CLASSICAL SAMKHYA:
A CRITICAL
STUDY

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Dr. ANIMA SEN GUPTA, M. A., Ph. D.
Vidya Viṣarada
PATNA UNIVERSITY
THIS BOOK
IS
DEDICATED
TO
MY MOTHER
WHOSE BLESSINGS I HAVE RECEIVED
ALL THE TIME IN
MY ACADEMIC PURSUITS:
—THE AUTHORRESS
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FOREWORD

* *Dr. Anima Sen Gupta of Patna University has already earned a name for herself as a sound scholar and as an authority on the Samkhya School of Indian Philosophy. Coming from a highly connected Bengali family of intellectuals, she has to her credit a distinguished academic career, after which she has engaged herself for the last 28 years in her vigorous academic pursuits, which have indeed borne good fruit both in her teaching and writing.

* *Though actively interested in all schools and branches of Indian Philosophy, Dr. Anima Sen Gupta has specialised in the study of the Samkhya thought, as would be evident from her several pioneering works on it, which she has already published.

Incidentally, she has recently contributed ten authoritative articles, very weighty indeed, on the various facets and thinkers of the Samkhya Philosophy, designed in our Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, and our Editors have been highly impressed by these thoughtful writings.

* *The present Book ‘Classical Samkhya: A Critical Study’ reveals once more her acute scholarship and deep insight into the subjects she has dealt with. Needless to say, this work is stimulating and illuminating.

* *The chapters of this Book have been systematically arranged. Philosophy, ultimately and in the last analysis, is a speculative search for a synthetic understanding, in life and thought, of what is and what should be, of ultimate facts and ultimate values: an ultimate speculative attempt to develop an outlook and to derive guidance from it in our life. To discover what is and derive guidance from it re, what should be, it would be necessary, in the first place, to study the nature and phenomenology of our knowledge,
and to formulate the norms and the criteria of its validity
and truth (this would be Epistemology, including Logic:
an ancillary study); in the second place, to ascertain, in the
light and by the means of the instruments and equipment of
knowledge so developed, the nature of the real or reality,
of ourselves and the world (this would be Metaphysics or
Ontology: a factual study); and in the third place, to
develop and to formulate, on the basis of the enlighten-
ment so gathered, the goals or values and the ways of
practical life indicated by that enlightenment (this would
be Ethics and Religion, a valuational study). Viewed from
this point of view, it is a matter of intellectual satisfaction
to see that this Book has been divided into four Chapters
on (I) ‘Epistemology’, (II) ‘Metaphysics’, and (III and IV)
‘Ethics’ and ‘Religion’, besides of course the ‘Introduction.’

The Introduction—gives a general description, as well
as a philosophical characterisation, of the Samkhya School
particularly highlighting its realism and rationalism.

* Chapter I (‘Epistemology’) makes, to begin with, a
general analysis of the knowledge-situation, and then
proceeds to analyse and to comment on the various sources
of knowledge, and also to discuss the problem of the
validity and the invalidity of knowledge, bringing into
bold relief, in regard to each of these questions, the
distinctive Samkhya positions in relation to the other
schools of Indian philosophy.

* Chapter II (‘Metaphysics’) explains, first, the Samkhya
approach to the metaphysical problem through an analysis
of experience, and then proceeds to present and discuss
the Samkhya theories of the Gunas, Prakṛti and Puruṣa
and their ‘relation’, the multiplicity and the bhoktrabhava
of the purusas, evolution of the Prakṛti (including the
evolution of the tanmatras and the mahabhutas and of the
cognitive and executive organs), the theory of causation of
the Prakṛti, and the non-causality of the Puruṣa. In all these
discussions, care has been taken to take due cognisance of,
and critically to consider objections taken by, the other schools and philosophers about the Samkhya positions. Indeed the Chapter is stimulating and illuminating.

* *Chapter III and IV (‘Ethics’ and ‘Religion’) are equally impressive. The Chapter on ‘Ethics’ points out how the Samkhya Ethics is metaphysically based and oriented, and presents the Samkhya ethical conceptions of subha (good) and asubha (evil) : and the Chapter on ‘Religion’ brings out the significance of the Samkhya atheism.

Towards the end of the book is added a comprehensive and useful Bibliography.

* *I warmly commend this book to all scholars interested in the various facets and phases of Samkhya Philosophy. I hope Dr. Anima Sen Gupta will continue to make similar contributions to philosophical scholarship by her further works on Indian Philosophy.

D. D. VADEKAR
(Retired Professor and Professor-in-Charge,
Departments of Philosophy, Fergusson College
and University of Poona, Poona)
Chief Editor,
Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

Saraswati-Prasad,
1603 Sadashiv Peth,
Tilak Road, Poona-9 :
30-3-69
PREFACE

I have so far written four books on Sāmkhya Philosophy, namely:—

(1) The Evolution of the Sāmkhya School of Thought.
(2) Chandogya Upaniṣad: Sāmkhya Point of View.
(3) Essays on Sāmkhya and Other Systems of Indian Philosophy.
(4) Katho Upaniṣad: Sāmkhya Point of View.

In these books, I have made an attempt to interpret the philosophy of Sāmkhya in a manner which will prove conclusively that the dualistic Sāmkhya is quite in keeping with the Upaniṣadic teachings. I am glad, my views have stimulated interest in the philosophical world: I judge this by appreciations which I have received from distinguished scholars in India and abroad. In my previous works I had showed that upaniṣads could be interpreted from the point of view of the dualistic Sāmkhya. I hope, other enthusiastic scholars will take up the work of interpreting the remaining upaniṣads in a similar manner. The late Dr. Sampurnanand who was a distinguished scholar, while writing a foreword to my book "Katha Upaniṣad: Sāmkhya Point of View", has correctly said—"The upaniṣads are so profound that any number of gems of the thought can be drawn from their depths".

In the present work, I have tried to give an exhaustive and critical exposition of the philosophical position of the Sāmkhya school. Various objections have been raised by the scholars against some of the subtle and knotty problems relating to Sāmkhya views on puruṣa, prakṛti, bhoktirbhāva of puruṣa, vahupuruṣa, creation, God etc., but no attempt has so far been made to solve these problems from the Sāmkhya
point of view. This, I have done in this book. Moreover if I am not mistaken, the epistemology of the Sāṁkhya school, too, has not been dealt with in the manner I have done. If the readers find the book stimulating, my labour will be well compensated.

I take the opportunity of expressing my gratefulness to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the late Dr. Sampurnanand, Prof. R. Ramanujachari, Prof. K. C. Varadachari, Dr. B. L. Atreya and Prof. Kedarnath Ojha who have always encouraged me in my research-work by their blessings and good wishes.

I am particularly grateful to Prof. D. D. Vadekar for writing the foreword to this book.

Patna University

ANIMA SENGUPTA.
EDITOR'S NOTE

Sāṁkhya is one of the oldest systems of thought: the seeds from which the classical sāṁkhya had sprung up as a well-knit system are strewn over a vast philosophical writings of ancient India. We know well that the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Itihasas, the Gita, the Puranas etc. contain sāṁkhya concepts and sāṁkhya thoughts. The nature of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and their relationship forms the central doctrine of the sāṁkhya philosophy.

Earlier, the author Dr. Anima Sen Gupta published a pioneering work "The Evolution of Sāṁkhya School of Thought" followed by three more valuable works, namely "Chandogya Upanishad: Sāṁkhya Point of View": "Essays on Sāṁkhya and other systems of Indian philosophy" and "Katha Upanishad: Sāṁkhya point of view". Throughout the centuries the unmistakable sāṁkhya leanings of the Upanishads were deliberately suppressed by the Sutrakaras and Bhasyakaras. The author has been trying to show how the great system of sāṁkhya thought has been neglected and misunderstood. According to the author, the classical sāṁkhya thinks that the illusion is of the nature of non-discrimination between the puruṣa and the prakṛti, and that this avidya is the cause of all misery. When the illusion is removed permanently, the puruṣa becomes free in its nature as pure consciousness and this is the state of mokṣa or liberation from the sorrows and sufferings of the world.

The author has tried to prove that the approach of the sāṁkhya school is not dogmatic. The existence of puruṣa and prakṛti is proved by rational arguments as its philosophical doctrine is really based on a thorough analysis of human experience. Indeed, human experience is not possible unless there are objects of experience, body, organs, ego-sense, mind, and intellect on the one hand, and consciousness on the other.
The peculiarity of all philosophical systems in India lies in the fact that they do not seek to satisfy merely the intellectual curiosity of man: rather they aim at enlightenment of life, and thus help man in his attempt to get rid of the sufferings of the worldly existence. In India, a philosophical system is also called the science of liberation. The history of the evolution of sāmkhya school begins with the dualistic preachings of the upanishads. The upanishads contain the ideas of prakṛti, puruṣa and jiva and hold that the guṇas of nature are responsible for the bondage of the individual souls, since the whole world of experience is the creation of these guṇas.

The present work "Classical Sāmkhya: A Critical Study" by Dr. Sen Gupta is a specialised work of the sāmkhya system. Her writings bear the stamp of maturity and sobriety. Not only that: her approach to the subject is clear, penetrating and critical.

Post-graduate students of Indian and foreign Universities offering Sāmkhya as a special subject will find the book immensely helpful.

May 20, 1969

—MON CHEN
INTRODUCTION

The Classical Sāṃkhya is a dualistic system because it explicitly recognizes the independent existence of the dual principles of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. In fact, the nature of Purusa and Prakṛti and their relationship forms the central doctrine of the philosophy of this school. The most important point in the Upanishadic Philosophy is the doctrine that the inmost self is of the nature of pure consciousness and that it is the ground of all our experiences. The Ātman is identical with Brahman. The diverse powers of Nature have no reality independent of it. But in the Upaniṣads, an attempt to show how from the one reality, the empirical world has sprung up, is nowhere visible. We are simply told that this universe has originated from Brahman and that ultimately it will return to it.

The Sāṃkhya doctrine has taken up the task of explaining how this world of multiplicity has gradually come into existence through the process of evolution from Prakṛti. In this glorious act of creation, Prakṛti is vitalised by the sannidhi of Puruṣa. Multiplicity, however, proceeds directly from Nature and not from the spiritual principle. The spiritual reality is self or Puruṣa which is of the nature of pure consciousness. Puruṣa is ever pure in nature and all impurities of action and passion are only falsely ascribable to it. The relation of the soul with the world is merely external and artificial. It is through ignorance and passion, gathered from the ceaseless flow of karma from beginningless time, that we ascribe to the soul all the impurities of our worldly life. The realisation of the pure nature of the self and also of its distinction from Prakṛti is the goal of this ceaseless cycle of births and rebirths.

The productive agent of the universe is Prakṛti or Nature. This agent is constituted of the three guṇas-sattva, rajas and tamas. The state of Prakṛti is the equilibrium of
INTRODUCTION

the three guṇas; when the equilibrium is disturbed due to puruṣārtha saṁyoga, the world of multiplicity comes into being. Nature is supposed to be impregnated with a sort of unconscious teleological force by virtue of which the guṇas are capable of providing the puruṣas with experience of various sorts and also of liberating them from bondage through the dissolution of buddhi which is the bond of the apparent union between the transcendental puruṣa and Prakṛti. There is no real relation between buddhi and puruṣa. But due to the presence of transcendental illusion in buddhi from beginning-less time, the distinction between the two is not realised. This illusion is mentioned as the bondage of Puruṣa. The Classical Saṁkhya thinks that the illusion is of the nature of the non-discrimination between the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti and that this avidyā is the cause of all misery. When this illusion is removed permanently, the puruṣa becomes free in its nature as pure consiousness and this is the state of mokṣa or liberation from the sorrows and sufferings of the world.

The Philosophy of saṁkhya is not merely a dualistic system; it is also a realistic and rationalistic system. A realistic system, as we know, is a system which believes that the object of cognition is different from and independent of cognition. In the opinion of a realistic philosopher, the object of valid cognition (pramāṇa) is never non-existent or unreal (asat). It is only the object of an erroneous cognition which can be regarded as asat in some sense or other. Again, the relation or sambandha may, sometimes, be proved to be false but the relata or sambandhi can never be false. The Saṁkhya, being realistic in attitude, has not made any distinction between mithyā and tucchā as has been done in the advaita vedānta. The object, which is negated in the empirical life, can, very well, be described either as mithyā or as tucchā.

Realism, however, may be merely epistemological, a form which is not incompatible with Idealism, or it may be both epistemological and metaphysical. One who holds that an object known is independent of the knowing mind, may still hold that the object is spiritual in nature. Here, the man is
a realist only in the epistemological sphere: In the metaphysical sphere, he is an idealist. A metaphysical realist admits the independent existence of the non-spiritual object outside the sphere of knowledge also.

The Philosophy of Sāmkhya is realistic both from the epistemological and metaphysical points of view. In the field of epistemology, the Sāmkhya Philosophers have admitted the independent existence of the object of cognition. The object of phenomenal knowledge is different from phenomenal knowledge and is also independently existent. The object of cognition is always revealed in cognition as something given, as idam and such a revelation is due to viṣaya’s own power of intelligibility. (Pratypasthitamidam svamāhāt myena vastu.) Since, the object of cognition possesses sattvaguna, it possesses knowability or intelligibility and it is because of the intelligibility that the object gets related to somebody’s experience. Had there been no object to be known, there would not have been any cognition. That which is revealed in cognition as ‘idam’, is real and existent. It becomes an object of phenomenal knowledge by means of its own jñeyatva dharma. The very fact that the object is revealed in cognition, shows that they are different. (Vedyatvasyābhedavyāpyatvābbāvāt kuto bhedapratipakṣatvaṁ, (T. V. IV—14).

The vijñanavādi says that because the knowledge of an object and the knowledge of the knowledge of that object occur simultaneously, knowledge and the object known are non-different. Knowledge is always apprehended along with the object of knowledge and never apart from the object of knowledge. Vācaspati has emphatically asserted that the non-difference between the knowledge and the object of knowledge cannot be proved by this sahopalambhanīyama. It is, indeed, true that the presence of knowledge always indicates the presence of an object of knowledge; but from the absence of knowledge, nobody can infer the absence of objects. We can never argue that since we are not knowing the object, the object does not exist. So, the non-difference of the object
from its cognition cannot be proved. Worldly objects are not mere viññāna as they are always experienced as objects external to cognition (Na viññānamātram vahyapratitheḥ).

Further, one and the same object can be presented to many buddhis or cognitions. So, the object cannot be of the form of any one of these cognitions. It has got its own sattā and it exists independently of cognition. This is because one and the same object can arouse different kinds of cognitions in different minds. That which arouses different cognitions, can never be of the form of any one of these cognitions. (Vastusāmye cittabhēdāt taych vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ).

In the metaphysical sphere too, the Sāṁkhya system is a realistic one. This is because according to this school, the unconscious mutable root cause of this world is a pāramārthika tattva. It is metaphysically real, independent and different from puruṣa or the principle of consciousness.

Although, according to Sāṁkhya, the sannidhi of puruṣa is necessary for creation, still Parakṛti does not depend on puruṣa for its existence. It is true that Puruṣa vitalises Nature by means of its sannidhi and thereby makes it fit for creation; but that does not in any way impair the independent nature of Prakṛti. The reflection of consciousness in Prakṛti simply becomes the exciting force behind creation; it is neither the material cause, nor the efficient cause of creation. Puruṣa is related only seemingly to the world through reflection. There is no real relation between the world and the principle of consciousness. The world is sat independently of Puruṣa and the root cause of the world is naturally different from puruṣa and is independently active.

Had the Sāṁkhya Philosophers admitted any such power in Puruṣa by means of which Prakṛti had become active in creation, then the svataḥ pariṇāmi nature of Prakṛti would have been absolutely meaningless. All objects of the world are the effects of a svataḥ pariṇāmi Prakṛti and are also dependent on it.
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Even though, the adriṣṭas of jīvas are regarded as sahakārī (assisting) kāraṇa in creation, still this also does not make creation dependent on Puruṣa. Changes are constantly going on in the infinite bosom of Nature. Even when there is no creation, there is svarūpa pariṇāma in the guna reals. So, adriṣṭa is not the cause of pariṇāma; it is the cause simply of diversities in creation. Adriṣṭas actually cause diversities in enjoyment. It cannot make Prakṛti dynamic or active.

The Sāmkhya is also a rationalistic system. This is because the Sāmkhya system has established the reality of its metaphysical principles by means of yukti or reasoning. Only those things which cannot be proved either by perception or by inference, are to be accepted on the basis of scriptural evidence.

The advaita vedānta uses the upaniṣadic text “neha nānāsti kiñcana” to prove the falsity of the whole world. The Sāmkhya, however, does not believe in the falsity of the world. From the Sāmkhya point of view this mahāvākyya may mean that before creation, there was no creative diversity in the celāna-viṣṭā (intelligised) Prakṛti (iha). It is because the advaita vedānta has believed in the falsity of the whole world that the creative process of the advaita vedānta is just a vyājanā and not a reality. In the Sāmkhya, however, the creative process is a real one. Just as in actual life, we find that if a heap of dried leaves and fire are kept very close to one another, the leaves assume a blazing form immediately and by nature. This is a fact of experience. So, the Sāmkhya has also held that the palpitating rajas, along with sattva and tamas is undergoing changes constantly and naturally, thereby forming different combinations. The result is the creation of this multifarious universe.

In the empirical life, we find that all objects are by their very nature, undergoing constant changes and modifications. Hence, it is quite rational to suppose, on the basis of worldly experience, that the root cause of the world is also a svarūpa pariṇāmaśūttattva. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas believe in atomistic
creation; in the opinion of this school of philosophers, the activity in the atoms is generated by God—a hypothesis which may not stand the test of reason and experience. The case is different with the Sāṁkhya school. This school has not introduced God as the prime mover; but it has shown that since every worldly object is sakriya (active) and parināmī, (mutable) the root cause of the world must be of the same nature. This is real yuktī and not mere imagination of the human mind.
CHAPTER I
Nature of Knowledge :—Epistemology

Sāṃkhya, like advaita-vedānta, has admitted a difference between pure consciousness and phenomenal knowledge or vṛtti jñāna. Pure consciousness, devoid of all relations to buddhi, is the form of ātma-puruṣa. This pure puruṣa is mere revealing consciousness and as such it is indifferent and neutral. This form of consciousness is different from intellectual understanding of puruṣa and Prakṛti as two (vṛttyātmaka viveka)—an understanding which is a dharma of buddhi. Puruṣa or mere revealing consciousness, in its pure form, is a witness, a seer, a non-agent and is also unaffected by misery. That pure consciousness is neutral is also expressed by the statement ‘Na Prakṛtiḥ, na vikṛtiḥ, puruṣah’. Puruṣa is buddheh Pratisamvedi.” In its pure form, it is eternal, ever-free and vibhu or all-pervading.

In the asamprajñāta samādhi in which all buddhivṛttis are annihilated, this pure consciousness shines by its own light. So, the stage of asamprajñāta samādhi is not a stage of unconsciousness. On the contrary, it is the stage of full consciousness in its pure and eternally free form. Just as in Tantra, vimarśa is regarded as the pure mirror in which Śiva experiences his Svarūpa, in the same manner, pure sattvika buddhi of the Sāṃkhya-yoga School serves as the nirmalādārśa (stainless mirror) which reflects the nature of self in the asamprajñāta-stage when all buddhivṛttis are stopped. Consciousness, therefore, in its pure form, cannot be the revealer of any natural object (Prakṛtika viśaya). It, then, reveals only its own true form.

In the impure form, however, puruṣa-caitanya remains

1. Samkhya-karika 19
2. „ 3
3. Kāmakalavītāsa
apparently associated with buddhi through reflection and is not discriminated from the latter. So puruṣa falsely appears as the viṣayī of viṣaya-jñāna caused through the operation of the intellect and this falsity (doṣa) is never felt in the empirical stage.

It is, therefore, evident that puruṣa is not the real substratum of vṛtti-jñāna. The real adhāra (locus) of object-knowledge is buddhi. Puruṣa seems to have object-knowledge because of reflection acting in co-operation with ignorance. Activity, agency enjoyment and object-knowledge have the same locus, i.e., the intellect which is a product of Prakṛti. Object-knowledge always presupposes the prior emergence of “I-consciousness” and as such this knowledge can never arise in pure puruṣa in which there is no vṛtti. Like advaita vedānta, Saṃkhya too, believes that pure consciousness is not even “pure-I” (suddha aham). In the Tantra as well as in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja School, the ultimate reality is supposed to be of the form of pure aham which is different from āhamkārika aham. This is due to the fact that these schools admit the ultimate reality as the creator of the world. According to Rāmanuja School, for example, Brahman, the ultimate spiritual principle, is the real creator of the world. In the beginning of creation, God desired to be many. The “I” became the “This” by stimulating its own sentient and non-sentient aspects. The desireful supreme entity cannot be impersonal pure consciousness.

According to Saṃkhya, however, puruṣa or the spiritual reality is a disinterested spectator of the world-show. It is neither the material cause of the universe, nor is it the efficient cause. Puruṣa does not desire to be many and it does not actively participate in the work of creation. It vitalises Prakṛti merely by its sannidhi. Hence, the Saṃkhya-school has not felt the need for describing puruṣa as suddha aham. It is true as an orthodox system, Saṃkhya has got to explain the upanisadic text “Eko’ham Vahusya’am”. Advaita vedānta has explained this creative desire of God as a vṛtti of Māyā which is His upādhi. Vaiṣṇava Philosophy and Tantra do not have
to face any difficulty in explaining this upaniṣadic text as according to both, the ultimate reality possesses the form of Śuddha aham. There is, however, no clear explanation of this upaniṣadic text in the Śāṅkhya literatures available in the present age; but judging from the position of the Śāṅkhya-School, it can be reasonably said that this creative desire is to be admitted as a vṛtti of cetanāvistā Prakṛti. Puruṣa is pure and immutable consciousness devoid even of I-ness. There is no logical error in such admission as in the advaita-vedānta too, the creative desire is a vṛtti of Māyā.

Now, object-knowledge is always due to the operation of buddhi. Buddhi, on the one hand, receives reflection of consciousness from puruṣa and on the other hand undergoes modification in the form of the object which has stimulated it. Vṛtti-jñāna, therefore, being a modification of buddhi, may be regarded as attributive in nature and since in the opinion of the Śāṅkhya-school, there is tādātmya between substance and attribute, this vṛtti-jñāna may also be regarded as substantive in nature.

The vṛtti-jñāna of the Śāṅkhya-school is, thus, not very different from the ray-like substantive attributive knowledge of Rāmanuja-school so far as its object-revealing nature is concerned. Regarding the locus of this knowledge, there is, however, important difference. According to Śāṅkhya, consciousness cannot be directly related to an object. Relation takes place only indirectly through vṛtti which is nothing but the modification of the intellect in the form of the object. So, buddhi is regarded as the locus of vṛtti-jñāna. According to Rāmānuja, the soul in its empirical state, is the locus of object-knowledge. The soul gets directly related to the objects but since the soul is immutable, it cannot go out to the object to get related. Rāmānuja, therefore, has admitted the existence of ray-like knowledge in the soul in the place of the vṛtti jñāna of the intelligised buddhi of the Śāṅkhya-school. This ray-like knowledge of Rāmānuja is capable of expansion and contraction. By expanding this ray-like knowledge, the soul gets directly related to the object.
Relation between the knower and the object of knowledge.

Although buddhi is the locus of knowledge and there is no real relation between the soul and the object of knowledge, still it appears as if puruṣa or the soul is having this phenomenal knowledge on account of reflection acting in cooperation with non-discrimination or (aviveka). In other words, puruṣa falsely appears as the knower of the object. Here, we should remember that according to dualistic Sāmkhya, puruṣa does not form an element of the experiencing ego which is formed in the intellect with the reflected consciousness of the self combined with buddhi's own conceptual determinations. In object-knowledge, therefore, the object is really related to intelligised buddhi (through vṛtti) and is only seemingly related to puruṣa through reflection. “So’yaṁ buddhi tattvavarttinā jñāna sukhādīna tatprativimvistachhyāyā pattyā jñāna sukhādīmāneva bhavati”.(1) So the problem to be discussed next is with regard to the nature of relation that exists between the intelligised buddhi and the object.

Relation between the intelligised buddhi and the object:

Although there is real relation between the intelligised buddhi and the object, still this relation is not direct in the sense that the object is not revealed directly. The object is revealed only indirectly through vṛtti (i.e., the form of the object assumed by the intellect). Vṛtti is the prativimba of the object and the object is the vimba. So, the relation between the buddhi vṛtti and the object is of vimba-prativimba form. The object gets revealed through its prativimba. It is the prativimba which is directly cognized. The vimba or the object is cognized by the intelligised buddhi only indirectly. So, the relation between the intelligised buddhi and the object is indirect (parokṣa sambandha). Since the intelligised buddhi is related to viṣaya through vṛtti, the relation between the intellect and the object may be described as paramparā-sambandha. The Sāmkhya-theory, therefore, is

(1) Vacaspati—Tattva Kaumudi—Karika—5.
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not a form of direct realism in which the object is directly revealed in knowledge. In this respect, the Śāmkhya theory resembles the theory of the advaita-vedānta but differs from the theory of knowledge upheld by the Nyāya-school or by the school of Rāmānuja. According to latter school, it is the object and not its vṛtti which is directly manifested in knowledge. Thus, according to Śāmkhya and the advaita-vedānta, three factors are involved in knowledge:—the intelligised buddhi or antahkaraṇāvacchinnā caitanya as the knower, vṛtti of the object which amounts to knowledge when consciousness is reflected through it, and the object. (It is, of course, true that in the Śāmkhya-realism, there is no such thing as prameyāvacchinna caitanya). According to Nyāya and the Rāmanūja-school, on the other hand, there is no intermediate factor in the form of vṛtti. The object is revealed directly to the knower and this direct revelation of the object is knowledge. For Śāmkhya and the advaita vedānta, knowledge is the direct revelation of the vṛtti and an indirect revelation only of the object (through vṛtti). In the case of perception vṛtti arises immediately (aparokṣa.)

From the above it would be apparent that there is resemblance between Śāmkhya and advaita-vedānta in regard to the theory of knowledge. So it will not be out of place if we discuss in brief outline, the position of advaita vedānta in relation to knowledge, specially in relation to perception, inference and śabda—the three sources recognized by the Śāmkhya philosophy.

According to advaita-vedānta, in the case of perception, antahkaraṇa goes out to the object of perception through the sense-organ which is in contact with the object, as a result of which, it becomes so modified as to assume the form of the said object. Perception is the immediate knowledge in which the antahkaraṇa vṛtti is non-different from the object and is illuminated by the consciousness of the self.

Although the sense-organs here are not āhamkārika, still they are produced from the five tanmātras (apañcikṛta bhūta)
which, being very subtle and simple, are more or less of the form of energy. For that reason, there is no difficulty in assuming that the visual and auditory organs can reach their respective objects. Antaḥkaraṇa, however, is tājās in nature, although it is composed of five elements taken in combination. (Pāñcabhūta-ārmanobuddhavyahāmkāra cittāni jāyante).

Hence, there is also no logical incongruity in thinking that antaḥkaraṇa too reaches the object and then, assumes the form of the object. Here, also, what is directly related to antaḥkarana is its vṛtti. Through vṛtti, antaḥkarana is related to the object of perception. It is because the antaḥkaraṇa is reaching the object and, therefore, getting changed into the form of the object that the question, how does the vṛtti correspond to the object—does not arise at all. Sea-water, coming out of the sea, reaches a river and assumes the form of the river. Here, there is no difficulty in admitting that the form of the river which the water assumes resembles the actual river-form.

The erroneous perception poses no difficulty either for the advaita-vedānta or for the Śāmkhya. Take the case of the ‘conch-shell-silver illusion’. The advaitin will say that it is Śūktīvā prakāraḥ avidyāḥ which covers the true form of the śūktī and projects the form of anirvacaniya rajata (This is a case of anirvacaniya śṛṣṭi made by avidyā). It is because there is the creation of the anirvacaniya rajata that there is no difficulty in understanding how rajata-kāraḥ vṛtti arises in the antaḥkaraṇa as a result of sense-object contact. According to Śāmkhya, however, there is sadasthāyati in the case of illusory perception. In ‘idamrajatam’, the perception of ‘idam’ is the perception of sadavāstus and so there is no difficulty in understanding how ‘idamvṛtti’ arises in the buddhi. So far as the arousal of the rajata-kāraḥ vṛtti in the intellect is concerned, the Śāmkhya will say that rajata-kāraḥ vṛtti arises in the intellect as a result of the combined
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operation of the awakened rajata-vāsanā and the non-discrimination of rajata and śukti (vivekāgraha). Now, here, although idamvṛtti and rajata-vṛtti are two different vṛttis, still due to reflection of one and the same consciousness through two vṛttis, knowledge arises as one.

In the case of inference, on the other hand, both Śāṁkhya and the advaita vedānta will hold that the buddhi or the antahkaraṇa will be modified into the form of the inferred object on account of the modification of the intellect or antahkaraṇa in the form of the mark (hetu) which is perceived by the sense-organ and which is in universal relation with the major term or the inferred object. Since one and the same consciousness is reflected through two vṛttis, (i.e.,) Pratyakṣa vṛtti of the hill and vahnyākara vṛtti), there is the arousal of one knowledge. In the case of śabda, intellect or antahkaraṇa assumes the form of the object (vṛtti) about which an assertion has been made by the āpta puruṣa. As soon as the word is uttered by the speaker and understood by the hearer, the intellect or the antahkaraṇa assumes the form of the object signified by the word. Hence, we find that according to Śāṁkhya and the advaita-vedānta, the object is never known directly either by the buddhi or by the antahkaraṇa. In this respect, Śāṁkhya and vedānta are so very close to each other that if we substitute antahkaraṇāvacchinna caityanya in the place of caityanya pratīvimitabuddhi, then the Śāṁkhya theory will become almost indistinguishable from the advaita-theory so far as the relation between the real experiencing ego (Paramāṇa) and the object is concerned.

Now, since puruṣa appears as the knower without really being so, it becomes necessary for us to consider also the nature of relation that can be logically supposed to exist between puruṣa and the object of knowledge.

Relation between puruṣa and the object of knowledge.

So far as puruṣa is concerned, there is no real relation
between it and the object of knowledge. Even the relation between puruṣa and buddhi-vṛti is apparent and is caused by reflection and non-discrimination. According to vacāspati, due to sannidhāna, a reflection of consciousness is caught in the buddhi by virtue of which all viṣayākāra vṛttis of buddhi get apparently changed into consciousness. This apparent change in the character of vṛttis gives rise to a sense of false identity (ekameva darśanam) between puruṣa and buddhi. It is on account of this non-discrimination that puruṣa seems to have knowledge of the objects through vṛttis (which are then falsely owned by puruṣa).

According to vijnāna-bhiksu, however, the intellect reflects the consciousness of puruṣa and becomes intelligised; the result is that the inherent ahamkāra of buddhi is falsely appropriated by the self. After that the viṣayākāra vṛttis of the intellect are reflected back in the self and it appears as if purusa is knowing objects through vṛttis. Truly speaking, there is no real relation of puruṣa either with buddhi and its vṛttis or with objects imaged through vṛttis. The seeming relation of puruṣa and buddhi-vṛtti may, therefore, be described as false tādātmya (caused by sannidhi and vivekāgraha of puruṣa and buddhi) according to Vācaspati and abhivyānga-abhivyānjaka relation according to vijnāna bhiksu.

Due to vivekāgraha, the puruṣa seems to be the knower who knows the object in an indirect manner through vṛtti. There seems to be a false parampara relation between purusa and the object although in reality purusa is asamga having no connection with the world of Prakṛti.

That non-discrimination is potent enough to create false knowledge has also been admitted by the Prabhakara School of Mīmāṃsā; because according to akhyātivāda of this school, erroneous perception arises because of non-discrimination between memory and perception and also between their
objects. In the case of the perception of silver in a conchshell, it has been stated:

20. Nanvatra rajatā bhāsakathameva ghatiṣyate  
Uccate suktīśa kalam grihitām bhedavārjītām

21. Śuktikayā višeśāye rajatādbhedahetavaḥ
Tena jñātā abhi bhavaj jñātā sāmānya rūpata

22. Anantaram ca rajatasmnītirjātā tathāpīca
Manodoṣāh tadityāṁśa parāmarśa vivarjītām

23. Rajatam viṣayikrityā naiva
śuktervīvecitām

Smrīyā to rajatā bhāsa
upapanno bhaviṣyatī
(PraKararo pāñcikā 4-26-29)

Both grahaṇa and smaraṇa fail to cognize the difference that exists between their objects (idam and rajatam) due to mental disability (mānasikadoṣa) as a result of which there is no discrimination between perception and memory knowledge. (grahaṇa-smaraṇa ceme vivekānabhabhāsini) In the absence of discrimination, grahaṇasmarāṇatmakā knowledge too, appears in a manner similar to what is experienced in the knowledge of real silver.

According to Sāṁkhya, however, there is no non-discrimination between perception and memory: there is the failure to discriminate one object from the other. Here, agrahaṇa is of svarūpa bheda (i.e., of the difference that exists in the natures of two objects) and also of the difference that exists between two vṛttis. Sāṁkhya believes that knowledge can also be false. This is because Sāṁkhya
holds that just as knowledge or ājñāna is a disposition of the 
intellect, in the same manner ajñāna too, is a disposition of 
the intellect. Prabhakara, on the other hand, believes that all 
knowledge is true by nature. The question of falsity arises 
only when we proceed to use that knowledge in our practical 
life.

Although Prabhākara has introduced aviveka to account 
for erroneous perception, still we should remember that the 
aviveka of Śāmkhya is different from the aviveka of the 
Prabhākara school.

The aviveka of Śāmkhya is primarily ontological, anādi 
and apriori. It is epistemological only in the sense that it 
is a failure to discriminate between the self and the not-self. 
Prabhākara’s aviveka is purely epistemological as it works in 
the field of knowledge only. It is not a creative force of the 
ultimate material stuff; nor is it the cause of the self’s attach-
ment to worldly objects. It is not even anādi.

Can Puruṣa be a sākṣi in the advaita sense?:

From the above discussion, it is clear that there is no real 
relation between puruṣa and vṛttijñāna. The relation is ap-
parent and false. Even then puruṣa has been described as Sākṣi. 
In the advaita vedanta too, there is the mention of Sākṣi-
caitanya which is necessary to produce vṛttijñāna. All objects 
of knowledge become viśayas of Sākṣi either through the 
operation of the Prāmaṇas (in the case of ājñāta viṣaya) or 
through the operation of ajñāna (in the case of ājñāta-viṣaya)*
The question, therefore arises: does the sākṣi of Śāmkhya 
possess the same epistemological status as is possessed by the 
sākṣi-caitanya of the advaita-vedanta?

*Pramāṇa makes an object viṣaya of sākṣi by producing 
ājñātatvadharma in the object of knowledge whereas ajñāna 
does the same by producing ajñātatvadharma in the object.
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In the Sāmkhya-Kārikā (No. 19) Puruṣa has been described as a witness, a seer only without any activity. The said Kārikā runs as follows:

"Tasmāt-ca viparyayat siddham sākṣītvan asya puruṣasya."

The use of the word 'sākṣītvan' in the Kārikā has led some scholars of India* to assume that puruṣa of the Sāmkhya philosophy is similar to the jīva-sākṣī of the advaitavedānta: but in the Sāmkhya philosophy, the objects to be revealed only by the witnessing self (jīva-sākṣī) are not mentioned after the fashion of the advaita-vedānta. (*Vedāntadarśane paramārtha tattva).

Kind of objects revealed only by the sākṣī-Caitanya or the witnessing self

*Dr. Sita Goswami—Vedānta darśane paramārthata-tattva page 15 (original book written in Bengali) "Puruṣa has been described as sākṣī in the Sāmkhya-kārikā (19). . . . Those who believe in sākṣī do not recognize that the mind is an organ (indriya). Those who admit that the mind is an organ do not believe in sākṣī. So, pleasures and pains which are generally admitted as objects of internal perception, are all objects to be known only by the sākṣī according to the view of the Sāmkhyas. Although, puruṣa has been mentioned as sākṣī in the Sāmkhyas-kārikā, yet the objects to be known only by the sākṣī have not been clearly mentioned. It is because Sāmkhya has admitted the existence of sākṣī without clearly determining the objects which are to be known only by the witness, its definition of perception given in kārika 5 has confused the commentators to a great extent. The commentators have thought that this definition gives us the characteristics of both external perception and internal perception. But truly speaking, according to Sāmkhya, external perception occurs through the functioning of the external sense organs: internal perception is not due to the operation of any indriya. This is sākṣī pratyakṣa. Unless this position is admitted, recognition of puruṣa as sākṣī is senseless like the utterings of a mad person. (Vedānta darśane paramārtha tattva)
The objects which are generally admitted as the objects of the witnessing consciousness (jīva-sākṣī) are those which are not cognized by the activity of the pramāṇas (sources of knowledge). Internal organ and internal modes (antahkarana-vṛttis) are, for example, admitted as objects to be cognized only by the witness (Sākṣya-vastu). Things of the world are known through vṛttis (internal modes) originating from the activity of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas). The internal modes, however, are cognised only by the witness in the individual self without the functioning of any one of the approved sources of knowledge. According to the Vedanta-paribhāṣā, which does not admit that the mind is an indriya (sense-organ), pleasures, pains etc. are also objects to be revealed by the witnessing consciousness.

**Jīva-sākṣī of the Advaita-vedānta**

In the philosophy of the Advaita-vedānta, the knowing and the experiencing self is regarded as false and phenomenal. This false and phenomenal ego is a mixture of this (idam) and not this (anidam). In other words, it is a unified category of antahkarana and cit, both fused into one. So, this ‘I,’ of the advaita-vedānta is both objective and subjective, changing and also the static perceiver of changes. “I” is recognized both as unhappy and as the object of love. The changing aspect of the experiencing ego is known as the pramāṇa and it is this pramāṇa that reaches the external object through the antahkaraṇa. But a changeable ego alone is not capable of explaining how different experiences of the ego, happening at different periods of time, can be gathered together round a single and identical conscious centre so as to give rise to such phenomena as a feeling of identity, memory, recognition etc. In addition to pramāṇa-caitanya or changeable consciousness, a static witnessing self (jīvasākṣī) has got to be recognized in the philosophy of the Advaita school. Hence, in the non-dualistic philosophy, the jīva or the experiencing ego comprises both jīva-sākṣī and pramāṇa. Consequently,
objects to be known exclusively by the जीवा-साक्षी are definitely mentioned in the philosophy of the Advaita-school.

In the philosophy of the Śāṅkhya, however, no mention of प्रमाण-चातुर्य as distinguished from the साक्षी-चातुर्य is found in any context. Here the individual or the जीवa refers to that puruṣa which has been caught in the snare of प्राकृति through reflection. Due to reflection, the unconscious intellect appears as conscious and it is the intelligised बुध्दि that actually gets related to the objects through its modifications. Modification of the intellect, in the form of the object, is the प्रमाणa and the reflection of puruṣa in it is प्रमाणa. Although, in the opinion of this school बुध्दि or the intellect is the real substratum of knowledge, still it appears as if puruṣa is having this phenomenal knowledge because of reflection acting in co-operation with ignorance. Since in the Śāṅkhya, puruṣa appears as the knower of the object, there is no need to assume the existence of another साक्षी in the Vedānta sense. When buddhi comes in contact with the worldly objects, it assumes the forms of these objects, and all these forms or modes (वृत्तिः) apparently get changed into knowledge through the reflection of cit in the intellect. Due to अविवेकa, this apparent change in the character of वृत्तिः gives rise to a false sense of non-discrimination between puruṣa and buddhi. It seems as if puruṣa is non-different from buddhi and there is only one principle and not two. Here, although the puruṣa of Śāṅkhya seems to perform the same function as is performed by the जीवa साक्षी of the Advaita-vedānta, the two do not possess the same status. जीवa-साक्षी of the Advaita-vedānta is the static consciousness within the experiencing ego, the changeable aspect of which is the प्रमाणa. Both साक्षी and प्रमाणa are equal (समाकाक्षा) in the sense that both of them are false and limited in space and time. In the philosophy of Śāṅkhya, on the other hand, the purusa (the साक्षी) has been admitted as real and it is not limited in space and time. It does not form an element of the experiencing ego (which is formed in the buddhi with the reflected consciousness of puruṣa united with buddhi’s own conceptual determinations).
Sākṣi or witness literally denotes that principle which is capable of revealing anything independently that occurs before it. Therefore, any tattva, which is self-revealing and is also the revealing principle of the world, may be called sākṣi or the witness. In order to be described as sākṣi, it is not necessary for consciousness to assume the role that has been taken up by the jīva-sākṣi of the Advaita school. Moreover, if purusa is brought down to the level of the phenomenal jīva-sākṣi then the followers of the Advaita will not be in a position to raise any objection against the Sāmkhya theory of multiplicity of selves as jīvasākṣis are many in number.

In fact, non-recognition of sākṣi-caitanya as distinguished from the pramātr-caitanya in the manner suggested by the Advaita-vedānta has not created any difficulty in the epistemological position of the Sāmkhya Darshana. Cognition, pleasures, pains etc. actually subsist in buddhi and the spirit simply appears to have knowledge of objects, pleasures, pains etc. through reflection and āviveka. Ekameva darśanam, khyātireva darśanam happens to puruṣa and not to a fictitious knower formed of sākṣi-caitanya, and pramātr-caitanya. Phenomenal knowledge is gained in the following manner.

Perception: In the case of perception, say the visual perception of a jar, the eye comes in contact with a jar as a result of which there are certain indriya-vṛttis which are presented to the mind. The mind analyses and synthesises those vṛttis and presents them to the intellect. Then through the functioning of the mind and the external organ, the intellect assumes the form of the jar (the buddhi-vṛttis or the pramaṇa). Finally, the consciousness of the self is reflected in this objectified form of the buddhi and the object is immediately revealed. This is the perceptual knowledge of the jar. The question that arises here is: who is the knower of this knowledge? According to Advaita epistemology, the knower is the category formed of sākṣī and pramātri-caitanya (antaḥkaraṇopahita caitanya and antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna caitanya): this knower is as false as the known. Sākṣi caitanya (witnessing
consciousness) constitutes the permanent nature of this metaphysically false but empirically real experiencing ego; and due to its presence, the personal identity which is absolutely essential for being a knower, can be accounted for from the point of view of the Advaita-vedānta. In the Sāmkhya, however, both the knower and the known, are metaphysically real. What is false is the abhedā grahaṇa (non-discrimination) of the intellect and the puruṣa. Puruṣa—the seer—becomes seemingly associated with buddhi through reflection, and due to advaita, it seems to us as if only one principle is operating in the perceptual knowledge. According to dualistic Sāmkhya, the objective ground is as real as the subjective one, and puruṣa can serve as the subjective ground of knowledge without being dragged down to the position of the Sākṣī of the Advaita-vedanta. In the Advaita-vedanta, a false knower has been formed to match with the false object of the false and phenomenal knowledge, because unless the individual knower is false along with the known, non-dualism of the Advaita school cannot be logically upheld.

Inference: Inferential knowledge is that knowledge in which the modification of the intellect in the form of the inferred object occurs in the absence of the contact of sense-organ with the object. Here, the middle term is perceived, and the major term is inferentially known through its relation to the middle term.

Śabda: In the case of śabda, the intellect assumes the form the object about which an assertion has been made by a trustworthy person. In all these cases (perception, inference, and verbal testimony) puruṣa is the apparent knower through aviveka, and therefore, there is no need for the recognition of any other static consciousness in the form of the sākṣī-caitanya of the Advaita type.

Cognition of pleasures, pains etc.: So far as pleasures, pains etc. are concerned, these are the objects of internal perception (according to Sāmkhya). Mind is the indriya that
operates in the perception of these objects. Dr. Sita Ram Goswami is wrong in holding that mind is not an *indriya* according to the Sāmkhya school. In the *Sāmkhya-kārikā* (27) it has been stated: *ubhayātmakam atra manah samkalpakam indriyam ca sādharmyat.* In the *Sāmkhyā Pravacana Bhāṣya*, too, we come across the following passage.

*Indrasya samghāteśvarasya karaṇamindriyam tathā cāham-kārakāryatve sati karaṇatvamindriyatvatamiti.*

Further, in the *Tattva kaumudi*, Vācaspati Miśra has emphatically asserted that the mind is an *indriya* because it has properties common to *indriyas*: ‘The property meant is that consisting in its having for its constituent cause, the I-principle abounding in the *sattva* attribute and not in its being a characteristic of Indra (spirit); for this latter property belongs to the will and the I-principle also......Thus then, being the characteristic of the spirit should be regarded only as an explanation of the derivation of the term *indriya*; it cannot be said to form its connotation.’ (English translation. G. Jha.)

It would therefore appear that it is not proper to assert that the mind is not an *indriya* and that pleasures and pains etc. cannot be the objects of internal perception. Cognition of everything, according to Sāmkhya, is due to the reflection of puruṣa in the intellect. Cognition of pleasures and pains, too, occur in the same process. Even then, pleasures and pains cannot be regarded as *sākṣī-bhāṣya* in the Advaita sense because these are known through mind which is an *indriya*. Mind is a *tattva* different from *buddhi* and *ahāmkāra*. It is to be classed with the *indriyas*. It is because the mind is an organ that the definition of perception given in the *Sāmkhya-kārikā* (5) (*prativiṣayādhy-avasāyo dṛśtam*) has been interpreted by Vācaspati Miśra in a manner so as to cover both external and internal perceptions. (‘What the term *prativiṣaya* stands for is the *indriya* in relation with the object. *Adhyavasāya* is cognition, the function of the intellect: in fact *adhyavasāya* stands for that excess flow of
sattvaguna which results from the suppression in the intellect of tamas due to the contact of the indriyas with their respective objects. This is vritti or ‘knowledge.’ (Tattva kaumudi) Since the mind is admitted as an indriya, pleasures, pains etc. are to be regarded as the objects of internal perception.

Cognition of internal modes: The internal modes, however, cannot be known through other vrittis. These are revealed directly by the reflected consciousness of purusa without the help of any other media. So, the internal modes are sakshi-bhāsyā in the Sāmkhya sense: (that is in the sense of puruṣa-bhāsyā) and not in the sense of Advaita-vedānta.

Comments

Truly speaking, it is the realistic frame-work of the Sāmkhya that makes the assumption of a sakshi-caitanya superfluous in the Advaita sense. In the Sāmkhya, no false knower is knowing falsely a false world. Aviveka in Sāmkhya implies misappropriation of something by the puruṣa which does not really belong to it. Phenomenal knowledge or vritti is real and its substratum—buddhi—is also real. So is the puruṣa which is by nature asamga and unchangeable. The worst mistake (mahādoṣa) therefore lies in misappropriation or confused perception. The reflection of puruṣa-caitanya in the intellect together with beginningless ignorance is causing the confused perception of the puruṣa due to which intellectual concepts appear as self’s own possession. So puruṣa, here, is serving as the static background of the phenomenal knowledge, but this puruṣa is not a sakshi in the Advaita sense as it does not form the part of a false and fictitious ego which is limited in space and time. By describing puruṣa as sakshi, the Sāmkhya philosophers have not made any ‘insane statement’. Sakṣat paśyati iti sakṣi. Puruṣa, therefore, is sakshi in this sense in which brahman too is a sakshi (sakṣiçetā kevalo nirgunaśca. Sveta. Upaniṣad 6-11.)
Sources of knowledge

According to Sāmkhya, there are three independent sources through which knowledge is acquired: Perception, Inference and Śabda.

Perception

Perception arises only when there is the presentation of an object on the one hand and operation of one of the sense-organs on the other. Perception always depends upon some sort of sannikarṣa between its object and a particular sense-organ. This fact has been stressed upon by Vācaspati Misra when he has said: "Viṣayam viṣayam prati vartata iti prativiṣayam. . . . . . . . artha sannikṛṣṭamindriyamityarthah".

External perception is caused by the combined operation of the external sense-organs and internal organ whereas internal perception is caused only by the operation of the internal organ. In both the cases, there must be the relation between a sense-organ and its object. Adhyavāśaya is definite cognition that arises due to this relation. This cognition is a function of the intellect. When a relation or sannikarṣa happens to take place between an external sense-organ and its specific object, the intellect which is permeated with the consciousness of puruṣa, gets changed into the form of the object. This change of buddhi into the form of the object is what is known as vr̥tti. This vr̥tti or modification of the intellect in the form of the object caused through the operation of the sense-organ (indriya-prāṇālīkāya) is Pratyakṣa pramāṇa and the reflection of puruṣa in this modification (or buddhi vr̥tti) is Pratyakṣa-pramā. (Ato buddhi vr̥tti prativimbitam caityanyam pramā) Pramā has also been defined as ‘pauruṣeyaya bodhaḥ’ (i.e., adhyavāśaya in the form of an apprenension by an experiencing ego (pramātā) which is asandidhāviparitānadhigata viṣaya).
In the cognition “ghatamahāṁ jānāmi” there is not only the revelation of the jar due to reflection of consciousness in the ghatākārā vr̥tti, there is also the appropriation on the part of the experiencing ego of the jar as an object of his knowing process.

There is, however, no inconsistency in defining pramā in both ways. This is because according to Sāṁkhya, the real experiencing agent is the intelligised buddhi in which aham-vr̥tti arises as an effect and not the puruṣa (that falsely appears as a knower due to sannidhi or reflection and aviveka). There is, therefore, no logical incongruity in defining pramā either as buddhivr̥tti through which consciousness is reflected or as the apprehension of the viṣaya (object) by an experiencing agent: because according to Sāṁkhya, there is tādātmya between pariñāma (vr̥tti) and pariñāmi (intelligised buddhi) which is the real pramātā. Intelligised buddhi is the substratum of vr̥tti as well as of bodhah. When pramātri aspect is to be stressed upon in knowledge, pramā is defined as pauruṣeyā bodhah. When the intelligised vr̥tti as the effect of pramān-avyāpāra is to be brought into prominence, pramā is defined as the buddhivr̥tti through which consciousness is reflected. As soon as there is reflection of consciousness through vr̥tti, there is immediately revelation of vr̥tti resulting in the consequent manifestation of the object to the experiencing ego. This manifestation of the object is what is termed knowledge.

In Muktavali, however, Visvanath has accepted pramā of the Sāṁkhya-school in the sense of caitanya prativimbita buddhi vr̥tti.

“Tasyā evendriya pranālikaya
pariñatirjñānarūpa gharādinā sambandhaḥ”.

In fact, there will be no mistake if we say that buddhi vr̥tti permeated with consciousness (citsambadhayuktah) is pramā because it is the effect of buddhi-vyāpāra.

Vyāpāra (as we have seen) is the process by which buddhi
(through the help of karaṇas in the shape of sense-organs) assumes the form of the object.

(Yo viṣayākaravr̥ttir̥po buddhivyāpāro jāyate 
sa eva vyāpāraḥ pramākaranatvāt pramāṇam)

Now, buddhi, being a product of Prakṛti is unconscious in nature. Hence, adhyavasāya, which is a unique disposition of the intellect, is also unconscious in nature; but all the unconscious modifications of buddhi are intelligised and revealed by the reflection of cit in the intellect. Hence, though knowledge as a buddhi-dharma, is unconscious in nature, still objects are revealed in knowledge on account of the light borrowed from puruṣa. Here, too, we can see that it is more logical to define pramā as vṛtti through which consciousness is reflected because it is the vṛtti which can be regarded as unconscious. In the case of ‘bodha’ or apprehension on the other hand, it is very difficult for us to think that it is unconscious; because the word bodhaḥ generally refers to conscious aspect of knowledge. It is only when we lay emphasis on the Caitanyaṁśa of knowledge that we can describe it as pauruṣeya bodhaḥ. Since knowledge is regarded as an unconscious disposition of unconscious buddhi, it is proper to emphasise the vṛttyāṁśa of knowledge (which is its real acetanāṁśa) and say that vṛtti, through which consciousness is reflected citsambandhaḥ) is the resulting knowledge or paramā.

Mind and the external sense-organs

According to vijñānabhiṣu, an indriya is the instrument of the soul (the lord of the body). The sense-organ serves as an instrument in producing knowledge and it is also āham-karika in nature. Regarding the number of organs, two views seem to be mentioned in the kārikā by its author. In two

(1) Śāṅkhya pravacana sūtra : 2-19
Indrasya saṁghateśvarasya karaṇmindriyam.
tathā cāhaṁkāra kāryatvesati
Karaṇatvamindriyatvamiti
karikas (24 & 25), the number of organs has been mentioned as eleven (5 organs of sensation plus 5 organs of action plus mind): but in kārika 32, organs have been counted as thirteen. (5 organs of sensation plus 5 organs of action plus 3 internal organs such as mind, ego-sense and the intellect). Naturally, therefore, the position becomes confusing and anomalous. This anomaly has been removed by vikṣu in his yogavārttika (II—18) where he has come forward to give us a satisfactory explanation of such apparent contradiction. In his opinion, buddhi and ahamkāra are suksam indriyas where-as mind which is an effect of ahamkāra is gross in nature. Since, mind and the other ten organs are effects of ahamkāra, they are to be counted together as eleven organs. Moreover, buddhi, as we know, is the cause of ahamkāra, and ahamkāra is the cause of the mind. Since, these three internal categories are related as cause and effect, counting of the mind (managrahaṇa) as an internal organ means counting of ahamkāra as well, (ahamkāragrahaṇa) and counting of ahamkāra as an internal organ means similarly the counting of buddhi. Hence there is no anomaly, if organs are described either as eleven or as thirteen.

According to Vācaspati too (who was earlier than Bhikṣu) the signs of an indriya are as follows :

(1) Indriya is a characteristic of Indra or soul.
(2) The upādāna of an indriya is ahamkāra 1.

If these be the characterisrics of an indriya, then the number should be counted as eleven because buddhi and ahamkāra cannot possess the characteristic of being the effect of ahamkāra mentioned above. Of these eleven, five are

(1) Vacaspati Misra—Tattva kaumudi
Commentary on
(Karika—26)
Sāttvikāhaṁkāropādānasakatvamindriyatyatvam
Indrasya—Atmacinhatvādindriyamyucyate.
organs of action, five are external sense-organs and one is internal sense-organ in the form of the mind.

It seems to us that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has included buddhi and ahamkāra in the list of karaṇas in karika 32 mainly due to the fact that in the said kārika, he is just trying to give us an exhaustive account of the different functions of all the tattvas which worldly soul requires for the purpose of enjoying this world through knowledge, feeling and action. The jīva or the individual soul cannot have any experience of the bhogya jagat (the world of enjoyment) unless the I—sense emerges in it through the awakening of ahamkāra which is an effect of buddhi. Life of an experiencing self is also maintained by the circulation of vital airs performed by the three internal karaṇas. (According to Gaudapāda, however, the circulation of vital airs is the function of all thirteen organs). Since purusārtha is the goal for which Prakṛti is undergoing ceaseless changes from time immemorial, it becomes a duty on the part of the śāstraṅkara to examine carefully all the tattvas which will be operative in leading the soul to its desired goal.

External sense-organs and their functions.

Eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin are known as external sense-organs because through the operation of these organs, the individual soul receives information regarding the external world.

The outer parts visible to us are not the real sense-organs. The sense-organs receive indeterminate impressions of colour, sound, smell, taste and touch from the external world. (Rūpādi-viṣayamacetanam ālocanam, tatkaṇaṁ buddhindriyam = Jñanendriyami tyarthāḥ). Since these indeterminate impressions of colour, sound etc. are received by these organs from the external world, they are known as external sense-organs. The organ that receives rūpa is known as the eye, the organ that hears sound is known as the ear, the organ that

1. Gaudapāda’s bhāṣya on kārikā, 32.
receives smell is known as the nose, the organ that receives
taste is known as the skin.

The external sense-organs can make an individual aware
simply of ‘This is an object’. (Vastusāmāṇyena-agrihitam) By
means of the external sense-organs alone, one is not able to
know any qualified object (Vastuviśeṣatvena-agrihitam,
viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva-rahitam). The object, at that moment,
is revealed only as ‘idam kincidvastu’ and there is no differen-
tiation (aviviktamevabhāti) of jāti, guṇa, sambandha etc:
There is also no integration in the form of one qualified
object. This awareness is known as ‘sammugdham’ due to
its not being the object of right cognition. Sāmkhya-kārikā
has described this awareness as ālocanamātram jñānam. This
is the nirvikalpaka stage of knowledge.

(asti hyālocanaṁ jñānam prathamaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ—
tattva kaumudī : bhāṣya on kārikā 27).

Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa

According to Sāmkhya, therefore, nirvikalpaka and
savikalpaka represent two stages of knowledge. This distinc-
tion is made there on the basis of the functional differences
of the external and internal sense-organs.

The external sense organs are first to operate in producing
perceptual cognition. The awareness that results from their
operation is of an indeterminate type. The external sense-
organs produce a non-relational apprehension of the object
simply as an indefinite only. The simple awareness begins to
change into the form of a determinate and qualified object
when the mind comes into operation. This is because the mind
possesses the power of determining the nature of the object
by making such discrimination as ‘ayam guṇaḥ’ : ‘iyam kriyā’,
‘iyatmatra jātiḥ’, etc. Both discrimination and assimilation
which are involved in determinate perception, are referred to
here by the word saṃkalpa. This is the special function of
the mind. Hence, determinate perception begins to emerge
as soon as mind comes to operate. Further, the functions of
the three internal organs and one external organ may be both yugapat and kramaśaḥ in perception. Here, it seems to us that the words 'yugapat' and kramaśaḥ do not refer to actual operations of the sense-organs; they, rather, stand for two different kinds of subjective feeling of the perceiving mind in respect of the awakening of knowledge due to the operation on the internal and external organs. Sāmkhya really believes in the successive operations of the different sense-organs. It has been clearly mentioned in the Sāmkhya-kārikā that the external sense-organ, first, perceives an object indeterminately; it then brings such indeterminate impression to the mind which presents it to the ego-sense and which, in its turn, presents it to the intellect through which consciousness of the self is manifested. All the organs cannot therefore, be supposed to operate actually at one and the same moment of time in any situation whatsoever. Moreover, had all the organs of knowledge operated simultaneously, there could not have been any discrimination between indeterminate and determinate forms. If two things occur at the same moment, they will not be regarded as different. The use of the word "yugapat" really suggests that in some situations the internal and the external organs operate in such quick succession that the knower has the feeling that he is having the knowledge of the object immediately after his external organ has come into operation. As for example, the recognition of a snake revealed by a flash of lightning and the immediate flight as a result thereof. Here, the gradual arousal of knowledge is not felt as gradual due to very quick succession of the operational processes. There are, however, other situations when the knower feels that his knowledge is gradually passing through indeterminate stage to the determinate one. As an evidence, we can cite the example of indistinct perception in twilight of a tall vertical object, the doubt followed by a recognition of that as a human being, the reference of that to the self and determination to meet and to talk to the man or to turn and walk away from him. Truly speaking: the different organs can operate
in different moments only in regard to one and the same object. If all the organs operate at one and the same moment, there will be conflict and confusion and no clear perception of the object as a consequence thereof. Successive Kramaśāh feelings, generally arise in the case of doubtful cognition.

The process of perception, when analysed fully, will be as under:

First moment of perception: Indeterminate impression of the object received by the external sense-organ, ādānākincidasti.

Second moment of perception: Discrimination and assimilation by the mind. This is the first moment of determinate perception when there is awareness of the form 'Ayam ghatāḥ'.

Third moment of perception: Functioning of the ego-sense and emergence of perceptual knowledge in the form 'ghataṁ grahitum śaknomi'.

Fourth moment of perception: Functioning of buddhi in the form of adhyāvasāya 'Mayaitat kartavyam'.

Thus, in the opinion of the Sāṁkhya, determinate perception begins from the second moment and assumes the form of adhyāvasāya at the fourth moment.

The Nyāya system, too, recognizes indeterminate stage as the initial stage of the perceptual process. In the opinion of this school, we cannot have determinate knowledge or viśiṣṭa jñāna without a prior perception of the simpler elements of jāti, guṇa, ākara, sambandha etc. in a state of separation (dvandva). A prior perception of viṣeṣaṇa is absolutely necessary for determinate knowledge of an object.
The Nyāya process of perception when analysed, stands as follows:—

First moment of perception: Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or non-relational apprehension of viśeṣya, viśeṣaṇa etc.

Second moment of perception: Determinate perception or relational apprehension.

Third moment of perception: This is the stage of anuvyāvasāya.

Second moment of determinate perception when aham will operate.

Fourth moment of perception: At this moment, 'hānopāda-nopekṣa buddhi' arises. This stage represents the full perceptual knowledge of the object, because, here, the sense of the object being desirable or undesirable dawns upon the mind of the perceiver.

Here we should remember that according to Nyāya, determinate knowledge arises after the second moment and in the third and the fourth moments (anuvyāvasāya-state and hānopāda-nopekṣa buddhi stage) this determinate knowledge, already aroused, becomes simply more clear, more rich and full. According to Sāṁkhya, however, determinate knowledge, in true sense of the term, does not arise until buddhi comes into operation at the fourth moment. Adhyāvasāya which is the proper form of determinate knowledge is a disposition of buddhi and as such without the operation of the intellect, savikalpaka jñāna cannot arise.

Although in respect of the number of moments needed for the arousal of full determinate knowledge, there seems to be
no difference between the Sāṁkhya-school and the Nyāya-school, still in respect of the number of internal organs operating in producing perceptual knowledge there is difference. There is consequent difference in Prakṛtyā (process) also.

**Difference in respect of the Number of Internal Organs.**

Buddhi and ahaṁkāra, as separate internal organs, have not been recognized in the Nyāya. According to this system, the co-ordinating function of the buddhi has been ascribed to the soul through the instrumentality of the mind. According to Naiyāyikas, I-consciousness is generated in the soul when it gets associated with the mind-body system. So egohood as a separate tattva, has not been accepted. Since, mind alone is capable of transforming non-relational awareness to full relational knowledge, no other internal organ is necessary to transform indeterminate impression of an object into determinate knowledge.

Now, Vācaspati Misra has stated in his bhāṣya on kārika 27, that indeterminate perception occurs through the functioning of the external sense-organs whereas mind has the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate.

Here, therefore, following Vācaspati, one may say that according to Sāṁkhya determinate perception arises fully due to functioning of the mind. There is no need for postulating three stages of determinate perception in accordance with the successive operations of mind, ego-sense and intellect at three different moments.

This view cannot be accepted. According to Sāṁkhya, definite knowledge of an object or adhyavasāya is a dharma of buddhi and buddhi is different from the mind. It is only when buddhi is stimulated by the functioning of the mind and the ego-sense that the tamoguṇa of the intellect is completely overpowered by the over-flowing sattvaguṇa and the object is definitely revealed through buddhivṛtti.
It is only at this point that puruṣa appears to have the perceptual knowledge of the object because of reflection acting in co-operation with ignorance. Hence, in the Philosophy of the Sāṁkhyya, (as has been already pointed out) the contributions of ahaṁkāra and buddhi towards the formation of determinate perception cannot be ignored. When Vācaspati has stated in his commentary on kārika 27, that determinate perception is due to the functions of the mind, he has done so because of the fact that he is considering (in the said kārika) the functions of the eleven gross organs only. Buddhi and ahaṁkāra, being subtle in nature and being of different kinds (tattvāntara) have not been mentioned here.

**Difference in the Pratyakṣa Prakriya of Nyāya school and the Sāṁkhyya school**

Both the schools believe that in perception, there is relation of the sense-organ with the object. Both also believe that sense-organs are prāpyakārī. The word prāpyakārī is, however, used in different senses by the Sāṁkhyya and the Nyāya-school. According to Sāṁkhyya, all external sense-organs are prāpya prakāśakārī, because they first get at their objects through vṛttis and then reveal them. The real indriya is the inner faculty which has ahaṁkāra as its upādana kāraṇa. It is because sense-organs are ahaṁkārika in nature that they can go out to the object. The stimulation of the external sense-organs produces further stimulation of the mind, ego, and intellect. The external sense-organs (as we have already seen) produce indeterminate impressions which are then successively operated upon by the mind, ego-sense and buddhi. The final result is the determinate knowledge of the object.

The Nyāya-school, on the other hand, uses the word prāpyakārī in a different sense. According to this school, it is only the visual organ which is of the nature of light that goes out and reaches the object. The other organs do not move out
to meet the objects. They come in contact with the objects remaining in their own places in the body of a living being. They are called prāpyakāri because they are receiving impressions by coming in direct contact with their respective objects.

Now, when there is a contact between the sense-organ and the object which is called sannikāraṇa, the sense-organ establishes a particular relation with its appropriate object according to both the schools. The nature of sannikāraṇa, however, is to be differently conceived by these two schools as will be shown in the succeeding section. This difference is due to the fact that Sāmkhya school believes in tādātmaya between substance and quality, quality and its universal etc. whereas according to Nyāya, substance, quality, universal etc. are entirely different. The relation that unites substance with its quality or the quality with its universal etc. is termed samavāya in the Philosophy of the Nyāya-school.

As soon as there is intercourse between the object and the sense-organ, there is the emergence of the indeterminate perceptual knowledge involving the operation of the sense-organs only. Now, according to Nyāya, determinate perception proper arises as soon as the mind comes into operation. The mind is connected with the soul and as such through mind the soul, too, becomes directly connected with the object. There is no such thing as vṛtti in the Nyāya theory of perception. The embodied soul is the pramāṇa who knows the object directly.

According to Sāmkhya, however, the sense-organ receives indeterminate vṛtti from the object and this, they present to the mind, for discrimination and assimilation. The mind then presents its own cooked up stuff to the ego-sense for further elaboration and the ego-sense, to buddhi. It is only when buddhi comes to make its own contributions to knowledge and assumes the form of the object of knowledge that determinate knowledge proper arises according to Sāmkhya. Buddhi is the principle that defines, ascertains
and recognizes the object as belonging to a particular type and also determines the desirability and undesirability of its attainment on the basis of which a definite conative attitude is adopted by the pramātā who is no other than the cetanāviṣṭa buddhi.¹ Spatial and temporal localisation of the object is also a function of buddhi.² Hence, determinate perception proper arises when the intellect works upon the material supplied to it by the other sense-organs.

From the above discussion, it is clear that in the perceptual process of the Nyāya-school, functioning of three internal organs in the forms of mind, ego-sense and intellect is not necessary. The soul can have a direct perceptual knowledge of the object through the functioning of the mind only. Buddhī and ahamkāra are not accorded any place in the perceptual mechanism of the Nyāya-school. Knowledge, according to this school, is a non-eternal quality of the ātman. The soul is the substratum of object-knowledge; but this characteristic (jñānadhāratva) does not do any harm to the kūtastha nature of the soul. This is because the Nyāya admits difference between substance and quality.

1. Vacaspati—Tattva Kaumudi—bhāsyā on kārikā 23
   English translation by G. Jha.

   “It is well known that when a man has to do anything, what he does is to review the situation: he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do it and then makes up his mind, that he should do it and then, does it. Now, ‘determination’ consists in the notion that this should be done, and it belongs to and forms the characteristic function of Buddhi.”

2. Śāmkhya Candrika—Nārāyana Tirtha—(Commentary on kārikā 23) Adhyavasayo buddhi riti. Adhyavasayo mayedam kartavyamityā āraniścayo.............. buddhiparināmo ‘vasthāvisaṣaḥ.'
CHAPTER I

Quality being different, changes in quality do not affect the unchangeable nature of the soul. There are changes in knowledge due to origination and decay. Knowledge has become non-eternal in nature. This non-eternity, however, does not affect the eternal and immutable nature of the soul.

According to Nyāya, the soul being immutable, cannot go to the object although it becomes the pramātā or the knower of the object. Mind is the agent, which, on the one hand gets related to the sense-organ in contact with the object (arthasāmyukta indriya) and on the other hand, gets related to the soul. Hence, the soul becomes connected with the object through the functioning of the mind and the sense-organ. Further, mind is eternal and not a product according to this school. So, there is no need to assume any other tattva as the samavāyi kāraṇa of the mind. If ātmā, mind, sense-organ and the object remain present and there is relation among them, then knowledge arises immediately without the intervention of any other tattva.

The position of Sāṁkhya is different. Sāṁkhya recognizes tādātmya between substance and quality. So, if the soul is regarded as the substratum of the non-eternal vṛttijñāna (phenomenal knowledge, which will then become a quality of the soul) then this changeable and non-eternal phenomenal knowledge will spoil the non-changeable and eternal nature of the ātman. So, the soul cannot be the pramātā or the substratum of vṛttijñāna. The Sāṁkhya has, therefore, admitted caitanya prativimbha buddhi (buddhi through which consciousness is reflected) as the substratum and pramātā of knowledge. Buddhi is the first evolute of Prakṛti and it is essentially sattvika in nature. So, consciousness can be reflected through buddhi in a full and clear form.

Sattvapradhāna buddhi reaches the object through the sense-organs and assumes the form of the object. There can be no real relation between puruṣa and the object from the point of view of the Sāṁkhya-school. Puruṣa is mere
illuminating consciousness. It simply reveals whatever is placed before it. It is buddhi which is close to puruṣa caitanya and not the object. So, buddhi is directly receiving reflection from the self. Hence the object can be revealed only if it can impart its form to buddhi which becomes related to it through the sense-organs. Hence there is the need for buddhivṛtti in the epistemology of the Sāṁkhya school. It is the vṛtti which is directly revealed. The object is revealed only indirectly through the vṛtti. Vṛtti, therefore, becomes the direct object of knowledge according to Sāṁkhya whereas according to the Nyāya school, it is the object which is directly revealed in knowledge.

Sannikarṣa

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāmsakas, the vedāntists have admitted different forms of sannikarṣa, to account for the perception of different objects. It is true that in none of the original Sāṁkhya-texts available uptill now, any mention of different forms of sannikarṣa is to be found. Even then since the sāṁkhya has defined perceptual knowledge as definite cognition received through the sense-organ in contact with the object, the nature of this contact must be examined fully as in this system too, it does not seem to be possible to have perception of the substance, quality, jātī etc. by one form of sannikarṣa only. There are some interpreters¹ who have made an attempt to enumerate different forms of sannikarṣa which may be justifiably held from the Sāṁkhya point of view.

Samyoga Sannikarṣa

According to Krishnavallbacarya, samyoga should be supposed to operate in the perception of the substances like earth, water etc.

(1) Krishnavallavacarya Swami Narayan, the author of Kiranavalitika on Sāṁkhya-tattva Kaumudi.
CHAPTER I

Samyukta-tādātmya

When we are to perceive the smell of the earth, the form of sannikarsa that produces this perception is saṁyukta-tādātmya. There is saṁyoga between the nose and the earth. Smell, being the quality of the earth is related to the earth by way of identity. Hence, samyukta tādātmya is the sannikarsa by means of which smell of the earth is perceived.

Saṁyukta-tādāma-tādātmya

This sannikarṣa is involved in the perception of that aspect of the thing which is in tādātmya relation with that perceived by saṁyukta tādātmya. The universal of the smell of the earth is to be perceived by means of this sannikarṣa. The earth is saṁyukta with the nose, the smell of the earth is in tādātmya relation with the earth and the universal of the smell is again in tādātmya relation with the smell.

Tādātmya relation is used in perceiving pleasures, pains etc. through budhivṛtti,

Universals of pleasures, pains etc. are to be perceived by tādātmma-tādātmya relation.

These are the sannikarsas expounded in kiranāyali tīkā on Tattva Kaumudī. Here, we may add that Tādātmya sannikarṣa can also be operative in the perception of sound because sound, being a quality of ākāśa (ether) is in tādātmya relation with the latter (ether). The organ of hearing is pervaded by ether and so there is tādātmya relation between the sound and the organ of hearing.

The universal of sound, on the other hand, can be perceived by tādātmma-tādātmya sannikarṣa.

It is, of course, true that Sāmkhya does not agree with the Nyāya-vaiśesika in holding that substance, quality, action, jāti etc. are different categories. On the other hand, according to Sāmkhya-school, quality, action etc. are related to the substance by way of tādātmya relation. So, there is not the acceptance of samavāya in the Nyāya sense in the Sāmkhya. Samavāya has been admitted by the Nyāya-school
as a form of bheda-sambandha (relation of difference) whereas tādātmya of the Sāṁkhya-school is a form of abheda (identity) sambandha. That saṁyoga and tādātmya (both singly and in combined form) are capable of serving as sannikārṣa for perceiving the various aspects of an object seems to be the view of the Sāṁkhya.

Here one may pose the following objection:

Since Sāṁkhya has admitted tādātmya or identity between quality and the possessor of quality, between jāti and jātīman, it can, very well be remarked that according to the school, the jar, the quality of the jar, and the universal of the quality of the jar can be directly perceived through contact (Saṁyoga) only. If the jar is the same as its colour and also as the universal of its colour, then one form of sannikārṣa will be capable of working in all cases of perception. What is the use, then of postulating that the colour of the jar is known through the mediation of the jar by saṁyukta tādātmya and that the universal of the colour of the jar is known through the mediation of the jar by the saṁyukta-tādātma-tādātmya? When one form (i.e. a saṁyoga) of sannikārṣa is enough for serving the purpose in all cases, what is the use of increasing its number?

To meet this objection, we may point out that tādātmya does not mean absolute non-difference (sarvathā-abheda). It means identity in difference.

Now, if difference (however little) is admitted between jar and its colour, then the colour of the jar cannot be directly perceived along with the jar by means of saṁyoga.

Further, it is a fact that when buddhi comes in contact with the jar through indriyas, it assumes the form of the jar. Now, jar-form includes the shape of the jar, smell of the jar etc.; still the eye can perceive only the shape of the jar and not its smell or touch. This is because a particular sense-organ is capable of receiving one specific impression only. Even if the sense-organ is in contact with other
aspects of the object (which are not its specific viṣayās), still viṣṭis of these aspects will not be received by that particular sense-organ. The eye, for instance is capable of receiving only the rūpa (form) of the object and not anything else. Had saṁyoga been only sannikārṣa for knowing all the aspects of a thing then not only the quality and the universal of quality would have been received directly by the eye along with the shape of the jar, the eye would also have been able to know smell, touch etc. of the jar because of its contact with the jar-form; It is only the ghaṭākāra that can be received directly by the eye due to its contact with the jar; viṣṭi of the colour of the jar (which remains in tādātmya relation with the jar) is of such a nature that it can be received by the eye only in an indirect manner through the mediation of the jar (i.e. by saṁyukta-tādātmya). Otherwise, the eye is not capable of receiving colour of the jar as it is incapable of receiving smell or touch of the jar. Hence, the law of parsimony has not been violated here by the admission of the different forms of sannikārṣa.

Due to the different forms of sense-object relation, different viṣṭis or pratīvimbās arise in the sense-organs. These are then presented to buddhi through akāṃkāra as a result of which the intelligised buddhi itself, changes into the forms of the object, thereby producing its own viṣṭis. Puruṣa, then, falsely owns these buddhaviṣṭis in the forms of knowledge, pleasures and pains because of the operation of non-discrimination and reflection. Buddhaviṣṭis are located in the buddhi and not in puruṣa.

Now, here we may point out another important fact which also needs satisfactory explanation. We have already seen that the eye is capable of receiving the colour of an object by saṁyuktatādātmya. Quantity and number are also qualities of the object which are to be received by the eye and touch. So far as the eye is concerned, it will know both quantity and number by saṁyukta tādātmya.
Colour of the jar is received by
sāmyukta-tādātmya

Quantity of the jar (length, breadth etc.) is received by
sāmyukta-tādātmya

Number too is received by
sāmyukta-tādātmya

These however, are not perceived simultaneously at one and the same point of time. Perception is gradual. This is so, because three vṛttis are not aroused simultaneously although sannikārṣa is equally present in respect of colour, quantity and number. Vṛttis are the waves which are caused by the blowing of wind in the form of udbuddhavāsanā. The kind of object that the knower is very eager to know is imaged in the vṛtti and the object is revealed to the knower. Udbuddha vāsanā is the cause that produces successive perception of colour, quantity and number although sannikārṣa is present in respect of all the three aspects of the object. When the desire to perceive the quantity of the object arises in the mind of the perceiver, there is the corresponding modification of buddhi resulting in the immediate awareness of the quantity. Similar is the case with the perception of number and the colour. Hence, we find that udbuddha vāsanā plays a very important part in savikalpaka perception. It is perhaps due to this fact that buddhists have admitted nirvikalpaka as the only type of valid perception.

Sāmkhya does not accept anupalabdhi as a separate source for knowing negation or abhāva. Abhāva can be known through perception.¹ Now, if abhāva is to be perceived then it must be perceived through a particular sannikārṣa suitable for its apprehension. On the basis of vācaspati’s commentary on Sāmkhya-Kārikā, we can say that according to Sāmkhya-school, abhāva can be perceived by Saṃyukta-tādātmya sannikarṣa. This is because according to this school negation

¹ Tattva Kaumudi on Kārikā
Evamabhāvo’pi pratyakṣameva.
of the jar on the ground (bhūtale ghatābhāva) is a modification of the ground only and not a separate category. (Yato bhūtalasya parināmaviśesādanyah Kaścit ghatābhāva rūpa padartho nāma nāstyatah pratyakṣamiti sambandhah.)

Of course, the word parināma generally refers to karya parināma only. Here, abhāva is a special kind of parināma which is different from kārya-parināma.

Parināma, according to Sāṃkhya, may be dharma parināma, laksāna parināma and avasthā parināma. When there is the absence of the jar on the ground, there is only ground as such. This is known as Kaivalya laksāna novastha parināma of the ground because at this point of time, ground exists as ground only (kevalatmataya). Hence, there will be saṃyoga between the eye and the ground. There is tādātmya between the ground and its Kaivalyāvasthāparināma. So this kaivalyāvasthā or abhāvavasthā of the ground will be perceived by saṃyukta-tādātmya sannikāraṇa.

Here, one may legitimately point out that when abhāva of a particular object is perceived, the adhikāraṇa (locus) does not always remain in kaivalyāvasthā or advitiyāvasthā. If there is a piece of cloth on the ground on which jar is absent there is no kaivalyāvasthā of the ground even though the negation of the jar on the ground will be perceived. How is this to be explained?

To solve this, we can say that the Sāṃkhya school, too, will have to admit that yogānupalabdhi (non-apprehension of the object which is suitable for apprehension) becomes an important aid in giving rise to the perception of negation. In fact, a suggestion to this effect can be found in Kārikā seven where the author of the Sāṃkhya-kārikā has stated the circumstances under which non-apprehension of the object does not mean its negation or non-existence. In other words, here, the author is saying that non-apprehension of the object, not suitable for apprehension (ayogānupalabdhi), does not mean non-existence of the object which by implication asserts that
yogyanupalabdhi helps us to apprehend abhāva of the object. When there is a piece of cloth on the ground, the ground is sadvitīya and not advitīya (kevala); even then ghatabhāva will be perceived because of the fact that had the jar been present, it ought to have been perceived. Even the Naiyāyikās who do not admit anupalabdhi as an independent source of knowledge acknowledge the assistance rendered by anupalabdhi in the matter of perception of negation.¹

Inference

Inferential knowledge is that knowledge in which the modification of the buddhi in the form of the inferred object occurs in the absence of the contact between the external sense-organ and the object. Here, the middle term (limga) is perceived and the major term is inferentially apprehended through its relation to the middle term.

In the Sāmkhya-kārikā, inference is defined as limga-limgipūrvakam which amounts to saying that limga-limgipūrvakam jñānamanumānam. In other words, according to Sāmkhya, inference is based on two things:—

1. Knowledge of vyāpti
   (Vyāpya-Vyapaka jñānapūrvakam)
   The knowledge of the hetu as invariably & unconditionally related to the major term.

2. Knowledge of the presence of limga as a dharma of the pakṣa (minor term).
   (Pakṣadharmatā jñānapūrvakam)

(1) Bhasa pariccheda (Muktavalitika)
   Karika ref: 62
   Atra abhāvapratyakṣe yogā-nupalabdhiḥ
   karaṇam ......................
   Sa ca pratiyogisattva—prasanjana—prasanjita—prati-
   yogikatvarūpa,
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Although the word liṅgī has not been repeated in the kārikā, still by the word liṅgī, we are to understand the minor term as well. Pakṣadharmaṭājñāna and vyāptijñāna, taken together, lead to the inferential knowledge. There is no need for the third liṅga paramārṣa of the Nyāya-school. According to Sāmkhya, it is the vṛtti which is to be treated as kāraṇa or pramāṇa because it is through vṛtti that object-knowledge arises.

Of course vyāptijñāna is generally regarded as the karaṇa: this does not, however, interfere with the Sāmkhya recognition of vṛtti as the karaṇa. If caitanya-prativimbita-buddhi-vṛtti (buddhi vṛtti through which there is reflection of consciousness) is to be regarded as pramāṇa, then it is logical to admit vṛtti as the karaṇa of valid knowledge. Nevertheless, vyāpti jñāna, too, may be admitted as karaṇa, since vṛtti is due to vyāpti jñāna. It is because vṛtti caused by vyāpti jñāna (vyāpti jñānajanyavṛtti) is regarded a karaṇa, there is no harm in describing vyāpti jñāna as the karaṇa of the inferential knowledge.

In arriving at the inferential knowledge ‘Parvato Vahnimān’, there is, firstly, the paksadharmata jñāna (i.e. perception of smoke in the hill) and secondly there is remembering of vyāpti in the form ‘where there is smoke, there is fire’. These two, taken together, lead to the inferential knowledge in the form ‘there is fire in the hill’. As soon as vyāpti is remembered, on perceiving the liṅga as a dharma of pakṣa, buddhi assumes the form of fire. This act of modification of buddhi in the form of the object (here the inferred object) is known as vyāpāra and pramāṇa arises as a result of this vyāpāra. Here, knowledge of fire which is nothing but reflection of

(2) Vācaspati—Tattva Kaumudī, Kārikā—4
Līṅga grahaṇam cāvartaniyam.
Tena līṅgamasyāstiti paksadharmata
jñānamapi darśitaṁ bhavaṭī
consciousness (through the modification of buddhi in the form of fire is anumiti-pramā (i.e. vahnyākāra buddhi vṛtti).

The vṛtti of ‘the hill with smoke as its dharma’ is perceptual or aparokṣa whereas vṛtti in the form of fire is parokṣa. It is because the same consciousness is reflected through both, that there is the knowledge of fire in the hill.

Although there is buddhi vyāpāra in perception, still perception is different from inference as in the case of inference this buddhi vyāpāra is due to vyāpti jñāna. In perception, this buddhi vyāpāra is caused by the relation between the sense-organ and the object. In śabda pramāṇa also, there is buddhi vyāpāra; but in this case the modification of buddhi in the form of the object is due to vākyārtha jñāna. Hence, śabda pramāṇa is different from both perception and inference. Vijñānabhidhikṣu has remarked: ‘Pratibandhadriṣaḥ pratibandhaśāmanumānam’ (S.P.B. 1-100). ‘Pratibandha’ refers to vyāpti and knowledge of vyāpaka arising from the knowledge of vyāpti is inference.

Nature of Vyāpti

Regarding the nature of vyāpti, the knowledge of which is absolutely necessary for anumiti pramā, it has been held by the followers of the Śamkhya-school that this vyāpti should be always anauṇḍhika (unconditional) in nature. Conditional vyāpti can never serve as the basis of inference. The middle term or the hetu must have a natural universal relation with the major term; otherwise, the middle term cannot be the indicator of the presence of the major term in the minor term in all cases. In the words of Vacaspati Misra, we can say “Śamkita—samaṇḍopitopādhi nirākaraṇa ca svabhāvapratibaddham vyāpyām yena pratibaddham tad-vyāpakam.”

(Tattva Kaumudī—Commentary on Kārikā 5)

(“The middle term is that where natural concomitance (with the major term) has been duly recognized after all
suspected and assumed adventitious accidents have been eliminated: and that with which the middle term is so concomitant is the major term"—Ganganath Jha).

Thus, like the followers of the well-known school of logic (i.e. the Nyāya school) the Sāṅkhya philosophers too, hold that inference is based on the knowledge of the invariable and unconditional relation between the middle term and the major term.

**Kinds of inference:**

Inference is of two kinds: (i) \( \text{Viṭam (viśeṣena itam = Jnātam) \text{}} \)

(ii) \( \text{Aviṭam} \).

Viṭa form of anumāna is that form in which vyāpti is principally (mukhena) arrived at by perceiving the universal co-presence of the middle term and the major term. “Yatra-dhūmastatra agniḥ (wherever there is smoke, there is fire) is the vyāpti which is arrived at by perceiving” “yo dhumavān savahnimān yathā mahānasah. When such a vyāpti serves as the basis of an inference, the inference is called a viṭa form of anumāna; but, here, we should not think that viṭa corresponds to kevalānvayi inference only. Viṭa also includes that form of inference in which vyāpti is arrived at by both anvaya and vyatireka. The word ‘mukhena’ simply implies that vyāpti in this case, is based mainly (mukhena) on anvaya sahacāra. This does not, however, exclude vyāpti arrived at by both anvaya and vyatireka.¹

Viṭa form of inference is again of two kinds:

Pūrvavat:—In this form of inference, the inferred object is qualified by such a universal (fire of the hill qualified by fireness) a specific individual of which has been perceived (dṛṣṭa svalakṣaṇasāmanya viṣaya).

1. Sarabodhini Tīkā on Kārikā-5

Anvayavyapti prādhānyameva kevalam vitatve prayojakam; na tu tatra vyatirekavyatyasattvam yabhi pretamityarthaḥ.
On perceiving smoke in a hill, we infer the presence of the fire in the hill qualified by the universal fireness. The universal ‘fireness’ is such that a specific instance of it has been perceived in the kitchen.

Sāmānya to dṛṣṭam (adṛṣṭa svalakṣaṇa sāmānyavaiśayam)

In this form of inference, the inferred object is qualified by such a universal that no specific instance of it has been perceived.

When we infer the existence of sense-organ as instrument of perception, we take the help of sāmānyatodṛṣṭāḥ anumāna. No specific instrumant in the form of an indriya qualified by the universal ‘indriyatva’ has been perceived; but, usually generally, it has been that where there is an action, there is an instrument to do that action. For cutting down a tree, an axe is needed. That is to say that although we have not come across any specific instance of the instrument in the form of indriya, still we have perceived specific instances of actions like cutting, writing etc., brought about by instruments in the forms of axe, pen etc. Now, perceiving, tasting etc. are actions like the actions of cutting, writing etc. Therefore, the actions of perceiving, tasting etc. need instruments and these instruments are the sense-organs. So, the existence of instrument in the form of a sense-organ is established. Here, vyāpti is established between the middle term “kriyā of the form of cutting, writing etc.” and the major term ‘instrument’ like axe, pen etc. necessary to perform all actions other than psychological actions which generate knowledge; but the inferred object is instrument in the form of sense-organ. This inferred instrument is different in kind from the instrument that becomes the sadhya of the vyāpti. It is because the inferred ‘instrument in the form of sense-organs’ is such that no specific instance of it has been perceived that sāmānyatodṛṣṭāḥ anumāna differs from Pūrva-vatanumāna in which a specific individual of the inferred object is perceived.
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Avītam

Avīta form of anumāṇa or śesavat anumāṇa is that form which is based on Kevalavyatireki Vyāpti.
As for example:—

Prithivi itarebhyo jalādibhyo bhidyate
gandhvattat

Yadi tarebhyo na bhidyate na tad
gandhavat, Jathā jalam.

Na ceyam Prithivi gandhābhāvavat
Tasmānna i tarebhedabhāvavat

Here, since the earth is the only thing that possesses smell, we cannot have anvayi-vyāpti like ‘yad gandhavat taditara bhinnam’ in the absence of examples. Here, vyatirekivyāpti alone is possible.

Vācaspati Misra has established the non-difference of the cause & the effect by means of the avīta form of inference in which there is only co-existence of negations (vyatireka sahacāra).

The cloth is non-different from the threads constituting it; because it subsists in the threads; no object differing in its essence from another can subsist in it; as the cow in the horse; but the cloth subsists in the threads. So, cloth is not different from the threads.

This is how Vācaspati Misra has described three forms of inference. Gaudapāda, on the other hand, has interpreted pūrvavat, sāmanyatodrāṣṭaḥ and śesavat in a manner which is found in the Nyāya Philosophy.

When both cloud and rain have been seen together before and when cloud alone is seen, one infers the coming of rain. This is the example of Pūrvavat anumāṇa.

The śesavat anumāṇa is that form in which from the effect, the cause is inferred. When one finds the river swollen, one infers that there was rain.
Samanyatodrasah is the form in which the movement of the sun is inferred on seeing changes in the position of the sun. This is because change in the position of an object is generally noticed when there is movement in the object.

Methods of Arriving at Vyāpti

From what has been stated before, it follows that according to Sāmkhya also, vyāpti can be obtained by three methods.

1. By perceiving mainly such instances in which there is co-presence of the middle term and the major term. (anvayadṛṣṭānta)

2. We have already seen that the expression "anvaya-mukhena" does not exclude the perception of vyatireki examples. Further, the avīta form of anumāna is a kevala-vyatireki inference. So, the Sāmkhya Philosophers have minimised in no way the importance of the perception of vyatireki instances. There is, therefore, full justification for holding that vyāpti can be obtained by anvaya-vyatireka method also. Perception of both anvaya dṛṣṭānta and vyatireka dṛṣṭānta, thus, constitutes the second method for arriving at vyāpti. (Anvaya-vyatireki method)

3. Kevala vyatireki method is the third method by means of which the vyāpti which forms the basis of avīta form of inference, is obtained.

We have seen that in the opinion of Vacaspati Misra vyāpti is to be established by removing all suspected and accidental upādhis. Upādhi-nirāsa (removal of upādhis) is the most essential requirement that is to be specially fulfilled when one proceeds to establish the vyāpya-vyapaka sambandha.

Since upādhi-nirāsa is essential for establishing vyāpti according to Sāmkhya, we can say that the Sāmkhya is more in favour of applying methods in the manner of Mill's experimental methods than in the manner of his method of Induction per simple enumeration. This is because upādhi-nirāsa can
be done in the most satisfactory manner by perceiving anvaya dṛṣṭāntas and vyatireka dṛṣṭāntas in different places and under different circumstances. If we collect different instances from different places and find that in none of them the relation between the two phenomena under consideration is brought about by any third thing, then we can more conclusively say that the relation between the said phenomena is anupādhika.

It is to bring about such an effective elimination of upādhis that the buddhists have mentioned

(1) Kārya-kārana relation.
(2) tādātmya relation.

(1) If we can prove that there is cause-effect relation between two things, then there is bound to be niyata sahacāra relation between them. The cause-effect relation is such that the effect cannot exist without the cause, so cause-effect relation can serve as vyāpti because the cause, can serve as the mark for inferring the effect and the effect, too, can serve as a mark for inferring the cause.

(2) When two things co-exist in the same locus (samānādhi karaṇa) then there is tādātmya between the two. There is tādātmya relation between simśapā and tree, because both of them co-exist in the same locus “treeness”. So, the vyāpti, in the form of “All simśapās are trees” will be an invariable and unconditional one.

Some orthodox systems take the help of tarka and āgama to eliminate doubt (samaśya) which may arise even after the examination of anvaya sahacāra and vyatireka sahacāra has been done. If through a thorough investigation, upādhi or any contrary instance is not discovered, then the relation between vyāpya and vyāpaka will be regarded as niyata, avyabhicarita and anupādhika. Such a vyāpti will serve as the basis of inference.

It should, however, be remembered that tarka is taken recourse to only when doubt arises even after the observation of sahacāra and non-observation of vyabhicāra between vyāpya
and vyāpaka. Where doubt can be removed by some other means, tarka is not needed. Truly speaking vyāpti sambandha is not established by means of tarka but the vyāpti already arrived at, is strengthened by tarka when it helps us to eliminate upādhis.

Śabda:

Śabda, as a source of knowledge, is to be considered after inference. This is because the inexperienced person understands the relation between the word and its meaning by means of inference. It is only when the inexperienced person attains the knowledge of the śabdārtha that he comes to possess what is known as śabdabodha.

Āptavacana refers to vākyārtha-jñāna and āptaśrutī refers to right revelation. Revelation stands for the knowledge of a sentence which is produced by the sentence.

Valid assertion, according to sāmkhya is an independent source of knowledge. It is valid because it originates from the words of the vedas which, being apauruṣeya, is free from all defects which are noticeable in the composition made by human beings. Knowledge, derived from itihāsa and smṛti, which are based on the vedas, should also be regarded as valid.

Gaudapāda, however, divides this mode of knowing into two sets—ācāryas and śrutī (āpta-ācārya brahmā-dayah śrutirvedah āptaśca śrutisca āptaśrutih).

If Vācaspati’s interpretation is accepted, then one may feel difficulty in including in āgama the teachings of Kapila who was a siddha puruṣa. Vācaspati, himself, has solved this problem. Kapila, according to Vācaspati, did not teach anything original. He simply remembered the revealed texts which he had studied in his previous births. Hence, what he taught was really apauruṣeya and not pauruṣeya. This explanation may seem to us mythical and irrational. Gauḍapāda’s interpretation may be considered as logical and apt. If ācāryas can be regarded as āptas, then the teachings of Kapila
can very well be regarded as āpatavacan. A little reflection will make us feel that this interpretation cannot be accepted from the point of view of the Sāmkhya-school. If teachings of ācaryas are to be regarded as a reliable source of knowledge, then the teachings of Gautama as well as of Mahāvira cannot be held as unreliable and faulty. It is, for this reason, that Vācaspati has understood by āptavacana vedic teachings only which are not the results of human efforts. Kapila only remembered what he had learnt in his past lives. Teachings of Kapila are not his original composition. The fact that the vedic truths learnt by Kapila in his past lives were remembered by him in the age in which he was born, could not be regarded as absurd; psychical research society, today, is trying to explain such rare experiences which are not normal.

Buddhistic philosophers do not admit śabda as a source of knowledge. This view is not justifiable because valid testimony as a source of knowledge is resorted to by all human beings in their day-to-day dealings. If we do not believe in the validity of the utterances of our teachers and experienced persons we shall never be able to learn anything and we shall never be able to reap the benefit of our elder’s experiences. It is, of course, true that on many occasions what is learnt from a so-called reliable person turns out false, but this unfortunate fact should not minimise the importance of valid testimony as a source of learning in human-life. Inferences also, are, very often, proved to be untrue; still inference is regarded as a source of knowledge by every school of philosophy excepting the Cārvāka school. Just as to make our inference valid, we try to establish a valid vyāpti between the vyāpya and the vyāpaka by eliminating all upādhias, in the same manner to make our śabdajñāna valid, we should try to test the āptatva of the āptas in a very strict and convincing manner. If the āptatva of the āpta puruṣa is proved to be beyond doubt, then the utterances of such a puruṣa can very convincingly be relied upon.
Upamāna:

Upamāna has been defined by the Nyāya in the following manner:

"Prasiddhasādharmyātsādhyaśādhanamupamānanāṁ". To be more explicit let us take the oft quoted assertion, "As the cow, so is the gavaya" (yathā gaustathā gavayaitī). This assertion gives the inexperienced person a knowledge of the resemblance between the cow and the gavaya. It is due to this vākyārtha jñāna that he understands the animal bearing resemblance with the cow as gavaya, although he is seeing the animal for the first time. This assertion, namely, "yathā gaustathā gavaya iti" helps the inexperienced person to understand the relation between the name 'gavaya' and the animal denoted by this name. (Saṁjñā-saṁjñī sambandha). This knowledge of the relation between saṁjñā and saṁjñī is what is called upamitijñāna: the knowledge of the similarity between the cow and the gavaya brought about by the assertion 'yathā gaustathā gavayaiti is the karāṇa of this upamiti jñāna. This is how the Nyāya school has understood the nature of upamāna as the source of our upamiti jñāna.

According to Sāmkhya, however, upamāna is not an independent source of knowledge. 'Vākyārtha jñāna' produced by the assertion 'yathā gaustathā gavaya iti' is purely verbal. As soon as the inexperienced person hears this sentence, relevant buddhi vṛtti is immediately formed. It is this buddhi vṛtti which is the pramāṇa and not the assertion, 'as the cow, so is the gavaya'. The knowledge that the term gavaya is denotative of the animal similar to the cow is purely inferential. The inferential process is like this:

Gavaya is a term which is qualified by pravṛttinimitta of the form of gavayatva.

As there is no other vṛtti like laksanā etc. the term gavaya is used by the experienced persons only in the case of an animal qualified by gavayatva.
If a term devoid of all other \textit{vṛttis}, is used in a particular sense only, then that term (here gavaya) becomes the \textit{pravṛtti nimittaka} of that sense (here gavayatva).

Generally, in inferential knowledge, sāmānya sādhya (major term in the form of universal) is established on the basis of sāmānya \textit{vyāpti}.

When on perceiving smoke, fire is inferred, it is the ‘universal fire’ which is established in a particular place.

In such a case, by means of inference, we can only say that the term gavaya has got some \textit{pravṛtti-nimitta} but the fact that this \textit{pravṛttinimitta} is to be had in gavayatva only, cannot be established by means of the type of anumāna mentioned above. Śabda, on the other hand, helps us to know that ‘similarity with the cow’ is the ‘\textit{pravṛtti nimitta}’ in the case of the term gavaya. That ‘gavayatva’ is the \textit{pravṛtti nimitta} of the term ‘gavaya’ is not made known to us by śabda.

Perception, by itself, can only reveal to us an animal having resemblance with the cow. It is only when perception is aided by śabda that we come to have a perceptual knowledge of the animal bearing the name of gavaya and also of gavayatva as the \textit{pravṛtti nimitta}.

Since perception, inference (in the sense mentioned above) and śabda cannot give us the knowledge of the relation between the term gavaya and the animal that is denoted by the term and is also qualified by gavayatva which is its \textit{pravṛtti nimitta}, upamāna has been regarded as an independent source of knowledge by the Nyāya School.

Now, apart from the type of inference already mentioned, there is also another form of inference by means of which a višeṣa sādhya (sādhya as a particular) can be established even on the basis of sāmānya \textit{vyāpti}. Where ‘\textit{itarabādha}’ is possible, sādhya established on the basis of \textit{vyāpti} is a particular one. For example, if in a particular place, coal is known to be the only fuel in the absence of other forms of
combustibles, then on seeing smoke, one can very well infer that there is that particular fire which is generated from coal only. This is the type of inference which has been already mentioned in the place where we have explained how the Sāmkhya attempts to prove inferentially the fact that the term ‘gavaya’ is used by the experienced persons only in the case of an animal qualified by ‘gavayatva’.

Of course, nowhere in the available commentaries of the Sāmkhya Kārikā this type of inference has been mentioned. Even then, there is no harm in supposing that the Sāmkhya philosophers were cognisant of this form of inference as it is the form of inference which can fulfill the function of upamāna in the most satisfactory manner.

Arthāpatti:

Arthāpatti may be defined as 'upapādyā jñāna prabhavam upapādaka jñānamarthapattih’. The given fact which cannot be explained without the supposition of some unperceived fact is known as upapādyā: the unperceived fact which is presumed to explain the given fact is known as upapādaka. We cannot explain the absence of a living person in his residence without supposing that he is present elsewhere. The absence of the living man in his residence is what is called upapādyā. The presence of the living person elsewhere is, therefore, the upapādaka without the supposition of which upapādyā cannot be explained. Here, upapadya jñāna which is the cause of the presumption of upapādaka is the pramāṇa and upapādaka jñāna which results from this pramāṇa is the arthāpatti pramāṇa.

Now, according to Sāmkhya, arthāpatti can be reduced to a form of inference. Inference can be of this form:—

_If a living being is absent from home he is present elsewhere._

_Living Caitra is not at home._

_: Living Caitra is elsewhere._
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If anybody says that the anvaya vyāpti of the form “whenever a person is not present at home, he is present elsewhere (i.e. a universal relation of concomitance between a living man’s absence from home and presence elsewhere) cannot be established in the absence of positive instances, to serve as the basis of an anvayi anumāna, then this can be proved by a vyatireki anumāna which has been recognized by the Śaṅkhya school. Inference, in that case, will be as under:

If a living being is present at home, he is not elsewhere
Caitra is absent from home
So Caitra is elsewhere.

Here vyāpti is of the form “where there is no absence from home in the case of living beings, there is no presence elsewhere” for which instances can be collected from living persons who are not absent from home and for that reason are not present elsewhere.

In the opinion of the Śaṅkhya school, living caitra’s non-existence in the house is not contradictory to his existence elsewhere. Non-existence of living caitra in his house does not wipe out his existence. Existence and non-existence are contradictory terms but non-existence in the house and existence in general are not to be regarded as contradictory to each other.

Generally, if any school of Philosophy admits vyatireki anumāna as valid, then it can very well reduce arthāpatti to a form of inference.

Vedānta and the Bhatta school of Mīmāṁsā do not accept vyatireki anumāna as valid. According to them, negation is to be known by means of a separate source of knowledge which, they term, as anupalabdhi. Hence both the schools have included arthāpatti in the list of pramāṇas as an independent source.

The Prabhakara school of Philosophy, however, has admitted arthāpatti as an independent source of knowledge although
this school has not recognised an independent status of anupalabdhi pramāṇa. Prabhakara’s analysis of arthāpatti is different. Suppose a person possesses prior knowledge of the living condition of Devadatta by some other means: he then perceives that Devadatta who generally remains at home is not in his residence. This arouses a sort of doubt in his mind regarding the living state of Devadatta. The absence of Devadatta, thus, throws the man into a doubtful state of mind in respect of the existence of Devadatta. To remove this doubt he has to imagine that Devadatta is elsewhere. Here, the perceived fact (i.e. absence of Devadatta in the house) is not by itself inexplicable; this perceived fact gives rise to a doubt regarding his previous knowledge of the living condition of Devadatta. It is for the removal of this doubt that there is the presumption of the unperceived fact.

Arthāpatti, thus, cannot be admitted as a form of anumāṇa as in no form of inference, an element of doubt is ever present. The perceived middle term never produces doubt in the mind of the perceiver regarding its existence. Hence, arthāpatti has to be made use of as a source of knowledge when such a sort of doubt is to be eliminated.

Here, although Prabhakara’s contention is that the doubt in question arises in regard to the living condition of Devadatta only and not in regard to Devadatta’s non-existence in the house (which will be the middle term in the inference) still we can point out that there is an element of doubt in respect of Devadatta’s existence as well. Unless Devadatta’s vahir satta (existence elsewhere) is samsayātmaka (doubtful), there cannot be any doubt regarding his living state. Hence arthāpatti can be reduced to form of inference in which a sandigdha sādhya will be established. The vyāpti will be of this form ‘whenever a living person is not present elsewhere, he is not absent from home’. For this, instances can be collected even from the life of the person who is making this generalisation.
The sāṃkhya has not accepted anupalabdhi as the source through which negation can be cognized. This is because abhāva has been accepted by them as an object of perception. We can perceive abhāva through samyukta-tādatmya sannikarṣa. The whole process has already been explained in connection with the exposition of perception as a source of knowledge.

**Probability**

Probability also is a case of inference. The heavier weight of khāri has been found to be invariably associated with the lighter weights of droṇ etc. It is this invariable relation that helps one to infer the existence of the lighter weights in the heavier weights.

**Rumour**

Rumour, generally, appears in the form of “such and such things have been said by such and such persons”. Here, when the original source is not known, this knowledge is not a valid knowledge. When the original source is found out and is known to be trustworthy, it becomes a case of śabda jñāna.

**Validity and Invalidity of Knowledge**

Knowledge which is revelation of reality may do its function either in a true manner or in a manner which is false. When reality is revealed truly, knowledge is called Pramāṇa and when this revelation is faulty it is treated as apramāṇa. In the sphere of epistemology, therefore, two important questions arise when we make an approach to reality through knowledge. These are:

1. How does validity or invalidity arise in knowledge?
2. How is validity or invalidity of knowledge known to us?

**The view of advaita vedānta**

The advaita-vedānta believes in the intrinsic validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya) and extrinsic invalidity (Parataḥ prāmāṇya) of knowledge. Knowledge is intrinsically valid and it is also known to be valid by its own intrinsic conditions. Cognition is self-revealed. A particular knowledge reveals not only its
existence but also its truth. The same set of conditions from which knowledge arises, also constitutes its validity. Hence, knowledge and also its validity are revealed simultaneously. In actual life, we do find that as soon as there is knowledge, it is accepted as valid, and we proceed to act immediately on the basis of that knowledge. It is, therefore, quite reasonable for us to believe that the truth of a knowledge and the knowledge of the truth of that knowledge are revealed to us by the same conditions which produce knowledge. Just as jñānatva is natural to knowledge, in the same way prāmāṇya, too, is natural to knowledge. When knowledge is vitiated, it is vitiated simply by conditions, external to itself. When conch-shell is perceived as silver, it is the sūktitvaprakāraka avidyā which is causing the illusion. This sūktitvaprakāraka avidyā is an adventitious positive entity (āgantuka bhāva kāraṇa).

Nyāya View

According to Nyāya, both validity and invalidity are externally caused. In perception, contact of the sense-organs with a large number of parts is the generating condition of validity. In the inferential knowledge, “sallinga parāmarśa” is the required condition whereas in śabda, the character of the āpta serves as the generating condition of prāmāṇya. The generating condition of invalidity in perceptual knowledge will, therefore, be the contact of the sense-organs with a smaller number of parts, in inferential knowledge, defective liṅga parāmarśa and in the case of śabda, untrustworthiness of the purusa etc.

Śāmkhya View Analyzed

The position of Śāmkhya is unique among orthodox systems because it has asserted not only the self-validity of knowledge but has also held that invalidity is intrinsic in knowledge. Both validity and invalidity are inherent in knowledge in regard to origination. Both jñāna and ajñāna are inherent in buddhi. Ajñāna is not negation of knowledge but it is confused knowledge due to non-discrimination
between two different things. The confusion in perception, is due to improper suppression of tamoguṇa which is an ingredient of knowledge. Sattva, rajas and tamas which are necessary for generation of knowledge, are also the factors which generate validity and invalidity by means of proper and improper suppression of tamoguṇa by the sattvaguṇa.

When the conchshell is truly revealed in knowledge, there is ‘tadvatitā prakāraka vṛtti’ in the intellect (i.e., there is sadvastu vṛtti) which is the pramāna and the illumination of this vṛtti by consciousness of the soul is the pramā. Prāmāṇya of this pramā is not generated by any adventitious positive entity. In the case of valid knowledge, there is the arousal of sat indriya and sat buddhi vṛtti due to excessive flow of tamoguṇa. Hence, the knowledge (i.e., revelation of vṛtti) is valid. The supposition of suktitva prakāraka avidyā is not necessary to explain the Śāmkhya-position. This is because in the opinion of the Śāmkhya, it is the excessive flow of tamoguṇa of the buddhi that functions as ajñāna or avidyā in producing invalidity in knowledge. So, the generating condition of invalidity is inherent in the conditions which are causing knowledge (jñāna karaṇa sāmagrī). Here, one may raise an objection by saying that the excess of tamoguṇa, being the cause of invalidity, cannot be inherent in the generating conditions of knowledge; because the ‘excess flow’ means that there is something more than the knowledge producing conditions. Hence, this excess flow of tamoguṇa is something outside the generating conditions of knowledge. Aprāmāṇya should, therefore, be regarded as parataḥ. This objection, too cannot stand. If the excess flow of tamaḥ is to be regarded as a condition external to the generating conditions of knowledge, then the excess flow of sattvaguṇa, needed for producing validity in knowledge, may also be regarded as external to the knowledge producing conditions. In that case, both validity and invalidity are to be regarded as parataḥ in regard to their origination in knowledge.
In the case of invalid knowledge, like the knowledge of silver in a conchshell, the \textit{vṛtti} of ‘this’ (idam \textit{vṛtti}) is \textit{pratyakṣa vṛtti} and this is also \textit{sadvastuvṛtti}. The \textit{vṛtti} in the form of silver (rajatākāra \textit{vṛtti}) however, originates due to combined operation of rajatavāsana and non-discrimination (vivekāgraha) between ‘conchshell’ and ‘silver’. Here, two \textit{vṛttis} are generated simultaneously; but as there is the reflection of the same consciousness though two \textit{vṛttis}, there is the generation of one cognition in the form “This is silver”. Here, the defects are ‘rajatavāsana’ and non-discrimination between the conchshell and the silver. These are positive but not adventitious. There are the effects of the excess flow of tamoguṇa. The Sāmkhya School has admitted tādātmya between the cause and the effect, dharma and dharmī (quality and the possessor of quality). So, vivekāgraha and the desire for the object (which is not present on that occasion) are non-different from the tamoguṇa of knowledge which is a disposition of buddhi. The result is that all the factors necessary for generating invalidity in knowledge are also inherent in the generating conditions of knowledge. Śuktitva prakāraka avidyā of the advaita-vedānta and contact with a small number of parts of the object of perception, defective liṅga-parāmarṣa, untrustworthiness etc. are all conditions external to knowledge-producing conditions. Hence, in the opinion of the advaita vedānta and the Nyāya, invalidity in knowledge is externally caused. According to Sāmkhya, however, both rajatavāsana and vivekāgraha are inherent in knowledge. Hence, invalidity is svatāḥ in regard to its origin.

Regarding the second question (i.e., how validity or invalidity is known) we can say that the natural tendency of man is to accept any and every kind of knowledge as valid as soon as it arises. Hence, in the case of valid knowledge, there is no extra factor (other than the factors needed for the generation of knowledge and its validity) to make its validity known to the knower. The intrinsic conditions which produce
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a valid cognition, also produce the knowledge of the validity of that cognition.

These in trinsic conditions are as under:—
1. Indriya vṛtti due to karaṇa vyāpāra.
2. Buddhi vṛtti.
3. No confused perception of sadasat vṛtti as one, due to excess flow of sattvaguṇa.

When these factors operate, valid vṛtti or valid knowledge is produced and is also immediately known as valid. It is because the validity is known immediately by the same set of conditions that the cognizer proceeds to act as soon as a particular cognition arises in his mind.

Regarding the knowledge of invalidity, however, we cannot say that the factors which are responsible for the generation of the knowledge and its invalidity are also the factors which make its invalidity known to the cognizer. In the case of invalid knowledge the intrinsic conditions which produce knowledge and its invalidity are as follows:—

1. Indriya vṛtti due to operation of karaṇas.
2. Buddhi vṛtti of an unreal object along with a real one due to the awakening of a desire for the unreal object.
3. Vivekāgra non the real and the unreal.

Both vivekāgra and the desire for the unreal object are the effects of the tamoguna resulting from the improper overpowering of tamoguna by the sattvaguṇa. As such, these two factors are non-different from the tamoguna which is in excess. Knowledge is always produced when the tamoguna of the buddhi is overpowered by the sattvaguṇa. In fact, adhyāyasāya or knowledge stands for the proper predomination of the sattvaguṇa in buddhi resulting from the proper suppression of tamas brought about by the operation of the karaṇas. If the suppression of tamas is done in a proper manner, there is excess flow of sattva and the consequent arousal of knowledge and its validity. If the suppression is not done properly, then there is the excess of tamoguna and the consequent origination of invalidity in knowledge.
We have already seen that 'excess' cannot be regarded as external to knowledge producing conditions, because in that case both validity and invalidity will become parataḥ.

Further, buddhi is changing from moment to moment and so it is becoming different at every moment. Similar is the case with knowledge. This difference, however, is not treated as a condition external to the knowledge-producing ones.

Now, vevekāgraha is not a negative condition because this has been described as khyāti and avidyā in the yoga-sūtra; it is that which causes “ekamevadarśanam” of two different things. This is not merely vivekābhava (negation of discrimination). On the other hand, this is a positive abhedagrahaṇa of two similar things.

Since, vivekāgraha is positive, it has got to be destroyed (the destruction of vivekagraha results in the apprehension of invalidity of a particular cognition) by some other positive fact. It is only when the annihilating factor comes into operation that aprāmāṇya (invalidity) of a particular cognition is ascertained. Hence, invalidity is known by a condition which is external to the conditions generating knowledge and its invalidity. This external, annihilating and positive condition is the production of unsuccessful effects in the external world by acting on the basis of that knowledge. So the occurrence of 'samvādīpravṛtti pratīkūlātā' is necessary for making invalidity of the cognition known to the cognizer. Origination of unsuccessful results takes place in the external world. The positive annihilating condition is, therefore, neither internal, nor is it included in the generating conditions of knowledge. Hence, we can say that according to Sāmkhya, aprāmāṇya is svataḥ in regard to origination but parataḥ in regard to its cognition.

It is not proper to say that if invalidity is svataḥ, then there can be no activity at all. Had Sāmkhya held that invalidity is known by the same set of conditions which generate knowledge and its invalidity, then this objection could have
some value. In that case, we could have said that invalidity would, therefore, be known to us simultaneously with knowledge. Since, in our previous discussion, we have tried to prove parataḥ iñapti of invalidity there is no difficulty in holding that invalid knowledge too, can give rise to karma-pravr̥tti (inclination to act.) When knowledge originates, the knower is not aware of its invalidity. It is the awareness of invalidity of a particular knowledge that really prevents the knower from acting according to that knowledge. Invalidity is to be known by the external condition in the form of the creation of unsuccessful effects. In other words, invalidity of a cognition becomes known to us only when it is applied in practical life.

So far as available texts of the classical Śāmkhya are concerned, there is practically no discussion about the validity and the invalidity of knowledge both in respect of origination and apprehension. It was probably Sucarita Misra who for the first time, declared that the Śāmkhya was in favour of accepting both validity and invalidity as svataḥ. Since then, it has become customary to hold that the Śāmkhya School believes in intrinsic validity and intrinsic invalidity in knowledge. Whether this ‘svatasta’ is in regard to utpatti (origination) or in regard to jñapti (apprehension) or in regard to both, has not, however, been clearly discussed by anybody.

In the discussion held so far, we have tried to prove that the Śāmkhya School believes in svataḥ utpatti and svataḥ jñapti in respect of the validity of cognition, but in respect of invalidity the said school believes in svataḥ utpatti and parataḥ jñaptivāda. If anybody is inclined to believe that in respect of apprehension of invalidity also, the Śāmkhya seems to believe in ‘svatasta’ then such a view too, can be logically harmonised with the philosophical position of the Śāmkhya School.

The Buddhistic School has admitted that aprāmāṇya is svataḥ in respect of its apprehension. The philosophers of
this school have also tried to show how practical behaviour is to be explained on the recognition of Svataḥ jnapti of invalidity in knowledge.

In the opinion of the buddhistic philosophers, pravṛtti samarthya is the condition that makes us aware of validity in knowledge. When knowledge is produced in such a manner that it brings about successful activity, then only, it becomes clear to us that this cognition is not invalid. Prior to the actual production of successful activity, validity of a cognition cannot be known. Since validity is known by a posterior condition external to the generating conditions of knowledge, there was no certainty about its arthakriyā kāritva at the moment of its production. Hence, it has been held that knowledge, when arises is treated as invalid. Pramāṇa is uncontradicted knowledge which possesses ‘arthakriyā kāritva (pramāṇam avisamvādī jñānam arthakriyā sthitih, avisamvādanam etc. Dharma kirtti, pramāṇavārttiaka)

The two characteristics, namely, ‘uncontradictedness and arthakriya karitva, are to be verified in practice. So long as they are not verified, knowledge is not treated as valid. The condition like avisamḥadītva (which is equivalent to arthakriyā kāritva) cannot be included in the generating conditions of knowledge; because in that case, all knowledge will be avisamḥadī and arthakriyā kari and will leave no room for visambadī knowledge. So, according to the buddhistic school, validity is extrinsic. When this school says that invalidity is intrinsic, it does not seem to mean anything more than the non-arousal of the certainty about the avisamvādī and arthakriyā kārī nature of a cognition at the very moment of its inception. In other words, at this moment, there is no cognition of the form “This cognition is not-valid”. This lack of uncertainty about the validity of a cognition does not prevent any man from doing actions on the basis of this knowledge.

The Sāṁkhya position is, however, different. According to this school, validity is svataḥ in respect of both origination
and apprehension. Hence, it seems to us that if invalidity too is believed to be \textit{svatah} in respect of both origination and apprehension, then one and the same cognition may be known as both valid and invalid at the same time which is absurd.

Now, it is our contention that even if we believe in \textit{svatah} \textit{ji\-\=n}\textit{apti} in regard to invalidity, the situation will not become so alarming.

Truly speaking \textit{svapra\=ka\=stva} of knowledge means that knowledge does not need the assistance of any other thing to perform its own function (\textit{svavyavah\=ara}). As soon as there is knowledge, there is revelation of object. Inclination to action or refraining from action (\textit{prav\=tti} and \textit{niv\=tti}) may originate from revelation of the object only. Knowledge of validity or invalidity is not necessary for the arousal of \textit{prav\=tti} and \textit{niv\=tti}. Invalidity, however, (though self-revealed) may not always be revealed due to the presence of some external factors such as distance, dim light, defective organ etc. When invalidity thus, remains non-revealed, there may be \textit{prav\=tti} due to revelation of object. In such a situation production of unsuccessful effects makes the invalidity known to the knower. Such a thing happens in the case of illusion. When invalidity is known immediately, it is known simultaneously with knowledge. There may be such a case where the perceiver says “The thing before me looks like a piece of silver but it is conch shell”. Here, the invalidity of the perception of conch shell as silver is known as soon as there is perception.

Cognition, to be effective, does not need to be known as valid. Non-apprehension of the invalidity of a particular cognition is sufficient for inspiring a man to act on the basis of a particular cognition. \textit{Samb\=adi} or \textit{visamb\=adi} \textit{prav\=tti} does not form a constitutive condition of validity or of invalidity; nor does it really make validity or invalidity known to the cognizer. The true function of the success or failure of \textit{prav\=tti} is to confirm the knowledge of validity and
invalidity of cognition. It is only where self-revealed validity and invalidity remain hidden due to some interfering conditions, that success or failure of actions makes validity or invalidity known, to the knower. If one is seeing a piece of rope from a distance, he may have a knowledge of this form. “It seems, I am seeing a piece of rope lying at that place; let me see, if it is really so”. Here, validity (though svapraṅga) is grasped only vaguely. Thus, immediate revelation of validity or invalidity depends on the non-presence of doṣas (doṣābhava) as doṣas or interfering conditions which arise silently in the process of the cognition of validity and invalidity prevent the revelation of pramanāya and apramanāya in knowledge. Hence, even on admission of both validity and invalidity as svataḥ, there will be enough scope for the arousal of doubt, illusion etc. in the philosophy of the Sāṁkhya School. Doubt, in such a case, is to be explained as being due to pratibandhakas which prevent the immediate manifestation of the validity of a cognition. Doubtful cognition is that kind of knowledge, the truth of which has not been ascertained. In doubtful knowledge, a particular is dharmī revealed truly but its characteristics are not properly ascertained. Regarding the characteristics of the dharmī, the mind wavers between the two sets of qualities which are simultaneously revived in memory due to similarity. When we perceive a tall object from a distance but do not perceive the peculiar features of the object correctly we have doubtful perception, such as, “Is it a lightpost or a man”? Here, we are definite about the tall object; but whether the tallness of the object is associated with the peculiar characteristics of the post or of a human being, is not revealed due to presence of doṣas. Only the tallness of the object is revealed validly and there is the doubt. Where the validity of a knowledge is revealed simultaneously with its origination, there the generating conditions of the buddhivṛttti are not accompanied by the vitiating factors. Hence, vṛtti is revealed properly and is also known to be so
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If there is any pratibandhaka in the process of apprehension, then phenomena like doubt, illusion etc. occur in the sphere of knowledge. Even the objection that if validity and invalidity are both svataḥ in respect of apprehension, then no certain knowledge is possible,—may be regarded as a point in favour of svataḥ jñaptivāda of both validity and invalidity of knowledge. The buddhistic school believes in the svataḥ jñapti of invalidity only. Hence, an objection is raised to the effect that if invalidity of a cognition is immediately known, then there can be no inclination to act on the basis of that knowledge. We do act on the basis of knowledge which is discovered as invalid only afterwards. Sāṃkhyya, however, is supposed to believe in the svataḥ jñapti of both validity and invalidity of knowledge. So, in this philosophy, there is room for the arousal of doubtful cognition and the doubtful cognition is not unfavourable for the origination of an inclination to act (Doubt never acts as an hindrance to pravṛtti).

The Mīmāṃsā believes in the svataḥ jñapti of validity only and so it faces difficulty in explaining the possibility of nisphala pravṛtti (unsuccessful efforts).

If the Sāṃkhyya view, as stated above, is accepted, then the origination of doubtful cognition will explain satisfactorily the occurrence of both successful and unsuccessful activities.

Further, particular dharmi may possess a number of characteristics (dharman). There is no such rule that all the characteristics will always be revealed along with the revelation of the dharmi. A jar, for example, possesses so many characteristics in the forms of jarness, substantiality, solidity, smell etc. It is quite possible, that at the time of the manifestation of the jar, all qualities will not be revealed. In the same manner, we can suppose that at the time of revelation of knowledge also, all its characteristic in the forms of jñātatva, pramātva, apramātva etc. may not be revealed simultaneously. Hence, even if we believe that validity and
invalidity are svataḥ, in respect of apprehension, still it does not follow that they should always be known immediately as soon as there is knowledge.

**Meaning of Svatahgrāhyatva in regard to Prāmāṇya and Aprāmāṇya.**

The **vedāntaparibhāṣā** has defined svataḥgrāhyatva of prāmāṇya (spontaneous apprehension of validity) in the following words:

“Doṣābhāve sati yāvatsvāsrāyagrāhaka sāmagrī grāhyatvam”

(“Spontaneous apprehension is the fact of being grasped by the totality of causes that apprehend the substratum of the validity, provided no defect is present.”)

The substratum of validity is vṛtti jñāna and the cause of its cognition (svāsraya grāhaka) is the witnessing consciousness or sākṣī-caitanya). When the witnessing consciousness apprehends consciousness manifested in the form of vṛtti, is apprehends also the validity of vṛttijñāna. According to Śāmkhya, however, the svāsraya grāhaka caitanya is the consciousness in the form of purusā which is reflected through buddhivṛtti. When puruṣa is revealing the buddhivṛtti which is the substratum of validity, it is revealing the latter (i.e. validity) as well. Here, deficiency, in the flow of satīvaguna and the consequent increase in the tamoguna, will be regarded as doṣa. Spontaneous apprehension of validity, therefore, can be defined in the Śāmkhya in the words which have been used in the vedānta paribhāṣa (i.e. doṣābhāv sati yāvat svāsrayagrāhaka sāmagrī grāhyatvam).

According to vedānta paribhāṣa, the conditions which cause apprehension of knowledge, cause apprehension of the validity of knowledge as well. Even then, validity is not always spontaneously apprehended, as in the case of doubt. So, the qualifying word, “doṣābhāve sati” are to be added to the definition of spontaneous apprehension of validity.

The vedānta paribhāṣa has admitted parataḥ jñāpti of aprāmāṇya because according to the said text, the grāhaka
Sāmagrī of knowledge are the conditions only of the apprehension of validity in knowledge. These conditions, however, do not cause the apprehension of invalidity. Invalidity which is extrinsic to knowledge is known through inference. When proceeding to act on a particular cognition, we find that it does not satisfy our practical need, we infer that it is false.

If we hold the view that the Sāmkhya like the advaita vedānta believes in parataḥ jñāpti of knowledge, then the definition of svataḥ grāhyatva of validity only will be sufficient. We have, however, seen that svataḥ grāhyatva of invalidity too, may be logically accepted from the Sāmkhya point of view. If this is so, then we shall have to formulate a definition to define svataḥ grāhyatva of invalidity in knowledge. The buddhists believe in svataḥ aprāmāṇya vavāda, but they have not attempted to define svatasta of invalidity.

Definition of Svataḥgrāhyatva of aprāmaṇya from the Sāmkhya point of view:

In the Nyāya-cintāmoni, svataḥ grāhyatva of validity has been defined as apprehension of knowledge-apprehending conditions which are incapable of causing apprehension of invalidity in knowledge. By following this definition of Nyāya-cintāmoni, we can formulate a definition of spontaneous apprehension of invalidity to suit the purpose of the Sāmkhya school. The definition will be as under:

Spontaneous apprehension of invalidity means apprehension of knowledge-apprehending conditions which are incapable of causing apprehension of validity in knowledge. If 'spontaneous apprehension of validity and invalidity is defined in the manner of Nyāya-cintāmoni, then the fear, that one and the same knowledge may be both valid and invalid at the same time, can be removed easily from our minds. Validity is apprehended by such knowledge-apprehending conditions (jñāna grāhaka sāmagrī) which are agrāhaka of invalidity; invalidity is, likewise, apprehended by such knowledge-
apprehending conditions which are agrāhaka of validity. When the knowledge apprehending conditions contain an excess flow of sattvaguna, they become agrāhaka of invalidity. When, on the other hand, knowledge-apprehending conditions contain such a quantity of tamoguna which is just sufficient for hiding the true nature of the object but insufficient for keeping invalidity unrevealed to the perceiver, these conditions become incapable of causing apprehension of validity: they are, however, capable of causing spontaneous apprehension of invalidity. I perceive a piece of rope as a snake but I understand at the same time that my perception of the snake is invalid. The real object is something else the nature of which has not been revealed to me. Thus, when the grāhaka sāmagri of prāmāṇya (in the form of the excess flow of sattvaguna) is not present, there is no apprehension of validity even though there is knowledge: in a similar manner, when the grāhaka sāmagri of invalidity is not present, there is no apprehension of invalidity in knowledge.

While defining the spontaneous apprehension of validity, the vedanta paribhasa has used the qualifying words "dosa-bhāva", in the place of the qualifying statement "absence of the apprehending condition of invalidity" (aprāmāṇya grāhakābhāva). According to the author of the Vedanta Paribhāsa, dosabhāva is not adjective. It is negative and as such, it does not contribute anything from outside towards the validity of knowledge. Doṣa, on the other hand, is treated as an adjective and as additional factor due to the presence of which, the advaita believes in the parataḥ jñāpti of invalidity. According to Śāmkhya philosophy both doṣa and doṣābhāva may be treated as adjectives. These are, however, nothing but excess of tamoguna and excess of sattvaguna in knowledge. These are, therefore, not regarded as additional factors.

Further, the author of the vedanta paribhāṣa holds that invalidity which is of the nature of 'tadabhāvavati', cannot be received directly by the vṛtti of buddhi; because buddhivṛtti is capable of catching directly the image of that thing only
CHAPTER I

which has a form. Hence, invalidity is to be known through inference.

According to Sāmkhya, abhāva can be perceived directly by means of samyuktatādātmya sannikarṣa. That there is no harm in admitting perceptual knowledge of abhāva by visual organ has been explained fully in the Nyāya Manjarī. It is only in the case of bhāvavastu that the visual organ cannot perceive a thing without being related to it. This rule does not apply in the case of abhāvavastu where even though there is no prāpyakāri saṁbandha, still the visual organ is capable of apprehending negation directly. We should however, remember that the perception of negation is relative to the perception of its substratum which should be within the range of vision. So, if abhāva can be regarded as an object of perception, then invalidity which is of the nature of ‘tadabhāvavati’ can be perceived spontaneously.
CHAPTER II

METAPHYSICS

Sāṁkhya Approach is Based on an Analysis of Human Experience.

The Sāṁkhya system is admitted on all hands as one of the oldest systems of thought, because the seeds from which the Classical Sāṁkhya sprung up as a well-knit system are strewn over a vast field of philosophic writings of ancient India. The earliest available systematic exposition of the Classical Sāṁkhya is found in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvara Krishna; Gaudapāda's commentary on Sāṁkhya-Karika, Vācaspati Misra’s Tattva Kaumudi, Aniruddha’s Vṛtti and Sāṁkhya pravacana bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu are some of the well-known posterior texts on the Sāṁkhya Philosophy.

Life in this world (as all of us know) is a ceaseless flow of experience. It is, therefore, expected that a good Philosophy which seeks to explain the significance of human life in relation to the whole universe, should establish its claim to general acceptance by showing that it has formulated its theory on the basis of a thorough analysis of experience.

A philosopher, who is a lover and interpreter of life, is unable to turn his eyes away from the living experiences of every moment; our reason must fall back upon experience for collecting its own data. If reason wanders away from experience, it will create a system of dead thoughts, devoid of any touch of life and reality.

A thorough analysis of human experience is also the starting point of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy. Experience is the felt result of the operation of the subtle tattva which is ordinarily imperceptible. Hence, if the tattva is to be known, it can be known through a thorough analysis of experience. Just as a chemist finds out the chemical ingredients by means
of analysis of the joint effects produced, by the combined operation of different chemical substances, in the same manner, a philosopher discovers the underlying principles of experience by means of a thorough analysis of experience. In fact, this process of analysis by means of which the subtle root principles and their essential natures and characteristic effects become manifested, has been deemed essential in all the philosophical systems of India. The *advaita vedānta* analyses experience and discovers that the mutable principle involved in experience is false and non-existent from the metaphysical point of view. The discovery of Śāmkhya is, however, different. In the opinion of the Śāmkhya School, the two fundamental principles, lying at the root of experience, are real. *Puruṣa* and *trigunāmikkā Prakṛti* are not mythical and airy but they are at the very root of the possibility of knowledge or experience. Experience is not possible unless there are objects of experience, body, organs, ego-sense, mind etc. which will constitute the instruments and objects of experience. These are also not enough to bring about experience. Experience presupposes consciousness; unless there is some principle of consciousness, mere unconscious instruments and objects are incapable of producing experience. So, the fundamental principles and categories of Śāmkhya were not dogmatically postulated; but they were discovered and accepted after proper analytical study of experience.

**Theory of the Guṇas**

The most distinguishing characteristic of the Śāmkhya-system is its guṇa theory, which holds that all mental and material objects of this phenomenal world, are the combinations in different proportions of the three ultimate reals which are technically known as *triguna*. The conception of these guṇas arose in the minds of these philosophers, undoubtedly as a result of their analysis of our phenomenal consciousness and its objects.

All objects of the world, whether simple or complex, have in them pure being or *sattā* (existence) as their ultimate basis
and essential stuff. This existence constitutes the intelligibility of an object. Only an existent object can be related to knowledge and can become intelligible to us. A sky-flower, for example, being devoid of satt\text{\textae} can never be intelligible to anybody. Consciousness is revelation; and if we are to become conscious of something, then that thing must have satt\text{\textae} or intelligibility by virtue of which it can be revealed as being related to consciousness as its object. When this chair becomes an object of my consciousness or thought, it becomes so only because it possesses intelligibility which is nothing but its capacity of becoming revealed as soon as it comes in contact with consciousness. This capacity lies in the very being of the object and can very well be identified with the being or the satt\text{\textae} of the object.

Each fact of experience is a being or satt\text{\textae} and this being or existence constitutes its intelligibility. This intelligibility or existence, therefore, is the ultimate factor in an object of experience and it is called sattvaguna by the S\text{\textamkhya} philosophers.

Now, the object of experience also possesses certain characteristics like resistance, impenetrability, shape and form, which are, in fact, due to the presence of massiveness in objects. It is because an object is massive in nature that it can assume shape and can also resist its complete destruction through change allowing only the change of form. Mass or tamoguna, therefore, is another element present in the object besides its sattvaguna or intelligibility. The object undergoes changes. It changes from form to form. There is no monotonous lingering of the same character in any object. This change or movement is due to the presence of another principle which is called rajoguna. Thus, sattv\text{\textae} (existence or intelligence stuff), rajas and tamas (mutability and mass) are the three gu\text{\textnas} which are responsible for all sorts of experience of a puru\text{\textsa}. These
are objective, ultimate and the irreducible elements of experience.

Due to the presence of the sat†va element,
an object exists and is intelligible.

Due to the presence of the raja element,
the object undergoes changes.

Due to the presence of the tamas,
the object assumes shape and resists
its utter destruction through changes.

These gun‡as are not the so-called qualities of the vais§éśika
system because they, themselves, possess the characteristics of
lightness, movement and heaviness. ¹ One quality cannot
be thought of as possessing other qualities. These gun‡as, of
course, become seemingly associated with and dissociated
from the puru§a, ² still they cannot be regarded as qualities
of the puru§a since qualities actually and constantly inhere
in the substance. So, these gun‡as are substances (Dravyas). All
objects of the world, both physical and mental, are the results
of the different permutations and combinations of these three
ultimate reals. Our thoughts and ideas, which seem to possess
a character different from that of the physical world, are not,
in fact, outside the realm of these three gun‡as. These are as
much the effects or the modifications of the ultimate reals as
the so-called physical things. The only difference lies in the
fact that in the mental sphere, the element of sat†va predo-
minates, whereas in the sphere of the physical universe,
tamoguna becomes the dominating element. Tamoguna is
present in all our ideas of objects, otherwise, these mental
products could not assume the forms of their objects in order
to make possible the experience of an individual. In fact, in
every citta-rtti, the indistinguishable union of the gun‡as is
detectable. (Buddhi rtti becomes manifested, it assumes

(1) The S‡mkhya K‡rik‡—verse 13.
(2) S-P.B l, 61.
the form of its object, and this needs movement). Our phenomenal consciousness as well as its objects are due to the functioning of these three *gunas* which are the sole productive forces of this universe.

Our experience, however, does not possess a cognitive aspect only, it has also a feeling aspect which is more primitive and more pervasive than the cognitive one. While analysing the *guna* concept, Prof. S. N. Das Gupta has shown that feeling formulates the marginal line between thought and matter, the animate and the inanimate. From feeling complexes, we can easily descend to matter complexes and from matter complexes, we can go up to feeling complexes very smoothly. That is why there is always the likelihood of mistaking a feeling complex for a matter complex and vice-versa. Sāmkhya Philosophy also does not recognize any rigid distinction between thought and matter. Both matter and thought are constituted of the same feeling-substances which form the neutral borderline between them. The *gunas* are also these feeling substances. Since the whole external world is made up of these elements, each object of cognition possesses the capacity of producing three different feelings in the minds of human beings, i.e., pleasure, pain and delusion or indifference. So, from the point of view of knowledge, these three *gunas* are known as sattva, rajas and tamas, but from the point of view of feeling, they appear as pleasure, pain and delusion.¹ A lovely woman, for instance, excites the feeling of pleasure in the beloved person, the feeling of pain in the co-wife and the feeling of delusion in the disappointed person. This, she can do, simply because she is objectively pleasurable, painful and delusive. In other words, *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, which on the plane of consciousness appear as intelligence-stuff, energy and mass and on the plane of feeling, as pleasure, pain and delusion, have themselves been transformed to create that lovely woman. The lovely

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¹ (1) (a) S-P-B-1.127 (b) *Sāmkhya Kārikā* 12.
woman is not merely the assemblage of ideas in some mind as is held by the idealistic philosophers, nor is she absolutely different from thoughts or feelings, as is ordinarily held by the realistic philosophers. Thought and thing, matter and the so-called intellectual processes do not lie in two absolutely distinct regions; and, therefore, the establishment of any kind of direct action and inter-action between them, is not at all difficult. Thus, the correspondence between the inner world and the outer world has been satisfactorily explained by the Sāṃkhya philosophers on the hypothesis that they represent two allied lines of development from a common source, (i.e., the three guṇas.). These reals, thus, on their supposition, are neither mental nor physical and in this respect, they remind us of the neutral entities of B. Russell. Like those neutral stuff, the guṇas also get arranged in different relations. When arranged in one way, they appear as mental and when arranged in a different way, they appear as physical or material.

Now, these reals are called guṇas because they act as ropes for binding puruṣa and also because they are subordinated to the puruṣa whose interest they serve.

These guṇas are infinite in number but they have been brought under three types in accordance with their three different characteristics. When we speak of satt vaguṇa, we do not mean one substance only; rather we refer to an infinite number of subtle substances possessing the common characteristics of self-shiningness and luminosity. Similar is the case with rajas and tāmas.

These guṇas, when they act together for the production of objects, exert mutual influence upon one another, and by so doing, they bring into existence new qualities and new substances. An object is called sāttvika, rājasika and tāmasa in so far as it represents the predominance of sattva, rajas

(1) Yogavarttik—Chapter 11-18.
and tamas; but even when sattvaguna predominates, rajas and tamas remain in conjunction with it, although in a subdued form. As soon as the influence of sattva weakens, due to some causes, the sahakāri guṇas at once become active and more prominent. In each act of production, these three guṇas become operative, although all of them cannot maintain the same status quo at the same time. In revelation, it is not sattva alone that is active, but sattva as dominating rajas and tamas.

The guṇas, no doubt, possess different characteristics; but while they act, there is co-operation or comingling like that of oil-wick and flame. If these three are not arranged in proper subordination and superordination, there will be terrible conflict resulting in chaos and confusion. Their proper manipulation, however, will bring about creation of new things and new varieties, just as the proper manipulation of wind, bile and phlegm contributes to the substance of the physical body.

When light is produced, it is produced for the enjoyment of some conscious being, and not for the benefit of oil, wick and flame. Similar is the case with the conjunction of these guṇas. The creativity of these reals is not an end in itself; on the contrary, it serves as the only means for the attainment of puruṣa's end. Enjoyment and liberation are the puruṣārthas and the guṇa stuff creates this ceaseless flow of modifications and complexities for his enjoyment and liberation. All products are, therefore, upkaraṇas for puruṣa's experience; but the guṇas, while creating the realm of experience, do not get mixed up with puruṣa like salt and water. Rather, they serve the bhoga purpose of puruṣa by mere sannidhi or proximity. Of course, this sannidhi does not mean nearness in space; rather it means that puruṣa bodha and guṇa bodha form indistinguishable parts of the same idea and are cognized as identical through mistake. Buddhī or intellect is sāttvika

(1) Saṁkhya Karika—13 (2); Tattwa Vaisaradi-11-18.
prakāśa whereas puruṣa is revealing consciousness. Due to ignorance, these two are not discriminated. All vyttātmaka changes of the intellect are, therefore, falsely attributed to puruṣa although the latter is immutable in nature. Suppose two glass cases are hung on the opposite walls and suppose one of them contains a picture; now, if a man does not know that one of them is empty, he will perceive pictures in both the cases. Here, due to ignorance and reflection the picture of the one glass case will create the confused perception of a picture in the other glass case which is, in reality, empty. Similar confusion arises when an individual thinks of himself as the knower and the enjoyer of the worldly objects due to non-discrimination between his buddhi and pure consciousness.

The example of ‘oil and wick’ has made it clear that mere oil cannot produce light, mere wick also fails to illuminate a room. It is only when oil co-operates with wick and flame that there can be such a thing as light. Similarly, neither the buddhivrtti alone nor the pure consciousness alone can produce phenomenal knowledge or object-knowledge. It is only when the two get related due to saṁnidhi that there is the illumination of buddhivrtti or the knowledge of an object.

The guṇas and the puruṣas are, thus, the main principles accepted in the philosophy of the Saṁkhya. Both the categories are equally eternal, but while the puruṣas are pure and inactive principles of consciousness, the guṇas are the unconscious, ever changing dynamic energy of the universe. They ceaselessly undergo changes, but changes take place in these ultimate constituents in two ways which are known as saṁputa pariṇāma and viṇīputa pariṇāma; saṁputa pariṇāma exists in the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas when they exert equal influences without creating any commotion. This state of equilibrium is absolutely indeterminate, undifferentiated and indefinite and it is called Prakṛti. The word Pariṇāma always implies change or modification which is of the form of action (Kriyātmaka). Activity belongs to rajoguṇa. Hence in saṁputa pariṇāma too, sattva and tamas must be related to rajas so as
to be able to undergo homogeneous modification (i.e., modification in which one guṇa will not overpower the other). Rajas possesses kriyāsakti by nature; but this kriyāsakti of rajas becomes excessive when there is a disturbance in the Prakṛti-sakti due to purusārtha samyoga. In the equilibrated state, there is no excess in the activity of the rajoguṇa. The natural activity of rajas becomes excessive in the vaisāmyavasthā as a result of which there are excessive modifications in sattva, rajas and tamas. The result of such excess in the activities of the guṇas is the production of new categories. (Tattvāntara parināma or virūpa parināma means the process of forming unequal aggregation of the guṇas through their excessive interaction and interdependence). Hence, when the virūpa parināma takes place, the guṇas begin to manifest their various characteristics and the phenomenal products come into being.

This is the dynamism of the Sāṃkhya physics and this aspect is as real and as obvious as the aspect of permanence. All sorts of movements and changes are so very real and forceful that they can be denied by no means. This fact of becoming should be accepted in every system of philosophy to avoid one-sidedness and narrow perspective. Guṇas, in the state of equilibrium and the puruṣa are the minimum noumenal realities which form the mutable and immutable presuppositional principles of the Sāṃkhya view. The entire universe of diversity and change is produced out of these guṇas in association with the puruṣa or pure consciousness. The world we live in, is not a static world; it is out and out dynamic. Perpetual changes, vibrating currents of life and constant movements, are the keynotes of this phenomenal show. The world that we see, feel and work upon does not remain steady and unchanging. On the contrary, it changes and changes every moment because of its inner push and inner mobility which are due to the palpitating nature of the three guṇas. The guṇas explain clearly both the sameness and diversity, affinity, and difference which are so obvious and unignorable in the
physical world. Sameness of objects is due to sameness of the ultimate stuff (i.e., the three reals,) but diversity is due to the different types of relatedness of these elements. Cause and effect, substance and attribute are identical from the point of view of the stuff, but from the point of view of forms and names, they are different.

These guṇas also form the realistic setting of the Sāṁkhya school. Knowledge and its objects belong to the realm of guṇas which are totally independent of the puruṣa. An idealistic system holds that in the acquisition of knowledge, consciousness contributes every item and that the object of knowledge is convertible into consciousness. The classical Sāṁkhya, however, holds that the stuff of which the object of knowledge is composed, is radically distinct from consciousness and is also independent of it. The whole world, therefore, rests on a principle which is as eternal and independent as the spiritual principle. Thus, according to Sāṁkhya, both matter and spirit are equally real, although matter, being an obstacle in the path of liberation, is of inferior value. The puruṣa can realise its true nature only when it turns away from the pain-producing nature. Pain, according to Sāṁkhya, is real but the connection of puruṣa with the painful experience is false. In the opinion of the advaita vedanta, however, pain is false, Sāmkara has admitted transcendental reality of consciousness only. The unconscious upādhi in the form of Mayā is transcendentally false. Hence, Sāmkara-philosophy has assumed the form of an absolute idealism or advaita caitanyavāda.

Objections Considered

It has been objected that the three guṇas of the Sāṁkhya School are not substances but qualities; because they are always experienced as the characteristics of lightness, movement, heaviness etc. belonging to fire, water, earth etc. They are never experienced as substances like clay, gold etc. They are also accepted in all other scriptural texts as qualities.

1. Śribhāṣya.
Further, the Sāṃkhya has accepted one cause of the world. If three guṇas are recognized and each guṇa is, again accepted as infinite in number, then the theory of one ultimate cause becomes a myth.

Secondly, Sāṃkhya holds that the three guṇas are the universal elements of all objects. But if we reflect carefully, we find that these guṇas are not the real elements constituting the substances of all objects. These three guṇas really represent three stages of modification which a thing undergoes in order to assume a particular form. “When a thing is by nature subject to modification, then it must have a stage from which modification should start and it must offer some amount of resistance to modification. This implies its inertia which is called tamās. Secondly, the process of modification implies its stage of activity or change which is called rajas. Thirdly, the stage at which it arrives as a result of its modification is the stage of self-manifestation or sattva. In whatever condition, a body may be, whether mental or material, it is always subject to change and it must have these three movements. The discovery of the three in all objects would simply signify the discovery of the fact that all things of the world are changing. These three guṇas, being really three movements of the process of modification, to regard them as constituents would amount to substantiation of abstract features”.

Further, according to Sāṃkhya, the guṇās are innumerable in number. Here a question may be posed: are they atomic or all-pervading or madhyama parimāna in size?

If the guṇas are regarded as atomic, then the effects which are not atomic, will be different from the cause in nature and this will go against the Sāṃkhya theory of Satkāryavāda. So, the guṇas cannot be atomic because the effects are not atomic and the Sāṃkhya believes that the effects are identical with the cause in nature. The guṇas cannot be middle-sized (madhyama parimāna) because middle-sized things are products and are non-eternal. The guṇas are eternal. The guṇas
cannot also be all-pervading. If the guṇas are all-pervading then there will be no change in them.

Lastly, if all causal substances are all-pervading, why should the effects be limited in nature?

Objections Met

These objections, raised against the guṇas theory of the Sāṃkhyya School, are not difficult and unanswerable. A little reflection on the original position of the Sāṃkhyya School will help us to solve the riddles.

So far as the first objection is concerned, we can say that Rāmānuja is not logically justified in raising it against the Sāṃkhyya theory of the guṇas. It is true that Sāṃkhyya has used a single word (Prakṛti) to denote the ‘equilibriated’ state of the three guṇas and it is also true that Prakṛti has been admitted as the root cause of the world. Now, although Prakṛti is a single word, still according to Sāṃkhyya, it is nānātmakā in nature. It possesses the potency of creating the multifarious universe. Sāmkara too, has regarded Prākṛti or Māyā as a principle of multiplicity and difference (vaicitryātmikā). So Prakṛti is the root cause of the world. Brahman cannot be the primary material cause of the world because Brahman is one and does not contain in itself the potency of difference. Again, one substance may possess different qualities but this fact cannot be regarded as a justification for admitting the substance itself as many. The body possesses many characteristics such as height, weight, complexion etc., but still the body is regarded as one. Hence, there is no harm in admitting Prakṛti as one although it possesses multifarious capacities. Further, according to Sāṃkhyya, there is tādātmya between substance and quality and “manyness” cannot be introduced in a place where abheda or non-difference is accepted. Moreover, the Sāṃkhyya School has not used the word ‘guṇa’ in the Nyāya-vaiseṣika sense. Rāmānuja, himself, has not accepted the Nyāya definition of quality. According to Nyāya, that which is admitted as a quality, can never be admitted again as a substance; but according to Rāmānuja, knowledge is
both a quality and a substance. The classical Sāṁkhya, however, holds that if the substance and the quality are admitted as distinct and different, then there will be violation of the law of parsimony (gaurabadoṣa) because every bit of experience can be explained satisfactorily by admitting non-difference between substance and quality. Since, there is abheda (non-difference) between substance and quality, luminosity, movement and heaviness are not merely qualities, they are also substances. If light is different from the lamp, then the non-difference between the cause and the effect will be destroyed. So, luminosity or movement is not a mere quality. If luminosity is a quality, then its cause also is a quality (because the cause is non-different from the effect). Sāṁkhya has described the unconscious material-stuff as guṇa simply because of the fact that the unconscious upādāna is of no use unless it is related to consciousness. Hence consciousness is regarded as primary and the unconscious material stuff as the secondary (i.e., guṇa in the sense of gauṇa) in the process of creation.

So far as the second objection is concerned, we can say that there is no inconsistency from the Sāṁkhya point of view if anybody holds that these three guṇas are the three states of modification. This, however, does not imply that the three guṇas cannot be regarded as substances. A state is always a state of a substance and according to Sāṁkhya, there is non-difference between the state and the possessor of state. (i.e., avasthā and avasthāvan). Moreover, even if we regard the three guṇas as three different states through which an object passes when it changes from one form to another, we would be careful not to allow any time-interval between one state and the other. There is no succession in the changing guṇas. The succession occurs in vr̥tti only. If this successive nature of vr̥tti is ascribed also to the nature of the thing, then there will be a hopeless blunder which will create only confusion of thought.
In reply to the third objection we can say that it is viṣṇu bhikṣu who has admitted the all-pervading nature of the guṇas and also their innumerable number. He has done this because otherwise, there will be difficulty in holding that creation is taking place everywhere. The Nyāya system too, has admitted a number of things as all-pervading. The souls are all-pervading, God is all-prevading. Space and time are all-pervading and ākāśa is also all-pervading. Even then, there is no difficulty in the generation of motion necessary for creation. According to the Nyāya School, it is only an object, endowed with the quality of touch, that occupies space. As all these things, mentioned above, are devoid of touch, they do not occupy space and do not resist movement. In the Sāṃkhya system too, the three guṇas possess the quality of touch in a very subtle form (so subtle that it cannot even be felt as the quality of touch different from other qualities). Hence, the three guṇas too, do not occupy space in such a manner as to resist movement.

Lastly, the difficulty in regard to the explanation of middle-sized effects arising from the all-pervading cause at the beginning of creation (ādīsṛṣṭi) is not peculiar to the Sāṃkhya system. In the case of the advaita vedanta too, Māyā, the changeable material stuff of the universe, is all-pervading besides the all-pervading Brahman. Hence, the question of the production of limited effects from the all-pervading cause at the very beginning of creation arises in this system also. Of course, the supporter of the advaita vedanta may say that Māyā is mithyā but the Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya School is real. The objection regarding the production of limited effects from the all-pervading cause however, does not create any special difficulty for the Sāṃkhya School. Prakṛti is not only real but it also possesses the potency of creating effects which are vilakṣaṇa in nature. Truly speaking, this objection is one which can be raised against any system that believes in satkāryavāda.

(1) (a) Yogavartika—Chapter 11—18.
(b) Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-bhāṣya 1—127.
Prakṣṭi and the Disturbance of the Prakṣṭi State

Previously, it has been stated that the three guṇas of the Śāmkhya School constitute the ground forces from which the diverse transformations and changes of this world have come into being, and that the movement, within these guṇas either holds these three in a state of equipoise or breaks up their equilibrium just to make them change and develop in the form of this manifold universe. Now, when the guṇas are held in a state of equilibrium, and there is no manifestation of any characteristic or modifications, it is called the state of Prakṣṭi, avyakta or pradhāna.¹ This state of equipoise is absolutely indeterminate, undifferentiated and homogeneous and it exists only as the possible source of energy of the whole world. Just as a forest is nothing but an assemblage of different species of trees, in the same way, Prakṣṭi is nothing but an assemblage of the three ultimate reals, held in a state of avyakta or non-manifestation.² So, although with the appearance and disappearance of individual objects, guṇas too seem to appear and disappear, yet, in fact, guṇas never get merged into something else, since they, themselves, are the Prakṣṭi and there is no other entity that can be admitted as their cause or ground. Again, if Prakṣṭi is the root cause of this world, it should be regarded as an uncaused principle; otherwise, there will be the fallacy of infinite regress.

The world process always reveals itself as an unending series of causes and effects and when by following the long line of causation, we arrive at the concept of the first or primary cause, we find that this ground principle is to be supposed as eternal, uncaused and beyond the region of this phenomenal existence. This is the Prakṣṭi of the Śāmkhya system. Since, this Prakṣṭi is the uncaused first cause of this vast and multifarious universe, it is unlimited, all-pervasive and infinite.³ Śāmkhya Kārika describes Prakṣṭi as ahetumat, nityām, vyāpi,

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(1) S-P-B- 1-61.  
(2) Yogavartika—Chapter-11-18.  
(3) S-P-B-1-76.
niṣkriyam, ekam, anāśritam, aliṅgam, niravayavam, svatantram, avyaktam, triguṇam, aviveki, viṣaya, sāmānyam, acetanam and prasavadharmi.¹

In other words, Prakṛti is uncaused, it is eternal and all-pervading; it is immobile only in the sense that in the avyakta state, there is no manifestation of products like mahat, ahaṃkāra etc.² Motion and changes take place also in this equilibrated state. Further, Prakṛti is one and is nothing but the unity of the three guṇas in a state of potentiality and incoherence. It supports all, being the cause of all and is not supported by anything else. It is aliṅga for it does not serve as the middle term to prove the existence of any other category. Prakṛti is also partless, since in this state, the production of different evolutes, does not commence. It is independent, non-manifested and unconscious, and is also the objective ground of all cognitions. Again, as such, it is not limited to individual consciousness, but enters into the knowledge of all.

The most important characteristic of Prakṛti is that it is out and out productive (being an assemblage of the three palpitating reals). Primal Nature is ever undergoing changes into forms and categories, thereby creating this phenomenal existence. Being is not the only irreducible ultimate of knowledge or experience as is held by the vedānta philosophers. Movement or becoming is also another inconvertible principle of experience and this principle is Prakṛti or triguṇa. Nature has two movements: forward (anuloma) and backward (pratiломa). In its forward movement Prakṛti becomes the generating agent of all sargas: while in the backward movement, it retraces the stages through which it developed.

Sāṅkhya also gives us rational justification for postulating an avyakta Prakṛti as the inexhaustive source of the manifest world. "Because of the finite nature of specific objects,

(1) S-K-10, 11.
(2) Yogavarttika-11-18.
because of homogeneity, because of evolution being due to
the efficiency of the cause, because of separation between
cause and its product and because of the merging of the whole
world of effects, there is the unmanifest as the cause".¹ Whatever
is finite is itself caused and all categories including mahat
are limited and finite. Hence, mahat too, is produced by that
which has the uncaused potentiality of mahat, that is to say,
by the Pradhāna or Prakṛti. Further, all objects of the world
manifest a common nature in the sense that each of them is
capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference. This is
because of the fact that they are all made of some such sub-
stance which is capable of producing these three different
feelings. Such a substance is Prakṛti. Again, the Sāṁkhya
theory of satkāryavāda holds that the effect is already existent
in the cause, and that in every case of causation, we have not
the production of some new characteristics, but the uncover-
ing of something already in existence. Hence, a cause can
produce that effect only for which it possesses efficiency or
potency. All categories, therefore, from mahat down to five
gross elements, must exist in the state of the unmanifest or
Prakṛti before their creation. The effect emerges from the
cause and also merges into it at the time of its so-called de-
struction. The unevolved or the avyakta, therefore, must be
supposed to exist as the great merging ground of the whole
world of experience.

Now, Prakṛti, in the unevolved state is the equipoise of
the three guṇas and it evolves the material world out of itself
when there is a disturbance in the guṇa equilibrium. The
question, therefore, arises: what is it that causes the disturb-
ance of the equilibrium? The Sāṁkhya answer is that it is
the puruṣārtha samyoga of Prakṛti with the inactive con-
sciousness, the purpose of which is served by the evolution of
Nature. Nature is, no doubt, unconscious and unintelligent,
still there is some inherent teleology(unconscious) in the guṇas

(1) Sāṁkhya-Kārika-15, 16.
as a result of which they produce this world. The inherent teleology means nothing but the disposition of unknowingly serving the purposes of enjoyment and liberation of puruṣa. The movement of Prakṛti, for the production of the world, is, thus, in a manner, controlled and influenced by the transcendental puruṣa. Hence, this blind teleological force of Nature is also said to be due to the transcendental influence of the spiritual principle. "Just as the unintelligent milk flows from the udders of the cow for the nourishment of the calf, so it is the function of the unconscious Pradhāna to liberate the souls from the sorrows and sufferings of this world". ¹ This unconscious teleology is, thus, an important hypothesis on the ground of which the Samkhya School seeks to explain the creation of this well-ordered universe by an unconscious Prakṛti even in the absence of any active guidance from puruṣa.

This natural change of the guṇas in the form of this systematized universe also benefits Prakṛti to a very great extent. In other words, mutual help or mutual benefit forms the basis of this need for disturbance and evolution. The verse 21 of the Saṁkhya-Kārika runs thus: "For the sake of Puruṣa’s perception of Prakṛti and for his release, a union of the two takes place, which resembles a union of the lame and the blind. By that union, evolution or creation of the world is effected."² The yoga sūtra of Patanjali says: "The union between puruṣa and Prakṛti takes place for the sake of knowing the essential nature of puruṣa and Prakṛti."³

Thus, it is clear and evident that the real object of disturbance in the guṇa equilibrium and the creation of the universe is twofold. (1) Prakṛti becomes the precept of the Puruṣa and (2) the puruṣa attains release from the torments and tortures of life on perceiving its own distinction from Nature.

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(1) Sāṁkhya Kārikā—57  
(2) Sāṁkhya Kārikā—21  
(3) Yogasūtra, Sādhanapāda—23
Being disturbed and dislocated from its state of equipoise by puruṣārtha, Prakṛti creates this manifold world of pleasures and pains; but this world of joys and grieves, happiness and misery gets merged into the pralaya state of Nature, when the actions of the guṇas become disintegrated forming again the state of equilibrium. The inherent teleology of the guṇas again, at the right moment, breaks up this equilibrated state of Prakṛti and gives start to a fresh process of creation. Thus creation and dissolution are the two functions undertaken by nature to serve the purpose of the spiritual principle.

**Objections Considered**

The Śaṅkhya conception of Prakṛti as the independent and unconscious material stuff of the universe has invited criticism from many quarters. Śaṅkara, for example, has said that since Śaṅkhya has admitted independent existence of two principles (one unconscious and the other indifferent) and has not admitted a third spiritual principle, there can never be any samyoga or samyogabhasa between the two. Hence, there can never be any creation of the world.

Prof. C. D. Sharma has supported this statement of Śaṅkara and has said that an unconscious and independent Prakṛti can, at least, create a mechanical and purposeless universe. A meaningful creation, we can never expect to result from the movement of an unconscious material stuff.

Śaṅkara has also criticised the use of the spontaneous flow of milk from the udders of the cow to explain the Śaṅkhya hypothesis of unconscious teleology. The cow is a conscious animal and there is the motherly love of the cow for her calf that acts as an inspiring agent. Prakṛti of the Śaṅkhya School does not possess these characteristics of the cow.

The example of unconscious grass changing automatically in the form of milk too, is not a suitable illustration to explain the inherent unconscious teleology of Prakṛti. Grass
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changes into milk only when eaten by a milch cow and not when it is eaten by a bull.

The example of the lame and the blind, working together for mutual benefit, is also not a satisfactory one. Both the lame and the blind are conscious and they are, therefore, capable of making a plan which will be beneficial to both. Prakṛti, however, is unconscious and puruṣa is indifferent. So, these two principles can never come together to form a plan by which both of them will be benefited.

Nor can we say that puruṣa, like a magnet, disturbs Prakṛti by means of mere samnidhi. Samnidhi is eternal and there will always be disturbance in the Prakṛti resulting in creation of the world-forming categories. Hence, there will never be any Prakṛti state of the guṇas or the state of dissolution.

Moreover, Prakṛti is creating the universe and puruṣa is enjoying it. That is to say, puruṣa is reaping the fruits of the activities performed by Nature. This goes against the law of karīna.

Objections Met

These objections are not very serious. A little reflection on the fundamental position of Sāmkhya will make us conscious of the unsound nature of these objections.

So far as the first objection is concerned, we can say that the relation which is suitable for creation, exists between puruṣa and Prakṛti from beginningless time. So the question, how did these two independent principles enter into a relation suitable for creating the universe,—does not arise at all. Just as Brahman is related to Māya from beginningless time, in the same manner, there is anādi srisṭyopayogi sambandha (beginningless relation suitable for creation) between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. No question regarding the why, how or when of this relation can be raised legitimately. According to Sāmkhya, vivekāgraḥa of puruṣa and Prakṛti is beginningless just as in the advaita vedanta, Māya or avidya is beginningless. In the
fīvan-mukta state too, the relation between buddhi and puruṣa is not destroyed. Buddhi remains in that state as a tattva; but the self, in the state of fīvan-mukti, has realised its distinction from the intellect and so it becomes non-attached to buddhi. Vivekāgraha is the real creative force of Prakṛti. The mere relation between two all-pervading tattvas (Puruṣa and Prakṛti) is not the real moving force behind creation. Since vivekāgraha is beginningless, creation too is beginningless. Hence, there is no difficulty in understanding the emergence of the world from Nature even in the absence of a third uniting principle in the form of God. If anybody points out any difficulty in the Sāṁkhya, in regard to this fact, then he may be asked to find out how this difficulty is solved in the advaita vedānta.

With regard to the second objection, we may say that according to advaita vedānta also, Māyā is unconscious. Even then Māyā is capable of producing a meaningful world. How is this possible? Brahman is eternal and immutable consciousness and is also eternally satisfied. Brahman has no need to be fulfilled through creation; still there is the creation of this purposeful universe.

Further, enjoyment which is the purpose of Puruṣa and which is fulfilled through creation, means simply the manifestation of the viṣayā-karā-vṛttis of the intellect through reflection. According to other schools, the object, when it is manifested, is also accepted either as beneficial (iṣṭa) or as harmful (aniṣṭ). In the Sāṁkhya, however, the puruṣa, in its neutral nature, simply manifests the objects. Now, the disinterested attitude, which is referred to by the word uḍāsina, is also a vṛtti of the intellect. Āsakti or attachment is a klīṣṭavrūtṛ whereas anāsakti or detachment is an aklīṣṭavrūtṛ of the intellect. This disinterested attitude is not negative in nature. It is a special state of the buddhi which arises as a result of concentrated and continued spiritual sādhanā. The niruddhāvasthā of the citta is not of the form of abhāva according to the yoga philosophy. It is something positive.
The udāsinā state (in which there is no āsaktivṛtti) is a state of buddhi similar to the niruddha state in which all cittavrūtis are stopped.

In answer to the third objection, we can say that Puruṣa and Prakṛti, being all-pervading, are always related. Prakṛti, which is the cause of the world is a cetanaviṣṭā Prakṛti. (Prakṛti, permeated with consciousness). Further, as long as there is viveka-graha there is no distinction between puruṣa and Prakṛti. Hence, there is no separation between the conscious principle and the unconscious principle. Cetanaviṣṭā Prakṛti is a mixed category in which aviveka is working as a creative force. Just as there is intelligence-part (caitanyāṁśa) and body-part (sarvāṁśa) in a cow, in the same manner there is intelligence part and acetana part in non-discriminated and intelligised Prakṛti. Hence, there can be teleological evolution from Nature. Hence, the example of the flow of unconscious milk from the udders of the cow is not an unsound one.

The example of the co-operation of the blind man and the lame man is also not unsuitable from the point of view of the Sāṃkhya-philosophy. Here, the author of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā has simply tried to prove that Puruṣa, by itself or Nature by itself, is incapable of producing this world,—a creation which is beneficial to both of them. The lame man cannot come out of the forest independently, nor can the blind man, by himself perform this function. It is only when the two act together, that they can reach their goal. Pure consciousness is immutable and as such is incapable of producing anything by itself. Pure Prakṛti is unconscious and as such is incapable of creating independently this meaningful world. Two must unite. Prakṛti must be vitalised by consciousness so as to be able to evolve this multi-coloured world.

Even the example of the magnet does not create any difficulty for the Sāṃkhya School. Creation is not due to mere sannidhi. In addition to sannidhi, there must be aviveka. It is only when aviveka acts as a creative force, that there is
disturbance in the guna equilibrium. There is also the consequent creation of the categories.

Lastly, the bhoktritva of Purusa and the kartritva of the intellect does not create any problem for the Samkhya-philosophy. The sense in which the word bhoktritva is used in the Sāmkhya-philosophy, is not in conflict with the doctrine of Karma. The word ‘enjoyment’, used in relation to purusa, refers simply to the connection which jiva purusa happens to have with the buddhivrttis through reflection. This type of enjoyment is wholly different from the enjoyment of the fruits of actions in the forms of pleasures and pains. Hence, this sort of enjoyment by purusa is not prohibited by the law of Karma. Moreover, in practical life, we do, very often, come across instances in which the fruits of actions of one person are found to be reaped by another due to false identification. The son commits crimes and is punished; the affectionate father suffers pains on that account. Here, the sufferings of the father are due to his false identification of himself with the son and this identification is expressed in the form of love and affection for children. In the case of avivekî purusa also, there is ‘ekameva darśanam’ due to aviveka. Hence, the pleasures and the pains which really belong to buddhi are mistakenly appropriated by the avivekî jiva purusa due to ekameva darśanam caused by ignorance.

Objections, raised by Venkatanath

Venkatanath has raised some objections against the arguments used by the Sāmkhya School to prove the existence of Prakṛti (by inference).

In his opinion, the first argument “Bhedānām parimānit” can serve as a middle term to prove the existence of an unlimited cause only; it cannot prove the existence of an avyakta Prakṛti1. This argument is based on the supposition that the cause must be greater in quantity than the effect.

(1) Tatvamuktakalapa with Anandayini Tika Published by Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, Page 112.
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This, however, is not always true. A big piece of cloth can be produced from a small bundle of threads. A huge tree is always produced from a cause which is very insignificant in quantity.

The argument "Samanvayīt" is also invalid. The qualities which are inherent in certain things may not always be their causal factors. (Na hi yat yeṣu-anugatam tatteśām kāraṇamiti niyamaḥ; sarvartha-siddhi). The qualities of whiteness, cowness etc. inhere in a large number of objects but they are never regarded as the causes of those things and beings. In the case of earthen jars, cups etc. the quality of earthiness which is transmitted to them, is not their cause. This quality inhere in the effect. The causal substance is never inherent in the effect. The followers of the Sāmkhya School cannot, further, hold that the cause and the effect are of the same material stuff as they are of the same form. In that case, the cause can never be distinguished from the effect.¹ Further, if the three guṇas are regarded as the cause of the world since they are present in all objects, then the Sāmkhya will not be able to establish the existence of a single cause in the form of avyakta Prakṛti. Even in sāmyāvasthā, the three guṇas cannot be regarded as one because they in that state also, produce their different types of effects.

The third argument "śaktitāḥ pravṛtteśca" too, is no good. The word "śakti" implies the energy form of the effect. The oil, in the form of energy, remains in the oilseed. Oilseed is the substratum of the oil. If avyakta implies energy, then like oil-energy, it, too, must have a substratum, as otherwise the example of oil and oilseed will be an unsuitable one. If the avyakta needs a substratum, then there will be more principles than what has actually been accepted by the Sāmkhya.

Lastly, the argument 'Kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgādavibhāgāditi" is also faulty. The vibhāgāvibhāgahetu establishes both the

¹ Tattvamukiakalapa with Sarvarthasiddhi: Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, Page 126.
efficient and the material cause of the world; the sāṁkhya definition of cause, however, covers the material cause only.

Solution

So far as these objections (raised by Venkatanath) are concerned, we can meet them in the following manner:

The first argument does not seek to prove the existence of Prakṛti on the basis of the principle that the cause must be greater in quantity than the effect as is supposed by Venkatanath. Here, the principle postulated is “whatever is limited (Pari-mita) is an effect. The root cause, therefore, must be unlimited (aparimita) as otherwise we shall have to suppose a further cause of the root cause (becoming an effect, due to limitation) which is absurd. This unlimited root cause is called Prakṛti because the word stands for the material stuff of which anything is composed.

The second argument (samanvayāt) again, refers to the fact that the effect is always connected with the cause (kāraṇān-vita). It is also of the nature of cause (Kāraṇātmaka). It is due to this fact that qualities of a causal substance are found in all the effects generated from it. The quality of being woodiness is found in all things made of wood. Since, the qualities of pleasure, pain and indifference, are found in all objects of the world, they are to be regarded as the qualities of the substance which is the cause of the world. The substance which is capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference, is no other than the triguṇātmikā prakṛti. We should also remember that according to Saṁkhya, the qualities of whiteness, cowiness etc. are not different from their respective substances. The Saṁkhya has admitted tādāmyya between the substance and the quality. White threads do, in fact, constitute the cause of the white cloth. To meet the third objection, we can also point out that the Saṁkhya has not admitted any difference between power (śakti) and the possessor of power (śaktimān) and hence there is no need for a substratum of avyakta. Śakti is not something new. It is what is called
parināma. It is due to the presence of parināma sakti in the causal substance that the latter shows a tendency towards manifestation in the form of the effect. Just as there is oil seed possessing oil energy in the same manner there is some changeable substance possessing the capacity of changing in the form of the world. This modifiable substance which possesses changing capacity (parināma sakti) is regarded as avyakta in the Sāṃkhya.

The vibhāga vibhaga hetu, too, establishes Prakṛti as the material cause of the world. Truly speaking, there is no avibhāga between the efficient cause and the effect. The word ‘avibhāga’ really exists in the case of the ādhāra-ādheya relation and the ādhāra-ādheya relation exists only between the material cause and the effect. Pārthivāmśa* of a piece of wood is not the cause of fire. It is the tejo part of the wood which is the upādāna kāraṇa of fire. It is because the pārthivāmśa is associated with the tejo part of the wood that whenever there is fire in a piece of wood, the pārthivāmśi is seen to be related inseparably to fire. Even then there is no ādhāra-ādheya relation between the fire and the pārthivāmśa of the piece of wood and so there is no avibhaga between the two.

Puruṣa :

If all the movements of Prakṛti are for the experiences and liberation of Puruṣa, then the consideration of Puruṣa’s nature and its relation to Prakṛti becomes an important problem for the Sāṃkhya Philosophy.

Prakṛti stands for the unconscious dynamic principle that undergoes changes and transformations for the creation of the empirical world. Although the contents of consciousness always change and become different, ‘consciousness’ as the principle of illumination and revelation remains always the same. So, there are not merely changes and transformations in the universe of ours; there is also the permanent principle of consciousness which manifests all these passing phenomena of the phenomenal world. This eternal principle of consciousness is the puruṣa in the Sāṃkhya analysis of the world. An

* (Earth-portion)
unconscious principle alone cannot produce an universe which seems to be full of meaning and purpose. Hence, at the root of the world, we should admit the existence of spirit (like puruṣa) which, somehow, influences the unconscious principle in its process of creation or evolution. Moreover, Prakṛti, being unconscious, the contents of experience cannot be synthesised and organized into one meaningful object, by its efforts. The principle of unity that can account for the relatedness of the different bits of experience and also for that reason can give meaning to the contents of experience, must be spiritual: in nature and this spiritual principle is the puruṣa. Thus, for the creation of this cosmic universe and also for effecting a meaningful knowledge of its objects (epistemological necessity), a spiritual principle is as necessary as the principle of objectivity and change. Puruṣa or spirit is pure consciousness and as such it is changeless and infinite. It is the transcendental principle and, therefore, its nature, per se, is non-apprehensible by experience. It, however, appears as the apriori principle in all forms of human knowledge. In other words, puruṣa is the logical pre-supposition of all knowledge. Beneath the forms of knowledge, there is some principle which is changeless but which reveals all mental states and processes by its own power of illumination. Puruṣa is this principle of consciousness distinct from the ideas and images of knowledge. This principle of consciousness is always pure and its nature is intelligence and non-activity. The Śāmkhya-Kārikā describes puruṣa as atriguṇa, viveki, cetana, aprasavadharmī, kevalī, draṣṭā, akarti etc. and all these characteristics reveal that puruṣa and prakṛti are diametrically opposite; while the essence of prakṛti is change, the essence of puruṣa is changelessness. Both are, however, equally, free and fundamental and both lie at the root of the world and its experience.

The existence of puruṣa is also proved by certain arguments in the Śāmkhya-Kārikā which may be summarised as follows:
Spirit exists as distinct from matter since (a) collocation serves the purpose of something other than themselves; (b) since the other must be the reverse of what is composed of the three constituents; (c) since, there must be control of the collocations; (d) since, there must be an enjoyer; and (e) since, there is activity for the purpose of release from three-fold misery.\(^1\)

The first four arguments seek to prove the existence of the soul on the ground that as the controller and enjoyer of the world of composite things, some intelligent being must be recognized to exist and that this intelligent being must not be of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. The world-process, therefore, is not moving and developing aimlessly, there is the eternal principle of pure intelligence which though inactive, yet through reflection, co-ordinates, synthesises and gives meaning to all our worldly experiences. These arguments, therefore, may be regarded as telological in the sense that they refer to the spirit as the central purpose of this world of change and mutation. The last argument is based on the scripture which promises release from misery and prescribes activity to that end. Nature or Prakṛti is unconscious and therefore, the release, striven for, must relate to a principle other than Prakṛti. This can be accepted as a form of ontological argument for proving the existence of soul or Puruṣa. Thus, both by telology and ontology, Sāmkhya has sought to prove the existence of Puruṣa which is an eternal principle besides Prakṛti.

Professor D. D. Vadekar, in his learned article under the title “The Sāmkhya arguments for the Puruṣa”, (published in the “Philosophical Quarterly”, January 1960) has taken great pains to show that the Sāmkhya arguments, employed in the seventh karika, fail to prove the existence of the pure Sāmkhya puruṣa, the nature of which has been described (in the nineteenth kārikā) as indifferent and neutral. Here, the first point

(1) The Samkhya-Karika—17.
that should strike us at once is that this seventeenth kārika has been employed to prove the existence only of puruṣa and not its indifference and neutrality. This puruṣa is the one that has been caught in the snare of Prakṛti through reflection. Hence, there is no difficulty in supposing that this puruṣa is a purposeful being and that its purpose is being fulfilled through the activity of the three guṇas. Hence, one may pose a question; if this puruṣa is a bound puruṣa, then how are we to prove the existence of an indifferent and neutral self? If we think over the metaphysical significance of this argument deeply and carefully, we shall be able to discover that this argument can be employed to prove the existence of the pure puruṣa as well. The real meaning of the first argument is that the existence of the unconscious matter becomes meaningful only when it is associated with consciousness. Matter, by itself, is of no use unless it is revealed by consciousness. In the absence of its revelation by spirit, it is as good as non-existent. Prakṛti is pure potentiality and such a pure potentiality, devoid of any actual character, is of no advantage to anyone. Prakṛti assumes a definite character through its connection with spirit and so, in and through the whole process of its manifestation, the meaning of Prakṛti is being continuously revealed through its connection with Puruṣa. Prakṛti looks upwards to Puruṣa and finds in it its true meaning. Consciousness as mere revelation is always pure, indifferent and non-agent. The word saṁghāt (collocation) refers to unconscious matter and the word parārthatvāt implies that without the existence of consciousness, matter is blind and meaningless.

Even if we understand by saṁghāta, the objects of enjoyment like bed, mat etc. and hold that the existence of these objects prove the existence of a bhoktr puruṣa only, then also there will be no contradiction in holding that puruṣa in its pure form, is indifferent and neutral. This is because, if we analyse bhoktritva metaphysically, we find that bhoktritva
ultimately implies nothing but the illuminating consciousness that constitutes the nature of the pure puruṣa. Such a pure consciousness is always indifferent and neutral.

The examples of bed, mat etc. are given here, only to show that these things cannot have any meaning unless they are related to some conscious being. These examples are not meant to suggest that a puruṣa too, enjoys the products of Prakṛti in a manner similar to what we find ordinarily in the case of the enjoyment of such objects by human beings.

Further, there is no such rule that there can be no enjoyment unless there is a desire for it. There may be an experience when there is no desire for it. The prisoners undergo jail experiences against their will.

The second argument too seeks to prove the existence of jīva puruṣa. It is only in such a puruṣa that viveka in the sense of intellectual understanding of the distinction between spirit and matter can arise. Such viveka is a vṛtti of the intellect. So, it is only a puruṣa endowed with buddhi that can become the possessor of viveka-jñāna. Just as the purely unconscious Prakṛti is incapable of having such viveka, in the same manner, a pure puruṣa, dissociated from buddhi, is not in a position to have viveka-jñāna. Vṛttyātmaka-viveka belongs to buddhi only. The viveka, that belongs to puruṣa is only Prakāśātmaka viveka, which implies simply the manifestation of two principles as different, and does not refer to an intellectual understanding and evaluation of the distinction. Hence, prakāśātmaka viveka is not in contradiction with the indifference and neutrality of puruṣa. Just as there is no distinction between caitanya and cetana in the Philosophy of Sāṁkhya, so also there is no distinction between viveka and vivekin. Vṛttyātmaka viveka belongs to puruṣa only when it is associated with buddhi. Even then, such intellectual modifications are owned by puruṣa through reflection only. Therefore vṛttyātmaka viveka is a seeming attribute of puruṣa and a real attribute of buddhi. There is,
therefore, no contradiction in describing puruṣa both as vivekin (from the point of view of Prakāśa) and indifferent.

The subjectivity of Puruṣa again refers simply to its power of receiving the reflection of buddhi vṛtti that has assumed the form of an object. In other words, puruṣa is a subject on account of the fact that it reveals naturally any object that happens to lie in its proximity. This viśayasambandha however, does not signify that puruṣa is not indifferent; on the other hand, every body will admit that consciousness as mere revelation of objects, cannot be regarded as anything but neutral. The objects of the world are getting manifested by the light of the sun; but nobody will admit that in respect of the objects which are manifested by the sun's rays, the attitude of the sun is anything but neutral. Triguṇadi viparyayāt means that puruṣa is indifferent from the three guṇas which form the stuff of all the objects of enjoyment. In the bound condition also, the self refers to pure consciousness only and not to buddhi, even though it is the most powerful jadapракāśa. All the objects of the world are manifested by the intelligised buddhi, and all attributes like agency, enjoyment of worldly experiences, purposefulness, the motive of evolution etc. belong only to the intellect and not to the pure puruṣa.

Here, we must remember that according to the Sāṃkhya, the true jīva is not the pratīvimbha puruṣa which is destroyed in the state of emancipation. Jīva is puruṣa, the consciousness of which is reflected in a particular buddhi. Hence the arguments which establish the existence of the jīva also establish the existence of pure puruṣa. Any attribute like subjective, discriminative etc. belongs to puruṣa from the point of view of Prakāśa only. Consciousness in the sense of pure prakāśa is always indifferent, non-agent and neutral.

In regard to the third argument, Prof. Vadekar says "This argument, most evidently proves, if it proves anything, the agency of the puruṣa, rather than its non-agency."
CHAPTER II

This argument simply seeks to prove that puruṣa is intelli-
gising Prakṛti by its mere sannidhi so as to make Nature fit 
for the creation of this world. Puruṣa is not, therefore be-
coming an agent: puruṣa is the principle of consciousness 
that vitalizes Prakṛti by its mere existence (sattā). Brahman 
too, is the adhiṣṭhāna of Māyā: but nobody imputes agency 
to Brahman on that account.

The fourth argument seeks to prove the bhoktribhāva of the 
puruṣa that has already been connected with Nature through 
reflection. Enjoyment in the ordinary sense, is not possible 
in the case of pure matter; nor is it possible in the case of 
pure consciousness. It is only the seemingly unified category of 
spirit and matter that becomes the enjoier of worldly ex-
periences. So, the puruṣa that emerges from this argument 
(when taken by itself) in its pure and unconnected form, must 
be admitted as neutral and indifferent, since pure conscious-
ness can never be the subject of any kind of experience. 
Moreover, Vacaspati has explained the bhoktribhāva of puruṣa 
in the sense of draśṭībibhāva whereas Vijñāna bhikṣu has inter-
preted bhoktribhāva in the sense of enjoyment through 
reflection.

Further, enjoyment and indifference are not really two 
contradictory terms. They can go together. A jivanmukta 
puruṣa is indifferent to pleasures and pains; still, he has to 
go through pains and sufferings, as long as his prārabdha 
karma is not wholly worked out.

The last argument seeks to prove the existence of puruṣa 
on the basis of the observed facts of the world. In this world, 
we find that the whole of creation is marching towards free-
donm which seems to be its supreme goal. Pure unconscious 
matter can never have the goal of freedom which belongs to 
the soul. So, we are led to believe that there must be bound 
souls which are to be made free in and through this process 
of world creation. In other words, the world is marching 
towards the freedom of these souls. All desires and strivings
belong to prakṛti. The pure self is not an agent. The winding up of the colourful net of prakṛti is done by prakṛti itself and not by puruṣa. Bondage means a false unification of consciousness with matter and liberation means its disso-
ciation. Unless, there is Pravṛtti (striving) in Nature there will be no change and mutation, and consequently, the distinction of a static prakṛti from a static puruṣa cannot be fully realised. So, the argument that the strivings of Nature are for the purpose of emancipation (kaivaiyārtham‘pravṛttiśca) is quite logical from the dualistic standpoint of the Sāṁkhya physics.

Thus, all the arguments given in the seventeenth kārikā do prove what they actually intend to prove (viz. the existence of puruṣa as consciousness and illumination).

**Multiplicity of Selves**

Now, the self or puruṣa according to Sāṁkhya is not one; rather there is the multiplicity of puruṣas and all of them are infinite, unchangeable, all-pervasive and eternal. The plurality of spirits follows from ‘the distributive nature of the inci-
dence of birth and death and of the endowment of the instru-
ments of cognition and action, from bodies engaged in action, not all at the same time and also from differences in (the proportion of) the three constituents (in different entities like sages, ordinary mortals and beasts) ¹. In the absence of such a plurality of souls, birth and death should be one for the whole universe. If one person be blind and deaf, all others should be blind and deaf: but this does not happen in the world. We perceive that people are born and die at different times and are differently constituted. How can we then say that there is only one puruṣa and not many? Viśṇu holds that oneness of spirit advocated by the śruti, the vedānta etc. refers to the homogeneous nature of the puruṣas and not to their numerical unity. ²

We cannot say that there is one spirit only and that this

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(1) The Sāṁkhya Kārikā—18
(2) Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya
one spirit appears as many due to the imposition of different upādhis* on it. In the case of space, limited by a chair the chair can be removed and the portion of space can be saved from limitation by such a removal of its upādhi. Even then there is the possibility that this same portion of space may, again, be limited by the imposition of some other thing on it. So, if one spirit is recognized, bondage and liberation, limitation and freedom will become absurd and meaningless.

Gaudapāda, however, has made an attempt to prove that the self in the Sāmkhya philosophy, too, should be treated as one. It is a fact that in the Sāmkhya Kārikā, the singular number has been used in respect of puruṣa: “Tadviparitaś-tathā capumān” (Kārika-11); “Puruṣasya darsanārtham (Kārika-21). While commenting on Kārika 11, Gaudapāda has said “‘Anekam vyaktemekamavyaktam tathā ca pumānapyrekaḥ”. While describing the points of similarities between vyakta and avyukta, Īśvarā Krishna has said: Sakriyamane-kamāsritam limgam (Kārikā-10).

Gaudapāda has joined anekam of Kārikā (10) with vyakta contrasting vyakta with avyakta and puruṣa. Thus, in the opinion of Gaudapāda, puruṣa is to be regarded as one.

Now, if we think of the realistic position of the Sāmkhya School, we sincerely feel that non-dualistic Atmavāda cannot be the keynote of this philosophical system. Sāmkhya admits real differences in the experiences and pains of different jīvas. Difference is a felt experience and hence it must be admitted as real. The difference between spirit and matter, the difference between one material object and another and the difference between one individual soul and another are all real facts. Hence, these real facts must exist in all levels of experience. The advaita vedānta believes in the falsity of difference and so all sorts of difference vanish in the air in the advaita state of mukti. Now, if we make an attempt to interpret the Sāmkhya with advaita inclinations, then we are bound to meet with logical contradiction and irregularity at every step. For

*Upādhis—Limiting adjuncts,
advaita, jīvabhāva or jivatva produced by buddhi, ahamkāra etc. is false. It is purely imaginary while the only reality is the undivided consciousness or Brahman. According to Sāmkhya however buddhi, ahamkāra etc. are not false. They are as real as consciousness. What is false is the relation of these with purusa. Since buddhi, ahamkāra, vāsanā, saṃskāra etc. are all real, the differences created by all these causes in the empirical lives of the different individual souls are also real. Differences, which are noticed in the different reflections of different buddhis are all real. Since the images or pratibimbas are different, the bimbas also must be different. Real distinction in effects can be produced by really distinct causes. In the empirical sphere, we find real difference among individuals and this difference must, therefore, exist in the transcendental sphere as well. There are different buddhis, different pratibimbas or reflections and different bimbas or puruṣas. When a puruṣa is finally liberated, the reflection is destroyed and so puruṣa becomes fully dissociated from its buddhi which then gets merged in Prakṛti. Diversity and multiplicity in creation are real and these can be satisfactorily explained by assuming the existence of the different avivekas of the different puruṣas. Created objects are many and the selves that reveal these objects in different ways are also many. If we hold that consciousness is one and it falsely appears as many due to unreal investments (upādhis) then we shall not be able to do justice to the essentially realistic and the dualistic position of the Sāmkhya. Real difference in the upādhis can never be caused by mere difference in the limiting adjuncts. A man may put on different dresses at different times; but this difference in his dresses will not cause any real difference in him. In the opinion of the Sāmkhya, difference in all its forms, is eternal. So, if difference is created by the non-eternal upādhi, then, with the destruction of the upādhi, difference, too, will vanish; and if difference is destroyed, the realistic and the dualistic position of the Sāmkhya cannot be maintained.
The use of the singular number (in Karikā 11 and Karikā 21) is not unjustifiable from the Sāṁkhya point of view. It should be remembered that the realistic Sāṁkhya has admitted multiplicity in respect of puruṣa owing to its admission of the reality of the individual buddhis but in its opinion, one puruṣa only is revealing itself to a particular buddhi to which it is related from beginningless time owing to āviveka. So, a particular buddhi is getting the impression of a single principle of consciousness and not of many. Each puruṣa, the real seer, becomes associated with a particular buddhi through reflection; and due to this seeming union, the experiences of the intelligised buddhi are falsely owned by the puruṣa through ignorance. The subjective ground is, thus, as real as the objective one.

Objections Considered

The Sāṁkhya theory of multiplicity of selves has been unsympathetically criticised by many critics.

It has been pointed out by some critics that qualitative identity cannot go with numerical plurality. If all selves are of the same nature, there can never be many selves, since, there will be nothing to distinguish one puruṣa from another.

Another objection is that according to the Sāṁkhya, there is no difference among the selves in point of proximity to prakṛti, due to which sorrows and sufferings happen to them. So, it follows that when one self is afflicted with sorrow, all the other selves will be equally afflicted.

Lastly, there is misunderstanding regarding the bhoktribhava of puruṣa. The critics raise the objection: how can an indifferent puruṣa be an enjoyer? Moreover, activity belongs to buddhi and enjoyment to puruṣa. This overthrows the moral law of karma.

Objections Met

If we reflect on the first objection carefully, we find that this objection cannot be logically justified. Truly speaking, it is possible for us to have numerical plurality even without
qualitative difference. In fact, qualitative identity loses its meaning unless there is numerical plurality, unless, there are at least two, there is no sense in asserting the existence of 'qualitative identity'. The expression, 'qualitative identity' can never be used if there is only one substance. This point has also been emphasised in the *Muktābalītīkā*, of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*.

The second objection, too, can be set aside very easily. Here, we should remember that a self is not afflicted with sorrows and miseries due to *sannidhi* alone. Pleasures and pains occur to a *puruṣa* on account of its *karmavāsanā* which remains stored up in the *buddhi* with which it is associated from beginningless time. Enjoyment, therefore, is different for selves. *Aviveka* creates a seeming association of attachment and identification between spirit and matter, and it is due to this sort of contact that a self goes through the experiences of pleasures and pains. When this *karmavāsanā* or *aviveka* of a particular self is destroyed, that self is liberated. If we consider the Sāmkhya philosophy from this point of view, there will be no contradiction or irrationality in respect of the nature of pure *puruṣa* and its multiplicity.

**Bhoktrībhāva**

The problem of *bhoktrībhāva* of *puruṣa* is, however, a very subtle one and it is to be understood by a careful philosophical thinking. *Bhoktrītva*, in the case of *jīva puruṣa*, cannot mean enjoyment of worldly pleasures and pains which are the results of actions, because there is no *vr̥tti* in consciousness. In this case therefore, the word 'enjoyment' means simply the manifestation of the *visaya kāraṇa vr̥ttis* of the intellect and also owning these *vr̥ttis* on account of ignorance. Due to *sannidhi*, a reflection of consciousness is caught in the *buddhi* by virtue of which all *buddhi vr̥ttis* get apparently changed into consciousness; and this apparent change in the character of *vr̥ttis* gives rise to a sense of false identity between *puruṣa* and *buddhi*. It is due to this feeling of false unity that the *buddhi vr̥ttis* are understood by the *aviveki puruṣā* as parts and
parcels of its own nature. It is this false appropriation that has been described as bhoktrībhāva of puruṣa.\(^1\) When bhoktrīva is understood in this sense, there cannot be any logical inconsistency in ascribing bhoktrīva to puruṣā although real vṛttis in the forms of pleasures and pains belong to buddhi which is the actual acting principle. Hence, the immutable nature of puruṣa remains unimpaired in the philosophy of the Sāṁkhya School.

Perception of the visible world is not possible in the case of pure puruṣa; nor is it possible in the case of pure matter. It is only the seemingly unified category of spirit and matter (jīva puruṣa) that can be the perceiver of the visible world through modification of the intellect.

**Further Elucidation of the bhoktri-bhāva of puruṣa**

Puruṣa is to be known through inference. The world is an object of enjoyment and as such it has got to be enjoyed by a spiritual principle. (Bhogyena bhokturanumānam). Prakṛti being unconscious, cannot be the bhoktā and so puruṣa, the seer, is also the enjoyer of the world. What then is the meaning of Bhoktrīva of puruṣa?

Here I propose to consider critically the interpretations offered by Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñāna Bhikṣu in regard to the Bhoktrībhāva of Puruṣa mentioned explicitly in the fourth argument of the seventeenth Kārika of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa.

The philosophy of Sāṁkhya is not merely a dualistic system: it is also a rationalistic and realistic metaphysics, because it mainly depends on logical analysis and argumentation at every step. Being an orthodox system, it believes in the authority of the Vedas. But it has not made any attempt to justify any of its views by appealing to the revealed texts.

The Sāṁkhya arguments for the existence of puruṣa are based on Logic and Reason and they are quite in harmony

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(1) Tattva vaisaradi
with the dualistic and realistic position of the classical Sāṁkhya.

Critics have expressed doubt about the applicability of the fourth argument to prove the existence of puruṣa. It is argued that if puruṣa is by nature neutral and indifferent to all worldly happenings, then how can we ascribe bhokṛbhāva to puruṣa? Both Vācaspati and Vījñāna Bhikṣu have tried to solve this riddle in a manner which will not be incompatible with the unaffected nature of puruṣa.

We should remember that the seventeenth karikā has been employed by the author of Sāṁkhya-karikā to prove only the existence of puruṣa and not its indifference and neutrality. This puruṣa is one that has been caught in the snare of prakṛti. It is a subject that reveals naturally any object that happens to be in its proximity. [This viśaya-sambandha, however does not prove that puruṣa is not indifferent. On the contrary it is admitted that consciousness as a revealing principle only (Prakāśatmaka Caitanya) cannot but be neutral]. Perception of the visible world is not possible in the case of pure matter: nor is it possible in the case of pure Spirit. It is only the seemingly unified category of Spirit and matter (Jīva-puruṣa) that can be the perceiver of the Drṣya through modifications of the intellect.

Accordingly, to Vācaspati bhokṛbhāva of such a jiva-puruṣa refers to its capacity of perceiving the world in a manner as if the latter has been imaged in its own vṛttis. In Tattvavaiśāradī, Vācaspati has introduced his unique conception of cicchāyā with a view to explaining the bhoga or bondage of puruṣa. Whether this cicchāyā refers to a unique relation or to simple reflection of cit in buddhi has not been clearly indicated. For the purpose of this paper, we shall however, be using the term 'cicchāyā' to signify the reflection of consciousness in buddhi, although in practical life we do admit a distinction between chāyā and pratibimba. In the opinion of Vacaspati Miśra, due to sannidhāna, a reflection of consciousness is caught in the buddhi by virtue of which all
buddhi-vṛttis get apparently changed into consciousness; and this apparent change in the character of vṛttis gives rise to a sense of false identity between puruṣa and buddhi. It is on account of this feeling of false unity that the buddhi-vṛttis are understood by the avivekī puruṣa as parts and parcels of its own nature. It is this false appropriation that has been described as the bhoktrbhāva of puruṣa.¹ Since the consciousness of puruṣa is the cause of manifestation of the modifications of buddhi in the waking state, it seems as if puruṣa is non-different from the intellect and there is only one principle, not two. This fact has been mentioned by Pañcaśikhāchārya in his famous sūtra Ekameva darśanam, khyātireva darśanam. Although puruṣa-caitanya is radically different from the intellect, the two are fused together intimately so as to give rise to a false sense of oneness which hides the real truth.

While explaining sannidhāna, Vācaspati has said that this does not mean any form of spatial or temporal contact between puruṣa and buddhi. Rather it implies a special kind of capability or yogyatā on the part of puruṣa to enlighten the states and the processes of buddhi, as a result of which, in the state of ignorance, a false sense of ownership arises in the spirit. Hence the spirit appears as the pramātā bhoktā etc.²

Vācaspati’s view has been criticised by Viśānā Bhikṣu on the ground that mere cicchāyā in buddhi is not potent enough to account for the world-sense of the real puruṣa. If buddhi is only intelligised by the single reflection of consciousness in it and there is not the double reflection of the buddhivṛttis in spirit, then, truly speaking, there can only be a relation between the image of puruṣa and buddhi and not between buddhi and real puruṣa. In such circumstances, intelligised buddhi plays the part of both the revealer and the revealed and as such this theory commits the fallacy of accepting one and the same category as both kartā and karma. Further, if

(1) Tattvavaisaradī, Chapter 1-4.
(2) Tattvavaisaradī (a) 1-4, (b) 11-24.
yogyātā is believed to constitute the nature of puruṣa, it will continue even in the state of emancipation and, therefore, puruṣa's experience will never come to an end. Consequently, emancipation will become meaningless. Hence, Vijñāna Bhikṣu gives us his theory of double reflection which explains the bhoktrabhāva of jiva-puruṣa in a better manner. According to this view, buddhi, first of all reflects the consciousness of puruṣa and becomes intelligised with the result that the inherent ahamkara of buddhi is falsely appropriated by the self. After that, the modifications of the intelligised buddhi are reflected back in the spiritual principle so as to reveal the objects (the forms of which have been caught in the buddhi states) as objects of enjoyment of an experiencing person. Here an intimate relation is established between buddhi and real puruṣa through reflection of buddhi-vṛttis in the self.

Just as the eye receives colour only and not any other quality, in the same manner, puruṣa receives in itself only the reflection of the modifications of buddhi. Real enjoyment in the forms of various psychological changes caused by actual spatio-temporal contact of the intellect with various worldly objects belongs to the intellect and not to the real self. It is the intellect that can be changed into the form of a jar and also into the form of intelligence: but consciousness cannot be changed in any manner. It can only reflect in itself intellectual modifications due to its own illuminating nature.

The reflection of consciousness in intellect, however, is incapable of revealing buddhi-vṛttis through which objects are manifested and enjoyed, because the image of consciousness formed in the buddhi is not potent enough to cause enjoyment of objects just as superimposed fire is not suitable for cooking food. Further, in the opinion of Bhikṣu, this type of double reflection does not affect the unchangeable character of spirit because change always means creation of new qualities: and no new quality is generated in the soul as a result of its union with buddhi through reflection.
From the above discussion, therefore, it would appear that according to Bhiksu a full fledged experiencer emerges when cit is reflected in the buddhi and the apparently intelligised buddhi and its modifications are reflected back in the purusa. It is due to this reflection of the intellectual modifications in spirit that the false sense of ownership arises easily in the self as a result of which there happens to be ‘ekamevadarśanam, khyātireva darśanam’ on the part of purusa.

Now, if we reflect on these interpretations offered by the two great commentators of the classical Śāmkhya, we find that both the views can be accepted with equal cogency as explanations of the bhokirbhāva of purusa. Vācaspersi’s interpretation though severely criticised by Bhiksu, is in fact, not less satisfactory than his own view. We shall be able to realize the merit of Vācaspersi’s view provided we succeed in catching the real spirit of his brief exposition. His view is quite in keeping with his advaita position and there is no logical error even from the point of view of the dualistic Śāmkhya. The concept of yogyatā which Vācaspersi has made use of in explaining the enjoyment of purusa, does not really involve any logical contradiction, if understood in its proper spirit. Yogyatā in fact, implies capability inherent in the nature of the self for (1) manifesting and also for (2) appropriating through aviveka all modifications of buddhi caused by the contact of the latter with various worldly objects. That the self is ever fit for manifesting everything that comes in its way will be denied by nobody. Difficulty arises in respect of the self’s capability for participating in the benefits offered by the intellect.

We should remember that this participation is logically possible due to the fact that the self is a revealing principle and in actual active state, this participation is caused by the false idea of ownership generated by aviveka. In fact, the Spirit’s participation in worldly experience is nothing but a perverted manifestation of the visible world due to existence of ignorance in the form of a great principle of
confusion. So, enjoyment of *puruṣa* in the form of perception implies truly that in the inactive state *aviveka* leads to the connecting of the spirit with the intellect which, in its turn, leads to the idea of ownership (in the spirit) from which arises immediately the experience of pleasure and pains. *Dṛṣṭya* or the visible objectivity seems to form the *sva* of *puruṣa* so long as it remains entangled in the creative activities of *prakṛti*. Hence, *yogyatā* (for owning the experiences of pleasures and pains) becomes effective only when the self remains under the spell of ignorance. In that miserable condition of the self, mere *sannidhi* is potent enough to cause intelligisation of all that has been placed in the proximity of the *puruṣa*. Then, due to its inherent capability or *yogyatā* assisted by Ignorance, the spirit comes to recognize all intelligised *buddhiḥritis* as parts and parcels of its nature. This capability or *yogyatā* (being the nature of *puruṣa*) does not exist as a quality to be lost in the state of liberation. Even in the state of final liberation, this fitness exists in the self, but in the absence of the medium (i.e. the intellect) through which objects are to be received, there is no revelation of objects of sense. Further due to the total annihilation of *aviveka*, the question of having the feeling of ownership of experience on the part of the spirit does not arise at all. To a *jīvan-mukta* *puruṣa* who has succeeded in removing totally the veil of *aviveka*, *prakṛti* appears as wholly different from and inferior to *puruṣa*. There will, no doubt, be the world-sense through the operation of *buddhiḥritis* in the active state of his worldly existence pending exhaustion of all his *prārabdha karma*. Still in his case, there will no longer be "ekameva *darśanam*", even though *yogyatā* will be present, (because the latter causes confused perception only when it is assisted by *aviveka*). In the transcendental sphere, *yogyatā* exists only as the revealing capacity of *puruṣa*; but in the phenomenal sphere, the same revealing capacity vitiated by ignorance gives rise to a confused perception as a result of which the fictitious idea of ownership of world-experience arises in the spirit."
Vācaspati being the propounder of the Bhāmati Prasthāna of the advaita vedānta, has not accepted the bimba-pratibimba-vāda of the vivaraṇa-school: perhaps due to this fact, in his interpretation of Sāmkhya-kārikā and yoga-sūtra, he has not adopted the bimba-pratibimba method for the purpose of explaining the relation between puruṣa and buddhi. In his writings, he has used the word cicchāyā to refer to the relation of cit to intellect. That intelligisation of buddhi together with aviveka (the assisting condition) is necessary for causing the confused perception of puruṣa, has been admitted both by Vācaspati and Vijñāna Bhikṣu. While Vācaspati has mentioned aviveka as the sole assisting condition for causing false identity of Puruṣa with intellect, Vijñāna Bhikṣu has stated a third condition in the form of the reflection of the intelligised buddhivṛtti in spirit.

Vācaspati has no doubt tried his best to keep unimpaired the dualistic and realistic position of the Sāmkhya by recognizing the reality of yogyatā and sannidhi: still due to his
advaitic bent of mind he has explained bondage, liberation and the relation between the soul and the world as being due solely to ignorance or *aviveka* (just as in the Advaita-Vedanta of Śāṅkara, all these are explained as being due solely to the operation of *māyā*) but Bhikṣu, by admitting the relation of double reflection between *puruṣa* and *buddhi* in addition to ignorance has succeeded more in providing us with a truly realistic explanation of the bondage and liberation of *puruṣa*. Otherwise, for simple understanding of the true meaning of self's enjoyment, both the theories are equally helpful to the readers.

**Evolution**

The Śāṅkhyā system believes that *prakṛti* is the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas which originally remain in a form of disintegration and disunion bringing no categories into existence. This equilibrated form was in existence before the creation of the present world, because that was the state of dissolution or deep sleep and the consequent suspension of all creative activities. Due to the seeming union of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* brought about by *aviveka*, a commotion and dislocation of *prakṛti* from the state of equilibrium takes place, with the result that the evolution of different categories in their own graduated series immediately starts in the collocation of the guṇa-reals. The guṇas, in their varied groupings and different relations of subordination and super-ordination, gradually evolve from their indeterminate bosom, products of more and more determinate forms. In this act of creation, however, the guṇas retain their specific characters. In every evolute, the three guṇas remain present, although the character of the evolute is always determined by the nature of the predominant one.

The process of evolution follows a definite law which is almost inviolable. Dr. B. N. Seal has stated it thus:

"The process of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated within the undifferentiated, of the deter-
minate within the indeterminate, of the co-herent within the incoherent. The order of succession is neither from parts to the whole, nor from the whole to the parts but from relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less co-herent whole to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate and more co-herent whole. The evolutionary passage, therefore, is not from simplicity to complexity but from the indeterminate to the determinate, from homogeneity to heterogeneity and from the more subtle to the less subtle or gross.

Now, this process of gradual emergence of categories is beginningless or anādi in the sense that the cyclic order of creation and dissolution of the world is taking place from time immemorial, without any break. A particular creation or a particular dissolution, of course, does take place in a particular point of time and is not, therefore beginningless.

The disturbance of Prakṛti does not, however, mean the disturbance of the whole equilibrium, because in that case Prakṛti will not be in a position to refill an evolute that will naturally be exhausted in the act of creating its own effect. The guṇas are infinite in number and only a large number of them is dislodged from the state of equilibrium. We should remember that according to the Sāṃkhya, Prakṛti is not only the source of energy that is needed for the formation of the world, but also it is an inexhaustive source which is constantly making good the loss sustained by the different evolutes in the act of creating their respective effects and stadia. The Sāṃkhya concept of evolution really means the gradual development of the different categories of existence and not mere changes of qualities or new combinations of the objects of the same order. The table is not made of reality

(1) Dr. B. N. Seal—Positive Science of the Ancient Hindus.
(2) Yogavarttika—11, 9.
different from the wood of which it is a modification, because both of them belong to the same order of gross material substances. The production of gross elements is not regarded as a case of evolution but as one of mere combination. Creation, therefore, ceases with the production of the gross elements of bhūtas. In the words of Prof. S. N. Dasgupta "Each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent category of being and offers scope to the more differentiated and co-herent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus, it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differentiation of new stages. The evolutes of Prakṛti do not separate themselves from Nature but remain within its body in more and more determinate forms. The tattvas which emanate from the indeterminate bosom of Prakṛti in a graduated series are as follows:—

"From Nature issues Mahat, from this issue ahamkāra, from which proceed the set of sixteen, from five of this set of sixteen proceed the five elementary substances.

The first evolute of Prakṛti is Mahat or Buddhī which is predominantly sāttvika in character. This is also known as Jagatvīja (seed of world). In its psychological aspect, it is known as Buddhī, but in its cosmic aspect, it is called the great principle. This first principle is not individual or particular. It is universal and as such it includes within it the buddhis of all puruṣas. It is buddhitattva. It exists as an all-comprehensive principle and therefore the potency of both the sargas (i.e., physical and mental) remains impregnated in it. It is because of this universal character of the first evolute, that the world becomes the common objective ground of experience for all persons. Had it been individual, then each jīva would have formed his own world of experience and there would not have been a common platform to facilitate co-consciousness of a mind independent object. Buddhī or the first evolute is,

(1) History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 1—P. 247.
(2) Sāmkhya-Karika—22.
in itself, unconscious, but it becomes intelligised by the reflection of purusa's consciousness in it and this reflected consciousness, being united with the conceptual determinations of the 'Buddhi', creates the phenomenal self which actually undergoes the various experiences of pleasures and pains. Purusa, the true seer, remains all the while beyond all impurities, and its identification with the intelligised buddhi, and also its appropriation of all the experiences of our phenomenal personality is only a transcendental illusion.

The viśiṣṭādvaita school has accepted the Sāmkhya theory of evolution with some modifications here and there. In their opinion, when a disturbance is caused in the three guṇas by the thought and will power of God, the subtle Prakṛti gradually becomes more and more gross so as to become suitable for creating the world. In the 'initial stage of evolutions Prakṛti assumes a particular form which is in between its avyakta form and the form of mahat. The intermediate form is termed Prāṇagā Prakṛti by Lokacharya. The bound soul remains in close touch with this Prāṇagā Prakṛti in which the false notion of self-hood is generated. This Prāṇagā Prakṛti changes into mahat with the three states of sattva, rajas and tamas. The introduction of Prāṇagā Prakṛti in the viśiṣṭādvaita scheme of evolution seems to offer some justification for the evolution of mahat with a preponderance of sattva guṇa. The critics of the Sāmkhya philosophy, on the other hand, hold that the Sāmkhya has failed to answer why the first evolute of Prakṛti should be such in which sattvaguṇa should predominate when Nature in the subtle state does not show any tendency towards the predomination of sattva over rajas and tamas. This objection is not however, sound. According to Sāmkhya, the evolutionary change means gradual change from more subtle to less subtle. Prakṛti is the subtlest of all the constitutive principles of the world. So, the first evolute should be such which is less subtle than

(1) Tattvatraya—acitprakaranam,
Prakṛti but more subtle than the succeeding categories. This is possible only if sattva guṇa becomes the predominating guṇa in the first category. (Subtlety can be generated in a category merely by increasing the satvaguna.) Hence, the first evolute of Prakṛti is mahattattva or buddhitattva in which sattva guṇa predominates. Moreover, if this is an objection to be raised against the Sāṁkhya, then a similar objection can be raised against the Nyāyavaiśeṣika philosophy and the advaita system. We can ask, why should two atoms combine together, in the initial stage, to form the dyaṅuka of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school? Why should not, there, be a combination of fifty paramāṇus in the very first stage of creation? Why should the five apancikṛta bhūtas emerge in the first stage of creation according to advaita vedānta? Hence, if the emergence of the buddhitattva as the first evolute of the Sāṁkhya philosophy is without ground, then the same fate will befall the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school and also the school of the advaita vedānta.

Now, this first evolute is determinative in nature. Determination or adhyavasaya is expressed in the form “this should be done.” Determination, however, is not different from the intellect because, according to the opinion of the Sāṁkhya school, an action is not different from the active agent. Buddhi, in its sattvika aspect, possesses virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and lordly powers as its properties, whereas, in its tamas aspect, it possesses vice, ignorance, attachment and negation of lordly powers (anaisvarya). Cultivation of sattvikā buddhi results in the formation of a virtuous character while the increase of tāmasika properties in the intellect brings a man down to the level of a lower animal. So, the yogasūtra has said “The river like citta flows in two currents—virtuous and vicious (vahati pāyāya, vahati kālyānāya ca).

Of the different sattvika properties of buddhi, virtue is that which leads to success in this world and also in the next one.
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This is a bondage producing property but the bondage is of a superior type.

Dispassion, which means absence of attachment, helps one to get merged in Prakṛti. This Prakṛtilina condition is, no doubt, a condition of bondage, but it is a higher level of bondage brought about by non-attachment to actions and their results.

Attainment of lordly powers, however, enables a person to enjoy non-obstruction of desires.

These three sāttvika properties of buddhi are capable of leading a person to a higher stage of bondage but cannot help him to attain liberation. Liberation can be attained only by the acquisition of discriminative knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

All tāmasika properties act as obstacles in the path of liberation and keep a man bound to the wheel of sorrowful life.

The next evolute that emerges from the intellect is ahamkāra. Ahamkāra, is, no doubt, a more determinate form of the mahat, but nevertheless, it remains integrated in all its three forms within the great principle, from which, it has been generated. The function of ahamkāra is abhimāna or self-assertion. It is only when ahamvytti is generated in the intelligised buddhi that there arises real enjoyment of pleasures and pains. It is the ahamkarā that induces puruṣa to wrongly consider itself the agent of actions. The senses present the immediate indeterminate impressions to the mind and these impressions are then synthesised by mind by assimilation and discrimination. They are, then, referred to the principle of egohood which is the principle of integration. Lastly, they are determined by buddhi which hands them over to the self.

From ahamkarā, in its sāttvika aspect, arise eleven organs, (i.e. the five organs of sensation, the five organs of action and the mind ). This view, we find in the Samkhya-karika as well as in Vacaspati's tattva kaumudi. Vijñabhikṣu's view is slightly different, although this difference is not of much
significance for the purpose of understanding the general trend of evolution. In his opinion, the mind alone springs forth from sāttvika ahaṁkāra; other sense-organs are derived from rājasa ahaṁkāra or tājiṣa ahaṁkāra. The five tanmatras, however, are derived from bhūtādi or tāmasa ahaṁkāra. The physical reals, therefore, are not directly derived from mahat but through the intermediate state of tāmasa ahaṁkāra. This is the view discussed in the Sāmkhyakārika ¹. But in the vyāsabhāṣya of yogaśūtra, the five subtle elements and the ego are mentioned as being the six aviṣeṣa-parināma of mahat. All of them remain integrated within that great principle.

Prof. Das Gupta has accepted this view of the yogaśūtra regarding the genesis of the tanmātras, since, in his opinion, the tāmasa side of ahaṁkāra cannot be one with the sāttvika aspect of the ego which is essentially different from it. It should rather be regarded as tāmasa mahat containing within it the seeds of the objective series.

“Its inclusion in ahaṁkāra with the other two phases is due to the fact that all the three of them are associated and taken up in the very first moment of the oscillatory movement in the mahat. The successive accretions of tanmatras for the formation of the tanmatras are made from the mahat through bhūtādi; or rather the bhūtādi represents the tamas side of mahat which is in a state of activity by the inherent rajas for the formation of tanmātras”⁵.

Of course, it is true that the tāmasa ahaṁkāra contains within it a greater quantity of tamoguṇa than what is present in sāttvika ahaṁkāra and that the quantitative inequality of the guṇa reals, generally, creates qualitative differences in the different evolutes; still, it may be pointed out that according to the Sāmkhya philosophy, the subjective series is never entirely dissimilar to the objective series as both of them

2. Yoga Philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian thought.—Prof. S. N. Das Gupta, Page 186.
have emanated from a common source. Hence, the distinction between sāttvika ahaṁkāra and the tamsa ahaṁkāra will be with regard to their specific characters only, and not with regard to their essential nature (as compounds of three guṇas). Moreover, evolution means differentiation in integration. So, we very well say that all evolutes are integrated either in the body of the avyakta or in the body of the Mahat, the great principle of the vyakta world. Here the six aviseṣas are taken together and the mahat has been mentioned as their common source. In the vyāsa bhāṣya of the yoga sūtra (1-45) ahaṁkāra has been definitely mentioned as the source of the tanmātras. In fact, buddhi cannot really act without a distinction of the universe into subject and object and this distinction is to be made by ahaṁkāra. Hence, the palpitating mahat changes into ahaṁkāra, which in the first moment of evolution appears as a mere general state of undifferentiated subjectivity and objectivity; and then a part of this undifferentiated mass under the predominating influence of sattva, develops into specific organs of individuals along with the definite sense of individuality (individual ego-sense). The remaining portion comes under the influence of tamas and is called the bhūtādi and this part becomes the basis of the objective world. This bhūtādi, being a part of the original undifferentiated mass, includes within it all the egos in a potential and undifferentiated form and hence the world that is created becomes a common objective world and not a private belonging of one individual. (Ahaṁkāra is the principle of both subjectivity and objectivity. Since subject and object are relative terms.)

Tanmatraas Expounded by Different Samkhyaacharyas:

Regarding the nature of tanmātras, however, there is some confusion on account of the fact that these are not explicitly discussed in the original texts of the Sāṁkhya philosophy, which are generally available.
The conception of tanmātra as a category (tattva) of the physical world is therefore often misunderstood and misinterpreted.

In Tattva kaumudi, Vācaspati Miśra has simply said that sound and the rest in their subtle forms are non-specific modifications of tāmasa ahaṁkara because the particle mātra in the term tanmātra connotes that these subtle elements are devoid of specific characters in the forms of calmness, turbulence, delusiveness etc. and as such these are not objects of direct experience of the ordinary human beings. From these tanmātras proceed respectively the five gross elements—ākāśa, air, fire, water and earth.

In the Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya of Sāmkhya Kārika* again, we find the following passage:

yāni tanmātrānyahamkārādut padyante......
etāni avīṣeṣā ucyante, devānamete
sukhalakṣana viṣayā duḥkhomaha rahitāh,

tebhyah pañcebhya stamātrebhyah pañcamahābhūtani......

That is to say, Gauḍapāda, too, has simply stated that these are subtle essences of sound, touch etc. and that these are devoid of specific characteristics due to which they cannot be known directly by ordinary human beings. These are the objects of enjoyment of the Gods and as such they are devoid of painfulness and delusiveness etc. From these five subtle elements have emerged the five gross elements.

While commenting on sūtra 1 (aviṣeṣādvaviṣeṣārambhah) of the third chapter of the Sāmkhya Pravacana Sūtra, Viśājīna Bhikṣu has only stated that these tanmātras are nonspecific modifications and that these are the material cause of the five gross elements.

Commenting on the same sūtra Aniruddha has said: ‘The diverse, i.e. the gross elements—arises from that which is not diverse : i. e. from the subtle elements,’ (English translation:

*Published by the Chowkamba Sanskrit Series.
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R. Garbe). Commenting on sūtra 18 of the third chapter of the said text, Aniruddha has remarked further: 'From the egotising organ which is a modification of the great one arise the eleven viz., the eleven senses which consist of sattva (i.e. which are produced by the cooperation of sattva). The subtle elements are produced by the co-operation of tamas' (English translation: R. Garbe).

The passages quoted above particularly reveal the following notable characteristics of the five subtle elements: (1) Tanmātras have emerged from the bhūtādi or tāmasa ahaṃkāra. (2) They are non-specific subtle essences which produce the gross elements and their qualities. (3) They are infra-sensible and therefore cannot be directly perceived by the powers of the senses of the ordinary human beings. (4) These tanmātras, however, are not as undifferentiated and indeterminate as the mere mass or bhūtādi. There is some determination even in tanmātric stage as they are already called śabda-tanmātra, sparśa-tanmātra etc.

The gross elements which are produced from the tanmātras constitute the last limit of prakṛtic evolution. Evolutionary passage, according to the Sāṃkhya school, is simply the passage from the subtle to the gross. After the emergence of the gross elements, the process of evolution stops in the sense that the pāñcabhautic changes are simply changes from gross to more gross.

Characteristics of the five Mahabhutas which are the immediate Effects of the Pancatanmatras

(a) Ākāśa is the śabdamaya sattā of the external world. (b) Air is the sparśamaya sattā of the external world. (c) Fire is the rupamaya sattā of the external world. (d) Water is the rasamaya sattā of the external world. (e) Earth is the gandhamaṇḍaya sattā of the external world.

The external world is characterised by the qualities of sound, touch, colour taste and smell. The substratum of each
of these qualities is called a bhūta or element. A question may be posed here: why did Śāṅkhya admit the existence of pañcatanmātra as an intermediate category between tāmasa ahaṁkāra and the five gross elements? The five gross elements could have been derived directly from the tāmasa ahaṁkāra. This is not possible because of the following reasons:

Ahaṁkāra, as we know, remains purely psychical when it emerges from the intellect. So, ahaṁkāra cannot be the immediate cause of these gross elements as there cannot be a direct transition from purely psychical to purely physical principles. Hence, there is a necessity for holding that in one of its aspects, ahaṁkāra develops in such a manner that tamoguṇa becomes the dominating element thereby changing the character of this aspect of ahaṁkāra from purely psychical to semiphysical. According to the Śāṅkhya, the psychical differs from the physical only in being more subtle in nature due to the supremacy of sattva guṇa. Since in the bhūtādi aspect (tāmasa aspect of ahaṁkāra) tamoguṇa has started gaining supremacy over the other two guṇas, this aspect of the egotising principle has begun to change from more subtle to less subtle or gross. Even then the tāmasa ahaṁkāra is not gross enough to produce the five gross elements. Moreover, the bhūtādi or tāmasa ahaṁkāra is a mere mass wholly undifferentiated and indeterminate whereas the five gross elements are fully differentiated and definitely characterised as pleasing, painful and sluggish. Hence, bhūtādi cannot be the direct cause of the five gross elements. The immediate causal state must be one in which differentiation has just started in a very vague manner (so vague that this stage cannot be described as specific): this stage is the tanmātric stage. It is, therefore, evident that the five gross elements cannot emerge unless there is the tanmātric stage in which differentiation has just started with the result that tanmātras have been distinguished as śabda-tanmātras, sparśa-tanmatra and so on. The qualities which remain latent in the tanmatric stage become fully manifest in the stage of the five gross elements.
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Tanmatras and Paramanus

The tanmātras of the Sāṁkhya school can be compared to a certain extent with the paramāṇus of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣīka school. Just as the four kinds of paramāṇus are the subtle causes of the four gross elements, in the same manner the tanmātras are the subtle causes of the five gross elements. Both tanmātras and the paramāṇus are to be known by us through inference only. In both, the qualities of sound, touch etc. exist in a latent form because of the very subtle nature of these infra-sensible elements. Just as in the tanmātric stage, tanmātras could be differentiated at least as śabda-tanmatra, sparśa-tanmātra etc., in the same manner the atoms also could be differentiated into four kinds.

According to the Sāṁkhya and Nyāya-vaiśeṣīka, the qualities of the Mahābhūtas are due to the qualities latent in these subtle causal substances.

There are, however, some important points of difference between the tanmātras and the paramāṇus. Paramāṇus are co-eternal with God and they constitute the ultimate material stuff of the universe. The tanmātras, on the other hand, are not eternal, being the products of prakṛti: they do not also constitute the root-cause of the universe.

The Sāṁkhya does not hold substance and quality as distinct and different as has been held by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣīka system. On the other hand, this school admits tādātmya between the quality and the possessor of the quality. So, it does not matter in the least whether the tanmātras of the Sāṁkhya school are considered as substances or as qualities because they are, truly speaking, both and neither exclusively. For this reason, whereas in the Sāṁkhya-system, the tanmātras are the causes of the five gross elements as well as of their qualities, in the Nyāya-vaiśeṣīka philosophy paramāṇus (being only substances) are the causes of the four (Mahābhūtas and the four Mahābhūtas are causes of their respective qualities. (The substance, being the material cause of the quality,
comes into being earlier than its quality.) In spite of these differences, we may hold logically that as the basic principles of the physical world the tanmātras occupy a place similar to that of the paramāṇus. These tanmātras, indeed, lay down the foundation stone of this multi-coloured universe—a universe which is known and acted upon by the organs of sensation and action.

**Tanmatras and the Organs of Sensation**

Just as tanmātras have emerged directly from the tāmasa ahaṁkāra, in the same manner, all organs including mind, have emerged directly from the sāttvika ahaṁkāra. Thus, ahaṁkāra is the upādāna-kāraṇa of both the organs and the five subtle elements—although in its different aspects. It is therefore quite natural for the sense-organs to have some connection with the pañcatanmatras. Since these tanmātras are non-specific, they cannot directly become the specific objects which are to be known by the sense-organs. Hence, Mahābhūtas arise as specific modifications from the tanmātras and the specific objects of the sense-organs are composed of them.

In Saṅkhya philosophy, the word indriya (sense organ) does not refer to its outer physical part. The real sense is the inner faculty which is ahaṁkārika in nature. The outer physical part of a sense-organ is constituted of the physical elements which have tanmātras as their material stuff. These tanmātras again are ahaṁkārika—although there is a predomination of the tamoguṇa in them. The real indriyas (inner faculties) therefore are not radically distinct from the physical outer parts which are constituted of tanmātras and which become the mediating agents between the sense and the object. The process can be explained in the following manner: Take the case of the olfactory perception of the smell of a flower. The flower being pañcabhautika in nature possesses tanmātras as its material stuff. Since tanmātras are ahaṁkarika, there is a natural kinship between the object of sense on the one hand and the outer and inner parts of the sense-organ on the other,
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As soon as the nose comes in contact with the flower, the _gandha tanmātra_ of the peripheral organ moves out and unites with the _gandha tanmātra_ of the flower; as a result of this, the inner sense-organ is at once stimulated; being stimulated, it forms an indeterminate olfactory impression of smell which is regarded as _nirvikalpaka indriyavṛtti_. (The whole process of the _indriya_ becoming stimulated and assuming the form of the object is known as _vr̥tti_.) Immediately on the arousal of the _indriyavṛtti_ mind, egotising principle and _buddhi_ start their respective functions and a determinate _buddhivṛtti_ of smell results therefrom. The consciousness of the self is reflected through it and the _vr̥tti_ is manifested. This is phenomenal knowledge. The gross physical elements, being gross in nature, are far removed from _aḥaṃkāra_. Moreover, due to very strong influence of the predominating _tamoguna_, these physical elements become heavy and consequently possess very low degree of mobility. Therefore, the peripheral organ cannot go out to the object. The _tanmātras_, on the other hand, being subtle physical elements and being more _aḥaṃkārika_ in nature than the gross physical elements, can be radiated outside both by the object and the sense-organ. _Prāpyakāra_ of the sense-organ, therefore, really signifies that the inherent _tanmātras_ of the sense-organ meet the inherent _tanmātras_ of the object. The inner sense-faculty is carried to the object through the _tanmātras_ in a continuous process and is modified in the form of the object. The whole of this process may be regarded as _vr̥tti_ and as such we may also hold logically that _vr̥tti_ connects the senses with their objects.

The _vr̥tti_ is neither a part nor a quality of the senses. It is not a quality because the quality of an object is static in nature. If _vr̥tti_ is regarded as a quality, then it will be incapable of connecting an _indriya_ with its object and will thus fail to serve its purpose. _Vṛtti_ is also not a part of the sense-organ. If it is a part and if this part is supposed to go out to the object then there will be a gap between the _mūlāśṭhāna_ of the _indriya_ and the object. The process will not be a
continuous one and hence there will be no knowledge due to
dissociation of the mūlasthanā of the indriya from the object.
Hence Bhikṣu has said: ‘visphulingavad vibhaktāmśe rūpādi-
vadgūṇaśca na vṛttiḥ’. We may however regard vṛtti as a subs-
tance because it is the modification of a substance (indriya).
If we stretch a piece of rubber then the stretched portion
(which is a modification of the original piece) will be called
‘rubber’ and not anything else. Similarly vṛtti is a modification
by which indriya reaches the object and since indriya is a
substance vṛtti also may be regarded as substance. Of course,
Bhikṣu has said : Vṛtti dravya eveti niyamo nāsti’ because vṛtti
means vyāpara i.e. function or kriyā. Even if we hold
that vṛtti is a function or kriya, then also there is no harm
in calling vṛtti substance. This is because kriyā is always
dravyāsrita and whenever there is kriyā, there is dravya
also. Moreover the Sāmkhya does not admit distinction and
difference between kriya and kriyāvān.

The gross atoms cannot be developed into any other order
of existence and so, according to the view of the Sāmkhya, the
evolution of the world stops at this point. Evolution really
means tattvāntaraparināma, and as this does not take place
after the evolution of the gross atoms, these paramāṇus consti-
tute the last stadium in the evolutionary flow of nature. These
gross elements, however, undergo ceaseless changes but these
changes are either dharma pariṇāmā or lakṣaṇa pariṇāma or uvas-
thā pariṇāma. Objects always change their qualities or appear-
ances as is generally noticed in the case of a lump of clay,
changing into the form of a pot. This is called dharma pariṇā-
ma. Again, all the changes may be viewed as existing in an
object as sublatent, actual and latent which may be termed as
past, present and future. So, the appearance of a thing may be
apprehended from the point of view of the three stages, the
unmanifested, the manifested and the previously manifested.
An object will come into being, it comes into being and it is
no more,—these are the three stages which the object passes
through, and these changes constitute the lakṣaṇa pariṇāma of
the thing. Then the thing passes through the stages of old and new and this constitutes its avasthaparīṇāma. These three forms of changes are all that can be seen in the present form of transformation, and so the evolution of newer and newer stadia is no longer found in this world.

The most important point regarding the evolution of the Sāṃkhya-system is that although the ultimate evolving agent is regarded as an unconscious principle, it does not give us any mechanical interpretation of the evolutionary process. The Sāṃkhya philosophy asserts that all these changes or modifications take place because of the teleology inherent in Nature. To be of service to the puruṣa is the central purpose in Nature and this goal guides the whole course of the process of evolution through its different stages.

Further, according to the Sāṃkhya theory, there is no distinction between power and the possessor of power. So, Nature and all its evolutes are both dravya and sakti (substantive entity and power). Mahat, ahaṃkāra and tanmātra are all substantive entities and are not as such distinct from their ‘respective’ powers of transformation into the succeeding categories. Each of them is a substance and is also a potential power which finds actual modification in the succeeding product. Thus, mahat is intelligence-stuff but it is also the potential ego-hood that springs forth from it. All viśeṣas and aviśeṣas are, thus, actualisation of the latent powers, embodied in Nature—the ultimate source of inexhaustive potency and dynamism.

Time and space, too, are not independent of prakṛti; they are dependent on the ākāśa and its upadhīs in the form of finite objects. Limited space and limited time arise from the ākāśa and its upādhis in the form of finite objects. Limited space and limited time arise from akāśa when it becomes limited and determined by the adjuncts, but the eternal time and the eternal space are the same as Nature.¹ The minutest

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(1) Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-bhāṣya—Π-12
part of a limited time is called a moment and the minutest part of an object, an atom. The time that will be needed by an atom for changing its own point of space is measured as one moment. All objects and conditions of the world are constantly undergoing changes and the changes generate in our intellect, a sense of sequence of events which we perceive as time. Each unit of change is measured as one moment. Collocation of these moments give rise to our concepts of hour, day, month, year etc. This act of measuring time and stating the evolutionary process in a temporal fashion is wholly a function of our buddhi. Hence, in yoga sūtra, succession and collocation of moments have been described as buddhinirmāna.

Modern physics also refers to this subjective nature of the measurable time and it describes time as the fourth dimension of space. The subjective nature of Time has been beautifully illustrated by Einstein in his humorous exposition of the relativity principle to a non-scientist friend. His statement amounted to that if one was in company of some fine girls, an hour would seem like being just a minute; on the other hand if one happened to be sitting on a stove, a minute would appear like an hour.

From the above discussion on evolution, it is clear that all objects of the world, without a single exception, are the creations of the three moving reals and consequently, at every moment every object of the universe is undergoing modification or change. The potential is, thus, becoming the actual in course of such transformation and movement, and the actual also is constantly becoming the sublatent. This transition or passage, from the potential to the actual, is what is known as the causal transformation and, therefore, for grasping more clearly the nature of the evolutionary changes, a consideration of the Sāmkhya theory of causation becomes urgent and unavoidable.
The Śāṅkhya theory of causation:

The Śāṅkhya theory of causation is based primarily on the principle that whatever is non-existent cannot be brought into existence and whatever is existent cannot be made totally non-existent. The corollary, that follows logically from this, may be stated thus: The effect that is produced from the cause is not totally dissimilar to it, as no intercourse is possible between two absolutely distinct entities. Of course, these two tenets are not so fully and clearly stated in the Śāṅkhya philosophy, yet the whole trend of discussion on the problem of causation suggests these two principles as its basic implications. The details of the theory are logically woven from these two, although the Śāṅkhya philosophers were not conscious of this fact. What this theory of causation has sought to prove is not the existence of the effect as such, but the existence of the effect in the cause prior to its production. The verse nine of the Śāṅkhya Kārikā runs thus "the effect exists (even prior to the operation of the cause) since what is non-existent cannot be brought into existence by the operation of the cause; since there is recourse of the appropriate material cause, since there is no production of all by all, since the potent cause effects only that of which it is capable and since the effect is non-different from the cause". ¹

The first argument states precisely that the non-existent can never be brought into existence. Blue can never be turned into yellow even by the combined efforts of a thousand artists. It is also a matter of our daily experience that one who wishes to produce a particular effect, seeks the appropriate material cause. For example, if any body intends to produce butter he chooses milk as its upādāna karaṇa and not water. Again, if the effect were non-existent in the cause prior to its production then anything could come out of anything which really does not happen in this world. Moreover, a cause can produce that effect only for which it possesses potency and

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¹ Kārika—9
power. Milk produces curd, because it is capable of producing that particular effect. Lastly, the relation between the cause and the effect is a relation of identity in difference and not of mere difference without identity. Thus the cloth does not differ essentially from the threads—its cause. They are different in form but identical in essence. So, the relation between the two is spoken of here as the relation of identity in difference. The effect emerges from the energy of the cause and is, therefore, of the same substance. Having taken into account all these points, regarding the relation of cause and effect, the Sāmkhya school holds that the effect is pre-existent in the cause. Before actual production, the effect exists in the guṇa collocation in the form of potential energy, on account of certain obstacles which prevent its actualisation; but as soon as the barriers are removed, the energy gets a free passage and produces the necessary transformation known as the effect. Thus, conservation and transformation of matter and energy from one form to another seems to be the basis of the Sāmkhya theory of causation. The effect is only the cause transformed and modified in a new fashion. Like causes always produce like effects, leaving no place for miracle and supernatural forces. The Sāmkhya theory of causation has, in this respect, some similarity with the Aristotelian view of causation, as Aristotle also used to believe in the maxim: “Something can never come out of nothing”. Causation is nothing but transition from the potential being to the actual being. Hegel, too, has defined causation as a passage from the implicit to the explicit. Cause and effect are, indeed, the potential and the actual forms of the same matter and energy.

Vacaspati Misra has given some arguments to prove the tādātmya relation between the cause and the effect. Cloth is not different from the threads because there is neither conjunction nor separation between them. Both conjunction and separation are found to take place in objects which are different from one another. There is conjunction between the well and the bucket and there is also separation between
the Himalya and the Vindhya. In the case of cloth and thread, their is neither conjunction nor separation. There is only tādātmya between the two.

Further, the cloth does not contain in itself anything which makes its weight different from that of the bundle of Treads. An object differing in essence from another always possesses a different weight. Cloth is not, therefore, different from the threads.

Now, since the cause and the effect are the undeveloped and the developed states of one and the same substance, all production is development and all destruction is disappearance into the cause. There is no such thing as utter destruction or annihilation.

But when we say that the effect exists in the cause before its creation, we must not suppose that it exists as such in the upādāna or the material from which it will be subsequently derived. It pre-exists in the cause only in the form of power or śakti and not in the form of full fledged effect. Therefore, the effect, in its potential form or causal form, cannot serve the same purpose that can be served by it in its actual form. When the existing force, that obstructs the manifestation, is removed, the conserved power or energy receives a natural flow and appears in a new shape and new form (i.e. the effect).

Now, in an act of production, we generally make a distinction between the efficient cause and the material cause. While the material cause enters into the effect, the efficient cause exercises influences from outside for the removal of the impediments. Milk is the material cause of the butter and the churning machine that removes all obstacles barring the manifestation of the said effect, is the efficient cause. There are some barriers, however, which cannot be removed in the ordinary manner and these act as the regulating forces for directing the course of the evolutionary flow through the definite channels. These are space, time, form and causality. We cannot expect a human baby to be born of a cow simply because of the resistance offered by ‘form’
against such manifestation. If these “niyānakas” (regulating forces) were not in operation, then the current of evolution could flow in any and every direction.

This theory of causation, offered by the Śāṁkhya school, is termed as Satkārya-vāda and parinama vāda as it states that the effect pre-exists in the cause. Parināmāvāda is that form of satkāryavāda according to which the cause and the effect belong to the same level of reality (samasattāka). Oil pre-exists in the oilseeds before production and it is also an actual transformation of its causal form. This law of causation is at the root of the Śāṁkhya conception of evolution.

Creation (stūti) is nothing but the process of transforming the implicit into the explicit form. Ahaṁkara remains in an implicit form in the mahat and the mahat in Prakṛti. When the barriers are removed, and the guṇas are thrown out of balance, Prakṛti changes into the form of the great principle, the great principle in the ahaṁkara and so on and so forth.

The three guṇas are capable of producing unlimited diversities by means of their unequal aggregations. The respective proportions of the three guṇas in a particular combination is, however, determined by merits and demerits (accumulated as effects of the past deeds of the individual souls). If the merits of an individual soul become very powerful, then the constituent elements of his mind-body system begin to change in quantity. Such a change is brought about by the removal of the obstacle in the form of adharma or demerit. When merit and demerit remain equally powerful, the individual soul is encased in a human body; but when merit becomes more powerful than the demerit, then the three guṇas, constituting the body-mind system of an individual soul change in such a manner that the individual comes to have a divine body (devaśarīra). Thus, it is clear that Prakṛti possesses power to produce immense diversities. Diversities are implicit in prākṛti which is anekātmikā in character. But since creation is regulated by dharma and adharma which are also the dis-
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position of prakrti, all diversities are not always manifested everywhere.

Now, although this law of causation reveals to us a continuous process of becoming, yet at the very root of it, something eternal is clearly admitted: and this eternal principle, though essentially mutative, is still the underlying support of all changes and mutations. Becoming is the becoming of some dynamic force and so the changes here are not hanging in the air or nothingness. Change is merely the change of form and not the production of something new. The Saṃkhya theory of causation is, thus, different from the Nyayavaiśeṣika theory of asatkāryavāḍā according to which the effect is a new creation. It does not pre-exist in the cause prior to its production.

This is because according to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika if the effect is existent (in the effect form) in its cause before production, the Karaka vyāpara, becomes absolutely useless. Further, if the followers of the Saṃkhya school say that the Jar which is the effect does not pre-exist in the cause in the Jar-form but in the form of the lump of clay, then also there is no sense in saying that the Jar exists in its cause prior to its production; because there is then nothing but the lump of clay. It is only by the operation of the causal factors that the Jar comes into being afterwards.

To say that the effect, first of all, exists in the form of energy and is manifested afterwards by kāraka vyāpāra is also not proper.

What is the meaning of manifestation? Does it mean that the effect comes into existence in the form of the effect, or in the form of samsthāna (arrangement of parts) or in the form of Pratīti or awareness?

If by manifestation, one has to adhere to the meaning of the first alternative, then he has to admit that what was non-existent before has, now, become existent. This is nothing but the theory of asat-kārya. If the Saṃkhya school still says that the Jar existed before production, then the causal operation becomes meaningless.
If any body interprets the word manifestation in the sense of the second alternative, then it means nothing but avayava sanniveśa. The Nyāya school believes in avayavas and in the paramāṇus.

Pratiti or awareness cannot be the sense of ‘manifestation’ because the causal operation that produces pratiti is performed by the sense organs whereas the causal operation that produces manifestation of the jar is performed by the stick, wheel etc.

Moreover, when the jar is destroyed there is the non-existence of the jar in the potter’s wheel. Hence the principle “Nāsato Vidyate bhāvo, nā bhāvo Vidyatesataḥ” is not acceptable.

Even if we admit the prior existence of the jar in the lump of clay in the form of energy, then also there will be difficulty. The question will arise: what is energy or power? If this power is different from the nature of the jar (ghata svārūpa) then we shall have to admit that the jar can not exist in a form which is other than its real nature.

If the power is the same as the form of the jar, then also the Jar cannot exist in the lump of clay prior to its production because nobody perceives the Jar in the clay before it is produced.

Power or śakti really means (i) being possessed of suitability (ii) being of the form of cause (iii) being in proximity of the assisting factors.

Power is also of two forms:—

Avasthitā śaktī and āgantuka śaktī.

That which exists only in the cause is to be called avasthitā śakti. That which exists in the assisting factors is to be called āgantuka śakti. The effect is the result of the combined action of both the powers. The effect itself cannot be called power because in that case the effect will be produced from the effect. One jar cannot be produced from another Jar.
Suitability or fitness constitutes the form of the lump of clay (i.e. the cause) and so in the empirical world we behold the operation of the upādāna kāraṇa niyama due to which a particular kind of effect can be produced only from a particular kind of cause. There is no need for admitting the theory of satkārya.*

Now, if we consider carefully the philosophical positions of the Sāmkhya and the Nyāya School, we shall be able to find out logical grounds for these different theories of causation advocated by them.

Both Sāmkhya and the Nyāya believe in the real transformation of the cause into the form of the effect and according to both the schools, the cause and the effect belong to the same level of reality. The effect is as real as the cause. The Sāmkhya, however, believes avasthā pariṇama whereas the Naiyāyikas believe in dravyapariṇāma. According to the Sāmkhya, the causal substance is one and the effects are the so many states of one and the same substance rising and dying out continuously through the operation of the efficient causes and the regulating forces (niyamaka). There is tadatmya between the states and the possessor of the states. The states or the avasthās can, therefore, exist in the causal substance in the form of potency before actual production. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, admit both cause and the effect as substances which are different and distinct from one another. Hence, one substance cannot exist in another substance prior to its production.

**Objections met**

If we reflect carefully upon the objections raised by the author of Nyāya Manjārī, we find that they are not really very serious.

The Naiyāyikas have admitted the existence of ‘avasthita sakti’ in the upādāna kāraṇa. The avasthita sakti has been described as kārya sakti by the Sāmkhya-school. According to Sāmkhya, āgantuka sakti of the Naiyāyikas simply removes the

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*Nyāya Manjārī*
obstacles or pratibandhakas due to the presence of which the effect remains non-manifested.

The Naiyāyikas have not felt the necessity for admitting the existence of power or energy in the material cause to preserve upādāna-niyama; but they have admitted the existence of something like yogyatā, avasthita śakti or prāgabhāva to uphold the existence of upādāna-niyama in the empirical world. So, they have to admit that there is something in the upādāna due to the presence of which a particular material cause is capable of producing only a particular kind of effects. The difference of opinion arises only in regard to the nature of this ‘something’.

The author of the Nyāya Manjari has raised questions in regard to the presence of kārya śakti in the causal substance. Similar alternative questions can be raised regarding the avasthita śakti of the Naiyāyikas also. We can raise such questions: Is avasthita śakti of the form of the effect? or, is it of the form of the cause? The defects pointed out by the Nyāya in regard to the kāryaśakti of the Sāmkhya will, then, creep into their own theory of causation.

The Naiyayikas make a distinction between the Samavāyi and the asamavāyi cause. Such a distinction is not necessary in the Sāmkhya philosophy because both are covered by the upādāna kāraṇa. (This is because Sāmkhya does not admit any distinction between guṇa and guṇī). Now, the differentiating characteristic which the Naiyāyikas will make use of to distinguish the samavāyi kāraṇa from the asamavāyi kāraṇa, will be accepted as the kāryaśakti of the upādāna by the Sāmkhya school.

According to the Nyaya school, the relation of samavāya is needed for the samavāyi kāraṇa. The relation of samavāya is a relation of inseparableness (ayuta-siddha). Ayutasisddhatva means that the effect is not found in any other substratum save the appropriate samavāyi kāraṇa. Now, the specific characteristic (viṣesatā) which will be needed to describe this ayuta-siddha nature of the relation of samavāya between
the cause and the effect, will be accepted as *upādana śakti* by the followers of the Sāṁkhya school.

While the Sāṁkhya has made use of the *tādātmya* relation, the *Nyāya* has admitted the relation of *samavāya* between the cause and the effect. *Tādātmya*, in the Nyāya, means 'sarvathā abheda' but not so in the Sāṁkhya. Nor is the Sāṁkhya conception of *tādātmya* (*Prakṛti savarūpam virupam ca*) identical with the Nyaya conception of the relation of Samavāya. While holding a discussion on the Sāṁkhya and the *Nyāya* view of causation, we should remember the difference that exists between the *Nyaa* conception and the Sāṁkhya conception in respect of *tādātmya* samavāya etc. If the words are interpreted in the senses in which they are actually used in different systems, then much of fighting and controversy over the issue of causality will surely disappear.

**Objections, raised by Venkatanath:**

Venkatanath too, has criticised the Sāṁkhya view that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in an unmanifested form. In the opinion of Venkatanath, causation is production. It is not the manifestation of what is already existent in an implicit form.

Production and manifestation are two different words having different meanings. Production always implies origination of a single effect by the whole of a *karaka*, whereas in the case of manifestation, the manifesting agent can reveal many things existing in the same place and perceivable by the same sense with the help of other existing factors. (*Tattvamuktā kalapa*) A lamp, for example, can manifest many other things besides a Jar. If the Sāṁkhya says that the manifestation of a specific object can be effected only by a special manifesting agent with regard to a particular sense-organ and at a particular place where the manifesting agent exists, then this also is not tenable; because the Sāṁkhya has to prove, first, that only the potential energy is manifested in the form of the effect and that no new thing is thereby produced.

The supporters of the *Sāṁkhya* view may urge that
instances available in our daily life invariably prove that causa-
tion means manifestation of what is latent in the cause. The
lump of clay can manifest a Jar simply because the Jar is an
implicit state in the causal stuff. There is no instance in which
a non-existent thing comes into being as a result of the causal
operation. Venkatanath, however, says that this contention
of the Śāṁkhyā school is true only in respect of the absolutely
non-existent object. It is only a sky flower that can never be
brought into being by the operation of the causal agent. No
effect, produced from a cause, is non-existent in this absolute
sense. An effect becomes existent or non-existent only in
relation to time. None can dispute the fact that the pre-
existence of the effect in the cause takes away from the causal
operation all its importance and necessary for existence.
Moreover, if a thing is prāksat, it cannot at the same time be
kriyamān.

The Śāṁkhyā view of the satkāryavāda contradicts our
perceptual experience. Had the effect been already existent
in the cause, we could have perceived it. But the effect is
perceived only when it is produced. The cause is really the
unconditional and invariable antecedent of the effect and this
definition is quite competent to explain the production of an
effect which was previously non-existent in the cause.

Again, according to Śāṁkhyā, the relation of constant
compresence (nityaprāpti) implies that there is the relation of
upādāna and upādeya between the cause and the effect. This
argument too, is not sound. There is nityaprāpti between
puruṣa and Prakṛti but there is no upādāna-upādeyā relation
between them. The follower of the Śāṁkhyā philosophy may
say that it is not nityaprāpti alone that proves causation:
this nityaprāpti ought to be a case of ubhayaprāpti as well.
This will not save Śāṁkhyā because in the Śāṁkhyā-kārikā,
the union of puruṣa and prakṛti has been compared with that
of a blind man and a lame man which is a case of ubhayapa-
ṝṛpti.

The Śāṁkhyā describes the cause as the potential effect.
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This description, however, is applicable only to the material cause and not to the efficient cause and other assisting factors, although they, too, contribute a good deal towards the production of the effect. If the Sāmkhya holds that the efficient cause too, possesses the potency of producing the effect, then the Sāmkhya will have to admit that the world exists in a potential state in the puruṣa as well (which is absurd from the Sāmkhya point of view).

The Sāmkhya cannot hold that the upādeya is always different from the upādāna as this system has not stated clearly what should be the real function of the material cause. The effect cannot be regarded as a mere modification of the material cause (tadvikāratva) because in that case there will be perfect identity between the cause and the effect as the Sāmkhya has not admitted any distinction between ‘avasthāvān’ and ‘avasthā’. Again, upādeyatva of the upādāna cannot mean tajjanyatva (i.e. due to the operation of the material cause) because the effect will then be non-different from the efficient cause as well. Upādeyatva cannot be tatsambandhitva either; because if there is perfect identity between the cause and the effect, then there cannot be any question of relation as relation always relates two relata together.

The Sāmkhya view that the relation of identity is to be inferred in all cases where relation of contact is non-existent, is also inadmissible. The relation of contact exists in those cases where both the terms denote substances. If one of the objects related is not a substance, then there cannot be any saṁyoga. The denial of saṁyoga, however, does not establish the existence of the relation of non-difference. The effect, which is not a different substance, is a state of the cause and as such is distinct from the cause. They are related together by the relation of aprithaksiddhi. There is neither saṁyoga nor tadātmya.

Objections met:

The difference between the Sāmkhya view and the view of Venkatakanath arises because of the fact that the latter has
used the word *sat* in a different sense. According to Venkatanath ‘*sat*’ is that which exists at any time. If it is non-existent with reference to the present time, it may be existent in future. If it is existent in regard to the present moment, it may become non-existent in future. According to Śāṁkhya, however, a *sat* object must be eternally existent. It can only swing between potentiality and actuality, manifestation and non-manifestation. It can never be totally destroyed. Since the effect is *sat*, it is always existent. Venkatanath, however, holds that the effect is a state of the cause. When this state is produced, it is existent in the cause, and when it is destroyed or is not produced, it is non-existent. Śāṁkhya has used the word *sat* to mean eternal existence involving no time reference, whereas Venkatanath seems to have used the word *sat* to mean existence in time only and not in the sense of eternity which is not punctuated by time. Hence, in his opinion, a causal substance can be described as (sadasadātmaka). It is *sadātmaka* in respect of that characteristic which exists in a specific time and *asadātmaka* in respect of its past and future states. Vijñana bhiksu in his *vijñānānta bhāṣya*, has admitted the *sadasadātmaka* nature of the cause in the practical sphere. A causal substance is *sadātmaka* in respect of the existent state; but in respect of the past state which is no more and the future state which is yet to be, the causal substance is *asadātmaka*.

Further, the Śāṁkhya philosophy has concentrated its attention on the explication of the material cause; because its main task is to establish Prakṛti as the material cause of the whole whold. Venkatanath, on the other hand, has given equal importance both to the material cause and the efficient cause and has considered them together under the conception of causation. He has described causation in such a manner as to include the efficient cause as well. The efficient cause works on the material stuff from outside only and the effect is not produced out of the potency of the material cause. The purpose of the Śāṁkhya is to prove that there is no production of an entirely new thing out of Prakṛti; there is
just the manifestation of what is already potentially existing in Nature. So, the Sāṃkhya has not taken the trouble of including it into its definition of the material cause. All the arguments of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā have been directed to prove simply the truth that the material cause always possesses the potency of bringing into existence certain specific effects which are its own states. (A detailed discussion on the topic of Venkatanath’s refutation of the Sāṃkhya conception of causation is to be found in my book “A critical study of the Philosophy of Rāmānuja”)

Non-causality of Puruṣa:

The Sāṃkhya philosophy has never admitted causality of puruṣa. Puruṣa is neither the material cause nor the efficient cause of the world. The upaniṣads have emphatically declared that puruṣa is by nature immutable and non-attached (asaṅga). Admission of the non-causal nature of puruṣa alone will keep intact the unchangeability and non-attachment of the spiritual principle.

Further, in the opinion of the Sāṃkhya school, the cause can never be aparīṇāmi. In order to produce the effect, the cause must either change its nature or it must exert active influence to bring about the effect. The cause will, therefore, cease to be immutable. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has ascribed efficient causality to God and in the opinion of this school, the efficient causality does not impair the immutable nature of God. This is because there is distinction and difference between power and the possessor of power according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Efficient causality of God is, thus, real and not false. Rāmānuja school, too, has admitted the real causality of God who is both the efficient and material cause of the world: but God is not the changeable material cause. He is called upādāna kāraṇa because He is the substratum of the material cause. Śaṅkara, however, has not admitted causality as real. Perhaps, he realised, that it would not be possible for him to preserve the immutability of Brahman by such acceptance. This is because the advaita
vedānta admits identity between the power and the possessor of power. Hence, God, in Saṁkara’s philosophy has made His appearance as the false creator of a false world. The fact that Saṁkara has preserved the immutable nature of Brahman by denying all causality to it, may be viewed as an effect of the influence of the Saṁkhya-philosophy which was the first one in the fold of orthodox systems to declare that immutability and causality could not belong to one and the same tattva.
CHAPTER III
ETHICS

The Sāṃkhya Conception of Śubha and Āśubha
(Good and Evil)

The most important feature of the Sāṃkhya ethics is its emphasis on moral considerations which, in its opinion, should spring from ontological necessity. It particularly lays stress on the fact that in our moral life we should be guided by the principle: ‘Whatever is real is good or śubha’. This means that the conception of śubha must be identified with metaphysical reality; otherwise, morality can never be of unquestionable authority. If moral consideration arises from social needs only, then morality becomes relative and conditional. Whatever is śubha or good for the society now may not be so for it after a hundred years. Moreover, duties arising from social needs are of empirical import only, and are therefore helpful only in social relations.

According to the Sāṃkhya, apavarga or liberation arising from discriminative knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛti (seemingly unified through ignorance) is the real good or śubha. It is this apavarga that is to be aimed at by man as the summum bonum of this life. Āśubha or evil is thus anything that keeps a man away from the path of liberation. Both good and evil are metaphysical in the sense that they are the offshoots of Prakṛti, the metaphysically real material cause of the whole universe.

According to the Sāṃkhya, experience is the joint effect of two subtle principles. If we wish to find out which of these two is responsible for the threefold miseries of life, we shall have to analyse experience thoroughly to detect the subtle principles lying at the root. These subtle principles should, therefore, be discriminated through analysis: and this discrimination will enable the experiencer to understand his
own contribution to experience and also his own essential nature, as a result of which he will be able to differentiate himself (as the experiencer) from his experience as well as from the object. This discrimination, effected through analysis, is therefore *śubha*, since it enables the individual to dissociate himself from foreign elements which are by nature painful. In fact, this process of analysis, by means of which the subtle root principles and their essential natures and characteristic effects become manifested, has been deemed essential in all the philosophical systems of India. The Advaita Vedānta analyses human experience and declares that the changeable causal principle involved in experience is false and, from the transcendental point of view, non-existent or *tuccha*. The Śāṅkhyā, however, analyses experience and finds out that the two fundamental principles lying at the root of the world-experience are real and are also of value in their respective spheres. Both can therefore be given due recognition without doing violence to the Vedic tradition. Analysis of experience, thus, becomes a moral obligation in the empirical life of every individual soul. *Aviveka*, which is the creative force of Prakṛti, is both epistemological and moral. It is the ignorance both of the true and the good. In the sphere of knowledge, *aviveka* implies ignorance of the true, whereas in the realm of morality it is nothing but ignorance of the good. Both good and evil are the necessary outcome of evolution of Nature on the psychical plane, because *buddhi* possesses knowledge and ignorance, detachment and attachment, virtue and vice, lordly powers and absence of lordly powers, as its inherent dispositions. Hence, in the *Yoga-Sūtrabhaṣya* (I. 12), it has been remarked: ‘*Vahati kalyāṇāya vahati pāpāya ca*—(The stream of mind flows towards good and flows towards evil.*)’ Truly speaking Prākṛtic evolution is a struggle against and a conquest of error in the sphere of knowledge and of evil in the sphere of morality. Worldly life of man is thus a life of constant struggle against error and evil so as to be able to
reach the realm of truth and good. The bound life is a life in which sattva-guna remains in a subdued state, with the result that all moral disorders and disabilities which are aśubha or evil raise their heads and offer resistance in the path of spiritual progress. Moral life is the life in which all these disabilities are gradually subjugated by the ever increasing influence of the sattva-guna. Since sattva-guna, which is of the nature of illumination, is more akin to spirit, purification of the sattva-guna results automatically in the realization of the Ātma-svarūpa. The bound souls are therefore striving ceaselessly to reach the highest goal of Self-realization, which is the culminating point of the evolutionary flow of Prakṛti.

The true nature of the soul can be realized through adhyātma-yoga. It is through yogic discipline alone that the buddhi becomes sāttvika in nature, and the sāttvika buddhi is the only mirror that reveals the true form of Ātman. One has therefore to go beyond Prakṛti with the help of Prakṛti. When moral disorders and disabilities arise in the intellect of an individual, he remains closely tight to Prakṛti and takes pleasure only in worldly enjoyments. These disabilities, however, do not constitute the sole fate of a bound individual. In and through his various births in various wombs, he enjoys Prakṛti to his heart’s content. Gradually, he realizes that Prakṛti is of inferior value in comparison with Puruṣa. This is the stage of the emergence of the sāttvika buddhi. Liberation is just one step beyond. Since both bondage and liberation are brought about by Prakṛti, the author of the Sāmkhya-kārika (62) has declared emphatically:

Tasmān na badhyate’ddhā na
mucyate nā’pi sāmsarati kaścit ;
Sāmsarati badhyate mucyate ca
nānāśrayā Prakṛtiḥ—

‘Of a certainty, therefore, not any spirit is bound or liberated, nor does any migrate; it is primal Nature, abiding in manifold forms, that is bound, is liberated and migrates.’
Thus, according to the Śāṃkhya, the ethical life, which is real and not false, remains confined to the sphere of empirical existence, i.e., to the sphere of Prakṛti, where the tragic confusion between spirit and matter exists owing to error and evil. As soon as such errors and evils are removed by spiritual culture, which results in the subjugation of rajas and tamas, the sattvika buddhi becomes luminous enough to reveal the true nature of the Self, which then shines forth as distinct and different from buddhi. These errors and evils (aśūbhas) that cause hindrance to liberation are termed viparyayas, aśaktis and tuṣṭis, whereas siddhis, which fall under the category of śubha, are described as effective means to liberation.

Viparyayas

Viparyaya or erroneous knowledge is of five varieties. These are: tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra, and andha-tāmisra. Tamas, again, is of eight kinds; mahāmoha is of ten kinds: and each of the remaining two, i.e., tāmisra and andha-tāmisra is of eighteen kinds. Tamas refers to false knowledge, owing to which the individual soul identifies itself with one or another of the following tattvas, viz Prakṛti, mahattatva ahaṁkāra, and the five tanmātras. In Yoga Darśana, tamas appears in the form of avidyā, which causes confusion between spirit and matter. Tamas, thus, is not mere negation of knowledge of the Self, but a positive abhedagrahaṇa of two radically distinct things. Śaṅkara, too, has admitted the positive character of avidyā, and, in this respect, there seems to be some similarity between the avidyā of Śaṅkara and the tamas of the Śaṅkhya philosophy. Even then, the difference between the two is very prominent and pressing. Avidyā of Śaṅkara is positive and also not positive in nature (bhāva-bhāva-vilakṣaṇa). It is positive in the sense that it is different from negation of knowledge. It is also not positive, because it is not an occurrence in the realm of reality. According to the Śaṅkhya, however, the abhedagrahaṇa or ekamevadarsana is positive both in the sense that it is different from jñānābhāva and in
the sense that this viparyaya is a real offshoot of Prakṛti, occurring in a real world.

Further, avidyā in Śāṅkara Vedānta is the apriori root, whereas in the Śaṅkhya the root cause is Prakṛti and not tāmas or avidyā. Intellect or buddhi emerges from Prakṛti, and it is from the intellect that tāmas emerges and causes ekamevadarsana of Puruṣa and buddhi-vṛtti.* In the opinion of the Śāṅkhya, non-discrimination (aviveka) of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is not a category different from Puruṣa and Prakṛti in the manner in which avidyā of the Advaita Vedānta is different from Brahman. Hence, the mūla aviveka of the Śaṅkhya school may be regarded either as negation of discrimination or as vāsanā of false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna).

Moha is of eight kinds, and is characterized by love for eight attainments such as animā, laghimā, etc. If an aspirant, after attaining aṣṭasiddhis, thinks that he has become a siddha purusa (a perfect soul), then he is said to suffer from moha or delusion. Moha, thus, corresponds to asmitā, of the Yoga philosophy. This asmitā, when it emerges in the intellect, brings about the downfall of the aspirant from the higher stage.

Mahāmoha stands for attachment to objects of sense. The objects of sense are five in number. Each object of enjoyment, again, may be either divine or human (alaukika or laukika). There are thus ten objects of enjoyment; consequently, mahāmoha, too, is of ten varieties. Mahāmoha corresponds to the affliction rāga of the Yoga philosophy.

Tāmisra is of eighteen kinds corresponding to eighteen objects of enjoyment, namely, the five tanmātras, the five mahābhūtas, and the aṣṭasiddhis already mentioned. These objects of enjoyment are impermanent. If an individual is deprived of any one of them, he dislikes it and gives vent to his unwholesome feeling. This is tāmisra, or what in the Yoga philosophy is known as the affliction dveṣa of the mind.

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*Puruṣa and buddhi-vṛtti are apprehended as one,
Andha-tāmisra is also of eighteen varieties, and relates to the same objects as tāmisra. This particular viparyaya stands for the fear of being deprived of these eighteen objects of enjoyment by death or some external agencies. This corresponds to the affliction abhinivesa of the Yoga philosophy.

Of these five, tamas or avidyā is the generator of the other four forms of viparyayas. It is due to abhedagrahaṇa* of spirit and matter, resulting in the formation of what in the Advaita Vedanta is known as cidacidgranthi, that the delusive feeling of being a powerful ego who is out to enjoy the objects of sense arises in due course. Vacaspati Misra has remarked thus in his Tattvakaumudi: ‘Egotism and the rest partake of the nature of error; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of error.’ (Trans.: G. Jha) In fact, one may raise an objection here by saying that from amidst that five viparyayas mentoned in the Sāmkhya-kārikā, we can compare avidyā alone to false knowledge, since false knowledge means false identification in knowledge of two distinct and different principles. Tamas or avidyā is thus cognitive in nature, and it alone can be termed as viparyaya. Egotism or asmītā is more of the nature of feeling than of cognition, since it is identifiable with the feeling of vanity. Feeling of attachment, feeling of aversion, fear of loss by death or some internal power are affections and not cognitions. Why should these be described as viparyayas or illusions? To defend the Sāmkhya, it can be said that, according to this school, buddhi is the principle that produces both cognition and feeling, as a result of which the feeling aspect of experience often remains indistinguishable from the cognitive aspect (Sukha-duhkha-nubhavo hi bhogah, sa ca buddhau, buddhisca puruṣarūpa iva iti—Sāmkhya-tattvakaumudī, 37). The whole structure of the Sāmkhya philosophy is based on the theory of the three guṇas. The operational relation between the three guṇas is such that an activity of sattva is always accompanied by a feeling of

* Apprehension as one,
pleasure, the activity of rajas by a feeling of pain, and the activity of tamas by a feeling of dullness and delusion. So, knowledge resulting from the function of the guṇas is always of the form of pleasure, pain, or delusion, the form being determined by the nature of the object of knowledge. So, from the Sāṁkhya point of view, there is no logical or psychological mistake in including moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra, and andhatāmisra in the list of illusions or viparyayas. These are the feeling aspects of non-discriminative knowledge, caused by the abhedagrahaṇa of the Puruṣa and buddhi. Avidyā or tamas is truly the false knowledge (viparyaya); moha or asmitā, mahāmoha or rāga, etc. are the feelings arising from this false knowledge and, as such, they are regarded as products of avidyā by Vācaspati Miśra. As the Sāṁkhya recognizes tādātmya between the cause and the effect, which are the different states of the same causal substance, it can legitimately describe the products of false knowledge as false knowledge. It is for this reason that avidyā has been described as ‘five-jointed’ by Vārṣagānya.

Organic Injuries (Indriya-vadha)

Now, viparyayās are not the only impediments which the aspirant has got to overcome in the path of his liberation. Man is endowed with eleven organs so that, by using these organs, he can know the world, can act on the world, and can churn out of the world the cream of happiness.

The external sense-organs are the channels through which information regarding external objects reaches the intellect, the main cognitive-affective-conative instrument of the individual soul. Hence, defects in the organs will cause failure of the intellect, which will automatically result in confused knowledge and perverted feeling and action. Such organic injuries are deafness, insensibility to touch, blindness, numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, numbness, paralysis of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal paralysis, idiocy, etc., consequent on the failure of the several sense-organs. These are the eleven forms of disability. These
disabilities affect intellect indirectly through the organs, but the intellect has its own disabilities also. These are seventeen in number (nine atuṣṭis and eight asiddhis: 'Buddheh saptadaśavadhā, tuṣṭi-siddhānām viparyayāt'.

**Nine Tuṣṭis and their Viparyayas**

Acquisition of knowledge is not a very easy task. Even if one does not suffer theoretically from false knowledge or does not possess any kind of organic disability, he may suffer from sloth and indolence, owing to which he fails to proceed actively in search of further truth. By reading the Sāṁkhya philosophy, he understands that the spirit is different from nature, but he may be ill advised by his preceptor that realization of this discriminative knowledge comes as a matter of course. Being thus advised and being indolent by nature, the aspirant may think that since liberation is sure to come by natural process, there is no use making efforts. It is only a question of time or good luck or little spiritual practice. So he remains satisfied and does not make any further efforts for gaining spiritual realization. This type of intellectual indolence is manifested in four forms of ādhyātmika tuṣṭi, viz. prakṛti, upādāna, kāla, and bhāgya.

**Tuṣṭi in the form of prakṛti**: Prakṛti is sure to bring about liberation by her own efforts.

**Atuṣṭi in the form of Prakṛti**: Prakṛti is not capable of bringing about liberation.

**Tuṣṭi in the form of upādāna**: Vairāgya is a disposition of buddhi, and so, if one embraces sannyāsa, he is sure to gain liberation. So, there is no need for meditation etc.

**Atuṣṭi in the form of reverse of upādāna**: Intellectual purification by cultivation of vairāgya can never bring about liberation.

**Tuṣṭi in the form of kāla**: Even if one has recourse to the path of renunciation, he can attain mokṣa only when the time is ripe for it. There is no need for under-going the troubles of renunciation before time.
Atuṣṭi in the form of akāla: There is no time when the buddhi can bring about liberation.

Tuṣṭi in the form of bhāgya: This refers to the feeling of satisfaction that arises from the following: ‘Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature nor from any other means, nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck.’

Atuṣṭi in the form of the reverse of bhāgya: Luck can never give us liberation.

Besides these internal tuṣṭis, there are five kinds of external tuṣṭis. These are based on the five objects of sense-enjoyment. “The external forms are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, etc. These belong to those who practise vairāgya, but nevertheless regard nature, intellect, ego-sense, etc. as the spirit. These forms are called external, because they presuppose the existence of spirit without knowing what it is and appertain to what is not spirit. The objects of sense being five, the abstinence from these must also be fivefold. These five abstinences are due to the perception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment, involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing.”

To acquire wealth, one has to take recourse to some sort of service, and service is always a source of pain to the servant. Contentment that results from the abstinence from the objects of sense owing to consideration of the painful nature of work is called pāra.

If wealth is acquired, then also it brings with it further trouble of saving it from the hands of the thieves etc. Tuṣṭi owing to abstinence arising from the consideration of such troubles is called supāra.

Again, one may acquire wealth and keep it in safe custody. Then also there arises the fear of its being spent up. Tuṣṭi owing to abstinence arising from this consideration is called pārāpāra.

Further, when one becomes interested in sense objects, one’s desires for pleasure increase; the very possibility that
these desires may not be satisfied brings about the abstinence that leads to the contentment called anuttamāṃbha.

Lastly, there is the idea that there can be no enjoyment of things without the cruel process of killing animals. Tuṣṭi owing to the abstinence arising from the realization of the cruelty of this process is called uttamāṃbha.

Viparyayas of these tuṣṭis, in the form of abstinence from sense-enjoyment, will mean indulgence in sense-enjoyment without realizing the defects inherent in them.

The reverses of the nine forms of tuṣṭi mentioned are admitted by all as impediments to true knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra has, however, stated that these nine forms of tuṣṭi, too, are impediments to true knowledge. But J. N. Mukherjee, the learned author of the book entitled Sāmkhya or the Theory of Reality, has asserted boldly that tuṣṭis have been absolutely misinterpreted by Vācaspati Miśra'. 'Tuṣṭis are not disabilities, but means to power.' (op. cit. p. 87) The reason for his holding this view is the use of the word 'viparyayāt' in the Sāmkhya-kārikā (49). The last line of the said kārikā runs as follows: 'Saptadāśavadhā buddher-viparyayāt tuṣṭi-siddhinam.'

According to J. N. Mukherjee, the word 'viparyayāt' is to be interpreted in relation to both tuṣṭi and siddhi, and so the meaning will be that the disabilities of the intellect will be caused by the reverses of both tuṣṭi and siddhi. Hence, in his opinion, tuṣṭis are powers and not disabilities born of indolence and sloth.

'Tuṣṭi is the sense of power born of the firm conviction that everything, the whole machinery of the universe, will submit to the demands of rational and moral meaning. Nature, conditions, opportunities, and even destiny will follow the determined Puruṣa like a tame dog......Even error and evil are bound to provide nourishing conditions.'

I agree with J.N. Mukherjee in holding that tuṣṭis are helpful for liberation, but I differ from him in believing that they
are helpful only up to a certain limit. Like virtue, tuṣṭis, which are vṛttis of the intellect, are also to be given up by an aspirant, if he seeks to reach the supra-intellectual stage. It is due to this fact that Vācaspati Miśra has described tuṣṭis, too, as impediments; no aspirant can reach the final luminous stage if he is not wholly free from these intellectual dispositions. These are, therefore, pratibandhakas like virtues. It is true that in the Sāmkhyakārikā, viparyayas of tuṣṭis (i.e. atuṣṭis) are specially mentioned as aśaktī. This is because atuṣṭi is not a negative term according to the Sāmkhya. Ātuṣṭi does not merely imply the absence of tuṣṭi. It is something positive and very harmful in nature. An atuṣṭi always hampers spiritual progress and never comes to any help of the aspirant. The viparyaya of the prakṛti form of tuṣṭi (i.e. Prakṛti as moksadā) is not merely the absence of knowledge regarding the power of Prakṛti to bring about liberation; but this is a definite knowledge of Prakṛti as amoksadā (i.e. Prakṛti as incapable of bringing about liberation.) Hence, atuṣṭis are real aśaktis, as they always create difficulties and illusions which prevent a soul from undertaking any work favourable for liberation. Tuṣṭis are, however, inspiring to a certain extent. This is because tuṣṭis do not occur when the Jīva Puruṣa remains in a state of complete aviveka. It is only when one aspires for liberation and is told that liberation is attained on the realization of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti and that this realization comes to everyone in the natural course, that he can be satisfied. In other words, he will have that form of contentment which is known as prakṛti. In the same manner, the contentment in the forms of upādāna, kāla, bhāgya, etc. will arise in the mind of the aspirant when he will not be properly advised. So, these tuṣṭis presuppose intellectual advancement to a certain extent, although their emergence is harmful for real progress. Atuṣṭis, on the other hand, always imply intellectual backwardness and disability, which are as harmful as the defects in the organs. So, in the Sāmkhya-kārikā (49), atuṣṭis (or viparyayas of tuṣṭis) and asiddhis (or viparyayas of siddhis) are specially
mentioned as *buddhi-bādhā*, along with the injuries of the eleven organs:

Ekādāśendriyavādha saha
buddhibādhairasaktiruddhiśāta;
Saptadasāvādha buddher-viparyayāt
tuṣṭi-siddhīnām.

_Tuṣṭis_ which are on a different plane are counted as _aśaktis_, but their _viparyayās_ are included in the group of twenty-eight _aśaktis_ mentioned in the _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_ (49). _Viparyayās_ of _siddhis_, too, are included in the list of _aśaktis_ and _tuṣṭis_ and _siddhi_ are mentioned together as ‘_viparyayāt tuṣṭi-siddhīnām_’. _Siddhis_ are always helpful for liberation, and since _tuṣṭis_ are mentioned along with _siddhis_, one may be induced to think that _tuṣṭis_ (like _siddhis_) are direct means to liberation and that they are to be adhered to till the end. It is with a view to removing such a false impression from the mind of the reader that Vācaspati Miśra has remarked that ‘success (_siddhi_?) is the most desired by all, and error, disability, and contentment are impediments to success’. _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_ (51) has also been understood by him as lending support to his previous view. The _Kārikā_ says: The eight forms of success are: (1) reasoning; (2) oral instruction; (3) study; (4-6) threefold suppression of pain; (7) acquisition of friends; (8) and purity.

‘The three before mentioned are checks to success’. The last line, ‘the three before mentioned are checks to success’, refers to ‘error, disability, and contentment’. And these act as curbs on the various forms of success, because they retard their progress; the success being likened to so many elephants whose movement is curbed by the goad (_aṅkuśa_) and thus being opposed to ‘success’, the latter three are ever to be abandoned’. (Tattvakaumudi).

Svāmī Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has expressed a similar view in his commentary on the _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_: ‘Āsāmupādeyatvam viparyayāsakti tuṣṭīnāṁ tu heyatvam jñāpayiṣyannāha siddheḥ pūrvo’āṅkuśastrividha iti’ etc.

The same view is found in the _Gaudapada-bhāṣya_ of the _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_: ‘Siddheḥ pūrvā ya viparyayāsaktitustīyastā
CHAPTER III

eva siddher şa$kastadbhedādeva trividāḥ, yathā hasti grhīthaka-
śena vasi bhavati evam viparyayā ṣaktitubhirgrhito lokojñāna-
māṇoti, tasmādetāḥ parityojya siddhiḥ sevyā, siddhesattva-
jñānamutpadyate tasmānmokṣa iti.*

Siddhis

Siddhis are eight in number. They are: (1) uha; (2) śabda; (3) adhyayana; (4-6) conquest of the three bandhas; (7) suhṛtprāpti; and (8) dāna.

Uha: This consists in reading properly the philosophical texts with the help of the teacher. This is called tāra.

Śabda: This means receiving oral instructions from the teacher and also understanding fully the meaning of such instructions. This success is called suṭāra.

Adhyayana: This consists in establishing truth by removing all doubts and objections with regard to it. This success is called tārātāra.

Threelfold suppression of pain: Three kinds of pain are to be suppressed. These three suppressions of pain are called pramoda, mudita, and modmāna.

Suhṛtprāpti: One should not only establish truth by the right process of reasoning, but should also discuss it with his fellow students with a view to winning their agreement. This success is called ramyaka.

Dāna: Vācaspati Miśra has interpreted dāna as purity. By purity is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions minded with different kinds of cravings or desires. This purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long, careful, and uninterrupted course

* Error, disability and contentment, which have been mentioned before, are checks to success. Just as an elephant is kept under control with the help of the goad, in the same manner, a person, who is under the influence of error, disability and contentment, remains in ignorance. So in order to attain liberation he should try to avoid them.
of practice; hence, the word dāna (purity) includes (as a means to success) this practice also." This is called sadāmudita.

All the siddhis lead an aspirant to liberation, whereas reverses of these act as impediments.

**Conclusion**

In the empirical life, buddhi is the supreme jādaprakāśa that guides a man through all stresses and strains of life. It is the intellect that is producing both jñānavṛtti and ajñānavṛtti, dhārmikavṛtti and adhārmikavṛtti, in the mental sphere of an individual, as a result of which his life is becoming a constant struggle between knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice, sattva and tamas. The seeds of bondage as well as of liberation are rooted in the intellect, and it is the duty of a bound soul to help the seed of liberation grow and bear fruits after rejecting the seed of bondage.

Hence comes the karma-yoga of the Sāmkhya philosophy. The Sāmkhya believes in the inviolable law of Karma that creates and sustains the empirical existence of man and his worldly affairs. Truly speaking, the law of Karma is a law of psycho-biological development of living beings; growth, development, and psychological progress of life in different spheres of existence are fully controlled and determined by this law. Our actions are the dynamic manifestations of our psychological dispositions and physical energy. The kind of action that a man chooses to perform is limited and determined by his own psychical make-up; character or personality of this life is the result of psychic dispositions of the previous life, and there is thus a continuous psychical inheritance. What a man thinks, feels, and wills is therefore of very great importance for himself as well as for the whole cosmos. It is by his own thoughts, feelings, and emotions that an individual determines his own nature, existence, and environment in this life as well as in the next. Man is liberated only when he attains discriminative knowledge and gets out of the sphere where the law of Karma operates. Purification of intellect or the psychical
apparatus is therefore regarded in the Sāmkhya as the most essential step towards attainment of peace and perfection.

Of course, to a casual observer it may appear that the classical Sāmkhya is incapable of giving full satisfaction to the conative nature of man as, in the opinion of this school, the real doer of action is the unconscious intellect and not the inherently conscious Self. If the individual soul is not the real agent at least in the empirical life, he will never feel inspired to lead a good and active life; there is thus no scope for freedom of will, which is the basic problem of morality.

In reply to this, it may be pointed out that although the soul is always asaṅga, still there is ample scope for free will and morality in the classical Sāmkhya. It is true that cognition, conation, etc. are dispositions of buddhi, and never really belong to Puruṣa even in the empirical life. But these dispositions are not the dispositions of a purely unconscious buddhi; these dispositions arise in buddhi only when it is permeated with consciousness (i.e. only when the buddhi is intelligized). Moral life belongs to bound souls only. Now, owing to the emergence of aśakti in the form of tamas in the bound soul, the latter feels as if it is identical with the intelligized buddhi and that there are not two principles but one (ekameva-darśana). Consequently, the bound soul falsely regards vṛttis of buddhi in the forms of knowledge, desires, and action as its own. Liberation really means two things: (1) not to have the feeling of 'myness' in relation to all desires seeking materialization in the form of actions: (2) not to be ignorant of the real source of these desires. So long as the bound soul lives in the world of 'as if' (īva), he never feels that these desires are not his own desires. Moral discipline is necessary to make him realize what he has forgotten (i.e. to make him realize that the soul is asaṅga and that all desires belong to buddhi, which is distinct and different from that soul). Now, so long as the jīva does not realize that these desires are the modifications of the buddhi, he feels as if he is free in willing and acting according to his will. So he thinks himself responsible for his actions, makes a distinction between
śubha karma and aśubha karma, and undergoes experiences of pleasures and pains resulting from actions falsely owned by him through ignorance. Moral responsibility does not require that individual soul must have freedom of will in the metaphysical or real sense. Even a false belief of freedom of will may inspire a human being to practise moral rules, since they do not know that their belief is false. The rope-snake causes fear in the mind of the perceiver, as a result of which the perceiver runs away from it. Moral responsibility is due to false identification of the soul and the intelligized buddhi, and it is because of this moral responsibility that there is scope for moral purification, that there is the enjoyment of pleasures and pains according to karma, that there are births and rebirths, and so on. Moral purification is necessary for removing false identification of the soul with the intelligized buddhi, and this can be done by leading an honest life and performing niskāma karma. That the soul can destroy desires and can perform disinterested action is a fact of experience, and this removal of desires is possible, because these are foreign to the Self. The soul in its pure form is eternally free. Its freedom is unchecked. The soul is different from buddhi, and so it is devoid of vṛttis and desires. Hence, the question of freedom of will does not arise in the case of an emancipated soul. Freedom of will and moral practices are necessary as means to liberation. When liberation is attained, the means cease to have any significance.

According to Advaita Vedānta also desires belong to buddhi and not to consciousness. According to Nyāya, however, desires arise in the embodied soul; but there also, moral practice is necessary so long as there is sarīrābhimāna. This sarīrābhimāna is due to erroneous knowledge. According to Rāmānuja also, the freedom of will, which is the basis of morality, is prākritika (natural), and is therefore heya from the point of view of the soul. Thus, we can say that the freedom of will does not have any place in the metaphysical or transcendental sphere from the point of view of all orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. But it has a place in the empirical sphere as a
means to the highest end in all the systems, including the Śāṁkhya.

LIBERATION

Our life, on earth constantly swings like a pendulum between pleasures and pains, happiness and misery. Even if it is possible for a man to shun all other pains and pleasures, it is impossible for him to resist decay and death. Of course, all men earnestly strive to remove every kind of misery and pain, but so long as we remain on the empirical level only, we cannot enjoy unmixed and pure pleasure or happiness. This is the most important truth regarding our life on earth. So, if a man is to rise above the level of sorrowful existence he must, first of all, realise that all worldly pleasures lead to sorrow and that no worldly means can remove forever the sufferings of this empirical life. The Śāṁkhya system has started with an analysis of three kinds of misery that generally destroy the pleasures of life. These are the adhyātmika pain, adhidaivika pain and adhibhautika pain. The first kind is caused by the disorders of the mind-body system. It includes under it fever, anger, greed, fear etc. The second is produced by external agents like other men, beasts, natural force etc. The third kind is produced by supernatural causes e.g. the pains inflicted by ghost and demons etc.

All these evils of life cannot be removed forever either by science or by religious practices and other known means. The performance of sacrifices according to vedic rites, may remove pain for a short period but as these actions involve the sacrifices of animals, they must ultimately produce pain and no pleasures. But this sort of relief, too, is very short-lived, as there will be recurrence of such mental and physical ailments. The knowledge of science and performance of religious sacrifices, cannot, therefore, lead to the final annihilation of sufferings and pains, though these ordinary means have a limited value in making life at least tolerably happy on this earth. Hence, the question arises, “how are we to attain absolute freedom from all pain and suffering?” The Śāṁkhya says that all our
misery is due to ignorance. *Buddhi* and *purusa* are distinct and different, but through ignorance a seeming unity between the two is wrongly established (ekamevadarśanam) as a result of which sorrows and sufferings, pain and misery which really belong to buddhi, seem to follow purusa from birth to birth. It is necessary, therefore, that through tattvābhyaśa, we should form in buddhi, the true conception of the nature of purusa and then with the help of this saving knowledge, we shall be able to attain liberation from the sorrows and sufferings of this world.

Change is in Prakṛti alone and it is the body that grows old and dies. The spirit is ever free but through misconception, bondage and liberation are attributed to the self. When the self is conceived of as bound and fettered, it experiences all the sorrows and joys that really happen to its case, i.e. the body. When discriminative knowledge is attained through tattvābhyaśa, Nature ceases to evolve in regard to the aspirant, the seeming unity is destroyed and the self attains release which is the final goal of Nature’s evolution. It is through a long course of spiritual training that the intellect becomes free from the soiling influences of rajas and tamas,* it becomes almost similar to the puruṣa in purity and transparency. In that purified condition of the buddhi, is reflected the true nature of the spiritual principle and so the ‘buddhi’ feels itself to be different from and unrelated to the pure and transcendent soul as a result of which ignorance of the jīva is totally destroyed. Under such circumstances, Nature turns its back on the liberated puruṣa and ceases its activity of binding such a self to this life of samsāra. It should, however, be remembered that with the attainment of release by a single puruṣa prakṛti does not cease to function. There are other puruṣas who are still to be liberated and Nature goes on working in her own way for the release of those bound souls. The released puruṣa too perceives prakṛti, but is no longer deluded by her powers of creation. In that state of release, both the

*Rajas and Tamas cannot, however, be totally eliminated but their presence will be harmless for all practical purposes.*
principles exist: What has been brought to an end is the delusion under which puruṣa thought that the evolutes of nature were its own creation and therefore identical with itself.

Now, the question arises, how is this beginningless delusion to be removed? Or how is Tattvābhayaṇa resulting in liberation, to be done? The tattvābhayaṇa, prescribed for liberation embraces yogapracṛtya which has been fully discussed in the yogasūtra of Patanjali.

In the initial stage, the study of the Sāṁkhya philosophy will provide the aspirant with parokṣa jñāna (Mediate knowledge) of the distinction between puruṣa and Prakṛti. The aspirant will receive instructions on the Sāṁkhya state from the preceptor. This is the stage of śravaṇa'. Next stage is the stage of manasa. This is the stage of rational reflection. The aspirant will reflect on the truths learnt from the Sāṁkhya sūtra rationally; he will drive out all possible objections that can be raised against the Sāṁkhya by reasoning and arguments (yukti & tarka) with the result that the truths (gained from the Sāṁkhya philosophy) will become firmly rooted in his mind. This is the stage when the aspirant develops a firm faith and respect (śraddhā) for ātma sākṣātkařa. This śraddha automatically results in virya or eagerness and mental capacity to undertake the difficult task of self-realisation. The virya, in its turn, increases dhyāna-sakti or the power of meditation. The aspirant, then, becomes fit for attaining the stage of samādhi which is the stage of pure knowledge and self-realisation.

Hence, after the stage of manana, the aspirant enters into the stage of nididhyāsana or the stage of actual yogic practice which in due course, results in immediate knowledge of ātmasvarūpa.

The eight limbs of the yogic process are to be followed strictly and in order: of course, yama and niyama are to be practised (in a sense) even in the initial stage to become the adhikāri for tattvajñāna. This is because a man, with a pure intellect alone, is capable of grasping the true significance of the scriptural truth. Before coming to the preceptor, the
aspirant should have a broad general training in ethical disciplines—a training which is absolutely necessary to develop human character; otherwise there cannot be much hope of success in the stages of spiritual life. But when the aspirant follows the path of *aṣṭāṅga yoga*, the ethical disciplines prescribed for yogic *sādhanā* and devotional practices are to be performed rigidly and with concentrated attention.

When the aspirant will rise up-to the mental level of one pointed attention and will be able to remain there steadily for a long period of time, he will become the fit person to attain *samādhi* with the help of attention and contemplation (*Dhyāna, dhārana*). The *samādhi* that takes place in the *ekāgrabhumi* of the *citta* is called *samprajñāta samādhi* which again, involves four stages. These four stages are known as four forms of concrete communion (*samprajñāta samādhi*).

In the first stage, there is the perception of gross substances and also of the distinction between consciousness and the gross substances of the world. Consciousness, no doubt, will be still *viśaya* of the *cittavṛtti* (since caitanya will be reflected in the *vṛtti* of the gross object): even then, consciousness will be perceived as something different from the gross substance. When an individual remains in the *aviveki* stage, he can perceive neither the pure consciousness, nor the gross object in its pure form. He, then, perceives both consciousness and gross matter in a mixed form. So long as the *citta* does not become steady, consciousness in its pure form cannot be perceived. Such perception, therefore, occurs only in the stage of yoga. By repeated performance of the triad of attention, contemplation and meditation, this spiritual progress will become steady and firmly rooted in the personality of the aspirant and he will be able to perceive the difference that exists between consciousness and the gross matter. This stage is known as *savitarka* stage in the yoga philosophy.

The next stage of spiritual progress is the stage of *savicāra* when by practising the triad of attention, concentration and
meditation, the aspirant will be able to perceive the difference of consciousness from all subtle things of the world. Here, we should remember that if anybody follows the path of yoga without possessing tattvajñāna* he will not be able to have a perception either of the mahābhūtas or of the tammātras, indriyas etc. in their pure form. Consciousness too, will be perceived by him not in its pure form but in a state of indistinguishable union (avivikta state) with the subtle parts of Prakṛti. This is what happens to vīdehalayī and Prakritisayī yogins who still suffer from aviveka. Such a samādhi which has ignorance at its root is known as bhavapratypaya. But the aspirant, who has got his vivekajñāna firmly rooted in him, by śravana, manana etc. and has also been able to perceive the distinction between caitanya and the gross matter of the world is, now, in a position to perceive the buddha svarūpa (pure form) of the subtle substances of the world and also of the true form of consciousness. Although he will be able to perceive indriyas in this stage, still his egosense or ahaṁvṛtti will not be annihilated. Ahaṁvṛtti which lies at the very root of our practical life and without which dealings in the practical sphere, cannot be carried on, is very firmly rooted in us. Removal of egosense, therefore, needs strenuous spiritual sādhanā. This ahaṁvṛtti nirodha becomes the special sādhanā of the third and the fourth stages of samprajñāta samādhi which are known as ānanda samādhi and asmitā samādhi.

In the stage of ānanda samādhi, the object of meditation is purely sāttvika ahaṁkāra. Due to the application of dhyāna, dhāranā and samādhi to svāttika ahaṁkāra, rajas and tamas parts become practically ineffective, only the pure sattvānā of ahaṁkāra remains operative. Sattva is of the nature of happiness or bliss. Hence, in the stage of ānanda (due to increasing activity of the sattva guṇa) the aspirant experiences a pleasurable feeling all the time. This happiness is pure happiness (unmixed with the effects of rajas and tamas

* i. e. the parokṣa jñāna of the difference between J āda and C aitanya is not properly attained by the aspirant.
which have become inoperative). Many aspirants become interested in the enjoyment of this unmixed happiness and prefer to remain in this stage. They do not make any more efforts to reach the highest stage of liberation. The happiness enjoyed in the ānanda stage is inferior to the bliss which forms the essence of consciousness. Since self-realisation is regarded as the highest and the best, the self must be admitted as the object of love and adoration. That which is very dear to us, is surely of the nature of ānanda. (Yat paramānandarūpo na bhavati sa niratiṣaya premaviṣayo na bhavati, Pañcadasī). Hence, to attain self-realisation, one has to go beyond the third stage of the samprajñāta samādhi. He has to make concentrated efforts to rise up to the asmitā stage which is the final stage of the concrete union or samprajñāta samādhi. By the time the asmitā stage is reached, the egosense that individualises a jīva, comes to an end; its cause, however, (in the form of mahattattva permeated with consciousness,) does not cease to be. By applying the triad of attention, concentration and meditation, the aspirant is capable of having a perceptual knowledge of the pure mahattattva and also of its distinction from consciousness which is the svārūpa of the aspirant. This is the stage which cannot be properly described in words. In this stage also, there will be some vr̥ttis of the form of jaḍa (unconscious) along with the Caitanyavr̥tti but there will be no awareness of what this jaḍaviṣaya is. Just as in the cases of some of our dreams, we can simply remember that we have dreamt of something but what this something is, is beyond our recollection, in the same manner, in this stage also, there is only the manifestation of the vr̥tti; the object of the vr̥tti is not known. It is because the object or the grāhyā is not manifested that there is no differentiation between grahitā, grahāṇa and grāhyā even though the intelligised intellect in the form of grahitā and vr̥tti in the form of grahāṇa are manifested. Vṛtti is no doubt manifested; even then we cannot describe it, because its object is not manifested. It appears as nirviṣayaka vr̥tti. It is because such vr̥tti is beyond the comprehension of
human beings that the Nyaya-vaisesika and Ramanuja have not admitted the existence of nirvisayaka jñana.

Asamprajñāta Samādhi.

Samprajñāta Samadhi is not the final stage of the svarūpa avasthāna of the puruṣa because in this stage, there is still the manifestation of consciousness through vṛttis. Manifestation of consciousness without vṛttis is what is described as svarūpa-pasthiti of the puruṣa in the sūtra “Tadā draṣṭuh svarūpe avasthānam”.

Hence the aspirant has to reach another stage of yoga which is known as asamprajñāta stage or the stage in which puruṣa is manifested without vṛttis. Such a manifestation of puruṣa is possible only when all vṛttis are stopped.

In the stage of samprajñāta samādhi, vṛttis annihilation starts and progresses step by step and finally it is completed in the asamprajñāta stage of samādhi. It is because all vṛttis are stopped in the asamprajñāta stage, that this stage is known as the stage of vṛttinirodha. Now, such a state, in which all vṛttis are stopped and consciousness is manifested without vṛttis, lasts (in the beginning) for a short duration. With the disappearance of all vṛttis, consciousness is manifested in its pure form: vivikta* condition is attained and snare of prakṛti is totally removed. This is the stage of jivanmukti. The jivanmukta has risen upto the stage of svarūpa avasthāna but this stage has not become firmly rooted as yet. Hence, the jivanmukta will have to make efforts to attain this svarūpa sthiti permanently. Vṛtti should not rise (even for a moment) either spontaneously, or by efforts. This is the first stage of asamprajñāta samadhi or the stage of jivanmukti according to Sāmkhya-yoga. How long this stage will continue will depend upon prārabdha karma.

When the asamprajñāta state or the nirvṛttika state will become steady and fixed, vṛttis will be stopped for ever. There will no more, be any grahaṇa and consequently the feeling of grahitā, grahaṇa, too, will come to end. Citta or buddhi in this stage, will stop functioning forever and so it will start

Vivikta—Differentiated.
contracting which will ultimately result in the merging of the citta in its causal substance (i.e. the gunas). So long as buddhi persists in its buddhi form (although it may be contracted to a considerable extent), the jīvanmukta will continue to live in this world: because there will still be the vital function due to the existence of the citta. As soon as citta gets merged in the gunas, the vital function too stops automatically and the yogi is separated forever from the body. This is the stage of videhamukti according to Sāmkhya-yoga.
CHAPTER IV

THEOLOGY

Meaning of Śāmkhya Atheism (Nirīśvaravāda):

The classical Śāmkhya represented by the Śāmkhya kārika, Śāmkhya Sūtra etc. is regarded as Nirīśvara Śāmkhya and it is held that there is no place for devotion and worship of God in the classical Śāmkhya.

It is, of course true, that the Śāmkhya School has not admitted God as the efficient and material cause of the world as has been done in the advaita vedānta. Even then, it is not proper to say that there is no scope for devotion and worship of God in the classical Śāmkhya. The term "Nirīśvara" really implies that according to classical Śāmkhya, there is no other conscious principle, besides the puruṣa. This puruṣa has been described in the upaniṣads as asaṁga. So to keep this upaniṣadic conception unimpaired, the classical Śāmkhya has not described puruṣa as the efficient and material cause of the world. (In the opinion of the Śāmkhya school the cause is bound to be changeable in nature). Although puruṣa has not been described as the cause of the world, still puruṣa is absolutely necessary for creation in the sense that Prakṛti becomes vitalised and fit for evolution due to the sannidhi of Puruṣa. Hence, the function of the advaitic God is, here, done by the Puruṣa. According to advaita vedānta, creative urge does not belong to Brahman in its pure form. It is the māyopādhika Brahman that really palpitates with the creative urge. The creative desire is a vr̥tti of māyā. The Śāmkhya view, if understood properly, is not very different from the view of the advaita vedānta. According to Śāmkhya, the creative desire may be supposed to arise in the cetanaviṣṭa Prakṛti.* Creation is the result of this creative urge. According to advaita vedānta also māyā is the real material cause of the world. It

* Prakṛti permeated with consciousness.
is because Saguṇa Brahman or God is the adhyakṣa* of māyā that He is said to participate in world-creation. The question, therefore arises, what is the meaning of this adhyakṣā in the advaita vedānta

Now, God, in the advaita vedānta, is consciousness, qualified or limited by samaṣṭi antahkaraṇa or māyā. Brahman, by accepting māyā or Samaṣṭi antahkaraṇa as a qualifying adjective (Viṣeṣaṇa) appears as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. It is because māyā becomes a viṣeṣaṇa or adjective of God that He is regarded as the adhyakṣa of māyā. Consciousness, qualified by samaṣṭi antahkaraṇa (samaṣṭi antahkaraṇa viṣeṣa caitanya) is the creator God. When māyā becomes simply a limiting adjunct (upādhi) of consciousness, the latter, then, appears as Īśvara sākṣi and serves as the steady revealer and steady background of creator God. This is the position of the advaita vedānta in regard to God.

In the philosophy of Sāmkhya, however, we find that consciousness of puruṣa reflects through samaṣṭi buddhi and thereby makes samaṣṭi buddhi its own avacchedaka. This consciousness can be compared with the Hiranyagarbha of the advaita vedānta. Hence, in the Sāmkhya too, consciousness can be regarded as the adhyakṣa of the buddhi tattva or samaṣṭi buddhi. When this samaṣṭi buddhi serves simply as a limiting adjunct of puruṣa caitanya, then the latter assumes, simply, the form of sākṣi. According to Sāmkhya, samaṣṭi buddhi or mahattattva possesses lordly powers (aśvarya). Hence, there is no harm if puruṣacaitanya, which has samaṣṭi buddhi as its avacchedaka, is accorded the place of God of the advaita vedānta. By worshipping such a God, the aspirant may be the possessor of many puruṣārthas except mokṣa or liberation.

Truly speaking, the aspirant who follows the course of Sāmkhya-Sādhanā, has to reach samaṣṭi buddhi by passing over vyāṣṭi buddhi (individual intellect). In the initial stage, he should realise that his consciousness, which is the revealer of

* Adhyakṣa—one who exercises supervision.
his body, is different from the body. Next, he should realise that his consciousness is also different from his sense-organs and the mind. Even when this type of realisation dawns upon the aspirant, he still feels that his consciousness is non-different from his ego-sense (ahaṁvṛtti) and the intellect. Hence, in this stage, also the aspirant thinks of himself as an individual. When, by means of samprajñāta samādhi, this ego-sense disappears, then the aspirant feels his non-difference from the Samaṣṭi buddhi: just as the worshipper of God of the advaita vedānta realises his identity with all jīvas, as soon as his feeling of individuality and separateness disappears, in the same manner the aspirant, who feels his non-difference from the Samaṣṭi buddhi only, experiences a sort of sāmyabhāva (sameness) with all things and beings of the world. God of the advaita vedānta is the yoni of the whole world: mahattattva of the Sāṁkhya too, is regarded as the seed of the whole world. After reaching the state of non-difference with samaṣṭi buddhi, the aspirant very easily passes on to the stage where he realises his distinction from the samaṣṭi buddhi and prakṛti. If Māyopādhika Caitanya of the advaita vedānta can be the object of devotion and worship, then the samaṣṭi buddhyavacchinna Caitanya of the Sāṁkhya too can inspire an aspirant with devotion and can very well serve as an object of his upāsanā.

It is true that Vacaspati Misra in his commentary on the Sāṁkhya Kārikā No. 56. has refuted the existence of God. In the first and the 5th chapters of the Sāṁkhya pravacana sūtra, too, we meet with refutation of the existence of God. But all these refutations simply indicate that in the opinion of the Sāṁkhya school, there is no conscious adhyakṣa* of prakṛti excepting puruṣa. The arguments as stated in sūtras of the 1st chapter of the Sāṁkhya pravacana bhāṣya, run as follows:—

(a) “On account of the non-proof of Īśvara”.

(b) “As Īśvara can be neither free, nor bound, nor be anything of a different character, there is no proof of his existence.”

* Supervisor.
(c) "If free from desires and attachment He cannot be the creator, and if bound, He must be as ignorant as we are. So, He cannot exist as the creator God".

(d) "The sacred texts, which speak of Īśvara are either glorifications of the free self or homages paid to one made perfect by yoga".

The above arguments may be summed up in the following manner.

God does not exist, for if He exists, he must be either bound or liberated. A bound spirit cannot be accepted as God because of his attachment with merit and demerit, nor can a freed soul be regarded as the creator God, as He would have no desire to act and create this manifold world. Hence, God cannot be admitted as the agent in the process of creation because of his liberated and non-attached nature. Nor can we say that God has undertaken the task of creating this universe disinterestedly for the good of his own creatures only. The world is so full of sins and sufferings that it cannot be said to be the creation of a good God who works only for the benefit of his own offsprings.

The 5th chapter contains some tenets, which when interpreted, give us the following view:

God is supposed to create the world of pleasures and pains for all living beings in accordance with the law of karma. The wrong doers are punished with pain and suffering but the doers of good deeds are blessed with pleasures. If this is so, then let karma alone become the agent of the products of action: what need is there of a creator God?

Here, it is clear from these arguments that the Sāṃkhya school is not in favour of recognizing any conscious principle as the cause of the world because consciousness cannot remain immutable if causality is ascribed to it. When puruṣa is capable of vitalising Samāṣṭi buddhi by Sannidhi only then where is the need for admitting another conscious principle as the efficient and material cause of the world? Puruṣa cannot be regarded as cause because puruṣa is an immutable principle.
The creative urge does not arise in pure puruṣa: This urge belongs to Samaṣṭi buddhi permeated with consciousness. Intelligised buddhi-tattva is actively and independently producing power in the form of aviveka. When the creative desire and also the creative activity belong to intelligised mahattattva, then there is no sense in describing puruṣa as the creator God. The word God stands for that conscious being who, of his own accord, becomes the material and the efficient cause of the world.

In the advaita vedānta too, it is a false Godhood (Īśvaratva) which has been ascribed to Brahman. The desire for creation and also the creative activity belong to Māyā, but these are superimposed on Brahma due to ajñāna. Brahman is regarded as world-cause only illusorily (vivarta kāraṇa). In other words, Brahman is cause in name only and not in actual fact. Of course, according to advaita vedānta, it is the mayopādhika Brahman who possesses lordly powers. Māyā, in the form of potential creative power belongs to God: so, in the advaita vedānta, mayopādhika Brahman is regarded as the creator God. The Sāmkhya school does not believe in vivarta vāda or the illusory modification of the cause in the form of the effect. In the opinion of the Sāmkhya, causality and mutability cannot be separated even in thought. Hence, in the Sāmkhya, lordly power, creative potentiality and creative activity etc. belong to intelligised Prakṛti. In the act of creation, Prakṛti is the primary principle (Pradhana). Prakṛti is the world-cause and puruṣa is asamga in the strict sense of the term.

Thus from the above discussion, it becomes clear that Sāmkhya too can claim to have a God in the form of intelligised mahattattva in a manner similar to that of the advaita vedānta where, too, Brahman by nature does not possess any aśvarya. Just as there is scope for Īśvara upāsanā in the advaita vedānta, in the same manner, there is scope for devotion and worship of God in the Sāmkhya. By means of upāsanā the follower of the Sāmkhya, too, will be able to enjoy the fruits prescribed by the scriptures.
In the case of avatāras like Ram, Krishna etc., there is no origination and destruction of consciousness: but these avatāras possess buddhis (the upādhis) which are endowed with highly developed moral excellences and extra-ordinary powers. It is because of their extra-ordinary buddhīsakti, that they are regarded as sarvajñā. There is better scope for admission of such avatāras in the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, than in the advaita vedānta. In the advaita vedānta, consciousness is one. Distinction in the forms of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara is due to differences in the upādhis whereas in the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, which admits plurality of selves, there is difference not only in the upādhis but also in the jivapuṣṭa or souls which become associated with the upādhis. These avatāras are the objects of love and worship.
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1. Sāṁkhya Kārikā.
2. Tattva Kaumudī with (Sarabodhini Tīka).
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BY

Dr. ANIMA SEN GUPTA

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This is indeed a rare book in English which should be preserved in all libraries for reference for the benefit of students of Philosophy. PRICE: Rs. 10/- only—Postage extra by V. P. P.

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ANANDA BAZAR PARIKHA, Calcutta: "The author's labour done with great sincerity and success is commendable."

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The author has treated the subject from the historical point of view in a manner in which nobody else seems to have done."

THE WEEKLY MAIL, Madras: "The author of this valuable work of research has given a brief and excellent exposition of the Sāṃkhya System of Philosophy. . . . It is a very valuable and well documented work."

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Dr. P. Nagraja Rao, M. A., D. Litt., Karnatak College, Dharwar: “It is a piece of admirable work, diligent and full of information and systematised. It is a fine addition to the existing literature on the Samkhya in English.”

Dr. A. G. Javadekar, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Baroda University: “I congratulate the authoress on her precious contribution to this subject of the evolution of Samkhya through a long period of Indian philosophical thought.”

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Dr. Brij Gopal Tewari, M. A., Ph. D., D. Litt., Head of the Dept. of Post graduate studies and Research in Philosophy, Jabalpur University: “I have been deeply impressed with the original line of approach, the keen insight, the profound learning, the lucid style, the grip over English, and the critical exposition of a classic theme, evinced in the "Evolution of the Samkhya School of Thought,"”
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Press Reviews And Selected Opinions.

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Dr. K. C. Varadachari, Tirupati.

“I appreciate greatly the work that is being done to restore Samkhyan mode of thought which was undoubtedly very influential in the vedantic period so as to be called almost the Jñana equivalent in the Gita. This will advance the knowledge of earlier Sāmkhya and provide also justification for calling Sāmkhya orthodox (astika and vaidika).”

The Pioneer, Lucknow.

“This is an original work produced for the first time to give an interpretation of the sadvidya of the Chandogya Upanisad from the Samkhya point of view.”

The Indian Nation, Patna.

“There is no doubt that philosophers will prize this extremely valuable research work as this is the first attempt to provide the philosophical world with a Samkhya version of Chandogya Upanisad....”

The Leader, Allahabad.

“This is a valuable research work. The presentation being in English, it is easy to appreciate her work which has
been developed on the basis of original Sanskrit texts.”

The Statesman, Calcutta.
“While admitting that the Upanisads are primarily advaitic, Dr. Sen Gupta sees the germs of Samkhya in their postulation of Prakṛti and guṇas. Where the advaitin sees Prakṛti as a mere manifestation of puruṣa, she prefers to stress the Prakritic consciousness....”

The Weekly Mail, Madras
“In this interesting booklet, Dr. Sen Gupta who is well-known for her earlier work on the evolution of Samkhyan thought interprets the sadvidya in the Chandogya Upanisad (Chapter Six) in terms of the Sāmkhya philosophy. The attempt has been worthwhile and if the author follows up this effort with studies in the other Upanishads it will be a work of lasting value.”

Dr. S. N. L. Srivastava, Vikram University.
“I have found the book very learned and interesting.”

Vedanta Kesari, Madras.
“We do hope the author will continue her study of other Upanisads with this approach and in the same methodical manner thereby enriching our knowledge of the Upanisadic lore.”

Hindustan Standard, Calcutta.
“To Dr. Anima Sen Gupta is due the honour of a pioneer. Her has been a bold attempt at interpreting the sadvidya from the Sāmkhya point of view.”

Nagpur Times, Nagpur.
“It is a work of great originality and erudition and is based on first hand study of the Sanskrit sources.”

Prof. Kedar Nath Ojha, Senior Professor of Philosophy. Govt. Sanskrit College, Patna.
“This novel production relating to the philosophy of the Samkhya school will certainly be an object of joy to those interested in Indian Philosophy.”

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“Dr. Anima Sen Gupta is one of the best scholars of Samkhya System in India and her work is very scholarly
and valuable. The book deserves the notice of the scholars in the field and it is expected that it will receive the recognition it deserves."

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"Dr. Anima Sen Gupta has undertaken to show that the Upanishads contain undoubtedly Samkhyan or dualistic trends and in her doctoral thesis mentioned this fact.

"We have here an original but none the less valuable work of critical understanding.

"Dr. Sen Gupta must be congratulated for her very contributory work to the subject of origins of Samkhya in the Upanishads."
No. 3.

“A Critical Study of the Philosophy of Ramanuja”

Rs. 20/-

The publication has been taken up by the well-known Oriental and Foreign publishers Messrs Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Gopal Mandir Lane, Varanasi. The book is a valuable contribution to the philosophy of Ramanuja as most of the objections generally found in the current works against Ramanuja have been exhaustively met in a manner which has probably not been done before. In fact, a comparative study of the philosophy of Ramanuja with other systems has been made. It will be of great help to those doing research on Ramanuja.

SELECTED OPINIONS

Prof. R. Ramanujachari, Dean, Faculty of Philosophy and Education, Annamalai University, who is an authority on Viśistādvaīta Vedānta, in a preface to the book writes inter alia:

“Dr. Anima Sen Gupta’s book is a lucid and authentic presentation of Viśistādvaīta Vedānta as expounded by Bhagavān Rāmānuja......In this excellent book, Dr. Anima Sen Gupta writes with sympathy, understanding, clarity and critical acumen. The distinctive features of Ramanuja’s philosophy have been faithfully presented. Her work is fully documented and is a very valuable addition to the books on Viśistādvaīta Siddhanta.”

Padmabhushan Knight Commander Darshanacharya Dr. B. L. Atreya, M. A., D. Lit., of Varanasi, in the course of a Foreword to the book says:

“It is indeed a work of extraordinary merit.

The author’s knowledge of the philosophy of Ramanuja is deep, exact and free from sectarian prejudice. Her approach to the treatment of the subject is not merely that of an expositor or commentator, but also that of a critical and comparative thinker. This volume is indeed a valuable addition to the literature on the philosophy of Ramanuja.”
The author Dr. Anima Sen Gupta is a young lady scholar, working as Reader in Philosophy at the Patna University. She has devoted herself to the study of Philosophy and has already published two pioneering works, namely, "The Evolution of Samkhya School of Thought" and "Chandogya Upanishad: Samkhya Point of View."

Dr. Sen Gupta is a very promising writer: she is bound to shine in the firmament of Indian thought.

*I congratulate her on this work which I consider as her first magnum opus to be followed by others.

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Prof. Olivier Lacombe, Professor of Comparative Philosophy, University of Paris, an authority on Śamkara and Ramanuja, in an appreciation of the book says: *inter alia.*

The author is a thorough thinker and her work does not read so easily. But her lucid mind knows how to express difficult matters in a clear and attractive way. With searching insight, she gets to the root of things and grasps the essentials of the vast Viśistādvaita synthesis.

She emphasises very aptly the organic, nay organicist character of Ramanuja's thought and shows that the keystone of the system is to be found in the body-to-soul relation: the whole world of sentient and insentient being is assumed in the unity of the God-head in the same way as the individual body is assumed in the unity of the individual soul.

*To sum up: Dr. Sen Gupta gives us a thorough, systematic and critical exposition of Viśistādvaita Vedānta. No important philosophical problem or issue of the doctrine is omitted. Her contribution is "critical and constructive." The work is original being based on the original Sanskrit texts of Ramanuja and also on account of the critical sympathy with which the author has explored the depths of her subject. We must be thankful indeed to Dr. Sen Gupta of this valuable and promising achievement.*

In a personal letter to the author, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says: "I have looked through the pages. You have done a valuable piece of work. It is a systematic exposition of the Philosophy of Ramanuja done with care and discrimination......You may dedicate the book to me."

The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi is to be commended for undertaking publication of such an important book which does full justice to the metaphysical and religious genius of Sri Bhasyakara, as the work is marked by an objective and rigorous approach. For the first time the book brings to light the essentially synthetic character of the philosophy of Ramanuja which has enabled this system to effect a happy reconciliation of Sastra and Jukti, Tattva, HitA and Purusarthadvaita and Advaita on the basis of Indian philosophical thought. There is no doubt that the book will attract the earnest attention of both Eastern and Western philosophers who are keenly interested in the philosophy of Ramanuja. The book will also be read and made use of by those persons who will be doing research work on Ramanuja.

The Leader: Allahabad, 11th June 1967.

The book has been dedicated to Dr. S. Radha-Krishnan who has described it “as a valuable piece of work and a systematic exposition of the philosophy of Ramanuja done with care and discrimination”. The author Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, a young lady scholar, has already established her reputation as a sound scholar of Indian philosophy. Her present work is original and gives a constructive interpretation of Ramanuja’s philosophy thereby maintaining a complete harmony with the original texts.

Hindu: Madras

“The book is a very praiseworthy addition to the growing literature on the subject. It is the outcome of deep study, proper understanding and accurate evaluation. The author’s qualification to deal with the subject is apparent from almost every page of the book.”

Sunday Standard

“Visishtadvaita has a complex and difficult philosophy. Dr. Sen Gupta throws herself into this with obvious zest and great competence.”

The Mail: Madras

Studies on Sri Ramanuja’s philosophy available to readers in English are not many and this handy volume is doubly welcome coming as it does from a Research Scholar of the Patna University who has specialised in the study of Indian philosophy. Whatever may be one’s individual view
on the different systems of philosophy, the educated mind enjoys the intellectual discussion and a reading of the book by all persons interested in Indian philosophy would amply repay perusal.

Mr. M. A. Ayyangar, Ex-Governor, Bihar:

"...I hope and trust the book will receive great appreciations amongst the learned men and will find a place in every Library and it will be adopted as a text book on Ramanuja's philosophy. I congratulate the author on the excellent work that she has produced and made Ramanuja better known in Northern India....She has done yeoman's service to the cause of Visistadvaita by discussing the various aspects of the system of philosophy in the book."
Book No. 4.

"Essays on Samkhya and other systems of Indian Philosophy"

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thinkers of India.......Her writings bear the stamp of
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authors.”

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*Embassy of the Federation Republic of Germany*

“The book ‘Essays on Sāṁkhya and other systems of
Indian Philosophy’ has in many ways clarified some of the
conceptions about Indian Philosophy on which I needed
further explanation. I should take this opportunity of con-
gratulating Dr. Sen Gupta for her painstaking manner in
which she has successfully tried to separate chaff from grain.”

**Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta**

“All the Essays are brilliantly written each maintain-
ing an original line of approach.”

**Vedanta Kesari, Madras**

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The Sunday Standard, Bombay

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Dr. G. Jacob: former Vice-Chancellor, Patna University

"Dr. Anima Sen Gupta's 'Essays on Samkhya and other systems of Indian Philosophy' has been appreciated in many quarters.....She is one of the most distinguished teachers of this University and personally I am proud of her attainment as a scholar and teacher of philosophy."

Dr. Sampurnanand: Ex-Governor, Rajasthan

"I congratulate you on this collection of essays. You deserve the particular thanks of all interested in Indian Philosophy for your attempt to rehabilitate Samkhya.....You have done well to add a chapter on Western and Eastern spiritual values of life and what might be called its supplement 'Spirituality: Indian and American: a reply.' This is a cogent reply to the frequently repeated charge that Indian Philosophy has no room in it for a consideration of ethical problems."

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"She is young in age but old in wisdom as philosophical works are not only immortal but also worth their weight in gold: she is sure to gain international status before long."

'The Mountain Path', a spiritual quarterly journal Edited by Mr. Arthur Osborne: July 1965 issue.

"Dr. Sen Gupta is well known to students of Indian Philosophy as an independent thinker who has specialised in
the Samkhya system and has written two valuable works, one on the Chandogya Upanishad from the Samkhya point of view and the other on the evolution of Samkhya thought.

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Hindusthan Standard, Calcutta

"Dr. Sen Gupta seems to have devoted her life entirely to philosophy.......with this author philosophy is nothing, if not an enterprise aiming at the creation of a New Man.......The collection of Essays under notice is a demonstration of the case with which one, though a female, can breathe in the thin air of metaphysics when the occasion arises... 'The evolution of Samkhya school of thought' and 'Chandogya Upanishad : Samkhya point of view' are the author's two valuable contributions to the contemporary philosophic thoughts of India."

The Astrological Magazine

".......Dr. Sen Gupta richly deserves the reputation which she has already earned for her scholarship and expository skill. There is a freshness of perspective, which characterises all her writings, and a keen, logical and chronological sense which is reflected in the strict sequence of thought, both in grasp and in exposition.......Here is a book which is sure to be welcomed by students of Indian Philosophy and by lovers of wisdom at all levels."

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Rs. 7.50

Dr. Sampurnananda, Ex-Governor of Rajasthan

"Dr. Anima Sen Gupta has for sometime been engaged in the task of what might be called the resurrection of Samkhya. . . . Every attempt of the kind made in this book brings us nearer to the vision of the Reality and to our understanding of it in so far as this is possible through the instrumentality of the intellect."

M. A. Ayyangar, Governor, Bihar, April 19, 1967:

"I am sure the book will be both interesting and instructive. I shall try to make the best use of it."

Prof. D. D. Vadekar, Poona, May 4, 1967

"I have glanced through the book and I feel very much impressed by it. Your specialisation in the Samkhya probably makes you the biggest living authority on this school. India and philosophical circles naturally feel very proud of you."

Pioneer, Lucknow, April 23, 1967

"The author Dr. Anima Sen Gupta is well known to the students of Indian Philosophy as a brilliant independent thinker. She has specialised in the Samkhya system and her earlier comprehensive work "The evolution on Samkhya school of thought" is a valuable and original contribution to the contemporary philosophic thought of India. . . . . in her present work she has tried to show how the Upanishads could be interpreted from the Samkhya point of view. Such an effort has never been made before."

Searchlight, Patna, April 16, 1967

"It is a very worthwhile venture since the germs of non-vedantic philosophies such as Samkhya and Yoga are to be found in the Upanishads. . . . Dr. Sen Gupta has contributed considerably to the understanding of Indian Philosophy by undertaking the task of integrating the teachings of different schools of philosophy."
The Statesman : May 7, 1967:

"Dr. Sen Gupta has made herself the champion and interpreter of the Sāmkhya viewpoint. In applying this to the Kathoupanishad she holds that it is not a materialistic school since it does not deny the existence of consciousness. Only it ascribes causality to Prakrti holding (as does Shankara also) that the immutability of Purusa excludes the possibility of causality”.

Tribune : Ambala, April 30, 1967:

"We have here an original work of critical understanding. Dr. Sen Gupta provides the philosophical world with a Sāmkhya version of Katho Upanishad. Modern advances in psychology prove that there are many psychological problems whose solutions seem to lie in the propositions postulated by Sāmkhya”.

The Weekly Mail : Madras, April 22, 1967:

"The present attempt is welcome for the light it sheds on the extent to which Dualism of the Sāmkhya allows itself to be modified at certain levels of its operation in order to find support in an important upanishad like the Katho”.

Vedanta Kesari : Madras, June 1967:

"Dr. Sen Gupta has been at work in this interesting study of the Upanishads with a view to trace the Sāmkhya content in their exposition. In the present work she takes select passages from the "Katha" and studies them in the light of the Sāmkhya though............it is a worthwhile study”.

Hindu Madras :

"One cannot but appreciate her serious and sincere study in the area of one of the major systems of Indian philosophy—Sāmkhya”.

Andra Jyoti :

".............We are all praise for the excellent work which Dr Anima Sen Gupta is doing. Every effort made to pull down the advaita from its high pedestal strengthens Sāmkhya, and it is welcome to us”.

Sunday Standard :

".............Dr. Anima Sen Gupta’s is a pioneer attempt in the field and she deserves to be congratulated”.

Deccan Herald :

".............The present work is certainly a valuable contribution to the study of Indian philosophy”.

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Press Report Dated 29th April, 1964

DR. ANIMA SEN GUPTA HONOURED

"Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, Reader in Philosophy, Patna University, and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Magadh Mahila College, Patna, has been awarded the title of "Vidya Vişarada" by His Holiness Sri Swami Venkateshwarananda, Head of the Arogya Asramam, Madras, popularly known as "Baba Bhawan". The title has been offered for her two pioneering works namely "The Evolution of Samkhya School of Thought" and "Chandogya Upanishad: Samkhya Point of View."

The title says: Founders award of "Vidya Vişarada" on this day of Tamil New Year and Telgu New Year (13th April 1964) goes to Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, Reader in Philosophy, Patna University, as she is a life-long student of philosophy, highly enlightened lady with divinity as heredity and capable of telling things in a telling way."

—"PIONEER" Lucknow
"A book that is shut is but a block"

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