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THE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S MILITARY STAFF AND
INSTRUCTION IN THE HINDUSTANI LANGUAGE

By

Dr. Nandalal Chatterji, M. A., Ph. D., D. Litt.

Whether the military staff of the East India Company should be
given instruction in the Hindustani language prior to their departure
from England for India, formed the subject of an interesting contro-
versy in 1826. The details thereof are buried in the contemporary
state papers. It is necessary that this controversy should attract the
attention of historians at the present day.

In one of his minutes of August 1800, Lord Wellesley had com-
plained of the lamentable deficiency in a knowledge of the Indian
languages, prevailing among the civil servants of the Company in
India, and it was to remove this deficiency that instruction in the
Indian languages was eventually provided for in the Fort William
College. Now, the question that came up for consideration in 1826
was that if such instruction was good for the civil servants it was equally
good for the military officers commanding the Company's troops in
India. It is worth mentioning in this connection that this subject
had been casually considered by the Court of Proprietors in 1805.
The Court of Directors of that period had agreed to consider the neces-
sity of giving all their servants the most ample means of instruction in
the Indian languages. But, it is rather strange that no attention was
paid to this question in subsequent years, and the military officers were
not placed on the same footing with the civil servants in this respect. Lord Minto, in one of his despatches of 1808, enumerates very pointedly the great evils arising from an ignorance of the Hindustani language. He points out, in great details, that such a want of knowledge on the part of the Company’s officers created almost unavoidably an unlimited dependence on the Indians; which often led to extortion, cruelty and injustice to the Indian subjects, and which delivered the officers themselves to the rule and power of men whom they should direct, but who soon changed their condition of inferior servants for that of masters. As a fact, a knowledge of the Indian languages was more necessary for the military officers than for the civilians. Educated Indians were always accessible to the civilians, and they could correct the latter when wrong in the interpretation of any document or of any conversation. The military officers, on the contrary, had no such assistance within their reach. So, unless the military officers knew the languages commonly spoken, they were not fit to discharge their duties, in an efficient way. It is true that interpreters\(^1\) were attached to each Indian regiment. But, this was indeed a reflection on the Company, for it was a reproach to the Company’s officers that, at so late a period of the Company’s rule in India, it was necessary to appoint interpreters between the troops and their officers.

At a meeting of the Court of Proprietors, held on January 18, 1826, the following proposition was introduced by a member\(^2\):——

“That this Court considering the great importance of a knowledge of the Hindosthanee language to European officers, destined to act with, and command the Native troops in India, recommend to the Court of Directors, to take into consideration the propriety of making regulations, in consistency with their own resolutions, that no Cadet shall henceforth be permitted to proceed to India, unless he shall, upon examination, be found sufficiently grounded in the rudiments of the Hindostanee language”.\(^3\) But, the Court meeting was adjourned till January 25,\(^4\) when the motion was taken up for consideration.

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1. They had been introduced in 1814 by Lord Hastings.
2. By Mr. Home.
3. This was a motion of which notice had been given much earlier.
4. At the outset, the Chairman had proposed the 1st of February, but, at the requisition of some members, the earlier date was fixed. By Act of Parliament, the Court was to be called within ten days from the receipt of a requisition.
Mr. Hume, the mover of the motion, in a speech of considerable length, pointed out the paramount importance to the Company and to the country, of obliging all who belonged to the service in India to be duly qualified with a knowledge of the language of the country in which they were destined to act.

Mr. Hume’s arguments are of the utmost interest to the students of modern Indian history. They may be thus summed up:—

Men having arms in their hands, and prepared to perform military execution, should be so trained as not to be likely to be misled by error, but errors had taken place, where men were called upon to act who were utterly ignorant of the language of those people over whom they were placed. A third of the entire military staff, in staff situations, were employed in duties foreign to their military duties. But, because of their ignorance of the Indian language, they were mostly “helpless and utterly useless”. A body of 1000 Englishmen were annually landed on the shores of India, without the means of communicating with any of the local people they might come in contact with. They were every one of them ignorant of Hindustani from the Colonel to the common soldier. To this ignorance could be attributed “many of the most disgraceful actions” in India.

As an instance, Mr. Hume cited an authentic story of the destruction of a whole battalion in 1804. And, he stated, “Now, when a case of this nature comes to our knowledge, is it not reasonable to infer that many occur of which we hear nothing?” There were of course interpreters, but they were not available in sufficient numbers. The result was that most of the officers who had spent many years in the service knew no more of the Indian language than was necessary,

2. The Company had about 150,000 men in arms, who were commanded by about 5,000 European officers or more. A great part of this number were not confined to military duty alone. In 1822 there were 1,795 European officers in Bengal alone. Of them 535 held staff appointments, and were called upon to perform duties out of the ordinary line of military duty. The number of cadets sent to India from 1814 to 1820 was 2,574, and from 1820 to 1824 it was 4,728, exclusive of medical servants.
3. The 18th Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
4. There was only one interpreter in each regiment of ten companies, so that if his services were requisitioned every now and then, the officers would have little else to do but to run about from one place to another in search of him!
to administer to their physical wants. They might proceed so far in their proficiency as to learn to say, "Give me water", "Give me bread"; "Come here", etc., but when the servant had to convey something of importance, they were totally in the dark. "I contend," Mr. Hume said, "that in the present state of matters, the Government of India, instead of being a paternal one, is quite the reverse, for bodies of armed men, for the most part totally ignorant of the current language of the country, are let loose on the natives."

Mr. Hume took the Court by surprise when he revealed, what the historians have totally overlooked, that the First Burma War was occasioned partly by a misunderstanding which had arisen from an ignorance of the local language. The facts are these. Some differences having arisen with the Burmese Governor of Arracan regarding the small island of Shapari, the British military officer sent a messenger to Mr. Warner, the Company's civil resident in his district, to request an interview with him in order that a mutual explanation might take place. Mr. Warner, however, did not understand the nature of the message, and not caring to meet the Governor, referred him to a daroga of police, an officer who received a salary of about Rs. 25 a month. The result of this was declaration of hostilities, and commencement of the First Burma War!

The Court of Directors had recently decided that all persons appointed to the Company's service in India, but more particularly those appointed to the medical service, should attain a knowledge of Hindustani previous to their departure for India, but, Mr. Hume pointed out that the Company was not acting consistently with this resolution. He ended his speech with the remark, "I desire to see India, where I have spent many happy years, governed in the best manner by the ablest persons. While that vast empire continues under the British yoke, it should be allowed all the advantages which can be derived from liberal British education."

Dr. Gilchrist seconded the motion, and in the course of a brief speech pointed out that a slight difference in the sound of a single letter

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1. Proceedings of the Court of Directors, November 4, 1818.
2. The Company only appointed Dr. J. B. Gilchrist to act as a teacher of Hindustani for three years. (Proceedings of November 4, 1818). The term was extended for another three years. (Proceedings of August 29, 1821). Later the expenditure was stopped.
of Hindustani could alter the meaning of a whole sentence. To illustrate this, he referred to the word "Ghaut", which if pronounced in one way meant an ambuscade, and if in another a desfile. If an officer, he said, did not understand the nicety of pronunciation, he might suppose, when an Indian apprised him of a 'ghaut', that he was told of a desfile, of which he had no reason to be afraid, instead of an ambuscade. In such a case the officer would proceed, and thus given the enemy an opportunity of pouncing on him and cutting his men to pieces!

Among the members who opposed the motion, Mr. S. Dixon was the most vociferous. He said, "The hon. Mover has used too severe language in bringing forward his motion. I never heard such an attack upon the Directors in my life." He urged that it was notorious that though a person might learn a language grammatically, yet, when he went to the country where it was spoken, he found himself at a loss to express his ideas. He concluded by saying, "Besides, looking at the success of the army as it has been constituted for years past, I do not think that the knowledge of the Native languages is of such importance to the inferior officers."

Another member, Mr. Darby, wondered whether the motion had been put forward to vilify the Court of Directors and with a very erroneous view of the case. He ended by asking the Court to reject the motion which in his opinion, was "a slur cast on every officer in the Indian army".

Captain Maxfield then rose to support the motion. In an interesting speech, he ridiculed the point of view of the critics, and pointed out that instances were not wanting where men were entrusted with important jobs, who did not know a word of the Indian languages. He excited mirth in the house by quoting a ridiculous blunder committed by an English magistrate in India. In a crowded court, on one occasion a man screamed out, and the magistrate inquiring the cause of it, was told, koost keta hai (a dog is biting the people). "Bring him to me", said the magistrate, "and I will teach him not to disturb a court of justice in future". The Court was convulsed with laughter, for it was apparent the magistrate had mistaken the dog for

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1. He cited the case of the last Surveyor-General, for example, who knew not a word of Hindustani.
a man. This showed that the ignorance of the Indian languages was not confined to one branch of the public service but was extended to them all. The speaker added emphatically that cadets must learn the Indian vernacular before they left England, for in India they were usually neglected under the plea of public emergency.

Sir Charles Forbes, in support of the motion, cited an instance where a man was sentenced to death on account of the wilful misrepresentation of his words by the Indian interpreter. A private individual noticed it, who was called out of the court afterwards upon some business, and in the meantime the man was found guilty. The gentleman, upon hearing this, wrote a letter to the Judge informing him of what he conceived to be the true meaning of the words, when the sentence was suspended, and ultimately the man was pardoned. With regard to the utility of communication by signs, the speaker humorously pointed out that the first sign that young gentlemen applied to the unfortunate Indians, if they were misunderstood, was a slap in the face, or a cane across the shoulders. He said, “God preserve the natives of India from such signs”.

Sir George Robinson, Deputy-Chairman, argued that the Directors had always encouraged the officials in India to learn the Indian languages, and no blame could be thrown on them. The Directors had prescribed the selection of subaltern officers of each Indian battalion as interpreters, and had laid down in 1810; that no staff appointment was to be held by any officer who had not previously acquired a competent knowledge of Hindustani. He assured the House that every encouragement would be given to proficient in the Indian languages by the Court of Directors. He, however, opposed the proposal of making the cadets learn Hindustani in England before

1. Captain Masfield.
2. The judge was Sir John Newbolt.
3. He gave an instance. “If a young officer is invited out, and happens to be late he first tells his palanquin bearers to go quicker. This they refuse to do under the broiling sun. He then begins to swear at them in English, and they not understanding him stop; he would then jump out and beat them. The consequence is the bearers take themselves off and leave him to shift for himself. This I have known frequently to have been the case”.
4. Letter from Court, March 12, 1813.
5. Letter from Court, January 17, 1810.
6. Revival of the practice of giving rewards for learning the Indian languages was at this time under consideration of the Court of Directors.
leaving for India on grounds such as these. Firstly, the emoluments of a cadet were too small to permit of a training in England. Secondly, detention of the cadets in London for such training might lead to immorality among them. Thirdly, it was better to learn a language in the very country where it was spoken. Fourthly, a knowledge of Hindustani was not of such importance as to be the *sine qua non* of his appointment. Fifthly, the proposal would operate as a bar to the advancement of those young men who lacked the means of attending the seminaries where the Indian languages were taught. Lastly, he urged, “the Court of Directors do not think it expedient that young men should be forced to prosecute their studies here, considering that their detention would be the consequence.”

Mr. Weeding likewise thought if the young gentlemen intended for India should receive instruction from anybody, it should be from some person in India, rather than receive it at home. He said it would be a very inconvenient practice, if the body of cadets should be subject to some kind of an examination and test before they proceeded on their voyage. Besides, it was not expedient to start a college in England for the purpose of instructing the cadets in Hindustani. If such an examination were introduced, the time spent in preparing for it would be so long that the supply of officers would not be equal to the wants of the Company’s military service. Even it should be a law that a mere smattering in the language was required, it would be attended with considerable difficulties. Again, for very good reasons cadets were appointed at the early age of sixteen; they could not be appointed beforehand, because of the uncertain wants of the military service. After all, the young cadets were never entrusted with important commissions the moment they set foot in India. He concluded by saying, “I think it, therefore, better, that instead of a young man wasting his time here on the acquisition of mere tyro’s information, he

1. There were many such seminaries in England. The most important among them was run by Dr. Gilechrist.

2. A month or two elapsed before they joined their regiments as ensigns. Here they could associate with the senior officers whose example would excite them to the attainment of a working knowledge of the Indian languages. The progress of the promotions also aided the same object. Before an ensign was made lieutenant a year or two elapsed; many years before he was promoted to the rank of captain, and many more still before he became lieutenant-colonel.
should be sent out at once to India, and there, on the theatre of his
future operations, in the midst of the language which he was to learn,
he would better acquire it, together, with his professional knowledge."

The mover of the proposal, Mr. Hume pressed his point in reply,
emphasising at the same time that he had no ulterior motive and that
he had brought forward the motion solely from a conviction, that if
it were acted upon, it would be beneficial to the interests of the Com-
pany. He stressed the fact that the Court of Directors had not given
sufficient attention to this question and what encouragement had been
held out for the acquisition of Hindustani was hardly adequate. There
were not even a sufficient number of interpreters in the army, and many
of the corps had none1. In refutation of the argument that the offi-
cers would learn the Indian languages on their own initiative, he said
that, unless some encouragement was given, they would not take the
trouble of doing so2. As for the argument that the morals of the
young men would be endangered by a residence in London or Edin-
burgh, while attending lectures or studies in Hindustani, it was, as Mr.
Hume said, ridiculous. No such danger existed, and the assertion of
it was a shallow argument for sending out young men unfit to discharge
their duties efficiently. There were many excellent seminaries in
London and its vicinity, where young men might be instructed in
Hindustani, and the Company could take advantage of them3. In
any case, it was extremely necessary that young men whose imme-
diate services were required, should go out fully qualified, especially
in time of war, when they joined their regiments in two or three weeks
after their arrival in India. As to the argument that a junior subal-
tern could not be promoted before a period of fifteen or sixteen years,
Mr. Hume cited his own case as an instance to the contrary, where an
ensign, the day after his appointment to the regiment, took the command
of a company. And this must have been the case in many instances,

1. There were about fifty "golandaz corps" without any interpreter at all. The
Bengal artillery was without one interpreter.
2. Even the reward of Rs. 150 was inadequate as an inducement to an officer
learning an Indian language.
3. It was a fact that the experiment of teaching them Hindustani in India had
been tried with little or no success. A cadet corps had been established in one Presidency
in the conviction that the cadets sent out to India were not qualified for immediate service;
but this had proved abortive.
for field-officers could not take the command of a company; and where there were few captains, ensigns were necessarily promoted. In the end, Mr. Hume openly criticised the attitude of the Directors who unworthily and selfishly sacrificed the interests of the Company to their own private views.

The Chairman summed up the debate before putting the motion to the Court. He agreed that though there might be a difference of opinion as to the expediency of the proposed measure, there could be but one as to the general importance of the question. But, he maintained that Mr. Hume's contention that the European officers of the Indian army had not industry enough to acquire a knowledge of Hindustani, which was indispensable to a due performance of their duties, "a very pointed libel on the army of India". He said that the Indian army did possess men who were no less remarkable for bravery in battle than for a knowledge of the feelings and habits of the Indian people. "I think it very unfair", he remarked, "that such a libel against the army of India should go abroad uncontradicted". These words of the Chairman who was a Director himself had the desired effect, and when the motion was put at last, it was declared negatived on a show of hands. The powerful and eloquent advocacy of Mr. Hume and his friends proved to be of no effect.

A perusal of the proceedings of the Court of Proprietors brings out the fact that the Directors were little inclined to give due attention to the excellent proposal of Mr. Hume, for that would have involved considerable expenditure. It was known at this time that several hundred young men were waiting to be sent out to India as officers. What Mr. Hume and his friends wanted was that these young cadets should be made to learn the rudiments of Hindustani, so that they could do without the aid of interpreters. One could have differed with the mover as to the mode in which this instruction was to be provided, but surely there could be no difference on the principle of the

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1. In Cutch, where once a number of troops were stationed, there were only two Captains in the corps and four companies were entrusted to the command of an ensign of only a few weeks' standing.
2. G. Marjoribanks, Esqr.
   Proceedings, January 25, 1826.
motion itself. The manner in which the motion was negatived was illustrative of the general lack of an understanding of the need for the teaching of Hindustani to the European officers. The public agitation set up\(^1\) by Dr. J. B. Gilchrist also proved ineffective, even though he was well known in London as a teacher of Hindustani and Persian. In his public letters on the Hindustani lectures, he vainly argued that any officer who knew nothing of the Indian vernacular was "unfit for any active service."

Mr. Hume's speech is of the utmost interest not merely because his reasoning was cogent, but because it throws light on the grave inconveniences and difficulties resulting from ignorance of the Indian vernacular. His revelation that the Burmese War had arisen partly out of a misunderstanding, originating from a want of a competent knowledge of the Hindustani language, was as interesting as it was surprising. At any rate, he convincingly demonstrated that the officers were generally not acquainted with the Indian languages. The very fact that it was found necessary to appoint interpreters in the army proved that the officers were ignorant of the Indian vernacular. If most of the officers had possessed a working knowledge of the Indian languages, there would have been no need for interpreters. They were evidently appointed as a medium of communication between the officers and the people, from the want of which the most undesirable results had been known to proceed. It is true that the officers of the Bengal army were better acquainted with the Indian languages than the officers of other Presidencies. But, on the whole, the officers had to depend on the interpreters who often misled their masters. In spite of the cogency of Mr. Hume's pleading, the majority of the Court of Proprietors voted against the motion from a mistaken belief that the teaching of Hindustani would be a costly affair and that the Company could not incur the due expenditure. A really sound proposal was thus rejected from consideration of petty economy.

\(^1\) Letter from Dr. J.B. Gilchrist to the Court of Directoors, June 30, 1828. He advocated in the course of this letter that a knowledge of the Indian languages was essential for "the present prosperity and future salvation of British India".
KASI CHERTY

By

Sri K. D. Swaminathan, M.A., Ootacamund

During the first quarter of the Nineteenth century (A.C. 1800-1825), embezzlement of public money as well as extensive combinations among the native servants of the East India Company, for purposes of fraud, bribery and corruption occurred frequently in the Coimbatore District. Combinations on the part of native servants in the Police and Judicial Departments, to prevent the Collection of revenue and to attack the conduct and character of public officers, with a view to bring them into discredit were also prevalent. We get detailed information about these embezzlements in the records relating to the Coimbatore District, preserved in the Government Records Office at Madras.

It was during the regime of Mr. William Garrow, Collector of the Coimbatore District (between 16th July, 1802,¹ and 20th January, 1815) the misconduct of the native servants was at its highest and uncontrollable level. A Treasurer stationed at Bhavani swallowed public money to an extent of 50,000 pagodas. The Collector gave necessary instructions to safeguard the Treasury and also to institute an enquiry into the case.² A customs official named Sabāpathy Mudali collected certain sums due to the Government and failed to account for an amount of 426 pagodas. The Collector proceeded against him to recover the amount and secured an order for his confinement. The principal manager in the Tobacco Department, Sitaram Singh made certain unauthorised changes in the establishment under him, with a view to increase the pay of his own relations. The Collector suspended him and took charge of the records.³ In the Karur Division, the Tahsildar, allowed one Gopala-kṛṣṇa Chetty to be in charge of three distinct offices, thereby giving room for grave frauds and abuses. The Collector promptly

³. Miscellaneous Correspondence, Vol. 625, p.51ff.
removed Gōpālakrishṇa Chetty from two of his situations and imposed a fine of one month's salary on the Tahsildar. Again the Tahsildar of Perundurai Annavaiah by name, made unauthorised collections from the inhabitants of Perundurai and other villages in his jurisdiction, amounting to a sum of 32,000 pagodas. Yet another Tahsildar, of Andoor, Sāraṅgapāṇi Pillay fabricated certain false receipts in the Tobacco Department.

Another native servant, Kasi Chetty, who was the Treasurer of Mr. William Garrow, figures very prominently as the most notorious and high-handed forger of the district. We have no means of ascertaining the early career of Kasi Chetty up to the time of his becoming the Treasurer of the Collector. The first reference to him is in a letter from the Board dated 17-3-1814, wherein a certain Sabāpathy Mudali, presents a complaint making certain allegations against the Treasurer Kasi Chetty and the Collector Mr. Garrow to the Zillah Judge at Coimbatore. According to the petition, Kasi Chetty, who was managing the transactions of the Collector, had been making unauthorised collections and had been directing the appellant and other native servants to make such collections with the express consent of the Collector. Obviously Sabāpathi Mudali wanted to get out of the entanglement and hence he seems to have accused the Collector also.

It would be interesting to sketch in vivid detail the various items of fraud and forgery of this person Kasi Chetty. In April 1814, Swamy Chetty, a merchant of Coimbatore, represented to the Government about the utter mismanagement of the Collectorate and tobacco monopoly, by Kasi Chetty, to whom the Collector had entrusted all his duties. Kasi Chetty, was represented as making unauthorised levies, engaging himself in private trade utilising public servants as also the facsimile of Mr. Garrow to suit his own purpose. The Government promptly ordered an enquiry into the incidents, and the Judge and Magistrate, who was asked to investi-

1. Miscellaneous correspondence Vol. 608, p. 149.
2. Letters from the Board, Vol. 583, p. 244 ff.
5. Ibid., pp. 1-25
gate, established the truth of the conspiracies. Kasi Chetty also advanced a sum of 13,000 pagodas for purchase of Tobacco without any voucher and without the knowledge of the Collector, in March 1815. The Tobacco Department was under the management of Sitaram Singh, Kasi Chetty’s man, who committed serious abuses in the department and appropriated considerable sums of public money. He was subsequently suspended. Kasi Chetty also seems to have gone to the extent of instituting a prosecution against the Collector as also to persuade one Gōpāla Ayan (Ayyan) to do a similar thing.

In August 1815, a representation was made to the Government by the discharged and discontented monigars, possibly at the instance of Kasi Chetty, accusing the Collector of making unauthorised collections to an extent of 5,30,000 pagodas. The Board, found that there was absolutely no truth in the allegations made against Mr. Garrow and concluded that the complaints were the outcome of a conspiracy that existed in the District against Mr. Garrow. The Board was however suspicious of Kasi Chetty and ordered an investigation into the charges made against him. Kasi Chetty also illegally deputed some persons to Tuticorin to buy pearls for his own use and private trade by issuing passports to them under the signature of Mr. Garrow. He further removed a sum of 8,000 pagodas from the Treasury Chest for trading in pearls and also used the Collector’s stamps to issue his own orders. Subsequently Mr. Bell, the acting Collector in charge placed him under suspension pending orders from the Board. The Tahsildar of Palladam was also suspended for having suppressed letters and orders issued by Kasi Chetty, so that the charges may not be proved against him. Sāraṅgapāṇi Pillay, the Tahsildar of Andoor was also charged and confined for having fabricated certain false receipts in the Tobacco Department and also for refusing to deliver certain accounts relating to embezzlements made by Kasi Chetty.

2. Letters to the Board, Vol. 608, p. 50-51
Kasi Chetty seems to have issued several orders to several Tahsildars in the District. These go to show the enormous influence the man wielded. He practically exercised the powers of the Collector and the whole establishment of public servants were in awe of him. He seems to have held the rents of sixty-seven villages either solely or jointly besides obtaining fraudulently the decenniel rents and receiving illegal gratifications from the monigars.\(^1\) He is also reported to have embezzled 42,000 *pagodas* from the money advanced for tank repairs in Fasli-years 1218-24.\(^2\) Another sum of 42,000 *pagodas* was swindled by him in the Maramat Department.\(^3\) A fraud for about 1,31,000 *pagodas* in the Tobacco Department was also proved against him in November 1815.\(^4\) An idol and silver bull, belonging to the Tiruvaṇṇāmalai temple also seem to have been appropriated by Kasi Chetty, issuing false orders.\(^5\) He amassed so much of public money that it was very easy for him to acquire properties in almost all the districts of the Madras Presidency, like Malabar, Coimbatore, Madras, Southern Division of Arcot, Tanjore and Tinnevelly. All these frauds resulted in a diminution of the revenue for the District for the Fasli year 1225 and the Board asked the Collector to explain the causes for it.

In 1815, the acting Collector Mr. Bell commenced an enquiry into the charges made against Annavaiah, the Tahsildar of Perundurai. This enquiry throws some side light on the further frauds committed by Kasi Chetty. Annavaiah wanted to hush up the enquiry by bribing the officers but the Collector was shrewd enough to trap the Tahsildar when he was actually handing over the money. According to the deposition of the Tahsildar, the extra collections were made under the express and positive orders of Kasi Chetty, through whose interest he had secured the position of Tahsildar. Further he deposed that a sum of 32,000 *pagodas* was collected at different times and paid into the hands of Kasi Chetty's relations. The remarks of the Collector on the orders issued by Kasi Chetty are worth quoting:

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"I have now in my possession very many written orders bearing the signature of Kasi Chetty addressed to Perundurai as well as other Tahsildars, extremely peremptory, and actually imposing heavy fines upon them for not complying with his various orders, a considerable portion of which is more strict and positive even than any, I have ever thought proper or found occasion to issue."  

The Board, however, wanted the Collector to explain as to how Kasi Chetty came to possess the seal of Mr. Garrow and authorised him to commit Kasi Chetty to trial before the Court of Circuit for forgery as also to ascertain the extent of embezzlement and fraud committed on the public revenue or on the Government, by public servants and the extent of the private extra collections made from individuals for corrupt purposes or for the benefit of individuals in situations of public trust. Two Sheristadars, were also sanctioned for this enquiry into the abuses of the District.

In September 1815, the Board gave instructions to the Collector for the recovery of 13,000 pagodas mismanaged by Kasi Chetty in the Tobacco Department. The then Assistant Collector Mr. Whish was made personally responsible for the amounts that may not be recoverable from Kasi Chetty. Towards the end of November 1815, the whole property of Kasi Chetty in Coimbatore, Malabar and Madras were attached and he was confined to Jail. In December, the Collectors of Arcot and Tanjore were instructed to confiscate the properties of Kasi Chetty in their districts. Further more he was also committed to trial before the Court of Circuit for suborning people to forge receipts with a view to cheat the government.

In September 1816, Kasi Chetty after obtaining his release on bail, had the audacity to question the legality of his confinement as also the validity of the demands against him. He filed a complaint against the Collector in the Provincial Court. The Government rightly decided to defend the suit at public expense.  

4. Ibid., Vol. 585, p. 163 ff.
the Collector reported to the Board the extent of money recovered till then by the sale and attachment of Kasi Chetty’s properties and the extent to which he was hopeful of recovering to make good the embezzled amounts. He further made the Board appreciate the great caution with which he proceeded in the matter and also explained to them the nature of the defence to be put up in the Court with regard to Kasi Chetty’s complaints against him and the company.¹

In March 1817, the properties of Kasi Chetty in the Arcot Division were attached and the Collector of the Southern Division of Arcot was instructed to receive into his treasury all the sums collected by the Amin deputed to attach the properties. In September, Mr. J. Forbes, Judge of Salem was appointed to conduct the defence of the case by Kasi Chetty.² Mr. Forbes was to be the deciding officer to frame the mode of proceedings to be urged upon the Court in the case. The task of the Government to bring Kasi Chetty to book was by no means easy. The Court considered the several suits for recovery of embezzled amounts as separate demands or charges against Kasi Chetty and it refused to consider them all as a single suit for damages. The Court proposed to enquire first into the Maramat embezzlement. Further the several embezzlements by Kasi Chetty were intermingled and it was very difficult for the Collector, Mr. Sullivan to adduce separate evidence for each charge. Meanwhile, Mr. Forbes was transferred to Malabar and Mr. E.H. Woodcock was appointed in his place.³ Hence the Collector had to acquaint the new officer with all the details of the case. Again certain private documents and accounts, which would have gone to prove that Kasi Chetty was guilty of the charges, were rejected by the Court on the ground that they were not officially authenticated and that they were seized from Kasi Chetty’s house. The Collector stressed the importance of these documents to the case and emphasized that their authenticity could be proved from the evidence of persons, who wrote them. Further the documents came into possession of Government while attaching the properties of Kasi

¹ Letters to the Board, Vol. 610, p. 81 ff.
Chetty according to regulations. In spite of the pleadings of the Collector, the Court refused to admit the documents.¹

In December 1818, the Tahsildar of Andoor, Sârangapâni Pillay, expressed his willingness to give necessary information and evidence to prove that Kasi Chetty was guilty of high-handed crimes.² Another gentleman Mr. Tirumalai Pillay gave substantial evidence to prove the Chetty’s guilt.³ These were no doubt welcome supports to the Collector. But now Kasi Chetty filed a suit in the Supreme Court against the commissioners and the East India Company accusing the Commissioners that they had acted contrary to the rules in attaching and selling his properties and thereby putting him to great loss. He further complained that he was not responsible for any loss to the Government and that all acts done by him were under the express orders of the then Collector, (Mr. Garrow).⁴

In June 1819, the Government instructed the Collector, Mr. Sullivan to devote himself solely to assist the Government Solicitor in defending Kasi Chetty’s suit and appointed another officer Mr. Cockburn, to look after the Collectorate of Coimbatore.⁵ Finding that the Government was bent upon establishing his guilt and was sparing no efforts to gain him, Kasi Chetty presented a motion to the Provincial Court, in September 1820, praying for leave to withdraw the prosecution against the Collector and instituted similar proceedings in the Supreme Court.⁶ The Government authorities were very strict and stubborn, and they appointed Mr. James Munro to oppose the withdrawal of the suit by Kasi Chetty.⁷ In November 1820, the Provincial Court allowed Kasi Chetty to withdraw his suit against the Collector, in spite of objections from the Government vakil. An appeal against the decision of the Provincial Court was made by the Collector in consultation with Mr. Munro.⁸

¹. Letters to the Board, Vol. 611, p. 275 ff.
³. Ibid. Vol. 613, p. 184 ff. Tirumalai Pillay was later granted a pension of Rs. 35 a month for the valuable help he gave in tracking Kasi Chetty.
⁵. Ibid., p. 164 ff.
Meanwhile Kasi Chetty was able to produce security bonds executed by several persons to a demand of 1,86,471-37-37 pagodas pending against him and the Provincial Court laid down that Kasi Chetty and his sureties can be proceeded with as if no suit had been instituted\(^1\) and dismissed the case. The Board asked the Collector to take steps for the recovery of the dues from Kasi Chetty and also to confine him in jail once more. The Collector duly instructed the Zillah Judge to proceed in recovering the dues in default as also the cost of the suit.\(^2\) In November 1821, the Zillah Judge promptly executed a warrant to place Kasi Chetty in Jail\(^3\) and also for the attachment of the properties of Kasi Chetty's sureties, as it was difficult to collect the dues out of Kasi Chetty's property alone.

In December 1821, Kasi Chetty presented a petition to the Board stating that an amount of 2,30,000 pagodas was due to him from Periyasamy Chetty, a private merchant stationed at Madras and that he was unable to proceed against him as he was imprisoned. The Collector rightly forwarded it to the Board recommending measures to enforce the just demands due to Kasi Chetty and further more to adjust all such amounts recovered towards his dues to the Government.\(^4\)

Thus Kasi Chetty was perpetrating a system of palpable and notorious fraud begun and carried on in direct violation of standing orders of the Collector and it took nearly seven years for the Government to detect and punish his frauds. This case of Kasi Chetty should, serve as an eye-opener to many a Collector of the modern day who pin much faith and trust on their treasurers.

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1. Letters to the Board, Vol 613, p. 90 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 186.
3. Ibid., pp. 208 and 228.
4. Ibid. p. 249-1
THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
IN MAHARASHTRA (I)

By

Dr. Brij Kishore, M. A., Ph. D.

Aurangzib and his mission in the South

Aurangzib breathed free in the north after the death of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh and Maharaja Jaswant Singh, the twin pillars of infidelity in Hindustan. But brave Durgadas Rathor appeared as a comet in the political sky of Hindustan and roused the Rajputs to arms for shaking off the Mughal yoke. He had drawn to his side Aurangzib’s favourite son, Mohammed Akbar, by dangling before him the prospect of making a Shahjahan of his own father. When worsted in fight and diplomacy by the astute Aurangzib, Durgadas pushed the storm centre to the south by escorting the rebellious Prince Akbar to the court of Shambhuji in June, 1681. Aurangzib made peace with Mewar and hurried across the Narmada with the intention of giving a finale to his project of making India a dar-ul-Islam by crushing the Kafirs and the schismatic shias of Bijapur and Golconda.

Victory followed upon victory. Bijapur fell in September, 1686, & a year after that Golconda ceased to exist. The Maratha Kingdom under the headstrong, cruel & vicious Shambhuji showed signs of final collapse. With an enemy like Aurangzib in front he waged a fruitless war against the Portuguese of Goa. He alienated by his vicious character the old council of Eight Ministers of his father’s regime, and raised to the highest position a poet and flatterer from the North, Kavi Kalash contemptuously called Kalusha, to the utter disgust of the Maratha nobles. Every one trembled for his fate on account of his cruel and vindictive nature. Of the old nobles only Senapati Hambir Rao Mohitè managed to keep his head on his shoulders. His daughter, Tara Bai, married to the captive Prince, Rajaram, remained a sort of hostage for her father. He died in a battle with Aurangzib’s Bijapur general, Rustam Khan, near Wai in October, 1687. Shambhuji felt utterly helpless after the death of his commander-in-chief.
Instead of taking the field in person he, under the influence of his evil genius the Kanaujiya Kavi Kalash, began drinking the cup of voluptuous pleasure to its lees, away from the reach of the Mughals. But his days were numbered.

Meanwhile Aurangzib had been drawing his net closer around Shambhují and ravaging the Maratha country most mercilessly. The lynx-eyed old Emperor had espied all the rents and holes of the Maharashtra polity and had taken full advantage of the inherent defects of the Maratha character. Maratha national unity brought about by Shivaji proved only a passing phase of their political career. Almost every Maratha calculated the interest of the nation only in terms of his own loss and gain. He had little scruples in going over to the side of the Mughals for good pay and handsome jagir. His love for his religion had not that totalitarian hold and appeal which Islam had upon the followers of the Prophet. By 1688 Aurangzib had as many Marathas fighting for him as those against him. Many of them cared more for their immediate deliverance from the tyranny of Shambhují than from the political servitude under the Mughals. But Aurangzib over shot his mark in the very hour of triumph.

Fate of Shambhují and his family

Disaffection and treason stared Shambhují on all sides throughout his short and inglorious reign. Many leading Maratha chiefs had been put to death by him and more were behind the prison bars of his hill fortresses. Though in the grip of a life and death struggle with the Mughal Emperor, the Maratha nation headed by Shambhují seemed indifferent or helpless in the face of the enemy. After having taken a vengeance on the shirkés for their attack on the devilish Kalusha, Shambhují retired with his favourite to the beautiful retreat of Sangmeshwar with only a few companions of his debauchery. Aurangzib’s general, Sheikh Nizam, got the news at Kolhapur and making a swoop on the unsuspecting Sambhují captured him and Kalusha on February 1, 1689.

The son of Shivaji recovered his true self under the torture of the Mughal prison. Aurangzib as usual offered him the choice of a cruel death or a comfortable vassalage on the condition of his conversion to Islam. Shambhují fell foul upon the prophet of Islam and de-
manded a daughter of Aurangzib in marriage having been determined to court death, which alone could expiate for his sins against his people and deprive Aurangzib of the fruits of his triumph. Shambhuji’s limbs were torn to pieces and given to dogs; but his spirit laughed at the fury of Aurangzib. No worse character in history was made a greater martyr, nor court death for a better cause. Aurangzib was for a while deceived by appearances and thought that he had killed a nation by cutting off the head that wore its crown. There was rejoicing in the Mughal Camp and gloom and despair at Raigarh which sheltered the surviving members of Shivaji’s family.

Thick clouds of evil omen descended on the land of Maharashtra when the news of the terrible fate of Shambhuji spread like wildfire to every Maratha home. “It seemed as if Shivaji and the men whom he had led to victory, had lived and died in vain. The great deluge, against which Shahji and Shivaji had struggled to protect the country for over sixty years, now swept over the land, carrying everything before it, and there seemed no sign of any possible resistance.” However, the unappeased spirit of Shambhuji seemed to cry for blood, more blood—blood of the children of Maharashtra as oblations to the altar of liberty, which no tyrant dare overthrow. Old enmities were forgotten and though everything was lost, there was hope in every brave heart stirred up by the call of their country to fight the Mughal Empire to its finish.

Prompt decisions were taken at the fort of Raigarh. Eight days after the capture of Shambhuji Changoji Ketkar, the Qiladar of Raigarh, and another official, Yesaji Kank, released Rajaram from prison and seated him on the throne in consultation, apparently, with Yesu Bai, widow of Shambhuji and the mother of the infant Sahahu. Prahlad Niraji, Manaji More and other political prisoners were set free. They formed the council of the new sovereign to decide on the future line of action. The Mughal army laid siege to Raigarh on March 25, 1689, and its fall was only a question of days. Of resources for resistance there were hardly any; the field army was scattered like atoms over a wide area and broken down in morale under the shock of the calamity; fort out of repairs and without provisions, the public treasury was empty, and the new king was without any territory beyond the walls of some of his forts which had not so far fallen
to the Mughals. In short, Shivaji’s kingdom was a thing of the past and a new one was to be created out of the wreckage of the old. At such a crisis came forward a Brahman, Prahlad Niraji, son of the deceased Nyayadhish and diplomat, Niraji Ravji, to attempt the impossible. Everything would have come to a deadlock but for the noble self-sacrifice of the heroic Yesu Bai, widow of Shambhuji. She offered to remain with her son at Raigarah and court a fate perhaps worse than death should the fortress fall. She insisted that Raja-ram should assume full regal powers and headship of the national struggle and escape from Raigarah for her sake and the future of her son. The emergency council at Raigarah further decided that should Maharasthra become unsafe for Rajaram, he should fly to Karnatak on the East coast and make the Mughals fight on two fronts. They “planned their measures with wisdom, unanimity and firmness” at this terrible national crisis.

Before the death of Shambhuji, Aurangzib had already taken the forts of Saler and Trimbak. By the end of May of the fateful year 1689 Raigarah, Rohida, Torna, Kalyan and Mahuli had also fallen to him. Thus, in the words of Saqi Must’ad Khan, the author of the Maaśī “the forts taken by the imperialists in 1689 were too many to be named.” In north Konkan his able agent, Matbar Khan, was on the high tide of success, taking fort after fort. Aurangzib pressed the siege of Raigarah with great vigour but since food and fodder could be grown within this massive fort it could hold out for long. The treachery of man, however, opened its door to the enemy much earlier than expected. Although Aurangzib had provided Itiqad Khan with ali that he wanted, the Khan knew the gravity of his position and hence had taken resort to diplomacy to expedite his success. One of the defenders, Suryaji, cared more for his personal aggrandisement than for the national cause. He opened the gates of the fort on the condition that he was given the Deshmukhi of Wai by the Emperor. The inevitable befell the lot of Yesu Bai and her son. Raigarah fell to the arms of Zulfiqar Khan on November 3, 1689, and the royal prisoners were carried to the camp of Aurangzib in honour and in safety. Better sense and political wisdom had dawned on Aurangzib, who regretted the frustration of his policy by the execution of Shambhuji. Yesu Bai and her child were kept in honourable captivity as pawns of diplomacy against the fugitive Rajaram and his partisans.
Arrangements made for the Governance of Maharashtra during the absence of the Regent

Rajaram and his wives bade their last farewell to noble Yesu Bai at Raigarh on April 5, 1689, and started on a new journey, a life of suffering but of freedom. They first came to Pratapgarh and thence to Panhala for safety. With Rajaram had come away Ramchandra Nilkanth, Prahlad Niraji and Shankraji Malhar to rouse the country to arms. Their desultory fighting lessened the pressure on Raigarh, which held out bravely till Rajaram was safely beyond the reach of the Mughals on his way to Jinji.

Before his departure from Maharashtra, it appears that a Council of Regency had been constituted for the administration of the home territory and for carrying on war with the Mughals on the western front. Ramchandra Nilkanth was made the executive head of this Council with vast powers and the title of Hukumatpanah. Such assumption of absolute authority by the Amatya over his equals was sure to cause heart-burning and dissensions among the Maratha chiefs. So, Tara Bai, the senior most among the wives of Rajaram, seems to have been appointed the titular head of this Council to disarm the jealousy of the self-centred Maratha chiefs.* She was only fourteen at the time; but she was after all the daughter of the deceased Senapati, Hambir Rao Mohité. Tara Bai seems to have been neither a cipher nor a clog to the wheel in the Royal Council. She knew the worth of Ramchandra Nilkanth and her own insecure position too well to interfere directly. Unfortunately no documents throw light on this period of Tara Bai's first experiment with politics and diplomacy.

Rajaram left Panhala with a picked following in September, 1689, to take shelter in the strong fortress of Jinji, 60 miles south-east of Madras and 40 miles inside from the coast of Pondicherry. The party travelled under various disguises, and a vivid description of the perilous journey is given in the Chitnis Bakhar and by Kesho Pandit, who seems to have been an eye-witness, in a small Sanskrit tract, Rajaram Charitam, lately discovered in the Saraswati Mahal Library at Tanjore. Hotly pursued by the Mughal officers, whose vigilance was commanded by the Emperor, he safely reached Jinji on November

*See Appendix.
15, 1689. He was well received in the Karnatak, and received special attention at the hands of the Rani of Bednur and his cousin, Shahji II of Tanjore. At Jinji he had to snatch power from the unwilling hands of his step-sister, Harji Mahadik’s widow.

**Maharashtra after Rajaram’s Departure for Jinji**

The combined exertions of the statesmen and the generals headed by Rajaram brought into being a force of 40,000, which though too small to face Aurangzib in the open field, was big enough for creating mischief and for fighting a hit-and-run sort of warfare with the Mughals. Establishing their base at Phalton they issued forth in small and highly mobile batches to harry the Emperor’s march. One such raid organized by Santa aimed at killing Aurangzib in the midst of his army at Koregaon. Although the raid failed to compass the death of Aurangzib, it gave to the Mughals the foretaste of what was to come next and also went a long way in rehabilitating the lost morale of the Marathas. Shaikh Nizam, the Captor of Shambhuji, was routed when he was going to besiege Rajaram at Panhala. Dhanaji repelled an attack on his base at Phalton. But these brilliant raids could not hide for long the pitiable state to which the Maratha State was reduced. After Rajaram’s departure the position was very bleak. The country’s fortune was at its lowest ebb. The civil and military arrangements of Shivaji’s time had collapsed; the soldiers were not paid regularly; the hill forts were not properly garrisoned or provisioned; and district revenues were farmed out to the highest bidder. Most of the forts and practically all the open country was in Mughal hands. The child king, Shahu, and his mother were prisoners in the Mughal camp. Resourceless and penniless how were they to drive Aurangzib’s grand army back to Hindustan?

**The New Maratha Court at Jinji**

Rajaram reached Jinji as a fugitive and as a lack-land prince with the twin purpose of diverting the Mughal army from his kingdom of Poona and re-taking the Bijapur and Golkonda Kingdoms with the help of the Nayaks.

In obedience to the instructions of Yasu Bai Rajaram assumed the ensigns of royalty and appointed the Council of Ministers, the Ashta Pradhan, with an additional member added to its original strength in
Shivaji’s time. This new post, the ninth one, of Pratinidhi was created for Prahlad Niraji who continued to be the principal counsellor of Rajaram. People from all parts flocked to Jinji in quest of titles and grants of Vatan-lands and Rajaram being anxious to add to his following obliged every body as best as he could. From the financial point of view his liberality was ill-advised. Rajaram had fled from Maharashtra with bare life; no regular revenue was coming to his exchequer and so his financial difficulties were great. In their extreme penury the Maratha government sold the fort of Tevenapatam (afterwards Fort St. David) with a gun-shot of land around it to the English.

Rajaram had left behind his wives in Maharashtra and was living at Jinji with concubines. One of them, Saguna Bai, gave birth to a son, who was given the name of Karna. The child being very handsome Rajaram was greatly attached to him, and it was feared that he might even be nominated Rajaram’s successor. Martin, who was in close and constant touch with the court at Jinji, says that Prahlad Niraji threw Rajaram into a life of debauchery and kept the young king constantly intoxicated by the habitual use of Ganja and opium.

The Mughal Policy of Terrorisation, Massacres, Bribery and Forced Conversions

The wily Aurangzib could not fail to take the utmost advantage of this psychological hour when the Maratha nation was badly in the grips of despair. This was, thought he, the time when he could give the final blow to the nascent Maratha State already tottering on its feet and thereby crush once for ever the urge for national liberation so carefully nursed in the Maratha hearts by Shivaji. To this end he directed all the resources of war and diplomacy at his command. His keen eye could not miss the rent and holes of the Maratha polity and he had put his finger on the weakest point of the Maratha character. Bent upon crushing the newly created sense of nationality in the inhabitants of the Peninsula he began a virtual reign of terror in the Deccan. Mass massacres, forced conversions, arson and loot became the order of the day. Most of the Maratha country was turned into a barren land where a tree or blade of grass could not be seen for miles.
Side by side with force he tried diplomacy and bribery as well. He knew the raging unscrupulousness of the Maratha character and their greed for Vatan-lands or hereditary rights of revenue collection in land. With a lavish hand he distributed Jagir-lands among them and employed other means to win over to his side as many of them as he could. The skin-deep patriotism of many of them easily succumbed to his temptations and by the time the first round of the war of National Liberation began as many Maratha leaders were fighting for him as against him. His gold, dresses of honour and Sanads for Vatans had worked havoc on the patriotism of the Maratha Sardars.

The Akhbarat and the Maasir make brief references about the Maratha Sardars who were in the Mughal camp for various reasons. The Jadhavs of Sindkhked were Mughal nobles since the time of Shah Jahan. Persecuted by Shambhuji, Kanhoji Shirkè and his sons had fled to the Mughals where they were eagerly received and given high posts. Nagoji Manè (the Thanadar of Mhaswad), Avji Adhal (Thanadar of Thanapur), Ramchandra (Thanadar of Khatau), Baharji Pandhere (sometime Thanadar of Kashigaon), Kanhoji of Utroli, the Jagdale of Masur Thana, Manaji and Subhanji (the ex-Commander of Satara) and his son were some of the Maratha Sardars who rendered long and meritorious services to the Mughals. Another important Mughal partisan, who was frequently mentioned in the court bulletins, was Satva Daslè of Athni. He had a very chequered career; sometimes he was in this camp and sometimes in that. The other turn-coat like Daslè was Amrit Rao Nimbalkar. The Akhbarat and the Maasir-i-Alamgiri also mention two close relations of Shivaji, Achalji and Madhaji Narayan, who joined Aurangzib. The treacherous behaviour of Suryaji Pinal has already been mentioned. The anti-national activities of persons such as these evoked from Rajaram those bitter remarks which he made in a letter addressed to Baji Sarzarao Jedhé Deshmukh of Kari on March 22, 1690. "In fact", writes Rajaram, "the enemy is nothing of himself: it is people like you who have raised him into that importance. If our Marathas had not joined him, he would have been nowhere..........

Aurangzib followed a calculated policy of terrorisation and forced conversions. He converted Netaji and Sabaji Ghatgé, Janoji
Rajé and several Brahmans to Islam. He offered liberty to Shambhuji on the condition of his conversion to Islam. The sword of conversion always hanged loose on the head of Shahu and later on when the Emperor was in his camp at Poona Shahu's conversion, to the great dismay of himself and his mother, was almost decided. Shahu was saved with great difficulty through the intercession of Zinat-un-Nisa Begam but only when two sons of Senapati Pratap Rao Gujar—Khandoji and Jagjiwan—offered themselves for conversion in place of Shahu.

The Reversal of the Administrative Policy of Shivaji

This was the situation which the leaders of the newly launched movement for national liberation had to face. Tara Bai and Ramchandra in Maharashtra and Rajaram and his Ashta pradhan at Jinji were busy forging the weapons with which to strike the mighty Mughal. The Maratha State was in the melting-pot; feudalism was too deeply ingrained in the Maratha character. The undercurrent of discontent against the centralised despotism of Shivaji and Shambhuji was coming to the surface. Rajaram and his advisers found the wise arrangements of Shivaji unworkable, and so making virtue of a necessity they initiated the system of feudal decentralization. Rajaram lavishly conferred Saranjam and Valans on all those who went to him at Jinji. Sometimes the assigned lands were in the Mughal territory in Maharashtra or Karnatak and the recipients thereof were expected to turn their de jure grants into de facto possessions. It was no doubt an incentive to make people work for gain. The creation of Valans and the grant of Saranjams worked a miracle. There sprang up out of void as it were, a large army to fight the Mughals on their own account without any financial liabilities to the Maratha State. The State got, moreover, a stipulated share of loot and revenue. The authors of it were not altogether ignorant of the inherent defects of the system but they had no other means to combat Aurangzib's similar activities. Once the mischief was, however, done it could not be stopped or controlled and ultimately proved one of the main causes of the ruin of the Maratha State.

The Maratha Strategy and their Recovery in Maharashtra

Having seen Rajaram safe at Jinji the Maratha leaders had set about putting their plans of defence and offence in execution. They-
clearly saw that their only hope of survival lay in widening the area of their operations and in the decentralisation of their forces. “Decentralisation of authority was exactly suited to the situation in Maharashtra. The Maratha captains, each acting on his own account, carried on a guerilla warfare (as described in Chitnis ii 43-45) and caused the greatest loss and disturbance to the Mughal territories. The imperialists did not know what point to defend, nor where to find a vital enemy position for their attack. The extremely mobile Maratha bands covered long distances and delivered attack at the most unexpected quarters; and such roving bands were countless. The result was universal unrest throughout the Deccan”. The country between Maharashtra and Jinji was infested by free-lance marauders headed by Babaji and his brother Rupaji Bhonslé. Their depredations were popularly known as “Bhale-rai” or spear rule. They were a menace to the country and were making the Maratha hated and unpopular. Ramchandra and Santaji tactfully absorbed this mass of roving Maratha soldiery into their own armies and thus forged a double-edged sword to strike at the Mughals and augment their own hands against rivals.

The first fruits of this strategy were gathered in May, 1690, when Ramchandra, Shankraji, Dhanaji and Santaji inflicted a crushing defeat on Sharza Khan alias Rustam Khan and captured him alive with his family, baggage, horses and elephants while reconnoitring near Satara with a large force. Aurangzib deputed Firuz Jang and Siddi Abdul Qadir to retrieve the lost position and to secure the release of Rustam Khan. The Siddi was looted and injured by Rupaji Bhonslé while going to join Firuz Jang. Rustam had to secure his liberty by promising to pay ransom of a lakh of rupees and gave his mother and eldest son as hostages for the payment. In the course of the year 1690 Ramchandra and Shankraji recovered the famous forts of Pratapgarh, Rohida, Rajgarh and Torna.

Shortly after the defeat of Rustam Khan another officer, Lutfulla, was sent by Aurangzib as the Thanadar of Khatau (25 miles east of Satara) charged with the commission of occupying and restoring order in the north Satara district. Immediately on arrival he was attacked by Santaji on the 6th July but the attack
was repulsed with loss to the Marathas, who, however, rallied round and led by Dhanaji, Dafile, Moré and others again attacked the Khan with a force of over twenty thousand near Piliv (12 miles east of Mhasvad). A sharp but indecisive action took place in which both sides suffered heavily. The Marathas suffered a temporary set-back.

After a short period of inactivity the Maratha raids revived in 1692. Their efforts gradually gained momentum and the first concrete result was the recapture of Panhala by Parashuram Trimbak in 1692. Santa also made constant raids on the vast and tempting plains of Bijapur from his base in the Mahadev hill. The important Mughal out-post of Akhluj was infested by the Marathas and when Prince Muizz-ud-din, who was sent there to drive them away, could effect nothing, Lutfulla was sent to clear the country between Bijapur and the Bhima. The Marathas were also creating disturbance in the Belgaon and Dharwar districts of Western Kanara. It was reported on October 8, 1692, that Dhana and Santa, at the head of a force of seven thousand, had seized some forts near Belgaon, had invested the town itself and had ravaged the neighbouring country side. The Emperor, therefore, with a view to stiffen the defence of Kanara sent three men of note—Hamid-ud-din Khan, Matlab Khan and Qasim Khan—to that region. The mughals enjoyed a brief respite as both Dhana and Santa departed with their forces for the other front in the Karnataka. Muizz-ud-din had been sent against Panhala in October, 1692, but met with various vicissitudes for several years baffling the efforts of three top-ranking Mughal generals—Muizz-du-din, Bidar Bakht and Firuz Jang.

The Maratha generals returned to the homeland in 1693 and immediately resumed their interrupted activities. With the opening of the campaigning season in October, Santaji sallied out of his retreat in the Mahadev hill and his bands swooped over the territory round about Bhupalgarh (65 miles north-west of Bijapur and 76 miles south-east of Satara). Himmat Khan rose equal to the occasion and chased and defeated Santa and his Berad allies at the village of Vikramhalli. However, in the hour of victory the Mughal generals—Himmat Khan, Hamid-ud-din Khan and Khwaja Khan—fell out among themselves and thus failed to gather the best fruits of their exertions. Santa roved about undaunted. He divided his
force: his lieutenant, Amrit Rao, moved northwards towards Berar with a force of four thousand troopers and he himself marched towards Malkhed with six thousand horsemen. But he was ultimately driven back to Mahadev hill where he lay inactive for some time. Dhanaji, Shankraji and a few other officers in the mean time had a rub with the besieging force before Panhala and although Dhanaji was defeated and driven away he succeeded in throwing in provisions into the fort. Santa was reported to be out again in Haidarabad territory on November 26, 1694. Pursued by Himmat Khan, he turned towards Bijapur but was defeated and put to flight in three successive actions—near Panur, near Naldurg and ultimately in the Raichur district which he looted. He was then pushed back to his refuge in the Mahadev hill. The Marathas blockaded the Mughal out-post of Khatau in July, 1695, but were successfully chased back in September by Hammid-ud-din to the fort of Chandan-Wandan, leaving a son of Dhanaji and another officer dead on the field. More unfortunate was the desertion of Amrit Rao, a political turn-coat, who had joined the nationalists and had raided the Mughal territory across the Bhima for some time. He went over to the Mughals with five hundred followers.

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APPENDIX

Readers of Maratha history are well aware of the important role played by Tara Bai in the annals of her country during her eventful career extending over 86 years from 1675 to 1761. But the story of her life becomes more lively when we are informed that she began her political career at the tender age of 14 when most girls of her age were still at their dolls or were serving their apprenticeship in household duties. This talented daughter of Senapati Hambirrao Mohité worked shoulder to shoulder with the veteran Ramchandra Nilkanth, when her husband, Rajaram, fled with bare life to take shelter in the strong fortress of Jinji in the Karnatak.

The general belief is that the active political career of Tara Bai began on the death of her husband in March, 1700. But the
documents which we shall forthwith discuss give the impression that she had entered politics much earlier and had enough schooling in the art of government before she came to the helm of affairs as the Regent of her infant son.

"The chief", says Khafi Khan, "then made Tara Bai, the Chief wife, and mother of one son, regent. She was a clever, intelligent woman, and had obtained a reputation during her husband's life time for her knowledge of civil and military matters." (Khafi Khan, 468). Khafi Khan is positive in his assertion that she had obtained this reputation during her husband's life time, and so this remark has nothing to do with the period of her regency after the death of her husband. The remark thus relates to the period between March, 1689 to March, 1700. During this period she was first in Maharashtra, then at Jinji and then again in Maharashtra. This reputation must have been quite wide-spread before it reached Khafi Khan in the Mughal camp, and postulates her taking part in the administration.

The version of Khafi Khan has been adopted by Sir Jadunath Sarkar: "Already in her husband's life time she had displayed masculine energy and intelligence, and begun to draw the threads of the administration into her own hands. (Sarkar: Aurangzib, Vol. V, page 200).

This view that she had taken part in the administration in the life time of her husband also finds support at the hands of a Marathi writer:—

"तेजस्विराम तत्कालिन प्रतिकूल असते ताराबाई ने महाराष्ट्रात एकाचा प्रथित रानी प्रमाणात सहज चालविला, नवरा भिंत्र असती ही हिंने रामचन्द्र पंता सारला जरब बसविली शिवाजी बो शारीर सूता।" (Bharat Varsha No. 8, year 1. Pant Pratinidhichi Bakhrivar Tippanen)

Looking into contemporary records we find that document No. 23 of the Bandha Dastir Vol. I provides evidence on which this reputation was based. This document suggests that Tara Bai had some part in the administration in 1690, i.e., when she was in Maharashtra with Ramchandra Nilkanth. The relevant portion of the text is:—

"वारा गंगा मुकाबलं जपं मनयाय एकात्मिक जय ईसापति व नूतन 'हिंदू' कार्यकीर्ती महाराज राजभी छापते साहवानी दिली होती, लयांचा विचार मनास अपेक्षा
The Arabic year given in the body of the document as it is printed in the *Bavda Daftar* Volume I is “"  " इहबे तीसैण अलक” which means 1091. The corresponding Christian year is 1690 \(= (1091 + 599 = 1690). \)

This very document is printed as No. 52 in Rajwade’s *Volume VIII* and the Arabic year given in the body of the document is “"  " इहबे तीसैण अलक” which is meaningless. This means 1001 of the Arabic year and 1600 of the Gregorian calendar. Tara Bai was not even born in 1600. So evidently through the printer’s devil “" तीसैण” has been left out in Rajwade’s volume. Of the two publications—*Bavda Daftar* and Rajwade’s volume—the *Bavda Daftar* Volume is a later publication (Published probably in 1935, edited by Sabnis) and its editor is supposed to have had knowledge of the date assigned to this document by Rajwade in his volume. In the *Bavda Daftar* the Arabic date given in the body of the document has been twice repeated as “"  " इहबे तीसैण अलक”. The Christian year given in the *Bavda Daftar* volume corresponds to the Arabic year given in the document itself but this is not the case with Rajwade. The Arabic year given in Rajwade’s volume is “"  " इहबे अलक”. The corresponding Christian year is 1600 and not 1700. It is not known on what basis Rajwade assigned the document to 1700 when the Arabic year given in the text of the document clearly indicates 1600. Rajwade was probably guided by the general belief that Tara Bai came to power only in 1700 after the death of her husband. This document, however, dispels this general belief.

It is admitted that this document is not a State document in the strict sense of the word but being a contemporary one its authenticity can be relied upon. The document is a copy of a memorandum of a decision arrived at in the *Royal Council* in 1690 and Tara Bai is also said to have taken part in the proceedings. In 1690 Rajaram was at Jinji and Tara Bai was in Maharashtra. A large number of people repaired to Jinji in quest of *Inams* and *Saranjams*. At Jinji Rajaram was a king without any territories, but in order to enlist a following he distributed *Inams* and *Saranjams* with a free hand. Most of the granted lands were in Maharashtra and so it was the local authority of that region which was to put in force the grants. The recipients of those
grants came back to Maharashtra and applied to the local authority for the enforcement of their grants. Since according to this document the decision with regard to the enforcement of these grants was given by Tara Bai and the Royal Council in 1690, it seems that there was a Royal Council of which Tara Bai, being the senior most free member of the Chhatrapati's family left behind in Maharashtra, can safely be presumed to have been at least the nominal or constitutional head. The functions of this Council might have been only advisory because Rajaram had ordered that the orders of Ramchandra Nilkanth could not be set aside even by himself.

There is one more thing which stands in the way of this document being assigned to 1700 or thereafter as Rajwade and Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai have done. In view of Rajaram's order dated February 19, 1699, there was no need for the Royal Council, headed by Tara Bai, to deal with the matter which forms the subject matter of the document in 1700 or thereafter. In this order (published as No. 144 of Rajwade's Vol. III) Rajaram on his return to Maharashtra had announced that all new Sanads granted by him were to be considered as cancelled. Dues were to be paid to the persons who held their Sanads from the time of Shivaji. All the new Sanads were to be scrutinised by the Nyayadhis, Konher Shastri. Probably the suggestion made by the Royal Council ten years ago in 1690 made Rajaram to adopt this course on his return to Maharashtra. When the Nyayadhis was the competent authority for the scrutiny of these Sanads why the Royal Council should have wasted its time about this matter in 1700 or thereafter.

On the basis of this evidence it may perhaps be safely assumed that the teenager Tara Bai was the nominal head of the Council which Rajaram seems to have established for the Governance of Maharashtra proper when he himself left for Jinji. Ramchandra Nilkanth was no doubt appointed the Chief Executive Officer with the title of "Hukumatpanah" and was given vast discretionary powers to meet any emergency. This schooling stood the Rani in good stead at the time when she filled up the voil created by the untimely death of her husband. She infused new life into the drooping spirit of the Marathas, and though resourceless and penniless, ultimately succeeded in driving the grand armies of the Mughal back to Hindustan.
A FORGOTTEN EPISODE IN INDIA'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM.

By

Sri Dayal Dass, M.A.

Very little is known about any concerted and co-operative effort on the part of Indian chiefs and rulers to extricate themselves from the gradually tightening grip of the British power in India, before the so-called “Mutiny” of 1857. Even the 1857 revolution is regarded by some not as a national uprising but an attempt by certain individuals to seize power during the prevailing confusion. However, certain records of the Government of India (Foreign Department, Secret Branch) preserved in the National Archives of India, reveal that as early as 1836 no less than seven Indian chiefs had joined hands in an active and deliberate plan to overthrow the British supremacy in India.

The plan devised by the various Indian Princes to achieve their object aimed at seducing from their allegiance the native troops in the service of the British East India Company “with the ultimate design of subverting the British Empire in India.” Dependable and trustworthy persons were employed to win over men from the various Native Regiments in British service. The plan might well have succeeded but for the “depositions of two very respectable Native Officers of the 23rd Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, at present cantoned at Sattara.” These “respectable Native Officers,” were “Soobedar Loogoolam Singh” and “Soobedar Gooljar Misser.” They were approached by a Brahmin (whose name is not mentioned), an employee of the Rajah of Sattara, with intention of winning them over. The Brahmin gave them some details of the plan and also offered to take them to the Rajah and the Dewan. The Dewan, named Govind Rao, was a special favourite of the Rajah of Sattara and his chief lieutenant in the plot. The two Officers at first showed their willingness to join the plot, but after securing all the details, divulged them to their British Commanders.
The following is the substance of the deposition of "Soobedar Loogoolam Singh", which was forwarded to the Government of India by the Government of Bombay¹:

"The Deponent States, that on the 11th ultimo (i.e., 11th July, 1836) having proceeded into the town of Sattara to make some purchases, he was accosted by a Brahmin who stated he wished to speak with him, and having retired outside the town informed him that persons were employed in going to all the Native Regiments in the British Service to gain over the Native Officers together with the men, as several of the Native Powers had combined to overthrow the present Government, among whom were Scindia, Holkar, the Rajah of Nagpur, the son of Chandoo Lal, Chintamen Rao (the chief of Sanglee in the Southern Maratha Country), the Rajah of Colapore (Kolhapur) and the Rajah of Sattara. The Brahmin said that the attempt would probably be made after the approaching Dusserah, but that this was uncertain as so many persons were engaged in the business, adding that a Vakeel from Scindia's Court was then at Sattara, to whom if he wished he (the deponent) should be introduced, and through him to the Dewan and the Rajah of Sattara, who he stated was delighted with the Scheme. In conclusion the Brahmin having ascertained where the deponent resided, engaged to visit him on the Sunday following or the 17th Último (17th July, 1836), but did not do so until the 22nd Último (22nd July, 1836).

"At this second interview the Brahmin enquired of the deponent whether he had made any arrangements, he replied in the affirmative, and having promised to bring his Brother the Native Adjutant of the Regiment possessing great influence with the men, he introduced a Havildar named Chandee Sing. In the first instance the Brahmin declined to speak before the Havildar but on being assured that he was a sworn friend of the deponent he repeated the conversation which had passed during the first interview. The deponent then introduced, as another of his friends, a Soobedar named Gooljar Misser and after some conversation the whole party went with the Brahmin into the Town to visit the Dewan, but found he had gone to the Rajah. The Brahmin gave them chairs saying the Dewan would come presently,

¹. *File Government of India, Foreign Department, Secret Branch Proceedings, 3rd October, 1836, No. 7,*
and soon after Lieutenant Colonel Lodwick passed the House in his Carriage, when the deponent remarked it might be dangerous if the Resident saw them there—Upon this they all left the House and saw Colonel Lodwick with the Rajah and other persons examining two brass guns in front of the Palace, where the Brahmin pointed out the Dewan to the deponent.—

"The deponent thus states, that when the Resident left, the Dewan did so also, upon which they followed him to his house, and were introduced by the Brahmin as the officers who had sworn themselves to secrecy. 'The Dewan asked why we had left his house, I told him that on seeing Colonel Lodwick, I was afraid of being seen, as for similar things officers had been hanged; and if the Rajah told the Colonel it would very likely occur to us. The Dewan said there was no fear of the Rajah saying anything, that he had no friendship for Colonel Lodwick, and was pleased with the present business. The Dewan then told me that this affair would take a considerable time to arrange as there were Men employed to gain over the officers and Men of all the Native Regiments, and that he hoped in a short time to be able to say that in certain Regiments he had so many friends. The conversation was here interrupted by the entry of a person who came to report the arrival of the Vakeel from Scindia's Court, upon which the Dewan said he would take us to make our salam to the Rajah, who would make a sign of recognition. The Dewan went some way in front and after having talked to the Rajah for sometime, the Rajah turned round to where we were standing. We immediately made a Salam, when the Rajah held up his hand and seemed to recognise us, which called the attention of all the people assembled towards us; we then returned to our lines.'"

The deposition of the other Native Officer named "Gooljar Misser" confirms the statement of the first with certain exceptions and the following additional particulars viz., that at the meeting with the Dewan, the door was shut, and as he gave them "Pan Sooparee" he told the Native Officers that they must frequently visit him and on being informed that their Regiment would leave Sattara in a few months, he observed it was of no consequence, but wherever they went they must communicate with him. Lastly, that when the Rajah had made the
sign alluded to by “Loogoolam Sing”, they retired accompanied by the Brahmin for a short distance, when he left them saying that he would come again on Sunday next. No deposition appears to have been taken from Havildar Chandee Sing.

On 22nd July, 1836, Lieutenant Colonel Lodwick, the then Resident at Sattara, despatched the above depositions to the Governor of Bombay, who was at that time camping at Poona, and proposed that Dewan Govind Rao “as well as the Bramin Emissary should at once be seized and confined in the camp, without any previous communication with the Rajah.”

On receiving the above communication from the Resident at Sattara, the Governor of Bombay, Sir Robert Grant, recorded a Minute on the 23rd July, 1836, in which he made the following observations:

“The circumstances which had been asserted by the Dewan and by the Bramin Emissary were not to be assumed as truth; that beyond their assertions no evidence existed to authorize the belief that the Rajah of Sattara and other Native Powers are leagued in conspiracy against the British Government, and that as far as the Rajah was concerned we ought to be slow to entertain such suspicion, but that nevertheless the same precautions should be taken as we implicitly believed in the representations made to the two Native Officers.”

With respect to Lieutenant Colonel Lodwick’s suggestion that the Dewan and the Brahmin should be seized, the Governor was of opinion that “such a measure had better be deferred if possible for the present, as the moment a public blow was struck the plot in all its ramifications would be arrested.” He therefore thought it preferable to allow the conspiracy to assume a tangible shape, and the principal actors to commit themselves effectively, before adopting any measure “which would make public our knowledge of it’s existence. On the other hand however, delay might be dangerous, the parties finding themselves suspected might escape and prevent the disclosures which might otherwise be elicited from them, if they were seized and examined unawares.”

1. Ibid.
On these ground the Governor of Bombay was of opinion that the Resident at Sattara be directed to act according to circumstances. If he could wait and watch a little longer he should do so, but if he had made sufficient discoveries and had reason to fear that the parties might escape, he should proceed to seize and examine them without scruple or delay.

The next question which suggested itself was, in what way the seizure of the Dewan and the Brahmin should at the proper period be effected: whether it ought to be effected by the Resident himself direct, or by application to His Highness the Rajah of Sattara.

The Governor of Bombay was of opinion that it was inexpedient to violate the Rajah's sovereignty, unless there was danger of the public interest being compromised. He, therefore, proposed that the Resident should be instructed to make arrangements for surprising the guilty parties, and then in a private interview "to require from the Rajah full authority in his capacity of Representative of the British Government to proceed to arrest and examine them, allowing the Rajah sufficient time to digest the proposition, but not to consult any other person, or to defer his answer until another occasion." He recorded his sentiments in the following words:

"The Rajah by Treaty is bound to act conformably to the Resident's advice and on an emergency like the present demanding prompt and decisive action, the Resident has a right to insist that the compliance shall be immediate. If such compliance be forthwith given, the Resident will at once proceed under the Rajah's authority to apprehend the parties implicated, but if it is refused the Resident will then be fully justified in adopting on his own authority such measures as the crisis may demand. The persons who have attempted to tamper with our Troops have distinctly declared that they did so with the concurrence of the Rajah. Should His Highness therefore hesitate to arm the Resident with all the powers which the occasion demands, a suspicion would naturally arise that the importations cast upon him are not altogether destitute of foundation, and by so doing he would moreover violate in a very important case the Treaty which binds him to follow the Resident's advice."
Instructions corresponding with above opinions were accordingly furnished to the Resident in the Bombay Government letter of the 23rd July, 1836.¹

No further communication was received from the Resident at Sattara until the 27th July, 1836, when that officer reported that nothing had transpired subsequent to the date of his letter of the 22nd July, "beyond a visit from the Bramin Agent to put off that of the Native officers to the Dewan until more favourable weather, but whether this delay is the result of excited suspicion," he could not state. In the same letter the Resident suggested that the outposts from the 23rd Regiment stationed at Malcolmpet and Akulkote should be relieved.

The Resident was informed in reply that the Bombay Government was surprised that he should have made "no communication to the Right Honourable the Governor from the 24th to the 28th Ultimo (i.e., July, 1836) on a subject of such interest, although the visit to the Native Officer from the Bramin Agent alluded to in the preceding paragraph, must at the latest have occurred on the 24th, but at the same time it was intimated to him that Governor in Council did not impute his silence to neglect, and did not doubt that had any active measure been required in the interval, he would have immediately reported it."

With regard to the relief of the detachments proposed by the Resident, he was informed that Government thought that the measure would probably excite suspicion and alarm and, therefore, it was not considered at the moment desirable.

The Secretary to the Government of Bombay in his letter² dated the 12th August, 1836, transmitted "for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council, extracts from the Proceedings of this Government on receipt of intelligence of conspiracy stated to be in progress at Sattara and several other Native Courts... and to communicate for the information of His Lordship in Council the measures which this Government has adopted in consequence."

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
The attention of the Governor General of India in Council was also drawn to a Minute recorded by the Governor of Bombay, dated the 24th July, 1836, "chiefly relating to the present situation of the 23rd Regiment Native Infantry in consequence of all communication with it having been cut off by the destruction of the Bridge over the River Nera in consequence of its sudden rise, which River forms the boundary between the Territories of the British Government and those of the Rajah of Sattara." It was stated that prompt measures were adopted to restore the communication between Poona and Sattara, by "such temporary expedients as were available, so as to admit of the 23rd Regiment in case of necessity being supported by the Troops at Poona."

The Governor General was further informed that the Government of Bombay "has it in contemplation to issue a Confidential Circular with the view to ascertaining whether any attempts are in progress on an extended scale to seduce the Native Troops of this Presidency from their allegiance, and that this measure has already been adopted at the Station of Poona where many circumstances exist to inspire hatred towards our rule."

The general impression formed by the Government of Bombay on the subject was that although "there is as yet no reason to credit to the full extent the representations made to our Native Officers at Sattara, sufficient has been elicited to excite suspicion, and to justify the adoption of measures of precaution to defeat any plot which may have been formed. On these grounds every care has been taken at this Presidency to ensure that these proceedings should be kept strictly secret...." The Governor General in Council was also requested by the Bombay Government to observe similar precautions in the matter.

The Secretary to the Government of India, W. H. Macnaghten, in his letter dated the 29th August, 1836, acknowledged the receipt of the above communication from the Government of Bombay. In reply the following opinion of the Governor General of India in Council was communicated to the Government of Bombay:—

"His Lordship in Council approves generally the measures adopted by the Right Hon'ble the Governor in Council on this occasion but in the present state of his information he is wholly unable to suggest any further steps for the discovery of the conspirators—His Lordship in Council has the fullest reliance on the vigilance and prudence of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council. He will anxiously await for the intelligence on this important subject and in the meantime I am desired to state that every means will be adopted of keeping secret the papers connected with it."

Another step taken by the Government of India was to send the following letter¹ to the Government of North Western Provinces:

"To

G. A. Bushby Esqr.,
Secretary to the Lieutt.
Governor of the North Western Provinces.

Sir,

I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council to forward to you for the purpose of being laid before the Lieutt: Governor the accompanying copy of a communication from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay dated the 12th instant and of its enclosures together with copy of there ply this day written by order of His Lordship in Council.—

2. The Lieutenant Governor will perceive that it is desirable to keep this matter secret for the present; but as the name of the Maharaja of Gwalior has been mentioned as implicated in the conspiracy it is as well that a copy of the papers should be sent confidentially... to that officer (Resident at Gwalior) who might be instructed to correspond privately on the subject with the Resident at Nagpur should he be of opinion that there is any ground for implicating the Chiefs of the Maratha Nation in the plot which has been discovered at Sattara.—

I have & ca.

Signed. W. H. MACNAGHTEN
Secretary to the Government of India."

Fort William
29th August, 1836.

¹ Government of India, Foreign Department, Secret Branch Proceedings, 3rd October, 1836, No. 10.
Thus the British Government took all precautions against the designs of the recalcitrant princes and were prepared in advance to crush any armed rebellion by the Indian rulers and their followers. All the details of the plot were discovered while still in the embryonic stage and the attempt to overthrow the British Supremacy in India proved abortive.

Though the above episode did not have any immediate consequences, it certainly brought to light the feeling of hostility with which the British power in India was viewed. It was this feeling of hatred towards the British rule which manifested itself with much greater intensity and with more serious consequences during the revolution of 1857.
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION OF WAJID ALI SHAH

By

Dr. G. D. Bhatnagar, M. A., Ph. D.

The framework of the revenue system in the time of Wajid Ali Shah was the same as had been established by his predecessors. The main source of income of the Oudh Government was the land revenue. The whole kingdom was divided into five permanent Nizamats viz., 1. Khairabad 2. Gonda Bahraich 3. Sultanpur 4. Baiswara and 5. Salone1. Besides, there were the following sub-divisions: (1) Bari Biswan (2) Daryabad Raudauli (3) Dewa Kursi (4) Nawabganj (5) Gosainganj (6) Mohan (7) Rasulabad (8) Safipur (9) Bangarmau Moilanwan (10) Sandipali (11) Muhammadi and (12) Mianganj. Sometimes more sub-divisions than one were put under one officer to facilitate work, and sometimes one sub-division was administered by two officers2.

Each Nizamat was placed under the charge of a Nazim who was responsible for the collection of the revenue in his districts. He maintained peace and was responsible for all acts of his subordinates. He was appointed by the King on a high salary ranging from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 2,000/- per month3. He also held the command of an army of about 3,000 strong with several guns to maintain peace and keep the Taluqdar’s of his region in check. In every Nizamat there were several royal forts under the direct control of the Nazim. But there were many others owned by big Taluqdar’s who sometimes proved a source of trouble to a weak and careless Nazim. The expenses of the army maintained by the Nazim were drawn direct from the Lucknow treasury. But in the latter part of Wajid Ali Shah’s reign the Nazims were allowed to deduct their pay from the revenue collected by them in their provinces and the balance together with the receipts was forwarded to the capital.

2. Ibid., p. 144.
To every Nazim were attached several news-writers ('Akhbar Navis') whose duty was to keep a record of the daily events and forward these records to the darbar every week. Colonel Sleeman vehemently criticized these news-writers on the grounds that they never furnished the correct news to the Darbar and were generally bribed by the interested parties. The atrocities of the state officers were therefore, never known.¹ The judicial administration of a Nizamat was under a Mufti appointed directly by the central government.

Each Nizamat was divided into 3 to 4 chulkas,² each of which was placed under the charge of a chukladar or a Tahsildar.³ He worked under the Nazim and collected the revenue of his chukla and dispensed rough and ready justice. The chukladar usually resided in one of the forts assigned to him. He maintained a posse of soldiers and lived with great pomp and show. There were several Quanungos and Patwaris under a chukladar who maintained the drawings of fields and kept a detailed account of the revenue to be collected.

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1. The Colonel reported... "But it is the interest of the Akhbar Naweeses generally to make a false report of what occurs to suppress the truth or misrepresent facts and circumstances. He sells his reports as Monks sold their plenary indulgences. The officer, Civil or Military who neglects his duty or abuses his authority has only to give the Akhbar Naweeses a fee in proportion to the offence, or to his emoluments, to secure such a report as will exonerate him from all blame. The honest man who discharges his duty faithfully is not secure till he fees this person, as his conduct and character is liable to be misrepresented; and the Akhbar Naweeses whose pay is less than ten rupees a month commonly get more than three hundred after paying a liberal share of what he gets to the Darogha with whom alone rests his appointment and dismissal. I have before me a case in which the wives and children of the Landholders and cultivators of whole towns and villages were lately driven off in hundreds like flocks of sheep, and sold into slavery by a rapacious and brutal contractor named Rogher Singh. A great many of them perished of cold and hunger before they were sold. The Hercears of the Akhbar Nawees were present the whole time, and received so much a head upon all who perished or were sold. The same person and his brother, Man Singh, sold off the whole of the stock in cattle and implements of husbandry, and made the district desolate but the circumstances were not brought to the notice of the Durbar till sometimes after and then by the Resident...." Vide Fcr. Deptt. Pol. Const. November 17, 1849 No. 255.

2. Vide Afzal-ut-Tawarikh, op. cit., p. 143,

3. According to Afzal-ut-Tawarikh (p. 143), the Tahsildars were under the charge of the chukladars. But from a study of other contemporary works this statement seems to be wrong. Chukladars and Tahsildars were the same and of equal status.
General Outram in his report\(^1\) of March 15, 1855, refers to four methods of revenue collection viz. (1) Through the Khalsa or crown estates (2) The Huzur Tehsil wherein the landholder paid direct to the government (3) Districts comprising the estates of Taluqders and Zamindars, the revenue of which was held in Ijara or under a contract and (4) Districts similarly composed but held under Amani, or state management. It is noteworthy that the Resident distinguished the Khalsa from the Huzur Tahsil, Amani and Ijara.

The modes of revenue collection were, therefore, only three viz., Huzur Tahsil, Ijara and the Amani. In Huzur Tahsil a special officer was appointed by the crown to realise the revenue of that place as it did not remain under the control of any other local officer.\(^2\) This arrangement was like the court of wards of the present day. Several Taluqders placed their taluqas under Huzur Tahsil in order to avoid the worries and troubles of the collection of revenue.

In Ijara or the contract system a person entered into a contract to pay a stipulated amount for a fixed term, during which period he exacted the maximum revenue without any regard for the poor cultivators. The royal army remained as usual in this system in districts and rendered help whenever it was required, but the collecting staff was appointed by the contractor himself.\(^3\) In the Amani system the Government directly appointed the Amils and other subordinate officers in every chuckla on the recommendation of the chuckladar.\(^4\) They calculated the probable income of every land and fixed the government demand at a rate varying from annas 6 to annas 8 in the rupee.\(^5\) In the month of January the revenue so calculated was realised by the Amils and deposited in the royal treasury with all the necessary papers called the “Dols”. The money that was paid by the zamindars to the revenue officers in the shape of “Nazr” was never recorded, but the state fixed it proportionately with the revenue.

4. Ihâl.
Before appointment every Amil had to execute a bond to pay the calculated revenue. He also became responsible for the payment of all the arrears; therefore, from the very beginning they tried to exact as much as possible from the poor farmers in the shape of "Nazr" together with the state revenue. If a Zamindar became a defaulter, his arrears were divided among others and thus paid to the state. But he continued to be harrassed until he paid his dues to the officers. The Zamindars who paid for the defaulter, however, never recovered their sums. Thus these officers over realized the revenue and enriched themselves at the cost of the helpless cultivators.

The Governors-General repeatedly impressed upon the Nawabs to change the Ijara into Amani. Consequently, experiments were tried on several occasions. Under Ghazi-ud-din Haidar, while Colonel Baillie was the Resident, the contract system was converted into Amani all over Oudh. But within two years the attempt was given up as hopeless and the whole country was again let out to the contractors.1 Under Nasir-ud-din Haidar, while Hakim Mahdi was the Chief Minister and Mr. Maddock and Colonel Low were the Residents respectively, a similar attempt was made and on a more extensive scale, but the results were the same. Under Muhammad Ali Shah, the experiment was again repeated on an extensive scale in order to gratify the Resident and the Chief Minister, Sharf-ud-daulah, converted districts yielding an annual revenue of thirty five lakhs of rupees into Amani land and did all in his power to make the system successful; and when after two years he was superseded by his successor, Amin-ud-daulah, he also tried his utmost to make this system a success. But he could not continue long in the ministry and when he was removed, the system was again allowed to yield place to the contract system.

The Amani system undoubtedly was the best mode of collecting revenue but it could not thrive in Oudh for want of efficient control. It is necessary to examine why this system failed in Oudh. The chief cause of its failure was that the persons who worked out the Amani system were thoroughly dishonest. They looked to their own interest rather than to that of their master,2 and since they neglected their

1. Vide Daroitee in Excelsis, p. 166.
2. A. T., p. 147.
duties, the subordinate officers under them also never missed their chance to rack-rent the farmers. Colonel Sleeman fulminated against the petty officers employed in the Amani system thus:

"There is the same rack-renting in the one as in the other, and the same uncertainty prevails as to the rate of the government demands. The officers under Amanat demand gratuities and nazrana as the contractors demand for their court supporters."1

The officers employed under the Amani system knew well that their employment depended upon the amount which they sent to the public treasury. So they took recourse to extortion as much as a contractor did. Moreover, a fixed assessment for a long period e.g., of five years as advised by Lord Hardinge, was never attended to, hence the same uncertainty prevailed as to the rate and the amount of the Government demands.

Apart from mismanagement, the Amani system had several other inherent defects. It always gave an advantage to the Amils who drew the salaries of the troops stationed with them, and, if they failed to pay to the soldiers, the latter plundered the cultivators and made good the amount. Those who resisted this aggression were treated as rebels and punished. Again, under this system the soldiers became unduly powerful, for they helped the Amils to collect the revenue from the warring Taluqdars. But the enhancement of their influence meant a corresponding weakening of the central government. On several occasions when an Amil became a defaulter of revenue or embezzled the public money, he became a formidable enemy of the state, whom, because of his great strength, it was not an easy affair to subdue.

Therefore, under neither system were the cultivators happy. They were, perhaps, slightly better off under the Taluqdars who owned about sixty per cent of the land. The Taluqdars were comparatively more considerate than a contractor or a state officer. They treated their tenants with some consideration because (1) both, the Taluqdar and the tenant knew that they would have to live together and their relations would continue indefinitely; (2) in his evil days when a Taluqdar was besieged by another Taluqdar or a state official, he coun-

1. Sleeman’s report dated February 1, 1852.
ted upon the help of his tenants who would sacrifice their lives for their master; (3) generally the Taluqdas knew full well that their own prosperity depended upon the prosperity of their tenants and so they would never normally rack-rent them.

But, the big barons were not lenient to the petty zamindars under them, and the estates of the latter were usually usurped by them, on some pretext or the other. The common device was to stand surety for their revenue, and when the petty zamindar delayed or expressed his inability to pay up the government dues, his powerful surety at once cleared off the government demands and confiscated the land for his own benefit.

A big Taluqdar extended his estates by other means also. Sometimes he paid a small sum to one of his vassals and later on forced him to give up his claims in his favour. Sometimes a big Taluqdar would bribe and secure his help in dispossessing the less powerful owner on some flimsy pretext. The complaints of these small landlords were never heard at the capital and it was only rarely that an investigation was ordered against a state official.

At the commencement of the financial year a Taluqdar or a zamindar presented himself before the Nazim to settle the revenues of his estate for the new year. These landlords never dared to come before a Nazim unless some civil or military officer of the state guaranteed their safe return. This standing in surety for safe return was called “Bhayyagiri”. When the amount of the government the surety revenue was settled, the zamindars gave surety for their payment and was generally an influential person at the capital or a high official of the state, or a big Taluqdar. Many of these sureties were professionals.

In case a Taluqdar refused to come to a settlement with the Nazim because of exorbitant demands of the government, he was allowed to return to his fort under Bhayyagiri promise. There he would shut

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1. In the beginning of every year each petty zamindar promised to pay a fixed sum in the state treasury and a big Taluqdar usually stood surety for the payment of the stipulated sum.
himself against the armies of the state. Then the Nazim applied to the durbar for the punishment of the defaulter. On receiving orders from the capital, the Nazim surrounded the fort and besieged the zamindar. But, generally, before the Nazim proceeded to such an extreme measure, the zamindar usually made a settlement with the durbar through his agent at the capital, and thus escaped punishment.

Sometimes the soldiers were paid by assignment of revenue in certain "ilaqas". This system was known as the 'qabz'.¹ No doubt this mode of payment was injurious to the state, but this system had to be adopted against turbulent peasantry. The soldiers who were permitted to realize the rent by force generally acted harshly and rack-rented the farmers, often leaving little for their own subsistence. The villages then remained desolate for several years. The soldiers who realised the rents under the 'qabz', however, prepared an account of the money realized and also a statement of the expenses they had incurred in realising it. Then, they forwarded the balance of money and the vouchers to the government.

Sometimes, to avoid any future trouble, a zamindar of his own free will placed his estate under military officer or an influential person for the collection of the rents and payment of the state revenues. This system was called 'jamog'.² Then the zamindar was paid an allowance from the revenues realised, in recognition of his proprietary rights. This allowance was known as 'nankar'.³ The 'nankar' was of two kinds: one was known as 'nankar-i-dehi' which was payable to the zamindar, while the other was known as 'nankar-i-tankhwahi'. It was given to the Qanungoes, Chaudhris and other petty village

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1. Ibid., p. 146.
2. Ibid.
3. Darogha Haji Abbasi Ali in 'An Illustrated Historical Album of Taluqdas of Oudh' defines 'jamog' and 'nankar' in the footnote of page 22 thus: 'jamog'—A process sanctioned under native rule, by law or custom, by which the lessor of a village or estate, not having confidence in the lessee, might send his own servant to collect the rents, an account being kept of the same, the lessee being entitled to the profit or liable for the loss accordingly as the collections exceeded or fell short of the sum for which the village had been leased.

'nankar'—An allowance or deduction from the rent of land made to the person who engaged for the revenue in the nawabi; it was at once an acknowledgement of his proprietary right and an allowance to him for managing the village.
officers by way of reward for rendering help in the realization of state revenue.¹

About sixty per cent of the Oudh kingdom was in the possession of the Taluqdars and there were more than 200 such barons who administered their taluqa estates. These Taluqdars had all the powers of a magistrate and collector within their estates. They had forts and maintained small armies. Some of them who were quite powerful held estates worth several lakhs of rupees. They held durbars and issued orders like their master at Lucknow.

Among the most powerful Taluqdars of Oudh may be mentioned the Maharaja of Balrampur, the Raja of Tulsipur, the Raja of Mahmudabad, the Raja of Nanpara and the Kshattriya Rajas of Tiloi. These Taluqdars had strong forts manned with guns. The Maharaja of Balrampur fought two battles against Tulsipur² when Raja Dignarain rebelled against his father Digraj Singh.

The Kshattriya Rajas of Tiloi in Baiswara were very peaceful chiefs. It would not be out of place to give here a short account of the Tiloi Rajas and their system of administration. In the reign of Wajid Ali Shah Raja Jagpal Singh, son of Raja Bumiad Singh was the chief of the Tiloi estates. His grandfather Raja Balbhaddar Singh had been honoured with the title of Raja by the emperor of Delhi and was given a mansab of four thousand, and later on, of five thousand.³ Raja Balbhaddar Singh was the son of Raja Peetam Singh and grandson of Raja Mohan Singh who held fourteen parganas in his state of Tiloi.⁴ Raja Kanah belonged to this illustrious house of Kshattriyas who later on founded the city of Kanpur after his own name. The state was divided into several divisions each held by a member of the family. The Raja represented the family and paid an annual visit to the King at Lucknow. Twice a year the Raja received hazars from other members of the family.⁵ The Tiloi

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¹ A. T., p. 146.
³ A. T., p. 155.
⁴ Ibid., p. 154.
⁵ Vide Butter’s ‘Outlines of the Topography and Statistics of the Southern Districts of Oudh’ p. 113.
state enjoyed a great degree of peace and order, and no "mela," "hat," town or village within its borders was ever looted by any zamindar or other depredators. Travel was safe, and murder was unknown. In the country immediately surrounding the Tiloi state, disturbances were unknown except as a consequence of boundary disputes, which generally terminated in a pitched battle, followed by plunder and arson of the property of the defeated party. But if any such dispute occurred within the Tiloi boundary, it was instantly put down by the Raja. He also investigated most of the important criminal cases and sent the parties when convicted to the capital for punishment.  

The Raja also judged civil suits with the help of the chuckladars. When the chuckladar was engaged in collecting the revenues in the Tiloi state, he was accompanied by the Raja or his relations, who in general had little difficulty in persuading the smaller zamindars to pay their dues. When any zamindar was obstinate, he was left to be dealt by the chuckladar, who put him in fetters and levied the rent from his ryots.

But other Taluqdar unlike the Raja of Tiloi were turbulent and were often at war among themselves and against the government of Oudh. It may, however, be noted that most of the Taluqdar followed the method of the Raja of Tiloi in the administration of their estates.

The revenue of the state estimated from all sources in 1846 was 1,23,68,841 in Lucknow repees while in 1847 it increased to 1,44,73,383 rupees.  

But Colonel Richmond, the Resident in Oudh, remarked that the estimated amount was never collected in full, and arrears, varying from 14 to 20 lakhs, always remained unrealised.

Captain Hayes furnished to Colonel Outram an estimate of the receipt of revenues for the years 1853 and 1854 as Rs. 12,166,214/- and Rs. 12,203,082/- respectively of which only 40 lakhs for the first and 36 lakhs for the second year were actually paid to the treasury. It may be remembered here that for the sake of convenience the minis-
ter had allowed the Nazims to incur expenditure in maintaining the civil, judicial and military establishments of their districts from the revenue realised. It was only the balance that was sent to the capital together with the vouchers of the expenditure.

Colonel Outram argued that if 53 lakhs were admitted as a fair computation of the expenditure incurred on all the districts, then the total realisation of the revenue on behalf of the government remained from 89 lakhs to 93 lakhs and thus the government was defrauded grossly by the Nazims and the minister.

But it must be remembered that the figure 53 lakhs for expenditure in the districts was taken by Colonel Outram from an estimate calculated in the reign of Muhammad Ali Shah. The figures supplied by Captain Hayes were unauthentic and based upon the information of an unknown person who claimed to have an access to the darbar accounts. But the darbar never declared the income of the state to be over 120 lakhs a year.

If the figures collected by Colonel Sleeman be accepted as correct, the total expenditure\(^1\) of the state amounted to Rs. 7,995,571-1-6 and the normal district expenditure as estimated by Colonel Outram was about 53 lakhs. Thus, the total expenditure of the state amounted to more than 130 lakhs. And if the income of the state as estimated by him at 93 lakhs be accepted, then the annual deficit of about 40 lakhs of rupees would have amounted to a huge debt at the time of annexation. But, such was not the case. Therefore, the statement of the Oudh darbar that the revenue of the kingdom was never less than 120 lakhs seems plausible.

\[\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{At the Capital} & \ldots & 3,427,562 & 15 \ 0 \\
\text{Army} & \ldots & 4,173,220 & 8 \ 0 \\
\text{Police} & \ldots & 394,787 & 10 \ 6 \\
\text{Total} & 7,995,571 & 1 \ 6
\end{array}\]
BILLs OF EXCHAngE IN MEDIEVAL INDIA (1600-1650).

By

Osman Hyder Mirza, M A.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of banking and finance in India about the end of the sixteenth century (when the English and the Dutch merchants embarked on their commercial enterprise in the East) was the extensive use of bills of exchange or banker’s drafts for making payments or remittances of money. Based on a nicely adjusted, indigenous system of credit, these bills or drafts, commonly known by their Persian and Hindi names respectively of BARĀT and HUNDI, constituted a sort of paper currency during the period, and had a very wide circulation. In fact, the vast extent of the Indian sub-continent, with its brisk and flourishing internal trade and commercial contacts with the outside world, afforded an unlimited scope to the astute Indian bankers and brokers for conducting exchange operations and thereby facilitating the transaction of business not only in the big cities but also in every small town or village. The importance of their activity in this direction was all the greater in view of the primitive conditions of transport prevailing at the time, the conveyance of coins or bullion to distant places being at best a slow and risky operation necessitating the employment of an expensive escort to guard the treasure on the way; while, on the other hand, bills could be safely sent through fast couriers or qāsids, as they were called, who

1. (Barāt).

In contemporary records barāt is the name generally used for these bills along with other Persian terms connected with exchange. Originally barāt signified a written order of payment on a treasury issued by the sovereign or his representatives. Alul Fazl, while describing the administrative procedure with regard to the grant of ranks and titles to fiefs etc., says:—

If His Maʻesty’s order specifies a cash payment, the firman is made out in the same manner, but it is generally called BARĀT (Cheque). The mode of payment is also detailed on back of it, viz., one-fourth is to be paid in gold (ezharua); one half in silver (rupcase), and one part in copper (chāme).


2. (Bills of exchange carried by a qāsid)

could be trusted to carry them to their destination in the shortest possible time with the minimum of expense.

We find scattered references to exchange operations in the voluminous correspondence of the English factors in India ("The English Factories in India", edited by William Foster) as well as in the accounts given by some European travellers in the East, which incidentally afford an indication of some of the main features of the exchange market and of the way in which it operated.

**Organisation of Exchange.**

So far as we can ascertain the exchange business was conducted on private lines by a number of individual dealers in exchange, whose ubiquitous character made them easily accessible in every part of the country. "In India", says a well-known traveller of the 17th century, "a town or village must be very small indeed, if a money changer is not found there, whom they call shroff and who serves as banker for making remittances of money and providing bills of exchange."  

A shroff was usually in communication with the principal centres of business through his "gumāśhtas" or agents, on whom he could draw bills whenever he had an occasion to do so. Similarly the agents would draw on their principal. Apart from this arrangement of what may be called "house bills", the dealer in exchange had as a rule, business connections with other people of his own class with whose collaboration he could extend his activities over a very wide area, covering inland places as well as foreign centres of commerce. It was, nevertheless, essentially a small scale business which a number of bankers or firms of bankers carried on independently of one another. The resources of a single firm were strictly limited, and the transmission at any time of large sums of money, running into tens of thousand, could be managed only by securing the services of several firms, each of whom made itself responsible for a portion of the total remittance. It

1. "Dans les Indes il faut qu'un village soit bien petit s'il n'y a un Changeur que l'on appelle Cheraf and qui sert de Banquier pour faire les remises et les lettres de change."

JEAN BAPTISTE TAVERNIER

"LES SIX VOYAGES",

SECONDE PARTIE CHAPITRE II.

PARIS, MDCLXXVI (1676).

2. (Limited resources of individual firms).

In spite of this limitation the shroffs were able to undertake large scale operations, such as the transfer by exchange of a public treasury from one town to another. (V.2, p.181)
is interesting to note that under an arrangement of this kind on record (V. I. p. 218)¹ the shroffs at Surat "utterly refused to secure each other if any should fail", i. e., to undertake joint responsibility for the due payment of bills. Individual responsibility, on the other hand, was the general rule in such transactions, and one could always depend on the due fulfilment of a contract provided one took care to deal in the ordinary way with the humble shroff, and had the good sense not to succumb to the blandishments of some charming persons, belonging to a more elevated plane, who happened to be short of cash at the moment, and to whom the beautiful simplicity of the bill of exchange as an instrument of credit offered an excellent means of replenishing their own depleted funds². For, what could be easier than to draw a bill on a friend, conveniently situated at some distance, and to turn the bit of paper into immediate cash? It may be true that in all probability the friend would prove faithless like most of his kind and refuse to honour the bill; but this would only happen later on, when the bill reaches its destination. So when "Jemseir Beague" (Jamshed Beg) of Burhanpur drew a bill on "Merza Myna" (Mirza Mina) of Ahmedabad for the modest sum of rupees two thousand and five hundred the buyers of the bill had to thank their own lack of prudence for the evasive reply which they received from the drawee. (V. 2. p. 72)

**Payment of Bills.**

In business circles, on the other hand, the shroffs made no bones about accepting a bill as soon as it was presented, provided it was in due form and came from an authentic source. Even in case of doubt or uncertainty in this respect they would usually accept the bill, contenting themselves with obtaining a "cusmonne" (khāsnāma), i. e. a special authorisation from the presenter of the bill, enabling them, if anything should go amiss, to ultimately recover the amount paid on the bill from the original drawer of the same (V. 1. pp. 247-48).

¹ Interlinear references in the following pages relate to the volumes and pages of the series "The English Factories in India" edited by William Foster.

² (Care to be taken in remitting money).

"Have received bills from Burhanpur for Rs. 12,500, all of which were : copied save on of Rs. 2,500 drawn by 'Jemseir Beague' on 'Merza Myna' who will give no certain answer. It is much better to remit money in the ordinary way than to deal with dishonest great ones whose means and credits are not worth a straw longer than they are in their Prince's favour, and how unstable that is daily experience shows." Ahmedabad April 7, 1622. V. 2. p. 72.
In some cases, however, when a payment for goods was made through exchange one had to get hold of a broker to insure (bima) the payment of one's bills before one could obtain possession of the purchased goods (V. 2. p. 199). Nevertheless, insurance of payment was not generally insisted upon; it was only when the drawer of the bill did not enjoy the full confidence of the payee that such insurance was needed.

It should be noted, however, that when a person purchased some goods with borrowed money, for the repayment of which he furnished the lender with bills of exchange payable at the centre to which the goods had to be sent, the payment of the bills was, as a rule, conditional on the safe arrival of the goods at their destination. For instance, an English factor who borrowed money at Agra for the purchase of indigo, cotton goods etc. arranged to repay it by drawing bills on his compatriot at Surat, the place to which most of the goods procured from inland places were sent for export. Now if through some mishap the goods were lost on the way the person who had lent the money was no longer entitled to the payment of the bills.

A similar principle of conditional repayment of money obtained in the maritime trade. The moneyed people who financed mercantile adventures on sea, could not obtain back their money in case the merchandise was lost in transit. The advance of money made to the traders yielded a high percentage of return, but as the risk involved was also great, such transactions were called, according to a contemporary "the great speculation".

**Exchange Money.**

Apropos of payments, it may be added that payment for bills was made, as a rule, in chalānī rupees (V. 4, p. 154) i.e. money coined during the current year, the so-called "exchanging money" (V. 9, p. 81). It appears, however, that on occasions the urgent need of the seller of a bill induced him to accept coins of some other description than the chalānī (V. 9, p. 81), and similarly an attempt was sometimes made to reduce the value of a bill by claiming a deduction from the due amount on the pretext that it did not represent newly coined rupees of full value. Such practices were, however, rare and not considered honest dealing. (V. 4, p. 154)
It should be added that bills drawn on Surat were usually payable at the discretion of the payee, either in rupees or mahmudis (V. 2, p. 147), the latter silver coins being locally current, along with the former, in the province of Gujerat, 2½ to 2½ mahmudis equalling, according to the condition of the exchange, a rupee in value. During the years 1630-33 there was a sharp fall in their exchange value owing to famine conditions in Gujerat and adjacent parts when the itinerant grain merchants, the so called “Benjares” (banjārās) from the North with their pack-oxen brought large supplies of provisions to Surat and other towns in the province, and receiving payment for the same in mahmudis hastened to exchange them for rupees at the best rates they could obtain; while, at the same time, the merchants of Surat, in their anxiety to procure grain, sent all the available rupees to Burhanpur and other places, thereby occasioning a great scarcity of the coins in the town and consequently an unusual appreciation in their value in terms of mahmudis. The discount or “batta” on the latter, we learn, rose to 13½ or 14½ mahmudis per 100 rupees in the height of the famine in 1630 and took a few years to gradually disappear.

It is interesting to note that the mahmudi was “none of the King’s coin”, but was coined by the Rajah of Mulher in Baglān, having survived, owing to its great popularity as a medium of exchange, the pre-Mughal kingdom of Gujerat. (V. 5 pp. 224-26).

Usance.

With regard to the payment of bills after a specified period it may be noted that custom or usage played an important, though by no means a decisive part in the usance of bills (known as band-i-muddat), and that the customary or barbast usance roughly corresponded to the time taken in transit of goods from one centre to another, the payment of the bills being conditional on the safe arrival of the goods (purchased with the money borrowed on the bills) at their destination. So, as a rule, the usance of bills varied with the distance of the place on which they were drawn and the time taken by a caravan in traversing the same. The usance of bills drawn at Tatta on Ahmedabad is given as “61 days of payment” (V. 5. p. 53), Agra on Patna, 40 days (V. 1, p. 56); Surat on Ahmedabad, “four double days accustomed”. (V. 2., p. 40).

When bills were used merely as a means of remitting money without any reference to despatch of goods, it was open to the parties con-
cerned, i.e., the buyer and the seller of a bill, to agree upon any of the customary periods, long or short, according to their own convenience, in which case the shortest possible period of payment depended on the time it took a fast carrier or qāsid to carry the bills to their destination. So we find William Hughes at Patna asking for a shorter period on bills he received from his compatriots at Agra in order to effect a saving in discount. “If future bills were made out at twice seven days’ barbast”, he writes; “these would be much save in the de-heig” i.e. the discount. (V. I. pp. 247-48). It was to avoid a similar “loss of time” that the English merchants at Surat, some time in the year 1640, thought it expedient to send two chests of silver rials to “Scinda” (the exchange on Tatta being payable 61 days after sight) although the rials sold there for rupees at an appreciably lower rate than at Surat (V. 6, p. 288).

Another instance, in a different context, of bullion (in the form of foreign currency) being preferred to bills occurs in the trade with Persia. The exchange from Ispahan to Surat was conveniently “money for money” (V. 8, p. 180); but it appears that the comparatively low charges at the Surat mint (V. 6, p. 84) made it more attractive to import silver (in the form of lāri coins) from Persia than to receive remittances from there by exchange.

It may be noted that Tavernier gives a uniform period of two months for bills drawn on Surat from various inland places, but this is not borne out by other sources of information.

**Uses of the Bills.**

As we have seen bills of exchange were usually employed in making remittances of money, as they provided a convenient, safe and speedy means of transferring funds from one centre to another. Bills were usually carried by fast couriers, though occasionally a merchant or a merchants’ factor found it more convenient to take them along with him when journeying to the place on which they were drawn so as to provide himself with the necessary cash for making purchases there. (Vol. I. Int.)

1. (Usance).

A variation of the term barāt in the form of ‘setonbarat’ or ‘setonbarrat’ occurs a few times in the factors’ correspondence. (V. 3, pp. 32.33). It seems to have been applied to a bill payable at sight. W. Foster in his annotation interprets the term as sitan-barat, ‘an order to take’.
Bills were also used for the purpose of borrowing money, when they were either exchanged for cash or given in exchange for commodities. Sometimes bills were exchanged for bills (V. 2, p. 115). This happened when money was remitted to a distant place through an intermediate station. The remitter purchased bills in the first instance on the intermediate station, where he next exchanged them for bills on the place for which the remittance was intended, whereby it was possible sometimes to effect a considerable saving in the cost of remittance. The remittances from Surat to Agra were usually made by this system of indirect or "double" exchange with Ahmedabad as the midway centre (V. I, pp. 181-82). A direct remittance from Surat to Agra was rather expensive as the exchange was usually in favour of the former place. On the other hand, exchange on Ahmedabad could be secured cheaply, while under normal conditions the exchange rates between Ahmedabad and Agra never ranged very high. So the dual exchange operation of remitting from Surat to Ahmedabad and from Ahmedabad to Agra was usually less expensive than the direct remittance from Surat (V. 4, p. 96). Similarly, in the reverse case, an English factor, for example, who had occasion to draw on Surat for money seldom did so directly. He set about by drawing bills on Ahmedabad, which were met by the factors at that place by drawing bills on Surat (V. 8, p. 103). By this indirect operation the loss in exchange was reduced to the minimum.

According to Tavernier, bills of exchange on Surat from Dacca, Patna, and Benares were always made out in the first instance on Agra, from where fresh bills were drawn on Surat.

**Transfer of a Debt by Exchange.**

A troublesome debt could also be easily got rid of through the medium of exchange. A debt could be transferred with advantage from a place where the rate of interest was high to a place where it was comparatively low, provided, of course, some one was willing to shoulder the burden at the other end. Thus we find the English factors at Surat advising the factors at Masulipatam to extinguish their debts by transferring them to the former place "as interest is so much higher there than here". Albeit, they consider it a sacrifice for the sake of comrades: "Thus to free them we enthrall ourselves until by supplies from Bantam or England they are again enabled to repay us" (V. 6, pp. 287-88).
It may be explained that the liability for a debt could be transferred by exchange from one person to another in the following manner. The debtor drew bills of exchange on the person to whom the liability was to be transferred; cashed the bills, and with the proceeds paid off the creditor. The debt was thus extinguished so far as the original parties to the transaction were concerned, who were now replaced by another set of people. The purchaser of the bills was now the creditor, while by accepting the bills the drawee placed himself in the position of the debtor.

In the above instance there was a replacement of both the debtor and the creditor. Sometimes, however, the creditor remained the same while the liability for the debt was shifted from one person to another. The creditor was repaid his money in the form of bills of exchange and the liability for the debt was transferred to the person on whom the bills were drawn. It may be added that a transference of this kind needed the previous consent of the creditor. He had to be careful when consenting to shift his claim from one person to the other, for, there was always a possibility of his coming to grief like the wolf in the old tale, who agreed to spare the rabbit and to eat the fox instead.

**Modus Operandi.**

There were two ways of benefiting from the mechanism of exchange; one could either receive remittances from a centre or draw on it according to one's requirements. A merchant's factor for instance, at some distant place, who needed money in order to pay

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1. (The wolf & the rabbit).

The story as given in the Anwar-i-Suhaili of Hujain bin Ali Al-Waiz Al-Kashif may be briefly recapitulated as follows:—

A poor, little rabbit was once cornered by a fierce, hungry wolf who wanted to make a mouthful of him on the instant. But the little rabbit, who was a brainy little fellow and had an eloquent tongue withal, managed to extricate himself from this delicate situation by persuading the simple wolf that it was all to his advantage to spare him—a wretched little morsel at best—and to transfer his attentions to a fat, juicy fox who lived nearby and could be easily ensnared. But in the end the fox proved too clever for the pair of them, and not only saved himself but contrived to land both the wolf and the rabbit at the bottom of a deep and nicely camouflaged well, which he had long ago dug in his den for the safe accommodation of dubious visitors. (Anwar-i-Suhaili, p. 80, Newal Kishore Press.)
for the purchases he had made on behalf of his principal, could either draw bills on the latter for the required sum and sell the bills in the market for what they were worth; or, in the reverse case, he could receive a remittance from his principal in the form of bills which could be discounted and turned into cash after their acceptance by the person on whom they were drawn (V. 2, p. 199). His preference in this respect depended on circumstances; it turned upon the condition of exchange and the urgency or otherwise of his need for money. By drawing bills on his principal and getting them cashed he could obtain the money at once; while, in the other case, he had to wait till the arrival of the bills. Moreover, the frequent variations in the exchange rates afforded a fair scope for opportunism (V. 1, p. 236). A favourable turn in the exchanges would induce the agent to draw on his principal, even though he had no immediate occasion for the money, or, the latter would seize an opportunity for making remittances on advantageous terms so as to provide his agent with funds for future needs. (V. I. pp. 247-48; V. 2, p. 199).

Rates of Exchange.

In fact, the rates of exchange which were quoted by the exchange dealers on a percentage basis, gave, as a rule, two separate sets of figures, one of which applied to "the takers up" and the other to the "deliverers" of exchange. The former had bills to sell on a certain place and the latter wanted those bills; while the dealer acted as an intermediary between them. He purchased the bills at a somewhat lower price than what he charged for the same, and the difference between the two prices constituted his profit or commission on such transactions. For instance, according to the English factor's correspondence, dated March 24, 1622, the current rate of exchange at Ahmedabad for bills on Burhanpur is that "the takers up shall receive 91\frac{1}{2} rupees and the deliverers to pay 92\frac{1}{2} rupees seecawes, to pay or receive 100 Brampore rupees". (V. 2, p. 68). Ignoring the apparent distinction between the "seecawes" (sikka) and Brampore (Burhanpur) rupees (the former simply mean rupees in specie, paid as price of bills, while the latter denote rupees in the form of bills payable at Burhanpur) the significance of the above quotation is that for every 91\frac{1}{2} rupees which the "takers up" receive in cash at Ahmedabad they have to pay 100 rupees at Burhanpur; and similarly
for every 92\(\frac{3}{4}\) rupees which the “deliverers” pay in cash at Ahmedabad, they receive 100 rupees at Burhanpur; the former take the cash and give bills in exchange for it, the latter part with ready money and receive the bills. But as bills of exchange are usually payable after a specified period of time, the “takers up” are in the position of borrowers, while the “deliverers” are in effect the lenders of the money. The profit of the exchange dealer in this instance, it should be noted, is 92\(\frac{3}{4}\)—91\(\frac{1}{2}\)=1\(\frac{1}{2}\) rupees on a cost price of 91\(\frac{1}{2}\) rupees.

It is evident that in the above instance the exchange is unfavourable to Burhanpur. It may be explained that at this time Burhanpur was a good market for the sale of goods, but a poor field for ‘investment’. Hence, merchants, as a rule, remitted money from Burhanpur to other inland places, where it could be profitably employed in the purchase of commodities, and the consequent demand for bills on these places turned the exchange against Burhanpur\(^1\). Similarly, as pointed out by Tavernier, the exchange was usually unfavourable to Surat at the inland places, such as Lahore, Agra, Patna, Dacca, Sironj, Ahmedabad, Bijapur etc., from where the merchants procured goods for export to various parts of Europe and Asia. Money was urgently needed at such places to pay for the commodities which the merchants bought there from the producers, and their brisk demand for bills payable at these centres turned the exchange against Surat. Moreover, Surat was generally better supplied with cash than the inland places, as most of the imported gold and silver was landed at this port and converted into the coins of the realm at the local mint.

The exchange being normally in favour of inland places, a merchant could, according to Tavernier, easily borrow money at Surat, if he could repay it with bills on any of the towns in the interior. In this case he had to pay only “coin for coin”, i.e., the exact equivalent of the sum borrowed. On the other hand, when

\(^1\) (Burhanpur).

“The English used to have a regular factory at Burhanpur for the sale of various goods; all the money obtained by these sales was remitted by exchange on Agra or Surat, because there is nothing to be had locally which is suitable for their trade or for ours.”

The Remonstrant of Francisco Pelsaert (p. 38). Translated from the Dutch by W. H. Moreland and P. Gzyl. 1925, entitled Jahangir’s India.
a merchant was short of cash at one of the inland places and had to borrow some money by selling his bills of exchange on Surat, payable after a period of two months, he could only do so at a considerable loss, the rate of exchange paid by him varying with the distance of the place from Surat. If he happened to be at Agra, for instance, he had to pay from 4½ to 5 per cent; at Lahore 6½ per cent; at Benares 6 per cent; at Patna 7 to 8 per cent; at Dacca 10 per cent; while at Ahmedabad and Bijapur the rates were 1 to 1½ and 3 per cent respectively. In the maritime trade with foreign countries where besides the distance, the element of risk was prominent, the rates rose as high as 20 or 24 per cent.

**Fluctuation of Exchange Rates.**

There was, however, no rigidity about the exchange rates, as the exchange market was a very sensitive organism, which readily responded to even slight changes in the external conditions. The accession of a few lakhs of rupees for instance, to the available funds in the hands of the exchange dealers sufficed to make an appreciable difference in the price of exchange, as expressed in the exchange quotations. "The exchange has fallen lately owing to Muqarrab Khan delivering out three lacs of rupees to be repaid him in Agra", writes Robert Hughes from Patna to his colleagues at Agra. (V.I, p. 236). Being in need of money he had been financiering himself by drawing on the factors at Agra and selling his paper for cash to local shroffs at Patna. He had recently drawn a bill for Rs. 2,000, payable to "Cassy and Baseser" at Agra after a period of forty days and sold it to "Maun Muckon Sherafes" for Rs. 1962½. The rate of exchange paid on the bill was thus 1 7/8 per cent. The exchange was already on the downward trend when Hughes drew his bill, and a little later he informed the factors at Agra that it had fallen as low as 1½ per cent. Evidently Muqarrab Khan's intended remittance had increased the demand for bills of exchange payable at Agra, and the shroffs at Patna were ready to pay a higher price for these bills; or, in other words, to cash them at lower rates for their clients.

Indeed, it was by no means rare for a purchaser of exchange to find that as soon as he started to buy at the rates current at the time, the same began to ascend quite unaccountably—a rather disconcerting experience, no doubt, for a novice. "The exchange is at present 6½ per cent but they fear it will rise when they seek to remit," in
a somewhat rueful strain wrote the English factors at Burhanpur to their colleagues at Ahmedabad. (V. 2, p. 54).

Among the external conditions which affected the exchange, reference is made in the factors' correspondence to "the sickness" at Agra in the year 1622. We learn that the rate of exchange on Agra fell to "money for money" at Burhanpur; and yet very few people cared to take advantage of the fall by remitting money to the stricken place. With business dislocated and "people flying out of the town" there could be little employment there for money in profitable channels. (V. 2 p. 24).

Psychological factors also had their share of influence on exchange. When "a great sheraff" happened to fail at Chaul, "the generality of that tribe" in Surat were so much affected by the untoward event that for some time no remittances could safely be made from that place. (V. 5, p. 154).

Some other instances of similar disturbances affecting the mechanism of exchange could be easily cited, but the important thing to remember is that with all its delicate structure and susceptible nature, it continued to function with efficiency even under the most trying conditions, such as those which prevailed in the territories of Bijapur and other parts of the Deccan about the year 1666 as a result of the Mughal invasion and the constant incursions of the Mahrattas, when, in spite of the prevailing chaos, the English factors on the Malabar coast were able to remit "the amount of what moneys they had in cash" at their factory at Karwar, by bills of exchange upon Surat and Cambaya. (V. 12, pp. 201, 208).

Based on private initiative, the exchange system nevertheless derived its strength and stability from a spirit of co-operation and mutual trust among the different classes of the people, and was in fact an index of the contemporary enterprise in trade and commerce.

**Conclusion.**

The above lines constitute an attempt to present in a simple and easily appreciable form a little known facet of the every day life of the period under review, broadly covering the first half of the seventeenth century. In the absence of a more complete delineation it may well serve to introduce a subject which is by no means deficient in historical or sociological interest.
THE BOGOMIL CREED IN BULGARIA

By

Prof. Dimitar Anghelev.

The Bogomil creed is one of the most powerful social and religious teachings which developed in Bulgaria during the Middle Ages. It sprang up in the first half of the 10th century during the reign of King Peter (927-969). Feudal relations had already been established in Bulgaria at that time. The peasants were subordinated to the central power, to the boyars and the higher clergy. They were over-burdened with taxation and exhausted by the continuous wars characteristic of the Middle Ages. Their discontent against the existing system was very great. And the Bogomils gave expression to this discontent.

The chief preacher of the Bogomil creed was priest Bogomil, who lived and worked during the reign of King Peter. His adherents were called Bogomils, under which name they became known throughout the country.

In its essence the Bogomil heresy was a social teaching directed against feudal oppression and expressing the protest mostly of the peasant population in mediaeval Bulgaria. In form it was a heresy—i.e. a religious teaching, aimed against the then existing official church as the main prop of the feudal socio-religious trends and particularly under the influence of Massalinism and Paulinism, two heresies widespread in those days within the boundaries of the Byzantine Empire, Bulgaria’s neighbour.

The Bogomils were dualists. They taught that there were two principles in the universe—the good and the bad. According to them the heavenly world and man’s spirit were the creation of the good principle; while the visible world and the human body were the work of the evil spirit (the devil). Through their dualist world outlook the heretics rejected the whole material world. According to them the representatives of earthly power were servants of the devil.

*By Courtesy of the Legation of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria in India, New Delhi.*
The Bogomils sharpest attacks were directed against the church and the higher clergy. They accused the higher clergymen of deviating from the righteous faith, of striving after material well-being and of living a life of luxury. Attacking the church and the higher clergy, the Bogomils rejected their sacraments and rituals: baptism, communion, marriage, liturgies, etc. They declared themselves against the veneration of the cross, icons, and the holy relics. In their striving to simplify religion, to free it from the numerous rituals and outer forms, they were forerunners of the reformists Jan Huss (in Bohemia) and John Wycliffe (in England).

The Bogomils were also definitely against the secular power. Kosma, a Bulgarian writer of the second half of the 10th century, and an opponent of the Bogomils, wrote that they "brand the rich, teach their followers not to submit to their master, hate the tsar, abuse the headmen. They think that God hates those who work for the king and order the slave not to work for his master." These words of Kosma are the most eloquent proof of the social and anti-feudal character of the Bogomil teaching, as an expression of the moods of the peasant masses in particular.

Created in a period of constant wars, characteristic of the Middle Ages, the Bogomil teaching opposed bloodshed and murder. The preachings of the Bogomils against the shedding of blood corresponded to the general mood. They expressed the year-long hatred of the people of the frequent wars waged by the king and the boyars.

Little is known about the organization of the Bogomils during the initial period of their teaching. In the 10th century the adherents of the Bogomils had a leader, whose disciples were called "apostles." Later, when their number increased, they began organizing themselves into brotherhoods. At the head of the brotherhoods stood the so-called "grandfather" or "headman", who had three assistants known under the names, "guest", "old man" and "ranker."

Documents of the 12th and 13th centuries contain data about the Bogomil communities. These were probably a group of brotherhoods within a definite territory. In those days there were three Bogomil communities in Macedonia - Dragovichiya, Bulgaria and Meliniksa. There were some communities in Thrace as well.
The life of the Bogomils was centred in their brotherhoods, where they gathered at common prayer meetings. They were organized after the pattern of the old Christian brotherhoods, described in "The deeds of the apostles."

The adherents of the Bogomil teaching were divided into three categories—"perfect," "believers" and "listeners." The first were bound to live a strictly ascetic life, according to the basic principles of the Bogomil heresy, while for the rest this was not compulsory. The number of "perfect" Bogomils was comparatively small. They were the chief, preachers and propagators of the teaching.

The Bogomil heresy found favourable soil in Bulgaria, and in a comparatively short period became a mass movement. The Bogomils found the greatest number of followers among the peasant population as well as among the poor townsfolk.

The mass movement of the Bogomils was cruelly persecuted by the secular power and the church. Even in Peter's day, continued persecutions were started against the heretics. They were thrown into prison and banished from the country. Inspite of all, it was not possible to eradicate the new teaching.

The Bogomil creed spread mostly during the two-century Byzantine oppression over the Bulgarian people (1018 to 1185). The Bogomils were not only fighters against feudal oppression, but also fighters for the liberation of the people from foreign oppression. Under the influence of their preachings the population prepared to fight against the oppressors and organized an uprising against Byzantine rule.

After Bulgaria's liberation from the Byzantines the Bogomils continued their struggle against the feudal oppression of the Bulgarian boyars and their church. Their preachings were particularly sharp during the rule of King Boril (1207-1218). For this reason Boril called a special conference in 1211 in Turnovo, Bulgaria's capital in those days. At this conference, the chief leaders of the heresy were condemned and anathematized, while many of their followers were exiled.
Despite the cruel persecutions it was impossible to uproot the Bogomil movement. It continued to spread in the 13th and 14th centuries, since conditions still existed for its spreading. There are much more data on the dissemination of the Bogomil heresy during the second half of the 14th century. At that time its influence had spread among the poor in the towns. Bogomil preachers worked in the capital, Turnovo. In 1350, a church conference was convened there, at which Kiril and Lazar, two of the Bogomil leaders, were condemned. A few years later (1361), a second conference was convened, again directed against the Bogomil heresy. But all attempts at uprooting it fell through. According to some data, in the period between 1360 and 1365, a great part of the population of North-Western Bulgaria were "heretics."

After Bulgaria's fall under Turkish domination in 1393 the Bogomil heresy began to decline.

The Bogomil heresy is one of the most remarkable manifestations of the Bulgarian people in the Middle Ages. In spite of its religious form and certain elements of nupticism and aceticism, characteristic of all peasant-plebeian teachings of those days, it played a profoundly positive role with its ideology. By their sharp attacks against feudal oppression, the Bogomils incited the peasants to struggle, not allowing them to be impartial witnesses of oppression.

The Bogomil heresy played an important role in the development of Bulgarian literature and education in the Middle Ages. In order to spread their teaching among the people, the Bogomils made use not only of oral sermons, but of written material as well. They wrote a considerable number of works, dualist stories in which they exposed their ideas in picturesque and vivid language. Their works did a great deal to raise the cultural interests of the people.

The Bogomil heresy, which spread in the course of about five centuries, did not confine itself to Bulgaria alone. It penetrated the neighbouring peoples where it found favourable soil for development. In the 11th and 12th centuries Bogomil preachers came to Byzantium, Serbia and Bosnia. Their heresy took firm roots in Bosnia, where it became a state religion for a certain time.
In the 12th and 13th centuries the Bogomil teaching spread beyond the boundaries of the Balkan Peninsula—in Northern Italy and Southern France. Under the influence of their ideas, refracted in local conditions, powerful socio-religious teachings of Cathars and Albigeuses developed in these countries which were the first mass protest against the Catholic Church, in Western Europe, preparing the soil for the reformist movements which appeared later.
RULE OF LAW

By

Dr. R. C. Nigam, M.A., LL.M., Ph. D.

Modern Conception

Modern jurisprudence waxes eloquent on the doctrine of ‘Rule Of Law’, which ordinarily is understood to mean that all persons, whether rich or poor, high or low are alike amenable to the law. According to Dicey¹, the ‘Rule Of Law’ has three meanings, “In the first place, it means absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, or even the wide discretionary authority on the part of the Government.... A man may be punished for a breach of law but he may be punished for nothing else.... It means again, equality before law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land and administered by the ordinary Law courts; ‘the Rule Of Law’ in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals.... ‘Rule Of Law’, lastly, (means)...... the law of the Constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land”. Modern jurists have critically examined Dicey’s conception of “Rule Of Law”, which, “has troubled students ever since it was expounded in 1885 and for many years it had been the fashion to attack its accuracy”². An eminent authority³ says, “it remains a principle of the English Constitution. It involves absence of arbitrary power that every man should be responsible to the ordinary law whether he be a private citizen or a public officer; that private rights should be determined by impartial and independent tribunals; and that fundamental rights are safeguarded by the ordinary law of the land”. This doctrine of “Rule Of Law”, in fact, does not mean that the same laws should apply to all classes of persons. Some classes of persons, such as, ambassadors, judges and trade unions have special immunities. Conversely, certain classes of persons, such as, minors

2. Wade: Introduction to Dicey’s Law of the Constitution (9th Ed.) page LXXVI.
or foreigners, convicts or bankrupts may suffer under disabilities in law. Moreover, with the increase in the functions of the state, it has become necessary to entrust wide discretionary powers to the public authorities. The powers of private citizens are, therefore, not the same as the powers of the public officials. But all this is consistent with the principle of “Rule Of Law” or equality before law. As has been explained by Dr. Ivor Jennings¹, “Equality before law means that among equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered, that alike should be treated alike. The right to sue and be sued, to prosecute and be prosecuted for the same kind of action should be the same for all citizens of full age and understanding, and without distinction of race, religion, wealth, social status or political influence”. In England the idea of universal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land has been carried to its farthest end. By the equality of all people before law is meant that every man irrespective of his position is amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.

This principle of equality before law is incorporated in the Constitution of India² as of other countries.³ Article 14 of the constitution of India is based upon Dicey’s conception of the ‘Rule Of Law’ as explained above. It also finds a place in the Indian Penal Code⁴. The words “equal protection of law” occurring in the Constitution of India have been borrowed from the Constitution of the

2. Constitution of India: Article 14. “The state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territories of India”.
3. U.S.A. Constitution: 14th Amendment: “No state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws”.
4. S. 40 (1) Irish Constitution: “All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law...”. So also S. 13 of the Burmese Constitution; Article 7 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.
4. S. 2, I.P.C.: “Every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within the said territories”. The object of this section is to declare the liability of every person irrespective of rank, nationality, caste or creed to be punished under its provisions, (Mahabir Singh V. King Emperor 25 All. 31) the principle underlying being, “that it is an evil that any man should be above the law; that it is still a greater evil that the public should be taught as a high and inviolable distinction the privilege of being above the law....” (Report of the Law Commissioners to the draft Indian Penal Code Bill, Page XX).
U.S.A., where it has been interpreted to mean, "that all persons and businesses similarly situated shall be treated alike".  

It is clear, therefore, that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not forbid the State from making reasonable classification based upon some real and substantial ground bearing on the object sought to be attained by the law. Of course, some just cause, some objective factor for making a discrimination between one class and another should be in existence. Thus a law prohibiting and penalising bigamous marriages among the Hindus while leaving the Muslims free to contract bigamous marriages does not offend against the equal protection of Article 14, nor will it prevent distinctions and discriminations being made between citizens and non-citizens in the interest of the good of the State.

Since absolute equality between all men is unthinkable in all matters, and it is the duty of the State to protect the weak and the poor and the sick and the needy, and to help them in the life of competition which they have to face if they should survive with any comfort or dignity, the term "equal protection of law" must necessarily be construed as permitting discriminations in their favour for the development of their native talents and resources. Under American law some matters have been declared by the Courts as permissive objects of class legislation, to wit, military service, professions and pursuits, municipalities, corporations and companies and so on. This is, in brief, the modern notion of the "Rule Of Law" or equality before law.

**Ancient Indian Conception**

(a) **Legal Evidence.**

In our ancient Indian Law Books we find several texts which amply demonstrate that there existed in Ancient India the 'Rule Of Law' stricter than in the modern jurisprudence. All persons, rich or poor, high or low were alike subject to the law of the land. Even

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the King was liable to be punished, if he committed an offence and in his case the punishment was more severe than that prescribed for the common man. For Manu ordains, “when any common man would be fined one Karshapana, the King shall be fined one thousand, this is the settled rule”. This text clearly establishes that the King could be tried and punished by the ordinary courts of the land. As regards the disposal of the money realised as a fine from the King, the commentators suggest that the King should throw the money, due as a fine for an offence he may have committed, into the water or give it to the Brahmans. This is in conformity with the text of Manu, which lays down that Vanuga is the law of: “Punishment”, for he holds the sceptre over the Kings. Then again, stressing the supreme force of ‘Rule Of Law’, Manu clearly says, “Punishment possesses a very bright lustre and is hard to be administered by man with imperfect minds; it strikes down the King who swerves from his duty together with his relatives”. It is so, because the same sage at another place gives punishment the supreme place and says, “Punishment is (in reality) the King, and the Male, the manager of affairs, the ruler, and it is called the surety for the four orders’ obedience to the law”. Thus, it is clear that the King, according to Manu, is not above the law but is under it like any other person. So also, the Arthashastra holds that a court could punish a King, as it

1. Manu VIII. 336
   कार्यवाद्यं भवेवेक्ष्यो यमायेश्वरवायं: प्राकृतिकं जन।
   तत्र राजा भवेवेक्ष्यं: सहस्त्रलिंक धारणं।
   स्वायत्वधिकर्षाय भवेवेक्ष्य धार्मिकण्मयोधाविहि, इशो वन्ध्यवव बवण।
   (See also Govindaraja and Medhatithi pp.124, 1071 and Mandalik respectively)
3. Manu IX 245.
   इशो वन्ध्यवव बवणो राजो बवणवर्हो हि सः।
   इश: सर्वत्रवस्स्त जगतो धार्मिकण्यो वेद पारा।
4. Manu VII 28:
   बवणो हि शुभमहो शुभरशचा कालात्मकोऽविष्कर्तः।
   प्रेमिकर्षत शुभत नुमेव सवःवबम्।
5. Manu VII 17:
   स राजा पुढ्यो ववण: स नेता शालिताः सः।
   चुतुष्णवध्यकारणो च धर्मवव ज्ञातमस्मृतम: स्मृतः।
can any commoner. For it prescribed, “taking into consideration the social position of a person, the nature of the offence, the cause, whether grave or slight (that lead to the perpetration of the offence); the antecedents and the present circumstances, the time and place of its occurrence, the Pradeshta (or the highest Criminal Court of the Province) shall impose the first, middlemost or the highest amercement on the King, the common man and the minister”\(^1\). Here also, we find that the King’s Courts could try and punish a King just like an ordinary citizen. These principles of the Hindu Criminal Jurisprudence are far in advance of the English law, where the King is immune from punishment. The King can do no wrong is a well-known common law maxim. Blackstone\(^2\) says, “No suit or action can be brought against the Sovereign even in civil matters, because no Court could have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction implies superiority and power; authority to try would be vain and idle without the authority to redress; and the sentence of the Court would be contemptible unless that Court had power to command the execution of it, but who, says Finch, shall command the King? Hence, it is likewise that by the law the person of the sovereign is sacred, even though the measures pursued in his reign are completely tyrannical and arbitrary, for no jurisdiction upon earth has power to try him in a criminal way, much less to condemn him to punishment”. But as we have noticed above this common law maxim has no place in the juristic thought of the Hindu Law Givers. It was spurned by them. The tribunals set up by the King could try and punish him, if he erred.

The members of the royal family and the high functionaries of the State were also amenable to the law. The Mahābhārata\(^3\) ordains that neither mother nor father, nor brother nor wife nor priest is

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\(^1\) A. S. Bk. IV. Ch. 10, pp. 255-256 (Jolly p. 134)
\(^2\) Blackstone I, p. 242.
\(^3\) Śāstiparaśa CXXI 60 (p. 207)
immune from punishment in the rule of a just King. Manu also says, "Neither a father, nor a teacher, nor a friend, nor a mother, nor a wife, nor a son, nor a domestic priest must be left unpunished by the King, if they do not keep within their duties." At another place, the same sage empowers the King to fine one thousand panas, his Ministers and Judges if they discharge their duties improperly. But if they accept bribes, they shall be deprived of all their property and banished. Similarly, Yajnavalkya says that the same law governs the crown prince, the King's brother, father-in-law, or maternal uncle, as for any ordinary citizen and that no one is exempt from the operation of the law. So also, Kautilya says, "When the priest is guilty of the gravest treason he should be imprisoned or banished; but when the heir-apparent is so guilty he should be given life long imprisonment or capital punishment provided that there is another son of good character. The Minister and the Commander-in-Chief are also to be punished similarly." Sankha-likhita

1. Manu VIII 335.

2. Ibid IX 234

3. Ibid IX 231.

4. Ibid VII 124

5. Yaj. I 358

6. A.S.Bk.IX Ch.3 pp. 374 (Jolly p. 210)

7. Sankha-likhita quoted in Danda-Visaka, pp. 57-58.

References:

1. Manu VIII 335.
2. Ibid IX 234
3. Ibid IX 231.
4. Ibid VII 124
5. Yaj. I 358
6. A.S.Bk.IX Ch.3 pp. 374 (Jolly p. 210)
7. Sankha-likhita quoted in Danda-Visaka, pp. 57-58.
and Kātyāyana¹, however, say that a King should not punish his parents, his family priest, teacher, near relatives, forest hermits and ascetics. But as the Smritrichandrika² explains that the real meaning of these texts is not that the King is to allow these persons to go scot free but that he should not inflict corporal punishments or fines on them but should employ admonition or severe reproof towards them. So also, Brihaspati³ says that Gurus, priests and other respected persons should be admonished.

(b) Literary Evidence

Now let us investigate as to how far these principles of the Dharmāsāstras were applied in practice by the Courts in Ancient India. The Mrishchhakatika⁴, an ancient drama, amply illustrates that the principle of equality before law was actually observed by the Courts. In this drama, the King’s brother-in-law goes to the Court of Justice like an ordinary litigant. He appears before the judge and a seat was offered to him as a favour. But this was objected to by the complainant, the opposite party. This objection was accepted by the Court obviously on the principle that all are equal in the eye of law. Then again, in the same drama the judge in the trial of Charuduttra referring to the qualities of a judge, says, “For the judge is to be well versed in law, expert in following the tracks of cunning and deceit, he must be a good speaker, he must not have a bad temper and must be impartial to friends and strangers alike”.⁶

1. Kātyāyana, verse 461
   आचार्यं नित्यरूपवचन्तानि तत्वं च।
   एतेवमपरायेव वण्डो नैव बिवीश्वते॥

2. Smritrichandrika, p. 126
   सत्त्वरूपावर्त वण्ड्योनाश्वर्य न पुनर्वेशमानसः॥

3. Brihaspati (Aiyangar's Edn) p. 96
   गुणमुपप्राधिकृतं नावींसत्त्वरूपावर्त वण्डवेत्।
   राजसात्मक नराधिकरणं विध्वस्तावं च वण्डवेत्॥

   इतिमात्रः अग्यविचारः स्त्रोपालकः। अग्योर्जयः रे स्त्रोपालकः। अग्योर्जयः ? अहो वायो
   ध्येनहः।। अहो! ध्येनहः !!! यदेतस्मै स्त्रोपालकाः आलं बीते। मरसु, ननु
   बीतस्ताः।।

5. Mrishchhakatika: Act IX 5 pp. 405-406; also see 6 C. W. N. p. III.
   यत: अविकर्तकः; खलः:—
   तास्ताः! कहानु वर्तकृतां वस्तता न च कृत्यवस्तुमयो मिश्र परस्तकेव च चिरििं पुःस्तेव
   इत्यतः।। क्लो०त्रय पापिता शान्तनवपिता पद्ममितिलोकावित्ररावभविष्यते वर्ततामयो वर्ततामयो
   रामस्य कोपात्॥
(c) Caselaw Evidence.

In addition to the evidence contained in this ancient drama, we have two well known decided cases on this point. One is the case of Bimbisara and the other is that decided by the Court of the Lord Justices of Sravasti, the then capital of the Kingdom of Kosala. These cases bear out the importance attached to the rule of law in Ancient India. The first is recorded by Hieun Tsing¹ and relates to Bimbisara. In order to prevent fires in the capital, which had rather become too frequent at that time, the King passed an Ordinance to the effect that any person in whose house a fire should break out would be banished to the cold forest. One day a fire broke out in the royal palace. Then the King said to his Ministers, "I, myself, must be banished", and he gave up the Government to his eldest son and retired to the forest, saying, "I wish to maintain the laws of the country. I, therefore, myself am going into exile." No comment is necessary. What the King did here was to follow the rules laid down in our Dharmaśastras, viz., no one is above the law. The other is the case of Sudatta v. Prince Jeta, which is related at great length in the ancient Pali Cannon, Chullavagga². Sudatta, a rich merchant of the capital wanted to purchase a garden which belonged to Prince Jeta. Sudatta, Anathapindika (Sudatta, supplier of food to the destitute) was a charitable man, and desired to make a gift of a particular garden to Lord Buddha. He enquired from the Prince as to what price he would take for the garden. The Prince named an unreasonable sum, whereupon Sudatta said, "Accepted, I have taken the garden at that price". But the Prince would not part with the property and so the merchant sued for specific performance. The Royal Judges (Voharika Mahamatta) heard and decided the case, decreeing the suit against the Prince³. This recorded case shows that the direction in the Law Books⁴ that all are equal before the law had been an old settled principle in Ancient India.

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1. Beal’s Buddhist Records of the Western World.
2. Chullavagga: VI 4, 9 ; also see 17 C. W. N. p. CLXII.
3. Refer to an article by Dr. K. P. Jayaswal in 17 C. W. N. pp. CLXII.
4. Yaj I 358. For text refer to Note 5 at p. 75 supra.
(d) **Historical Evidence.**

Moreover, historical evidence is not wanting to show that the Kings in Ancient India did punish the members of the royal family. Emperor Asoka ordered his chief queen, Tishyarakshita, to be burnt alive for her heinous offence. The Chola King, Manuneetikandacholan, had his son crushed under chariot wheels for culpably running over a calf. Sivaji had his son, Sambaji, imprisoned for outraging the modesty of a woman. All this evidence furnished by legal, literary, judicial decisions and historical sources amply demonstrates that ‘Rule of Law’ was strictly applied in practice by the Kings in Ancient India.

**Three anomalies.**

The Dharmaśastras, as we have seen above, endeavoured to reach the ideal of the Rule of Law and succeeded to a greater extent in doing so than has been done by the modern laws. They laid down in clear terms that every man whatever his rank or condition, was subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. Undoubtedly, we come across certain texts here and there which allow a certain amount of differential treatment to certain classes of persons in certain matters. It is proper, in this context, to examine these texts and see how far this differential treatment, if at all it may be so called, was consistent with Equality Before Law propounded by the Hindu Law Givers.

(a) **In the cause-list.**

In the first instance, this differentiation appears in the matter of the order of taking up cases of the litigants. On this question Manu says that this order should be regulated by the Varpa of the plaintiff. In other words, the suit of the Brahmana plaintiff should

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1. The offence in question was that she caused her stepson, Kunala, to be blinded because he did not respond to her amorous gestures.


be taken up first and so on. Another jurist, Kautilya, says that cases of the litigants should be looked into either in the following order, namely, idols (or temples)—ascetics; heretics; minors; aged; those afflicted with disease or misfortune; helpless and women; or according to the importance of the cases or their urgency.

(b) In the appointment of Judge.

In the second place, as regards the appointments of judges also, we find that some discrimination is shown. It is ruled that the Chief Justice was to be a learned Brahmana. If a learned Brahmana was not to be found for the post of the Chief Justice, then a Kshatriya or a Vaiśya who knows the Dharmaśastras could be appointed, but the King had carefully to avoid appointing a Śūdra as a judge.

(c) In the award of punishments.

Thirdly, in the matter of the award of punishments in certain offences also there seems to be an apparent differential treatment in favour of the Brahmana, though on closer examination it turns out in reality to be against him.

The anomalies examined and explained.

We take up the question of the award of punishments at first. Prescribing the punishment for perjury, Manu says, “But a just


2. Manu VIII. 9 and 20;

Also Yaj II 3.

Similiarly, Kātyāyana. Verse 67


kṣatras tva tu jñavaṇāḥ śriśvarāṇaṁbhāgīḥ tuḥ. 

vidhātaraṇaḥ vā dharmaṁ tu bhavedvīpyet. | 92||

vaṣṭraśīrṣaṁ maḥ tu śrāvāṇaṅgaśāstakṣerōriḥ

brāhmaṇaṁ maṁ tu śvarakartā bāhyavitam | 126||
King shall fine and banish men of the three lower castes or *Varṇas*, who have given false evidence; but a Brahmana he shall only banish. *Svayambhu Manu* (Son of the Self-Existent) has named ten places on which punishment may be inflicted on the three lower castes or *Varṇas*, but a Brahman shall depart unhurt from the country. Similarly, in the matter of corporal punishment for abuse, defamation and assault, the Brahmanas are given lighter punishment. It is laid down that the Brahmana is not to be sentenced to death or corporal punishment for any offence whatever, but if he shall be found guilty deserving the death penalty, he shall be punished by ordering his head to be shaved and thereafter he was to be banished from the country or the town and a mark appropriate to the grave sin committed by him was to be branded on his forehead and he was to be paraded on an ass. Manu goes a step further and says, “Let him never slay a Brahmana though he may have committed all possible crimes; let him punish such an offender leaving all his property to him and (his body) unhurt.” “No greater *Adharma* is known on earth than slaying a Brahmana; the King, therefore, must not even conceive of in his mind the thought of killing a Brahmana.” Kautilya is less considerate, though even

1. Naradasmriti XVII. 910;

2. Manu VIII. 380, 381.

3. Buhler has wrongly translated it as “crime”. It is apparently inappropriate.

4. A. S. Bk. IV, Ch. 11. page 257 (Jolly p. 134)
he at another place admits Brahmana’s immunities. Manu like Kautiliya rules that the Brahmana should be branded with various indelible emblems reflecting his guilt, and be turned out of the society. He was to be excluded from commensuality, from sacrifices, from instruction, from matrimonial alliances, from all religious duties, and be cast off from all relations and receive neither compassion nor salutation. A Brahmana was not above being fined and in some cases the fines imposed on him were heavier than those imposed on the lower Varnas. This immunity from corporal punishment appears to have been granted to the Brahmana due to the persistence of the old feeling that killing a Brahmana carried with it a heavy load of sin. Further, the supposed leniency to the Brahman was really a greater severity. He was made not only an outlaw socially and legally but was practically starved to death. Probably the greatest punishment inflicted on him was that he was made incapable of performing any expiatory rites that would atone, even partially, for his moral lapse and thus he was condemned to endless punishment in re-incarnations. In fact, the purpose of Hindu Criminal Law was to adjust the punishment to the mood and mentality of the offender and the opinion of the times. It will be interesting to note that the force of popular opinion on the point of exempting a Brahmana offender from the death sentence was so great that even Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, had to exempt by Regulation in 1827

1. Ibid Bk. IV, Ch. 8. page 280 (Jolly p. 130)
Brahmans and women from death sentence even for murder. Judged in this light the discrimination in punishment is not in favour of the Brahmanas. Nay, it may even be construed against him. It is thus clear that the punishment prescribed for the Brahmanas was quite consistent with the principle of Equality before Law. Ancient Indian Criminal Law did not accept equality of all persons in the popular modern sense as it would really result in inequitable punishments.

Now we take up the second point of the differential treatment, which pertains to the appointment of judges. Here, if we probe in the matter deeply, it will be clear that these posts went, as even in modern times they go, on merits of education and knowledge. Sudras were not so qualified for these posts in those days and hence they were excluded. But later on this rule which prohibited the appointment of Sudras to these offices was relaxed, provided they were able and competent for these jobs. Sukraniti, a Smriti of a later date, expressly permits people of all castes to be associated in the administration of justice, provided they are otherwise qualified. It prefers members of the Royal family. This limitation on the right to hold a judicial office to certain sections of the community was not peculiar to Ancient India. It was a familiar feature of almost all the ancient and mediaeval societies of Europe. It was known to the Celts, to Greeks, to Romans and also to Muslims. Even in England such disabilities were recognised till recent times.

We shall now examine the third point as regards the differential treatment, which relates to the order in which the cases before the judges were to be taken up. The cause list was to be arranged according to the caste of the plaintiff or the complainant and sometimes also according to the importance of the case or its urgency. All this was, of course, to be determined by the presiding judge of the Court, as is the modern practice. This was entirely a rule of procedure which was to be governed by the discretion of the Court. Moreover, it may be that the cases of the Brahmanas were to be taken up first because it was expected that they were continuously engaged in religious duties and, therefore, they should not be kept away from the same unnecessarily.

1. Regulation 14 of 1827 S. IV cl. 5.
CONCLUSION

The upshot is that the Ancient Indian Criminal Jurisprudence preached and practised with full vigour the Rule of Law or Equality before Law in the truest modern sense as explained by Dr. Ivor Jennings. As has been pointed out at the outset modern freedom loving people wax eloquent on the doctrine of the Rule of Law on paper, but in practice indulge in lynching. The Smritis, be it said to their credit, do not contain rules like those contained in the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, which entitled Europeans and Americans in India to claim a jury preponderantly composed of their countrymen and claiming trial only by special courts. Unlike the English Peer, who could only be tried by the House of Lords for felonies, or the Clergy in the medieval Europe, England and U.S.A., who could claim special privileges, the Brahmana in our country was tried only in the ordinary courts, by ordinary rules of procedure, and by ordinary methods of evidence and when judged guilty was sentenced in ways that appear to but do not really discriminate in his favour. How even in the twentieth Century the much vaunted Equality before Law of all people is far from being achieved and how it often proves illusory when the poor and the labouring classes are concerned is clearly explained in recent times by an English barrister.

2. Cr. P.C. (1908) S.229A and Ch. XLVIASst. 5-8A; 5-8D. Of late, when the Britishers left India, these obnoxious provisions have been deleted from the said Code.
3. The Benefit of Clergy was abolished in 1827 in England. It survived longer in some parts of the U.S.A. and was claimed in South Carolina at least so recently as 1855 (State v. Bozé 42. S. C. 276).
INDIAN MUTINY OF 1857—1859 AND THE REACTION OF THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC*

By

P. Shastitko

The first report of a popular uprising in India reached Russia on June 27, 1857, when Khreptovich, the Russian ambassador in London, telegraphed the news to St. Petersburg of the outbreak at Meerut and the seizure of Delhi by the insurgents. On the same day he wrote a memorandum to Prince Gorchakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and appended extracts from the London papers. A detailed description of events was sent by Colonel Ignatiev, Russian military attaché in London.

Ignatiev wrote: “The uprising in India is not a chance mutiny of several native regiments against the Company; it is rather an expression of the desire of the region to free itself from a hateful foreign yoke.” Ignatiev believed the reasons for the mutiny lay in the “abuses of the administrative personnel and the devouring greed of the Company.” In Ignatiev’s opinion, the Company policy in relation to the Indian states, conducted by the Earl of Dalhousie, led to even the “feudal leaders of India” realising that “sooner or later every convenient piece of land within the reach of the English merchants will be seized by them.”

When it appeared in the press, the sensational news from London roused the Russian public opinion. “There is hardly a question more important, interesting or grave than that of India in the political world today. News from India is awaited with the greatest impatience; the most exciting headlines are ‘India’, ‘Indian Post’ and ‘Correspondence from Calcutta,’” declared the liberal magazine Otechestvennye Zapiski (“Fatherland Notes”). “Indian affairs have become the most vital problem of the day. The eyes of all Europe have been fixed on India for five months,” the magazine Russky Vestnik told its readers.

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*By courtesy of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in India, New Delhi.
A furious polemics developed in the newspapers and magazines as to Russia’s attitude to the mutiny. The public found it hard to obtain a correct idea of the reasons for the mutiny and how it was developing since the Russian press took most of its material on the subject from English newspapers. Those circumstances explained the contradictions and confusion in the viewpoints not only of the different magazines and newspapers but even in the views of various writers.

The clearest and most definite opinion about the mutiny was undoubtedly found only among the Russian revolutionary democrats. Their views were expressed in N. A. Dobrolyubov’s article “An Opinion of the History and Contemporary State of the East India Company,” which appeared in the September issue of the magazine Sovremennik (Contemporary), the organ of Russian democracy. N.G. Chernyshevsky, writer and philosopher who headed the Russian revolutionary democratic movement, noted with satisfaction that “the article really turned out well.”

Dobrolyubov’s article was distinguished, for one thing, for its mature approach to the subject. It considered the mutiny not as a chance outburst of dissatisfaction but as a “historically necessary affair.” Dobrolyubov began his study of the reasons for the mutiny by investigating all the springs and levers of the East India Company’s machinery of exploitation, combining, as it did, the insolence of the robber with the greed of the petty shopkeeper.

With complete objectivity, Dobrolyubov traced the history of the establishment of British rule in India and the growth of a small company of enterprising merchants into an oligarchy of commercial tycoons. He flatly rejected the claim of historians and journalists who, through naivete or hypocrisy, talked of the “civilizing” mission of the English. “England’s ultimate aim is state and private profit and not civilisation,” Dobrolyubov wrote.

In his estimate of the mutiny Dobrolyubov took the side of those who did not regard it as a religious revolt of “fanatical Hindus” or a “mutiny of soldiers who have gotten out of hand,” but as the emancipatory uprising of people who had selflessly risen against invaders. He was able to understand that “......the people rebelled because they finally detected evil in the very organisation of the British rule.”
At that time official Russian view was presented by the newspaper *Russky Invalid*, which carried regular and thorough reports on the events in India. On October 13, 1857, the newspaper published a long article by Sergeberg entitled "East Indies Affairs." The author's sympathies were exclusively on the side of the insurgent Indians. "The British lion is accustomed to clawing up the political bodies of states. This time, as regards India, it may have to restrain its fierce habits." Sergeberg found the reason for the mutiny, in the "English brutal treatment of the Indians (particularly when collecting taxes) and their absolute ignoring human rights."

The highly popular newspaper *Petersburgskie Vedomosti*, edited by A. A. Kraevsky, a member of the political group known as "Westerners," also kept its readers well informed. On July 30 the paper began to run a series called "Letters about East Indies Indignation" in which the author advised his readers to take a critical attitude towards the London papers inasmuch as "the English," he said, "possess the Roman art of hiding or denying failures." From the history of how British rule was established in India the author drew the conclusion that "the very structure of the Indo-British empire contains in itself an embryo of death." He labelled as nonsense the claims of British journalists that the reason for the mutiny lay in the officers having ignored the religious feelings of the Hindus. (The introduction of those ill-starred cartridges for new rifles.)

As to those who claimed that "enlightened Europe" had a cultural mission in "stagnating, barbaric Asia," the *Petersburgskie Vedomosti* called the thesis unscrupulous Pharisaism, arguing reasonably that "England acquired a vast empire in order not to civilize it but to devour it."

The reason for Russian authors devoting so much attention to Europe's "civilizing role" in Asia was that it was the argument used to justify the frank and undisguisedly cynical actions of the colonizers. Reactionary circles in Russia also tried to utilize that Jesuitical weapon. The *Russky Vestnik* reflected the opinion of those circles when it said: "We do not sympathize with England's foreign policy; we have points of conflict with her. But we shall always have the magnanimity and conscientiousness to recognise the unity of our tasks. Both England and Russia are called upon to
spread the light of the European way of life in the moral darkness of stagnating Asia. Here we are allies; here there is solidarity between us."

However, justice requires us to note that the opinion of the Russky Vestnik did not receive any support from the Russian public. That is quite understandable. Besides sympathizing with the Indian people in their struggle for freedom and independence, the Russian people were themselves still smarting from the insult to their national pride inflicted by British and French arms in the Crimean War of 1854. Hence, their sympathies were on the side of those fighting to free India from the colonial yoke.

The grim echoes of the storm in Hindustan rolled over the snowy peaks of the Himalayas and across the plains of Russia until they reached St. Petersburg. The progressive section of the Russian public detected in that storm the power of the first spring squall, forerunner of the coming storms of emancipation.

* * *

Soviet scholars study the history of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-1859 with great interest. That interest is based on an understanding of history not as an aggregate of subjective views but as a corollary of objective laws, a study of which makes it possible to understand the direction in which society is moving. The Indian people's heroic struggle in the past, India's formation into a great power in the present, and the prospects for her future development make a study of Indian history both fascinating and responsible.

According to the Soviet scholars, the Indian Mutiny is not an isolated incident. The mutiny in India, the Taiping rebellion in China, Babiism in Iran, and the rise of the emancipatory movement in Indonesia all represented the reaction of the peoples to attempts to convert their countries into colonies.

The Mutiny in India was directed against British rule, and peasants, artisans and sepoys were its chief motive force. But besides this force there was a feudal force headed by nobles whom the British deposed and who saw an opportunity to regain their lost rights and
privileges. The chief weakness of the mutiny obviously lay in its lack of organisation.

In spite of the fact that the mutiny was put down it played an exceptionally important role in developing national consciousness in India and laid a firm foundation for joint action on the part of her anti-colonial forces, irrespective of religion, caste or language.
THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF 1824-5 ON THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER OF INDIA

By

Dr. Nandalal Chatterji, M.A., Ph.D., D. Litt.

The military operations of 1824-5 on the borders of Bengal in Assam, Sylhet and Cachar have not received from the historians the attention they deserve. These operations showed how vital the North-Eastern frontier was to the safety of the low-lying plains of Bengal. The Burmese occupation of Assam and the hill states bordering Sylhet and Tipperah not only weakened the defence barriers of Bengal, but constituted a direct menace to its security along upwards of six hundred miles of its frontier. The campaigns which came in the wake of the Burmese conquests in Assam demonstrated the urgent need for a scientific frontier for Bengal on that side. They also illustrated the risks and dangers from a lack of adequate military defences on the eastern borders.

On the eve of the out-break of the first Anglo-Burmese War, the eastern borders of Bengal were more or less unguarded on account of the want of foresight and care on the part of the British authorities. The Chittagong frontier was left with no more than five companies of Sepoy infantry and a police force called the Chittagong provincial battalion. Sylhet was in the care of four companies of the Rangpur local battalion, and Rangpur itself was guarded by the headquarters of that corps stationed at Jamalpur on the Brahmaputra. The borders on the Assam side were protected by two companies of the Dinapore local battalion, with some gun-boats. Only five companies of regular infantry were posted at Dacca, until the latter part of 1823, when an additional five companies had to be transferred from the cantonment of Berhampore. The military defence thus was most inadequate. Whatever force was available was scattered, and it was hardly in a position to stop an organized enemy offensive. There was no fortress or fortified position along the Brahmaputra from the Naaf in the south to Goalpara in the north. The ill-guarded frontiers of Bengal must have been a standing incitement to the Burmese expansion in Assam. To make mat-
ters worse, the authorities at Calcutta had very little topographical knowledge of the hill regions of Assam, and little or no statistical information about the people and the resources of the neighbouring areas. Thus, when the Calcutta authorities were involved in the first Burma War of 1824, they were almost ignorant of the eastern terrain on which it was to be prosecuted, and equally unaware of the resources of the enemy. And, the whole frontier was practically defenceless.

It is therefore hardly surprising that the initial arrangements for the prosecution of the war in Assam, Sylhet and Cachar were wavering and inefficient, and every operation had to be conducted with insufficient and unsatisfactory resources. It was because of the semi-defenceless state of Bengal that there was alarm even for the safety of Calcutta, and the Commander-in-Chief had to improvise hastily a gun-boat establishment or flotilla which was to cruise on the salt lake, east of Calcutta, and guard the river barrier from the Sunderbans or Delta to Dacca. In due course, this flotilla was apportioned to the forces about to penetrate into Assam, Cachar and Arracan.

The military operations on the North-Eastern frontier were prosecuted from several points in 1824-5, viz., from Goalpara into Assam; from Sylhet into Cachar; and from Chittagong into Arracan. The objectives of these campaigns were, firstly, to complete the conquest of Assam, secondly, to reinforce the British forces in Burma, thirdly, to create a diversion inside Burma from the side of Cachar and Arracan, for which purpose, upwards of 30,000 men, of all arms, were concentrated in Bengal, and lastly, to secure the Chittagong frontier and counteract the Burmese moves in Arracan.

From the contemporary despatches and unofficial reports, it is possible to reconstruct one connected and comprehensive day-to-day account of the main campaigns of 1824-5. This summary account would throw some light on the emergence of the North-Eastern Frontier of Bengal as a vital link in the Chain of its defences, and also on the inefficient prosecution of the war in the early stages on account of the utter mismanagement of Lord Amherst and Sir Edward Paget.
INVASION OF ASSAM, 1824.

In January, Brigadier McMorine succeeded Brigadier Popham, who went back to England on account of ill health. The new Brigadier came to Goalpara on the Brahmaputra—a point on the eastern frontier leading into Assam, where a force was collected for the eventual invasion of that area. A gun-boat flotilla on the Brahmaputra, three brigades of six-pounders, six companies Rungpur and the Dinapore local corps were assembled here. To these were subsequently added seven companies, and a wing of the Champaran local corps, giving a total of about 2,202 rank and file, with a small body of irregular cavalry. As against this, the Burmese were reported to have 3,000 or 4,000 well-armed troops in Assam, although this estimate was found incorrect afterwards.

March 13, 1824—Flotilla stores and 46th Regiment N.I. moved up the Brahmaputra. The remainder of the troops moved by land.

March 23—From KUMURPOOTAH, a detachment of the Champaran brigade diverged to dislodge the enemy from the stockades of LU RIEDEWA. The object was effected without difficulty; the Burmese leaving two men killed, and a few wounded.

March 26—At PALASBARRY, the two divisions were united. This was a stockaded position, ten miles from GAUHATI, the capital of South Assam, and seventy miles from GOALPARA.

March 27—After few shots, the Burmese evacuated their position. An ineffectual pursuit was attempted.

March 28—The town and stockades of GAUHATI were occupied. The Burmese, prior to their retreat up the Brahmaputra to KULLIABAR, impaled some forty Assamese, suspected of intrigue with the British. On this date, a proclamation was issued by the Brigadier, explanatory of the views of the invaders, and calling on the Assamese to join in expelling the Burmese. The Brigadier's operations were under the control of the political agent, Mr. D. Scott, who was, at this period, personally attending to the Burmese movements from Cachar on Sylhet.

April 5—Mr. Scott, with an escort of three companies 46th. Regiment N.I., quitted Sylhet to reach the Brahmaputra, by a direct
route through the state of the JYNTIAH (Jaintia) Raja, who was inimical to the Burmese.

April 15—Mr. Scott, with his escort, arrived in safety at RUSSU CHOKEY on the Brahmaputra, about 80 miles above Gauhati. The distance traversed by his party was about 90 miles in eleven days; the greater portion of the route lay across a high tableland, easy of access, and the JYNTIAHS very friendly. NAOGAON had been deserted by the Burmese, soon after the Brigadier reached Gauhati.

April 29—Mr. Scott moved down to Gauhati, leaving his escort, under Capt'n Horsburgh, to occupy NAOGAON.

May 5—Some movements of the Burmese indicating an intention to dispute the possession of Naogaon, Lieut-Col. Richards, with the gun-boat flotilla, and five companies 46th regiment, N.I. moved from Gauhati to prosecute operations as far as the KULLUNG river, or KULLIABAR.

May 9—Reached MUNGULDYE, thirty miles up the Brahmaputra.

May 15—Having been joined by the Naogaon detachment, Col. Richards gained the Kullung river, about 90 miles above Gauhati. On the two following days, possession was taken of the stockades of HAUTBAR, or Kullung, which the enemy did not venture to defend.

May 24—A movement was made by water to turn the stockades of RUNGLYGUR, above Kulliabar. During this operation, the camp at the latter place was left under charge of Captain Horsburgh, with four companies, and a party of irregular horse. The Burmese, before a final retreat from Lower Assam, ventured an attack on the camp at Kulliabar. For this effort, they lost 50 killed, and 150 or 200 wounded and drowned on their retreat. The loss of the British was limited to some camp-followers at the commencement of the Attack.

May 30—Brigadier McMorine fell a victim to an attack of cholera. He died on his way from Gauhati to Kulliabar, where
Lieut.-Col. Richards who succeeded to the command, established his headquarters for some time.

July 10—Brigadier Richards found himself under the disagreeable necessity of retreating to Gauhati; the difficulties of supplying the troops with provisions being found almost insurmountable, owing to the rapidity of the current of the Brahmaputra, and the great distance from which the supplies were obliged to be brought; Assam itself furnishing nothing but beef, an article of food which Hindus did not approve. Most of the baggage cattle and cavalry (for which water carriage was not obtainable), perished on the way down, though the distance was not above 90 miles.

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Thus ended the operations of the season in Assam. The delay in the advance of the troops, during February and March, was regrettable, and was the subject of adverse comment. Owing to mismanagement, the land column could not easily penetrate the deep and high grass jungle which lay in its route. The progress of the flotilla was equally slow owing to the rapidity of the current, and the want of track paths along the banks of the river. On the whole, the advance of the troops was most unsatisfactory. There was inefficient transport both by land and by water. Provisions and stores were inadequate, and the advance of the army could not outstrip the commissariat supplies. It was by great exertions that the means placed at the disposal of the commissariat officer enabled him to meet the wants of the troops on their limited line of operation; any extension of this line, the department could certainly not meet. The campaign closed without a signal success, although there was no mishap. Much exposure and privation were endured by the troops; but, there was no opportunity for obtaining laurels.

SYLHET AND CACHAR, 1824.

To meet the Burmese invasion, the British collected on the Sylhet frontier the 1st Brigade 10th, three companies 2nd Brigade 23rd, and the original detachment of four companies of the Rungpur local corps, with a very inadequate detail of artillery. Altogether, the effective strength of this force might be estimated at 1,200 rank and file.
January 16, 1824—At Jutrapoor, on this date, Major Newton had concentrated his small force, and attacked the enemy in their stockades; losing five men killed and eleven wounded. The Burmese lost about seventy killed, and retired. But, owing to the want of provisions, the British army had also to retreat to Bhadrapur, on the Soorma river, fifty miles from Sylhet.

Feb. 13—The Burmese having re-entered Cachar in greater force, and with more apparent combination, pushed forward on this date a party to occupy the heights across the Soorma, within 1,000 yards of the British post at Bhadrapur. Here, they began to stockade their position. Mr. D. Scott sanctioned an attack on the Burmese. The Burmese fired on the advanced parties from the British force, but their attack was not strong enough to rout the British, although the latter had to suffer losses. Then, the Burmese retired without any loss on their side. On this second reverse, the Assam division fell back on the passes, while the Burmese stockaded on the heights of DUODPATLY, a distance of a few miles only from Bhadrapur.

Feb.—16—Since the affair of the 13th, Lieut.-Col. Bowen had moved from Sylhet. Major Newton also advanced, and again occupied Jutrapoor. Here Lieut. Col. Bowen's division, which had to proceed by water, also arrived on the following day. By these diverse movements the Assam troops were induced to retire altogether from Cachar, influenced, no doubt, by the preparations at Goalpara for the invasion of Assam.

Feb. 21—The movements of this day brought the advance of Col. Bowen's force into contact with a detachment of the Burmese, which was briskly attacked, and an attempt made to follow the enemy into the stockaded position on the ridge of Duodpatly; but, being drawn on the strongest point, the attempt failed. Col. Bewan persevered in his efforts to carry the heights after the first repulse, but totally failed in all! After a prolonged exposure to the Burmese fire, the British troops were compelled to fall back two miles to Jutrapoor; leaving a party on the intervening ridge. The British loss was one officer killed, five European officers wounded, and 150 men killed and wounded.

Feb. 25—No further movement occurred until this date, when it was reported that the Burmese were in retreat from Cachar.
The British troops then went into quarters for the rains, but the main body fell back to cantonments at Sylhet. Towards the end of this month, an ordnance depot was formed at Dacca, and a local corps was ordered to be organized at Sylhet, to be composed of hill tribes and Manipuris.

Nothing material occurred on this frontier during the months of March, April and May. Towards the end of May, a British army moved in haste towards Chittagong, where the greatest alarm prevailed after the great disaster of the 17th of May at Ramoo. Later, more Burmese invasions of Cachar took place from the side of Manipur. The British troops had to fall back in consequence.

June 7—Unfavourable accounts were received from the frontier. The Burmese had re-established themselves on the heights of Talayn, Juttrapoor and Duadpatly. Col. Innes was recalled.

June 12—Col. Innes, with part of his harassed troops, retired to Sylhet; the men had to track their routes night and day against the stream, with brief intervals of rest; and, as the whole country is at this season under water, the essential indulgence of landing to cook their meals was seldom to be obtained.

June 20—Col. Innes’s force, amounting to about 1,000 rank and file, reached Bhadrapur.

June 27—The force gained the Barak river, near Juttrapoor; some previous efforts to cross a detachment by land were obstructed by the state of the rivulets and marshy hollows.

June 28—Col. Innes landed apart of his force, and with two five-and-a-half howitzers, and four six pounders occupied a ridge of hills, with the intent from thence to prosecute his attack on the stockades of Talayn and Duadpatly. So little attention was paid to the elevation of surrounding heights, that the Burmese cleverly seized a point from whence they commanded the British position. After some fruitless expenditure of ammunition, a feeble attempt to recover the lost height, and some loss, Col. Innes withdrew to his boats on the Barak river. With this ill-planned and ill-executed effort the operations for the season closed. The season was unfavourable and equipment in artillery insufficient.
July 6—The troops passed the season in boats; the Burmese in quiet possession of their heights. There was considerable sickness among British troops. Sometimes, more than half the men were in hospital.

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It is clear that the operations in Cachar were entirely mismanaged. The Government and its political advisers were ill-informed of the movements and intentions of the Burmese. The officers on this front were inefficient, and nobody seemed to know that a successful prosecution of hill warfare is the most difficult field for the exercise of military skill, and one in which stratagem is more usually called forth than tactics, and therefore extensive local knowledge is an essential requirement. Owing to the lack of local knowledge, the British officers committed a series of blunders, and the ignorance of the theatre of operations on the part of the British troops was a great advantage to the Burmese. Col. Innes's action against the latter on the 28th of June was badly conducted, and it showed no foresight and vigour on his part. The repeated abandonment of the commanding positions in Cachar betrayed a total lack of experience in hill and jungle warfare. The Burmese thrice occupied the passes and the heights, and were neither driven from, nor manoeuvred out of these positions. It was a very costly lesson that the British learnt in frontier operations during this war.

CHITTAGONG FRONTIER, 1824.

The quarrel between the British and the Burmese in 1823, with regard to the right to the island of Shapari ("Shahpuree") had ended in its occupation by a small force commanded by an Indian officer from the Chittagong police corps. A small naval force was equipped to interpose between that island and the Burmese positions on the Naaf and at Mungdoo. Chittagong which is at a distance of 140 miles from the Naaf was re-inforced by the transfer of a force from Dacca. The seizure and deportation to Arracan, on the 21st of January 1824, of Mr. CHEW, who had been invited on shore to a conference with the Burmese was an act of hostility, and so reinforcements were ordered to Chittagong. A local Mug levy was recruited, and was placed under the command of Capt. Pringle on the 29th of April. The entire force, regular and irregular, numbered about
3,000 men; but of these the small detail of artillery and the regulars were alone to be depended on, and these were no more than a half of the total number. There was a detachment at Ramoo, about 100 miles from Chittagong, and within a few miles of the Burmese outposts on the Naaf. Early in May the Burmese crossed the Naaf with about 2,000 men, and took up a position fourteen miles distant from Ramoo.

May 9—A British force moved as a reconnaissance towards the Burmese, when its advance was successfully opposed by the latter. The British force had to retreat to Ramoo, having had two officers wounded, and twenty-five men killed and wounded.

May 12—Having heard of the approach of the Burmese, Brigadier SHAPLAND sent three companies from Chittagong to reinforce the British positions.

May 14—The Burmese kept on advancing. An attempt was made to check them, but it was of no avail. The British officer in charge was contemplating retreat from the entrenched position.

May 15 and 16—Much desultory firing, under which the Burmese continued to push on towards the British front and flanks.

May 17—The Burmese were still advancing towards the rear of the British force. They occupied an important position at 10 A.M. a decisive success which proved critical for the British troops. There was general panic among them. The Burmese obstructed the retreating force by effective attacks. The British were in dire peril. Most of the officers died in their vain efforts to rally a defeated army. In the end, however, a fair part of the force could disperse safely. Only three officers escaped, two of them being wounded. This was a disgraceful rout, indeed!

May 18—The great disaster at Ramoo created a deep sensation all round. In Calcutta, the greatest alarm prevailed. The safety of Chittagong was "past praying for". Dacca was in immediate danger, and even Calcutta itself was supposed to be in peril. But, the Burmese could not follow up their success. The season was unfavourable for a rapid advance, and they were not fully equipped for an extended line of operations. Reinforcements for the defence of Bengal were now called from every quarter.
May 24—A wing of infantry was embarked for Chittagong from Calcutta. There was a baseless rumour of the occupation of Chittagong by the Burmese. The Burmese could in fact make no advance beyond Ramoo. Their default saved the situation for Bengal, for if they had rushed on for Chittagong and Dacca, they could have captured both the stations easily.

June 2—The Burmese successfully captured the British detachment at Shapari. A few men escaped with difficulty.

June 10—The Burmese had to send most part of their army in Arracan to reinforce their forces at Rangoon. This marked the beginning of the end for the Burmese.

July 27—The Burmese had to evacuate all their positions north of the Naaf and retire inside Arracan. This was due to a number of factors. Firstly, the war situation was changing inside Burma. Secondly, most of the Burmese troops had to be sent away to Rangoon. Thirdly, Arracan lay exposed to attack by sea. Lastly, sickness was an important cause for the Burmese withdrawal.

These operations brought to light the defenceless state of the South-Eastern frontier of Bengal, and demonstrated a lamentable lack of foresight on the part of the Bengal authorities. The measures of defence were totally inefficient and inadequate. The rainy season alone saved the British position in Bengal, and it was purely providential. There is no doubt that the British authorities committed error after error, and the lessons of hill and jungle warfare during the Nepal War were forgotten with disastrous results. These lessons were learnt afresh now. The authorities found, firstly, that the art of stockading must be thoroughly acquired, secondly, that the advantages of position when held by a foe must not be despised, thirdly, that an engineer corps with artillery parks is absolutely necessary in hill warfare, fourthly, that the troops on the frontiers can be reduced only at grave risk, and, lastly, that the knowledge of the theatre of operations must be fairly accurate and full.

CAMPAIGN IN ASSAM, 1824-5.

In the latter part of 1824 when the operations were resumed in Assam, some of the early errors were avoided. Firstly, the commis-
sariat was now better organised and equipped, secondly, the communication with the Bengal provinces was kept open, thirdly, Brigadier Richards was to work in co-ordination with Mr. D. Scott, Political Commissioner, as a junior Commissioner so as to avoid the risks of divided authority, fourthly, the troops were now adequately reinforced, and, lastly, several new and suitable posts were established for cantonments.

Oct. 19, 1824—The Burmese were in possession of Kulliabar, whence their parties were pushing into Cachar. Major Cooper, who was stationed at Mungle Dye was directed to proceed towards Kulliabar with four gun-boats and a flotilla.

Oct. 31—The British troops surprised the Burmese at Dikeree. This success restored the British prestige to some extent. The Burmese had to retreat hereafterwards. One of their parties was surprised at Hautgaon in incessant rain.

Nov. 2—The Burmese were again surprised at Raha Chokey, and their flight was intercepted. They had to suffer considerable losses, without any on the part of the British.

Nov. 3—It was reported that the Burmese Governor in Assam was preparing to withdraw to Manipur.

Nov. 4—The Burmese made a precipitate retreat from Naogaon, and left behind most of their baggage, plunder and stores, including twenty guns and three war boats. These repeated successes restored the British troops to the former positions lost by their retreat in July last.

Nov. 25—The 57th regiment Infantry reached Gauhati, when the 46th regiment Infantry was ordered to move by water to Kulliabar.

Dec. 3—British operations were directed against Rangpur, the headquarters of Upper Assam. The great obstacle to a speedy movement lay the insufficient supply of transport. Carriage, the principal resource being in water-transport, ill adapted to facilitate operations against many of the least accessible points of attack.

Dec. 27—More British reinforcements advanced from Kulliabar by land and by water. The number of store-boats caused the progress to be very slow.
Jan. 6, 1825—The British entrenched-themselves at Maura Mookh: The force consisted of artillery, flotilla, irregular cavalry, Infantry regiments, and Dinapore and Rangpur corps. A party of the Burmese were forced to retire, but without any loss. Arrangements were begun to clear the country on the flank and rear. Advance parties were sent in all directions.

Jan. 10—The British forces reached Deorgaum at one A.M.; but the Burmese were alert, and they managed to leave their stockades on one side as the British troops entered on the opposite, and escaped with little or no loss. A Burmese stockade near Deorguroo was carried by assault. The Burmese abandoned Kutcheree Hath, but a part of their detachment was cut up. As a result of this, the neighbouring country was cleared. The Burmese had to retire towards Rangpur.

Jan. 16—The Dinapore corps, under Major Waters, reached Jorhat after its hasty evacuation by the Burmese. Large supplies of grain were detained here.

Jan. 17—The British troops expected an attack at the mouth of the Dessung river. Precautions were taken, but the Burmese did not appear.

Jan. 18—The headquarters joined the advance of Jorhat, while Captain McLeod, with the fleet, was making slow progress against the currents and shallows towards the Dhekun river. From this date to the 26th, the movements were slowed down, and the British suffered considerably from the rain that fell daily.

Jan. 21—The fleet and stores, under Captain McLeod, reached the Dhekun river, which proved too shallow to admit a nearer approach than fourteen miles from Rangpur. No enemy had been seen by the fleet.

Jan. 22—The Burmese left the stockades at Millung.

Jan. 24—The Burmese still continued to retire as the British advanced.

Jan. 25—The British troops encamped at Gowrie Saogor on the Dhekun river.
Jan. 26—A reconnaissance was conducted close up to Rangoon, and an outwork gained. This was so buried in woods and marshes that little could be traced of the nature of its defences.

Jan. 27—At 11 A.M., the Burmese made a brisk and unexpected attack on Captain McLeod's position. The troops and camp followers who were cooking beyond the bridge made such a rush on the first alarm that the Burmese actually gained a footing on the bridge before the British defenders could act. But, the Burmese had to give ground eventually. Captain McLeod placed his men under cover, and remained on the defensive. Brigadier Richards soon arrived, but would not order any movement until it was clear that the enemy had no other object of attack. During this brief interval, the Burmese kept up a smart fire and loud yelling from the high grass jungle, which concealed their numbers and position. Once, they pushed on the road, across which they quickly threw up a redtrenchment to command the bridge. At length, the British moved on to the assault. There was stiff fighting, and the Burmese retreated, and were pursued.

Jan. 28—An advance on Rangpur was arranged after the arrival of more guns and howitzers, and also provisions.

Jan. 29—The force moved at 7 A.M. At 11 A.M. the advance came on the enemy's outworks, from which a smart fire was opened. Then, the British troops had to diverge right and left into the dense jungles. A Burmese stockade was carried in gallant style, and the enemy hastily retreated to the fort of Rangpur. There were losses on both sides. Brigadier Richards took up position in front of the fort, occupying two stockades within 700 yards of the ramparts. The Burmese opened an ineffectual fire, as the British troops were protected under cover of a big tank and the ditches of the road. Troops were posted in two temples within 300 yards of the walls.

Jan. 30—At 3 A.M., two men killed at the left temple piquet by the enemy. After daylight, a few shot were fired from the fort; but at noon a flag of truce was displayed, and negotiations opened for the surrender of Rangpur, which was taken possession of by 2 P.M. on the following terms; viz: The evacuation of Assam by the Burmese; the surrender of all forts with military stores and arms; such
of the troops as wished to come over to the British to be protected in their persons and property; the rest to retire out of Assam to Ava without molestation, provided no act of aggression was committed. Under this historic capitulation, SAUM PHOKUN, with some other chiefs, and 700 men, surrendered; the rest of the garrison, estimated at 200 fighting men, but 9000 of all classes, ages and sexes, retired towards the passes leading to Manipur. The fort of Rangpur was a quadrangular structure, each face about 1200 yards, a rampart faced with brick, decayed in several places; bastions at the angles, gates at the centre of each face, and a moderate ditch surrounded these defences. The principal obstacle, however, to overcome was a glacis, thickly sprinkled with spiked bamboos, a mode of defence much practised. From the camp, the ramparts made a respectable appearance, but the fort could hardly have stood an assault, as the ditch was very imperfect, and there were several branches in the ramparts, hastily repaired with a breastwork of timber.

Feb. 2—The British troops set out against a tribe of mountaineers who harried the plains and carried off the inhabitants. Several of the tribe were cut up, and a great number of Assamese set at liberty.

March 2—Ghergaong, eleven miles south from Rangpur, was found a complete ruin; in the old fort, 350 pieces of ordnance, of small calibre, were discovered; and, in a tank, a number said to equal 1000 more.

April—From the 20th of March to the end of April rain fell daily, and the low lands became inundated; the troops were placed in cantonments on the most suitable sites. The attention of the Commissioners was directed to negotiations with the several hill tribes that held the upper part of the valley of the Brahmaputra and border Assam; and many were made to submit to the British authority. Small detachments were frequently called to act against the refractory tribes.

May—The Burmese again appeared at Beesa Gaum, on the extreme boundary of the Wykayut, leading into Manipur. A detachment was ordered against the chief of Wykayut.

June 4—A British force reached the Now-Dheng river.
June 10—The Burmese stockades at Dupha Gaum were carried by Lieutenant Kerr. The Burmese hastily retired.

June 12—At Beesa Gaum the Burmese made a show as if inclined to dispute possession, after having tried to decoy a small party to that point by giving out that it was abandoned. Scouts dogged the march of the British troops, but when they deployed to assault the stockades, the enemy fled too hastily to suffer loss.

June 13—A British detachment pushed forward early to press the Burmese rear. Several hundred Assamese were liberated, and the Burmese driven beyond the passes.

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These operations closed with the fall of Rangpur, and the capitulation for the retreat of the Burmese from Assam. At Rangpur, a decisive blow was struck against the remnant of the Burmese power in Assam. But, it is true that the hill tribes in the neighbourhood gave a lot of trouble after this, and so the campaigning was protracted in the midst of great difficulties such as inadequate supplies in hilly parts, the deficiency of land-carriage and unfavourable weather. The conduct of the British troops was in this campaign exemplary despite the handicaps to which they were exposed.

CAMPAIGN IN SYLHET AND CACHAR, 1824-5.

After the close of the last operations in June 1824, the subsequent months of July, August and September passed without any other occurrence than a knowledge that the Burmese troops were quickly diminishing from disease, and that their commanders anxiously waited the return of the fair season to lead the survivors back to Manipur. The Burmese also suffered from want of food; constant foraging having drained the Naga, as well as the few straggling villages in Cachar, of their scanty supplies. The British troops were as follows:—a flotilla of ten gun-boats, foot artillery, 100 men; and four regiments Indian Infantry; exclusive of Raja GHUMBEER SINGH’s irregulars, or nearly 3000 effective men.

On the 25th October 1824, a reconnaissance was made on Talayn to verify a report of the actual retreat of the Burmese; the works were found partly destroyed by the enemy, who had fallen
back on BANSKANDY, and was said to have reached Manipur on the fourth of November.

Brigadier Innes might easily have intercepted the retreating Burmese by a timely movement to the rear, but their stockades were too formidable to warrant their assault by a coup de main. Besides, he could not have launched an offensive without the permission of the Commander-in-Chief, who was about 400 miles from the scene of action.

June 5, 1824—Brigadier General Shuldham, appointed to command on the frontier from Kissengunj to the border of Chittagong, including Assam and Cachar, fixed his headquarters at Dacca where he reached in September.

October 21—The Infantry was brigaded and numbered, viz., third brigade, 7th, 23rd, and 44th regiments infantry; fourth brigade, 14th, 39th, and 52nd regiments infantry. General Shuldham moved from Dacca for Sylhet with the third brigade, and was expected to drive the enemy out of Cachar and Manipur.

November—Brigadier-General Donkin was appointed second in command on the Sylhet frontier. The augmented force on this frontier was as follows:—Gun-boat flotilla, Artillery—two companies with four 24-pounders, four 8-inch mortars, and a light field battery of two brass 12-pounders, two howitzers: 5 1/2 inch, and four 6-pounders. Pioneers—four companies. Cavalry—3rd irregular horse. Infantry—two brigades of regulars and the Sylhet local battalion. Raja Ghumbeer Singh, as an ally, had 500 infantry and 60 horse; forming an effective total of 7000 men. To provision and move so large a force, one officer of the Commissariat department was placed at Sylhet, but the resources placed in the hands of the Commissariat were a scanty supply of elephants and 800 camels.

Dec. 11—Major Swinton, with his pioneers, reached Bhadrapur, and, by the 8th January, carried a road to Banskandy, 19 miles.

Dec. 19—The route to Manipur, via Lukipoor and Kala Nagah was reconnoitred, but was not approved. The more northern route by Noongshil was adopted.

Jan. 22, 1825—The Pioneer gained Koora Bel, 12 miles from Banskandy.
Jan. 30—Blair's horse, from the Nerbuddah, after a march of four months, reached Doadputty, and a wing moved to join the advance under Captain Dudgeon.

Feb. 4—The forest areas and reed jungles around Manipur were reconnoitred. A road for guns and cattle was built with much labour. Invasion by a heavy equipped army of 7000 men was obviously impracticable. The Naga tribes seemed little inclined to afford help. They had perhaps suffered too much from the passage of Burmese troops to favour another army.

Feb. 13—A 40 British force moved across the Jiree river, about 40 miles from Banskandy. Heavy and frequent rain damaged the newly constructed road, and impeded the advance.

Feb. 16—Brinjara bullocks and camels for the carriage of supplies arrived, but the march of the troops towards Banskandy was impeded by rain.

Feb. 24—Until this date, a great sacrifice of cattle was experienced in this short march. As the surface which covers the hills and low grounds was of clay, every fall of rain made the roads impassable to cattle, and even difficult to men.

March 2—The Pioneers carried the road to the Jiree; but on the 5th, a want of supplies forced them to fall back on the nearest depot. The march towards Manipur was suspended for the time being. A wing which had vacated Noonghie was forced to retrograde for supplies. The Commissariat was now urged to put forth all its means to convey a month's supply for the advance and third brigade to Nooghe. 800 bullocks, out of 1000, reached Nyapurra, but half the grain was destroyed in transit; the remaining 4000 bullocks did not advance beyond Kumrungabad; a great portion of their loads also spoiled. As a further resource, the Commissariat officer at Sylhet had made a requisition on the magistrate for 7000 coolies which number was furnished at different times. 1000 of these men did actually reach Doadputty, but only 150 the banks of Jiree, so great was the desertion.

March 8—The periodical rains, termed the "Chota barsat", set in early in February, continued through the month with occa-
sional intermission but for the last ten days the fall was heavy, and without intermission. The roads became literally impassable, and as a month’s fair weather was not to be hoped for even, orders were issued for the advance to fall back.

March 29—On this date, the guns and baggage that had been pushed forward to the Jiree, after great labour, got back to Bans-kandy, with the loss of six elephants, 150 camels, and 200 bullocks; the cattle in general sick, or so jaded, that little work could be got out of them. It was now realised that the advance to Manipur was for some time utterly impracticable.

April 26—The army was now disposed of for the great rains, or “Burra bazar”, as follows:—viz., the fourth brigade which had remained in boats on the Soormah river for two months was broken up; 14th regiment infantry was sent to Allahabad; 39th infantry to Dinapore; and the 52nd infantry was ordered to Jamalpur. Some infantry regiments remained stationed in Cachar at Panchagaong and Phoolbarea. The artillery pioneers and 44th infantry stayed at Sylhet. General Shuldharn went back to Dacca. Blair’s horse was sent to Comillah, leaving one squadron at Sylhet. Thus terminated the operations against the Burmese upon the Sylhet frontier in 1824-5.

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It would appear that Sir Edward Paget intended to make Manipur the line of operations for the conquest of Upper Ava; and, it was with this intent that a big army was assigned for service in Sylhet. How long this scheme, formed in May or June, lasted, is not easy to ascertain, but all the European troops were not withdrawn until the mutiny at Barrackpore on the first of November.

A survey of all the operations on the North-Eastern and South-Eastern borders in 1824-5 would serve to bring out a number of important facts. Firstly, the knowledge of topography and terrain was imperfect. Secondly, the commissariat resources and arrangements were inadequate and inefficient. Thirdly, the number of troops employed in the early stages was absurdly small, and even at the end it was far from adequate. Fourthly, transport arrangements were very unsatisfactory. Fifthly, the rains rendered these areas practically impassable, and in such conditions camels were utterly useless in the
marshy and mountainous tracts of Eastern Bengal and Assam: The number of bullocks was also quite inadequate to the task. Sixthly, coolies were available with great difficulty at the rate of five rupees a month, but from the absence of strict control, by the institution of Sirdar contracts, and the want of a supply of adequate food, these men deserted as fast as they were nominally furnished. Seventhly, since the departure of Mr. Scott, in April 1824, for Assam, the plenary power in Sylhet seems not to have been vested in any resident authority. Eighthly, Rs. 2,000 had to be spent every month as presents to the hill chiefs, whose loyalty these were intended to procure, nothing tangible came out of it, and it is noteworthy that, in times of need, the local chiefs remained either apathetic, or even semi-hostile, if not openly inimical! The hill tribes also gave little or no aid. Ninthly, there was a gross deficiency in pioneers, irregulars and scouts. Tenthly, the rugged and hilly terrain afforded little facilities for road building, and whatever tracks were built were washed away in heavy rain. Eleventhly, the lack of an adequate corps of engineers proved to be a very difficult handicap to the advancing troops in so wild and difficult a country as Assam. Twelfthly, the rivers constituted another handicap of a difficult nature, for many of them were not fordable, and many of them were navigable only to light boats. Thirteenthly, sickness was much too common in the malaria ridden jungles of Assam, and the casualties were always heavy on this account. A large number of men had to be sent to hospital, if not to the grave. It was throughout a big problem to carry and feed the huge number of invalids. Lastly, the army was encumbered with cavalry and heavy artillery which were quite unsuited to the theatre of war.

When all is said, the fact remains that the direction of the operations was faulty all along. The want of foresight and a lack of energy and promptitude were the besetting sins which prevailed at the head quarters, and at Calcutta. Lord Amherst was no Wellesley, or Hastings, and Sir Edward Paget was one of the most incompetent Commanders-in-Chief British India has ever known. It was only the inability of the Burmese to prosecute the war farther after their initial successes that saved Bengal from the threatening clutches of the Burmese Empire. If the British army retrieved the position in the end, it was possible only after a series of blunders and humiliations,
and after incurring a ruinous expense during the long drawn out campaigns in Assam, Sylhet and Cachar.

Note:—For a fuller account of the campaigns, one has to read, besides the contemporary journals and newspapers, the official papers as follows:—Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, Foreign Department, Volumes of Correspondence on Arakan; Parliamentary Papers relating to the first Burma War (Session 1825), etc.
JAUNPUR IN VIDYĀPATI’S KIRTLATA

By

Prof. Radhakrishna Choudhary, M.A.

Vidyāpati has thrown a flood of light on the life and condition of the people of Jaunpur. His description is without any admixture of the marvellous. In the Kirtilata, our poet transports his readers to the Shārquī capital in its best days. He saw for himself the Hindus and the Muslims living together. His representation of these two communities is the true picture of the conditions, then obtaining in India. By this time, Mithilā’s contact with Islām had become an established fact and the kings of Mithilā had either to wage wars against the Muslims or to fight for their Muslim masters. This is evident even from his songs wherein we find that he has mentioned a number of Hindu and Muslim rulers.¹

Jaunpur was a very fine city having beautiful gardens, culverts, embankments, ponds, houses and temples. The city was nicely decorated and there were fine roads.² The existence of various Śiva temples is an ample proof of Ibrāhim Shāh’s liberality towards the Hindus. Though the ruler was liberal, the relationship between the Hindus and the Muslims was far from satisfactory. One was reviling the religion of others.³ The common man had to face a lot of difficulties. Fuel was sold at the rate of sandal wood.⁴

¹ H.P. Śukrī—Kirtilata—Introduction:—‘‘—गान्युव्विं... 
भिन्न भिन्न लोकेः फर्माइल न लेखा हुआ छिल्’।

² Kirtilata (Saxena, B.R.)—P. 26-27—

³ Ibid—

हिन्दु दुर्गे मल्ल बास, एक धम्मे अमोका उपहास ।
कतहु वांग कतहु बेद, कतहु विसमिल कतहु छेद ।
कतहु ओशा कतहु बोझा, कतहु नकत कतहु रोशा।
कतहु तन्वास कतहु कूजा, कतहु नेमाज़ कतहु पूजा।

⁴ Ibid—PP. 40-43—for a description of the Muslims and their ways of life, Vidyāpati’s description may be taken as the first hand report of the relation between the Hindus and the Muslims. Economic condition is evident from the following lines:—

“पानक सजु सोनाक टंका।
चाम्बनक मूल इत्यन विका।”

Cf—Kārī Nāgari Prachārīni Patrikā—Vol. 56; No. 1 Page 51-52.
irresponsible persons had their say in every matter. From our poet’s description, it appears that the ruler failed to regulate the economic life.

The market was the chief centre of attraction. There was a regular din and bustle. The market presented a beautiful show. It was an ocean of people. People from Telāṅg, Chola, Kaliṅga and Bengal flocked here and spoke different languages. It was a busy market no doubt. Every type of metal goods was sold. Sweets and fish were in abundance. Practically every aspect of human consumption was available here. The description of the stylish public women is marvellous. These public women used to earn their livelihood through bad means. It appears that prostitution was the legalised social evil.

The stylist women flocked to the market and induced young maidens to join their camps. Woman was a necessary accompaniment to wine. This was a regular feature of the feudal society. Dancing and singing girls were not unknown. Prostitution was practically a regular feature and its earliest reference in the Muslim period is found during the reign of Alāuddin Khaljī who fixed the tariff of wages for public women and ordered for its regulation. In one

1. Ibid—P. 48
2. Ibid—P. 28—
3. Ibid—P. 30—
4. Ibid—P. 34:— Cf—S.K. Chatterjee—Varṇastraśāstra”.
5. Ibid—P. 42
6. Tāriḵ-i-Fūṭūḥā—I—199.
of the tales of Vidyāpati's *Purusha-Parikšā* we find how harlots were "the highest treasures of passion in the eyes of cunning husbands." The state made no attempts to abolish this evil system on ethical grounds.

Slavery was another important feature. Its reaction on the manners and outlook of the age was of a far-reaching character. In a slave-holding society, the ruling classes get used to highly undemocratic ways of life. It is prejudicial to the social well-being of the society. Like other commodities, slaves were also sold openly in the market. Slaves were purchased and kept. A slave had nothing of his own, even his name or identity. Vidyāpati hints at a regular slave-trade. The system created two opposite classes—an offensive and brutal upper class and a bitter and vindictive lower class. Manual labour became identified with slave labour and hence undignified and discredited.

Vidyāpati has also described the court of Ibrāhim shāh and has thrown some light on the court etiquette and manners. According to Vidyāpati, Ibrāhim was second only to god. Jaunpur was second Amarāvatī or Indrapuri. He was surrounded by all sort of persons—Khāns, Maliks and Chiefs from distant places. The ceremony of presentation to the monarch was duly observed. Vīrasinh and Kirtisingh of Mithilā had to wait for sometime before they could be allowed to see the king. Special rows were assigned

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1. Neruka's edition of Vidyāpati's *Purusha-parikšā*—146
   
   Cf.—Jāyasi's description of the mart of public a women to bewitch the people by their accomplishments. From our poet, we learn that the dealers in cosmetic goods flocked to Jaunpur market (Sasena edition—P. 28).


3. *Kīrtīlālā*—गरीबे गरीबे बढ़तो मुलामो— In these lines our poet brings to light some important traits of the Muslim society, then obtaining in Jaunpur. Besides their usual social customs of greetings whenever they met, the following also deserve notice (a) onions and garlics were commonly used (b) they owned a large number of slaves (c) drank excessively; (d) read books regularly and (e) they were expert in needlework.


to the nobles according to their ranks. Hājib occupied an important office and supervised the ceremonies of court presentation. The presentation ceremony took place in the royal court, situated in the centre of the palace with a number of gates leading to its entrance. Various formalities of presentation were observed. Below the monarch, was the highest noble, called Khān and the next in rank was Mālik and the last in hierarchy was the Amīr. These nobles had a definite social status and supported the monarch in power, but stepped into the shoes if the dynasty grew weak. Even in the award of titles, Hindu influence was felt in outlying provinces and the Sultans of Bengal awarded such titles as Nāyak khān and Satya Rājā.¹ The Ulemās occupied a prominent place at Sharqui court and expounded theological principles. Vidyāpati’s description of the court and palace is wonderful.

Jaunpur was a prosperous and busy city. All avenues of expansion were opened within the frame work of a feudal state manned by the monarch and his nobles. Such economic units as the village gold-smiths and betel-nut sellers were also represented in the market place. Due attention was paid by the rulers towards the beauty of the city. Jaunpur had a composite population. The triumphant Mulim had little regard for Hindu convention and belief. Even Vidyāpati’s patrons sometimes found it difficult to protect their religious scruples in the company of the muslims. Forced labour was not unknown. The code of behaviour of the muslim army was different from that of the Hindus.² In the wake of their victorious march, they forgot even the minimum decency of human sentiment. They cared more for their luxury. According to the old Indian standard, the agriculturists were never touched by the invading army but the Muslims cared little for them in course of their expansion. A more critical study of this work along with other similar sources will reveal to us details of daily life of Jaunpur.

² Khāliṣṭhī—P. 40.
The Royal Court

loaha samudre bhau virahau, ambar mahal pooroana.
Aavast tuhsaka, bhan muhsaka, pah bher pahar juoirata.

* * *

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The Palace

et batahu sambhale upar, tams upar karatal pah.
Aho aho adaan.

* * *

Nayar, 132113

Nature and characteristics of the Muslim army.

* * *
Description of Jaunpur (Jonāpur* in Kārtikeya).

King was above all

*For a different interpretation of the word 'Jonāpur' and its identification—See, Subhadra Jha, The Songs of Vidyāpati (Introduction).
THE PROBLEM OF PERMANENT SETTLEMENT IN THE CEDED AND CONQUERED PROVINCES

By

Dr. R. N. Nagar, M.A., Ph.D.

When the Ceded and Conquered Provinces were acquired by the East India Company and added to the Bengal Presidency, Cornwallis' notions, in the field of revenue administration, apparently still held sway. The two revenue reforms of major importance, promulgated under Cornwallis were (a) introduction of the zamindari tenure; and (b) establishment of a permanent-settlement.

At the inception of the British rule in the Ceded Province, a Proclamation was issued, on 14th July, 1802, to the people, recognising zamindars as proprietors of the soil, and promising the grant of a permanent-settlement to land-holders at a specified period. It declared that at the commencement of the Fussilly year 1210 a revenue settlement was to be concluded, 'in all practicable cases', 'with zamindars or actual proprietors of the soil (unless disqualified)', for a period of three years, 'at a fixed, equal, annual jumma'. After the expiration of the term, another triennial settlement was to be concluded with 'the same persons (if willing to engage) 'at a fixed, equal, annual jumma,' which 'would be formed by taking the difference between the annual amount of the first lease, and the actual yearly produce of the land at the expiration, adding two-third of such difference to the annual rent of the first lease.' At the end of the sixth year another settlement was to be formed for a period of four years by 'adding to the annual rent at the second triennial settlement, three-fourth of the net increase of revenue during any one year of that period'. At the end of the quartennial settlement, a permanent-settlement was to be formed 'with the same persons (if

1. The Ceded territory was ceded, in 1801, by the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh, and the Conquered territory was acquired from the Marathas in 1803.
3. 1803 A.D.
willing to engage, and if no others, who have a better claim, come forward) for such lands as may be in a sufficiently improved state of cultivation to warrant the measure, on such terms as Government may deem fair and equitable. This arrangement was extended\(^1\) to the Conquered Province by the Regulation IX of 1805.

Since the aim of the Government was to introduce permanent-settlement at a specified period, their chief effort was directed towards achieving a maximum assessment, instead of levying a moderate revenue. The reason was obvious; the Government feared that, otherwise, they might have to sacrifice a large revenue, which might legitimately be theirs. Landholders put up with the increasing demands, because they hoped that the promise held out earlier will be implemented at a near future date.

The Central Government, however, did not have any qualms of doubt about the implementation of the promise, but the Court of Directors felt apprehensive lest the measure should be introduced before full and accurate information regarding the state of agriculture in all districts was gathered. They wrote\(^2\) to the Governor-General-in-Council on 14th September, 1803, approving the measures adopted by Henry Wellesley, and hoped that the desired information would be forthcoming within the stipulated period. They wrote\(^3\) again on 28th August, 1804 reiterating their stand.

As a result of the apprehensions expressed by the Court of Directors, the Governor-General-in-Council were compelled to declare that after a specific period 'the revenue would be settled in perpetuity and the arrangement shall receive the sanction of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors'. The original promise was, thus, circumscribed after a lapse of five years. But even after this condition was set, the authorities in India were never in doubt regarding the possibility of its introduction in such cases as satisfied the two essential stipulations, viz., (a) where the demand of revenue had reached its maximum

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2. The Government Revenue Records of the North-Western Provinces (1818-20) page 57.
3. Ibid., page 57.
level; and (b) where the cultivable but uncultivated land did not exceed one-third of the total.

In the meanwhile the members of the temporary Board of Commissioners were required to report on the suitability of the various districts regarding the recepiency of the measure. Messers Cox and Tucker, members of the Board, issued a circular to all collectors, stating⁴, "The Governor-General-in-Council, in enacting Regulation X of 1807, has evidently had in view to extend to the Ceded and Conquered territory the benefits, which have already been realised in Bengal from the practical operation of those principles. We consider it to be a point established that it is desirable to extend to the Ceded and Conquered territory the benefit of a permanent-settlement whenever the circumstances may admit it." It may be emphasised that most of the Collectors, in reply, expressed their opinions⁵ against its introduction; and most of them wrote⁶ in favour of a decennial or even a longer term of settlement. On the receipt of these opinions the members of the Board revised their attitude, and pleaded against the introduction of the measure; and, because they were convinced that it would finally be enacted, they decided to resign their offices in good conscience rather than be a party to its enactment. Their successors, Messers Colebrooke and Trant, members of the permanent⁴ Board of Commissioners, however, stood firm in favour of its introduction. Hence, when the first decade was closing, the general belief prevalent in the Government and amongst landholders was that the promise of a permanent-settlement would be implemented at the stipulated date.

The Court of Directors, however, insisted on non-implementation of the measure. So, ultimately, the interference of the Court of Directors 'compelled' the Governor-General-in-Council to promulgate

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1. The Government Revenue Records of the North-Western Provinces (1821) page 279.
2. Ibid., pages 306-360.
3. Ibid.
4. The temporary Board of Commissioners was made permanent by the Regulation I of 1809—Regulations of the Government of Fort William in Bengal Vol. II page 95.
the Regulations IX\textsuperscript{1} and X\textsuperscript{2} of 1812 for the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, respectively, which postponed the measure for an indefinite term. The administrators were certainly placed in an awkward position. In fact, certain tracts in the Ceded Province were even declared fit for the recepiency of the measure;\textsuperscript{3} and the Governor-General-in-Council wrote to the Board of Revenue that in the Conquered Province the settlement which the Regulation X of 1807 had rendered provisionally permanent expired in the month of September, 1811. For landholders it came as a bolt from the blue. In their eyes, not only was a solemn promise violated, but they apprehended further enhancement of the revenue, which had already reached the taxable limit in a large number of cases.

The tone and temper of the Court of Directors can be judged from their subsequent communication dated 17th March, 1815, which said,\textsuperscript{4} "We showed in our dispatch of the 16th March, 1813 that by the the Regulation XXV of 1803 and IX of 1805, and consequently by the Regulations IX and X of 1812, which went to revive the provisions of the two former regulations, the point of improvement was not determined at which permanent-settlement of lands in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces would become expedient, or even justifiable, and that it could not be determined by any prospective regulation, that the question was left completely open for the future exercise of the judgment of Government, that there was nothing in those Regulations by which its decisions could, or ought to be, in the smallest degree fettered; that it was for the constituted authorities at home, aided by the information transmitted by the local Government, to decide whether the land was, or was not, in such a state as to warrant a measure irrevocable in its nature, and involving so materially, not only the financial interests of the Government, but the welfare and prosperity of those living under its protection; and that by a decision in the negative, supposing even the decision to be universal in its application, the obligation of public faith would not be at all infringed."

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} & \textsuperscript{2} Regulations of the Government of Fort William in Bengal Vol. II pages 205 and 207 respectively.
\item \textsuperscript{3} The Government Revenue Records of the North-Western Provinces (1818-20) page 59.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Ibid., page 57.
\end{itemize}
The bitter frustration generated by the rescinding of the promise led to violent reaction in some cases. Henry Trant pointed out\(^1\) that the withholding of the promise disappointed the zamindars, which led to open insurrections. He cited the example of Bareilly and observed\(^2\) "\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots it ended in a conflict, an attack upon the military party which we had there, and a most grievous destruction of the people, which was quite necessary, to the amount of about 600".

Despite the decisive interference of the Court of Directors and the promulgation of the regulation postponing the measure indefinitely, the authorities in India had not altogether abandoned hope of its introduction. Holt Mackenzie, Secretary to the Central Government, was specifically commissioned with the task of preparing a Memorandum\(^3\) on the existing revenue conditions, 'with heads of a plan for the permanent-settlement of these Provinces.' The Governor-General and Messers Stuart, Fendall, and Adam sent a joint-letter to the Court of Directors pleading for the grant of a permanent-settlement. They reiterated\(^4\), "It is, then, our unanimous opinion that a system of a permanent-settlement of the land revenue, either upon the principle of a fixed jumma, or of an assessment determinable by a fixed and invariable rate ought to be extended to the Ceded and Conquered Provinces." But, all speculation was set at rest when the Government Resolution of August, 1822 conveyed\(^5\) the decision of the Court of Directors that the local Government would not in any case grant a permanent-settlement; and that they had interdicted the adoption of any measure calculated to raise or renew the expectation. One can discern a ray of nostalgic hope lurking in the instructions which the Resolution contained, when it said\(^6\), "They must be met by a distinct and candid declara-

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1. Minutes of the evidence taken before the Joint-Select Committee of the House of Commons Vol. III page 238.
2. Ibid.
5. Ibid., page 246.
6. Ibid.
tion that the Supreme Authorities in England have reserved the
decision of the question to themselves, and that decision can be
expected when circumstances of the several mehuals, and the persons
owing and occupying them, shall be; developed in manner contemp-
plated at the revised settlement." But this ray of hope soon faded
out, and was never resurrected.

The question naturally arises as to what extent were the
Court of Directors, themselves fettered by the promise originally
held out? We may allow Holt Mackenzie, a highly responsible
officer of the Government, to supply the answer. He observes¹
"The letter of the 28th August (of the Court of Directors) seems to
convey as distinct an acquiescence as possible in the scheme of a perma-
nent-settlement as promised by the Proclamation, and though the
expectation is promised......that at the expiration of the decennial
period an ample information would be obtained, yet the expression
can, with scarcely any frankness, be interpreted as conveying an
adequate restriction of their concurrence in the pledge to cases in
which such information could be before them." We may cite the
same authority to show the extent to which public faith had been
broken. He said², "Zamindars might urge that Government had
bound itself to take means of procuring the required knowledge
within a reasonable time that, if it failed, the penalty of the failure
ought to attach to Government, not to them, since the ground of
complaint was equally valid whether founded on the neglect of
Government, or of its officers......"

Regarding the question whether a maximum taxable limit had
been reached or not, the members of the Board of Commissioners were
unequivocally emphatic that it had. For instance Colebrooke, a
member of the Board, observed³ "I have long had reason to believe
that a greater revenue than what is now derived from these Provin-
ces is not to be expected, and that the assessment is likely to fall
off than to improve at future settlements". In several cases, as the
Commissioners pointed out, the second condition was also fulfilled,

¹. The Government Revenue Records of the North-Western Provinces. (1818-
20) page 57.
². Ibid.
³. Ibid., page 196.
namely, that no cultivable land should remain uncultivated beyond a certain specific limit.

We may now examine the provision set forth by the Court of Directors that an investigation into the agricultural resources of the Provinces was, also, a necessary preliminary to the granting of the measure. To be plain, the apprehension of the Court of Directors was that without some such investigation the Government might permanently compromise a substantial share of the revenues. Later, the suspicion that a lot of land lay concealed, which could only be exposed by a competent survey, was confirmed. But the two problems could have been tackled separately on two distinct levels without any infringement of the principles, or fear of loss of revenue, Sir E. J. Colebrooke commented, "In the minute which I lay before the Hon'ble Board. . . . . suggesting the expediency of some early settlement in the Western Provinces, I confined myself wholly to the question of limiting the demand of Government from the land without any reference to the right of parties with whom the engagements for such limited demand should be made, or in other words, to the question of permanency of settlement, as between individuals, holding, or claiming to hold, a right to engage. The two questions are in fact so entirely distinct that either of them may be fully considered and finally decided without any reference to the other."

It was obvious that the intention of the sponsors of the measure was to fashion it after Bengal. Had that been established, the original step of vesting the zamindars and the taluqdars with proprietorial rights would have been carried to its logical conclusion. The rights of co-sharers would have been beyond rescue. Immense harm would have been perpetrated. Thus, it was for the good of the country that its introduction was prevented, though the reasons which prompted the Directors for its prevention were not exactly identical with the higher interests of the country's welfare. However, the

1. Ibid., page 319.
2. Quoted by Henry Trant—Minute of the evidences taken before the Joint-Select Committee of the House of Commons on the affairs of the East India Company Vol. III, page 240.
heated controversy generated one outstandingly beneficial reaction. It rivetted the attention of the Government on other problems of major importance connecting the land. Discussions were provoked on the problems of estates, rights of co-sharers, resident-ryots and other under-tenants, sales of land, and on the needs of introducing a competent survey. It is doubtful if, without such provocative discussions, Government would have awakened to the task of deputing Holt Mackenzie to prepare a comprehensive memorandum on the revenue conditions existing in the Provinces, which was, indeed, the biggest achievement of the second decade of British rule in the Provinces, and was also a milestone in the history of British administration in the North-Western Provinces.


THE BREAK-UP OF THE TREATY OF AMIENS AND ITS
REPERCUSSION ON
THE ANGLO-FRENCH TUSSLE IN INDIA.

By

Dr G. S. Misra, M.A., Ph.D.

The short breathing space which followed the treaty of Amiens did not last long enough to permit the French to regain a positive foothold in India. Hardly was the ink on the treaty dry when portents of a fresh rupture began to appear on the western horizon. The prophecy of the critics that the treaty of Amiens would prove a temporary and delusive truce was fully borne out by the sequel that in fifteen months brought a rupture and renewal of the war. On 8th March, 1803, the King’s first message to Parliament announced that, in consequence of the considerable military preparations that were set afoot in the ports of France and Holland, it had been judged expedient to adopt measures of precaution for the security of the dominions. A circular from the Admiralty of the 10th March, communicated the message to Admiral Rainier and to all other Admirals and Captains on the seas. The governor general in India was, likewise, apprised of His Majesty’s message which involved the probability of an imminent rupture with France. A similar notification of the event was made to the several governments in India.

It was quite unlikely that, in the event of a renewal of war in Europe, France would be in a situation to direct her efforts against the British possessions in India. But the news that a small squadron with troops was being fitted out at Brest, with probable destination for India, necessitated the immediate adoption of precautionary measures on the continent of India. Measures of secu-

1. French in India, V. 12; India Office Library.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 12, March, 1803, Lord Hobart to the Governor-General; India Office Library.
rity were, therefore, recommended to the several Indian governments, although, they were cautioned to avoid, as much as possible, an increase of expense or an augmentation of their forces. It was considered highly improbable that France would be able to menace India, or that she would have the means to attempt any direct attack against the British possessions in India. Whatever efforts France may be able to make in Europe, India could not be considered as more exposed in 1803 than what she had been during 1793 and 1795. The governor general was consequently advised to keep the army in a state of adequate preparation under the smallest possible extension of expenditure.

The governor general also received instructions that such of the possessions of France and Holland in India as were under the occupation of British forces should not be evacuated until further orders, and that such reasons might be assigned for this delay as were likely to excite the least jealousy or suspicion. It happened, however, that no possessions of France or Holland had been evacuated by the British troops which still retained their occupation, nor had any person arrived in India with authority to receive any of the restitutions stipulated by the treaty of Amiens. Lord Wellesley was anxious to avoid hostilities as far as possible, but in case an armed force of the enemy was to arrive to carry through the restituions, he resolved to resist it by force if that extremity should become necessary. Anticipating a renewal of the war with France, he urged the importance of taking early measures to increase the effective strength of the European force in India. The Company's artillery in Bengal particularly was at that time reduced to a state of absolute inefficiency. Lord Wellesley also requested the Board of Commissioners, in the event of a renewal of hostilities, to direct their serious attention to the weakness which must result from the

1. Minutes of the Secret Committee, V. 4; 17, March, 1803; India Office Library.
3. Ibid., 13, 469, Lord Hobart to Wellesley, 19 October, 1802; Wellesley Papers; 13, 469; Br. Mus. Add. Mss.
4. Home Miscellaneous Series; 502, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 20, April, 1803; India Office Library.
abolition of the controlling power of the supreme government of India over the island of Ceylon, and consequently over the military force stationed in that important possession.¹

Early in May, 1803, the expectations of a speedy renewal of hostilities suddenly bounded up, and it became certain that the discussions between the British and French governments yielded no prospect of a favourable termination. The governor general was, thereupon, directed to exercise the utmost vigilance and circumspection in every department of the service under his government.² In the same month, the discussions between the two governments terminated in a failure, and Lord Whitworth, the British ambassador, was recalled from Paris which relieved all suspense on the question of peace or war. On May 16, the King’s second message announced the rupture with France. A circular secret dispatch was, thereupon, transmitted to the several presidencies, notifying the recommencement of hostilities with the French, and directing them to take possession of all their settlements in India and to capture their ships or vessels.³ They were also authorized to take possession of the Dutch settlements on the continent of India, under an explanation that they shall be restored in case the Batavian Republic was to remain neutral in the war, and also to detain their ships.⁴ In the event of a war with Holland, however, the fortifications of Cochin were to be destroyed, and measures to be adopted for the recapture of the Dutch settlements in the east. But no extended expeditions were recommended at this stage either against the Mauritius or Batavia, without express orders from the home government. The Dutch factory at Surat was to be taken possession of, and all Dutch ships within the limit of that authority were to be detained.⁵

¹. *Ibid.*, [The island was rendered independent of the Company’s authority on January, 1, 1802, after which the control of the Governor General no longer operated in Ceylon.]
³. Minutes of the Secret Committee, V. 4; 16, May, 1803; India Office Library.
⁴. *Ibid*.
⁵. Home Miscellaneous Series, V. 479, Letter from the Bombay government to Edward Galley, Acting Lieut. Governor of the Castle of Surat, 22, August; 1803, India Office Library.
It was considered to be very unlikely that Portugal would long escape the rapacity and influence of France. But Lord Wellesley was advised to abstain from any act which might afford a pretext to France for hostilities towards the Portuguese government, unless the French might endeavour to take possession of their settlements to justify an attack. The governor general entered into pacific negotiations with the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa for the defence and protection of the Portuguese possessions in India, and at Macao, against any attempt of France to seize or occupy those settlements. Lord Wellesley emphasised upon the ancient friendship which had subsisted between the Courts of Great Britain and Portugal and solicited the co-operation of the Viceroy for the purpose of protecting Goa a second time against the designs of France. He was fully aware of the difficulty in securing the acquiescence of the Portuguese Viceroy at a time when France was at peace with Portugal and when the Portuguese rupture with Great Britain was not formally announced. Sir William Clarke was, therefore, instructed to explain to the Viceroy that the British entertained no other object than the defence of the Portuguese settlements against any unwarrantable violation of the principles of the treaty of Amiens. In case the Viceroy was to refuse the admission of British troops, it was Lord Wellesley’s resolution to assemble a body of troops at Mangalore, or at some other favourable station in the district of Canara, from where they could protect Goa. The refusal of the Viceroy to admit a British force was, however, given in the most positive terms and it appeared impossible at the time, either by argument or negotiation, for him to alter his decision.

Lord Wellesley had received authentic intelligence from Lord Hobart and Mr. Addington, the latter writing as late as 22nd March, which induced him to believe that war with France was inevitable and, in fact, must be immediate. It was, therefore, his resolution not to restore the French and Dutch possessions in India.

1. Ibid., V. 505; Castlereagh to Wellesley, 16, May, 1803. India Office Library.
until he received further instructions from England, and he boldly ordered Lord Clive, the governor of Madras, to regulate his conduct on this important subject by this determination.\(^1\) Lord Clive was particularly instructed to withhold the surrender of Pondicherry and other southern settlements pending further instructions—an action afterwards approved by the home government when the governor general was declared justified by the speedy renewal of the war. On 15th June, Binot, the French captain general's chief of staff, arrived at Pondicherry to take over the place. Lord Wellesley, who had already resolved not to hand over the French possessions, deferred replying to the dispatches from Decaen, the newly appointed captain general of French India, until he should himself arrive in India. Decaen's arrival on 11th July did not become known at Calcutta until the 23rd, by which time the news of the war had broken out. Decaen's squadron, thereupon, quitted Pondicherry, while Binot and his party were left behind, and when the news of war arrived, were obliged to surrender. Lord Wellesley also instructed the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay to refuse compliance of any claims being made to them on behalf of the Batavian Republic for the restoration of any of the Dutch possessions under the treaty of Amiens, stating at the same time that those possessions were retained in trust only and would be restored if the Republic maintained a strict neutrality during the fresh war with France.\(^2\)

There were also indications of French intrigue being active with the Indian rulers, particularly with the Mahrattas. The governor general had received intelligence that a Frenchman, named Brieux, had lately arrived whose real object was to enter into negotiation with the Mahratta chiefs on the western side of India.\(^3\) Lord Wellesley thought it very necessary to preclude all such contacts,

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2. Wellesley Papers, 13, 761; Br. Mus. Add. Mss. [Extracts from letters from the Governor General in Council to the Governors in Council at Fort St. George and Bombay; 14 Sep. 1803].
and authorized the government of Bombay for intercepting any correspondence which Brieux may establish with any of the Indian states and, if necessary, for preventing him, or any agent of France, from landing on the western side of India. Decaen had actively taken up the quest for allies and his agents and spies spread themselves in every part of the country. A manifesto, addressed by Decaen to the chiefs of India, urged them to attack the Company with their united force. But all this served the English cause better than the French. It helped the English in recognizing their enemies, and goaded the French to adopt what was to prove a suicidal policy.

Lord Wellesley’s anxiety to cross swords with Scindia was intensified by his knowledge of constant intrigues and correspondence between that ruler and the agents of France. At Delhi also, Monsieur Perron, one of Scindia’s ablest French officers, commanded a large body of regular troops. The governor general in council judged it expedient to issue a Proclamation on the 29th August, 1803, requiring all British subjects holding employment in the service of Scindia and the Raja of Berar, or any power confederated with them, to relinquish the service of such chiefs, and promising them a provision which should enable them to remain in India during the continuance of the war so long as they were to be employed in the service of the English Company.¹ The benefits promised by this Proclamation were, from obvious motives of policy, also extended to the subjects of France, or any other European or American State. In consequence of the operation of the Proclamation, the enemy was deprived of the services of nearly the whole body of European officers. It also rendered it practicable to establish such an arrangement with the Mahratta states as would preclude the introduction of any European into their service without the express concurrence of the British government. The conclusion of the Second Mahratta War had already forced the Mahratta chieftain to fall within Wellesley’s fold, to dismiss all his French officers, and to accept the establishment of a large British force. In the success of the British arms against the confederated Mahratta chieftains, Lord Wellesley saw the accomplishment of a com-

prehensive system of alliances calculated "against the hostile attempts of any native or European power, and especially to destroy the last remnant of French influence in India."\textsuperscript{1}

It also came about as a consequence of the treaty of Amiens that the French took advantage of the situation by entertaining political and military projects in India. When the restoration of Pondicherry was stipulated by that treaty, Bonaparte had used the opportunity of sending out to the French settlements in India a considerable military staff whose mission was to communicate with the shadowy emperor of Delhi through the French officers in Scindia's service. It was also part of a wild project submitted to Napoleon at this time that an expedition be sent over and to India by way of Persia, Afghanistan, and Lahore, "with the ostensible object of rescuing the imperial house from its enemies."\textsuperscript{2} Lord Wellesley was quite convinced that he was threatened by the aggrandisement of the French power in India "to a degree that compelled him to lose no time in placing the person and nominal authority of His Majesty Shah Alam under the protection of the British government". He had been able to obtain two papers which related to the designs cherished by the French who had arrived in India in consequence of the peace. The first of these was obtained at Pondicherry by Lieut. Colonel Cullen, the officer appointed to conduct the restitution on the coast of Coromandel, and was in the form of a Memoir presented to the First Consul of the French Republic. The second was addressed to Lord Wellesley himself by Mr. Muller, who had held the rank of a Chef de Brigade in the French army, which disclosed important information respecting the designs of France. Although the papers contained propositions in many respects absurd and chimerical, Lord Wellesley held them to be significant as sufficiently indicating the spirit of the Frenchmen who had composed them.

The renewal of war between Great Britain and France necessitated the adoption of measures for making the detachment of French

\textsuperscript{1} Wellesley Papers, 13, 418; Br. Mus. Add. MSS. Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee, 25 Sep. 1803.

\textsuperscript{2} European MSS., V. 2, Part 2; F. 18/II; India Office Library; Loustaunau's plan for a French invasion of India submitted to Bonaparte, First Consul of the French Republic, Thermidor 15, year II (3, Aug., 1803).
troops, which had remained at Pondicherry after the departure of General Decaen, prisoners of war. On the receipt of the dispatch of the Secret Committee, dated 17th May, announcing the event of war, His Majesty’s 73rd Regiment was ordered to march to Pondicherry, with instructions to the Commanding Officer for demanding the surrender of the French troops. In view of the recent turn of affairs in Europe, Lord Wellesley also realized the expediency of improving further the machinery for forwarding dispatches from India to Europe by way of Egypt. During his mission to the Arab States, Sir Home Popham had appointed Mr. Rossetti to be the agent of the Company in Egypt, subject to his confirmation by the supreme government in India. Although this appointment had appeared to Lord Wellesley to be unnecessary at the time when it was made, the changed state of affairs in Europe and in India convinced him that British interests in India may eventually be promoted by this arrangement. He now deemed it proper to recognize Mr. Rossetti as the Company’s official agent in Egypt, and recommended the confirmation of that appointment during the war with France.¹

The fact, however, remained that the French at this time, as in the Revolutionary War, could not get within reach of India, and Decaen’s agents in the peninsula did not secure any material support. His military forces were barely enough to garrison the French islands. The only serious means of attack in Decaen’s power was the encouragement of the privateers who scourged the Indian seas in all directions and succeeded in capturing a few of the Company’s ships. Conflicts occurred on many occasions between French frigates and British vessels, as when the Company’s ship ‘Althea’ was captured by two French frigates, or when the French brig privateer fell in and engaged the Company’s cruiser, ‘Princess Royal.’² But all these efforts did nothing beyond inflicting heavy private losses, and left the Company’s position in India unimpaired. At the same time, the Company’s ships were quick

in retaliating. On several occasions they captured French privateers and inflicted heavy damage upon their shipping.

It was in contemplation of His Majesty's naval commander in the eastern seas to despatch a squadron of ships to the French islands for the purpose of forming a regular blockade of the Mauritius, according to the established law of nations. The operation of such a blockade, if found practicable, would not only prove advantageous to the trade of the Company and of private merchants in the Indian seas, but also help in obtaining the most regular and authentic information of the designs of the French against the British possessions in India. The governor general took prompt action in apprising the Select Committee of the supra cargoes at Canton of the intentions of the Admiral and directed them, in the event of such a blockade being determined, to notify it to all neutral vessels.¹

The importance of building ships of war in the East Indies, and making the Prince of Wales' Island a naval arsenal, now became an object of serious attention. Since the acquisition of this island (formerly known as Penang) in 1786, the government appointed for it had been of a temporary nature, while the situation of the island, its climate and produce, had long pointed it out as an acquisition of very great value as a commanding station for the refitting and supply of the navy for the protection of the British possessions in the eastern parts of Asia. Dundas (now Lord Melville) was himself impressed with the importance of that possession, and had privately corresponded with the governor general on that subject.² The attention of the Court of Directors had also been lately called to that object, not only by the general advantages to be derived from it, but by the necessity which the renewal of war had evinced of putting this important station in a state of security from the enemies. The Court unanimously approved the plan of a new government at that island, and appointed Philip Dundas,

² Castlereagh to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Co., 9, Sep., 1804; Parliamentary Papers relating to the East Indies, V. 10 of 1805 India Office Library.
a nephew to Lord Melville, who had just returned from India, as governor of that possession.¹

Intelligence was also transmitted about this time of the despatch of a French squadron with its probable destination for the West Indies. Unless a more definite information was received indicating the East Indies as its object, Lord Wellesley was advised not to disturb the system of naval distribution concerted by the Admiral in command, though it was suggested that such measures should be adopted in advance as would enable him to collect his squadron on the first notice of the enemy’s approach.² There is evidence to show also that the attention of the French government at this juncture was assiduously directed to the interception of the overland dispatches to and from India. At the same time, the establishment of French consuls throughout the Turkish dominions in Europe left no doubt that the dispatches by that route would be exposed to a considerable hazard. Lord Wellesley realized the seriousness of the situation arising from this activity of the French, and invited the attention of the Secret Committee to the adoption of adequate measures for maintaining the communication with Constantinople.³

The projects of the French against the British power in India reached their climax in a Declaration from General Decaen, the governor of the French Islands, to the chiefs of India, calling them to rise whole-heartedly with their united force against the British power for “liberating Hindostan from their violence, oppression and tyranny”.⁴ The Declaration began by recounting the “treachery and savagery” displayed by the English in their treatment towards the Indian princes, and the “aggressive wars” in which they were at that time engaged with the Mahratta chieftains, and suggested an immediate attack upon the British possessions in India.

¹. Home Miscellaneous Series, V. 492, India Office Library. At a Court of Directors held on 7, Dec. 1804.
². Home Miscellaneous Series, V. 505; India Office Library; Castlereagh to Wellesley, 19, Feb., 1805.
³. Bengal Secret Letters, V. 6; India Office Library; Secretary Lumsden, Fort William, to Ramsay, Secretary to the Secret Committee, 23, March, 1805.
⁴. Home Miscellaneous Series V. 623; India Office Library; Fort William, Secret Deptt.; 27; March, 1805; Enclosed in a letter from the Acting Resident at Poona, 20, Feb., Received 18, March, 1805; Translation of the Declaration.
In the meantime, Napoleon had given ample provocation in Europe. The death of the Duc d’Enghien had roused the new idealist Tsar, Alexander I, and the assumption of the imperial title by Napoleon had challenged the prestige of the Holy Roman Emperor. In June, 1805, Napoleon having annexed Genoa to France and abolished the Cisalpine Republic, crowned himself as king of Lombardy and of Italy. Russia and Austria, thereupon, on the promise of English subsidies, declared war against France. Thus was formed against France a Third Coalition in Europe, consisting of Great Britain, Russia and Austria, and in the second line, Sweden and Naples. A fresh and renewed impetus was thus added to the deep antagonism between Great Britain and France, opening a new chapter in the Anglo-French struggle of the period, and inaugurating Great Britain’s another and still closer wrestle with Bonaparte.

The circumstances that had given scope and encouragement to Lord Wellesley’s ardent and spirited statesmanship had been extraordinary. He had reached India in the darkest hour of the fierce Anglo-French struggle, when Bonaparte’s star was in the ascendant over Europe, when he was invading Egypt and contemplating Asiatic conquests, and when at home a powerful Tory ministry was governing by measures that would be described as arbitrary coercion. At such a period, the intrigues of the French in India had naturally reached their high watermark, and the opposition from the Indian powers gained an unprecedented level, which had forced upon him the necessity of disarming or dethroning them. Lord Wellesley never lost sight of the interdependence of India and the other parts of the British empire. The effect of his policy was to interdict any hostilities between state and state, to fix down their rulers within their territorial limits, and to cast aside all avenues of their future combination and communication with any foreign power. Lord Wellesley had carried with him the full support of Pitt’s ministry, though he had completely alienated the sympathies of the Court of Directors who had frowned at the constant extension of the Company’s dominions, and revealed their uneasiness at the mounting Indian debt.\footnote{D. Scott to Wellesley, 9 Aug., 1801; Philp, G. H. Correspondence of David Scott, V. 2, p. 334.} Dundas, however, consistently encouraged Wellesley’s
forward policy in India. The policy pursued by the sagacious governor general did not rest solely upon the local Indian situation. He had fully realized that India had been drawn into the vortex of European politics and, as such, Indian politics must inevitably be dictated by the needs of the situation in Europe. To Lord Wellesley's masterly statesmanship must be attributed the triumphant emergence of the British from a crucial tussle at the most critical stage of the whole period of Anglo-French rivalry.
Reproduction of the Photograph of a Portrait of Tipu Sultan

(By courtesy of the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, Govt. of India)
TIPU SULTAN, SOVEREIGN OF MYSORE

By

Dr. Brij Kishore, M.A., Ph.D.

Tippoo Sultawu, Sovereign of Mysore.

During the War of Lord Cornwallis against this sovereign, it was the delusive Revel of the day, in Leadenhall street, and in both houses of Parliament, to call him The Tyrant. But, what said Lord Cornwallis in his public dispatches? "I found his Country a Garden from one end to the other; and had not a deserter from Him during the whole of the long and arduous contest." And, what has the Historian, an Eye-witness, recorded since Tippoo's fall and death in 1799? "His remains were found under the Gateway which He personally defended, covered by upwards of seventy of his faithful nobility; and his Subjects, throughout the Empire, deplored the loss of their common Parent." —

The Government of Mysore, under the House of Hyder, was really patriarchal: a vigilant eye, and strong arm, over his own officers in Station and Power. His Code of Laws was found at Seringapatam. Simple and concise in Theory, summary in practice, breathing and exercising the pure spirit of justice and mercy. To quarrel with our subjects, said this liberal sovereign, "is to war with ourself. They are our Shield and our Buckler; and it is they who furnish us with all things. Reserve the hostile strength of our Empire, exclusively, for its foreign Enemies." "What splendid Proofs of—Tyranny." —

*We are indebted to the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, Govt. of India, for kindly placing at our disposal a photograph of the portrait of Tipu Sultan, ruler of Mysore (1782-1799), and a photostat-copy of the document that was found at its back, for the purpose of utilizing them in our Journal. From the letter of the Ministry, dated the 13th of December, 1957 (No. D. 6682/57—C. 1), it appears that the aforesaid portrait which is an oil painting on canvas, was in the possession of the present Duke of Wellington and that the Govt. of India acquired it from him early this year, in exchange for the portrait of his illustrious ancestor, the Duke of Wellington, hero of the Battle of Waterloo (1815), and Prime Minister of England (1828-1830), who also as Col. Arthur Wellesley, had played an important part in the capture of Seringapatam, during which Tipu lost his life (4th May, 1799). The portrait of that veteran army leader and astute politician was hitherto kept in the Raj Bhavan (Government House), Madras. It is evident that the portrait of Tipu Sultan came in the possession of Col. Wellesley, when the fort of Seringapatam was plundered by the British army, after the death of the former. He took it away with him to England; and since then, it had remained in the possession of his successors who preserved it as a war trophy from India. Nothing, however, is known about the person who recorded his estimate of Tipu Sultan at the back of his portrait. We are thankful to Dr. Brij Kishore of the Department of History, University of Lucknow, for bringing out fully the historical significance of that interesting document on behalf of the U. P. Historical Society. —Editor, 20. 12. 57.

1. Copy of the document found at the back of the portrait of Tipu Sultan (See Plate II).
A photo of the portrait of Tipu Sultan and a photostat-copy of the document at the back of it have been received from the Ministry of Education, Government of India, for publication in the Journal of the U.P. Historical Society. The Government of India say that it is an oil-painting on canvas and was acquired early this year from the present Duke of Wellington in exchange for a portrait of the first Duke hung in the Raj Bhawan at Madras. The portrait is a common place one—the one which has been in circulation all these years. In the absence of personal examination nothing can be definitely said about the age of the portrait. Since it has been found in the collection of the Duke of Wellington it is just possible that it might have fallen into the hands of the Duke (then Col. Wellesley) immediately after the collapse of Tipu’s power in 1799. But even if the portrait belongs to a period earlier than 1799, it is doubtful that the document on the back of it can be so old. On the basis of hand-writing and the probability of the case I am inclined to give the authorship of it to a westerner. Such a generous appreciation of Tipu, as is to be found in the document, could not be expected from an Englishman near about 1799. Moor, writing as early as 1794, gives us an idea of the English prejudice against Tipu: “Of late years, indeed, our language has been ransacked for terms in which well disposed persons were desirous to express their detestation of his name and character: vocabularies of wild epithets, have been exhausted and doubtless many have lamented that the English language is not copious enough to furnish terms of obloquy sufficiently expressive of the ignominy wherewith they in justice deem his memory deserves to be branded.”¹ The internal evidence also suggests a date not earlier than the second half of the 19th century unless the author was so important a person that he could have access to the despatches of Cornwallis before their publication.²

¹ Moor: A narrative of the operations of Captain Little’s Detachment and of the Maratha Army Commanded by Purseram Bhow. p. 193.
² In the document reference has been made to the public despatches of Lord Cornwallis. His correspondence was published by Roys in 1859. Selections from his State papers were published by Forrest in 1926. It is therefore doubtful that the document belongs to a period earlier than 1859 unless the author was so important that manuscript despatches of Lord Cornwallis were available to him.
Tipoo Sultan was Sovereign of Mysore.

During the War, I Lord Cornwallis, against his Sovereign, it was the delusive boast. The day, in Londonhall Street, and in all houses of Parliament, to call him The Tyrant. But, what said Lord Cornwallis, in his public dispatches?

"I found his country agitated from one end to another, and had not advence from him during the whole of the long and arduous contest. And, what has the Historian, in his inimitable words, since Tipoo's fall and death in 1799 said? "His remains were found under the Gateway, which he personally defended. To "unveil the Virtue of his faithul Nobility, and his Subjects, through the Empire, declared the "lois of their common Parent.""

The Government of Mysore, under the House of Brind, was really patriarchal: a vigilant Eye, and strong Arm, over his own officers in Station and Power. This code of laws was found at Seringapatam, simple in Theory, summary in Practice, breathing the pure spirit of justice and mercy. To guard with our Subjects, said this liberal Sovereign, is to guard with yourself. They are our Shield and our Buckler, and his. They who furnish us with all things besides the hostile strength of our Empire, exclusively for its defence. What splendid Words of "Tyranny"!

Reproduction of the Photostat-copy of a Document found at the Back of the Portrait of Tipu Sultan

( By Courtesy of the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, Govt. of India )
Leaving the question of authorship and antiquity unsettled for the time being let us make a brief review of the circumstances which led to the final extinction of the power of the Prince represented in the portrait and see how far the contents of the document are corroborated by the facts of history. The main issues of the contest are sufficiently intelligible if dispassionately perused.

By the time Lord Cornwallis landed on the shores of India the power of Tipu had become a veritable nightmare for the native rulers as well as for the English. Cornwallis had left England as a confirmed man of peace fully determined to carry out the policy of the British nation as laid down in the Pitt’s India Act of 1784—“to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and the policy of this nation”. But the political climate of India brought about a quick change in the attitude of this erstwhile pacifist. The overtures of the Nizam, which were sure to bring him and his friends in clash with Mysore, were not altogether repugnant to the Governor-General, who was developing a taste for a crooked kind of diplomacy. Tipu’s growing power alarmed him as much as it had alarmed his other neighbours. He was one with them that his wings should be clipped in time. The mandate of the nation, however, stood in his way and he taxed all his ingenuity to wriggle out of it. He could not raise the French bogey, although many later writers have tried to justify his aggression on that basis. That there was no imminent danger of a French coalition with the ruler of Mysore is clear from his letter to Malet, the English Resident at the Peshwa’s Court. “I have no reason to believe”, writes the Governor-General, “that Tippoo has on this occasion acted in concert with the French Government in this country and the convulsed state of the affairs of that nation in Europe render it at least highly improbable that they will be inclined to come to an open rupture with us, by supporting a Prince who has been notoriously the aggressor.”1 Tipu’s attack on Travancore thus came as a god-send and was greatly welcomed by the Governor-General. He wrote to Raghunji Bhonsle: “By the blessings of God this faithless conduct (of Tipu) will afford me an

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opportunity of proving my attention to treaties and my determination to protect my friends against an enemy whose ambition is known to the world......and who is the enemy of all mankind." That Cornwallis wanted war and not peace is clear from his letter to Meadows: "At present we have every prospect of aid from the country powers, whilst he (Tipu) can expect no assistance from France." Determined on war Cornwallis resorted to a rather desperate piece of casuistry and entered into an alliance with the Nizam in flagrant violation of treaty obligations with Mysore. The Mahrathas were also drawn into the coalition and the powerful trio ultimately brought the Mysore Sultan to his knees. Tipu's wings were effectively clipped. He was deprived of half of his territory and was made to pay and promise payment of a huge war indemnity. Cornwallis wrote to his masters with great satisfaction "that the overgrown power of Tippoo, from which we have at different times suffered so much, and which has so long threatened your possessions on both coasts with total destruction, has been reduced by the event of this war within bounds which will deprive him of his power and perhaps of his inclination, to disturb us for many years to come." It secured in addition "Solid and lasting advantages to the company and to the British nation". If Cornwallis had done a little introspection he would have said what Charles Napier said after the annexation of Sind—"I have sinned and I have half of Mysore". Whether he had the feeling of sin or not his policy received the warm approval of both Houses of Parliament and was hailed as a great piece of service by his employers in the Leadenhall Street. "The breach of its Act was approved of by the House itself, a fact sufficiently indicative of the opportunism and the tortuous nature of British policy in this country.

The territories left with Tipu were the "rugged and unproductive countries of Mysore and Chittledoorg" and he naturally

1. Political Proceedings, March 10, 1790, cons. 5 quoted by Khan, pp 170-171.
2. Ibid, cons 4.
3. Forrest: Cornwallis, p. 61.
4. Ibid, p. 46.
5. Ross: correspondence of Cornwallis, p. 536.
burnt with resentment and looked round for an opportunity to take revenge. Some might say that Cornwallis committed a blunder in leaving Tipu a wounded tiger. Either he should have tamed him permanently by convincing him of British magnanimity in the hour of triumph or should have completely finished him as was suggested by Meadows from his camp at Pannadoor in January, 1791. Says the General "but it is more than likely we may crush this disturber of the public peace, if it is not sounder politicks only to cripple him; but for my own part I freely confess I should prefer the dignity and justice of dethroning this cruel tyrant and usurper and restoring the Kingdom to Hindoo family—the lawful owner—to the wiser policy perhaps of only clipping wings so effectually that he could soar no more in our time." Known facts of history, however, tell us that even if Cornwallis had desired to take such a drastic step he could not do so.

Tipu's inveterate rancour and determined enmity to the English are to be read, if Allen's suggestion is accepted, in an inscription upon a stone found in Seringapatam on the final collapse of his power: "Oh Almighty God disperse the whole body of infidels! Scatter their tribe! Cause their feet to stagger! Overthrow their Councils! Change their State! destroy their very root! Cause death to be near them, cut off from them the means of sustenance! Shorten their days! be their bodies the constant object of their cares! deprive their eyes of sight! make black their faces! destroy in them the organs of speech! slay them as Shendan was Slain! drown them as Pharaoh was drowned and visit them with the severity of thy wrath. Oh avenger! Oh avenger! Oh universal Father! I am depressed and overpowered, grant me thy assistance."

This leaf out of Ernumenhus's book of curses gives us a true indication of the Sultan's mind. He was now convinced that he

2. Immediately after the fall of Tipu Sir Alexander Allen found this inscription inscribed on a stone and kept at a place where everybody could read it. He suggests that the inscription was put up soon after Lord Cornwallis's war against Tipu. (An account of the Campaign in Mysore, 1799, by Sir Alexander Allen, pp. 94-95)
3. Ibid.
could not expect any justice from the English and even fidelity to treaty obligations could not be had from them. In vain did he make an appeal to the Nizam in the name of a common religion; equally fruitless was his appeal to the Peshwa in the name of a common motherland. British diplomacy out-manoeuvred all his efforts. Friendless in the country he thought of making friends outside of it. Ambassadors were sent to France and to Kabul; some of them had already contacted the Porte at Constantinople. Completely ignorant of the under-currents of international politics Tipu allowed himself to be led away by false hopes and pompous proclamations. Nay, it provided Mornington with the very pretexts with which he could justify his high-handed conduct against Tipu. The indiscrетion of Tipu on the misrepresentations of the worthless sailor, Ripaud, the equally indiscreet action of Malartic, the Governor of the Isle of France, the landing of a handful of French volunteers in the harbour of Mangalore gave the imperious Governor-General the much-desired and ardently-sought-for opportunity of making a hill of a mole. The French danger was magnified out of all proportions and feelings were worked up to feverish heat. Tipu was not allowed sufficient opportunity to explain his position. The altercation that took place between Mornington and Tipu was a rehearsal of the Wolf and the Lamb. The action against Tipu was swift and decisive. The Sultan died a hero’s death defending his person and his country against an alien hand. The account of Sir Alexander Allen, who sorted out the body of Tipu from a large heap of the dead and the dying, is touching indeed: “When Tipu was brought from under the gateway, his eyes were still open and the body was so warm, that for a few minutes, Col. Wellesley and myself were doubtful whether he was not alive. On feeling his pulse and heart, that doubt was removed. He had four wounds..... Thus fell the determined and inveterate enemy of the British power in the east, an awful example of the instability of human greatness.”

Treachery was in part responsible for the quick fall of the Sultan. We have the testimony of Mir Hussain Ali Khan Kirmani, the author of Nishan-i-Haidari, that Mir Sadiq, the Diwan, and Mir

1. Ibid, pp. 80-81.
Nadim, the Killedar, betrayed the Sultan by blocking all paths of retreat when he was hard pressed by the invading English column. The same author tells us that it was Mir Sadiq again who had induced the Sultan to refuse French help when it was offered.

Whatever be the causes of Tipu’s defeat the English were greatly satisfied with the turn that events had taken. With great jubilation and in a prophetic vein Wellesley wrote to his masters: “But the success of your arms in the short period of the late campaign has not merely excluded the French from Mysore, provided an ample indemnity to you and your ally for the charges of the war, destroyed the hostile power of Tippoo Sultan and effectually precluded its revival, but has transferred the sword of your implacable enemy into your own hands and turned to your use the main springs of his wealth and strength.”

Though Mornington’s policy received the general approval of the Home authorities and earned him an Irish Marquisate, acute observers did not fail to express their regret that “though none of the great acts of Marquis Wellesley’s administration is more questionable than the attack upon Tippoo Sultan, that is a part, which till now, has been exempt from censure.”

Tipu was not a tyrant pure and simple as most English writers like Wilks, Beatson and Kirkpatrick would make us believe. He was harsh to his officers and to Englishmen, but his harshness was not altogether senseless. Both Hyder and Tipu kept strict control over their officers and in Hyder’s time “the backs and sides of his negligent and extortionate servants were frequently softened by stripes of the whip.” So severe were they with their officers that if highway robbery etc. was committed, the Kawuligar or guard of that part was impaled without delay and another person appointed to his office.”

The result was that the “name of cut pursuer, thief or highway robber was erased from the records of the cities, towns and villages of his dominions.” Sometimes even

2. Owen: Selections from Wellesley’s Dispatches, p. 149.
6. Ibid.
the families of the most incorrigible of them were kept as hostages at the capital. Tipu was no doubt cruel to the English but this was so because “they were people who had exasperated him almost to frenzy and whom he regarded as the enemies of God and man”.

It was not a case of cruelty for the sake of cruelty. In the draft of a treaty which he transmitted to the Isle of France there is a distinct article: “I demand that male, and female prisoners, as well English and Portuguese, who shall be taken by the republican troops, or by mine, shall be treated with humanity.”

Both Hyder and Tipu were solicitous of the welfare of their people and there is ample evidence to prove that their country was well-cultivated, prosperous, and the person and property of the subjects was well protected. They ruled over a land not favoured by nature as is clear from the observations of Lord Cornwallis: “The soil of all parts of the Mysore country that I have seen is, in general, dry and by nature unfruitful, and sustenance either for men or animals can only be raised upon it by a most persevering industry in its inhabitants.”

This barren country was converted into a well-cultivated one and “when the English conquered Mysore in 1799, they were surprised at the flourishing condition of the country.” Sir Alexander Allen also testifies to the fact that he passed “through a well-cultivated and generally open country.”

James Mill goes to the extent of saying that Mysore was better governed than even Bengal under British rule: “As a domestic ruler (Tipu) sustains an advantageous comparison with the greatest princes of the East......He had the discernment to perceive, what is so generally hid from the eyes of the rulers in a more enlightened state of society, that it is the prosperity of those who labour with their hand, which constitute the principle and cause of the prosperity of the states; he therefore made it his business to protect them against the intermediate orders of the community, by whom it is so difficult to prevent them from being oppressed. His country was, accordingly at least during the first and better part of the reign, the best cultivated and its population the most flourishing.

in India, while, under the English, and their dependants, the population of the Carnatic and Oude, hastening to the state of deserts, was the most wretched upon the face of the earth; and even in Bengal itself, under the operation of laws ill-adapted to the circumstances of the case, was suffering almost all the evils which the worst of governments could inflict.” Speaking about their solicitude for their people Kirmani, the contemporary Persian historian, writes: “They reigned over their Kingdom (Mysore) and fostered justice and liberali…towards the conclusion of the reign of these prosperous chiefs, they became the asylum of the weak, the safe-guard of the rich and poor and the refuge of the Tribes of the Earth.” In the words of the same historian so great was Hyder’s solicitude for his people that “sometimes by night, secretly, and covered with a Gileem or blanket, he went out, alone, into the streets and lanes of the city, to ascertain the condition of the inhabitants, the poor and the strangers…..” The son could not be far behind the father.

Allen challenges the popularity of Tipu and observes that “it is impossible that Tipu could have been beloved by his people. The Muselman, certainly looked up to him, as the head of their faith and by them perhaps his death is regretted but they could not have been attached to him by affection…….” There is sufficient material to refute this suggestion. Dirom testifies to the fidelity of the Mysore troops to Tipu. Wilks also admits that the army remained loyal to the Sultan till the last. The same author says that “Tipu was not only popular with the army and the officers, but also with his subjects. Mackenzie, who was with the English armies during the Third Anglo-Mysore war, wrote: “Nor have we to boast of many instances when his people induced by our flattering prospects of success to throw his yoke and shelter themselves under the benign influence of christian rulers” Similarly, Moor testifies that “we have reason to suppose his subjects to be as happy

1. Mill: op. cit. 105-106.
2. Kirmani: op. cit. p. XXVIII.
as those of any other sovereign, for we do not recollect to have heard any complaints or murmurings among them."

Mill has nearly the same thing to say: "Tippoo was severe, harsh and perhaps cruel"... but... his servants adhered to him with a fidelity which those of few princes in any age or country have displayed." Nothing can establish his popularity more than Stuart's extract describing the scene of his funeral procession: "The streets through which the procession passed were lined with inhabitants, many of whom prostrated themselves before the body, and expressed their grief in loud lamentations." This was done when the Sultan could slash them no more with his whip. The many poems found in Stuart's collection also show that Tipu did not die quite unwept and unsung.

His popularity would have been still greater if he had continued his father's religious policy. His Khudadad state smacked of something sectarian. If he was no Firoz Tughluq, Sikandar Lodi or Aurangzib, he was certainly no Akbar or Hyder either. Wilks exaggerates when he says that "a dark and intolerant bigotry excluded from Tippoo's choice all but the true believers; and unlimited persecution united in detestation of his rule every Hindoo in his dominions. In the Hindoo no degree of merit was a passport to favour; in the Musalman no crime could ensure displeasure"; but no less erroneous is the attempt to call him a perfectly tolerant king by generalizing a singular instance of his bounty to the Shringeri Math. Tipu could get no better opportunity than this to blacken the face of his Maratha opponents. A Hindu desecrating a sacred Hindu idol and a Muslim helping its re-installation! was something unique in the annals of the country and even a person less shrewd than Tipu would not have failed to make a capital out of it. His conduct in general, his persecution of the Nayars of Malabar in particular, his frequent circumcisions of non-muslims and his repeated appeals to the Nizam in the name of a common religion are all indicative of a narrow out look

4. "Hyder was of all Mahommedan princes the most tolerant....It was his avowed and public opinion that all religious proceed from God, and are all equal in the sight of God...." (Wilks's Mysoor, pp. 456-57).
if not actual fanaticism. Mill's observation, therefore, is the right kind of censure that meets the case: "His religion... contained in it a large infusion of the persecuting spirit. He imagined that he exceedingly pleased the Almighty by cultivating within himself a hatred of all those whose notions of a God did not correspond with his own; and that he should take one of the most effectual modes of recommending himself to that powerful and good being, if, in order to multiply the number of true believers he applied evil to the bodies of those who were not of that blessed description."¹ May be, it was the influence of the age he lived in.

Tipu was a man of honour and a good friend as well. He did not surrender his French friends to the English till his last although M. Chapuis himself suggested that he should make peace with the English by making a sacrifice of them. How chivalrous was Tipu's reply to this suggestion: "If on your account, you being strangers from a distant land, the whole of our Kingdom should be plundered and laid waste, well and good; but you shall not be delivered up."² In fact, Tipu and the French were strange bed-fellows brought together on account of their common enmity to the English.

Tipu lost his life and Kingdom not because he was born to lose them³ or he was a friend of the French but because he was a lover of liberty. He was the only Indian ruler who had read correctly the portents of the coming storm and had made a frantic effort to arrest it with all the vehemence at his command. His appeal for a united front against a common danger failed because his countrymen feared his ambition more than the apparently innocent moves of the John Bull in the East. Tipu thus remained alone in the field to face the fury of the storm, leaning on the weak reed of foreign help which failed him entirely. The English wanted him to live not as a tiger that freely roams about the wood but as a collared one tamely walking behind the tail of the British Lion. This was a situation wholly unacceptable to a proud spirit like Tipu's.

¹ Mill: op. cit. 108.
² Kirmani: op. cit, 263-264.
³ "...and the decision of history will not be far removed from the observation almost proverbial in Mysore 'that Hyder was born to create an empire, Tippoo to loose one'...." (Wilks's Mysoor, p. 465).
ANNUAL REPORT
OF
THE U.P. HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR 1955-56

The U.P. Historical Society has passed through another year of useful work under the able guidance of Hon'ble Dr. Sampurnanand.

The last Annual Meeting was held on April 4, 1955, when the following office bearers were elected.

President
Hon'ble Dr. Sampurnanand

Vice-Presidents
R.B. Prayag Dayal
Dr. N.L. Chatterji

Secretary
Dr. R.K. Dikshit

Treasurer
Shri B.N. Srivastava

Chief Editor
Prof. C.D. Chatterji

Auditor
Shri R.S. Panday

Members of the Executive Committee
Dr. Banarsi Prasad
Dr. S.L. Pandey
Shri M.M. Nagar

Members of the Editorial Board
Dr. N.L. Chatterji
Shri M.M. Nagar.

The gentlemen mentioned above remained in office throughout the year under report.

An important change was affected in the working of the Society when it was decided at the last Annual Meeting that its financial year should correspond to the Budget year of the Government, instead of the Calendar year, as had been the practice heretofore.

Various factors had delayed the publication of the Society's Journal in the past years. Inspite of our best efforts, we have not been able to make it up-to-date. Parts I and II of the Volume II in the New Series—for the year 1954—were published during the year. They have been ably edited by Prof. Chatterji and contain important articles by eminent scholars. Part I of Vol. III is already in the press.

There has been a steady demand for the publications of the Society from Indian and foreign customers, and we sold, during the year, the Memoirs and the back numbers of the Journal, respectively, for Rs. 268/12/- and Rs. 1012/5/-. 
The Society has become a member of the Indian History Congress with effect from 1955. Its representatives attended the Calcutta session of the History Congress, and other allied Congresses and Conferences. They read valuable papers there and took part in the discussions and deliberations. Eight new members joined the Society during the last year. I take this opportunity of extending to them, on behalf of us all, a hearty welcome.

There was no financial crisis during the year, but our very limited means seriously handicap the Society in the attainment of its objects. We had not only to postpone the preparation and publication of the Catalogue of our manuscripts, but were also compelled to withdraw from the press the Index Volume of the Old Series of our Journal.

We are contemplating to bring out a Buddhist Number of our Journal during the coming year, but, that will be possible only with a special grant from the Government. Our scheme of bringing out a descriptive list of historical monuments and small brochures on archaeological sites in the State could not be given effect to for want of funds, nor could we think of publishing other Memoirs.

It would be our aim to achieve these ends, so far as possible, during the next year, and we would once again appeal to the Government of the State to help us in the realisation of our objective by increasing the grant of the Society to at least Rs. 5,000/- per annum.

Lastly, I deem it my pleasant duty to record my grateful thanks to Dr. Sampurnanand for his constant interest and valuable advice in the affairs of the Society. I also thank the Hony. Treasurer, the Executive Committee, the Editorial Board and other members for their willing co-operation and keen interest in the Society. Our thanks are particularly due to the Hony. Auditor, Sri R.S. Pande.

19th August, 1956.

R. K. Dikshit
Hony. Secretary.
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**Total**                             | 11080| 0   | 0  |

**Deficit**                             | 4500 | 0   | 0  |

**Total**                             | 6580 | 0   | 0  |

**RUPEES SIX THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY ONLY.**

B. N. Srivastava,
Hony. Treasurer
U. P. Historical Society,
LUCKNOW.
### Statement of Accounts (Income and Expenditure) of the U.P. Historical Society

**For the Financial Year 1955/56**

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**Total Expenditure:**

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**Rupees Six Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty Six Annas Nine Only.**

Department of History,
Lucknow University

**Dated:** April 26, 1956.

B. N. Srivastava,
Hony. Treasurer,
U.P. Historical Society,
LUCKNOW
NOTICE

All articles, with or without photos, drawings and maps, intended for publication in the *Journal of the U. P. Historical Society*, should be sent by registered post to the Editor, at his address given below. Articles should be either typed or neatly written, as far as possible, only on one side of the paper. If any article is not considered to be suitable for publication in the *Journal*, it will be returned to the sender, within three months of the date of its receipt. The Editor is not to be expected to state the reason for not publishing a particular article in the Society's *Journal*.

All articles published in the *Journal*, shall be treated as the copyright of the U. P. Historical Society, and they cannot be reproduced elsewhere in any form, without the written consent of the Editor.

The system of transliteration adopted by the Society for the New Series of its *Journal*, is the same as that followed by the Archaeological Department of the Government of India for its official publications.

The Society pays to all contributors at the rate of Rs. 3/- per each fully printed page, for their articles published in its *Journal*.

All contributors must be prepared to read the proofs of their articles, and no exception will be made in this case.

Books may be reviewed in the *Journal*, if their authors send two copies of their respective works to the Editor for the purpose. No guarantee can be given regarding the time to be taken for the publication of the review of a particular work; but the Editor will try his best to publish it as early as possible, in the interest of historical research. Books reviewed in the *Journal* cannot be returned.

All communications, except those which are specifically meant for the Editor, should be sent to the Hony. Secretary of the U. P. Historical Society also at the address given below.

Department of Ancient Indian History and Archaeology, Lucknow University, Lucknow (India).

EDITOR, *Journal of the U. P. Historical Society*. 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE U. P. HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

Memoirs.

1. Dr. Moti Chandra: Geographical and Economic Studies in the Mahābhārata, Upāyana-parva  
   Rs. 5/-  
   (Out of stock)

2. Dr. V. S. Agrawala: Gupta Art.  
   Rs. 5/-

3. Dr. Moti Chandra: Technique of Mughal Painting. Rs. 10/-

The following back numbers of the Journal of the U. P. Historical Society are also available:

OLD SERIES

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NEW SERIES

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