BUDDHIST ESSAYS AND REVIEWS

BEING

A COLLECTION OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOURNALS ON THE SUBJECT OF BUDDHISM

BY THE LATE

A. D. JAYASUNDERE

Proctor, Galle

COLOMBO

THE MAHA BODHI SOCIETY OF CEYLON

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PREFACE

The author of these **Buddhist Essays and Reviews**, Mr. Abraham Dias Jayasundere, was born on the 1st February 1869 at Meepe, a village in the Talpe Pattu of the Galle District. He received his education first at the Central School, Galle, which was a Government institution in the charge of Mr. J. E. Anthonisz, a noted educationist of the time, and which subsequently became the All Saints’ School, and later at St. Thomas’ College, Colombo, then administered by the famous Warden Miller. His leaning was towards the Classics and he was particularly proficient in English and Latin which was eventually shown in the facility with which he explained the most abstruse points of the Dhamma to many a learned audience.

In accordance with the wishes of his father, who was himself learned in Sinhalese and had a fair knowledge of Pali and Sanskrit, he decided to enter the legal profession and apprenticed himself to the late Mr. Nicholas Dias Abeyesinghe of Galle, a famous Proctor of the time, who commanded a lucrative practice on the criminal as well as on the civil side.

It was during the period of his studentship that Colonel Olcott first visited Ceylon and inaugurated the revival of Buddhist education. The task of infusing the Buddhist public with enthusiasm as to the necessity of establishing Buddhist schools for the education of their children was tiring and laborious but Mr. Jayasundere flung himself with all his energy into the work and spent several years in such service and thereby delayed to some extent, to the evident displeasure of his father, his entry into the profession of his choice. The outcome of his efforts was the inauguration of the Galle Buddhist Theosophical Society and the establishment of Mahinda
College. He was Secretary of the Society and later its President and he took the keenest interest in its work till his retirement from active practice at the bar.

In the year 1894 he qualified for admission to the profession and was enrolled a proctor of the District Court of Galle. While being a keen student of the law he devoted much time during this period to the study of literature and philosophic subjects. He was a keen supporter of the Rationalist Press and read every book turned out by that Association at the time. He was also for many years a regular reader of the "Open Court" of Chicago, and all theosophical and many philosophical publications. He inaugurated the Galle Debating Society by inducing many lawyers and public officers to join it and was for many years its Secretary and guiding spirit. He not only contributed his share to practically every debate but also read many a paper before it and worked so hard for its improvement that before long it acquired a reputation equal to that of the well-known and contemporary Smallpass Literary Association of Colombo.

He carried his energy and thoroughness in due course to his professional work and soon established for himself a large civil and criminal practice which left him little time for his previous avocations. He then purchased, and went into residence at, the bungalow called "Nālanda", about a mile from the Fort of Galle, where he came into close contact with several noble men who influenced his life to a great degree and gave a fillip to his study of the Buddha Dhamma. They were the Venerable Yaṭamalagala Somānanda Thera, Incumbent of the Gunaratana Āvāsa in Dickson Road, E. R. Gooneratne, Wāsala Mudaliyar and Acting Maha Mudaliyar of Atapattu Walauwa, Dickson Road, Goḍage Sagāris de Silva, Sinhalese Pandit of Mahinda College, and Frank Lee Woodward, Principal of the same College, of whom only the last named survives today.
Mr. Jayasundere first read every available publication on Buddhism in the English language and later decided to study the Dhamma in the original text and for that purpose started a Pali study class under the said Venerable Thera to which he induced several of his friends at the bar to join. These classes were at the beginning regularly held two days in the week but later declined to one a week and eventually lapsed altogether. Nevertheless Mr. Jayasundere continued his studies and remained a pupil of the Venerable Thera till the latter's death in 1936.

As a result of this study he decided to translate the Catukka Nipāta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya in continuation of the work of his esteemed friend the late E. R. Gooneratne Wāsala Mudaliyar, the well-known scholar and first local representative of the Pali Text Society of England, who had some years previously, in 1913, published a translation of the Ekaka, Duka and Tika Nipātas. In the foreword to his book, Mr. Jayasundere refers to the Mudaliyar in the following affectionate terms: "His sweet memory it was that prompted me, about a year ago to take up, from where he stopped, his labour of love". Mr. Jayasundere's translation was edited by Mr. Woodward who also was responsible for the rendering of the gāthās into blank verse and was published in 1925.

These Essays and Reviews were contributions by Mr. Jayasundere to different Buddhist journals at various periods of his career, the first having been written at about the time of his entering the legal profession.

He did not confine himself to writing on Dhamma topics but made many an attempt to teach the Dhamma to those who were apathetic and for this purpose organised the Buddha Dhamma Saṅgama which was later merged in the Galle Young Men's Buddhist Association. He used to be regularly elected President of these Associations in spite of his opposition and
much pleading but he got the better of his admirers by himself introducing a motion that a president should not be re-elected the following year and having it carried.

He also induced many Buddhists both from among his friends at the bar as well as from outside it to join in the observance of the Eight Precepts on Vesak day. Started in 1909 this observance was repeated during a number of years and on every such occasion he fed the upāsakas on sumptuous repasts in the preparation and administration of which his wife, who was the elder daughter of the late Mr. George Amarasinghe of Unawaṭuna, took a keen and delighted interest. In the giving of alms and the feeding of their guests, Mr. and Mrs. Jayasundere found the relaxation which their simple, abstemious and unostentatious way of living would otherwise have denied them.

In 1920 Mr. Jayasundere had retired to the quiet of Unawaṭuna and taken up residence at the house built on the site of an old Dutch Governor’s residence called “Nooitgedacht” by his father-in-law, to which he added a two-storey wing for his personal use, where it was his delight to entertain all students of the Dhamma; and it was seldom that any visitor interested in Buddhism and coming from foreign lands escaped his hospitality or the benefit of many discussions with him on the most abstruse points of the Doctrine.

The loss of his wife in the year 1937 was a great blow to his peace of mind but after some time he got back to his normal routine of devoting the major part of the day to reading and study. He had his wife’s ashes interred in an ornate tomb in his garden, within sight of his bed-room, and also had space reserved in the receptacle for the admission of his own ashes on a future date.

After his wife’s death the number and extent of his alms-givings became, as was to be expected, much reduced owing to his inability to supervise them but he made up for this
short-coming by giving more lavishly to improvements to Buddhist Vihāras and other institutions and for the publication of books on the Dhamma.

He was a life member of the Colombo Young Men's Buddhist Association and as such expressed his dissatisfaction that *The Buddhist*, the organ of the Association and the oldest Buddhist journal in the world, should appear without a cover and was not well supported by the members by contributing suitable articles for publication. He therefore donated to the Y.M.B.A. a sum of Rs. 10,000.00, invested by him, for the purpose of making improvements in *The Buddhist* with the income derived from the investment.

He was a Trustee of the Buddhist Congress Tri-piṭaka Trust and undertook to defray the cost of publication of the Pali text and its Sinhala translation of the Dīgha Nikāya of which Part I came out soon after his death.

Mr. Jayasundere was a firm believer that the Theravāda school had handed down the Teachings of the Lord Buddha in their pristine purity and he had many a complaint to make against the conduct of the Editors of *The Mahābodhi* of Calcutta for giving publication in that journal to the views of the Mahāyānist school. He therefore had a great admiration for both Mr. H. D. Ratnatunga of Tangalla, who delivered the seventh lecture under the Dona Alphina Ratnayake Trust and for the columnist “Damsenevi” of *The Sinhala Bauddhaya*, as prominent living exponents of the Theravāda Doctrine. He rewarded the latter on one occasion with a personal gift of Rs. 500.00 for the excellence of the replies given by him to his many questioners. Ruhuna enjoys the unique distinction of having preserved the Sinhala literature during the past two or three centuries and among its literary giants and patrons of learning the name of A. D. Jayasundere will find a conspicuous place.

He died of heart disease on the 31st July, 1947 at his residence surrounded by his relations. He had no children.
By his Last Will he has bequeathed a sum of Rs. 100,000.00 to his Trustees for the benefit of the Mahā Bodhi Society, the Vidyādhāra Sabhā and the Colombo Y.M.B.A.

By his death the Buddhists have lost one of their learned scholars and the Mahā Bodhi Society its first life member and lay patron and one of its most ardent supporters. His scientific mind and the analytical method of his sifting of the Dhamma are well illustrated in the following articles and essays which the Mahā Bodhi Society have, as a token of gratitude to his memory, much pleasure in placing before the public.

The Society regrets the delay in bringing out this volume. The work, originally undertaken to be done by Brahmacāri Devapriya Valisinha; fell, on his return to India on 7th January 1948, on the shoulders of a very busy member of the Society, and at one stage a part of the typescript and valuable notes gathered for an Introduction were completely lost. The loss of the former had to be made good by again collecting the material from the different journals in which it had appeared and in so doing one article has, by an oversight, been repeated under two heads, namely, "Buddha-Dhamma and the Sinhalese" taken from The Buddhist for April-May 1936 and "The Uniqueness of a Religion" from the Daily News Vesak Number of the same year.

The publishers wish to express their gratitude to Dr. G. P. Malalasekera for editing, in the midst of his multifarious activities, a large part of these Essays and Reviews for the present issue.

P. P. SIRIWARDANA,
Hony. Secretary of the Mahā Bodhi Society of Ceylon.

SOME CORRIGENDA

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The late A. D. Jayasundere
BUDDHIST ESSAYS & REVIEWS

BISHOP COPLESTON ON "BUDDHISM"*

It is admitted on all hands that, of all religious literatures, the Buddhist is the most voluminous and abstruse. It affords heights, where the imagination of a Goethe may wing its loftiest flight, and depths, in which the reason of a Spencer may plunge with unavailing soundings.

It is with such a system that the valorous Bishop of Colombo ventures to grapple, with only the preparatory study gained by leisure during a period of only three or four years. The reputation, however, of a conscientious Christian and ripe scholar made us expect a fairer and abler treatment. The Bishop could have had a decided advantage, due to tuition by an eminent Pali Scholar. Although the Bishop acknowledges his indebtedness to his corrections, apparently he has not availed himself of this singular advantage, as the value of the treatise is seriously marred by many and various errors.

His Lordship is the head of the S.P.G. in the Island about 70 per cent. of whose population are "heathen" Buddhists. The avowed object of the Bishop's office is the "conversion" of Buddhists. No use disguising the fact, therefore, that Dr. Copleston began the study of the subject with hostile intent, just as a General would learn the stratagems of the enemy. The author truly says: "Impartial in a sense it was impossible for me to be. The questions raised are not for me open questions. I start with immovable convictions about the main

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*Buddhism.—Primitive and Present in Magadha and Ceylon by R. S. COPLESTON, D.D., Bishop of Colombo, Later Metropolitan of Calcutta.
principles of truth and goodness.” Thoroughly convinced of the tenets of Christianity, which are *toto coelo* opposed to the root-doctrines of Buddhism, it is never to be expected that the latter will meet with his approval. “To be indifferent which of two opinions is true,” says Locke the philosopher, “is the right temper of mind, that preserves it from being imposed on, and disposes it to examine with that indifference, till it has done its best to find the truth and this is the only direct and safe way to it.”¹ The Bishop’s position confessedly precludes all possibility of such an attitude. We shall therefore take his treatise on Buddhism as a Christian functionary’s view of it, derived from a hurried and fragmentary study. This is the most favourable construction a Buddhist can put on the Bishop’s attempt, without impugning that honesty to which every gentleman has a claim.

We shall, therefore, not be surprised at his glaring mis-statements and erroneous conclusions. Nevertheless, it should be admitted, to His Lordship’s credit, that he has taken a new departure. A phalanx of shallow-minded missionaries, who had conceit enough to undertake this Herculean task, have ever used the black brush alone. The Bishop, in his earlier lectures here and abroad, followed the footsteps of his *confrères*. He has, however, with maturer experiences, become more discreet. He knows that the disgraceful demeanour of so many *padres*, who denounced Buddhism as the “Devil’s imitation of Christianity” and the Buddhists as “idolaters” and “demon-worshippers,” has proved utterly futile, and, in return, made them ridiculous and repulsive to the Buddhists. The Bishop will not stoop to pick up such ignoble weapons, but will fully and freely admire the luxuriance of the leaves and the flowers, only to lay the axe deliberately at the very root of the tree.

The Bishop seems to have grown more sensitive with experience, and bitterly complains of the so-called “opposition” of the Buddhists. Does he not know that his own

¹. *Conduct of the Understanding.*
party are the aggressors and the Buddhists are only exercising their right of self-defence? He asks his Buddhist neighbours not to misrepresent Christianity. Charity begins at home. Let His Lordship begin his message of peace, (which, however, comes rather late in the day) by exhorting his own subordinates to be more tolerant and fair towards Buddhism. The Buddhists, true to their traditions, will gladly follow.

The *raison d'être* of the volume before us is a disguised attack on Buddhism. That the Lord Bishop is an expert in tactics is clear from the ambidextrous policy he adopted at the last Synod, in compromising with both the Ritualists and Evangelicals by blowing hot and cold on either side. The Bishop is almost pretentiously liberal in saying that Buddhism has some external charms, but is so only to point out how far they fall short of his own peculiar ideals. But where the teaching of Buddhism can be decisively shewn to better advantage, he takes leave of his fairness and disdains any comparison.

Under the circumstances we would certainly have preferred His Lordship to have altogether abstained from all comparison. The Buddhists will never fear a just and fair comparison, as they know full well that Buddhism seeks not concealment like a hideous leper, who avoids the public gaze. It is a religion of pure rationality and courts free and fearless enquiry. However erroneous His Lordship's conclusions may be, he will be respected in so far as he attempts to be conscientious.

We are grateful to the Bishop for his pains, as he has assured the reader by his treatise, that no one need ever be ashamed of calling himself a "Buddhist." Can His Lordship be ignorant of the fact that the immediate result of over a century of Protestant missionary enterprise was to turn out a generation of hypocrites, who are perverts to the loathsome vices of Europeans rather than "converts" to practical Christianity? With the absolute conviction of a conscientious heart, I make bold to tell him, that if *padres* will confine them-
selves to their own flocks (like Catholics), or turn their attention homewards to the growth of infidelity and materialism, they will be of infinitely greater service. The Lord Bishop of Liverpool lately said, in the course of a sermon, "We are in danger from the alarming progress of infidelity. A large school of writers has risen up in the last forty years, which almost monopolizes the periodical press, and is gradually sapping the foundations of Christianity all over the land." The whole tone of this high dignitary is most depressing; and why not, therefore, friends, hie home and convert your own?

Rightly did the Archbishop of Canterbury, as President of the S.P.G., caution the irresponsible missionaries that "religious workers in all lands ought to do their utmost to be careful in destroying the religious tone of any nation, however superstitious, without being able to replace it; and it followed that they ought to do their utmost to understand the religion, with which they had to deal." Now, Dr. Copleston cannot honestly say that he has done his best to "understand" Buddhism, as he has deliberately fallen into errors, which some care and less condescension could have corrected. When the Bishop employs the noble cause of education as a bait for the ignoble purpose of perversion, he undoubtedly resorts to questionable methods.

As for the accuracy of his translation and the authenticity of the texts he has used, the present writer does not claim to pronounce an opinion. Thus far it is certain, that a great many citations and inferences betray a pitiful lack of an acquaintance with the spirit of the philosophy and the circumstances which occasioned the teachings. The Bishop's claim to "independent study and originality" is thus sustained at the expense of accuracy and authenticity.

Dr. Copleston writes on page 171:—"The credit of having first founded hospitals belongs undoubtedly to Buddhism. Nor can any reader, who has before him the passages which we have been considering in this chapter, claim for either the
Old or the New Testament the exclusive communication to
man of the theory of disinterested kindness and the law of love.
The same Holy Spirit, who wrote our Scriptures, gave to some
of the Buddhist teachers no despicable measure of insight into
these truths." Noblesse oblige! Now, does His Lordship
maintain that the Christian "theory of disinterested kindness
and the law of love," confined as it is to an infinitesimal portion
of sentient beings, is at least complete? The above quotation,
however, is significant as showing the writer's animus. We
are here tempted to question My Lord: If such a partial
"inspiration" were possible in the case of Buddhism, what
guarantee has he that the "Old and New Testaments"
received the full measure?

Truly there is only one step from the sublime to the
ridiculous. Passing from similar sentiments to his treatment
of the First Noble Truth, we do not meet with Dr. Copleston,
the scholar, but with the veritable offspring of old Adam. He
represents the First Truth as "Sorrow is universal." This he
says, is "either obviously true or utterly false." It may mean,
he admits, something like this: "Pain and suffering are
indispensably one universal fact in human life: pain is the
inseparable condition of all existence: all is pain." But My
Lord holds this alternative interpretation untenable—for no
given reasons. He therefore concludes that the First Noble
Truth "is a categorical falsehood."

The above specious reasoning and altered tone force one
to suspect His Lordship's conscientiousness. What is the
fact? To begin with, he misrepresents it. Mudaliyar
Wijesinghe, in his translation of the Dhammacakkappavattana
Sutta, renders: "The First of the Noble Truths, O Bhikkhus,
is sorrow. Birth is sorrow, sickness is sorrow, death is sorrow,
associating with those unpleasant to us is also sorrow,
separation from those dear to us is sorrow, disappointment is
sorrow, and, in short, the generation of the five Skhandhas
is sorrow." Existence subject to these is not free from sorrow
which aptly coincides with the second alternative explanation. The change of tone and the free use of unparliamentary terms here, apparently the central point of his attack, lower him in the eyes of the reader and colour all his pages with a deep stain of suspicion.

Having followed the Bishop to the culmination of his purpose, let us review other minor points. The Bishop goes on to tell us that "The string of causation does not bear upon conduct" and that the "eightfold path, constantly as it is praised, is never explained and the link between the Four Truths and the moral system is little more than artificial—" all of which allegations prove that the Abhidharma is still a sealed book to him, and he has scorned to give it any attention, misjudging it to be a metaphysical after-growth. On his own confession the Bishop's knowledge of the Pitakas is limited—and he is, therefore, far from an authority. The admirable scholarship of his teacher, Pandit Bārṇāvantudāwe, could have stood him here in good stead, except that the mitred dignitary disdainfully thought to himself "My foot my tutor."

When the Bishop ostentatiously tells us that he has "no sympathy with those critics who urge the ignorance of the death of these two men (Ālāra and Uddaika) as fatal to Gautama's claims," let us heed the advice:

"Quidquid id est timeo Danaos et dona ferentes."

The Bishop, like so many other western writers, falls into the clutches of that inevitable incubus in the very first chapter. He fully agrees with Dr. Legge, that Buddhism takes only the fifth place in the number of her votaries. He summons before his exalted throne the 500 millions of Buddhists and 400 millions of them are turned away as Confucianists, Taoists, Jains, &c., &c. But he gathers under his Episcopal wings all the Catholics, Roman and Eastern, Lutherans, Calvinists, Methodists, Unitarians, Salvationists, Ranters, Peculiar People, Secularists, Materialists, Agnostics, &c., and assigns
them the first place! Confucius and Laotze were Sages and Reformers, whose teachings were essentially Buddhistic and in no material way antagonistic, standing to Buddhism just as Elijah, John the Baptist and Augustine stand to Christianity.

The Bishop, however, admits that “more men and women have owned the Buddha, than have owned as yet any other teacher.”

“Buddhism” he writes, with apparent disapproval, “is not claiming exclusive possession of the ground. It is a parasitic religion, ready to thrive where it can, without displacing or excluding others.” On the contrary, we consider it the glory of Buddhism, that it allows its followers liberty of thought, boundless as the free sky above, which practically makes every man’s own reason the ultimate standard of his belief, as witness the words of the Kālāma Sutta. “For this I taught you, not to believe merely because you have heard: but when you believed of your consciousness, then to act accordingly and abundantly.” From this it obviously follows that there may be considerable difference of opinion, in minor matters, between those who nevertheless agree entirely on essential points and have, therefore, every right to be called Buddhists. Thus, many Buddhists in China pay reverence to the sage Confucius as well as Our Lord, but they are surely none the less Buddhists for that. But, if the Bishop refers to the lamentable fact that some of the more ignorant Buddhists of Ceylon still occasionally perform ceremonies connected with elemental spirits, and even offer sacrifices to them, they are yielding to influences and ideas decidedly condemned by Buddhism.²

Dr. Copleston seems to think lightly of what is aptly termed the Great Renunciation. Even in its historical aspect,

². I must here mention my indebtedness to an able critique by Mr. Leadbeater on the Bishop’s Lecture at Oxford.
I unhesitatingly say, it is without a parallel. The Buddha gave up the throne of a universal monarch with all its bliss, clad himself with rags from the graves, endured absolute self-abnegation for a period of six years in a desert and lived a life of pure altruism for a period of forty-five years. Well may that liberal-minded Catholic Theologian, W.S. Lilly, therefore write: "No amount of prejudice appears to have been able to dim the lustre of his personality or to obscure the sweetness and winningness of his character."\(^3\) That story is its best advocate and why should I attempt to polish burnished gold? Perhaps Dr. Copleston has his reasons for avoiding a comparison in this instance.

As for the carping critics who cantingly say that Sir Edwin Arnold and other writers gave to the Buddha "all that was good and beautiful in the character of Christ," I defy them to point out a single instance of such pilfering. Every impartial observer must have remarked that there is not a single noble trait in Christ's character, which is not found in that of the Buddha. For instance, that veteran Orientalist, Barthelemy St. Hilaire, fastidious critic as he is, does "not hesitate to say, that among the founders of religions there is no figure more pure or more touching than that of the Buddha. His life has not a stain upon it. His constant heroism equals his convictions. He is the perfect model of all the virtues he preaches; his abnegation and charity, his inalterable gentleness never forsake him for an instant. He dies in the arms of his disciples with the serenity of a sage, who practised during his whole life, and who is sure to have found, the truth."\(^4\)

"The following of the Lord Buddha during His life-time," says the Bishop, "was no more than that of S. Francis of Assisi or 'General' Booth." But he gives the lie to it himself when he tells us that "one myriad of Bimbisāra's subjects

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enrolled themselves as lay disciples.” How many like additions may not have been made on very many similar occasions to justify the Bishop to write (on page 57): “So numerous were the adherents of the Buddha that the people began to complain.”

The Bishop is *ex professo* a true-blue Graecophile. He cannot but fall into that ever-recurrent error, which haunts the path of the latter-day Orientalist, that the Greeks conquered India and therefore “the presence of the Greeks stimulated the literary growth of Buddhism” and that the “Bible narratives and Greek myths had reached the India of the Buddha.” Almost every Western Orientalist, from Max Müller downwards, has implicitly assumed Greek infallibility as the universal solvent of every Indian problem. They assumed that the “Yavanas” (a word meaning merely “foreigners”) were Greeks. This assumption is maintained in spite of the Asoka edict, which styles the Greek king his “tributary,” and the utter absence of any Indian record or oral tradition to justify it. On the contrary, Brahmin and Buddhist scholars contend that the Greeks never advanced beyond Attock on the N-W. Frontier, much less were they “conquerors” or even “invaders” of India. It has been the fashion, both among ancient Greeks and modern Europeans, to style everything Eastern “Indian”; hence Columbus discovered India in America. As for the migration of Bible narratives and Greek myths to India, it reminds one of carrying coals to Newcastle—India being the cradle of fables, allegories and myths. Prof. Rhys Davids has conclusively shewn, *per contra*, how Indian myths have penetrated to Europe. Richard Proctor, the renowned Astronomer, quoting Max Müller, says: “Even some of the Buddhist legends and parables sound as if taken from the New Testament. Though we know that many of them existed before the Christian Era”—which is Prof. Max Müller’s quaintly cautious way of saying that the New Testament stories read
as if derived from the former more ancient legends. "There is not," he continues, "one of the teachings regarded as more characteristic of Christianity, which is not more ancient than Christianity by many hundreds of years, albeit to the Jewish people those writings were new, as they were also to those Western Gentiles, whom the Apostles of Christianity taught. Christ was an Essene, being taught by those teachers who belonged to that sect. There is strong evidence that the Essenes had received their doctrines from Buddhist teachers." By a similar process the Bishop assumes the spurious "corrected" date (477) of the Lord Buddha's Nirvāṇa, and that writing was not known before Pāṇini (350 B.C.), although he will not deny that civilization had already made giant strides and developed all known arts and sciences.ª

Our author is under the impression that the Buddhist idea of knowledge is confined to a knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. True, Lord Gautama's ministry was not the role of a Professor or Minister of Education. He found an advancement in learning already in existence, but the Teacher knew that this was not the light that expelled the darkness. Knowledge is from the intellect and wisdom from the heart. All knowledge was mere twilight compared to the real knowledge of the Four Truths, which solved the human sphinx-riddle. Much as He emphasized this fact, He never disparaged intellectual knowledge, but cultivated it Himself and positively advocated the teaching of "science and lore." When our critic fails to grasp that wisdom is the goal of the Buddhist, and it is ignorance which prevents man from realizing the Four Truths, he betrays incompetence as a judge of the system. The Deus ex machina of a being is ignorance or error. How truly has this been independently divined by that luminary of the Cartesian school of philosophers, Malebranche, who wrote: "Error is the universal cause of the misery of

ª Vide Vol. II of The Theosophist for a conclusive refutation of these two fallacies.
mankind." But we agree with the Bishop when he writes: "The Buddhist, like the Platonist, can never separate virtue from knowledge." Let His Lordship ponder over the lamentable fact that in modern times education had advanced pari passu with the increase of vice. I am here again tempted to remind His Lordship to draw a comparison. Let him cite two passages from the Bible inculcating learning and enlightenment.

His Lordship is right when he gives it as his opinion, that the "Buddha knows nothing conditional or tentative." But how will he reconcile this with his statement that His system "is a parasitic religion" and "tolerates caste"? His reverence betrays unexpected simplicity when he seems to think that Ānanda could not attain to 'Rahathood' during his Master's life-time. He could have easily ascertained that Ānanda had a special reason for desisting from passing into that sublime state of beatitude, as it would disqualify him from attending on the person of the Buddha. A slight condescension would have spared our author from many kindred blunders.

The Bishop, as a High Churchman, takes a sympathetic estimate of meditation. He admits the value of meditation, but fails to see the Buddhist's rationale of it. "The Buddhist's solitude," says he "is a withdrawal from all things to nothing, the Christian's from all things to God." The Bishop, however, writes elsewhere: "Nirvāṇa is not the culmination of abstraction." To the Buddhist, therefore, Nirvāṇa is not "nothing" but really "everything." Let His Lordship not talk glibly of meditation, when he and all theologians fail to understand the true meaning of "Pray to one's father in secret."

I beg respectfully to remind His Right Reverend Lordship that he shows want of circumspection in commenting on the Buddhist idea of "giving" (Dāna) which logically culminates in the giving up of one's father, mother, family—all, to take
up the cross and follow Him. His Lordship says: "the motive is the pure selfishness of the donor," which is rather strange in view of the fact that destruction of selfishness is the end of the Buddhist. Rightly does Dr. Eitel say: "Here lies the moral strength of Buddhism. It is a religion of unselfishness." Then again Buddhism teaches that avarice, hatred and ignorance are the three main roots of all evil. The three antidotes are charity, morality and meditation. How much better is this as a motive than the Christian one of "He that giveth to the poor lendeth to the Lord?" That virtue is its own reward is thus true of Buddhism. It is a duty to others and thereby to one's own self.

The Bishop writes (on page 204) "it is never imputed as blame to him (the Buddhist) if he kills animals for the table." The Bishop evidently judges the Buddhists from his own standard, which construed "Thou shalt not kill" of old to favour man's carnal appetite. This is no unconscious blunder on his part, as he has made the same statement in his Oxford lecture. Referring to the said lecture of the Bishop, Mudaliyar Wijesinghe, a recognized authority, writes:—"It is not at all true, as some missionary critics of Buddhism have perversely represented, that Buddhist Commentators generally interpret the sin of killing as 'the killing of birds, etc.'" 6 The peculiar education of His Lordship's feeling has rendered the humane spirit of Buddhism repulsive to him. He says: "The public announcement of this maxim by royal authority, as a counsel, if not as a law for a vast Continent, is surely one of the most curious events in the history of the human conscience. The conscience of Gautama, Asoka and the Buddhists was at fault; and this enormous piece of moral law has been promulgated with such a publicity and earnestness and imperial authority, as probably has never been placed at the service of any other moral rule." Seeing how the onward paths of Christianity and Mahomedanism have been stained

with human blood, and how whole pages of history have been blackened by the violation of that noble law, His Lordship cannot conscientiously say that it was exaggerated by Buddhism. The gentle spirit of the teachings of meek and mild Jesus cannot revolt against such a humane law. Alas! it was true, when the late Laureate exclaimed:

"All very well, but the good Lord Jesus has had his day."

"He who lies is guilty of all sin" quotes the Bishop from the Majjhima Nikāya. "The fact remains," he says, commenting on it, "and it is one to be reckoned to the credit of Buddhism, that the moral teaching as to the use of speech is practical, full and high-toned." Let not our opponents any more try to lay the sin of the recent increase of dishonesty among the Sinhalese at the door of their religion. Its origin is, therefore, external. Let them heed the candid confession of the Archbishop of Canterbury: "In the Christian Church itself there had been vices and wickednesses, which had gone far to make Christianity intolerable to students and observers... It would be just as reasonable to impute to the Gospel the sins of London."

It is regrettable that we are compelled to suspect His Lordship of disingenuousness, and a plea of ignorance alone can combat it. For instance, he brings forward against Buddhism a statement that there are passages in the Vinaya Piṭaka, which he says, "expatiate in regions of unimaginable and impossible obscurity." Here the Lord Bishop does not tell his reader that these prohibitions are not part of the publicly used Scriptures, placed in the hands of all indiscriminately, but that they are part of the private instructions written only for monks—those who have deliberately chosen a life of complete celibacy. They are not intended for the eyes even of laymen—far less of women and children. As to

7. The Presidential speech at the last S.P.G. Anniversary.—The italics are mine.
the passage itself, there were men in the world two thousand years ago, and there are men now, who are so degraded as to have some incomprehensible attraction towards the most loathsome forms of sin; in our day it is the fashion politely to ignore these things lest our finer sensibilities should be shocked and so the unhappy sinner is left unwarned and unadvised. Our Lord in His wisdom chose a different course; He recognised the fact that these horrible crimes existed, and gave clear directions as to their avoidance: are we prepared to maintain that our modern method of dealing with such sin is the better one? We cannot but, however, feel great surprise that a Christian official should venture to make such an accusation as this, when he must know that he thereby lays himself open to an infinitely more crushing rejoinder. The Bishop’s remark forces us to remind him that there can be no “obscenity” more utterly loathsome than that contained in his own sacred Books, and that in their case it appears not in a private manual of direction for celibates only, but in a book which is habitually put into the hands of women and children. We would also hint that, unpleasantly detailed as may be some of the directions of the Vinaya Piṭaka, they are at least distinct prohibitions; whereas in the Bishop’s Scriptures they are not prohibitions at all, but are presented as matters of history, and often represented as occurring in the lives of those heroes whom his Deity especially approved.

“Drunkenness is not emphatically condemned in Buddhism,” says the Bishop, “and there is no hell set apart for drunkards.” This is rather astounding in view of the fact, that Buddhism regards drink as the common mother of all vices and that the hell called “Lokumbuniraya” is specially assigned to drunkards. I do not hesitate to say after this that the Bishop’s knowledge of the Buddhist Scriptures is extremely limited. May I ask the Lord Bishop why he avoids a comparison between the Buddhist and Christian teaching on this head? It is fair to charge a religion with the fault, if it does not condemn a special form of vice. Now,
Christianity does not prohibit the taking of alcoholic liquor, and the torturing to death of animals. Nay Christ himself has set an example (if we are to credit the story) of both these. So it is fair to charge to the discredit of Christianity the lamentable increase of these vices, the one of which has reduced the world to a lunatic asylum, and the other degraded it to a slaughter-house.

All this to the contrary notwithstanding, my Lord would take up the pen and unblushingly write: "The two moralities have no more in common than a list of bones on paper has with a living body." Very good that, of a system of which Max Müller can say: "That moral code taken by itself is one of the most perfect which the world has ever known." But what has a greater than the Bishop of Colombo, the Bishop of Peterborough, as President of the Diocesan Conference at Leicester, to say? He "stated his firm belief that any Christian State, carrying out in all its relations the Sermon on the Mount, could not exist for a week, and illustrated this striking thesis in detail."

The Lord Bishop, nevertheless, does not agree with the lawn-tennis school of critics, who find in Buddhism a sanction of the low status of women in the East. "In regard to regulation of married life," says the Bishop, "the teaching of the Pitakas is excellent, and the ideal Brahmns or Buddhists of old are commended, for that they did not buy their wives, but married for love." Speaking generally on the system of morals the Bishop admits: "There stand out certain noble features exhibiting a high ideal of purity, kindness and moral earnestness. I do not wish to detract from that impression. I share it and continued study of the books does not weaken it."

As the great part of the broad field of Buddhist Scriptures is a terra incognita to his Lordship, many of his hasty conclusions may still be revolutionized.

As it should be expected, the Bishop finds Buddhism cold and pessimistic, as it does not allow free indulgence to the emotions. It is rather unpleasant for him to find Jesus giving vent to his emotions, when the Arhats, the disciples of the Buddha, are incapable of tears. Perhaps it will be news to His Lordship that Buddhism considers the emotions as a part of man's lower nature, which it has in common with the brutes. A man subject to the influence of the emotions is, therefore, of a lower stage of development. A man swayed by the storms of passion and the waves of emotion is far from a Saint, who

"Stands firm and resolute,
Like a forest calm and mute,
With folded arms and looks, which are
Weapons of an unvanquished war;"

The Lord Bishop says, "A system which knows nothing of good desires, righteous anger, holy sorrow, reasonable fear, or just hatred, so far libels human nature and is doomed to be so far ineffective." Had he said "the brutal part of human nature" he would have been less incorrect. The answer, however, is: strictly speaking these are all contradictions in terms; scientific investigation and even results shew that the Buddhist teaching on this head is sound and effective.

It is a significant admission on the part of the Bishop that the teachings on Cosmogony, Geography and the Jātaka tales are no part of the Tripitakas. Now, we trust that critics of Buddhism will hence-forth stand by their repudiation and not cull passages from the later books, as has been frequently done, to criticise Lord Buddha's knowledge of Geography.

The last two chapters of the volume are devoted to a description of the monks and the laity. It is a pity that the Bishop does not record his personal observation as to the character and habits of the monks. He relies on second-hand information evidently derived from a hostile source. "On the whole" says the Bishop in a rather sweeping way, "the lives of two-thirds are bad." This statement may, perhaps,
to a certain extent, hold good in the case of the upcountry-
barons than religious ascetics. The lives of the low-country
monks, I must say, are far superior. The Bishop’s personal
experience seems to be limited to the admirable discipline and
the wholesome influence of the Vidyodaya College under
Sri Sumangala Mahanayaka Thero. If he took any pains, he
could easily find scores of kindred institutions, where the
monks are living purely blameless lives. On the whole, I make
bold to say that the Sinhalese Bhikshus will bear a favourable
comparison with any other priesthood in the world; even in
their present condition they are far better representatives of
the ascetic of Galilee than the mitred Bishops and silk-robed
Cardinals of the Christian church. The country was con-
quered by three foreign nations within a period of three
centuries; conversions were made at the point of the sword;
the religion was scoffed at, and the monks were subjected to
public humiliation. The higher classes put on the garb of
nominal Christianity simultaneously with the imitation of all
the vices of the conquerors and the process of national de-
geneneration began. The noxious wave spread and paralyzed
the priesthood. The Bishop incidentally admits the enlighten-
ment of the early days, when he cautiously writes:—“The
pansalas (temples) are said to have been of old the chief if not
the only schools of a nation, which was certainly an educated
one.” The Reverend Gardiner, who as manager of public
schools in the Island during the early part of the century, had
great opportunities of collecting reliable information, says:

9. The following summary of cases, gleaned by one gentleman
from the newspapers shows a record of a year’s doing of the clergy of
the Church of England:—

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<tr>
<th>Charge</th>
<th>Cases</th>
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<tr>
<td>Breach of Promise</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Cruelty to Animals</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bankrupts</td>
<td>254</td>
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<td>Elopement</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Suicides</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Drunkenness</td>
<td>121</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assaulits</td>
<td>109</td>
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<tr>
<td>Various other Charges</td>
<td>84</td>
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(Pall Mall Gazette).
"All the wants of the Buddhist priests are supplied by the people and the most beautiful females in the country attend them in their houses without wages. So great is the sanctity of their character that a virgin, who has served in their abodes, is considered by the young men as enviable wife." Davy writing in 1821, corroborates him:—"Their character in general is moral and inoffensive. As moral teachers they appear in their best light . . ."

The Lord Bishop disingenuously and technically writes: "Buddhism is the only established religion in the Island." He refers, no doubt, to recent legislation, as regards the Buddhist Temporalities. If so, I shall remind the Bishop that the Government did not pass the Bill as an act of special favour, but in keeping with the solemn word of honour pledged to the Buddhists at the Convention of 1815. But the fact is the law is wholly inoperative as it is without a mandate. It only encumbers the statute-book and gives a handle for the Bishop's argument. If by "establishment," the Lord Bishop means legislation to regulate the affairs of a priesthood, can he deny that his own Church of England is also "established," as it is only the other day a Bill was brought in to regulate the affairs of the Clergy? Nay, the Anglican Church in Ceylon is established, and that in a much more practical and real sense. All the authority and influence of the Christian officials is thrown on their side. The power of the Church is such that an Executive Bill was passed to Boycott Buddhist and Hindu schools, without any notice to, or consent of, their Managers. The Bishop forgets his own purge, when he glibly talks of the "establishment of Buddhism." He alone, not to speak of his Chaplains, draws a yearly salary of Rs. 20,000.00 from the hard-earned savings of poor half-starved Buddhists and "heathens."

"Wherever Buddhism is to be found in Ceylon," says the Bishop, "it is substantially the same," and yet he would fain find "two Buddhisms." Perhaps he means the old fossilized
customs and religious habits of the people and the more enlightened culture of the intelligent monks and laymen. Let the Bishop, however, remember that Buddhism attaches no importance to external forms and ceremonies, which the Lord Buddha never countenanced. Buddhism is the life, independent of local rites. As a ritualist, however, the Lord Bishop cannot divest himself of these trifling prejudices. After all, by a parity of reasoning, how many Christianities cannot be found in Protestant Christendom alone? The Bishop, however, admits that Buddhism has seen a revival during the last decade, due to external influences, and that there are a few leaders of character. Come, my Lord Bishop, call a spade a spade, and say it is due to the Theosophical Society. Yet he thinks it rather artificial and academic than national. As all similar movements are, they should be academic first, and national afterwards. We have too much faith in the potentialities of the present times to agree with the Bishop that "it is already passing away." We thought it *infra dignitatem* for the Bishop on his exalted throne to descend to childish trifles. He, perhaps, thinks it inconsistent for the Buddhists to call their Master "Lord Buddha." We do not know that the Lord Bishop has the sole prerogative of giving only a Christian connotation to an English word, when he jeeringly points to the title "Lord" applied to the Buddha.

The Lord Buddha was called Lokanātha (Lord of the World), Dharmarāja (King of Righteousness), Messiah, Guardian of the Universe, the Anointed, Saviour of the world, &c., &c. He then makes an extraordinary statement:—"The living Buddhist, as a fact, believes in personal deity: and herein his belief is better than his creed." Had he said all Buddhists believe in the existence and power of the *Devas* (Gods) he would have been correct. We are of opinion that the living Buddhist is one who believes that he is God himself *in posse* and relies on his efforts, and that Buddhist is dead who lives in dread of the gods or elemental spirits. The Bishop's idea is, of course, that no one is living except for God,
who gives life. Let the impartial reader judge between us. Stretching the same argument, he makes capital of a possible mistake on the part of an ignorant Buddhist in setting up on a board "God bless the Lord Buddha," although the Bishop inconsistently admits that Buddhism recognizes no God.

The Lord Bishop gradually grows bolder and more militant and throws down a challenge to the "scientific Buddhists." He asks them to "reconcile its claim to be scientific, with its tolerance of superstition and virtual Polytheism." With all respect to My Lord's scholarship in Classics and Theology, I shall remind him: *ne sutor ultra crepidam!*

If, by "superstitions" he means sacrifices to elemental spirits, we have shown above that they are anti-Buddhistic and condemned by the Lord Buddha. But if the Bishop refers to a variety of mesmeric rites practised by the Buddhists, for purely therapeutic purposes, "the scientific Buddhists" maintain that they are truly scientific, and are being daily vindicated by the discoveries of Hypnotism. Even if, by "Polytheism" he means a belief in the existence of devas (gods) the "scientific Buddhists" will still hold their own. Kant, the most profound and far-seeing philosopher of modern times, wrote a century ago: "I confess I am much induced to assert the existence of immaterial beings in this world, and to class my soul itself in the category of these beings. It is as good as demonstrated, or it could be proved, if we were to enter into it at some length, or better still, it will be proved in the future." Yes, it is now proved beyond the shadow of a doubt, and such distinguished scientists as Professors Crookes, Wallace, Hare, Du Prel, Bulterof, are the leaders of modern spiritualism, which counts over 25,000,000 votaries in Christendom alone. "The human soul stands," continues Kant, "in indissoluble communion with all immaterial beings of the spiritual world, it produces efforts in them, and, in exchange, receives impressions from them, without, however, becoming humanly conscious of them, so
long as all stands well.” Prof. Huxley, the High Priest of fastidious Agnosticism, writes in his latest volume of essays: “Without stepping beyond the analogy of that which is known, it is easy to people the cosmos with entities in ascending scale.” The Bishop is evidently a stranger to all this, but his own Bible gives him proof of an invisible world, although he might believe that the age of miracles is gone, and all communication is at an end. If Buddhism were a bantling of yesterday, we could understand Buddhists seeking the refuge of modern science. Still as the Bishop throws down the gauntlet, we will give the opinion of an Oriental scholar, Ernest J. Eitel, Ph., Doc., Tubingen, who is better qualified than a Bishop to pronounce upon the scientific aspect of Buddhism. He writes: “It acknowledged a design in nature, it recognized immutable laws underlying the endless modifications of organic and inorganic life, and attained, even so long as two thousand years ago, to that remarkable idea of a pre-existing spontaneous tendency to variation as the real cause of species.”

“I have shown with what broad and enlarged views the Buddhist expounded that mysterious book of revelation, Nature, anticipating, centuries before Ptolemy, the latter’s system of cycle and epicycle, orb in orb.”... “It must be acknowledged that Buddhism forestalled in several instances the most splendid discoveries of modern astronomy.” “Even some of the results of modern geology may be said to have been intuitively divined by Buddhism. The Buddhists knew the interior of our earth to be in an incandescent state, they spoke of the formation of each earth as having occupied successive periods of incalculable duration.” Good that, of a system that seeks scientific support, although it is well-known that the Master never enunciated any theories in

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10. The poet Laureate, Tennyson, himself was a believer in "Spiritism" and In Memoriam is imbued with it.
11. Three Lectures on Buddhism, p. 66.
12. Three Lectures on Buddhism, pp. 63-94.
physical science. The Bishop should look before he jumps. The Buddhists challenge the "scientific" Bishops to reconcile their claim to be scientific with their tolerance of such "superstitions" as the creation of the world in six days by a personal God, standing still of the Sun and the Moon, and that a whale swallowed Jonah and carried him about in his belly for three days, and cast him up alive and a host of similar "scientific facts."

This paper which I first intended to be a brief review has grown to an inordinate length, and I will conclude with a word on the last page of the book. The Buddhists have ever been on the side of those "who are letting in light, by whatever channel, into the dark places." We would ever regard as our colleagues, all those "who are diffusing knowledge of the true tenets and history of Buddhism, when they do so not merely to praise Buddhism, but to get virtue practised." It is unfortunately his own Christian Church, that has allied itself with the forces of obscurantism, and been a bar to progress and enlightenment. I conclude with His Lordship's own words:

"My challenge to my (Christian) neighbours is this:

Teach the highest possible doctrines of purity, kindness and justice.

Make the lives of the priests (and the laymen too) examples of these virtues.

Discourage openly and utterly all (superstitious unscientific and un-Christian teachings of Judaism, and the Church).

While using sober argument in the proper place, abstain from all abuse of the faith of others (the particular occupation of the Missionary)."
Admit that (Dharma, Karma, Reincarnation and Nirvana) are doctrines characteristic of Buddhism.

If this is done, I assure my Lord Bishop of Colombo, he will find that during the next decade "Othello's occupation is gone."

Galle, 10th December, 1892.
F. L. WOODWARD AND MAHINDA COLLEGE

After Dr. Bowles Daly left about the year 1902 (sic, 1892?), Mahinda College passed through a critical stage with varying fortunes owing to changes of Principals and want of funds. What remained of the old Buddhist National Fund was exhausted and other resources were sorely crippled to such an extent that the bare existence of the School was due practically to the self-denying munificence of the late Muhandiram Amarasuriya. He had repeatedly refused to accept any office in the Buddhist Theosophical Society, so that it was a brilliant coup d'état that he was at last prevailed upon to accept the Presidency of the Society and the Managership of the School. The School had reached the lowest level, with about 60 boys, and was in a helpless condition when Mr. Woodward was persuaded by Colonel Olcott to accept the Principalship, in the year 1903. Mr. Woodward endured the "agonies of hell," as he used to describe them, living in the old Fort building, and manfully laboured until, within a few years, the School became self-supporting, with over 300 boys, and there was no further accommodation. Soon, however, the cause of Buddhist education in the Galle District suffered a grievous loss when in 1907 Mr. Amarasuriya died. But his mantle fell on his worthy son Henry, who espoused the cause with even greater enthusiasm than his father and was always a strong pillar of support. All this were in vain but for the efforts of Mr. Woodward. With liberal contributions from the late Mudaliyar Gooneratne and his worthy son, and Muhandiram Wickremesinghe and numerous other generous donors, the present buildings, some of the most picturesque in the Island, were put up, and the
Buddhist public will always remain under an irredeemable obligation to Mr. Woodward, whose architectural skill and aesthetic culture were only rivalled by his munificent donations amounting to over Rs. 20,000.00, he being the largest single contributor to the cost of the buildings.

The alumni of Mahinda College have not only held their own at public Examinations and in the field of sport (the uses of which are so much emphasised nowadays), but also in the outer and broader field of life. Many of them occupy prominent positions in the learned professions, in Government Service and other pursuits in various parts of the Island and even abroad.

Mr. Woodward developed the mind and the body and trained the moral character of the boys. The high moral tone which Mr. Woodward has infused will prove an inspiration to generations still unborn. This great ideal which I may call the "Woodward tradition" has attained a permanence and a veneration that are remarkable.

He was, above all, a deeply religious man and the severe simplicity and absolute purity of the Brahmachari life he led will be long cherished. His devotion to and zeal in the religion of his adoption will prove a stimulus to those who were born in the religion and counted 25 centuries of Buddhist ancestors. His eminence as a scholar in several languages, including Pāli, and in the philosophy of religion is acknowledged. His translation of the Yogāvacara’s Manual has evoked admiration. His learned contributions to the Bacon-Shakespeare controversy were marked by diligent research and scholarship of a high order.

The position he occupied as a teacher and educationist is well known and commanded respect. A high authority once declared that he was in all respects about the best teacher in the Island. His ideal of a teacher was that of the ancient ‘Guru’ who disdained pay or reward and who treated
his pupils with kindness, as comrades rather than inferiors. How he achieved his ideal is known to thousands who bear witness for the fact. The hoi-polloi marvelled; what manner of man is this! who despises money, scorns the pleasures of life, abhors honours and is the same to all men. The question was raised, what did he do for the Bhikkhus? The retort courteous was plump and plain—he even washed their feet. He was the humblest of men but at the same time possessed self-respect in the highest degree. His kindness knew no limit and it extended to the meanest living thing. He was generous to a fault, from the worldly point of view. In this commercial age, immersed in its damnable materialism, Mr. Woodward was a veritable enigma. No wonder, when it is the fashion to reduce all human actions to f., s.d. It is the pernicious habit of these decadent times that even man's high aspirations, noble sentiments and chivalrous conduct have come to be assessed at a money value.

For the edification of the man-in-the-street (Mr. Woodward will pardon this pandering to Philistinism), let me state his services in terms of Rupees and cents. (Strictly speaking his services are simply invaluable, but such idealism transcends ordinary understanding.) Considering the pay graduates of his standing receive, he should have been paid at least a salary of Rs. 700·00 a month, i.e., over Rs. 130,000·00 for 17 years. Add to this the Rs. 20,000·00 spent by him, and the Sinhalese Buddhists are indebted to Mr. Woodward in over Rs. 150,000·00 apart from other sums which it is impossible to account. Mr. Woodward characteristically refused to accept even a part of this amount and the members of the Buddhist Theosophical Society were much embarrassed at his magnanimous attitude when they proposed to make a tangible recognition of his generosity. But it is open to the public to perpetuate the memory of his work by a suitable monument. The members of the Buddhist Theosophical Society have already subscribed for the purpose a
sum of over Rs. 8,000.00 and it is incumbent on the other Buddhists to raise the total to at least Rs. 30,000.00,—i.e. \( \frac{1}{3} \)th of what we owe him in money—to make it worthy of a great and good man.

Let us take at their word all those who value everything in terms of cash. Here is an opportunity they dare not ignore, if they are consistent. The only alternative is that the Galle Buddhists will stand convicted of gross ingratitude. On the eve of his departure there was a plethora of speeches, addresses and presentations, to the great danger of all our enthusiasm evaporating in words. I hope and trust that this calamity has not befallen us and that our deeper and more sober feelings will still respond and materialise in the shape of a monument worthy of one who spent himself and nearly his all in the service of our religion and country.

—The Mahinda College Magazine, December, 1919.
AHIMŚĀ : NON-HURTING :

All tremble before punishment; to all, life is dear;
Judging others by yourself, slay not, neither cause to slay.

DHAMMAPADA.

As life is dear to oneself, so it is to other living beings; by comparing oneself to others, good people bestow pity on all beings.

HITOPADESA.

"AHIMŚĀ" is correctly rendered "non-hurting," as 'hinṣā' comprehends all kinds of pain both physical and mental. It is essentially an Eastern Ariyan doctrine emphasised chiefly in Buddhism and Jainism. The Semitic teacher, Jesus Christ, placed a premium on killing by blessing the nets of his disciples on the sea of Galilee, in sharp contrast with the example of Pythagoras—(the Indian yāvanā chariya)—who bought and set free all the fishes caught in a net by fishermen. The Jains, however, push the teaching to extreme lengths, so as to reduce it to an absurdity. Jainism forbids flesh-eating and even the use of silk, wool and honey, "as each drop of honey is won by the murder of innumerable creatures." "The guilt of vegetarianism is as big as an atom, but of meat-eating is as big as Mahāmeru." Strange to say, Jainism does not forbid the milk of animals as food, though born in a land where starving cattle are so common.

Buddhism characteristically confines Ahimśā within reasonable limits, exactly in keeping with its doctrine of the golden mean — Majjhima - paṭṭipadā. The Bhikkhus are strictly enjoined not to injure life of any sort.

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The rule was not applied in all its vigour in the case of the laity. A Brahmin once introduced himself to the Buddha; "I am Ahimsaka, O Gotama!" To him the Buddha replied: "As is the name, so may it be; be thou a non-hurter by body, speech or thought." The layman has to observe the spirit of the injunction though not to austerity. Ahimsa has a direct bearing on the ethics of flesh-eating. Flesh is permissible if it is pavutta-mamsa—"already existing meat," as opposed to uddissakata-mamsa—"prepared for one's use." One must not have seen, heard or suspected that an animal was killed for one's sake, thus the flesh becomes tikoji-parisuddha—'clean in three respects.' That the Master who taught Ahimsa should not also have prohibited flesh-eating has been an eternal puzzle to critics of Buddhism. The explanation seems to be that the Tathagata was not a supporter of extravagant practices, thus avoiding the antas (extremes), but taught the doctrine of the Middle Path. In the Amagandha Sutta He clearly laid down: that it was killing, lying, theft etc., that defile man, and not the eating of flesh. Ahimsa, complete in its essentials, is to be found in the Dhamma, and Abhaya (fearlessness), full and universal, was offered to a trembling world by the Lord of Compassion.

In other systems of religion and law, killing admits of such glaring exceptions that non-killing completely loses its force and effect as an ethical precept. In Hinduism, Christianity, Islam etc., even homicide is permissible under certain conditions. All systems of Municipal Law permit the infliction of pain, even to the extent of causing death, in private defence of person and property. The Buddha-Dhamma precludes all exceptions whatsoever. The doctrine loses its value as a virtue almost completely, once it is deprived of its universal applicability. Certain religious systems tolerate killing in self-defence.
The reason is not far to seek—Buddhism is universal in ethical doctrine, whereas other religions are only opportunist. The Jesuitical teaching—"the end justifies the means"—can never find a place in the moral code of Buddhism. The hideous dogma, that violence may be used for the propagation of religion, is responsible for seas of blood that have stained the path of religions, save and except Buddhism. The recent titanic conflict between might and right has completely discredited the gospel of violence. That eminent journalist A. G. Gardiner, late editor of London Daily News, in a recent sensational article headed "The False Bottom" has completely exposed the hollowness of the foundation on which the whole fabric of social policy is based. Nahi verena verāni sammantidha kudācanm, etc. (not by hatred does hatred ever cease), Akkodhena jine khodham, etc. (overcome hate by non-hate) and Jayam veram pasawati dukkham seti parājito etc. (victory begets enmity, the vanquished live in sorrow) are golden maxims which have been triumphantly vindicated by the tragic experience of recent years. Kings and statesmen who directed their policies relying on the strength of their armaments, have been humbled in their pride of power and obliged to acknowledge the absolute futility of force. A great and marvellous transformation has been brought about in the thinking of mankind. The doctrine of the Superman the fetish of German Kultur, is an exploded folly. The cruel idol of force has been overthrown in the dust and in its place is now enthroned the goddess of Love. The League of Nations is the logical outcome of the change in ideals.

A materialistic world scoffed at the doctrine of "non-resistance" taught by Count Tolstoi. But the Russians have been soon overtaken by Nemesis for rejecting their prophet. Bolshevist anarchism has devastated the country that prosecuted its greatest son.
Certain critics hurl the reproach at the Buddhists that they ill-treat their draught animals. But the facts do not accord with the charge. Kindness to animals has been practised in the East even to the extent of establishing hospitals, dispensaries and drinking troughs. The modern Humanitarian Movement in the West is only an echo of this traditional solicitude of Eastern peoples, for their dumb fellow-beings from time immemorial. The reformatory movement in schools, jails, penitentiaries, and abolition of capital punishment, are signs of the times.

The Satyagraha movement, recently initiated by Mahatma Gandhi in India, collapsed inasmuch as the populace were not sufficiently schooled in the teaching of Ahimsā, which was the main factor of the principle.

Lokamanya Tilak, a great Sanskrit scholar, once remarked to Sūriyagoḍa Sumaṅgala Thero, that the Buddhist commentators were wrong in assigning a metaphorical meaning to the well-known Dhammapada verse:—Mātaram pita-ram hantu vā rājano āveca khoṭṭiye etc. (having killed "Mother" and "Father," "Kings," and two "Rulers") which was exactly in keeping with the Hindu view that killing was allowed under certain circumstances.

A common error has found favour even among some Buddhists that it is more merciful to make short shrift of old and decrepit horses, dogs, cats and other pets, than to allow them to drag out a painful existence. Let us put this view to a practical test. If the opinion is ethically sound, it must be certainly applicable to human beings also.

I shall confess my error and stand refuted if our critics will pursue their view to a logical conclusion by applying the rule to their old and infirm parents and other dear ones.

Another class of critic is fond of putting the poser: "What will you do if a cobra is going to attack Mr. A? Will you not kill the cobra and save Mr. A’s life?" They rub
their hands in glee that they have impaled the Buddhist on the horns of a dilemma. But the Buddhist replies in this wise: "My dear friend, who made thee Judge over life and death? How can you be sure that the cobra will kill A? There may be 1,000 chances of escape for him, without the alternative of killing the cobra. Mr. A in this life is a human being, but the cobra may be a Bodhisatta or an Arahant in his final stage of evolution. Ah, Mr. Critic, do please cultivate a little humility! Be slow to assume the role of a Lord of evolution. There are more things in heaven and earth, my friend, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." The Buddhist must not only guard his action but also keep constant watch over his words and thoughts, lest they offend brother men. Slander and libel can assassinate character—a crime sometimes just as heinous as murder. Cruel thoughts vitiate the atmosphere and predispose to hatred and violence.

Though the doctrine of Ahimsa is enunciated in a negative form, as a virati or abstinence, Buddhism, at the same time, lays emphasis on its positive aspects—in the form of metta, love or kindness, karuna, pity and mudita, sympathy. These virtues have to be cultivated to a high degree in all detail.

It is an interesting fact that the opinion of the Western World is veering round to the Eastern point of view, that violence, drink, gambling, etc., are evils prolific with disastrous consequences to Society.

But absolute Ahimsa is impossible in practice even to the strictest ascetic. This is not a recent discovery, as some wiseacres assume, for we read in the Mahabharata the story of the "pious butcher," the conclusion of which is that since nobody can avoid destroying innumerable animals in walking, sitting, lying down, eating &c., nay, in everything he does—there is not a single "non-hurter" in the world:—Nasti kascid ahimsakah. This is certainly a truism. It is the tragic fact of life that, in order to live, one has inevitably to cause death. The only possible exception is that of the
Ariyas who, by exercise of ādhi power can prevent injury by body, word and thought. Hence the great consummation, devoutly to be wished, is the attainment of this Lokuttara state, when one shall no more cause injury to fellow beings.

Until we puthujjanas (worldlings) attain to such heights, it should be our endeavour to avoid giving pain and alleviate suffering, remembering the words of old Bhīma: “Neither was there, nor is there, a higher gift than the gift of life.”

Prāṇadānāt paramaṁ dānam
Nabhūtam nabhāvisyāti.

—Mahābhārata.
FRANK LEE WOODWARD: 
A BUDDHIST IDEALIST

The ugliest feature of the present period of the Kaliyuga (Dark Age) is its "damnable materialism." Every phase of life has become infected with the virus of a demoralising commercialism. This malady in the body politic has broken out in virulent forms: in German Kultur and Bolshevist anarchism. The materialistic tendency has become rampant in many lands. This tendency has insidiously permeated even the spiritual East as evidenced by the moral depravity of the Sangha and the authorities of Buddhism. The appearance of an Idealist at such a time is a rare phenomenon indeed. The story of the life and work of Mr. Woodward sounds like an old-world romance. That a comparatively young Cambridge scholar, born and bred in Western tradition and surroundings, should renounce his family ties and the comfortable life of an English Public School with bright prospects before him for the uncertainties of a career of incessant sacrifice and unimaginable hardship among an alien people of a different culture and strange habits of life is a spectacle at which an astonished world stands aghast. He had drunk deep of the fountain-spring of the Classic lore of Greece and Rome and was imbued with the ideals of Christian culture. Being the son of a Church of England clergyman, his up-bringing was that of the best type of Englishman. Shall we not, therefore, conclude that his prenatal tendencies attracted him towards Oriental religion and philosophy? Those who had the good fortune to come in close contact with him were deeply impressed by his remarkable personality. How he assimilated Buddhist knowledge and culture and the Eastern views of life and ideals, how he sympathised with the aspirations of his
coreligionists, and rendered yeoman service in advancing the cause of Buddhist education are matters of common knowledge. The austere simplicity and absolute purity of his life and habits were worthy of a Brahmachāri. His noble self-denial and the spirit of service will remain monuments more enduring than bronze or marble. The bulk of his fortune he laid at the feet of his Master as a thank-offering. His brilliant talents and splendid accomplishments he devoted to the service of the noble religion of his adoption. He strenuously aimed and manfully laboured to place Buddhist education on a sound footing. The eminence to which Mahinda College has attained is mainly due to his efforts, seconded by a few generous and loyal helpers. An insignificant school in a tottering condition seventeen years ago, has attained to a high place among contemporary institutions, thanks to Mr. Woodward's labours. Apart from the knowledge and learning imparted, he infused a high tone and created a healthy atmosphere. Duty and work were a second nature with him. He was known to observe that he could not understand why he was praised for what he ought to have done under any circumstances.

He had acquired a sound knowledge of Pali and was an admirer of the sublime philosophy of Buddhism. In fact he took to Buddhist thought and life as a duck takes to water, bespeaking a familiarity with Buddhism in previous lives. Ananda Metteyya Thero once remarked that there had taken birth in Western lands at the present time a large number of persons of both sexes with prenatal Buddhist proclivities. The formation of the London Buddhist Society and the appearance of other Buddhist organisations in Germany and America are proofs of this sage observation. Mr. Woodward is undoubtedly one of these fortunate beings, and how well he has used his opportunities! He observed Ashtāṅga Stīla true to the manner born and was a zealous devotee of the Faith, who wholeheartedly entered into the spirit of Buddhist worship and other rites and ceremonies,
with an enthusiasm rare even in a born Buddhist. Such an example should prove an inspiration to the Buddhists and stimulate them to high achievement and noble endeavour.

His charity knew no bounds. In the materialistic language of the West he was generous to a fault. Similarly a depraved world blamed Vessantara for wasting his substance.

Mr. Woodward was a man of many parts. Among his accomplishments were Poetry, Music, Drawing, Architecture and Antiquarian Research. He was no mean athlete, for he had a proficiency in Cricket, Football and Rowing. He thus possessed a *mens sana in corpore sano* in a real sense. The spiritual, mental and physical faculties were so combined in him that in course of evolution he approached the ‘Bodhisatta’ ideal. May his memory be always cherished by the Sinhalese and prove a source of inspiration to posterity.

—*The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon, 1920.*
THE PAṬTHĀNA-PAKARĀṆA AND IMMANUEL KANT

MR. W. T. STACE in his booklet "Buddhism and Western Thought," whilst admitting that "Buddhism philosophically is the greatest of all religions" and "Modern Science and philosophy make ship-wreck of Christianity, but cannot touch Buddhism," makes the strange pronouncement: "Gotama's analysis of the soul is open to philosophic criticism," and in another place: "It stands at the lowest on the plane of Hume." The development of philosophical thought in the West proceeded on theological lines down to the time of David Hume, who, "first" delivered a formidable blow on the animistic position and shattered it to pieces. Mr. Stace thus arrives at the conclusion that the Psychological conclusion reached by Hume was the same as the 'Anattā' teaching of the Buddha. Conceding that the main results of Hume's investigation still remain a lasting factor of Western philosophy, our critic maintains that Hume has been refuted and Kant has improved upon and developed Hume's conclusions. Now, if we take the 'Sutta' exposition in the 'Piṭakas,' Mr. Stace appears to a certain degree to be justified in assuming that the views of Hume coincided with those of the Buddha. Hume's speculations were crude and materialistic—hence easily understood of the man in the street. Likewise the 'Sutta' exposition was intended for popular acceptance. The 'Khandha' analysis of man into groups, as illustrated by the well-known similes of the chariot and the house, which were addressed to the hoi polloi, is a rough and ready confutation of the Ātman doctrine. The learned author asks whether the notes of a musical tune taken separately constitute the tune. The order in which the notes are
played and the relations of time between the different notes make up the tune. "It is the systematic unity of the notes bound into one whole by time-relation which constitute the tune. It is the systematic unity of conscious experiences bound into one whole by the forms of space and time and by the categories (cause and effect, reciprocity, etc.), which constitute the soul. Kant agrees with Hume that the soul is not a 'thing,' it is simply the fact of unity of things. A tune is not a 'thing,' it is a unity of relations among things (sounds)."

Similarly, in the Buddhist simile of the wave, the relations in space and time of the particles of water comprise what Kant calls "the Categorical Unity of Apperception," which, according to him, is only another name for the "soul." Hume either did not know or did not recognise this unity of relations. Hence, Hume is condemned as a materialist. Kant emphasised this unity and is numbered among the "believers." Therefore, on the one hand Kant was right, and on the other Hume and consequently the Buddha, were wrong—an astounding conclusion indeed in view of our critic's previous admission that "Science and Philosophy cannot touch Buddhism."

We are, however, prepared to concede that this contention is justified, if we do not actually possess a fully developed Compendium of Relations in the Seventh Book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, called Paṭṭhāna-Pakaraṇa which, in the words of Mr. Aung, the learned translator of the Abhidhammatthā Saṅgaha, "is essentially the Buddhist philosophy of Relations covering more ground than the Association Philosophy which deals with the association of ideas only." The Paṭṭhāna sets forth all the possible laws of relation obtaining among things; that is, it treats not only of the "related modes of consciousness" to use Manse's descriptive phrase, but also all the modes of Existence in the universe. Western Associationists seem to have been concerned about
the empirical phenomena of accidental suggestions of ideas, in association with the past experience of one or other individual thinker. The relative importance of "The Great Book,"—Mahāpākaraṇa, among the Seven Books of the Abhidhamma may be judged from the Buddhist tradition that all "the six rays of the human aura" were simultaneously emitted from Buddha's body when He expounded the principles of relation. The method of "The Great Book" from, its universality of application has received two epithets—"infinite" (Anantanaya) and "universal" (samantanaya). This book has been likened to a bottomless ocean fathomed only by the Buddha's omniscience. To this we may add another modern illustration—that the Paṭṭhāna and the Buddha's intellect ran in parallels, meeting only in the depths of infinity, even as parallel rays do in distant stars.

Mr. Aung writes in his "Compendium of Philosophy": "Berkley, the greatest idealist of the West, reduced matter to a mere group of qualities and proved (for us Buddhists quite convincingly), that the hypothetical substance or substratum, in which the qualities are supposed to inhere is a metaphysical fiction. But the mind-stuff proved refractory in his logical crucible. Hume, however, was skeptical as to the existence of this very mind-substance for whenever he tried 'to catch himself,' he always 'tumbled on a particular perception.' But both Berkley and Hume were forestalled three and twenty centuries ago by the Buddha who had 'got rid of that shade of a shadow of the substance,' by pushing the Berkleyan arguments a step further to their rigid logical conclusions. If Hume stands refuted to this day (as Mr. Stace has so well shewn in his booklet), it is probably because Humean philosophy does not contain the elaborate 'Laws of Relation' which the Buddha propounded and expounded in the valley of the Ganges two centuries before Aristotle sowed the seed of the
Association Philosophy. The triumphant vindication of Aristotle's claim to be regarded as the earliest expositor of the theory of Association is, therefore, not justified. Had Sir William Hamilton known the existence of a body of the Laws of Relation in the Paṭṭhāna, he would certainly have accorded that honour to the Buddha."

The Paṭṭhāna elaborates twenty-four modes of relation, comprising in the words of Mrs. Rhys Davids, "a system of relations, the analysis, that is to say, of all the types of relations observable between phenomena, . . . and these are formulated with interminable detail." Our philosopher will be interested to know that even the very categories of "cause, effect and reciprocity, etc.," mentioned above by him are numbered among these twenty-four modes of correlation.

Thus, it is quite clear that the Buddha did teach a "unity of relations," but it must be distinctly understood, that this unity is not the same as "the transcendental unity" upheld by Kant. In fact, Kant was wedded to the "transcendental," for Mr. Stace himself says: "Kant divided the universe into two parts—phenomenal existence and what he called the thing in itself—the mysterious unknowable entity which is not in the plane of phenomenal existence. Our author grants that, "this conception, obviously a shift and containing within itself a host of contradictions, could not satisfy Western thinkers" and, in another place, that, "at this point Kant becomes in the highest degree obscure." It is, therefore, useless to pursue the enquiry further, as however Mr. Stace has done, to the cloud-land of "transcendental idealism," on the lines of "the speculations of Fichte and Hegel," which he himself curiously enough admits "are mere speculations."

As has been well said, it is futile to attempt to classify Buddhist philosophy, as this "ism" or that "ism." The Dhamma stands by itself aloof from the sixty-two heresies
(diṭṭhi) detailed in the Brahmajāla Sutta. It is the middle-path (Majjhima-paṭipadā) of practice between sensualism and asceticism, and as philosophy it is removed from both materialism and idealism. Nibbāna is neither Existence (bhava) nor Annihilation (vibhava). The Dhamma is a thing unique. It is nothing but itself, i.e. the teaching of Actuality—(Yathābhūtañāṇa), in a word: 'Truth.

Let our learned critics try ever so much to grip it tight in the fist of their theories (diṭṭhīs), it simply slips through their fingers. Sooth to say: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

—you Points of Buddhism, January, 1921.
A MODERN CRITIC OF THE DHAMMA

M R. W. T. STACE, in his brilliant treatise "Buddhism and Western Thought," has rendered a signal service to both Buddhism and European Philosophy. It is, indeed, a rare treat to read such vigorous thought expressed with such refreshing candour, in pellucid English. The work is iconoclastic to a degree. He has pulled down right and left even at the risk of burying himself in the debris. He has completely demolished that poor thing Christianity in rather unceremonious fashion. "Christianity is no longer extant... It died nearly two thousand years ago," says Mr. Stace, but concludes with a strange inconsistency, "Buddhism pales as a religion before Christianity"—a non-existent thing. This is the result of attempting epigrammatic pronouncements of the ex-cathedra type, in which our learned author seems to indulge a little too frequently.

He has traced the evolution of philosophical culture and religious thought which in Europe had proceeded on parallel lines in contra-distinction to the East, where religion and philosophy always formed one indissoluble whole. He candidly admits that: "In the East religion and philosophy are one and the same thing. In the West they are divorced from each other. The whole of Buddhist philosophy is contained in Buddhism, but almost the whole of Western philosophy lies outside Christian theology. Western philosophy satisfies the head and not the heart. Western culture is thus split up and divided against itself." Frank, but damaging admissions, indeed.

He thus made it clear that in the West, owing to these reasons, philosophy had no connection with religion. In the East philosophy was always the helpmeet of religion.
Philosophy supplied the *raison d'être* of religious doctrine and formed its rational basis and complete explanation. Philosophy was cultivated in Europe as an aesthetic accomplishment, or, in plain English, as a hobby. The mechanical inventions and discoveries of physical science had far-reaching consequences on material progress. There was no equivalent service rendered by philosophy to religion, ethics or civilisation. This was in sharp contrast to the conditions in the East, where "Religion and philosophy being one and the same thing, Oriental Culture formed one harmonious whole."

It, therefore, followed, Mr. Stace argues, that in Europe philosophy grew only on the soil of empiricism and rationalism. In other words, it appealed to reason and reason only. But religion was more a matter of the heart, than of the head. It is not the head that requires religion but the heart. In the East religion and philosophy being one and the same, philosophy was therefore as much a matter of the heart as of the head.

This is the reason for Mr. Stace's conclusion: "Its (philosophy's) abstruseness, its cold rational attitude, renders it the plaything of a few recluses, takes it out of the human world and tends to give it a merely academic air. To the man in the street it is simply non-existent. It has no influence on the life of men and women, no message for the common people, to whom it seems cold and bloodless." No wonder the Buddhist calls Western philosophy "an insipid thing"—to use our critic's own words. "But in the East" he continues, "philosophy is instinct with life, with beauty, with religious feeling, so that it influences national life." But Western philosophy is theoretical only. The sharp contrast has never been so admirably expressed to the evident discredit of Western culture.
I ask in all seriousness cuì bono? Our scholarly critic should learn a lesson in modesty after this catastrophic confession. Are we unfair in concluding that European philosophy is nothing more than mental gymnastics and intellectual jugglery? The Oriental will rather admire the athletic feats of a Sandow or a Carpentier, than European metaphysics, for there is indeed much practical use in the former and admittedly none in the latter.

Be slow therefore to hurl reproaches at the Eastern "heathen"! Where is the much-vaunted practical good sense of the European as opposed to the dreamy fancies of the unpractical Indian?

What further advantage in pursuing the comparison? But our philosopher has many entertaining things to tell us in developing his Comparative Study. Let us try and follow him.

He describes the evolution of the soul-theory from the Scotch Materialist Hume, evidently ignoring the whole of the philosophy before that time as animistic. Hume's conclusion and even his methods of argument seem so strangely similar to Buddha's Anattā teaching that Mr. Stace is led to think that the developments of philosophical thought since Hume were an advance on the Buddha's conception of the "soul." He is at pains to elaborate Kant's "improvements" on Hume's position, although he concedes "that in a sense Hume's doctrine has never been overthrown and remains a component part of philosophy today," Kant seriously challenged Hume's position, therefore, by implication the Buddha's teaching of Anattā. The theory of the "transcendental unity of relations" reached by Kant is explained with reference to a tune, the Buddhist simile of a wave, and the sphericity of a ball. The argument of Hume was that there remained no soul-entity when man was analysed, just as there was no substratum left when the pieces of a chariot were taken apart. But Kant's conclusion was that the
soul was, as Hume says, "not a thing, it is simply the fact of the unity of things, it is a unity of 'relations' among things"—Mr. Stace's conclusion that this idea is an advance on Buddha's teaching would never have been made had he known that the last and the "Great Book" of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, called "Paṭṭhāna-Pakaraṇa," contained a treatise on the Laws of Relation.

Buddhaghosa argues in "Visuddhi Magga" (Chap. 18): "Just as the word "chariot" is but a mode of expression for axle, wheels, chariot-body, pole etc., placed in a certain relation to each other, in exactly the same way attā is only a mode of expression of the attachment groups; but when we come to examine the elements of being, we discover in the absolute sense there is no living entity there to form a basis for such figments as "I am" or "I". In other words that 'in the absolute sense there is only name and form.' The insight of him who perceives this is called knowledge of the truth."

Our author admits that Kant, however, from this point became vague and obscure. But Dr. Paul Carus states: "Kant did not exactly deny the separate existence of an ego. Theoretically he rejected the existence of an ego-soul, but for the sake of morality he retained it as a postulate of practical reason."

Fichte and Hegel carried the idea of an ideal or transcendentental unity a step further by conceiving this 'unity' which they called the 'soul' as not individual, but a universal ego, or the absolute. This ego was not individual and had no existence but was only an "idea." Nevertheless, it was the supreme and only reality. Everything that exists is not real. The universal ego only was real and that has no existence. "This is the beginning of wisdom," continues Mr. Stace, "and the veritable pons asinorum of Western philosophy."
This universal ego or the absolute, though not existing, is at the same time the supreme reality. This idea is only interesting as a parallelism to the Nibbāna-concept, but seen through a glass, darkly.

The Buddha says in Udāna, (viii, 3): "There is something not born, not caused, not made, not formed. If there were not this, there would be no escape from the born, the originated, the made, the formed." But Mr. Stace is in the end obliged to make the significant admission: "The speculations of Kant and Hegel are simply speculations. The idea that by means of them men could be shown the way to the extinction of evil or of suffering never even occurred to their authors."

This is the climax of our critic's formidable contention: That all the conjectures of Western philosophers were only a puppet-show of views (speculations) barren of practical good.

It, therefore, behoves our critic to observe a little diffidence when he attacks a philosopher who has been adored for 25 centuries by a majority of the human race as the Omniscient One and who, even according to Mr. Stace, formulated a system of Psychological Ethics culminating in the sublime idea of Nibbāna—the Lokuttara. He must now admit that no other teacher or philosopher ever ventured even to propound a complete scheme of salvation based on an ethical-philosophical basis such as the Dhamma.

Let me hark back. Mr. Stace has all along in the course of his argument taken for granted that Western philosophy has always proceeded only by "the exercise of reason, exclusive of emotion"—as distinguished from the methods of Eastern philosophers who had recourse to Intuition as well as Reason. In fact, he has become somewhat over-bearing, apparently owing to confidence in the soundness of his
position. But I beg leave to think that here he has overstated his case, for he has forgotten his former admission about "the speculations of Kant and Hegel." Why does he call their conclusions "speculations" if they were the results of pure logical reasoning alone? Nay, the fact is that "Intuition" has played a great part in the evolution of Philosophy, as well as the physical sciences, indeed a part almost equal in value to the part played by Reason and Experiment.

Dr. Dahlke has explained with wonderful felicity the function of Intuition in the domain of Science: He says "Galileo's law of falling bodies, the Newtonian law of Gravitation, Robert Mayer's law of the conservation of Energy are all intuitions. But many another flash of insight to which Science has denied the status of legitimate child, contemning them, instead, for bastards, are like intuitions such as the phrenology of Gall, Hahnemann's homoeopathy and many others. All these intuitions have this in common that they have not been abstracted from a duly defined number of experiments. They are each an experience in the domain of cognition that has come to pass by reason of a single impulse." Dr. Dahlke proceeds: "Such an intuition is the Buddha-thought also. The sight of an old man, a sick person, a corpse, gave rise in Siddhattha to the impulsion which drove him forth, eventuating finally the ripe fruit of the Buddha-teaching. Though I lay the Buddha-teaching before the ablest scientific thinker that ever lived, it must always remain for him an entirely insipid thing if his intellectual faculty is not in such a condition as to vibrate in harmony with it, reach to the 'provocation' offered, work it up, assimilate it." No wonder that our learned critic approaching the subject, as Mrs. Rhys Davids aptly puts it, "wearing the spectacles of our own Greek tradition," sees it all wrong with regard to Buddhism.
Dr. Dahlke continues: "Strictly speaking, no intuition whether pertaining to the Buddha or to science can be proven. All so-called proofs, as is most clearly to be seen in the case of the scientific proof of the law of the conservation of energy, are speculations. The value of an intuition admits of being measured only by its usefulness as a working hypothesis."

Is our critic, therefore, justified in his severe strictures, when he says: "In the East a metaphor is held to be the solution of a problem. In the West nothing excites the philosopher's anger more than the man who gets over a difficulty in thought by a metaphor, instead of giving a bold, hard, actual, logical reason?"

In the first place, let me submit to our critic that in the East nothing can excite a "philosopher's anger." This weakness is a peculiar characteristic of Western philosophers, quite in keeping with the purely "secular" nature of their philosophy. Let me also add the somewhat humorous remarks of Dr. Dahlke: "Science conceals within herself a domain in regard to which it is equal with us all in regard to the sexual commerce of daily life. We are proud of our children but are shame-faced over the act that has brought them into the world. Even so is it with science in respect of those of her children that have not originated homunculi in the reagent tube, but have really been forgotten—her intuitions." So Mr. Stace need no longer be ashamed to admit that Western philosophical speculations are bastard children as distinguished from the legitimate facts of physical science. He can no longer deny the claims of the Intuitive method of the Eastern thinker, specially because he admits the practical benefits of Eastern philosophy in contrast to the futility of Western philosophy.
This conclusion becomes of great value when we proceed to examine the fifth chapter of Mr. Stace’s book on his “Difficulties in Buddhism.” I say they are his “difficulties” advisedly, because they do not really exist for the Buddhists.

As Mrs. Rhys Davids says: “The perspective of the Western thinker is that of the Greek tradition.” Until Mr. Stace changes his angle of vision he will never “see things in themselves as they really are,” in Mathew Arnold’s happy phrase. Notwithstanding the Herculean efforts of our critic to shake them off, I fear he still continues to be influenced by the “animistic beliefs,” which are hereditary in every Western-born. That is how he has come to a complete dead-stop on the question of moral responsibility in the absence of a soul. He does not grasp it—all the time he is “thinking of something else.” If one has once actually divested himself of the notion of “personal identity,” which the teaching of anattā involves, why bother about the identity of the person who is rewarded by his good deeds and punished for his bad deeds? What, then, becomes of the grandiloquent idea of Western moralists that “virtue is its own reward”? Advanced moralists maintain that virtue lies in altruism regardless of consequences. The good deed loses in value when the doer calculates on the reward. Try and realise the sweet simplicity of the Dhammapada verse:—“I have sons, I have wealth, thus the fool worries; when you have no ‘I,’ how can you have sons, or wealth?”

The sure and certain philosophical basis for morality is the absence of this I; where there is the idea of self, virtue cannot exist. Then, let there be a truce to all these fine speculations as to personal identity and moral responsibility, but whoever wishes to pursue them can find numberless similes, metaphors and illustrations in the Milinda-Pañha, Visuddhimagga and Kathā-Vatthu-Pakaraṇa.
The second difficulty of our critic is totally due to a misconception which is simply surprising in a scholar of Mr. Stace’s attainments.

But I am content to leave this and his other difficulties to the revered Thero Silācāra, whose magnificent reply to the penultimate chapter of Mr. Stace’s book, together with an instructive article on “Paṭṭhāna Pakaraṇa and Kant” has been just published by “The Times of Ceylon Company.”
ANATTĀ: THE CRUX OF BUDDHISM

Sabbe Dhammā ANATTĀ—Dhammapada

THE Tathāgata has summed up the whole of His teaching in three words consisting of eighteen letters: Anicca, Dukkha and Anattā. The doctrines of Anicca and Dukkha are also the common property of some of the other religions, but the profound Truth of Anattā is the specific teaching of Buddhism alone.

The cardinal tenets of God and Soul form the basic concepts of all the great religions of the world, save and except Buddhism. All other religions are attavādī (animistic), whereas Buddhism only is Anattavādī. God and Soul, in the last analysis, are counterparts of one and the same thing. Soul is an emanation of God.

If Buddhism is true in its psychology, it logically follows that all the other religions are wrong; and the converse proposition is equally true. It is, therefore, not a matter of surprise that even eminent scholars, not to mention the easy-chair critics, have gone completely astray on the Buddhist idea of no-soul. A recent critic made the bold assertion: “Thus, after all, the appeal to rationalism breaks down at the most essential point of the impermanence of personality. Retribution in the proper sense of the word is excluded; and with it goes overboard moral responsibility on which is based the whole fabric of social morality.” He, thus, concludes that the doctrine of No-Soul is an egregious error, and the Dhamma, therefore, deserves to be relegated to the limbo of exploded superstitions. This is indeed a severe indictment to make of a Teacher, who, according to Professor Huxley, saw deeper and reached higher than even Berkeley, the greatest of all Western idealists. Let us, therefore, carefully examine the impeachment.

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The supreme ethical significance of the Anattā teaching turns upon the question whether there can be moral responsibility without personal identity. If there is no continuity of consciousness between the present and the future life, there can be no moral responsibility. Such is the objection of another critic, who thinks that the dilemma is inescapable. In short, the animist maintains that unless a soul passes, there can be no reward and punishment at all. But, the Buddhist teaching is: Naca so naca aṁño—not he, yet not another. So, Buddhism by keeping to the golden mean affirms identity of a sort, but not in the absolute sense of the animist.

Identity is a static idea and, strictly speaking, cannot apply to life or biological values. One can correctly envisage life and its functions only from the dynamic viewpoint. Mathematics, jurisprudence and the physical sciences deal in identities but not the sciences of ethics and psychology. In Buddhist psychology both the subject and the object are transitory; only the inter-relation between them remains constant. This constancy of relations, which is called by some "consciousness," gives rise to the false animistic notion of personal identity. "Because of the continuity of temporary selves or successive states of consciousness, man blinded by nescience (Avijjā) mistakes similarity for identity, and takes this river of life for an abiding soul, even as he thinks the river of yesterday identical with that of to-day."

Life, according to Abhidhamma, is like the current of a river—Nādi soto viya or the flame of a lamp (ḍīpaṭijālā viya). It is a conclusion of modern Science that the cells of the human body undergo constant change, so much so that every particle of the body of a boy of ten becomes completely transformed and gradually replaced in that of the youth of eighteen. This doctrine was taught by the Buddha twenty-five centuries ago. The ceaseless flux of things applies equally to mind and body, nāma as well as rūpa. In the former, the flow is
even more rapid than in the latter and, therefore, it is truer to seek of the body as a permanent thing, attā, than of the mind. Existence indeed is like a river current, which, though it forms a seeming identity, does not remain the same for two successive moments—even as the river of to-day does not contain a single drop of water which formed it yesterday.

According to Abhidhamma: when the mind is thought-free, it is said to be in a state of bhavāṅga (sub-consciousness) like dreamless sleep. This state or life continuum is comparable to the current of a stream. In a thought-process of maximum duration which consists of seventeen thought-moments, the first is bhavāṅga. When this current is opposed by an obstacle (ālambana) from within or without through the sense doors, a vibration sets in; and this thought-vibration is called 'bhavāṅga całana' (the perturbation of bhavāṅga) which is followed by the next thought, which causes a break in the current—'bhavāṅga upaccheda' (the cutting-off of bhavāṅga). There then arises 'pañcadvārā vajjanā'—adverting to the sense-doors; next, cakkhu (or other) viññāna, as the case may be. The consciousness now gets hold (sampaticchāna) of the object (ārammaṇa), examines it (santīraṇa) and determines its nature and properties (votthappana).

Up to this point the process is purely mechanical and is without any ethical value. Then come seven 'javanās,' cognition-thoughts, followed by two 'tadārammaṇās,' retentive-thoughts. The javanās constitute Karma-thoughts, and the seventh javana is the rebirth-producing thought. The first javana causes 'dīśha-dhamma-vedaniya-kamma (action-results in this present lifetime); the seventh javana originates upapajja-vedaniya-kamma (action-results in the next); while the intermediate javanās cause aparāpāriya-vedaniya-kamma (action-results in any life after the next or failing this, not at all). Such is a complete normal process of thought of maximum length, atimahantārammaṇa. There
is a juxtaposition of these thoughts or states of consciousness, but never a superposition of such states throughout a lifetime, or even from one lifetime to another.

According to Abhidhamma, the last or death-thought and the first or conception-thought in all puthujjanā always occur among the intermediate thought-moments of a single process of thought. In the case of Arahats the dying-thought is always the last one of a process. Such a process of seventeen thought-movements, is said to be one process, because it was set in motion by one sense-object (ārammaṇa). Thus it is said that a material phenomenon lasts seventeen thought-moments, and consequently the life-term of matter is the same period.

The matter of utmost significance here is the strange fact that death and re-birth take place within the duration of one single process of thought. There is, therefore, no break in the succession of thoughts between death and conception, nor any interval between them.

But it may be asked: how is Memory possible if no entity passes from one thought to the next? For a full and complete answer to this—the crux of Buddhism—we must look to the "Paṭṭhāna-mahā-pākaraṇa" for an answer. This Book, appropriately called the "Great Book" of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, contains twenty-four modes of Relation, which is more comprehensive than, and transcends, the Association Philosophy of the West, which deals with the relations of Ideas only, whereas the paṭṭhāna comprises the Relations between all phenomena.

Each thought is related to the one next to it, both before and after, in at least four of these twenty-four ways. These four relations (paccayā) are proximity (anāntara), contiguity (samanāntara), absence (nāthi) and abeyance (avigata). Each thought, as it passes, gives service to the next or gives up the whole of its energy (Paccaya-satti) to its successor. Thus, each successor has all the potentialities of its predecessors.
'Therefore, the mental principle of cognition or perception (sañña) in each mental state of consciousness, with all its heritage of the past, is a re-cognising in the image reproduced the idea of the original object revived by the very marks which were observed by its predecessors in a certain reflection.'*

Let us consider a modern simile. If we place a number of billiard-balls touching one another in a row and slowly strike the last ball of one end, what will happen? The ball at the other end will move off. This is due to the transmission of the force of impact through the balls and may be called, heredity of energy. In similar wise, there is no interval between the last thought of the dying man and the first thought of the new person that is conceived. The succession of thoughts is like the billiard-balls placed in juxtaposition. The sum-total of the forces, activities, and faculties of a man (nāma-dhammā) re-individualizes itself as another personality. The succession of thoughts thus remains unbroken at death.

In Buddhist parlance, the psychic activities of a being are his Kamma. It is Kamma that reincarnates. The will has creative power; cetanāham bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi. The reality consists in Kamma, not in the physical identity as maintained by the attavādi.

The Annattā teaching has a profound ethical value. So long as man believes in a soul-entity how can he get rid of selfishness? It is an impossibility. Whoever asserts such a proposition commits an outrage on sane thought. Everything becomes reduced to his ego-centric system, and every

* That brilliant scholar, Dr. Evans-Wentz, to whom Ceylon is indebted for a series of illuminating expositions of Rebirth, traces to memory the solution of the difficulty in Buddhism. It will be of absorbing interest to know how the learned Doctor solves the sphinx-riddle—how Rebirth is possible in the face of Anattā. Unfortunately for us, this puzzle he does not unravel, but takes for granted that the question is met by postulating Memory. Is not this a petiole principi
thought becomes subservient to his self. As the Buddha says: "Where self is, virtue cannot exist." Banish the self-idea and altruism is replaced on its proper ethical basis. Even as in the domain of Astronomy the heliocentric system has supplanted the now exploded geocentric theory, the teaching of "No-Soul," or the new psychology, has overthrown the ego-centric system of the attavādi.

The anattavādi alone can thus realise the full significance of all life. Once grasp this sublime idea, what folly than to steal one's neighbour's purse or to kill his brother-man, for he thus commits these offences against him-self?

Strange it is, yet true, that this glorious and noble outlook on life and its problems receives wonderful corroboration from the researches of the modern Western Psychologists. The recent tendency in philosophical thought has been so marked that modern psychology is nicknamed, "psychology without a psyche (Soul)." Says W. S. Lilly, the great Roman Catholic Author: "The existence of the immortal in man is becoming increasingly discredited under the influence of the dominant schools of modern thought. The scientists whom the XIXth century heard most gladly have been much more affirmative in negation. The so-called 'Soul' they insist is a bundle of sensations, emotions, sentiments, all relating to the physical experiences of the race and the individual." Wundt, the eminent psychologist, in his well-known work, tells us: "Psychology proves that not only our sense-perception, but the memorial images depend for their origins upon the functionings of the organs of sense and movement," and holds that a "continuance of this sensuous consciousness must appear irreconcilable with the facts of experience." Professor James, who is even more modern than Wundt, accounts the term "Soul" a mere figure of speech to which no reality corresponds. "The word," he insists, "explains nothing and guarantees nothing; its successive thoughts are the only intelligible things about it;
and definitely to ascertain the correlation of these with brain processes is as much as psychology can empirically do." Western science forsooth can do nothing more, but Eastern sages by psychical exercises can so develop the clairvoyant faculty (divine eye) that they can look back into the past lives.

All religious teachers placed the Sumnum Bonum or Salvation in eternal existence. The Tathāgata alone posited the highest good in a hypercosmic (lokuttara) state. As an eminent thinker puts it: "Thus where all the other teachers placed plus signs ('willing'), they failed to solve the sum of life, for there was left over the ever-recurrent remainder. The Buddha alone placed a minus sign ('non-willing') and the whole sum was thus resolved without a remainder, by substituting non-willing for willing; this remainder is the irreducible factor—God or Soul. The admission of this factor, far from solving, only complicates the problem, and makes it impossible of a solution."

Anattā is therefore the central pivot on which the whole of the Buddha’s philosophy turns. Even as all sea-water has the same taste of salt, so if we take any part of the Dhamma, or for the matter of that, any phase of life in a Buddhist country, we shall find it saturated with the blessedness of its saving grace.

—The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon, 1922.
THE CAUSAL FORMULA IN TERMS OF HAPPINESS

Buddhism has been characterised by some Western critics with an imperfect understanding of the Dhamma as a system of glorified pessimism. This serious misconception has gained currency in the West in a great measure owing to the misapprehensions of the German philosopher Schopenhauer, who in an egotistical way extolled Buddhism ranking it patronisingly as only second to his own systems of pessimism. Apart from this circumstance, however, there are critics who still maintain that, because the ultimate spiritual good of all other religions is eternal life in heaven and the summum bonum in Buddhism is a clear negation of individual existence, Buddhist Nibbāna is annihilation, and hence the Dhamma is a system of pessimism. Such people ignore the significant fact (when dealing with all Buddhist teachings one should always keep it in mind) that the doctrine of the golden mean, Majjhima paṭippadā, applies to the Nibbāna doctrine, quite as much as it does to each and every other tenet of the Dhamma.

"If any teach Nirvāna is to live
Say unto such they err.
If any say Nirvāna is to die
Say unto such they lie."

Such is Sir Edwin Arnold’s severe admonition. Nibbāna is, in short, the mean between individualised existence and total annihilation. It is not a mere concept, Paññatti, like space or time, but a vatthu or basic element—hence the expression Nibbāna-dhātu. Nibbāna is an object, ārammanā of the transcendent, lokuttara mind, and can be experienced
here and in this life, diṭṭhadhammasukhavicārena. One thing only we can however predicate of Nibbāna; in the words of the Venerable Nāgasena: “Nibbāna is.”

The all-important question, which every earnest seeker after truth has to address himself early in his quest, is whether in seeking an escape from this world of sorrow he can ever find such escape in heavenly life or not. All the religions start with this one great postulate: that sorrow is a thing given. Perhaps Buddhism and Vedantism lay emphasis on sorrow more than other systems of religion. But it is, nevertheless, the raison d’être, from which all religions derive their motive and find their justification. But for sorrow, religion has no meaning, has no message for humanity.

The Master has therefore expounded, in His well-known formula of Causal genesis, His entological philosophy with marvellous precision and profound insight. The Paṭicca-Samuppāda is an elucidation of the circle of births, deaths and rebirths—Sansāra-Vatṭa. Most Buddhists are familiar with the twelve links of the chain, and this knowledge is indeed an essential thing, as it confers the hall-mark of Sammādiṭṭhi. The first two Holy Truths of Sorrow and Sorrow’s Cause are explained by this chain of twelve nidānas, links. But the fact that the Tipiṭaka in one solitary place (of course, so far as we know) has laid down twelve additional nidānas which deal with the two remaining Holy Truths of Sorrow’s Ceasing and the Way thereto in continuation of the same causal series, has mirabile dictu not yet received the attention nor aroused the interest of the student of Buddhism, which the importance of the matter rightly deserves.

In the Saṃyutta Nikāya (Vol. 2, of Mrs. Rhys Davids’ Translation), we find a causal Formula of Twenty-four nidānas beginning with Avijjā paccayā Saṅkhārā and going down to Bhava paccayā jāti, Jāti paccayā Jarā Maraṇa, Dukkha, etc.; and the additional twelve links are continued thus: Dukkhaupanisā Saddhā, Saddhāupanisā Pāmojja, Pāmojjāupanisā Pūtī, Pūtīupanisā Passadhi, Passanidhiupanisā
Sukham, Sukha upanisā Samādhi, Samādhi upanisā Yathābhūta Nānadassanaṁ, yathābhūtānānadassanaupanisā Nibbidā, Nibbidā upanisā Virāgo, Virāga upanisā Vinutti, Vinmutti upanisā Khaya-Ñāṇam, Khayañāna upanisā Āsavakkhayam.

In the Paṭṭhāna Mahā pakaraṇa are to be found 24 Modes of Relation, which are more comprehensive, profound and far-reaching than anything found elsewhere on the subject in any known system of philosophy. The first of these 24 Relations is Hetu Paccayā—the causal relation. This is the Paccayā that applies to Paṭiccasamuppāda. And upanisā-paccayā is also one of these 24 modes of Relation, and upanisā means Causal Association. It is upanisā-paccaya that comes into play in connection with this complementary series of 12 additional links.

Mrs. Rhys Davids writes of this Causal Chain: “Yet more refreshing is it to find that oasis on page 26, where a causal sequence of joy and happiness is, for this once only, harnessed to the scheme! How might it not have altered the whole face of Buddhism to the West if that sequence had been made the illustration of the causal law. And how true! Yet, how it is hidden away in this book! How many students of Buddhism have ever seen it?... The discovery of the statement was to the writer, some 20 years ago (1902) like a flash of sunshine in a dark room.” Even as Paṭiccasamuppāda is a description of individual existence in a round of births and deaths, this complementary series of twelve is an explanation of how a being gains emancipation from Samsāra by attaining Nibbāna. If the series of twelve is an elucidation in terms of sorrow, the second series is indeed and exposition in terms of happiness.

Mrs. Rhys Davids’ words, therefore, apply here in their full force and significance. Aviṣṇa causes Sankhāra, but Saddhā arises in association with Dukkha. It will be at once noted that the words are Paccaya in the one series and Upanisā in the other series; Aviṣṇa, so to say, gives rise
to \textit{San\k kārā} by way of cause but \textit{Dukkha} does not so produce \textit{Saddhā}; by association with \textit{Dukkha}, \textit{Saddhā} comes into being. Here we are confronted with a difficult problem. Once, however, a solution to this crucial question is found, the rest of the links fall into line and can be easily explained. Now let us meditate for a few minutes on this important problem. How does \textit{Saddhā} arise in causal association with \textit{Dukkha}? That is the question. It will be noted at once that \textit{Dukkha} and \textit{Saddhā} are as the poles apart. How then is it possible that Dukkha will produce something that is diametrically opposed to itself? There is absolutely nothing in common between the two things. Yet \textit{Dukkhaupanisā Saddhā}. Let us, however, consider the matter patiently in this light and we may get a glimpse of its explanation.

\textit{Dukkha} (sorrow) is a deep-seated disease to which all flesh is heir, all life is subject. The reign of \textit{Dukkha} is mightier than the power of all empires and extends from the lowest hell to the highest heaven.

Inasmuch as there is this dire disease in the world, there are also many physicians and as many supposed remedies for its cure. The initial difficulty is that a particular person should realise that he is actually ill and suffering from this great malady of \textit{Dukkha}, in a word, that he is a patient. Some will vehemently repudiate this idea, insisting that they are hale and healthy. These so-called optimists will never get a chance, for they are beyond redemption. It may well be that these megalomaniacs will never give a thought to the trouble and will perish without ever making the discovery at all. Some, more fortunate perhaps, may realise that they are stricken with the disease, when it is only too late and the disease has so far developed that it is then beyond all hope of treatment and recovery. Such \textit{soi disant} optimists, who make-believe that they are impervious to the ailment, will consequently enjoy the pleasures of life; so they eat drink and dance, for to-morrow they die. Were the patient
ever to find a cure, he must, in the first place, realise beyond any doubt that he is really ill and stricken down by this dire disease of sorrow. Then indeed he is sure to search for a physician.

Now, the next great difficulty is to find the right doctor, the greatest specialist that can be found. There are and have been doctors and doctors, some with wonderfully high qualifications and others, of necessity, mere quacks and imposters. Who are really the expert physicians? This is the all important question that the patient must next put to himself. However important may be the the advice and suggestion of friends and well-wishers, this is a matter which in the end the patient must decide for himself. He should inquire whether there have been instances of any cures. If so, who is the doctor?

Now, the range of his choice is luckily quite a small one, for there have been only three physicians who have actually prescribed a treatment which can be said to be of universal application. These are, to mention them in the order of time, Buddha, Christ and Mohammed. These are the only three doctors of world-wide reputation. There have been lesser lights in the profession, but their treatment and careers have been confined to certain tribes, peoples and races, and never intended to be of general benefit to humanity. These were Krishna, Zoroaster, Moses, Confucius, Laotze, etc. It is unnecessary to enumerate the quacks who have imposed upon suffering humanity for countless ages and caused endless misery.

Now, the simplest and most effective way to choose the proper doctor is to consider whether he has rightly diagnosed the cause of the disease. Have any of these physicians, Buddha, Christ and Mohammed, rightly diagnosed this particular case? Christ and Mohammed, quite in keeping with their knowledge and teaching, have assigned the cause of the disease to an invisible, mysterious and supernatural
agency, namely God whereas the Buddha, on the other hand, has traced the cause to a natural, simple and clear cause—Craving (*Taṇhā*), in the patient himself. In short, the Buddha, the scientist *par excellence*, has discovered a physiological cause for the disease, whereas the other two doctors, who combine with their knowledge of therapeutics the functions of the sorcerer and the thaumaturgist, have assigned an external agency as their diagnosis. It is, therefore, quite clear that the treatment of the former will necessarily be strictly confined to a course of pure medical treatment whereas the latter must have recourse to prayers, supplications, oblations, exorcisms and sacrifices. Now, the patient, if he is really one who has out-grown the primitive stage which is the childhood of the human race, will naturally prefer the physician who prescribes a scientific course of treatment. But if the patient happens to be one who has not yet become an adult among religious people and is still in the swaddling clothes of infancy, he is sure to choose the treatment of the thaumaturgists and the sorcerers.

The adult among religious men will ask himself: is it possible that the goal of an eternal heavenly life held out by Christ and Mohammed, which is to be attained by faith and grace, prayer, forgiveness, atonement, sacraments, etc., can be anything more than a mere chimera? Is it not more reasonable to conclude that no eternal individual existence is possible which is not also associated with Sorrow? And that it is only by the cessation of the craving for sensual pleasures and for continued existence that true and lasting happiness can be achieved? When he comes by this decision, he at once places his confidence in the Physician who has in his opinion made the correct diagnosis of his ailment and thus begets *Saddhā* in Him. Therefore, *Dukkhaupanisā Saddhā*.

Once the patient has selected the right Doctor, accepts his prescription and starts on the course of treatment, he attains *Pāmojjām*,—satisfaction or joy. When he follows the
treatment a step further, he begets Piti—rapture. As he obtains relief from the treatment he passes from Piti to Passaddhi—serenity. He now feels more secure and has developed balance of mind—Passadhi which leads to Sukham—happiness; and once the patient is established in Sukha he easily attains Samadhi—self-concentration. Concentration enables the yogavacara (which literally means the patient undergoing the practice) to achieve the insight called Yathabhuta-nāṇa-dassana—seeing things as they really are. Now, we have arrived at a very important step in this series, expressed in terms of happiness. Let us ask ourselves: what is this “seeing things as they really are”? It is simply to see and realise everything in terms of the three signata of Anicca, Dukkha and Anattā—Transcieny, Sorrow and Insustantiality. Man’s mind may be compared to a pot of boiling water, which is in a state of great agitation. When the water cools down a little, it is like the mind in a state of Pānojja. When the water has cooled considerably, it is similar to the condition of Piti. Passaddhi may be compared to the water when it is completely cooled down. When the water is disturbed and agitated, it is mixed up with all kinds of impurities and other particles of matter. When it cools and settles down, it resumes its original clearness with all the sediment subsided at the bottom of the pot. When the water is thus reduced to a condition of serenity, peace and tranquillity, it clearly exhibits what is within the pot and easily reflects external objects. Thus the yogavacara, who has developed Passadhi, Sukha and Samadhi, will clearly see life and all its problems in their true perspective and, therefore, knows and sees rightly (Yathā-bhūta-nāṇa-dassana). If one places a straight pole in disturbed water, the pole will appear to be crooked, but when the water subsides and is reduced to quietude, the pole will be seen straight even as it really is. When one sees life as it really is, i.e. in the light of the three characteristics of Anicca, Dukkha and Anattā, one will be at once repelled by and disgusted with
life and its attendant evils. He thus develops *Nibbidā*—repulsion. Then he at once seeks to detach himself from the allurements of life’s pleasures; this is *Virāga*—passionlessness. *Virāga* leads naturally to *Vimutti*—emancipation. Emancipation or liberation paves the way to the knowledge of the extinction (*khaye ṅāṇa*) of the *Āsavā*. This knowledge logically results in the last link of the series, *āsāvakkhayam*—destruction of the intoxicants. The glorious deed is done: *Kataṁ Karanīyaṁ*.

The Master then illustrated this Causal Formula by this simile:

"Just as when, brethren, on some hill-top rain is falling in thick drops, that water, coursing according to the slope, fills the hill-side clefts and chasms and gullies; these, being filled up, fill the tarns; these, being filled up, fill the lakes; these, being filled up, fill the rivers; and the rivers, being filled up, fill the sea, the ocean—even so, brethren, where causal association of activities with ignorance etc., etc., of sorrow with birth, of faith with sorrow, of joy with faith, of rapture with joy, of serenity with rapture, of happiness with serenity, of concentration with happiness, of the knowledge and vision of things as they really are, of passionlessness with repulsion, of liberation with passionlessness, of knowledge about extinction (of intoxicants) with liberation."

This complementary series of twelve additional *nidānas* or factors is indeed rightly characterised as the Causal Formula in terms of Happiness. *Imāpaṭipatti Nibbānassa paccayo hotu*

—The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon, 1924.
KESI—THE HORSE-TRAINER

(Translated from the Pāli of the Aṅguttara-Nikāya.)

Once, a horse-trainer, (named) Kesi*, drew near to where the Exalted One was. Having come, he made obeisance to the Exalted One and took a seat at one side. To the horse-trainer Kesi, so seated, at one side, the Exalted One spoke thus:—

"Indeed, Kesi, you are a skilled horse-trainer. Kesi, how do you then train a horse that is to be tamed?"

"Indeed, Lord, I train a horse that is to be tamed by gentleness, I train by severity, and I train both by gentleness and severity."

"Then, Kesi, if the horse does not yield to your training, either by gentleness or by severity or by both gentleness and severity, what do you do to him?"

"Then, Lord, if the horse does not yield to my training, either by gentleness or by severity, Lord, I destroy him. What is the reason? Lest it be a reproach unto the lineage of my teacher. Lord, the Exalted One is the peerless trainer of humans to be tamed. Lord, how then does the Exalted One train the human that is to be tamed?"

"I also, Kesi, train the human by gentleness, I train by severity and I train by both gentleness and severity. Kesi, this is how (it is done) by gentleness: 'Thus is good done by body and thus is the fruit of such deed; thus is good done by word and thus is the fruit of such good; thus is good done by thought and thus is the fruit of such good; thus are the devas and thus are men.'

* An appropriate name, indeed, for a horse trainer—'Man with a mane.'
"Kesi, this is how (it is done) by severity: 'Thus is bodily evil, thus is the fruit of bodily evil; thus is evil done by word and thus is the fruit of such evil; thus is evil done by thought and thus is the fruit of such evil; thus is purgatory, thus is re-birth into animal life and thus is the spirit-world of the earth-bound.'

"Kesi, this is how it is done by both gentleness and severity: . . ." (Repeat the same as above.)

"Then, Lord, if the human to be tamed does not yield to the training, either by gentleness or by severity or by both gentleness and severity, Lord, what does the Exalted One do to him?"

"Now, Kesi, if the human to be tamed does not yield either to gentleness, or to severity or to both gentleness and severity, Kesi, I destroy him." ("Indeed, Lord, the Exalted One does not destroy life. Still the Exalted One says: 'I destroy him.'")

"True it is, Kesi, the Accomplished One* does not take life. But if the human to be tamed yield not to training either by gentleness, or by severity or by both gentleness and severity, the Accomplished One does not regard him as deserving of being told or admonished. Of a truth, Kesi, it is death in the discipline of the Noble Ones, when neither the Accomplished One nor the wise Holy Ones regard him as one deserving of being told or admonished." "Slain indeed is he, Lord, by the Happy One, whom neither the Accomplished One nor the wise Holy Ones regard as worthy of being told or admonished. Oh, wonderful, Lord. Oh, marvellous, Lord . . . Lord, may the Exalted One admit me as lay disciple, who has taken Thee as Guide from this day forth as long as life endures."

—The Mahābodhi, February, 1925

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* Tathāgato.
GOTAMA THE MAGICIAN AND HIS SPELL

(Rendered from the Pāli of the Aṅguttara Nikāya.)

ONCE upon a time, the Exalted One was sojourning at Vesāli, in the Gable-roofed Hall of the Great Wood. Now then, Bhaddiya, the Licchavi, came to the presence of the Exalted One and took a seat at one side. So seated at one side, Bhaddiya, the Licchavi, addressed the Exalted One thus:

"Lord, I have heard this: 'Gotama the recluse is a magician and knows a spell, whereby he entices the adherents of other sects,' Lord, those who say this: 'Gotama the recluse is a magician and knows a spell whereby he entices the adherents of other sects'—perhaps, Lord, are sayers of what has been said by the Exalted One and do not misrepresent the Exalted One by saying what is not (true), and they are explaining according to the truth of the Norm, so that no one, who is of His doctrine and a sharer of His views, would render himself liable to blame (by mistaking what the Exalted One says). Indeed, Lord, we ourselves do not desire to misrepresent the Exalted One."

"Come you, O Bhaddiya, accept not on hearsay, nor by tradition nor by what people say; accept not because it is in the scriptures; nor by mere logic, nor by inference, nor by consideration of appearances, not because it accords with your views, nor (because you think it must be right) out of respect, with the thought 'one must revere a recluse.' But, Bhaddiya, if at any time you know of yourself—' these are immoral
conditions, these are wrongful, these are reproached by
the wise and these, when observed and fulfilled, conduce
to loss and pain—Bhaddiya then eschew them."

"What think you of this, Bhaddiya? When greed
arises in oneself, is it to his well-being or disadvantage?"

"To his disadvantage, Lord."

"Bhaddiya, this greedy person, overcome by avarice
and with mind overpowered by it, kills living beings,
steals, commits adultery and tells lies; also he urges others
to do likewise to their loss and pain, for a long time."

"It is so; Lord."

"What think you, Bhaddiya? When thoughts of
ill-will and confusion of vindictiveness, arise in oneself,
is it to his well-being or disadvantage?"

"To his disadvantages, Lord."

"Bhaddiya, this vindictive person, overcome by
desire for vindictiveness, kills living beings, steals, com-

"Yes, Lord."

"What think you, Bhaddiya? Are these conditions
meritorious or demeritorious?"

"Demeritorious, Lord."

"Are they wrongful or blameless?"

"Wrongful, Lord."

"Are they reproached or praised by the wise?"

"Reproached by the wise, Lord."

"When observed and fulfilled, do they conduce to
loss and pain or not? What is your opinion?"

"O Lord, when observed and fulfilled, they do con-
duce to loss and pain—this is my opinion."
"Of a truth, Bhaddiya, that which I said: 'Come Bhaddiya, accept not on hearsay... Then Bhaddiya eschew it.' It has been so said, and this is why it was so said.

"Come Bhaddiya, accept not on hearsay..." (as above). "Bhaddiya if at any time you know of yourself—these conditions are meritorious, these are blameless, these are praised by the wise, and these, when observed and fulfilled, are conducive to advantage and happiness—then, Bhaddiya, you should act, abiding therein.

"What think you, Bhaddiya? Do thoughts free from greed, arising in one-self, tend to one's advantage or not?"

"To his advantage, Lord."

"Bhaddiya, this person who is free from greed and not overcome by avarice, and his mind not being over-powered, neither kills living beings, nor steals, nor commits adultery, nor tells lies. Also, he urges not others to do likewise (thus conducing) to their advantage and happiness, for a long time."

"It is so, Lord."

"What think you, Bhaddiya? Do thoughts free from anger and ignorance and vindictiveness arise in oneself to one's advantage or disadvantage?"

"To his advantage, Lord."

"What think you, Bhaddiya? Are these thoughts meritorious or demeritorious?"

"Meritorious, Lord."

"Are they wrongful or blameless?"

"Blameless, Lord."

"Are they condemned or praised by the wise?"

"Praised by the wise, Lord."
“When observed and fulfilled, do they conduce to advantage and happiness or not? What is your opinion?"

“When observed and fulfilled they do conduce to advantage and happiness—this is my opinion.”

“Of a truth, Bhaddiya, that which I said: ‘Come you, Bhaddiya, accept not on hearsay... Bhaddiya, if at any time you know of yourself: these are meritorious conditions, these are blameless, these are praised by the wise, and these when observed and fulfilled conduce to advantage and happiness. Then, Bhaddiya, abide you performing them.’ It has been so said, and this is why it was so said.

“Now, Bhaddiya, some good and generous men in the world exhort their pupils thus: Come you, my dear men, dwell ye controlling (thoughts of) avarice, and so dwelling with avarice controlled, you will not commit acts born of avarice, either by body, tongue or mind; dwell ye controlling ill-will and ignorance, and dwelling with ill-will and ignorance controlled, you will not commit acts born of ill-will and ignorance either by body, tongue or mind.”

When this was uttered, Bhaddiya, the Licchavi, spoke thus to the Exalted One: “Excellent, O Lord. Excellent, O Lord... May the Exalted One accept me as a lay-disciple who has taken Thee as guide from this day forth as long as life lasts.”

“But, Bhaddiya, have I said thus: ‘Come you, Bhaddiya, become my disciple, I shall be your teacher?’”

“Indeed not so, Lord.”

“Then, Bhaddiya, those recluses and Brahmmins do indeed accuse me, who speak and declare thus, with what is not true, empty, false and fictitious when they say:—The recluse Gotama is a magician and knows a spell, whereby he entices the adherents of other sects.”
"A lucky thing, O Lord, a fair find, indeed, is this alluring spell. Lord, would that my beloved blood-relations were enticed by this alluring spell. It would, indeed, conduce to the advantage and happiness of my blood-relations, for a long time. Lord, would that all the warrior clans were enticed by this alluring spell; it would, indeed, conduce to the advantage and happiness of the warrior clans, for a long time. So also, would it tend to the advantage and happiness of the Brahmans and Sudras, for a long time."

"It is so, Bhaddiya, it is so, Bhaddiya. If all the warrior clans, likewise if all the Brahmin clans and also the peoples of the lower castes, enticed by this alluring spell, were to eschew immoral conditions, it would be to their advantage and happiness, for a long time.

"Of a truth, Bhaddiya, if this world and the world of devas, Māras and Brahmans, with the host of recluse and brahmans, including gods and men, enticed by this alluring spell, were to eschew immoral conditions and promote meritorious conditions, it would be to the advantage and happiness of devas, Māras and Brahmans, with the host of recluse and Brahmans including gods and men, for a long time.

"Verily, Bhaddiya, if these two great Sāla trees, enticed by this alluring spell, were to eschew immoral conditions and produce meritorious conditions, it would indeed, conduce to the well-being and happiness of these Sāla trees for a long time, if they could only think. Needless, indeed, to speak (of the well-being and happiness that will accrue) to one who is a human.

---The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon, 1925.

1. P.T.S. text o but Sinhalese text and commentary read dve (two). It would appear that there were two (Sāla Shorea robusta) trees in front of the Teacher at the time of speaking.

2. Sace Ceteyyum—if they were conscious, probably refers to dve mahā sāla. If so, the P.T.S. edition places the full-stop in the wrong place.
BUDDHISM AND THE WORLD PROBLEM

The Pali word for 'world' is *loko*. *Loko* has two meanings—the world of living beings, *sattaloko* and the outer world, *saṅkhāra loko*. Strange to say, the Greek word for 'world,' cosmos, has the same two meanings—micro-cosmos, the little world or the world of living beings, and macro-cosmos, the large world of space.

The final goal or destiny of a living being is, therefore, the solution of the world-problem. The problem of the inorganic world is the peculiar province of physical science and, therefore, lies outside the scope of our enquiry. An investigation into the latter question falls within the category of profitless discussion banned in Buddhism.

Given one thing, the world—in other words the pain-filled world of sorrow (*satta-loko*)—the salient feature of all sentient life is its accompaniment of sorrow. This is the First Āryan Truth. It is important to determine at the outset the true import of sorrow in Buddha-thought. This *satta-loko*, according to that teaching, is divided into thirty-one spheres or, more accurately, phases. The sphere of sense desires (*kāmāvacara*) consists of the six *devalokas* (heavens), the world of human beings, the animal kingdom, the *Asuras* (Titans), the *Petas* (manes) and the so-called hells, the sixteen *Rūpa-brahma-lokas* (with corporeal bodies) and the *Arūpa*-realms. The duration of life in all these phases differs according to the degree of existence in each.

If we compare the sum of sorrow in all these spheres with the amount of happiness, it remains an open question whether, after all, the happiness does not counter-balance the sorrow. For, we must remember that the incalculable cycles of un-
alloyed bliss which the devās and brahmās enjoy may be even greater than the tortures the beings in hells undergo. Therefore, even from the Buddhist viewpoint, when we lay side by side the sorrow and the happiness in the world, are our critics justified in characterising Buddhism as pessimism? If, then, the happiness is no less than the sorrow, why does the Tathāgata lay down sorrow as the First Āryan Truth?

The full and complete answer to this important question is to be found in the right comprehension of that refrain which we find so often recurring in the Canon. The Master addresses the disciples thus:—

"Bhikkhus, is body, is mind, permanent or impermanent?" "Impermanent, Lord." "That which is impermanent, is it liable to suffering or not?" "It is liable, Lord." "Of that which is liable to suffering, is it then right to say: This is mine, I am this, this is the soul of me?" "No, Lord."

It is, therefore, clear that according to the Master, it is the certainty of impermanence or transiency that makes life sorrowful. We read in a Sutta of the Āṅguttara Nikāya that, just as when the lion, king of beasts, at eventide issues forth from its lair, surveys the four directions and roars thrice, all animals tremble with fear and alarm and flee on all sides, even so when the Tathāgata roars the lion's-roar—Sabbe Saṅkhārā Aniccā—the devas in long possession of splendid mansions begin to quiver and tremble and exclaim: "Alas, so long have we fancied ourselves secure in our blissful abodes, now they are no longer permanent and but passing shadows."

The Mahā-brahmā the soi disant creator of the world, who with the radiance of his small finger can light up a thousand world-systems, may at any moment be reduced to the condition of a fire-fly! The great Sakra, king of the gods, in all his glory and majesty, may indeed at once be reborn as a sūkara (pig).
And man himself, the so-called lord of creation, who has wrung so many secrets out of Nature's bosom, ever and anon falls a ready victim to the tiniest bacillus that fells him to the ground. When one looks around the whole wide world one sees how life feeds upon life and lives upon death. The bigger preys upon the smaller animal: this is the usual rule of all life, from the biggest mammalia down to the minutest bacilli. One contemplating the idea is simply dumbfounded at the ghastly spectacle. In a word, the universe is a veritable shambles. The picture blackens still more when one sees the smaller animal in its turn waging war upon the bigger one. A curious illustration, culled from Natural History, is well worth repetition: The "killer-whale" is the smallest and the "sperm-whale" one of the largest of the whale family. But Nature has so ordained that the killer is more than a match in actual combat with the sperm-whale. Whenever the killer meets the sperm-whale, it lays hold of the lower jaw of the latter and lashes it with its tail again and again with such violence that it eventually succeeds, may be after a several days' incessant struggle, in dislocating the lower jaw of the sperm-whale, so that it can no more close its mouth. Then comes the opportunity of the killer, who enters the mouth of the sperm-whale and actually eats out its tongue and leaves the huge monster to die in agony and sheer starvation. The world is full of such horrible cruelty that our hearts simply revolt at the very thought. Life is so arrayed against itself that it is an incessant warfare to live. "Struggle for existence" is the final watch-word of science. What a hideous fallacy then to hold an all merciful god responsible for such monstrous cruelty!

We must thus conclude that it is transitory nature of all life and its liability to suffer at any moment, which establishes the truth of Dukkha-sacca.

What, then, is meant by realising the First Aryan Truth? If to realise sorrow is to endure sorrow, then indeed he who has suffered most should have best realised sorrow. The
denizens of the hells, who undergo nameless tortures for countless ages, must have utterly comprehended Dukkha-sacca. But this is absurd. We are thus driven to the conclusion, that to suffer or endure sorrow is not necessarily to realise sorrow.

Let us now take a glance into the early life of the Bodhisatta in his royal palace. Brought up as he was in the lap of princely luxury, and cribbed and confined with jealous care by his kingly sire, it was after witnessing the omens of a sick man, an old man, a corpse and a recluse that Prince Siddhattha received the motive-impulse to his great renunciation. The young prince suffered no unhappiness whatever in his own person. But it was his seeing the sufferings and afflictions of others that brought home to his kindly heart that ennui and worldweariness, which urged him to flee from the life of the home, as though from a pit of live coals, to the homeless state. It was, therefore, not sorrow felt or endured in his own person, but pain and suffering which he witnessed in others, that made him realise the truth of the great intuition: All life is sorrow-fraught. Strictly speaking, Prince Siddhattha comprehended the First Aryan Truth of Sorrow or, at any rate, had the first glimpse of it, whilst still in the family life, though he discovered the other three Aryan Truths at the foot of the Bodhi-tree.

We must thus bear in mind that, when the Master lays emphasis on the realisation (avabodha) of the First Truth, what is meant is: Sorrow understood and not sorrow felt. In other words, it is not an emotional feeling that is implied but experience through knowledge or insight. This is the all-sufficient reason why Buddhism is called the religion of enlightenment through knowledge (pañña). Thus to sum up: Satta-loko is only a synonym for the world of sorrow (samsāra-vatta).
All religious teachers, other than the Tathāgata, ascribed to an external agency the source of pain and suffering. Even in the Christian Bible we read that “God brings peace and creates evil.” It follows as a logical necessity that man must look for escape from “this vale of tears,” as the Christian scriptures put it, to an external power. Prayers, supplications, offerings, sacrifices are naturally the only means prescribed to attain salvation from sorrow.

The Buddha alone of all religious teachers, with a master-stroke of genius, discovered the cause of sorrow to be craving (taṇhā) inherent in the living being. “Verily,” He says, “in this fathom-long, beminded body with its perceptions, I declare to be the world, the world’s arising, the world’s ceasing and the path to the world’s ceasing.” The Master laid hold of life by the root and addressed the majestic query: What right has life itself to exist? The answer to this question He found by a flash of glorious intuition that eventful night so full of profound significance to all living beings, as He sat under the “Tree of Knowledge,” which was justly so called. Rendered with the strictest accuracy, the Causal Chain runs thus: Ignorance must be present in order that volitional activities may come to pass, and so forth, up to craving and finally to birth thus bringing about the entire mass of Ill.

When the Buddha places ignorance at the head of the system, it must not be taken, as is so often erroneously done by some scholars, as a sort of primordial first cause. What is the cause of a living being? Volitional activities (saṅkhārā) is the answer. When ignorance is stated to be the condition of volitional activities, it should be taken as an abstract answer to the same question, which is answered in the Kamma-teaching in a real fashion. It is the same thing, whether we say a being is born by reason of his Kamma (saṅkhārā) or ignorance. We say light is present or shadow is present but they are aspects of the same thing—the one positive, the
other negative. Therefore ignorance, of itself, means nothing but that willing is present. Ignorance is willing but only in abstract form.

All the religious teachers the world has ever seen always affirmed eternal life in heaven as the final and supreme salvation. They failed to solve the world-problem, in so far as they placed only plus signs or "willing" in an infinite series, when they posited eternal life. The Lord Buddha alone of all religious teachers placed a minus sign, that is "non-willing," and the sum of life was resolved without that ever-recurring remainder, which in other systems of religion is called god or soul—a factor which has rendered the world-problem altogether insoluble.

In the Fire-Sermon (Aditta-paniyāya), the Sermon on the Mount of Buddhism, the Master says: "All things, O Bhikkhus, is a burning. The eye is a burning. Visual consciousness is a burning. Visual contact is a burning. The resultant sensation is a burning," and so forth. Likewise with regard to the other senses and their respective sense-objects.

The other religions say: Everything is in a static condition, that is where the creator placed it, whereas the Buddha says: "Everything is a fire," that is a becoming or a process. This is where the great Teacher breaks away from all conventional forms of thought in a most surprising manner and establishes His unquestioned pre-eminence and roars the lion's-roar of victory.

He presents the same idea in a different form, in another place.

"What, O Bhikkhus, is the arising of the world? Because of the eye and of forms arises visual consciousness. The coming together of these is contact. Because of contact arises sensation," and so forth in terms of the Formula of Causal Genesis up to birth and the resultant mass of all Sorrow.
This is, in sooth, the highest form of Kantian idealism applied to the ends of religion. Just as a flame is a mere succession of flickering moments and never the same for even two successive seconds, even so is the "I-process," which ever and anon renews itself, and the only constancy about it is its incessant change.

Kamma, so to say, throws up a bridge between this life and the next and welds together the manifold phases or flashes of the empirical personality, so as to present an apparent "I." But since all life is but sorrow, it is Kamma that keeps the "I-process" going. We are thus faced with the all important question: How is deliverance to be found from this endless process of becoming, or in other words, how can we escape from sorrow?

The empirical ego is only an apparent "I"—it has no reality, because it is merely an aggregation of the Khandhas. It is Kamma that causes their coming together. Remove Kamma and the Khandhas fall asunder. Even thus is brought about the complete abrogation of personality. When there is the arising, there is also the passing away of life. This is change or transiency (anicca). Because of transiency there is Sorrow (dukkha). And thus to conclude: The world is conditioned by the action of the senses. Upon the senses, therefore, depends the world. The world in the last analysis is the sum-total of the sense-impressions. The activities of the senses constitute the generative cause of the world. Therefore, the senses are the real creators of the world in all its vast totality.

This is the highest, the deepest and the sublimest thought that ever was conceived by the mind of man, in all time and in all space. And it is crystal-clear that the human mind reached its natural perfection 2,500 years ago, when once
the human tree blossomed and put forth its sweetest Flower,
which radiated its exquisite fragrance to all quarters of the
boundless universe.

Thus was solved the world-problem, without the
recurrent remainder. But let us remember it is a problem—
Quod erat faciendum, and not a theorem—Quod erat demon-
strandum. “We ourselves must walk the Path, the Buddh
has only show the Way.”

(The writer acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. P. Dahlke
for some of the ideas.)

—The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon, 1926.
THE
BUDDHIST IDEA OF GIVING (DāNA)

RECENTLY a certain Western critic, who is a professed Buddhist, was pleased to pass some severe strictures on the Buddhist idea of charity. It behoves us, therefore, to make even a brief survey of the Buddhist view of Dāna and to enquire: What is the real significance of giving, not only in the abstract as it is found in the Teaching, but also in actual practice among the present-day Buddhists?

Charity or giving is the lowest of all forms of morality and is the common property of all religions. It is the A. B. C. of every ethical system or moral code. As an eminent thinker says: "Charity is like the seconds hand of the horologue of morality." Even as the action of the seconds-hand is clearly visible, Dāna manifests itself in material or gross form. Just as the movement of the minute-hand is less perceptible, and that of the hour-hand is still less so, the higher moral virtues of Śīla and bhāvanā are hardly noticeable at all in practice.

Giving is such an elementary form of moral conduct that it does not even enter into or find a place in the scheme of the Noble Eight-Fold Path. What is the reason of this significant omission? The Eight-Fold Path, it should always be borne in mind, is actually trodden only by the Eight Ariyas, or the Four Pairs of Noble Ones. The rest of us, even the highest of them, are at best merely trying—some of them may be trying very hard—though yet unsuccessfully, to reach the lowest rung of the Eight-Fold Ladder. This stage of the disciple's progress is in Buddhist parlance called the 'Pubba-bhāga-.paṭi-padā,' or the practice of the prepara-
tory stage. Giving forms only a part of this preliminary practice of the aspirant, and he oversteps this stage only when he has highly developed the practice of giving.

All deeds of ordinary worldlings are actuated, more or less, by motives of a self-referable character. In other words, all human actions, save and except those of the Arhans, are traceable in the last analysis to selfishness.

Egoism (taking the term in its empirical sense) is, therefore, the inevitable motive for morality. We are at once confronted with the great problem: How can then man, who is selfish by nature, get rid of his selfishness, so that he may reach the goal of final emancipation? He does so, we maintain, just in the same way as a sailor crosses the sea by paddling his own boat or by steering his own ship. The disciple of the Buddha reaches the further shore of 'Sāṃsāra' by practising acts of merit though prompted thereto by his own egoistic impulse.

The Buddhist gives with one of two objects in view. Being a believer in the doctrine of retributory justice (Karma), he either gives expecting a worldly reward herein this life or hereafter in the course of rebirths, or he gives with intent to eliminate all the roots of greed from his heart. Even in the latter case, it should be observed, egoism is at bottom the motive impulse.

Unfortunately, there is a good deal of confusion in the public mind on the Buddhist idea of Dāna. For, it is commonly held that gifts should always be made only to virtuous individuals. To put it briefly, this idea is both true and false. But we must here discriminate. Who gives expecting a worldly return should certainly find a virtuous recipient for his gifts. Forsooth, the wise farmer who looks forward to a plenteous harvest sows his seed on fertile soil. But the man whose object is to eradicate all the noxious weeds of craving from his heart, so as to prepare a favourable soil for the planting of the higher virtue of Śīla and Bhāvanā, need
not hanker after virtuous recipients of his charity, for to him any form of voluntary divestment of his property is to that extent a diminution of his attachment to worldly possessions.

The first of the Ten Perfections of the Bodhisattva is this virtue of Dāna which he practised in numerous lives over and over again, even to the extent of making the supreme sacrifice of his life itself for the sake of fellow-beings. But a virtuous person never could accept the gift of another's body or flesh. The Bodhisattva was therefore obliged on all occasions to make the supreme gift to a being of no virtue whatever, be it a demon, a cannibal or a wild beast.* The highest gift can, therefore, never be made to a righteous person. Nay, such is only acceptable to a sinner. It is thus clear without more ado, that he who gives without any worldly object but solely with the idea of ridding himself of greed, need not go after virtuous persons, but may give irrespective of the virtues of the recipients of his gifts.

The degree of worldly reward is necessarily commensurate with the virtues of the recipient. Hence, he who gives with a view to a worldly return should go after persons advanced in righteousness. Though such gifts are also acts of merit, they are hardly of any moral value for the higher function of eradicating greed, with a view to the attainment of the goal. On the contrary, such misconceived acts of charity do indeed retard his spiritual progress, for every gift with

* In this connexion the writer recalls an interesting incident. Once a Christian Padre, daring to beard the lion in its own den, offered to deliver a lecture on Buddhism to a Buddhist Society. The lecturer was accorded a right Buddhist welcome. But forgetting the ordinary canons of hospitality, the lecturer in the course of his address, proceeded to pass severe strictures on the act of suicide committed by Buddha (so he put it), when once of yore he offered his body as food to a famished tigress. The retort courteous was promptly administered: Jesus Christ, the son of God, offered himself as the supreme sacrifice to save mankind from sin. Buddhists consider this deed as one of the highest renunciation, but it was astounding to hear from a Christian minister that such a noble act was only a cowardly act of suicide. The *Tu quoque* argument went straight home. Needless to say the poor man collapsed!
a worldly object in view will only prolong his journey through Sāmsāra and detain him unnecessarily in the blind alleys of individual existence.

Who gives in order that he may reap a manifold reward hereafter, be it here on earth or in heaven, is like unto the careful creditor who lends money on interest. He will get back his money with interest, nay, with compound interest, without risk or uncertainty. But no virtue, as such, can be attached to a money-lender’s dealing. On the contrary, such a giver merely aggravates his greed by the very fact of his expecting rewards. But he who gives in order that he may get rid of his greed does an act of highest virtue, and his a giver in the highest Buddhist sense. The best, nay, the only antidote to Lobha is Dāna.

There is also a donor, let us not forget, who gives out of sheer love or kindness, without the slightest reference to any reward. But such a gift should be more properly counted as an act of Mettā or Karuṇā, for the predominant quality of such a gift is rather the excellent motive behind it than the mere act of giving itself. It will then be rightly accounted a Bhāvanā, a very much higher act of merit than Dāna.

All donors, therefore, fall into one of these two categories. The great majority of givers are the ordinary, blind worldlings who give even as money-lenders invest their money, or very often as it happens quite aimlessly. This former is in accord with the saying of the Christian Bible: ”he that giveth to the poor lendeth to the Lord.” But the instructed Buddhist gives with the object of diminishing and ultimately eliminating his craving for wealth.

In that wonderfully scientific system called the Saddhāamma, ethics are founded upon a purely psychological basis. The specific teaching of the Buddha is His sublime doctrine of Anattā. This is a teaching altogether peculiar to Buddhism. So much so, it is this Anattā-teaching that
differentiates it from all other religions of the world. Now, what is the ethical import of this Anattā-teaching with reference to Dāna? He who realises that he has no ego, soul or I, cannot give to benefit such ego, soul or I, either by worldly reward or by eradicating craving, for the pure and simple reason that no such ego, soul or I, as a matter of fact, exists. So, the true Buddhist does not give with a selfish object. Taking this ego, soul or I, in its strictly philosophical sense, the Buddhist who rightly understands, knows that if he gives with a view to worldly reward, it is not after all he himself but in one sense another in his place who will actually reap the benefit of his gift. Professor Rhys Davids in his "American Lectures," page 131, says:—"The fruit of Karma as Buddhists call it, survives where one dies and will advance the happiness of some other being or of some other beings who will have no conscious identity with himself." It is therefore, only a believer in "No-soul" (Anattā), who can make an utterly unselfish gift. That is why the Dhamma is called the religion of enlightenment as to the true nature of the basic facts of life. For, herein knowledge is given the foremost place of honour. And knowledge is here full realisation of Anattā. Sammā-diṭṭhi is the first step of the Path.

But others who do not comprehend the Buddha’s teaching on the point give only with a selfish idea, for they are constantly thinking of their own selves or souls, except perhaps in the only other instance where one gives without knowing the ethical significance of what one is doing or prompted by the power of a merely casual impulse.

Be it then noted, that a gift rooted in the ignorance of its effects, according to the Buddhist point of view, can never form a virtuous action of high value, though it may be followed by a reward of an insignificant character. A
person who gives unaware of the moral value of his act is like unto the man who throws up a stick without any aim as to which of its two ends will strike the ground.

Those moralists who posit a criterion for morality by saying: "Virtue is its own reward," must now realise that they are only pursuing a mere shadow.

"Where self is, there cannot be virtue," says the Master. The only philosophical basis for morality is then this Anattā-teaching, for all those systems of ethics based upon the soul-theory must for aye and ever flounder in the selfishness of the souls (Atis) of their own creation. To them there can be no end to Samsāra. Anattā is thus the master-key to the Dhamma, and Anattā alone can unlock the elusive mystery of the ethical problem.

In the words of the Dhammapada:—"Sons have I, pelf have I: so the fool worries. Of a truth, thou hast no I: how then canst thou own sons or pelf"?

—The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon, 1928.
ONCE a certain brother came into the presence of the Exalted One. Having drawn near he made obeisance to the Exalted One and sat at one side. So seated aside that brother said thus to the Exalted One:—""Liver according to Norm,"" ""liver according to Norm"" one is called, O Lord; in what respect, Lord, does a brother become a liver according to Norm"?"

""Herein, brother, a brother masters the Norm consisting of sermons in prose, sermons in verse and prose, exposition, songs, solemn sayings, my own utterances, stories of (former) births, talks about the supernormal, discourses long and short of diverse nature. He spends the day thus, thoroughly learning, abandons seclusion and does not practise the inward calm of mind. Brother, this brother is called One Full of Learning, but not a 'Liver according to Norm.'"

""Again, brother, a brother preaches to others in detail the Norm, according as he has heard and learnt. He spends the day in the exposition of the Norm, abandons seclusion and does not practise the inward calm of mind. Brother, this brother is called an "'Expositor,'" but not a 'Liver according to Norm.'"

"'Again, brother, a brother recites in detail the Norm, according as he has heard and learnt. He spends the day reciting the Norm, abandons seclusion and does not practise the inward calm of mind. Brother, this brother is called a "'Constant Reciter,'" but not a 'Liver according to Norm.'"

*Navāṅga-Buddha-sāsana or the Nine Factors of the Norm.
"Then again, brother, a brother reflects, ponders and considers in his mind the Norm according as he has heard and learnt. He spends the day reflecting, pondering and considering in his mind the Norm, abandons seclusion and does not practise the inward calm of mind. Brother, this brother is called "One Given to Reflection" but not a 'Liver according to Norm.'

"Yet again, brother, a brother masters the Norm (consisting of the said nine factors). He does not, however, spend the (whole) day in learning the Norm, nor does he abandon seclusion, but he practices the inward calm of mind. Verily brother, this brother is a "Liver according to Norm."

"Of a truth, brother, thus have I declared the "Learner of the Norm," declared the "Expositor," declared the "Reciter," declared the "One who Reflects," and also declared the "Liver according to Norm." Whatsoever should be done, brother, by a kindly master out of compassion for his disciples, that I have done unto thee. Here are, brother, roots of trees, here are vacant houses. Meditate brother, tarry not, and thus become not remorseful afterwards.

"This is my admonition unto thee."

—The Buddhist Annual of Ceylon, 1928.
"ADDRESSES AND PAPERS ON BUDDHISM"

By BHIKKHU SĪLĀCĀRA: A REVIEW

Among European expositors of the Dhamma Mr. J. F. McKechnie, better known as Bhikkhu Silācāra, occupies a foremost place. For well over a decade his was the experience rare among Europeans, to lead the life of an actual member of the Noble Order in a Buddhist land. Thus he had the good fortune to drink deep from the very fountain-head of the pure Teaching, sitting at the feet of Buddhist teachers. In mastering the sacred language of Pali, he brought to bear the great gifts of a brilliant intellect. The learned author of these essays therefore stands pre-eminent as a safe, sound and able exponent of the Dhamma. He is, moreover, a linguist of a higher order. It was Silācāra who has rendered into choice pellucid English the several philosophical works of the late Dr. Dahlke, especially his last on "Buddhism and its Place in the Mental Life of Mankind," a monumental book, which has set the learned world athinking. One is at a loss which to admire more, the marvellous originality of the author or the exquisite facility and literary grace of the translator.

We felicitate the editor, Mr. S. W. Wijayatilake, and the publishers, Messrs. W. E. Bastian & Co., on the present volume of fourteen selected essays, covering 385 pages octavo. The Buddhist public owes them a debt of gratitude for thus preserving these rare gems, which might otherwise have been lost to the world.

Here is an admirable piece of apologetics to be placed in the hands of every earnest student, nay, even the severest critic of the Dhamma.

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The essays range between deep psychological topics like *Anattā*, and simple moral precepts. The third essay deals with the Four Noble Truths, upon which the author has dwelt at length and in detail, in a separate booklet. The first and twelfth essays treat on the fifth and third precepts. The second and the tenth on "Viriya" and "Duty." The seventh, eighth, ninth and eleventh on some scientific aspect of the Dhamma. The fifth, sixth and thirteenth on Anattā in theory as well as practice. The fourth on Schopenhauer, the pioneer European Buddhist, and the fourteenth or the last essay is a miniature auto-biography of the author's pilgrimage to Buddhism, which is of entracing human interest. Some of these essays have already appeared in one or another of the Buddhist magazines; nevertheless the publishers deserve well of the reading public for giving these essays the present permanent form. Limits of space forbid us from yielding to the temptation of giving even a glimpse of the rich contents of these able theses, which every one who takes an interest in the Dhamma should for himself read, mark, learn and inwardly digest.

As marvels of Buddhist exegesis in English, these essays will hardly be excelled, and as models of simple, terse and nervous diction they will be highly prized. We heartily commend the book to every English-understanding reader, Buddhist or non-Buddhist.

—*The British Buddhist*, September, 1929.
WHY BUDDHISM? A DIALOGUE

Christian: Hail friend! A fine evening to resume our once interesting talk.

Buddhist: Welcome indeed, we cannot better spend the time. Let us begin from the beginning.

Christian: There you are, you put your foot in only too soon. You Buddhists are so inconsistent. Don’t you vehemently insist there is no “beginning,” and it is foolish and futile to talk of origins?

Buddhist: Patience, my pal; by beginning I do not mean the origin of things or beings. You are a little too fast for me. I am only referring to the ever recurring, fundamental question: “Why Buddhism?”

Christian: I see. There we come at once into tight grips. Yes, indeed, of all religions in the world: why Buddhism? What is there so unique and distinctive in it? Does it stand in a separate category by itself? How do you differentiate it from so many other man-made religions and philosophies? Is Christianity as a divine revelation not superior in every respect to Buddhism, for the matter of that, to any other natural religion?

Buddhist: The all-important point is whether or not a religion is true. Its grandeur, sublimity, beauty, profundity, simplicity or that it is easy to understand and easier to practise—these are all subsidiary and even negligible considerations, in the face of the one primary question: Is it true? Is it in keeping with actuality, ‘Yathā-bhūta-ñāna: knowledge of things as they really are,’ in Mathew Arnold’s happy phrase.

Christian: Do you, then, maintain that Buddhism is the one and only true religion?
Buddhist: Exactly so; but let me clear the ground first; there is one singular fact beyond all dispute and which you yourself as a fair-minded man will not gainsay.

Christian: Pray, what is this extraordinary thing, about which you become so tantalising?

Buddhist: Well, to put it in a nut-shell it is this: The Buddhist ideal of the *summum bonum* or, in a word, Nibbāna. All religions postulate eternal individual existence as salvation, but Buddhism interposes an emphatic No. Do you deny it?

Christian: Let me see: Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrianism; yes, they all teach eternal life in heaven, as the goal; but what about Hinduism?

Buddhist: Hinduism also holds out heaven. But the highest form of Hinduism or Vēdānta lays down Mōksha or absorption of the soul. None-the-less it is existence, on that account.

Christian: So the current eclectic idea, that all religions have a common spiritual goal is mere moon-shine according to you.

Buddhist: You do not go far enough; I venture to say it is not so real as even moon-shine; to compare it to the hare in the moon is more to the point.

Christian: Let me hark back: what are your grounds, pray, for this extraordinary proposition that Buddhism is the only true Religion?

Buddhist: Let me at the outset differentiate. All religions, save and except Buddhism, are what, in the last analysis, I may classify as animistic or “soul”-religions, whereas Buddhism is, so to say, the only “non-soul” religion. It follows, as a logical consequence, that salvation in the “soul-religions” must be eternal existence, for the “soul” is immortal and everlasting. Whereas in Buddhism, the “non-soul” religion, the *summum*
bonum cannot possibly be eternal existence. Thus the fundamental question resolves itself into this: Can eternal existence be the ultimate spiritual goal? If Buddhism is right on this point, the other religions are wrong and vice versa. Now, according to Christianity and Mohamedanism, man’s beginning is with this life, followed by an eternity hereafter. Such a view has to be laughed out of court as manifestly absurd.

Christian: Alright, a truce for a moment. Let us grant for a while that your argument is sound with regard to Christianity and Mohamedanism, but what about Hinduism which teaches pre-existence as much as Buddhism? Does not the case of Hinduism knock the bottom out of your elaborate argument?

Buddhist: Don’t be too confident, my friend. Take the highest form of Hinduism, to which I have already referred. The Védânta or Advaita philosophy teaches absorption or Môksha and at the same time re-emanation—(Manvantara and Pralaya). So after all, the sumnum bonum in Hinduism is not even an eternal state in the strict sense, although the period is incalculably long. If the Hindu Môksha is not eternal, how can your heaven be eternal at all?

Christian: So our holy scriptures say, both Christianity and Mohamedanism are divine revelations, unlike your Buddhism or even Hinduism. We must have faith, and faith, books say, can move mountains. Don’t the miracles mentioned in the Bible prove its authenticity?

Buddhist: You make it impossible for me to preserve the composure required for a solemn religious discussion. You simply make me laugh. “The miracles prove the Bible”! Christian apologists should be ashamed of this stock argument of theirs. You may just as well argue that Baron Munchausen’s stories prove the veracity of their author. Are you not putting the cart before the
horse? Far from the miracles proving the truth of the Bible, if you cannot prove them by independent evidence, all the miracles go by the board, and the whole of the Christian system collapses like a pack of cards.

Christian: Can't I turn the *tu quoque* argument upon you with equal justice? What about the miraculous elements in your own books; don't they carry their own condemnation?

Buddhist: I am prepared to go to the length of making a present of all the 'miraculous' statements in the Buddhist scriptures. The Rev. Silācāra Thera has published "*A Young People's Life of the Buddha,*" carefully purged of all the so-called miraculous elements, yet preserving intact the historic figure of the Master in all its majestic grandeur and wonderful simplicity. Do this of Jesus Christ, he at once ceases to be God, and the whole foundation of Christianity instantly collapses, and you will be buried in the debris.

Christian: Are we not digressing from your main point that Buddhism is the only true religion?

Buddhist: Let me clinch the argument. If eternal life cannot be the true spiritual goal, then the only religion which says so, I maintain, must be true in laying down the only true ideal of salvation as the *sumnum bonum*.

Christian: I am just beginning to see new light (looking up at the stars and down at his watch).

Buddhist: May the bright sun of truth shine upon you ere long in its mid-day splendour.

Christian: I hope such great light will not blind me, who was so long in darkness.

Buddhist: Better luck; good-night, friend.

—Mahābodhi, June, 1929.
ANATTĀ AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Our esteemed brother Pandit Sheo Narain's instructive contributions to successive issues of this Journal have kept alive the sustained interest of readers. I feel sure they will join me in according him our grateful thanks.

In the August number he pertinently calls attention to a voluminous work by Mr. Har Dayal on "The Bodhisatva Doctrine," gives a lengthy quotation from that book and, pathetically, adds as follows:

"One point has always puzzled me in my readings of Buddhist literature and it is this: What survives death to bear the results of Karma in one's life?... I wish some learned Buddhist scholar who has studied the subject in Pali would throw some light to set at rest the controversy."

Let me confess at the outset that I do not intend to pose as "a Buddhist scholar who has studied the subject in Pali." Far from it. But as an earnest student of the Dhamma, who had experienced the same difficulty, our friend will pardon me, if I venture to intrude where angels should fear to tread.

Difficulties on religious questions are, in the very nature of things, altogether personal to the individual concerned. This is obviously the reason why our Lord in common with other religious teachers, adopted the dialogical method of instruction. A most persuasive reasoning was the argumentum ad hominem. A fully sounded thesis or a set discourse often missed the point of an enquirer's doubt or difficulty.

I shall, therefore, with our learned brother's permission present my views on the question at issue in the form of a dialogue, at the same time tendering him my humble apologies for the liberties I propose to take with him, by imputing to him words which he may perhaps repudiate.
S.N.:—My friend, let us have a heart to heart exchange of views on the vexed subject of “Anattā and Moral Responsibility.”

A.D.:—I shall be only too glad. But you must pardon me my short-comings.

S.N.:—That is alright. We are not infallible—not even the youngest of us.

A.D.:—That reminds me, we both are past our three score years. I cannot consistently plead: ‘Deal gently with the young man.’

S.N.:—Let me plunge in medias res. To put it categorically—did the Buddha teach Anattā or Attā?

A.D.:—Most emphatically Anattā, and not Attā.

S.N.:—Are you quite sure on the point?

A.D.:—I am as certain as the sun is the centre of our solar system. Until Copernicus discovered the heliocentric system the world believed the Ptolemic theory. Likewise, until the Lord Buddha proclaimed the Anattā-doctrine, mankind was enmeshed in the ego-centric, ātmanistic heresy.

S.N.:—That sounds rather dogmatic, does it not? But quote your authority please.

A.D.:—Why, my first authority is the First Step of the Eight-fold Path.

S.N.:—That is strange indeed. Where is Anattā in the First Step? I can’t find it.

A.D.:—I am not surprised. In the Samyutta Nikāya, 21(5) the Master says: “When one understands that form, feeling and the other khandhas are transient, subject to pain and soul-less (Anattā), in that case one possesses Right Understanding.”

S.N.:—That bears you out, I admit. Do you then maintain that one who hugs the Attā-heresy, is a micchādīttika, ergo not a Buddhist?
A.D.:—Most certainly, yes, if we abide by the Master’s teaching.

S.N.:—Your second authority please?

A.D.:—I rely next on Anattalakkhana Sutta, the second sermon delivered to the Pañcavaggiya-bhikkhus on the fifth day after the first sermon.—“The Turning of the Wheel of the Law.”

S.N.:—Now, my friend. There I think I catch you napping. I put to you this poser: Did not myriads attain Nibbana as a result of the first sermon, even before the specific discourse on Anattalakkhana was preached? If so, the Anattâ-teaching was not a sine qua non for winning Arahanthood.

A.D.:—Bear with me, Sir, for a moment. The wonder is that not one of the five bhikkhus, let alone the myriads of Devâs and Brahmas, became an Arahan, on hearing the first sermon and only one out of the five, namely Aññã Kondañña, gained the “Spotless Eye of Truth” as a Sotâpanna.

S.N.:—But how did Aññã Kondañña break the fetter of Sakkâya-diṭṭhi without the aid of the Anattâ-teaching?

A.D.:—Quite right, Sir, that is just the point. I am glad you appreciate it. May I recall what I have already said? I showed you by a quotation from the Samyutta, that Anattâ is implicit in the First Step of the Path; and that fact barely sufficed a Sotâpanna to break asunder the gross fetter of Sakkâya-diṭṭhi. But the explicit elucidation of Anattâ in the second sermon was a sine qua non for an Arahan to do away with the finer fetters of Mâna, Uddhacca and Avijjà.

S.N.:—I regret I do not follow you. Do you contend seriously that full realisation of Anattâ is not indispensable to break a gross fetter, whereas it is essential to get rid of a finer fetter?
A.D.:—That does sound paradoxical. But I do submit it is so. Every Arahant extinguishes the Āsavas, but not the Vāsanā (impressions or traces) of such Āsavas, which a Buddha alone can eliminate. Does that not demonstrate to a nicety, that a keener Insight, a greater Realisation is essential to get rid of a finer and, therefore, more elusive, evil?

S.N.:—That hits the nail on the head. It is sound reasoning, I grant. But need we further expatiate upon a basic teaching like Anattā?

A.D.:—Surely not; Anattā runs like a streak of scarlet right through the Piṭakas. There is no mistake about that. One can gauge its utmost value from this fact. It is by clear Insight into the reality of things—Yathā-bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana that one sees Nibbāna.

S.N.:—What is this clear Insight—Ñāṇa dassana? I am curious to know.

A.D.:—It is purely and simply seeing in terms of Aniccā, Dukkhā and Anattā, and, therefore, conversely to see wrongly is to see in terms of Niccā, Sukhā and Attā, as all Micchādīṭṭhiṃkas do. Moreover, this all-important subject of Anattā is placed at the fore-front in the very first discourse Brahamajāla in the Dīgha-Nikāya, and in the Mūla-parīyāya of the Majjhima Nikāya; it also forms the main theme of the first chapter of the Kathāvatthu and of the later Milinda-pañha.

S.N.:—But what does our author Mr. Har Dayal say? "It is certain," he emphatically writes, "Mahāyānist writers believed in the continuity of personal identity in the most unmistakable terms." Surely, he must have good reason to say so.

A.D.:—Well, it is difficult to say whether Mr. Har Dayal's grounds are good or bad, until we have them before us. For the present let us be guided by the father of Mahāyāna,
Asvaghōsa himself "the very first champion, promulgator and expounder" of it as Dr. Suzuki aptly calls him. Asvaghōsa opens his famous Sarddhotpāda-sāstra (translated as "The Awakening of Faith") the bible of Mahāyānism, as follows: "Adoration to the Dharma whose essence and attributes are like the ocean, revealing to us the principle of Anātman and forming the storage of infinite merits." Dr. Suzuki is perhaps the greatest living authority on Mahāyāna. Do, please, mark what further he writes: "The Doctrine of Anātman is considered to be one of the most important and characteristic features of Buddhism and justly so, for both the Hinayāna and Mahāyāna uphold this as essential... In the case of the Anātman or non-ego theory, the Mahāyānists assert that there is no Ātman or ego-soul, not only in its subjective aspect but also in its objective application. That is to say, they deny with the Hinayānists that there is such a thing as the ego-substance behind our consciousness as a cover etc., simple, ultimate, independent unit; but they go still further and declare that this objective world too has no ātman, no ego, no God, no personal creator, no Ishvara, working and enjoying his absolute transcendence behind this concatenation of cause and effect. This is technically known as the double negation of the subjective and objective world and for this reason the Mahāyāna school has often been called, though unjustifiably and quite incorrectly, Nihilism or Sūnyavādin."

S.N.:—Let us, at last, hark back to our original point. How do you reconcile Anattā with Moral Responsibility?

A.D.:—Before we tackle your very difficult question we must take, so to say, a preliminary canter. The whole world for centuries upon centuries has been nurtured on static ideas—both in the East and the West. So our norms and canon of Logic have evolved from static notions. But the
Tathāgata created a revolution in the mental world when He enunciated the *Paccaya-Kāra-Dhammā*, the dynamic conception of life and of the world. We find a modern echo of this teaching in Henri Bergson, the French philosopher. Let us bear in mind that there is a marked difference between the Buddhist idea of identity, which is purely dynamic, and that of other schools of thought which was only static. Elsewhere, I once wrote: "Identity is a static idea and strictly speaking cannot apply to life or biological values. One can correctly envisage life and its functions only from the dynamic view-point. Mathematics, jurisprudence and the physical sciences deal in identifications but not the sciences of ethics and psychology. In Buddhist psychology both the subject and the object are transitory; only the inter-relation between them remains constant. This constancy of relation, which is called by some consciousness, gives rise to the false animistic notion of personal identity. Because of the continuity of temporary selves or successive states of consciousness, man, blinded by nescience (*Avijjā*), mistakes similarity for identity and takes the river of life for one abiding soul, even as he mistakes the river of yesterday as identical with the river of to-day."

"Life according to Abhidhamma is like the current of a river (*nadi sōtō viya*) or the flame of a lamp (*dīpa-jālā viya*). It is a conclusion of modern science that the cells of the human body undergo constant change, so much so that every particle of the body of a boy of ten becomes completely transformed and gradually replaced in the body of a youth of eighteen. The ceaseless flux of things applies to both mind and body. In the former the flow is even more rapid than in the latter and, therefore, it is truer to speak of the body as a permanent thing (*Attā*) than of the mind." To put it in a nutshell—the Buddhist, that is the dynamic, view of identity consists in continuity
alone and not in the permanence of substance, which is the static idea. We have to keep this distinction clearly in mind as the first step in our argument.

S.N.:-—But you have not yet come to the point of my difficulty: “what survives death to bear the results of Kamma in one’s life?” Please address yourself to that.

A.D.:-—Let me see. Your question is vitiated by a *petitio principii* or in plain English, it begs the question; when you say ‘what survives death, you assume or take for granted that something does survive—which is not the case. Strictly speaking—the question is wrongly put and must therefore be put aside (*thaṇṇiya*). Similar questions or something to the same effect were put to the Master by a brahmin of old: “How now, Lord Gotama? Is he who acts, the same as he who feels the result of the act (so *kuroti so paṭisanvedayiti*)?” “He who acts is the same as he who feels—’ that, brahman, is one end (heresy).” “How then Lord Gotama? Is he who acts another Man than he who feels?” “He who acts is another than he who feels—that, brahmin, is the other end. Overcoming these two ends the Tathāgata points out the doctrine in the middle, in terms of *Paṭicca Samuppāda*”—(*Nidāna Samyutta*).

Now, what does this mean to us moderns? It means as I understand it: there is no permanent, unchanging identity between the actor and the feeler, but there is at the same time a *continuity* between them—*na ca so na ca añño*. Hence, the Buddhist idea of identity consists in *continuity* and not in identity of substance, for the simple reason that there is no such thing as identity of substance in the universe—*Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā*.

S.N.:-—I am beginning to see some light. It all comes to this, One must alter his view-point, if one wishes to understand the Buddhist idea. We must give up our static way of
thinking and adopt the dynamic view of life. We must
discard our coloured glasses, and "think ourselves in
sympathy with the Buddhist position."

A.D.:—Exactly so, you put it admirably. When even in
this life as it is, there is no permanent soul, how can a non-
existing thing 'survive death to bear the results of Karma
in one's life,' as you put it?

S.N.:—So far alright, but I have not done with you. There
is the further question yet outstanding—where is moral
responsibility in that case? In the magisterial diction
of another critic, Dr. Stace: "If the next life is only
a continuation of Karma and not of personality, why should
any one bother himself about the consequence of his
action"?

A.D.:—I have previously called attention to the fact that in
both mind and body the youth of eighteen was different
in every particle from the boy of ten. Let me then put
this counter-question: What youth is therefore not
morally responsible for his acts done when he was a boy
of ten, because in all respects he is different: Is it not
so?

S.N.:—But the boy continued to exist till he became the
youth. The boy did not die and was not reborn as the
youth.

A.D.:—That makes all the difference. Do you not thereby im-
plicitly admit that moral responsibility depends on the
continuity and not on the identity?

S.N.:—Just so, I grant it. There being no soul the only
conceivable form of identity is continuity and not identity
of an unchanging substance—which we mistakenly call
personality.

A.D.:—I am glad you appreciate the fine distinction. Let
me make it clearer by asking you a counter-question:
Suppose that that boy of ten underwent a sudden loss of
memory and recovered his consciousness to find—that all his past was a perfect blank. What moral responsibility would he feel for acts done before he lost his memory and which he cannot remember?

S.N.:—Moral responsibility therefore depends, as I take it, not only on continuity of personality but also on memory. Am I right in saying so? If the youth of eighteen does not actually remember the act he did as a boy of ten (because of the loss of memory he underwent), it matters not that he became the youth of eighteen? He cannot feel a sense of responsibility for an act he does not remember.

A.D.:—Then, after all, it is not a question of memory either. You are actually forced to that conclusion. Moral responsibility cannot possibly depend upon memory, for the simple reason that there can be loss of memory.

S.N.:—What do you say so? If the murderer does not remember his crime by some loss of memory, what is the use and where is the justice of sending him to the gallows? There is no object in punishing him, except as an example to others, perhaps.

A.D.:—You are quite right and your reasoning is flawless, if the universe is run, controlled and judged by some omnipotent arbiter who rewards and punishes. Unfortunately the world is not so constituted but is governed by unintelligent, and impersonal physical and moral laws. The law of Karma is just one of these moral laws and there is no Lord of Karma to dispense rewards and punishments, in terms of the laws of Kamma. In the inimitable way that our brother Silācāra puts it: “If a person does something in his sleep, gets out of bed and walks over the edge of a veranda, he will fall into the road below and in all likelihood break an arm or leg or something worse. But this will happen not at all as a ‘punishment’ for his sleep-walking, but merely as its result. And the fact that
he did not remember going out on the veranda would not make the slightest difference to the result of his fall from it, in the shape of broken bones. So the follower of the Buddha takes, measures to see that he does not walk over verandas or other dangerous places, asleep or awake, so as to avoid hurting himself or anybody who might be below and on whom he might fall." Luminous words indeed!

S.N.:—What is the upshot of it all? If then memory is not an essential factor in assessing moral responsibility, it necessarily follows that the interruption of memory by death will not prevent the operation of the law of Kamma. The fact that the man who dies does not remember his acts in his next life is no bar to his reaping the fruits of such acts. The murderer is hanged whether he remembers his crime or not.

A.D.:—I congratulate you. You have gained "the spotless eye of truth" at least in the intellectual sense. May you ere long win "the Spotless Eye of Truth" in the highest spiritual sense, also a Sotāpanna. Moreover, have you not heard of such a thing as Pubbenivāsānussati-ñāṇa—knowledge or memory of previous lives?

S.N.:—Yes, I have indeed. But how is such knowledge or memory possible when death breaks up the process of thought and the body also?

A.D.:—That, my dear sir, opens up a very large deep question, so much so I fear, we both may find ourselves ere long floundering beyond our depths. But subject to correction by learned Abhidhammika scholars, I shall proceed to state how I understand it in my humble way.

S.N.:—Do it please, because, after all, we have reached the climax of our interesting talk.

A.D.:—The Lord Buddha says, and both Eastern and Western psychology bears Him out on the point, that man dies every moment (khanika-marana). We have
seen before that the cells of the body constantly change and that the flow of thoughts in the mind is even more rapid. Philosophically speaking, i.e., in actual truth and fact, man therefore dies every moment and is reborn in the next, both as regards mind and body. What the world conventionally calls death is the termination of a life-time. The former is not apparent whereas the latter happens before the eyes of all. But according to Abhidhamma there is the strange fact that the succession of thoughts that goes on in life is not interrupted by death, and there is no interval between the dying thought (cuti-citta) in this life and the rebirth-thought (paṭi-sandhi-citta) in the next life.

S.N.:-I see what you are driving at. Because there is no entity that passes from one thought to the next, and there is an unbroken succession of thoughts all through life and even between death and rebirth, I do not see much difficulty now in believing that memory of previous lives can be recalled. At least, it is a bare possibility.

A.D.:-Memory of past lives, be it noted, is not a mere abstract conception, a mere possibility or even a probability only; it is and has been a concrete fact. There are innumerable instances of those who have acquired this psychic power. But for a full and complete explanation of its modus operandi in view of the Buddhist teaching of Anattā, we must look to the Paṭṭhāna-pakaraṇa of the Abhidhamma for an answer. This book appropriately called the "Great Book" contains twenty-four modes of Relation which is more comprehensive than and transcends the Association Philosophy of the West which deals with the Relations of ideas only, whereas the Paṭṭhāna comprises the Relations between all phenomena.
According to the Paṭṭhāna, each thought is related to the one next to it both before and after in at least four of these twenty-four ways of Relation. These four Relations (paccaya) are proximity (anantara), contiguity (samanantara), absence (natthi) and abeyance (avigata). Each thought as it dies gives service to the next or gives up the whole of its energy (paccaya-satti) to its successor. Thus each successive thought has all the potentialities of its predecessors. Therefore, the mental principle of cognition or perception (saññā) in each mental state of consciousness, with all its heritage of the past, is a re-cognising in the image reproduced the idea of the original object revived by the very marks, which were observed by its predecessors in a certain reflection. I hope you now see more clearly how memory of past lives is recalled. (Vide my article on "Anattā—the Crux of Buddhism" in the Buddhist Annual of Ceylon for 1922.)

S.N.:—To sum up the whole of our long but edifying discussion: the Buddhist position is that moral responsibility is possible without a soul (Anattā), there is continuity but not identity and memory of past lives can be recalled even though there is no soul. I offer you my grateful thanks for the great pains you have taken in enlightening me.

A.D.:—I reciprocate your kind sentiments, my friend. If I have thrown even a little light on an obscure and deep subject, which an Arahant alone can fully realise, I should feel amply rewarded. Our friendly talk should be a constant reminder to all of us what puny things we mortals are with our poor feeble crutch of an intellect, and that
we must diligently cultivate the Higher Insight—(Vipassanā) if we wish to see, as by day-light, what we now glimpse as through a glass darkly.

Please forgive the polemical tone I have at times assumed.

S.N.:—That is alright. *Au revoir.*

—Mahābodhi, November, 1932, and March-April, 1933.
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS AND "THE HIGHER CRITICISM"

MRS. RHYS DAVIDS is perhaps the most brilliant Pāli scholar the West has yet produced. The only possible exception was her late distinguished teacher and husband. But even he lacked the rare philosophical equipment, which his pupil possessed to a marked degree. The veteran scholar was too modest to tackle the Abhidhamma books. Nothing daunted, as early as three decades ago, Mrs. Rhys Davids grappled with the Dhammasaṅgani and gave to an astonished world her first fruits in that rich field of profound psychological enquiry. So long as she remained a learner under the tuition and guidance of her mentor, she proved true to the genuine Theravāda tradition of Anattā. Once that restraining influence was removed, and perhaps goaded on by another untoward event which cast a shadow on her life, she drifted away till she was caught up in the meshes of that unholy thing—spiritualism. The quondam advocate of Anattā has performed a volte face and has now assumed the role of a true-blue and even vociferous ātmanist, having recanted her reasoned conclusions and jettisoned her cherished beliefs. Two of her latest works are: Gotama The Man and Sākya or Buddhist Origins, the former worded in a quaint, uncouth and archaic jargon, making confusion worse confounded of a difficult subject, and the latter luckily couched in more tolerable language, ‘understood of the people.’

These two books embody her latest vagaries, which may be euphemistically termed "Buddhist higher criticism," but more appropriately called pedantic hypercriticism. The sum and substance of them are an elaborate effort with the one aim to prove her foregone conclusion: that the great
Anattavādī was not so after all, but only a thinly disguised Atta-vādī. The only redeeming feature is her transparent honesty. But it is said that even the way to hell is paved with good intentions. The evil is all the more on that account.

The specific teaching of Anattā runs like a streak of scarlet right through the Piṭakas. And it is this unique doctrine that differentiates Buddhism from all the other religions of the world. The very first discourse on 'The Turning of the Wheel of the Law' was addressed to five select humans, amidst a host of devas and brahmas. But none of them, be it noted, attained Arahat-hood and only one of the five bhikkhus, namely Aññā-Koṇḍañña gained 'the spotless eye of Truth.' It was when the Teacher delivered His second sermon, Anatta-lakkhaṇa-sutta, that all the five won to the crown of Arahatship. What is the reason? What is the cause that the first sermon failed to induce full saint-hood in any one of the five pupils, let alone the myriad host of the heavens? The highly religious value of the Anattā teaching, we submit, is the answer. Although Anattā is implicit in Sammā-diṭṭhi, it needed the complete explicit elucidation of the second sermon to bring about full realisation. The general idea of Anattā implied in the First Step of the Path barely sufficed to do away with the gross fetter of Sakkāya-diṭṭhi, which a Sotāpanna has to break asunder. But complete realisation of Anattā was a sine qua non for an Arahat to get rid of the finer fetters of Māna, Uddhacca and Avijjā. Moreover, the profound significance of the Anattā-teaching is evidenced by the remarkable fact, that it is placed in the very fore-front of the Brahmajāla-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya. It forms the main theme of the very first dialogue of the Kathāvatthu and also of the later Milindapañha.

It must be at once said to the credit of Mrs. Rhys Davids that in her earlier writings she made due acknowledgement of the profound value of this fact. But in her later 'higher
criticism,' be it noted after her conversion to atmanism, she goes back and is bent upon upsetting all her previous conclusions.

With this mental revolution, the authoress addresses herself to the task of adding yet another to the translations galore of the Dhammapada. There is perhaps no more popular or more important portion of the Dhamma, and readers the world over cannot be too thankful to her for bringing her ripe scholarship and critical acumen to bear on it. But we Buddhists are most unfortunate in our well-meaning friends and even staunch adherents. Mrs. Rhys Davids with the best will in the world aims at bringing out a translation to excel all the existing ones, ranging from Fausböll's Latin version down to the metrical rendering of Mr. Woodward. But, lo and behold, she makes a sorry hash of it. Verily, the mountain laboured and brought forth a mouse!

Mrs. Rhys Davids begins her 'higher criticism' of the Dhammapada-text, with a whimsical attempt at separating the teaching of the Master from what she fancies are monkish grafts of later days. She prints in bold characters some of the verses, and even, parts of verses, which she picks out at random and labels as the original teaching of the Founder, relegating to smaller type the alleged interpolations and additions of the scholastics.

Were it not so heart-rending, it would prove an interesting occupation to go through the whole gamut of her hypercriticism. Suffice it however to place before the reader Mrs. Rhys Davids' reconstruction of the famous opening verse of the text, so sacred to the hearts of believers. She lays sacrilegious hands and cruelly emasculates it as follows:

Attapubbaṅgamaṁ cittam
Attaseṭṭham attamayaṁ,
paduṭṭhatto ce puriso bhāsatī vā karotivā, etc., etc.
Here is the ātmanist unmasked! Nor is this all. Better gems follow. If there are other verses in the book which are fraught with equally profound meaning, they are those three standard gāthās, which have become classics among both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, namely the 277th, 278th and 279th verses:

Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccāti, etc.
Sabbe Saṅkhārā dukkhāti, etc.
Sabbe dharmā anattāti, etc.

which she translates as follows:

"Transient is all men think and do," etc.
"Woeful is all men think and do," etc.
"Without the self men think and do," etc.

Our authoress thus translates both Sāṅkhārā and dharmā by the same words, what ‘all men think and do,’ thereby making a pitiful mess of the right meaning. Why does she omit sabbe in the third verse? Had she only condescended to come down from her high pedestal and followed the commentator Buddhaghosa, for whom, by the way, she has nothing but cheap contempt, the woeful catastrophe would have been averted. But why Buddhaghosa when there is Mrs. Rhys Davids! The exigency of poetic requirement is perhaps her only excuse for this deplorable lapse. We are at a loss to understand how she can possibly justify her rendering by the same English words, those two highly technical terms, with divergent meanings. The translator’s atta-dīṭṭhi here has got the better of the scholar. So she strains the meaning to make it accord with her foregone conclusion of atta-vāda, thus making utter nonsense of the third verse. Dharmā here, as the veriest tyro and the merest sāmaṇera knows, comprises not only what ‘all men think and do,’ but also all component things even including the unconcionioned element of Nibbāna. To crown her marvellous feat, she comes to
grief at what we may, with all respect, call the *pons asinorum* of Dhammapada expositors, namely the 294th and 295th gāthās:—

Mātaram pitaram hantvā,
Rājāno dve ca khattiye, etc.

The verbal rendering here is, of course, plausible enough, but our learned critic meets her Waterloo in the foot-note, which she is tempted at a weak moment to append as follows:

“*The violent antithesis in acts and subsequent betterment possible in a man have led to sophisticated explanation in Commentary, accepted by writers. To the Christian the regenerate murderer should present no difficulties.*” Reject the commentator’s ‘sophisticated explanation,’ and the gāthās confront the Buddhists with an insurmountable absurdity. The pity of it is that our learned critic is blissfully ignorant of the elementary Buddhist teaching: that a person guilty of an ānantariya-kamma* never can be or become an Arahant in that life. So, taken literally, these two well-known verses become the veriest nonsense. We defy the most eminent philologist to make sense out of these two verses, without recourse to the despised commentators. Verily, this is just retribution for the contempt, which some writers have heaped upon Buddhaghosa, Buddhadatta, Dhammapāla and other expositors, of immortal fame.

The German Buddhist scholar Dr. George Grimm has produced a best-seller entitled *The Doctrine of the Buddha*, which is only marred by this same flaw of ātmanist bias. Quite unlike his eminent compatriot Dr. Paul Dahlke, he attempts to belittle the venerable Buddhaghosa in these words: “*The later actual commentaries are worshipped with such a reverence that in the end one might easily forget that to the authors of this exegetical literature there also once lived a Buddha... Why a Buddhaghosa? Why all the other commentators*”

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* See for instance the case of King Ajātasattu who killed his father—Dialogues, Vol. I, p. 95.
when you could have the Buddha-word in the original?" For the very simple reason, we venture to reply, Lest self-sufficient German and English scholars of this very learned twentieth century trip and fall. Retribution immediately overtakes poor Dr. Grimm. Ignoring the commentator he errs in the distinguished company of Mrs. Rhys Davids and others, when on page 321 of his book, he is confronted with the self-same 294th and 295th verses of the Dhammapada. He falls into the same egregious error, when he writes that an Arahat may even have killed father and mother and yet goes scot-free. A more painful travesty of the Buddhist teaching was never penned by any writer. We beseech western scholars to learn of their follies and mistakes and to cultivate even a modicum of humility after this bitter experience.

For our part, it is needless to add that we do not for a moment say that the commentaries, or any exegesis whatever for that matter, must take a higher place than, or equal rank with, the sacred Canon. By no means. But all canons of legitimate criticism agree in one thing, that no true student of the Dhamma can afford to overlook the interpretations of previous scholars, scholastic or otherwise.

In the East it is a common maxim, that those who wish to learn (ye keci sikkhā-kāmā) should sit at the feet of a teacher, having first humbled themselves even as the rug, whereon the teacher cleanses his feet. Those who follow this counsel of perfection have a right to enter the holy temple of knowledge, others with pride of heart and head will have the door rightly barred against them.

On the portals of every academy in the West must be inscribed the motto:

"Learn before you teach."
"THOU SHALT NOT KILL"

According to Buddhism, suffering results from eight different causes, the chief of which is Kamma. When we see a person suffer, say, from an incurable disease, we have to put it down to one of these eight causes. If the cause is Kamma, as it very often happens, it is obvious that our intervention will not end his suffering. For, even if we kill such a person, he still has to expiate the remainder of his Kamma, elsewhere, some other day. If the disease is due to Kamma or one of the other causes, we can put an end to the disease by killing the patient, but at the same time we cause to arise bad Kamma of a more heinous character, for the victim of our kindness is sure to put forth thoughts of ill-will (dosa) at the dying moment towards the person who kills him. Even the suicide at the last instant recoils and clutches at a straw to save his life; so strong is the will to live (bhavatayhā). The person killed may in consequence of his evil death—proximate (yadāsanna) Kamma—pass over to a worse state of woe than the incurable disease from which he escapes. The victim of our mistaken charity thus goes from the frying-pan into the fire.

Moreover we ourselves, actuated by a false notion (Mohā) of compassion, commit evil Kamma of a grave nature and store up age-long suffering for ourselves. So, after all, our remedy will in the end prove worse than the disease. Here, as elsewhere, ignorance is no excuse.

We must remember that according to the Buddha-dhamma our acts by thought, word or body, when actuated by lobha, dosa, or moha become Akusala-kamma, but when actuated by alobha, adosa or amoha become Kusala-kamma.
The law of Kamma is, however, of such a highly complex character, that we puny "many-folk" must beware how we dare to interfere with its mysterious operation.

If death annihilates a person and there are no such inconvenient things as Kamma and rebirth to reckon with, the right thing is, no doubt, to make short shrift of incurables, snakes and all dangerous animals, nay, even cannibals and criminals to boot. But Nature has ordained otherwise and we have to order our lives accordingly.

Our logical conclusions may be sound provided of course, all our premises are right. But if we omit to take count of essential factors, our reasoning will lead us completely astray.

So, well-meaning and estimable friends, who propose to improve upon the Dhamma, will do well to pause before they rush in where angels fear to tread. The Dhamma is *Atakkāvacara*, i.e., not to be realised by mere logic.
BUDDHISM AND WARFARE

It was with considerable amazement that I recently perused an article which propounds a pernicious and mischievous heresy that cuts across the very spirit of Mettā inculcated in the Dhamma. In support of his contention the learned writer gives two quotations which purport to justify warfare in a righteous cause or by way of self-defence. The pity of it is that both quotations are taken over from Dr. Paul Carus' *The Gospel of Buddha*, paras. 15, 16 and 17 on pp. 126 and 127.

If we now turn to p. 237 of the same book we find the letters "E.A." (Explanatory Addition, see p. 242) placed against the said paras. 15, 16 and 17 and so on down to para. 30, which reads as follows:

"Struggle then, O General, courageously; and fight your battles vigorously but be a soldier of truth." What an Apologia for war?

The learned writer would have fortified his position all the more, had he only quoted this para. 30, which, however, he has failed to do. The fact is that although Dr. Carus is a distinguished scholar and an admirer of the Master, he has allowed his discretion to out-run his sound judgment, when in all innocence he interpolated into Prof. Rhys Davids' translation of the Sutta all those paras. 15 to 30. We must, however, admit to the credit of Dr. Carus that he was an honest man who was careful to state (as pointed out above) that all these 16 paras are his own "Explanatory Addition" deliberately put into the mouth of the Lord Buddha and not at all found in the Pāli text.

It is extraordinary that a critical scholar of Dr. Paul Carus' eminence failed to appreciate the inconsistency between paras. 15, 16 and 17 and the quintessence of the
Master's doctrine of absolute *Ahimsā*. It is also inconceivable that the Omniscient One could have justified violence under any circumstances, who gave emphatic utterances to the following words:—"If villainous bandits were to carve limb from limb with a two-handled saw, even then the man who should give way to anger will not be obeying my teaching."—Majjhima Nikāya (P.T.S.), Vol. i, p. 90.

The fact remains that Dr. Carus adopted practically the whole of the discourse to Siha-Senāpati from Prof. Rhys Davids' translation of Vinaya texts, Part II, p. 108, and interpolated the paras 15 to 30 both inclusive. Siha asked questions on eight points of doctrine which have no bearing on warfare or violence. The learned doctor evidently gave rein to his fertile imagination and concluded that nothing was more likely or appropriate than that a professional warrior should have wedged in a dialogue on Warfare at this encounter with the Master. Contrast this effrontery of a Western Pandit with the reverent and devout attitude of Eastern Buddhist Commentators, Exponents and even Copyists in handing the Sacred Texts. Far from making spurious interpolations of whole paras., the latter would rather cut off their hands and fingers than add to or take away from the Dhamma one jot or tittle.

Mrs. Rhys Davids, our vigilant critic, would be better occupied with pointing out the errors and crimes of Western Pandits than with accusing Sinhalese Bhikkhus of forgery and grafting on the word of the Teacher.

If the reader cares to pursue the matter any further, I refer him to Vinaya Piṭaka, Mahāvagga VI, 30-5 translated by Rhys Davids in Vinaya Texts II, pp. 108 ff.

Moral:—Let us therefore learn from this bitter experience, never to take our Buddha-Dhamma second-hand or third-hand, as in the present instance, but go straight to the original Pāli Texts, lest we trip and fall.
IS KILLING JUSTIFIED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES?

THIS is a question that seems to perturb some good people nowadays. I say nowadays, because I have not come across, either in text or commentary, a single instance of such a difficulty presenting itself to the ancients. This dilemma has escaped the critical ingenuity of even king Milinda. Jātaka tales, if I am not mistaken, do not mention a single instance of 'justifiable' killing.

The Old Testament commandment 'thou shalt not kill' is absolute, so far as the words go. But theologians and commentators have glossed it by limiting the injunction to human beings. Nay, they have gone a step further and justified killing even human beings in the name of religion, in warfare and in self-defence, thus reducing the commandment to an absurd nullity.

Fortunately, no such calamity befell the first and foremost precept of Buddhism. But it is painful to meet with recent attempts by well-meaning friends to fritter away the rigour of the precept in order to seek a loop-hole of escape. Surely the Great Lord of Compassion and His Holy Disciples must have come across innumerable snakes and persons suffering from incurable diseases, nay even vermin—a very common nuisance in India—and animals 'wringing in an agony of pain.' But there is not a single instance of their breaking the first precept, or sanctioning its breach even by laymen. On the contrary, the Āṅguttara Nikāya gives an instance of a Bhikkhu who was bitten by a cobra and died. The fact was brought to the notice of the Master, and if the reasoning of our modern critics is sound, the Lord of Compassion should have at once ordered His saintly disciples,
who had laid aside cudgel and sword for all time, to resume them and massacre all the snakes of snake-infested Jambudipa, out of abundant compassion for probable victims. The Buddha and His holy disciples were too 'cruel' not to do such a silly thing! Instead of destroying snakes, the Master enjoined His followers to extend Mettā to all various species of snakes as the only panacea for escape from snake-bites. That was the true Mantra. The Master further explained that that unfortunate Bhikkhu would never have died of snake-bite, had he only carried out that precaution. If our modern critics are right, the Master missed a grand opportunity to revise and amend the first precept, to bring it into line with the advanced ethics of this Twentieth Century. A thousand pities indeed! Pious Buddhists of later days did not depart from the utmost rigour of the precept. History speaks of King Buddhādāsa of Ceylon who instead of killing all the snakes of his realm actually performed a surgical operation on a snake and saved its life. What a 'cruel' man that humane king was! That cobra due to that Buddhist king's "mistaken" notions of charity, may have stung and killed a number of human beings. Instead of curing the cobra a modern 'advanced' Buddhist would have scotched the poor thing out of sheer Karunā! Verily, there must be some huge fallacy in our modern manner of reasoning!

No doubt the Master has allowed His followers, nay all persons whatsoever, absolute liberty of thought, speech and action. They are free to exercise their reason with regard to all teachings and reject what is false and wrong and hold fast to that which is true. But our reasoning faculty at its best is but a poor thing, a feeble crutch only. Reason is not man's highest faculty. That is why the Dhamma is said to be atakkāvakara—not to be reached by logic alone. In our vehemence of logical reasoning we are apt to throw the baby away with the bath. Let us beware of it.
Once a Christian friend put me a poser 'Suppose,' he said, 'a cobra is going to bite a man. What would you as a Buddhist do? Will you not pick up a stick and kill the cobra and thus save the man'? 'Who made thee judge over life and death?' I rejoined, and added, 'Certainly not, I shall do nothing of the kind. I will certainly try my best to prevent the cobra from biting the man. There my duty ends. I am absolutely certain of one thing; the Lord Buddha and His holy Arahats would under similar circumstances have behaved in the same manner.' My friend was non-plussed. To relieve his confusion I further added: 'That person though born as a man in this life may in the scale of spiritual evolution be very much below that snake, who born as a man in the very next life may in all possibility become an Arahat whereas that man may die and be reborn in hell.' Such is the diverse complexity of Karma. Am I the Lord of Kamma, and have I mastered the manifold mysteries and abstruse workings of that law, that I shall take upon myself the tremendous responsibility of interfering with its operation, especially when I can never be sure? No, certainly not. I rather doubt the infallibility of our modern critics than take such a great risk. There is that margin of hope still left to us.

Let us consider the psychological aspect of the question. It is inconceivable that a victim, animal or man, will not harbour a feeling of ill-will (dosa) as the dying thought towards the murderer. Even the suicide in his last moment of agony will have a feeling of anger towards himself for doing such a dastardly act. So any one dying a violent death by reason of his last evil Karma will be born in an acuter form of torture than the incurable disease from which he escapes. Thus in his folly the charitably disposed person will be causing a greater calamity by his mistaken zeal.
The final conclusion to which we will be driven is this. Close down all our homes for incurables, and asylums for the aged and the insane and let all 'benevolent' Buddhists, in the name of Mettā, Karuṇā and Muditā, arm themselves with deadly weapons and make a holocaust of snakes, tigers, lions, vermin, incurables and all those who are suffering any agony. And those Buddhists who have developed iddhi-power might with great advantage extend the operation to the regions of woe like the Nirayas, for it is more down there than elsewhere, that such 'Mettā' can render its best service.

Nor, sir, let us rather conclude that there is a huge flaw in the reasoning of modern critics and exclaim: "There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy!"

—The Buddhist, August, 1933.
KĀLI-DEVI, THE FIRST FEMALE SAINT

WESAK is the holiest day of the Buddhist calendar. Next in importance comes Ēsala-pūrṇami, when three memorable events in the life of the Master took place. The Conception, the great Renunciation, and the delivery of the First Sermon occurred on that day.

Moreover, the full-moon of Ēsala at that time was also a day of festival among devas and men. Bhagalavati was a plateau on the highest Himalayan range. In this charming place was a mountain-crag of exquisite beauty. The devas became so enamoured of the glorious landscape that they selected this spot as their fortnightly meeting-place, where they held their deliberations for eight consecutive days. Not only the devas but also the yakkhās, led by Vessavana their chief, were members of this assembly.

Sātāgira and Hemavata were two leading members of this body. They were captains of yakkhās, whose names figure prominently even in the well-known Āṭānāṭiya-sutta preached by the Master as a protection (paritta).

In the long dim past, during the dispensation of the Buddha Kassapa, it so happened that these two yakkhās were born as human beings. In course of time they met and became close friends. But, falling victims to the lure of wealth and fame, they misconducted themselves and dying therefrom were reborn in consequence as yakkhās. Their retinues also were likewise reborn as yakkhās. Though the two yakkhās, Sātāgira and Hemavata as they were called, were at first not known to each other, they used to attend the meetings at Bhagalavati. One day they met face to face, and instantly the old friendship re-kindled. Love or friendship needs no words or any other form of communication.
It springs up spontaneously and continues from life to life. Mere sight suffices. It arises even as the lotus blossoms forth in response to the first contact of the rays of the morning sun.

Once Sātāgīra addressed his friend Hemavata in these words: "Dear friend, the Himālayas are always famous for their bewitching scenery. Everyone is fascinated at the very sight of them. If any strange phenomenon occurs there, do please inform me at once." "Quite true, my friend; the Himālaya region is really a wonderful place," replied Hemavata. "Most strange sights appear at times. If ever I come across any such, you can depend upon me promptly to communicate the fact to you." So saying, after exchange of courtesies, they parted company and each went his way.

Sātāgīra, it should be noted, was born in the neighbourhood of Buddhagayā in Central India, whereas Hemavata as his name implies, was a denizen of the Himalayan region. It is just because they lived so far apart that Sātāgīra came to this understanding with his friend.

Although thirty-two strange phenomena accompanied the Conception, the Birth, the great Renunciation, and the Attainment to Enlightenment of the Lord, the two yakṣhā chiefs were so pre-occupied with their duties or engrossed in their enjoyments, that they altogether failed to take notice of such unusual occurrences. Or perhaps, it might be, such phenomena were only of momentary duration, and did not, therefore, arrest their attention. But the thirty-two strange events that foreboded the delivery of the first Sermon lasted a considerable length of time. Hemavata, who espied the glorious radiance that played upon the mountain-peaks and all around the Himalayan range, was so awe-struck that he at once thought of his friend Sātāgīra. Hemavata thought to himself: "What miracle can this be"? Instantly it was borne in upon him that it was the marvellous accompaniment to the establishment of the Kingdom of Righteousness
by the Master at Isipatana. Hemavata hurried to the august presence of the Master and was for sometime engaged in listening to the sermon. Once again he was reminded of his friend Sātāgira and looked around to see if he also was present. Finding that he was absent, Hemavata instantaneously disappeared and hurried away in search of him. On the way, Hemavata soliloquised to himself as follows: "Oh, wonderful! Oh, marvellous! I never beheld anything like this in all my life. I ought to get my friend Sātāgira to share with me this divine feast." So saying to himself he hastened away, until by some happy chance he came across his friend face to face right above the royal city of Rājagaha. The following conversation ensued:

"My dear friend Sātāgira, I never saw such a glorious sight in all my life. O marvel, not a leaf on tree or creeper, not a trunk or branch was visible. But lo and behold, the mighty Himalayas were one gigantic heap of sweet smelling flowers. So I came in search of you, my friend, to give you the news."

"O joy, my beloved Hemavata," exclaimed Sātāgira in reply. "Do you know the cause of this marvellous appearance of heaps of flowers out of season? It is not confined, mind you, to the Himalayas only. The whole Jambudīpa, nay, the ten-thousand world-systems are aglow with an unearthly radiance and bestrewn with gardens of celestial blossoms. What in the world is the meaning of this, my friend?"

"Don't you know my dear Sātāgira?"

"Believe me, I have absolutely no idea. I am simply nonplussed," he replied.

"Well, my friend, it is simply this. Prince Siddhattha, the scion of the Sākya race attained Buddhahood last Wesak at Gayā-head, and tonight at Isipatana, the Lord is seated in the open air under the fullmoon of Esala and sets rolling the holy Wheel of the Law, for the
good and welfare of gods and men and of all living beings. This strange phenomenon is only a witness to this epoch-making event."

"My Hemavata, to whom is the Master delivering His first discourse?" asked Sātāgīra. "To devas and brahmas, headed by Aññā-Koṇḍañña and his four comrades," replied Hemavata. "What is the Dhamma He is thus expounding? Have you any idea, my friend, for I am consumed with curiosity to know?"

"The Master is expounding the Dhamma-Cakka-Sutta, setting forth the evils of sensuous pleasures and the faults of a life given to austerities, and extolling the virtues of the Noble Middle Path that lies between these two extremes and leads to the bliss of Nibbāna."

"That is indeed profoundly interesting, my friend. But is that all that the Master preaches?"

"No, No. The Master is discoursing on the Four Holy Truths of Ill, the arising of Ill, the ceasing of Ill and the Eight-Fold Path leading to the cessation of Ill."

Nor was this all; Hemavata gave his friend a vivid description of the numerous excellent virtues of the Master. At the end they both went back together to the Deer-park at Isipatana, came into the presence of Lord Buddha and questioned Him about the bliss of Nibbāna.

The royal city of Rājagaha was celebrating the Esala festival on that eventful day. The streets were superbly decorated, rivalling Indrapura, the capital of Sakka, king of the gods. Prince and peasant, rich and poor, man and woman, one and all turned out in full holiday attire to witness and take part in the public sports. A certain lady of rank named Kāli (Miss Black), fatigued by the exertions of the day, retired to her mansion and repaired to the terrace on the upper storey to rest her limbs and escape from the overpowering heat. Reclining on a divan, she overheard an
interesting conversation between two unseen persons. It was something strange and unheard of before. Her curiosity was at once roused, and she anxiously gave ear to the two sweet voices. When the word "Buddha" uttered by Hemavata fell on her ears, she was thrilled through and through with a five-fold ecstasy. She eagerly took in every word of the dialogue including the eloquent description by Hemavata of the great virtues of the Master, which created a profound impression upon her. Kāli-Devi was highly matured in wisdom, and taking one by one the virtues of the Master, she began to ponder over them. In her mind she wove a treasure-garland of the noble virtues of the Lord and wore it around her beautiful neck. As a wonderful result, this noble lady without having had the happy advantage of setting her eyes on even one out of the holy trinity of the Buddha, the Dhamma or the Sangha, won the fruition of Sotāpatti endowed with a thousand hypercosmic qualities. This is a unique victory which no deva, brahma, māra, yakkha or man had yet won in the dispensation of Lord Gotama. Even Aññā-Koṇḍaṅña, if the books speak true, was eclipsed by this mere woman. The former it should be noted, became a Sotāpanna only at the termination of the First Sermon. Aññā-Koṇḍaṅña was indeed the first male to achieve Sotāpatti. But he was forestalled by our heroine. So the credit of being the first to become an Ariya belongs to a woman.

All Ariyas, except the Buddhas, it should be borne in mind, must have the great boon of paratoghosa (instruction from another) before they can achieve saintship. Even the generalissimo of the Faith, Sāriputta, endowed with profound wisdom, had to be instructed by the Arahant Assaji in part of a stanza of the Dhamma; and Moggallāna the Great in a full stanza, before they won full realisation. Strange to say, in the case of lady Kāli, of blessed memory, the Dhamma as preached by a yakkha proved to be her paratoghosa.
"JUSTIFIABLE" KILLING

Our venerable friend Mr. C. T. Strauss takes exception to my two articles. I regret if what I wrote has given any offence, as nothing was further from my mind.

My comments were intended to combat a school of thought which has recently come into vogue and advocates the perverse doctrine that Buddha-dhamma allowed certain exceptions to the rule against killing.

I appeal to Mr. Strauss and others who share his views to give further thought to the arguments advanced in my two articles, for I fear he has not appreciated the point of view I tried to explain. For instance Mr. Strauss says: "If it is dangerous to interfere with Kamma, it ought to be wrong for a physician to try and cure a patient, and it would be wrong for us to try and save a person fallen into a lake or river, etc." This clearly shows that our good friend is not impressed by what I wrote on page 31 of the July issue. There I said: suffering results from eight different causes, one of which was Kamma. If Kamma was the cause of the illness or of the person falling into the lake or river, our interference would be useless. In our ignorance, we do not know which of these eight causes is operating in a particular instance, for a Buddha alone possesses the necessary knowledge. Placed as we are, it is therefore our duty to do our best to save the patient or the drowning man, for it may be that he is the victim of one of the other seven causes, in which case our attempt may prove quite successful.

I regret our good friend has misunderstood my caution against interference with the law of Kamma. It is a popular error to confound Kamma (the act) with its vipāka (the result). By all means let anyone, if he can, interfere with the
vipāka; no harm is done and perhaps some good may come out of the attempt. But beware lest anyone should be caught up in the mysterious working of the wheel of Kamma (the act). Not only is it useless but also fraught with grave danger. To illustrate what I mean: a doctor may successfully cure a patient if the illness is due to a cause other than Kamma, but if he is suffering owing to Kamma-vipāka all the doctor’s efforts would be in vain. But one cannot kill a living being with the noblest of intentions and also with impunity, for he is thus setting in operation a fresh Kamma (act) and not merely interfering with a vipāka. This is what I mean by interfering with the law of Kamma. It is a distinction one has to keep clearly in mind. The working of Kamma is indeed a highly complex subject. The pity of it is that the advocates of “justifiable” killing have failed to cull one instance, cite one illustration or quote one authority from text or commentary, in support of their contention.

That eminent modern apostle of Ahimsā, Mahatmā Gandhi, perhaps misled by these modernist views, once caused a calf suffering agony to be done to death. The incident instantly brought a hornet’s nest about his ears. He was plied with a plethora of questions and confronted with a number of dilemmas. Would he push the principle of his conduct to its logical conclusion by depriving the life of human beings also, under similar circumstances? We see here the greatness of the man—in his significant reply—“No, certainly not,” he at once retorted. He would do nothing of the sort nor advocate such a monstrous heresy. He confessed that his act of killing the calf was simply prompted by the impulse of the moment. That one act of his was rather the exception that proved the universal rule against taking the life of the meanest thing. He would not justify his act as it was a momentary lapse and he was prepared to reap its evil consequences.
Let us however remember that Mahatmā Gandhi was not a Buddhist, but an adherent of a religion which admits of a number of exceptions to the precept against killing. A Jain, on the other hand, will drive the precept to the limit of absurdity and condemn all killing—even unintentional. The Buddhist stands on sound practical ground. In this connection I can do no better than quote a luminous passage from a learned editorial in The British Buddhist of July, 1933, under the significant heading “Accommodation in Religion,” which runs as follows: “The head of the Hindu religion (Sri Saṅkarāchārya) says: ‘It is true that no life should be injured... But no wrong is done, even if it is a sinful deed that is done with devotion. In sacrificing animals in temples there is no bad thought in the mind, therefore there is no sin.’ Here again Buddhism is poles apart from Hinduism. The rule against taking life stands unimpaired and uncompromising in the Master’s precepts, as something which every professed follower of His must without equivocation strive to observe. When he fails to do so, he still lets the precept stand in all its strength, demanding fulfilment of him even though he has broken it; and thus it still remains an ideal calling him upward towards its own high level continually, however often he fails to reach it. Though the man fails, the precept stands.”

Verily Gandhi is a Mahatmā—a great soul. For he is better than and goes even beyond the religion he professes.

The advocates of “justifiable” killing are, therefore, preaching good Hinduism but bad Buddhism.

—The Buddhist, August, 1934.
"Dharma" and "Nirvana"*

Dr. Bimla Churn Law has won a reputation as a scholar and an indefatigable worker in the field of Buddhist literature. After a surfeit of the far-fetched hypercriticisms of Mrs. Rhys Davids and others of her school who are bent upon arguing to a foregone conclusion, it affords us infinite relief to take up a treatise by an earnest student who approaches and treats his subject in the right spirit of scholarship. But at times there does seem to be too many exponents of Buddhism, more especially when they seem not to have mastered the correct meaning of the end to which Buddhism points the way and think they have, and in all good faith set out to propagate their misunderstanding of it among the ignorant many. Today the world is rampant with pseudo-scholars very much more so than in the days of the pioneer workers in the rich field of Buddhist research. The genuine scholar was careful to interpret the thought and the teaching of the Master and His immediate disciples in the light of the authentic commentaries handed down from the very days of the Founder, before he ventured to give expression to his own personal opinions and conclusions. This was not only the so-called "historical" method, but also the most natural and commonsense manner of dealing with the sacred literature of any given religion. We do not for a moment say that our authors, or critics for the matter of that, should blindly follow the commentaries and previous expositions. By no means. Let them at least treat with due courtesy the interpretations of previous scholars before they venture to reject them as untenable. We go even further and concede the right to all

* Two booklets on "Buddhist Conception of Dharma" and "Aspects of Nirvana" by Dr. B. C. Law, Ph.D., M.A., B.L.
critics to refute and repudiate such expositions for sound reasons and on satisfactory grounds. But to start with startling misconceptions and prejudices and to strain and strive with every scholastic nerve they possess to prove that Buddha did not see what He did see but only what they are able to see is, to say the least, an impertinence of the first magnitude. For instance, we are familiar with recent attempts to prove that the great Anattavādi was after all no other than a thinly disguised Attavādi.

It is gratifying to note that Dr. Law is a scholar of a different type. It is genuine Buddhism and not "Lawism" that we meet with in the two booklets before us. He has taken great pains to place before the reader an exhaustive and comprehensive survey of the available literature on the two subjects with which he has dealt. He has given us almost all aspects of the question in his essay on "Dharma," not only from Buddhist literature but also from the teachings of Hindu sources. The so-called "historical or comparative method" and the "philologial method" are no doubt attractive. But we take leave to opine that such "methods," though plausible from the point of view of scholarship, are of very little use in the correct interpretation of such doctrines as 'Dharma' and 'Nirvāṇa' from the purely religious standpoint. For instance, if we interpret the words "Sabbe Dhammā Anattā" in verse 279 of the Dhammapada or "Mātaram pitaṁ hantvā" etc. in verse 294, as Mrs. Rhys Davids and her followers have done from the purely philological point of view, we land ourselves in a reductio ad absurdum.

When our author says that "the definitions of the term 'Dharma' as met with in the Buddhist and Brahminical works are all one-sided, not to say far-fetched," we must remember that it is so with regard to all attempts at definition in religious teachings. Conceptual thinking is but a poor crutch to help us in our approach to truth.
The Lord Buddha, if we be permitted to use such a simile without any irreverence, had His new wine which He poured into old bottles. He put new and novel contents into old words then in vogue. Almost all technical and religious terms in use underwent a revolutionary change at His hands. Even such fundamental doctrines as Karma, Rebirth, Dharma, Nirvāṇa, Ātma, were metamorphosed in their meanings, values and implications. The learned author has dealt with most of these aspects in his inimitable style. When he writes, "Nirvāṇa (Vimokṣa) itself is a Dharma in so far as it is an object of attainment through a life of effort," we yield a ready assent; yea, it is just so. Nibbāna is one of the nava lokuttarā dhammā.

Then again when the author writes—"According to the opening verse of the Dhammapada, mind and all things mental are dhammā," he has fallen into a grave error. It is indeed a pity that these first two couplets of the Dhammapada, which are acknowledged classics, still prove caviare to the scholar and a stumbling block to the general reader. If we turn to the commentator we find the correct interpretation. In Mano-pubbaṅgamā dhammā, Mano is correctly rendered 'mind' and dhammā is translated as 'things mental.' Mano is obviously Viśñāṇa-kkhandha and Dhammā is Vedanā-Saṁñā- and Saṁkhāra-khanda. So, mano is not included in dhammā.

Barring slight slips of minor importance, we gladly acknowledge the able and well-informed treatment of Dhamma in this pamphlet.

As regards the other essay on "Aspects of Nirvāṇa," it is certainly a very much more abstruse subject. The author has brought to bear on it a wide range of information and approaches the subject with remarkable courage.

He gives a large number of synonyms from books and pathetically concludes—"The multiplication of these so-called synonyms of Nirvāṇa and the philological explanation of them which is more or less fancied and fantastic, are of
little help in appreciating the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa or in distinguishing the same from the Jaina or Brahmanical conceptions.” It is just so in the very nature of things—, when we try to name the nameless we stultify ourselves more or less.

The author goes on to say—“The only sure and scientific way of attacking the problem of Nirvāṇa would be to consider it from the different points of view. Our approaches to the subject should not only be logical and mystical, but also eschatological, historical, poetical or popular psycho-ethical.” Perhaps he is now on safer ground, but we opine that all other so-called aspects except the ‘psychical’ (we prefer to call it ‘intuitional’) are more or less illusory. In the “historical” aspect we at once see the futility of the comparative method. Indian systems of religion, save and except Buddhism, posited an ātma as the one main basic doctrine. Buddha-dhamma alone taught anātma. Thus, Nirvāṇa to the atmanist means one thing viz. absorption of the ātma in paramātma, whereas to the Buddhist anātmanists, Nirvāṇa signifies something absolutely different. Therefore, to compare atmanist-nirvāṇa with anātmanist-nirvāṇa is comparing black and white. Such a comparison, far from elucidating the question, simply confuses it.

The author rightly says:—“With the Brahminist thinker, precisely as with the Jaina, the problem of Nirvāṇa is approached from the point of view of ātman, whilst with the Buddha or Buddhist thinkers the approach is from the view point of anātman.” True words these. Unlike Mrs. Rhys Davids or even Sir Radhakrishnan and others, Dr. Law correctly and scrupulously states the Buddhist position. Other scholars have pruned and strained the ātma doctrine and have striven might and main to prove that the Buddha’s anātman teaching was only a thinly veiled ātmanism.
The other 'points of view' meet with no better fate. But we are glad to acknowledge that the 'psychical aspect' as we must naturally expect, has thrown considerable light.

He writes:—"The Mystic aspires to be a kāyasakkhi or personal witness to be face to face with, to have a direct perception of, to come in immediate touch with, in short to realize Nirvāṇa by himself, for himself. It is after such realisation that he utters the joy of self-expression (udānam udāneti) to give expression to selfmastery (ānā) and to teach the way of realising Nirvāṇa to others (abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti) ... As an element of experience Nirvāṇa is inalienable, because the wise are to experience each in himself by himself for himself, (paccattam veditabbaṃ viññūhi)." Luminous words these and we applaud them.

But when he writes:—"With the Jaina, however, Nirvāṇa or mokṣa is not a dreadful or terrible term like the Buddhist parinirvāṇa, which suggests at once an idea of complete annihilation of individuality of a saint after death by the simile of total extinction of a burning lamp on the exhaustion of the oil and the wick," we feel bewildered. We fear that our learned author has been misled by simply "thinking of something else" as R. L. Stevenson would say. Has not the Buddha said and repeated times without number that Nirvāṇa is not annihilation, and that the saint who has attained parinirvāṇa is 'immeasurable'?

No one who is incapable of grasping what actually happens when a light goes out can ever form the slightest idea of what parinirvāṇa is. Whoso thinks that the light when it is blown out is annihilated, rightly concludes that Nirvāṇa is annihilation. But he who has the right insight sees that the light did not get annihilated and therefore Nirvāṇa is not an annihilation. There cannot be annihilation of a thing that does not exist (ātma). If there is no ātma there cannot be an annihilation but only a cessation of a process (santati)."
To say that Nirvāṇa is a state, a sphere or a condition, removed from the plane of a physical or rūpa- and arūpa-worlds, is equally misleading. In our humble opinion the right view is to treat Nirvāṇa as an event, an occurrence, or a happening. Nibbāna means extinguishing and is extinguishing. There is therefore a corresponding verb—nibbāyati parinibbāyati, parinibbuto.

The phrases: “Already in this life extinguished (ditthheva dhamme parinibbuto)” and “one who already in this existence is extinguishing (ditthheva dhamme parinibbāyamāno)” are often found in the Canon. In another passage we read: “The non-conditioned (asaṅkhata) will I show you and what leads to the non-conditioned. The non-conditioned is the ceasing of Lust, Hate and Delusion. Inward quieting and clear vision is the way to the non-conditioned.”

“This insight,” as a brilliant thinker put it, “can never come about through conceptual thinking, since through the latter no actual knowledge is produced but only new processes of living. This insight can only come about through inward quieting, i.e. through the coming to rest of the attempts at grasping. The light of the concepts must be extinguished if the light of actuality is to flash up out of the depths; and then there is the clear vision (vipassanā) on the basis of which one then lives it out, knowing: Thus it is.” So it is.

—The Mahābodhi, November, 1935.
PROBLEM OF ANATTĀ

DURING the 43 years of its existence no subject has been discussed in this Journal, which is of more absorbing interest than this question of Anattā.

It is, therefore, nothing but fitting that the 44th volume should open with this profoundly edifying theme. Your readers will join me in expressing our gratitude to Mr. Christmas Humphreys and the Ven. Jagadisa Kassapa for their learned contributions on the subject.

I have read and re-read both the articles with close attention, but I feel that something slips through the fingers. I simply cannot grip it. That eminent philologist, Mrs. Rhys Davids, once characterised the All-Enlightened One as "a gentleman of no metaphysical training." Perhaps it is due to my own utter lack of 'metaphysical training' or, more likely, my innate density, that I am unable to follow either of these two learned gentlemen.

It was a Greek philosopher who pronounced the wise dictum that before launching into a discussion the best thing to do was to define one's technical terms. The whole trouble, I venture to say, would have been obviated if this wise precaution had been taken.

Let us first take Mr. Humphreys. He uses the words: 'Self,' 'self,' 'higher self,' 'lower self,' 'Ego,' 'individuality,' 'Life,' 'the fragment of potential Buddhahood,' etc. The Ven. Kassapa uses in addition the words: 'Soul,' 'Spirit,' 'Spiritual Self,' 'Indentical-Individual-Self,' 'Material-self,' 'Life,' 'personality' 'Living-Self,' etc. (Mark the capital letters.)
Now let us put the categorical question: Do all these technical terms or any of them equate the Pāli word Ṭhā? Until this point is settled as a preliminary point, we shall be pursuing shadows.

It is gratifying to note that our learned friends are agreed upon one point, viz., "The Self is itself an ever-changing, growing, ever-becoming compound of qualities, which moves towards enlightenment."

Mr. Humphreys states that the "Buddha expressly implies the existence of this Self and never denies it." Mark the paradoxical phrase *expressly implies* which Mr. Humphreys is obliged to coin. He ventures further and says: "And I claim it is the Message of the All-Enlightened One." Fancy: The expressly implied Message of the Omniscient One.

The Ven. Kassapa, evidently not satisfied with this "expressly implied" message, goes one better and says: "The Buddha has maintained the Living-Self ever-becoming, ever-growing, etc., which attains liberation or Nibbāna."

The Ven. Kassapa distinguishes between the Soul which is "eternal unchanging and primeval" as stated in the Bhagavad-Gītā and this "Living-Self," and evidently condemns the former as a Sassata-vāda. But the trouble is: Mr. Humphreys is not satisfied (if I am not mistaken) with this denial. He is anxious to know: "What moves towards Nibbāna and enters it, if there is no soul"? Mr. Humphreys goes further and says: "this fragment of potential Buddhahood slips into the Shining Sea of pure Enlightenment" or "the universal consciousness"—Nibbāna.

Mr. Humphreys' position is set forth in a pamphlet entitled: "Buddhism Applied" (published by the London Buddhist Lodge of which he is the President), where one finds written about an "immortal Self which never left Nibbāna."
It is, therefore, conclusive that Mr. Humphreys pins his faith to an immortal Soul, which ultimately merges in Nibbāna or "universal consciousness" as he calls it, whereas the Ven. Kassapa is not prepared to go beyond a "living Self ever-growing ever-progressing," etc., which is therefore subject to Anicca.

Now, neither the Master nor His followers have any quarrel with those who choose to believe in such a "changing" Self or Soul. Forsooth the Buddha has not only denied such a soul but also not condescended to notice such an irrelevant thing. Let there be a soul corresponding to each of the six senses and even more. So long as they are one and all subject to Anicca, such souls cannot possibly "enter Nibbāna" to use Mr. Humphreys' expression.

What the Buddha has revealed is compared to a handful of Simsapā leaves, whereas what He has left unrevealed is like unto the Simsapā-forest. "This ever-growing, ever-becoming, Living-Self," for all we know, may be discovered in the Simsapā-forest, but we fear a superior to a Supremely Enlightened One will be required to reveal what is left unrevealed by the Supremely Enlightened One.

I must confess I do not pose as a Pāli scholar: very far from it. Though a mere dabbler in Buddhism, I am deeply in earnest in seeking light on this crucial question of Anattā. I therefore heartily join Mr. Humphreys in his request for a reasoned and documented exposition by a competent scholar who will elucidate this knotty problem.

I have tried merely to clarify the issues but by no means to pronounce a verdict upon them.

—The Mahābodhi, April, 1936.
“JAINISM AND BUDDHISM”*

“Profound, O Vaccha, is this doctrine, recondite and hard to comprehend, good, excellent and not to be reached by mere logic, subtle and intelligible only to the wise, and it is a difficult doctrine for you to learn, who belong to another faith and sit at the feet of another teacher.”

—The Buddha.

I am reminded of the above-quoted words when I take up this essay in comparison by a Jaina scholar between the doctrines of the two religions. The learned author makes an elaborate attempt to show far-reaching similarity in essential particulars. Nothing is more gratifying than to see such an object successfully accomplished. With this end in view he has been at pains to obtain first-hand information about Buddha-dhamma and has had the advantage of having sat at the feet of Sri Dhammānanda Nāyaka Thera of Ceylon, for a period of one full month. He has, however, as he admits, “not read the Svetambara Jain literature which is in Prakrit.”

Equipped with these qualifications, he has undertaken the herculean task of reconciling the two religions. For this purpose he devotes 333 pages octavo, but we opine 33 thousand pages will not be a trifle too many to achieve the impossible, viz., to prove that white is black or Anattā is the same as Attā.

For, in the last analysis, the whole question resolves itself into one single point of Attā or Anattā. The bulk of the volume is naturally devoted to a laboured effort to show that the great Anattavādī was after all no other than a thinly disguised Attavādī.

* A Comparative Study, by Brahmachari Sital Prasodji, published by the Jaina Mission Society, Madras, whom I thank for two presentation copies sent for review.
As the author himself points out, there are more than 15 passages in the Pāli canon referring to the many occasions on which the Lord Buddha was brought into direct contact with the Nigaṇṭhas. If the contention of the essential identity or similarity of the two religions is sound, the Master would have readily acknowledged the fact at the very first opportunity. Mahāvīra or Nātaputta, we must remember, was a contemporary of the Buddha who therefore must have been well acquainted, even from the very beginning, with the teachings of the former. The great Teacher of Compassion, who invariably evinced the utmost toleration towards the views of other teachers and readily acknowledged their excellence whenever possible, would have cheerfully applauded and expressed His agreement with the Jaina doctrines if only He could conscientiously do so.

On the contrary, we find Him in numerous instances confuting and denouncing the Nigaṇṭha errors, in unmistakable and uncompromising terms.

The Buddha's attitude to rival creeds of the day is indicated in the rules laid down for admitting converts. The general rule was to require a probation of four months before enrolling a proselyte from another sect as a bhikkhu. But an exception was made in favour of converted Jaṭīlas who were admitted without probation, on the express ground that "they held the doctrine that actions received their reward and that our deeds have their result." This seems to be in keeping with the Buddha's teaching of Kammasaka-samma-diṭṭhi. In one sense, therefore, even the Jaṭīlas were Sammā-diṭṭhikas. True it is that Nigaṇṭhas taught Karma or result of action to a certain qualified degree, but the trouble was that their Karma-teaching was confined to what was called Pubbekatavāda or that "all weal and woe was the result of previous actions," which the Buddha condemned as a heresy (Sutta ro1 of Majjhima Nikāya and Aṅguttara, 111.7).
Here was a fine opportunity for the Buddha to thankfully express His concurrence with the Niganthas, if He agreed with them. Far from subscribing to the idea, He expressed His entire disagreement. We may, however, concede that Niganthas were partial Kamma-vādins and, therefore, Sammādīṭṭhikas pro tanto. This is, I fear, the utmost extent to which the similarity on the question of Karma can be said to reach.

There is, however, we must admit, another similarity, though this time of a negative character, in the rejection, common to both religions, of the doctrine of Issara-Nimmaṇa-vāda or creation by God. It is interesting to find some measure of agreement on this remarkable point. (But see pp. 82, 85 and 89 where God and Soul are said to be identical.)

As regards moral maxims and rules of conduct, there seems to be an apparent similarity. But the Jain doctrine of "The shedding of Karmas by austerities" (see p. 165) completely nullifies the significance of morality as a means of emancipation. The comparison on salient features may be said to end here and the contrast begins. The dissimilarities, I am constrained to say, are fundamental and may be classed under two heads—Soul and Self-mortification.

The learned author devotes, as I said, a large part of the book to prove that the Teacher of Anattā actually taught Allā. Buddha-dhamma may be compared to a mirror. Each person who looks into it can see the reflection of his own likeness. A theist will see theism and an atheist atheism, a materialist materialism, a pantheist pantheism, a polytheist poletheism, an idealist idealism, an agonistic agnosticism, a spiritualist spiritualism, and an ātmanist (eternalist) ātmanism, or a nihilist will find nihilism, etc.

All these and other—isms and—logies are categorically condemned as Sassata—and Uccheda-heresies, enumerated in the Brahmājāla-sutta, whereas Buddha-dhamma remained the doctrine of the golden mean, lying between the two extremes.
Uccheda and Sassata are like unto Scylla and Charybdis. The Dhamma sails serenely midway between the two, avoiding collision with either.

In other words, Buddhism differs from both Sassata and Uccheda, and at the same time partakes of the nature of both and thus synthesises them. In one sense, Buddhism is Sassata, because it teaches rebirth or the continuation of personality without the passing over of a soul. On the other hand, Buddhism inculcates Uccheda, as it points out the cessation of the five skandhas at death, though a new set of skandhas takes rebirth as the cause-effect of the previous skandhas—Na ca so na ca aśnño. Once again, Nibbāna shares the characteristics of both Sassata and Uccheda. Nibbāna has the feature of Sassata, inasmuch as it is not an annihilation. At the same time, Nibbāna possesses the nature of Uccheda because the perpetuation of individuality ceases at Nibbāna. To venture to go further than this on questions declared by the Lord to be "unthinkables" (acintiya) is to run counter to His positive injunction.

Buddhism treats a living being as a dynamic organic process, whereas other religions regard the essence of a living being as a static substance—an eternal soul. Take away from Buddhism its unique teaching of Anattā, and you deprive it of its one claim to distinction among religions.

"Aṭṭhakkharā tīni ṭ prādā Sambuddhena pākāsitā."—Three words of eight letters were proclaimed by the Supremely Enlightened One”—namely, Anicca, Dukkha and Anattā. Now Anicca and Dukkha, a little reflection will show, are the common property of all religions of the world. Otherwise every religion would lose its raison d'être and self-justification.

But Anattā alone remains the specific teaching peculiar to Buddhism. Hence the gigantic efforts of Ātmanists, be they Jains, Hindus, Christians or others, to remove this bugbear out of the way at all costs. We read in Aṅguttara III, 14, 134 and Dhammapada, verse 279, and elsewhere these
world-staggering words: *Sabbe Dhammā Anattā*—All things are void of soul. But the pity of it is that a pre-eminent Pāli scholar, like Mrs. Rhys Davids, has the hardihood to mistranslate the technical terms Saṅkhārā occurring in both verses 277 and 278 and the equally technical term Dhammā in verse 279 by the same English words, "what men think and do," thereby making a pitiful mess of the right meanings of the two words (see her translation of Dhammapada, p. 93).

Mr. F. L. Woodward, the learned translator of the Aṅguttara passage mentioned above, goes one better than Mrs. Rhys Davids and renders the same two words Saṅkhārā and Dhammā by the one English word "Phenomena" (see his *Gradual Sayings*, p. 265, Vol. 1).

The right interpretation of Dhammā, we submit with all deference, is simply "things," thereby including all Saṅkhāras (*Saṅkhata*) and even Nibbāna (*Asaṅkhata*).

Moreover, the second discourse preached by the Buddha to the Five Disciples, five days after the First sermon, was exclusively devoted to Anattā—thereby inducing Arahantship for the first time. Anattā is the main theme of the first discourse of the Dīgha Nikāya, *viz.*, Brahmajāla Sutta. It is also placed in the very forefront in Kathāvatthu and in the Milinda-questions. Last but not least, the whole of the voluminous Abhidhamma Piṭaka supplies one gigantic master-key to the elucidation of the glorious doctrine of Anattā.

It is, therefore, futile at this time of day to attempt to prove that the Buddha taught the very Attavāda (which He emphatically condemned) even in the indirect way, for such is the utmost claim made by ātmanists for the Buddha. "In Buddhist literature, though no direct mention of the soul is found, it is described in an indirect way in the enunciation of Nibbāna." (See p. 39.) "To describe only in
an indirect way” such a fundamental teaching is, to say the least, passing strange. If the Supremely Enlightened One observed an eloquent silence on such questions, it is preposterous on the part of puny mortals to blaspheme Him by attempting to improve upon Him.

This reminds me of a recent attempt by another writer to prove by means of logic that there is a soul in Nibbāna. His ingenious argument ran in this wise:

Samsāra (loka) is Anicca, Dukkha and Anattā. Conversely, Nibbāna (lokuttara) is Nicca, Sukha and Attā. Ergo, there is a soul in Nibbāna. Astounding conclusion indeed! Unfortunately for Atmanist-dialecticians, the converse of every proposition is not true, least of all where lokuttara is concerned. This is another instance of the truth of the Master’s teaching that the Dhammā is Atakkāvacara, i.e., “not to be realised by logic alone.”

So “Sabbe Dhammā Anattā” remains unrefuted and there is after all no Soul in Nibbāna.

As regards self-mortification, the author rightly points out that Prince Siddhattha before his enlightenment practised austerities unparalleled even in Jainism. This, to say the least, is a disingenuous comment to make, in view of the fact that as soon as Siddhattha discovered his error he gave up self-mortification and reverted to his usual mode of living. Moreover, in the very first Sermon after His Enlightenment He denounced Atakilamatānuyoga (self-mortification) as “ignoble, vain and painful.” What more conclusive proof is required of the absolute futility of self-mortification as a means of salvation?

If the contention of the writer that there is no fundamental difference between the two religions is sound, the Buddha who perfected the Pāramitās for countless aeons
laboured in vain. He has thus missed His mission, for Mahāvīra forestalled Him. The Buddha has, therefore, made no unique contribution to world-thought!

So, even on a priori grounds, it is impossible to argue that the two religions are one in essential particulars. We need hardly add it will be a highly gratifying conclusion, if only we can conscientiously arrive at it, that all religions are true and simply so many different Paths to the one Common Goal. Nothing can better promote goodwill and harmony among mankind than such a sublime idea. Unfortunately, the eclectic doctrine of the unity of all religions is a chimera.

Let us, therefore, in a friendly way agree to do the next best thing, i.e., manly to differ where we cannot agree to agree. Is this not infinitely better than "flabbiness of thought, a false geniality which shuts its eyes to the facts and ignores fundamental differences, loose, vague and inaccurate thinking, a backboneless mysticism and a shallow mentality which tries to combine incompatibles in an inept and colourless unity"?

It is gratifying to note that the author had the advantage of instruction under learned Theras in Ceylon. But we regret that he has not derived full benefit from such association, as he has hopelessly failed to grasp the flagrant differences between the two religions. Perhaps the fault was not altogether on the part of the author. There is yet hope and there is, therefore, no reason to be discouraged. If only our learned friend can manage to put aside, at least for the time being, all prejudices and misconceptions and bring himself into sympathy with the Buddhist view of life and also ("without thinking of something else" as R. L. Stevenson would say) think out things to a conclusion, he may still see light, where now he finds darkness and confusion.
With this frame of mind, let him take up once again those fifteen canonical passages addressed to Nigaṅṭhas and mark, learn and inwardly digest them, always bearing in mind that the bed-rock of the Buddha’s teaching was Anattā and not Atī. If he does so, our friend may yet write another treatise on the contrasts between the two great religions. So may it be.

—*The Mahābodhi*, May, 1936.
THE UNIQUENESS OF A RELIGION

There are three world-religions. To mention them in historical order, they are Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. Whilst these three world-religions make a universal appeal to all mankind, there are other religions whose message is confined to a particular race, nation or tribe. Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, Shintoism and Judaism are religions or cults, which are limited to those born to them. The very life-breath of Buddhism, Christianity and Islam is their propagandist or missionary character, whereas rigid exclusiveness is the characteristic of the other religions.

It is a strange historical fact, that out of the three world religions, Buddhism is the only Aryan religion, Christianity and Islam being Semitic in origin. The Lord Buddha is, therefore, the sole Aryan world-teacher. The genuine pristine Buddha-dhamma, which came to be called Buddhism, is enshrined in the Pāli canon. The Mahāyāna literature, which is Sanskrit, represents the "developed" doctrine of a later age and is obviously not the original teaching of the Master, except as regards some salient features.

Debt to Theravāda.

The world is therefore indebted to Theravāda or Pāli Buddhism for a correct knowledge of the actual original teaching of the Buddha. The Pāli Piṭakas, together with a running commentary, were handed down in unbroken succession from teacher to pupil from the earliest days of the Founder and His immediate disciples for several centuries until they were first committed to writing.

Where did this epoch-making event take place and who was instrumental in making it possible? are questions of memorable significance to the history of human thought.
It is a well-known fact that it is in this land of the Sinhalese, by Sinhalese Bhikkhus with Sinhalese pens (or styles), on Sinhalese materials that the Saddhamma was first reduced to writing.

**Gift from the Sinhalese.**

Foreign invasions, internecine warfare, rebellions, famines, pestilences and other disturbing influences notwithstanding, the Sinhalese Bhikkhus, representing the Mahā-vihāra fraternity, have preserved to this day the Pāli documents. The Sinhalese Bhikkhus—ignorant and illiterate as some of them were—guarded this priceless treasure for centuries against the ravages of time, weather, vandals and foes. They fled from mountain-fastness to remote valley and ravine concealing with jealous care their invaluable possession in cave, cell and temple.

More than one-third of mankind own and profess the Buddha as Lord and Teacher. A large area of the surface of the globe is swayed by the spiritual sovereignty of the Buddha. But it remains a singular, historical phenomenon that the tiny Sinhalese nation occupying a tiny island is the only Aryan world-teacher.

It was in the Aryan soil of Śrī Laṅkā that Pāli Buddhism first obtained a foot-hold. From Ceylon it spread to Burma, Siam and Cambodia. But Burma, Siam, Cambodia, China, Japan, Tibet, Manchuria, Bhutan and Sikkim are one and all Mongolian countries.

Every civilised nation and country has made its distinctive contribution to world-thought and culture. The unique gift offered to the world by the Sinhalese is Pāli Buddhism. It is due to Buddha-dhamma that the Sinhalese became a civilised people. It is owing to their religion that the Sinhalese preserved their sovereignty and independence for over two millenniums. Their kings and heroes shed their life-blood to defend their religion and country. Buddhism inspired
Sinhalese rulers and chiefs to carve out vast lakes, and to erect mountain-like relic-mounds. Buddhism encouraged patriotism, stimulated arts and sciences, inculcated learning and gave an impetus to culture and civilisation, which even in their present condition evoke the admiration of the world.

*Priceless Legacy.*

The Sinhalese Bhikkhu may, in course of time, have broken away from the rigid discipline of the olden days. He may have fallen from grace owing to many a lapse. But let us not on that account deny him his due meed of praise, honour and gratitude for the inestimable service he has rendered to the world preserving the priceless legacy of the Pāli-Piṭakas.

When the Sinhalese Bhikkhu is painted in lurid colours as is too often done, let us at least remember that it is due to him that pure Buddhism exists today in the world, and it has made its unique contribution to the mental life of mankind.

"CONCENTRATION & MEDITATION"

(Published by the Buddhist Lodge, London)

This is the second Manual published by the London Buddhist Lodge. The book is the product of wide research and sustained thought on the part of the members and reflects much credit on their enthusiasm, learning and industry.

So far as it deals with actual experiences in meditation of individual members, it is not open for others to quarrel. It would indeed be an impertinence on my part to attempt to do so. But as regards exegesis of some Buddhist doctrines which this volume and their first Manual, "What is Buddhism?" present, I am constrained to enter an emphatic protest and to take serious exception.

It is indeed a great pity that when the Buddhist Lodge severed its official connection with the Theosophical Society, it did not at the same time divest itself of the Theosophical bias and also surrender its allegiance to the fundamental Theosophical doctrines.

"The Unity of all religions" or in other words that all religions are true and simply so many different Paths to the one common final Goal, is a characteristic Theosophical teaching. Now, this dogma is either true or false. Let us face the crucial issue fairly and squarely. The Lord Buddha has stated and reiterated in numerous passages as follows:

"In whatever doctrine and discipline the Noble Eightfold Path is not found neither in it is there the true saint of the First, Second, Third or the Fourth degree. Void are the systems of other teachers—void of true saints." In the face
of these uncompromising and unmistakeable words can anyone consistently maintain that the Noble Path to Nibbāna is laid down in all religions?

When an eminent thinker once characterised Theosophy as "the monstrous lie that at bottom all religions are one," he was certainly not guilty of a cruel exaggeration.

We read on page 126—"There are two ways of meditating: One way is to destroy the Not-self and the other is to cultivate the Self. The former is the method of the Theravāda... This is the doctrine of Anattā or Not-attā, attā being the Brahmin word for Self. The other is the way of mystics... This method finds it supreme expression in the Bhagavadgīta, etc."

I feel bewildered. In the first place "Not-self" is a mistranslation of Anattā. The nearest English equivalent would be "Non-self" or 'without substratum.' Starting with this initial mistake the authors have come to the startling conclusion that when the Buddha characterised each of the five skhandhas as anattā or 'void of soul,' what He meant to say was the soul (attā) was really outside the skhandhas, evidently hovering over and around them. It would be doing violence to language and common sense to argue that when He said the soul is not inside, He actually meant to say the soul is outside.

Buddhism is absolutely unique in one main respect, i.e. by virtue of its specific teaching of Anattā, Non-soul. Once it is established that the great Anatta-vādī was, after all, only a thinly disguised Attavādī, the Theosophical miracle of the reconciliation of all religions is, I conclude, a fait accompli.

We read on page 129 as follows:—"There are those who still imagine that because there is no abiding Self in the skhandhas or Constituents of Being, there is therefore no Self to use the vehicles (the Theosophical vehicles?). But
the Signs of Being, imperfection, variability and Anattā or Not-self apply to samsāra, whereas the opposite pole of Being, Nirvāṇa would exhibit those of perfection, changelessness and Self (atta). Let those who cling to this illusion, this 'nihilistic and depressing doctrine' turn to the Dhammapada's opening words," etc.

Pure and perfect logic indeed. Samsāra is Anicca, Dukkha, Anattā. Ergo, conversely, Nibbāna is Nicca, Sukha, Attā. Hey presto! There is thus a Soul in Nibbāna. Q.E.D.

How true after all are the-words of that great thinker who once said: "Logic is pure there only where it turns against itself and leads itself into absurdity"? Unfortunately for our friends of the Buddhist Lodge the converse of every proposition is not true. Least of all where Lokuttara is concerned. "Let those who cling to this illusion turn to the Dhammapada's" classic verses 277, 278 and 279, which begin respectively as:—

277—Sabbo sankhārā anicca etc.
278—Sabbo sankhārā dukkha etc.
279—Sabbo dhammā anattā etc. which Mrs. Rhys Davids translates:
277—Transient is all men think and do etc.
278—Woeful is all men think and do etc.
279—Without the Self men think and do etc.

This pre-eminent Pāli scholar thus unblushingly translates both those highly technical terms Saṅkhārā and Dhammā, having divergent meanings, by the same English words "what men think and do," thereby making a sorry hash of the true meanings of the two words. Dhammā here, as the veriest tyro knows, comprises not only what "men think and do" (saṅkhārā) but also all conditioned things (saṅkhata) and includes even the (asaṅkhata) Nibbāna.
How true indeed are the Noble words of the Master when He said that the Dhamma is *atakkāvacara*—not to be reached by logic only: certainly not that the Dhamma is illogical but a-logical, i.e., beyond logic. So after all there is no soul in Nibbāna!

_Sabbe Dhammā Anattā_—"A nihilistic and depressing doctrine." Let us once for all be honest with and among ourselves and agree manly to differ where we cannot conscientiously agree to agree. Is this not infinitely better than "flabbiness of thought, a false geniality, which shuts its eyes to the facts and ignores fundamental differences, loose, vague and inaccurate thinking, a backboneless mysticism, a shallow temper, which tries to combine incompatibles in an inept and colourless unity—which result logically in what passes current as modern Theosophy?"

To our mundane minds it is certainly a most comforting doctrine, if only it is true, that Buddhism, in common with Vedantism and other religions, teaches a merging of the individual soul or self into the universal soul or self. The trouble is that genuine pristine Buddhavacana enshrined in the Pāli Piṭakas does not lead us to such a conclusion, however acceptable and desirable otherwise, to those who still hug Atta-vāda.

A brief review is hardly the proper place to enter at length into further questions of exegesis. If the learned authors of the Manual, who favour a "Buddhist emphasis," divided the Eightfold Path into _Sīla, Samādhi_, and _Paññā_, following the usual classification, they would have imparted more lucidity to their exposition of Concentration and Meditation. For Samādhi is concentration.

The attempted distinction between Concentration and Meditation would have appeared in bold relief, if this mode of division had been adopted. As it is, the Manual is a blank on _Vipassanā_ meditation, which alone is the gateway to
Nibbāna. Perhaps it is advisable that this abstruse subject remains untouched by a treatise meant for the ordinary tyro in mind-development.

Barring some obvious defects, the book affords interesting reading and should prove of practical benefit to earnest beginners in the difficult art of meditation.

Our brothers of the London Buddhist Lodge, the Authors of this instructive publication, will forgive us if a semblance of polemics has entered our observations, which are tendered with the utmost good-will (mettā).

—The Mahābodhi, July, 1936.
BUDDHA-DHAMMA AND THE SINHALESE

There are three world-religions. To mention them in historical order, they are Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. Whilst these three world-religions make a universal appeal to all mankind, there are other religions whose message is confined to a particular race, nation or tribe. Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, Shintoism and Judaism are religions or cults which are limited to those born to them. The very life-breath of Buddhism, Christianity and Islam is their propagandist or missionary character, whereas rigid exclusiveness is the characteristic of the other religions.

It is a strange historical fact, that out of the three world-religions, Buddhism is the only Aryan religion, Christianity and Islam being Semitic in origin. The Lord Buddha is therefore the sole Aryan world-teacher. The genuine pristine Buddha-dhamma, which came later to be called Buddhism, is enshrined in the Pali canon. The Mahāyāna literature, which was in Sanskrit, represents the developed doctrine of a later age and is obviously not the original teaching of the Master, except as regards some salient features.

The world is therefore indebted to Theravāda or Pali Buddhism for a correct knowledge of the actual original teaching of the Buddha. The Pāli Piṭakas together with a running commentary were handed down in unbroken succession from teacher to pupil from the earliest days of the Founder and His immediate disciples for several centuries until they were first committed to writing.

Where did this epoch-making event take place and who was instrumental in making it possible, are questions of memorable significance to the history of human thought.
It is a well-known fact that it is in this land of the Sinhalese, by Sinhalese Bhikkhus, with Sinhalese pens, on Sinhalese paper, that the Saddhamma was first reduced to writing.

Foreign invasions, inter-necine warfare, rebellions, famines, pestilences and other disturbing influences notwithstanding, the Sinhalese Bhikkhus, representing the Mahā-Vihāra fraternity, have preserved to this day the Pali documents. The Sinhalese Bhikkhus—ignorant and illiterate as some of them were—guarded this priceless treasure for centuries against the ravage of time, weather, vandals and foes. They fled from mountain-fastness to remote valley and ravine concealing with jealous care their invaluable possession in cave, cell and temple.

More than one-third of mankind own and profess the Buddha as Lord and Teacher. A large area of the surface of the globe is swayed by the spiritual sovereignty of the Buddha. But it remains a singular historical phenomenon that this tiny Sinhalese nation occupying a tiny island is the only Aryan people who, as such, profess the only Aryan world-teacher.

It was in the Aryan soil of Sri Lanka that Pāli Buddhism first obtained a foot-hold. From Ceylon it spread to Burma, Siam and Cambodia. But Burma, Siam, Cambodia, China, Japan, Tibet, Manchuria, Bhutan and Sikhim are one and all Mongolian countries.

Every civilised nation and country has made its own distinctive contribution to world-thought and culture. The unique gift offered to the world by the Sinhalese is Pāli Buddhism. It is due to Buddha-dhamma that the Sinhalese became a civilised people. It is owing to their religion that the Sinhalese preserved their sovereignty and independence for over two millenniums. Their kings and heroes shed their life-blood to defend their religion and country. Buddhism inspired the Sinhalese rulers and chiefs to carve out vast lakes
where-with to erect mountain-like relic-mounds. Buddhism encouraged patriotism, stimulated arts and sciences, inculcated learning and gave an impetus to a culture and civilisation which, even in their present degenerate condition, evoke the admiration of the world.

The Sinhalese Bhikkhu may in course of time have broken away from the strict discipline of the olden days. He may have fallen from grace owing to many a lapse. But let us not on that account deny him his due need of praise, honour and gratitude for the inestimable service he has rendered to the world by preserving the priceless legacy of the Pāli-Piṭakas.

When the Sinhalese Bhikkhu is painted in lurid colours as is too often done, let us at least remember to his credit that it is due to him pure Buddhism exists today in the world, and has thus made its unique contribution to the mental life of mankind.

—*The Buddhist*, April-May, 1936.
THE GODS AND THEIR PLACE IN BUDDHISM

THE BUDDHIST conception of the universe is a lofty one. The spiritual domain of a Buddha extends over 10,000 world-systems. Our own world-system is inhabited by human beings and the animal kingdom, surrounded on all sides by a teeming world of spirits.

The hierarchy of the spirit-world consists of Brahmas and Devas. Brahmas are always of a beneficent nature and occupy the highest place, with the exception in certain respects of man, in the scale of beings. Devas may be either benevolent or malevolent in disposition. The latter are classed as Yakkhas and Rākshasas (demons).

Petas (manes) and Asuras (titans) and the denizens the hells (Avīci) make up the rest of the inhabitants of this world-system.

One comes across numerous instances in the Pali Canon where Brahmas and Devas play active and important parts in the Buddhist dispensation. Mahā-Brahma, the chief of the Brahmas and Sakka or Inda, the king of gods (Devas), figure prominently in the principal incidents in the Tathāgata’s life. Mahā-Brahma and Sakka and their respective retinues minister to the Master at His birth, Enlightenment, the first Sermon and Parinibbāna.

Vishṇu is charged with the commission of protecting the Buddha-Sāsana and the minor deities perform different roles and functions.

Important events in the numerous lives of the Bodhisattta have brought about the personal intervention of Sakka.

World-staggering events have heated the stony throne of the king of gods. It is even said that Sakka looks down
on the earth on holy days and bows down his majestic head to human beings who practise the virtues and records their acts of merit in a golden book.*

The Master has at the special request of Sakka enjoined all devotees of the faith on all occasions to transmit the merit of their good deeds to the Devas and other beings. Not only this, the Master has ordained that offerings of food, drink, flowers and incense should be made to Devas and Petas. Moreover it is recorded that the Master spent a whole Vassa Season in the Tusita heaven and preached the Abhidhamma to His mother who was then born as a Deva called Mātu-Deva.

Petas are usually the ghosts of the human dead, some of whom according to the Khuddaka-pañha wait by walls, doors, caves, houses and cross-ways hoping to receive offerings of food, etc., and although they may not be able actually to consume such food but the very sight or smell gives them some sort of nutriment or satisfaction.

Some varieties of Petas are described as thin as leaves and suffer from continual hunger and thirst which cannot be appeased. In the Ratana Sutta, the Master expressly requires the devotees to make offerings to the gods (Devas) both by night and by day so that such gods may protect them in return, with vigilance.

"Divā ca ratto ca haranti ye baliṁ
Tasmāhi ne rakkhata appamattā."

Addressing the Licchavi clans the Master said that the Vajjis would not go to decay and decline so long as they maintain their temples as of yore and continue the customary acts of reverence and offerings to the tutelary Devas.

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*This is not such an extravagant statement as to be dismissed with a sneer in these days, when Clairvoyance, Telepathy, Television, etc., are taken au sérieux.
The Buddha’s attack on the god-conception was never directed against the Devas who in many instances happened to be some of the most devout adherents of the faith. Moreover the Piṭakas give numerous instances where innumerable Brahmās attained the fruition of the Four Holy Paths. Brahma Sahampati and Sākka are themselves counted among those who attained the first step of the Path (Sotāpatti).

The pantheistic or monistic conception of god does not seem to have been in vogue at the time of the Buddha. The Advaita or Vedānta idea can only be regarded as a later development. Otherwise it is inconceivable that the Master could have ignored such an important school of religious thought and not caught it up in the Supreme Net (Brahma-majāla) of His doctrine. The Tathāgata’s challenge was confined to the erroneous conception of a creator-God (Issaranimmāna-vāda) and hence Buddhism came to be nicknamed atheism.

Now suppose a European tourist visits a Buddhist Temple in Ceylon as it often happens. Most probably, especially if it happens to be a poya day, our visitor may witness a Sinhalese devotee worshipping and offering lights, flowers, food, drinks, incense, etc., at the shrine of the Master’s image. If the visitor has the patience to linger for some time and look on with an observant eye, he may chance to see a strange sight. He will be surprised to find the self-same Buddhist devotee going round to the images of the Devas probably Vishnu or Skandha, in the wing of the same Buddhist temple, and repeating the same process of worshipping and making offerings. The visitor at once jumps to the conclusion that the Sinhalese Buddhist is a demon-worshipper. It is no wonder that a superficial observer from overseas should fall into such a common error, when there are today even so-called educated Buddhists among us who see here a huge inconsistency.
Now if our critic, be he foreigner or of the local variety, will only take in hand this seemingly erring brother and gently and politely question him as to what he asked and expected of the gods when he thus worshipped, our critic will get the invariable naive answer that the unsophisticated man merely desired an ordinary material benefit such as the cure of an illness, a rich harvest at the next season, protection from an enemy or some other immediate relief or advantage. If the critic has the good sense to go a step further and ask the Upāsaka point-blank whether by such offering he expects Nirvāna or even to go to heaven of such a god the devotee, with a beaming smile will turn upon the strange questioner and calmly retort: "No, Sir, don't take me to be such a simpleton. When I worshipped and offered to the Lord Buddha I aspired for Nibbāna and when I offered to the Devas I asked them to cure my child's illness and to give me a bumper crop at the next harvest." Sir Charles Eliot, writing on Buddhism in his monumental work "Hinduism and Buddhism" says: "The spirits may set a good example or send good luck: they have nothing to do with emancipation or nirvāna."

If our visitor is a man of some critical acumen, he may put a further and more important question: "Is it not wrong for a good Buddhist who is enjoined by the Master to seek refuge in himself and not to look to any external refuge, to work out his own salvation, as he is lord of self who else could be the Lord, to behave in this scandalous fashion? In short does not this un-wholesome dependence on gods cut across the very spirit of the Master's teaching of self-help and self-reliance? What about the efficacy of Karma and the pronouncement that we ourselves must make the effort, the Buddhas can merely show the way?" At first sight there appears to be some plausibility in this common objection. A little close examination will however betray the fallacy underlying the reasoning. But even our imaginary ignorant
Buddhist does not say that he offers to the gods to get them to work out his own salvation for him. The most illiterate Upāsikā will not be guilty of such crass folly. Not only we human beings must work out our salvation but also the mightiest of Brahmās and Devas have on their own part to carry out the very same arduous task by themselves.

Our critic may not be satisfied with all this and put the next question: “Well then, why should a Buddhist not rely on himself and stand on his own merits instead of going a-begging to even such mighty beings as the gods?” Just so. But there are occasions on which even a good Buddhist has to go down on his knees to such frail specimens of humanity as the doctor, the lawyer, the charmer, the official or even to a miserable police constable. The critic may retort: why go to the doctor, the charmer when the Buddha has laid down the Parittas? The trouble is that even the Master has not prohibited a Buddhist from having resort to other resources when Paritta fails. There are diseases that cannot be cured by Parittas alone. The Master Himself resorted to Parittas and medicine both. On the other hand there are Devas and Yakkhas and Petas who are not amenable to, and will not be influenced by Parittas however beneficial Parittas may otherwise be. Medicine can cure diseases which Paritta cannot. Again, a simple mantra may cure an illness where medicine fails.

Our critic’s next question may perhaps be: “Does not a Buddhist break or tarnish his sarāṇa or faith in the Buddha by resorting to the gods in this wise?” Certainly not, as he does not expect to achieve Nibbāna or even heaven by such an act. Otherwise a Buddhist who calls in the aid of a doctor or a charmer to cure a disease will be tarnishing his sarāṇa by so doing. Is it not however more manly for a Buddhist, if he does not go a-begging and praying for favours in this humiliating fashion? Certainly so. It is rightly said that the good Buddhist is the only adult among religionists,
others are like unto children asking for presents and favours. No Buddhist expects Nibbāna or even heaven by means of prayers or offerings to gods. If he does, it would be Sīlabba-parāmāsa. A really advanced Buddhist will scorn to ask for favours from either god or man. Even a self-respecting gentleman of the present day, be he of any religion, will not stoop so low as to go seeking for favours and presents.

But we are not all advanced Buddhists nor even present-day so-called gentlemen. There are humbler folk among us and we have to condone their foibles and frailties and humour them occasionally. What an admirable member of society will a man be, if he only refuse to beg, borrow or seek any help or favour from another fellow being, be he parent, brother, sister, son, daughter or closest friend? But there are only quite a few within this circle of the elect. That is the pity of it. The rest of us many-folk are only one step removed from the beggar in the street who goes from door to door. At every turn and on the flimsiest pretext, we are on the alert to turn to our next door neighbour or relative, friend or barest acquaintance for some trifling benefit or advantage. To such as these no greater boon can be held out than the gifts of the tutelary gods who are ever ready to help frail humanity. Let the so-called advanced Buddhist remain on this exalted pedestal by all means. Let him not however on that account look down upon his humbler brethren, who cannot afford to rise up to his own high standard.

The fact is, Buddhism is a religion suited to the capacity of the best cultured as well as the most ignorant and illiterate. It has heights which the greatest intellects attempt in vain to scale and depths the keenest thinkers fail to fathom. The rest of us men of mediocre or meaner attainments only see one of the various aspects of the Dhamma which may make its own special appeal to each of us, even as a prism has a number of facets which present different colours and images to different persons.
Truth to say, there are more things in the Dhamma than are dreamt of in the philosophy of each one of us. Let us therefore cultivate some modicum of humility and be less harsh in our judgment of our humbler brethren.

_The Mahābodhi_, May-June, 1939.
DR. PAUL CARUS'S "THE GOSPEL OF BUDDHA"

According to a review appearing in the July issue of the Mahābudhi Journal a Bengali translation by Bhikkhu Silabhadra has been published of this popular book by an American scholar. The book, first published more than 25 years ago, has received universal commendation from Buddhist authorities and others and undergone many editions. It has been translated into several languages, both Eastern and Western and adopted as a text book in Buddhist schools of Ceylon.

Dr. Carus's manual is on the whole one of the best English treatises on the subject and is deservedly popular among Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike.

It is all the more reason why such a book by an eminent author can prove distinctly harmful, if it contains any grave errors. The book purports to present to the reader quotations from the Tripiṭaka and other accredited sources.

But Dr. Carus is a conscientious man and is careful to indicate in a Table of Reference certain numbered paragraphs marked "E.A" (i.e. Explanatory Additions, see p. 233) which are the learned writer's own words deliberately introduced into the text at his own discretion.

It is a consolation that most of these interpolations are more or less innocuous, but when we come to para. 30 in chapter II, we meet with a pernicious heresy innocently put into the mouth of the great Lord of Compassion which cuts across the very spirit of Mettā and Karuṇā, so consistently and clearly inculcated in the Dhamma.

The paras. 1 to 13 of this chapter 51 are a verbatim reproduction of Professor T. W. Rhys Davids' translation of the well-known story of Sīha-senāpati (Vinaya Texts, II,
p. 108), and the remaining paras. 14 to 30 of the chapter are Dr. Carus's "Explanatory Additions." The great pity is the learned compiler has placed within inverted commas paras. 14 to 30 and has put them into the mouths of the Lord Buddha and Siha-senāpati, as if they were the ipsissima verba of the Master and of the general.

Now if the reader will take the trouble to look up page 124 of "The Gospel of Buddha," he will find that the Licchavi general in paras 1 to 13 deals with eight different points of doctrine, none of which has the remotest connection with warfare, legal punishment or self-defence. The learned author has evidently given free rein to his fertile imagination, when in all innocence he concluded that nothing was more likely or appropriate than a professional warrior should wedge in a dialogue about warfare at this historic encounter with the Master. So Dr. Paul Carus has interpolated paras. 14 to 30 which gave a graphic and dramatic dialogue wherein the great Lord of Compassion, who made the emphatic pronouncement:

"If villainous bandits were to carve limb from limb with a two-handed saw, even then the man who should give way to anger will not be obeying my teaching," is made to sanction warfare by saying:—Para 17 "He (the Tathāgata) does not teach that those who go to war in a righteous cause after having exhausted all means to preserve peace are blame-worthy." Also in para 30 "Struggle then, General, courageously; and fight your battles vigorously, but be a soldier of truth and the Tathāgata will bless you." Verily a magnificent apologia for war.

As the words are alleged to be addressed to a soldier and in view of the context, it is impossible to construe these words in a metaphorical sense.

Moreover, the matter is not one of passing academic interest only, because a noted Buddhist journal in Ceylon quoting and relying on the said spurious paras. 15, 16 and 17
has (wonderful to relate!) actually advocated warfare by way of self-defence of one’s country, his hearth and home. What a deplorable travesty!

So the Rev. Silabhadra will be well advised to consider this important point and to expurgate from all future editions of his Bengalee translation the passages shown as Dr. Carus’s “Explanatory Additions,” especially paras 14 to 30 in chapter 51, which are palpably fraught with mischief.

(I am of course assuming that these objectionable passages do appear in the Bengalee translation also.)

Moral:—Let every student therefore beware how careful he should be not to be led astray, when he takes his Buddha-Dhamma second-hand or third-hand and even fourth-hand as in this Bengalee translation.

—*The Mahābodhi*, September, 1939.
"BUDDHISM AND DEFENCE"

Under the above heading Mr. Basil Crump has an article in the last Vesak number of this journal, advocating warfare in defence of person and property against any aggressor. We Buddhists will be disloyal to the Master and lacking in common courtesy to an earnest student of the Dhamma, if we do not point out the grave fallacy of this conclusion, which is fraught with immense mischief, though preached and propagated in all innocence and good faith by a professed admirer of the religion. This is all the more reason why we should at the earliest opportunity, and in emphatic terms repudiate such a pernicious heresy. The pity of it is that Mr. Crump quotes and relies on only one solitary passage purporting to be a pronouncement of the Master. The pity is all the greater when one finds that the words attributed to the Lord Buddha are a spurious interpolation by Dr. Paul Carus in his well-known book The Gospel of Buddha.

Unfortunately Mr. Basil Crump refrains from giving reference for his quotation. But if the reader will only take the trouble to look up pp. 126 to 129 of Dr. Carus' treatise, he can easily trace the passage which runs as follows:—

A Jaina general asked the Buddha whether it was wrong to go to war for the protection of homes and property. The reply was: "The Tathāgata teaches that all warfare is lamentable in which man tries to slay his brother, but he does not teach that those who go to war in a righteous cause after having exhausted all means to preserve the peace are blameworthy... Struggle then O general, courageously and fight your battles vigorously but be a soldier of truth and the Tathāgata will bless you"—what a marvellous apologia for warfare!
Dr. Paul Carus was undoubtedly guilty of a grave indiscretion when he in all innocence and best will made this interpolation by imputing to the Lord words which He never uttered. But at the same time the late Dr. Carus was a scrupulously honest man and scholar. So he annexed a table of reference (see p. 238) in which he stated that paras. 15 to 30 in Chapter LI, were his own "Explanatory Additions."

The above quoted passage which he put into the mouth of the Master occurs among the interpolated paras, and is therefore Dr. Carus' own and certainly not the ipsissima verba of the Master.

It is deplorable that these words were placed within inverted commas, thereby misleading even a careful student like Mr. Crump, not to speak of the ordinary reader of this journal and of Dr. Carus' mischievous book.

A couple of years ago I pointed out in the Mahābodhi Journal this self-same grave error when Rev. Silabhadra published a Bengalee translation of Dr. Paul Carus' popular work.

The writer is grieved to find Mr. Crump repeating the blunder and even emphasizing it in the very next issue of this journal. On p. 250 he writes:—

"In my article 'Buddhism and Defence' (p. 151) I quoted the Lord Buddha's advice to a Jaina general to fight bravely in defence of home and country and this is just what China has been doing against heavy odds for the past five years" etc.

If Mr. Crump's contention is right Tipiṭaka-passages galore should be forth-coming, justifying, warfare in any shape or form, instead of spurious interpolations by a German-American scholar.

—The Mahābodhi, Nov.-December, 1942.
IS BUDDHISM A RELIGION?

Once a learned friend of a sceptical turn of mind and with a penchant for discussion said with magisterial emphasis:—

"Excuse me, Ariya Dhamma, your Buddhism is not a religion at all, it is only a system of philosophy."

A.D.: Thank you for the small mercy my friend: but pray: How do you define the word religion?

Friend: My definition in terms of the derivation of the word is: A binding or abiding relationship between man and his God.

A.D.: I am free to admit that according to your definition, Buddhism is not a religion, as it has been put together without the concepts of God and Soul. On the contrary, I claim this very reason as Buddhism’s chief merit.

Friend: Well then on your part, what is your definition of religion?

A.D.: As for myself, I define religion simply as a mode of salvation from the ills of life.

Friend: That in all conscience is wide enough to include all religions of all time, and covers even Mathew Arnold’s famous definition of religion as: "Morality touched with emotion." I must now admit that in terms of your definition Buddhism is a religion par excellence.

A.D.: Bear with me my friend; Why do you say Buddhism is only a philosophy?

Friend: For the simple reason that you Buddhists are experts in philosophizing.

A.D.: That may be a good ground for calling Buddhists mere philosophers, but not for saying that Buddhism is only a philosophy.
Friend: Surely you can give the reason yourself better than I can hope to do. Do oblige without more ado.

A.D.: The Four Noble Truths form the basis on which, as you know, is founded the whole system. The first Three Truths formulate the Philosophy and the Fourth Truth supplies the ethic or morality. So that all the Four Truths taken together make Buddhism a perfect system of religion.

Friend: I am afraid you are all too brief. Do you mind expatiating a little more.

A.D.: The crowning glory of the Buddha’s supreme Enlightenment is without doubt the unique doctrine of Paṭicca-Samuppāda or Dependent Genesis, with its mind-staggering corollary of the Paṭṭhāna, containing Twenty Four Modes of Correlation, which are elaborated with an infinitude of detail. The Paṭicca-Samuppāda taken in regular order is an exposition of the philosophy of the First and Second Noble Truths of Sorrow and the cause of Sorrow. So it is aptly called Vaṭṭa-Katā or description of the wheel of life. Paṭiccasamuppāda, viewed in reverse order explains the Third Noble Truth of the Cessation of Sorrow.

Now my friend, you will find more than enough of philosophy in Buddhism.

Friend: I have a surfeit of it already. The difficulty is to digest it all.

A.D.: Nil desperandum, my friend. Remember that if a thing is easy, it is certainly not worthwhile. The converse is often equally true.

Friend: I prefer a thing, he who runs may read—something less highbrow.

A.D.: I wish you better luck next time, but seek it elsewhere. You seem to be in a hurry. I will not detain you.

Friend: Cheerio.

—The Mahābodhi, May-June, 1946.
THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF 
ANATTA

WHAT disappears when in course of time the Buddha-
sāsana becomes extinct? The answer is as simple as 
the question itself. That teaching only vanishes 
which the Buddha introduced as an innovation to the current 
religious ideas of His day and time. What then were the 
religious ideas then in vogue? Fortunately for posterity 
the Master Himself has left a tract containing a complete 
summary of all the important religious doctrines and philoso-
phical speculations of the time. In what the Tathāgata called 
the Magnificent Net (Brahmajāla), He caught up with unerring 
accuracy all the various views (Diṭṭhis) then in vogue.

This net was so-called because its meshes were so fine 
that even minute objects could not escape through. The 
Master collected them all, subjected them to His ruthless 
(Vibhajja) analysis and enumerated them as sixty-two 
different theories. Moreover the analysis revealed that all 
these Diṭṭhis had at least one factor in common. This 
common factor was the basic concept of a soul-entity (atta-
vāda). As, distinguished from Soul-theory Buddha taught 
His Anatta Doctrine.

SASSATA and UCCHEDA—In the very first discourse 
(Dhammacakka) soon after Enlightenment the Tathāgata 
divided into two main categories namely Sassata (eternalism 
of the soul) and uccheda (annihilation of the soul) all the then 
existing religious and philosophical speculations. It is these 
very same two main categories which the Master subsequently 
sub-divided into sixty-two in Brahmajāla sutta.

Nāyaka Thera’s Simile:—In this connection the writer 
is reminded of an interesting episode of long ago. Once 
an eminent Nāyaka Thera, a brilliant scholar, when invited

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to explain the Middle Path (Majjhima Paṭipadā) smilingly asked the writer: "Do you remember as a boy playing the game of pebbles"? "Yes, sir," was the reply. "You picked up an even number of pebbles and threw them on the ground scattering them. Then with your tiny finger you drew a line between each pair of pebbles taking care not to touch any of them. If you succeeded in drawing the line between all the pairs without touching a single pebble, you scored one point to your credit against your opponent. That is exactly what the Master did," concluded the Nāyaka Thera in laying down the Middle Path midway between Sassata and Uccheda.

Scylla and Charybdis:—To adopt another metaphor the Lord, like unto a skilful navigator, steered a Middle Course between the Scylla of Sassata and Charybdis of Uccheda avoiding conflict with either of them. The Anatta teaching has a close bearing on the doctrine of the Middle Path, inasmuch as Anatta provides its philosophical basis. Majjhima Paṭipadā is a popular exposition in plain conventional terms addressed to the common man of the deep psychological tenet of Anatta.

Just as the Middle Path lies between the extremes of Sassata and Uccheda, even so does Anatta hold the place of the golden mean between Atta, (which being interpreted is the same as Sassata) and Niratta (Uccheda).

A Characteristic of Anatta:—Anatta possesses this peculiar characteristic. In one sense Anatta partakes of one feature each of both Sassata and Uccheda which of course, are diametrically opposed to each other. Anatta joins hands with Sassata in negating the annihilation of a soul which is maintained by Uccheda. On the other hand Anatta arrays itself with Uccheda in rejecting the eternalism of a soul advocated by Sassata. If a person allies himself with one of two antagonists he, as a matter of necessity, places himself in opposition to the other. Anatta therefore stands by itself
aloof from both Sassata and Uccheda. The logical inference is: Buddhism does not come into conflict with any other religion but takes its flight serenely above all other systems.

*Anatta and Nibbāna* :- The supreme value and profound significance of the Anatta teaching becomes clearly manifest when we consider the intimate relationship which Anatta bears to the doctrine of Nibbāna—the *Summum Bonum*. If Sassata is true and there is such a thing as an eternal soul Nibbāna must be at once ruled out as an impossibility. On the other hand if Uccheda is true, we are driven to the irresistible conclusion that Nibbāna is annihilation pure and simple.

We are thus confronted with this inescapable dilemma. It follows therefore as a logical necessity that both Sassata and Uccheda are wrong and it is the golden mean of the Anatta doctrine, as explained by the Buddha, which at least makes Nibbāna even a bare *possibility*.

*Anatta and Rebirth* :- The universal animistic conception of a soul has its natural counter-part in the widely held doctrine of transmigration of the soul. The Buddha subjected this teaching along with other tenets then in vogue, to relentless Vibhajja analysis and rejected them all as untenable and enunciated His unique doctrine of rebirth without soul. Critics of Buddhism have stated that Anatta conflicts with Rebirth and renders it impossible. We venture to say that on the contrary it is the Anatta teaching that makes the Buddhist doctrine of Rebirth even a possibility. Once again let it be said, that it is the soul theory (atta-vāda) which supports transmigration of a soul and militates against rebirth as taught in Buddhism. But how can rebirth take place if there is no continuation of a soul from life to life, like unto a worm which moves from leaf to leaf as it is stated in the Upanishads? This is certainly a legitimate question and deserves an adequate reply. The Buddhist answer in brief
is that Kamma takes the place of the soul. It is the rebirth-producing (Janaka) Kamma energy which brings about rebirth. Just as a dying man communicates to a wireless set a message which will be reproduced elsewhere by a receiver tuned to the corresponding wave length, after the death of that person, even so the last thought of the dying man (Yadāsanna-Kamma) generates a fresh being. If you switch off an electric light and switch it on over again, the two lights are the same, in the sense that they are only separate stages of the same electric current, whereas the flames of the two are altogether different. Even so says Buddhism the dying person is not the same, and yet not another, that is reborn.

—The Buddhist, October, 1946.
WE MUST WALK THE PATH, BUDDHAS
ONLY SHOW THE WAY

To suffer sorrow is not to realise sorrow.

The Pali word for ‘world’ is loko. Loko has two
meanings—the world of living beings, Satta-loko,
and the outer world, Saṅkhāra-loko. Strange to say
the Greek word for ‘world,’ kosmos, has the same two
meanings, micro-cosmos, the little world or the world of living
beings, and the macro-cosmos, the large world or the world
of space.

The final goal or destiny of a living being is, therefore,
the solution of the world problem. The problem of the
inorganic world is the peculiar province of physical science and,
therefore, lies outside the scope of our enquiry. An investiga-
tion into the latter question, therefore, falls within the
category of profitless discussion banned in Buddhism.

Given one thing the world, in other words, the pain-filled
world of sorrow (the Satta-loko), the salient feature of all
sentient life is its accompaniment of sorrow. This is the
first Aryan Truth. It is important to determine at the
outset the true import of sorrow in Buddha thought. The
Satta-loko, according to that teaching, is divided into thirty
spheres or more accurately, phases. The sphere of sense
desires (Kāmāvacara) consists of the six Devalokas (heavens),
the world of human beings, the animal kingdom, the Asuras
(Titans), the Petas (manes) and the so-called hells, the fifteen
Rūpa-brahma-lokas (with corporeal bodies) and the four
Arūpa-brahma-lokas (without such bodies). The duration
of life in all these phases of existence differs according to the
different states of existence.
If we compare the sum of sorrow in all these spheres with the amount of happiness, it remains an open question as to whether, after all, the happiness does not counterbalance the sorrow. For, we must remember that the incalculable cycles of unalloyed bliss which the Devas and Brahmās enjoy may be even greater than the tortures the beings in hells undergo. Therefore, even from the Buddhist viewpoint, when we lay side by side the sorrow and the happiness in the world, are our critics justified in characterising Buddhism as pessimism? If then the happiness is no less than the sorrow, why does the Tathāgata lay down as the First Aryan Truth Sorrow?

The full and complete answer to this important question is to be found in the right comprehension of that refrain which we find so often recurring in the canon. The Master addresses the disciples thus:—

"Bhikkhus is body, is mind, permanent or impermanent?"

"Impermanent, Lord."

"That which is impermanent, is it liable to suffering or not?"

"It is liable, Lord."

"Of that which is liable to suffering, is it then right to say: 'This is mine, I am this, this is the soul of me'?"

"No, Lord."

It is therefore clear that, according to the Master, it is the certainty of impermanence or transiency, that makes life sorrowful. We read in a Sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya that just as when the lion, king of beasts, at eventide issues forth from its lair, surveys the four directions and roars thrice, all animals tremble with fear and alarm and flee on all sides, even so when the Tathāgata roars the lion's roar: "Sabbe Saṅkhārā anicca," the Devas in long possession of splendid
mansions begin to quiver and tremble and exclaim: "Alas, so long have we fancied ourselves secure in our blissful abodes; now they are no longer permanent and but passing shadows!"

The Mahā-Brahma, the soi-disant creator of the world who, with the radiance of his little finger, can light up a thousand world systems, may at any moment be reduced to the condition of a fire-fly. The great Sakra, king of gods, in all his glory and majesty, may indeed at once be reborn as a Sükara.

And man himself, the so-called lord of creation, who has wrung so many secrets out of nature's bosom, ever and anon falls a ready victim to the tiniest bacillus that fells him to the ground. When one looks around the whole wide world, one sees how life feeds upon life and lives upon death. The bigger preys upon the smaller animal: this is the usual rule of all life, from the biggest mammalia down to the minutest bacilli. One contemplating the idea is simply dumbfounded at the ghastly spectacle. In a word, the universe is a veritable shambles. The picture blackens still more, when one sees the smaller animal in its turn waging war upon the bigger one. A curious illustration, culled from natural history, is well worth repetition: The 'killer-whale' is the smallest and the 'sperm-whale' one of the largest of the whale family. But nature has so ordained that the killer is more than a match in actual combat with the sperm-whale. Whenever the killer meets the sperm-whale it lays hold of the lower jaw of the latter and lashes it with its tail again and again with such violence that it eventually succeeds, may be after a several days' incessant struggle, in dislocating the lower jaw of the sperm-whale, so that it can no more close its mouth. Then comes the opportunity of the killer, who enters the mouth of the sperm-whale and actually eats out its tongue and leaves the huge monster to die in agony and sheer starvation. The world is full of such horrible cruelty that our hearts simply revolt at the very thought. Life is thus so arrayed against
itself that it is an incessant warfare to live. "Struggle for existence" is the final watch-word of science. What a hideous fallacy then to hold an all-merciful god responsible for such monstrous cruelty?

We must thus conclude that it is the transitory nature of all life and its liability to suffer at any moment, which establishes the truth of Dukkha-sacca.

What, then, is meant by realising the First Aryan Truth? If to realise sorrow is to endure sorrow, then indeed he who has suffered most should have best realised sorrow. The denizens of the hells who undergo nameless tortures for countless ages, must have utterly comprehended Dukkha-sacca. But this is absurd. We are thus driven to the conclusion that to suffer or endure sorrow is not necessarily to realise sorrow.

Let us now take a glance into the early life of the Bodhisatta in his royal palace. Brought up as he was in the lap of princely luxury, and cribbed and confined with jealous care by his kingly sire, it was after witnessing the omens of a sick man, an old man, a corpse and a recluse that Prince Siddhatta received the motive-impulse to his great renunciation. The young prince suffered no unhappiness whatever in his own person. But it was his seeing the sufferings and afflictions of others that brought home to his kindly heart that ennui and world-weariness that urged him to flee from the life of the home, as though from a pit of live coals, to the homeless state. It was, therefore, not sorrow felt or endured in his own person, but pain and suffering which he witnessed in others that made him realise the truth of the great intuition. All life is sorrow-fraught. Strictly speaking, Prince Siddhatta comprehended the First Aryan Truth of Sorrow, at any rate had the first glimpse of it, whilst still in the family life, though he discovered the other three Aryan Truths at the foot of the Bodhi-tree.
We must thus bear in mind that, when the Master lays emphasis on the realisation (Avabodha) of the First Truth, what is meant is: Sorrow understood and not sorrow felt. In other words, it is not an emotional feeling that is implied but experience through knowledge or insight. This is the all-sufficient reason why Buddhism is called the religion of enlightenment through knowledge (Paññā). Thus to sum up: Satta-loko is only a synonym for the world of sorrow (Samsāra-vatta).

All religious teachers other than the Tathāgata ascribed to an external agency the source of pain and suffering. Even in the Christian Bible we read that "God brings peace and creates evil." It follows as a logical necessity that man must look for escape from "this vale of tears," as the Christian scriptures put it, to an external power. Prayers, supplications, offerings, sacrifices are naturally the only means prescribed to attain salvation from sorrow.

The Buddha alone of all religious teachers with a master-stroke of genius discovered the cause of sorrow to be craving (Taṃhā) inherent in the mind of every living being. "Verily," He says, "in this fathom-long be-minded body with its perceptions, I declare to be the world, the world's arising, the world's ceasing and the Path to the world's ceasing." The Master laid hold of life by the root and addressed the majestic query: What right has life itself to exist? The answer to this question He found by a flash of glorious intuition that eventful night so full of profound significance to all living beings, as He sat under the Tree of Knowledge which was justly so-called. Rendered with strictest accuracy the Causal Chain runs thus: Ignorance must be present in order that volitional activities may come to pass, and so forth up to craving and finally to births thus bringing about the entire mass of ill.
When the Buddha places ignorance at the head of the system, it must not be taken, as so often erroneously done by some scholars, as a sort of primordial first cause. What is the cause of a living being? Volitional activities (Saṅkhāra) is the answer. When ignorance is stated to be the condition of volitional activities, it should be taken as an abstract answer to the same question which is answered in the Kamma-teaching in a real fashion. It is the same thing, whether we say a being is born by reason of his Kamma (Saṅkhāra) or ignorance. We say light is present or shadow is present but they are aspects of the same thing, the one positive, the other negative. Therefore, ignorance of itself means nothing but that willing is present. Ignorance is willing but only in abstract form.

All the religious teachers the world has ever seen, always affirmed eternal life in heaven as the final and supreme salvation. They failed to solve the world problem, in so far as they place only plus signs or willing in an infinite series, when they posited eternal life. The Lord Buddha alone of all religious teachers placed a minus sign, that of non-willing, and the sum of life was resolved without that ever-recurring remainder, which in other systems of religion is called god or soul, a factor which has rendered the world problem altogether insoluble.

In the Fire Sermon (Āditta-pariyāya), the Sermon on the Mount of Buddhism, the Master says:

"All things, O Bhikkhus, is a burning. The eye is a burning. Visual consciousness is a burning. Visual contact is a burning. The resultant sensation is a burning" and so forth; likewise with regard to the other senses and their respective sense-objects.

The other religions say: Everything is in a static condition, that is where the creator placed it, whereas the Buddha says: "Everything is afire," that is, a becoming or
a process. This is where the great Teacher breaks away from all conventional forms of thought in a most surprising manner and establishes His unquestioned pre-eminence and roars the lion's roar of victory. He presents the same idea in a different form, in another place: "What, O Bhikkhus, is the arising of the world? Because of the eye and of forms arises visual consciousness. The coming together of these is contact. Because of contact arises sensation," and so forth in terms of the formula of causal genesis up to birth and the resultant mass of all Sorrow.

This is in sooth the highest form of Kantian idealism applied to the ends of religion. Just as a flame is a mere succession of flickering moments and never the same for even two successive seconds, even so is the I-process which ever and anon renews itself; and the only constancy about it is its incessant change.

Kamma, so to say, throws up a bridge between this life and the next and welds together the manyfold phases or flashes of the empirical personality, so as to present an apparent "I". But since all life is but sorrow, it is Kamma that keeps the I-process going. We are thus faced with the all-important question: How is deliverance to be found from this endless process of becoming or in other words escape sorrow?

The empirical ego is only an apparent I—it has no reality, because it is merely an aggregation of the Khandas. It is Kamma that causes their coming together. Remove Kamma and the Khandas fall asunder. Even thus is brought about the complete abrogation of personality. When there is the arising, there is also the passing away of life. This is change or transiency (Anicca). Because of transiency there is Sorrow (Dukkha).

And thus to conclude: The world is conditioned by the action of the senses. Upon the senses, therefore, depends the world. The world in the last analysis is the sum-total of the
sense-impressions. The activities of the senses constitute the generative cause of the world. Therefore, the senses are the real creators of the world in all its vast totality.

This is the highest, the deepest and the sublimest thought that ever was conceived by the mind of man, in all time and in all space. And it is crystal-clear that the human mind reached its natural perfection 2,500 years ago, when once the human tree blossomed and put forth its sweetest flower which radiated its exquisite fragrance to all quarters of the boundless universe.

Thus was solved the world problem, without the recurrent remainder. But let us remember it is a problem, *Quod erat faciendum*, and not a theorem, *Quod erat demonstrandum*. "We ourselves must walk the Path, the Buddhas only show the way."

WHY IS DĀNA NOT INCLUDED IN THE NOBLE EIGHT-FOLD PATH?

THIS is indeed a very pertinent question which every earnest Buddhist must necessarily answer for himself. Dāna, it should be noted, is only an elementary virtue which even primitive man practises in some form or other. One may go a step further and maintain that even the lower animals also give when they feed their young. Some non-Buddhists give even on a colossal scale.

The Noble Eight-fold Path is precisely, as its name implies, the Noble Path of the Ariyas, and is actually trodden by them alone. We others who are mere many-folk (Puṭhujjanā) are still in the preliminary stage (Pubba-bhāga- paṭipada); may be some trying harder than others, but still only trying to reach the first step of the Ariyan Path.

One comes across discourse after discourse in the Sutta Piṭaka wherein are extolled in superlative terms the supreme excellence of giving (Dāna). Rewards many-fold ranging up to heavenly bliss are held out as tantalising objectives. These rewards are graded in proportion to the virtuousness of the recipients of the gifts. This is the conventional teaching and is no doubt correct as far as it goes. The wise farmer sows on fertile soil and reaps a bumper harvest. According to the law of action and reaction, or Kamma in Buddhist parlance, the giver gets back a thousand-fold. But then where is the virtue, what is the ethical value of a gift actuated by a mere self-regarding motive? The selfish motive defeats its very object and will delay such a giver in the blind alleys of Saṃsāra, instead of hastening his emancipation.

The Tathāgata says: Tanhakkhayo Nibbānam, cessation of craving is Nibbāna. Craving comprises Kāma-taṇhā (attachment), Bhava-taṇhā and Vibhava-taṇhā. Kāma-
tāphā consists of Vatthu-kāma or lust for possessions and Kīlesa-kāma or sensual desires. Vatthu-kāma thus forms a sixth part of Tāphā. What is the sure antidote to Vatthu-kāma or Lobha? The obvious answer is Dāna or giving away of such possessions. The parting away snaps the bond of attachment.

Thus it is clear without more ado that the paramattha or the highest spiritual benefit of giving is to eradicate Lobha or greed. This view is corroborated by a strange fact.

The Dāna Paramattha Pāramitā is the giving away of life itself. If the highest ethical value of giving is commensurate with the degree of righteousness of the recipient, then the gift of life or flesh must be acceptable to righteous individuals or Silavantā. But this is not so. Such gifts are therefore invariably given to a cannibal, demon or a wild beast. This proves that a giver actuated by the aim of eradicating greed has perforce to give quite irrespective of the virtues of the recipient. We are thus led to the inevitable conclusion that the highest object of Dāna is to get rid of Lobha but not to reap rewards.

APPENDIX


Mrs. Rhys Davids and "The Higher Criticism," (p. 108, supra)

We wish to draw the attention of our readers to the article contributed by "Arya Dhamma" in which the writer, who is one of the few Eastern scholars whose erudition can be compared to that of Western scholars, makes a trenchant but dignified criticism of the mischievous writings of Mrs. Rhys Davids. The latter had done such splendid work at one period of her life, that it makes one feel sad that in her declining years she should try to undo her own work. Doubtless she has lost her grip of the essence of the Dhamma and is today floating hopelessly in a sea of doubts. Yet she is audacious enough to attempt to alter the Dhamma and give her own interpretation as against those of such immortal commentators like Buddhaghosa. Here is, however, not the whole fault. Both Buddhists and non-Buddhists had enthroned her as an authority without considering the obvious fact that she was not a Buddhist. She had taken to the study of Buddhism not for the sake of its sublime truths but as a mere profession and there are many of her type in the field of Buddhist studies today. At least after this lesson is it too much to expect that Buddhists will seriously consider the question of translating their religious works themselves into foreign languages?
2. Editorial comment on the article "Mrs. Rhys Davids and 'The Higher Criticism,'" (p. 108 supra), in *The British Buddhist*, June 1932.

Scholarship Run Mad.

We make no apology for reproducing in our pages this month an article from the latest number of *The Mahābodhi*, "Mrs. Rhys Davids and 'the Higher Criticism'", since it deals with a matter of which no European Buddhist ought to remain in ignorance. At one time an esteemed Pali scholar justly famed throughout the whole Buddhist world, Mrs. Rhys Davids has now turned her attention to one of the classics, indeed *the* classic, of Buddhist literature, and with perverse learnedness seeks to make that classic bear out the perverse view of the Buddha's teaching which she has adopted since the death of her late lamented husband, and of her son, the latter a victim of the war. In pursuit of this aim she has no scruple in falsifying the most famous and pregnant of all the couplets of the Dhammapada, that one which states that mind is the first foundation and chief thing in all that makes up a human being, and making it read that *self* is such a foundation and main ingredient in man's composition. It is quite permissible for Mrs. Rhys Davids, as for everybody else, to hold what view they choose as to the nature of conscious beings. But it is not permissible for Mrs. Rhys Davids or anybody else, failing to see and grasp what the Buddha saw and taught on this subject, to strain and strive with every scholastic nerve they possess, to prove that the Buddha did not see what he did see, but only saw what *they* are able to see. And what this particular individual is able to see in the inner world of mind is fairly well exemplified in that utterance of hers a few years ago: "The Buddha was a gentleman of no metaphysical training," the implication being, we suppose, that if only He had had the opportunity of attending the lectures of comparative religion delivered by the whilom professor of that subject at the Manchester
University, how much more worthy of our attention He would have been. If the profound penetration of a Buddha into the nature of conscious existence is beyond the grasp of a Mrs. Rhys Davids or anyone else, does that give them the slightest right to make out that He only saw something else which is within the grasp of their smaller minds? There can be only one answer to that question. The great sea remains the great sea, even if we cannot fit it into our little pint pot. But when we try to make out that we have got it all in that tiny measuring vessel, why, then we only make ourselves ridiculous.

Any ordinary mind can see the substantiality of things, like a Dr. Johnson when he kicked the stone and so doing, thought he had disproved Bishop Berkeley's assertion that all is idea. And any common mentality can see what looks like the permanent "soul" of conscious beings. But it takes a Buddha to penetrate that appearance and perceive and make clear the reality of the impermanence even of that which we deem ourselves, and so open out wide, vast horizons, whose width, whose vastness, it almost seems, frightens little minds, and makes them shrink back into their old, familiar, loved illusions, where they can feel safe and comfortable again. In Mrs. Rhys Davids' case, we have one more exemplification of the truth of that dictum of the Buddha, that the Dhamma is not to be come at by logical reasoning alone. And we see that scholarship and "metaphysical training" are of equally little avail to open "The Eye of the Truth" in a human being. Here what is needed is humble patient willingness to learn, simple, quiet readiness to be taught. If one is unable or unwilling to bring these things to the study of the Buddha's Word, then it were better, far better, that one never meddled with it at all. The honest opponent of a teaching may in time come to know it better and accept it. But what hope of knowing a teaching like that of the Buddha is there for one who, adopting a wrong view of what that teaching is, believes
it is the right one, and bends all her energies to demonstrating that it is the right view and inducing others to believe that it is the right view? Her prospects of ever coming to a right understanding of it seems very far away, and to recede ever further the longer she pursues her present course.


**Mrs. Rhys Davids and “The Higher Criticism.”**

We invite the special attention of our readers to the spirited contribution of “Ariya Dhamma” a close student of Buddhism and prominent Pali scholar, on Mrs. Rhys Davids’ so-called “Higher Criticism.” Three of her latest works, *Gotama the Man, Sakya or Buddhist Origins* and *Milinda Questions*, present the latest phase of her mental evolution. In these works she makes an elaborate but futile attempt to prove that white is black—that the great Anattavādi was the very opposite. Attavādi. This lady has won a high place as a philologist in Pali and achieved distinction in Western philosophy. But the palpable mistakes that our contributor points out on elementary points completely demolish the infallibility of Western Pandits in the field of Oriental scholarship. The idol has at last displayed its feet of clay. *Sic transit gloria mundi.***

4. A European Bhikkhu, asked to comment on the article “Gods and their place in Buddhism” (p. 158 supra), observes as follows:

I understand quite well that there is nothing wrong, nothing unbuddhistic in resorting to gods. But now the opposite. Is there nothing wrong in not resorting to the gods? Will they not get angry when neglected? Are we not led by a wrong spirit when we do without them?
"Resorting to the gods" may be for material benefits or spiritual instruction. The former is of course allowable. The latter is allowable only if the instruction is in keeping with the Dhamma, but not otherwise, in which case it will be Silabbata-parāmāsa.

There is nothing wrong in not resorting to the gods. No god or man will be reasonably offended if he is not asked a favour. As regards "spiritual assistance," it is a question of loyalty. If the Lord Buddha deserves our highest loyalty, we are perforce obliged to ignore the gods. If the gods get angry on that account, they are not worth the salt. They do not count and we may leave them severely alone.

His reverence further states:—"As a Bhikkhu I would like to go round to beg for my meal, but I do not like to go from god to god for higher assistance. What is wrong here? And how should I change my attitude?"

There is nothing wrong and your attitude, Sir, is proper. As I said before, we may go to man or god for a material benefit. We may also approach a god for "higher (spiritual) assistance," if only such instruction is in keeping with the Dhamma, but not otherwise. But this is so very rare that we may not take it into account. The Dhammasonḍha Jātaka relates the story that a demon preached the Dhamma to Bodhisatta.

The reverend gentleman further observes:—"'Let the advanced Buddhist remain on his exalted pedestal by all means'. But what if that pedestal is pride and self-illusion? How can we know if we are led by the proper motive and what is the proper motive?"

I beg to reply:—If the pedestal is one of pride or self-illusion, neither "'the Buddhist is advanced'" nor the pedestal is "exalted." If the Buddhist is really advanced he will
ipso facto realize that his motive is good. As regards "proper motive," that also is a matter of personal experience—paccattam veditabbo viññāhi.

Having read the above note the reverend Bhikkhu rejoins:—"All is quite clear now. Thanks very much, you got my meaning quite alright."


In our last issue we were only able to make the bare statement in our stop press columns, of the most generous endowment of Rs. 10,000 given to *The Buddhist* by Mr. A. D. Jayasundere, of Galle. Generosity of this nature is so rare in the annals of this Journal, that we cannot possibly allow the event to pass "unhonoured and unsung" though the gracious donor himself would, we know, prefer no "fuss" to be made about it at all.

Mr. Jayasundere is one of our most veteran workers; we believe it correct to say that he began his career as a school teacher of distinction.* As a lawyer he made a great name for himself before he retired from active practice many years ago. His achievements in many fields of public activity are too well-known to need recital. But it is as a student of religion, chiefly of Buddhism, that Mr. Jayasundere would best wish to be regarded. His knowledge of Buddhism is both profound and accurate, not vague and woolly. His own contributions to Buddhist scholarship, made mostly under the pen-name of "Ariya Dhamma," have been numerous and extremely useful, both because of their thoroughness and their meticulous attention to detail. He is a firm believer that in the exposition of religious truths no trouble is too great to secure strict adherence to the original message of the Teacher. We are

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*This is incorrect. He was never a school teacher.—*Editor.
proud to be able to say that many of these articles were published in *The Buddhist*, from time to time. Mr. Jayasundere's translation of the Second Book of Aṅguttara Nikāya, under the title of "The Book of the Numerical Sayings II," still remains a classic. He insists with a sincere conviction born of life-long study that the Theravāda Buddhism of Ceylon represents the genuine doctrine of the Master and that nowhere are the uniqueness and supremacy of the Buddhas' teaching more manifest than in the doctrine of Anatta. He has always been most anxious, therefore, that this teaching should not be tainted by attempts to explain it in terms of other religions and systems of philosophy. In his defence of the orthodox teaching of Anatta, he has waged many battles undaunted and often, single-handed. One remembers with particular vividness and a sense of relief the battle royal he ones carried on with Mrs. Rhys Davids, herself a scholar of redoubtable intellect. His consistency in the views he holds which he refuses to change, either to "keep abreast of the times" or to please others in order to win them over to the fold, has often earned for him the charge of "intolerance." But like all men who honour truth, Mr. Jayasundere knows that there is a wide gulf between "tolerence" and "toleration," and that in the deepest things of life there can be no compromises. The doctrine of Anatta he rightly holds to be the very life-blood of the Buddha Dhamma and he will not allow it to be poisoned by the admixture of extraneous dyes, however attractive they may appear to be.

It is this life-long attachment to the correct study of Dhamma that has, more than anything else, made Mr. Jayasundere appreciate the paramount need of making *The Buddhist* worthy of its heritage and responsibility. It is not perhaps, known to many of our readers that *The Buddhist* is the oldest Buddhist journal in English in the world. Many others were started during the last half a century but most of
them fell by the wayside. *The Buddhist*, however goes on. It has itself had a varied and chequered career. Originally started by the Buddhist Theosophical Society under the inspiration of Colonel Olcott of revered memory, it soon became the doughty champion of the Buddhist cause and had many triumphs to its credit. It counted among its contributors in its early days many distinguished savants of the East and the West. Its roll of Editors includes such names as L. C. Wijesinghe, translator of the Mahāvamsa, and D. B. Jayatilaka. But it has had more than its fair share of ups and downs. Not seldom in its career it suspended publication for considerable intervals, even after its custodianship was transferred to the Colombo Y.M.B.A.

Mr. Jayasundere is determined that there should be a bigger, better, brighter *Buddhist*, than we have ever had so far. He would like to see its permanency secured and its development accelerated. He is among those, for instance, who complain against the present "‘nakedness’" of *The Buddhist*, caused by the present prohibitive cost of cover-paper. It is with this laudable ambition of improving the character and usefulness of the Journal that he has inaugurated an Endowment Fund with his own magnificent contribution. He hopes, and we join fervently in the hope, that very soon it will be possible to have an endowment Fund of at least Rs. 50,000.

Mr. Jayasundere’s noble gesture comes at a very opportune moment when, now that the War is over, plans are under weigh to effect various improvements in the Journal. *The Buddhist* is meant primarily for the members of the Y.M.B.A. who receive it as a part of their rights of membership. It is only fitting, therefore, that it should cater primarily to their needs. Most of them belong to the younger generation and are not necessarily deeply interested in the study of religion alone. They want some profitable reading for the leisure hour, something not too "‘heavy.’" But, at the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact the *The Buddhist*
has always been regarded, both in Ceylon and elsewhere, as the chief medium of expression of the point of view of the Buddhists of Ceylon in matters affecting the Buddhist cause both here and everywhere else in the world. It has also become a cultural link between the Buddhists of Lanka and Buddhists in other parts of the world. This function will, in the coming years, greatly and rapidly increase in importance because of attempts now being made to establish a common bond of solidarity with Buddhists all over the globe. As our plans mature, we shall make them known to our friends and well-wishers. Meanwhile, to Mr. Jayasundere we can only say, by way of expressing our heart-felt gratitude: "Ciraṃ jīva (may you live long); imāya paṭi ṭatīya āsuvakhayāvanā hotu (may this good deed lead to Nibbana)."

6. Reception address at the Second Annual Sessions of the All-Ceylon Congress of Buddhist Associations, 1920.

Mr. A. D. Jayasundere, of the Galle Y.M.B.A., who was the Chairman of the Reception Committee delivered the following address.

Reverend Sirs, Brother Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Galle Y.M.B.A. I extend to you the right hand of fellowship and offer you a hearty welcome to this second sessions of the congress of Buddhist Societies now being held in this historic town of Galle. First of all, I have to thank the Executive Committee for the honour they have done us in accepting our invitation to hold this year's meetings at Galle. We highly value the privilege and appreciate the responsibility which the honour entails. If the delegates will only co-operate with that friendly fellow-feeling which is a distinctive characteristic of the Buddhists, there is no reason why our efforts should not be crowned with success; and the bold step and the daring undertaking, as one writer called it, in offering the invitation would be justified.
There are important problems in Buddhist affairs at this time awaiting solution, and some of them, I am glad to find, are included in the resolutions that will be submitted to you.

The question of paramount importance is the education of our children on the lines of our religion and in keeping with our national ideals. Enlightened pioneers of education have established a number of vernacular schools in addition to the several high schools in the principal towns. By these means the tide of perversion of our children to an alien faith had to a great extent been averted. But let us ask ourselves the important question: Whether we have placed them on a permanent basis? I am grieved to confess that we have not. Every one of them is only having a precarious existence, however efficiently they are being conducted at present. It is therefore the duty of the Buddhists to endow these institutions and establish them on a permanent basis. The next matter of importance that occurs to my mind is that our schools are not devoting sufficient attention to the teaching of the Dhamma, and to train our Children to more closely observe the precepts of our religion. Are our children acting up to our national ideals, and cherishing our time-honoured manners, customs and traditions? What is the difference between the character of a child that attends a Buddhist school and another that receives education in a Christian school? Is there much to choose? I am not sure there is. Well then, how are we going to improve this sad state of affairs? This question in turn involves several other questions of a social, moral and religious character. The first thing we have to do is to alter our perspectives, in other words to change our angle of vision. We have proceeded all these long years in our march of progress—I mean material progress—with our faces turned straight towards the West. We have now to turn right about and to face the East, to execute a volte face and go back to our national and religious ideals which we have been so long neglecting.
Definite steps should be taken without further delay by the leaders of society to bring about a reformation in our dress. Thanks to the excellent initiative of the Anagarika Dhammapāla, the dress of our women is gradually undergoing a rapid transformation for the better. A similar movement should arise to simplify and cheapen the dress of males also and to evolve some uniformity out of the grotesque variety that now forms such a hideous spectacle. The present mode of dress involves a ruinous waste and is prohibitive to a poor parent, who finds it absolutely beyond his means to feed, clothe and supply the other wants of his child to attend a school under the present conditions. We should make arrangements in our schools to pay more attention to systematic and regular teaching of the Dhamma. Next we must take steps to ensure that the children cultivate Buddhist virtues and carry them into practice in their daily lives, at school, at home and outside, that they observe daily the pañcasila and on Uposatha days Āṭṭhaṅgasila, that they abstain from the Dasakusala and perform the Dasakusala. Every Uposatha Day should be observed as a school holiday, to enable teachers and children to observe the Eight Precepts and to perform other meritorious acts. The study of Pali and classical Sinhalese should form a part of the regular curriculum and special attention should be paid to these subjects both in our schools and by our Y.M.B.A.

Leagues should be formed in our schools by young men and women to observe the Silas and promote Social Service. Another important matter to which we have to address ourselves is the scandalous licence, which today enables any impostor to don the robes of a Bhikkhu and to masquerade as a member of the Sangharatna which is adored by the Buddhist world. This should be put a stop to at once. The control of Bhikkhus in the matter of robing, disrobing and general discipline calls for immediate legislation. In this connection I am pleased to observe that this serious question
APPENDIX

has roused the attention of the Bauddhārakshaka Sābhā and
that the recent report of the Buddhist Temporalities Com-
mission lays emphasis on this particular matter. For this
and other important points we are indebted to the personnel
of the Commission which consisted of more than one prominent
Buddhist one of whom I am glad to note was our worthy
President-elect. This report also lays special stress on the
necessity for fresh legislation for the better administration of
our temporalities, and I trust that the proposed new ordinance
will be successful in coping with the present maladministration
of Saṅghika property, and also in securing that the incomes
will in future be duly collected and devoted to proper ends.

I expect this Congress of Buddhist Societies to promote
public opinion to such an extent that it will no more be
necessary to establish Temperance Societies, Societies for the
prevention of cruelty to children and animals, etc. in a
Buddhist country. I can quite understand the existence of
such societies and institutions in Christian countries, for
instance, as the Christian religion does not prohibit killing
or use of alcoholic liquor. But in Buddhist countries the
existence of such societies is only a sad confession of failure of
the sanctions of religion to promote virtues.

I would appeal to the members of Y.M.B.A. in particular
to always keep in their minds and in the fore-front of their
programme of work, that their primary object is the study
and the practice of the Buddhist religion. I grieve to contem-
plate that in Galle we have not succeeded in achieving this
object to any appreciable extent. We have certainly not
done all we should do in this direction.

I look to this Congress to cause an organised and
systematic effort to be made to more effectually carry out this
principal object. Other objects which are of an intellectual
and social character have their own uses and serve different
purposes. But the be-all and end-all of such societies is to promote moral and religious ends, and to these we must concentrate the bulk of our energy and endeavour.

These are some of the principal questions to which we must address ourselves with all the strength at our command in order to place our house in order.

At the same time, I beg to invite your earnest attention to a matter of utmost significance at this particular juncture.

It is now admitted on all hands, that the Great War just happily ended, was brought about by the cult of violence that has been in vogue for centuries in Western Countries, directly contrary to the spirit of the gentle Jesus, meek and mild. This great religious teacher founded a religion of love, but his followers by a strange irony of fate, substituted for it a religion of hate. Hence this great holocaust which turned the whole wide world to a funeral house, and devastated the whole human race. All thinking men are now agreed on the great lesson of this war; that this doctrine of violence is a colossal blunder and a monstrous fallacy. The whole of humanity is indebted to that great and noble man, Dr. Wilson for the glorious idea of a League of Nations, whose object is to prevent the recurrence of such catastrophes. The idea of this league is a sign of the times and of the change of view. The idol of violence has been overthrown in the dust and in its place is set up that of the goddess of peace and of love.

Another epoch-making event next in importance perhaps only to the Great War is the almost incredible yet stupendous fact that a hundred million free human beings by common consent have totally abolished the manufacture, sale and consumption of all alcoholic liquor. These two events have staggered humanity and set thinking all thoughtful men.
Both of these afford proofs that a mental revolution of a far-reaching character has taken place in the Western Countries, and people are veering round to the Eastern point of view in these momentous matters.

Two of the most important precepts taught by the Tathāgata are against killing and the use of liquor. It is therefore a matter of gratification for Buddhists to find that the tremendous experience of such ordeals as the Great War and the equally great liquor-war has proved to mankind that the Omniscient One’s teaching on these two great points at any rate stands absolutely justified.

Now the greatest and most precious possession that we decadent Sinhalese still retain in its pristine purity is the Buddha Dhamma. Our greatness and our ideals one gone, our prowess has waned, our courage has ebbed, our literature has decayed, our patriotism has oozed out, our self-respect has vanished and nationality extinguished, but we still possess, preserve and cherish the great treasure of the good Law—an invaluable possession indeed. Every good trait of our national character depraved as it is can be traced to the Dhamma, and if ever the Sinhalese can regain their lost greatness and glory, it will only be in keeping with the teachings of the Great Lord of Compassion.

It is therefore clear that this is the psychological moment for a systematic attempt to make known the pacific doctrine of Dhamma to war-worn Europe and America. Out of gratitude for the inestimable blessings that we Sinhalese have received from the Dhamma, and as its sacred trustees and custodians, it is our bounden duty to do our utmost to promote the dissemination of the Buddhist Scriptures among the peoples of the West.

The Pāli Text Society, the Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland of which the President-elect is also president, and other Buddhist societies and organisations and a variety of publications in both Europe and America
with only a little assistance from individual Buddhists who may be counted on our fingers are engaged in a great and noble task, whose results it is impossible to over-estimate. It was the other day that we learnt that the first edition of 7,000 copies of a German work on Buddhism was sold away in a very short time. Such is the great demand for Buddhist literature at present.

But the Buddhist public has never given a serious thought to this great subject. The average Buddhist would rather devote his hard-earned savings to raise a lasting monument to his vanity or add to the already numerous Dāgābas and Vihāras which stud the land, but it is a lamentable fact to contemplate that such shrines will ere long find fewer and fewer worshippers, unless the Buddhists in time realise the important fact that the Buddha-Sāsana does not consist of brick, stone and mortar, but exists in the minds and lives of human beings.

Thus if we Buddhists do care to promote the ends of religion, let us teach and promulgate the Dhamma, inculcate Buddhist virtues and live the lives of good and consistent Buddhists.

As to the spread of Dhamma in Western countries let us extend a helping hand to the existing organisations in those lands and devise ways and means of extending and organising operations on a greater scale. I would suggest that a National Missionary Fund be started under the auspices of this Congress, to carry into execution this grand and glorious project.

Perhaps if I go on this strain I might be trespassing upon the special province of the President who may be disposed to dwell upon some of these very topics. My apology is that subjects of such great import will not suffer from repetition but rather gain by the eloquent emphasis which they are sure to receive at the hands of our learned President.
In conclusion it is my privilege to invite Dr. W. A. de Silva the President-elect to occupy the chair and guide the deliberations of this Congress. It is peculiarly appropriate that Dr. de Silva who is a true and worthy son of Galle, should preside at this second sessions of the Congress, which assembles at Galle. Dr. de Silva is well-known to you as a prominent Buddhist, as a scholar and distinguished Sinhalese, who is always at the fore-front wherever and whenever the cause of our religion or country summons him.

I now ask you, Sir, to assume the chair and commence the proceedings of this second sessions of the All-Ceylon Congress of Buddhist Associations. May the influence of the Three Gems rest on us all, and may the guardian devas of Buddha-Sāsana watch over our deliberations and lead them to a successful issue.
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