The extension of the mind cannot be accomplished through an agent. Incidentally, I have not found a single case where a philosopher asserted that reading the classics is the only or chief way of obtaining knowledge or that a thing is true simply because the classics say so. Knowledge is always one's own adventure. This is not to deny the heavy weight of authoritarianism in the Chinese tradition. But authority is found in other quarters, not in knowledge. Yen Yüan said that knowledge consisted in practice, and by practice he meant the Six Arts, that is, the arts of government, social intercourse, etc., as laid down in the classics. Still he insisted that one must make his own discovery of truth. This is why revelation has had no place in Chinese philosophy, including Buddhism and Taoism. This is also why dreams have been regarded by Buddhists as illusory and by Confucianists as obstructions to clear thinking, although Taoists see in them a large measure of truth.

From the foregoing, the relationship between knowledge and conduct can be appreciated. Next to the question of human nature, the question of the relationship between knowledge and conduct has been most persistent in Chinese philosophy. Philosophers have differed greatly as to whether knowledge or action comes first, and as to which is more difficult. But most of them have agreed that, in essence, knowledge and conduct form a unity. Some philosophers, like Wang Yang-ming, confined their discussions to certain types of knowledge, such as tasting, perception of color, the practice of filial piety, etc. Others included all types of knowledge. The general argument is that, unless
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coupled with action, the full value of knowledge cannot be realized, and, unless coupled with true knowledge, no action can be really intelligent or correct.

The whole matter of the understanding of \( \text{t}i \) is summed up in the Chinese phrase \( \text{t}i \text{ yen} \), which, roughly, means personally testing, or \( \text{t}i \text{ jên} \), that is, personally understanding. The word \( \text{t}i \) also means the body, thus emphasizing active personal experience. This experience involves, first of all, one's identification with the object of knowledge, secondly, moral preparation and social action, and, thirdly, both the rational and the intuitive methods. In a word, it combines metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics into one harmonious whole. Many contemporary Chinese philosophers believe that this \( \text{t}i \text{ yen} \) or \( \text{t}i \text{ jên} \) may be an important contribution China can make to the world. Even if the claim is exaggerated, there can be no mistake as to where the Chinese emphasis lies.

I have stressed the tendency in Chinese philosophy to synthesize. Not all syntheses have been successful. For example, the macrocosm-microcosm relationship is not supported by the evidence of science. The concept of the identity of knowledge and conduct needs to be more critically analyzed. The moral for us, however, is that apparently contrary concepts may not be incompatible after all. Of course, there can be no compromise between good and evil. To define clearly what is good and what is evil has occupied much attention of Chinese philosophers throughout the ages. But, significantly enough, in Chinese metaphysics even the relationship between good and evil in man has not been placed in such an impossible position as to require either the denial of evil or the grace of God for its removal.

OBSERVATIONS

As a footnote to this paper, let me make a few observations.

1. Chinese metaphysics is simple, unsystematic, and in some instances superficial. Chinese philosophers have debated metaphysical questions in conversations, letters, and commentaries on the classics, and have debated them primarily as theoretical foundations for ethics.

2. Western philosophy developed from metaphysics to social and moral philosophy, whereas Chinese philosophy developed the other way.

3. Since Chinese philosophy has been devoted chiefly to the good life, metaphysical questions discussed have been those closest to the moral life, and the conclusions have made Chinese metaphysics very earthly and practical.

4. There has been a curious absence of any deduction of categories.
5. There has also been a conspicuous absence of materialism. It is definitely wrong to label Hsün Tzŭ a materialist. All he did was to describe Heaven in naturalistic terms, but nowhere did he ever reduce the mind to matter or to a quantity. Even Wang Ch’ung (A.D. 27–ca. 100), often called a materialist in the West, did not go that far. He merely elaborated the Taoist doctrine that all things are “self-transformations,” and denied the existence of spirits. This shows that Western terms need to be applied to Chinese philosophy with great care. For example, Chu Hsi has been called both a rationalist and an empiricist. Some say he was an empiricist because he insisted on moral preparation for knowledge and on rapport with the object, and because he demanded not only self-evident premises but also a finer degree of receptivity to the realities operating in the given world. Others say he was a rationalist because he insisted that observation must be attended by thought, and that, since the nature of li is rational, the only correct method of knowing li was the rational one. What was Chu Hsi, then, a rationalist or an empiricist? The answer is a typically Chinese one: he was both.

6. The word “mysticism” has not been mentioned in this paper. One can detect a mystical element in Mencius, Chu Hsi, and Wang Yang-ming. But after the decline of Buddhism and Taoism in the eleventh century, mysticism ceased to have any appreciable place in Chinese philosophy. In this paper, less space has been given to Taoism and Buddhism than to Neo-Confucianism, partly because they have been assimilated into Neo-Confucianism and partly because Neo-Confucianism has been the Chinese philosophy for the last eight hundred years.

7. If the history of Chinese philosophy proves anything, it shows that materialism and extreme forms of mysticism, or indeed any extreme philosophy, will not find China fertile soil. In the last two decades there has been a revival of Buddhist idealism and Buddhist mysticism. But very significantly they soon reached their climax and rapidly declined. No one should be so dogmatic as to say that Buddhism and Taoism will remain dormant in the next eight hundred years as they have in the last eight centuries. Besides, Buddhism has tremendous possibilities. But the fact remains that the most influential philosophers today are those who are trying to reconstruct Neo-Confucianism in the light of Western philosophy or combine it with Western objectivism.

8. Any future Chinese metaphysics will have to be fortified by science and logic. Fortunately there is nothing in the nature of Chinese metaphysics to prevent the introduction of these two.
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9. The synthesis that is going on today and will likely continue for years to come will be easier than the task of the early Neo-Confucianists, for in the eleventh century the three systems that were finally synthesized had incompatible features, whereas today the currents that meet reinforce each other.

10. Finally, most contemporary Chinese philosophers I have talked to feel that, while in ethics China will probably have something to offer the world, in metaphysics she is on the receiving end. Personally, I feel that when different streams come together, all of them, no matter how large or small, will affect the river. Ideas travel in strange ways. If Buddhism influenced Schopenhauer, as indeed it did, and if Chu Hsi impressed Leibniz, as certainly he did, who can foretell with certainty that Mencius or Tai Tung-yüan will not influence a future Spinoza who may be in our midst?

NOTES

1The text is not directly translatable. It might be a reference to a specific text or idea, possibly related to Buddhist thought.


6The Book of Changes, Appendix I, Sec. 4.

7The Great Learning (Ta Hsūch), Ch. 2. See The Four Books, p. 316; also Hughes, op.cit., p. 150.

8J. P. Bruce, Chu Hsi and His Masters (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1923), Ch. XII.

9Tao ê Tê Ching, Ch. 5.

10T'ung Shu, Bk. XXII.

11Chêng Mêng, Bk. II.

12The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. 22: The Works of Mencius, Bk. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. 1.

13The Great Learning, Ch. 5.

14Lu Hsiang-shan Ch'üan Chi [Complete Works of Lu Hsiang-shan] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1919-22), Bk. XXXIII.

CHAPTER IX

Some Aspects of Reality as Taught by Theravāda (Hinayāna) Buddhism

GUNAPALA PIYASENA MALALASEKERA

In regard to the question "What is ultimate reality?" the different schools of philosophy or systems of thought seem to fall into two main divisions. Some of them say that the ultimate reality is one; they believe in a permanent unity behind all the variety and change of the world. They are the monists, theists, animists, eternalists, traditionalists, ideists, dogmatists, ontologists, realists, idealists, and energists. All these schools, though distinct among themselves and even opposed to each other on many points, nevertheless have this in common: They accept an ultimate reality as an entity in the metaphysical sense, whether that entity be called substance, or soul, or God, or force, or categorical necessity, or whatever other name may yet be invented. They may be said to follow a subjective method, molding reality on concepts; hence theirs is mostly a method of conjecture. The other schools say, some of them not very explicitly but still implicitly in their doctrines, that the ultimate reality is plural. They follow an objective method, molding their conceptions on observations. They generally deny a unity behind or within nature's plurality. These are the dualists, pluralists, atheists, nominalists, relativists, rationalists, positivists, phenomenologists, annihilationists, occasionalists, transformists, progressivists, materialists, and so on. Here again, all these schools, though differing among themselves on many points, have this in common: They reject a metaphysical entity.

Now, what is the place of Buddhism among these different "isms"? The answer is that it does not belong to either group. The ultimate reality of the phenomena in the universe—the chief phenomenon around which all others center being the "I," the self—is, according to Buddhism, neither plural, nor one, but none. In religion and philoso-
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Phy, as well as in metaphysics, the words "real" and "reality" express more than one aspect of things: the actual as opposed to the fictitious; the essential as opposed to the accidental; the absolute or unconditional as opposed to the relative or conditioned; the objectively valid as opposed to the ideal or the imagined; that which ultimately and irreducibly is as opposed to that which by means of various names signifies the mind's stock of knowledge. It must be admitted that in the suttas, or discourses, attributed to the Buddha we do not find any terms exactly corresponding to "real" and "reality," but all the above antitheses do occur and find expression in a variety of ways. The Buddha's teachings are more deeply and directly concerned with truth and the pragmatic importance of things, more with what might be called "spiritual health," than with theories. There are certain facts regarding spiritual health, however, about which it is necessary to have right views in order that action may be taken accordingly. These are the actualities; other things are of very much less value. The true is, therefore, the actual, that which is; it is expressed by the Pali word sacca (Sanskrit, satya), which means "the fact" or "the existent."

It must always be borne in mind that Buddhism is primarily a way of life and, therefore, that it is with the human personality that it is almost wholly concerned. Various metaphors are used to describe the essential nature of the personality; they are meant not so much to indicate the ontological unreality of objects and sense impressions (like the māyā, or illusion, which we come across in the Vedānta) as to express a repudiation of permanence, a sense of happy security, a superphenomenal substance or soul underlying them. They are also meant as a deprecation of any genuine, satisfying value in spiritual life to be found either in "the pride of life" or in the lust of the world.

At the time of the Buddha there were in India views similar both to those of the Parmenidean school of Greater Greece—that the universe is a plenum of fixed, permanent existents—and to that other extreme held by Gorgias and the Sophists, that nothing is. In all things the Buddha’s teachings represent what he terms the Middle Way (majjhima paṭipadā), and here, too, he formulated the doctrine of the golden mean, the theory of conditioned or causal becoming, the most succinct statement of which is to be found in the Saṁyutta Nikāya. "Everything is: this, O Kaccayana, is one extreme; everything is not: this, O Kaccayana, is the second extreme." The Tathāgata [that being the term which the Buddha used when speaking of himself], not accepting these two extremes, preaches his doctrine of the Middle Way.

The followers of the first extreme were known to the Buddha as
eternalists (*sassa*ṭavādīno). Some of them stuck to the old sacrificial religion, which promised blissful existence in heaven after death. Others favored a monistic view of the universe and believed in the attainment of a supreme bliss which consisted in the dissolution of personality in an impersonal, all-embracing Absolute. There were others who held the idea of an eternal, individual soul, which, after many existences, would return to its genuine condition of free spirit as a result of accumulated merit. These various views are described in the Brahmajāla Sutta of the *Dīgha Nikāya*. It is interesting to note from these descriptions that the various schools of idealism, which later appeared in the West, had their counterpart in the India of the Buddha, e.g., subjective idealism, which holds that it is the "I" alone which exists, all the rest being a modification of my mind; or the objective idealism which holds that all, including the "I," are mere manifestations of the Absolute; or, again, the absolute idealism of Hegel which informs us that only the relation between the subject and object is real.

All these varieties of idealism the Buddha held to be "painful, ignoble, and leading to no good, because of their being intent upon self-mortification." Idealism, according to the Buddha, has but one reality, that of thought, and strives for but one end, the liberation of the thinking self. Addiction to self-mortification is merely the practical side of the speculations of idealism, in which the "self" is sublimated, with the natural consequence that the "self" must be liberated from matter; the "soul" must be freed from the bonds of the body. The passions of the body must be subdued even by force; body becomes the eternal enemy of the spirit, to be overcome by prayer and fasting and other austerities.

The followers of the second extreme, who denied any survival of the individual after death or any retribution for moral and immoral deeds, the Buddha called annihilationists (*ucchedavādīno*). The annihilationists, too, or, as they came to be called later, the materialists, had many varieties of belief in ancient India. Some, like the Epicureans, denied any external agency as the cause of matter and maintained that the highest good was pleasure. Others, very much in the manner of Hobbes or Comte or John Stuart Mill, held that only the sensuous could be an object of knowledge. But all of them saw only one origin, matter, and strove only for one end, material well-being. Increase of comfort, said the Buddha, only leads to desire for still more, and the desire for more leads and will always lead to conflict and conquest. He, therefore, condemned materialism as "despicable, vulgar, ordinary, base, and leading to no good."
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In the Buddha’s view, both idealism and materialism, though theoretically opposed, converge both in their starting-point and in their goal, for “self is their beginning and satisfaction their end.” Between these two extremes, therefore, of materialistic self-indulgence and idealistic self-denial, not as a compromise, but “avoiding both,” the Buddha formulated the Middle Way, “the way of knowledge and wisdom,” not in the wavering of speculation, or in the excitement of discussion, but “in tranquillity of mind and penetrative insight, leading to enlightenment and deliverance, enlightenment with regard to the real nature of things and deliverance from suffering and its cause.”

In following the middle course the Buddha borrowed from the eternalists their doctrine of the gradual accumulation of spiritual merit in a series of existences, but rejected their doctrine of an eternal spiritual principle. He saw contradiction in assuming an eternal, pure, spiritual principle which for incomprehensible reasons became polluted with the filth of mundane existence only to revert later to original purity. With the annihilationists he denied every permanent principle. The Buddha’s originality consisted in denying substantiality altogether and converting the world process into a progression of discrete, evanescent elements. His position was not an easy one, because he had also to find a theoretical basis to establish morality. He was faced with the contradiction of a moral law without a personality on whom the law was binding, salvation with nobody to reach the goal. How he solved the problem will appear in the sequel.

The shortest statement of the Buddha’s doctrine is contained in a formula which has come to be regarded as the Buddhist credo: “Whatever things proceed from a cause, the Tathāgata [i.e., the Buddha] has declared the cause thereof; he has explained their cessation also. This is the doctrine of the Great Recluse.” It declares, in other words, that the Buddha has discovered the elements of existence, their causal connection, and a method to suppress forever their active efficiency and secure their quiescence.

The Buddha claimed that his was a practical teaching; its object was to show a way of escape from the ever-revolving round of birth-and-death, which constitutes samsāra and which is considered a condition of degradation and suffering (dukkha). This way of escape was meant primarily for human beings. True to this central conception, therefore, as stated above, the Buddha started with a minute analysis—using “analysis” in its strictest sense of “dissolution”—of the human being into the elements of which his being is composed. Analysis has always played a very important part in Buddhist teaching; in fact, one of its names is the doctrine of analysis (vibhajjavāda).
In this analysis, the human being was found to consist of two parts, nāma and rūpa, loosely translated as mind and matter, rūpa representing the physical elements and nāma the mental ones. Matter is composed of the four elementary qualities of extension, cohesion, caloricity (lejo), and vibration. The relative qualities of hardness and softness and the occupation of space are due to the elementary quality of extension (paṭhasī). It is the element of cohesion (āpo) which makes the many parts adhere intrinsically and to one another, and this prevents an aimless scattering about or disintegration, thus giving rise to the idea of a “body.” Caloricity depends on vibration (vāyo), for by increased vibration the temperature rises and when the temperature is lowered the speed of vibration is reduced; thus do gases liquefy and solids solidify.

The mental elements are similarly divided into four groups: feelings or “receptions” (vedanā), ideas or “perceptions” (saññā), variously translated as “mental activities” or “complexes” (sañkhāra), and cognition or “conception” (viññāya). Rūpa (matter) and these four divisions of nāma (mind) are called khandhā (aggregates or groups). The whole, in brief, is an analysis of the “I” or “personality” (sakkāya). The apparently unitary “I” is broken up into a number of layers, somewhat as in a burning flame a number of layers of color can be distinguished. But the layers of color in a flame are not parts laid out after the fashion of pieces in a mosaic, alongside one another; so also is it with the five khandhā or groups. They are a continuous, unbroken process of action, of which it is expressly said that they are a “burning.” In all of them an arising and a passing away are to be cognized; they are not parts of a whole but forms of action, a process of mental-corporeal “nutrition” or “sustenance,” in which the corporeal as well as the mental forms of grasping (upādāna) fall together into one conceptual unity. They are the different modes in which the “I” enters into relation with the external world, lays hold of it, “seizes” it. The relationship is not an immediate relation with the external world in which a metaphysical “I” is endowed a priori with the power of cognizing, nor is it the mediate relation of a purely physical process in which the “I” only builds itself up a posteriori on the basis of continued experiences.

The external world with which the human being comes into relationship is also analyzed into its component elements. This relationship is one of cognition, and in discussing how this cognition is established mention is made of cognitive faculties (indriya) and their objects (visaya). There are thus six cognitive faculties or senses—the senses of vision, audition, smell, taste, touch, and the faculty of intellect or
consciousness. Corresponding to these as objects of cognition are, respectively, color and shape, sound, odor, savors, tangibles, and nonsensuous objects. These twelve factors, the cognitive faculties and their objects, are called āyatanañī, or bases of cognition. The term āyatana means place, sphere, entrance, or point of support, and is used to cover both organ of sense (internal or ajjhattāni āyatanañī) and sense object (external or bāhirāni āyatanañī), the meeting of which constitutes cognition (viññāya). This cognition, which results from the meeting, can be divided into six classes, according to the cognitive faculty concerned and the sense object, such as eye-cognition (cakkhu-viññāya), and so on. In the case of the sixth cognitive faculty (manas), consciousness itself, i.e., its preceding moment, acts as a faculty for apprehending non-sensuous objects. The three constituents that comprise a cognition—sense faculty, sense object, and resultant consciousness—are classified under the name dhātu (element). We thus get eighteen dhātu—the six sense faculties, their six sense objects, and the six varieties of resultant consciousness. This consciousness is the experience of the unity between concept and object; it is not something that is, but something that becomes. It is not an object of knowing, but knowing itself, an ever-repeated new becoming, new upspringing, out of its antecedent conditions. As such it resembles what the physicist calls living-force, vital energy. It is formed, enfleshed, in nāma-rūpa, (mind-form, i.e., mind and body). Mind-form is the antecedent condition of consciousness, on the basis of which the next new upspringing of consciousness will assume new individual value. Consciousness is actuality as action, which means something that is not, but which, in order to be present, first must ever spring up anew. Between mind-form and consciousness exists the same ceaseless, quivering, leaping play which exists among the ever-repeated, new moments of combustion of a flame and its external shape. Without sufficient cause (aśñatra paccayā) no consciousness can arise. Just as for consciousness to be present, it must ever and again spring up anew, similarly the antecedent conditions upon the basis of which it springs up must also be present. It is from the friction of the living contact of senses with things that consciousness is born. It is thus a process of nutrition, of grasping, which embraces itself in its grasping, a process of growth, in which one moment is neither the same as the next, nor yet another, but in which every moment becomes another, passes into that other, just as one moment of a flame is neither the same as the next, nor yet another, but becomes the next.

The human personality and the external world with which it enters into relationship are thus divided into khandha, āyatana, and dhātu.
The generic name for all three of them is dhamma (plural dhammā), which is translated as "element of existence." In Buddhism these dhammā are the only ultimate reality. Broadly speaking, the dhammā are divided into two classes, saṅkhata (conditioned, i.e., subject to various conditions) and asaṅkhata (unconditioned). Ākāsa (generally, but unsatisfactorily, translated as space) and Nībbāna (Sanskrit: Nirvāṇa) are asaṅkhata dhammā; all other dhammā are saṅkhata (conditioned). The saṅkhata (conditioned dhammā) have four salient characteristics: they are non-substantial (anatta), evanescent (anicca), in a beginningless state of commotion (dukkha), and have quiescence only in a final cessation (niruddha).

It must always be recalled that the basic idea of this analysis is a moral one. Buddhism is defined as a religion which teaches defilement and its purification (saṅkilesa and vodāna). Purification or salvation lies in Nībbāna or nīrodha, which is cessation from samsāra. Thus, when the elements of being are analyzed, they are divided into purifying and defiling elements, good and bad (sāsava and anāsava), propitious to salvation and averse to it (kusala and akusala). Purifying, good, and propitious factors are those elements, those moral factors, that lead to Nībbāna; their opposites lead to or encourage samsāra.

This analysis was part of the Buddha’s attempt to find answers to the great, primary questions which lie at the bottom of every religious system, which form the seed of religious development, upon the answer to which depends the nature of any religious philosophy—such questions as: Whence am I? Whither do I go? What happens to me after death? How do I know myself? How does this world enter into me, into my consciousness? To the Buddha’s way of thinking, all these questions have one great fallacy, that of begging the question, petītio principīi. His view was that there should be another question prior to all these inquiries, upon which depends the very possibility of further questioning, namely, Is there anything at all which deserves the designation “I”? Here was a problem which the Buddha felt could not be solved by argument or mere logic (atakkāvacara), for in logic one has to presuppose the reality of the thinking subject as standing outside the process of thinking, as a witness or, rather, as a judge. The concept cannot sit in judgment where it itself is the judge. Only one kind of logic, he said, could help here: the logic of events, because it is beyond sophistry; actuality can be understood not by argument but by analysis (yonisomanasikkāra).²²

As a result of such analysis, the Buddha discovered that the individual, conventionally called “I” or the “self,” is a mass of physical and psychical elements without any permanent entity behind them to
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keep them together, without any "soul" inhering in them, the elements themselves being a mere flux (santāna), a continuity of changes. In postulating a mythical, unchanging entity as the possessor of changing qualities, one merely assumes, he said, the existence of that which has to be proved. The conviction that men hold that, though thought and actions change, the thinker and the doer remain the same was a delusion, for it is exactly by thought that we change our minds, by actions that we change our lives. Actions cannot exist apart from the doer, cannot exist freely as such. If the action changes, the so-called actor must change at the same instant. Thus, the "I" must be identified with action. It is only the "I" which can walk and sit and think and eat and sleep. But that "I" is not a permanent, unchanging entity; it is identified with the action and is the action itself, and thus changes with the action. "I" cannot stay at home while "I" go out for a walk. It is the conventional language (sammatti) which has spoiled the purity of conception (paramaitha—ultimate sense, the supreme-thing-meant), though, in some cases, language does remain pure enough, as when we say, "It rains." Who rains? What rains? Simply, it rains, meaning, there is rain. Likewise, the concept should not be: "I think," but "There is thinking." This is the teaching which came to be known as the doctrine of anattā.

In this doctrine, the Buddha went counter to the three main systems of philosophy that were current in India in his day: the teaching of the Upaniṣads, of the Jainas, and of the Sāṅkhya. Briefly stated, the Upaniṣadic teaching is a kind of monism, where a real being, Brahma, is assumed to be something eternal, without beginning, change, or end, and man's soul (ātman) is assumed to be an integral part of that Being. Ātman and Brahman being one. The Jainas had a highly developed theory of moral defilement and purification and a theory of spiritual existence extending even to plants and inanimate, non-organic things, which are also supposed to possess souls. The Sāṅkhya taught the existence of a plurality of souls, on the one hand, and of a unique, eternal, pervasive, substantial matter, on the other. Buddhism is opposed to all three systems. Forsaking the monism of the Upaniṣads, it declares that there is no real unity at all in the world. Everything is discrete, separate, split up into an infinity of minute, impermanent elements, without any abiding stuff. It agrees with Jainism in opposing the monism of the Upaniṣads and in maintaining that being is joined to production, continuation, and destruction, but disagrees with the Jaina doctrine which ascribes a physical nature to kamma. To the dualism of Sāṅkhya the Buddha opposes the most radical pluralism, converting the world process into an appearance of evanescent ele-
ments, and calls the eternal pervasive matter, which is imagined as their support or substratum, a mere fiction.

The term *anattā* (Sanskrit, *anātman*) is usually translated as "no-soul," but, strictly speaking, *attā* is here synonymous only with a *permanent*, enduring, entity, ego, self, conscious agent, etc. It is the permanence that is denied in *anattā*. The underlying idea is that, whatever may be designated by these names, it is not a *real*, *ultimate* fact; it is a mere name for a multitude of interconnected facts which Buddhist philosophy attempts to analyze by reducing them to real elements (*dhammā*). Buddhism does not deny the existence of a personality or a "soul" in the empirical sense. What it does deny is that such a "soul" is an ultimate reality, a *dhamma*. The Buddhist teaching of *anattā* does not proclaim the absence of an individuality or self; it says only that there is no permanent individuality, no unchanging self. Personality or individuality is, according to Buddhism, not an entity but a process of arising and passing away, a process of nutrition, of combustion, of grasping. A man's personality is conceded as being something real, a *fact* (*sacca*) to him at any given moment, though the word "personality" is only a popular label and does not correspond to any fixed entity in man. In the ultimate constituents of conditioned things, physical and mental, Buddhism has never held that the real is necessarily the permanent. Unaware of this anticipation, modern philosophers like Bertrand Russell are asking modern philosophy to concede no less.

The Buddhist term for an individual, a term which is intended to suggest the Buddhist view as opposed to other theories, is *santāna* (stream), viz., the stream of interconnected facts. It includes the mental elements as well as the physical, the elements (*dhammā*) of one's own body and external objects, as far as they constitute the experience of a given personality. The representatives of the eighteen classes of *dhātu* mentioned earlier combine to produce the interconnected stream. Every combination of these elements represents a nominal, not an ultimate, reality. The number of psychical elements at any given moment is variable. It may be very considerable, because undeveloped, dormant faculties are also reckoned as actually present. Some *dhammā* are constant, present at every moment, others only under certain conditions. Elements which combine at any moment vary both in number and in intensity. In any individual, at a given moment, a certain element may predominate. All mind at every moment is an assemblage of mental faculties (*saṅkhārā*) or elements. Two elements, which are constantly present, are most precious: *samādhi* (power of concentration) and *paññā* (insight). If they become predominant they change the
character of the individual and his moral value. The predominant element in ordinary men is ignorance (avijjā), which is the reverse of paññā and not merely its absence. It is a separate element, present at the same time with dormant paññā. But it is not constant, and can be cast out of the mental stream.

There is a special force of kamma, sometimes called prāpti, that holds these elements in combination. It operates only within the limits of a single stream and not beyond. The stream of elements kept together is not limited to the present life but has its source in past existences and its continuation in future ones. This is the Buddhist counterpart of the soul or self in other systems.

From the denial of substance follows the denial of every difference between the categories of substance and quality. There is no “inherence” of qualities in substance; in this respect all real elements (dhammā) are equally independent. As separate entities they then become “substances” sui generis. All sense data are also substances in the sense that there is no stuff they belong to. We cannot say that matter has extension, cohesion, temperature, and vibration, but that matter is extension, etc., and that without these qualities there is nothing called matter. Matter is thus reduced to mere qualities and forces which are in a constant state of flux, in which there is no entity to support the qualities or to be the possessor of attributes or, as substance, to stand under them all, to uphold them all, and to unite all the phenomena associated with it. Independent of attributes, there is no substance, no substratum, not even the idea, because the idea is dependent on certain conditions. When science bends more and more to the view that all matter is merely a form of energy, a grouping and re-grouping of forces, as advocated by scientific materialism, or as some would prefer to call it, energism, it is only admitting in different words the unsubstantiality of matter, which the Buddha declared more than two thousand years ago.

The same principle applies to the mental sphere. Mind is not an entity but a function; consciousness is thought, and it arises when certain conditions are present. Thought does not arise as the action of a “thinking subject,” but is conditioned by, originates from, is dependent on, other states. As such, it will again be the condition, the origin, the raison d’être, of further states. When it ceases to be it passes on its momentum, thus giving the impulse to new arising. Yet the individuality of consciousness is not a mere physical process either. It is a process of grasping and will last only as long as grasping lasts. Just as a fire can only burn as long as it lays hold of new fuel, so the process of individuality is a constant arising, an ever-renewed laying hold of
the objects of its craving. It is craving that causes the friction between sense objects and sense organs, and from that friction leaps forth the flame of new kamma which, because of avičča (ignorance), will not be extinguished, but in grasping lays hold of fresh material, thus keeping alive the process of burning.

Thus the universe, with all that is in it, represents an infinite number of discrete, evanescent elements, in a state of ceaseless activity or commotion. They are only momentary flashes of efficient energy, without anything perdurable or stable, not in a condition of static being, but in a state of perpetual becoming. Not only are entities such as God, soul, and matter denied reality, but even the simple stability of empirical objects is regarded as something constituted by our imagination. The empirical thing becomes a thing constructed by a process of synthesis on the basis of sensations. Reality does not consist of extended, perdurable bodies, but of point-instants (khaṇa) picked up in momentary sensations and constituting a string of events. Our intellect, then, by a process of synthesis, so to speak, puts them together and produces an integral image, which has nothing but an imagined mental computation.

A single moment of existence is thus something unique, unrepresentable and unutterable. In itself, set loose from all imagination, it is qualityless, timeless, and spaceless (indivisible), timeless not in the sense of an eternal being, spaceless not in the sense of being ubiquitous, motionless not in the sense of an all-embracing whole, but all these in the sense, respectively, of having no duration, no extension, and no movement. It is a mathematical instant, the moment of an action’s efficiency. A representation and a name always correspond to a synthetic unity, embracing a variety of time, place, and quality, but this unity is a constructed unity, constituted by an operation of the mind, a chain of moments cognized as a construction on the basis of some sensation. Actions take place in time and space, space as the expression of the pure simultaneousness of things and time as the pure successiveness of the processes, but there is no space or time apart from their being correlates of the concept.13

There are thus two kinds of reality: the one, ultimate or pure reality (paramattha-sacca), consisting of bare point-instants (khaṇa), without definite position in time or space and with no sensible qualities; and the other, empirical reality (sāmmutti-sacca), consisting of objectivized images, endowed by us with a position in time and space and with all the variety of sensible and abstract qualities.

How, then, is the illusion of a stable, material world and of perdurable personalities living in it produced? It is in order to explain
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dis this that the Buddha put forward the doctrine of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda). Just as the Four Noble Truths—of Suffering, its Cause, it Cessation, and the Way thereto—form the heart of the Buddha’s teaching, so does the doctrine of paṭicca-samuppāda constitute its backbone. According to this doctrine, although the separate elements (dhammā) are not connected with each other either by a pervading stuff in space or by duration in time, there is, nevertheless, a connection among them. It is this: Their manifestations are subject to definite laws, the laws of causation (hetu-paccaya). The flow of evanescent elements is not a haphazard process (adhicca-samuppanna). Every element, though appearing only for a single moment, is a "dependently-originating-element," i.e., it depends for its origin on some other preceding element or elements. Thus, existence becomes dependent existence (paṭicca-samuppāda), and this is expressed by the formula, "If there is this, there comes to be that" (asmiṁ sati, idam bhavati). Every momentary entity springs into existence or flashes up in coordination with other moments. Strictly speaking, there is no causality at all, but only functional interdependence, no question of one thing’s producing another, since one momentary entity, disappearing as it does at once, cannot produce any other entity. The relation is one of "consecution," in which there is no destruction of one thing and no creation of another, no influx of one substance into another, but only a constant, uninterrupted, infinitely graduated change.

Thus, the formula, "If there is this, there comes to be that," came to be supplemented by another formula, "Not from itself, not from something else, nor from a combination of both, nor by chance, does an entity spring up." It is coordinated, not actually produced. There is neither causa materialis (continuing substance) nor causa efficiens. This view of causality, that the law of causality is rather the law of coordination between point-instants (khaṇḍa), is not strange to modern science and philosophy. The world of Buddhism is like the world of the mathematician; the world dies and is born afresh at every instant; it is evidently the world that Descartes was thinking of when he spoke of "continuous creation."

The fact that the Buddha declared the khandha (nāma and rūpa, i.e., mind and matter) to be completely free from any unchanging, undying essence does not mean that Buddhism taught annihilation of body and mind at death. For, besides the doctrines of transience (anicca) and soullessness (anatta), there is also the doctrine of kamma, or the transmitted force of the act, bodily and mental. A living being is a khandha-complex, ever changing, but ever determined by its antecedent character, and that is ruled by kamma. The long-drawn-
out line of life is but a fluctuating curve of evolving experience. Man, even in this life, is never the same, yet ever the result of his pre-existing self. Action, which is another word for kamma, will be present as long as there is existence, because existence is not something static but a process. A process must proceed and this is done by activity, the activity of the senses. Just as a flame cannot exist without consuming, its very nature being combustion, so also the senses cannot exist without activity. But this is not the same as the psychological determinism of Leibniz and Herbart, for kamma is not fatalism. "If anyone says," declares the Buddha, "that a man must necessarily reap according to all his deeds, in that case no religious striving is possible, nor is there an opportunity to end sorrow."

How is the doctrine of rebirth to be reconciled with that of anattā? The question, "What is reborn?", is based on ignorance of the selfless process of kamma. Kamma is not an entity that goes from life to life, like a visitor going from house to house. It is life itself, in so far as life is the product (vipāka) of kamma. In each step we take now in full-grown age lie also the feeble attempts of our babyhood. The present actuality, which expresses itself as the result of all the preceding processes, carries in its very action all the efforts which went into the making of the previous actions. When a seed becomes a sprout this is done by the last moment in the seed, not by those moments when it lay placidly in the granary. Yet, it is also true, in a sense, that all the preceding moments of the seed are the indirect causes of the sprout. Every moment in the phenomenal world has its own totality of causes and conditions owing to which it exists. What we regard as a break in the continuity is nothing but the appearance of an outstanding or dissimilar moment. Death is but one such moment.

When a man dies, the component elements of his new life are present from its very inception, though in an undeveloped condition. The first moment of the (apparently) new life is called conventionally viññāya, "conception." Its antecedents are kamma, which in the formula of the doctrine of dependent origination (paticca-samuppāda) are designated saṅkhāra (pre-natal forces). These saṅkhāra, which through conception (viññāya) find continuity in the new life, contain latent in them the anusayā, which is the name for the resultant of all the impressions made on the particular flux (santāna) of elements in the whole course of its faring (samsāra). It is these latent factors that the psychoanalyst, for instance, finds as so much refuse and slag in a man's mind when he penetrates into it. They are his heritage of action (kammadāyāda), brought down through countless lives and not inherited by him, as is sometimes stated, as the heritage solely from the
past of his race. Life is kinetic; rebirth in Buddhism is nothing but a continuity of impulse, kamma-santati.

It is sometimes said that the doctrine of anattā takes away moral responsibility and that with it goes overboard the whole fabric of social morality. But it will be seen from what has already been stated that there is no contradiction at all between the denial of an unchanging entity and the fact that former deeds engender a capacity for having a consequence. In fact, the doctrine of anattā enhances the idea of responsibility, for there is here no Savior or Redeemer to intercept the unfailing consequence of one’s actions. Likewise, the statement that the doctrine of anattā is inconsistent with free will is also due to a misconception. If nothing arises without a cause, if everything is of “dependent origination,” can there be free will? That is the question. There is a tradition that the doctrine of dependent origination (paticca-samuppāda) itself was established by the Buddha in defense of free will and against a theory of wholesale determinism. The Buddha singled out for special animadversion the doctrine of his contemporary, Makkhali Gosāla, who maintained that all things are unalterably fixed and that nothing can be changed. The Buddha called this the “most pernicious” of doctrines.16 On the other hand, the Buddha declared himself to be an upholder of “free action” (kryāvādā). The law according to which a moral or immoral deed must have its fruition is the law of kamma, but in order to have a consequence the action must be produced by an effort of the will. The Buddha declared, “Will alone is kamma” (cetanāhāṃ bhikkhave kammom vaddami).17 It must also be remembered that free will really means “strong will,” for the possibility of choosing shows the presence of two or more opposites. If there were no attraction or motive, equilibrium would have been established already and no choice would be necessary. When inducement or coercion is not absent, it is a contradiction to speak of free will. Will is thus only a milder term for craving, and craving exists only in dependence upon feeling. Our real freedom lies, therefore, not in the will but in being without will.

How is the cessation of this round of birth-and-death, which is transient, sorrow-fraught, and “soulless,” brought about? By following the path laid down by the Buddha. There are two factors that help a man to get started on the path: the one is right reflection (yonisomanasikāra) and the other is friendship with the good (kal-yānamittatā). The Buddha is man’s best friend; that is why the appearance of a Buddha in the world is an event of such significance. The cessation of suffering is called virodha or Nibbāna. Nibbāna has so often been discussed that there is no need to say much here.

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Only when the grossly wrong views regarding personality are disposed of is the path entered upon which leads to final deliverance. Nibbāna consists of two stages. When, by treading the Noble Eightfold Path, the process of the arising of craving has come to a stop, the grasping of the "aggregates" (khandhā), which form the individual, will cease also. When the lust for life has ceased, no further rebirth will take place, and the highest state, that of a saint (arhant) is attained. But, when the lust for life has ceased, life itself will not disappear simultaneously. Just as the heat in an oven, produced by fire, will remain for some time even after the fire is extinct, so the result of the craving which produced rebirth may remain a while even though the fire of the passions be extinct. In this state of sainthood or arhant-ship which is called Nibbāna with residue (saupadīsesa-nibbāna), neither act nor thought can be regarded as moral or immoral. The arhant's apperception is ineffective. His actions are not influenced by craving and do not, therefore, produce kamma. They are free from tendencies, from likes and dislikes. Where no new kamma is produced no results follow. But, when the result of previous kamma is exhausted and the arhant's life comes to an end, this state is called Nibbāna without residue (anupadīsesa-nibbāna).

In this final emancipation, all suffering (dukkha) ceases. Nibbāna is where lust, ill-will, and delusion are not. In Buddhism life is a process which has its sufficient cause neither in something metaphysical, like God, nor in something physical, e.g., parents. It is a process which is destined to come to an end and awaits the moment of coming to an end. Ignorance (avijjā), i.e., ignorance about life itself, is the beginningless starting-point from which life ever and again springs forth, as from some hidden source that never dries up as long as it remains undiscovered. Life is begotten of ignorance; what keeps it going is grasping or clinging, which is prompted by craving (tanhā). In life, grasping is the only activity, and there is only one actual object of this grasping, that which is conventionally called personality. Personality is the object in dependence upon which grasping exists, and, at the same time, is that which exists in dependence upon grasping. It is grasping that gives life its nutrition (ākāra). Through this nutrition, through the power of maintaining itself, life proves itself to be life. But to say this is not to say that grasping is the cause of life; that would be like saying that the cause of a flame is the fuel there present. Fuel creates no flame; it only maintains the flame. To understand this, to realize this, to live it out—that, in the deepest sense, is Buddhism.

Ignorance is destroyed by knowledge, by insight. The first step is insight into the real nature of conditioned things (samma-saṇāña),

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as having the three characteristics of impermanence, suffering, and
soullessness. He who perceives suffering only, but not the transiency
thereof, has only sorrow, but, when the unreality of life is understood,
the unreality of suffering will also be perceived. From this under-
standing will ensue insight into the nature of all things as processes
(udayabbaya-nāṇa), the knowledge that there is nothing but a process
of becoming. The next step is insight that becoming is ceasing (bhāṅga-
nāṇa). Becoming and ceasing will be seen as two aspects of one process.
This is followed by knowledge of the dangers that have to be feared
(bhaya-nāṇa) and the understanding of the perils inherent in clinging
(ādīnava-nāṇa), together with the reasons for being disgusted with
such an empty show (nibbidā-nāṇa). Thereupon arise the desire to be
set free and the knowledge thereof (muñcītukamyaḷa-nāṇa) which will
grow into recontemplation (patisaṅkhāra-nāṇa), that is, contemplation
of the characteristics of transiency, sorrow, and soullessness, but with
increased insight as seen from a higher plane. This will be followed by
even-mindedness regarding the activities of life, which is due not to
lack of interest but lack of self-interest. The climax of discernment is
reached with the insight of adaptation (anuloma-nāṇa), which is the
gateway to emancipation (vimokkha-mukha), where the mind is quali-
fied for final deliverance.

The basis of all this is renunciation. Renunciation cannot be
learned; it must grow, like the dawn. When it is night we can admire
the millions of stars, but all their beauty and the glory of the moon,
too, fade with the first rays of the sun. Renunciation begins when one
learns to distinguish between the value a thing has because one wants
it and the value it has apart from one's desire. The value of a thing is
regulated by one's desire for it; if one wants to know its real value
one must give up one's desire for it, but then it will be seen at once
that it has lost all value. To be carefree—that is the secret of happiness
—but not to be careless. This freedom from care is the result of for-
getting the self, the result of self-renunciation. When pleasures vanish
of their own accord, they end in keen anguish of the mind; when
relinquished by one's own will, they produce infinite happiness, pro-
ceeding from tranquillity. Just as darkness can be experienced only
when all light is extinguished, so, also, Nibbāna can be realized only
when all attachment has been destroyed.

The realization of this truth is attained by the threefold practice
of sīla, samādhi, and pañña. Sīla is discipline of both body and mind,
whereby the defilements that cloud wisdom are removed. But mere
morality is not enough; it must be accompanied by mental develop-
ment. All morality which strives to perpetuate the self is a subtle kind
of selfishness. The more subtle and sublimated it is, the more rationalized and idealized, the more dangerous. Samādhi is the stilling of thought, the perfect equilibrium of mind, which is attained by the jhāna (Sanskrit, dhyāna), the so-called "trances," perhaps better translated as "musings." They constitute the first taste of the happiness of Nibbāna. It is the joy of having found a possibility of escape from the round of birth, suffering, and death. The increase of this joy becomes sheer delight, which then gives place to a serene tranquillity, and then to a sense of security and equilibrium, the bliss of well-being (sukha), which is the very opposite of insecurity and unbalanced striving. In that state of tranquillity, not disturbed by likes and dislikes, not made turbid by passions, not hazed by ignorance, like sunlight that penetrates a placid lake of clear water, there arises the supreme insight (paññā) that "All birth and death have ceased; the noble life has been lived; what had to be done has been accomplished, and beyond this there is no more." This is the supreme moment of illumination when the saint (arhant) sees the whole universe with the vividness of a living reality. It is described as a double moment, a moment of feeling as well as a moment of knowledge. In sixteen consecutive thought-instants, the arhant has seen through the whole universe and has seen it in the four stages of its evolution toward quiescence. This supreme moment of illumination is the central point of the teaching regarding the path to salvation.

Such is Nibbāna, where the insight of non-self has taken the place of delusion and ignorance; where being will be seen as a mere process of becoming, and becoming as ceasing; where the spell that has kept us in bondage will be broken; where the dream-state will vanish into reality, and reality will be realized. This reality is not the eternalization of a self but the escape therefrom, not the deliverance or the salvation of the self but the deliverance and salvation from the self, from the misconceived "I." And with this, the last word has been said. Where craving has ceased, the process of becoming, which is grasping, has ceased also. Where there is no more becoming, there is no more birth, with all its concomitants of sorrow, decay, and death.

Is Nibbāna annihilation? Yes and no. Yes, because it is the annihilation of the lust for life, of the passions, of craving and grasping, and all the things that result therefrom. But, on the other hand, where there is nothing to be annihilated, there can be no annihilation. That which constantly arises and in arising is nothing but a process of change and in changing also constantly ceases—that cannot be said to be destroyed; it merely does not arise again. Nibbāna is thus best described as deliverance, surpassing all understanding, above all emotion,
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beyond all striving, the non-created, the non-conditioned, the non-destructible, which all may attain through insight and realization. It is the culmination of the Buddha’s teaching: “Just as, O monks, the ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt, so the doctrine and the discipline have but one taste, the taste of deliverance.”

“Hard is the infinite to see; truth is not easy to see; craving is pierced by him who knows; for him who sees, naught remains.”

NOTES

1E.g., “To regard the body as something of worth would be like taking frescoes to be real persons.” Or, again, “As one would view a bubble, as one would view a mirage, so should the world be looked at.” (Dhammapada, 170.) “The world is like a dream.” (Sān̄yutta Nikāya, III, 141.)


5Ibid.

6Ibid.

7For a very good exposition of this and what follows, see Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923).

8“Sāṅkhārā” is a very difficult term to translate, since it means various things in various contexts. Etymologically, it means “what is put together as a composite thing.” See T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, Pali-English Dictionary (Chipping, England: Pali Text Society), s.v.

9“The Form, O monks, is a burning” (rūpaṁ bhikkhave ādītam)—and so on with the other khandhā. Sān̄yutta Nikāya, Khandha Sān̄yutta, 61. See F. L. Woodward, Kindred Sayings (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), Vol. V.

10For an excellent exposition of this point, see Paul Dahlke, Buddhism (London: The Macmillan Company, 1927), pp. 129 ff.

11See the Majjhima Nikāya (Further Dialogues of the Buddha) (London: Oxford University Press, 1926 — ), Mahā Sāṅkhya Sutta, 38.

12For an explanation of this very significant word, see Pali-English Dictionary, s.v.

13The Buddhist conception of time and space is given in Sān̄yutta Nikāya. See Woodward, Kindred Sayings, Vol. I.

14See Majjhima Nikāya, Mulaparipiyaya Sutta, 1.


16Ibid., I, 33.

17Aṅguttara Nikāya, III, 415.

18Ibid., IV, 201.

CHAPTER X

Buddhism of the One Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna)

SHINSHO HANAYAMA

Śākyamuni Buddha’s teaching was centered on our daily life. Therefore, his thought was focused upon the welfare of human beings. He did not attempt to interpret or explain a cosmos or natural world that was devoid of mankind, for he was chiefly interested in mankind. Since he looked at our daily life with man at the center, it was natural that he should begin by looking at himself. This meant reflecting within himself and gaining insight into his being, which led him to examine his environment. The conclusion he reached was that all things are impermanent.

This insight into the nature of all things as impermanent—which produces emancipation from their tyrannical hold—is called Nirvāṇa, which literally means “quietude.” Buddha’s death was interpreted as his entering into Parinirvāṇa, or perfect quietude. This was interpreted by his disciples as emancipation from pain, as entering into the absolute realm of spiritual freedom, and as laying the foundation for positive activities. This is the highest truth, which means becoming one with the Dharma, generally translated as “Law” or “Principle.” This is the realm of non-duality and identity, where absolute reason and discriminating intellect become one.

THE IDEA OF NON-BEING

The beginning of Mahāyāna thought is found in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra. The principal idea expounded in this class of Buddhist literature is that of non-being. This means that all things we perceive in our experiences have no self-nature (svabhāva), no substance. It means also that the truth exists in the realm transcending our thought. The truth is beyond speech and thought, and, therefore, it is śūnyatā, “nothingness.” In other words, all worldly phenomena are illusory.
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In śūnyatā there is no one who sees, no object that is seen. The subject and the object become one; they are in a state of self-identity. No discrimination is possible between them; knowledge is no-knowledge. This is called undifferentiating knowledge (nirvikalpa-jñāna).

This śūnyatā knowledge affirms on the one hand and denies on the other; it does both at the same time. Since absolute nothingness includes and unifies all oppositions and discriminations, it is also absolute existence. When we gain insight into the nature of śūnyatā and thus become free from dualistic attachments, all thoughts we cherish acquire a new aspect; they become true as they are. This is what is meant by the phrase "truly nonexistent, mysteriously existent."

THEORY OF THE "MIDDLE PATH"
The San-lun or Mādhyamika

Nāgārjuna’s theory is founded upon the idea of śūnyatā, and, to make it more clearly understandable, he called it the "middle path."

By this he wished to purify the mind of one-sidedness, to show it the proper way of thinking, to lead it to the middle path, whereby the distinction of subject and object is abolished and the mind realizes the truth of non-duality. Śūnyatā thus comes to mean the clarification of the mind in order to restore its original purity.

The mind in our daily life is active as consciousness engaged in differentiating things. While this consciousness is what we ordinarily call mind, Buddhists conceive as active at its base another mind, which we may designate reason-mind, or reality-mind, in distinction from the consciousness-mind. The reason-mind is the true mind, and the ordinary mind as consciousness is an illusion. Our temporal mind is stained owing to its defiled affections.

The reason-mind is the mind which is absolutely pure, one, true, and non-illusory. All the universe is included in this one-mind. The pure mind is not to be mistaken for our relatively conditioned individual minds. It is the One in which all things are contained. It is what makes our thinking possible, and therefore it transcends thought.

While transcending thought, this absolute mind is the principle of discrimination, and is present in every form of discrimination. It discriminates, and yet it does not discriminate; it thinks and yet it is above thinking. It expresses itself in words, but words fail to describe its nature as reality-mind.

This reality-mind is also called bhūtatathatā (suchness or thusness of things), Nirvāṇa, Dharma-dhatu (the domain of the Dharma), the Dharma-kāya (Dharma-body), Tathāgata (the one who is thus come).
SHINSHO HANAYAMA

But, since our ordinary minds think of this mind as absolutely pure in its nature, it must be said that this pure mind subjects itself to limitations and assumes a form of relativity. We thus have this world of distinctions coming out of purity. Impurities are our stained minds filled with all sorts of defiled affections. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, defilements as such are nonexistent and are regarded as not belonging to the mind. The mind being absolutely pure, there is no room in it for the principle of impurity. Impurities in our ordinary minds are of our own making, resulting from our ignorance. When ignorance is cleared away, the true nature of the original mind is restored.

While absolutely pure in nature the mind allows itself to become impure as well as pure. Hence, this triple world is said to be of one-mind only. The triple world is: (1) the world of living beings; (2) the world of form; and (3) the world of no form.

That all the phenomena in the universe are of one-mind is taught in the Kegon sūtras. What is true and real is this one-mind only, and things that are imagined to rise from it are mere phenomena and hence illusions. But we are apt to regard all illusory phenomena as permanently fixed realities; this is the work of our ordinary minds. When the real existence of these illusory phenomena is denied, the one-mind reveals itself. This doctrine of one-mind only is Buddhist idealism.10

THE TENDAI SCHOOL11—PHENOMENOLOGY
(The T‘ien-t‘ai or Saddharma-pūndarīka)

The basic teaching of the Tendai school is “sarvadharmaṇāṃ dharmatā,” which means that all things are in reality the same as they are in appearance, that all phenomena are such as they are. According to the Saddharma-pūndarīka-sūtra, which is the text of the Tendai school, “It is Buddhas only who can realize the true state of all dharmas as they are.” This state of “suchness” or “thusness” is expressed in the following formula:

(1) All objects are of such form;
(2) All objects are of such nature;
(3) All objects are of such substance;
(4) All objects are of such power;
(5) All objects are of such activities;
(6) All objects come from such causes;
(7) All objects have such conditions;
(8) All objects come to such effects;
(9) All objects acquire such reward;
(10) All objects begin, end, and are completed in such ways.
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These ten modes of suchness or thusness, in which all objects are conceived to manifest themselves, belong to the realm of relativity. "Thusness" itself remains unaffected by all these changing modes, and is beyond words. To explain the formula:

(1) Form is the form assumed by an object;
(2) Nature is that which underlies the form;
(3) Substance is the body sustaining the form;
(4) Power is a power not yet in manifestation;
(5) Activities are the power brought out in full evidence;
(6) Cause is the efficient cause;
(7) Conditions are that which helps the cause to work out in actuality;
(8) Effect is that which is produced by the combination of causes and conditions;
(9) Reward means an effect not directly issuing from them;
(10) Completion means the ultimate conclusion of all these events enumerated in succession; beginning refers to form (1) and ending to reward (9).

The first nine modes of "thusness" belong to what is known as relative knowledge (saṁvypti-satya), while the last one is true knowledge (paramārtha-satya). The idea is to show thereby how all objects in the phenomenal world are of absolute reason even as they are in their various modes of actuality. Absolute reason is not something transcending objects; it is in them, with them; it is they such as they are.

According to the Buddhist view, the world of living beings is divided into ten realms. Reading upward from the lowest inhabitants, these are: (1) occupants of hell, (2) departed spirits, (3) beasts, (4) fighting demons, (5) human beings, (6) heavenly beings, (7) śrāvakas, or Hinayāna disciples of Śākyamuni Buddha, (8) pratyekabuddhas, or Hinayāna saints, (9) bodhisattvas, or Mahāyāna saints, and (10) Buddhas, perfectly enlightened ones. These ten realms do not exist separately; each contains all the others. Man has in his nature something potentially beastly as well as potential Buddhahood or Buddha-nature. It is because of this potentiality that all beings are able to become Buddhas and thereby be saved. As each of the ten realms contains in it all the other realms, there are one hundred realms. As each of these realms has the ten modes of thusness, one hundred times ten makes one thousand modes of thusness. Further, each of the one thousand modes of thusness contains a threefold world: (1) the world of living beings, i.e., beings endowed with mind and body, (2) the
world of spatial extension, and (3) the five skandhas, or aggregates: form, perception, conception, volition, and consciousness. When the one thousand modes of thusness are multiplied by the threefold world, this makes three thousand worlds. And these three thousand worlds are contained in one thought. All the three thousand worlds are thus said to be immanent in one thought. When a single thought-wave is stirred up in the ocean of consciousness all the three thousand worlds must be regarded as coming into existence. The All is the One and the One is the All. The ultimate reality is not a separate entity transcending the world of pluralities.

THE KEGON SCHOOL—TOTALISM
(The Hua-yen or Avatamsaka)

The principal teaching of the Kegon school is "the self-origination of the Dharmadhātu." The Dharmadhātu is the world conceived spiritually, and all forms of activities manifested here have their reason within themselves and are not controlled by an outside agent.

The Kegon doctrine distinguishes between ri (li) and ji (shih); ri is absolute reason, and ji is this world of plurality. Ri is not to be conceived, however, as an independent something residing in the multitudinous objects and moving them; it is they, and they are it.

All our experiences are experiences of an actual world of pluralities (ji), and reason (ri) is a logical postulate. Reason is not one of the pluralities we experience, but by this conception the mutual interpenetration or mutual fusion of the individual objects becomes intelligible.

The Kegon school thus teaches that the One is the Many and the Many is the One. One particle of dust is said to contain in it the entire cosmos. This doctrine of perfect interfusion is apt to be conceived in terms of space only, but the Kegon theory applies it also to time.

From this it derives the formula known as "The Origination of the Ten Mysteries," and another known as "The Interfusion of the Six Forms."

Briefly, the philosophy of the Kegon school is based upon the following key-terms:

(1) Sō-soku (hsiang-chi): Sō (hsiang) means "mutual"; soku (chi) is a difficult term to translate—"identity" is the best approximation. Sō-soku, therefore, means "mutually identical."

(2) Sō-nyā (hsiang-ju): Nyā (ju) means "to enter," and so sō-nyā means "mutually entering" or "mutual fusion."
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(3) Yen-nyū (yüan-jung): Yen (yüan) means "perfect," and
yu (jung) or nyū means "fusion" or "dissolution" or "so-
lution" or "thawing." Yen-nyū, therefore, means "in perfect
solution."

(4) Mu-ge (wu-ai): Mu (wu) means "not," and ge (ai) means
"obstruction" or "hindrance." Mu-ge, therefore, means "no
obstruction."

THE SHINGON SCHOOL—MYSTICISM
(The Chên-yen or Mantra)

The teaching of the Shingon school is based on the conception
of the Absolute Buddha as the Dharmakāya. It is called a mystical
or secret doctrine because it is too profound and mystical for the
common people to understand. The central point of the teaching is
"attaining Buddhahood in this body," which means one can attain
Buddhahood in one moment or in one life.

The Dharmakāya or Mahāvairocana Buddha has no beginning, no
ending; he has been enlightened since the beginningless past. There
is no time, no place where he is not already in existence. To realize
this originally enlightened Buddha in ourselves is the aim of the
Shingon teaching. The other schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism teach
that Buddhahood is attained by religious practice, while the Shingon
school emphasizes that Buddhahood is immanent in us and is not
something to be acquired or added to us from an external source.10

According to Mahāyāna Buddhism generally, the ways leading
to enlightenment are teachable but enlightenment itself is beyond
description, for enlightenment is the ultimate truth, which transcends
our thoughts and words. The Shingon school, however, claims that
enlightenment itself is expressible in words, for this relative world
of thoughts, words, and actions as such is the absolute truth itself.
No distinction is to be made between phenomena and noumenon.
Phenomenal facts are noumenal. When reality is referred to, the
emphasis is to be placed on phenomenal facts rather than on that
which is abstracted from them.10

It is generally taught in Buddhism that Buddhahood is attained
step by step and through long periods by morally disciplining one-
self, but the Shingon school teaches that one can become Buddha in
this very body and in this life here and now.

The ritualistic prescriptions,11 so rich and elaborate in the Shingon
school, are the rites symbolizing the mystical, abrupt enlightenment
attained by the Tathāgata. They richly describe the various forms of
Buddhas and *bodhisattvas*, methods of meditation, recitals and mass, *mandala* (circle), *dhāraṇī* (mystic verse), and *mudrā* (the fingers intertwining).

The *sūtras* deal with the doctrines, while the ritualistic prescriptions are for the practical guidance of the devotees. Teaching without practice is empty. In conformity with the ritualistic prescriptions, the Shingon yogin meditates on the Buddha as the principal image in his mind, recites mystical verses silently, and makes forms of intertwining with the fingers. When the three mystical actions are harmonized with the three mystical actions of the Buddha or *bodhisattva*, the enlightened nature originally inherent in the devotee is realized. This is the unification of one with the Buddha or the realization of Buddhahood in this very common body in one moment, in one thought, in one life, instead of going through immeasurable periods.

*Mahāvairocana* Buddha is the Absolute. He is all-embracing; he is omnipotent; he can become any Buddha at any moment. It does not matter what Buddha is to be made the principal Buddha. Thus the realization of Buddhahood in this very body has taken place through the three mystical actions, words, and mind in the Shingon school, though all these are not absent in the Kegon and Tendai schools.

In the Shingon doctrine, earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness are called the six fundamental “Greats,” because they prevail in all phenomena. All things are manifestations not of the ultimate reason but of these six fundamental “Greats.” Of the six fundamental “Greats,” the first five belong to “form” or body and the last one is mind. The first five belong to reason or principle and the last one is wisdom. Consequently, *Mahāvairocana* Buddha is nothing but the six fundamental “Greats.” Therefore, the Dharma-nature is the six fundamental “Greats,” which pervade all phenomena at the same time. The six fundamental “Greats” are mutually identified and harmonize in making up our one great universe.

The teaching of the mutual penetration of the tenfold world in the Tendai school and the doctrine of the non-obstruction of all things and all events in the Kegon school are taken into the teaching of the *Mahāvairocana* Buddha or *Dharmakāya*. Both the Kegon and Tendai schools have a tendency to treat the noumenon as the source of all phenomena, but the Shingon school emphasizes the sameness of phenomena and noumenon by the “realization of *Mahāvairocana* Buddha in one’s very body” and by the causation-theory based on the six fundamental “Greats.”

The concept of noumenon (*rī*) is man’s abstraction, the result of ratiocination, set up to explain the phenomena, which are actualities
facing every one of us. Noumenon, taken by itself, has no real existence apart from the phenomenal world and cannot be regarded as an independent something out of which the world takes its rise. Noumenon is that which we finally reach when we continue our intellectual search for an underlying principle of all things. It is that which comes as the ultimate, and not the first thing from which we start. We are immediately conscious only of sense objects made of the six "Greats" or elements. It is not necessary to go beyond these in order to discover their source. Things as they are, are realities.

This world of actualities is something quite definitely differentiated. It is this that is found confronting us, and we take it at its face value. Even the idea of the six "Greats" is an assumption placed at the back of sense actualities; they are the outcome of logical inference. The Shingon world is therefore the same as our sense world, i.e., where we have form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and the laws existing among the sense objects.

**THE JÔDO SCHOOL**—**PURE LAND**

(John Ching-t’u or Sukhavati)

In the various schools of Pure-Land Buddhism, Amitābha ("infinite light") and Amitāyus ("infinite life") Buddha is worshiped as the object of faith. If a man reflects upon his own evil nature he will find that it is impossible for him to become a Buddha by his own efforts. All people become Buddhas by believing in the Amita Buddha as the savior of all beings. Therefore, Pure-Land Buddhism is the way for the common people to become Buddhas, while all the other forms of Buddhism are for saints of highly gifted minds. The former is called "the easy path," where there is no need for complicated philosophical discussions, and the latter is "the difficult path." Pure-Land Buddhism is the teaching for people with limited mental abilities. Becoming deeply conscious of their sinfulness and stupidity, they humbly believe in the absolute power of the Buddha as savior and pronounce the name, "Namu-Amīta-Butsu." When this is done with the utmost sincerity of heart, they are surely led to final enlightenment. For the Amita Buddha, as the object of faith and as the possessor of infinite all-embracing compassion, will take everyone into himself. This absorption into Amita’s boundless compassion is the climax of the Jōdo teaching. The devotees are thereby freed from the grip of all egotistic impulses and pronounce in the most natural way the name of the Amita Buddha.

When we reflect upon our daily life, we discover that it depends
altogether on others. We are thus filled with the spirit of humility and
gratitude.

In Buddhism all phenomena are explained in terms of cause and
effect. All things originate from the combination of direct and in-
direct causes. In indirect causes we distinguish two factors, positive
and negative. For example, rice grows from the seed ("direct cause")
sown in the ground, is helped by water, sunshine, and fertilizer ("posi-
tive indirect causes"), and is not disturbed by birds or frost ("negative
indirect causes"). These direct and indirect causes are due in their turn
to other direct and indirect causes, and thus the process goes on ad
infiniitum. Understanding this, we realize that rice exists in infinite
relations to other things making up the whole universe. The universe
is a system of all things united and intimately related in causal chains,
indeed to such an extent that even a single particle of dust can be said
to contain the whole universe.

When rice ripens and is harvested, it becomes the staff of life, and
we are thereby sustained. Similarly, our existence depends on others;
we cannot be ourselves except for them. The whole universe conspires
to our support. We ought to feel grateful for this.

When we understand our relation to the universe, we realize that
we ought to be doing something for the welfare of our fellow beings,
non-sentient as well as sentient.

While we live on earth, therefore, it goes without saying that our
life must be one of repentance and gratitude: repentance for our sin-
fulness and gratitude for Amita's boundless compassion.

After being born in the Pure Land, we are not to stay there; we
must think of other fellow beings who are still deeply submerged in
the mire of birth-and-death. This thought naturally leads to a life
of work again on this earth.

Being born in the Pure Land should not be interpreted in its
ordinary and relative sense. "Being born" really means "not being
born"; it is a birth of no-birth.

Nor is the Pure Land to be interpreted dualistically. It is a world
which transcends opposites, free from the dualism of purity and non-
purity. It is a world of absolute purity, beyond thoughts and words.

THE ZEN SCHOOL—PURE INTUITIONISM
(The Ch'an or Dhyāna)

The Zen school is also called the Buddha-Mind school. The school
claims that the enlightenment attained by Śākyamuni is not to be
expressed in words. It is transmitted directly from one mind to another.
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It is called an abrupt attainment because it is attained immediately in this life. According to Hinayana Buddhism enlightenment requires sixty kalpas (eras) or at least three lives for a man. Mahayana Buddhism, on the whole, teaches that Buddhahood is attained by passing through fifty-two stages of hard religious practice during a period of innumerable kalpas, which means endless time. In other words, the abrupt realization of Buddhahood is impossible for ordinary beings, and yet all human beings can become Buddhas.

Enlightenment means casting off the various forms of defilement such as covetousness, anger, infatuation, arrogance, doubt, false views, etc. But our world of experience is that of good and evil in all possible combinations, and it is impossible to do away with defilement.

Personality is ever perfectible by incessant spiritual effort, but an instantaneous realization of enlightenment is impossible.

The Zen school, however, claims that abrupt enlightenment is possible by realizing the truth that "the mind is identical with the Buddha." This may be considered a further elaboration on the Shingon idea that "one becomes a Buddha with this body in this life." The mind referred to in the Zen teaching is not our everyday mind; it is what may be termed the Buddha-Mind. But these two, the Buddha-Mind and our minds, are not to be conceived as separate and mutually negating entities, for they are really identical, but this identity is to be achieved only by our own spiritual effort—and that constitutes enlightenment.

The Zen school represents the extreme form of self-effort or self-power, and even the Amita Buddha is thought to be discoverable in one's own mind.

The differentiation of self and not-self is not so clear as we might desire. As one's viewpoint expands, one's self expands. If a man lives for himself alone, his self is limited to himself. If he lives for others, his self expands and includes others as well. In the Great Self there is no difference between self and not-self. As the Great Self includes others as well as its own Self, it may be called the other self. To see the "Great Other" is tariki (t'aa-li, other-power), and to see the "Great Self" is jiriki (tsü-li, self-power). The former represents the Jodo school, and the latter the Zen school. Therefore, the culminating point of these two schools is the same.

When the self becomes identical with the not-self, enlightenment is attained, and all our actions are Buddha's actions.

The enlightenment supposed to be acquired is not something imposed upon one from an outside source; it has been present from the beginning. Before this truth was discovered, one had all kinds of
deilement, but after the discovery of the truth all these are changed to deeds of purity. Covetousness, anger, and ignorance are sublimated into the noble virtues of precept (śīla), meditation (dhyāna), and wisdom (prajñā). "Defilement is even enlightenment"; "this world is the Pure Land itself."39

CONCLUSION

In Buddhism generally, absolute reason (ri, lî) is contrasted to individuals (ji, shîh). Absolute reason is the outcome of postulation and cannot be considered as reality. We often forget this, and try to start from the absolute reason instead of beginning with individual objects. Absolute reason is what we finally reach after speculation and must not be considered as the starting point of our study of reality. Especially, absolute reason is not to be understood in terms of time, in which case it is certain to be understood as a sort of actual entity.

Our active life is not the product of speculation but is a real fact. It is something that has come out of absolute reason and, hence, is not an object standing in opposition to absolute reason. Individuals are not individualized absolute reason, as nations are not particularized mankind. Mankind is an abstraction and is therefore without content, and we cannot deduce from it the concrete facts of life which we individuals experience.

According to the Mahāyāna, which is the latest development of Buddhism, we are already Buddhas just as we are; this fact is apprehended by some Mahāyānists as a conviction40 and by others as a matter of faith.41 Those who express the immediate apprehension of this fact in the form of a conviction have a doctrine known as "original attainment and mysterious disciplining,"32 whereby they explain this world of activities. Those who teach faith in, Amita have the doctrine known as "deeds of gratitude"33 "spontaneously and naturally"44 surging from one’s inmost heart.

The object of this paper was to show that the following key terms in the Mahāyāna texts are not to be understood as meaning an entity enjoying a transcendentinal existence by itself: the Dharma, the Dharmakāya, True Suchness,46 the Matrix of Tathāgatahood,48 the Reason (ri), the Dharmadhātu, the Dharmatā,37 the Three Thousand, the six "Greats," Mahāvairocana, Amitābha Buddha, etc.

NOTES

1The three traditional and characteristic tenets of Buddhism are: (1) All things are impermanent (sārva-saṁskāra-anityatā: 諸行無常), (2) All things are selfless (sārva-dharma-anātma: 諸法無我), (3) Nirvāṇa is Bliss (Peace) (Nirvāṇa sukhām: 涅槃寂靜). Sometimes a fourth is added: All is suffering (sārva-duṣkham: 一切苦)
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In speaking about Nirvāṇa, two phases are usually to be observed: (1) the u-ye-e-ne-han (有餘依涅槃) [sopākhīśa-Nirvāṇa] [incomplete Nirvāṇa] and (2) the mu-ye-e-ne-han (無餘依涅槃) [nirupākhīśa-Nirvāṇa] [no-remainder Nirvāṇa, the Nirvāṇa state in which no remainder of the kamma of suffering exists]. Even though all the roots of illusion and, thus, the cause of transmigration through many lives, are extirpated, so long as one has physical existence in the present life, which is but the fruit of the one preceding, the Nirvāṇa of such a one is called the u-ye-e-ne-han, because, as long as one is subjected to a life of flesh and blood, it is but natural that one should suffer physical pains, even though one's soul is enlightened. When the corporeal existence is nullified, however, and no more such pain is experienced, a person is perfectly emancipated. Such complete Nirvāṇa is meant here.

Nirvāṇa is primarily a term to signify emancipation from pains arising from the life of the present after having totally nullified one's corporeal existence. But this would also mean, on the other hand, one's arrival at a wisdom of the bodhi (enlightenment) itself, and an emancipation from the pains of the present life will at once lead to the experience of true knowledge, which will engender positive action to save others.

Gautama, a man, had become a Buddha by awakening to the Dharma, the law governing the universe. When the Dharma reigns over a man, he is called a Buddha. In Buddhist terminology this is called the mutual identity of man and Dharma.

In Buddhist terminology this is called a mutual and identical fusion of the objective and the subjective worlds.

The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, which speaks about lünyatā (nothingness), represents the thought of the early part of the Mahāyāna school, laying thereby the foundation for all later Mahāyāna thought.

Nāgarjuna (A.D. 150–250), who was born in South India, may well be called the progenitor of Mahāyāna thought. In India he was the founder of the Mādhyamika school; in China such schools as the San-lun Tsung (San-ron-shū), the Shih-lun Tsung (Shi-ron-shū), and the T’ien-t’ai Tsung (Ten-dai-shū) drew their tenets from such works by him as: Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā, Dhādaśanikāya-sūtra, and the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra.

The original aim of the lünyatā theory is to extirpate the illusory conception which a man is likely to fall prey to, and, therefore, it does not intend to speak of reality as "nothingness" or "nonsense." When all illusory conceptions are removed, only then can all phenomena be understood as they are. Both the negative and the positive are the guiding milestones in the path of truth. When it is accepted that both the "truly nonexistent" and the "mysteriously existent" are one, we arrive at a plane of thought where both are true. This aspect is further synthesized and is called the middle way. (mādhyamā pratīpada).

The term "triple world" means the universe.

All the phenomena of the universe are of the eternal present that incessantly changes and differentiates in the course of time, and all are controlled by mind. That is to say, only what is conceived in the realm of mind alone can be regarded as having existence. This doctrine, therefore, is called "idealism." All Mahāyāna Buddhism upholds idealism in one form or another.

The Tendai is one of the Buddhist schools founded in China. It was organized and brought to perfection by T’ien-t’ai Ta-shih, i.e., Chih-i (智顗) (A.D. 538–597). The school bases its tenets upon the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra and the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā by Nāgarjuna. The Hok-ke-gen-gi (法華文義), the Hok-ke-mon-gu (法華文句), and the Ma-ka-shi-kun (摩訶止觀) are regarded as the three great representative works.

This means that everything in the world exists in a fraction of our own thought. Of course, there is no need of particularly restricting the application to a fraction of thought, since the purpose is to say that in all souls, in a particle of substance, or in one thought, all others co-exist. But, as a personal experience of one journeying up
toward enlightenment, it is both natural and reasonable that one should start from
a fraction of one's own thought. Therefore, effort is purposely made to take up one
thought, and say "one thought, three thousands." Philosophically there is no need of
particularly restricting it to a thought, but from the standpoint of religious practice
stress needs to be placed on a fraction of thought. The case is a practical one in which
the relation of all versus one is to be realized in one's own mind, particularly in a
fraction of thought.

The Kegon is another Buddhist school that represents Chinese Buddhism. It
is a "One-Vehicle religion" (Ekayōna Buddhism), organized and perfected by Hsien-
shou Ta-shih (Gen-ju Dai-shi), i.e., Fa-tsang (法藏) (A.D. 643-712). The Tendai
and the Kegon are the two great representatives of Chinese Buddhist philosophy.
Kegon bases its tenets upon the Astānīska-sūtra. The representative works of the school
are the Ke-gon-tan-gen-ki (華嚴玄記) and the Ke-gon-go-kyō-shō (華嚴五教章).

In Japanese, hok-kai-en-ge (法界縁起): hok or hō, dharma or law, principle;
ka, world; en, conditions (abbr. of in-men (因縁), cause and conditions); gi or ki,
rise—abbr. of shō-ki (生起), being born or arises.

The Kegon school speaks about the shi-hok-kai (四法界), a way of explaining
this discriminatory world from the four angles of: (1) the discriminatory practical
world; (2) the world of ultimate reality that rests upon the basis of equality; (3) the
one-and-not-two relation of the phenomenal and the noumenal; and (4) the world
in which each phenomenon is freely related to and is identical with all other phenomen-
a. The end at which the Kegon school aims is to heighten one's perspective up
to the perspective of the fourth, the true, aspect.

Jō-gen-en-ge (十界縁起): jō, ten; gen, profound; en, conditions; gi or ki,
arise. This is the theory in which the phases of the above-mentioned ji-ji-mu-gen-
hok-kai (事事無縁法界) are approached from ten angles. Only when one be-
comes enlightened concerning this truth does he enter the profound depths of the
Kegon philosophy. Hence the term "gen-mon" (profound gate) or, abbreviated,
merely "gen." As each of these ten elements mutually works as a condition causing
thereby the birth of the other nine, we say "en-ge" (縁起). The ten Mysteries are:
(1) when all things exist side by side, in the same category of time, in their full
being, each fully exerting influence upon others and reflecting to each other; (2) when
one and all do mutually fuse into each other, though each does not lose its own
individuality; (3) when one and all are freely and mutually identical with each other
and when one is all and one is all; (4) when one and all are mutually identical and
interfuse, multifariously phenomenalizing and yet showing no end, like inter-
reflection among all the jewel stones of the Indra-net; (5) when one includes all and
all include one, yet all the phases of one and all show balance and stability; (6) when
one and all, perceptibly or imperceptibly, originate each other, yet showing no prece-
dential order of fore and aft; (7) when one and all mutually fuse into each other,
comprising all in one; (8) when things that exist separated through time mutually
fuse into each other. We say "ten worlds," as there are the past, the present, and the
future, each of these possessing again the three worlds of the past, the present, and
the future, which, combined, constitute the nine worlds, and as the nine worlds
mutually fuse into each other and exist in a fraction of thought, the separate nine
and the whole make up the number ten; (9) when all things are conceived of, after
all, as but the manifestation of a fraction of thought; and (10) when one realizes
and manifests that each fact accords with the Dharma.

Roku-tō-en-nya (六相聞論): roku, six; tō, form; en, perfect; nya or nya, har-
monization. This is a term in which an exposition is sought toward showing that six
forms are seen in everything, thus showing mutual harmony: (1) each phenomenon
possesses in itself all the virtues of the other, as, for example, a house contains rafters,
tiles, etc.; (2) as an existence is an aggregate of all things, as, for example, a house is
made up of rafters, tiles, etc.; (3) as all the conditions conjoin, making up one entity
of existence and not breaking down each other, as, for example, rafters, tiles, etc.,

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conjoin together, materializing a house; (4) as all things are different in their own constitution, as rafters, tiles, etc., differ from each other; (5) as a thing comes into being by the joint actions of conditions, as, for example, a house comes into being by the joint working of the rafters, tiles, etc.; (6) as all conditions are different in nature, each having its own immovable stand to hold, as, for example, the rafters, the tiles, etc., have their own manifestations of existence, being in themselves the house itself, of which they are parts.

For further details see J. Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1947, 1949).

Historically speaking, the Shingon is an esoteric religion that came into being in India, passing therefrom to China and Japan. But the school is one that represents Japanese Buddhism, the theological system having been perfected by Kū-kai (空海), also called Kō-bō Dai-shi (a.d. 774–835), who was sent to China by the then Japanese government to study Buddhism. The sect bases its tenets upon the Dai-nichi-kyō (Mahāvairocanābhisambodhi-sūtra) and the Kon-gō-cho-kyō (Vajraśekhara-sūtra). These sūtras of esoteric nature came into being in India around a.d. 600–800, having been brought over to China by Subhakarasinha (Zen-mu-i, a.d. 637–735), Vajrabodhi (Kon-gō-chi, a.d. 671–741), Amoghavajra (Fu-kū, a.d. 705–774), and others.

As this school originally stressed the self-consciousness of the enlightening quality that one possesses, it reached the conclusion that the moment one is conscious that he is none other than the Buddha himself one may be said to have attained Buddhahood.

As in the Kegon school the emphasis is shifted from the theory of ri-ji-mu-ge (no obstruction between absolute reason and individual objects) to that of ji-ji-mu-ge (no obstruction among individual objects), so, in the Shingon school, which follows the Kegon, matters pertaining to the world of particulars (ji) are much more highly valued than those pertaining to the rational or universal (ri) aspect of things.

The Shingon school differs from others of Mahāyāna Buddhism in that it puts much more stress upon ritualistic prescriptions than upon sūtras. These are sacred books in which the actual ways and means of becoming the Buddha are set down in words, corporeal forms, finger intertwinnings, and thoughts.

This means that the body, words, and mind of the Buddha or the bodhisattva fuse with those of persons practicing the Shingon system. The Buddha and our own self fuse and become one and the same, when the three mysteries of Buddha’s body, speech, and thought are added to us and held by us.

The Jōdo school is one of the representatives of Japanese Buddhism. It was founded by Gen-kū (源空) (Hō-nen, a.d. 1133–1212), who based his teaching on the three sūtras and one lāttra, i.e., Dai-mu-ryō-ju-kyō (The Larger Sukhāvatīyavāca-sūtra), Kwan-mu-ryō-ju-kyō (Amitāyurdhyāya-sūtra), A-mi-ō-kyō (The Smaller Sukhāvatīyavāca-sūtra), and Jō-do-ron (Aparimitāyusvātra-lāttra) by Vasubandhu. His main work is the Sen-chaku-kon-guan-ten-butsu-shū (普照本願念仏集), which was followed by his disciples. Shin-ran (新鶴) (a.d. 1173–1262), one of his disciples, organized the doctrine. Thereafter, the houses of Ben-a (辨阿) (a.d. 1162–1238) and Shō-kū (護空) (a.d. 1177–1247), the other disciples of Gen-kū, came to be called the Jōdo-shū, against which the school of Shin-ran was called the Jōdo-shin-shū or merely Shin-shū. The teachings of these two schools serve as guides for men to birth in the Pure Land in the West, they having been saved by the Amita Buddha. Whereas in the former the pronouncing of the name of the Amita Buddha, i.e., "Na-mu-ami-ka-butsu," is regarded as the condition of salvation, in the latter it is simply regarded as the spontaneous flowing out of the inner feeling of happiness after acceptance of the faith, repetition of the name of the Amita Buddha not being regarded as conditional in any way.

Traditionally, the proper course for the Mahāyāna bodhisattvas is to practice for the long period of the three great asamkhyaus (innumerable eras) and to develop into a Buddha. This is the “difficult path.” It was the Amita Buddha who took the
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vows and became a Buddha to save all those who cannot become enlightened by
their own power. It is extremely easy and simple to become the Buddha by straight-
way believing in the vow of the Amita Buddha (which will have all people of all
times and lands saved) and thus to be saved by faith alone. Nāgārjuna distinguished
the "easy path" from the "difficult path" of the bodhisattvas for those who cannot
stand the hardship of the difficult path.

Generally we are aware that man’s power is limited, but it is not always so easy
to reflect deeply into one's own self and feel that one is ignorant and fully clad in
evils and to repent. But so long as one does not think deeply into one’s own self of
ignorance and evil, one cannot easily feel in oneself the salvation of the Amita
Buddha. This being the case, although the path may seem easy (to be guided by
the others' power), it is not easy for everyone to follow the path purely and truthfully;
believing may seem simple, but it is not easy. That is why Shin-ran says, "Nothing
is more difficult than to have fully the faith of belief."

We find in the Dai-mu-ryō-ji-kyō (The Larger Sukhāvatīyūkha-sūtra) that the
Amita Buddha takes vows to the effect that when he attains perfect enlightenment
in the future he will save all people of all times and all lands.

According to the faith of the Jōdo school death is a return from the temporal
world to an eternal and true life. It is not death, therefore, but birth. Accordingly,
this is called "going and being born." But going and being born in the Pure Land is
not our final goal; but, as it is not possible to save others in this world of limited life,
the goal is to save others after being born in the Pure Land, becoming thereby the
Buddha and reappearing in all worlds freely and unmolested, to perfect one's task
to save others. And, as both going and coming back are conceived of as resulting
from the other power of the Amita Buddha, we call this "e-kō." The term "e-kō" in
the accepted terminology of Mahāyāna Buddhism means turning one's good and all
toward others. But in the Jōdo school, especially in the Shin school of Shin-ran, the
term implies "being given by the great power of the Amita Buddha." Therefore, it
must be understood why it is said "by the absolute other power." Everything is ac-
cepted as arising from the grace of the Amita Buddha.

The Zen (Ch’an) school is a practical school of Buddhism. It was brought to
China by Bodhidharma (A.D. 516-?), whence it was brought to Japan by Ei-sai
(永証) (A.D. 1141-1215), Dō-gen (道元) (A.D. 1200-1253), and others, flourishing
in Japan as the Rinzai-shū and the Sōtō-shū. It is a school of Mahāyāna Buddhism
which penetrates deeply into one's inner self and reveals the immanent nature of
Buddhahood, which we possess in our own self, instead of expounding the precepts of
the sūtras or depending upon outside and material practices and rituals. The Zen
is one of the foremost advocates of ji-rikō Buddhism, i.e., "Buddhism of self-effort or
power," standing quite opposite to the Jōdo school, which is ta-rikō Buddhism,
"Buddhism of other effort or power."

That is, an ideal land of tranquillity and wisdom.

This is ji-rikō Buddhism. This is ta-rikō Buddhism.

When one is conscious that one has already attained to Buddhahood his sub-
sequent action will be, as a natural course of events, like that of the Buddha. This
is to say that everything could not but become positive and active.

This is to say that from the moment one has attained the conviction that one
is already saved by the Buddha, the natural course of events will lead to a life in
which our actions will be turned into gratefulness, to answer to the great grace of the
Amita Buddha and that our everyday life should consist of happy gratefulness, with
the result that our life will become lively and positive, in every phase of social actions.

It is a life of gratefulness, naturally being saved by the Amita Buddha.

A term serving to speak of a state transcending the categories of time and space.

A term which does not conceive the Tathāgata as transcending, but as immanent
in one's defiled self.

This means the original nature of the Dharma.
CHAPTER XI

Metaphysical Theories
in Indian Philosophy

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For the present discussion, we shall take a metaphysical theory to be a theory of reality, being, or existence. The question, What is real? cannot be separated from the question, How is it known to be real? If a person says that X is real, we naturally ask, "How do you know that it is real?" The problem of reality cannot be detached from the problem of knowledge.

Thus reality is what is known to be real and is an object of knowledge. But if reality remains an "other" to knowledge, the problem of truth becomes insoluble. None of the theories of correspondence, coherence, and utility is self-sufficient to solve the problem for us. Nor do they together constitute a criterion adequate to prove beyond theoretical doubt that a cognition is true or an object real. So, if self-sufficiency or self-validation is needed somewhere, if we are to get it in some cognition, then why not acknowledge it in every cognition? That is, the truth of every judgment must be self-revealing, and reality or existence must be self-revealing. But what would be the nature of a reality that is self-revealing? It cannot be anything but Self. Hence the Upaniṣadic utterances: "All this is the Ātman," and "All this is from the Ātman." The Brahma-sūtras say that the ultimate reality is known and realized within us as the Self, and this work is treated as an authority by all Vedāntic schools, monistic and pluralistic. The Vedānta is regarded as the essence of Indian philosophy, and of the Vedāntic schools the Advaita of Śaṅkara, for which truth is self-revealing and so of the nature of Self, is regarded as belonging to the orthodox tradition.

Let me say at the outset that what the Upaniṣads mean by the word Ātman (Self) is not the finite mind but something deeper and higher. Yet it should not be imagined that it is a mere transcendental entity, disconnected from us and existing elsewhere. It is our own
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Self existing everywhere, dividing itself into subject and object, matter and form, and "I" and "Thou."

Further, it should be noted that not all schools accept the view that Self is the only reality. And even those that deny reality to everything other than the Self accord the former a lower reality that is ultimately to be sublated or transformed into the highest, which is the Self. Then, do all schools follow the Upaniṣadic tradition? Even the Buddhist and Jaina schools, averse as they are to accepting the Vedas and the Upaniṣads as the final authority, belong to the spiritual tradition started by the Upaniṣads.

II

Philosophical Beginnings

The early Aryans of India were nature worshipers. They were children of nature and did not think very much of ultimate problems. Yet we find in the Rg Veda a hymn giving painful expression to the deep doubt whether the world comes from being (sat) or non-being (asat). But, on the whole, the Rg Vedic Aryans cared more for the pleasures of this life than for salvation. Natural forces themselves were at first their gods, but later the conception of a deity dwelling in each force took shape. These gods were conceived of as controlling the destinies of mankind and as amenable to prayer, gifts, and sacrifice. Still later, the spiritual element, the idea that the ultimate reality is within us and not without, that the fullest satisfaction of life can be had by realizing it and not by appealing to external deities, entered their philosophy of life and finally dominated it. The idea took definite shape by the time of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, that is, the ninth century B.C., according to many scholars. Further, the idea developed into that of the Self as being everything, as being prior to everything, as being identical with the Brahmā, and as being that upon the knowing of which everything else becomes known.

One would rather be tempted to ask how we are to reconcile the view that the Ātman or the Brahmā is the prior, final, and only ultimate reality with the dualism of the Saṅkhya and the Yoga and the pluralism of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, all of which claim to be Upaniṣadic. To answer this question, let me bring to your notice the references made in the life stories of Buddha and Mahāvīra, who belonged to about the sixth century B.C., to ascetics like Maskarin Gosāla and Saṅjaya, and to others who were independent seekers of ultimate truth, not caring to follow the way prescribed by the orthodox tradition. These ascetics are an indication of the existence of

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independent thinkers and seekers after the ultimate truth and after a way that would lead man to the realization of the highest aim of life. Many such thinkers came to the conclusion that the highest truth lay deep within man. Evidently some of them, like Buddha and Mahāvīra, did not care to pay obeisance to the Vedas. But others, like Gautama, Kaṇḍāda, Kapila, and Patañjali, did not cut themselves off from the Vedic tradition. Nevertheless, they found it practically impossible to fit their ideas into the Upaniṣadic theory, and so could not furnish commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras, which were written by Bādarāyaṇa for the purpose of giving a connected interpretation of the Upaniṣads. Viñānabhiṣku, of the fifteenth century A.D., practically gave up the dualism of the Sāṅkhya in the attempt to write a commentary from the standpoint of that school. There has never been a commentary from the side of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, or the Yoga.

It is interesting to note that the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad refers to several views: that the world is to be explained in terms of time (kāla), the nature of things (svabhāva), fate (niyati), chance (yadṛcchā), elements (bhūtāṇi), womb (yoni), and person (puruṣa), which shows that at that time, a little later than that of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, several philosophical views were accepted by men independently of the general Vedic tradition. But, whether the particular school developed out of the Vedic tradition or grew independently at first and later was assimilated by its followers to the Vedic tradition, whether it was orthodox or unorthodox by accepting or rejecting respectively the authority of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, its guiding motive was invariably the discovery of the nature of man in relation to the universe and of the highest aim of life on earth. It was not the mere satisfaction of intellectual curiosity. However, the questionings of intellect were to be answered, because the questioners were anxious that the aim of life which they set before themselves should not be a false aim, but an aim which was in accord with the nature of man and the universe. The discord between nature and morality, or the indifference of the former to the latter, which was so painfully felt by the time of Kant and particularly in the nineteenth century in the history of Western philosophy, did not offer a serious problem to the Indian thinkers of the time. It should be noted immediately that the highest aim of man was not merely the improvement of the life of man as a member of society but the realization of a state of existence which, in terms of the whole of the universe, was the purest and the best. Morality was valued, not merely for morality's sake, but as leading up to, and sustaining, the spiritual ideal, in the realization of which it finds its own completion.
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Historically, the Buddhists seem to be the first great synthesizers in philosophy. The Prajnāpāramitās, which formed the basis of all the Mahāyāna schools, belong to the first century B.C. or A.D. It is now generally accepted that Buddhism is an offshoot of the Upaniṣads. Buddha’s object in leaving his home was not different from the aim of life extolled by the Upaniṣads. And, though early Buddhism tried to cut itself off from the Upaniṣadic tradition, Mahāyāna or later Buddhism staged a significant return to the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, if not to the texts, at least to the main doctrines. The Mahāyāna schools took shape in the first four centuries after Christ, during which period the orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy also came to be systematized: the Nyāya by Gautama, the Vaiśeṣika by Kaṇāda, the Yoga by Patañjali, the Sāṅkhya by Kapila, the Mīmāṃsā by Jaimini, and the Vedānta by Bādarāyana. The Jainas, the followers of Maḥāvīra, did not at first care to build up a metaphysical system to support their way of life, but had to construct one following their rival schools.

Cārvāka

The Cārvākas were a school of materialists who accepted the reality of only four elements—earth, air, water, and fire—and the validity of perception alone, and not even inference. But in some of the later references to, and expositions of, this school, we find that a few of its followers accepted inference and a few rejected even perception as a valid source of knowledge. This school had few followers and no developed system of philosophy. But its ideas were worked out as hypothetical anticipatory objections by the followers of orthodox schools, some of whom indulged in a display of logical powers by writing books on behalf of the Cārvākas. The Tattvopaplavasvinha, for instance, is a book of that kind, written by an orthodox Brahmīn. It is important to note that, according to the traditional belief, the school was founded by Brhaspati, the priest of the gods, in order to mislead the demons by giving them a false philosophy of life, supporting a low type of Epicureanism.

Jainism

The Jainas accepted the Upaniṣadic ideal of the realization of the pure state of the ātman as the highest aim of life. But to the end they remained naïve realists, and we find no evolution of metaphysical theories in their writings. One peculiarity of this school is that, like most schools of Buddhism, the Sāṅkhya, and the extreme forms of
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the Advaita, they admitted no God and believed that salvation lies in the liberation of the soul from the bondage in which it finds itself and which is due to accidental impurities entering it. The Jaina metaphysics is an out-and-out metaphysics of substance (dravya), for even what we generally regard as unsubstantial, e.g. time (kāla), is a substance for them. Substance is every entity to which we can assign an attribute, and time therefore comes in this class. Substance is of two kinds, the extended (astikāya) and the nonextended (anastikāya). Time falls in the second class. The extended is of two kinds: the soul (jīva) and the non-soul (ajīva). The soul can be either the liberated (mukta) or the unliberated (buddha). The non-soul is of four kinds: the principle of movement (dharma), the principle of rest (adharma), space (ākāśa), and body (puṇigala). The three peculiar doctrines of this school are: first, action (karma) and its effects are regarded as consisting of material particles which enter the soul and bind it down, a theory which appears to be a very naïve form of the philosophy of substance; second, the soul is of indefinite magnitude and assumes the size of the body it enters; and third, dharma and adharma mean motion and rest, meanings not given to the terms by any other school.10

Buddhism

Like Jainism, Buddhism started in revolt against the Vedic ritual and sacrifices, and at first occupied itself exclusively with the practical method of attaining salvation by analyzing all the accumulated overgrowth on our deeper and purer being—an overgrowth which it discovered to be ultimately due to ignorance and which concealed the pure truth from vision. But later Buddhists felt the need for a theory justifying their practice and slowly developed system after system in consequence of controversies among themselves and with rival schools. The history of Buddhist philosophy offers a vast panorama of various types of realism and idealism, pluralism and monism, starting with naïve realism and culminating in certain types of high idealism. Buddhism showed the greatest amount of open-mindedness, not only in matters of religious practice, but also in matters of philosophical speculation.

Buddha refused to answer the question whether the self existed or not, as both the term "self" and his answer were subject to conflicting interpretations and misinterpretations. We can best appreciate his silence when we remember that even the Mīmāṃsakas, followers of Jaimini, and the Vedāntins, followers of Bādarāyaṇa, understood it differently, the former contending that the purpose of the Vedic teaching could not be the discovery of such an obviously simple entity
as the ātman, which was the same as the ego (aham) of each person, and the latter claiming that it was something more than the simple empirical ego. However, the Buddhist sought to discover the substratum, by whatever name it was to be called, underlying our worldly being, which they thought was an aggregate of aggregates (skandhas). Personality (pudgala) consists of five aggregates: the aggregates of matter (rūpaskandha), of feeling (vedanāskandha), of ideas (sāniñāskandha), of instincts, propensities, and impressions (sānskāraskandha), and of consciousness (vijñānaskandha). The aggregates are all subject to momentary (kṣanika) change. Nirvāṇa, or salvation, which is above change, results from analyzing away the aggregates and reaching their substratum. This analysis is a hard self-analysis involving discrimination of elements within oneself.

All the Buddhist schools accept four noble truths (āryasatyas): all is pain; pain has a cause; it has cessation; and there is a way leading to its cessation. If pain is to be removed, its cause should be analytically understood; and hence the second and the third of the four noble truths were later developed into the twelve-linked chain of causation (pratītya-samutpāda). These twelve links are: ignorance, instincts and propensities, consciousness, mind and matter (nāma-rūpa), sense, sense contact, feeling, craving, grasping, becoming, birth, and old-age-and-death. Of these, each is a condition of the next following.

Another classification of truths is: everything is pain, everything is momentary, and everything is śūnya (void).

As indicated already, there are so many Buddhist schools that it is possible to find several types of metaphysical theory in them. The Hinayāna schools on the whole tend to be realistic and pluralistic, and the Mahāyāna schools to be idealistic and monistic. But there is a sense in which it can be said that all Buddhist schools are idealistic, because the analysis of the world by which the underlying Nirvāṇa is to be realized is an analysis of personality, and vice versa. The doctrine of the aggregates has already been mentioned. Reference may also be made to the doctrine of fields (āyatanas). They are the bases or fields for the growth and working of personality. They are twelve in number: the five fields of the senses (eye, ear, tongue, nose, and touch), the five fields of their corresponding objects, mind (manas), and law (dharma). It is obvious that this analysis takes the individual and the world together: the world ceases with the cessation of personality, and so must have taken form with the formation of personality.

The Buddhists hesitate to characterize the underlying Nirvāṇa as either being or non-being, for they contend that in this world
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there is no being without non-being and no non-being without being. And as Nirvāṇa is beyond this world, though forming its substratum and pervading it, it can be neither being nor non-being. The Mādhyamikas develop this idea further and maintain that it is neither being nor non-being, nor both, nor neither. They, therefore, call it Śūnya, or void, or the indeterminate. It is still identical with the world, because it is the essential truth of the world;¹¹ and yet it is different from the world, because it is above the flux of becoming. To be more exact, they say that Śūnya, or Nirvāṇa, is neither identical with, nor different from, the world.

The Viśnunavādins, however, say that its nature is viññāna, consciousness, at the same time acknowledging that even to call it by the name viññāna is to assign an attribute to that which lies beyond attributes. Reference may be made here to the pluralistic idealism of Śaṅkarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, according to which these viññānas are many.

The Viśnunavādins on the whole distinguish between a receptacle-consciousness (ālayaviññāna), which is the potential state of the world, and a kinetic consciousness (pravṛttiiviññāna), which is the world in the process of becoming. Yamakami speaks of a higher viññāna than the former, called Alayaviññāna (with a short A), the unperishing consciousness.¹²

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika Systems

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems are generally treated together because of the great similarity of their metaphysical theories. Both of them are pluralistic. They postulate seven categories: substance, quality, activity, universal, particular, inheritance, and negation. All these categories are familiar to Western philosophy except inheritance, which means the eternal relation obtaining, for instance, between substance and quality. The relation of the quality red to the rose is not a relation of contact like that between a pen and table. It should be noted, however, that, though the Naiyāyikas regard all these entities as belonging to reality, most of them attribute reality or existence only to the first three and not to the rest.

Substance is of nine kinds: earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The peculiarity to note here is that time, space, and soul are treated as substances. The first five substances are to be understood not merely as hard, soft, subtle, etc., but as peculiar causes of the properties of smell, taste, color, touch, and sound. Both schools accept the atomic theory of the first four substances and mind and regard the visible world as due to the grouping of atoms.¹³ The ātman
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(soul), though infinite, is by nature unconscious and remains so after salvation. Both schools, again, accept God, who is just one of the ātmanas and is as eternal as the other substances, but is somehow able to control the processes of creation and dissolution. But they do not explain how. They reject sakti, or the energy of God, as a category, which, it is interesting to note, is employed to solve the problem by the pluralistic Vedāntic and non-Vedāntic monistic systems, for which plurality is the expression of God’s energy (sakti). And every man naturally has control over his own power.

In these two schools, salvation is a return to the original unconscious state of the ātman. It involves, further, the severing of all contact with the world, a retreat into an eternal state of blind unconscious existence, devoid of pain, of course, but also equally devoid of pleasure.

The Sāṅkhya and the Yoga

Like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga are usually taken together, the only difference between them being that, while the Yoga accepts God, the Sāṅkhya rejects Him. According to both, the two fundamental categories of reality are spirit (puruṣa) and nature (prakṛti). Nature has three qualities (gunaṣ), which are really factors as well. They are intelligence (sattva), activity (rajas), and inactivity (tamas). When prakṛti is left to itself, the three gunaṣ are in a state of equilibrium, and there is no world. But when it comes into contact with puruṣa, their equilibrium is destroyed, and the creation of the world begins. In this creation, the gunaṣ do not become separated from each other, but each tries to dominate the others. The contact of puruṣa and prakṛti results in the latter’s receiving the reflection of the former; and, in the consequent disturbance of the three gunaṣ, when the sattva is predominant, prakṛti transforms itself into mahat or buddhi (intelligence). This intelligence is not the intelligence of any particular individual, but has a cosmic aspect and is therefore called mahat, or “the great.”

The transformation (parināma) of prakṛti is regarded by these two schools as the actualization of the potential. It is just like pressing oil out of the sesame seed. The effect is therefore existent (sat), though only in a potential state, in the cause. This is called the theory of existent effect (satkāryavāda) in Indian thought. This theory is not accepted by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, according to which the effect is nonexistent before it comes into being. This is called the theory of nonexistent effect (asatkāryavāda).
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Out of mahat, the next lower category, ego (aḥamkāra), is born; and out of the ego are born mind (manas), the five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, taste, and touch), the five organs of action (hands, feet, speech, the generating organ, and the anus), and the five subtle elements (tanmātras), which are actually the subtle forms of the properties of the elements and out of which the gross elements issue forth. Western readers should be careful not to identify mind with ego, and the two, again, with intelligence (buddhi). Further, the ego (aḥamkāra) is not the same as the subject, which is generally the correlate of the object in Western philosophy, but is the matrix of the correlates of the sense organs and their objects; so that what the Sāṅkhya calls the ego is not merely the correlate of the body but of the body as well as the objects that are concerned with it. The human body is just a gross object among gross objects, made up of gross elements that issue out of the ego. Yet it is a privileged object for the ego and is a special instrument for the enjoyment of other objects.

When the bond between prakṛti and puruṣa is severed, the former regains its original equilibrium, and puruṣa is liberated. We should note here one important point of similarity between the early Buddhist method of liberation and that of the Sāṅkhya. For both, liberation consists in reaching a level beyond nature, not in transforming nature into something sublime.  

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā

The school of Mīmāṃsā, also called Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, or the Prior Mīmāṃsā, started not as a philosophical system but as an attempt to explain the nature of law or duty (dharma), which according to them consisted in obeying the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. The Vedas enjoined different kinds of sacrifices in order to obtain pleasures in this world and the next. Consequently, questions arose about the nature of actions, how they could produce effects in this and the other world after a lapse of time, and how the effectuality of the sacrifices could be guaranteed. These questions led the Mīmāṃsakas into speculation about the nature of self, God, action (karma), etc. We do not, however, get a rounded-out system of metaphysics in this school, though its followers made very significant contributions to individual problems.

The Mīmāṃsakas believe in the reality of this world and the next; and they remain to the end fairly consistent realists. Kumārila and Prabhākara were the important followers of this school who tackled metaphysical and epistemological problems. The categories of this
school are, with some additions and omissions, very nearly the same as those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Prabhakara accepts eight categories: substance, quality, action, universal, inherence (paratantratala), force (śakti), similarity (sādṛśya), and number. Kumārila divides all categories into the positive and the negative. The positive categories are four: substance, quality, action, and generality. Force and similarity are brought under substance, and number under quality.

The nature of the self is said to be consciousness but not bliss. Here the Mīmāṁsā and the Śāṅkhyā are in agreement. A most interesting doctrine of the school is that of apūrva. The performance of sacrifice leads to heaven; but it does not lead one there immediately in this body. Karma, as sacrifice, then, becomes an unseen force, which Jaimini, the founder of this school, calls by the name apūrva (generally, unseen, imperceptible), and which remains in a latent form until the time comes for producing the effect.

The Mīmāṁsakas did not at first accept God. But the question arose as to how the fruition of karma could be guaranteed, and they had to include God as the preserver of the principle of karma. The ultimate reality of the world is, on the whole, looked upon as the constant principle of karma, and God is the principle of duty or law (dharma), the contents of which are embodied in the Vedas. As Professor Radhakrishnan says, the emphasis of this school is on the ethical side.16

The Vedānta or the Uttara Mīmāṁsā

The Vedānta, also called the Uttara Mīmāṁsā, or the Posterior Mīmāṁsā, is the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. There are several Vedāntic systems, each system being the result of the attempt of a school to systematize the teachings of the Upaniṣads and give its own interpretation to them. This attempt was made by realists and idealists, monists and pluralists alike. We have, therefore, several varieties of Vedāntic systems, three of which, namely, those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, are well known. But there are several others, the most important of which are those of Bhaṭṭārka, Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha, Śrīpati, Baladeva, Vallabha, and Śuka.16 All of them maintained, in accordance with the Upaniṣads, that the Brahman was the highest reality. All of them were avowedly absolutistic, for, in one form or another, they had to reckon with and accommodate the dominant monistic and absolutist trend of the Upaniṣads. But, if the Brahman is to be the only reality, what becomes of the world of individuals (jīvas) and nature? To Śaṅkara, individuals and nature were neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither; some, like Madhva,
were prone to treat them as real and separate from the Brahman; but Bhāskara was satisfied with treating nature only as real and separate from the Brahman, for he thought that the finite individual could be derived by bringing the Brahman into relation with nature, which was the "finitize" principle. Others, like Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha, wanted to treat the Brahman as the sole reality, while regarding the individuals and nature as real, though not separate from the Brahman, but forming its body; others, again, following Nimbārka and Śrīpati, thought that the individuals and nature were both identical with, and different from, the Brahman.

Further questions, such as whether this identity or difference is of form only, or of being (nature) only, or of both, were raised, Nimbārka maintaining that identity was of both kinds while difference was only of form, and Śrīpati contending that both were of both kinds. It is important to note that Rāmānuja did not accept the view that the relation between the Brahman and the phenomenal world could be both identity and difference, as the two are contradictories, but viewed it as that between body and soul; while those who accepted the relation of identity-and-difference rejected the body-soul relation as it involves mutual interaction and so the affectability of the Brahman by the actions of the individuals. Śuka, like some Advaitins, believed that there is only one individual (jīva), who assumes the forms of many.

While the self, according to the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, has only being and no consciousness, and, according to the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, both being and consciousness, according to the Vedāntic schools, it possesses bliss also as a part of its essential nature.

In spite of so many differences, whether the soul is ultimately identical with the Brahman or different from it, all Vedāntic schools maintain that the Brahman is to be realized as one's own soul. That is, the Absolute is within us; in searching for it, we have to look inward and not outward. Bādarāyaṇa, to whom all Vedāntic schools owe allegiance, says in his Brahma-sūtras17 that the Brahman is known and grasped as one's soul. For one who views the Vedāntic or Upaniṣadic tradition as a whole, in order to adjudge it in comparison with other traditions, this is the most important aphorism; and the views of causality, etc., depend on how this aphorism is interpreted by the particular school. Rāmānuja says that the Absolute is realized as the soul of one's soul; Śāṅkara that it is just one's soul; but Madhva says that it is the controller of one's soul from within.

The problem of how God could control the world if the world had an independent existence did not escape the notice of the Vedāntins. This question has greater force against the philosophical dualism of
Madhva than against the systems of the rest, for he emphasized the
relation of difference between the Brahman and the individual more
strongly than any other. But, curiously enough, he rounded out his
system by saying that these independent individuals and nature were
only expressions of God’s śakti (power, potentiality). And, as we have
control over our own power, God has control over his. This peculiar
absolutist trend of the Vedāntic schools was overshadowed by con-
troversies over the reality and unreality of māyā; and even modern
interpreters have missed its importance, as they have followed the
fashion of the epistemological approach set by modern Western
philosophy. Consequently, the importance of the role which the concept
of śakti, or energy, played in the Vedānta has so far been ignored. It is
with the help of this concept that the dualistic systems, like the
Sāṅkhya, and the pluralistic systems, like the Nyāya, have been in-
corporated into the Vedānta and rounded out into varieties of ab-
solutism. Thus, in the Vedāntic tradition, we shall not be wrong if
we say that the distinctions between realism and idealism, and between
pluralism, dualism, and monism, hold good within absolutism. The
Sāṅkhya was content with the dualism of prakṛti and puruṣa; but the
gap between the two was bridged by Viṣṇuabhikṣu in his commentary
on the Brahma-sūtras by making prakṛti the śakti (power) of the
Brahman. Similarly, Madhva adopted a large number of categories
apparently independent of each other, but ultimately made them all
expressions of God’s power (śakti). Herein was a way for the Nyāya
pluralism to rise above itself; but what prevented it from doing so was
its rejection of śakti as a category. Even Śaṅkara admitted śakti; he
explicitly called māyā by the name māyāśakti. But he was not pre-
pared to accord it reality. He maintained that the rays of the sun have
no existence independent of the sun but are expressions of its energy.
But some would say that they have an independent reality, some that
they are both identical with and different from the sun. It is more
appropriate, therefore, to say that the Vedāntic systems, except that
of Vallabha, differ from each other in metaphysics by understanding
the nature of śakti differently. But all accept the view that śakti is
logically inexplicable: why and how it works in the way it does we
cannot understand. To this Śaṅkara adds that it is inexplicable
ontologically also: we cannot prove that it is real or unreal, or both,
or neither.

Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, and others, who accept the ontological
validity of the śakti of God, maintain that God creates the world by
allowing his śakti to undergo transformation (parināma), while he
himself remains unaffected by the process. But Śaṅkara says that this
is impossible, like slicing half the hen for cooking and leaving the other half to lay eggs, for, if God’s sakti undergoes transformation, He also changes. Therefore, Śaṅkara postulates a sakti that is neither real nor unreal, and makes it responsible for the creation of the world. It is interesting to note that, in spite of being neither real nor unreal, its details are as seriously worked out by the later Advaitins as if it were real. Now, if the Brahman does not produce the world by transforming its own sakti, how can the Upaniṣads declare it to be the cause of the world? Śaṅkara here formulates a new concept of cause, called vivartakāraṇa. It is difficult to translate the word into English, but it means essentially a cause that produces the effect without itself undergoing any transformation. Thus the cause of the world can be the Brahman itself.21

The Pāṣupata, the Śākta, and the Pāṇcarātra Systems

Reference should be made here to the Pāṣupata, the Śākta, and the Pāṇcarātra systems, from which all the commentators except Śaṅkara and Bhāskara obtained their philosophical inspiration before they approached the Brahma-sūtras to write their commentaries in order to gain prestige and recognition as Vedāntins. The Pāṣupata, the Śākta, and the Pāṇcarātra Āgamas (sacred works) are sectarian as opposed to the Vedas, and are accepted by the Śaiva, the Śākta, and the Vaiṣṇava sects, respectively, as their final authorities.22 The most interesting feature of these works is the way they synthesize pluralism, dualism, and the Buddhist doctrine of śūnya, and erect a monism which is at once sublime and constructive. While the Śāṅkhya and the Advaita Vedānta could not find a place for entities like time, these systems gave it a distinct place, of course, as a manifestation of either Śiva’s or Viṣṇu’s sakti, identifying Śiva or Viṣṇu with the Brahman of the Upaniṣads. Some of them, particularly the followers of the Kashmir school of Śaivism, like Vasugupta and Abhinavagupta, who were definitely influenced by Śaṅkara, accepted his non-dualism intact, with the proviso that māyā, as the incomprehensible power of the Brahman, was real. And now and then for argument’s sake, they even admitted Śaṅkara’s position, thereby implying—it seems to me rightly—that this kind of formulation is of secondary importance when we accept the fact that māyā is a sakti of the ultimate reality and is identical with it. Śaṅkara’s reluctance to concede reality to māyā, while maintaining identity of existence between it and the Brahman, is due, it seems to me, to his feeling that people would identify them in form also. Herein lies the answer to the charge of pan-
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clesism often brought against him; the world is not identical with the Brahman in form but only in being.

These systems hold that śānya is the state in which the subject-object distinction disappears, and yet the final state of their thoroughly mediated immediacy, in which the puruṣa and prakṛti become absolutely identical in both being and form and transparent to each other, is not reached. This is a state in which the puruṣa is shrouded and does not shine in its full glory. The highest stage is still above. The Buddhist schools, indeed, would not accept this interpretation, which gives only a subordinate position to their highest concept. However, this shows how eagerly and systematically the orthodox schools incorporated the metaphysical discoveries of Buddhism, in spite of the severe criticisms they leveled against them.

Among contemporary metaphysical thinkers like Radhakrishnan, Bhagavan Das, Aurobindo Ghosh, and Tagore, the tendency to regard māyā as an element of the Absolute is very strong. Though Radhakrishnan is a follower of Śaṅkara, we do not find in him that negative attitude to the world which a few extremists among the Advaitins adopted. The others make māyā definitely an element of the Absolute.

III

A paper like the present one can hardly present all the metaphysical theories. But Indian philosophy has a rich variety of them; and the extreme form of the Advaita is only one of them. In spite of several important differences, the systems strove hard to preserve the unity of the Indian philosophical tradition, which is spiritual or, we may say, Upaniṣadic. In spite of their heterodoxy, several Buddhist and Jaina scholars openly trace their origins to the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. The only system that is completely independent of them is the Čārvāka, which is a very unimportant school, and according to which there is an end to our existence after death and we should make the most of our life here.

It might have been noticed by now that, while for Jainism, early Buddhism, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya, and the Yoga, salvation lay in becoming something, whatever be its name, that is detached from the rest of being, in the Vedāntic systems it lies in the realization that everything is the ultimate being. Even Śaṅkara makes no secret of this: the Brahman is everything, and the world is the Brahman. Viewed sub specie temporis, the world is the world of finitude around us; but, viewed sub specie aeternitatis, it is the Brahman. The Mahāyāna schools also proclaim the same truth, Śūnya is Nirvāṇa:
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Nirvāṇa is this world, and this world is Nirvāṇa. Yet the two are not the same. This may sound paradoxical; but the paradox disappears when we introduce the distinction between viewing the world *sub specie temporis* and *sub specie aeternitatis*. It amounts to this: Salvation lies in transforming what appears to be the material world around us into something spiritual; it is not an escape from the world but a spiritual conquest of the world—not a retreat after defeat but assimilation after conquest.

An important question that arises while discussing the value of Indian metaphysics is: Have the Indian philosophers given a metaphysics of morality? We should consider carefully the significance of the fact that the first great philosophical work written in the West was the *Republic* of Plato and in India the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. These two works are mainly responsible for the respective traditions. The main interest of the *Republic* is the discovery of the true nature of man in society in order to build up a stable society upon earth. But this interest is conspicuously lacking in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. It would be wrong to conclude from this fact that the Indian society of the time was in a chaotic state. To have no metaphysics of ethics is not the same as to be unethical. One might conclude that a metaphysics of ethics was necessitated by social and ethical instability in Greece at that time and that conditions in India were such as not to make its thinkers feel this need. But the safest conclusion to draw would be that the thinkers of ancient India were not motivated by the aims of Plato's *Republic*. Thus, while the Indian philosopher tried to discover within himself the ultimate truth, which was an eternally accomplished fact, the Platonic philosophy was intent upon discovering eternal laws of man and society, in order to remodel them accordingly. The only metaphysical work of importance with some reference to society is the *Bhagavadgītā*. But it should be mentioned that this is part of the *Mahābhārata*, which is an epic. Writers like Manu and Yājñavalkya, who gave India her ethical codes (Dharma-śāstras), did not push their inquiries to their metaphysical foundations, nor did the metaphysicians develop the social implications out of their systematized technique of spiritual self-control. It was not impossible to do either. The material was there, but the attempt was not made.

It would be wrong to say, with Hegel, that in Indian philosophy the concept was merged with existence, while for Western thought Socrates liberated it from existence, for the reason that Indian philosophy has had a variety of theories about the universal. Yet there is some meaning in this statement, in that the practical motive of Plato was to apply the concept to man and society, whereas the motive of
Indian philosophy included no notion of such application. I am therefore much in sympathy with Mr. Northrop's distinction between the general characteristics of Indian and Western philosophy, but should add that the terminology he uses should bring out more clearly the distinction between spiritual immediacy and an immediacy at the sensory level. Indian philosophers would accept the former but not the latter. So far as the higher categories are concerned, they are conceptual constructions in Western philosophy, postulates of thought made to meet the demands of logical explanation. The question of treating those concepts as realizable in experience is ignored except by a few mystics, with whom most logical thinkers will have little to do. But, in Indian philosophy on the whole, the categories of existence (tattvas), to whatever level they belong, are meant for realization in experience. These categories include our deepest levels of being, the deepest category being the Brahman, which forms the basic spiritual principle pervading and sustaining everything. Furthermore, the word "continuum" is not suitable here, as it suggests extension. At the sensory and mental levels there is interruption of continuity, as the separateness consequent upon the formation of the individuals begins to be felt. But the categories of existence, as they are derived or evolved from our deepest being, always have the quality of immediacy to us, viewed, we should note, from within, not from without. If the ultimate reality is inclusive of both subject and object, then we should look for the center of that reality not within the subject but between the subject and the object, and view its circumference as including both the subject and object. We have already seen how, in the Sāňkhya, mind and its objects are included in, and derived from, the ego. Our natural tendency is to look for the ego within the body; we should, on the contrary, look upon the physical body as within the ego. All the Vedāntic systems, particularly those inspired by the Pāñcupata and the Pāñcarātra Āgamas, may rightly be regarded as the developed and integrated forms of the Sāňkhya, and they thoroughly exemplify the inwardness of the categories (tattvas).

What would Indian metaphysicians say regarding categories of material and social existence? Ultimately these categories would be inward and, therefore, immediate. But, at our level, they belong to conceptual mediacy until they are applied to the realms of matter and society and are made to embody themselves in existence. Let me put my own views on the matter in my own way. To say that the concepts of matter and society do not belong to existence in Western thought would be wrong; but to say that they are considered in detachment from existence, manipulated, combined, and reconstructed, and then
applied to matter and society in order to make the two conform to the
built-up concepts would be right. Indian philosophy, in the narrower
sense of the well-known systems, did consider the concepts in logical
detachment from existence, but did not manipulate, combine, and re-
construct them for further application, for the reason that such an
application was out of place and impossible in the realization of the
deepest truths, which are eternally accomplished facts. The difference
between the two traditions is due to the difference between the levels
of being in which they have been primarily interested, the interests
giving peculiar color to the respective traditions. Had Indian thought
directed its attention to social and material sciences, it might have set
up a different philosophical tradition. It would perhaps have found
concepts at the social level that fell short of concepts of ideal society
and needed combination, modification, and reconstruction for final
application, and concepts at the material level needing the same proc-
ess for molding matter to serve man’s ends. The need for detaching
concepts from existence comes only with reference to realms in which
the actual falls short of the ideal but not where the two are one. The
realm with which Indian philosophy mainly deals, namely, the inward
spirit, is of the latter kind.

Judged with the standards of modern philosophy, Indian thought
can be said to have reached the highest speculative heights; but it lacks
the breadth which Western philosophy has attained, for the reason that
it did not think it necessary to be broad. The sense of self-sufficiency
long suited India. But times have changed. The West has built up
philosophical structures to support newly discovered, formulated, or
revived values, which are demanding recognition from the East as well.
It is here that Indian philosophy should incorporate elements from
Western philosophy in order to make up for its one-sided preoccupa-
tion with the realm of spirit. Thereby it would not only include all
the realms of being with which man’s life is concerned but would make
its logic and metaphysics richer and lay the foundation of a social
philosophy that could supply a plan for at once meeting the spiritual
needs of man’s inner spirit and the material and social needs of his
mortal existence. The West also might find it worth while to supple-
ment what it has achieved in philosophy with the deeper elements of
Indian thought. Western philosophers might find it useful to under-
stand man, not only as a product of material atoms, as the materialists
do, or as a product of society as, for instance, Mead and Dewey do, but
also as the product of the Great Spirit, as a spiritual being far tran-
scending his relations to matter and society. The integration of the
three perspectives without doing injustice to any, not merely to satisfy
our intellectual demands, but also to furnish a plan of life for working out our life's aim that would aid in the realization of all our potentialities, should, in my opinion, be the aim of East-West philosophical synthesis, to discover ways and means of accomplishing which we are meeting now in this Conference. The cosmopolitan and universal outlook which philosophy had from Greek and Roman times had changed, as Ruggierio says, into the national outlook by the eighteenth century, so that until very recently each nation was supposed to have a philosophy of its own as a systematic articulation of its own culture. The emphasis is now shifting from nations to cultural groups; but simultaneously the idea that we can have a synthesis of cultures, an integration of values framed and fostered by different cultures during centuries of their history, is dawning upon the minds of men of thought. The new culture, which would contain all the highest values for which peoples have lived and died, would not appear alien to any group and, when adopted by all, would lessen the possibility of conflict at least at the cultural level. The philosophy representing such a culture would be a world philosophy. It would be difficult to maintain that it would be one system of philosophy; there would be several systems, but all of them would be expressive of the same new outlook in its broader aspects, integrating all the highest values, each in its own way.

What significance do the peculiar spiritual point and aim of the Indian metaphysical tradition have for the metaphysical tendencies that have become strong in the West? Professor Radhakrishnan, India's leading contemporary philosopher, has very significantly named one of his books Eastern Religions and Western Thought. The thought of the East, except for Confucianism in China; has tended to give one-sided importance to the spiritual viewpoint, delved deeply into our being, transformed what to the West is a matter of faith into ideas of reason, which it carried to its very bounds, until it found its completion and rest, and was transformed into self-conscious spiritual immediacy, in which the provoking strangeness of an "other" was annulled. The thought of the West, on the other hand, has been content on the whole to remain conceptual; it has conceptualized matter and on the whole has succeeded in rebuilding the idea of matter in terms of pure conceptual formulas representing the ultimate constituents—ultimate in consequence of their being further unanalyzable in terms of the method it has adopted—of even unperceivable atoms. It is attempting to conceptualize life, mind, man, society, and spirit, and to reconstruct their meanings in terms of the ultimate concepts it has postulated and successfully used in explaining matter. Against this attempt, it received vigorous protests from the sciences of life, mind,
man, society, and spirit. The biological revolt succeeded in freeing its science from the domination of the concept of mechanism, and the concept of organism compelled men of thought to recognize its autonomy. Matter is instrumental to life, and so is mechanism to organism. Still, this instrumentality is not recognized as such: philosophers speak of life as a quality emerging out of a structural pattern of material particles, which in their turn are, according to some philosophers, repetitive patterns or events. But this way of understanding life leaves out the idea of the organism as an agent acting on its own mechanism. Life seems to be equated with this structural pattern. What is more than the pattern is reduced to the status of a quality of the pattern. Quality might be interpreted as an active agent, but then we would be doing so much violence to the concept of quality as to destroy it. There is a priori no mistake in using the concept of evolution in understanding the relationship between matter and life. But we should note, however, that what evolves is not a mere quality of matter, but an agent that tries to rule matter. Similarly, the higher and higher forms of being rule the lower and lower ones—the significance of which fact has not been fully recognized by philosophers.

Mind, and especially the unconscious mind, obtained adequate recognition only after World War I. Its processes defied explanation in terms of matter or life. These protests and refusals are a sufficient indication that a conceptual reconstruction of the world, in which we can get a complete correlation of mediacy (concepts) and immediacy (being), is bound to be a failure even at the lower levels of being, and, as a practical consequence, may result in the destruction of being if pressed into what we treat as the mediated concept. Moral disaster is sure to follow if, at the level of man and society, we are too sure of the adequacy of our mediated concepts and press being into their forms. Our mediated concepts may be our favorite concepts, results of an ideological bias, partially true and partially untrue. But, when a part is made to do the work of the whole, the other parts suffer and the whole is destroyed. And destruction at the level of man and society is a moral disaster. At the level of matter we are in an advantageous position. Though the principle that no amount of conceptual analysis can exhaust the nature of the individual is true at all levels, still our analysis of matter, with the practical mechanistic motive in view, has given us conceptual constituents with which we can rebuild the concept of matter, which, for practical purposes, is equivalent to matter in the realm of reality. We have the further advantage that we are more agreed as to what matter is than what life or mind is; and we are much less agreed as to what man or spirit is. To put the same point in an
extreme form, many generally agree that matter is, but fewer will agree that mind is. At higher and higher levels we have greater and greater difficulties in building up adequate concepts, because the forms of being are less and less tangible to sense perception, and verification of our conceptual formulation by reference to the forms of being is more and more difficult. At the purely biological level, the moral and spiritual implications of the process do not bother us very much. But at the higher levels, particularly of man, society, and spirit, it is the historical process of centuries that verifies our concepts and brings to light their inadequacy. It is here that the total truth or falsity of our cultures and ideologies is made manifest to us, but made manifest, unfortunately, through political, moral, and spiritual catastrophes, involving misery for millions. Our obvious conclusion would be that the philosophical foundations of these cultures and ideologies contain an inadequate formulation of the concept of man and that, when man is pressed into that conceptual mold, he suffers "destruction." At the level of man and society, our conceptual formulations are likely to move in a vacuum.

Here, therefore, we seem to have an a priori insoluble problem. We require a verification of the concept of man, but we are in doubt as to what man is. Experimental verification is not impossible. But it is experiment with a moral being and involves moral catastrophes, very often on a vast scale. Even the concept of man as a mere moral agent, which Fichte and some German idealists formulated, failed because it was an incomplete concept. Morality implies not only that man is confronted by an alien "other," which is to be forced to conform to the dictates of his reason, but also that he can so force it. It is easy to confuse the moral dignity and prestige of man in facing an "other" and making it bend to his will with the necessity for arrogance and aggressiveness involving moral violence to the "other," which must be man and not dead matter. Here is the need for what we may call a spiritual ethics, a standard of conduct that involves self-surrender to a universal will within, the laws of which we can imperfectly comprehend. Such an ethics will counteract our tendency to impose our own selfish will, which we can easily mistake for the universal will, upon the other. Here is the true role of religion as reason with spiritual orientation, which is distinct from what we usually call ethics, which is reason with social orientation, between which, of course, no clear-cut distinction can be drawn since each passes into the other. And here is the need for a metaphysics that is consistently spiritual in outlook and aim.

It would be wrong to say that India did not produce conceptual reconstructions of the world, but we do not find in Indian philosophy
that tenacity and stubborn resolve to analyze and reconstruct the world conceptually at all levels, starting with the lowest concepts at the material level and gradually building up the concepts at the higher levels. We have seen that the inherent failure of the Western attempt is due to not recognizing the instrumentality of the lower to the higher and to treating the higher as merely a qualitative emergence. What emerges should be a new substantiality—if we are to use the concept of emergence at least for argument's sake—and not a quality. The higher should be the substance, turning the lower into its own quality, as it were. Correspondingly, what we lack in Indian metaphysics is the systematic working out of the necessity of the lower as an instrument of the higher. This underemphasis can do violence to man as a social unit, while allowing an overemphasis on man as a spiritual being. The lower as a quality cannot exhaust the nature of the higher as the substance. But substance cannot exist without qualities. At the spiritual level, if man is engrossed in the spiritual and is indifferent to the values of the world, he may neglect his lower nature. But, at the purely ethical level, this attitude does violence to man as such and to society. Just as at the biological level inanimate material particles become transformed into living particles, so at the spiritual level the ethical becomes transformed into the spiritual, and the spiritual should be looked upon therefore as the transformation of the ethical. Just as life has an independence of its own from matter, however imperfect that independence may be, so the spiritual also can have an independence of its own from the human and the ethical. Further, like any bit of matter which is connected at the material level with every other bit of matter, no human being at the human and the ethical level should regard himself as independent and isolated from other human beings. Social orientation cannot be lost sight of by man at the human level.

What Indian philosophy needs is the recognition of the necessity of a social ethics as an indispensable instrument of social life. Just as life suffers if it is equated to a structural pattern of material elements, so spiritual life suffers if equated to ethical life, and man suffers if equated to a social unit. But, again, ethical life and therefore man as a social unit suffers if man is equated only to spirit. So long as he remains man, his nature as a socially ethical being should not be ignored. And this idea should be made an essential part of our metaphysics and should be worked out accordingly. Thereby naturalism, empiricism, and realism, on the one hand, and spiritualism, rationalism, and idealism, on the other, can unite and furnish man with a balanced view of life.

Taking into consideration the Confucian humanism of China and certain philosophical trends of India, it would be truer to say that by
the above method we bring together different trends of thought and modes of approach dominant in both the East and the West than trends in East and West, respectively. Neither is the East completely devoid of science and humanism nor is the West devoid of spirituality. Moreover, there has been no development of thought in India since the fifteenth century A.D., because of constant communal and political unrest, and it is only since the British advent that India has been having some respite for reflection. Thus men of thought in both the East and the West may object to being classified into two distinct groups; and we shall be on safer ground if we make the dominant trends and philosophical outlooks of the world bear on each other for reconciliation and synthesis. We should not ignore the Indo-European kinship in metaphysical thought and the Sino-European kinship in humanism. Again, Islam, which has its origins in the Near East, has a humanism of its own kind, however communal it may be. The Oriental influence, however subtle, on Plato and Neo-Platonism and on Christian mysticism and German idealism was not unimportant. The influence of the Upaniṣadic ideas on the Schlegels, Schelling, and Schopenhauer and, through them, on German idealism and Christian theology has not completely escaped the notice of scholars. The East-West philosophical, religious, and other cultural contacts from a time before the invasions of Alexander the Great will create serious difficulties if, in philosophy, we distinguish the East and the West too sharply. But certain interests became all-engrossing in certain cultures in both the East and the West and gave rise to differences of outlook, and the analytical classification of the world's philosophies would therefore be more advantageous than one based on East-West differences. We need not assume that the two hemispheres must have their differentia philosophically also. Further, the common features of the East as distinct from those of the West and the common features of the West as distinct from those of the East may not be so important for our purpose as the dominant trends of thought that obtain in the world, including the East and the West.

NOTES

2. Ibid., VII, xxvi, 1.
3. IV, i, 3.
5. Bhādarāṇyaka Upaniṣad, I, iv, 1 and 10.
6. Ibid., II, iv, 5.
7. B. M. Barna, A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1921).
8. W. R. Sorley paraphrases T. H. Huxley's views thus: "The cosmic order has
nothing to say to the moral order, except that, somehow or other, it has given it birth; the moral order has nothing to say to the cosmic order, except that it is certainly bad." Recent Tendencies in Ethics, p. 47. Quoted in J. T. Merz, History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1914–1930), Vol. IV, p. 232.


11Ibid.


16IV, i, 3.

17I am here reminded of the Islamic conception that matter is the habit of Allah, Vijñānavādikṣu, Commentary on the Brahma-sūtras.

18H. N. Raghavendrachar, The Dualist Philosophy and Its Place in the Vedānta (Mysore: University of Mysore, 1941).

19There are several differences of view on this point among the Advaitins themselves. See Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha.


21Mādhyaṃkika Kārikās, XXV.

22See the writer's article, "The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions," The Philosophical Review, LVI (March, 1927), 127–135.

23It should not be inferred from this that all Indians are preoccupied with the realm of the spirit, taking no interest in the world, though the Indian would understand by philosophy the subject dealing with spiritual life.

24G. de Ruggiero, Modern Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 16. "The philosophy of this new era in history is thus a national philosophy. Criticising the anti-historical and impersonal tendency of naturalism, it springs from the traditional thought of each separate people and thus represents in its spontaneity and originality of its growth the theoretical and self-conscious aspect of this historical movement towards the differentiation of nationalities."

25The paper read to the Conference ended at this point. The remainder of the chapter was added especially for this volume in response to questions and discussion of the paper at the Conference. [Editor's note.]
CHAPTER XII

The Nature of Brahman in the Upaniṣads
—the Advaita View

SWAMI NIKHILANANDA

The Upaniṣads are not mere speculative philosophy. They are called darśana, a Sanskrit term derived from the root “drś,” which means to see. The Upaniṣadic truths are to be seen. Their ultimate validity is to be derived from direct personal experience. The seers of the Upaniṣads did not argue; they only told what they experienced. The later philosophers established the Upaniṣadic truths by reason. It appears that the seers discovered these truths through detachment, self-control, and contemplation. They also closely observed nature.

The three tests of supersensuous truths, according to Vedānta, are scriptural evidence, reasoning, and personal experience. The pupil first learns them from the scriptures as explained by a qualified teacher; then he reasons about them; and, lastly, he experiences them in the depths of contemplation. Scriptural evidence refers to the direct and immediate experiences common to previous seers. As these truths are supersensuous and supra-mental and without any counterpart in the physical universe, the beginner cannot depend solely upon unaided reasoning. But scriptural evidence alone is apt to degenerate into authoritarianism and dogmatism. Therefore it must be subjected to severe reasoning. Reasoning, again, may become a rationalization of one’s favorite notions. Further, truth arrived at by reasoning alone cannot be final, and may be superseded by superior reasoning. Reasoning may indicate truth but cannot say what it is. Our experience of the phenomenal world is immediate and direct. The knowledge derived from reasoning is mediate and indirect. Only a direct and immediate experience of reality can remove the error of phenomenal multiplicity. It is personal experience that gives such direct and immediate knowledge. But personal experience may very well be self-deception. Thus

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the three tests are necessary. Like the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the Executive of the United States of America, they are mutually corrective. When the three corroborate the same fact or point to the same conclusion, then one knows the truth.

The Upaniṣads deal with two kinds of knowledge: lower and higher. Lower knowledge consists of knowledge of the relative universe: theology, Vedic rituals, astronomy, and the various physical sciences. It is acquired through the sense organs, which also include the mind. Higher knowledge reveals the "imperishable" truth—which transcends time, space, and causality. By means of lower knowledge one overcomes such physical handicaps as disease and suffering; by higher knowledge one attains deathlessness, or immortality. Lower knowledge is sometimes called knowledge of the manifestation or phenomenon (kārya Brahman), and higher knowledge, knowledge of the Great Cause (kāraṇa Brahman). Both forms of knowledge are necessary for the complete understanding of reality. Then "the fetters of the heart are broken and all doubts are resolved."1

The aim of the Upaniṣadic teachings is to enlarge and deepen a man's understanding. "May He illumine our intelligence" is a text of the Vedas universally repeated by the Hindus. Knowledge, when properly cultivated, is accompanied by direct experience, or realization. The Upaniṣads, according to the etymological meaning of the word, reveal to us the knowledge that totally loosens a man's attachment to the material world and destroys his ignorance, thus enabling him to realize the true nature of the self. Self-knowledge is the bestower of real freedom.

According to the Upaniṣads, mere theoretical knowledge is futile. "The Self cannot be known by study of the Vedas alone."

To know is to become. Further, the mind, which is the instrument of empirical knowledge, is also used to win higher knowledge. For the latter purpose it must be freed from passion, attachment, and aversion. The lower nature is to be so transformed that it can be the fit conduit for the flow of higher knowledge. A sound body, a discerning intellect, a strong mind, healthy sense organs, and the legitimate enjoyments of life lead the eager aspirant to the goal of self-knowledge, as a well-built chariot, a discriminating charioteer, healthy horses controlled by strong reins, and well-marked paths enable the rider to reach his destination. The Upaniṣads insist upon certain disciplines on the part of the pupil. First, he must cultivate purity of mind through the observance of moral laws, the performance of obligatory duties, and the practice of daily religious devotions. In this way the mind acquires the clarity necessary for understanding the transcendental truths. Then come the
higher disciplines: discrimination between what is real and what is unreal, detachment from the unreal, cultivation of inner calmness, control of the senses, and the practice of forbearance and concentration. The pupil should cultivate a spirit of reverence and a yearning for freedom from bondage to whatever is impermanent and unreal.

The truths of the Upaniṣads are to be learned through personal contact. Spiritual knowledge is different from ordinary knowledge. The latter is related to material objects. It can be learned from a book or from the words of a teacher. It can be expressed in the form of a proposition, whereas spiritual knowledge, without qualification, cannot be so expressed. Ultimate spiritual knowledge is self-luminous and requires no further corroboration. It already exists in the deepest consciousness of the student, though covered by various obstructions. Like a midwife, the teacher removes the obstacles, and the self-existent knowledge reveals itself by its own irresistible force. It is not a new acquisition as is the case with ordinary knowledge; it is transmitted from one soul to another, as one candle is lighted from another candle. The teacher gives the second birth to the pupil and is aptly called his “father.” In the Upaniṣads, the teacher is very important. Well versed in the science of Brahman, of unimpeachable conduct, unselfish, and compassionate, he must be endowed with the knowledge of truth.

As early as the times of the Rg Veda, the Indo-Aryan thinkers recognized the eternal unity of existence, which “holds in its embrace all that has come to be.” In this unity are included all objects, animate and inanimate. Gods, men, and subhuman beings are all conceived of as parts of it. As the unchanging reality behind the universe, it is called Brahman; as the immortal spirit in man, it is called Âtman. Identical in nature, Brahman and Âtman constitute the first principle in the Upaniṣads.

Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa, in the Brahma-sūtras, describes Brahman as that “from which proceed the origin, the preservation, and the dissolution of the universe.” He further states that in Brahman alone all the Vedântic texts and all experiences of the Vedic seers find agreement and are harmonized.

The Upaniṣads describe Brahman as having two aspects: acosmic and cosmic. The one is devoid of attributes and the other is endowed with them. The first is called Nirguṇa Brahman, or the unconditioned Brahman, while the second is called Saguna Brahman, or the conditioned Brahman. The unconditioned or supreme Brahman cannot be described by any characteristic sign. The conditioned or inferior Brahman, on the contrary, can be pointed out by its attributes.

Here is a striking passage about the unconditioned, attributeless
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Brahman: "It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long; it is neither dryness nor moisture, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor space (ākāśa); it is unattached, without savor or odor, without eyes or ears, without vocal organ or mind, non-luminous, without vital force or mouth, without measure, and without interior or exterior."4

The following is a typical statement about the conditioned Brahman: "Whose body is spirit, whose form is light, whose thoughts are true, whose nature is like space (ākāśa); from which all works, all desires, all odors, and all tastes proceed."5

According to Śaṅkaraśārya, the chief exponent of non-dualistic Vedānta, the purpose of the Upaniṣads is to establish the attributeless Brahman as ultimate reality, whereas, according to Rāmānuja, the leader of the qualified non-dualistic school, it is to establish the Brahman endowed with benign qualities.

As we shall see, there is no real conflict between the two points of view, the acosmic and the cosmic. Brahman is one and without a second. It is the same Brahman that is described in two ways from these two points of view. The one is the real or unconditioned point of view; and the other, the empirical or ordinary. According to the first, the world of names and forms, though endowed with an apparent reality, is ultimately unreal, and only Brahman is real. All that is perceived in the universe is Brahman alone; and this Brahman is unconditioned, free from all qualities and attributes. Therefore there cannot, in truth, be any such thing as a creator, sustainer, and destroyer, endowed with omnipotence, omniscience, and other qualities. From this point of view, Brahman is unconditioned. According to the other point of view, the empirical world is real, and Brahman, its omnipotent and omnipresent creator, sustainer, and destroyer, is endowed with attributes. Thus the same indefinable reality is described in two different ways according to the point of view of the perceiver. Further, a man conscious of his body and of the functioning of the mind cannot but perceive the outside world. To him the physical world is real. But the same man, in the depths of meditation (e.g., while contemplating art) becomes oblivious of the body. His reasoning, intellect, and ego do not function. At that time the world disappears. Subject and object merge in an indefinable consciousness.

According to the Vedāntic view, the exclusive investigation of the sense data of the waking state gives a pluralistic or materialistic view of the universe, which falls within the scope of the physical sciences. If there is no higher form of knowledge, then we are inevitably limited to the physical sciences. The investigation of the data of the dream state gives the philosophy of subjective idealism. The knowledge de-
rived from dreamless sleep is a sort of mysticism. The true transcendent

dental knowledge (ānīya), illuminating and permeating all empirical
knowledge, is acquired by the analysis and integration of all the three
states, which contain the totality of human experience.

What we shall see is that Brahman, in association with māyā,
which is its own inscrutable power, becomes the creator of the universe
and is called Brahman with attributes (Saguṇa Brahman).

NIRGUṆA BRAHMAN

Devoid of indicative marks, qualities, or attributes, Nirguṇa
Brahman cannot be adequately described by words. "From whence all
speech, together with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it."8 That
is why it is sometimes explained by silence. Śaṅkaračārya, in his com-
mentary on the Brahma-sūtras,7 declares that Bādhva, being ques-
tioned about Brahman by Bāṣkalin, explained it to him by silence.
"He said to Bāṣkalin: 'Learn Brahman, O friend,' and became silent.
Then, on a second and a third questioning, Bādhva replied: 'I am
 teaching you, indeed, but you do not understand. Silence is that
Ātman.'" The impossibility of knowing Brahman by any human
means is most emphatically expressed in the famous formula employed
by Yājñavalkya: neti, neti—"not this, not this."9

The attributeless Brahman is described through the technique of
negation: "Which otherwise cannot be seized or seen, which has no root
or attributes, no eyes or ears, no hands or feet... which is imperishable
and is the source of all beings."9

Though unknown and unknowable, Brahman is yet the eternal
"knower of knowing" and also the goal of all knowledge. It is con-
sciousness, which functions through the senses but cannot be known
by them. "How can you know the eternal knower?" "It is different
from the known; it is above the unknown."10 Nothing whatsoever can
be predicated of it. Yet the search for Brahman is not futile. The
Upaniṣads reiterate that its realization is the supreme purpose of life.

Sometimes the Upaniṣads ascribe to Brahman irreconcilable attri-
butes in order to deny that there are in it any empirical predicates and
to show that it is totally other than anything we know. "That non-dual
Brahman, though never stirring, is swifter than the mind. The deva
[gods, that is to say, the senses] cannot reach it, for it moves ever in
front. Though standing still, it overtakes others who are running."11
The opposing predicates in these passages are ascribed to Brahman in
such a manner as to cancel each other and leave to the mind the idea
of an indefinable consciousness, free of all attributes. Pure conscious-
ness, in association with material upādhis, or limiting adjuncts, appears
to possess empirical qualities such as nearness or distance, rest or movement, like a transparent crystal that assumes different colors in the presence of flowers of different hues.

Brahman is free from limitations. It transcends time, space, and causality. Brahman is not in space, but is spaceless. This spacelessness is sometimes pointed out by describing Brahman as infinitely great and infinitely small. "In the beginning Brahman was all this. Brahman was one and infinite; infinite in the east, infinite in the south, infinite in the west, infinite in the north; above and below and everywhere infinite. East and the other regions do not exist for Brahman—no athwart, no beneath, no above."12 "Brahman is my self within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice, smaller than a grain of barley, smaller than a mustard seed, smaller than a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed. Brahman is my self within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds."13

The timelessness of Brahman is indicated by stating that it is free from the limitations of past, present, and future. Sometimes it is described as eternal, without beginning or end; sometimes as momentary, involving almost no time at all. "At whose feet, rolling on, the year with its days passes by—upon that immortal light of all lights the gods meditate as longevity."14 Brahman is described as of instantaneous duration, through the illustration of lightning. "It is like a flash of lightning; it is like a wink of the eye."15

Brahman is independent of causation. Causation operates only in the realm of becoming and cannot affect pure being. No change is possible in Brahman. It is itself causeless. "The knowing Self is not born; it does not die. It has not sprung from anything; nothing has sprung from it. Birthless, eternal, everlasting, and ancient, it is not killed when the body is killed."16

Brahman is not knowable in the ordinary sense. To be known, a thing must be made an object. Brahman, as pure consciousness, is the eternal subject; it cannot be made an object. One must presuppose Brahman in order to know objects; therefore one cannot know it as an object. Brahman, the substratum of all experience, cannot itself be an object of experience. But, more properly, one cannot even say that Brahman is a subject, for a subject must have an object to perceive. Nothing exists, however, except Brahman. All that can be said, then, of Brahman, is that it is. "Brahman is never seen but is the witness; Brahman is never heard but is the hearer; Brahman is never thought of but is the thinker; Brahman is never known but is the knower. There is no other witness but Brahman, no other hearer but Brahman, no other thinker but Brahman, no other knower but Brahman."17
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Brahman is infinite (bhumā). What is the Infinite? "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else—that is the Infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else—that is the finite. The Infinite is immortal; the finite is mortal."18

The Vedānta philosophy often describes Brahman by the term Saccidānanda, a compound consisting of three words: sat (existence, reality, or being), cit (consciousness or knowledge), and ānanda (bliss).

Brahman is existence. It does not exist, however, as an empirical object—for instance, a pot or a tree, perceived by a subject—but as absolute existence, without which material objects could not be perceived to exist. Just as a mirage cannot be seen without the desert, which is its unrelated substratum, so the universe cannot exist without Brahman. Further, when the Vedāntic process of negation is followed, step by step, to its conclusion, there remains a residuum of existence or being. No object, illusory or otherwise, can exist without the foundation of an immutable existence; and that is Brahman. Therefore, the term sat, or existence, as applied to Brahman, is the negation of both empirical reality and its correlative, unreality.

The unity of existence is the essence of the Upaniṣadic teachings. The multiplicity that men take to be real is not really so. "There is no differentiation whatsoever in Brahman. He goes from death to death who sees in it, as it were, differentiation."19 The tangible duality is māyā—an appearance. When the truth is experienced, duality does not exist. All experiences in the empirical world are māyā: "When there is duality, as it were, then one smells something, one sees something, one hears something, one says something."20 The phrase "as it were" (iva) is the very crux of the Upaniṣadic instruction regarding the universe and our daily life in it. Whenever the Upaniṣads concede the reality of the world, even in the slightest degree, the phrase "as it were" is implied, for anything other than Brahman is an appearance only.

An effect, apart from the cause, is nothing but a name, a mere matter of words; it is, in essence, the same as the cause. We distinguish cause from effect by superimposing upon the latter a name and a form for practical purposes in the empirical world. This name and form, apart from the substratum, are māyā. From the practical point of view, one may see a gold bracelet and a gold earring and the difference between them; but in truth they are only gold. It is the same with the ocean and its waves, which in essence are identical. Likewise it is the non-dual Brahman alone that appears as the universe and its objects. Just as, from the standpoint of name and form, one distinguishes between a bracelet and an earring, so, also, from the standpoint of name and form, one makes distinctions between the various objects.
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of the world. Yet all are in reality Brahman, for nothing whatsoever exists but Brahman. If a man believes that he sees something other than Brahman, he is being deceived by an illusion. What an ignorant person, a victim of māyā, regards as the universe, endowed with names and forms and characterized by the interplay of good and evil, pain and pleasure, and the other pairs of opposites, is realized by the illumined person to be the non-dual Brahman—just as the water of a mirage, seen by a deluded man, is realized by a knowing person to be dry sand. But saṁsāra, or the relative world, as such, the Upaniṣads warn, is māyā (māyā mātram īdam dvaitam) and not Brahman, or ultimate reality. Time, space, and causality, which are projected by māyā, create saṁsāra and account for its unreality. Māyā itself is unreal. Since the apparent multiplicity is in essence Brahman, one must understand Brahman in order to understand the universe. “By the realization of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection, and meditation, all this is known.”

Secondly, Brahman is cit, or consciousness. That consciousness, unlike the mind, is not related to any object. It is absolute consciousness, which illumines the activities of the senses and the mind during waking and dreaming, as well as their inactivity in dreamless sleep.

The soul is conceived of by many philosophers, in East and West alike, as something similar to reason, spirit, thought, or intelligence. The very conception of Ātman in the Upaniṣads implies that the first principle of things must above all be sought in man’s inmost self. The core of Yājñavalkya’s teachings in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad is that Brahman, or Ātman, is the knowing subject within us. “You cannot see that which is the seer of seeing; you cannot hear that which is the hearer of hearing; you cannot think of that which is the thinker of thought; you cannot know that which is the knower of knowledge. This is your Self that is within all; everything else is perishable.”

The consciousness of Ātman is never nonexistent. Ordinarily the experiences of the waking state are different from the experiences of a dream, and these, again, from the experience of deep sleep. But the consciousness that illumines all these mental states never changes. Brahman needs no other light to illumine itself. It is self-luminous. “The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor lightning, not to speak of fire. Everything shines because Brahman shines; by Brahman’s light everything is lighted.”

Brahman is, in the third place, bliss. “He perceived that bliss is Brahman.” Needless to say, this bliss is not to be confused with the pleasure that a man experiences when in contact with an agreeable sense object. Worldly pleasure is but an infinitesimal part of the bliss
of Brahman; it is the bliss of Brahman manifesting itself through an earthly medium.

The bliss of Brahman pervades all objects. Without it a man cannot live. "He who is self-created is bliss. A man experiences happiness by tasting that bliss. Who could breathe, who could live, if that bliss did not exist in his heart?" For a more vivid description: "It is not for the sake of the husband, my dear, that the husband is loved, but for the sake of the self that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the wife, my dear, that the wife is loved, but for the sake of the self that she is loved. It is not for the sake of the sons, my dear, that the sons are loved, but for the sake of the self that they are loved. It is not for the sake of wealth, my dear, that wealth is loved, but for the sake of the self that it is loved."

_Sat, cit, and ánanda_—existence, consciousness, and bliss—are not attributes of Brahman but its very essence. Brahman is not endowed with them: Brahman is existence itself, consciousness itself, and bliss itself. In the Absolute there is no distinction between substance and attributes. Existence, consciousness, and bliss refer to the same entity; when one of them is present, the other two are also present. Absolute being is absolute consciousness and absolute bliss.

To summarize the discussion of the attributeless Brahman: It is pure consciousness, the negation of all attributes and relations. Though it is spaceless, without it space could not exist; though it is timeless, without it time could not exist; though it is causeless, without it the universe, sustained by the law of cause and effect, could not exist. Without the unchanging white screen, one cannot relate in time or space the separate pictures on a cinema film. Likewise, only if one admits the reality of pure consciousness as an unchanging substratum can one understand proximity in space, succession in time, and interdependence in the chain of causation. No true description of it is possible except by the denial of all empirical attributes, definitions, and relations: _neti, neti_—"not this, not this."

Obviously, _Nirguna_ Brahman cannot be worshiped, prayed to, or meditated upon. No relationship whatsoever can be established with it. Yet this Brahman is not meaningless or altogether detached from the experienced world; for it is the very foundation of the relative universe. It is the _setu_ (dike) "that keeps asunder these worlds to prevent their clashing together." It is the unseen unity that pervades all relative existence and gives a strong metaphysical foundation to fellowship, love, unselfishness, and the other ethical virtues. Being the immortal essence of every man, it compels us to show respect to all, despite their illusory masks. Though it cannot be an object of formal devotion, yet
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it is what gives reality to the gods, being their inner substance, and
thus binds together all worshipers in the common quest of truth.

The attributeless Brahman is the basis of Saguna Brahman, of the
personal God, immanent in the universe and conditioned by mâyā.
Without any compulsion from outside, Brahman imposes upon itself
a limit, as it were, and thus becomes manifest as God, soul, and world.
Creation, preservation, and destruction are activities of Brahman with
attributes, mere waves on the surface of the ocean, which can never
touch the serene depths of the attributeless reality.

SAGUNA BRAHMAN

When Brahman becomes conditioned by the upâdhi, or limitation,
of mâyā, and shrinks, as it were, because of that mâyā, it is called
Saguna Brahman, the conditioned Brahman, Brahman with attributes.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the conditioning is not real,
but only apparent. Mâyā is Brahman’s inscrutable power; in associa-
tion with mâyā, Brahman becomes the dynamic creator of the universe.
Like the ocean, Brahman appears in two aspects. Pure Brahman is like
the calm ocean, without a ripple. Saguna Brahman is the ocean
agitated by the wind and covered with foaming waves. The ocean is
the same, whether it is peaceful or agitated. Similarly, a snake is the
same, whether it remains coiled up or wriggles about. It is mâyā that
creates the apparent difference between the conditioned and the un-
conditioned Brahman. Mâyā, as we shall see, has no independent
reality. It inheres in Brahman as the power of Brahman.

MÂ YÂ

The doctrine of mâyā can be traced to the Rg Veda. In the Upani-
śadic philosophy this doctrine is applied to the sphere of metaphysics
and is thus enlarged. Without the concept of mâyā, such ideas as the
unity of existence, the reality of Âtman, and the unreality of the uni-
verse independent of Âtman, as discussed in the Upaniṣads, become
meaningless. It was, however, the later Vedântists, such as Vyāsa,
Gauḍapâda, and Śaṅkarâcârya, who fully developed the doctrine and
embodied it in their respective systems of thought.

The Upaniṣadic teachers came to the conclusion that the essence of
things is not given in objects as they present themselves to our senses
in space and time. The entire aggregate of experience, external and
internal, shows us merely how they appear to us, not how they are in
themselves. Empirical knowledge does not give true knowledge, or
vidyā, but belongs to the realm of “ignorance,” or avidyā. The Upani-
śadic philosophers, through a rigorous process of discrimination, analyzed both the individual soul and the universe. All that does not belong to the inalienable substance of things they considered as non-self and hence stripped it away. The conclusion they arrived at was that the “great, omnipresent Ātman,” which is greater than heaven, space, and earth, is, at the same time, present—“small as a grain of rice,” whole and undivided—in man’s own self. The universal Self is identical with the individual self.

A well-known text in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad describes the yearning of the aspirant to be led from the unreal to the real, from darkness to light, from death to immortality. The Isa Upaniṣad states that the “door of the truth” is veiled with a “golden disc.” This veil must be removed that the seeker may behold the truth. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad teaches that a sage never finds reality and certainty in the unrealities and uncertainties of the world.

Śaṅkarācārya admits the two standpoints from which truth can be observed. As already stated, the one is the relative standpoint, the other the absolute. From the relative standpoint, time, space, and causality cannot be denied. Multiplicity bears the stamp of reality. Good and evil exist; so also pleasure and pain. The gods, heaven, and the afterlife are all real. The Vedas ask those who are conscious of the body, and who therefore believe in duality and seek celestial happiness, to propitiate the deities through sacrifices, according to the scriptural injunctions. Further, they are asked to discharge their social responsibilities through philanthropic activities. The elaborate system of theology, cosmology, ethics, spiritual discipline, and methods of worship given in the Vedas was all based on the admission of the empirical reality of the individual ego and the manifold universe. The division of Hindu society into four castes, and of the individual life into four stages, implies a recognition of the relative world. The insistence on the pursuit of righteousness, wealth, and sense pleasures, along with final liberation, shows that the Vedāntists appreciate human values and are solicitous for human happiness. They never considered the world to be nonexistent or without significance, in the sense that a barren woman’s son is unreal.

Relativity is māyā. That the One appears as the many, the Absolute as the relative, the Infinite as the finite, is māyā. The doctrine of māyā recognizes the reality of multiplicity from the relative standpoint, and simply states that the relationship between empirical reality and the Absolute cannot be described or known. How is it that the infinite Brahman’s appearance as the finite world cannot be grasped by the finite mind? The very limitation of the mind precludes a satis-
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factory answer to this question. In fact, there is no relationship between the One and the many, since there can be a relationship only between two existing entities that are genuine in the same way. The One and the many do not exist in the same sense. When a man sees the One, he does not see the manifold universe. When anyone, seeing the manifold universe, attempts to establish a relationship of any kind between it and the non-dual Brahman, the non-dualists call that notion of relationship māyā. A mirage is māyā, and so, too, is its relationship with the desert. It is because of māyā that one sees a snake in place of a rope, water in the desert, and multiplicity in place of the non-dual Brahman. But no one can explain how the rope has become the snake; the desert, the mirage; and the non-dual Brahman, the manifold universe, for the simple reason that such becoming is not real, but apparent. Māyā is not an explanation of the universe, but only a statement of fact. Vedāntists admit that for our practical life there is a difference between illusions, dreams, and the experiences of the waking state, but insist that from the standpoint of the Absolute they are all equally unreal.

Non-dualists describe creation as the illusory superimposition (adhyāropā) upon Brahman, through māyā, of names and forms, which can be negated by true insight. They explain this subtle concept by means of illustrations. The following is sometimes used: Once a flock of sheep was grazing on a wooded hillside. Suddenly a lioness jumped upon one of the sheep and in so doing gave birth to a lion-cub and died. The cub grew up among the sheep and considered itself as one of them. It ate grass as they did and bleated. One day a lion from the forest chanced to see the flock and was amazed to find a lion there. As it pounced upon the sheep-lion, the latter began to bleat. The wild lion dragged the sheep-lion to a pool of water and asked it to look at its reflection. Then it pushed some meat into the frightened creature’s mouth, gave a loud roar, and asked the sheep-lion to roar also. Instantly the veil of oblivion fell off and the deluded sheep-lion discovered its true nature. It was through ignorance alone that the lion had regarded itself as a sheep and acted like one. This is a case of illusory superimposition. Through the power of māyā, names and forms are attributed to Brahman, and the relative universe comes into existence. Through the negation (apavāda) of the illusory manifold, Brahman, or pure consciousness, again becomes manifest. The true nature of Brahman is not in the least affected by the superimposition of illusory notions, which appear to be real to the ignorant.

It is through māyā that Brahman, which is the eternal subject, becomes an object of knowledge. Māyā obscures the reality of Brah-
man. The Self, in reality ever free and infinite, regards itself as a finite entity bound to the world. Seeking liberation, this seemingly finite self practices spiritual discipline, such as study of scripture, self-control, and concentration—all of which have meaning in the world of māyā—and at last realizes Brahman, its true, infinite Self. This means that as the veil of māyā disappears the everlasting light of Brahman reveals itself.

It is Saguna Brahman who is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the universe, and also the object of man’s worship, as the personal God, under such names as Śiva, Viṣṇu, Kālī, and Rāma. Many striking passages are found in the Upaniṣads and other similar Hindu texts describing the glories of Saguna Brahman, e.g., “Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, seeing without eyes, hearing without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows Him. They call Him the First, the Great Person.”

The Upaniṣads contain texts supporting realism, theism, and pantheism. These different standpoints serve to help students at different stages of spiritual evolution. As already stated, the very perception of the external universe is the result of māyā. But the fundamental thought that runs through the whole body of the Upaniṣads is the sole reality of Brahman. Even when the reality of the universe is conceded, the purpose of stressing its reality is to maintain that the manifold universe is not essentially different from Brahman. But the reality of multiplicity, independent of Brahman, is denied when it is reiterated that with the knowledge of Brahman everything is known. What the wise see as the non-dual reality, the unillumined see, on account of māyā, as the manifold universe. Therefore, though perceived by the ignorant to be immanent, Brahman remains transcendent. “It is inside all this and it is outside all this.” The Kaṭha Upaniṣad clearly describes both the immanent and the transcendent aspects of Brahman: “As the same non-dual fire, after it has entered the world, becomes different according to whatever it burns, so, also, the same non-dual Âtman, dwelling in all beings, becomes different according to whatever it enters. And it exists also without.” Though immanent in the universe, Brahman remains unaffected by its limitations. “As the sun, which helps all eyes to see, is not affected by the blemishes of the eyes or of the external things revealed by it, so, also, the non-dual Âtman, dwelling in all beings, is never contaminated by the misery of the world, being outside it.”

The following is a vivid description of the immanent Brahman: “In the beginning the Creator stood alone. He had no happiness when alone. Through meditation He brought into existence many creatures.
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He looked on them and saw that they were without understanding, like a lifeless post, like a stone. He thought, 'I shall enter within, that they may awake.' Making Himself like air, He entered within."

We have seen that the Upaniṣads deal with the two aspects of Brahman, the unconditioned and the conditioned. The former is pure consciousness and the immutable foundation of the universe. Again, in association with māyā it becomes conditioned and is known as the Great Lord of the universe, who, from the standpoint of the Absolute, is mutable and impermanent. Knowledge of pure consciousness is called higher knowledge, and that of the universe, lower knowledge. Higher knowledge brings about immediate liberation, resulting in the cessation of all suffering and the attainment of supreme bliss. Lower knowledge leads to the realization of the World Soul (the personal God), the highest manifestation of Brahman in the relative universe. Through realizing one's identity with the World Soul one can enjoy great happiness in time and space. But still this is not immortality. The goal of the spiritual life, as conceived by the Indo-Aryan seers, is higher knowledge. But lower knowledge is not to be neglected or despised. One who is identified with the ego and the body, and accepts the outside world as real, only feels confused if he follows the austere discipline of negation as laid down for attaining higher knowledge. Lower knowledge leads by gradual steps to higher knowledge. From experience and through reasoning one knows the transitoriness of lower knowledge and also of the results obtained from it. The infinite soul can never remain satisfied with finite experiences. When disillusioned about the assumed permanence of lower knowledge, the aspirant renounces attachment to all objects governed by the law of causality and thus prepares himself for higher knowledge. The Mūndaka Upaniṣad exhorts the pupil to cultivate both higher knowledge and lower knowledge. "The fetters of the heart are broken, all doubts are resolved, and all works cease to bear fruit, when He is beheld who is both high and low."34 Through higher knowledge one realizes the deathlessness of the soul. This knowledge itself is liberation.

The unconditioned Brahman and the conditioned Brahman are not fundamentally different entities. It is māyā that creates the apparent difference. Rāmakṛṣṇa compared the Absolute to the infinite ocean, and the conditioned Brahman to blocks of ice. Intense cold freezes the water of the ocean into solid ice; again, the blazing heat of the sun melts the ice into water. On account of the intense love of the aspirant, Brahman, with the help of māyā, embodies itself and becomes God with form; again, the discrimination and knowledge of the aspirant, like the heat of the sun, melt the form into the in-
definable Absolute. When a bird—to use another illustration of Rāmakṛṣṇa's—gets tired by continuously flying in the sky, it seeks a tree to rest its weary wings. Likewise, a seer of truth, when not in communion with the pure Brahman, enjoys the embodied forms of the Godhead. "Even the sages, who experience the bliss of communion with the inmost Self and have cut all the bonds of the world, show for Hari (that is to say, the personal God) love which is utterly free from motive—such is His wonderful glory."

Māyā exercises its bewitching power upon the unillumined; but the sages, whose minds are enlightened by knowledge of Brahman, see in the relative universe created by māyā the manifestation of Brahman. To them everything, even māyā, is Brahman. They do not deny the forms of God or the creation. Whether contemplating the Absolute or participating in the relative, they see only Brahman everywhere—in the undifferentiated Absolute and in names and forms as well. Māyā cannot delude them. They regard it as the sport (līlā) of God. Rāmakṛṣṇa used to say that to accept names and forms divorced from the reality of Brahman is ajñāna, ignorance; to see Brahman alone, and deny the world, is jñāna, philosophical knowledge; but to see Brahman everywhere, in names and forms, in good and evil, in pain and pleasure, in action as well as in the depths of meditation, is vijñāna, a supremely rich knowledge. Endowed with this supreme knowledge, vijñāna, emancipated souls commune, in silence, with Brahman, and devote themselves, when not in meditation, to the service of the world.

NOTES

18. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*.
CHAPTER XIII

Certain Basic Concepts of Western Realism and Their Relation to Oriental Thought

JOHN WILD

The issues that can be settled by the application of scientific method to the restricted fields of what we now call the sciences are not the fundamental issues that divide men into warring camps, and which lead to the most serious and tragic conflicts of individual men and cultures. We know how easy it is for scientific results to be reconciled with the most divergent philosophic systems. Idealists accept them; materialists accept them; pluralists and dualists accept them. Monists accept them. The West certainly accepts them. The East accepts them. This is because these results concern only certain limited phases of reality, particularly its measurable phases, and not the basic structure of reality itself. For the understanding of this a more basic science is required, the one which we here represent.

No doubt we represent it in many varying ways, but, in spite of the divergent cultures and traditions from which we come, in all of them philosophy is recognized as a distinctive discipline with a peculiar object of its own, requiring peculiar methods and lives of complete concentration for the attainment of any lasting results. It is to this discipline, it seems to me, that we owe our first obligation.

I have never been able to discover precisely what is really meant by the phrase "American philosophy," now widely current in my own country. If it is American, then *ipso facto* it is not universally true, and hence not sound philosophy. If it is philosophy, then it is true, and *ipso facto* not American. The same considerations, I think, apply to "Eastern philosophy," "Western philosophy," etc. What such phrases really mean, I suppose, is the effort to achieve philosophic truth which has taken place *in* America, *in* China, etc. No doubt the geographic names indicate certain cultural attitudes and limitations
which have restricted and impeded the enterprise in various areas of the surface of the earth, for the enterprise is a most difficult and arduous one. I know how hard it is to overcome such cultural limitations, and I am deeply conscious of them in what I am going to say.

Nevertheless, the aim of philosophy, as of all science, wherever it occurs, is to gain a certain detachment from such extraneous, particularizing influences, in order to penetrate to what is really sound and true. Unless this happens to some degree, the whole enterprise is fantastic and absurd, and should be abandoned. Hence, I shall address you not as "Eastern philosophers" or as "Western philosophers," not as Northern or as Southern, but as philosophers, coming together in order to compare notes, and to see whether we can bring together into some stable solution the tiny drops we may severally have gained from the great ocean of truth.

The task confronting us is not merely one of devising ingenious formulations for the purpose of attaining agreement amongst ourselves. What we are concerned with is a prior and more difficult task, that of attaining agreement amongst ourselves concerning the nature of existence itself. This must carry us beyond language and syntax, beyond methodology, beyond ethics, and certainly beyond epistemology to the more foundational regions of metaphysics, or, as it was first called in the West, first philosophy. Hence, the principle of synthesis I shall attempt to present for your examination and criticism is a metaphysical principle, the principle of being and its diverse modes, and this paper will fall into the following five divisions.

First, I shall attempt briefly to explain this principle, its connection with empirical method in philosophy, and its irenic uses. The general problem of this Conference is to seek a way of harmonizing the philosophy of the East with that of the West. But surely it is futile to discuss the union of two things, each of which is really divided by deep schisms. There is clearly a prior problem. How is the West to be reconciled with the West, the East with the East?

Therefore, in the second place, I shall try to show how the first principles of metaphysics may be used in an irenic manner to harmonize some of the deeper philosophical issues which have arisen within the West as well as the East, idealism versus materialism, and absolutism versus pluralism. Needless to say, I must be content with a brief outline, for there is no time for adequate expansion.

Then, third, I shall attempt the very risky task of analyzing the basic differences between philosophy as it has been developed in the East and philosophy as it has been developed in the West, a task which I am sure must be first undertaken before any adequate synthesis can
be made, and which in my opinion has been so far largely neglected by this Conference. How is a synthesis possible unless we first know what we are trying to synthesize?

After suggesting certain points of difference, I shall then, in the fourth place, examine the categories by which Mr. Northrop attempts to explain these differences. In my opinion, these categories need to be clarified and enriched.

Finally, I shall suggest such a modified set of categories, and attempt to show how they may serve to shed some light on the major problem of this Conference.

Of course, all philosophic ideas have their antecedents, and mine are no exception. I have learned such philosophy as I have from the Western tradition of realistic thought to which Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and many modern and contemporary thinkers have contributed. But the basic concepts which have been developed and refined by this tradition are common to mankind, and my superficial acquaintance with Oriental philosophy has already shown me that they have also been critically studied in the East. These suggestions are presented, of course, in a hypothetical and tentative way, and are subject at every point to completion, correction, castigation, and downright amputation, if necessary.

**BEING AS A PRINCIPLE OF SYNTHESIS**

It has been suggested that the best way of achieving cultural or philosophical synthesis lies in the adoption of an attitude of relativity toward all systematic positions. There is some truth in this way of putting the matter. But I think that it must be protected from the charge of abandoning the concept of truth. What we desire is not only a synthesis but a *true* synthesis which can be verified by accessible evidence. Theories are not purely subjective instruments. They intend or refer to reality, and the first obligation of the philosopher is to *being* as it really is.

When we are confronted with conflicting philosophical views which divide human minds and cultures, let us, then, not only regard these views impartially, but let us look at the facts themselves to which they all refer. Let us see if we cannot observe some basis in these facts for each of the conflicting views. The world is full of a great number of things. It may be that each view sees something really there which the other does not see. It may be that each is perhaps correct in its affirmations, but wrong in its negations. In this way, we may be able to achieve not only a subjective synthesis but a synthesis based upon actual evidence.
JOHN WILD

I am not suggesting, of course, that all philosophical disagreements may be resolved by this method. I do think, however, that a large number of them can be. This will depend upon our discovering certain over-arching structures in reality which may be expressed by concepts of far-reaching scope. Are there any concepts of this sort? In particular, is there any one concept holding everything whatsoever within its scope? If so, it should be of extraordinary interest to any mind seeking the broadest possible basis for cultural synthesis.

There is such a concept with a real objective reference. In our language it is symbolized by the word being. But it is well known to the philosophers of many different cultures under many different names, and certainly has been deeply and critically studied, though in ways with which I am less familiar, in the East. Hence, I shall begin by making an attempt to summarize very briefly certain results which have emerged from this study of being in the Western tradition, with which I am less unfamiliar.

All that exists in any way falls within the range of this concept. Every other concept is of some mode or kind or part of existence. At first we are inclined to believe that it is simply an abstract universal of widest scope, related to other concepts as any genus is related to its species. But, as Aristotle first pointed out, this is not the case, for a genus abstracts from its differences, and cannot be predicated of them. Thus the genus animal contains a number of traits which do not belong to rationality as such, or to brute as such. Therefore, we cannot say that rationality is animal. But being and certain other characters, like truth and unity, attending it wherever it is found, permeate their own differences which also exist and are one. If being were an abstract universal, or a supreme genus, as has often been supposed, it would have to be abstracted from all real differences. If so, it would be the emptiest of all concepts, and actually equivalent to nothing, as Hegel pointed out. But it does not abstract from its differences in this way. It includes them all within its range. Hence, it is not the emptiest but rather the richest of all concepts.

This thesis may be verified by anyone taking the trouble to examine the matter with care. It is also true of the basic modes of being such as possibility, actuality, and noetic existence. Such a mode of existence is not abstracted from the entities or essences which exist in its mode, but permeates them all from the highest down to the lowest. This indicates that existence is a peculiar kind of structure which is apprehended in a non-abstractive manner, quite distinct from that in which essences or determinate natures are apprehended by specific and generic concepts.
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Every true judgment is the assertion of some act of existing. Therefore, the concept of being is not only involved in all other concepts, but also in all true propositions. Only nothingness lies beyond its absolutely universal scope. Hence, the opposition between being and non-being is the most absolute and unqualified of all oppositions. There is no structure which bridges the gap between the two, no concept which can embrace them both. Thus the so-called law of contradiction, which expresses this most fundamental and unqualified opposition, is a principle presupposed by all other intelligible assertions, just as the concept of being is presupposed by all other concepts.

Every concept is of some mode or kind of being. Hence, when we really become confused about something with which we are confronted in the mysterious flux of experience, we ask the philosophic question—what is it? (τι ἔστι;?) This question can be satisfied only by an answer which expresses the relation of the thing in question to being. This is achieved in part by what has traditionally been called a real definition showing the essential traits in terms of genera and species. But this understanding can be completed only by also discovering what kind of existence it has, whether it is actual or only potential, and whether the entity is an extrametual reality, or only an object before the mind.

There is no time here to attempt any further development of the few insights which have been achieved in the West concerning this most basic and mysterious concept and its even more mysterious object. This must suffice. But a word must be said concerning its methodological importance in connection with the problems of philosophical empiricism and synthesis.

Being is said in many senses, or as the Greek saying runs: τὸ ἀφ 
πολλαχῶς λέγεται. The great enemy of true empiricism is an a priori dogmatism, often exemplified in the history of Western thought, which identifies being with some particular mode or manifestation, and denies any other. Thus, being has been identified with absolute, infinite existence, with material being, and with mental being. One of the common manifestations of this reductionist tendency is now connected with a widespread use of the term experience, meaning something that is subject to certain conditions of human knowledge, usually certain conditions of sensory knowledge. When experience in this sense is tacitly assumed at the start of a philosophical investigation to be equivalent to being, reductionism is at work.

We have no right to make such an assumption at the beginning of any philosophical inquiry. There is nothing about the notion of being which requires that it be restricted to the conditions of ex-
perience, of sensory experience, or of any conditions at all. In fact, it contains all such possible conditions within its scope, and still leaves room for many more. Only nothingness is excluded from its unrestricted range. Experience, whatever it may turn out to be, is necessarily some kind of being. But being is not necessarily some kind of experience. Hence, the concepts are not equivalent, as is so often assumed.

If the empirical attitude means the willingness to examine all evidence without bigotry or a priori dogmatism, and to be determined by the evidence alone, then the concept of being must be regarded as the indispensable protector of such an attitude. Any other concept adopted at the beginning of an inquiry must involve the making of tacit assumptions concerning what being must be. This is to indulge in a form of a priori prejudice which is the antithesis of true scientific inquiry. Without a careful examination of the evidence we have no right to assume that being is nothing but experience, nothing but matter, nothing but mind and ideas, or nothing but unqualified existence. Such assumptions are all forms of reductionism.

I am now going to argue in the time at my disposal that if we follow the actual evidence, we shall discover that all these phases and modes of being exist, and that the denial of any of them is to indulge in a type of prejudice which is unnecessarily blind to ranges of accessible evidence. This, I believe, if so, may have a very direct relevance to the problems of this Conference.

MODES OF BEING AND PHILOSOPHIC SYNTHESIS

Our cognitive faculties can grasp the essence of a thing by a clear and distinct idea, or a definition, in so far as it is complex. These essences are fully determinate, and it is easy to grasp their differences from one another. The existence which completes and actualizes the essence, however, is less easy for us to grasp. Since it is always found together with the essence it actualizes, and since it therefore corresponds point for point with the essence, it is easy for us to assume that, when we have defined a thing, this is the end of the matter. Thus existence is ignored, or simply merged with essence, which has no degrees or modes, but simply is what it is.

This is a great oversimplification of the facts. An essence as such is merely a possibility, and it makes a great difference whether or not it actually exists. Furthermore, this existence can be attained in various modes which it is most important to understand and distinguish. Thus, what we have called essence ordinarily possesses an
imperfect mode of existence which we may call *potency* or *capacity*, since it is something that *can be* actualized.

When it emerges from its causes and is realized in nature, it possesses another mode of existence which we may call *reality*. Since each essence is limited as only one kind of being and since existence always corresponds to essence, such realities will always be finite or limited. They will be this existence or that, not existence itself.

If there were any such being, it could contain no distinction between essence and realization, for it would be the act of existence itself. Hence, it would exist necessarily. Whether there is any such being or not is a disputed point which can be settled only by a close examination of the evidence. There is nothing about being, so far as we know it, however, that would rule it out as impossible. Considerable evidence of many kinds has led great thinkers of the East as well as of the West to the conclusion that such an unqualified, or necessary, existence does actually exist.

Thus we have three modes of existence or modal categories as they have been called—the possible, the actual, and the necessary—each of which is contained within the possible range of the concept of being. There is no time here to examine the evidence carefully in each case. We must be content merely with the blunt statement that evidence has been found for the actual existence of all three modes of being, and that no contradiction is necessarily involved in accepting the implications of this evidence that such is the case. If these modes of existence are granted, we then have in our hands a way of reconciling certain forms of monistic and pluralistic reductionism that have caused important philosophical cleavages in the East as well as in the West.

If certain thinkers, focusing and carefully analyzing the evidence which points to the existence of finite possibilities and actualities in the universe, work out a pluralistic theory which asserts the existence of a large number of such finite entities, we may accept their conclusion. If, however, they become so obsessed by their theory as to ignore the evidence, derived from causal principles as well as direct experience, which points to the existence of unqualified and unrestricted existence, or attempt to misinterpret or distort this evidence so as to make it fit their reductionist finitism, we must negate their negations. This synthetic principle also works the other way. If a thinker is rationally convinced by an impartial scrutiny of evidence pointing to unqualified existence that such a being exists, we may accept his affirmations so far as the evidence bears them out. But, if he then ignores that which clearly points to finite modes of existence, or dis-
torts it to fit with his reductionist absolutism, we must negate his negations. There is room in being for both these modes and many more. There is no need for negating any one mode or for forcing it into another.

Similar considerations may play an important role in the resolution of the issues between traditional forms of idealism and realism or naturalism. This will require, however, the recognition of a fourth mode of relational or noetic existence in addition to the three already mentioned.

Physical entities in nature have an actual existence that is private and restricted to their material dimensions. As such, they cannot know. But certain entities, including man, have cognitive faculties possessing another relational mode of existence which enables them to reach out and to become noetically identified with existences physically distinct from themselves, and with their own existence. Thus a single human individual by the proper use of his cognitive faculties may transcend his subjective loneliness, identify himself cognitively with the farthest reaches of the material universe—with the past, which no longer physically exists at all, and with the future, which does not yet physically exist—and share his ideas and thoughts with others through human communication and discourse.

The very same physical entity—for instance, this chair—may enjoy its own subjective, physical existence, and yet also become the object of a relational mode of existence possessed by a knowing mind, without undergoing any change whatsoever. And yet these two modes of existence are clearly not the same, for, as indicated, I can make something noetically present before the mind which is not physically present at all. Furthermore, many things which are physically present or inherent in me are not known by me, as, for example, the detailed cortical configurations of my brain. Nevertheless, it is very easy to confuse the two modes of presence or to reduce the one to the other.

Thus the idealist, paying attention to the evidence of human knowledge and rational discourse, rightly defends the immateriality of knowledge which becomes noetically identified with things physically quite distinct from the knower. In this he is right. But if he becomes so impressed by this mode of existence as to ignore every other, or to insist that the only kind of existence a thing can have is to be present before a cognitive faculty, he is going too far. His negations must be negated. In addition to objective, cognitive existence, entities may also have a subjective, material existence which is restricted to their physical dimensions, and which marks them off from other entities. I may share my immaterial thoughts. But my physical attributes belong to me alone and cannot be shared. A wide range of evidence,
WESTERN REALISM AND ORIENTAL THOUGHT

derived from both external and internal experience, seems to support
the conclusion that such restricted, physical entities exist.

The naturalist, or materialist, is, I think, rightly impressed by this.
But when he takes the next step and denies that there is any mode of
existence other than this more easily imagined and familiar one, he is
going too far. He must then try to explain the indubitable facts of
knowledge exclusively in terms of those categories which adequately
describe the private, subjective nature of material things and attrib-
utes. This leads toward a radical subjectivism which does not so
much explain knowledge as explain it away. Such negativism or re-
ductionism should also be negated. Both the naturalist and the idealist
are right in their affirmations—wrong in their negations. There is
room for both modes of existence, and both should be recognized in
any genuinely empirical philosophy which respects the very rich and
complex evidence.

I realize that this exposition of four modes of being—the possible,
the actual, the necessary, and the noetic—has been very brief. I know
that more explanation and argument are required to clarify it fully.
I think, however, that the basic conceptions involved have been
formulated and studied in the East as well as in the West. I hope,
therefore, that in spite of this sketchy outline I may have been able to
suggest a possible way of synthesizing certain basic cleavages which
have marked the history of both Eastern and Western thought.

But the more difficult problem of the relation between Eastern
philosophy as a whole and Western philosophy still remains. In the
rest of this paper I shall try to make certain suggestions concerning
the nature of this problem. In the first place, are there any underlying
differences between Eastern and Western thought?

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EASTERN
AND WESTERN THOUGHT

The question raised here is, of course, a very difficult one. Never-
thel ess, it underlies the whole problem of synthesis in which we are all
interested. Before we can speak intelligently of synthesizing, we must
first gain some conception of the positions we are trying to synthesize,
and how they differ, if at all. The direct discussion of this delicate
matter has on the whole been avoided at these meetings. But surely
this is the place to discuss it. I am offering a few tentative suggestions
now in the hope that they may stimulate a fuller consideration of the
matter by those much better qualified to speak than I.

Two opposed positions have been expressed by members of the
Conference. On the one hand, there are those who hold that no gener-
alizations concerning either Eastern or Western philosophy can be safely made. The situation is too complex. In each field we have a vast variety of different philosophies, some of which are as extremely opposed to each other as any representatives of the East are opposed to representatives of the West. On the other hand, there is Mr. Northrop, who takes the position that there is a sharp and clear-cut epistemological divergence between Eastern and Western philosophy, the former being dominated by a method of immediate intuition and a resulting sense of continuity, the latter by a method of abstract postulation and a resulting sense of discontinuity and pluralism. At this point I should like to follow the example of my Chinese friends in seeking a middle position.

I am ready to accept the fact which has been so convincingly explained and illustrated to us in our meetings that there is a vast variety of philosophical theories in the East, that all the major forms of Western thought are to be found there, and that the same basic issues of pluralism versus monism, idealism versus realism, etc., have arisen. On the other hand, I cannot escape the impression that there are certain underlying differences of tone and emphasis which need to be studied and, if really existent, to be explained. These differences, it seems to me, are three in number. Two of them have been discussed by Mr. Northrop in a certain way. In my opinion, this way of dealing with them needs to be toned down and altered in certain respects. Also a third, more fundamental difference needs to be added, as I shall now try to explain.

(1) I believe that Mr. Northrop is correct in calling attention to the fact that in Oriental thought one finds a greater emphasis on the apprehension or intuition of something which is eminently concrete, and yet relatively vague and hard to pin down in precise definitions. In Western thought, on the other hand, one finds an opposed emphasis upon fixed and determinate objects which may be clearly and distinctly defined, and from which deductive consequences may be more readily drawn. I hope that it will be noted that I am putting this not as an exclusive opposition, but rather as one of tendency and degree.

Of course, one finds logical analysis, determinate definitions, and deduction in the East. In their complete absence no disciplined reflection would be possible. But at the same time one finds a deeply developed sense of the partiality and inadequacy of what can be grasped in this way, and of the presence of something else requiring another and less abstract mode of apprehension. I suggest the influential Jaina principle of syādvāda as an example of this in India. For China, I refer simply to the statement of Mr. Chan that Chinese philosophers
shunned abstraction and generalities and were interested more in a
good life and a good society than in organized knowledge. 6

In Western thought, on the other hand, there is, of course, a recogn-
nition of the concrete and actual, which is never exhausted by exact
definition and logical analysis. But at the same time one can discern
a predominant tendency never to rest satisfied with such vague in-
tuitions, but to reduce them to precise, essential definitions, though
this effort never fully succeeds. This contrast, I believe, as a matter
of relative emphasis, can be defended.

(2) I cannot follow Mr. Northrop’s exposition of what he calls the
“aesthetic continuum.” 6 I find no evidence for this in my own ex-
perience, which is always differentiated. Nevertheless, in his discussions
of this obscure topic he does, it seems to me, suggest a certain general
difference between Eastern and Western thought which, if modified
in certain respects and stated as a matter of relative emphasis, may
also be defended. Eastern philosophy, of course, has had its pluralisms,
as in the case of Theravāda Buddhism, 7 and Western philosophy its
monisms, as in the case of Spinoza. Nevertheless, when one compares
the two traditions in general, one may notice a stronger tendency in
the East toward integration and the synthesis of distinctions, as op-
posed to a stronger tendency in the West toward separation and the
analysis of complex wholes. Mr. Chan has stressed this “tendency and
ability to synthesize” as “one of the outstanding facts in the history
of Chinese philosophy.” 8 The strong tendency toward monism in
Indian philosophy is well known.

As a concrete example of this synthesizing tendency, I offer the
example of philosophy itself, which in the East has certainly been
pursued in an integral manner without sharply separating the diverse
disciplines of metaphysics, logic, ethics, etc. All philosophy is regarded
as an essential aspect of the good life and integrally viewed from this
perspective. In India we have been told that even in the realistic
Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools philosophy was regarded in this way,
and Mr. Chan has emphasized the fact that “knowledge and conduct
were identified in most Chinese philosophers.” 9 In fact, I think it is
ture that in the case of every Eastern philosophy so far expounded to
us this integration of philosophy with human life, in what we now
recognize as the “existentialist” manner, has been a prominent feature.

In the West, however, from the time of the Greeks, these disci-
plines, though recognized as interdependent, have nevertheless been
very sharply separated, so that they have almost completely fallen
apart. This I offer as a rather striking example of what I think can
legitimately be understood as a predominantly integrative tendency
in Eastern thought, as opposed to a predominantly analytic tendency in Western thought.

(3) I now come to a difference which has not been specifically discussed by Mr. Northrop, though it has been obliquely referred to by him and by other members of this Conference. In my opinion this difference penetrates to the very heart of the matter. I refer especially to the paper by Mr. Suzuki, his interesting remarks on Kierkegaard, and his suggestive statements that: "Prajñā is existential and not dialectical"; that "it does not work with logical formulas and abstractions," but "is a concrete fact in itself"; and finally that it is "not a paradox but a direct statement [by the men of prajñā] of their living existential experience."¹⁰

These statements, in my opinion, convey the most basic difference in emphasis which so far has distinguished the philosophy of the East from that of the West, and on the basis of which all the other differences may best be understood. Of course, both principles of being, the determinate whatness of a thing and the existence which realizes and activates it, have been recognized in the East as well as the West. But the Eastern mind has been less deeply interested in the various determinate aspects into which an entity may be analyzed than in the integral existence which activates all of these aspects together at once, and which brings them into concrete actuality.

Suppose now for the sake of the argument that some such differences as these actually exist between philosophy in the East and philosophy in the West: on the one hand, a greater concern for essences which may be apprehended by clear and distinct ideas and definitions, with a resulting tendency toward pluralism; and, on the other hand, a greater concern for the more inclusive structure of existence which is apprehended by richer but vaguer ideas, with a resulting tendency toward synthesis. How are these differences to be understood and explained?

This is a most crucial step in the investigation, for on it must depend the possibility or the impossibility of attaining any sound and fruitful synthesis. If we decide that the actual evidence justifies only one attitude or the other, we must abandon any such hope. Each side may listen politely to the other, but each will eventually go its own way, guided by its basic metaphysical convictions. If, on the other hand, we may rationally hold that the evidence is rich enough to sustain both views, and if we have concepts basic enough to express this evidence, then we may hope for a synthesis in which each may actually learn something from the other without negation or contradiction.
Mr. Northrop has attempted to perform this difficult task of synthesis by offering an epistemological explanation of these differences between Oriental and Western thought. Certain phases of this explanatory scheme can be accepted as intelligible and in accordance with the facts. But others, I think, require further clarification and revision for reasons which I shall now attempt briefly to summarize.

(1) When I examine my own "immediate" experience so far as I can, I find that everything there, so far as I am aware of it, is differentiated. I cannot find a purely "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum." When I think away all differences, nothing remains. It is true that beyond the focus of attention there is a vague undifferentiated fringe which James and others have described. But such confusion and indistinctness arise rather from an indetermination of the apprehending faculties which are focused elsewhere than from anything which is apprehended. This is clearly indicated by the fact that as soon as I turn my attention to this fringe, I find that it becomes a differentiated object of some kind.

(2) Mr. Northrop wishes to escape from the epistemological problems involved in the traditional concept of a "mind" or "noetic faculty." Hence, he simply identifies immediate intuition with the existence that is intuited. To know something immediately is to become existentially merged with the thing. But this is to fall into a basic ontological confusion of two distinct modes of existence. The being that an object may have before a noetic faculty is not to be identified with the being it has in itself. The chemist can know water without becoming physically liquefied.

(3) Mr. Northrop describes his experience of "the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" as wholly "ineffable" and even applies this term to his immediate awareness of the color green, which he claims must be wholly indescribable and unintelligible to a color-blind person. This, I believe, is incorrect. Even a color-blind person would understand what was meant by saying that green was a color. Even a completely blind person would understand what was meant by saying that it was a quality. And even a blind child of six would understand what was meant by saying that it was something. No actual or conceivable experience is wholly ineffable, not even that of an "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum." If these predicates may be truly applied to it, then surely it is not "ineffable."

(4) Even if there were such an intuition (which I certainly lack)
of an undifferentiated continuum, I do not see how Mr. Northrop could be correct in identifying it, as he attempts to do, with Aristotelian matter, which never exists alone and by itself apart from some differentiating and determinate form, with James’s fringe of consciousness, with the ultimate emptiness or thusness of Buddhism, the Tao, and the Brahma of Vedanta philosophy. These conceptions are too radically distinct. It is especially hard for me to see how anything that can be properly referred to as a continuum is to be identified with the indivisible unity of the Brahma of Advaita Vedanta philosophy, which is altogether without parts of any kind.

(5) Mr. Northrop first sharply opposes the “immediate,” “private,” “intuitive” knowledge by inspection that is characteristic of the East to the “indirect,” “communicable,” “postulational” knowledge that is characteristic of the West. But then he says that intelligible, postulational theories concerning definite, structuralized entities must be verified by immediate inspection. This seems to me to be true, but to be definitely inconsistent with the original sharp opposition. If they are even partially to verify definite, scientific theories, the immediate objects of awareness must themselves be definite and structuralized, certainly not “ineffable” and “private.” I infer from this that the attempt to separate the brute datum of knowledge from its structuralized interpretation is mistaken. All knowledge involves an “immediate” or “intuitive” object of some sort, which we may then attempt to complete and to amplify by means of postulation and deduction.

(6) For these and for other reasons it seems to me that the sharp, conceptualistic opposition between an intuitive apprehension of raw stuff and a constructive factor, which stems from Kant, is hardly adequate to serve as a sound basis for the synthesis of East and West. Certainly it cannot be safely used as a guide for interpreting the epistemology of any realistic thinker such as Plato or Aristotle, for whom all knowledge involves a direct apprehension of some differentiated object, which may require completion by postulation and deduction. In Indian logic also we have learned that the inductive and deductive methods, far from being opposed, are regarded as closely interconnected.

(7) Finally, even if we grant that there is such an entity as the “undifferentiated continuum” and a plurality of determinate objects, the question arises as to how they are related. Mr. Northrop seems to have very little to say about this. But it concerns the most fundamental metaphysical issues dividing philosophers. Does the postulated many alone exist? Or does the one alone exist, the many being only a de-
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illusion? Or do both exist? If so, how? Mr. Northrop’s analysis sheds very little light upon these fundamental questions. But they lie at the very root of the basic differences between philosophy in the East and in the West.

I believe that Mr. Northrop desires to avoid any negativistic reductionism which would rule out any mode of existence for which there seems to be any actual or even possible evidence. In this I wholly agree with him. But in order to achieve this end without falling into contradiction and difficulty, a richer and clearer ontological framework is required. The very suggestive differences Mr. Northrop has noted between philosophy in the East and in the West can only be adequately understood and harmonized on the basis of such a framework.

We may put the question in this way. Can we account for two modes of knowledge, one vague and integrative, the other definite and analytic, without distorting the evidence, or passing altogether beyond the field of knowledge in trying to establish the distinction? More especially, can we account for two distinct objects of knowledge, one definite and restricted, the other less definite and less restricted, which are actually supported by evidence accessible to all, both of which can be recognized without falling into contradiction or reductionism? I think that these questions can be answered affirmatively, but only in terms of the ontological distinctions already suggested. In the last part of this paper, I shall now try to clarify them further, and to show how they may shed some light on the problem of this Conference.

SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THE HARMONIZATION OF EASTERN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

What we now call science, and the limited type of evidence to which it is restricted, can never settle such an issue. A distinct scientific procedure, capable of dealing with the broader and more fundamental phases of being in a disciplined way, is required. One of the first results of the pursuit of this discipline is the recognition of a distinction between two constitutive phases of all finite being, essence and existence, each of which is found to be dependent upon the other. Both are found in reality. But it is easy for the human mind, in making those basic metaphysical judgments, which underlie all other judgments and decisions, to emphasize one at the expense of the other.

Such divergent ontological emphases may lead to profound differences in tone and outlook which will affect every phase of the
intellectual enterprise of man. When these tendencies are pursued in abstraction from each other, they may crystallize into fixed systems between which no logical reconciliation is possible. But, when we pay more attention to the ontological facts, in this case the distinction between essence and existence, then a possible means of reconciliation comes into view.

WESTERN ESSENTIALISM

Essence is a distinct, determinate phase of being which can be readily grasped by the human mind in terms of clear definitions, abstracting altogether from existence. When regarded in this manner, essences are readily analyzed into disparate, logical atoms which may then be arbitrarily endowed with some special mode of existence and conceived of as the ultimate elements of the universe. Sometimes they are given a special subsistence and spread out in a timeless realm of their own, like the ideas of the Platonists. Sometimes they are merged with physical existence and spread out in the void, like the atoms of Democritus and his followers. At other times they are endowed with an exclusively mental existence, like the ideas of Berkeley. But always it is the determinate essences which have played the predominant role, existence not being sharply focused or distinguished in its major modes of possible, actual, and necessary being.

This has sometimes led to a serious neglect of the more restricted existential categories of substance versus accident, cause versus effect, and creation versus change. Such extreme versions of essentialism are, I believe, very rare in Eastern thought. But they have repeatedly occurred in Western philosophy from the time of Antisthenes in ancient Greece to that of Nicolaus of Autrecourt in the Middle Ages and certain versions of modern empiricism. When we regard entities from a more integral, existential point of view, we can recognize the difference between certain essences which can exist in themselves and certain others which can exist only in a dependent manner in something else (like qualities and acts). But from an abstract, essentialist point of view, this distinction between substance and accident becomes meaningless and purely arbitrary. Each distinguishable essence as such is just as much an essence as any other.

The existent entities of nature tend in various ways and causally influence one another, for existence is something active and diffusive. Essences as such do not tend to one another. Nor can one abstract essence diffuse anything to another. Each simply is what it is. Hence, the existential categories of potency, tendency, and causal efficacy are either negated or reduced to essentialist terms, as when causal con-
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Connections are regarded as the mere succession of one determinate type of essence by another.

Neither change nor creation, strictly speaking, has any legitimate place in a realm of fixed and determinate essences, such as whiteness, sweetness, and the number two. They do not change, for apart from existence they do not act at all. But the notion of sudden appearance and disappearance is less foreign to this point of view. It is contradictory and unintelligible to think of twoness gradually turning into threeness, or of sweetness changing continuously into sourness. So, when confronted by strong, empirical evidence of continuous growth and change, the essentialist mind interprets this, following Zeno, as a discontinuous succession in which divergent essences first emerge from nothing and then are annihilated, to be replaced by others essentially quite distinct, but perhaps indistinguishable by us.

This metaphysical essentialism has a marked effect upon logic. A is necessarily A, and B is necessarily B. There can be no necessary relation between the two. All logical deduction has to be forced into the pattern of tautology. Hence, the sort of empirical, causal connection expressed in conditional propositions and contrary-to-fact conditionals becomes most dubious, and formal logic is divorced from inductive logic and the realm of concrete existence.

In ethics this essentialist mode of thought has severed value as an essence from existence, analyzed it into a multitude of seemingly incompatible fragments, and then left the decision to subjective interest and arbitrary desire. This has led to a general neglect of the crucially important existential categories of personality and freedom, which are not so much essences as modes of existing and acting. It has also led to that arbitrary and false separation of virtue from happiness and duty from interest which is opposed so sharply, as we have learned in this Conference, to the most penetrating moral insight of East as well as West. This has recently brought forth those endless, artificial discussions of rightness and goodness as determinate properties or essences which seem to imply that the fundamental concepts of ethics are either indefinable and ineffable or so hopelessly abstract as to have nothing to do with the real facts of life.

In religion it has led either to a complete neglect and misunderstanding of the classical arguments for an ultimate reality, which depend upon the distinction between essence and existence and the existential principle of causation or, if any first cause is recognized, to a justification of this on irrational, fideistic grounds. This ejection of reason from religion has helped to produce those anthropomorphic conceptions of God, more characteristic of the West than of the East,
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in which He is conceived as an arbitrary tyrant or cosmic pantocrat, ruling the world like an imperial dictator, and fitting everything, good as well as evil, heroic sacrifice as well as brutal torture, into the inflexible pattern of a providential plan.¹⁸

It would be possible to trace out further consequences of this reductive type of essentialist metaphysics. This should suffice to identify an abstract mode of thought which has been a rare phenomenon in the East, but a recurrently manifested phenomenon in the West. In the modern period, since the time of Descartes, essentialism has become so widely prevalent as to call forth a series of recent rebellions that are perhaps the most interesting and significant manifestations of contemporary Western thought, of peculiar importance, I think, to this Conference.

EXISTENTIALISM

In America, William James attacked the monolithic, block-universe of post-Kantian idealism, consisting of essences with noetic existence alone, as too one-sided, and defended a radical empiricism which recognized a plurality of actual, individual entities sustaining real relations. Bergson and the philosophers of emergent evolution have attacked the static changelessness of post-Cartesian philosophy, and have emphasized the continuity as well as the discontinuity of natural change. This return to the existential categories of individual substance, genuine causal relations, and continuous change was certainly salutary. But it was unfortunately often combined with an anti-intellectualism which held that human reason was incapable of grasping these existential facts, being limited to the apprehension of universal, changeless essences.

This modern revolt against essentialism has at last reached its climax in the movement known as existentialism, which began with Kierkegaard’s attack on Hegelian idealism in the middle of the last century, and which is now exerting a far-reaching influence on the thought, literature, and life of present-day Europe. In a striking and often very cogent manner, Kierkegaard and his followers have been able to call attention to many important existential facts, most of them closely connected with ethics and the life of man, which had been distorted or disregarded by the essentialist emphasis of post-Cartesian thought.

Spurning the notion of man in general as a nonexistent, universal concept, they focused their attention on the material human individual, his contingent and ephemeral life, and the choices which freely determine it. But with a keener ontological insight than many other anti-
intellectualists of recent times, they realized that the central core of their doctrine concerns the basic distinction between essence and existence. Seeing correctly that extramental existence had been banished from the great conceptual systems of Hegel and other idealists, they went to the opposite extreme and tried to banish essence from their philosophy with many paradoxical results, for all intelligible thought must involve some determinate nature.

We are thus left with the following dilemma. If thought is intelligible, it must apprehend determinate essences which lack existence. On the other hand, if it attempts to grasp existence, it must be unintelligible, undifferentiated, and ineffable—a conclusion, I think, which is definitely contradicted by the best existential literature, since it often reveals in a perfectly intelligible way certain modes and phases and structures of actual existence.

I suggest that this dilemma is a false one. We do not have to choose between an essentialist philosophy without existence and an existentialism without intelligibility, and hence without philosophy. We must rather return to a fundamental insight of classical Western metaphysics that being is constituted by both essence and existence, and that the neglect of either one must lead to a reductive distortion of reality.

In recapturing this basic insight I believe that contemporary thinkers of the West may be greatly aided by a study of Eastern thought, where it seems to me the more extreme dangers of abstract essentialism have been largely avoided. This is because Eastern thought, on the whole, has never lost sight of the more inclusive and vaguer categories of existence by which concrete entities may be grasped at least confusedly in their full concreteness and vast realms and reaches of reality may be apprehended together through their existential modes.

The essences of diverse things (this pencil and this man) are sharply distinct, but existence is something which they share from a common source. Hence, existential reflection, when fully developed, as in the East, is strongly integrated, tolerant, and synthetic in its tendency. The great danger of this mode of thought is that it may readily lose sight of those clear-cut, essential structures which distinguish one finite entity from another, and which may be clearly defined and inferentially completed by logical analysis and deduction. In its more extreme and reductive manifestations, existential thought may deny the existence of all such finite structure and lose itself in absolute monisms where no legitimate place for finite being, change, human personality, and moral freedom may be found.
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Between the *extreme* versions of Western essentialism and Oriental existentialism, of atomistic pluralism and exclusive monism, I can see little possibility for a reconciling synthesis. But the great thinkers who have with ruthless consistency worked out these views to their last consequences have performed an important service for human thought. They have at least shown us ways to be avoided, and, as in the history of science, important mistakes are often more revealing and significant than a piecing together of trivial truths. Even more than this, they have helped to lay bare, though perhaps inadvertently, the inexhaustible richness of being and its diverse modes, which demands a corresponding richness and diversity of modes of thought in the finite mind of the philosopher.

*SUGGESTIONS TOWARD A NON-REDUCTIONIST PHILOSOPHY*

Any philosophy which is truly existential must combine the exact, structural analyses of the West with the great integrative insights of the East. Such a philosophy would not only recognize the definite structure which is to be found in the finite entities of nature, and which is subject to scientific and logical analysis; it would also recognize many categories and modes of the over-arching existence in which all these share. Within this framework it would find a place for the positive insights of the great historic systems.

One mode of existence is that of the ever-changing, material things of nature. Here the insights of materialists, naturalists, and realists actually apply. But there is also the realm of noetic existence, where all these things and many more may be given an objective, relational existence before the mind of a knowing agent who in this way noetically becomes all things and reflects the universal macrocosm on the microcosmic tablet of his mind. Here the positive insights of the idealist actually apply.

But all these entities are finite. None of them exists necessarily. Their existence emanates from some source of necessary existence. Hence, this ultimate existence also should be recognized. Here the insights of the sages of both East and West, which have been obtained through the practice of concentrated meditation and concentration, will apply. When these insights are used to interpret those general truths which philosophy may be able to establish concerning this mysterious and unfathomable source of existence, anthropomorphic concepts of the Deity will be discredited. No longer will He be viewed as a cosmic autocrat, but rather as an inexhaustible source of creative energy and as a liberating power. Far from being seen as incompatible
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with fullness of being, perfect freedom will be recognized as resting on that completeness of existence which removes every constraint of privation or need, as was stated in the Upaniṣads, where the creative act of Brahman is spoken of as a sort of free and unconstrained play (līlā).  

If such a philosophy were ever developed, the subordinate disciplines of epistemology, logic, and ethics would no longer be pursued as independent, separate disciplines, but rather as branches of first philosophy, as they have always been pursued in the East. Logic, understood as the study of those conceptual devices and principles which must be followed if the truth about being is to be attained, would no longer devote itself primarily to formal analysis, but, following the example of the early Indian logicians, would pay equal attention to the connection of this with concrete existence and empirical analysis.

Ethics would no longer regard value as an abstract essence or property, but rather as a realizing of existence, the free act of human perfection. The source of obligation would be found in the natural tendency of man to realize his nature, and the moral law would be understood as that universal structure of action everywhere required for this activation.

The national antagonisms of our time and the desperate need for world cooperation have led to a recent revival of interest in the concept of such a universal moral law, not based upon any arbitrary, positive decree, but on the nature which all men possess in common. The most important expression of this interest is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1948. This Declaration is founded on the conception of natural law, which in turn is founded on certain metaphysical principles—that nature is originally good, that it is incomplete and tendential, and that the frustration of this basic tendency is bad, its realization always good.

In this paper I have tried to outline such an existential ontology, and to defend it as capable of giving an intelligible account of every major phase of human experience, as being in harmony with the common reason of mankind, and, finally, as capable of justifying divergent ontological tendencies which are found in the East and the West. But such a philosophy has never been more than remotely approximated in the past. Its adequate formulation and defense will require the cooperation of many thinkers from every tradition in the courageous exercise of philosophic imagination, criticism, and penetration.
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NOTES

1Metaphysics, 998b 22.
5He gives several illustrations of this, ibid., especially pp. 167 and 172.
6Cf. The Meeting of East and West, pp. 331 ff.
8“Syntheses in Chinese Metaphysics,” above, p. 163.
9Ibid., p. 172.
10D. T. Suzuki, “Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy”; quotations from Conference paper, not included in revised form here.
11Cf. The Meeting of East and West, pp. 336–337.
13 Ibid., pp. 333, 461 ff.
14Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, Ch. 3, 1029a 28; 1042a 30–31.
15Cf. The Meeting of East and West, p. 367.
16Ibid., p. 297.

18This idea has been defended by comparing evil to “necessary dissonances” in an aesthetic whole by Plato, Republic, IV, 420; Augustine, City of God, Bk. IV, Ch. 13; and Aquinas, Summa Theol., Pt. I, Qu. 22, Art. 2, ad. 2.
19... because of this freedom, the spirit transcends our thought which is deterministic in outlook.” P. T. Raju, Thought and Reality (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1937), p. 274.
CHAPTER XIV

Integration

GEORGE P. CONGER

One of the fragments which in Western philosophy comes down to us associated with the name of Heraclitus says, in effect, that learning a multitude of details does not teach the mind, but that wisdom consists solely in knowing the thought—or, we might say, the principle—by which all things through all are guided. Something similar is adumbrated in the Confucian saying that the moral laws form the same system by which the seasons succeed each other and the operations of nature take their course without conflict or confusion, and that it is this one system running through all that makes the universe so impressively great. In India the terms ṛta and adṛṣṭa refer both to moral and to cosmic rightness, or law. Widely familiar is the Taoist doctrine that man should live in accordance with Tao, the Way of the world, the order of nature. The Greek and Roman Stoics, in their own way, held similar views. The idea need not have been lost or eclipsed in Jewish-Christian-Muslim supernaturalism, since it is taken for granted that the laws of nature and of man are ordained by the one God.

What is the thought, or the principle, by which “all things through all are guided”? From various considerations, empirical as well as speculative, it now begins to appear that we come close to it when we discern in nature and in history the principle of integration. I mean now by integration a combination, or successive combinations, of parts forming wholes which, as wholes, have properties other than those of the parts taken severally.

In both East and West the principle has been detected many times in a matrix of other doctrines. There has been much emphasis on a transcendent or supernatural process, as in the Sāṅkhya sankyoga and, at least by implication, in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim creationism. Among recent writers, Whitehead holds that the organization of various “societies” of objects marks the creative advance of nature, according as some eternal objects, rather than others, are envisaged by God. Again, the principle has been subjective, as in Śaṅkara’s buddhi and
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Kant's "synthetic unity of apperception." For traditional vitalism and animism there are synthetic forces at work in the organism and in the mind, almost like Browning's Abt Vogler at the organ bringing out "not a fourth sound, but a star." Less transcendent and more immanent in the world, Bergson's élan² and Alexander's Nisus⁸ may be said to proceed synthetically.

In both East and West in other systems the principle of integration has been distinguished as operating objectively and spontaneously. This is the case with Buddhism's bhautikas⁹ and in the Chinese yin-yang-tao.¹⁰ After the Hegelian synthesis in the West, first honors belong to Herbert Spencer, whose very agnosticism enabled him to concentrate his attention upon the knowable, the empirical, and to treat the process of integration in its own right. His treatment now seems stilted and awkward. Presupposing the "instability of the homogeneous" and the "persistence of force," he held that a uniform force falling upon any aggregate produces unlike modifications in its different parts, with like and unlike motions resulting in segregation into minor aggregates, each consisting of units that are severally like each other and unlike those of the other minor aggregates.¹¹

Since Spencer's time the terminology has varied and vast reaches of empirical data have been added to the available store. In the work of R. W. Sellars and E. G. Spaulding the principle of integration appears as "creative synthesis."¹²

Sometimes, and not without some documentary warrant, the notion of integration is confused with that of emergent evolution or emergence. It appears, however, that, strictly speaking, the two are different. Emergence is not necessarily the emergence, as into actuality, of something whose properties were hitherto submerged or latent or implicit. The main line of the doctrine of emergence is merely that the data show conspicuous differences or gaps. For Lloyd Morgan, the universe is jumpy; for Alexander, there are gaps between organisms with minds and what we must suppose to have been organisms without them. Emergence, then, might better have been called occurrence, or occurrent evolution. Sometimes, in a kind of minor key, one finds a more detailed description which makes it possible to say that the gaps are bridged, or leaped, by integrative processes. According to Lloyd Morgan, supervenient at any emergent stage of evolutionary progress is a new kind of relatedness—new terms in new relations—hitherto not in being.¹³ Alexander says that at each change of quality the complexity gathers itself together and is expressed in a new simplicity.¹⁴

The clearest development of the principle of integration is in the "holism" of Jan Christian Smuts, who, even if philosophers are seldom
kings, maintains the tradition that British public officials and statesmen, from Newton and Locke to Asquith and Balfour, are frequently philosophers. According to Smuts, each whole has a measure of self-direction and an individual specific character of its own. Both the individual functions of the parts and their composition or correlation in the complex are affected by the synthesis, which is the whole.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{INTEGRATION AS A METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE}

Concerning integration as thus far sketched, four remarks are now in place. First, (i) the notion of synthesis, which in these days of synthetic chemical products has come to connote certain deliberate operations of ours and certain artificial results, might well be replaced by the notion of "synopsis." Syn-thesis, by derivation, means a placing together; syn-opsis means a seeing together. Integration is here regarded as an objective, natural process, detected not so much by synthesis as by synopsis, i.e., observing the parts related in each whole. Analysis is, of course, necessary, but instead of being disruptive or reductive, it is "analysis in situ."\textsuperscript{16}

As a second remark, (ii) it appears that the process of integration can be rather neatly described in abstract terms, as a \textit{genetic continuity of process resulting in a generic discontinuity of products}. The fact that these two are compatible is of crucial importance for an understanding of evolutionism. The word "genetic" refers to origins or processes of derivation; the word "generic" refers to kinds, to classifications of the products of such processes. Where the question concerns the origin or derivation of later stages or levels in nature or history, the answer, as regards integration and evolutionism, is that they arise from earlier stages in a process which (with some of the usual assumptions involved in the use of this adjective) may be called continuous, and primarily by a continuously operating inherent causation, rather than by an intermittent or intervening causation. But where the question concerns the kind of entity resulting from the continuous process, the answer is that it is of a new kind and belongs in a whole which is distinct and discontinuous from the old. There is a continuity of process, entirely compatible with a discontinuity of products.\textsuperscript{17}

In the third place, (iii) no one should be caught saying that a new whole is more than the sum of its parts; probably this misstatement has done more than any other to alienate careful thinkers from the notion of integration. No whole is more than the sum of its parts; it should not be described, either, as over and above its parts.\textsuperscript{18} All that need be claimed is that the whole, or integrate, is other than its parts when the latter are taken severally.
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As a fourth general remark, (iv) the process of integration is closely related to certain other processes. First, it typically occurs in spite of reverse processes of disintegration. Further, as Spencer saw, it must be understood in connection with a preliminary and closely allied process of aggregation. The difference between the two is certainly not easy and, I think, is really impossible to specify with precision. It will not do to say that the integrate is ordered, and the aggregate disordered; "order" and "disorder," too, are relative. The difference between an aggregate and an integrate is one of degree merging into a difference of kind. Even an aggregate, just as it exhibits at least some type of order, has properties other than those of its parts taken severally.18

Again, as Spencer also saw, the process of integration must be recognized in connection with a concomitant and convergent process of differentiation. The distinction is one of emphasis and point of view; it depends upon what parts or wholes are under consideration at a given time. For example, if we happen to be considering atoms of hydrogen and oxygen, the molecule of water is an integrate, but, if we are considering the earth, the same molecule is a differentiation within the earth, a new arrangement of some of its constituents. As an illustration from biology, some early multicellular organisms appear to be integrates of unicellular organisms, but the familiar and much more complex later multicellular organisms, as regards their essential germinal materials, are differentiated within the societies composed of their parents, or the species to which they belong.19 The upshot of this is that integration and differentiation are convergent. This, again, is of great importance for understanding evolutionism: the cosmic process goes on not merely by integration, from simple to complex forms, but also from complex to relatively simpler stages.

In what has already been said we are well within a discussion of the metaphysics of integration. In fact, we are in metaphysics whenever we make any general statements pertaining to the world. Even a statement that metaphysics is impossible, or that metaphysics is meaningless, involves at least a rudimentary metaphysics. Metaphysics is like gravitation; every attempt to controvert it illustrates it, and no one has yet developed sufficient logical or epistemological velocity to get out of its field. The difficulty about metaphysics for many modern minds has been its own extravagance—its wandering outside the empirical data, its tending too much to be "metempirics." But, with or without the transcendent and the supernatural, the metaphysics of integration may stay close to the facts, and deal with structures and processes detectable in or plausibly inferred from the data of the sciences.
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We must be careful not to claim too much empirical ground for the principle. When we look at the data, it may be disappointing to find that sometimes there is relatively little clear evidence, and there is never proof, of integration. As regards evidence, the answer is, in effect, that, if evidence is defined as data which compel belief, the degree of compulsion and belief varies for different individuals as well as for different data. As regards proof, it is now understood that, strictly speaking, we find no proofs of anything apart from analytic sentences or tautologies. Whatever be the case with pure logic and mathematics, at least for science it is not proof, but probability, on which we must depend. It is a kind of forced option, too: if we are to have any science, as well as any empirical metaphysics, or achieve any empirical understanding of the world, we must somewhere throw in the benefit of the lingering doubt. Somewhere we must take the inductive leap, whether it is a step or an air-lift. Empiricists try to reduce the air-lift to a broad jump and the broad jump to a step. The more cautious try to reduce the step to a shuffle, but even he who shuffles along, with his feet always on the ground, may slip. Somewhere we have to take a chance, even when we restrict ourselves to the attempt to determine what statements are sufficiently confirmable to be included in the formulation of a science. In all strictness we do not know what statements are confirmable until we have confirmed them.

(A) Let us say, then, that the data as now detected suggest some probability that electrons, which are singularities in fields of energy, are combinations or integrations of energies. It begins to be suspected that protons are combinations made up of some units which at least include mesons. It is clear enough that neutrons are close combinations of protons and electrons. Atoms are made up of protons, neutrons, electrons, etc., and may be presumed to have been integrated from them. Diffuse nebulae are at least aggregates of atoms. Stars, differentiated within such nebulae, may be regarded as integrates of atoms. Planets arise in one way or another from stars or are formed in a process similar to the formation of stars. Stars are grouped in star clusters, some open, others globular. On a smaller scale, stars and planets together make up solar-planetary systems; one or two rudimentary systems besides our more highly differentiated solar system are beginning to be recognized. Star clusters and stars are found together in the spiral nebulae or galaxies, and in their distribution these show some local concentrations which enable us to say that there are supergalaxies. It should be noted that according to some theories the primeval universe was an enormous nebula in which the spirals, clusters, solar systems, and stars have been differentiated or formed by
successive condensations. Thus it may be argued that integration and differentiation in astronomy, as in the case of the molecule in the earth, are convergent.

(B) Eventually, by a new differentiation in at least one of the planets, i.e., the earth, some of the atoms of carbon form compounds with auxiliary valences, the organic compounds, capable of extensive substitutions. As these become highly complex, their new surface properties become important and characterize the micelles or organic colloids familiar as proteins and enzymes. Viruses, which crystallize as proteins, and genes, with their chromatin, are typically still more complex and (assuming that there are, or were, free genes) begin to exhibit the dynamic equilibrium in a polyphasic system which we know as life. The present unicellular organisms, including bacteria and amoebas, are presumably descendants of early integrates of such rudimentary forms, and the present multicellular organisms are almost certainly the descendants of early integrates of unicellular forms. Without arguing at all that a society is an organism, we maintain only that a society is an integrate. The units in the societal integrate are discrete and the structure seems loose and open, but this is a matter of scale; to an X-ray, the atoms in a solid crystal would seem discrete and the structure would seem open. It is clear enough that groups of multicellular organisms, i.e., plants and animals, constitute primitive societies—in the case of the human species, primitive forms of the family. Families make up tribes; tribes unite in early or primitive nations; and nations or sovereign states combine in the great imperial and federated states of political history. Also to be discerned are groups of such states in racial and continental civilizations. The races and peoples of the various continents constitute at least an aggregate, although their progress toward effective integration is disappointingly slow. Ecologically, however, they constitute a natural unit—the earth's total population, bacterial, plant, animal, and human. Here, as before, the process of formation of successive societal units may be interpreted not merely as integrations but as differentiations within a total population. Integration and differentiation, again, are convergent.

(C) In the preceding paragraph, a most important factor has been disregarded. Societies of the later types mentioned do not arise without nervous systems and minds. The development of nervous systems and minds, however, although the study of it presents some baffling difficulties, affords some of the clearest examples of integration. Within a primitive multicellular organism, let us say a sponge, some of the constituent cells with their metabolic gradients transmit impulses; the cells thus linked—i.e., integrated—in the process of transmission con-
stitute excitation arcs, and an impulse as it passes along the succession of cells illustrates "neuroid transmission." In the sponge, conduction is diffuse, and various impulses are not correlated: the flagella may whip the water when the sphincter is closed. In the jellyfish, however, where the first nervous cells appear, such lost motion is typically reduced: there is correlation, coordination—the beginnings of what Sherrington has made familiar as the integrative action of the nervous system. In the segmental reflexes and super-segmental reflexes of worms there is still higher integration, with the variations involved in the making and breaking of synaptic connections. Reflexes, which are themselves not as simple as a schematic treatment might indicate, in the higher organisms are grouped and work together in more or less smooth and unified fashion in patterns, for example, the visual patterns of seeing, the motor patterns of walking, and the language patterns of speaking. When some of the patterns involve the action of distance receptors, so that adjustments are made to objects while they are still remote, there is the notable integration of precurrent and consummatory reactions in simple goal-seeking behavior, at the stage which may be called that of end-reaction complexes.

From here on, the terminologies differ, and the outlines, like the outlines of a crystal or a table for a cosmic ray, seem vague to many investigators, but it is fair to say that many an end-reaction complex, directed upon one or another object, is integrated in the course of a sentiment like love or patriotism, directed typically toward a person or group of persons. Here the factor of time begins to be increasingly conspicuous. Sentiments are involved in still more inclusive valuations, where the orientation is not so much toward goal-objects or persons as toward abstract ideas or ideals, like justice. Groups of valuations characterize the relatively individuated selves which are aggregated, and sometimes integrated, in the long-time or lifelong unity of a personality. Once more it is important to note particularly that reflexes, patterns, end-reactions, sentiments, valuations, or selves may be interpreted in Gestalt fashion as differentiations within a personality.

This, perforce briefly and inadequately sketched here, is the course of integration-differentiation in nature and in history. The successive stages may be called levels of development. Implied in what has been said is extreme evolutionism—that matter is integrated from energies; life from matter; and mind, or nervous systems at work, from physiological structures and processes. Matter and life and mind are respectively similar in that they are integrations, and there is a certain fundamental kinship between them. At the same time, their differences are, of course, marked and important. Each exhibits the new
properties of a new whole—properties not found in the realm where it originates, or in the parts of which it is composed. This point affords an answer to the idealist and personalist objections to the above allegedly abstract constructions, or reconstructions, of "reality." The objection is that the account of the eventual integration of personality out of data of physics and chemistry and physiology does not yield the concrete facts of rich, intimate, and essentially or occasionally free personal experience. The answer is that the principle of integration itself provides for just such a discrepancy. At our level, we are the new things, and of course have our own intrinsic, unique properties. When enough attention is paid to integration in anthropology, sociology, and history, even our moral judgments may be accounted for in this way; they are, indeed, *sui generis*, but they are not *a priori*. They are the result not of ingestion from outside or above but of progression within and from below.

Let us now attempt some further generalizations, considering some further characteristic features of integration, as the process is exhibited in the data we have summarized. For convenience of reference the features will be given numbers continuing those used above.

(v) Integration takes place typically within an aggregate and usually involves some, rather than all, members of the aggregate. (vi) Integration may occur merely as a local condensation of members of the aggregate which have never been far apart. This, however, is not to say that the units entering the integrate are, in Spencer's term, homogeneous. In fact, (vii) some of the most stable integrates are formed by units whose properties are in some respects opposite or complementary to one another. From time immemorial the Chinese insight into the world has distinguished the *yin* and the *yang* as opposed cosmic principles. Hegel, in his "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" formula, attempted to exhibit the development of all nature and mind. One should note that for Hegel each thesis not only encounters but engenders the antithesis with which it eventually effects the synthesis. The whole Hegelian process was colored by the epistemological metaphysics of Fichte and Schelling, who were trying as best they could to establish some unity of the subjective and the objective, to reunite the mind and the world, which Locke had cleft apart and Hume had well-nigh pulverized. More realistically and naturalistically in the data we have considered, an integrate typically involves constituents which are equally objective, although of opposed or contrasted properties—as when a proton and an electron form a hydrogen atom, or a visceral-autonomic consummatory pattern and one or more cerebrospinal precursory patterns combine in an end-reaction complex.
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(viii) The process of integration typically involves some elimination; there is an "economy" in the new household, all the way from the minute radiated energy marking the difference between four hydrogen atoms and a helium atom to the economies incident to effective alliances of nations against war rather than against one another. On the other hand, as our definition of integration indicated at the outset, (ix) there are new properties, not found either in the parts or in the aggregate. In the helium atom they are the properties distinctive of helium. In the other example, they may be the blessings of a world at last at peace.

(x) Finally, some constituent parts are distinguishable within an integrate, and one constituent or set of constituents typically dominates another there. With the differences and differentiations appropriate to their levels of development, the atomic nucleus, the sun in our solar-planetary system, the core of the galaxy, the germ cells of an organism, and the visceral-autonomic consummatory patterns in a complex afford typical examples. A point of very great importance for us here is that, as cosmic integration proceeds, this relation of dominance tends to be increasingly reversible or reciprocal. In the atom and the solar-planetary system the peripheral constituents are far outweighed by those which are nuclear or central. In the organism the somatic cells have some effect, but not much, on the germ cells. In a disciplined mind, the cerebrospinal patterns, especially ideas, are able to exert some increasing measure of control over the fundamental visceral-autonomic appetites. In the cumulative result of all these integrations in societies and in human history, the dominance of one person or group in some respects and relations can be relieved and even rendered beneficial when integrated reciprocally with the dominance of other persons and groups in other functions.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATION OF METHODS

The foregoing appear to be the more relevant general characteristics of integration. We may now ask how they apply to problems of comparative methodology. Again we employ the numbers used above.

(v) In the first place, there is no doubt that we have the initial confusions, the aggregate, and hurly-burly of contending theories. Throughout all the world, in ways abundantly evidenced in discussions at the Conference, rationalists, empiricists, pragmatists, and intuitionists (perhaps under some other names) argue with one another. It is not merely that many Eastern experts differ with their Western colleagues in these matters; neither East nor West, neither India nor China nor Europe-America, is altogether at peace with itself.
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(vi) The beginnings of integration are, however, equally evident. There is no need to argue that rationalism, according to which we know what we have thought through, and empiricism, according to which we know what we have observed, either by introspection or inspection, and what in these latter days we have confirmed by one or another type of experiment, are complementary and indispensable, even if their results sometimes appear divergent and their more complete integration is a persistent problem. In the West, the pragmatic method, according to which we know what we have worked through to one or another kind of satisfactory conclusion, is difficult to distinguish from traditional empiricism; the difference is one of emphasis. Pragmatism is an emphatic, aggressive, reshaping empiricism. Where the orientation of traditional empiricism has been, as we might say, afferent, that of the pragmatic method is efferent. The method has so much empiricism in it that as between these two—and, counting rationalism, these three—the process of integration seems already partially accomplished.

The fourth method, intuitionism, is the ground of more controversy, partly because the name used for it is used in more than one sense, and partly because its advocates have tended to keep it aloof from the other methods. According to intuitionism we know immediately, with or without—traditionally more often without—reason, observation, experiment, or practical application of our concepts. Sometimes this means simply that objects are presented to us or represented by us with an intrinsic quality of being here-now, as compared with which thought is after-thought, and activity, if not itself immediate, is irrelevant. The same word, intuition, is also used for more contentful, richer, personal insights and realizations characteristic of the moral and religious life. One of the lesser obstacles to integration here is the lack of terminology adequate to distinguish these two usages.

The case for integration of the methods is strengthened when one considers the ordinary psychological processes involved. Each of us, practically all the time, is perceiving, thinking, acting, and feeling. Each of us naturally and inevitably has in him at least the rudiments of empiricism, rationalism, pragmatism, and at least some intuitionism. We need to revise some of our theories to make them square with what we are.

(vii) The suggestion of the next general characteristic is that we should consider extremes. In this case, these would usually be said to be empiricism on the one hand and intuitionism on the other. There appear to be reasons for grouping empiricism and rationalism together, and contrasting them with pragmatism and intuitionism;
the reason is that perception and thinking are characteristically *selective*. I perceive any given thing \( A \) against a background which may be denoted as *non-\( A \)*, and at the moment of perception I do not treat the two in the same way: \( A \) is selected; *non-\( A \)* is neglected. It can be argued that thinking, or at any rate descriptive thinking, follows the same "horizon" principle, so that I think by selection of any describable referent \( A \) (whether material object, group of objects, abstract concept or group of concepts, the self, the universe, being, the "Absolute," or whatever it is that I am seeking to describe) with an inevitable and correlative neglect of the corresponding indescribable *non-\( A \).* Perception and thinking partition the field, but activity and feeling appear to be not so sharply divisive. We seem to act upon \((A + \text{non-}A)\) and feel \((A + \text{non-}A)\) without being limited by the contrast unless perception or "thinking makes it so." In other words, we perceive and analyze and describe the world in part; but we act in it and feel toward it with open reference.

(viii) An integration of methods, if it conforms to the next general characteristic, must involve some scaling down of each of them where it has been over-ambitious or presumptuous. The course of events has often been helpfully abrasive here, and the process will doubtless continue. When viewed in a world frame there need be no question that just as medieval Western rationalism could not preserve itself intact against the advances of empiricism, so the contemporary stringent empiricisms, especially positivism, however useful for defining a field of science, cannot hope to be an adequate interpretation of the world. The story of pragmatism, too, should teach us to beware when a method magnifies itself into a metaphysics. It should be added that intuitionism, as Hocking and Radhakrishnan have maintained, should not be trusted apart from the critiques afforded by other methods.

(ix) What are the new properties incident to integration? Lloyd Morgan maintained that the new properties of a new emergent are unpredictable beforehand; perhaps here we should await a true integration of the methods before venturing to describe it. But we may at least expect, as in any other integrate, less lost motion and wasted energy, less controversy and partisanship. Some of the old questions lose their edge; they are not quite meaningless, as long as they are questions, but their meaning is much less likely to obscure that of more important matters.

For one thing, an adequate integration of the methods of obtaining knowledge must mean a reduction of the areas of conflict between science and philosophy. Right now the traditional conflict tends indeed
to be resolved, but resolved by an attempted assimilation of the methods of philosophy to the methods of science, and by maintaining that philosophy is properly only a critique of scientific or logical method. An integration, rather than such a restriction, would make science and philosophy alike attempts to understand ourselves in the universe; science is the specialized, and philosophy the generalized, phase of this attempt. In particular, philosophy may and should draw more freely upon the resources of our activities and our feelings.

Again, an integration of methods would have a marked effect on the application of epistemology to ethics. Aristotle long ago recognized that ethics is not an exact science; a proper integration of our methods would help to indicate the reason. It is that all valuations, which themselves are integrates, including emotional components, because of their emotional components somewhere lack precision. But they are not for this reason to be banished from the field of philosophical concern. They should by all means be analyzed and scrutinized: emotive appeals should be criticized and sometimes curbed. This, after all, is only incidental to the process of integrating feeling and thinking, or intuitionism and rationalism. Valuations should be explained, but not explained away. To explain them involves making clear their status in the universe—a status as authentic as that of perception or ideation, only more complicated. It is not necessary to claim for them cognitive validity; cognitive validity is an issue at the cognitive level, while valuations, which include cognitions along with emotions, have characteristics of their own. This is not to say that valuations can be made fundamental or ultimate in metaphysics; perceptions are more fundamental, and personalities are more nearly ultimate. It is not to be expected, either, that the content of valuations can ever be rendered precise. Precision is a matter of scale; in a world where no one can tell just where the table ends and the electronic or energetic milieu begins, no one need expect unanimity as to just what constitutes the good, or the good life. The point for all of us is at least to keep decently away from the edge, while, with free and cooperative use of all available methods, as well as under the pressure of world events, we may look for increasing convergence and clarity. An integration of methods surely must have important consequences for philosophy of religion also, however damaging it may be for various theologies, mainly by its admission of empiricism and its application to doctrines hitherto held to be immune or sacrosanct.

(x) The problem of dominance is usually thorny; our only relief from it is in the fact that in a high-level integrate dominance is reversible or reciprocal or mutual. In this particular area, however, there
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is a practical answer. We said that the plain fact is that each of us every day must observe, reflect, act, and feel. To keep the balance is an art. It is the art of living. If anyone objects that only one or another, or some but not others, or all of the four methods are methods of obtaining knowledge, and that any proposed integration takes us outside the scope of theories of knowledge, then let us agree that what we are seeking in and by the aid of philosophy is not merely knowledge, but knowledge in life, knowledge for life—the larger knowledge, which is wisdom. The old Greek fragment says that it is wisdom to know the idea or principle by which all things through all are guided. If we need a new word for our method of methods, let us call it integralism.

TOWARD INTEGRATION IN ETHICS

Passing over the important, but sufficiently evident, applications of the characteristics in problems of personal integration, and turning to problems of social or societal integration, let us first look at some political issues, where the problem at least seems clear. Examples of political integration lie close at hand; the national motto, E pluribus unum, and the maxim, "In union there is strength," remind us both of the process and its results. Great nations, as we indicated earlier, are integrates. The most pertinent questions concern the extension of the process to international relations. If, as here maintained, in this principle of integration we begin to discern something genuinely natural and cosmic, there should be no difficulty in discerning and, let us hope, no hesitation in following, the detailed characteristics we have noted.

(v) Certainly there is the initial confusion, the hurly-burly of the aggregate. The League of Nations was at a kind of "Articles of Confederation" stage; as it turned out, it was somewhere between an aggregate and an integrate. Sometimes it looks as if the United Nations might not advance beyond that stage. But there is a brighter aspect of the picture, because (vi) the process of international political organization may start anywhere, among nations already associated. Here one naturally thinks of nations long allied by ties of blood and culture, as are England and America, and of other groups already associated in other ways. We need not, however, despair of (vii) effective integrations of nations of opposite interests. The present-day extremes are, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union, each of them an integrate. The most momentous problem of the contemporary world is that of finding the formula for their further integration.

(viii) Integration, as found elsewhere throughout nature, points
up what seems to be the only effective way to a more perfect union. Each of the member nations, like Rousseau's untamed individuals entering the social contract, must be prepared to give up something. The principle is clear; it is the application, the details, the determination of which shall give up what, that blocks the way. Imperialism dies hard; totalitarianism strives to be total; and sovereignty of any sort is difficult to relinquish, or, once de facto relinquished in the pressure of events, difficult to acknowledge as lost. Here we have to discern the signs of the times, and beware lest the signs of the times are in the handwriting on the wall. It is commonplace to say that (ix) the nations stand to gain by closer political union—if by nothing more, then by economy in the astronomical sums now being spent for armaments. The prospective cultural, moral, and spiritual advantages are beyond reckoning.

In any brave new world, however, there must remain (x) the problem of dominance. By all the signs, something of the nature of world government marks here the difference between a loose aggregate and a stable integrate. The chances are that at least for a long time to come any possible central, federal, or confederal governing body will still show the seams of the nationalisms of which it may be constituted. What nation or people, then, shall govern, and who will be content to be governed or dominated or surpassed? The suggestion might be that of some kind of reciprocal dominance, a turn-and-turn-about in leadership and followership. It is the idea behind rotating chairmanships for large nations and memberships in high councils for smaller nations, but it must be confessed that so far such arrangements have been rather too formal and mechanical, and have proved too weak to carry the load. Practically, as of now, the tendency seems to be toward a revival, on a global scale, of the old balance-of-power policies. The danger in this is, as in 1914 and other years, that the balance of power will turn out to be only a balance of powder, which some trifling incident will serve to set off in a holocaust of ruin for us all.

A possible or partial solvent for the difficulty may consist first in recognizing that political interests and dominations, after all, are not primary, but are secondary, and arise to meet needs of regulation and control of other interests. To restate political issues in economic terms is more or less reductive; it may be like describing a molecule in terms of atoms, or a metazoan organism in terms of cells. But analysis in situ at least simplifies some of the problems. One does not need to be a Marxian to discern economic forces which shape political policies and institutions. The problem of dominance, so forbidding when phrased in political terms, becomes natural enough when translated into
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economic terms. Then the edge of political controversy may be turned by economic interchanges. Mutual trade agreements are obviously steps in this direction. The best available remedy for chauvinism, nationalism, and aggression seems to be a cooperative effort to raise standards of living, economic, cultural, and spiritual, no matter how ice-locked and glacierlike may be our progress.

What we have said about dominance takes us from political problems into the field of economics and to problems more pointedly domestic in their scope, but the transition is easy. With or without Marx, we all see, better than we did in 1914, and perhaps better than we did in 1939 or 1941, that political issues, if they are not merely veneer or symptoms of economic issues, are at least correlated with them, and that no account of societal integration can be anywhere near complete unless it addresses itself to economic difficulties.

Here, again, the usual characteristics appear. We can easily recognize (v) the milling crowd of special-interest groups with their struggles for advantages. Obviously, some solution, some resolution or dissolution, must come. Is there any hope anywhere, save in integration? Somewhere there must be some kind of "commonwealth." (vi) Once convinced that integration is the hope for our economic future, it should be clear that the place to start is not Utopia, but any place where there are singularly good relations between labor and capital. Economically this area does not seem to be an industry where high wages are paid and superior working conditions provided, because the demands for these things seem to be insatiable and the policies seem never to come to equilibrium. Concerns where open books and profit-sharing plans are in operation, and where, in the Western system, there is opportunity to acquire capital stock, seem now to be the most promising foci or nuclei for industrial integration. At the same time, steering once more by our general principle, even though it leads us into troubled waters, and though it is hard to imagine here any attraction of opposites, there may come to be (vii) an integration of them. To make it seem as extreme as possible, think of the National Association of Manufacturers and the United Electrical Workers—could they ever really get together? Certainly not without (viii) each side's giving up something, making concessions, conciliations, compromises, in a kind of collective bargaining. The principle, again, is clear enough; the problem, again, is who will give up what, but this is the way to integration and (ix) its benefits in industrial peace and economic well-being. The other way, so prevalent, begins (does it not?) by contrast to show its inherent defects; if it is not clear, it ought to be clear that in the long run, industrial disputes, carried beyond
the normal range of peaceful adjustments, benefit nobody and injure labor, management, capital, and public alike. (x) The crux, again, is in the problem of dominance, and the answer seems to be to make dominance, here again, reciprocal. Industries which admit workmen to representation on directorates, where the representation is anything more than formal, seem to be on the right road. The problem after all is not so much the ownership of the instruments or the fruits of production as it is the control of those instruments, and if by any means control can be diversified, mutualized, integrated, the way would seem to be clear to economic peace and prosperity. Mutualization of control seems desirable, while government control seems harsh, but in a real democracy the two controls coincide.

EPILOGUE

Much more might be said concerning the integration of systems of philosophy. The Conference, in its factual and richly informative aspects, makes obvious (v) the differences between the systems, as well as (vi) promising rapprochements and points of contact. Sometimes (vii) extremes meet, as in Mr. Sheldon’s studies of polarity. If extreme views do not fuse forthwith, the point may be that (viii) not all the features of the parts enter an integrate. We should all scrutinize our traditions to see what elements may now be relinquished—nay, must be relinquished as the cost if there is to be synthesis. Here, too, (ix) there is much to gain. Our eyes should be open to the new features, the things not seen as yet, the promise, at last, of world understanding in a world commonwealth of mind and spirit, where our winds of doctrine are trade winds. (x) In such a consummation the problem of dominance may sink to insignificance, in proportion as the truth makes us all free.

NOTES

1Diels, Fr. B 41; Diogenes Laertius, De vita...ix, 1.
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9See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1932), p. 147.
15Holism and Evolution (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), pp. 93, 123.
17A diagram illustrating this might take the form of a helix, which may be said to be generated in a continuous process but which shows discontinuities in the diameters of its coils. In such a spiral, $x = z \cos \theta$, $y = z \sin \theta$.
19The difference appears somewhat clearly when the empirical data over a long range are considered in detail; it is, in brief, that an integrate belongs in a series or succession of further integrates, whereas an aggregate in this respect somewhere fails to qualify. See G. P. Conger, A World of Epitomisations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1931), p. 17; Epitomization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Library, 1949), pp. 26 f.
20See references in preceding note.
21This and the following paragraphs sketch briefly and loosely the process of integration/differentiation which is examined and documented in exhaustive detail in the books indicated in note 19.
22For this theory and many of its implications, see G. P. Conger, The Horizons of Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1933). In the present connection it appears that when Being, the Absolute, Brahman, Tao, Thusness, etc., are declared to constitute the whole of reality, they respectively should not be given any definite attributes, affirmative or negative. The whole is not the describable $A$, but the partially indescribable $(A + non-A)$. We may say that there is $(A + non-A)$, but not what $(A + non-A)$ is or is not. So much for perception and thinking, but these are not all our valuable methods. We may actively live and grow in $(A + non-A)$, in voluntaristic or pragmatic fashion, by a kind of extension of the horizon which marks off the two. We may feel the totality in an integralism. As another possibility, we may seek to obliterate the distinction by adopting a reclusive procedure, a "suicide of the intellect," the extinction indicated in some doctrines of Nirvâna, or a lapsing or relapsing into an "undifferentiated continuum." A further study of these problems is in preparation.
25See G. P. Conger, Epitomisation, pp. 397 f.
Main Contrasts Between Eastern and Western Philosophy

WILMON HENRY SHELDON

These contrasts are, I think, fundamental; they lie in the point of view, in the attitude, from which East and West regard reality. They are generally pervasive as between Eastern and Western metaphysics by and large. Not that they are universally present. Not every system of the East differs from every system of the West in these three respects, though most of them do. There are systems of the East which agree on certain specific doctrines with some systems of the West. For instance, as Coomaraswamy has said, Hinduism (Vedânta) is really at one with the central teaching of Plato, however differently they are phrased. And many points of agreement might be brought out between Taoism and Christian mysticism, between yin yang and the polarities of the Hegelian dialectic, and so on. Yet even though common theses may be found in plenty, the Eastern way of accepting them, so to speak, usually differs from the Western way; to the common element is added a difference in attitude. The Eastern philosopher typically looks to the bearing of his philosophy upon man’s life in ways which the Westerner does not envisage—and conversely. Not, however, that there need be any conflict, any opposition, between the two in these three respects; their perspectives are indeed opposite, but they are not necessarily opposed. The relation is one of polarity, to use the old word; but a polarity that must be carefully understood. Indeed, the object of this little essay is to suggest that just because the two halves of man’s earthly home do differ in the said perspectives, they can, if men will, be combined in a great harmony.

In stating these contrasts I do not attempt to demonstrate their presence by detailed evidence from the many, many systems. That would be an impossibly long story. But in any case it is needless; they are simple and obvious; they leap to the eye. Many have already seen them; no novel insight is here offered. Yet they have too often been
overlooked by partisans of either group. Philosophers of the West have been prone to condemn the Eastern systems because the latter do not view reality from the Western perspective; the converse also. But the opposition is not a matter of going through the vast complexity of the systems and finding here a rigid proof, there a slip in argument; the deepest differences turn on the smallest pivots. A man looks in opposite directions by just turning his face around; the little rudder reverses the course of the giant ocean steamer. The accumulation of tons of evidence doesn’t persuade one who is looking the other way. And so in what follows there will be little of argument, just a record of what seems so obvious to the impartial outsider.

Now to state roughly the three contrasts.

(1) For the East, ultimate reality is not to be proved by reasoning from data of this world, but by direct experience. Philosophy is a way of life, not a thought about it; an experiment in living. It begins with an experiment and ends with an experience, in Dean Inge’s phrase. The point of view is primarily practical, not theoretical, though reasoning may be used, perhaps must be used to suggest the way of experimenting. Witness the experiment of Vedânta or Buddhism whereby the disciple withdraws to the forest and remolds his thought and desire by concentrating on the inner light. For the West, philosophy is thinking about reality, observing things and events and inferring what may be gleaned therefrom. It is not necessarily a way of life, though reasoning may and indeed should discover the proper way. But the proof of that way is assured beforehand by reason; experimental proof is needless. This contrast came on the human scene, at least prominently so, when the Greeks began to speculate about the principles underlying the world of nature. Reasoning from the given facts of this external world and of man’s natural make-up—that way of philosophy dominated Europe and America in the centuries to come. It was and is still the first great contrast; as we shall see, the other two follow from it, are phases of it. Thoughtful Europe knew Greece; it did not know the East to any important degree; Europe’s mind, Europe’s philosophy, came from the “classics” of Greece. Europe—and America, which humbly followed Europe in intellectual matters until the pragmatic revolt—was pervaded by the Greek-aesthetic attitude: reality is object of contemplation, of theoria, beholding from without, not the direct experience, the sensing or feeling of the ultimate as a life within one’s self. Europe wanted to see, Asia wanted to be the real. True, we today use the same word contemplation for the way of philosophy in both; but for the West contemplation is to see, for the East to be, the object. The difference is between theory and practice,
thinking and doing, simplest and deepest of all dualities in man. To be sure, the West means by practical the changing of external things: making a bridge, forming a political party, founding a college. But surely it is quite as practical a matter to change one's own inner behavior, to steer one's desires from bodily to spiritual goods, to focus attention on Atman, Nirvana, Tao, to discipline one's self in keeping the proper balance of yin and yang in one's family life and social relations—to do these things rather than seek better food, clothing, housing, ships, and planes. It is an experiment, not with external bodies as in physical science, but with the internal mind. True again, the Western idealists have been concerned with mind or spirit rather than body; but primarily as something to be demonstrated by argument rather than experimentally verified. Also there have been many Western mystics, and mysticism is an experiment; here, indeed, the contrast disappears. Yet certainly the mystical discipline is not typical of the Western search for ultimate being. Rather does the Occidental reason from the facts of the everyday world, physical or mental facts or both, to prove the basic principles.

(2) From the facts of this world, we said. That brings out the second contrast. A practical attitude, a doing, behaving, is directed toward something not a given state of affairs here and now—something desired, a good, not yet a plain fact. So appears the deep-lying opposition of ideal and actual, ought and is, right and might. What then is to natural man the arena of given fact, fact often far from good, as in sickness and death, but fact as just something in and for itself, independent of its goodness or badness? Of course it is this present world, the world of physical things and mental things, or perhaps really of either one alone as idealists and materialists claim, but at any rate this given world, of which we get our first knowledge by sense and later by reasoning from sense-data. So when the theoretical perspective enters the West through the gateway of Greece, philosophers will be occupied not so much with discovering some saving good, not given by nature, but with this world as actually given. Western philosophy is going to study nature, the principles governing the make-up and course of specific concrete facts, interesting for their own sake, individuals too from man to atom. Thus said Aristotle: "all men by nature desire to know." And knowledge, not seeking to change things (not until a later stage, as we are to see), will take what is given—this world. So the West will develop a cosmology, a world history, a philosophy of nature. So too indeed the East—since no man is quite without the theoretical motive—but to a much less degree. We need hardly say that these contrasts are only of emphasis, probably seldom or never of one per-
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spective to the total exclusion of the other. Buddhist schools and
Chinese philosophers have proffered accounts of nature’s elements and
processes. All the same, these were not the focus of their concern. They
did not lure the disciple to prod and poke about in nature, to unearth
new knowledge of her ways, as happened in the West. So the West
generated the natural sciences, as the East did not. The Western
interest in the given world grew by what it fed on, branched out into
chemistry, physics, biology. In the Orient, philosophy has primarily
the moral and religious animus; in the Occident, the scientific, loving
knowledge for its own sake, only later finding it useful, and even then
useful for the physical well-being of man, scarcely more.

But further: new values, worldly values, come into view. Perhaps
there are no mere facts; perhaps everything is good or bad in one way
or another; at any rate men sensed the specific beauties of nature, the
particular values of man’s everyday mind, as good in themselves,
values of action, feeling, thought, and above all, the worth of persons.
So too had the Hindu and the Chinese; some of them to a degree ante-
dated the modern Western personal idealism. Even so, they did not
reach that degree of interest in concrete human society which pro-
duces a democratic polity or at least a philosophy of the state, a
social ethics, and the like. The Oriental purview is not centered upon
this complex and changing world. It seeks a better world—rightly, no
doubt—but it has not typically cared to better the human social situ-
tion, to gratify more fully the body’s needs. And of late certain Eastern
thinkers have said so too. Even the more concretely minded Chinese
has been occupied chiefly with securing a stable and well-ordered
society, rather than improving the standards of living, which is the
Western motive. All this explains why materialism never got much
influence in the East, whereas it is a perennial Western type, perhaps
stronger than ever today because of the brilliant success of the physical
sciences.

So, in addition to the contrast between philosophy as primarily a
successful way of life—successful in the higher, not the vulgar, sense—as
in Asia, and philosophy as a picture of reality, we see this second
contrast between concern with an Ultimate beyond or deep within this
world, and concern with this world as given fact, with its vast mani-
fold of things and relations. Roughly it is other-worldly versus this-
worldly interest. But again we must remind ourselves that the contrast
is not necessarily between exclusive extremes. We note only, for ex-
ample, that the concretely practical Chinese with his yin-yang account
of wood, water, earth, and fire, has not that overwhelming urge to
know more and more of their detail which gives the long process of
scientific research. Enough for him to see the general principle of balance, that he may have a stable life in a stable society.

(3) When interest is centered on things of this world, with the theoretical perspective that holds the mirror up to nature, the *speculum* or speculative philosophy of the Occident, then sooner or later will emerge a certain doctrine, not characteristic of the Orient, but uniquely expressing the spirit of the former. This doctrine declares the ultimate reality, power, and value of time, time the savior of man, perhaps of all things. Recall the words *temporalism, process, creative evolution, emergent evolution, progress*—favorites with many of late in France, England, the U.S.A. They pertain to what we may call the process-metaphysic, latest type to appear in history, itself as new and positive as the novelties it ascribes to the course of time. Said the poet Tennyson, "For I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs"; poets and other artists often portray the great truths more convincingly than thinkers. Why is this adoration of time as a saving principle, a guarantee of man's increasing well-being or at least an opportunity for that—why is this so uniquely expressive of the Western love of this world? Surely the reason is obvious. Of all human motives, the rock-bottom motive is to escape the bad and assure the good. Even the theoretical philosopher follows it; for him ignorance is the bad, knowledge the good. For different perspectives, what is good may differ, what is bad may differ. Now the Hindu or Buddhist or Taoist finds his good where? Not in the particular events of nature's course, not in the moment-to-moment pleasures of us men; their fundamental interest is not in this world as it is in all its complexity and individuality. This world is the scene of misery; the true good is not to be gained by rearranging or reordering its make-up, but in penetration deep within the differences to the One within, or beyond, or wherever. The cure of misery is not gained by manipulation of nature's things or ways, but by turning away. Even Gautama, who loved men so truly that—it is said—he would not cross the threshold of Nirvana until he could bring all men thereto—even Gautama saw no salvation in the worldly scene, in remolding human society, in reforming the state, in changing mundane things for the better as time goes on. Recall his teaching in respect of time, so widely accepted in Asia: there is nothing permanent in the physical or the psychical, no lasting substance or perduring ego; time is but the continual destruction of everything that is born. This temporal world is not to be saved. Here then is precisely where the Western love of the world changes the whole perspective. This world is *worth saving*, in all its complexities and particulars. But if these are to be saved, they cannot vanish like the soul of a man into the eternal; the

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eternal is not this world. If this world is to be perpetuated and perfected, it must still be this world; in brief, it must change what is bad or imperfect within it into something good, also within it. It must improve, progress, increase its goods, grow in strength and grace. Time then ought to mean, must mean, not destruction but construction, novel production, growth. What is timeless cannot improve; if good it should be perfect. The point is not that this world, being essentially temporal, can be bettered or perfected only in the course of time. The point is that any given manifold of individuals, even if non-temporal, provided it contains some evil, can be saved only by change, by introducing time. Time is necessary to save it. Not by its disappearance; that would not be its salvation. Rather by its retaining its identity while the evil disappears and the good replaces the evil. Perduring through change is the only way of salvation for what is, like this world, partly good and partly bad. So the West idealizes time, takes it as a positive principle, the opportunity of improvement, preserving the good of the past and adding new goods. Such is the modern Western notion of time: we think of Bergson, Alexander, Whitehead, of the humanists, emergent-evolutionists, etc. Not that these all claim to prove that there must be progress, but rather hope to redress the ills of this sorry world, and seeing that time has a native bias toward progress, they believe that hope may well be gratified—the bias being evidenced by the facts of the world’s history, by biological evolution, by man’s gradual ascent, and so on. That is why this third contrast must emerge. And clearly the three contrasts are all of one piece.

Gautama taught that there is no ground for hope in this world, since all things perish just after they arise. The modern West suggests a new and incremental view of change which is not hopeless but hopeful. Time preserves much at least of the past: so in man’s memory and in the evolution of life where the higher species retain the capacities of the lower, with new capacities added. The Wheel of Existence is now an outgoing spiral, ever enlarging itself by preserving the past in the present. Thus time turns out to be positive, creative, ultimate reality, and good, savior of this imperfect world.

And with this the practical perspective with which philosophy started in Asia returns in a new dress. Again philosophy becomes a way of life, a conscious search for progress in this mundane sphere, expressing and embodying the Western meaning of practical. Knowledge is no longer a merely theoretical satisfaction (though it has such a satisfaction too); knowledge is power, knowledge of nature’s laws enables man to gratify his physical wants with less and less of weary toil. Let man then learn to understand himself and he may thereby
root out the evil in his make-up. Let him understand the laws that
govern society and he may plan the perfect state. This is the modern
humanism or naturalism of the West, whose purview is wholly of the
everyday world. But the hopeful process-metaphysic is not confined to
these deniers of the supernatural. Idealists of the personal school em-
brace it; the Christian philosophy of Thomism may well do likewise,
for Thomism has the true Western interest in things of this world, yet
without denying the claim of a higher realm of supernature.

But the West is nearer to the East than has just been seen. Out of
the new temporal perspective, we said, has grown a new view of
knowledge. Notice then how it has developed. It is, as said, a revolt
against the old Greek passive beholding, the purely theoretical atti-
dtude. Now, if all things are in process, that static notion of knowledge
must be wrong. To know is not to gaze with a glassy eye at a ready-
made object (C. W. Morris' phrase); knowing is a process, a doing, or
perhaps a tentative doing, a tendency to do so and so, a plan of action.
What is it, to know the nature of iron, wood, water, etc.? It is to be
able to manipulate them, deal with them properly and successfully.
If we treat water as we treat iron, we fail; water will not do what we
expect iron to do. To know is to be able to deal successfully with the
objects we know. Knowing comes by experimenting. Armchair knowing
is not knowing. The physical sciences have learned by experimenting.
See then the agreement with the East. For the latter, philosophy is a
living experience, not a thought about an object. Brahman, Ātman,
Nirvāna, Tao, yin yang—these are experiences following the experi-
ment of the disciple. Once more, knowing is behaving: quietly indeed
for the Oriental, in mobile ways for the Occidental. But both are prag-
matic. The Hindus were the first pragmatists; we at the other end of
the world have at last rounded to their original insight, though only in
respect of everyday things. And by no means all of us; the "instru-
mentalists" (as they prefer to be called) of North America are but a
small group in the whole. But they at any rate have seen that truth
about an object means adequate behavior with respect to that object,
adapting our conduct to its behavior that we may gain the goods we
need. As Dewey has said, when we are lost in a forest, the true view of
the way out is the view by which we get out. Let not the East disparage
the practical attitude of this latest doctrine; it is the first Western
revolt against the exclusive theoretical attitude inherited from old
Greece. It sees the proof of the pudding in the eating. So too with the
ultimates of metaphysic: the proof of God's being, the genuine proof
which convinces, is the living experience of that being, both in the
mystical ecstasy and in the conduct of life here and now in our world.
CONTRASTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

No mere demonstration of such a being by reason will suffice, however correct and flawless it may be; though such proof is welcome indeed, since it shows the harmony of reason with experience.

The circle has completed itself. We began with the practical attitude of the East; we end with the practical attitude of the West. The two should join hands; they apply the same method to different regions. True, the Western pragmatist usually denies the supernatural; he does not see that the Eastern philosopher has pragmatically proved the being of the supernatural One. On the whole it seems that he is more exclusive than the Vedântist or Buddhist or Taoist; they do not necessarily deny the reality of this world, though some of them may; rather they find it relatively uninteresting, unimportant for salvation, perhaps the source of evil. And the West is more exclusive, more given to mutual refutations, just because it has so long relied on theoretical proofs alone in regard to reality; for these are never truly convincing since they are denatured forms of proof. They hold of the domain of possibilities, as in logic and mathematics; proof in respect of real things is never disconnected with conduct. The East is more tolerant of its own differences because there is a central agreement, due to the experimental perspective, upon the reality and power of the One, be it approached as positive and within all things, as negative or other than the many individuals as merely many, as the all-pervading source of the polarities that make up the world—as Brahman, Ātman, Nirvāṇa, Tao. But being more tolerant, the East has long been somewhat indifferent to the differences of approach; those differences are due to the manifold and complex nature of worldly matters, especially to the manifold nature of man as he is here and now. Man’s different approaches are, as Coomaraswamy has said, paths that lead to the same summit. But a summit would not be a summit without the many sides of the mountain, with their various slopes, cliffs, valleys, forests, brooks, and open spaces. Disinterestedness so easily leads to uninterestedness. But as everyone knows in his heart, this world too is real; the mystic’s very struggle to overcome its lures shows its power, and power is being. As the Thomists have well insisted, man is not just a mind but a mind-body in one individual. The greatness of the One which pervades all nature would not be seen as greatness if there were no nature which it could pervade. It is no tribute to the majesty of God to regard His universe as unworthy of man’s interest and respect. Let the modern West learn from the East how man may approach Deity in the way of the quiet life; let the East learn from the West how to make man’s earthly life—which God gave him—as full and rich as possible.

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The harmony so far indicated obviously unites the first two of the contrasts drawn above. It joins theory with practice: the experimental proof of the Ultimate One could not be conducted without thinking, thinking over the possible ways, reviewing the causes of man's misery and formulating the details of the upward path. Never is reason excluded until perhaps the end, of which the outsider is not entitled to judge. True, reason is not given the exclusive right of decision, as in typical Western metaphysics; neither is reason excluded. It is precisely as in the modern scientific experiment, with the one distinction that measurement does not enter, since the experiment is non-physical and measurement is of physical things alone. It is scientific method applied to non-material subject matter. And as applied to external nature, the method does justice to the purely theoretical perspective of European thought, since it searches the endless realm of possible hypotheses—intellect's home lies in that region, the region of logic and mathematics—and deduces by rigid necessity the consequences of this or that hypothesis before doing the experiment. The two perspectives are here united, cooperating, each contributing to the result, neither sufficient without the other to the advance of the sciences of nature. And while the non-physical experiment reveals reality in the spiritual realm the physical experiment reveals it in the physical realm. Interest now focuses on both worlds. Thereby the third contrast—between the temporal and the unchanging—comes into its own. For this world is above all things temporal; some, like Gautama and at the other extreme John Dewey, say it is always and everywhere in flux; others do not go so far. But certainly it contains all manner of change. And for the practical perspective, which is now added to the passive beholding of unchangeable objects such as number, quantity, and the like, knowledge itself (of reality) comes through action changing external things. From the baby who learns that the wall is hard by pushing against it, to the most elaborate experimenting of the laboratory, knowledge is gained by leading nature to do something, to respond in her own way to what we do to her. Scientific method in our world is method in a time-world. Improvement of man's lot comes through knowing more and more about nature, including himself, as time goes on. Not, of course, that natural science will by itself suffice to perfect mankind; but it does give opportunity for a fuller and richer life in nature. The mystic saint may reach salvation apart from his bodily life, in a timeless heaven; the bodily life is not such, yet it is good enough in its own right to deserve its own kind of salvation—and that comes only in time, however long deferred.

All this willingness to grant each perspective its unique contribu-
RATION IS, TO BE SURE, NOT RIGIDLY DEMONSTRATED TO BE A NECESSITY, NOR EVEN A POSSIBILITY. ITSELF IS AN EXPERIMENT. REASON SEEMS TO INDICATE ITS PLAUSIBILITY; BUT MEN CAN NEVER PROVE THAT THEY ARE ABLE TO AGREE AND TO HAVE A DIVISION OF LABOR WITH POOLED RESULTS UNTIL THEY DO AGREE. IF THE PHILOSOPHERS OF THE WEST ASSERT THAT THE POINTS HERE MADE AREN'T PROVED, WHEREFORE THEY WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE EAST—WELL, NOBODY CAN REFUTE THEM. OR IF THE EASTERN PHILOSOPHERS SAY, "ALL RIGHT, BUT IT REALLY ISN'T WORTH WHILE TO TRY TO IMPROVE THINGS VERY MUCH IN THIS VALE OF TEARS," SURELY NONE CAN COMPEL THEM TO ACCED TO THE PROPOSAL HERE MADE. ALL PHILOSOPHY IS—SHOULD BE—REASONING PLUS EXPERIMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE EXPERIMENT OF SEEKING PURE THEORETICAL PROOF HAS BEEN TRIED IN THE WEST AND HAS RESULTED IN PERENNIAL BICKERING AND A RETREAT TODAY INTO THE IVORY TOWER OF METHODOLOGY AND LANGUAGE-STRUCTURE, WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST PROSPECT OF EMERGING TO LOOK AT THE REAL WORLD. SEEN ONLY FROM ITS OWN CONTEMPLATIVE PERSPECTIVE, WESTERN PHILOSOPHY HAS BEEN A COMPLETE FAILURE. NOT SO IN THE EAST, WHERE THE PRACTICAL ANIMUS HAS AT LEAST MINIMIZED MUTUAL REFUTATION. AND YET HUMAN LIFE IN THE EAST HAS BEEN FOR THE MAJORITY FAR FROM HAPPY; SO MUCH SICKNESS AND DEATH MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY A MODICUM OF APPLIED WESTERN SCIENCE. DRAW THEN THE LESSON.

ON THE OTHER HAND, DO NOT FORGET THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OPPOSITE PERSPECTIVES BY NO MEANS COMMITS THE WOULD-BE HARMONIZER TO ALL THEY HAVE CLAIMED. TRY THE SPIRITS, SAID THE CHRISTIAN APOSTLE, TO SEE IF THEY BE OF GOD OR OF THE DEVIL. SO HERE; NOT ALL THE CLAIMS OF HINDU OR BUDDHIST SCHOOLS, OF CONFUCIUS OR CHU HSI, HAVE BEEN EXPERIMENTALLY PROVED. IS THE ACCOUNT OF NIRVĀṆA AS PURE NEGATION EXPERIMENTALLY VERIFIED? HOW COULD IT BE? NO DOUBT THERE ARE MISTAKES IN DETAIL, IN BOTH EAST AND WEST. WE MAY GRANT THAT AND YET BE SURE THAT ON THE WHOLE THERE NEED BE NO DEEP DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE POSITIVE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS REACHED IN RESPECT OF THE EASTERN SUPERNATURALISM AND THE WESTERN COSMOLOGY DRAWN FROM THE RESULTS OF THE SCIENCES. FOR BOTH HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES TO HAVE A SOUND BASIS OF TRUTH, IN THE FACT THAT BY THEM MAN CAN REACH THE GOODS HIS NATURE CRAVES—TO A HIGH DEGREE AT LEAST.
Part III

ETHICS AND
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
The Basis of Social, Ethical, and Spiritual Values in Chinese Philosophy

Y. P. Mei

The field of social, ethical, and spiritual values in Chinese philosophy is so wide and the content so rich that the paper here presented will have to be highly selective in scope. It is proposed to limit the treatment to the following sub-topics:

I. Some general characters and the problem of Chinese philosophy
II. Values in Confucianism—as expounded by Confucius
III. Values in Confucianism—as developed by Mencius
IV. Values in alternative systems
   A. Moism
   B. Taoism of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu
V. Values restated in Neo-Confucianism

The discussion of values in the several systems will be concentrated on their respective search after the highest good, as the other virtues and standards are usually found subsumed thereunder. It is hoped that such a plan of treatment will afford the best perspective for a general view of the basis of values in Chinese philosophy, without permitting ourselves to get involved in the many features that might sidetrack us from the central issue.

I

In so far as one may speak of Chinese philosophy and not of Chinese philosophies, he may suggest that Chinese philosophy is predominantly a system of ethical realism. The major tenets of this philosophy may be outlined as follows:
Metaphysics

(1) Both the universe and man’s life are real.
(2) The nature of reality is dynamic and not static, relational and not absolute.
(3) All forms of change may be regarded as expressions of the interaction of two forces, the yin and the yang, between which there can be equilibrium and harmony as well as conflict and opposition.
(4) Change takes place in the form of supplementation and alternation and usually in the form of cycles or spirals but never extremes.
(5) The universe is a macrocosm and man is a microcosm.

Ethics

(1) Running through life and the universe is one all-pervading principle, rational and ethical in nature.
(2) Man’s duty is to follow this principle, which brings him in harmony with society and in tune with the universe.
(3) Evil results when there is deviation from this path.
(4) Every mortal has in him the capacity to become a sage.
(5) The sage is one who “assists the transforming and nourishing powers of heaven and earth, and so with heaven and earth forms a ternion.”

These tenets are most fundamental in Chinese thought. In fact, they are as much the contents of a credo of the Chinese race as the doctrines of Chinese philosophy. Such a faith about man and his universe antedates all philosophical systems on the one hand, and is still the basis of Chinese life and conduct on the other. Philosophy only performed the useful service, a very useful service to be sure, of midwifery to the embryonic ideas in the ancient culture and of outlining more clearly defined precepts for later ages. The feeling of kinship between man and the universe is so strong that it is sometimes difficult to know where ethics ends and where metaphysics begins.

Assuming a common root for man and the universe, Chinese philosophy is grounded in man and his life. Man is the center of all things, and it is his nature, his relations, and the development of his personality that are of absorbing interest. And how, in the end, is man able to achieve perfection and to identify himself with the universe—a synthesis of this world, which man affirms and does not relinquish, and a world beyond—this is the final problem of Chinese philosophy and particularly of Chinese ethics.
If man gives rise to the problem, life itself is considered adequate to provide the basis and standard for all values. Transcendental and supernatural considerations have as little place here as do methods of abstraction and objectification. The world beyond is beyond in the ontological and moral, but not the temporal, sense. Of course, agricultural people are children of nature living among vegetation and growth and moving in the intimate circle of the family. Everything goes on in the experience of the immediate, and understanding depends upon appreciation rather than analysis and calculation. Plato’s problem of abstract justice, for instance, has hardly ever been discussed in China. Knowledge means wisdom, the Greek \( \text{σοφία} \) before Aristotle differentiated it from \( \text{φρόωνης} \), and wisdom is virtue. It is something direct and personal, something like what is called a “realizing sense.” Philosophy is therefore decidedly a way of life, just as the Orphic communities in ancient Greece claimed. And ethical inquiry is always conducted in the same spirit as that of Aristotle when he said, “We are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise an inquiry would have been of no use.” Thus, there is a large aesthetic element in morality, whereas an ethics based on abstraction leaves life in want of the saving grace of art that is developed independently and provided as an addition. It might be significant to realize that the component Chinese character for ethics, \( \text{ Lun} \), comes under the \( \text{jên} \) (meaning “man”) radical, and that an ancient form of the character for morality is \( \text{tê} \), which comes under the \( \text{hsin} \) (meaning “heart”) radical, whereas the Western terms “ethics” and “morality” have their origins either in the nature of gods or in social customs.

II

Confucius\(^8\) (551–479 B.C.) may or may not have been the keenest thinker among the Chinese, but, for two and a half millenniums, he surely has been the chief molder of China. The Confucian way of life remains the key to a study of values in Chinese philosophy. Confucius repeatedly spoke of his “one unifying principle,” which is also rendered as “an all-pervading unity.” This unifying principle is generally assumed to be \( \text{shu} \), or reciprocity, which Confucius once said was the one word that might guide one’s conduct throughout life. Reciprocity was stated to be “what you would not have others do unto you, do not unto them,” and this formula has usually been referred to as the Chinese Golden Rule. But when Confucius tried to make clear to a disciple what \( \text{jên} \) meant, the explanation consisted of exactly the same Golden Rule. \( \text{Jên} \) is, of course, the cornerstone of Confucianism,
and it may be assumed that reciprocity or the Golden Rule is an expression of jên, and that it is just as proper to regard jên as the one unifying principle of all of Confucius' teachings. Historically, jên is a distinct Confucian concept, a concept that was little used before his time.18

Now, jên has been variously translated as "magnanimity," "benevolence," "perfect virtue" (James Legge), "moral life," "moral character" (Ku Hung-ming17), "true manhood," "compassion" (Lin Yutang18), "human-heartedness" (Derk Bodde), "man-to-manness" (E. R. Hughes), etc. Evidently there is no term in the English language that corresponds exactly to this fundamental Confucian concept. It is probably just as profitable if we do not try to adopt some one translation but use the transliteration "jên" in these paragraphs.

While not one of the list of translated terms seems entirely satisfactory, the whole list together should afford some notion as to what jên means. Confucius' own brief answer, when a disciple asked about jên, was, "Love men."19 Han Fei Tzû20 (d. 233 B.C.) elaborated this idea and said, "Jên is to love men joyously and from the inmost of one's heart."21 In The Doctrine of the Mean there is the pun, "jên is jên"22 or "jên is manhood."23 One of the earliest and most influential commentaries24 on the Confucian Analects pointed out that "jên denotes what is common in two men," which is right in line with the etymological origin of the character. (An older form of the character is made up of the two components which separately mean "thousand" and "hearts.")25 When Mencius inquired what it was that distinguished man from the birds and beasts, the answer was also jên.26 Thus, jên is the common denominator of humanity on the one hand, and the mark which distinguishes man from animal on the other. It is both the innermost nature and the highest ideal of true manhood, the beginning and the end of the way of life. The man of jên has no anxieties27 and is free from evil,28 and it is only he who knows how to love men or to hate men.29 All virtues, like love, reciprocity, loyalty, courage, trustworthiness, etc., may be regarded as expressions of jên, and jên is thus, like Socratic justice, the super-virtue of virtues. A superior man is said not to act contrary to jên, but to hold himself true to it under all circumstances.30 The Master's highest praise for his favorite disciple was that his heart did not deviate from jên for as long as three months.31 And, when necessary, the virtuous man would rather give up life than permit the jên in him to be injured.32

One arrives at jên not so much by way of intellect or emotion as by intuition. Jên is inborn in us all, and we all have the "feel" for it. He whose intuition is more sensitive than others' has a better apprehension of jên and attains it to a higher degree. Even today, Chinese
medical language speaks of paralysis as "absence or lack of jën." Confucius said, "Is jën something remote? If I want jën, behold, jën has arrived." And, "The attainment of jën depends upon oneself. What does it have to do with others?" Borrowing Mr. Northrop's immensely suggestive term, without subscribing to all the uses he has put it to, however, one might say that jën was to Confucius "an immediately apprehended aesthetic continuum or manifold."

In spite of several frequently employed quotations from The Analects which seem to point to the contrary, Confucius was truly a religious man. Confucius had a deep sense of affirmation of life and was ever ready to offer his praise. He had something of the feeling that "God's in his heaven: all's right with the world." He prayed, he fasted, he attended sacrifices, and once he even swore by Heaven.

In his disappointments, he trusted that Heaven knew him. His sense of a heavenly mission grew upon him only with the years. He observed, "Does Heaven speak? The four seasons run their course and all things grow. Does Heaven speak?" This observation might partly account for his own reticence in such matters. Confucius was not a preacher of an institutional religion but he was a God-filled man.

One of the marks of the superior man that Confucius emphasized was that he was always composed and contented, whereas the inferior man was always worried and full of distress. A record in The Analects says Confucius' manners were easy and his looks very cheerful. There was an occasion when four disciples were in attendance. Of the four, Tseng Hsi was the last to speak his mind and said:

We will suppose now that we are in the latter days of spring, when the new, light garments are ready. I would then take with me five or six grown-ups and six or seven boys. We will go and bathe in the Ch'i River, after which we will air and cool ourselves on top of that ancient terrace; and then we will loiter back home, singing on our way.

Confucius, who had kept his silence as he listened to the others speaking their minds, which invariably consisted of some political ambition or plan, thereupon spoke up and said, "Ah, you are a man after my own heart!" In describing his own spiritual development, Confucius said that at fifty he knew the will of Heaven, at sixty he was obedient to it, and at seventy he could follow his heart's desire without transgressing the moral law. Confucius thus achieved an ease and serenity within himself and attained a harmony and identity with the universe. He was at once a perfect citizen of society and of the universe, and in him was a synthesis of this world and the world beyond. Confucius knew that such a state of mind was neither reducible to conceptual analysis nor subject to systematic teaching. But his personal example
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has stood like a beacon light to all seekers after truth. Worthily indeed has Confucius been revered during these long centuries by the Chinese as their Supreme Sage and Foremost Teacher.

Although jên is inborn in us all, Confucius understood very well that it was only the few who would reach the final stage in the pilgrim’s progress of the soul. For the benefit of the many, and to pave the way leading to their attainment, he discoursed constantly on the various virtues and the proper relations of men in their several stations in life. Subsequently Confucian followers developed out of these the code of the five social relations and the codes of filial piety and ancestor worship, which have had an important influence on Chinese life. Confucius’ reiteration of the Golden Mean, an idea dating from antiquity, gave rise to The Doctrine of the Mean, and it has since in turn become a central doctrine in all philosophical thinking. Confucius made much of the rites of propriety and music. The manner in which an act is performed is of as much importance as the motive that prompts it. If jên is the spirit of conduct, propriety and music are to be its form and to give it the finishing touch. When the natural qualities and good manners are well blended in a person we have a superior man. In politics, Confucius was the champion of the idea of government by virtue, a novel idea at a time when absolute powers were vested in a hereditary aristocracy. Elevation of the citizen’s character becomes the purpose and procedure of such a government, and moral life and education are one with political activity and process. The liberating and democratic tendencies of such a political ideal are evident, but it was left to Mencius to give these tendencies a clear and definite formulation.

III

Mencius (372-289 B.C.) had the greatest admiration for Confucius. He accepted all the tenets of Confucius and devoted himself to their clarification and to giving them a more intelligible formulation. In the process, he made his own very significant contributions. The Confucian idea of government by virtue was at the hands of Mencius directly turned into government by jên. Government by jên is actually the easiest thing in the world. All that a ruler has to do is to let his innate jên impulse have its natural play and give it a wide extension toward all people. Of course, special attention should be given to the needs of the people, material and spiritual. Mencius went into great detail about what may be called his economic planning. He was very insistent about it and in The Works of Mencius reiterated
this plan several times. When, finally, there is plenty in the country, the rulers are to share all the good things of life with the people and then provide them with proper education. Government by jen is the political norm. In case of disharmony between the ruler and the people, usually due to the degeneracy of the ruler, he should be emphatically reminded that the people rank the highest, the spirits of the land and grain next, and the sovereign the lowest. And Mencius quoted with emphasis from the Shu Ching (The Book of History), "Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear." If a wayward ruler should turn a deaf ear to such warnings and admonition, then not only would his forceful removal be permitted but he by whose hands this act is done would be regarded as a vessel of God as well as a savior of men.

Here we have the most articulate expression of the democratic ideal in Chinese political thought. The right of the sovereign rests on a trust, a divine trust if you wish, but God exercises his vigilant powers through the people. In such a system revolution becomes part and parcel of the scheme and poses no problem for political theory. The exaltation of the individual resolves itself in providing for his needs as much as in calling attention to his worth. Mencius' maxim is to "live and let live," and thus the formalism of Confucius' political thought is here given a realistic content. At the bottom of it all, we shall find that Mencius' enthusiasm for political democracy comes from his deep-seated faith in moral democracy. Such enthusiasm and such faith are indeed remarkable when we realize that at that time the individual common man was just emerging out of the tenant slavery of feudalistic society and had hardly shaken off all its vestiges.

Confucius simply posited the concept of jen. Mencius explicitly maintained that jen, with its accompanying virtues of righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, arose from the inner springs of the human heart. His doctrine of the goodness of human nature is well known, and his illustration of the poor "child about to fall into the well" has been used until it is in tatters. What it says, in a nutshell, is that the expressions of the four cardinal virtues are universal and come naturally, just as taste for food and hearing for music and sight for beauty come naturally. Therefore, if it is guided by its innate feelings our nature will be good. Evil and misbehavior are due to pressure and influence the source of which is external. We all have the seeds of the four virtues in us, sparks of divinity in terms of some theology, and our business is to give them the opportunity of full extension and development. Self-cultivation is a task that requires constant attention, but one must not overexert oneself trying to be good. That
would be like the foolish man of the State of Sung who tried to help his crop grow by pulling up the young sprouts just a little.\(^{61}\)

Mencius has thus given a theory of the origin of the all-important Confucian concept of *jên* and outlined a procedure for its development. Both are important supplements to the Confucian doctrine. The theory of the goodness of human nature has since stimulated much discussion and is one of the major problems in Chinese philosophy.

Mencius' ideal of personal cultivation stops at nothing short of the true sage. When he was asked wherein did he excel, he replied that he knew well how to feed his boundless spirit.\(^{62}\) As to the meaning of this boundless spirit, Mencius said:

> It is rather difficult to describe. The spirit is infinitely vast and powerful. When properly cultivated and carefully preserved, it will fill up all between heaven and earth. It is in accord with both virtue and reason. Without the spirit, man is but an empty shell. It is the sum total of all righteous deeds, and not the result of incidental acts of righteousness.\(^{63}\)

There is a strong element of mysticism in Mencius. And his sagehood constitutes a power permeating man and the universe and heaven and earth,\(^{64}\) again "an immediately apprehended aesthetic continuum or manifold." It would be futile to try to describe this feeling on his part except in his own words. But we have to limit ourselves to the briefest of his remarks:

> All the ten thousand living things are found within us. There is no greater joy than to look into our life and find this true. To have strong feelings for others and follow them is the nearest road to *jên*.\(^{65}\)

> He that goes to the bottom of his heart knows his own nature; and knowing his own nature he knows Heaven. By keeping his heart and feeding his nature he serves Heaven. Long life and early death are as one to him. By mending his life whilst he waits he carries out the bidding.\(^{66}\)

And yet, the truly great man is he who is able to preserve his heart like that of a new-born babe.\(^{67}\)

Although such a state may appear too lofty and unattainable for the ordinary man, Mencius exhorted him to take heart. When Mencius was asked if it was true that every man could become like Yao\(^{68}\) and Shun\(^{69}\) (the great ancient sage-kings), he exclaimed, "Certainly!"\(^{70}\) And he put into the mouth of Yen Yuan,\(^{71}\) the favorite disciple of Confucius, the following expression of confidence: "Who was Shun? Who am I? To do our all is to be like him."\(^{72}\) If Mencius departed from the traditional anthropomorphic god, he laid his faith in a new realization of the true worth of man. For traditional religion he substituted a vital ethical mysticism. Mencius was confident that not only he himself but everyone else as well could attain the identity of man with the universe. Everyone has potential sagehood in him.
BASIS OF VALUES IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

It all depends on how well he can extend and develop those inborn beginnings of the virtues. To a more profound moral democracy than this no man can profess.

IV

(A) Mo Tzu72 (470–391 B.C.) had a vivid sense of a personal God and was an outspoken champion of orthodox religion. He considered Confucius' reticence about religious matters indicative of a lack of faith and his skepticism a danger to morals. Religion is to be revitalized and new content put in, to be sure, but it must be God and not man who is to be the center of things. Confucius' spontaneous quality of jén suffers from the lack of a solid foundation, and in practice it works for gradation and partiality, the root evil of all the chaotic conditions of the day. Universal love74 becomes, therefore, the well-known ethical doctrine of Mo Tzu, with emphasis placed on the quality of universality.75 Mo Tzu's political teachings consist of establishing a hierarchy of rulers chosen on the basis of virtue and talent, and then carrying through a process of identification with the superior.76 This process reaches its climax through the emperor, the "Son of Heaven," in Heaven itself, just as the concept of universal love finds its origin in the content of the will of Heaven.77 Both ethics and politics thus receive their sanction from religion. At the same time, Mo Tzu was an outspoken utilitarian. The phrase "universal love and mutual profit," which he used repeatedly,78 did not seem to embarrass him in the least, and, in fact, seemed to him to be the only possible expression that would make the idea meaningful and intelligible. For the same reason, Mo Tzu found Confucius' idea that jén was derived from the direct intuitive sense unintelligible. For instance, he was greatly annoyed when a Confucianist announced, "We make music for music's sake." To Mo Tzu this was sheer nonsense, the same as telling people we build houses for houses' sake. What one ought to have said is that a house is built so as to keep off the cold in winter and the heat in summer, and to separate the men from the women properly.79 His own doctrine of universal love was proposed because it would result in mutual benefit and eventually the greatest good to the greatest number.

Mencius' doctrine of the goodness of human nature may be regarded as an answer to Mo Tzu's criticism regarding the origin of Confucius' concept of jén. Confucianism insists on grounding morality and value in man himself. No external standard, though it be from God, will be acceptable. Self-conscious, self-critical, and self-realizing
manhood is the center of all goodness and the origin of all virtues. Therefrom Mencius went on to condemn Mo Tzū's principle of universal love. Universal love, contrasted to love as jên in action—call it graded love if you must—is not at all a higher level of moral sentiment but simply an arbitrary and artificial notion about human relationships. What could be more ideal than to let the well-spring of the human heart issue forth freely in its natural course and to its natural degree? To say that one loves or should love the man on the street as much as one's parents violates every sense of rationality. As to proposing love for profit, well, the Sage Mencius could do without any such sacrilege. When Mencius compared Mo Tzū to birds and beasts, he meant that Mo Tzū altogether overlooked the all-important jên in himself and in others, which was to him the line of demarcation between man and animal.

The twofold religious and utilitarian motive enabled Mo Tzū to develop a way of life characterized by asceticism, obedience, and self-denial. Mo Tzū had a considerable following for several generations after his death, and these followers organized themselves into a community that can very properly be called a church under the undisputed authority of a grand master. Members were men of strict discipline, and the community had a stern sort of order. But the strength of this discipline and of this order was of the brittle kind, and the movement lasted for about two centuries and then dwindled into oblivion. The teachings of Mo Tzū left their marks on Chinese life, and it would be difficult to find a more self-sacrificing person than Mo Tzū himself. But to lead a man to inner peace with himself and happy relationship with his fellow men, as well as harmony with the universe, Mo Tzū's way would hardly suffice.

(B) Lao Tzū (fifth century B.C.) and Chuang Tzū (369–286 B.C.) had no use for the anthropomorphic god that Mo Tzū tried so desperately to salvage for the orthodox tradition. To Mo Tzū, God was the absolute standard and the final reality. To the Taoists, God was neither. Heaven was said to be unkind and to treat the creation like the straw-dogs we use at sacrifices. And Lao Tzū spoke of the Tao as "an image of that which existed before God." On the other hand, the Taoists could not see anything in the jên of Confucius or the yi (righteousness) of Mencius. Jên and yi are, at best, of secondary significance: after Tao is lost then arises the doctrine of jên; after jên is lost then arises the doctrine of yi. And people are told to abandon their saintliness and put away their wisdom, to abandon their jên and put away their yi.

The highest good and at the same time the most fundamental
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reality is Tao. It is difficult to talk about Tao because it is nameless and unnamable, elusive, and evasive. If one must call it something, one may call it great. Out of Tao the created universe is born; Tao is the mother of all things. Yet Tao does nothing. In fact, the things of this world come from being, and being comes from non-being. Tao transcends time and space and causality and knowledge, and is beyond good and evil, truth and falsehood, life and death. Tao is the prime mover, and underlies man, God, and the universe.

While in Lao Tzu there is still room for a life of humility and quietude in society, in Chuang Tzu the one aim in life for man comes to consist in apprehending the Tao. He who attains the Tao becomes the true man, the ultimate man, the spiritual man. The stages in the pilgrim's progress of the mind are marked by forgetfulness of the world, of the manifold, and of life itself. Positively, there is enlightenment, then a sense of the wholeness of things, then the merging of the present and the past, and finally the oneness of death and life. What may be called the Taoist beatific vision may be described as an equilibrium in which all differences and distinctions—those between the ego and the non-ego, between man and the universe, as well as between life and death—disappear and are melted into a sea of identity. The true man is therefore conditioned by nothing and is free in the absolute sense. Taoist religion later readily turned him into a fairy spirit, practicing alchemy and teaching the secrets of longevity. Worse blasphemy and irony can hardly be imagined. Actually, what we have here is again an "immediately apprehended aesthetic continuum," and the term is used in Mr. Northrop's sense, this time with less reservation. Chuang Tzu, of course, employed to the full his power of literary imagery in inducing an appreciation of the Tao, and at times he achieved poetic heights of fantasy.

In relation to the all-important attainment of the Tao, all else becomes secondary. A naturalistic pantheism is all, if there is anything, that is left of religion; ethical values become relative or insignificant; and the political ideal is found in the primitivity of small rural communities where the voices of the cocks and dogs would be within hearing and yet the people might grow old and die before they visited one another. Both the ethical realism of Confucianism and the naturalistic mysticism of Taoism are interested in the final perfection of man or his identification with the universe, but there is a difference. Whereas to Confucius this attainment is the crowning glory of a process of cultivation in which each step is a positive good contributing to the upbuilding of the personality of the individual and the welfare of his society, to the Taoists the towering height of the one all-engrossing
goal dwarfs all other values to the level of insignificance. This contrast between Taoism and Confucianism may be grasped in another way. Lao Tzu and Mencius were equally fond of speaking of the new-born babe. But Lao Tzu was attracted by its freedom from the fetters and burdens of life, whereas Mencius was impressed by its vitality and promise and potentialities. Maybe here is a key to the proper approach to, and understanding of, the two systems.

V

For nearly a millennium, roughly speaking from the time of Christ, Confucianism was overshadowed by Taoism and, more fundamentally, by Buddhism. The major doctrines of Buddhism about man and reality have already been admirably presented at this Conference. Suffice it here to point out that the teachings of Buddhism brought from India proved to be refreshingly interesting to the Chinese mind. It is no exaggeration to say that for the greater part of the millennium the best thinkers in China were all Buddhist thinkers. The Ch'an school, or Zenism, with its charm of simplicity and yet its depth of profundity, for instance, is one of the fruits of Buddhism flowering in the Chinese mind. The story of Buddhism's arriving in China as a foreign doctrine both geographically and intellectually, coming there to its fruition, and finally ingraining itself in the very fiber of the Chinese mentality, is an intellectual epic to which a conference devoted to a synthesis of the philosophies of the East and the West would do well to pay some attention.

Stimulating as Buddha's teachings may be, they go against the grain of the Chinese outlook on life and have always been regarded by the orthodox Confucianists with suspicion. Voices have recurrently been raised against this foreign system, and large-scale persecution has occurred more than once in history. But the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung and Ming dynasties was the first revival movement that succeeded in directing the Chinese mind from Buddhism to the indigenous Chinese heritage. The Neo-Confucianists had to state their philosophy with the challenge of Buddhism very much in mind. In their formulation, they leaned heavily on such sources of Confucianism as The Book of Changes, The Doctrine of the Mean, The Great Learning and the mystical phase in Mencius. Although they claimed to be stating their views from the purely Confucian position, they were actually influenced by Buddhism and occasionally they even made use of certain Taoist ideas. Synthesis does seem to come easily to the Chinese temper of mind.
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By the time of the Neo-Confucianists the time-honored feeling of kinship between man and the universe had grown even stronger. Chang Tsai (A.D. 1020–1077) bluntly announced, "Heaven is my father and earth is my mother. . . . What fills the universe is my body, and what commands the universe is my nature. All men are my brothers; all things are my relatives." And the essay known as "The Western Inscription," from which the preceding quotation is taken, is a classic in Confucian ethics. This twofold aspect must be borne in mind in following the discussion of this period of either the cosmos or of man's being. According to Ch'eng Hao (A.D. 1032–1085), the older of the two Ch'eng brothers, the man who has jen in him identifies himself with all things without discrimination, and the superior man is in a position "to extend his affection to all and to respond spontaneously to any occurrence."

Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130–1200) was, of course, the most comprehensive scholar of the period. His metaphysics is built on the basic notions of li (rational principle) and ch'i (material principle). Every object is an embodiment of these two components. Human beings in common derive their essential nature from the li, whereas individual characteristics are accounted for by the ch'i. Evil is due to the coarse grade of ch'i that a person embodies in his make-up. Chu Hsi used this explanation to buttress Mencius' doctrine of the goodness of human nature and at the same time to account for the phenomenon of original evil. The Supreme Ultimate, which is like a super li embracing all the individual li, is, at the same time, the supreme good, and there is a sharp contrast of human passion over against heavenly reason (li). Final unity can be achieved only by way of jen, which to Chu Hsi is the life-giving vitality in the universe as much as it is the heart-warming sentiment of love in man.

Chu Hsi's keenest critic was his contemporary Lu Chiu-yüan (A.D. 1139–1193). Lu found the dualism of li and ch'i in Chu untenable and unnecessary, and he discovered the true being completely in the rationality of his own mind. Against the authoritarian background of Chinese thought, he was prompted to declare that there was no use in writing commentaries on the Six Classics, as the Six Classics were but commentaries on his mind. And his saying, "The cosmos is in my mind; my mind is in the cosmos," has since become celebrated. Man's attainment comes, therefore, entirely through an inner process. In this way Lu represented a synthesis of Confucianism and the teachings of Ch'an Buddhism, although he was very wary of being called a Buddhist. And Lu's great contribution lies in his having been the source of inspiration to Wang Shou-jen (A.D. 1472–1529),
more popularly and respectfully known by his appellation Yang-ming. The first mention of the idea of intuitive knowledge occurred in The Works of Mencius. Wang Shou-jên expounded the doctrines of the extension of intuitive knowledge and the unity of knowledge and conduct. Thus knowledge contains in itself the factor of action, and action has an intelligible reference. Wang's Dialogue on the Great Learning is an elaboration of his doctrine of intuition as it bears on the concept of jên. Jên is an all-inclusive whole, and in the ordinary life of man this natural feeling of jên becomes the categorical imperative of conduct.

These teachers of the Sung and Ming dynasties reaffirmed Confucius' way of jên. To them the views on life of both the Taoists and the Buddhists of their time were unacceptable. The Taoists suffered from too much attachment to life and hence their cultivation of magic and alchemy in the hope of discovering the elixir of longevity. The Buddhist suffered from too much negation of life and hence their search for release and freedom from the perpetual wheel. In common, they suffered from a mistaken view. Life is here: it is to be lived. Man is to be of this world and, at the same time, of the world beyond. To achieve this ideal is possible only when the individual has apprehended the jên that is the final unity or continuum.

It is remarkable that out of an intervening intellectual heterogeneity and richness that lasted for centuries the eventual sanction of the Chinese mind went back to Confucianism. And to this day the way of jên is the accepted way among the Chinese masses, and in it some few Chinese seers have, with the sages and teachers across the ages, found joy and satisfaction and a peace that passes understanding. The catholicity of jên breeds tolerance. May I conclude this paper with the suggestion that the system of jên will be found, by those who will try, to synthesize easily and well with any system of values the world over that has an element of true worth?

NOTES

2Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1103a.
3倫
4人  "直(心胸)"
5心
6孔夫子
7Analects, Bk. IV, Ch. 15; Bk. XV, Ch. 2.
8Analects, Bk. XV, Ch. 23.
9仁
10 Analects, Bk. XII, Ch. 2.  "Ibid., Bk. XV, Ch. 23."
The character "jēn" is not found once in all the ancient bronze or oracle bone inscriptions.

The character "shēng" is not found once in all the ancient bronze or oracle bone inscriptions.

The character "xīn" is not found once in all the ancient bronze or oracle bone inscriptions.

An older form of the character is 千 (心脚) which breaks into 千 or "thousand" and 心 or "hearts."

The Works of Mencius, Bk. IV, Pt. 2, Ch. 19.

Ibid., Bk. IX, Ch. 28.

Ibid., Bk. IV, Ch. 5.

Ibid., Bk. VII, Ch. 29.


The Works of Mencius, Bk. VI, Ch. 16.

The Works of Mencius, Bk. I, Pt. 1, Ch. 3, and other passages.

Mencius' doctrine of the goodness of human nature is discussed in several passages in The Works of Mencius, Bk. VI, Pt. 1, is probably the most important and should be read in its entirety.

The Works of Mencius, Bk. II, Pt. 1, Ch. 6.

Ibid., Bk. VI, Pt. 1, Ch. 7.

Ibid., Bk. II, Pt. 1, Ch. 2.

The Works of Mencius, Bk. II, Pt. 1, Ch. 2.

Ibid., Bk. VII, Pt. 2, Ch. 25.

Ibid., Bk. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. 1.

The Works of Mencius, Bk. VI, Pt. 2, Ch. 2.

The Works of Mencius, Bk. III, Pt. 1, Ch. 1.

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Cf. Chuang Tzu, Ch. 33.

Tao Tê Ching, Ch. 5.

Ibid., Ch. 19.

Tao Tê Ching, Chs. 1, 32.

Ibid., Ch. 42.

Ibid., Ch. 40.

Chuang Tzu, Ch. 6; Fung Yu-lan, trans. (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1931), pp. 119, 128-129.

Ibid., Ch. 6; Fung, pp. 119-120. Ibid., Ch. 1; Fung, p. 33.

Tao Tê Ching, Ch. 80.

宋朝

唐經

J. P. Bruce in his study of Neo-Confucianism found it relevant to give the following warning to his fellow students of Chinese philosophy:

"It is very important that the reader of Chinese works on philosophy should keep this twofold aspect continually in mind. When reading of Law and Matter, for example, or of the Supreme Ultimate, we must remember that the writer is treating of these from the point of view of human nature; and perhaps in some passage where it is least expected, he is referring to them as inherent in man, and as explaining the constitution of man's being. And, vice versa, when reading of man's nature or mind, we must keep before us the wide cosmic outlook if we are to keep in touch with the writer's thought. Only thus can we obtain a true perspective for the study of Chinese Philosophy." J. P. Bruce, Chu Hsi and His Masters (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1923), p. 4.


朱熹

太極


陸九淵


王守仁

陽明

The Works of Mencius, Bk. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. 15.

CHAPTER XVII

The Basis of Social, Ethical, and Spiritual Values in Indian Philosophy

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY is essentially a philosophy of values. Facts as such do not fascinate the Indian philosopher except as revealers of value. The discovery of facts and of the laws that govern them is the business of science and not of philosophy. It is true that the discoveries of science are often put to some use for mankind; but such use is a consequence and not the end of science; and the use may in no sense be construed as a value which is pertinent to philosophy. Philosophical inquiry, on the contrary, must, according to the Indian view, lead to the apprehension of value. Any metaphysical investigation which does not so lead is generally compared to such futile occupations as examining the teeth of a crow. Logic is a useful instrument of catharsis by means of which the philosopher rescues his intellect from obscure and conflicting conceptions, and from unreflective modes of thinking. It is of negative help in so far as it may clear away impossible ideas about the nature of reality, self-contradictory notions, and uncritical dogmas. By employing the canons of logic, one may know, at any rate, what reality is not. It is the purified intellect that is said to become the instrument of intuition. But when logic degenerates into logic-chopping, reveling in a mere display of fine-spun theories, it is worse than useless to the philosopher, because it does not then aid in the process of discovering and realizing the supreme value. So it is that the Upaniṣads declare that wisdom is not obtained by intellectual acrobatics. A philosophy is to be judged by its fruits; and the final fruit of philosophy is the experience of value.

A well-known episode in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad is illustrative of the typically Indian philosophical outlook. Nārada, a versatile genius, master of many arts and sciences, secular as well as sacerdotal, finds
himself sorrow-stricken in spite of all his learning. He approaches a preceptor, Sanatkumāra by name, confesses that he knows only the texts and not the Self, and implores the teacher to impart to him the knowledge of the Self, which alone would ensure the attainment of sorrowlessness.¹ The plight of Nārada, the problem he faces, and the way he goes about solving it are typical of the manner in which reflective thought begins and functions in India. The attainment of sorrowlessness is the common goal of all the schools of Indian philosophy. The Sāṅkhya, for instance, which sets out to distinguish spirit from matter and trace the various stages in the evolution of the universe, prefaces its inquiry with the statement that its ultimate aim is to help man achieve complete freedom from all misery. The Nyāya, which is the school par excellence of logic, regards the investigation into the categories of knowledge as the means to the attainment of liberation (nīhīreyasya). It was the observation of cases of sorrow and pain that made Gautama, the Prince of Kapilavastu, leave a sheltered life of ease and pleasure and wed the strenuous life of inward seeking, which led to his enlightenment (bodhi). “Just as the great ocean has one taste only, the taste of salt,” says the Buddha, “just so have this doctrine and description but one flavor only, the flavor of emancipation.”² The critical student of Indian thought often wonders why the school of materialism known as Cārvāka came to be counted as a system of philosophy at all. The reason, it seems to me, is that the Cārvāka does not stop with advocating a philosophical view, but aligns itself with the rest of the systems in so far as it professes to show a way of life as well, however crude and short-sighted that way may be. Thus, one of the fundamental features of Indian philosophy as a whole is that it goes beyond logic, and becomes an affair of one’s life—not sound and fury signifying nothing, but a thing of utmost significance for man’s entire being.

THE SCHEME OF VALUES

The Indian scheme of values recognizes four human ends (purusārthas). They are: wealth (artha), pleasure (kāma), righteousness (dharma), and perfection or spiritual freedom (mokṣa). Not all these, however, are ends really. The first of these, wealth, is never an end in itself except for the miser in his moments of miserliness. In the Bhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, a wise lady, Maitreyī, puts this question to her husband, Yājñavalkya: “If this entire earth filled with wealth were mine, would I become immortal by that?” The reply which Yājñavalkya gives is, “No; just as is the life of men of means, so will your
life be. There is no hope of immortality through wealth." The Cārvāka, in conformity with its positivist-materialist outlook, recognizes only one intelligible human end, which is pleasure, the second of the values listed above. Quite apart from the Cārvāka view of reality, its view of the human end is unacceptable because it is not only the pleasure of the moment, sense pleasure, or the greatest amount of pleasure in this life that we desire, but everlasting happiness. Moreover, indulging the senses does not seem to be the way to attain happiness. Desire grows by what it feeds on. "Never are one's desires satisfied with their indulgence," says the Mahābhārata, "but they flare up like the fire with clarified butter poured into it." The Kaṭha Upaniṣad declares: "The good (śreyas) and the pleasing (preyās) come to man. One who is wise considers the two comprehensively and discriminates between them. He chooses the good in preference to the pleasing. One who is stupid chooses the pleasing for the sake of acquisition and prosperity." While it is true that wealth and pleasure are not intrinsic values, they have their own place in the scheme of things. Man has to live before he can live spiritually. His physical body is the location of all his endeavor, including that which relates to morality and the higher life. A certain measure of economic security is essential, therefore, to keep body and soul together. There is no virtue in poverty. The example is often cited in India of King Janaka, who lived in the world, shared a large measure of its burdens, and yet pursued the path of spiritual discipline and wisdom. Anyone who is acquainted with the history of India will testify to the fact that the arts and the sciences, the systems of philosophy, and the great religions flourished most when the country was prosperous and the people contented. There is a maxim in the Tamil language that one must cross even the high seas in quest of wealth. But, at the same time, it must be remembered that the Indian view of property is that it must be held as a trust. Kālidāsa, the great poet, speaks of acquiring wealth in order to give it away. Earning is not for hoarding, but for sharing. Almsgiving is one of the essential virtues enjoined on the householder, though in degenerate days this led to the encouragement of laziness and parasitism on the part of a section of Indian society. Elaborate and detailed instructions are to be found in the scriptures as to how, under what circumstances, and to whom gifts are to be made. The economic factor, then, has its value; and the value consists precisely in the use made of it. As for the question whether one can attain everlasting happiness (mokṣa) through wealth, the reply is what I have indicated already. One can understand and appreciate the statement of Jesus that it is easier for
a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for the rich man to enter the Kingdom of God. The Sanskrit term for wealth is *artha*, which means what is sought after as good. But it is a misnomer, since not infrequently wealth is the source of what is evil. As Śaṅkara says in one of his popular poems, *artha* is *anartha*.

The normal man has his desires, and he seeks pleasure in the objects of sense. The passions are an integral part of his nature, and there must be channels through which they may flow. The world would seem to be a dull affair without its dance and music, sport and recreation, connubial love and filial affection. Indian thought does not attempt to suppress the desires and emotions that well up from the human heart. On the contrary, its purpose is to let them flow within bounds and so canalize them that through them one may reach higher levels of experience. Marriage and the founding of a family are helpful in that they make the individual less egocentric and assist in the process of sublimating his desires. The Lord of the Bhagavadgītā says: "I am pleasure (*kāma*) that is not opposed to goodness (*dharma*)." But here, again, one should not be so purblind as to believe that outside of life in a family there is no happiness. The number of broken homes is legion; and this shows, among other things, that to regard domestic happiness as the goal of human life is to court disappointment and spiritual desolation. It is not unusual for worldly men to look upon those who are unworldly with pity and say: "They do not know what they are missing," little realizing that there may be much more that they themselves miss by not making their vision extend beyond the limited and the finite. According to the Indian view, the stage of the householder is but a stage in life's journey, and not the stopping place. As a householder, the individual has to earn and spend and take his pleasures without serious transgressions. But there is a stage when he has also the duty to renounce and mount the higher reaches in the path to his goal. In order to gain an insight into the nature of Hindu ethics, one must understand the character of the classes into which society is divided and of the stages in an individual's life. This is usually referred to by the expression *varṇāśrama-dharma*. But, before I proceed to deal with it, let me complete my account of the human goals (*puruṣārthas*).

One of the most difficult terms to translate into any other language is *dharma*. It is derived from the root *dhṛ*, which means "to uphold, to sustain, to nourish." The concept itself may be traced to the *śloka* of the *Rg Veda*, which means both the order of nature and the moral order. The advocates of Mīmāṁsā define *dharma* as obedience to the commands of scripture. The more general meaning is righteousness
or moral goodness. Man's life, individual as well as collective, would be impossible but for a certain measure of morality. In this sense, dharma is man's inner nature. The greater the approximation to the moral standard, the more truly does man realize his own nature. Each man's dharma—what the Bhagavadgītā calls sva-dharma—is to perform the duties that pertain to his station in life. But how is one to know what one's duties are? So long as one is immature, one has to depend on an external authority. In what may be regarded as the oldest convocation or graduation address on record, the teacher in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad gives the following advice to his pupil: "Should there be any doubt regarding conduct, you should conduct yourself after the manner of those wise men who may be living in your vicinity—those who are competent to judge, dedicated to good deeds, not led by others, not cruel, and lovers of virtue." The persons who are already perfect need not obey any commands. Neither prohibitions nor prescriptions apply to them. They are good by their own nature. The majority of men, however, have to take into cognizance (1) the declarations of scripture, (2) the tradition and practice of those who are learned in scripture, (3) the conduct of virtuous men, and (4) their own conscience. There are several modes in which the rule of dharma is presented. One of them, and the most comprehensive of all, is that one should look upon others as upon oneself. "What is harmful to oneself, one should not do to others. This is the quintessence of dharma. Behavior which is contrary to this is born of selfish desire."

It is an oft-repeated charge leveled against Indian philosophy by Western scholars that it is unethical, or that, at any rate, it does not give to morality its proper place. Such a verdict, however, is based on an acquaintance with the Upaniṣads and the philosophical works inspired by them, without a corresponding appreciation of all that they imply. It is the function of the Dharma-śāstras (treatises on dharma) to deal exhaustively with questions of ethics. The Upaniṣads generally assume an intensive ethical discipline before a student can even hope to understand what they teach. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad says, "Not he who has not ceased from bad conduct, not he who is not tranquil, not he who is not composed, not he whose mind is turbulent can obtain Him (i.e., Brahman) by intelligence." Śaṅkara prescribes cultivation of the cardinal virtues as an essential prerequisite for the study of Vedāṇta. Since the Upaniṣads presuppose ethical excellence on the part of the prospective student of philosophy, they do not discuss elaborately the principles of ethics. But even so, they do contain, here and there, teachings about morals. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad, for instance, gives detailed instructions as regards the most ordinary
rules of conduct. In the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, a whole ethical philosophy is summarized in the three words, dāmyata, datta, dāyadhvam, which mean, "Cultivate self-control; be generous; and have compassion."11

It is true, however, that the aim of Indian philosophy is to yield an experience which is supramoral, as it is supra-mental. The realm of morality with its claims and counterclaims, rights and obligations, necessarily involves imperfection. Though the goal of moral life is perfection, one cannot attain the goal so long as one remains merely moral. The difference between the level of moral experience and that which goes beyond can best be explained with the help of the doctrine of sheaths as it is taught in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad.12 The soul or spirit is said to be enclosed by five sheaths—the sheaths of matter, life, mind, reason, and bliss. Each of these sheaths is pictured in the form of a bird, and the parts of each are mentioned. For our present purpose we need to consider only the last three of these sheaths. The sheath of mind and the sheath of reason correspond roughly to what Kant would call pure and practical reason, respectively. The parts of the sheath of mind, as enumerated by the Upaniṣad, are the different Vedas, the books of knowledge. The parts of the sheath of reason are the moral values. "Faith is its head; righteousness, the right wing; truth, the left wing; contemplation, the body; greatness, the tail, the foundation." Beyond the sheath of reason, which represents the level of morality, is the sheath of bliss. Describing the parts of this sheath, the Upaniṣad says: "Love is its head; delight, the right wing; great delight, the left wing; bliss, the body; Brahman, the tail, the foundation." This represents the experience of Brahman, which transcends even the realm of morality.

We now come to the last of the human goals, which is described as the supreme end, viz., mokṣa or spiritual freedom. In the Indian philosophical schools, mokṣa is variously conceived. According to some, it is a negative state of absence of sorrow. According to others, it is a positive experience of unexcellable bliss. To the former group belong the Śāṅkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiṣēṣika systems, and to the latter the schools of Vedānta.13 The Śāṅkhya conception of the final goal is the spirit's realization of its complete difference from the prius of evolution, called prakṛti in the system. The spirit no longer identifies itself with prakṛti and its evolutes; it remains as a witness, alone and uncontaminated. This state is known as kāivalya,aloneness. According to the Nyāya-Vaiṣēṣika view, the soul, when it attains freedom (apavarga), is stripped of all qualities, including consciousness. The reason the state of release is conceived in these views to be a state
of absence of sorrow and not a positive experience of happiness seems to be that, since it is not possible to have pleasure without pain, one must get rid of pleasure also in order to be free from pain. The schools of Vedānta, however, regard the state of release as involving not only the utter absence of sorrow but also the realization of plenary happiness or bliss. As to what this happiness consists in, the various schools differ greatly. It may be the presence of or participation in God, who is the home of all auspicious attributes. Or, it may be the realization of identity with the Absolute, which is of the nature of bliss (ānanda). But in all the schools of Vedānta, by the happiness which is characteristic of release is meant, not pleasure as opposed to pain, but an experience of fullness and peace which transcends both. The term for release which is most frequently used in Buddhist teachings is Nirvāṇa, which literally means “blowing out” or “becoming cool.” Opinion is divided as to what the Buddha meant by Nirvāṇa, whether he meant a negative state of ceasing to be or the positive experience of bliss. Is Nirvāṇa “only the sleep eternal in an eternal night,” or is it “life eternal?” The classical schools of Buddhism and the critics thereof seem to think that the Buddha meant by Nirvāṇa “really nothing.” Others, especially some Vedāntic interpreters of Buddhism, take Nirvāṇa to mean “as if nothing” or “nothing, as it were.” “It does not mean complete extinction or annihilation,” says Radhakrishnan, “but the extinction of the fire of the passions and the bliss of union with the whole.”

Though the schools of Indian thought differ among themselves in their views regarding the content of mokṣa, all of them are agreed that mokṣa is release from the wheel of life and death, which is termed saṁsāra. Like the worms that are hurried from one whirlpool to another in the rapids of a swift current, the souls are tossed from one birth to another and are thus caught up in a cycle of repeated births. Mokṣa, or release, consists in an ultimate withdrawal from this cycle, in non-return to birth, or, phrased differently, it is no-more-death.

METEMPSYCHOSIS AND KARMA

Regarding the duration of the soul, three views are possible: (1) that the life of the soul is coeval with the existence of the body; (2) that the soul is born with the body, but does not perish with it; and (3) that the soul has neither beginning nor end. The systems of Indian philosophy, with the exception of the Cārvāka, adopt the third of these views. The soul is timeless. Somehow, on account of metaphysical ignorance (avidyā, ajñāna), it gets involved in the time-
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process. It goes from birth to death, and from death to birth. The expressions "birth" and "death" refer to the soul's "entry into" and "departure from" a physical body. The vehicle which carries the soul, as it were, from one body to another, and from one location to another, is the mind-stuff, which attaches itself to the soul, with all its accumulated impressions (saṃskāras) of previous states of existence. The law or principle which governs the nature of the successive births, their respective endowments, and the types of experience is karma.

*Karma* means "deed" and "the result of deed." The law of *karma* applies to the realm of morality the principle of cause and a regulated course of things. According to this law, there is nothing chaotic or capricious in the moral world. As we sow, so we reap. What we are and what circumstances we find ourselves in are dependent on what we were and what we did; similarly, what we shall be and how we shall be circumscribed will depend on what we are and what we do. Nothing is lost which has been earned by work; and nothing comes in which is not deserved. Every action has a double effect; it produces its appropriate reward, and it also affects character. The reward may be reaped either here or in a hereafter, either in this life or in a later one. The determination of character is in the form of residual impressions (saṃskāras) left on the mind by the deeds. These are responsible for the repetition or avoidance of similar deeds. Thus, the chain revolves, character informing conduct, and conduct in turn molding character. "A man becomes good by good deeds," says the Upaniṣad, "and bad by bad deeds."18

If the law of *karma* is the counterpart in the moral sphere of the mechanical law of causation, where, then, it may be asked, is the scope for freedom, without which morality would be meaningless? In reply to this question, I should like to point out that modern science no longer believes in an unalterable and absolutely determined mechanical process. On the contrary, it admits that there is a certain measure of indeterminacy or uncertainty in nature. The past, no doubt, is determined and can be calculated. But the future is uncertain, not merely because of our ignorance, but also because of the very nature of things. The causal law is not absolute and cannot explain all things. Even where it applies, the plurality of causes imports an element of uncertainty. Scientists used to characterize the doctrine of plurality of causes as a popular myth. But now they seem to be convinced that it is a genuine defect of the causal concept. If there is uncertainty and incalculability even in the realm of physical nature, there must certainly be a greater degree of freedom in human nature. *Karma* does not bind man completely. The cycle of *saṃsāra*
has not the inevitability of fate. Man has the freedom to get out of the vicious circle; and, if he has the will, karma will help and not hinder his progress. There is a certain amount of determination; but it is not to the exclusion of all freedom. In the words of Radhakrishnan, "The cards in the game of life are given to us. We do not select them. They are traced to our past karma, but we can call as we please, lead what suit we will, and, as we play, we gain or lose. And there is freedom." It is important to remember that the goal of man is not to continue perpetually in the process of saṃsāra, and be governed by the rule of karma, but to break through both and become eternally free. Mokṣa is the final end, not longevity. For, as the boy Naciketas in the Katha Upaniṣad pertinently asks his teacher, Yama, "Who would revel in mere length of life?" "There are people," remarks Emerson, "who cannot dispose of a day; an hour hangs heavy on their hands, and you offer them rolling ages without end."

THE CLASS SYSTEM

Having explained the Indian scheme of values, and incidentally the doctrines of metempsychosis and karma, let me proceed to give a brief account of the institution of classes in society and the scheme of stages in individual life.

No effort is made here to defend the extremely complicated social texture of castes and subcastes as it has been in vogue for the last several centuries in India. Due to historical circumstances, the classes became castes with numerous subdivisions, and a cold rigidity made them freeze, as it were, thus preventing the growth and progress of Hindu society. Fortunately, in recent times, the inflexibility of caste has been under the sledge-hammer blows of a revival of interest in the original teachings of Hinduism, the rise of national consciousness, and a zeal for reform and purification. The old lawgivers of India repeatedly said that social institutions were not ends in themselves, but only means to the social good, and might be reconstituted or even discarded to suit the changing conditions of each age.

The four classes in Hindu society are those of priest-teachers (Brahmins), warrior-kings (Kṣatriyas), trader-craftsmen (Vaiśyas), and manual laborers (Śādṛas). These, to start with, should have been professional groups based on the principle of division of labor. They were meant to be complementary classes, each fulfilling certain specific social needs. The Puruṣa-sūkta, in which the earliest reference to the division of Hindu society into the four classes is to be found, describes the classes as having come out of the different limbs
of the body of the Primeval Being, and thus shows the organic relation among the classes. If the hands quarrel with the stomach or the head, it is not the stomach or the head alone that suffers but the entire organism, including the hands. The head, again, cannot claim superiority over the feet simply because it extends in the air while the latter tread the dust; the feet are as essential to the organism as the head. It is the principle of integration and coordination, then, that must have weighed with the builders of the class system. "It is a law of spiritual economics," says Mahātmā Gandhi. "It has nothing to do with superiority or inferiority."

**Varna**, which is the Sanskrit term for class or caste, means color. Originally, the term may have referred to the color of the skin. India has had to deal with the problems of race in its acutest form. Even at the dawn of her history, she had as her inhabitants the dark aboriginal tribes, the sturdy Dasyus, the yellow-pigmented Mongols, and the fair-skinned Aryans. Very soon she developed trade relations with the Persians, the Greeks, and the Scythians, some of whom settled in India. Then there was a succession of invaders through the northwestern passes of the Himalayas—the Bactrian Greeks, the Parthians, the Śākas, the Kuśāpas, and the Huns. These alien races mingled with the native groups, and the result was a medley of cultures and civilizations. India tackled this problem in her own characteristic way. Not elimination but assimilation was her watchword. The various racial groups were absorbed into the Hindu fold; and with the progress of time the contrast between colors was toned down by all sorts of permutations and combinations. The result was a composite Hindu society; and the term varna assumed a new meaning—no longer the color of the skin, but the color of one's character.

According to the Sāṅkhya theory, which may be traced back to the Upaniṣads, there are three fundamental types of nature, called guṇas. Out of these all things are made, both bodies and minds. The three guṇas are purity (sattva), virility (rajas), and dullness (tamas), represented symbolically by the three colors, white, red, and black, respectively. No individual in the universe is made exclusively of any one of these guṇas. What we have in each case is a mixture in different proportions. The social classes, like everything else phenomina, represent varying groupings of the guṇas. The Brahmins are those in whom sattva is predominant; they are men of thought. The Kṣatriyas are those in whom rajas is the dominant trait; they are men of action. The Vaiśyas are those in whom tamas predominates; they are men of feeling. The Śūdras are those in whom none of these traits is highly developed. As the aptitudes of these classes differ, so do their
professions. These two, then, viz., character (guṇa) and kind of work (karma), determine the class to which a person belongs. Looked at from the point of view of society, all the classes are equally important, since each fulfills a set of definite social functions. Viewed from the standpoint of the individual, each person is a mixture of these character types and has to evolve from tāmas, through rajas, to sattva, and beyond; for, the goal of spiritual evolution is transcendence of the guṇas.

The classes as social groups probably started as professional guilds; but soon they became hereditary in character. It is difficult to examine each individual, determine what his aptitudes are, and then fix his calling. And so, heredity is made to serve as a working principle. Normally, the son inherits the trade of his father as he shares in some of his traits. But this principle was never intended to be applied like an iron rod, inflexible and inviolate. Manu, one of the codifiers of law, expressly says, "The Brahmin who, not having studied the Vedas, labors elsewhere, becomes a Śūdra in that very life along with his descendants." And again: "A Śūdra becomes a Brahmin and a Brahmin a Śūdra [by conduct]. Know the same [rule to apply] to him who is born of a Kṣatriya or of a Vaiśya." In the Mahābhārata, Yudhīśthira gives the same teaching: "Truth, charity, fortitude, good conduct, gentleness, austerity, and compassion—he in whom these are observed is a Brahmin. If these marks exist in a Śūdra and are not found in a twice-born, the Śūdra is not a Śūdra, nor the Brahmin a Brahmin." According to the Bhāgavata, "One becomes a Brahmin by his deeds and not by his family or birth." Thus, class is primarily a question of character. Conduct counts and not lineage. An interesting incident is recorded in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Satyakāma, a young lad, desired to lead the life of a student. Before he could approach a preceptor for this purpose, he had to know his lineage. He had only his mother to enlighten him on this matter. But she could not throw any light on it. She told him, "I do not know to what lineage you belong, my son. In my youth when I was moving about as maid-servant, I conceived you. So, I do not know to what line you belong. I am Jābālā by name; and you are Satyakāma. Therefore, you may call yourself Satyakāma Jābālā." Then the boy went to a preceptor, Gautama, and announced himself in the manner in which his mother had instructed him. The preceptor was pleased with the boy's outspokenness and concluded that he must be a Brahmin because he had spoken the truth. Thus, in Satyakāma's case it was character and not birth that determined his class.

The duties of the classes are these: The Brahmin is the custodian
of the spiritual culture of the race. His first duty is to specialize in spiritual ideas and broadcast them. He is the friend, philosopher, and guide of humanity. He is not to burden himself with worldly goods, and society has the obligation of keeping him above want. He is the leader (purockita) of the community. He leads not by virtue of physical might, but by the strength of spiritual power. His counsel is sought by all, from the king to the commoner. Serenity, self-control, austerity, purity, forbearance, uprightness, knowledge, insight, and faith—these are his virtues, according to the Gita. The Ksatriya is the guardian of society, its protector and preserver. He is the soldier, who fights for the freedom of the race, and the prefect, who keeps the peace of the land. He has to save the social polity from alien domination and internal dissensions. His duties are: deeds of heroism, vigor, firmness, resourcefulness, dauntlessness in battle, generosity, and majesty. The Vaishya is the expert in economics. His is the duty of arranging for the production and distribution of wealth. The Gita enumerates three of the important professions of the Vaishya: agriculture, tending cattle, and trade. The Sudra is the worker. His place in society is no less important than that of the other three classes, and he is to receive no less honor. By his manual labor he places the entire community under a debt of gratitude. The weal of society depends upon his welfare. No nation can rise higher than the level of its proletariat. With a fluid and functional class system based on the principle of bearing the burdens and not of sharing the spoils, there is no reason why a community should not live in harmony and peace, and progress toward the ideal of perfection.

The Indian mind is characterized by its critic as being individualistic. That such a characterization is unfair will be evident to those who take the care to study the class system. Not rights but obligations are said to be the foundation of the system. The state, in the abstract, is, no doubt, a means to the individual’s realization of his ends. But the individual cannot realize his ends without the help of society. His dependence on the community for realizing ends like economic security, pleasure, and even moral goodness is obvious. His pursuit of moksha, spiritual freedom, too, redounds to the benefit of society, since the Self that is sought to be realized is not the empirical ego but the supreme Spirit, which is the substrate of all beings. The Mahabharata declares: “One individual may be forsaken for the sake of protecting a family; one family may be forsaken for the sake of protecting a village-community; one village-community may be forsaken for the sake of preserving society; and for the sake of [realizing] the Self even the earth may be forsaken.”
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THE FOUR STAGES IN LIFE

Turning from society to the individual, we notice that, according to the teachings of Indian thinkers, each individual has to go through four stages in his life's journey. These stages are called āśramas, a term which means rest-places as well as training-grounds. The four āśramas are: brahmacarya, or the period of studentship; grhastrha, or the stage of a householder; vānaprastha, or the stage of a forest-dweller or ascetic; and sannyāsa, or the life of renunciation.

The first stage is the period of study and discipline. The student is required to stay in the house of his teacher and learn the sciences and the arts. The preceptors in ancient India usually lived in hermitages not far from towns. These forest-hermitages were centers of common and equal living. The student has to regard the teacher as his spiritual parent and render unto him unstinted service. He has to eschew distracting pleasures and refrain from active participation in the affairs of the world. Secular as well as sacred knowledge is imparted to him. He learns not only through word of mouth but also through communion with nature. At the conclusion of his formal education, he returns to his home.

The second stage in life is that of the householder. Normally, when the period of studentship is over, one should marry and shoulder the responsibilities of life. Marriage is to be regarded as a sacrament which launches two companions on a career of righteous living. The status of the householder is all-important in the body politic. According to Manu, just as air is essential to the life of all creatures, so is the householder necessary for the support of those who belong to the other three orders. His duty is to acquire wealth and dispose of it in the proper way. He may court pleasures; but he should not overstep the bounds of the moral law. Through the opportunities afforded by the institution of the family he has to outgrow his innate egocentrism.

The next stage is that of the vānaprastha. Manu says: "When the householder sees wrinkles [on his skin], greyness [in his hair], and the son of his son, let him retire to the forest." Married life is not an end in itself. It is a home of trial and a school for sublimation. When a man has passed through it, he must relinquish the responsibilities of restricted life and seek for conditions which will accelerate his spiritual progress. As a vānaprastha he undergoes the second period of probation which prepares him for the final stage, that of sannyāsa.

The sannyāsin (i.e., one who has renounced the world) is the ideal man. He renounces all worldly cares in order that he may attain the supreme goal (mokṣa). As has been aptly remarked, "The last part of
life's road has to be walked in single file." The sannyásin spends his
days in contemplation, ponders over the mysteries of life, and wanders
far and wide as the spiritual sentinel of the human race. His very
striving for perfection, and his experience of it when he attains it, are
a great blessing to the world. If he scorns worldliness, it is because he
desires to place the world above scorn. He is the free man of the spirit,
who has broken through the narrow confines of clan and country.
Praise and blame, success and failure, make no difference to him. He
has no private ambitions or personal desires. He has nothing to ac-
complish for himself either in this world or in the next. When he has
achieved the supreme human goal, what need has he for the trinkets
of the world? He beckons all—though only a few listen to the call—to
share in the infinite happiness which has become his.

The four àsramas are intended to lead man to perfection by suc-
cessive stages. In exceptional cases, some of the stages may be skipped.
But whether the progress be quick or slow, by grades or by leaps, the
goal that one should keep in view is the same, viz., spiritual perfection
and freedom.

**THE PATHS TO PERFECTION**

Of the paths to perfection outlined in Indian thought, especially
in the Vedānta, three are the main ones: *karma-yoga, bhakti-yoga,* and
*jñāna-yoga.* The term *yoga*, which is cognate with the English *yoke,*
means union with the ultimate reality, as also the way thereto. *Karma-
yoga* is the path of selfless work, dedicated service. *Bhakti-yoga* is the
method of unwavering devotion to God. And *jñāna-yoga* is the way of
self-knowledge.

Work ordinarily binds the individual to finitude. He works in order
to enjoy and enjoys in order to work. Each of his deeds is intended to
yield a particular end. These ends, which are by nature perishing, do
not afford him lasting happiness. There is toil in getting a thing; and,
after getting it, there is anxiety in keeping it and the fear of losing it.
This, then, is the round of desire, work, enjoyment, and more desire.
The method of *karma-yoga* consists in working without desiring the
reward of work. Whatever be the action one has to perform, let it be
performed without a selfish motive. But, is action without desire possi-
ble? Is not desire the spring of action? The answer to this is: It is true
that action without an end is like a road without a destination. What
the doctrine of *karma-yoga* teaches is that, instead of each action's
having its own particular, finite end, the *sole* end of all action should
be God-realization or Self-realization—these being the theistic and
absolutistic ways, respectively, of expressing the same goal.

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Bhakti-yoga is the method of sublimating one's emotions by turning them toward God. This is what a Vaiṣṇava saint of South India says: "The emotional feeling which, in the case of the ignorant, flows toward the sense objects, the same is called bhakti when directed to God." Love for things that are transient is the cause of misery. Love for God, who is the eternal source of all things, makes for everlasting happiness. Bhakti takes several forms, and is of different grades. The highest of them transcends all convention. What is ordinarily called mystic experience is the soul's direct experience of God. Nārada, the author of the Bhakti-sūtras, says: "It is as if a dumb man who has tasted delicious food could not speak about it. It is an experience pure and selfless, subtle, unbroken, and ever-expanding. A man who has once experienced God-love will see that alone, hear that alone, and speak of that alone, for he ever thinks of that alone."

Jñāna-yoga is the path of knowledge. According to Advaita Vedānta, knowledge (jñāna) is the principal means to release (mokṣa). Ignorance (ajñāna) is the root of all the imperfections and ills of the world; and it can be removed only by its opposite, which is knowledge. On account of ignorance, the individual thinks that he is a finite center—an agent and an experient. The truth is that the absolute Spirit is non-dual and the so-called individual is non-different (abheda) from it. When the individual realizes this truth, he is freed from finitude. The knowledge that liberates, however, is not mere intellectual understanding, but intuitive insight. The difference between mediate knowledge and immediate experience is sometimes explained thus: Once a group of travelers, ten in number, crossed a swollen river. After crossing, they began counting themselves to be sure that all had safely arrived. But each time, the one who counted forgot to include himself in the counting, and so, according to the reckonings, there were only nine. A passerby detected the mistake, and addressing the man who had counted for the last time said, "There is the tenth man," and then added, "you are the tenth." The first of these statements gave to each of the travelers the mediate knowledge of the tenth man; the second revealed the immediate identity of each person with the one whom each thought had been lost in the river. Similarly, the knowledge that there is the non-dual Brahman is but mediate. The further immediate experience of Brahman as non-different from the soul is necessary for effecting release. This is to be accomplished by the removal of the obstructions that block the way to knowledge—obstructions such as identification of the self with the body, mind, etc.

There are two stages in the discipline to be undergone before the intuition of Brahman can be gained. The first is the stage of moral,
intellectual, and emotional preparation. It consists of discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, detachment from all selfish pursuits, cultivation of the cardinal virtues, and intense longing for release. The second stage consists of three steps: study (śravaṇa), reflective thinking (manana), and meditative contemplation (nīdi-
dhyāsana). The process is not unlike the one pursued by the scientist in his field of inquiry. But there is this difference: while the object of the scientist’s inquiry remains at all stages external to him, the object of the Vedānta is the deeper reality of the inquirer himself—a reality which he realizes to be the ground of all things.

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF THE VALUE SCHEME

The metaphysical basis for the Indian theory of values is to be found in the Upaniṣadic conception of Brahman. The term “Brahman” probably meant at first “prayer” or “speech,” from the root “byḥ,” “to burst forth” or “to grow.” In the Upaniṣads, it comes to mean the ground of the universe or the source of all existence, that which has burst forth into the universe, or that from which the universe has grown. From an analysis of the cosmos, the ancient thinkers seem to have arrived at the truth that there is a common ground of all things, which is of the nature of spirit or self. By a parallel process of inquiry into the reality of the subject, they discovered that what lay as the substrate of the soul (Ātman) was the same Brahman which was the ground of the universe. Thus, the grand doctrine of identity or non-difference was formulated: Brahman = Ātman.

What is the nature of this reality? From the standpoint of the Absolute (paramārtha), if standpoint it may be called, there is no plurality, not even the least distinction. But from our standpoint, the standpoint of empirical usage (vyavahāra), the supreme reality is the ground of the pluralistic universe. Reality-in-itself is the Nirguṇa Brahman (the Absolute without attributes). Reality-in-relation-to-the-world is the Saguṇa Brahman (God with infinite attributes). While the latter may be designated and described, the former admits of no such designation and description. The Nirguṇa Brahman is that from which mind and speech return, being unable to comprehend or express it. The best that one can do is to indicate what it is via negativa by saying what it is not (neti, neti; not this, not this). Even such a statement requires careful understanding. In truth, there is nothing other than Brahman. But somehow there seems to be an other, as it were, the world of plurality. To questions like “How did the pluralistic universe arise out of the non-dual Brahman?” one can only say, “It is māyā.”
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Māyā may be interpreted from three different levels. From the level of worldliness, māyā is real. From the standpoint of the inquiring mind, māyā is a puzzle. The world of māyā is neither real, nor unreal, nor both. It is not real, because it comes to be sublated at the dawn of self-knowledge. It is not unreal, because it appears to us so long as we are in it. It is not both real and unreal, because contradictory predications cannot be made of one and the same thing. So, from the standpoint of inquiry, māyā is indeterminable. There is a higher standpoint, viz., that of self-realization or wisdom, at which there is no problem to be solved. And, here, māyā is a name for that which is not.

When the plenary experience is realized, there is no speech and no discourse. All philosophizing is necessarily from the middle standpoint of the inquiring mind. The highest conception of reality that one may obtain from this vantage point is that Brahman is attributeless; for, even to say that Brahman is without attributes is to indulge in a conception. This negative conception, however, is not that of a blank or a void. While Brahman is indeterminable, it is not indeterminate. While it is devoid of characteristics, it is not characterless. It is as a corrective to a barely negative interpretation of the negative texts that Brahman is indicated by such terms as being (sat), consciousness (cit), and bliss (ānanda). These expressions, however, should not be understood as importing either the distinction of substance and attribute or a plurality of attributes into Brahman. It is not that Brahman is existent, conscious, and blissful, but that Brahman is existence-consciousness-bliss.55

This is expressed in axiological terms in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad in the famous text:

"From the unreal lead me to the Real;
From darkness lead me to Light;
From death lead me to Immortality!"56

Unreality, darkness, and death constitute the world of māyā, which, when viewed by itself, is disvalue. Reality, the light of intelligence, and the bliss immortal, are value expressions indicative of the nature of Brahman. Thus, Brahman is the supreme reality and value; it is the final end (paramārtha), the fulfillment of all aspiration, the goal of all endeavor.

WORLD PHILOSOPHY (VIŚVA-DARŚANA)

It is interesting to note that at this Conference, while the Orientals have, in the main, played the role of analytical exponents of their re-
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spective views, the Occidentals have attempted several syntheses of the philosophies of East and West. And yet, strangely enough, the Oriental approach to problems of life and reality is said to be synthetic, and the Occidental approach analytic. The truth is that analysis and synthesis are aspects of the same process, though the emphasis may shift from the one to the other at different times and under different conditions. The problem of synthesis, as it has emerged from our discussions, seems to relate not only to the philosophical views of East and West, but also to the differing doctrines of each hemisphere and each country.

Now, in what sense can we achieve "a world philosophy through a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the East and the West?" The Sanskrit expression for cosmic philosophy is viśva-darśana. In the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavadgītā there is a beautiful allegory which may be pressed into service for our present purpose. Śrī Kṛṣṇa confers a blessing on Arjuna by offering to reveal to him His cosmic form (viśva-rūpa). But, before revealing it, he says to his disciple: "With these eyes of yours you cannot see Me; I shall bestow upon you the eye divine, with which you shall behold my lordly power." The cosmic philosophy, or more strictly the all-view or total perspective, would require for its comprehension the eye divine. So long as there is plurality, the synoptic vision is only a remote possibility. But we can approximate it through our different perspectives, which we are wont to call systems of philosophy. A world understanding through appreciation of one another's point of view is not only possible but also, I believe, what the world urgently needs today. In order to promote such understanding, the following, it seems to me, would be necessary:

(1) Each philosophical view or perspective should be, as far as possible, self-consistent.
(2) It should contain within itself seeds of self-correction.
(3) It should not be so narrow as to prevent it from realizing that there may be truth in other views also.
(4) It should be such that it is integrated with life as a whole. Philosophy, instead of being a fraction of life, should aim to become the whole of life.
(5) It should not stop with edifying our mind; it should also exalt our life—exalt it in such a way that we are drawn closer to the highest value.

If our different perspectives strive to satisfy these conditions, then we shall be able to appreciate the truth of what an early teacher
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of Advaita, Gauḍapāda, said regarding those who considered themselves to be his philosophical adversaries:

"We do not dispute with them.
Realize the truth of non-dispute."\(^{27}\)

NOTES

1Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VII, i.
2Cullavagga, IX, i, 4.
11, lxxv, 49; see also Manusmṛti, II, 94.
11, 2; see T. M. P. Mahadevan, op. cit., p. 31.
8Raghuvaṃśa, IV, 86. VII, 11.
9Mahābhārata, XIII, cxviii, 8; see also Manusmṛti, XII, 91.
10II, 24. \(^{11}\) V, ii, 3. \(^{11\prime}\)
11No attempt is made here and in similar contexts to enumerate and classify exhaustively all the schools of Indian philosophy. Only some of them are chosen as examples.
12S. Radhakrishnan, "Gautama the Buddha," Proceedings of the British Academy, 1938, pp. 181-182; see also p. 183: "Nirñāṇa, the fruit of the noble path, the freedom from passions, the rest that knows no break, the life that even the gods are said to covet, the goal of all striving, is not nothingness."
13Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV, iv, 5.
15I, 28.
17Rg Veda, X, 90.
18See Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, IV, 5.
19Manusmṛti, II, 168.
20Mahābhārata, III, clxxx, 21 and 25.
21IV, iv, 1-5.
22I, cxv, 36.
2452-55.
25According to systems less absolutistic than Advaita Vedānta, this is the highest reality.
26Taittirīya Upaniṣad, II, ix.
27According to philosophers like Rāmānuja, however, the former mode of expression would be the truth.
28I, iii, 28.
29Māṇḍūkyokārikā, IV, 5.
Chapter XVIII

The Philosophical Basis
of Indian Legal
and Social Systems*

C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar

In the examination of the philosophical basis of the legal and political systems of various major cultures, it is inevitable that the right apperception of Indian ideals should be of fundamental importance. It has, therefore, struck me that a study of the sources of Indian philosophical theories as applied to politics and the law would be of some assistance, not only to the student and philosopher, but also to the man of affairs who is grappling with the crucial problems of the present-day world. I have essayed to take a bird's-eye view of such theories and to furnish an aperçu of the Indian doctrines relating to political and social evolution.

It is very true, in the words of the poet, that each age is a dream that is dying or one that is coming to birth. Is it not also manifest that the ideas and ideals of each country as they progress from age to age have and indeed ought to have something indigenous in them, and that in politics and philosophy, as well as in literature and the arts, nothing that is not evolved from within and is not in harmony with inherited as well as individual traditions will be characteristic or essentially fit to live? Today we are producing and putting to practical use new constitutions. New thoughts are thundering at our doors and while we shall do well, as throughout our history, ever to be tolerant and hospitable to fresh views, nevertheless, we must also be alive to the need for assimilating them with our own culture and we may imitate the wise gardener when, for improving the yield, he skilfully inserts a graft. A great French critic, Henri Taine, declared: "Quand on veut comprendre un art, il faut regarder l'âme du public auquel il

* Because of space limitations it was necessary to abridge this paper considerably. [Editor's note.]
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s’adressait." Although this was said of art, it is equally true of a nation’s philosophy and politics that they are outward expressions of national culture and sentiment and that they use the symbols best understood in the country of origin. They bespeak an acquaintance with national life and thought. Our political ideas are a function of our intellectual and civic life and it may not be out of place to remember that during many millenniums we have had a succession of thinkers who, like the medieval Churchmen in Europe, were founders and partakers of what may accurately be called a university tradition and an educational system which in India as in Europe until recent times was based on, and culminated in, religious training but included also in its scope an attempt at universal research born of catholic sympathies and curiosity.

It has been our good fortune to be brought into touch with the currents of Western thought and speculation, and we have been under their influence for nearly a century in our universities. Owing to our natural anxiety to utilize the new opportunities which have come to us, we have perhaps overlooked, if we have not disdained, our past traditions and history. There is a great danger of our not securing the full benefit of the newer culture for lack of proper assimilation. Should it not be our aim to build, on the foundations of our own accumulated lore and inherited stock of capacities and temperament, a stately and enduring structure with the full aid of Western learning and science and thus to develop our own soul? Especially is this process called for in the study and practice of politics, an art and a science more intimately connected with national aptitudes and national outlook than almost any other. What is in the bone cannot be eliminated and, as pointed out recently by a discerning thinker, the author of The Dangerous Sea, one realizes with a shock the cyclic character of life and of ideas. The French proverb "plus ça change plus c’est la même chose" ("the more it changes, the more essentially it remains the same") is not a mere piece of blasé cynicism. The whole history of the French Revolution, its rise and fall, and the dictatorship which followed it, as the author of The Dangerous Sea indicates, constitute really a transplanted chapter of Roman history. The Fascists, the Spartacists, and the Nazi revolution of our own times have also had their prototypes in the past. The curious student may also discover analogies between certain developments of communism at the present moment and similar phenomena which were observed by the compilers of the Purāṇas, not to mention incidents in the history of the later Roman Empire and the Middle Ages. It was in these so-called dark ages that there arose the idea of a league of nations fulfilling the functions which were
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part of the program of the Holy Roman Empire and which were elaborated by medieval theorists, both regal and private, who strove to bring about an effective policing of the nations.

No nation building its future political or social habitation can afford to ignore its past racial culture or the lessons of its history. My endeavor, therefore, has been to try to find out how far in the various departments of political and socio-economic theory we can get guidance from our own heritage of speculation and action. I was stimulated to perform this task after I read the scholarly analysis of the social and political life in the Vijayanagara Empire, which we owe to the research of Dr. B. A. Saletore, and, later, it became necessary for me to deal with one aspect of the subject in its practical application when I was endeavoring, as head of the administration of His Highness the Mahārāja of Travancore and for reasons connected with the formulation and carrying out of His Highness’ historic Temple Entry Proclamation, to discover the sources and methods of legislation in the old days. I then saw that the monarch who, in the *Code of Manu*, is described as embodying in himself the four ages was understood by the medieval philosopher Śukra to be the maker of the age, so that if customs, usages, and movements are not assimilated to the needs of the times the fault is said to lie in the king himself. Śukra avers that “The king is the maker of the age as the promulgator of duties and sins. He is the cause of the setting on foot of the customs and usages and hence is the cause or maker of the times.” The same principle of politics and social legislation was enunciated by Bhīṣma in the Śāntiparva thus: “Whether it is the king that makes the age or the age that makes the king is a question about which you should not entertain any doubt. The truth is that the king makes the age.”

As Dr. Saletore aptly observes in the book to which I have already alluded, national regeneration was regarded by the great kings of the Vijayanagara dynasty as achievable only when the ruler created the proper environment, both political and cultural. It is evident that other rulers, of whom there are records in our sacred and secular literature and from whose achievements we can construct a fairly coherent political philosophy, have adopted the same view—a view which may be made suitable to modern times and conditions.

Beginning with the times prior to recorded history, we find as an indisputable fact that the evolution of what are termed *Kēraḷa ācāras* is a conclusive proof of the flexibility of ancient lawgivers and pristine laws. It is incontestable that there are laws, customs, and observances prevalent among the Nambudris on the west coast of India which are not followed by the *Brahmins* of other parts of India and which furnish
clear evidence that the Hindu ādāras or laws have been modified to suit special or local conditions. The form of marriage known as sarvavasvadānam, which is not recognized by the widespread code of the Mitākṣara (commentary on Yājñavalkya Smṛti), the adoption of a son in the dvāmasūryāyana form as the son of two fathers (the natural and the adopted), the difference in the custom regarding the marriage of girls, the absence of any rigid insistence on the early marriage of women under penalty of forfeiture of caste—obviously a later innovation in Hindu law forced on the people on account of foreign invasions and the insecurity of the times—the possibility of a woman remaining unmarried to the end of her days, the modification of the rule that every male should marry within his own caste in order to lead a grhaśta (householder) life, the importance given in worship and ritual to Tantras as distinguished from the Mantras—all these and many other differences in social usages, etiquette, and practices relating to daily life, which taken together distinguish the ādāras of Parasūrāma’s country, indicate that there was no crystallization of social or even religious law and practice and that there was abundant scope for changes to meet altered situations and conditions. This policy was not confined to prehistoric ages, but was followed even later, as was triumphantly demonstrated by what is historically known regarding Rāmānuja’s gospel and that of the Teṅkalai saints, who brought about the adoption of Tamil as a concurrent sacred language with Sanskrit, their remodeling of the society of their days by virtue of a process of religious fusion and the consequent and inevitable unification of sects and communities.

The basic idea of dharma underlay alike the ethical, social, and political ideas of the Indian lawgivers. Wherever there was doubt or controversy, the practice of right-minded Aryans was the touchstone and determining factor. In the Śikṣā Vāllī of the Taittirīya Upaniśad (11th Anuvāka) occurs the well-known passage:

"Those Brāhmaṇas (Brahmins) in thy neighborhood who are of sober judgment, who are meek and set upon the performance of their duties, as they act in any matter, so also do thou act therein."

As a logical result it was ordained that the higher the station or caste, the more serious is the offense when a moral law is broken. Manu¹ says that a king should be fined a thousand times as much as a common man for the same offense. The Mahābhārata² lays down that the greater the men, the weightier should be their punishment.

It must, however, be admitted that the later developments and the hardening of the caste system led to conditions and regulations analogous to those present in other countries where a small racial or
religious aristocracy is surrounded by a large number of so-called inferior races.

The pristine lawgivers began, as in the case of Egyptians and Hebrews, to consolidate and compile lists of domestic and social observances and rules; their task gradually expanded; more general rules were enacted; and lawbooks came into existence.

The source of legal power was the king and, as will be pointed out later, he was regarded as embodying the wish of the people, by whom, according to many Hindu sources, he was originally elected "to avoid confusion and anarchy." The law and order to be maintained constituted the dharma or right order of the world, which was generally equated with ancient divine rules and age-long usages or prayoga. Such usage was held to stand next to revealed scripture in authority. The real lawgiver or law-creator was thus not the king but right usage, of which the enforcement was vested in the king.

The elimination of conflict and strife and the avoidance of interference with a man's right to happiness and peace undisturbed by a neighbor's violence were the objectives of this polity. It is noticeable that there has always existed in India, side by side with the elaboration of ritual and propitiatory ceremonies, the realization that dharma transcends sacred or ritual observances. "He who has performed all the sacred observances and has not the following qualities comes not to a union with Brahma. These qualities are compassion, patience, freedom from turmoil and avarice and envy, purity, active endeavor, and thought."

Righteousness or dharma, which has to be promulgated and enforced by the king, implies and connotes a comprehensive code of behavior and attitude necessary to maintain peace and order.

The importance of "natural law" and of conscience is recognized by way of guidance in matters of doubt where the Vedas, usage and custom, and divine commands do not furnish any help.

Hindu thinkers proceeded by a logical method and also relied upon traditions and past history in their investigation of the essentials of a state. Their theories regarding the evolution of the state from the non-state are most instructive, the explanation being found by them in the doctrine of what is called matsya nyaya (or the doctrine of the fish). Hooker in his Ecclesiastical Polity and the Leviathan of Hobbes were anticipated by Indian philosophers who declared that the state of nature is a state of war and the right of might. It is seen that the same theory or doctrine also flourished in China. The Mahabharata in the Santiparva declares that if there were no rule to regulate life and to punish the guilty, the strong would devour the weak, like fishes in
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water. This theory of the state of nature had an important bearing on the doctrine of Indian political philosophy. This doctrine of the fish was also termed in later literature the logic of sundopa-sunda (two destructive demons). This state is further described in the Mahābhārata as the greatest of evils, and the following description may be noted: "The one is deprived of his loot by two and the two are robbed of theirs by several combined."

The doctrine of dānḍa (law) and its sanction arose out of a contemplation of this mātsya nyāya (the doctrine of Nature) and the means to overcome its results. The philosophical theory of the state which evolved was that it exists because it can restrain and compel. If control be eliminated from organized social life, saṁśāra (the state as an entity) vanishes.

The doctrine of dharma and the doctrine of property or mamatva are then envisaged as essential factors in the theory of the state. Manu makes it clear that dharma is created by the state and the sanction of the state. A people can have no dharma according to Indian philosophy when, through loss of freedom, revolution, or anarchy, the state and its life come to an end. Dharma is a very elastic term, and it comprises all the attributes of law as analyzed by Western jurists as well as the concept of natural justice as perceived by a regulated conscience. Dharma is obeyed as such because of the coercive might of the state and the Dharma-śāstras of India (the legal textbooks), like those of Manu, Yājñavalkya, Nārada, Bṛhaspati, and others, acquire the validity of statutes on the recognition of their authenticity and authority by the state.

In Europe, law has been regarded sometimes as the embodiment of eternal justice, as part of the natural heritage of man, and as embodying natural reason. Another school of thought is that law is that which is brought into existence by the fiat of a lawmaker—in other words, that law is obeyed not merely because it is just or good but because it has been laid down by the state. In this way arises the distinction between positive law and ethics. The ethical conceptions of law was the first to be expounded by Indian lawgivers and philosophers. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,7 law is equated with truth, and Brahmā, in order to enforce his strength, is said to have created law “than which nothing is higher.” It declares, "Therefore even a weak man rules the stronger with the help of the law.” In the Apastambha Dharma-sūtra,8 law is what is approved in all countries by men of the Aryan society. In the Manu-saṃhitā,9 law is defined as what is practiced and cherished by the virtuous and the learned. Vasiṣṭha10 holds that law is the practice of the Śiṣṭas, namely, disciplined persons. The
well-known definition of Yajñavalkya contained in the opening verse is that law is sadācāra, the practice and conduct of good men. Later on, theories were supplemented by the concept of positive law, and there is a long catena of Indian law-givers, including Nārada, Śukra, and Jaimini, who hold that, the performance of duty for its own sake having fallen into disuse in the course of human history, positive law (vyavahāra) was introduced and the king became the superintendent of the law, the wielder of the power to punish (daṇḍadhāra). Kautilya lays down that dharma or law is rājñām ājñā—the command of the ruler. Having laid this down, Śukra insists that on this account the greatest amount of publicity should be given to the laws by the king, who should have them inscribed in all public places, bearing the king’s signature and date. This interpretation gives rise to the theory adumbrated in Śukra Niti that the king is the maker of the age and the promulgator of the principles of virtue and vice. The philosophical basis of this concept of law is also illustrated by Jaimini in his definition of dharma, which says that “Dharma brings about its object as the result of command.”

It cannot be forgotten that, side by side with these definitions of dharma and the emphasis laid on the coercive powers of rulers and kings, there came into existence definitely radical ideas about the authority of the people and the logic of resistance. Śukra states that the ruler is a servant of the people, getting his revenue as remuneration. His sovereignty is conferred only for the protection of the people. Bodhāyana proceeds so far as to declare that the king, like every other public servant, is liable to fines for violation of the law. In fact, it may be rightly claimed that arbitrary monarchy has no place in Indian philosophical thought. It is in fact laid down that the monarch who follows his own will soon gets estranged from his kingdom and alienated from his subjects.

It follows from this doctrine that Hindu political philosophers have not ignored the possibility of active resistance to tyranny or misrule. The Mahābhārata says that the king who is not a protector and leader can be destroyed by the people and the Śukra Nitisāra emphasizes that, if the king is an enemy of virtue, morality, and strength, the people should expel him as the cause of disaster for the state.

Whether as a result of such revolutions or otherwise, republics have been known to exist in India from very early times and are mentioned not only in Buddhist and Jain records but also by Greek and Roman writers. The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa states as a fact that among the Uttara Kuruś the whole community exercised rulership. In the Sānti-parva of the Mahābhārata, there is a description of a state in
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which the rule of equality is observed among all people. The men in charge of the executive government of such republics were, however, called rājās or kings. During and soon after the lifetime of the Lord Buddha, the Śākyas and the Videhas were numbered among the republics, the Videhas being originally monarchical and later having abolished the monarchical system and joined the Vaiśālīs to form a confederacy. It is stated that the business of the Vajjian Republic was carried out in a common hall by representatives of the people. Buddha, in fact, in more than one of his dialogues refers to such a political development. In the Mahānibbāna Suttānta, Buddha is reported to have stated that "So long as the Vajjian clans meet often for discussion, so long may they be expected not to decline but to prosper," and when the king of Magadha sought to destroy the republican state, Buddha declared that the Vajjians should not be allowed to be overcome by the king of Magadha.

These types of government as well as the sabhā (or council) form of administration seem to have existed side by side for a long time, and the council system grew out of the village and tribal organizations (the so-called village communities), but it seems gradually to have disappeared in India before the Mauryan Empire assumed its predominant character. But all through the pre-British history of India, rural communities existed as more or less self-sufficing units of local government, neighboring villages having also united to build halls of assembly and construct rest-houses, reservoirs, and irrigation works. Metcalfe's report on the "rural communes" of India is worth quoting in this connection: "They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down. Revolution succeeds revolution but the village communities remain the same." No one who ignores this basic ideal of Hindu life can build securely for the future.

The political evolution of the India of the Ṛg Veda, according to Radha Kumud Mookerji, may be traced in the following ascending series of groups, viz., the family (kula), the village (grāma), the clan (viś), the people (jana), and the country (rāṣṭra). A family was composed of several members living under a common head. An aggregate of several families made up a village. The viś was a larger formation, implying settlement, while jana was an even more comprehensive term, embracing as it did the entire population occupying a particular area which subsequently converted it into a rāṣṭra. Society in those days had to keep itself in constant readiness for combat, not only to quell external aggression but also internal dissension, and the origin of the rājanya (Kṣatriya) class has to be traced to this circumstance. The invocation of the blessings of unseen powers through an adept
agency became a necessary incident of that arrangement, and this
gave rise to the Brahmins as a distinct class. The bulk of the Aryan
community not included in either of these categories was known as the
viś or Vaiśyas, while the exigencies of conquest led to the absorption
into the Aryan fold of numerous non-Aryans who eventually became
Śūdras.

LATER THEORIES

The Mahābhārata narrates the following story on the origin of
kingship: In ancient days men were ruined in consequence of the
prevalence of anarchy. They devoured one another as stronger fish
devour the weaker ones. A few men then assembled and agreed among
themselves that the babbler, the cruel, the voluptuous, and the greedy
among them should be renounced. That arrangement worked for some
time. But then, seeing that it was no longer satisfactory, they ap-
proached Brahmā with a prayer to grant them a king. Brahmā there-
upon induced Manu to take up the kingship. The people agreed to pay
certain taxes and prayed that in return the king should destroy their
enemies to enable them to lead peaceful lives. Bhiṣma, who relates
this incident to Yudhiṣṭhira, gives a slightly different version of the
same story in a previous chapter. He says that in the Kṛtayuga (Golden
Age) there were no sovereignty, no king, no punishment, and no
punisher, and that all men protected one another, actuated by a sense of
righteousness. They, however, soon found that this work was too much
for them and became gradually a prey to confusion (moha), greed
(lōbha), desire (kāma), and lust (rāga). When such confusion set in and
righteousness perished, men sought the help of Brahmā, who thereupon
composed a stupendous treatise on the puruṣārthas, of which the works
of Bṛhaspati, Sukra, etc., were but abridgments. The Devas then
prayed for a king to rule over men and Viṣṇu created Virajas. Virajas,
however, did not relish the kingship conferred on him, and Anaṅga,
his great-grandson, became the first king of Bhāratavarṣa. Both these
stories show, as does the passage cited from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa,
that the Aryans had no ruler in the olden days and that kingship with
them was regarded as a comparatively late institution. There are cer-
tain passages in the Vedas pointing to the king’s divine origin, and
this had become an accepted belief by the time Manu’s Dharmo-
śāstra (Manu-smṛti) was composed. Manu states that when men were
without a king and dispersed through fear in all directions the Lord
created a king for the protection of all of them and that the essence
of the Dikpālas (Protectors of the Corners) was used for his creation.

There is, however, no doubt that this was in reality a merely meta-
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phorical description of the paramountcy of the monarch designed to enforce obedience from the subject. In a striking passage Kautālya says that the vulgar opponents of a king may be silenced by the argument that the duties of Indra (the reverter) and Yama (the punisher) are blended in him and that whoever disregards him will be visited with divine punishment.23

The Buddhist Dīgha Nikāya also says that mankind was righteous at the beginning and that, as sinfulness gradually crept into human society, men selected one who was the most handsome, gracious, and powerful among them and made him king. He was called mahāsammata because he was selected by the great.

Śukra, who also propounds the theory of the divine origin of kings, is careful to explain at the same time that they only resemble Indra and other gods in the performance of certain functions.24

Although the early rulers were elected, kingship in course of time became hereditary. Ordinarily, the crown descended from father to the eldest son; but if that son was a minor, if a younger son had to be preferred to an elder, if an heir-apparent had to be ordained, or if an interregnum had to be avoided by the appointment of a temporary ruler, the express consent of the people was imperative. The same was the case in the event of a king’s desire to abdicate.

There were several ways in which the king’s possible leaning toward the exercise of unbridled authority was kept in check. In the first place, the right to oust an unrighteous king was emphasized although seldom exercised in practice in India. In the Anuśāsanaparva of the Mahābhārata, it is stated that a king who tells his people he is their protector, but who does not or is unable to protect them, should be killed by his subjects like a rabid dog.27 In the Śāntiparva we come across a passage to the effect that a king who follows the advice of bad ministers and becomes a destroyer of righteousness deserves to be killed by his subjects with all his dependents.28 The appellation Naradeva, a god among men, is applied only to virtuous kings. Śukra, in his Nītisāra, has stated that, while a virtuous king is a part of the gods, a vicious king is a part of the devils.29 Manu says that a king who does not afford protection but receives his tax will soon sink into hell and that he takes upon himself all the foulness of all his people.30

The most common name used for a king in Sanskrit is rāja. The Mahābhārata says that seeing Pṛthu, his subjects exclaimed, “We love him,” and on account of their loving attachment he was called rājan.31 Kālidāsa expresses the same idea in Rāghuvamśa when he states that Raghū’s appellation of rājan became possessed of meaning when he made himself lovable to his subjects.32 If a king without doing violence

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to the dictates of righteousness does what is good to all his subjects he stands as firm as a rock, and everybody thinks of him: "He is mine." Manu says that he should behave toward his subjects as a father treats his children. Kālidāsa expands this idea in Raghuvamśa when he says that Dilipa was the real father of his people because he led them along the path of righteousness, protecting and feeding them. It is also stated in the Mahābhārata that he is the best of kings in whose realm every subject moves fearlessly as a son in the house of his father. From the constant comparison instituted between the king and a father in ancient works, some scholars have come to the hasty and unwarranted conclusion that his position was that of a benevolent despot. This is by no means correct. The actual conception was that the king should live for his subjects and not for himself. It is stated in the Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa that the prince was entitled to enjoy himself only up to the moment when the sacred abhiṣeka (bath) water fell on his head. How the king should conduct himself thereafter is well explained in the Mahābhārata by the observation that just as a mother who, not even caring for the objects which she likes best, seeks the well-being of her child alone, so the king should sacrifice what he loves best to secure the well-being of his subjects. The same idea is repeated in the Agni-purāṇa. In the Mahābhārata it is stated that everywhere the people from Brāhmaṇas to peasants were more attached to Yudhiṣṭhira than to their own parents. Kauṭilya says: "In the happiness of his subjects lies the king's happiness, in their welfare his welfare; whatever pleases himself he shall not consider as good, but whatever pleases his subjects he shall consider as good." Kauṭilya also says: "The religious vow of a king is his readiness for action; the discharge of his duties is the performance of his sacrifice; and equal treatment of all is his offer of fee and ablution at consecration." Somadeva also points out that the sacrifice to be performed by a king is the protection of his subjects and not the killing of animals (which is incidental to ordinary sacrifices).

"Paripālanam," or all-round protection, is an expression embracing a very wide meaning. It is not merely the preservation of law and order. It is the administration of the state in such a degree of perfection as to enable the king and every one of his subjects to pursue undisturbed the paths of dharma, artha (wealth), and kāma (desire). The king himself is to be the exemplar of his subjects, since whatever dharma is respected by him will be respected everywhere and since the subjects will generally like to move only along the path trod by him. Righteousness should therefore be first practiced by him before he enforces it on his subjects. The king, according to the Mahābhārata, was created in
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order that righteousness might emanate from him and that, if he were
void of it, he should be called a *vṛṣala*.* One becomes a king to
advance the cause of dharma and not to act capriciously. All creatures
depend on dharma, and dharma depends on the king. He is therefore
the true king who maintains dharma.* The question “What is dharma?”
has been clearly answered in Chapter 109 of the Śāntiparva. Dharma
is what is conducive to the advancement of everybody, what prevents
injury to everybody, and what is capable of upholding everybody. It
need not be precisely what is stated in the Vedas, because everything
has not been ordained in them.

In order that the subjects might carry on their occupations peace-
fully and earn a sufficient competence for pursuing the other two
purusārthas included in trivarga, it was imperative that the tax
imposed on them should not be heavy. In the Mahābhārata it is observed:
“A king should milk his kingdom like a bee collecting honey from trees.
He should act like the cowherd, who takes milk from a cow without
injuring her udder and without starving the calf. He should, like the
leech, take in the blood mildly. He should treat his subjects like a
tigress carrying her cubs, touching them with her teeth but never
biting them. He should behave like a mouse, which, although it has
sharp and pointed teeth, nibbles at the feet of sleeping animals in
such a manner as to keep them unaware of it.”*

The protection of subjects necessarily involves, as a correlative,
the punishment of the wicked. A king should be neither too lenient nor
too severe, but should administer such punishment as may be deemed
fit and proper. Kauṭiliya says: “Whosoever imposes severe punishment
becomes repulsive to the people, while he who imposes mild punish-
ment becomes contemptible. But whoever imposes punishment as
deserved will be respected.”* In the Mahābhārata it is stated: “Al-
though the most impregnable fortress of a king is the love of his sub-
jects and it is therefore essential that he should be merciful, if he is
always forgiving, the lowest of men may guide him as a mahout guides
an elephant. Nor should he be ferocious. He should be like the vernal
sun, neither too hot nor too cold.”*

The activities of the state covered a very wide range. As observed
by Dr. Beni Prasad: “While there was much which had been fashioned
by other associations and on which the State could only set its
imprimatur, the seal of its force, there was much else which it essayed
to perform by means of its own resources. From time to time it elected
to propagate dharma, to inculcate and enforce morality, to maintain
or improve the social order, to encourage learning, education, and art;
to subsidise various academies, to regulate industry and commerce, to
foster agriculture, to relieve the distress from famine and other calamities, to establish hospitals, rest houses, charity halls, etc. All this it essayed to do in addition to its primary functions of defence, order and justice.\textsuperscript{49} The seven constituent elements of the state were the king, the ministers, allies, treasure, territory, fortress, and army. The ministers formed an important and indispensable part of this constitution. The \textit{Mahābhārata} says that it is impossible for a king to look after all his duties and that hence he should devolve his duties on his ministers.\textsuperscript{50} Kauṭilya also points out: "Sovereignty is possible only with assistance. A single wheel can never move. Hence a king should employ ministers and hear their opinion."\textsuperscript{51}

Even in the Vedic days, there were gradations among the kings, importing some kind of paramountcy, or a feudal integration. This feudalism was more or less of the federal type. The \textit{maṇḍala} was a circle of states, generally twelve in number, some of which had not full sovereign powers. In this connection, some observations made by Dr. Beni Prasad as a result of his close study of ancient Hindu states are worthy of quotation. He says: "The State in ancient India was not unitary in the strict sense of the term. It was saturated through and through with the principles of what for convenience may be called federalism and feudalism. ... They are only meant to imply that as a general rule a Hindu kingdom comprised a number of feudatories who enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy, that they might have themselves subfeudatories of a similar status under them and so to the third, fourth, or fifth degree. A big empire was partly a series of alliances, partly a series of relationships of suzerainty and vassalage and partly an area of directly administered territory. The high-sounding 'Digvijayyas' could only lead to such a result on a large or small scale. The tie which held an empire together was not very strong. Under every regime, suzerain or feudal, the village was the ultimate unit of society. ... Finally there were a number of associations and corporations, religious, economic, and social, which enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy. Sovereignty \textit{de facto} was diffused among all these organisations and influences which supported them."\textsuperscript{52}

Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerji points out: "The administration of the Mauryan empire was possible because it did not cherish the ambition of setting up a centralised government consciously legislating for and controlling the life of every part of that vast whole, but aimed only at an elastic system of federalism or corporation, in which were incorporated along with the central government at the metropolis, as parts of the same system, the indigenous local administrations. The essence of this imperial system was thus a recognition of local autono-
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my at the expense of the authority of the central government, which
was physically unfit to assert itself except by its enforced affiliation to
the pre-existing system of local Government."52 There are also passages
in the ancient texts leading to the inference that our ancestors were not
for the wholesale destruction of alien nations. Kāmandaka says that
peace may be concluded by Aryan kings even with non-Aryan because
by such alliance an Arya can never become a non-Arya even in times
of calamity.54

The village was the unit of ancient Hindu society, since agriculture
was the main occupation followed by the people. The desertion of
villages in favor of town life was viewed with disfavor by smṛtikārṇas
(lawgivers). “Let him avoid going into towns,”56 says Apastamba,
while Bodhāyana says, “It is impossible for one to attain salvation
who lives in a town covered with dust.”54 While towns were enclosed
by high walls, villages had no such artificial enclosure. Rules have been
laid down by Kauṭilya for the formation of new villages. He states:
“Either by inducing foreigners to immigrate or by causing thickly
populated centres of his own kingdom to send forth the excess popula-
tion, the king may construct villages either on new sites or on old ruins.
Villages consisting each of not less than a hundred families and of not
more than five hundred families of agriculturists, mainly of the Śūdra
caste, with boundaries extending as far as a krośa (2,250 yards) or two
and capable of protecting each other, shall be formed.”57 R. K. Mooker-
ji correctly remarks: “India presents the rare and remarkable phenome-
non of the State and the society coexisting apart from, and in some
degree of independence of, each other as distinct and separate units or
entities, or independent centres of national, popular, and collective
life and activity.”58

I have now completed a rapid and necessarily imperfect survey of
some of the political ideas and theories that were evolved and obtained
currency at various periods of Indian history. To summarize, they
point to a continued tradition of a strong central government where
the king was a real factor to be reckoned with and not a roi faisant.
His authority and powers were exercised, however, after constant con-
sultation with a ministry and through heads of departments whose
jurisdiction was extensive and who, under wise kings, were always
encouraged to speak their minds. Kingship was mainly hereditary but
sometimes elective. The pulse of the public was felt not only through
the espionage system of those days but also by means of assemblies
which, especially in the south of India, flourished in great abundance
and with much vigor. Provincial, or rather local, autonomy was, how-
ever, the main feature of Hindu India, and the essence of government
lay in the formation and functioning of village groups, taxing themselves, expending their revenues on works of public utility, and governing themselves. Political speculation was active and the theory of a compact with the king, the idea that taxation is the return for good administration and protection, the formulation of the need for a cabinet system of government with dharma or vox populi as the ultimate sanction—these were some of the conspicuous features of Indian polity. The resort to popular opinion was in the nature of a referendum, as in Switzerland.

The old dispensation was outwardly and, in later theory and practice, actually unfettered and autocratic; but nevertheless, by reason of the grant of complete local freedom and the practice of what, in effect, was a form of state socialism, the king acted as being ever in the great taskmaster's eye—the taskmaster being what was indifferently called dharma or the voice of the people, which latter, when it expressed itself, was clear and unequivocal. Popular gatherings, if the Atharva Veda furnishes an accurate picture, were full of life but at the same time animated by a lively desire to achieve concord. The greatest contribution to posterity made by the Hindu tradition was the broad-mindedness, sympathy, and tolerance of different viewpoints exhibited almost alone in India amongst the civilized communities of earlier days. When Egypt persecuted the Jews, when racial and communal conflicts disfigured the history of Babylon and Nineveh, when, later on, we see that the slave states in Greece and Rome formed the basis of those marvelous cultures, and when in the medieval ages the baiting of Jews alternated with the baiting of Roman Catholics by Protestants and vice versa, we had the spectacle in India of unfailing hospitality to foreign religions and foreign cultures. It would be unfair and inaccurate not to mention that the Buddhists and Jains suffered some pains and penalties especially in the south of India; but what country can show anything like the treatment of the Parsees, who, flying from oppression in their own country of Persia, asked for and obtained succor of the wise west-coast king, to whose protection and active encouragement of their faith and tradition the Parsees ultimately owe their dominant position in the India of today? What country can furnish a parallel to what happened in Travancore under the rule of extremely conservative and religious-minded monarchs? From the days when Christian congregations were split into innumerable and warring factions owing to the Arian controversy at the Council of Nicaea and the question of images, the Cera kings of Travancore gave a wholehearted welcome to the followers of the Eastern Church whose Patriarch of Antioch even now boasts of a
larger following in Malabar than perhaps anywhere else in the world? What king outside of India has surpassed the monarchs of Travancore and Malabar who conferred sacerdotal honors, presents, lands, and dignities on the ministers, bishops, and archbishops of the Christian Church with the result that today the largest Christian population in India is found in the State of Travancore? What ruler in the world's checkered history has enunciated in more moving and powerful language than is found in the Edicts of Aśoka the Great the principles of tolerance and comprehension of differing creeds and ideals coexisting with a spiritual urge toward the consolidation and regeneration of the ruler's own faith?

Such have been the marks and the characteristics of Indian civilization not only at its peak points but through the centuries until recently, and it is not too much to say that the Proclamation of His Highness the Mahārāja of Travancore has an authentic Hindu background and lineage. Can this instinct of universality, this understanding of all points of view, and the feeling that the realization of the Supreme must connote a sympathy with, and a reconciliation of, many forms of thought and belief, be better expressed than in the words of Tāyumānava in his Hymn to Pārvatī:

"The light and bliss of supreme knowledge that envelops and absorbed all forms of belief as the ocean absorbs all rivers"?

In Rock Edict 12, Emperor Aśoka declares that he does reverence to men of all sects, whether ascetics or householders, and he adds that he who does reverence to his own sect while disparaging the sects of others wholly from attachment to his own with intent to enhance the splendor of his own sect, in reality, by such conduct inflicts the severest injury on his own sect; and he ends the Edict with these ever memorable words: "Concord is the supreme good." (Samavāya eva sādhuḥ.)

This is the idea that underlies the United Nations Organization; it has uniformly characterized the philosophies that have been evolved in India, which have been always based on non-violence (ahimsā) and compassion (dāyā), as well as on fearlessness (abhaya) and on the recognition of the conformity and unity of all existence.

NOTES

1VIII, 336. 3XII (Śantiparva), 368.
2Apastamba, Dharma-sūtra, I, xii, 11.
3Bodhāyana, Dharma-sūtra. 4Chs. 67, 68.
4I, iv, 14. 5I, v, 6.
6I, 375, 376; IV, 2. 7I, 10, 18.
8Bk. VII, 14. 9I, 11.
10IV, 1. 11Śukra, II, 5-8.
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[Footnotes: 
XI, 61, 32. II, 549, 552. VII, 314. Ch. 106, 30, 32. 
Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, Ch. 67. 
Ch. VII. 
Śukra Nītīsāra, I, 73–77. Ch. 61. 
Ch. 92. 
I, 70. VIII, 307–308. Śāntiparva, Ch. 29. 
Ch. 4. Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, Ch. 120. 
Ch. VII, 80. Śāntiparva, Ch. 57. Ch. 130. 
Śāntiparva, Ch. 56. 
Ch. 222. 
Sabhāparva, Ch. 13. 
Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, Ch. 75. 
Ibid., Ch. 90. Vṛṣala: A man of one of the three highest classes who has lost his caste by the omission of prescribed duties. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., Ch. 88. 
Arthaśāstra, Vol. I, p. 33. Śāntiparva, Ch. 56. 
Śukra Nītīsāra, Ch. 9. 
Apastamba, Dharma-sūtra (Mysore: Government Oriental Series, No. 15, 1898), Ch. 1, p. 32. 
Bodhāyana, Dharma-sūtra (Mysore: Government Oriental Series, No. 34, 1907), Ch. 2, p. 3. 
III, xxx, 5–6.]

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We are in this Conference attempting to extend the range of our philosophizing. Acquaintance with the philosophies of the great cultures, noting their similarities and differences, is part of the task. This phase of the work is comparative philosophy, with its three main subdivisions of comparative methodology, comparative metaphysics, and comparative axiology. But we are also doing some philosophizing on our own, making initial explorations as to possible bases of integration. There are suggestions that methodology is the strategic area. Others believe that metaphysics is the strategic focus. But some suggestions have appeared that perhaps the fundamental sources of philosophic differences arise in the domain of value. This seems to me a very fruitful lead. For the methods persons use will vary with their goals; the basic categories they employ will vary with their problems; and their problems will vary with their natures and the circumstances in which they find themselves. It may well be that the differences between philosophies in a given culture, and the philosophical contrasts between cultures, stem from differences in persons, problems, and goals. If we are to explore this possibility, we must bring man—his nature and his history—into the focus of our attention. It is not enough to compare different systems of value; it is necessary to seek their source. This requires that we must begin to build a theory of value on the securest possible foundations. Then in terms of such a theory, together with the fruits of comparative philosophy, we may perhaps in time see our way to more comprehensive integrations of value, to more comprehensive life-ideals. Perhaps we can only widen our philosophizing by widening our selves.

The instructive study by Charles A. Moore, "Comparative Philoso-
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philosophies of Life," in Philosophy—East and West, makes unnecessary at this time a comparative survey of the philosophers' philosophies. The term "strength" in the title of the present paper indicates the emphasis to be given to the problem. It is meant to suggest that at some points at least we can begin to move from general contrasts of attitude to quantitative study of the strength of the attitudes which underlie the life-ideals found in various cultures. To show that this is possible and that the results so obtained are relevant to the theoretical problems of axiology and to the practical attainment of more comprehensive value integrations is the task of this paper. That it is only spadework will be only too clear!

THE PRIMARY DATA

The data upon which discussion is to be based consist of the evaluations of thirteen possible ways to live by college students in Japan, China, India, and the United States. The material from the United States was collected between 1945 and 1948; that from China during October through December, 1948; that from India during January through March, 1949; that from Japan was collected by Dr. Shunsuke Tsurumi during the spring months of 1949. As we shall see later, the situations in the four cultures were very different at these times. And since the data are from college students alone we must not take them as the basis for generalizations about all persons in the four cultures. Nevertheless, the study of the philosophies of life current among college students is important in itself, for it is these persons whom my colleagues here instruct, and it is these persons who will be important factors in the development of their cultures and in their philosophies.1

The first thing to be noted is that there are not two value patterns, one Eastern and one Western. The preferences of the Indian men are surprisingly like those of American men. The Chinese men differ strongly in certain respects from the men of Japan, India, and the United States: thus Way 5, which stresses the mergence of oneself with society for the accomplishment of social goals, and Way 13, which advocates that one become a confident instrument of the great forces working themselves out in nature and society, are both rated high by Chinese men and rated low by the men of the other cultures. Japanese men differ markedly from those of the other cultures in the stress put upon sympathetic concern for others (Way 3) and upon the stoical attitude (Way 10). No general line of division between Orient and Occident is visible.

This fact is made clearer by comparing similarities rather than
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Way</th>
<th>College Men</th>
<th>College Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Preserve the best that man has attained</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Independence of persons and things</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sympathetic concern for others</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Festivity and solitude in alternation</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Group activity, group enjoyment</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Constant making and renewing</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Dynamic integration of diversity</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Wholesome carefree enjoyment</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Wait in quiet receptivity</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Stoical self-control</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Meditation on the inner life</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Active adventure seeks</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Be an instrument of the great powers</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows the percentages of first choices of thirteen ways to live (1948-1949) by college men and women in the USA, China, Japan, and India.
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differences. Ways 2, 4, 9, and 11 stress non-aggressive attitudes which seek not power but receptivity or some form of inwardness; Ways 5 and 6 advocate energetic action to control natural and social processes. But in respect to these two sets of alternatives there is again no significant difference between East and West.

It may be noticed that the preferences of women students for these various ways to live do not differ greatly from those of the men in their culture, but the difference is significant in several respects. Way 1, the conserving attitude, is preferred by women somewhat more than by men in all four cultures, and Way 6, the reconstructing attitude, has only about half the appeal to women that it has to men. The most striking difference between men and women is in the case of Way 13 in India: it is given first choice by only 2 per cent of the men and by 15 per cent of the women. But in general the division between the acceptances of life-ideals in these cultures does not coincide with the division between men and women.

The most important point is the bare fact of the multiplicity of life-ideals within each of the four cultures. None of them even begins to approach homogeneity in this respect. Each of them is pluralistic. This does not mean, of course, that there are not similarities in manners and traditions and loyalties in each culture which distinguish these cultures from each other; but it does show that there are underlying differences in each of them as to the conception of the good life, and that all these alternatives are found in all four cultures. This is a fact of great importance, and it raises basic problems of theory and practice.

INTERPRETATION: SOME CULTURAL FACTORS

The theoretical problems posed by such results are themselves twofold: one concerns the interpretation of the results; and the other, their bearings on one of the basic problems of axiology—the nature of appraisals. Something must be said on both of these matters, but only in the most preliminary and tentative manner.

That the results "make sense," that they are not merely an accidental array of numbers but an indication that the domain of value has structure and lawfulness, can be shown in two ways: by considering them in relation to the conditions obtaining in each culture at the time of the study, and by considering them in relation to the persons who chose the various alternatives. We will do each in turn.

Japan had tried a path of power (Ways 5 and 13 in extreme forms) and had failed. It is sensible under such conditions to try other alternatives. Way 6, which demands continual reconstruction of life, becomes
more prominent; the stoical attitude of Way 10, of working in the world but not expecting too much, is noticeably strong; Ways 2, 9, and 11, which counsel receptivity, simplicity, or inwardness, while not strong, are favored more than in the other cultures; and the surprisingly large vote for Way 3, with its stress on sympathetic concern for others, may be in part an appeal for sympathetic consideration from others by extending the hand of sympathy to them. This illustrates how life-ideals vary with cultural problems.

Consider the Chinese value profile. Here was a country torn by civil war. Decisive cooperative action was necessary whether one was sympathetic to the Communists or the Nationalists. The life-ideals which stress passivity or the inward turn (Ways 2, 9, and 11) do not make much appeal, nor do those which stress hedonic or stoical attitudes (Ways 4, 8, and 10). While concern of the individual for himself is thus looked down upon, strong approval is given to Ways 5 and 13, which bind the individual to the community and call upon him to be a resolute instrument of the forces molding China's destiny.

The general similarity of the preferences of Indian and American men is unmistakable. The slight differences are in the direction we might expect: the Indian men are slightly more desirous of holding on to what India has attained (Way 1), somewhat more attracted to attitudes of detachment and meditation (Ways 2 and 11), more favorable to the stoical attitude (Way 10), and less given to delight in physical action (Way 12). But the over-all picture is in both cases much the same. This may be connected with the fact that both cultures were at the time of the study confident of the perpetuation of their heritages; neither was in a revolutionary crisis; neither had suffered greatly because of the war. The emphasis upon vigorous social transformation (Ways 5, 6, and 13) is much less than in China, while the attitudes which favor holding on to what man has attained or developing a rich and variegated personality (Ways 1 and 7) rank very high indeed, much higher than in revolutionary China and very much higher than in Japan in defeat.

The appraisals in all these cultures vary in an understandable manner with the situation in which each culture found itself at the time. But that this is not the whole story is clear, for it does not explain the diversity of the ways to live favored in each culture simultaneously. If time permitted we could show from other data that this diversity is clarified slightly if we consider economic status and the size of the community in which the individuals choosing the various alternatives live. But only slightly. Social factors alone do not account for the acceptance or rejection of philosophies of life.
It is now necessary to look at our data in terms of the kind of person who chooses a given alternative. Different persons may react to a social problem in different ways. And not all problems involve the state of a culture as a whole. Can we get any insight into the effect of individual differences upon the acceptance or rejection of life-ideals?

This is, of course, a very complex problem. But, at the risk of being misunderstood, I will single out one type of difference between individuals to give plausibility to the position that appraisals do differ with the types of persons who make them. The difference singled out is that between different types of physiques. This difference is chosen in order to simplify the problem. It is not, of course, maintained that bodily differences are the most important ways in which personalities differ. But it is the easiest factor to handle, and it is sufficient to make the point important to our argument: there are deep-seated individual differences which transcend cultural boundaries, and these differences are one of the factors which account for differences in evaluations.

Dr. William H. Sheldon, in his book *The Varieties of Human Physique*, presents a classification of physiques in terms of the extent to which they are endomorphic, mesomorphic, and ectomorphic. To put it very crudely, endomorphy refers to the soft roundness of the physique, mesomorphy to its bone and muscular development, ectomorphy to its linear fragility. These characteristics occur in various degrees of strength and in various combinations. The strength of each component is recorded by a number from 1 to 7, 1 indicating minimum strength and 7 indicating maximum strength. The combination of the three numbers indicating the strength of the three components gives the somatotype of the physique. The convention is to state endomorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy in the order of these terms. So, to say of a person that he is of somatotype 431 would mean that he is 4 in endomorphy, 5 in mesomorphy, and 1 in ectomorphy. To call him a mesomorph means merely that mesomorphy is his strongest component. Physiques differ, of course, in other ways (as in body-size, harmony or disharmony between various parts of the body, etc.), but these important differences must here be ignored.

Is there a relation between somatotypes and the choices of ways to live? In approaching this question let us first consider persons with severe personality disturbances ("insane persons," "psychotics"). Dr. Sheldon, in work done with Dr. Phyllis Wittman (reported in his book *The Varieties of Delinquent Youth*), has found that in the United States the manic form of disturbance (in which the individual is physically
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and psychologically over-active, uninhibited, forceful, distractable, euphoric) is most common in persons high in mesomorphy and low in ectomorphy. On the other hand, the schizophrenic disturbance (in which the individual is detached, shy, sensitive, conscious of self, lacking in energy, apathetic, withdrawn from social and physical activities) was found to be most common in persons low in mesomorphy and usually, but not always, high in ectomorphy.

Through the courtesy of Dr. Leslie Cheng of Nanking, Dr. A. S. Johnson of Madras, and Dr. N. N. Chatterji of Calcutta, it was possible to secure data indicating that the state of affairs found in the United States obtains in China and India as well. In India, for ten manics the average mesomorphy was 5.25, and the average ectomorphy 2.10, while for sixteen schizophrenics the average mesomorphy was 2.72, and the average ectomorphy 4.79. In China the cases were few in number, but the direction was the same: for four manics the average mesomorphy was 4.75, the average ectomorphy 3.00; for seven schizophrenics the average mesomorphy was 3.00, the average ectomorphy 4.29.

These facts suggest that physically similar individuals are disposed toward similar ways of life in quite different cultures, for a psychosis is a way of life, an attempt by an individual to solve a perplexing problem. The strategies adopted vary with the resources available. Since the psychotic individual has made, as it were, his final choice, and has settled upon a strategy appropriate to his nature, the relation of psychotic ways to live to types of physiques should be closer than is the case with non-psychotic ways to live, since the normal individual is still flexible enough to try out various alternatives. But the psychotic data are useful in providing a clue. And the fact that few of the Indian or Chinese psychotics were college students warns us against too easily dismissing the similar results found in our normal students as being due merely to Western influences upon their colleges.

We now return to our college group. Some five hundred of the persons who rated the thirteen ways to live were somatotyped, those in the United States by Dr. Sheldon’s careful photographic technique, those in China and India by the writer during personal interviews. Unfortunately no such data have yet been secured from Japan.

To illustrate the more clear-cut cases of relationship between somatotype and appraisal of a way to live, let us note Ways 5 and 11, since they parallel somewhat the extroverted life of the manic and the introverted life of the schizophrenic. Way 5 advises us to merge ourselves with the community and to act resolutely for the achievement of its goals. Of the somatotyped students who liked Way 5 very much the average mesomorphy was 4.52, and the average ectomorphy 3.08;
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88 per cent of them were 4 or above in mesomorphy, and only 12 per cent were less than 4. Way 11 counsels the cultivation of the inner life: of the somatotyped students who liked it very much the average mesomorphy was 3.25, and the average ectomorphy was 4.00; only 25 per cent of them were 4 or above in mesomorphy, and 75 per cent of them were less than 4 in mesomorphy. In all three cultures it is mainly the mesomorphs who prize Way 5 and the non-mesomorphs who prize Way 11.

With respect to the other ways to live, the relation to somatotype is seldom as sharp, and some of the best-liked ones appeal almost equally to endomorph, mesomorph, and ectomorph. No attempt will be made to present the facts in detail. But in China, India, and the United States the persons who like Ways 5, 10, and 12 very much are above the mesomorphic group averages of their countrymen, while those who like Ways 2, 4, and 11 very much are below these averages. With respect to endomorphy, Ways 2 and 8 are above the group averages, Way 7 below them; with respect to ectomorphy Ways 1 and 2 are above the group averages, Ways 5 and 8 below them. Way 4 is most favored by the endomorph, Way 13 by the mesomorph. While there are some differences of degree, Ways 1, 6, and 7 are widely liked by endomorph, mesomorph, and ectomorph. This is no exception to our thesis. Part of the explanation can only be given later in the argument. But in general it can be said that if a way of life requires no special physical emphases or aptitudes it can make an appeal to a wide range of somatotypes.

Perhaps enough has been said to give credibility to a point essential to our argument: even in widely different cultures and under widely different contemporary circumstances the ways of life preferred by both normal and psychotic individuals bear a significant relation to their physiques. And if this is so in the case of the most elementary physical differences between persons, it is quite likely that the more complex types of personality differences act selectively in the acceptance or rejection of value patterns.

The relations of preference for ways to live to somatotype differences make sense. Ways 4 and 8 find most favor with the endomorphic physique, the soft rounded physique—and these are ways that stress relaxation, letting go, enjoyment. Ways 5, 12, and 13 are most favored by the mesomorphic physique, the bone-muscle physique,—and these ways stress activity in and on the world of man and nature. Ways 1 and 2 are most favored by the ectomorphic physique, the linearly fragile physique—and these ways provide a place for restraint and refinement, detachment and inwardness.
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How a person meets a problem depends as much upon himself as upon his environment. For a problem is only a problem to a person, and as persons differ so do their problems and their appropriate strategies. Biological factors and social factors (whether cultural or situational) both influence our appraisals. So does the physical environment, and so does our knowledge. We are not yet in a position to state very clearly the relationship of these various factors. But our data suggest pattern and structure in the domain of prizings and appraisals. This may lure us to deeper explorations.

THE NATURE AND TEST OF APPRAISALS

For our purposes axiology may be regarded, with John Dewey, as the study of prizings and appraisals (or valuings and evaluations) and their relationships. It is believed that the methods used in the study of life-ideals can be employed in the study of other values. This suggests that a science of axiology is possible, in the sense that data open to many observers can be used to control generalizations and predictions about prizings, appraisals, and their relationships.

The main doubt about this possibility centers around the question as to the nature of appraisals themselves. It is often admitted that scientific knowledge might be had about prizings and appraisals, but then it is claimed that such knowledge is irrelevant to the making of appraisals, either on the ground that appraisals are not themselves candidates for knowledge or that the knowledge which they embody cannot be controlled by scientific methods.

Since appraisals are signs, the investigation of their nature is the task of the science of signs (semiotic). The pragmatists from Charles Peirce on have always maintained that appraisals ("judgments of value") are assertions and so can be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence—the differences among pragmatists centering on the question as to the kind of evidence involved in their control. The most recent discussion is found in C. I. Lewis' Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.

The issues are too complex, and too important, to be dealt with summarily. But it seems that on one point the preceding data may be helpful. It can be assumed, I suppose, that the 13 ways to live, as formulated on the questionnaire, are appraisals. What the data suggest is that the acceptance or rejection of these appraisals is in terms of whether the individual in question prizes what is signified ("prizes" here may be taken either in a mentalistic or behavioral sense or both). Thus the mesomorph, who in general prizes energetic activity, accepts in general ways to live which signify energetic and active modes of
life and rejects in general those which do not. This suggests that an appraisal is a sign the ultimate evidence for whose application is prizing. If this is so, then what an appraisal signifies is that something is prizable. This may not be the full story, but in what follows we shall restrict ourselves to appraisals in this sense of the term.

An appraisal, so conceived, differs from other assertions in the fact, and only in the fact, that the evidence by which it is confirmed or disconfirmed must in the last analysis be prizings or failures to prize. Since the appraisal signifies prizability, it does have a predictive or cognitive character; but just because it does signify prizability, it is prizings that are the ultimate test for its truth or falsity.

Since appraisals are themselves cognitive in nature, reliable knowledge about prizings and appraisals will influence the appraisals of those who have this knowledge. And, if we mean by the term "scientific" the ascertainment of the truth or reliability of signs in terms of evidence open to all those who participate in the inquiry, then there can be scientific appraisals and not merely scientific knowledge about appraisals—provided only that there be such evidence that prizings occur or do not occur.

By and large, the advocates of the various ways to live have maintained that their way is the Way. In terms of our analysis, this can mean only that all persons under all circumstances will prize the way in question more than all others if they give it a chance. Evidence from history and from case studies does not bear out this contention. Construed as generalized assertions, the evidence available seems to indicate that each and every positive appraisal of a way to live is false.

If ways to live are asserted not as unconditional generalizations but as predictions that given persons under given conditions will prize them if they give them a chance, then all of them may be true, and there is no contradiction among them. Nor is there then any objection to presenting them persuasively. For, to let it be known that one has found a way to live that one prizes more and more in the living of it acts as a lure and an inducement for others to give it a chance. But whether it is a mode of life which a given seeker will prize if he gives it a chance can only be determined by evidence of prizing, indirect evidence in terms of what others like him have found in trying it out, or direct evidence gained by trying it out for himself. By making appraisals objectively relative (that is, relative to given persons in given circumstances) we avoid alike absolutism and subjectivism, both in axiology and in our lives.
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DEPENDENCE, DOMINATION, AND DETACHMENT
IN THE GREAT CULTURES

We now return to problems posed by our material. How are we to understand the divergence between the students' choices of life-ideals and the traditional impression of great contrasts between the cultures of China, India, Japan, and the United States?

Part of the explanation lies in the fact that our results reflect only one moment within long and complex cultural histories, while our impressions of the great cultures are formed in terms of their whole histories as we encounter them in art, literature, and philosophy. But the greater part of the explanation must come from the recognition that our study taps, as it were, only some of the levels of personality, mainly the human raw-stuff, while the cultures represent various ways in which this raw-stuff has been given content and form. And the raw-stuff is more alike in different regions of the earth than are the character-structures formed on its basis. What we should like now to suggest is that all of the great cultures find modes of expression for all of the main types of persons, though the emphasis upon these modes of expression differs with the cultures and gives them their distinctive flavors.

We must widen our conceptual framework by adding three new terms: dependence, dominance, and detachment. These terms refer to the three most basic attitudes that a human being can take to the world in which he lives. By dependence is meant the attitude of reliance upon something other than oneself. It is the attitude of keeping close to one's world, of waiting, of being receptive. Dominance is the attitude of gaining control over things or persons. It is an active, explorative, outgoing, manipulative attitude. Detachment is the attitude of keeping one's distance. It is an unwillingness to let oneself go, a refusal to let oneself be taken in by things or persons. These attitudes are basic in the sense that a human being can only let things work upon himself, or work upon things, or give up both working upon things and being worked upon by them. While there are no alternatives to these attitudes, each can take many forms and have many degrees of strength, and they can be combined with each other in innumerable ways.

The ways to live are particular forms and degrees and combinations of these basic attitudes. Way 9 stresses dependence; Way 12, dominance; Way 2, detachment. Most of the ways combine several of the attitudes. Ways 1 and 7 combine all three, but with different emphases.

Our results suggest that some kinds of persons take on these three
attitudes more easily than others: the endomorph, the attitude of
dependence; the mesomorph, the attitude of dominance; the ecto-
morph, the attitude of detachment. But the results also show that this
is only a tendency. The basic attitudes are therefore to be regarded as
character traits at the more complex levels of personality and not
simply manifestations of biological differences. While they are related
to bodily factors they are not related so closely as are temperamentnal
traits. Character traits depend upon what has happened to a person
during his life-career in his interactions with other persons and things.
They are subject to considerable variation by education, by social
approval and disapproval, by self-nurture, and by group crises.

It is for this reason that persons from various cultures may differ
much more among themselves with respect to life-ideals than in their
physiques. It is also possible for persons from two cultures to agree
much more among themselves with respect to life-ideals than in their
physiques. By the same token, a culture may differ greatly at different
periods of its history with respect to the strength of life-ideals, and
while this may accompany a change in the distribution of types of
physiques among its members, it need not necessarily do so. It would
be interesting to study the difference of emphasis with respect to de-
tachment in earlier and later India in these terms, and to seek answers
to the question why Indians became progressively more concerned
with control of themselves while their biological cousins in Europe and
America became progressively more concerned with the control of the
environment.

At a given time, or over long periods of time, some single way of
life may by its emphasis give to the culture a dominant coloring. But
because of changes in the society, and because of the press of deep-
seated individual differences, in large and old cultures there arises a
plurality of philosophies of life permitting satisfaction to each of the
three basic human attitudes, even if some one life-ideal is favored in
the sacred texts. Thus, if in China, Confucianism, with its stress on the
rectification of society, gives one expression to the attitude of domi-
nance, Taoism and Buddhism keep the doors open for the attitudes of
dependence and detachment. If in India detachment comes to be the
favored attitude of the later Vedas, provision is made in the conception
of the stages of life and in the recognition of the validity of the ways of
devotion and action (in addition to insight) for the attitudes of de-
pendence and dominance as well. If in Europe the New Testament
stressed an ultimate dependence upon God for salvation, this had to be
interpreted in ways that made a place for the jolly friar, the warring
crusader, and the withdrawn anchorite—and their secular relatives.
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In the course of time the emphasis on basic attitudes changes even within the great cultures. India has not always given priority to detachment, and there is evidence that young Indians no longer do so; China passed from emphasis on dominance to emphasis on dependence and now is bringing dominance again to the fore. In Europe the early Christian stress on dependence gave way to an almost manic stress on dominance, but there are now signs of protest in the name of dependence and detachment.

Each of these attitudes is deep-seated in human nature and each of them expresses itself when and in what form it can. Because of this multiplicity the press of culture is toward some form of integration.

AN EMERGING FORM OF INTEGRATION

It is significant that the ways to live which stress strongly only one of the three basic attitudes (such as Ways 2, 9, and 12) do not win wide favor in any of the great cultures. By contrast, the ways which find a place for all three attitudes (Ways 1 and 7) are highly favored. Ways 1 and 7 both provide expression for dependence, dominance, and detachment. Way 1 is more cautious. It seeks moderation and avoids extremes. Its stress is upon the preservation of the best that mankind has attained. Way 7 is bolder. Its stress is not upon preservation. It seeks a dynamic integration of the diverse facets of selfhood. Its unity is that of interacting and mutually transforming multiplicities.

The high appeal of these ways to live is grounded on the fact that many persons possess fair amounts of the three bodily components and prize with recognizable strength the attitudes of dependence, dominance, and detachment. This is why the press toward integration has its source in human nature itself. We seek to pull ourselves together lest we find ourselves pulled apart.

Among men, Ways 1 and 7 are strongest in India and the United States, and weakest in China and Japan. Way 7 is stronger than Way 1 in India and the United States, and weaker than Way 1 in Japan and China. This suggests that the tendency to integrative life-ideals is stronger in periods of social confidence and stability and weaker in periods of social stress and insufficiency. This seems to be even truer of Way 7 than of Way 1. Way 7 may, therefore, have a special importance for the future. While it is not the Way, the data suggest that it may be the dominant attitude of the younger generation. It is strong in both the East and the West. It is supported by basic factors in the psycho-physical make-up of many persons.
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It appears from our data that Way 7 will grow stronger if the conditions of life are ameliorated for more and more persons—and scientific technology has given men the instrument by which this can be done. But, since the attitude expressed in Way 7 is already strong, it will be a force toward its own actualization and extension.

Since the core of the attitude of Way 7 is the dynamic integration of diversity, it is intrinsically tolerant of multiplicity. It cannot, therefore, with consistency hold itself to be the way of life for all persons. So, while Way 7 can act as an integrative force for many persons in diverse cultures, and thus provide one core of unity for cultural integration, it will protect the different emphases of persons in any given culture, and the different emphases of the cultures themselves. Its present strength and its tendency to grow in strength may be an important sign of the possibility of new forms of integration at the level of individuals, cultures, and the world community. And if philosophies grow out of value commitments, then a widespread commitment to a way of life that prizes the dynamic integration of diversity will bring in its train new forms of world-philosophizing.8

NOTES

1The questionnaire describing the thirteen ways to live is appended to this chapter in the exact form in which it was used. Students in the northern parts of India, China, and the United States were more adequately sampled than those in the southern parts of these countries. More extensive data from India are now being studied. These results, together with results from a number of other cultures (based on data secured through the cooperation of UNESCO), will be reported later.


4For a fuller discussion of this topic, see my Signs, Language, and Behavior (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946).

5Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1946.

6The broader cultural and philosophical implications of the existence of a plurality of value patterns were discussed in my Paths of Life (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), now out of print, and in The Open Self (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948). In the latter work there is shown the tendency for different kinds of persons to favor certain types of philosophy. This is understandable in terms of the fact that the thirteen ways to live are drawn from the major religious and ethical systems, and these systems in turn have natural affiliations with specific philosophies. A more detailed study of the relation between the acceptance of philosophical doctrines and value patterns is planned for the future. The bearing of the present type of investigation upon world-philosophizing is expressed in The Open Self (p. 129) as follows: "The coming philosophy will embrace in a wider synthesis the philosophies answering to the more specialized selves. Its perspective will involve whatever truth is in theirs. It will not give the truth, or the whole truth, but truth on a wider canvas. It will not transcend perspectives but attain a more complex perspective. It will not obliterate multiplicity but embrace multiplicity. It will be as Oriental as it is Western. It will talk to endomorph, mesomorph, and ectomorph alike. Its objectivity will come not by abandoning our selves but by expanding them. The most objective philosophy can issue only from the most comprehensive self."
WAYS TO LIVE

INSTRUCTIONS: Below are described thirteen ways to live which various persons at various times have advocated and followed.

Indicate by numbers which you are to write in the margin how much you yourself like or dislike each of them. Do them in order. Do not read ahead.

Remember that it is not a question of what kind of life you now lead, or the kind of life you think it prudent to live in our society, or the kind of life you think good for other persons, but simply the kind of life you personally would like to live.

Use the following scale of numbers, placing one of them in the margin alongside each of the ways to live:

7 I like it very much
6 I like it quite a lot
5 I like it slightly
4 I am indifferent to it
3 I dislike it slightly
2 I dislike it quite a lot
1 I dislike it very much

WAY 1. In this "design for living" the individual actively participates in the social life of his community, not to change it primarily, but to understand, appreciate, and preserve the best that man has attained. Excessive desires should be avoided and moderation sought. One wants the good things of life but in an orderly way. Life is to have clarity, balance, refinement, control. Vulgarity, great enthusiasm, irrational behavior, impatience, indulgence are to be avoided. Friendship is to be esteemed but not easy intimacy with many people. Life is to have discipline, intelligibility, good manners, predictability. Social changes are to be made slowly and carefully, so that what has been achieved in human culture is not lost. The individual should be active physically and socially, but not in a hectic or radical way. Restraint and intelligence should give order to an active life.

WAY 2. The individual should for the most part "go it alone," assuring himself of privacy in living quarters, having much time to himself, attempting to control his own life. One should stress self-sufficiency, reflection and meditation, knowledge of himself. The direction of interest should be away from intimate associations with social groups, and away from the physical manipulation of objects or attempts at control of the physical environment. One should aim to simplify one's external life, to moderate those desires whose satisfaction is dependent upon physical and social forces outside of oneself, and to concentrate attention upon the refinement, clarification, and self-direction of one's self. Not much can be done or is to be gained by "living outwardly." One must avoid dependence upon persons or things; the center of life should be found within oneself.

WAY 3. This way of life makes central the sympathetic concern for other persons. Affection should be the main thing in life, affection that is free from all traces of the imposition of oneself upon others or of using others for one's own purposes. Greed in possessions, emphasis on sexual passion, the search for power over persons and things, excessive emphasis upon intellect, and undue concern for oneself are to be avoided. For these things hinder the sympathetic love among persons which alone gives significance to life. If we are aggressive we block our receptivity to the personal forces upon which we are dependent for genuine personal growth. One should accordingly purify oneself, restrain one's self-assertiveness, and become receptive, appreciative, and helpful with respect to other persons.

WAY 4. Life is something to be enjoyed—sensuously enjoyed, enjoyed with relish and abandonment. The aim in life should not be to control the course of the world
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or society or the lives of others, but to be open and receptive to things and persons, and to delight in them. Life is more a festival than a workshop or a school for moral discipline. To let oneself go, to let things and persons affect oneself, is more important than to do—or to do good. Such enjoyment, however, requires that one be self-centered enough to be keenly aware of what is happening and free for new happenings. So one should avoid entanglements, should not be too dependent on particular people or things, should not be self-sacrificing; one should be alone a lot, should have time for meditation and awareness of oneself. Solitude and sociality together are both necessary in the good life.

WAY 5. A person should not hold on to himself, withdraw from people, keep aloof and self-centered. Rather merge oneself with a social group, enjoy cooperation and companionship, join with others in resolute activity for the realization of common goals. Persons are social and persons are active; life should merge energetic group activity and cooperative group enjoyment. Meditation, restraint, concern for one’s self-sufficiency, abstract intellectuality, solitude, stress on one’s possessions all cut the roots which bind persons together. One should live outwardly with gusto, enjoying the good things of life, working with others to secure the things which make possible a pleasant and energetic social life. Those who oppose this ideal are not to be dealt with too tenderly. Life can’t be too fastidious.

WAY 6. Life continually tends to stagnate, to become “comfortable,” to become “sickled o’er with the pale cast of thought.” Against these tendencies, a person must stress the need of constant activity—physical action, adventure, the realistic solution of specific problems as they appear, the improvement of techniques for controlling the world and society. Man’s future depends primarily on what he does, not on what he feels or on his speculations. New problems constantly arise and always will arise. Improvements must always be made if man is to progress. We can’t just follow the past or dream of what the future might be. We have to work resolutely and continually if control is to be gained over the forces which threaten us. Man should rely on technical advances made possible by scientific knowledge. He should find his goal in the solution of his problems. The good is the enemy of the better.

WAY 7. We should at various times and in various ways accept something from all other paths of life, but give no one our exclusive allegiance. At one moment one of them is the more appropriate; at another moment another is the most appropriate. Life should contain enjoyment and action and contemplation in about equal amounts. When either is carried to extremes we lose something important for our life. So we must cultivate flexibility, admit diversity in ourselves, accept the tension which this diversity produces, find a place for detachment in the midst of enjoyment and activity. The goal of life is found in the dynamic integration of enjoyment, action, and contemplation, and so in the dynamic interaction of the various paths of life. One should use all of them in building a life, and no one alone.

WAY 8. Enjoyment should be the keynote of life. Not the hectic search for intense and exciting pleasures, but the enjoyment of the simple and easily obtainable pleasures: the pleasures of just existing, of savory food, of comfortable surroundings, of talking with friends, of rest and relaxation. A home that is warm and comfortable, chairs and a bed that are soft, a kitchen well-stocked with food, a door open to the entrance of friends—this is the place to live. Body at ease, relaxed, calm in its movements, not hurried, breath slow, willing to nod and to rest, grateful to the world that is its food—so should the body be. Driving ambition and the fanaticism of ascetic ideals are the signs of discontented people who have lost the capacity to float in the stream of simple, carefree wholesome enjoyment.

WAY 9. Receptivity should be the keynote of life. The good things of life come of their own accord, and come unsought. They cannot be found by resolute action. They cannot be found in the indulgence of the sensuous desires of the body. They cannot be gathered by participation in the turmoil of social life. They cannot be
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given to others by attempts to be helpful. They cannot be garnered by hard thinking. Rather do they come unsought when the bars of the self are down. When the self has ceased to make demands and waits in quiet receptivity, it becomes open to the powers which nourish it and work through it; and sustained by these powers it knows joy and peace. To sit alone under the trees and the sky, open to nature’s voices, calm and receptive, then can the wisdom from without come within.

WAY 10. Self-control should be the keynote of life. Not the easy self-control which retreats from the world, but the vigilant, stern, manly control of a self which lives in the world, and knows the strength of the world and the limits of human power. The good life is rationally directed and holds firm to high ideals. It is not bent by the seductive voices of comfort and desire. It does not expect social utopias. It is distrustful of final victories. Too much cannot be expected. Yet one can with vigilance hold firm the reins to his self, control his unruly impulses, understand his place in the world, guide his actions by reason, maintain his self-reliant independence. And in this way, though he finally perish, man can keep his human dignity and respect, and die with cosmic good manners.

WAY 11. The contemplative life is the good life. The external world is no fit habitat for man. It is too big, too cold, too pressing. Rather it is the life turned inward that is rewarding. The rich internal world of ideals, of sensitive feelings, of reverie, of self-knowledge is man’s true home. By the cultivation of the self within, man alone becomes human. Only then does there arise deep sympathy with all that lives, an understanding of the suffering inherent in life, a realization of the futility of aggressive action, the attainment of contemplative joy. Conceit then falls away and austerity is dissolved. In giving up the world one finds the larger and finer sea of the inner self.

WAY 12. The use of the body’s energy is the secret of a rewarding life. The hands need material to make into something: lumber and stone for building, food to harvest, clay to mold. The muscles are alive to joy only in action, in climbing, running, skiing, and the like. Life finds its zest in overcoming, dominating, conquering some obstacle. It is the active deed which is satisfying, the deed adequate to the present, the daring and adventurous deed. Not in cautious foresight, not in relaxed ease does life attain completion. Outward energetic action, the excitement of power in the tangible present—this is the way to live.

WAY 13. A person should let himself be used. Used by other persons in their growth, used by the great objective purposes in the universe which silently and irresistibly achieve their goal. For persons and the world’s purposes are dependable at heart, and can be trusted. One should be humble, constant, faithful, uninsistent. Grateful for the affection and protection which one needs, but undemanding. Close to persons and to nature, and secure because close. Nourishing the good by devotion and sustained by the good because of devotion. One should be a serene, confident, quiet vessel and instrument of the great dependable powers which move to their fulfillment.
CHARLES MORRIS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR RANKING YOUR PREFERENCES: Rank the thirteen ways to live in the order you prefer them, putting first the number of the way to live you like the best, then the number of the way to live you like next best, and so on down to the number of the way to live you like the least:

FINAL WORD: Thanks for your help! If you can formulate a way to live you would like better than any of the thirteen alternatives, please do so here:

Name

Sex Age

Height Weight

If you have any physical disability, please describe it:

Where was your father born?

Where was your mother born?

To what religious group, if any, did your parents belong?

In what place did you spend your childhood?

The population of the above place was

over 500,000

between 100,000 and 500,000

between 25,000 and 100,000

less than 25,000

To what income group did your parents belong in the community in which they lived?

upper income group

upper middle income group

middle middle income group

lower middle income group

lower income group

Do you feel that your society is satisfactory for the development and expression of your own particular abilities and wishes? Why or why not?
The Theory of Types
and the Verification
of Ethical Theories

FILMER S. C. NORTHROP*

One of the major errors of the philosophy of Hegel and of Marx, and of much contemporary social science, is the identification of the "ought" for culture and personal human conduct with the "is." This error we have elsewhere called the culturalistic fallacy. The error arises in social science when one attempts to determine normative social theory by applying the empirical methods of natural science to social and cultural facts. This gives very important scientific social theory but it is factual social theory of what is the case; it is not normative social theory of what ought to be the case.

Even social scientists and philosophers such as Marx and Hegel, who identify the "ought" for culture with the empirical, historical "is" of culture, recognize, however, that the culturalistic fallacy occurs if the "ought" is identified with the "is" of present cultural and social facts. The normative ideal for judging today's human behavior and cultural institutions cannot be the de facto "is" of that human behavior and those social institutions; otherwise the status quo would be perfect and reform and reconstruction unnecessary. The Hegelians and Marxists see that this is clearly wrong; otherwise there would not be the need for the criticisms of the social status quo in which they indulge and the need for radical and even revolutionary reconstruction of contemporary social and cultural institutions upon which they insist. The Hegelians and Marxists believe, however, that the fallacy of identifying the historical "ought" for culture with its historical "is," is avoided if one identifies the "ought" with tomorrow's historical "is" instead of with today's.

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To carry this theory through, however, it is necessary for them to affirm a determinism in cultural evolution such that today's "is" entails but one possible form of tomorrow's "is." Otherwise they would not be able to specify today the character of tomorrow's historical "is," and hence they would be left without any criterion today of the "ought" against which today's cultural institutions are to be measured normatively and in terms of which they are to be reconstructed and reformed.

It can be shown, however, that a historical process which evolves on either Hegelian or Marxist lines according to the logic of dialectic is not deterministic. The essence of the dialectic theory of historical evolution is that a given stage of cultural history is described by a given set of propositions called a thesis, and that this thesis gives rise by its negation to an antithesis which describes the next stage of the historical process, which antithesis in turn, when combined with its antecedent thesis, gives rise by another negation to a synthesis which describes the succeeding stage of the historical process. To be deterministic, the negation of the thesis must permit one and only one antithesis.

Both Hegel and Marx assume this, but clearly this is a false assumption. The thesis which is the set of normative assumptions defining a bourgeois society can be negated in several different ways: by negating any one or all of the postulates defining the bourgeois theory. It can be negated, as has occurred in fact in the United States, by the development of very strong labor unions with influence upon all political parties, which, because of the larger number of voters who are laborers as compared with businessmen, is such that the votes of labor influence the political regulation of the means of production in such a way that labor obtains its share and perhaps at times even the predominant share of the fruits of production. The normative assumptions defining a bourgeois society can be negated also, as has occurred in fact in Great Britain, by the laborers forming a Labour Party guided by socialistic rather than capitalistic economic principles, which obtains the direction of government and of business by democratic parliamentary practices within a multi-party political system. It can be negated, as occurred in Germany with the Weimar Republic followed by Hitler's Fascism, by a still different antithesis from that of the communistic revolution of the proletariat with its one-party dictatorship. Thus, both the logic of the situation and the facts of history show that a dialectic principle of evolution grounded as it is in the logic of negation is not deterministic. Today's cultural "is" can be negated in more than one way. Consequently, the Hegelian and Marxist attempt
to find the meaning for the distinction between the "is" and the
"ought" of today's culture by identifying the "ought" with the in-
evitable "is" of tomorrow's cultural institutions is a failure.

But even if there were a cultural historical determinism so that
tomorrow's cultural "is" could be specified today, there is no reason
for believing that tomorrow's historical "is" will be any more perfect
and hence any more of a criterion of the normative than is today's
cultural "is." Today's "is" was once a future "is"; tomorrow's "is,"
when we arrive at tomorrow, will be a today's historical "is." What
reason is there for believing that tomorrow's present is any more of a
criterion of the ideal or the normative than today's present?

All the facts of history in every culture of the world indicate that
today's cultural institutions in their *de facto* character are never per-
fekt; their *de facto* character never defines the normative ideal. Again,
we must conclude that the attempt to distinguish the "ought" of
cultural institutions from the "is," by identifying the normative which
describes our concept of the ideal with tomorrow's "is" rather than
with today's, as do not merely Hegel and Marx but all those social
scientists and historians who attempt to determine the norms for
reforming present cultural institutions by applying the methods of
natural science to social facts or by examining historical trends, is
an error.

This error does not arise merely because human behavior and
human cultural institutions imperfectly realize the personal and social
norms which they are attempting to actualize. The error of the identi-
fication of the normative ideal for culture with the factually actual
would be present even if a given culture realized its ideal perfectly
in fact. The reason for this is that the correctness of the normative
ideal itself is always open to question, as the existence of ideological
conflicts demonstrates. This is shown by the fact that the normative
personal and social ideals in one culture are very often regarded as
evil from the standpoint of the ideals of another culture. The Vatican
and the Kremlin are contemporary cases in point. Even if the Kremlin
realized its normative theory perfectly, the Vatican would not approve
of it. Similarly, even if the Vatican realized its Thomistic Christian
normative ideal perfectly, not merely the communists but also at
least some Protestant Christians and naturalistic liberals would regard
the result as the intensification of evil rather than the realization of
good. Mr. Mei has indicated that the introduction of Western ethical
and normative social theories into China had the effect of weakening
rather than harmonizing with Confucian ethics. Nor is this difficult
to understand when Western social theories place dedication to de-
terminate economic and political principles prescriptive for everybody in an entire nation above the Confucian priority of the warm feeling of filial piety for one's parents and ancestors. Nor are Western Christian religious doctrines less in conflict with Confucian values than are Western political principles. Certainly a religion whose Savior said that he came to put father against son and husband against wife is hardly a religion whose doctrines will sustain rather than disrupt Confucian filial piety.

The foregoing considerations make one fact evident which has not received the attention of this Conference which it deserves. This fact is that there are within the West and between the East and West normative theories which are not merely different but mutually incompatible. The one cannot be believed without the other's being rejected.

This conflict of values is not restricted to the values of people in different cultures. It also occurs in certain instances with respect to the differing values of the same people at different stages of their cultural history. The traditional Tsarist Greek Orthodox Christian ideology, now superseded in the case of Russian social policy by the Marxist communistic ideology, is an instance. Conversely, a norm which a given people at a given stage of their cultural history may damn as unorthodox and evil may be regarded by them later as a true measure of the divine and the good. The Aristotelian formulation of Roman Catholic Christianity, which was branded by William of Champeaux and the Vatican as heresy when it was first proposed by Abelard and which since the canonization of St. Thomas early in the fourteenth century has been used by the Vatican as the criterion of the orthodox and the good, is a case in point. In fact, the main characteristic of the contemporary domestic politics of any people or culture is the conflict of ideologies, normative social theories, and values which it exhibits.

Each one of these differing and conflicting sets of values is in significant part the humanistic operational consequence of a specific philosophy. A philosophy is a set of propositions. Since the differing sets of propositions of the different philosophies with their respective operationally different attendant values are in some cases at least not merely different but mutually contradictory, it follows that the given values or norms of any specific culture cannot be taken as valid on either a priori rationalistic or a posteriori empirical grounds. When any two philosophies or ideologies are mutually contradictory, both cannot be true. This entails that the prevalent ethical notion expressed by the proposition "There are facts and there are values," where
by "are values" is meant "values given empirically as data the same for everybody," must be rejected.

Values are not facts given as data which are the same for everybody, against which the propositions of ethics can be verified after the manner in which the propositions of natural science are verified against its data. Instead, values reflect rather than define or verify the philosophical premises from which one's normative theory is derived. To accept non-dualistic Vedānta is to take the intuition of Brahman as the ultimate value. To accept Thomistic Roman Catholicism is to regard the actualization in society of a rationalistically determined natural law as the social good and to regard discursive determinate reason as the criterion of perfection in both man and God. To embrace Communism is to use the principles of Marxist philosophy as the criterion of the good. As Edward Hallett Carr has written in his *Soviet Impact on the Western World*, "A true revolution is never content merely to expose the abuses of the existing order, the cases in which its practice falls short of its precept, but attacks at their root the values on which the moral authority of the existing order is based."

In short, a new philosophy which is accepted does not conform to given values the same for all men independent of philosophical beliefs; instead, it repudiates the given values and puts new values in their place. This is the case because ethics is but philosophy applied. Hence, when the philosophy changes, the norms and values change.

To use Socrates' language as expressed by Plato, given values are not objective things, the same for everybody, out of which one's moral philosophy and normative social theory can be constructed and against which it can be verified; values, instead, are "shadows on the wall of the cave," reflecting one's philosophy. To mistake shadows (i.e., cultural institutions and culturally conditioned introspective values) for objective things has been the error of most modern Western moral philosophy since the time of Kant.

Since specific values reflect a specific philosophy, it is fallacious, because it is circular and question-begging, to test any normative theory or philosophy against the denotatively given values of any given culture or against the historical institutions of any given culture. This is the real error in the culturalistic fallacy of attempting to derive the "ought" for culture from its "is."

But, if a given philosophy creates values rather than adjusts itself to values, and if a given philosophy therefore cannot be verified by appeal to values, either those of the present or those of the future, how can the propositions or postulates of a philosophical theory whose ethics is that philosophical theory applied be verified? Unless one
assumes that ethical propositions are non-cognitive and accepts the consequence that one philosophy with its particular attendant values is as valid as any other, there is but one answer to this question: Nature rather than culture must be the source of verification.

This was the answer given by the Chinese philosophers of the Orient when they said that good conduct is conduct in harmony with one's conception of nature when that conception of nature is determined not a priori but "by an investigation of things." A. Vernon Arnold, in his classical work Roman Stoicism, makes it clear that for the Roman Stoics and for every school of Greek philosophy after the time of the earlier Socrates, philosophy was conceived as composed of three parts—logic, physics, and ethics—where logic is the science which studies the methods with which one knows things; physics is the science which specifies the nature of things as known by the methods of logic; and ethics is the application of this knowledge of things to human conduct. As Arnold makes clear, even sin is defined as assent to false propositions about things. In short, for the Greek philosophers and Roman Stoics, ethics is applied philosophy verified by the logical methods of science against nature and natural man. In fact, this is the point of the basic dictum of Roman law that jus gentium, the humanistic law which is universally valid for all men, is grounded in jus naturae.

This means that the normative theory of the good for personal behavior and cultural institutions is one's philosophical theory of the true for nature and natural man as verified by scientific methods, or by what the Chinese sages and the Greek and Roman philosophers termed "an investigation of things." There are in any non-question-begging philosophy not two philosophies, the one a moral philosophy defining values with its particular assumptions and the other a natural philosophy verified against the facts of nature and natural man with its different assumptions; there is in any cognitive philosophy but one philosophy, namely, the philosophy of the true for nature and the natural man. Ethics is merely true (i.e., empirically verified) natural philosophy applied to human conduct and relations. When the empirically verified philosophy of the true for natural man is pursued with respect to what man must do to fulfill what this particular philosophy indicates the full and true nature of natural man to be, then the philosophy of the true for nature and natural man becomes the idea or measure of the good for culture, cultural man, and the humanities.

Indian philosophy, whether it be Buddhist or Hindu, is no exception to this rule. The Hindu philosophers tell us that Ātman, which is the psychical principle in man, is identical with Brahman, which is the
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cosmic principle in nature. Since the highest value for most Hindu philosophy is the achievement of Brahman, and since Brahman is a factor in cosmic nature as well as in natural man, the highest value for most Hindu philosophy is conduct in accord with the true for nature.

Brahman, Ātman, and Nirvāṇa, furthermore, are indeterminate, undifferentiated, and immediately apprehended. They are known not merely by immediate experience but only by immediate experience. The question whether that which the signs "Brahman," "Ātman," and "Nirvāṇa" denote exists is therefore a straightforward question of fact about nature and natural man as part of nature which is quite independent of culture. Either nature, including any natural man in any culture when experienced solely with immediacy, contains such a purely denotatively known factor as well as the equally immediate introspective and sensed differentiations which come and go within this Brahman-Ātman-Nirvāṇa factor or it does not. Certainly nothing can be more scientific than that which can be verified by appeal to factors which can be experienced with immediacy.

It is to be emphasized, however, that it is not the facts of nature which define the good for man, but one's scientific theory of the facts in their interrelations as a whole, when this scientifically verified theory has been analyzed to bring out its epistemology and its ontological assumptions, if any. Now, a scientific theory is not a body of natural facts; it is, instead, a set of propositions verified by appeal to such facts—those given with immediacy by introspection and sense awareness and also the all-embracing immediacy within which sensed and introspected differentiations come and go, as well as any theoretically designated, non-immediately experienced factors which can be scientifically inferred from immediately experienced facts.

It appears, therefore, that facts qua facts are neither good nor bad. Goodness and badness are predicates applying not to facts but to propositions referring to facts for their truth or falsity. This is the point of the ethical dictum, common to all systems of Greek and Roman philosophy, that virtue is true knowledge in the light of the whole.

Furthermore, propositions are not good or bad because of any primitive ethical quality of goodness or badness which resides in them. The only properties which propositions possess are properties such as truth or falsity. From this it follows that not only are facts qua facts neither good nor bad but also that propositions qua propositions are neither good nor bad. It is only their truth-value relation to facts which makes propositions good or bad. In short, a proposition is not good or bad because either it or the facts to which it purports to refer are good or bad; a proposition is bad because it is false to the facts
to which it purports to refer; a proposition is good because it is true to the facts to which it purports to refer.

Those acquainted with issues in modern logic which were debated throughout the first decades of this century will recall that at one time the psychological fact of judging was regarded as true or false. It is now generally agreed that no psychological acts are true or false. A psychological act, being a fact, merely is; it is not true or false. Instead, only propositions are true or false.

The analysis of this paper applies the same type of reasoning to ethics. The psychological act of assenting, qua fact, is neither good nor bad since facts merely are. Facts are not good or bad any more than they are true or false. Only propositions are good or bad, and even then only because of their truth-value relation to the facts to which they purport to refer.

It does seem to make sense, however, to say that a murderer's behavior is bad or that Hitler's conduct was bad. Now, clearly Hitler's past conduct is a fact; the behavior of actual murderers is also a fact. How, then, can we reconcile this conclusion with the foregoing conclusion that only propositions, because of their truth values, are good or bad?

It is at this point that the theory of types becomes important for ethics. Facts can be good or bad if they are facts which are, in part at least, the consequence of man's assent to propositions which are true or false. Only the facts of culture and of culturally conditioned man can be of this character, since only the facts of culture are what they are, in part at least, because of the propositions believed in by men. The facts of nature and the natural man are by definition those facts about man and nature which are not man-made.

Making use of the theory of types, let us call natural facts, facts of a type of the first order. Such facts are antecedent to scientifically verified philosophical theory. Such facts also are neither good nor bad. Let us, on the other hand, call cultural facts, facts of a type of the second order. Facts of this type can be designated as good or bad. They achieve their goodness or badness, however, not because they are facts, but because they are facts which derive their character and existence, in part at least, from human behavior based upon beliefs in scientifically verifiable propositions about nature and natural man which are true or false.

This use of the theory of types enables us to assert that the factual conduct of Hitler was bad because this conduct was the consequence, in part at least, of philosophical beliefs about natural man which scientific method can demonstrate to be false. This distinction between
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the second-order facts of culture and cultural man and the first-order facts of nature and natural man permits us to obtain verifiable philosophical theory which when applied gives its particular norm for culture and cultural man, while at the same time preventing us from falling into the culturalistic fallacy of identifying the "ought" for culture with the "is" for culture. By making the first-order facts of nature and natural man the source of the verification of the philosophical theory, conformity to which in human conduct defines the good for culture and cultural man, one obtains a philosophically grounded norm for culture different from the "is" of culture, which is nonetheless verified.

One final consequence, very important for this Conference, remains to be noted. The difference between Eastern and Western philosophy (with the exception of modern Western moral philosophy of the idealistic or Marxist vintage since Kant, which is either fallacious, as with Hegel and Marx, because it commits the culturalistic fallacy, or purely formal and hence empty, as with Kant, if it does not commit this fallacy) is not that the one is concerned primarily with values and the other is concerned primarily with scientifically determined technological instruments. Western philosophical systems and also some Western theistic religions, such as Thomistic Aristotelian Roman Catholic Christianity, have new religious, social, and moral values as well as new scientific technological instruments to give to Oriental philosophy, religion, and culture. Conversely, Oriental philosophy and its intuitive religion with its Brahman, Ātman, Nirvāṇa, Tao, and jen factor have new religious values to give to Western religions as well as new aesthetic and social values to give to Western normative social science and aesthetics. The difference between the many Eastern and the many Western philosophical systems, with their respective different values, centers instead in their differing empirically determined theories of nature and natural man.

Oriental philosophies for the most part are what they are because the scientific studies of nature and the natural man as a part of nature from which they derive have restricted themselves to inductive and deductive reasoning about propositions concerning immediately experienced man and nature which are built out of concepts by intuition that gain their complete meaning purely inductively and denotatively. This is why Mr. Datta was able to say, speaking, as I recall, for all systems of Indian philosophy, that Indian philosophers are never content to reason deductively from merely hypothetical premises but require also that the premises be known to be empirically true by themselves apart from the deduction so that the logical consequences
of the premises will be true also. This can be the case only if the premises contain only concepts by intuition, which, since they refer to what is denotatively immediate, are verified directly.

Western systems of philosophy, on the other hand, except in those positivistic intervals, such as the recent past, when a traditional philosophical theory has broken down and before its successor is put in its place, are what they are because the scientific studies of nature and the natural man from which they derive have for the most part restricted themselves, following the early natural-history stage of Western scientific method, to inductive and deductive reasoning about propositions concerning a theoretically known, non-immediately experienced component of nature and the natural man. Such propositions, precisely because they describe a non-immediately experienced factor, must be constructed in part at least out of concepts by postulation with postulationally designated rather than inductively denotable meanings. It is for this reason that such scientific and philosophical knowledge can be verified only indirectly, as Albert Einstein and many others have emphasized, by deducing consequences from the non-inductively given, postulationally designated meanings and then checking the deduced consequences, by way of epistemic correlation, with immediately experienced fact, denotated by concepts by intuition. It is for this reason also that Western deductive reasoning permits and often requires hypothetical syllogisms, the conclusions of which are not known to be empirically verified when they are deduced from the premises. It is for the same reason that in Western theistic religion one must doctrinally postulate what one believes first and accept and act upon the belief before one can obtain the immediate experience, never identical with the object of religious knowledge, which confirms it.

Following a usage which I have introduced elsewhere, let us call the immediately apprehended factor in nature, against which Oriental philosophies have tended to be verified, the intuitive or aesthetic component of nature, and the theoretically known, non-immediately apprehended factor in nature to which so much of the deductively formulated, indirectly verified science and philosophy of the West refers, the theoretic component of nature. Recent investigations of the relation between these two factors in scientific method and knowledge show that both are ultimate. Furthermore, the aesthetic and theoretic components are compatible. Both can exist as real in nature—the one is not appearance, the other reality. This means that an adequate philosophy verified against nature must include both factors. It entails also that an adequate naturalistically verified contemporary philosophy must be a synthesis of the philosophy of the Orient, which refers
to the aesthetic component of nature for its direct verification, and the
deductively formulated science and philosophy of the West, which
designate the indirectly verified theoretic component in nature and
natural man.

If according to the afore-mentioned theory of ethics of this paper,
the normative for culture and moral man is conduct and institutions
in conformity with the philosophy of the completely true and verified
for nature and natural man, then very important normative conse-
quences follow: An adequate ethical theory for the contemporary
world must be the expression of a philosophy which thus combines and
harmonizes the Oriental and Occidental philosophies of nature and
natural man.

Fortunate indeed it is that the traditional philosophies and their
respective ethical applications are in considerable part different in the
East from what they are in the West. Certainly it would hardly be
worth while to have had this East-West Philosophers' Conference, nor
would it be significantly rewarding to have further similar conferences,
if all that Oriental and Western philosophers could learn from one
another is that their philosophical doctrines and the respective ethical
applications of these doctrines are identical. Were this true, there
would be nothing of fundamental importance which the one could gain
from the other.

It is not necessary in order to have a harmonious East-West
philosophy that the East should equal the West. We are the richer
because East is not identical with West and the relation between them
is East plus West.

One qualification of the afore-mentioned conclusion must be noted.
As the earlier portion of this paper has emphasized, there are not merely
different philosophies with their respective ethical applications which
are compatible; there are also different philosophical systems which
are incompatible. Philosophical doctrines of the latter type can never
be reconciled by merely adding the two systems together. When in-
compatible differences appear, reconciliation can come only by moving
to a new theory which without contradiction takes care of the facts in
nature and the natural man that led to the two traditional, incom-
patible doctrines. This is the reason a world philosophy which faces
the incompatible as well as the compatible differences between Eastern
and Western philosophical theories must be a new, fresh, technically
formulated specific philosophy.

It appears also from the foregoing analysis that this new philosophy
must contain both concepts by intuition indicating precisely what
Oriental doctrines are to be included and excluded, and concepts by
postulation designating with equal precision what doctrines from traditional Western philosophical systems are to be included and excluded; also it must specify how the factors in nature denoted by the included concepts by intuition and those designated by the included concepts by postulation are related.

NOTES

5Ibid., p. 133.
6By "natural man" is meant those characteristics of human nature which are not the effect of the beliefs of men.
8See F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, Chs. VI-VIII.
CHAPTER XXI

Western Theories of Value

CORNELIUS KRUSE

To be spokesman for Western value theories in the context of this Conference is indeed a task which may well inspire one with great apprehension. If there is one thing which has emerged from the Conference, it is the realization that in matters philosophical nothing is simple and all is complex. Many of us, relatively new to Eastern philosophies, no doubt thought that we nevertheless had some rough idea of what Hindu philosophy, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism meant. Upon closer contact, however, we have discovered a prodigal complexity, as one by one these various schools of thought and ways of life were presented to us by their representatives or their expert spokesmen. The scholar, however, always discovers that whatever he touches in no matter what field, like the seed pod of the touch-me-not, which the moment it is touched scatters its seed in profusion, turns into something far more multiple and complex than he had originally anticipated.

Western value theories are no exception to this experience. Any adequate presentation of the prevailing varieties of value theories in the West would require a volume of at least the size of Professor Urban’s massive pioneer work *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*.¹ This complexity might occasion surprise, since, as a special branch of philosophical inquiry, axiology is a late comer in the history of thought, in fact, hardly more than half a century old;² but, in spite of its recent origin, axiology once more exemplifies that whatever philosophers touch soon becomes complex.

Considerations of value have, of course, been important in all Western philosophies from earliest times, especially since the days of Socrates and Plato. Indeed, it may be said that the history of philosophy in the Western world, and, from what we have recently learned from our Eastern colleagues, we may now add, in all the world, is at the same time the history of value theory. One can go further and say that all human activity, certainly in so far as it is deliberate, and some
philosophers would even go beyond deliberate behavior, is inspired by value concerns and, in that sense, it is possible to regard value as being primary in all philosophy. One is not surprised, then, to find a North American contemporary philosopher, C. J. Ducasse, asserting that the primitive subject matter of philosophy is appraisals and that its enterprise is a methodical search for wisdom. At any rate, even when value considerations are less explicitly dealt with than, let us say, in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, value like a golden thread runs through all philosophies in all countries.

In view of this pervasiveness of occupation or preoccupation with value in the course of the history of philosophy, it is all the more surprising that axiology as a special branch of philosophical inquiry is so recent a development in the West and seems not yet to have been systematically undertaken in the East. Ordinarily, we regard axiology as having been established in the Western world by the so-called Austrian school of value philosophy, of which Franz Brentano, Alexius von Meinong, and Christian v. Ehrenfels were the conspicuous members. In 1897 when Ehrenfels published his System der Wertheorie, he observed that "there has probably been no time since the great Greek and Roman ethical philosophers of antiquity when value theory and all the problems essentially related to it are so in the center of general attention as today." But at that time few books had appeared dealing with general value problems. Soon, however, this new movement proceeded to gather momentum in other parts of Europe, at first in Austria, Germany, and England, and later in France, and finally in the United States. Personal inquiry here among our philosophical colleagues from the East makes it clear that as far as the Orient is concerned, up to the present, no special attention has been paid to the general theories of value in India, China, and Japan. Of course, as has been pointed out repeatedly in this Conference, philosophy in the East as a rule prefers not to single out for special analysis parts of the total philosophical situation. "Indian philosophy," we are told in the text of which Mr. Datta is a co-author, "discusses the different problems of Metaphysics, Ethics, Logic, Psychology and Epistemology, but generally it does not discuss them separately.... This tendency has been called by some thinkers... the synthetic outlook of Indian philosophy." Similarly, we find in Professor Fung's A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, "Since what is discussed in philosophy is the Tao of sageliness within and kingliness without, it follows that philosophy must be inseparable from political thought.... This does not mean that in the various schools of philosophy there are no metaphysics, no ethics, no logic." It would seem inevitable, however, that,
just as epistemology is now receiving separate treatment in the Orient, special attention will also sooner or later be given to this extremely important field of philosophical inquiry here under discussion, especially since, as we have been told so often in this Conference, Eastern philosophy is so predominantly practical in the sense of stressing a way of life and since, as Mr. Mahadevan so clearly stated in the opening sentence of his admirable paper, "Indian philosophy is essentially a philosophy of value." In the Western world at any rate, the importance of the development of a general theory of value is increasingly making itself felt, as a scrutiny of any recent bibliography of books and of articles in philosophical journals on this subject would reveal. In the United States during the early decades of this century, it was chiefly Professors Wilbur Marshall Urban and Ralph Barton Perry who, from opposite points of view, laid the foundations for this field of study.

What relevance does value theory in general have for our present undertaking at this Conference? May it not be said that, during the weeks of our discussions of important philosophical themes in a comparative context, we have been speaking not only mind to mind, but also heart to heart? Have there not been moments when, after a particularly effective presentation of an Eastern point of view, some of us in the West have felt, at least while under the spell of the representative spokesman for various types of Buddhism, Hindu philosophy, or the Chinese way of life, "almost persuaded," and, even afterwards, continued in the persuasion that there was much in the philosophy of the East that we would do well to assimilate in our own philosophy and the way of life resulting therefrom? If this has been so, it was due no doubt to our having come to feel that, across the great barriers of foreign terms and contrasting modes of philosophical approach, there were values resident within cultures other than our own which could recommend themselves to us either as interesting variants of our own values or as values that we had hitherto tended to overlook. In any case, value, like "justice" in Plato's Republic, has, it seems, been all the while tumbling at our feet.

It is certainly obvious that, if there is ever to be a real meeting of East and West, it will have to be on the basis of a reciprocal interpenetration of values and of a mutual give and take of them. This is a sphere of human interest where it is as blessed to receive as it is to give. Mere juxtaposition of beliefs, however ably presented, is, as we have discovered in the last few weeks, not yet interpenetration. To remain at the level of technical understanding, which is indeed exceedingly important and indispensably necessary, is not yet enough
for the mutual enrichment of our philosophical outlook. The multiplication of knowledge about, as William James always maintained, does not yet give us the needed direct acquaintance with a culture other than our own. The United States National Commission of UNESCO recently devoted a whole session to the problem of what type of understanding it is that we need in order to have peace through understanding. Very clearly, it is the understanding of fundamental values that alone can lead to an appreciative appraisal of new values with a view to their eventual appropriation in whole or in part. It would seem, therefore, as if a general theory of value in these days of increasingly felt need for intercultural world understanding and cooperation is destined to become throughout the world central in our philosophical considerations. There is no danger in conferences such as ours that the descriptive statement of the content of diverse values will be neglected. This, as stated above, is the first step in understanding. We are naturally all of us eager to tell each other the full story of the values cherished in our respective cultures, and to remove the many misunderstandings of them which seem to have gained currency in cultures other than our own. I am sure that we will all agree that at least one great gain of this Conference has been the removal of much initial misunderstanding. We certainly will now never forget that the culture and philosophy of China cannot be treated as if they coincided with those of India; neither shall we ever forget that India in emphasizing the life of the spirit is not forgetting the everyday life of the householder. The next necessary step toward understanding cultural values other than those we are familiar with would seem to be the analysis of the nature of value with the view of hoping that with this knowledge there might be some gain in wisdom appropriate for the task which is before us.

Among philosophers it would seem hardly necessary to urge the importance of general considerations in a given field of inquiry, so long as the considerations are important and genuinely meaningful. At any rate, it is my conviction that value problems are of prime importance in our undertaking here initiated, and that to make progress we shall have to attain more insight regarding them.

The problems of value theory, as was suggested earlier, are manifold, intricate, and complex. For the purpose of our limited discussion here, I shall invite attention simply to two major problems:

(1) The possible verification, validation, or justification of evaluations, and the relations of knowing to evaluating.
(2) The relation of evaluating to reality.
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In any relatively new field of philosophical discussion, there is an initial period in which there is a good deal of preliminary trial and error in the choice of definitions or use of terms. If even symbolic logicians for some time seemed unable to decide and agree whether their symbol for negation should be a straight or wavy line or should precede a letter-symbol or be imposed upon it, we might expect some wavering in value terms and their meanings. At first, with much confusion and resultant misunderstanding, the single term "value" was burdened with excess of meaning.

The psychological experience of value and what the experience referred to, the subjective and the objective aspects of the value situation, were merged by use of the term "value" for both. Today, there is almost general agreement that the subjective factor in value situations should not be called "value" but rather "valuing" or "prizing." Value, it seems to have been established by now, should be reserved for what is valued rather than the process of valuing itself. Evaluations or appraisals are judgments of value. Validated or verified evaluations in tested appraisals refer to values worthy of our prizing. In spite of much improvement in making axiological terms clearer and sharper by men like Dewey, Ducasse, and C. I. Lewis, much work still needs to be done to bring axiology to the terminological maturity of epistemology. Perhaps a conference of axiologists for this purpose alone would not be amiss.

Professor Perry's treatment of value in his important work, which one might well call a classic of early discussions of value, was, in my judgment, excellent if read from a predominantly psychological point of view. Its difficulties arose from the extreme subjectivism suggested by his defining value as "the object of any interest," which interest "depends fundamentally ... upon the existence of certain governing propensities, or drives, which draw upon the energies of the organism and direct them through effort to certain ends." In spite of his efforts to discover and define standard values which would be universally valid and not simply descriptive of what someone at any time happened to take an interest in, the psychological character of his treatment remained predominant. Professor Perry, it should be added, has in recent years become among philosophers perhaps the most eloquent spokesman in our country of the universal validity of the values of democracy. It would seem as if a more objectively grounded theory of value were necessary to provide adequate support for a value judgment of such universal scope.

Of course, it must be remembered that psychological questions in value fields, including that of religion, enjoyed great popularity in the
United States and elsewhere earlier in this century. One need only think of William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* and the studies in the psychology of religion made by Professors Leuba, Ames, and Pratt. Even the Austrian school of value theory began with a predominantly psychological interest which, however, in time was superseded by a greater interest in the nature of value itself. Alexius von Meinong published in 1894 his *Psychological and Ethical Investigations of Value Theory*, but by 1912 in his important article in *Logos* he protested impressively against the psychologizing tendency in axiological discussions. Urban, a student of Meinong, showed a similar development away from being content with what he calls a "kind of phenomenology of valuing" to a more objective interest in value.

It would seem, then, that one of the first concerns of a mature theory of value is to free itself from exclusive preoccupation with the psychology of the valuing process. Philosophers naturally wish to go beyond the descriptive phase of their subject matter.

In the United States, I am glad to say, in recent years, a great change has come about in the attitude of contemporary philosophers toward the value problem. One of the curious anomalies of the earlier period was that axiology and epistemology were out of harmony with each other in the various realistic schools of epistemology. Representatives of neo-realism, for instance, who prided themselves upon their repudiation of subjectivism in epistemology, and had only scorn for those who used the "ego-centric predicament" in support of a subjective theory of knowledge, nevertheless, failed to extricate themselves from the ego-centric predicament in valuing. This was notably true of Professor Perry, the very inventor of the term used above, but even Professor Montague, who would, as he declared, like to have called himself the right wing of neo-realists—"but alas, one feather does not make a wing"—in his *Ways of Knowing*, continued to draw a rather sharp distinction between knowing and valuing, saying in effect, that, in knowing, man conforms himself to his environment, whereas, in valuing, man conforms the environment to his wishes. In England, and this was true even of Bertrand Russell in the earlier days, when he followed G. E. Moore rather than Santayana, a more consistently realistic attitude was adopted toward both knowing and valuing.

Time was, then, when any student of value theory in this country, struck by the parallelism between knowing and evaluating, felt that his was a voice crying in the wilderness. Pragmatism and the instrumentalism of Dewey's type, it is true, gave aid and comfort to anyone interested in the great importance of values. But at least James's
interpretation of reality as experience was at times so suggestive of subjectivism that one was not sure whether, in bringing evaluation and cognition together as he did, he really had established values on a realistic basis.

In recent years, however, almost, though not quite, universally, not only is there willingness to grant a parallelism between cognition and evaluation, but also a tendency to maintain that they really interpenetrate. One of the most striking examples of a presentation from this latter point of view may be found in C. I. Lewis' recent masterly exposition of cognition and evaluation in his Carus Lectures.\textsuperscript{13}

Even when the distinction between cognitional and value judgments is maintained, and indeed stressed, as in Professor Sellars' important article, "Can a Reformed Materialism Do Justice to Values," written from a naturalistic and avowedly "materialistic" point of view, the objectivity of value judgments or their family resemblances with cognitional judgments are not denied. "Both ... involve claims which are empirical, rational, and justifiable upon relevant data." Value judgments, it is held by Professor Sellars, are justifiable, testable, and "objective after their kind," and even may be said, for all their differences from cognitional judgments, to "move within the framework of cognition."\textsuperscript{14}

Sellars and Lewis use almost identical language in stating their chief purpose as an attempt to try to develop a \textit{via media} between transcendentalism on the one hand and mere affective subjectivism or Protagorean relativism on the other.\textsuperscript{15}

Today, then, it may fairly be said that representatives of almost all schools of Western philosophy, whether idealistic, pragmatic, or naturalistic, have come to make a reappraisal of the value situation,\textsuperscript{18} and with a heartening unanimity are determined to attempt to discover whether and how value relativism with its attendant danger can be overcome.

Under the threat to democracy by totalitarian regimes and their frank admission either, as with Mussolini, that they took pride in having no antecedent philosophy but in making it as they went along, or, with Marxists, that their philosophy is, of course, not "objective" in the bourgeois sense, but "the cutting edge of the revolution," many philosophers in the West, interested in making firm the philosophical foundations of democracy, have addressed themselves anew to the task of discovering whether and how the claims of democracy could be validated. Once more the consequence of this reappraisal has been the reinforcement of the movement away from contentment with a subjective value theory. Furthermore, not only democracy, but also the

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possibility of operating under the auspices of a sense of world community, requires faith and the possibility of discovering a basis for validating universal values.

We are, then, far from the time when philosophers could complacently accept the suggestion that values are tertiary qualities coming after primary and secondary qualities. It is rare that one finds statements nowadays to the effect that value judgments are not properly judgments at all that could be verified, but simply are expressions of emotions or commands and the desire to induce these emotions in others in order to achieve obedience to these commands.\textsuperscript{17}

The reason for making so much of the necessity of overcoming subjectivity in the interpretation of values is that announced in the Chinese motto Mr. Northrop used for his justly celebrated book:

"Where standards differ there will be opposition.
But how can the standards in the world be unified?"

It is maintained by some that value relativity is precisely what one should welcome as leading to a wide tolerance based on the recognition that valuings and valuations are personal affairs, and should never lead to opposition, once their true character has been understood. But for at least two reasons such a hope is certain to be disappointed. Deep-seated convictions about values in any field of human interest cannot be treated as if we were dealing with matters of exclusively personal tastes. We may give an urbane shrug of the shoulders and murmur politely \textit{de gustibus non disputandum} when our interest is peripheral. Furthermore, the fact, often referred to, that we are now all neighbors makes of more than passing interest what values are held to be central in any culture. If one does not have to live with people, one can continue to shrug one's shoulder and smile at the different ways of life. But when representatives of all nations assemble for common consultation and cooperative action, the sharing of common fundamental valuations, if possible, is of the first importance. An additional characteristic is that value relativism tends to be Janus-faced, representing urbanity in inconsequential matters and ruthlessness in imposing evaluations in matters deemed by the stronger to be of paramount importance to him.

Technically, of course, the question presents itself: What is intrinsically the relationship between judgments of facts and judgments of value? Almost every conceivable position has been taken with regard to this crucial question. It is, of course, possible to propose that they be kept completely separate. Kant is often credited with this position, though all depends on how one interprets the relation of
Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* to his *Critique of Practical Reason*; however this may be, we seem at the present time to be, for the most part, out of the phase of value theory which sharply separates judgments of facts from judgments of value. There still remains, however, the question of whether judgments of value and judgments of facts are to be kept parallel, but not separate, or whether they are to be assimilated one to the other, and, if the latter, whether judgments of value are to be assimilated to judgments of facts or vice versa. In idealistic circles, perhaps best represented today by Professor Urban, the tendency is to give the primacy to judgments of value. In naturalistic thinking, the pattern has recently been established of maintaining that judgments of value are a form of empirical knowing. Pragmatism in its earlier tendency of equating the true with the good, of course, exemplified the simple identification of judgments of facts with judgments of value. At the present time, pragmatism, at least as presented by C. I. Lewis, would no longer seem to adhere to that point of view. I understand from Mr. Northrop that for him, too, judgments of value reveal themselves, when analyzed, as judgments of facts. It is in this area, no doubt, that much discussion will take place, and will need to take place, in the near future, but, no matter what the prevailing solution offered by different schools will be, certain important gains can already be recorded, namely, that the gulf between fact and value is no longer as wide, if indeed it exists, as it formerly was thought to be.

*How* evaluations are to be validated, confirmed, justified, or verified is, of course, the important question. If judgments of value are really judgments of facts, then the problem is simplified since we do not know a great deal, fortunately, about the process of verification in epistemology, though even here, as Mr. Northrop reminds us, it would be a mistake to think that there is but one scientific method applicable to all types of problems, for recent analysis of logic and scientific method disclose that problems of facts and problems of value have each their unique method or unique sequence of methods for scientific verification.18 But whatever attitude one may take toward the possible ways of relating judgments of facts and judgments of value, and how they are to be validated, it would seem that both experience and reason would have to enter into the method adopted. Since philosophy may be described as the harmonization of experience, we may be sure that here as elsewhere consistency with reason and experience will be the most imperious claimant. For our purpose, it would seem important to remember, as has so often been eloquently stated during this Conference, that Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Taoism and,
I may add, Western philosophies also, are "come-look" philosophies of life, whose worth can be appreciated only in the experiment of experience. Here surely there is a field where there can be no coercion, but where there must be complete reliance on persuasion, operating first by the natural authority of the person exemplifying this way of life and then by whatever experience reveals, in personal experiment, to be worthy of acceptance or rejection.

We now come to the second question involved in my treatment of value theory, namely, the relation of our valuations and valuations to metaphysics. Problems, of course, bristle in this area of discussion, but they are the same problems that we always meet in attempting to declare, when we know, and act upon that knowledge, what the nature of reality is in which we live and move and have our being. Individual or social standpoints naturally will tend to distort or restrict our conception of reality; but frankly, in this area, we cannot detect any intrinsic differences between the problems of epistemology and axiology. Finite man can never really fully overcome his limitations, even when he pools his resources with those of his fellows or corrects his findings by comparing them with those of others. But, on the other hand, man both in knowing and evaluating will never be content with the suggestion that we simply know our empirical selves in the process and nothing further. One of the great contributions of recent naturalism in this field, in which I include the philosophy of John Dewey, is the rejection of the view that man's values are epiphenomenal. In his *Quest for Certainty*, Dewey expressly states that values are a part of nature and therefore are deserving of as much respect as anything else "appearing in relativity," to use the terms so frequently employed by our Indian friends. Professor Randall in the book previously referred to gives us the credo of the group of naturalists for which he is spokesman by saying, "in its fundamental attitude, in its basic metaphysical position, contemporary naturalism is thus back once more with the naturalistic world view of the Greeks... for it, man is still what he was for the Greeks, an intelligent and valuing animal living in an intelligible and valuable world." He is eager to have it understood that for naturalism of the present day artistic, moral, and religious activities are "integral natural processes with an assured status in the universe whose structure science has begun to reveal to us."19

I am well aware of the fact that for our Indian and Buddhist friends naturalistic metaphysics, even of the mature and modern type, would seem initially alien to their age-long habits of thought; and I do not wish to make it appear as if all Western philosophy were now naturalistic. But in the Western world, and I am sure also in the East,
there is no philosophy, whether idealistic or naturalistic, that would not feel itself obligated in principle to remain close to the findings of science and to take full account particularly of its fundamental presuppositions, larger generalizations, and important tendencies. Taking account of what the natural sciences discover does not, however, mean allowing the physical sciences or all of them together to determine the nature and status of man’s values.

In giving this attention to the attitude of naturalism in its present interesting stage of development toward the status of values, we must not forget, though I cannot for lack of time here discuss, the value theory of Western idealism, especially as it is represented in Germany by men like Nicolai Hartmann and Max Scheler, nor the great influence which through Ortega y Gasset this philosophy has had on Latin American thinkers.

It is not necessary to make mention of the fact that Western philosophy presents the same complexity and diversity in its history and present manifestation that we have found in Eastern philosophy. But whatever the philosophical persuasion, I think it may be assumed as universally accepted that man does not invent the reality with which he is in contact at all levels of experience, except in so far, of course, as he deliberately, through art and industry, sets about to transform it. Philosophy of whatever nature would regard itself as failing in its great task if it lost contact with reality.

On the side of the relation of valuation to metaphysics one important question cannot be passed over, namely, that of the ranking or ordering of value. Some values are clearly lower than others: we eat to live rather than the reverse. Some values are instrumental and shine by reflected light; others are intrinsic and, like Plato’s Good, are, like the sun, givers of life and light. There has been some objection to this division of values into these classes. John Dewey in particular, inveterate foe of all dualisms, has tried to show that means tend to become ends and ends means, and that their separation is unjustified in theory and baneful in practice. This warning by Dewey and others must, to be sure, be taken into account. Rigidity of classification is as much out of place here as in most matters of life and reality. We know, for example, that the organic and inorganic merge at their touching edges. Even Descartes, arch-dualist in philosophy, assured Princess Elizabeth that for all the difference, by definition, between mind and body, they indubitably interact. His failure to show how this interaction took place did not obliterate the experienced distinction between what traditionally has been referred to as man’s mind and body; and this distinction will remain no matter how named or explained.
similar situation obtains, it seems to me, with the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values. As a matter of fact, as Mr. Morris has shown us, one of the best clues to the inner nature of a culture is to study how representatives of it order their valuations. It is here that our deep-seated agreements and differences reside. Time and again, our Eastern colleagues have had to remind us that, contrary to Western judgments or beliefs about Eastern philosophies, they do not neglect this life, the body, action, concern for social service, and the elevation of their peoples' standards of living. It is a great gain for mutual understanding to have this correction made so explicitly. We in the West should never again forget it, and yet a lingering feeling, one could detect, remained among us Westerners that a difference persists, subtle perhaps, difficult to put one's finger upon, but still there. I should now like to ask our Indian colleagues whether this felt difference does not reside in a difference in the ordering of the gamut of values in terms of their intrinsic and extrinsic qualities.

The values mentioned above, which are also cherished by the East—are they not regarded as instrumental values, which do not completely achieve the dignity of being values in their intrinsic right? Studies of comparative cultures do well to make careful comparisons of such revealing orderings. The flavor of a man's philosophy and life depends on some simple but deep-going value judgments. Santayana's conviction, for example, that all action is for the sake of contemplation is in sharp contrast to Dewey's philosophy, in spite of Dewey's demurrer at having the statement attributed to him in reverse. One philosophy mocks the runner's heat because of its special type of Platonism, and the other, because of its instrumental naturalism, urges the runner on, if not to greater, at least to more intelligent, expenditure of heat.

Now let us take the distinction, basically a matter of valuation, whether the transitory is to be regarded as the deep cause of our suffering, or whether the transitory is to be valued in, if not for, its transitoriness. It is true that in the Western world, poets have often lamented the brevity of life, of love, and of beauty. Some have made brave attempts at assuring themselves and others that a thing of beauty is a joy forever or that love is not love that alters when it alteration finds; but elegies in and out of churchyards abound in Western literature. In fact, transitoriness is the first and most widespread source of Western pessimism. On the other hand, we learn from a writer who lived and was beloved in these Islands that to travel hopefully is better than to arrive. Mr. Sheldon has convincingly set forth how time for the West has become the savior of man, a guarantor of man’s
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increasing well-being, and how process-metaphysics, so strong in the West since the nineteenth century, has become the predominant Western metaphysics. Of course, that polarity, as Mr. Sheldon suggests, requires the unchanging as well as the changing, the West might well remember. Should we not remember Kant’s celebrated statement that only that can change which constantly remains the same?

Another instance of a basic difference between East and West in ordering values can be found in the fact emphasized by Mr. Raju in his article in this volume, namely, that all Indian schools, without exception, stress the inwardness of reality, and give primary importance to the spiritual life of man. Of course, Western philosophers certainly do not believe that their task is done when they have inquired of the various natural sciences what their most recent findings are, and when they have presented a summary of such findings, but there is no question that, as Mr. Sheldon has shown, there is a strong tendency in the West to stress external factors rather than those of self-realization and inwardness.

An even greater wave of difficulty, to use Plato’s phrase, now approaches: If it is granted that our valuations may be validated and that some of them may have objective referents in reality, will the customary distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values not lead—I tremble to assert it—to a belief in various levels or a hierarchy of reality? Now, hierarchies of reality are from certain standpoints a scandal in philosophy. At best, they are philosophically difficult to account for, as Platonism, Neo-Platonism, and Spinozism, to mention but a few outstanding examples in Western philosophy, illustrate, and yet these types of Western philosophy proclaiming a differentiation of modes or levels of being persist. Indian philosophy too, we have learned from Mr. Mahadevan, does not hesitate, in spite of all difficulties, to attribute superior reality to its supreme spirit and culminates in the declaration of its majestic discovery that “Brahman is the supreme reality and value.” I have been told by one of our Indian colleagues that, while most epithets or attributes of the supreme reality may be both affirmed and denied, no Indian philosopher would deny that it is Great. In the end, when all other modes of speech have failed, only value expressions remain. I was deeply impressed during this Conference when, one day in class, Mr. Suzuki, after having spoken of the ineffable nature of supreme reality in Zen Buddhism, added in final utterance: “We just call it Great.” Taoism, too, it would seem, does not hesitate to give a supreme value ascription to the nameless One. This reminds us of Spinoza’s famous Definition VI in Book 2 of his Ethics, “I call reality and perfection one and the same thing.”

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I think by now I have raised enough questions for discussion. I am only too painfully aware of how little this paper offers by way of solving the great number of problems that remain in general value theory and in comparative value studies in particular. Am I alone in thinking that this task of developing a value theory appropriate to the synthesis of values is second to none in our attempt at accomplishing our common task? It goes without saying that if we are to rethink our basic evaluations, we need all the help we can get from the further development of the general theory of value. Above all, we need to be taken into each other's innermost sanctum of being where central valuations have their abode. It is clear that not before much rethinking of our valuations is done shall we have a basis for the world community we are all dreaming of and the enrichment of our lives that will follow upon sharing as far as may be our deepest values. But, if this is done successfully, we may still, in spite of the turmoil and confusion of our present age, come to say about man what was said by the Greek poet Anacreon so long ago: "How amiable is man when he is really man."

NOTES

3Philosophy as a Science (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1941), pp. viii, 137 ff.
4Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1897, q. v.
6Way.
10Psychologische-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie (Graz: Leuschner and Lubensky, 1894).
14Ethics, LV (October, 1944), 42.
16Besides the references indicated above, see in the cooperative volume, Yervant


Whether this hierarchical ordering of reality does not, in the end, yield, as it does in the Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkara, in Buddhism, and Taoist philosophy, to a complete and all-comprehending distinction-less monism is an important question, which, for lack of space, cannot be discussed here.

*Cf.* T. M. P. Mahadevan’s statement, above, p. 332: “What is the nature of this reality [the Upaniṣadic Brahman]? From the standpoint of the Absolute (*paramārtha*), if standpoint it may be called, there is no plurality, not even the least distinction. But from our standpoint, the standpoint of empirical usage, the supreme reality is the ground of the pluralistic universe.”
CHAPTER XXII

Metaphysics and Ethics in East and West

CHARLES A. MOORE

At the beginning of this, the second, East-West Philosophers' Conference is was stated that the work would concentrate upon what is now considered to be the essential problem of any trend in philosophy which seeks reconciliation between East and West, namely, Eastern and Western conceptions of ultimate reality in their relations to the empirical world and human values. Now that we have studied Eastern and Western conceptions of the nature of ultimate reality and the nature and status of ethical, social, and spiritual values in the major philosophical traditions, it is appropriate that an effort be made to bring these thoughts into clearer focus by facing directly the relationship between the metaphysical theories of East and West and the ethical theories which stem (or do not stem) from them.

The question may be formulated thus: Do the philosophies of East and West think differently about the relationship between reality and the world of ethical values and conduct? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, I can see serious problems which threaten to preclude the possibility of any meeting of the minds of East and West. It is often thought that Indian philosophy is lost in abstract metaphysics, transcending the world of empirical fact and value, and specifically ethical values, so completely that the latter become utterly insignificant. It is said, on the contrary, that Chinese philosophy is merely ethical and practical, so much so that it repudiates or ignores metaphysics. If these opinions are true, then East and West are speaking foreign languages in philosophy, and each is inscrutable, basically, to the other, for, in the West, despite the widespread opinion that philosophy is departmentalized and that Western philosophy is so academic that metaphysics has no relation to life, the West has seldom if ever divorced metaphysics and ethics. Ethics and metaphysics have been closely allied in the West ever since the days of Heraclitus and
Pythagoras, and have maintained this relationship continuously except in the very few important thinkers who have been interested more or less exclusively in only one phase of philosophy. It is unquestionably true that the thinkers of the East are much more strongly dominated by the practical motive in their philosophizing, but philosophy in the West has also been conscious of the practical problem. Not only have many Westerners been predominantly motivated by the urge for social and ethical reform, but almost all of them have assumed, in their search for the truth about reality, that it would be applied to life. Dr. R. B. Perry’s statement of this situation seems to express the point exactly. He says that the business of philosophy is “to discover the nature of the universe and to apply it to the meaning of life.”1 (Or, as Mr. Sheldon has stated here, “It [philosophy in the West] is not necessarily a way of life, though reasoning may and indeed should discover the proper way.”2) If that is the meaning of philosophy in the West—and I believe it is—then metaphysics and ethics are inextricably related in the basic fabric of the Western philosophical tradition.

This paper is looked upon by the writer not as a positive thesis to be stated and defended but rather as a statement of a basic problem, the presentation of a working hypothesis, and the hope that those more qualified to speak will offer constructive suggestions.

The working hypothesis of this paper is the conviction that, in basic principles, the great philosophies of East and West face this fundamental issue of the relationship between reality and life similarly (with one very important distinction to be noted later), namely, by setting up a close relationship between metaphysics and ethics. The writer realizes the many doubts that spring to mind in response to such a bald and oversimplified statement, and these objections will be brought out later.

This paper may serve a related and secondary, but important, purpose, in view of the fact that the study of the relationship between metaphysics and ethics in any given philosophical system serves to clarify and render more precise the fundamental principles of both metaphysics and ethics, the metaphysical principles by showing what they mean in action, and the ethical principles by noting precisely their metaphysical foundations.

**METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS**

As a point of departure for our analysis of metaphysics and ethics in East and West, let us state what seems to be—but apparently is
not—a very obvious philosophical thesis, and then illustrate this thesis by reference to typical Western philosophical systems, and, finally, examine the chief Oriental systems in the light of this particular principle.

This thesis is that ethics is not autonomous. As Schopenhauer said, even the ultimate principle of one's ethical system is, as such, "an unexplained riddle." He continued, "... the want is felt of a final interpretation (which, obviously, cannot be but metaphysical) of the ultimate data, as such, and through these—if they be taken in their entirety—of the world." No matter how one approaches ethics, no matter what type of ethical principles one enunciates, it is elementary that in philosophy we must think things through, and, in this case, thinking things through inevitably drives one to metaphysics. Ethical problems cannot be solved in ethics alone. Whether one speaks in the language of duty, self-realization, pleasure-seeking, the search for the good, or any of the frequently enunciated philosophies of life, one can never supply a satisfactory answer to the question "Why?" without basing one's ethical attitude upon one's conviction about the nature of reality. Every metaphysics implies or justifies a way of life, and any way of life that is not grounded in metaphysics is open to question.

There are numerous ways to illustrate or demonstrate the necessity of a metaphysical foundation for ethics. For example, ethics makes assumptions or sets up postulates (not necessarily the same ones in different systems) without which the moral life may not or cannot be "real" or "valid," such as (for one ethicist) "free will ... objectivity and reality of moral distinctions ... the cosmic significance of moral values." Ethics alone cannot justify these assumptions or postulates.

Ethics alone cannot provide an adequate criterion for decision among competing standards, principles, or values. Lacking a basis in reality, ethical standards and values or scales of value tend to become, or necessarily are, arbitrary or conventional or possibly pure fictions. As S. Radhakrishnan says, in unison with practically all Western thinkers, "We cannot help asking ourselves whether our ideals are mere private dreams of our own or bonds created by society, or even aspirations characteristic of the human species. Only a philosophy which affirms that they are rooted in the universal nature of things can give depth and fervour to moral life. ... If ethical thought is profound it will give a cosmic motive to morality. Moral consciousness must include the conviction of the reality of ideals." Radhakrishnan's interpretation of the ethics of Vedānta, as paraphrased by D. S. Sarma, is: "Mokṣa, on its negative side, means freedom from blinding egoism, but, on its positive side, it means identification with a fuller
life and wider consciousness. The emancipated soul is roused to a sense of its universality. The point I am trying to make is that unless there is in fact this universality of soul and a fuller life and a wider consciousness with which the soul can be identified—presuming for the moment that this is valuable—then moral obligation or even ethical aspiration has no justifiable foundation. Swami Nikhilananda makes the case more specific when he insists that "Self-Knowledge is vital. All other forms of knowledge are of secondary importance; for a man's action, feeling, reasoning, and thinking are dependent upon his idea of the Self. His view of life will be either materialistic or spiritual according to his conception of himself. If he regards himself as a physical creature, ... he follows the ideal of material happiness. ... If, on the other hand, a man regards himself as a spiritual entity, then he is [will be in action] spiritual." In other words, his ethics depends upon his metaphysics, that is, if one's conception of the self (or of reality) is materialistic, then there is no reason to act as if one were spiritual and certainly no obligation to do so; and, if one's conception of the self is spiritual, then certainly to act as if one were a material being could not be accepted as a way of life grounded either in reason or in truth.

Only on a metaphysical basis can we decide between competing concepts of value; for example (as brought out in the ethics seminar), between the Buddhist, who in ethics denies the values gained in momentary existence, and the pragmatist, who finds value in the developmental changes of existence. Simply stating that one or the other is the good in life is not sufficient; one's concept of reality as a whole must be brought to bear upon the problem if a satisfactory answer is to be reached.

Every philosophy of life has its underlying metaphysics, that is, a philosophical conception of the nature of reality as a whole. Humanism, pragmatism, naturalism, idealism, supernaturalism, as well as all others, have their particular interpretations of reality which render their ethical concepts reasonable and justifiable.

Perhaps the best-known example of the thesis I am trying to present is to be found in Plato's Republic, where, on one interpretation, it is found that the ethical problem of Book I cannot be answered purely in terms of ethical discussion; and so, in a transition from Socrates to Plato, the question is restated in Book II in terms of a categorical obligation to be good, and this necessitates for its justification the elaboration of a complete metaphysical system. Only then can Socrates (or Plato) hope to answer Thrasymachus satisfactorily.

The essential principle of ethics, as I understand it, is the concept of moral obligation, the concept that a person ought to do one thing
rather than another because it is right, the concept stated in the
Republic, where it is suggested that we must "strip virtue bare" and
then prove that it is the good way of life, which ought to be followed
regardless of all expediency and benefit. This principle, if it is to be
more than a fiction or the result of arbitrary authority, must be ground-
ed in reality, i.e., in the nature of man and the universe in which he
lives. Furthermore, such an obligation to do the right regardless of
benefit therefrom must be grounded not only in the facts of reality,
not only in all the facts of reality—my meaning of the content of
metaphysics—but also in a metaphysics which includes value as one
of its intrinsic qualities, if not its basic category.

This is an "old story" in moral philosophy, but I feel, since a recent
Conference discussion, that I must defend the thesis, especially since
it is essential for an adequate treatment of the Oriental systems.

It is not my thesis that every metaphysical theory in the West has
been consciously applied in ethics, or that every ethical system has
been traced back directly and logically to its metaphysical foundation.
However, that such a relation is indispensable has been recognized if
the thinker in question has been interested in both metaphysics and
ethics—and most Western philosophers have been. For the purpose of
illustration of this intimate correlation in the West, and also for the
purpose of introducing and clarifying the second major part of my
thesis, namely, that only a metaphysics of value or a value meta-
physics can provide a basis for moral obligation, I would like to recall
to mind some of the most pertinent Western systems.

The kinetic atomic theory of Leucippus and Democritus or the
atomic materialism of any Westerner has provided the basis for in-
dividualistic hedonism or "naturalism" in the crude sense of the word
and a relativity of individual conduct which makes little of significant
moral obligation. The fact that pre-Epicurean atomic materialism
included mechanical determinism and that Epicurus, though an atomic
materialist, was compelled to change this doctrine is a signal example
of the necessity of grounding one's ethics in metaphysics—not to men-
tion his very serious concern with the status of God, the soul, and
the hereafter, all of which did intellectual violence to his ethical doc-
trine. If I may be permitted to indulge in a questionable paraphrase,
Plato's metaphysics of "a place for everything and everything in its
place for the good of the whole" finds its equivalent in the social and
personal ethics of the Republic, while the more other-worldly aspect
of his theory of ideas finds its ethical equivalent in the other-worldly
or negativistic ethics of the Phaedo. Aristotle's metaphysical concept
of teleological development—from potentiality to actuality toward an
entelechy which embodies the full self-realization both of the individual entity and of the universe guided by final cause—is reflected almost exactly in his ethical system. The Stoic metaphysics, consisting essentially of the concept of a Universal Law determined in all details, but, being a rational principle, determined for the best, necessarily justified an ethics of imperturbability, of conforming to the progress of the Universal Law, and even of joyfully accepting that law, whatever it dictates. (It is to the point to note that metaphysical determinism conflicts with ethical freedom of action, and this has almost universally attracted attention to a failure of Stoic philosophy.) In fact, the traditional interpretation of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies illustrates the point, namely, by showing that the ethical system was constructed first and the metaphysics afterward to provide the basis without which the ethical doctrine would be groundless. Christianity as a philosophy, despite modern denaturing attempts, can hardly justify its non-prudential ethics—and I take it that such is the ethics of Christianity—except in terms of the metaphysics of God, soul, and the spiritual brotherhood of man.

But more important than any of these for purposes of explaining the complete thesis under consideration are Spinoza, Kant, and Schopenhauer. In Spinoza’s mind, his ethical doctrine of joyful acquiescence in the station assigned to one by Nature or God comes directly from his metaphysics of deterministic monism (with the same culpability in terms of determinism that was mentioned in connection with Stoicism). Schopenhauer’s basis of morality, the morality of sympathy on the practical level and of asceticism and denial of the Will on a higher level, is derived from his thesis of the oneness of the Will and his doctrine of the suffering entailed in all finite living.

In all these cases, the ethical doctrine, although it might be justified (and sometimes more adequately) by some differing type of metaphysics,* finds its basic sanction in the particular metaphysics of the thinker in question; in his mind, the ethical system necessarily follows from the metaphysical system, so that no other ethical system is correct.

**VALUE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS**

I mentioned Kant as important in this connection. I refer especially to his argument for the existence of God—although his postulates of freedom and immortality are also pertinent—because this introduces the final phase of my thesis, as far as the general problem of metaphysics and ethics is concerned. As I interpret the argument of Kant, it is that God is essential to ethics because, without God, moral obli-
igation is meaningless and without foundation. God thus represents value in reality, and value is indispensable to a metaphysical basis of ethics. In the West, metaphysics must recognize value, and, to some extent, basic ethical values must have ontological status and meaning in reality, if the metaphysical system is to provide a foundation for ethics. (There are two aspects of this situation, first, the necessity of a value metaphysics, and, second, in some sense and in some significant degree, the necessity of an ethical connotation for this metaphysical value, or a meaning which may intelligently and intelligibly be translated into ethical terms when the "good" becomes the object of ethical action.)

Certain of the metaphysical theories mentioned previously in this paper and certain other approaches to the problem of reality do not qualify as philosophical foundations for ethics. Another way of putting the general point is to say that reality need not of necessity be good or involve value, in which case it cannot serve as the basis of any categorical imperative or moral obligation. Spinoza and Schopenhauer are examples of the point I wish to make. I find in Spinoza no justification for ethics, in view of his attitude that the attributes of value, worth, and purposiveness, and final cause do not have real existence. Things simply are, and necessarily so; that is all. If that is all there is, if that is a complete and true statement of the nature of reality, then moral obligation, the categorical imperative that a person should seek the good, or do his duty, can be grounded only in a "must" and not in an "ought." There is no answer in this system to the question "Why?" except that of factual necessity.

The situation is accentuated and the point brought out more clearly, I think, in the case of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer might not have agreed in detail with my interpretation of his view of reality, but, as I understand it, the Will is the real, but the Will inevitably objectifies itself in forms which produce suffering. For this reason, the Will is considered to be evil, and therefore the ultimate process and goal of morality in the final sense of the word (where it becomes "religion") are the denial of the Will, that is, to reject reality (which process even Schopenhauer recognized as a "miracle"). There is no moral obligation to accept, or to act in accordance with, that which not only is not good but is conceived of as positively evil. In fact, if there is any obligation, it would seem, rather, to be one of defiance.

By the two illustrations of Spinoza and Schopenhauer, and by reference to any materialism or any other philosophy in which the real is either axiomatically neutral, or in which the real is not positively shown to possess the quality of goodness (regardless of the specific
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connotation of the word), or, finally, in which it is described as positively evil, I am trying to show that there is no logical necessity that the real must be the good. This is not a doctrine which has a real and adds a quality of goodness to it from the outside, as it were. However, unless the good is an intrinsic part of the real, the real does not provide a basis for moral obligation, and that means that there is no metaphysical basis of ethics. If the universe is "sound and fury signifying nothing," morality in the sense of a categorical imperative to do the right or to seek the good is unintelligible and without foundation. The only basis upon which to ground ethical distinctions and moral obligation is reality, complete reality—that is, metaphysics—but the only type of reality which can adequately ground such moral obligation is a specific type of reality, namely, a value-inclusive reality.

Is the good merely a tag for the true or real without regard for what that real is? Is good conduct merely conduct that accords with the true or the real? Can good conduct be adequately described as the acceptance of and acting in accordance with a true proposition—unless the true or the real or the fact reported in the proposition is good as well as true and real? It is not necessary that the statement that the ultimate is true, good, and beautiful means that it is good and beautiful merely because it is true. Instead, these are, in the minds of the Greeks who expressed the idea, three equally true descriptions of the type of real which they had in mind. The Greek concept of Nature was much wider than the modern concept and could and often—but not always—did include the good.

"The science of nature and [of] the natural man," "the philosophy of the true for nature," and "empirically determined scientific theories of nature" do not necessarily provide the basis for moral conduct, even if they are true and complete. If "real" and "good" are distinguishable concepts, as they seem to be, there is no logical necessity that the good must be identical with the real.

In other words, I see no escape from the "naturalistic fallacy" for any thinker who tries to ground ethics and its "ought" in the "is," not only of limited and incomplete science or "nature," but even in the complete "is" of a wert-frei metaphysics.

The moral skeptic poses a problem. It is he who asks, "Why should I be moral?" or "Why ought I do the right?" (His doubt consists in the denial of the consciousness of any unconditional or categorical imperative—to do the good simply because it is good.) Short of a value-characterized metaphysics I can see no answer, except a "must" or a purely hypothetical imperative, and neither of these touches the heart of ethics.
Such, then, is the working hypothesis which I should like to apply to Oriental systems for the sake of clarifying their positions in the field of ethics and metaphysics and also to provide a basis of comparison between Eastern and Western attitudes in ethics, in metaphysics, and in the relationship between the two. This working hypothesis is obviously divided into two aspects, what might be called the factual and the axiological. I think the factual side (which demands a metaphysical grounding of ethics) is generally characteristic of Western thought in the field, and, although I realize that some readers of this paper will not agree with the second phase of the thesis, I think it provides a valuable tool for the investigation of attitudes in Oriental ethics and for comparison with Western systems.

In applying this working hypothesis to the Oriental systems, four chief questions are to be kept in mind, although in my presentation they will unquestionably become entangled at times:

1. What is the general status of ethics?
2. Is moral obligation a basic concept, the essence, as it were, of Oriental ethical systems?
3. Is the metaphysics of each of the several systems related to the ethics involved, and is it consciously or unconsciously used as a basis for ethics?
4. Is the metaphysics of such a type, that is, a value metaphysics, that it can justify the ethical norms or moral obligation imposed in the ethical system?

It is my conviction (1) that ethics and metaphysics are intimately and indispensably related in all major systems in the East; (2) that moral obligation, rather than some ulterior motive, is the essence of major Oriental ethical systems; (3) that the ultimate sanction for moral distinctions and moral obligation is, in each case, the metaphysical theory of the particular system; and (4) that, despite much opinion to the contrary, the real in Oriental metaphysical systems is not amoral or _welt-frei_ but, rather, value-filled and thus adequate to provide a philosophical foundation for ethics and moral obligation.\(^{11}\)

**THE GENERAL STATUS OF ETHICS**

**IN EASTERN PHILOSOPHIES**

There are many criticisms of Oriental philosophy in respect to ethics and the relation or lack of relation of ethics to metaphysics. Many of these criticisms are not pertinent to this analysis. However, it is imperative that we bring into the open those aspects of Oriental
ethical thought which seem to deviate so markedly from the traditional Western relationship between metaphysics and ethics. At the beginning of this paper I mentioned the over-all criticisms which I have most in mind now, namely, in effect, that there is no ethics in the broad, Western sense of the term in India, and that there is no metaphysics in China, or at least no application of metaphysical theories of India in the field of ethics, and, in China, no derivation of ethics from, or grounding of ethics in, metaphysical theory.

India

Briefly, I should like to consider three important questions relative to Indian philosophy in this connection: (1) the previously mentioned contention that Indian philosophy is not especially interested in ethical considerations because it is fundamentally a development of an attitude of inwardness, without special concern for man's social activities in the here and now; (2) the contention that Indian philosophy has no system of ethical thought as such bearing upon man's social life and activities, and (3) the ultimate transcendence of the level of morality by the sannyāsi, the one who has realized Brahman, the arhat, and the siddha. The last of these points—which I consider of great importance in Oriental ethical philosophy and possibly of great value for the West—I reserve until the end of this paper, where I hope to relate it to other considerations of the same general type.

In reference to the first point—the lack of a system of ethical thought in Indian philosophy—I think it requires a very narrow definition of ethics or morality to limit it to the development of an attitude of inwardness, consisting of "principles of discipline governing conduct irrespective of society." But whether we admit this or not, I still find in Indian philosophy not only inwardness and renunciation but also a philosophy of service and activity in the spirit of the new insight which the enlightened man carries into action. According to M. Hiriyanna, the essence of Indian philosophy is a combination of renunciation and service, which, as he says, stand in "an intimate and vital relation to each other." This is the spirit of the doctrine of karma-yoga, the lesson of the Bhagavadgītā (especially where it speaks of service in the interest of mankind—lokasamgraha), and the type of conduct exemplified in the life of many Indian saints, including Śaṅkara and the Buddha. Certainly ethics in India does not stop with inwardness and renunciation. Renunciation is merely the beginning of what the Indian might call real morality, that is, work and service without any spirit of attachment to the fruits of action.
CHARLES A. MOORE

Neither the particular ethical virtues nor the social values are overlooked in Indian ethical thought and life. Certain specific moral virtues, such as \textit{ahimsā}, truth, honesty, and continence, are common to Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism. Furthermore, all these virtues, in addition to being indispensable aids to the moral and spiritual progress of the individual, also have inevitable social implications and applications. Self-control, renunciation, and the specific virtues thus constitute both the inward and the outward ethics of India. As Mr. Raju has written, "Self-control is an indispensable step coming under \textit{yama} [restraint] and \textit{niyama} [practice], in spiritual progress. . . . Every Indian has to perform his duties (\textit{dharmas}) as provided by his caste and \textit{āśrama}. . . . When Buddhism, which confined itself to monasteries, worked out the monastic ideal, its ethics did not touch social duties as such, but insisted solely upon self-control. The difference [between Hinduism and Buddhism] is perhaps best expressed by saying that self-control was more a psychological technique than a social virtue with Buddhism, whereas it was equally both for Brahmanism. For the latter, self-control was at first canalisation of our propensities according to prescribed social laws for realising certain social values. . . ."

Mr. Raju adds that the \textit{āśramas} preserve the social values.\textsuperscript{14} The caste system, which has ethical and spiritual significance, the \textit{āśramas}, and the \textit{puruṣārthas} provide the substance and modes of social ethics in India for the Hindus, as we saw in Mr. Mahadevan's paper.

The significance of morality in India cannot be overemphasized. The concept of \textit{dharma}, or duty, is absolute until one has reached the stage of \textit{sannyāsa}. That is the core of Hindu, Buddhist, and Jaina morality. In accordance with \textit{dharma} specific social duties must be performed. Morality has even greater significance—it is an indispensable preliminary to the search for and attainment of the truth; it constitutes the two preliminary stages of yoga, the goal of which is \textit{samādhi}, which corresponds to \textit{prajñā} in Buddhism. Furthermore, moral conduct is considered by some schools of thought as either the main way to ultimate salvation or an indispensable part thereof, the former being the view of the Mīmāṁsakas and the latter being the view of those who hold that \textit{karma-yoga} is a way to identification with Brahman. Morality in India is more than a mere socially stabilizing factor, although it is that; it is also an indispensable aid in spiritual progress. Thus, it cannot be thought of as insignificant either individually or socially, either inwardly or outwardly.

Space limitations prevent adequate consideration of the second point mentioned above, namely, the theory that Indian philosophy
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does not really possess any system of ethical thought in the Western sense. The language and form of ethical theory are, to be sure, quite different from those which are usual in the West, but, as has been pointed out so many times at this Conference, one must neither evaluate nor even describe the thought-patterns of other cultures in terms of one's own, thereby ascribing to them or denying them ideas and theories which may "sound" and "look" different from one's own perspective. Texts on ethical theory as such—in the Western manner—are rare in India, but ethical treatises in the Indian manner are extremely numerous. Perhaps it is true that the social morality (caste, purusārthas, and āśramas) of India is, as it were, taken for granted—and is therefore not studied critically. However, differences among Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism do not reflect this automatic acceptance of them. In any case, exposition and analysis of these ethical concepts are both many and elaborate. The books of ethics in India are the famous Dharma-śāstras, the Purāṇas, and the two famous Epics. Not only in these, however, but also in the systems themselves, there are profound and subtle technical considerations concerning the locus of moral value, specific moral rules, and the meaning of the ultimate good, although in view of the common spiritual metaphysics, the general nature of the ultimate good is not a matter of serious intellectual conflict.

China

The picture is less complicated when we look at China and examine the opinion often expressed that Chinese philosophy is exclusively ethical. It can be safely said that, apart from the writings of Confucius himself, there are no merely ethical systems in China. Surely, the Chinese, with their unquestioned mental ability and philosophical keenness, cannot be thought to have engaged in centuries of philosophical reflection without ever concerning themselves with developing a metaphysical basis for their ethics. Such a view is absurd. To be sure, as Fung Yu-lan says, "Chinese philosophy . . . because of its special stress on human affairs, has not put equal emphasis on metaphysics." But he also points out that even Confucius differentiated between the fields of ethics and metaphysics, doing so, however, in the Chinese manner of distinguishing between studies of "human nature" and "the ways of heaven." Just for the record, let it be said that, while Confucius, perhaps like the Buddha, was so vitally interested in ethics and social conduct that he paid little attention to metaphysics as such, even he laid the foundations of a
metaphysical basis of ethics by recognizing—without philosophical analysis or systematic elaboration—the will of heaven as the basis of morality. Following him, every Confucian had a definite theory of reality which provided him with a basis of ethics. The same is true, without any question, about the subdivisions of Neo-Confucian philosophy, where, to be sure, the achievement of a solid metaphysical basis of ethics was reached more fully than ever before in Chinese thought, but where it is recognized as in large measure the outgrowth of preceding tendencies and suggestions.

MORAL OBLIGATION IN ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Moral obligation is a basic category of ethical thought in almost all major Oriental systems, but, again, we must recognize that Easterners need not use the same form of expression we do in the West to state the idea. From the language of much of Indian philosophy one might suspect that there is no categorical imperative or anything short of selfish hedonistic instrumental hypothetical imperatives. Practically all texts of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism start with the fact of suffering and state that a knowledge of reality is essential to the elimination of that suffering and the gaining of happiness. In some of the Dharma-śāstras of India and in much of Confucianism one might get the impression that, at most, ethical action is based upon social welfare, rather than upon any categorical "ought." It is not too frequently said that a certain action is categorically right or that one "ought" to do a certain thing because it is right and for no other reason. Of course, if these interpretations are correct, then there is very little in common between ethics in East and West.

The interpretation of the ethical motive in the East which denies basic moral obligation is a misinterpretation. The several Oriental philosophical systems or traditions express the concept of moral obligation in varying ways, but in a very important Oriental doctrine, namely, the attitude which is called karma-yoga in India, many of the systems appear to agree in a doctrine which might be a significant contribution to Western philosophies of life. The doctrine of karma-yoga, in brief, is that individuals have definite and rather absolute duties to perform, whether they be the detailed duties of the Hindu āśramas and castes or the social duties of Confucianism. These they are to perform without any sense of desire or profit or attachment.

This doctrine is essential to all of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism and has its most famous expression in Hinduism in the Bhagavadgītā. In Buddhism there is also the concept of following the natural (anā-
bhoga), which corresponds to the Chinese wu yü which means "without desire," the idea being to act naturally but in all instances without craving or desire. In Taoism the closest equivalent is the doctrine of wu wei, which, though sometimes translated "do nothing," means something quite different, namely, spontaneity or natural action, without craving or striving, after the pattern of the forces in Nature. The Lao Tzü (Tao Tê Ching), for example, says, "The holy man . . . quickens but owns not. He acts but claims not. Merit he accomplishes, but he does not dwell on it."18 In Confucianism, as set forth by Fung Yu-lan, the kindred doctrine is that of "doing for nothing, that is, for every man there is something which he ought to do. Nevertheless, what he does is 'for nothing,' because the value of doing what he ought to do lies in the doing itself, and not in the external results."19 In all these cases, the moral imperative consists in doing one's duty because it is right without any consideration of the profit, if any, to be derived therefrom.

India

In speaking of duty in India, Radhakrishnan says, "Next to the category of reality, that of dharma [duty], is the most important concept in Indian thought."20 Dharma, to the Indian, is the concept of duty, the categorical "ought," which directs his entire life. There is nothing hypothetical about it. It is an aid to his progress to spirituality, as a result of his past deeds, and is to be followed without any questions. Numerous stories in the Mahābhārata, chiefly that which constitutes the substance of the Gītā, express the point very precisely. It is said that one should never abandon one's specific work, whether it be high or low.21 In the Śāntiparva of the Mahābhārata it is said, "Thou shouldst adhere to the duties, even if reproachable, of thy own order."22 In all such cases, as Yudhiṣṭhira said in the Mahābhārata, "I follow dharma not because I see any immediate profit from it but from a conviction that virtue is to be followed for its own sake."23

Coming now to the ultimate question of all obligations in Hinduism: Why should one seek identification with Brahman? The typical Westerner thinks it is merely because by that process one gains bliss and complete escape from the pain which provided the original incentive to seek wisdom. To the Indian this would be like saying that a Christian is good in order to go to heaven and for no other reason. The motive can be clarified only by understanding the true and full meaning of mokṣa and realizing that it is not merely an escape from pain or the gaining of happiness, but, as was said in a previous quotation from Radhakrishnan, "identification with the fuller life and a
wider consciousness." Jainism similarly thinks of mokṣa as the complete perfection of the real self, rather than mere escape from pain. In mokṣa one transcends entirely all concepts and all feelings that might be even closely related to the urge of hedonism. One ought also to seek identity with Brahman because Brahman is the embodiment of "those qualities which are to be loved." Also, as the Chāndogya Upaniṣad says, "Brahman is to be sought" (anveṣṭavya), i.e., the realization of Brahman is an obligation. The passage goes on to say, "He obtains all worlds and all desires who has found out and who understands that Self." That is to say, virtue is rewarded, but the reward is not the motive of virtue.

In the case of Buddhism, the concept of moral obligation is implied throughout the system, in the sense that one ought to follow the truth rather than illusion, as, for example, when the Buddha said, "Learn to distinguish between Self and Truth. Self is the cause of selfishness and the source of sin; truth cleaves to no self; it is universal and leads to justice and righteousness." Again, "There is no wrong but what is done by the assertion of self." More specifically, the concept of duty is expressed in Buddhism in various sets of precepts or laws or vows, such as the five universal precepts of ahimsā (or abstinence from destroying life), abstinence from theft, from fornication and all uncleanness, from lying, and from intoxicating liquor. In Mahāyāna these are maintained, of course, but are supplemented by other sets of duties, chiefly for the bodhisattvas, duties which include universal love and devotion. One of the prime duties of Buddhists of all schools is compassion, which stands, therefore, as a basic obligation. In original, Theravāda, Buddhism the concept is explained in terms of the two principles which govern all human conduct, namely, fear and shame (or a sense of dignity). There is no question of reward in this latter concept; it can be equated with self-respect or a recognition of the dignity of man, in terms of which some things are worthy or expected of man.

China

The concept of social duties is well known as a major aspect of Confucian philosophy, but in almost the entirety of Chinese philosophy, especially in Confucianism, moral obligation is much wider and much deeper than that. Among the four cardinal virtues is yi, usually translated "righteousness." This, in a sense, is the deepest of the virtues, for it represents the categorical imperative of morality; it is that which makes character superior even to life itself. The love of virtue for its own sake was a constant theme with Confucius and
Mencius. Tung Chung-shu defined yi as follows, "Set right what is proper without calculating the profits." "Explicate the Tao without considering the results." Confucius mentioned the "will of Heaven" as something which he ought to follow. Mencius spoke of "Heaven's mandate." Chu Hsi said, "The Decree of Heaven is like the command of a sovereign; the Nature is the receiving of office from the sovereign; ..." He also said, "Heaven may be likened to the Emperor; the Decree is like his handing to me letters patent; the Nature is the duty attached to the office which I thus receive. ..." Wang Yang-ming said, "When the decree of Heaven settles upon man it is called nature; when one acts in accordance with this nature it is called the path of duty." Kuo Hsiang, commenting upon the Chuang Tzu, said, "[When] all things are following their own nature and doing according to their own capacity, all are what they ought to be and equally happy." The Confucian doctrine of the "rectification of names" at least implies it is obligatory to fulfill one's nature without consideration of reward. In substance, Mr. Mei gave us the essence of the matter when, in summarizing the principles of Chinese ethics, he said that there is an all-pervading principle in the universe and that man's duty is to follow this principle which brings him in tune with the universe. He also noted that the "natural feeling of jên [basic in all Confucianism] becomes the categorical imperative of conduct."

**THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF ETHICS IN THE EAST**

One gets a strong sense of the metaphysical basis of ethics in reading the texts of the various major schools of Oriental philosophy. Practically all basic texts of the Indian classical schools call for knowledge of the truth about reality as the solution of the practical problem which is the initiating cause of philosophy. In China, even in The Analects of Confucius, there is repeated reference to the ultimate principle of reality, whether it be the will of heaven, God, Tao, or li, to name some of the more prominent ones. Similarly, with reference to both China and India, one is conscious of changes and variations in the moral systems in accordance with changes and differences among philosophical metaphysical systems. On the other hand, one is conscious of similarity of basic metaphysical doctrine, when one finds similarity of ethical admonition—for example, in Indian systems, where, despite important differences of opinion concerning the qualities and number, as it were, of the ultimate, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism agree on the one fundamental that the real is, in some sense of the word, "spiritual." In view of this agreement we find common
adherence to the doctrine of *ahimsa* and certain other ethical principles, all of which have in common the development or freedom of the spirit and the control of the body. It constantly strikes the reader of Oriental philosophy that he can understand ethical norms only in terms of metaphysical concepts, and, similarly, that it is only in terms of metaphysical principles that he can explain the conditions of life which it is so often the purpose of Indian philosophies to escape because they are not only painful but also unreal.

**India**

If space permitted, it would be possible, I think, to show the direct relationship between every major aspect of Indian philosophy which has to do with conduct and the necessary metaphysical fact in terms of which the ethical concept becomes intelligible and obligatory. Since space is not available, however, we must limit ourselves to certain examples. Mr. Mahadevan, in the ethics seminar, talked of the three fundamental concepts of ethical life: *sannyasa* (renunciation), *ahimsa* (non-injury), and *samadhi* (super-conscious experience). These, he said, were common to all systems of Hinduism, and in his explanation it became clear that such attitudes or practices would have no necessary basis or justification unless reality (including man) were such that they "fitted" reality. One could ask "Why?" in each case, and the answer would of necessity be couched in terms of metaphysics. A more common example is the concept of seeking identification with Brahman, monistically or pluralistically. The world should be unified; all religions should be one; and man should realize and should comprehend and eventually achieve his unity with the ultimate. Why? Only because in the Hindu metaphysics, especially in all major schools of Vedânta, there is some sense in which reality is one, and all agree that in some sense man is identical with Brahman. Universal love, tolerance, and non-injury, in Hinduism, have an unquestioned metaphysical basis—the basis which Schopenhauer adopted for the same purpose, the oneness of reality.39

We of the West argue against the Hindu concept of seeking complete identity with God or the Absolute, and often feel that Indian philosophy thinks of man as God and forgets that man is man rather than God. The point of the Hindu's answer would be the metaphysical statement that man is God (or Brahman), *Tat tvam asi*, and on that basis the Hindu ethico-religious scheme is correct and not the objecting Westerner's concentration upon man as man.

One could examine all the various systems of Indian philosophy,
orthodox and unorthodox, in this same vein and be forced to recognize that each ethical system collapses unless the requisite metaphysical principles are present. Omitting for the present the ramifications of the orthodox systems, let us note simply some basic principles of the unorthodox systems, Cārvāka, Jainism, and Buddhism. Cārvāka is simply atomic materialism in metaphysics and advises what one would expect in ethics, namely, individualistic and sometimes sensuous hedonism. Cārvāka ridicules opposing moralities on the ground that the metaphysical bases of those other moralities are untrue. In Jainism the doctrine of ahimsā and the general attitude of asceticism are outstanding. The doctrine of ahimsā is based metaphysically upon the recognition of life or soul (jīva) from man down to the lowest plant and the sense of respect or "awe" which Jains feel for jīva as the highest type of reality. Asceticism, as a general ethical pattern, is justified, not merely in terms of an escape from pain, but primarily as a means to the perfection of the self, free from all karmic bondage and possessing infinite power, infinite knowledge, and infinite bliss. If the metaphysics of Jainism did not include such a soul, Jaina asceticism would not have an adequate justification.

The question of the metaphysical basis of ethics in Buddhism is extremely difficult, not only because exactly pertinent statements are scarce but also because of the great complexity and variety of Buddhist schools and doctrines. To begin with, there are three reasons for believing that there is no metaphysical basis for ethics in Buddhism: first, the fact that the Buddha refused to answer, as profitless, those questions which referred to the ultimate nature of reality and the soul in Nirvāṇa; second, the related belief that the Buddha, like Confucius, was interested exclusively in alleviating the suffering of mankind in the here-and-now, was exclusively an ethicist, and had no metaphysical doctrines; and, third, the point brought to our attention so forcibly by Mr. Malalasekera that this life is real and good to the Buddhist and therefore no metaphysical basis is necessary; if we follow the ethical way of the Buddha we will be happy in this life—regardless of metaphysics.

I find it difficult to accept this interpretation in view of other considerations which I shall now mention very briefly. For example, it seems to me that the three characteristics of things which were enunciated by the Buddha—impermanence, non-self, and pain or unsatisfactoriness, and especially the theory of the transitory self and the transitory nature of reality—are metaphysical concepts without which Buddhism would not be Buddhism and without which Buddhist ethics would have no justification. According to the quotations
cited earlier in this paper, the Buddha was very strong in contrasting the truth with the belief in the self, in the ordinary sense of the word, it being his conviction, apparently, that following a false view of the self was the cause of the suffering from which it was his object to point the way of escape. Evil in Buddhism is that which leads to or involves greed, ill-will, or selfishness. If one asks the question "Why?", I can see no adequate answer except in terms of the metaphysical doctrine of *anatman*, i.e., because these vices are at variance with the true nature of man. Why should the Mahayana Buddhist, even the *bodhisattva*, practice universal compassion?—unless it be because all men possess the same Buddha-nature and are in that sense one?

**China**

In reference to China, I would like to recall from Mr. Mei’s paper the over-all point that Chinese philosophy generally believes in an all-pervading universal principle to which it is the duty of man to conform. To go beyond Mr. Mei, it seems to me that since conceptions of this ultimate principle vary from system to system, so vary the ethical systems. There are several ways of life and ethical doctrines taught in China, from the extreme primitivity of mystical life in the *Chuang Tzu* to the aggressive nature-conquering philosophy of Hsün Tzü. For every one of these the metaphysical parallel is in the given system and the ethical pattern finds its justification in that metaphysical system.

For the sake of much-needed brevity at this point, I wish merely to quote or refer to a few ethical maxims and to note the ease and inevitability of referral to related metaphysical principles. In each case, the reader is requested to think of the question "Why?" He will find the answer only in the metaphysics of the thinker involved. "Perfect is the virtue which is according to the constant mean."43 "Reason [Tao] always practices non-assertion, and there is nothing that remains undone."44 "I would restrain them by the simplicity of the inevitable."45 "Vast virtue’s form follows Reason’s norm."46 "This is called the virtue of non-striving ... this is called complying with Heaven—since olden times the highest."47 "Heaven’s Reason is to benefit but not to injure; the holy man’s Reason is to accomplish but not to strive."48 " ... it is said that the perfect man has no self; the spiritual man has no achievements; the true sage has no name."49 "Superior virtue is unvirtue. Therefore it has virtue. Inferior virtue never loses sight of virtue. Therefore it has no virtue."46 "When the great reason is obliterated, we have benevolence and justice."51 (These
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last two mean, as Derk Bodde has said, that "... the Chinese Taoists said that human moral standards are artificial and hence invalid..."—but, he added, "Taoism... replaced them by a higher standard, that of the Tao or Way, the first cosmic principle of the universe."

If one interprets Chinese ethical thought as pure humanism, or as having no general or universal principles, or as lacking rigidity—"Rigid morality is not at home in China"—or as concrete and realistic rather than characterized by abstract values and ideals, one adopts such an interpretation not exclusively on the basis of ethical practice alone but because of an observation like this: "To the Chinese, the only reality is the sensed world, that is transitory and relative."64

Chu Hsi, the outstanding Neo-Confucian philosopher, well expressed the generalized Chinese thesis on metaphysics and ethics—although it is essentially Confucian, of course—when he said, "Of all the philosophers, the nearest to the truth are those of our Confucian school, who teach that the Nature in its original essence is nothing else than the substance of Love, Righteousness, Reverence, and Wisdom."65 He then related the Nature, that is, an individual's nature, to reality, when he said, "Law is Heaven's substance, the Decree is Law in operation, the Nature is what is received by man, the Feelings are the Nature in operation."66 There can be no clearer metaphysical basis of ethics than that, and that represents the main tradition in Chinese philosophy.67

VALUE METAPHYSICS IN EASTERN PHILOSOPHIES

At this time I can obviously attempt no exhaustive consideration of this problem. I intend, instead, to present certain fairly obvious points, to pose certain problems, to cite certain areas which are very difficult to interpret with assurance, and to draw certain conclusions with reference to the similarity or dissimilarity between Eastern and Western philosophy on this particular matter. The perspective from which this section of the paper is being approached is the conclusion of the first part of the paper, namely, that, if good is not an essential and intrinsic attribute or nature of reality, there is no adequate metaphysical basis of ethics. The question is, then: Do the major systems of Oriental philosophy conceive of the real as intrinsically characterized by value? (A subordinate question would concern the reason for attributing value to the real, or consider the possibility that metaphysics in the East commits the naturalistic fallacy of accepting as good that which is real simply because it is real.)

It seems to me that reality, ultimate reality, is thought of as good
in all major Eastern systems, possibly—but not necessarily—excepting Cārvāka. This is true, not only of those systems, such as Confucianism and Moism in China and the many theistic systems in India, which express this goodness in terms almost identical with those used in the West for the same purpose, but also of the three major schools which, by their terminology, seem to exclude all possibility of the goodness of reality in the same breath that they deny all other qualities to the real. I am referring, of course, to the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, the school of śūnyatā in Buddhism, and Taoism. In all of these the fact that the real is used as the basis of ethics seems to me to be an indirect sign—or a direct sign—of the value content of the real. For example, why should I seek identification with Brahman—even if Tat tvam asi expresses the factual truth—unless Brahman and identification therewith are in some sense good? Even in these three seemingly value-free metaphysics of neti, neti, śūnyatā, and the nameless Tao, I feel that the quality of goodness is never excluded along with other qualities, but, rather, that it is the one basic characteristic. In all these systems, in which reality transcends characteristics and in which the good man transcends moral actions and norms, the real is good but not “good.” What I wish to say is what Mr. Mahadevan meant in his paper when he said, “While Brahman is indeterminate, it is not indeterminate. While it is devoid of characteristics, it is not characterless.” He added, “Reality, the light of intelligence, and the bliss immortal, are value expressions indicative of the nature of Brahman. Thus, Brahman is the supreme reality and value; it is the final end (paramārtha), the fulfillment of all aspiration, the goal of all endeavor.” He also pointed out, as have so many others, that the seers of India, in order to avoid a barely negative interpretation, indicated Brahman by such terms as being (sat), consciousness (cit), and bliss (ānanda). These are not qualities of Brahman but they are Brahman, the essence of Brahman, and ānanda is certainly a value concept. Brahman is frequently spoken of as “the highest,” “the great,” “both truth and virtue,” “the true (satyam),” the good (śivam),” and the beautiful (sundaram),” and the possessor of “the qualities that are to be loved.” It is the object of the “quest for values,” which characterizes Indian philosophy. Thus, it cannot be a neutral or value-empty reality, even in its pure absolute state as “Nirguṇa Brahman,” although all words, even the highest, can be, at best, mere approximations.

This interpretation, as I take it, applies even to the extreme view of Śaṅkara; of course, there is no question whatsoever about the value content of Brahman as envisaged by Rāmānuja, Madhva, and all other Indian theists, and they are many. Before I take up other sys-
tems, I must repeat that it is very important that we be constantly alert to the fact that Śaṅkara expresses an extreme form of Vedānta, and that his type of Vedānta, important as it is, is by no means the whole of Indian philosophy or the whole even of Vedānta. Two facts are most important, namely, that Śaṅkara's Vedānta is not synonymous with Indian philosophy or even with Vedānta, and, second, that, even in Śaṅkara's Vedānta, Brahman is value.

The goodness of Tao, regardless of its namelessness, is reflected in many passages in the Tao Te Ching (the Lao Tsē). There are passages which seem to indicate no value content and no purpose whatsoever, but the following statements could not be used with reference to a Tao that was not conceived of as good: "Through what do I know that 'it heeds the good of everything'? In this way, verily: through IT."81 "To know the harmonious is called the eternal. To know the eternal is called enlightenment."82 "... Reason [Tao] alone is good for imparting and completing."83 "To accomplish merit and acquire fame, then to withdraw, that is Heaven's [Tao's] way."84 "Superior goodness resembles water. The water's goodness benefiteth the ten thousand things."85 "But for heaven and earth's [Tao's] humaneness, the ten thousand things are straw dogs."86 The Chinese have always assumed that Tao, regardless of the fact that "Tao has no distinctions,"87 is good. Otherwise, how could Tao provide the basis for man's actions? Why follow Tao if Tao is not good? How could it otherwise provide the tao of life, which is the right path for man to follow? Like Brahman, Tao is not describable as "good," but Tao is unquestionably good by its very nature. Tao, in itself, seems to be above all distinctions, including that of good and evil, but it is also in relation to man and serves as the standard of conduct; in this latter capacity it necessarily exhibits the characteristic of goodness or value. This twofold nature of Tao may be expressed thus: "Heaven's Reason (Tao) shows no preference but always assists the good."88

I am decidedly unsure of myself on this question in the case of Buddhism. There seems to be no doubt that early Buddhism assumed what has been called "an eternal right that dwells in the constitution of things." It seems even more unquestionable that, in the Mahāyāna, Buddha-Nature is thought to be the good as well as the real, regardless of the fact that the real is śānyā, or void. Nirvāṇa, like Brahman and Tao, is devoid of all particular characteristics, but must be intrinsically good if it is to be the object of the aspirations of man. As Dr. T. R. V. Murti of India has just written in a doctoral dissertation on Mādhyamika Buddhism, "Is it possible to follow an ideal of conduct which claims the allegiance of the entire man without raising, by implication
at least, questions about the ultimate value, the nature and destiny of the individual undertaking the discipline, and his relation to that ideal? 68 Dr. Murti insists, on the basis of Buddhist ethics, that Buddhism must have a distinct metaphysics, and that the real must be conceived of as value; otherwise, the ethics of Buddhism collapses without adequate foundation. I see no alternative to this interpretation. Possibly Vasubandhu expressed the essence of the Buddhist view when he said:

This is the realm of passionlessness or purity,  
Which is beyond description, is good, and is eternal,  
Where one is in the state of emancipation, peace, and joy. 79

One further point remains to be considered, although I must omit Buddhism from this consideration because I do not feel that it necessarily conforms to the pattern. My point is this: These Oriental philosophers, even the advocates of the extreme so-called “negative” metaphysics, do or must attribute value to the real, not because it is real but because it is a particular kind of reality. No matter what the Hindu says about reality or how the Hindu describes Brahman, Brahman is still identical with Ātman, and Ātman is self or soul. Self or soul is by its very nature a value-filled concept. (Buddhism may conform to this pattern, though with a different meaning for the spiritual principle.) Similarly, Tao represents a principle of orderliness, possibly even rationality—recall the frequent (though possibly incorrect) translation of “Tao” as “Reason”—and this nature of Tao inevitably forces man to think of Tao as good. The case parallels that of the Stoics, whose Universal Law was good because it was a law of reason, and reason by its very nature (at least, as they understood it) is or seeks the good.

Now, perhaps, we can return—briefly—to a point raised early in this paper, namely, the transcendence of ethical values and norms by the one who has achieved wisdom—spiritual realization, prajñā, enlightenment. This concept can best be understood by thinking of it along with the metaphysical doctrine of transcendence of all empirical qualities. We of the West can understand and appreciate the metaphysical doctrines of neti, neti and śūnyatā without doing serious violence to our intellectual integrity or our intellectual tradition. Reality is not determinable by any finite qualification but it is still not characterless—to repeat Mr. Mahadevan’s words. So, in the realm of ethics, we of the West can understand and appreciate the spiritual transcendence of ethical values and norms. The man of perfect character is above the rules of morality, because the conflict of good and evil no
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longer has any force in his mind. He, like the reality of the absolutist metaphysics of some systems in the East, is good but not "good." (This does not mean that moral distinctions have no meaning for the man who has not yet achieved this perfect state of moral character.) In both ethics and metaphysics, some Indian systems and possibly one phase of Taoism go one step beyond the West, but the point I want to stress or offer for discussion is that even in these extreme views I see no basic conflict between East and West, but merely an added interest on the part of the Easterner to realize the ultimate. At this point religion or absolutism transcends philosophy, but does not negate philosophy. The East goes one step beyond the West in both metaphysics and ethics—in its extreme systems—but this does not mean conflict.

CONCLUSION

This study presents a proposed avenue of synthesis of East and West through the medium of a consideration of the relationship between metaphysics and ethics. For all their differences in language, techniques, and attitudes, the East and the West are not alien to each other or inscrutable to each other in this fundamental problem of philosophy, which touches both the highest theoretical and the most practical aspects of the subject. In fundamentals we are speaking a common philosophical language; but the details are varied and the richness of total perspective, which is philosophy, may be gained by filling in the content of our perspective with the varying details—metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical—which are different in the different traditions.

More specifically, however, this study indicates that the problem of attaining a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of East and West is more difficult than some of us might think. The ethics seminar noted—as have we in the course of listening to the papers at this Conference—that there are many ethical and value principles (and practices) which East and West seem to hold in common. Professor Krusé, expressing one of the major points of view relative to a synthesis of East and West, states in his paper that "... if there is ever to be a real meeting of East and West, it will have to be on the basis of a reciprocal interpenetration of values and of a mutual give and take of them." Is this sufficient? I think not. Real synthesis—even an orchestrated unity—can be achieved only on the level of metaphysics and then only on the basis of significant agreement on and common acceptance of certain fundamental doctrines. Without real agreement on meta-
physical fundamentals, no amount of agreement on the level of ethical ideals and practices can provide an acceptable synthesis in philosophy — unless the major thesis of this entire paper is incorrect, and most of the evidence seems distinctly to deny that.

NOTES

2See above, p. 289.
5Eastern Religions and Western Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2d ed., 1940), p. 82.
6The Renaissance of Hinduism (Benares, India: Benares Hindu University, 1944), p. 624.
8For example, ahuimśa (non-violence or non-injury) is grounded in a different metaphysics in the several Hindu systems, in Buddhism, and in Jainism.
9See his Ethics, Pt. I, Def. XXXVI, appendix. But recall also Pt. II, Def. VI: “Reality and perfection are synonymous terms.” “Perfection” in this latter instance, however, refers to mathematical perfection, not moral.
10See above, F. S. C. Northrop, “The Theory of Types and the Verification of Ethical Theory.”
11Several of the preceding papers by representatives of Oriental philosophy have referred directly or indirectly to these problems and have provided much material pertinent to this discussion. The reader is asked to refer to those papers for substantiating or opposing interpretations.
12For a presentation of both of these contentions, see P. T. Raju, “The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions,” The Philosophical Review LVI (March, 1947), 127-155.
14In typed ms. of article, “India’s Culture and its Problems,” for future publication by UNESCO, p. 30.
16This statement is generally true, but a study like S. K. Maitra’s The Ethics of the Hindus (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1925) makes one feel that precise ethical speculation has been very much in evidence in the great systems of the Hindus.
18Tao Tê Ching, Paul Carus, trans. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1914), Ch. 2.
21See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan
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Company, 1932), p. 123. See also Bhagavadgītā, Chs. I–III; VI, 1; and XVIII, 7–9, 23, 45, 47–48.

Mahābhārata, Sāntiparva, Ch. 33.


Ibid., p. 5.


Analects, Bk. XV, Ch. 8: The Works of Mencius, Bk. VI, Pt. 1, Ch. 10.

For example, see Analects, Bk. IV, Ch. 6; Bk. XV, Ch. 8: The Works of Mencius, Bk. I, Pt. 1, Ch. 1.

See Pan Ku, Ch’ien Han Shu [History of Former Han], Bk. 56.


Ibid., p. 6.


Fung Yu-lan, trans., Chuang Tê (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1933), p. 27.


See above, p. 302. See also Frank Rawlinson, Chinese Ethical Ideals, (Shanghai: College of Chinese Studies, California College in China, 1934), p. 63, where he says that this duty to imitate the way of Heaven “approaches somewhat Kant’s idea of the categorical imperative.”


For a discussion of this doctrine, see S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 3rd ed., 1948), pp. 122, 123 n.


For a forceful statement of this interpretation, see S. Radhakrishnan, Gautama the Buddha (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1945).

Analects, Bk. VI, Ch. 27.

Tao Tê Ching, Ch. 37. Loc. cit.

Ibid., Ch. 68.

Ibid., Ch. 81.

Chuang Tê, Ch. 1; Fung, p. 34.

Tao Tê Ching, Ch. 38.

Ibid., Ch. 18.


W. T. Chan, in public lecture in series given by Conference members.

F. S. C. Northrop, in same series of lectures.

J. P. Bruce, op. cit., p. 51.

See also The Great Learning, The Text of Confucius, 4, and its reference to the utmost extension of knowledge and the investigation of things as the ultimate basis upon which to establish personal and social rectification; and The Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. I: “What Heaven has conferred is called the Nature; an accordance with
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this Nature is called the path of duty; ...” See, further, Mo Tzu, Chs. XXVI-XCVIII, and Hsüan Tzu, Chs. II, XVII, XIX.

“See above, p. 333.

"Loc. cit. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 2d ed., 1937), p. 103: "The supreme is real, not true, perfect, not good," Italicis mine. I feel that Dr. Ram Pratap Singh expresses the point clearly when he writes: "That the metaphysical notion of ‘reality’ is the notion of ‘value’ is the fundamental contention of Śaṅkara; ... he brings out the value character of the predicate of reality, ... and finally reiterates, after the Upaniṣads, the identity of the most supremely ‘real’ and the most supremely ‘good,’ both of these being but forms of ‘value.’" The Vedānta of Śaṅkara, a Metaphysics of Value (Jaipur, India: Bharat Publishing House, 1949), pp. i–iv. He also explains the difficulty some of us have in reconciling this view with the doctrine of neti, neti when he says: “... Śaṅkara ... believes that there is a point where value and existence come together and meet and fuse in one. That point is what he calls Brahman or Ātman or Mokṣa. But this point cannot be experienced without ‘treading on the mystical.’ Thought can have access only to the ‘axiom’ of the oneness and inseparability of value and existence and not to their ‘identity.’” Ibid., p. ii.

“See Chāndogya Upaniṣad, III, xiv, 1–4; IV, xv, 2; VIII, vii, 1; Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II, iv, 5; Katha Upaniṣad, II, 13; II, 16; III, 11; Taittirīya Upaniṣad, II, 1; II, 5. See also D. S. Sarma, What is Hinduism, pp. 58–59. I feel that this subject cannot be left without at least mention of the fact and possible significance of ṛta and karma in this connection. Ṛta, both in the Rg Veda and in much of later Indian thought, stands as the moral order of the universe, and karma has been similarly described by virtue of its guaranteeing the application of justice in the field of life and conduct.

“Tao Tè Ching, Ch. 21. “Ibid., Ch. 55.

“Ibid., Ch. 9.

“Ibid., Ch. 8.

“Chuang Tzu, Ch. 2; Fung, p. 57.

“Mādhyamika Dialectic, p. 40.

“Vasubandhu, Trīśūla, XXX. Italics mine.

“See above, p. 385.
Part IV

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
CHAPTER XXIII

Reports of the Conference Seminars

As stated in the Preface, the Conference was held in conjunction with the Summer School of the University of Hawaii. The Summer School included in its program seven courses specifically related to the Conference, all of them being conducted by Conference members. Among these courses were seminars in comparative methodology, comparative metaphysics, and comparative ethics and social philosophy.

These seminars were attended by some regular students of the Summer School, but chiefly by members and associate members of the Conference. Discussion was kept on a high level, and the seminars thus provided a medium through which doctrines and problems considered at the Conference could be subjected to more detailed analysis and discussion than time permitted at the Conference meetings proper. In each of the seminars there were two representatives of Western philosophy and one representative each of Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and Buddhist philosophy.

In the planning of the final two meetings of the Conference, it was decided to ask the leaders of the seminars, with the assistance of members and associate members attending the classes, to prepare statements of conclusions reached in the seminars in the light of the trends of the discussion which had occurred at the Conference. The three reports, which constitute the body of this chapter, therefore, present the combined results of the Conference and the seminars.

These reports were read to the Conference and were discussed as fully as time permitted. They were not formally approved—or disapproved—by the Conference membership, but, within limits, they represent the conclusions of the Conference in so far as any definite conclusions were reached.

The reports present not only the general conclusions of the Con-
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ference and points of general agreement, but also, in the form of ques-
tions and unresolved problems, some thoroughly worked-out and
clearly formulated avenues of future research in the field, research
which is indispensable if progress in comparative philosophy, as well
as progress toward a synthesis of the philosophies of East and West,
is to continue.

REPORT OF THE SEMINAR IN METHODOLOGY

In its work in the field of methodology the Conference addressed
itself to two main tasks: (1) to bring out the trusted ways of gaining
knowledge that are characteristic of India, of China, and of the West;
(2) to explore the areas which seem to pose special difficulty in realizing
a harmonious reconciliation of these ways.

These tasks were pursued directly in the Seminar in Comparative
Methodology, and several Conference papers made notable contribu-
tions toward fulfilling them.

As it concentrated on the second of these two tasks, the seminar
centered its attention, first, on the major differences between Eastern
and Western methodological assumptions, and then on four main
problems. The body of this report is organized around a presentation
of the findings which seem to emerge with respect to these differences
and problems.

Major Differences in Methodological Assumptions
Between East and West

MR. NORTHROP: The East uses "concepts by intuition"; the West
assigns a very important role to "concepts by postulation."

MR. MALALASEKERA: The West wants concrete logical and em-
pirical proof for any belief; Easterners say that some things may be
understood only by intuition.

Westerners want to experience everything for themselves before
being convinced; Easterners are prepared to accept as essentially
trustworthy the experience of their ancestors.

MR. SHELDON: Western philosophies are primarily theoretical, aim-
ing at thinking truthfully about reality; Eastern philosophies are
primarily practical, aiming to show men how to realize identity with
reality.

The West is basically concerned with this present world; the East
with an ultimate beyond this world (or deep within it).

The West believes that this world can be saved by changing it
through time; the East that it is hopeless and cannot be saved.
MR. BURTT (in supplementation of the above points): Western philosophy shows a zest for analysis, and is convinced that analysis is significant independently of any ulterior considerations; for Eastern philosophy analysis is almost always related to some further purpose and is regarded as insignificant when detached from it.

The West, generally speaking, is convinced that the result of any knowledge-seeking enterprise is fully expressible in verbal symbols, whose relations are subject to the ordinary logical rules; for the East the intuitive “higher” knowledge is not capable of verbal expression and communication, at least to those who have not attained it.

Western thought tends to center its primary attention on the external world; Eastern thought on the inner self, with its spiritual and social potentialities.

The general consensus seemed to be that there was something in each of these suggested contrasts if they are not pressed too far or regarded as more than dominant tendencies. It also seemed to be generally agreed that they should be analyzed on the supposition that East and West can be found in the main to complement rather than to contradict each other’s methodologies, but that points of possible conflict should be frankly faced.

Main Problems Arising from These Differences

1. Does a philosophical method have valuational presuppositions? If so, what can be done about them, both in general and in reference to the specific problem of harmonizing Eastern and Western methodologies?

   a. Both Eastern and Western thinkers appeared to recognize that there are such presuppositions. To the former they seemed to pose no serious difficulty, perhaps because of essential agreement on fundamental values.

   b. The Western thinkers found here an issue among themselves, which challenges further clarification. Some held that these presuppositions largely determine our very criteria of reality and of relevant evidence, hence that empirical method by itself is inadequate to deal with them. Others held that if they can be known to reflect a valuation this very circumstance is a fact capable of discovery and verification by empirical method.

2. While Eastern and Western philosophies alike believe that their theories are supported by “experience” and employ something akin to “inductive” method, there seem to be differences in what is regarded as
relevanf "evidence" on which important beliefs can be grounded. How are these differences to be dealt with?

a. On this matter, the Eastern delegates seemed to accept Western inductive method as validly applicable to the finite objects and events of external experience, but not to the Self, which is for them the most important entity to be known. The Western philosophers found it difficult to accept as data of experience all that the Eastern thinkers were prepared to accept—especially data disclosed in dreamless sleep and in the experience of ultimate self-realization. The main focus of difficulty seemed to lie in the confidence of Eastern thinkers in a method of intuition which the modern West distrusts; some findings on this problem will be summarized below.

b. In this connection, informative material previously unfamiliar to most of the participants was introduced by Mr. Hughes, with respect to the development of inductive and deductive methods in China.

3. Is intuition a valid method of knowledge?

a. In the West, the word "intuition" often refers to an infra-rational apprehension, which philosophers do not regard as dependable. In the present context it refers to a method which is believed to be supra-rational and is of the highest philosophic respectability in India and in some strains of Chinese thought; it is the trusted means by which ultimate metaphysical knowledge is attained.

b. Its attainment according to Eastern thinkers requires preparatory disciplines which are non-intellectual as well as intellectual. Logical reasoning is necessary, because only by its means can our path be cleared of contradictions. But moral disciplines are also requisite; the mind must be cleared of obstructions which arise from selfish desire and turbulent emotion. Western thinkers found it hard to accustom themselves to this idea, since in the West no moral virtue except honesty or intellectual integrity has been regarded as needed. When attained, this intuition is believed to give self-evident insight; nothing corresponding to verification in the West is required. Whether this insight is regarded as evidence for anything other than its own occurrence did not seem to the Westerners entirely clear. Perhaps (the discussion indicated) this is because, according to their wont, they took this knowledge to be a kind of information about something, whereas from the Eastern standpoint it is rather the intellectual aspect of a process of self-realization.

c. The crucial points of difficulty to Westerners were these:

(1) The "higher" knowledge gained in this way is not communicable to others by the medium of words. Words attempting to describe
it would be meaningless to those who have not attained the experience, and to those who have they are unnecessary. This caused difficulty because the West characteristically distrusts any sort of esoteric knowledge.

(2) The West increasingly tends to regard any experiential knowledge as always corrigeable by further experience, whereas Indian thinkers hold that intuitive realization is not similarly corrigeable. The suggestion emerged that perhaps what the East is aiming at here is, again, a knowledge which brings saving union with the ultimate rather than a knowledge which adds to our information. But can we tell infallibly when we are saved?

4. **What sort of synthesis is really desirable and valid? In harmonizing East and West do we want a synthesis guided by the ideal of inclusiveness or by some alternative ideal?**

a. It would seem that methodological synthesis might be pursued in any of the following ways:

(1) **Co-presence:** That is to say, it might be held that one method is appropriate to one area of discourse, the other to another, and that there is no reason why two groups of investigators in two areas of discourse may not use the two different methods.

(2) **Combination:** That is to say, it might be held that one could (or should) develop a single method which combines both. Thus, the scientific method has been said to combine both induction (in the narrower sense) and deduction. Or again, many have felt that Kant's transcendental method combined the methods of empiricism and rationalism. The difficulty here would be that in the combination one of the original methods probably has to be given dominance. Thus Kant's transcendental method has been called the empirical method in disguise, and the method of science seems simply to be induction in a broader sense.

(3) **Supersession:** That is to say, it might be held that true synthesis involves the development of an entirely new method, totally unlike those with which one starts, rendering all of them outmoded. Kant himself felt that his method superseded the methods of empiricism and rationalism in this sense.

b. Certain suggestions on this matter may be ventured:

(1) Whatever limitations it may reveal, the way of co-presence would presumably have the virtue of showing philosophers that there are intelligible areas of discourse other than the areas with which they are familiar, and of thus awakening them to their previous provinciality.
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(2) The way of combination seems to be peculiarly difficult to pursue in seeking a synthesis between East and West. The difficulty is amply illustrated in the above discussion of the problem of intuition.

(3) The way of supersession seems to offer reasonable hope. To be sure:

(a) One cannot pull new ideas out of a hat. A committee composed of empiricists and rationalists meeting in 1780 would probably not have been able to predict the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

(b) But such a committee, provided its various members had given each other sympathetic audience, might have come to significant agreement concerning the limitations of the two points of view represented. In fact, the results of such agreement might have been far preferable to the actual results of Kant’s lonely cogitations.

(c) If both sides in the present issue become vaguely and hesitantly aware of their own limitations, the implication may be that at some point upon which we cannot at present quite place a finger we are heading toward a recognition of some common ground. To be unable to specify that common ground with any exactitude is not failure. Enough if what we here do leads to a greater unity in what our successors think.

REPORT OF THE SEMINAR IN METAPHYSICS

This report is presented as the result of an intensive discussion of basic philosophical topics by representatives of Hinduism, Mahāyāna Buddhism, Chinese philosophy, and Western naturalism and realism, and by those attending the seminar. In view of the great variety of these points of view and the mutual unfamiliarity of some of the basic concepts involved in their expression, it is understandable that no consistent body of basic doctrine can at present be precisely formulated which will fully satisfy representatives of all traditions.

Three rather clear-cut differences of metaphysical outlook have emerged from our discussions, and in our opinion deserve some special mention in this report.

First of all, Hindu and Buddhist philosophies have focused so much attention on an ultimate reality, largely inaccessible to the categories of ordinary logical discourse, that the field of finite existence has been to some extent neglected, and in some cases denied any independent, metaphysical status. This has been opposed to a prevailing Chinese and Western tendency to emphasize the substantial reality of nature and the individual.
Second, Chinese Confucianism and Western naturalism have generally found little need for the recognition of any absolute or self-sufficient reality transcending nature. This has been opposed to important trends of Hindu and Western thought which have stressed arguments requiring the recognition and postulation of such a necessary reality.

Finally, in the third place, it seems to be true that Eastern thought has rarely insisted on such a sharp distinction of the purely theoretical modes of investigation from the practical as has been made in the West.

In spite of these divergences of opinion our discussions nevertheless brought out the fact that basic metaphysical similarities also exist. Substantial agreement among the members of this seminar was worked out with reference to ten points which may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. The object of metaphysics is reality, and this can be known by reason, or intuition, or both. Further, some conceptions of reality and its various modes are common to both East and West. In each area, metaphysics aims at reliable knowledge, or direct experience, of fundamental modes of being.

Most members of the seminar agreed that these modes offer a possible, objective ground for a philosophical synthesis.

2. One important mode of reality is the realm of finite, changing existence.

Different members of the seminar characterized it in different ways, but all members agreed that the finite, changing world (including man) of common experience must be accepted as real in some sense.

3. There is something more ultimate than man which includes, completes, or explains the commonly experienced facts of finite existence.

This was characterized in different ways by different members of the seminar, as “necessary existence,” “all-inclusive existence,” “cosmic order,” or “law,” but all members agreed that there is some factor in the universe to which human life and value are subordinate, and to which religious experience and devotion and the so-called spiritual activities of man may with reason be directed.

4. Human nature includes a physical aspect which links man with the other animals and with the realm of inorganic nature.

All members of the seminar agreed unequivocally to this proposition.

5. Human nature also includes another aspect through which an individual person may become noetically identified with other entities
and with himself, and may voluntarily strive for ends that are rationally understood and freely chosen.

Some members of the seminar identified this aspect of human nature with the "immaterial faculties of reason and will"; others with what they would call "spiritual insight and aspiration"; still others, more naturalistically minded, with "the highest emergent phases of the evolutionary process." In all of these a distinctive cognitive factor is recognized.

6. In the human order, the individual person alone is the bearer of rational and spiritual faculties. The human group is not a superindividual organism or substance containing its members within it as cells or subordinate organs. It is rather a moral union of cooperative, individual activities founded upon a common purpose or ideology.

This thesis was accepted by all the members. It implies the rejection of exclusive social determinism. It also implies the right of the individual to criticize and to participate actively in the reconstruction of the social order.

7. Perfection, goodness, value, and other similar terms refer to a reality independent of individual and cultural judgment or decree.

All members agreed to this proposition.

8. Human value or goodness lies in the concrete realization of human nature as a whole, that is, in its material, social, and spiritual phases.

Different members defined this realization in different ways. But the thesis itself was accepted by the Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, and Western representatives in the seminar.

9. There are certain universal laws which must be followed if human nature is to be realized, and these do not depend upon any arbitrary decision or decree.

This conception of an objective moral law was analyzed in divergent but nonetheless overlapping ways by different members. The general conception was accepted by all.

10. The basic, natural needs of man are both material and spiritual, arising from the different aspects of his nature.

It was agreed by all members of the seminar that at the present time the West has much to learn from the East concerning the spiritual needs of man and their satisfaction, while the East has much to learn from the West concerning the material and social needs of man and their satisfaction.

In the opinion of this seminar, the importance of the ten theses mentioned above consists not so much in the fact that they form mere
points of agreement as in the fact that they constitute a consistent and related whole. The unity which they possess was arrived at in the face of a wide diversity of systems of thought, and not from the dominance of any one point of view exclusively.

It was the conviction of the seminar that the above statements, in their unity, suggest a conception of reality which may provide a firm and flexible framework for the further discussion and possible resolution of some of the major issues confronting this Conference. Thus, the conclusions actually obtained concerning basic, metaphysical issues indicate not only that the conflicts which have often been thought to divide Eastern and Western theories of reality are not irreconcilable, but also that their resolution may have positive and fruitful consequences for contemporary life and thought. More especially, the principles agreed upon seem to afford a philosophical basis for a common ideology, essentially compatible with the social and ethical ideals expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

REPORT OF THE SEMINAR IN COMPARATIVE ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Since it was understood that the Conference was to concern itself primarily with comparative philosophy rather than with comparative religion, Judaeo-Christian ethics, though referred to from time to time, was not made a specific or special part of the comparative study of ethics in this seminar. Nor did Western idealistic ethics receive special attention. It was generally agreed, however, that Judaeo-Christian and Western idealistic ethics, on the one hand, and Hindu and Buddhist ethics, on the other, have much in common, amounting in fact to an easily discernible "family resemblance," in spite of important differences. Western naturalism in its present mature, non-reductionistic development, Chinese Confucianism and Taoism, Theravāda Buddhism, and Hindu philosophy were the main theories discussed. It was soon discovered that complexity characterized all the systems considered; many misunderstandings had to be removed; and stereotypes had to be rejected. No basic and consistent East-West cleavage was discovered in moral doctrine and ethical theory. Differences in emphasis and in the ordering or ranking of values were often evident, however.

Moral Doctrines

EMPHASIS ON LOVE

Emphasis on the ethics of love or compassion was found to be central in most schools, East and West. The Golden Rule in both its
negative and affirmative formulations is a universal ideal the world over. This in itself is a solid ethical and social achievement.

SOCIAL SERVICE

While there is common agreement that some form of social service is natural and important in all ethical systems, differences in emphasis soon became discernible.

1. In general, though not necessarily, naturalism finds the highest good and supreme moral value in social life and action and not in individual salvation or self-perfection.

2. In Confucian ethics the foundation is jên and the expression is yi (righteousness), which leads to a stress on obligations rather than rights and on mutuality in family and wider social relations.

3. Buddhism emphasizes the exercise of compassion in action and stresses the individual's obligation to the community.

4. In Vedânta ethics social service takes primarily the form of ministering to man's spiritual needs, but other needs are not only admitted but insisted upon. All selfishness disappears when "Tat tvam asi" is taken seriously.

5. It is frequently asserted that Western and Confucian ethics stress the need for an active ethical life, while Hindu, Buddhist, and Taoist ethics emphasize the need for "inaction." Taoism in its "wu wei" doctrine wishes to exalt the ideal of acting with spontaneity and naturalness. The ideal of Buddhism is equanimity in action, not inaction. Hindu inaction is selfless action, not passivity. Frequent reference was made to Gandhi's statement that, if in the presence of evil there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, violence is to be preferred, but non-violence (akinsâ), which is not meek submission but putting one's whole self against the evildoer, remains infinitely superior.

THE STATUS OF THIS-WORLDLY VALUES

Western naturalism and Confucian humanism are in accord in their concern for man's life here and now. Taoism's concentration on the achievement of the Tao induces an attitude of relative indifference to values of this world, although in practice it encourages a life of contentment and detachment which possesses a simple charm of its own. Buddhism in its doctrine of release from the wheel of rebirth seems to deny the values of this world. Buddha, however, advocated that, if at all possible, perfection and salvation should be sought in this life. Moreover, Buddhism is opposed to asceticism and self-mortification. In Vedânta ethics this-worldly values are recognized, but only as instrumental and not intrinsic. While renunciation of attachment to
lesser values is central, there is joy in renunciation when there is spiritual self-realization. The possibility of release in this life is also emphasized in Vedānta.

THE STATUS OF THE REALM OF THE SPIRIT

Recent Western naturalism, in contrast to Western Judaeo-Christian and idealistic ethics, tends normally to find the highest good in moral, aesthetic, and intellectual, rather than in spiritual or religious, values, but, again, in its present development it does not wish to exclude any actually experienced value or insight. This relatively new attitude of Western naturalism is of great importance for our present undertaking. Confucianism "keeps its feet in two boats" in accepting and transforming this life, especially in its human relations, and, while not accepting Taoism’s exclusive concentration on the spiritual life, makes room for spiritual values also. Both Buddhism and Hinduism, while holding moral values in high esteem, find their highest value in a state of Being that transcends, but does not annul, moral values.

Ethical Theory or the Grounds of Ethics

FREEDOM

All schools of ethical thought insist on freedom and on man's responsibility for his action and destiny.

CONCEPTION OF SELF AND INDIVIDUALITY

Western naturalism places great emphasis on the individual conceived pluralistically, but analyzed in social terms. Confucianism, likewise, gives an important place to the individual in the social context but also provides for the development of the individual to the last stage, which culminates in his identification with the universe. Taoism, of course, stresses self-transcendence and merging with nature. Buddhism and Vedānta distinguish between the empirical self and the selflessness or self-transcendence achieved in Nirvāṇa or samādhi.

THEORY OF HUMAN NATURE

Naturalism emphasizes the differences in cultural and individual patterns. Man has ethical capacity of all sorts. Confucianism bases its view of human nature on common-sense experience and history. In general, all ethical systems are optimistic about man's capacities to achieve the highest good of his culture if man will sufficiently exert himself and submit himself to the training necessary for the attainment of his goals. The good life is always possible, but is not achieved without careful, systematic, and sustained effort.
GROUND OF MORALITY

(1) Method of Ethics: All systems discussed were found to contain large elements of empirical reference. Western philosophy, especially Western naturalism, inspired by the ideal of scientific method, attempts to stay close to empirical exploration and evidence for the confirmation or rejection of its ethical hypotheses and tends to regard ethical judgments as closely related to judgments of facts without, however, committing the culturalistic fallacy. All systems invite men to "come and see" what is good. In the East there would seem to be a greater appeal to the authority of classical texts and of perfected saints or sages than in the West. Intuition seems to play a greater role in the East—especially in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism—than in the West.

(2) The Relation of Ethics and Metaphysics: There is general agreement that ethics and metaphysics are closely interrelated in both East and West. Buddhism and Hinduism make much of the overcoming of selfishness by the enlightening insight that the individuated empirical self is not ultimately real and attains its highest goal either in Nirvāṇa or through the discovery that Ātman is Brahma. While Buddhism makes much of the doctrine of rebirth and how to escape the wheel of rebirth, Buddhist ethics does not stand or fall with the acceptance or rejection of this doctrine.

Areas for Further Study and Discussion—Remaining Questions

INDIVIDUALITY AND HUMAN NATURE

What value is to be attached to the empirical personality of the individual? Is the locus of value the individual person, society, or a trans-human entity? Does emphasis on either of these detract from the others? What is the place in ethical theory of scientific empirical investigations of man and society? Are they crucial, useful as secondary correctives, or quite unnecessary?

THIS-WORLDLY VALUES

How can these be prized and cultivated, when deprecated, renounced, transcended? Is there any loss to the ethical life if this-worldly values are analyzed as merely instrumental to the life of the spirit? Are they to be merely admitted, accepted, or joyously sought after and affirmed? What is the specific content of the philosophy of inaction, detachment, contemplation, or renunciation? What bearing does it have in overcoming present evil and injustice?
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SOCIAL REFORM AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Where should the stress fall in ethical concern: upon spiritual enlightenment, social service, or economic and social transformations? Or should all be combined in equal degree? Should social considerations be regarded as merely compatible with moral doctrines, positively enjoined, even when without connection with the rest of the doctrine, or regarded as logically entailed by the doctrine?

SPIRITUALITY
What is the place of spirituality in ethics? Does sublimation of ethical values affect their importance? Has it philosophic as well as religious significance? How is emphasis on spiritual values to be reconciled, if reconciliation is deemed necessary, with the philosophy of nature and experience?

METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS
Is a metaphysics logically necessary as a ground for morality? Psychologically? Can divergent metaphysics sustain in effect the same or similar moral doctrines? What is the relation between a metaphysical and an empirical grounding of moral doctrine? Does emphasis on either detract from the other? Can each profit from the insight of the other?

Final Conclusions
No single system or world philosophy in the sense of unqualified homogeneous sameness is either possible or desirable. Orchestrated unity is the goal. There is no desire to make mutual concessions just for the sake of apparent harmony. Our faith in the possibility of achieving a deep-going mutual understanding and agreement on fundamentals is stronger than ever: we realize we are all human beings on the same planet, equal participants in seeking the truth about ethical and social values and in translating these insights into concerted action. Given the fundamental harmony discovered at the Conference, differences of emphasis and point of view contribute to the enrichment of human experience—and, as said earlier, one of the major goals of the Conference was to achieve just that.

NOTES
1 Leaders of this seminar were Professors Burtt, Datta, Dennes, Hughes, Northrop, and Suzuki.
2 In the discussion, some Conference participants challenged several statements in this report in which the terms "East" and "West" were used uncritically, without adequate consideration of major differences of view and method within each. Too often "East" seemed to refer exclusively to certain prominent—though not uni-
versally accepted—views in Indian philosophy, neglecting the strongly different attitudes of Chinese philosophy. [Editor's note.]

*This question was debated at length and in detail at the Conference meeting at which this report was presented. It remains one of the major unresolved problems of the Conference. Mr. Raju participated very actively in the discussion of the problem, taking serious objection to the general trend of thought in the Conference with reference to statements about the status of intuition in Indian philosophy. He pointed out that an attempt had been made to identify the East, particularly Indian philosophy, with intuition and the West with reason. Some, he said, sought to point out that Indian thinkers made use of intuition as a philosophical method, whereas the Western philosophers relied upon reason and argument. There is confusion and danger lurking in this identification, he said. To recognize the claims of intuition as a valid source of knowledge is one thing, and to treat it as a philosophical method is another. No Indian system, not even that of Śaṅkara, was a mere description of intuitive experiences alone. Śaṅkara used any amount of logic, not only in criticizing other schools, but also in establishing his own. The logical intricacies of the dialectic of post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta are too well known to need special reference.

Further, Mr. Raju pointed out, first, that intuition has no definite meaning in Western philosophy, the word being used in the meanings of sensation, imagination, sympathetic feeling, and the higher intuition of ultimate reality; second, that intuition can be a valid means of cognition but cannot be a philosophical method; and, third, that no Indian philosopher simply referred to intuition to establish his own position or to refute his rival. Indian systems, not excluding Śaṅkara's, are quite rationally articulated and logically constructed. [Editor's note.]

*Leaders of this seminar were Professors Chan, Conger, Hanayama, Raju, and Wild.

*Leaders of this seminar were Professors Kruse, Mahadevan, Malalasekera, Mei, and Morris.

*Emphasis was placed upon Western naturalism for strategic reasons, because it was felt that in the contrast and conflict of this doctrine and several Oriental systems lay the basic cleavage between East and West in this field. Most of the questions brought out by Westerners in the detailed discussions of the seminar inevitably forced this issue to the front rather constantly. There was no need to reconcile the "idealisms" of East and West, since their affinities have been abundantly demonstrated by scholars on both sides. Consequently, the seminar addressed itself primarily to the crucial point of the over-all problem. This desire to remove first, if possible, the greatest initial obstacle accounts for the prominence of naturalism as representative of the West in the work of the seminar and in this report. There was no intent to regard Western naturalism as the present-day philosophy of the West, nor were Christian and Western idealistic ethics neglected in the seminar discussions. [Editor's note, based upon consultation with leaders of the seminar.]

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