



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IDEALISTIC THOUGHT OF INDIA



BY DR. P. T. RAJU
THOUGHT AND REALITY

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EDITED BY
W. R. INGE, L. P. JACKS
M. HIRIYANNA, E. A. BURTT
AND P. T. RAJU

RADHAKRISHNAN
Comparative Studies in Philosophy
Presented in Honour of his Sixtieth Birthday

IDEALISTIC THOUGHT OF INDIA

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TO
SWAMI VIDYARANYA
Saint, Philosopher, Scholar and Statesman
AND
MAHATMA GANDHI
Saint and Statesman
for whom the conditions of peace are
primary in political struggle

*

Philosophy without life corresponding is like a body without life.

I know that in this land of ours we have enough philosophy but little life. But I know also that the laws governing the conduct of man have still to be explored and the condition of exploration is imperative and unalterable.

Mahatma Gandhi (*Young India*, Vol. II,
p. 147, edited by Babu Rajendra Prasad)

Dharma is the innermost nature, the essence, the implicit truth of all things.

Rabindranath Tagore (*Sādhana*, p. 74)

Early Buddhism had implicit trust in an eternal right that dwells in the constitution of things. The structure of the universe is ethical. It is dharmadhātu.

S. Radhakrishnan (*Idealist View of Life*, p. 71)

एकमेवाद्वयं धर्मं संन्यासे खड्गधारणे विद्यानगरसाम्राज्यमन्त्रणे तन्त्रणेऽपि च ।
योपश्रुत्तान्वतिष्ठत् स विद्यारण्यमहामुनिः धर्मानुवर्तिराज्यस्य स्थापको
धर्मरक्षकः । धर्मब्रह्मैक्यसत्यत्ववादां तस्मै कृतिं मम अर्पयामि नमस्कृत्य
गंभीराय महात्मने ॥

अपि च

गान्धी गान्धीति सर्वत्र महात्मेति च कीर्तितः अहिंसाधर्मस्थित्वर्थं यद्य प्राणान्
समत्वजत् । यद्य दीनजनैः सर्वैः भावितः पितृवत् सदा यस्य सत्त्वापहं तन्त्रं
धर्मब्रह्मैक्यबोधकम् । शान्तितत्वानुयुक्तस्य राज्यधर्मस्य स्थापकः भारते
पुण्यभूमौ यः सोऽपि गृह्णातु मे कृतिम् ॥

*I offer this work of mine, expounding the identity of the Law and the
Brahman to that profound and great soul, Swami Vidyanaraya, the
protector of the Law, the founder of a kingdom on the Law, who saw
and obeyed the same Law in renunciation, in holding the sword, and in
advising and conducting the state affairs of the Kingdom of Vizianagar;
and to*

*Mahatma Gandhi who is everywhere glorified as Gandhi and Mahatma,
who sacrificed his life in establishing the Law of Ahimsa (non-injury), who
is looked up to as a father by the meek, who has founded a government on
the Law of Peace, and whose principle of Satyagraha (attachment to
Truth) preaches the same identity of the Law and the Brahman.*

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Valuable assistance has been received in writing this book from renowned scholars and thinkers, to whom grateful thanks and acknowledgements are due. Professor C. A. Campbell of the University of Glasgow read the first two chapters. Professor M. H. Fisch of the University of Illinois, one of the foremost philosopher-scholars of America, not only went through the proofs but also offered useful suggestions. Their criticisms were very useful. Dr. E. J. Thomas of Cambridge, one of the authorities on Buddhist philosophy, helped me by going through the chapters on Buddhism. Professor Hirianna of Mysore University, who is a well-known orthodox scholar and writer with profound appreciation of Western thought, went through the chapters on the Vedantic systems. Yet the author only is responsible for the plan of the work and for the interpretations and ideas expressed and developed in it. And the faults of the work also are his own.

Grateful acknowledgements are due to many others like the late Professor J. H. Muirhead, whose sympathies with views other than his own are very well known and who encouraged me to write this book, and Professor S. Radhakrishnan for going through the manuscript and for giving me similar encouragement.

The accounts of a few of the contemporary thinkers like Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Dr. Bhagavan Das, and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan were submitted to them in manuscript. They approved of my understanding and presentation of their views and a few changes are made according to their suggestions.

The sections on Mahatma Gandhi, Tagore and Iqbal were published as articles in *The Visvabharati Quarterly*, on Dr. Bhagavan Das in *The Hindustan Review*, on Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in *The Calcutta Review*, on Nagarjuna's conception of the Śūnya in *The Bhāratiya Vidyā*, on the Buddhist Conception of Dharma in *The Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, on the *bhedābheda* (identity-difference) systems in *The New Indian Antiquary*, on the schools of Vijñānabhikṣu and Śrī Caitanya and on the *Bhagavadgītā* in *The Vedanta Kesari*, and on Śrī Aurobindo in *The Andhra University Colleges Magazine*. I thank the respective editors for permitting me to reproduce the matter with a few Editions and alterations in this book.

I thank the University of Rajputana also for their contribution towards the publication.

20th December, 1952.
125 Lincoln Hall,
University of Illinois, Urbana.

P. T. R.

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
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INTRODUCTION

I

THE GENERAL AIM OF THE WORK

My purpose in writing this book is not merely to expound the different systems of thought, but also to formulate and help the solution of the problem of idealism. There has been no unanimity about the meaning of idealism even in the West. The word somehow or other has come into use, and very different systems are brought under it. Now in India, when attempts are made to translate important literature from the West into the Indian vernaculars, writers are at a loss to find a word corresponding exactly in meaning to the term idealism. But the difficulty is due to the fact that the idealistic systems in the West have not carried to the end their lines of argument. Problems have been suggested to the Indian thinkers in a way different from that in which they were suggested to the Western. And some problems not broached by the former have been formulated by the latter, and similarly those raised by the latter have not been seen by the former. Only when the problems omitted are added and the systems made complete, can their definite nature be understood. For this purpose, the idealistic systems of the West and of India seem to be complementary to each other. And in the light of each other, the general tendency of both idealistic traditions can be best comprehended.

It very often happens that, in certain countries and at certain times, a particular problem is felt to be all-important, and the rest are treated as only subsidiary. Certain ideas appear to be truisms in certain ages and countries. People rarely question them. They are presumed to be facts in the light of which others are judged. But in other ages and countries the light of reason is directed towards them, and they are scrutinized; while those that are questioned elsewhere and at other times recede to the background and are taken to be established facts. But to understand fully the significance of the prevalent ideas of any age, even the ideas in the background have to be lighted up by reason. This can be done by bringing together both sets of ideas and treating them as complementary to each other. Then the real structure of

thought in its fullness can be comprehended to an appreciable extent. Then can the actual drift of an idea be traced out. And the study of Indian idealism has particular value in this connection. In its light, the true nature of idealism is better grasped; the problem of idealism and its solution are thrown into greater relief.

II

NEED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PURE METAPHYSICS
IN INDIA

So far Indian philosophy as taught in our universities and colleges has been applied European metaphysics. Pure metaphysics by itself, without an admixture of religion, is not much known to the Indian. Except in the heterodox systems of Buddhism and Jainism, the reverence for authority like the *Śruti* is too strong. Fortunately, due to the elasticity of the Sanskrit language, absolutely opposed theories could be based upon the Upaniṣads; and free and independent thinking was made possible. Yet taking Indian philosophy including the heterodox systems as a whole, the modern philosophical study began with naïve and superficial comparisons. Points similar to those in the Western thought were sought after, and our ancient philosophers were complimented on having raised them. Metaphysics was treated as if it was a monopoly of the West; and, by applying its ideas, scholars attempted to estimate the value of Indian philosophy. The natural result has been the devaluation of Indian philosophical ideas. These attempts have missed the underlying spirit of Indian thought, the value of which was gauged from outside and not from within.

Indian philosophy, as pure philosophy, may be said to have begun its life with the work of Professor Radhakrishnan. He it is who tried successfully, for the first time, to disentangle the strands of pure metaphysics from the complex web of Indian philosophical writings. And much inspiration for this study has been derived from his works. But as more or less an historian of Indian philosophy, he did not adopt any single perspective into which he could throw all the systems. The work has to be undertaken by others, though the ground has been broken by him. Pure metaphysical ideas in Indian thought have to be thrown together into a perspective, their direction studied, and their possibilities understood. Indian philosophy has to be turned into

IS THERE NO IDEALISM IN INDIA?

metaphysics proper. Then will the strain and seriousness of original thinking appear, and Indian thought will develop from within. This development means the reaction of the Indian mind to contemporary problems. We can understand how the Indian mind will react to those problems only when we grasp its true nature. To do the latter, the ancient systems have to be marshalled in the light of the European. Certain developments that have already begun, have to be aligned with the old. Then only can new developments of any value be undertaken with seriousness. The present work, it is hoped, would be of use for such an enterprise.

Occasionally we hear of protests against new developments in Indian philosophy. It is maintained that in Indian thought the limit of all possible development is reached. In one sense, the protest has a justification: thought cannot go beyond the results of the Advaita. But the problems solved by the traditional Advaita are of a limited scope. It was mainly concerned with man and his salvation. The peculiar method with which it attempted to solve this problem was not applied to the problems that shape themselves about the affairs of this world. And if new developments are to take place, they are to take place in this wise. For this purpose, the reasoning of the Advaita has to be given a form that can be conveniently applied to other spheres. And this should be done not only with reference to the Advaita, but also with reference to other systems that claim to be comprehensive. Then will Indian philosophy appear as pure metaphysics, in the light of which sciences that pertain to social life may be developed.

III

IS THERE NO IDEALISM IN INDIA?

Some may doubt whether there is any idealism in Indian philosophy. We read of a European interpreter contending that Indian philosophy has no idealism, because its general tendency is to disbelieve in God as a personal creator. Even the Western idealists would be surprised at such a definition of idealism, and we may pass it over without any comment. Besides, even the Western idealists are not unanimous about the meaning of the word idealism. If we take any specific definition of idealism as given by a Western idealist, we may not find views corresponding to it in Indian thought. But then, even in Western philosophy a large

number of systems that have been called idealistic will no longer be covered by it. It would be futile, therefore, to adopt some ready-made definition of idealism, and begin the search for corresponding views in Indian philosophy. Instead, the general trend of all those systems that have been called idealisms in European philosophy has to be studied; and by examining further possible developments, it should be shown which Indian systems possess that tendency. The search for exact parallels may well be the task of an undergraduate student. But to understand the relations between systems from within requires wider study and deeper thought, which reveal not mere similarities between ideas but that certain systems are possible developments out of certain others. By discovering such relationships, we not merely compare the two idealistic traditions of the East and the West, but also understand the real nature of idealism itself.

For this purpose, the first two chapters are devoted to a discussion of the nature of idealism. No single definition of idealism is accepted. Many are taken into consideration and examined. The salient phases which idealism has assumed in the history of European philosophy have been touched upon, in order to describe the general direction of its growth. And by pointing out how it is possible to develop it further in that particular direction, it has been shown how some of the Indian systems fall in line with it.

The only question that would remain then is why that particular line of thinking should be called idealism. And the answer to it is that the Indian systems treated here are called idealistic, because their mode of thinking is in agreement with what is called idealism in Western thought. This is ultimately a question of terminology. And whether one agrees to call such systems idealistic or not, one should admit the usefulness of the presentation in a particular perspective of the Indian systems given here.

IV

THE AIM OF THE CONCLUSION

This book is therefore not merely meant for the European reader's information, but also for the Indian student of philosophy. Certain topics had therefore to be discussed which may be felt to be too familiar either by the one or the other. For instance, the section on the development of European idealism may be unnecessary for the European reader, but very necessary for the

INCLUSION OF CONTEMPORARY THINKERS

Indian in view of the prevalent misunderstanding of idealism in India. Further, it helps to show how my own thesis of the identity of the Brahman with the Dharma of Buddhism can be developed. India is a country that seeks to be a nation; it is necessary therefore to know how its mind is constituted. The interest that is taken in Indian philosophy so far is more or less antiquarian; and it is being gradually shoved into the museum of antiquities. The metaphysical significance of Indian philosophical concepts is very little appreciated. The mark of such an appreciation is the use made of them in the development of a world philosophy. But we have few instances of it. And where there has been such use, it has been more often than not a wrong use. Foreign interpretation of Indian philosophy has been closely connected with missionary activity; so the religious side of it is more familiar to the Western thinkers than the purely philosophical. The interpretation of Indian philosophy has been so far the reaction of the European mind to it. The Indian mind has practically been silent all the while. Only of late has it begun to stir with life, and to express its own reactions to the West. But this expression should take on a more serious and systematic form.

The metaphysical bent of the Indian mind has therefore to be exactly known. This book is an attempt to describe it. It is written not merely to remove the misconceptions about Indian philosophy, but also to contribute to the world's idealistic thought in general and to that of India's in particular. The author is therefore not satisfied with a mere presentation or exposition of systems, but gives an estimate of them in the Conclusion, in which he brings together the results of his discussion. The Conclusion therefore contains an unavoidable repetition of these results, which are not all familiar to Western philosophy. They may be implied by it or involved in its concepts. The author's wish is to make them explicit.

V

INCLUSION OF CONTEMPORARY THINKERS

This is the first work in which contemporary thinkers of India are discussed and criticized together. The author's task has been to gauge how Indian thought has been progressing, how the influence of Western thought on minds steeped with their own traditional ideas is affecting it, and what turns it is taking; so that we may judge what possible developments it may have.

The author has thought it proper to include idealistic elements from Islamic philosophy as well. Islam has turned idealist only after coming into contact with Aryan thought. Its idealism seems to be contained only in its Sufi doctrines. Though Sufism is old enough, the author has devoted a section to it only in the chapter on contemporary idealism. For Sufism is of foreign origin and entered India comparatively late. In India it has begun to exercise much influence on Indian Muslims and to a certain extent on the Hindu masses. The insertion of a section on it in a chapter on contemporary idealism therefore seemed appropriate.

Nothing of importance attaches to the order in which contemporary philosophers have been discussed. The order simply follows the order in which they have been studied by the author. The first chapter on contemporary idealism includes all those philosophers who are most known to the world. It begins with a discussion of the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi, because he is at least one of the greatest men of the world who try to put their ideas into immediate practice; and ends with the philosophy of Professor Radhakrishnan, because he is the greatest academical philosopher of modern India. About the others, the order is only a matter of convenience.

VI

USE OF PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM

As the main interest of the work is the development of Indian thought, ancient systems also are treated, because the trend of the present-day philosophical thinking can be well grasped only if its connections with the ancient are understood. It may probably be said that, as contemporary thought has been influenced by Western thought as well, the treatment of Western idealism too will not be out of place. In fact, two chapters are devoted to a treatment of the general nature of idealism as it is understood in the West. However, so far as the development of Indian philosophy is concerned, Western thought can only be a tributary that adds some momentum to the progress of the Indian. The latter by itself has been rich. But due to reasons mainly political, it was neglected and became stagnant. Contact with the West has given it new impetus. It has begun to move, and its movement has to be studied.

Such study naturally involves a criticism of contemporary thinkers. Criticism does not mean any disrespect to the philo-

TREATMENT OF THE ANCIENT SYSTEMS

sophers criticized. No philosophical writer can be expected to approach another with a blank mind. One's understanding of another is always a reaction, however sympathetic it may be. And sometimes the innermost depths of a philosopher's thought cannot be brought to light without consistent criticism. Hence, all contemporary philosophers, particularly the academical, have been critically examined. Only criticism enables us to see the gaps in argument, and can pave the way for further syntheses. And the criticism has been made for the author's own use. Respect for a philosopher does not always mean blind acceptance of his views.

Sometimes criticism is confused with condemnation. But there are criticisms and criticisms. There is criticism for the sake of criticism, which is silly and worthless. It may be excused if made by an undergraduate student, and that too within certain limits. It is not done in order to understand what the author says, but in order to refute whatever he says. Such criticism is puerile, if not malicious. In either case, it is meaningless, unless it is to damn a person. But there is criticism that is constructive, that attempts to clear up what the author says; and where there is disagreement, it tries to suggest a new solution. This criticism does not condemn a man, but brings to light whatever is of value in him. And generally the more a philosopher is studied, the more must he have been criticized; but the more he is studied, the more must he have been valued.

VII

TREATMENT OF THE ANCIENT SYSTEMS

Of the chapters devoted to the ancient systems, the Advaita gets one for itself, because of its peculiar development. Philosophically, it has more associations with Buddhism, which depended mainly on reason, than the other Vedāntic systems have. Some of the latter have been content with being simple monotheisms. In the Advaita, the relation between its final results on the one hand and the problems of truth, illusion, etc., on the other, are more closely and systematically established than in the others. The attempts of some of the other systems to establish them are imitations of it. Therefore, it is possible to disentangle better the metaphysical elements of its argument and present them in clearer light. Some of the other Vedāntic systems, like those of Vallabha, Vijñānabhikṣu, etc., are not developed fully.

Of the two chapters on Buddhism, the first is devoted to

tracing out the growth of the ideas of the Mahāyāna Buddhism in the Hīnayāna schools. It is not easy to say how many Mahāyāna schools there were in India. In China and Japan, a separate school has sprung up almost for each Mahāyāna work. Whether each of these schools is a continuation of a corresponding school in India it is difficult to decide. But the differences between these schools are not very great. They are only differences of emphasis. So the author thought it advisable to present the ideas of some of the important works separately, devoting to each a separate section.

Buddhism is a gradual growth, and is a good example to illustrate the change of realism into idealism. But a similar treatment is not possible of the Vedāntic systems. Realistic systems like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are not called Vedāntic, though they too claim the Upaniṣads as their authority. And they are not the forerunners of the Vedāntic idealisms. Logically we may trace some such relation; but chronologically there is none.

The real foundation of the Vedāntic systems is not the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, but the Upaniṣads. Yet the Upaniṣads do not contain any single system of philosophy. They are the basis of all the Vedāntic systems. Hence only a brief sketch of all the idealistic ideas contained in the Upaniṣads is given as one of the sections of the first chapter on Vedāntic idealism. The *Bhagavad-gītā* is often quoted by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, etc. But unlike the Upaniṣads, it is of a late origin, and constitutes a single work. It has therefore been found possible to attempt a somewhat systematic presentation of its ideas. Yet this is a difficult controversial task; for the advaitin, the viśiṣṭādvaitin, the dvaitādvaitin, and the dvaitin, all claim it as supporting their views. For this reason, an attempt is made to collect its ideas together without any bias, and see what kind of system they form. The author's feeling is that they agree most with the philosophy of Jīva-gosvāmi, that is, with the school of Caitanya—a feeling that renders support to the view that the *Bhagavad-gītā* is a work of the Bhāgavatas, a Vaiṣṇava sect. Because of its popularity, even the advocates of the other schools wrote commentaries on it, and attempted to demonstrate that it supported their own views.

Brief reference is made also to schools like that of Madhva, because, though dualistic or pluralistic, as monotheisms at least, they have an idealistic strain. But no reference is made to Jainism as it is far removed from all idealism. The Sāṅkhya practically is omitted, because it makes no effort to unify the concepts of

Prakṛti and Puruṣa. According to the Sāṅkhya, Prakṛti or insentient matter and Puruṣa or self are two independent entities, and creation is due to their contact. But it is not explained why and how they come into contact. Vijñānabhikṣu, commenting on the *Brahmasūtras* from the side of the Sāṅkhya, had to accept a personal God who was to effect the required contact. And by this acceptance, he deliberately differed from the Sāṅkhya, and even treated Puruṣa and Prakṛti as together constituting the *śakti* or energy of God. The Yoga system, in spite of its personal God, rarely brings into unity the three ideas of God, soul and matter. For this reason, it too has been left out.

VIII

Of late in India there has been a lot of talk about the uselessness of philosophy. It is said that the Indian mind has become passive because of too much philosophy. Now, one cannot say that the German nation is passive; but it has produced some of the greatest philosophers, and the output of philosophical literature in that country is one of the largest. Of late, some of the most revolutionary ideas originated from the Germans. Whether we accept them or not, we have to give them the credit due to the kind of work they have done. German philosophers like Hegel and Nietzsche were blamed for the last war. The ideas they disseminated became motive forces, and stirred the German nation into feverish activity. If philosophy is at the root of action in Germany, why should it be the cause of passivity in India?

It is not philosophy or metaphysics as such that is to blame, but the kind of philosophy or metaphysics. There is a philosophy that preaches action and another that preaches inaction. The differentiation between action and inaction is not new to India: it is discussed at length in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The reader will see that many of the contemporary philosophers have seen the difference and emphasized the need for a change of tone. Philosophy may supply more, but it must at least give us a plan for action. It is a superstructure reared on a plan of life, thought out in a certain age according to its requirements. It provides a basis for that plan by connecting it with the nature of reality, and thereby infuses confidence in the individual who wants to adopt that plan. If this conception of philosophy is true, then Mahatma

Gandhi is one of the greatest philosophers of India. The great stir of political life and the recent ferment of ideas are really his work. One has only to glance through the pages of *Young India* to see how many pages have been devoted to a discussion of philosophical and religious questions. Tilak, who is much more a man of action than Gandhi, is a philosopher in his own way. Devoid of their philosophy, their teachings would have appealed only to a few. Had a man without philosophy started the present political movement, it would have been dead in its very inception. It could hardly have spread. It would have been limited to a few directly connected with the political mechanism of the country. The complaint, therefore, should be, not against all philosophy, but against a particular kind of philosophy.

Really, there can be no conscious life without ideas. Sometimes ideas follow life: sometimes they lead it. It may be that now and then life may succumb under their burden. But such ideas must always be false. When thought becomes weak, it cannot carry its ideas, and gets confused. As it is the searchlight of life, life is misguided by weak thought and destroyed. The strength of thought lies in the vigour of life. Where life does not lose its adventurousness, thought advances with it, and the conflict of ideas is solved and inactivity put an end to. Life apart from thought is blind movement, and thought apart from life is a light that reveals nothing. The successes of unplanned life are lost as easily as they are won. Such successes are not life's achievements but its accidents. It can have no reason for claiming them as its own.

Rational living is impossible without philosophy. It is the gift of a very few to formulate their own philosophy. To the majority of mankind, their plan of life must be supplied ready-made. That is, a ready-made philosophy guides them. Ideas therefore have to be spread that suit the time and help life. And they cannot be isolated but connected. They form a system; and when the system is made rigorous, they become philosophy. The ideology of every age has a philosophy involved in it; and no age or country can be without a philosophy of its own.

But the question now is, which philosophy suits our country at this time? A suggestion has been made that the Vaiśeṣika system must now be popularized, because it is more materialistic than the Vedāntic systems. But it should be noted that no ancient philosophy as such will suit our present needs. First, it should be noted that to accept a particular system of philosophy because it meets

certain social needs is to subject philosophy to an external standard and to deprive it of its autonomy. Further, philosophy, like everything else that belongs to life, is a growth. Just as the garments of childhood do not suit youth, the Vaiśeṣika or any other ancient system as such will hardly suit us now. Elements may be borrowed from many; but they have to be assimilated, and our life has to arrange them according to its own needs. In fact, our contemporary thinkers have begun doing just this. They are sensitive to the shortcomings of our ancient philosophy, and are trying to make them up. Materialism is not necessary in order to preach against inaction. The reader will see how some of the contemporary thinkers are reconciling with idealism the necessity of the conquest of matter and not escape from it. Idealism has come to stay as the highest achievement of the world's thought. And any change in our ideas must be a change within it, and not in opposition to it. Concerning this point, most of the contemporary philosophers in India are adopting the right attitude. None can better glorify desire than Iqbal. And the conquest of matter preached by him and Aurobindo Ghose will surprise those who hold the complaisant notion that Indian philosophers preach other-worldliness and escape from material values. And yet both Iqbal and Aurobindo are idealists.

It is a general rule, therefore, that philosophy is a guide to life. The lives of only a few can guide philosophical thinking. They are those who are in constant touch with the innermost depths of life, who intuitively feel what is wanting in the ideas that have been so long directing men's actions. To do this is not given to the ordinary run of mankind. Those to whom it is given are the real leaders of men. Not that every academical philosopher is such a leader. It is to the systems of these academical philosophers that Hegel's assertion that philosophy, like Minerva's owl, starts on its flight when the evening shades of twilight have begun to fall, applies. It is the duty of philosophers to take stock of the ideas disseminated by the true leaders, systematize them, and give them a definite shape. The kind of work they do has its own value. It not only gives a definite form to those ideas, but also evaluates them. They are understood best through such work. Those ideas cover the whole of life as experienced at a time. So the philosophy of any time comprehends the whole of experience. It is not limited merely to the solution of the problem of the relation between God and man. A philosophy of this type is an

eternal need. Times change, and with them the importance of life's problems shifts. Philosophy therefore must be continually moving. It must guide life and be guided by it.

For having such a philosophy, Indian thought has to be so reconstructed as to be applicable to the problems of life. The systems and their ideas have to be arranged in such a way as to enable us to use the principles that run through them. These principles have to be made easily available for application to those problems of life to which they were not applied by our ancient philosophers. We shall then have comprehensive philosophical syntheses and developments of sciences in all spheres of social life. Then there would be no occasion for complaint against philosophy.

So far about the social side of philosophy. But as dealing with all aspects of our experience, it covers those phases also which are beyond the social. Religion, for instance, is not merely a social phenomenon, though there is a social side to it. So far as it is institutionalized, it has social importance. But institutionalized religion is only its external aspect. In its deeper aspect, it is a phase of the individual's experience, often incommunicable, not depending merely on prophets or saviours. The institutions left by them, or founded by their disciples, are its non-essentials. And this deeper individual aspect of religion also is studied by philosophy. Thus philosophy of religion studies both aspects. Our ancient philosophers devoted themselves more to the study of the individual side of religion than to that of the social.

Not only in religion but also in all other branches of experience, this distinction between the individual and the social aspects is to be found. We find it in moral, political, and economic life. Our ancient philosophers have said little or nothing on politics or economics; and their morality is individualistic, because they laid their main emphasis on the deeper aspect of religion, and treated morality as its hand-maid. The tone and temper of their teaching may not be much liked by contemporary men, whose interest is more in the social, political and economic uplift of the country. But by discouraging philosophy one would be encouraging thoughtlessness. We should demand of philosophy what it has so far not supplied us. To dismiss it altogether would be to lead a blind life. We should ask rather that philosophy should flood the whole of our experience with its light. We should say that if it wants the encouragement of society, it should think of the social problems and be useful to society. Society, of course, cannot do

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without philosophy; but it will appreciate only such philosophy as has some bearings on its life, and ignore that which is detrimental or indifferent to it.

IX

CRITICISM AS THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRESS

The present philosophical stagnation in India is due not only to the kind of philosophy taught and the discouragement given to it, but also to lack of fair and honest criticism. In philosophy criticism is the way of progress. It brings thought to bear on life, and life to bear on thought; and as life is a continual movement, philosophy would then be always on the march. So far, Indian philosophers are paying more attention to the interpretations of Indian systems than to developments out of them. And whenever a philosopher is criticized, he is criticized for interpreting a system or concept one way or another. The appreciation of the underlying philosophical ideas by themselves, apart from the question whether they are actually held by this or that teacher, is not attempted. And so philosophical progress has been slow. The interest appears antiquarian, and not philosophical in the strict sense. We seem to have no philosophy separate from ancient Indian history and culture. The impression is created that there can be no pure philosophy in India except the European.

And besides, some of the interpretations too are uninteresting. If Bergson formulated the idea of creative evolution, somebody here would rise and say that, in some ancient system, the idea has already been advocated. If General Smuts propounds the theory of Holism, someone here would interpret some system as that too. These attempts are not absolutely valueless. But they become uninteresting after a point. They generally miss the peculiar quality of Indian thought, which can be grasped only when presented as an internal development. If we want to infuse fresh life into Indian thought, it should be presented as a particular method, so that we may catch it and develop it further. Then shall we have pure philosophy; and philosophical criticism, besides mere criticism of interpretations, will commence.

X

TRADITION AND PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT

To a certain extent this procedure involves a break with tradition. But the break will not be complete, for the philosophical principles

of our ancient systems will be carried on. Only, we shall not show so much dependence on the *Śruti* or any other such text as our ancient philosophers did. We need not show any disrespect to those books, but our dependence on them will be less. Respect for tradition may be respect for a text, person, or thought. Of the three, respect for thought must certainly have the greatest value. What is of importance in a text is not the paper of which it is made, the ink with which it is written, or the words which are written, but the ideas that are expressed. Similarly, it is not the physical body of the teacher or the language he uses that is of chief importance, but the thoughts he wants to convey. When we get them out, all else is secondary. It is the study and examination of these thoughts that make for progress. Respect for tradition may be cultivated only so long as it does not become an impediment to progress.

But in one important sense this is a strengthening of tradition rather than its weakening. The principles of our traditional thought, now that they are made available in their pure form, can be applied to other spheres of our experience to which they have not hitherto been applied. This means a thoroughness in the establishment of our tradition rather than a break with it. This procedure organizes better our outlook, makes it more definite, and makes us feel our individuality more intensely. With such a philosophical support, we shall feel the presence of reality in every phase of our experience, and shall carry on our lives with confidence born of conviction. We shall not feel that our experiences are opposed to reality and are leading us away towards non-existence and ruin.

XI

NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT

A new synthesis in philosophy does not mean always the invention of a new argument or new result. There may be a few of the belief that originality in philosophy lies in the discovery of new arguments, and some of the belief that it lies in reaching astoundingly new results. But it is not so. Many in India have little respect for new arguments. The undertaking to discover them may be dishonest, if not childish. What the philosopher has to do is to trace out certain generalities in the intricate web of experience. Much depends on the way he marshals our experiences, on the point with which he starts, and the way he proceeds. Thereby

he may see some new significance in our experience, not noticed by others. Novelty, therefore, does not mean that the philosopher will not be an advaitin, a dvaitin, etc., but some new one. This misconception about originality in philosophy, prevalent among some in India, has to be cleared. Originality lies in the discovery of a new method of approach to our problems, and also in the application of some old methods or principles to some new problems. There is large scope for the latter kind of work in India, because our ancient philosophers left out such work, which may be done now. For this purpose, the underlying principles of our philosophy should be definitely grasped. The direction of our ancient thought should be carefully noted.

We get what we call moral philosophy, social philosophy, etc., when the metaphysical principle is reflected in our moral and social experience. The ancient use of the idea of God may or may not be retained. But the method of argument should be transferred. The use of the same method for interpreting all phases of our experience gives the latter a unity, and we shall have a philosophy comprehending the whole of it.

XII

Indian philosophy is neither socialistic nor individualistic. Even as religion, it did not identify itself either with the capitalist or the labourer. The Indian philosopher of ancient days had no vested interests. He belonged to that privileged class which possessed no property and was satisfied with the bare necessities of life. He had little contact with society. It was probably for this reason that he did not give a social or political philosophy. However, with his philosophy both the prince and the servant were satisfied. But times have changed; and such philosophers are very hard to find. The modern philosopher is forcibly dragged into the current of social life, in which politics and economics are playing more and more important roles. He can hardly remain a passive spectator of it now. His reflections therefore should not merely be confined to the relation between God and man, but cover that between man and society as well. It is not necessary that he should be a socialist or an imperialist. He may frame his own theory in the light of his traditions and modern examples. It should not be forgotten that Indian philosophy developed, so far

as this point is concerned, in an atmosphere different from that of the West. If a philosopher in future is a socialist or an imperialist, it is not because Indian philosophy favours this or that theory, but because he chooses it of his own accord.

XIII

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS: NEED FOR HARD FACT

In the Andhra province of India, there is a belief current that, unless a *tārkika* or logician becomes a Vedāntin, he will turn mad. For a long time the author wondered what the significance of that belief could be, and took it to be a superstition and prejudice against the study of Nyāya, with which pure logic was more closely associated than with the Vedānta. But after further study of, and reflection upon, the philosophical systems with their logics, the feeling dawned upon him that it was not impossible to argue endlessly and defend every philosophical position if we depended merely on logic. It is possible for the disputants to disagree even about logic, for every system of philosophy has its own logic. Every logic has its metaphysical presuppositions, the elaboration of which is its philosophy. Logic and metaphysics presuppose each other. But then, if every logic has its own metaphysics and every metaphysics has its own logic, is the truth which the philosophers try to give us different for each? The bewildering variety of philosophical systems takes away the ground from under our feet. If the fact is one, how can there be many truths? A mere logician, therefore, unable to find a hard fact on which to stand, doubts everything, feels that anything can be logically defended, and, in the despair that naturally follows such an attitude, may turn mad. The aim of the Vedānta is the direct presentation of reality, of a hard fact the truth of which cannot be disputed.

Even in European philosophy the number of systems is confusing. What one system regards as a brute fact another rejects as a construction. There seems to be no unanimity about the basis of philosophical constructions. Self is regarded as hard fact by some, matter by others. Some say that the basic fact is history, and this history is identified with mind itself; so that, though the word has gained in meaning, its use has become uncommon. Philosophical thinking appears as if it accomplished only one thing, namely, the removal of bias in favour of anything as an established fact. Nothing for it seems to be axiomatic. The truth

FINAL RESULT OF INDIAN IDEALISTIC THOUGHT


of even the idea of coherence has been called in question by some. Every determinate conception has been doubted. If it is upheld by some, it has been rejected by others; so much so that, in India, Śankara, for similar reasons, questioned the validity of *tarka* or argument itself. We have Buddhistic and Vedāntic systems, the upholders of each of which quarrel with the rest. But is there nothing common to all? Is there no reality which is the same for all? Whatever be their starting-points, however they may differ in their method, both the Buddhistic and the Vedāntic traditions agree in saying that reality is a That and not a What, it is beyond all determinations and so indescribable. As it is a That and not a What, no dispute is possible over it. For over which What are we to dispute? Reality is not a What, and there is no occasion for dispute over it. Old gods have vanished at the touch of wary philosophy. But philosophy must have failed in its duty if, in place of false gods, it has not substituted the true one. What seem facts vanish at its sight. But without some fact to stand on, we land in despair. The Indian idealistic systems furnish an example of how the factuality of an ultimate reality which can never be doubted can be established. The reader will notice, in spite of numerous differences of view, all these systems are directed towards the same point like radii towards the centre.

XIV

FINAL RESULT OF INDIAN IDEALISTIC THOUGHT

To anticipate the result reached by Indian idealistic thought, it is the final and absolute identity of the universal and the particular, law and thing, norm and existence, reality and value, and the ideal and the actual. This has been reached in slightly different ways by the different systems; and some of them, if they have not actually reached such a result, have tended towards it. It is not merely the result that is interesting, but also the methods by which the different systems reached it or tended to reach it. Dharma¹ is the central conception of Indian idealism, and any philosophy that makes it or tends to make it its central conception is idealistic.

¹ See ch. vi, Section XVII for a discussion of the meaning of Dharma.



IDEALISM AS A THEORY OF REALITY

I

DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE WORD IDEALISM

The nature of idealism even in European thought is so indefinite that we can hardly get a fixed notion of it from the writings of the idealists themselves. It is generally thought to be opposed to realism, but is often put as an antithesis to naturalism and sometimes to actualism. Again, the empirical tendency is often regarded as antagonistic to idealism, but the latter crept into empirical philosophy as well, so that the tendency opposed to empiricism is designated rationalism and not idealism. Idealism thus seems to be positively related to both empiricism and rationalism; and it is interesting to note that empiricism, which started with the presupposition that the objects experienced are real and are there,¹ comes to the conclusion that they are not real but are our ideas.² But when cornered again, empiricism treats these ideas not as ours but as God's;³ and thus the objects regain their reality for us. This passing and repassing of idealism and realism into each other do not allow us to treat them as fixed theories with clear demarcations. Consequently, it seems that, for a philosophy which is comprehensive, to be called either realism or idealism is in principle precluded, if the antagonism between the two is to be retained. Sometimes, a scientist would call any speculation that leads him a little beyond where he is prepared to go idealism; so that any attempt at metaphysics is dubbed idealism. In the history of European philosophy, idealism assumed various forms which often appear to be conflicting and contradictory; and therefore if one of them is called idealism, the rest may have to be treated as opposed to idealism. In contemporary philosophy, idealism claims as its followers quite rival philosophers. In view of these difficulties, some like Professor

¹ Cp. Bacon.

² Cp. the subjective idealism of Berkeley.

³ Cp. the theological idealism of Berkeley.

John Mackenzie declare that idealism is rather a tendency than a fixed theory.

II

DEFINITIONS OF IDEALISM

But whether a tendency or a theory, can we define it? In the current edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Professor J. H. Muirhead writes that idealism is "a term generally used for the attitude of mind which is prone to represent things in an imaginative light and to lay emphasis exclusively or primarily on abstract perfection. . . . With this meaning the philosophical use of the term has nothing in common." "Idealism as a philosophical doctrine conceives of knowledge as a process or experience in which the factors of subject and object stand in relation of entire interdependence on each other as warp and woof." According to this definition, neither the subject nor the object is real by itself; either is real only in relation to the other. But this definition is rather the definition of what idealism ought to be according to Professor Muirhead. It does not cover idealism of the Platonic type, or subjective idealism or mentalism.

In the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, E. Troeltsch writes: "Idealism is a term of varied application. As 'personal idealism' it may denote a view of human life in which all utilitarian and eudaemonistic considerations are subordinated to duty and to objective ideals of culture and in which the mind asserts its superiority in the face of all determinism and materialism." "Again, the term may be applied generally to philosophical and religious systems, to views of the universe and poetic creations, in which the world is represented as being dominated by spiritual ends of a moral, religious, and aesthetic character." "But these rather general applications of the word have no place in scientific terminology." Finally, he gives his view that idealism "denotes the metaphysical theory which, as regards the primary and most certain datum of experience, takes its stand upon consciousness and its contents." Here the definition is given not in terms of the inseparable relation between subject and object, but more or less in terms of the subject alone. In Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, it is written: "In metaphysics: any theory which maintains the universe to be throughout the work and embodiment of reason and mind. In epistemology, the view which holds, in opposition to Realism . . . that the reality of the external

world is its perceptibility." The division here into metaphysical and epistemological definitions is not final. There is a way, as will be shown later, from epistemology to metaphysics, if not again back to epistemology from metaphysics. So far as the metaphysical definition goes, reality for idealism is identical with reason, which is an aspect of mind, though it be the Supreme Mind and not the finite with its imperfect reason. The epistemological definition, unlike that of Professor Muirhead's, is given in terms of pure subjectivism. Again, in Calderwood's *Vocabulary of Philosophy*, we read that idealism "is a theory of 'external existence' of the Universe as a whole. The former (idealism) makes our knowledge of the external indirect by restricting our knowledge to ideas. *Realism* is the term for all the theories of external perception which maintain immediate knowledge of the external. Idealism treats the so-called 'external' as the objectifying of the subjective conditions. In its more extended application, idealism is a unifying of reality; a representation of the totality of being as explained under a single conception, or according to an ideal scheme." That is, in epistemology idealism, as opposed to realism, proceeds with the presumption that we directly know only our ideas, and that the existence of the external objects is simply constructed. But metaphysically, it is what views the world as a totality or whole, and explains it in terms of a single principle or concept or according to a preconceived scheme. That is, the principle of its explanation is what is not obtained from experience itself but is *a priori*, and experience is explained in its terms. But one apparent defect of this definition is that, in its extended application, it may cover what is generally called materialism even.

We may now consider the definitions given by some philosophers in their works. Professor N. K. Smith writes: "The meanings attached to the term 'idealism' are so numerous and so conflicting that I have found it convenient to use it in a very wide sense, as covering all those philosophies which agree in maintaining that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe."¹ But referring to this definition, Dr. Ewing observes: "But if we were to use it thus now, its denotation would be far wider than is usually the case, for we should have to describe all believers of God as idealists."² He adds that all philosophers who call

¹ *Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge*, p. 1.

² *Idealism: A Critical Survey*, p. 5.

themselves idealists, "have in common the view that there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience, and this might perhaps be taken as the definition of idealism, provided we regard thinking as a part of experience and do not imply by 'experience' passivity, and provided we include under experience not only human experience but the so-called 'Absolute Experience' or the experience of a God such as Berkeley postulates."¹ Recognizing that this definition of idealism is narrow, for it is almost the same as that of Professor Muirhead, he remarks: "To frame a formula which would include all the shades of opinion that have, more often than not, been described as idealist and exclude all those that have been, more often than not, described as realist is almost and quite beyond human capacity."² Professor Cunningham writes: "The question: What is idealism? has been frequently asked, but a satisfactory answer is not readily to be had . . . idealism shows itself to be a very complicated doctrine. To provide a general formula which applies to all the types . . . is not easy, but it is apparently not impossible; and I wish briefly to indicate what such a formula seems to me to be."³ "To the question: What is idealism? our answer, then, would seem to be: Idealism is that philosophical doctrine which undertakes to show that, in order to think matter or the spatio-temporal order of events in its ultimate nature, we are logically compelled to think mind or spirit along with it as in some sense foundational to it."⁴ This is Professor Muirhead's definition given in different words. Professor Hocking defines idealism as "the philosophy which holds that reality is of the nature of mind."⁵ Professor Patrick says: "Idealism, too, is changing its character and losing its harsher aspects. Its subjectivistic forms are harder and harder to maintain. Many now call themselves idealists who claim that the world is neither dependent on mind, nor the product of mind, nor the manifestation of the absolute, nor made of mind-stuff. It is sufficient to say that spiritual values are the significant things, that is, the real things in the Universe, and that perhaps they have a determining voice in its ordering."⁶ This conception is the same as that of Professor N. K. Smith's. Still, Patrick tries to give us a definition and says: "Just as materialism considers the

¹ *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy*, p. 337.

² *Idealism: A Critical Survey*, p. 5.

³ *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy*, p. 337.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

⁵ *Types of Philosophy*, p. 247.

⁶ *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. vii.

Universe as grounded and rooted in matter, or in physical energy, so idealism considers it as grounded in mind."¹

Some time ago, an attempt was made to fix the precise difference between idealism and realism in the pages of the *Journal of Philosophy*. The controversy was started by Professor J. B. Pratt; and the occasion was the publication of *Contemporary Idealism in America*, in which some philosophers who up till then were treated in many philosophical circles as realists and as opposed to idealism, were included as idealists; and Professor Pratt's previous ideas about idealism and realism were disturbed. Up to 1905 or 1910, he tells us, idealism was understood to be a sort of mentalism. In support, he quotes from Paulsen's *Introduction to Philosophy*, that idealism is to be defined by its teaching that "mental processes constitute reality;"² and from Bradley, that "sentient experience is reality and what is not this is not real"; and from Royce, that "that is real which finally presents in a complete experience the whole meaning of a System of Ideas." He further says: "I remember Royce telling me personally that in his opinion the *esse est percipi* must form an aspect of every genuine idealism—though of course the *percipi* need not refer to finite thinkers but requires only the Absolute Mind." But later, after Moore's "Refutation of Idealism"³ and Perry's "Ego-centric Predicament"⁴ were published, the idealists themselves began refuting the *esse est percipi*, and giving new definitions of idealism. They maintain that idealism is not opposed to realism; that the chief characteristic of idealism is giving the highest place to the self; that it interprets the world in terms of human values; or that it treats the world as an organic whole, and so forth. Professor Pratt finds these views mutually contradictory; nay, on reading *Contemporary Idealism in America*, he finds that some of its contributors contradict themselves in the same essay. For example, Professor Bakewell starts with the declaration that idealism is not mentalism, but asserts later: "We come nearest to a description of reality when we regard it as a community of self-active creative spirits." Professor Pratt wonders whether this is not mentalism.

In answer to Professor Pratt, Professor Clifford Barrett distinguishes between subjective and objective idealism, and calls the

¹ *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. vii.

² *Journal of Philosophy*, p. 169 (March 30, 1933).

³ *Mind*, 1903.

⁴ *Journal of Philosophy*, 1910.

latter speculative idealism. He maintains that it has nothing to do with mentalism and its *esse est percipi*; and that it depends upon "the cosmic significance of value, coherence, and systematic completeness."¹ He concludes that idealism and realism are not identical and yet are not opposed. "The realist in epistemology is an idealist in metaphysics, it would seem to the writer, when he regards himself as being a genuine organic part of the real world, and when he regards that world as intelligible and looks upon the constitutive principles of his spiritual life as existing in and expressing its order." But then Pratt finds it difficult to understand how such speculative idealism can be different from realism or at least theistic realism.² He raises the question about what the idealist means by the phrases "systematic whole" and "organic whole"; for idealism must mean, on Barrett's view, any theory which holds that reality is a systematic and organic whole. Pratt writes: "I can think of three meanings any one of which might quite properly be intended. One would be the Roycean interpretation—Reality is the content (or object) of one Absolute conscious mind. A second possible meaning would be this: Every part of reality logically implies every other part: every entity and every event could be deduced from the remaining facts about the universe, and from the fundamental logical structure of the Whole, without the aid of any empirical facts or observed sequences, but by the necessary laws of thought and with strictly *a priori* necessity. A third interpretation of the 'organic unity' of the world would be that every part of reality is related to every other part in various ways, but what entities are to exist and what events are to happen and what specific relations are to obtain between them, is not determined by *a priori* logical relations and it is to be learned (if at all) by experience." He contends that speculative idealism cannot mean the first, as that is obviously mentalism; it cannot mean the second, for "to say that the world of existence, of physics and biology, of history and of personal experience, is a world completely ruled by *a priori* logic is at the best the expression of a pious hope," and is hardly philosophy. But in its third meaning, Pratt continues, speculative idealism is simply realism, and is not opposed even to naturalism. For, pronounced realists like Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, Sellars, and Strong hold the same view. He considers the view of Professor Cunningham as given in *Contemporary Idealism in America*, that

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, pp. 673 ff. (December, 1933).

² *Ibid.*

"speculative idealism differs from naturalism in that it resolves matter into a system within which mind or spirit is held to be of basal logical significance," and points out that the idealistic argument *a contingentia mundi*, which alone, for Cunningham, succeeds in proving the idealistic position, "does not prove . . . the proposition which was presented as the distinguishing feature of speculative idealism as contrasted with naturalism. Nothing is said in the whole discussion of this argument to show that matter necessarily has 'an implicative relationship to mind or spirit in any sense which naturalism would deny.'" The argument is: Whatever is contingent implies something absolute; everything in the world is contingent, and so depends upon an absolute. But this absolute may be the God of many realists, who admit that the creation appears purposeful and meaningful.

For Hegel every philosophy is idealism. He says: "The ideality of the finite is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every genuine philosophy is idealism." "The proposition that the finite is of ideal nature constitutes idealism. In philosophy idealism consists of nothing else than the recognition that the finite has no veritable being. Essentially every philosophy is idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far it is actually carried through. This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion equally with philosophy refuses to recognize in finitude a veritable being, or something ultimate and absolute, or non-positd, uncreated and eternal. The opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy is therefore without meaning. A philosophy which should ascribe to finite Determinate Being as such, veritable, ultimate, and absolute being, would not deserve the name of philosophy: the principles of old and new philosophies such as water, matter, or thoughts, universals, are of ideal nature, not things such as we find them immediately, that is, in their sensuous isolation."¹ That is, every principle of philosophy, whether it be matter, motion, cause or anything else, is not that object itself, but the idea of the object. But this implies its finitude, for so long as there is the difference between the idea and the object, the object is finite and is ideal. So the reason for calling every philosophy idealism is not merely that the principle of every philosophy is an idea, but also that every finite is ideal. The ideality of the finite is ultimately the principle of all idealism.

Croce writes: "But if philosophy is by its logical nature pure

¹ Hegel's *Science of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 168, English translation.

concept or idea, every philosophy, to whatever result it may attain, and whatever may be its errors, is in its essential character and deepest tendency *idealism*. This has been recognized by philosophers of the most different and antagonistic views (for example, by Hegel and by Herbart). It should be taught as truth to those who are ignorant of it and those who have forgotten it should be reminded of it. Determinism negates end and affirms the cause; but the cause which it posits as its principle, is not this or that cause, but the idea of cause. Materialism negates thought and affirms matter; but not this or that matter, which composes this or that body, but the idea of matter. . . ."¹ For Croce, as for Hegel, every philosophy is thus idealism, because it explains the world in terms of the idea of something. Even materialism would be idealism, because it explains the world in terms of the idea or concept of matter.

While Hegel and Croce maintain that all genuine philosophy is idealism, philosophers are not wanting who hold the opposite view, namely, that all philosophy is realism. J. S. Haldane writes: "Since philosophy is our ultimate interpretation of reality, every philosophy must claim to be realistic."² Every philosophy is an attempt to find out the true reality. Its aim is not to avoid reality and grasp the fictitious and imaginary; it is a search for reality, and is therefore realism.

III

IDEALISM AND REALISM

Consequently, if the realist asks the idealist to define idealism in order to point out that he has no genuine theory of his own to be called idealism, the idealist may as well question the realist: What is realism? and show that he has no distinct philosophy of his own to be called realism. The controversy carried on in the *Journal of Philosophy* between the realists and the idealists is interesting in that it shows that the two groups, however they might have started in the history of thought, are meeting. Bosanquet can write a book, *The Meetings of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, in which he points out how the highest idealism and the rankest realism arrive at the same or similar conclusions. The realist would find the task of defining his position not less difficult than the idealist his own. For there is not one realism but many,

¹ *Logic*, p. 266, English translation.

² *The Sciences and Philosophy*, p. 258.

and they have differences of view on almost every point. Whitehead, who maintains that feeling is the stuff of the world and that the world is an organic whole, and James, who accepts humanism or the theory that human values are the clue to the understanding of the universe, claim to be realists. But the doctrines of both these thinkers are central to the systems of many idealists. The truth seems to be that the lines of thought that are regarded as peculiar to both idealism and realism, have almost worked themselves out, trying to emphasize their differences for a long time. But the time has arrived when they can no longer ignore the incompleteness of their speculations, and have to incorporate what is contained in the other systems—when each becomes the other. I maintained elsewhere that whatever be the starting-point of any philosophy, if it tries to be comprehensive and just to reality, which it claims to explain, and to its method of explanation, it must become absolutism.¹ No wonder that Pratt doubts whether the speculative idealist is not a realist and perhaps, we may add, whether he, a realist, has not been unwittingly a speculative idealist all along. Professor J. H. Muirhead, in his Foreword to *Thought and Reality*, tells us that the distinction between idealism and realism “has been wearing thin of late and perhaps had better be dropped now that it has served its purpose.” The distinction between many other rival theories has been wearing thin of late. Materialism, for example, is no longer maintained in its old form, nor is its rival theory spiritualism. The conflict between the two seems to lie only between the starting-points. If matter really contains the promise and potency of life and mind, or if mind really contains the promise and potency of matter and life, then neither matter nor mind is ordinary matter or mind which are opposed to each other. If matter is really to be the fundamental principle of the universe, then it must be matter as we generally understand it plus life and mind; similarly, mind as the fundamental principle of the universe, must be mind as we understand it plus life and matter. And there is no real difference between $A + B + C$ and $C + B + A$. The value of both is the same. There is difference only between the starting-points; but when all the necessary elements are included, the results are identical. One may call the first starting-point matter, and another may call the second mind. The quarrel between the two is due to the emotional associations of the words.

¹ “Opposite Approaches to Absolutism,” *The Vedanta Kesari*, 1939.

But when such a result is reached, we should look back on our method and make necessary modifications in it. If reality is pure matter as we generally understand it, then mechanism may hold true. But if matter potentially contains life and mind within it, mechanism must be pervaded by organic unity and freedom. Otherwise, how can pure mechanism give rise to the two? It is the presupposition of mechanism that nothing can come out of nothing. If we apply even this principle to the relation between mechanism, freedom, and teleology, we shall find that mechanism is by itself inadequate. To treat mechanism, teleology, and freedom as independent, may be useful so far as the treatment of some special sciences is concerned. But philosophically, the position is inadmissible. When we find that the three corresponding objects are interrelated in the world, our reason cannot rest satisfied without understanding the relation between the three methods. And this demand of reason is fair too. When, in the light of the results, changes are introduced into the methods also, even rival systems of philosophy approach each other.

IV

IDEALISM TO BE STUDIED IN ITS GROWTH

It would not be of much use for our purpose, therefore, to merely borrow the definition of idealism from someone. A number of seemingly conflicting definitions may be true and imply each other. We have ourselves to decide which is the most comprehensive, and which follow from it. Sometimes a question may be raised at some stage of our enquiry, where it should not have been raised; but if allowed and answered, a particular conception of idealism will prove true. Notice has to be taken of such cases. As the controversy referred to must have shown, the highest truth reached by what is called an idealism may be found acceptable to those who style themselves the enemies of idealism; in which case, we have to understand how idealism in its primitive form developed into the new. We have, again, to ask what shape it would take, if developed farther on the lines it has been so far developed and made more consistent, and how the original problem with which the tradition started would look in the light of the new results. Whatever be the starting-point, no phase of our experience should be neglected or left out from our speculation. Otherwise, our philosophy would be too narrow and one-

sided, and its systematic nature would be destroyed by what is left out. The impact of the latter upon it will let loose contradictions, which would gradually dissipate the whole system. That is why idealism in the course of its development recognized one fact after another, brought forward in criticism by its opponents, and incorporated them into its system. We have to understand how this has been accomplished, and how the result reached affects its original principles and presuppositions.

V

ETYMOLOGICAL MEANING OF IDEALISM

Even to answer the questions: When can idealism appear in the history of thought? What are the conditions of its appearance?, we have to know what is meant by idealism. But as what is called idealism assumed many phases, the conditions of each differing from those of others, we shall be moving in a circle if we take idealism in any one of its phases, and treat its conditions as the conditions of idealism in general. There seems to be, therefore, no other recourse than beginning our enquiry with the help of etymology, though it cannot be of use all through our enquiry.

It is said that the word idealism is derived from two words, *idea* and *ideal*. Almost all idealist philosophers reject idealism as the theory that advocates some abstract impracticable ideal, as it has nothing to do with philosophy. Some like Calderwood accept that idealism, in its widest sense, interprets the universe in terms of some ideal scheme, that is, in terms of perfection. But in fact, every philosophy has its ideal and an ideal scheme of explanation, its standard of explanation, and has therefore to be called idealism in this sense. For example, Bradley and Bosanquet use coherence or organic unity as the standard of truth; but, as Pratt tells us, some realists like Alexander also use it, and for that reason have to be called idealists. And Croce's contention that every philosophy in view of its using an idea as its principle of explanation, is idealism, may have to be accepted as well. But then even materialism would be idealism, and it would be unnecessary to know what idealism is. But suppose the materialist admits that his principle is not matter itself but the idea of matter, and is prepared to accept all the implications of that admission; that is, if he admits that the principle of philosophy is always a concept, which belongs to reason or thought, and so reason or thought or that to which

reason or thought belongs is the basic philosophical principle, he will naturally be an idealist. What is therefore required in order to be an idealist is not merely an explanation in terms of an ideal scheme prepared beforehand, but the readiness to make it consistent with facts and at the same time with itself, that is, the readiness to modify it in face of facts and make its application thoroughgoing without the fear of following wherever the argument leads.

Let us see what Alexander does. He starts with space-time as the matrix of the world, and maintains that matter, life, mind, deity, etc., are qualities that emerge out of it. Evidently, he tries to understand the higher in terms of the lower. But when the question is raised: How can pure life-less space-time be the source of mind, life and deity?, we may have to attribute to space-time properties which we do not usually associate with it. And when the attribution is made, it ceases to be ordinary space-time. Alexander has objection to start with spirit, for the reason that pure spirit cannot out of itself produce matter. Scientific reason works only in terms of causality; and that cannot be understood if the start is made with spirit. But is the same reason satisfied if the start is made with space-time? And when once the start is made, is not our idea of space-time to be modified so as to include the ideas of life and mind as well? Pure space-time, even if there were such, would never change into something else; it is only our idea of space-time that can be changed. And this change in our idea may lead to any result, the final result being absolutism. But when this change is introduced into our idea, can it still be the original idea? If the realist is prepared to solve this question satisfactorily, he has to turn idealist. For reality would then be such as to comprise within itself matter, life, mind, etc., in some intimate union. As it must be continuous with mind as with other things, and as the essential nature of mind is consciousness, reality must somehow be conscious also. Is the realist prepared to accept this conclusion? Even if we apply the concept of evolution to our philosophical principle, our contention stands. For if space-time does not contain the higher qualities potentially within itself, these qualities cannot come out of it. We may not hold the box-within-a-box theory. But whatever be the nature of this potentiality, if it is there, space-time is not pure space-time. And if it possesses the freedom of creation and foresight, it can hardly be different from mind.

Hence, though idealism is not to be identified with sentimentalism, in it as a philosophical theory, the concept of the ideal plays the decisive part. Every monism would then be idealism, provided it is all-inclusive and its principle is adequate to explain the world. The principle of philosophy which is at first an idea, turns out on examination to be an ideal. But this ideal is not what we understand generally by the word, namely, an ideal which we set before ourselves as something to be realized but unrealizable. Idealism has nothing to do with an Ought-to-be that never is. The ideal must, at the same time, be treated as the real, as the truly existent, and as lying at the very root of the phenomenal world. Only then can it satisfy the demands of scientific reason; only then can it be a principle of explanation. If it is only an object of wish or pious hope, it can never claim to be a rational principle which can be employed in interpreting our experience. Hence it is not only necessary for the idealist to be ready to modify his ideal scheme in face of facts and to follow wherever the argument leads; he must also assert that the ideal reality is existent, it is the root of the phenomenal world.

The word idea also has its share in the formation of the term idealism, especially that kind of idealism which is often called subjective idealism and epistemological idealism. By Hegel and Croce every philosophy is called idealism for the reason that its principle is an idea. But this idea is also an ideal, and an ideal scheme in terms of which the world is understood. So in this definition, we may say, what we call Platonic idealism and subjective idealism are blended. And it must be so; because the mind of which the philosophical principle is an idea, is the transcendental mind and not the finite mind, though this transcendental mind is treated by Croce as immanent in our experience as history. However, idea, as purely mental, plays the decisive part only in epistemological idealism. And this is so called, because, according to it, the subject, in distinction from the object, is the real, and every object is an idea of the perceiving subject. Though we find few supporters of this view in this extreme form—for if the object is an idea of the mind, it would be different for the different subjects, and what we call the common world, the identity and the continuity of objects, and even the possibility of our knowledge of objects, cannot be explained—the theory that the objects are the ideas of a Supreme Mind finds many supporters. This is called theological idealism or theistic idealism, as the Supreme

Mind is identified with God. It is also called objective idealism, because, though the objects are ideas, they are the ideas of God or the Absolute, and retain their objectivity, so far as the finite perceiving subject is concerned. In its extreme form, the theory is sometimes called subjectivism, pan-egoism, pan-psychism, and mentalism. The latter two names are sometimes given to that theory according to which, though the object is different from the subject, it is regarded as being made of the same stuff as that of mind.

VI

FORMS OF IDEALISM IN THE HISTORY OF
EUROPEAN THOUGHT

Plato's philosophy is an idealism of the ideals, and not of ideas in the sense of mental states. He uses the term ideas also, and tells us that they only, as contrasted with physical things, are real. But his ideas are patterns or standards for the things of sense. The idea of man is the ideal man, and the idea of horse is the ideal horse. They are also called concepts or forms. Reality, for Plato, is a system of these ideals, all interconnected by the supreme ideal of the Good. Plato did not conceive of subjectivism or mentalism, though the germs of the theory were not wanting in the philosophy of the Sophists who preceded him. Their principle, man is the measure of all things, was interpreted in an extremely solipsistic sense, and led to the scepticism of Pyrrho, according to which our knowledge could never be certain and we could never be certain even of the truth of the sceptical principle that our knowledge can never be certain. Of course, even Plato's ideas may be interpreted as the ideas of human thought; and, though they are given cosmic significance, the thought of them is after all the thought of the finite individual. Yet they are not ideas in the sense of mental states but norms or standards, though one may call them the constructions of the human mind. But Plato did not treat them as subjective but as having their existence in some heavenly sphere, though he could not have been unconscious of the subjectivistic tendencies in the Sophistic teachings.

Though the concept of *nous* or mind was discovered as early as Anaxagoras, Greek philosophy in general displays very few subjectivistic tendencies. The hylozoists made practically no distinction between mind and matter. We find some emphasis on mind in Anaxagoras, the Sophists, and the last Greek schools. Even

this emphasis is more on the individual than on mind as such. The interest of Greek philosophy in its highest developments was, on the whole, mainly ethical and it is natural that human values play the determining role in the Greek interpretation of the universe. Burt writes: "That the scientific philosophy of the Greeks, with all its sublime passion for the very truth of things, arrived in its turn at an exalted philosophy of man, might be due to the circumstances insisted upon by some historians of thought, that the zenith of Greek metaphysics was attained quite consciously through the extension, to the physical realm, of concepts and methods already found helpful in dealing with personal and social situations."¹ Consequently, the interpretation must be spiritualistic. And as thought does not appear without some felt conflict in the process of life, ethical conflict in some form must have been felt by the Greeks. Yet the conflict between the spirit and its surroundings was not exactly that between mind and matter. It was rather between the human and the non-human. The spiritual, for Plato, was what could be interpreted in terms of the Good; and, on the whole, his thought cannot be treated as mentalism.

Towards the end of Greek philosophy we find the conflict between the human spirit and its surroundings intensified. Professor Erdmann writes: "The discrepancy between the subjective and objective elements continually increases after Aristotle's time, and leads, by reason of separation of the factors combined in Plato and continually reunited in Aristotle, to the generation of one-sided tendencies."² But, he adds, "what is merely decay from the point of view of Greek philosophy, appears also as progress from that of the world's history." The systems that appear at that time "formulate the dissension and the inner misery of mankind before the entry of Christianity."³ "Because the times have become Roman, there must be substituted for a philosophy which, in true Hellenic fashion, represents the whole as prior to its parts, and consists of speculative devotion to the universal reason, one in which the isolated subject receives absolute value, and never quite loses himself in any cause, but always considers also his own relation to it."⁴ Then appeared the systems of the Epicureans with their atomistic psychology preaching the pleasure of the individual, of the Stoics advocating independence from nature,

¹ *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, p. 12.

² *History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 180. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 181. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

and of the Sceptics teaching that the individual subject was shut up within himself and so could not have certain knowledge of the external world. The immediate and naïve belief of the early Greek that he was permeated by the spirit of the universal was no longer held.

The advent of Christianity did not lessen this conflict which was, on the other hand, aggravated. The attitude of Christianity towards the world and its values was obviously negative; it preached that the true place of the soul of man was the Kingdom of God but not the world of nature. Man should abhor the flesh and all that belongs to it; the human body is only a tabernacle, which the soul has to quit one time or another. The object of man's interest became more and more subjective; he became more and more soul-centred, and treated the world as alien. We may therefore say that Christianity in this respect fulfilled and completed what Greek philosophy towards its end began. The Medieval philosophy widened the cleft not only between human and universal reason, but also between man and nature, to such an extent that human reason as we find it in Descartes could not be sure of anything but of itself. The Protestant Reformation added further strength to this tendency by emphasizing reliance upon the light of the individual's conscience. In this respect, Erdmann tells us, even the Renaissance, reputed to be the revival of Hellenic culture, tended to bring to the forefront the mind of the individual. He writes: "However much the so-called Renaissance is distinguished from all other medieval phenomena, it has nevertheless a purely medieval character, something as the period of the Roman Empire belongs to antiquity in spite of its contrast to the earlier forms of the latter. What makes it a feature, and a very characteristic one, in the physiognomy of the Middle Ages, is the individualism, which has hardly ever been so prevalent as just when the object of general enthusiasm was that antiquity which invariably sunk the individual either in the nation or the State."¹

Thus, at the time of the beginnings of modern philosophy, the mind of man found itself in strong opposition to both God and the world. This is exactly the chief condition for the appearance of idealism as mentalism or subjectivism. The approach to an understanding of the universe was made neither from the side of pure being as in Greek philosophy nor from the side of God as in

¹ *History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 595 fol.

medieval philosophy, but from the side of the human mind. Descartes could be certain of nothing save his own mind. The distinction he drew between mind and matter was so sharp that it gave rise to the problem how mind could know matter at all, which was so disparate from it. For knowledge is possible only of things with which mind can come into contact; but between things which have nothing in common contact is impossible. On the Continent, this problem led to the formulation of the doctrine of Occasionalism, according to which indirect contact was established between mind and matter through the instrumentality of God. God was thus the *deus ex machina* resorted to for solving a problem made insoluble. Even then the difficulty was only pushed back, not solved. For the problem took on a new form: How can God make a material event an occasion for a corresponding mental event in knowledge? What is His relation to matter on the one hand, and to mind on the other? In the question, How can there be any connection between matter which is unconscious and God who is a spirit? we see the old problem again.

However, the inevitable result of the bifurcation of reality into mind and matter was the theory that mind could know only what was mental, that is, its own ideas. This was definitely stated by Locke in England. And any understanding or construction of reality could be effected only from the side of mind and its ideas. The standpoint or, for some at least, the starting-point, had become subjective. Still, we do not have as yet pure subjective idealism, according to which the whole world could be nothing but the subject and its ideas. Matter was still thought of as existing external to mind, and the ideas, though they belonged to mind, were ideas about material things. They were reflections or copies of the latter. What are called the representative theory of perception and the correspondence theory of truth were the result of Locke's theory of knowledge.¹ According to these theories, every idea represents a physical object external to mind, and is true when it corresponds to the object, false when it does not. But Berkeley, coming after Locke, found that matter was allowed to exist only by convention; for if we know only our ideas how could we have known that there was something called matter outside our minds? Further, how can there be any correspondence between ideas, which are mental, and matter, which is uncon-

¹ There are other interpretations of Locke, but most of the historians of philosophy adopt this interpretation.

scious? He therefore dispensed with matter, and maintained that objects were just our ideas. For an object to exist is to be the idea of a mind—a view that has become famous as the principle *esse est percipi*. In this principle we have subjective idealism unalloyed or, as it is sometimes called, Berkeleyan idealism. It is this idealism which Moore and Perry refuted in their famous articles, and which most of the contemporary idealists disavowed, to the great surprise of the realists.

But Berkeley could not stop at this point. He had to explain the objective world in terms of ideas. Locke, before Berkeley, defined idea as "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks."¹ And Descartes, before him, says: "I hold that there is no other difference between the mind and its ideas than between a piece of wax and the diverse figures which it can receive."² Descartes uses the word idea definitely in the sense of mental state, though Locke's meaning is rather indefinite. However, as Berkeley dispenses with matter altogether and therefore, along with it, the external reference of ideas, his ideas must consequently be subjective. But then, the distinction had to be made between ideas which were treated as objects and ideas which were merely imaginary. Hence, in his later speculations, Berkeley held that what we called objects were not our subjective ideas, but ideas in the mind of God. This theory is known as theistic or theological idealism. Berkeley thus tried to save the subjectivity of the objects by transferring them from the finite to the infinite mind. For the finite mind, they remain objects.

Thus was the attempt made to understand the world from the side of the finite subject and his ideas. These ideas are not like those of Plato ideal essences or standards. They are decidedly mental in existence: they are what belong to mind. For Hume, who came after Berkeley, they are faint copies of impressions we receive of things. For Kant, as we shall see, they created the problem, How can ideas which are subjective correspond to objects which are physical and objective? So though attempts are made in contemporary philosophy, especially by the critical realists, to interpret Locke's ideas as essences which stand midway between physical things and mind, the general understanding of the age was in favour of treating them as mental. But then, the problem became keen, how to pass from the subject to the object.

¹ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 15. (Edited by Pringle-Pattison.)

² *Op. cit.* Quoted as a footnote.

Spinoza was dissatisfied with the dualism of Descartes, and wanted to include mind and matter under one term Substance, which he identified with God. Mind and matter ceased to be two opposed substances, and became the attributes of the same substance, God. Consequently, both mind and matter were explained by Spinoza in terms of substance and attributes. In spite of the great heights reached by Spinoza in speculative monism, his explanation could not satisfy an age that reached an inwardness of spirit, in which mind was conceded not only its rights but also supremacy over matter. The thought of the age was mind-centric. This is what Hegel means when he protests against Spinozism, saying that its fundamental concept should have been that of spirit, not of substance. Substance is pure unity or pure being, which is inactive and not free, whereas in spirit we find activity, diversity and freedom. In it, we see diversity in unity and unity in diversity. It is the only concept which can comprehend the diversity which the phenomenal world exhibits, and the unity which philosophy requires. Naturally, we have the reaction against Spinozism in Leibnitz's theory of monads, wherein each monad is treated as a mind that grasps from its own standpoint the whole macrocosm as a single unity. The stuff of the universe is mental, that is, monads; and what we call physical matter is only monads as they appear to our imperfect thought, for perception is only imperfect thought. But as the whole universe is represented by each monad from its own point of view, there is nothing external to the monad; its knowledge of the world is the knowledge of its own internal structure. The monad is therefore treated as windowless. If perfect, it is fully conscious of itself, and so of the whole world. And as its own nature is reason, the world becomes a system of innate ideas. Rationalism and mentalism seemed to have reached their zenith in Leibnitz's philosophy. The explanation of the world in terms of mind and its ideas seems to have been carried to an extreme. This is Leibnitzian idealism, which is also pluralism; for the monads are independent of each other, and God is only one of the monads.¹

The difference between the Berkeleyan and Leibnitzian idealism is that Berkeley was not a rationalist and did not advocate the theory of innate ideas. At the most, we may say that, for Berkeley, the objective world can become a system of innate ideas in the

¹ However, God is regarded as conceiving all the possible worlds, an idea inconsistent with this view.

mind of only God, but not of man; for he holds that the *esse* of the world of physical objects is the *percipi* in God's mind. But the God of Berkeley is not a spirit among spirits, but occupies the privileged position of having the whole world as an idea.

Again, there was dissatisfaction with the ambitious rationalism of Leibnitz. The empirical tendency to believe in a world external to ourselves was puzzled and disconcerted by his rationalism, especially in solving the problems of God, freedom and immortality; and the need was felt to understand the bounds of human reason. The same problem was raised by Locke in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*; but his empirical bias and pronounced opposition to rationalism prevented him from seeing the full implications of his own argument and the truth underlying the rival theory; and the credit of having gone further and deeper into the problem went to Kant. The starting-point of Kant was rather subjective; for the recognition of the distinction of mind both from God and matter has come to stay once for all in the history of European philosophy, and this is a recognition which, once made, can never be denied. Yet because of the bias towards the belief in an external world, Kant started with a provisional dualism of subject and object, and raised afresh the question, How can our ideas, which are subjective, be true of things which are objective? Which ideas are true and which not? Why is our knowledge of mathematics and physics certain, but not our knowledge of God, soul and immortality? What are the limits within which our understanding can be certain of its achievements? As a solution, he advocated the theory that the things are constructs, according to the forms of sensibility and understanding supplied by the mind, of sensations produced in it by things-in-themselves, which are unknowable. Thus between the mind and the thing-in-itself there appeared the phenomenal object, which is a combination of sensations and forms of sensibility and understanding, both sensations and understanding belonging to the mind. The phenomenal object was thus explained in terms of mind and its ideas; and scope was given to some critics for identifying the theory with subjectivism or mentalism. But Kant was really elusive for them; for he distinguished between the finite or the empirical self and the infinite or transcendental self, and maintained that the activity by which the phenomenal object was constructed was the activity of the transcendental self, which thus occupied a position similar to that

of God in Berkeley. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant has a long polemic against idealism of the Berkeleyan type. His own idealism is called critical idealism, in which the start is made with the act of experience as an indivisible concrete unity, critically examined in order to bring to light its presuppositions. Of course, that this is the starting-point of critical philosophy is known later, and the problem was actually given to Kant by the assurance of mind only. Because of the felt opposition between the mind and its object, even in Kant's philosophy the start is actually made with the mind; that is, the mind starts with the certainty of itself and enquires how it can be certain of the objects it knows. Of course, this sort of subjectivism is common to all philosophies of the modern period, even to realisms, though there may be a few, like Russell, who think that the doubt of Descartes may be extended to the doubter himself. But though the certainty of mind is there in the starting-point of Kant, the dualism too of subject and object is there; and Kant enquired critically the presuppositions of the subject's ideas being true of the object, which is alien to them. The thing-in-itself and the noumenal self became a sort of limiting concepts, which had to be postulated in order to explain our experience. The activity of the transcendental object in producing sensations, and that of the transcendental subject in supplying the forms, are shown to be presupposed in our experience. The provisional dualism has given place to another dualism; and subjectivism loses its bad odour when it is seen that the subject here is not the ordinary mind. Only because of the current philosophical usage did Kant start as he did. He thus cleared the way for the solution of the problems left unsolved by Berkeley and Occasionalism; and whether his solution is successful or not, we see that at least it is more definitely and concretely formulated. The transcendental self or God is the presupposition of our experience, both of the finite self and the object. It is through its activity that the phenomenal object is constructed. Its activity through us is spontaneous and involuntary like the workings of our heart. God's activity is thus brought closer to us; and we can understand better one of the tenets of Occasionalism, namely, that we partake of the knowledge of God and so can know objects through Him. Even Berkeley's contention that the physical things are ideas in the mind of God is more clear to us.

Idealism of the Platonic type also is to be found in Kant's philosophy. Kant distinguished between the forms of sensation,

the forms or categories of understanding, and the forms or Ideas of Reason. The first are space and time; and as mathematics is based on both these forms and as both belong to our mind, our knowledge of mathematics is certain. The second are substance, cause, etc.; and as these are the foundational concepts of natural science and at the same time belong to our mind, our ideas of the world of nature can be true. And for the application of both kinds of forms we have the material given as our sensations. But when we come to the Ideas of Reason, we find a different situation. These ideas are, for Kant, the world as an object, the self, and God. But none of these is given to us in sensation; and the forms of either sensation or understanding cannot be applied to them. So we cannot understand their nature, and solve questions like whether the world has a cause, whether the self is mortal, and whether God exists. But then can our philosophy do without these Ideas? It cannot; for criticism of our experience reveals that they are presupposed by it. Any understanding of our experience is impossible without them. Kant therefore calls them regulative ideas, that is, ideas without which our experience cannot be systematically understood. He advises us not to treat them, like the forms of sensibility and of understanding, as constitutive of our experience. These three Ideas he compares to Platonic forms. Like these latter, Kant's Ideas are never given to us in sense; yet only in the light of those Ideas can we understand our experience. The Idea of God is that of an all-inclusive spirit, whose understanding is intuitive as well. And according to many interpreters who want to treat Kant's philosophy as a rounded system, in this intuitive understanding the two limiting concepts, the transcendental object and the transcendental subject, are brought into unity.¹ Even the dualism of the two transcendental entities is now overcome. Though Kant has been able to explain why the objects we see correspond to the ideas we have of them by saying that the physical object is a construct of sensations with the help of the forms of sensibility and understanding; he raised the old problem in a new form, Why do sensations conform to these forms? Why does the transcendental object produce sensations that agree with the forms supplied by the transcendental subject? If the sensations already contain these forms, there is no need of bringing them under these forms;

¹ Cp. Caird: *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II, pp. 14-22. Some interpreters do not accept this view.

if, on the other hand, they do not contain these forms, how can two entities which are alien to each other conform to each other? Only if the understanding, which supplies these forms, also produces the corresponding sensations in the same act, can the conformity be explained. That is, ultimately, what produces the sensations must be the same as what supplies the forms. Unless the two are unified, explanation is impossible. God is that unity, and His understanding is an intuitive understanding. Yet, as God is acting through us as the transcendental self, what we call *our* sensations also conform to what we call *our* forms. God, intuitive understanding, and the transcendental self become practically synonyms; they are the ideal in terms of which alone our experience can be understood, just as, according to Plato, the phenomenal things can be understood only in the light of the Ideas.

We here see how what started as epistemological idealism in Berkeley and Descartes could take on a form of the Platonic in Kant. As Plato maintained that a physical horse, for example, could be explained in terms of an ideal horse, Kant holds that our ordinary experience can be understood only in terms of the ideal experience of God. Though Kant is unwilling to concede that this ideal experience is constitutive of ours, he tells us that it is the latter's presupposition. But Plato declared that it was the ideal alone which was real and existent, while the object of our perceptions was only a shadowy copy. The ideal was full being; but the sensible object had being only in so far as it approached the ideal: the rest of it was non-being. We find, in Kant, the drive of epistemological idealism towards absolutism, which was not left unnoticed by subsequent philosophers. The rift, in the human mind, between the intuitive understanding of God and the separated faculties of sensation and understanding, could not be allowed to remain in practical philosophy. Morality implies that any duty is binding on man only if it can be accomplished by him; or, in Kant's terms, "Thou shalt" implies "Thou canst." Where the implication does not obtain, the moral law is not binding. Practical activity consists in producing modifications in external nature; and if the latter is regarded as alien to practical reason, which gives us the moral commands, they will have no binding force. But as they are all really binding upon us, we have to say that there is really no opposition between nature, in which pure determinism rules, and practical reason, which credits the individual with freedom, as without freedom there can be no

moral responsibility. That is, the activity of what we call the intuitive understanding of God, which produces sensations according to its own forms, must be recognized as operating even within us and as constituting our experience.

This was the line of thinking adopted by Fichte, the great German patriot philosopher. He said that the Ego, which was the same as reason, posited the Non-ego, which was the world of nature, as the sphere of its activity. That is, nature is created by the Ego in order to realize its moral ideal in it. Hence, nature conforms to reason, as it is created to serve the ends of the Ego. This philosophy is really ethical idealism, though often it is called subjective idealism for the reason that Fichte used the word Ego for the ultimate reality. But he denies that this Ego is the individual self, and maintains that it is really the unity of the finite subject and the object. It is what Kant calls the noumenal self or the transcendental subject accredited with intuitive understanding. In Fichte's philosophy, this Ego is not merely a regulative idea as in Kant, not even a limiting concept, but the basic principle of his system, and constitutes the world. It is easy for us to see how Fichte arrived at the idea that this Ego included, within itself, both the subject and the object. In Kant's intuitive understanding of God, who is finally identified with the transcendental subject, understanding creates the sensations in conformity to its forms. Consequently, the objects so created must be its productions. The transcendental object, which is said to produce the sensations, is now identified with the transcendental subject itself. The line of thought tending towards the identification of the transcendental object with the transcendental subject, is present in Kant himself. And Fichte, with his keen intellect and moral enthusiasm, found that the solution of the ethical problem lay there. He therefore dismissed the thing-in-itself, and started with the transcendental subject or the Ego.

Schelling, coming after Fichte, felt that the opposition between mind and nature, found even in Fichte, was still too much. If nature is really a product of the Absolute Ego, it must be more than merely what is opposed to the Ego, an impediment which the Ego tries to overcome by its practical activity. Schelling therefore showed how nature came to realize itself as spirit in

* This is according to Caird. N. K. Smith thinks that Caird's identification of the intuitive understanding with creative understanding is illegitimate. However, Kant's system can be made thorough only by such identification. See Smith's *Commentary*, p. 468, footnote.

man through a process of dialectical evolution, and maintained that both nature and mind were completely identical in the Ego, which was the Absolute. Hegel felt dissatisfied with this philosophy of pure identity, and understood that the Absolute was an identity in difference of both subject and object, and the distinction between the two could not be lost in it. Schelling's philosophy is really absolutism, though he himself calls it transcendental idealism, while the name absolutism is generally associated with Hegel. But in truth both are absolute idealists. Yet Hegel holds that this Absolute not only transcends our experience but is also immanent in it. However, idealism in Europe is regarded as having reached the highest of its speculative heights in Hegel; and he really tried to work out his principles most consistently in their detail. Mind, from which philosophy approached reality, has been transformed, sublimated, and identified with God. Meanwhile, philosophy of religion made its appearance, rationalized the idea of God, and identified him with the Absolute of philosophy. Epistemological idealism has become, and remains Platonic idealism. And Platonic idealism, on the other hand, has become absolutism.

Though mind or self was treated as the basic principle of explanation by the post-Kantians, still it was generally in its aspect as intellect, thought, or reason that it was given that high place. But mind is not merely intellect but also will, emotion, feeling and imagination. Though the nature of reality was understood in terms of mind, it was still possible to understand it in terms of the different functions of mind. Even in Fichte we find that his principle is practical reason or will, and his philosophy is in truth voluntarism or idealism of the will. The intellectual intuition of Schelling, by which the pure identity of the subject and the object is said to be grasped, is aesthetic; for did not Kant hold, in the *Critique of Judgment*, that, in our aesthetic feeling, we experience the ideal of reason in our sensations? There is fusion of the two only in our sense of beauty. Of the recent philosophers, Bradley understands reality as pure feeling,¹ in which the difference between the subject and the object is overcome. For, so long as the two are regarded as opposed, the fullest truth cannot be attained. Reality is one indivisible whole, an individuality; and so long as thought finds an object standing over against it, it can never enter the core of the object's indivi-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 160.

duality, but can grasp it only in terms of predicates that can be referred to it. But the subject of these predicates is never exhausted by them, and can never be constructed out of them. Hence, so long as thought finds itself in opposition to the object, it can never attain complete truth. The opposition between the two has therefore to be abolished; and thought must become reality. The experience in which the two are one, is feeling. Yet this is not the feeling of this or that subject; for the subject can exist only so long as the opposition between it and the object lasts; but in this feeling the opposition is surmounted. It is really the source of the subject and the object. Sometimes Bradley calls this feeling sensation. Whatever be the name, his philosophy is not mentalism or subjectivism, as mind or subject, opposed to the object, fades away in it; but is absolutism, though slightly different from that of Hegel.

The pragmatism of James, the humanism of Schiller, and the instrumentalism of Dewey treat reality as plastic to the touch of man. Man can transform it as he likes. Truth is what has value, and ideas are the instruments of human activity. We have, in the voluntarism of these philosophers, reminiscences of Fichte, though these shun his speculative metaphysics and shrink from the transcendental. They claim to be realists, and refuse to be called idealists. Still, they approach philosophy from the side of man and his values. Their tendency is really idealistic, though they are not prepared to follow its light wherever it leads. They started in reaction against idealism in its intellectualistic and absolutistic forms which it took in Bradley, Bosanquet, etc., and naturally disliked being called idealists. But their starting-point and tendency are not opposed to all idealism, but only to some forms of it.

Bergson, in France, advocates the theory that intuition is the nature of reality. He protests against the intellectualism of the general European tradition, saying that it turns metaphysics into universal mathematic. His intuition is a sort of creative force, and so the will aspect too of the mind gets its recognition from him. Before him, Schopenhauer, a contemporary of Hegel, maintained that the world was the manifestation of the Absolute Will, and he is the greatest of the advocates of absolutism in which reality is treated as will.

Idealism in Italy took a novel form, though it remained absolutistic. Croce and Gentile felt dissatisfied with the transcen-

dental forms of absolutism, and wanted to bring down the Absolute from the so-called inaccessible heights and make it immanent in our experience. Further, they conceived mind not as static but as dynamic, not as a fact but as an act. This immanent absolute spirit they identified with history. History is a continual process which rolls with the weight of the past into the future. It is not an unconscious but a reflective process. The concept of matter is a limiting concept. Matter is something which spirit finds given, and which it transforms in its onward march. The reality which philosophy studies is the reality of history. History is the stuff of the universe, the fact of philosophy. It is not blind change, but the movement of self-conscious life. Hence history is philosophy, and the philosophy of history is essentially the history of philosophy. Though there are some important differences between the views of Croce and Gentile, there is general agreement as regards the nature of mind and reality. Croce is a Hegelian; and in order to understand the central idea of his philosophy, we have to go back a little to the beginning of a line of thinking that originated from Fichte.

Fichte, starting with the Ego as the first and supreme principle of philosophy, used dialectic as a constructive method for deducing the world or Non-Ego from it. The Ego posits itself through the principle of identity, "A is A" and posits the Non-Ego through the principle of contradiction, "A is not not-A." The Ego and the Non-Ego are the thesis and the antithesis. But what the Ego posits as its opposite, namely, the Non-Ego, is derived from itself, and is therefore its own self; hence arises the synthesis in which this opposition is transcended and which includes in itself the subject and object. By further application of this method, Fichte attempts to deduce the rest of the world. Schelling also used this method for deriving his Absolute; and he found the dialectical process not only in the activity of spirit, but also in the process of nature. To Hegel goes the credit of having used the method on a grand scale. He criticizes Fichte for having started with the Ego without deducing it; and Schelling for his separating mind and nature, subject and object, and for treating his Absolute as their pure identity reached as a result of the dialectical process. In Hegel's philosophy the difference, though not the distinction, between process and result, and subject and object, is cancelled. Spirit is activity, and its activity is dialectical; the object is what is posited by the subject; and the subject knows and posits itself,

only in knowing and positing the object. Hence the Absolute is not a mere identity but an identity in difference, not merely a static result but also a dynamic process. Such is Hegel's claim.

Croce criticizes Hegel for saying that the motive force of the dialectical process is opposition or contradiction, and maintains that this movement is possible even through the distincts. In Croce's philosophy, dialectic moves through four distinct moments of spirit, which are not opposed to each other. Mind or spirit has two main moments, the theoretical and the practical, the theoretical in its turn comprising the beautiful and the true, and the practical comprising the useful and the good. These four moments, which form a hierarchy and which Croce calls degrees of reality, form the foundation of the four sciences, aesthetic, logic, economic, and ethic. Though they are not opposed to each other, yet each moment carries within itself its own opposite: the beautiful the ugly, the true the false, the useful the harmful, and the good the evil. Spirit is a continual process through these four distincts containing their opposites.

While Croce's philosophy is called historical idealism, Gentile's is designated actual idealism or idealism of mind as pure act. Gentile is dissatisfied with Croce's scheme, because the latter's moments are not deduced from spirit itself. So far as they are *given* to mind, they transcend it, and immanence, which is chiefly aimed at by Italian idealism, is not complete. Therefore Gentile treats mind as a pure act which, by being conscious of itself, makes itself its own object, that is, a fact. What is called fact is only a past act. History presses forward through the dialectical process, in which each moment or act of mind, in preserving its predecessor within itself, negates it. Nature is the fact; but this fact is part and parcel of history; and history, in its turn, is the creation and forward movement of spirit, which is reflective, and is therefore philosophy. Thus in the systems of both Croce and Gentile, we see the conclusion arrived at that history and philosophy are one and the same.

Mind in its aspect of imagination also is not lacking advocates. Long ago Schlegel and Novalis, who were contemporaries of Schelling and Hegel, held that the nature of the eternal truth could be understood in terms only of poetic imagination; and the philosophy of Novalis, who was a little more systematic than Schlegel in his theories, was called magical idealism. Of the contemporary philosophers, Douglas Fawcett treats imagination as

the sole creative, all-inclusive, and all-explanatory principle of reality. He calls his philosophy imaginism. He tells us that there is an imagination which is not private to this or that individual, but is cosmic. It is both creative and conservative. Fawcett coins the term *consciring* to denote imagining in its active and self-conscious aspects.

Mention may be made here of the pancalism of J. M. Baldwin, who believes that reality can be best understood only in terms of aesthetic experience. He calls his philosophy aesthetic immediatism. We can trace his thought to Kant and Schelling. Kant held that we see the ideal in sense only in aesthetic experience; and following him Schelling interpreted his intuition of reality. But Baldwin is not an absolutist: his sympathies are with the pragmatism of James. Still, as in many other forms of idealism, it is one of the forms or aspects of mind that is taken as the clue to the understanding of the nature of reality.

Whitehead occupies a peculiar position. Like Bradley and many others, he maintains that the ultimate stuff of the universe is feeling. But he calls himself a realist. But his philosophy, as he himself sometimes says, is only provisional realism. His leanings towards Plato are too strong to allow him to remain a realist. And already, by many, he is placed in the camp of the idealists.

Many idealists, who were dissatisfied with absolutism for the reason that it failed to give adequate recognition to persons as real beings with moral responsibility, developed a pluralistic form of idealism, often called personal idealism. Lotze in Germany, Ward in England, and Howison in America may be referred to as examples. According to them, reality is a system of personal selves. Personality and plurality hold true even of noumena. This is the spiritual pluralism of Leibnitz in a new form. McTaggart also holds a similar view. His Absolute is not one, but a system of individual selves.

In this connection, it may also be noted that, even in absolutism, in which only one reality is posited, the Absolute is sometimes treated as a person. This idealism is not pluralistic but monistic.

One very curious phase of contemporary philosophy is the idealism of the scientists. Sir James Jeans, for example, accepts Berkeleyan idealism. He believes that, because the physical world exhibits mathematical properties, it must have been the work of a mathematical mind. Eddington maintains that our knowledge

of the physical world is symbolic. Atoms, electrons, protons, etc., are symbols, formulas: what they are in themselves we do not know. Symbolic knowledge is mediate and indirect; what can be directly and immediately known is only mind. Hence the stuff of reality for immediate knowledge must be mental.

This account is a bird's-eye view of the whole history of philosophy. In truth, if a history of idealism were to be attempted, it would really be identical with the history of philosophy; for all great constructive philosophies are idealistic, and realism enters now and then only as a protest to check the idealistic speculation, whenever its divergence from fact is felt. Without being content to remain in opposition, whenever realism tries to be constructive, it turns into idealism, as in the hands of Whitehead. But philosophy is nothing if not a constructive system that can comprehend the whole experience within it; and as only idealism can be such a system, the history of philosophy is essentially the history of idealism. The history of realism can only be a history of protests and reactions. Thus we are led to support, though for a somewhat different reason, what Hegel and Croce held, namely, that every philosophy is idealistic, if not actually idealism.

VII

GENERAL DIRECTION OF ALL IDEALISM

We have surveyed the course which what is called idealism in the West has followed in history, and found that it assumed many forms. Is there nothing common to all these, so that, in terms of what is thus common, we can define idealism? Even if idealism is a tendency and not a fixed theory, what is its direction? Platonic idealism interpreted reality in terms of Ideas, which are really ideals. But these are also called concepts; and they are concepts of the human mind, though said to exist in a heavenly sphere. They are ideals of things as the human mind understands them. It is the motif of Plato's philosophy that the ideal of our reason is a reality in which the form of the Good is the central principle; so that we see purpose running through the whole of reality. It is what satisfies human beings as ethical personalities. At the beginning of modern philosophy, idealism appeared as merely epistemological. But had it remained merely epistemological, it would have lost much of its sublimity and attractiveness, which almost all great men felt towards it. It lifted men above

the pettiness of every-day realities. Everything great achieved in the past was mainly due to it. Mere epistemological idealism leads to unalloyed subjectivism, and will end in the despair of scepticism. Such a situation gives no satisfaction to the human intellect. Curiously enough, in the systems of the continental philosophers of the time of Berkeley, the epistemological problem did not take so acute a form as in the writings of the empiricists of England. For the continental philosophers, the problem was mainly that of the nature of being, while that of knowing occupied only a secondary place; but for the English, the main problem was that of knowing. However, each cannot be divorced from the other. The problem of knowing led to that of being. The reasoning is unavoidable. If what is known is an idea, then what exists must have the same sort of being as that of the idea. Even if we are obliged by the pressure of experience to admit that we see difference between idea and matter, at least the source of the two, we must accept, must be the same. And this source must include the natures of both mind and matter. But this is an ideal concept; and idealism thus postulated an ideal reality, spiritual in nature. What idealism therefore wants is a reality that is all-comprehensive, in which the difference between mind and matter is removed. Such a unity is the Absolute. Hence the drive towards the Absolute in all forms of idealism. Even what is called personal idealism or spiritual pluralism exhibits this tendency. Only, it treats the Absolute as an organic unity of persons, each person having a noumenal status. This can be seen in Ward's realm of ends, and McTaggart openly calls it the Absolute. The point is that whether it is a realm of noumenal persons or the Absolute, it is an ideal of our thought; and so it is reasonable that we should follow our thought to the greatest height to which it can lead us. It is an illusion to think that this ideal can explain our ordinary experience with all the stubborn facts it contains. Certainly, Hegel could not have deduced Kruger's pencil from the Absolute, in spite of the great claims of the dialectical method. If the statement that the Absolute explains our experience by being its fundamental principle means that it is presupposed by our experience, we may accept it. But if it means that the world can be deduced from the Absolute, we have to reject it. Can the ideal of a perfectly moral world explain the world of imperfect morality? It can only pronounce that our world is imperfect; but why and how such an imperfect world

has come to be, neither the realm of ends nor the Absolute can answer. Even supposing it is true that the object I see is my idea, can this truth solve the problem, why I see the idea as matter? Kant's intuitive understanding is the explanatory principle involved in our cognitive experience. But can it explain why some of our ideas are not true of the objects? Even what is called scientific explanation does not really explain the phenomena it tries to explain. Explanation, as Meyerson has noticed, tries to see a stable identical element in the changing phenomena, and naturally the former cannot explain the dynamic. Even if we distinguish between the Why and the How of things, and even if we set aside Bergson's observation that the How ultimately reduces itself to the Why, no philosophical principle can give the whole How of things. Can the Absolute, whether it is an identity in difference, or only identity, or will, or feeling, or anything else, explain how the world of finite and imperfect things comes out of it? Can the infinite explain the finite? When therefore no ideal can explain the imperfections of our experience, are we not to accept the highest ideal that our reason can show without stopping abruptly at some point lest the ideal, if too high, should not be able to explain the world? The bias of idealism is towards such an acceptance. Idealism may not have reached its greatest heights in the philosophies of some. But still, what we say represents the general tendency.

It may probably be objected: How can an ideal which cannot explain our imperfections be treated as real? But the start is made in philosophy to find out the real, because the world around us shows signs of unreality. The illusion we experience in perceptions is contradicted later, and we formulate the criterion that what is real ought never to be contradicted. But what would be the reality that can never be contradicted? Such a reality must be an ideal; for we can never say with certainty that the conditions which would turn our cognitions into illusions are absent here. Can such a reality explain why we have illusions? On the other hand, can we dismiss as unreal that ideal reality which satisfies our criterion, because it cannot explain how unrealities appear?

We may examine this point, taking Kant's philosophy as an example. To answer the question: Why do our ideas correspond to objects? he turned physical objects into what he called phenomena, which are the products of the combination of sen-

sations according to the categories of the understanding. But this solution merely pushed the original problem a little back, which came to the forefront again in the question, Why do sensations conform to the categories? The required conformation is possible only in an intuitive understanding which can create sensations according to its own forms, and which does not depend upon anything else than itself, to produce the sensations. But do we possess such an understanding? Evidently not. Otherwise our wishes would have been horses. But then, if we do not possess such an understanding, why do objects correspond or conform to our ideas? That they often do so implies that such an understanding is somehow real and is working through us. But then can it explain why sometimes our ideas do not conform to the objects, even when it is working within us? Certainly not. It can only reveal that our ideas then do not conform to the objects; that is, that conditions for such a conformation are lacking in us, or that conditions for destroying such a conformation are also working within us. But such an answer, if one feels that it is satisfying, can be given by any ideal of our reason. The Absolute can say that conditions for the appearance of illusion, immorality, and ugliness are present in the world. But we need not wait on the Absolute for this teaching.

Supposing we admit that the intuitive understanding is working within us, as otherwise we could not have seen objects as they are, and therefore our understanding is the same as the intuitive understanding; will the admission that *esse* is *percipi* not follow necessarily? The temptation, after once we have formulated the ideal knowledge situation, to come down and explain our ordinary experience accordingly, is too strong. And if we yield to it, the result would be disastrous. The dissatisfaction with the Hegelian absolutism, felt by later philosophers, is really due to Hegel's having yielded to this temptation, saying that philosophy is the process of speculative reason in which sensation is transformed into a concept of thought, and that therefore the difference between sensation and understanding is abolished. This may be true of the ideal experience of the intuitive understanding; but for us it is not. Even in the neo-idealism of Croce and Gentile, the Absolute is dragged down and identified with history. Thereby, it is true, the concept of history gained more profound significance; but it is almost forgotten that this spirit which is history is an ideal spirit, and its relation to the finite spirit remains unexplained.

The thoroughly rational explanation of the universe, which is presented, appears a consistent fancy far removed from our imperfect experience. The doubt does not seem to have occurred to them that, if the intuitive understanding creates its sensations as it supplies its categories, the sensations will not be the sensations that we know. How the ideal spirit works is beyond our thought to comprehend. If we attribute our sensations, categories, etc., to it, we may as well ask for the daily time-table of God. The Hindu may ask the question how much rice he eats every day, and the Englishman how much meat.

We have, therefore, to notice that the higher the conception of reality the lesser the applicability of our categories to it. No start can be made from that principle, no construction of the world attempted from it.¹ If, by this construction, we mean the demonstration that the Absolute, or something like it, is the final presupposition of our experience, and that our experience has to be organized with this presupposition in view, we have to accept it. But if it means that from the Absolute the world is to be deduced, we have to reject it as an impossibility. Yet we should not forget that the ideal is what is reached from our experience. It must constitute our experience. Yet the problem how it constitutes our experience should never be raised. We should be prepared to recognize that the lower categories are transformed in the higher experience; and it would be unphilosophical to raise the question how, after the transformation, the categories work. For, to answer the question, we have to use our categories; we have no other way. But our categories are not applicable to the higher experience. When once we forget this, in spite of all our protests against the principle *esse est percipi*, we have to helplessly accept it.

In European philosophy, the real task before idealism is to change its attitude to the relation between the ideal and the actual. Idealists may denounce, with the realists, the Berkeleyan principle. But the realists hesitate to fall in with the idealists, because the idealist philosophizes in terms of the ideal experience, which finds no discordance within itself, as if it were his own; but if it were really his own, then *esse* would be *percipi*. The business of the idealist is to get the idea of a reality which can do justice to every aspect of our experience, and therefore which is all-

¹ Professor Campbell's *Scepticism and Construction* would be an instructive study in this connection.

comprehensive. It is an ideal to be realized, and certainly can be realized. Surely, it is the principle in terms of which we can understand whatever is rational in our experience. But the rational is what answers to the ideal, and the ideal is what rationality posits. Yet the irrational should not be left out of consideration. This is what gives rise to the philosophical problem, and what could never be explained or absorbed as such by the ideal. Its absorption can be accomplished by complete negation of it as such. But for this, is needed a courage which is more noble and sublime than what can be shown in the battlefield. The philosopher's task is to trace the rational in the irrational, and lift it above the latter. But the irrational can never be deduced from the rational; for the rational is not in organic dependence on the irrational. The idealist should notice, in the process of his enquiry, how the lower ideas get transformed in the higher phases of our experience. Because of this transformation, our criterion of reality too undergoes modification. The idealist should therefore be careful to note which problems to raise at which stage, and which problems are meaningless at that stage. When once, for example, the Absolute, call it mind or by any other name, is reached, the epistemological problem has no meaning. And to prove epistemological idealism on the basis of the Absolute Mind is therefore a philosophical mistake and confusion.

To call the Absolute by the name Mind does not necessarily mean mentalism. This is the unity in which both subject and object are included; and mentalism with which are associated subjectivism, scepticism, etc., is that theory according to which the subject, as opposed to the object, is the only reality. Even if we call the Absolute by the name Subject, we shall not be preaching subjectivism, according to which every individual may take himself and his ideas as the only reality and treat everything else, including the objects he loves and those he hates, as his own ideas or mental states. None of these charges can be laid against absolutism, whether we call the Absolute Subject or Mind. Herein lies the answer to Pratt's question whether to think of the Absolute as Mind is not the same as mentalism. One may call it mentalism if one likes, for the reason that the nature of the relation between the Absolute and the plurality of the phenomenal world is explained in terms of mind and its ideas. But to this mentalism do not accrue all those defects found in that mentalism according to which the finite mind and its ideas are the

only reality. Philosophy, if it is to be consistent and thorough in its thinking, cannot but reach the absolute; and the best way of understanding the Absolute is in terms of the highest kind of reality with which we are familiar. Even that reality has to be transcended, and we may have to admit the transcendence of thought itself by the Absolute. But still the Absolute cannot fall short of the highest we know.

Spiritual pluralism is only a half-way house to absolutism. We have already noted that, whether the Absolute is a unity or plurality, it cannot explain why there is immorality in the world. It may be sought to explain that there is morality in the world on the ground that we are essentially members of a realm of ends, or that the Absolute is a kingdom of selves. But this harmonious plurality of self-legislating selves leaves the question, how self-legislation agrees with legislation for others, unanswered, if some substantial identity between the selves is not postulated. But when that is postulated, plurality may be dissolved, or at least we shall have no evidence for the confirmation of plurality in the Absolute. This means that we have to go beyond the realm of the kingdom of ends, where the questions of morality, etc., do not arise and can have no meaning. So for the reason that the Absolute cannot explain the finite world, in the sense that from it the latter can be deduced, we need not stop at the conception of a plurality of selves; for even then our world cannot be explained. And it is but right that we go wherever our thought leads, and do not fight shy of the Absolute, which can explain the world as much as the conception of a plurality of selves.

Once we know that the Absolute, like the Ideas of Plato, is an ideal reality presupposed by our experience, we may concede that, in absolutism, values play a determining part in interpreting our experience. But this is not the same as saying that what is true is the useful. It means that the determination of truth is a normative consideration, and that the Absolute is reached through normative considerations. Because of this, we may see purpose or meaning running through the universe. For our very method of explanation is normative. Therefore consideration of value is an essential aspect of idealism. But we cannot conclude from this that every theory in which considerations of value play the chief part, is definitely idealism. The tendency of course is there; but the philosophy may not carry the tendency to its logical con-

clusion, and may be pragmatism or humanism. But we shall not be far wrong in calling it idealistic.

Similarly, the definition given by Professor Muirhead that idealism treats the subject and object as mutually dependent on each other points towards absolutism. The Absolute is certainly a unity of the subject and the object. But it may be a unity in which the distinction may be regarded as transcended, or a unity in which the distinction is retained. In either case, we have idealism or absolutism. When we enquire into the ontological nature of the Absolute, this distinction may not be relevant. But epistemology has no place in the Absolute, as it transcends the epistemological situation. Some idealists admit a distinction, though not a difference, between subject and object even at the level of the Absolute. But the distinction is so thin and groundless that it is difficult to believe that, if one were really at that level, one would feel it. For in an integral unity, where differences are not experienced, there is no ground for distinction, just as there can be no similarity where there is no dissimilarity. Unless there is an Other, thought cannot remain to make distinctions; and where there is an Other, there would be difference also. Or to put it more plainly, are the distincts regarded as distincts because of the difference of their properties or because of the distinction between their properties? If the former, then difference must be accepted at that level. If the latter, then the distinction between the properties must be due to some difference between the properties of the properties. Just as two things cannot be said to be similar without some point of identity, two things cannot be distinct without some difference. Hence it is useless to attempt to characterize what lies beyond thought. It seems, therefore, that even the idea of the mutual dependence of the subject and the object has to be transcended in idealism. We may say that even this definition is a stage in the idealistic tendency, which can advance further.

The modern idealists' attempts to interpret the world in terms of one of the aspects of the mind may similarly be regarded as marking certain stages in the idealistic tendency. If we interpret the world in terms of will, we shall find it necessary in some places to interpret reason, feeling and imagination in terms of will—which must of course be a failure. If we attribute to will the properties of the other functions of mind, then will will cease to be will as we understand it generally. And it would be meaning-

less to say, for example, that the world is will, when that will includes the other functions. Even if we regard the interpretation as a matter of emphasis, it must naturally be one-sided; for we find other facts in which the other functions have to be stressed. So, if it is to be consistent and true to facts, the idealistic tendency cannot stop short of the Absolute.

VIII

TERMINUS A QUO AND TERMINUS AD QUEM OF
ALL PHILOSOPHY

The starting-point of idealism, and indeed of every true philosophy, is man dissatisfied and, therefore, in search of something better and higher. It can never be matter which is below mind; for matter is really matter as mind knows and understands it, and hence matter, apart from a knowing mind, cannot be the starting-point. For the same reason, we can never explain everything in terms merely of the object or of the subject. Neither is found apart from the other. Nor can the starting-point be God or some ideal spirit or experience. For no finite mind can place itself in his or its place and see how he or it constitutes the world. The starting-point of materialism and even of Hegelian absolutism is therefore unnatural. Always the starting-point of philosophy is the philosopher himself; and because, as it is said, thought never starts without the experience of some contradiction, the starting-point is the philosopher feeling some contradiction within himself. He feels it between his material and spiritual nature, between his actual and ideal nature, between practice and theory, etc. His object is the removal of the contradictions, and the search after a reality that lies at the core of the self-contradictory finite experience. If all our experience were nothing but self-contradictory, we could never have had the notion of the non-contradictory. Sometimes our cognitions are correct, other times incorrect. Some aspects of our experience show comparative absence of contradictions. These give the clue to the formulation of our criterion of reality, which, by application and criticism, is modified until it gives an idea of ideal and perfect reality. That naturally must be the Absolute. *The so-called explanation of the world therefore is the discovery of the ideal in the actual.* And as the approach to philosophy is from the side of the human mind, reality, according to that philosophy, must show purposiveness,

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF IDEALISM

not in the sense that it is directed towards something else, but in the sense that everything else is directed towards it. It is the goal of human activity, both theoretical and practical. All the lower realities are stepping-stones to it. This is what human beings have to understand and can understand. And as the idea of perfection plays an important part in determining the nature of that reality, it must be the fulfilment of human values.

IX

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF IDEALISM

We may now define idealism as the theory which asserts the reality of the ideal, and explains the world in order to maintain this conception of reality. This conception may be maintained by explaining the world in terms of the ideal reality, or by saying that the imperfect vanishes or is transformed at the level of the perfect. All the other definitions are true so far as they involve this view. But these definitions, if each is taken by itself apart from the others, may appear conflicting, and may not cover theories which are generally regarded as idealistic. Even if we regard idealism as a tendency, the direction of this tendency has to be known and defined: we cannot leave it vague. Whatever be the starting-point, if a philosophy is directed towards proving this thesis, it may be called idealism. Some philosophers may stop before reaching the final goal, and refuse to go farther; even then, if the direction of their philosophy is the same, we may call it idealism. But the direction must be sufficiently clear, and its result must have approached the goal of idealism sufficiently near. This clearness and nearness cannot be measured exactly, and their minimum cannot be fixed. But then the general trend can be apparent, and enable us to find out whether it is idealistic. We have already noted that there is no hard-and-fast distinction between idealism and realism; and so whether a system is idealism or realism depends upon how far it has gone in its argument and speculation. The contemporary tendency which we see in Broad, for example, to simply analyse things, without caring to look into the presuppositions of our analysis, is certainly not idealistic. But we may say that this analysis is not complete, in that it overlooks its own presuppositions; and, if complete, it also must be idealistic.

An idealism that does not posit an ideal reality does not seem worth the name. Pure epistemological idealism may better be

called *idea-ism* or even mentalism or subjectivism. It is confusing to call it idealism. Where no ideal reality is posited, then does the controversy between what are usually called idealism and realism make its appearance. Further, the starting-point is mistakenly regarded as decisive. One who starts with mind and its ideas calls himself an idealist, and another who starts with the belief in material objects existing without any relation to mind calls himself a realist. But neither can be wholly just in his contentions, as both must be one-sided in their arguments. The value of the principle *esse est percipi* can be nothing more than that of a reaction against the neglect of mind and its contribution to the structure of what we call the world.

The question why only a philosophy that posits an ideal reality should be called idealism, and not the theory which holds that physical objects are mental existences, is one of etymology, and may be left to the philologists to decide. We propose to call it so, because what is called idealism exhibits that general tendency in the history of European philosophy, and epistemological idealism is only a partial treatment of the problem. However the word might have originated, the idea which it means gets new content by being interconnected with several other concepts, and, in the course of the history of its development, may get new significance, more profound than what it was at the beginning. We have shown, in this chapter, what forms idealism has taken, and what form it should take if its general tendency is pushed to its farthest extreme. It may be that idealism may take many new forms in the future. But the highest form it can ever take is some absolutism. We should naturally understand idealism in the light of its highest form. And this is never opposed to realism. Realism, like the *esse est percipi* theory, is only a half-hearted speculation, which does not fully recognize its implications and their significance and, therefore, gives us a philosophy stunted in appearance.

II

IDEALISM AS A THEORY OF VALUE

I

EXISTENCE AND VALUE

Our conclusion that idealism is the theory that affirms the reality of the ideal naturally draws us into the discussion of idealism as a theory of value. It is maintained in the previous chapter that, for idealism, reality is ideal reality, which is the true existence. But it may be held that this is a conception of reality as only a norm or standard, an Ought and therefore a value, which stands in opposition to actuality. The ideas of existence and reality, it may be said, are inapplicable to it. If value exists or is real, it would not have been set over against the actual. Rickert, for example, maintains this view. According to him, "every judgment of existence or truth presupposes an over-individual *Sollen* or Ought, the acknowledgment of which is necessary to give meaning to the judgment. This *Sollen* presupposes values; and these 'logical values' are neither existent nor subsistent, but merely valid." "Logic deals neither with existents, physical or mental, nor with subsistents, but rather with the problem as to what values must be acknowledged in case *any* answers to the question what is or is not, what is true or not true, shall have any meaning whatever." "However much the sciences that deal with existents or subsistents differ from each other, according to material or method, they always have one thing in common: all seek to establish what is and how it is. This we may call their ontological character: *das Seiende* is their problem. Objective logic, on the other hand, never enquires after this, and in so far stands above all sciences of being." According to Rickert, then, the Absolute of Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, etc., the intuitive understanding of Kant, the Ego of Fichte, and all such ideals presupposed by our experience are simply values, which are neither existent nor subsistent; they are, as Kant said, merely heuristic principles, the validity of which has to be acknowledged if our experience is to be true. If their validity is not accepted, our experience becomes

inexplicable, we cannot know whether our judgments are true or false. For example, in Kant, without the intuitive understanding as the ideal of reason, why objects correspond to our ideas remains unanswerable. It can be answered only on the hypothesis that, for the transcendental self, the sensations are not given, but are created by it according to its own forms and categories. Similarly, without the transcendental Ego of Fichte, the problem, why nature conforms to our moral will, becomes insoluble, and is soluble only on the hypothesis that the transcendental Ego itself posits nature as the field of its moral activity. Bradley's Absolute also is postulated as the ideal of logic and judgment; and without it as the ultimate subject that guarantees the truth of every judgment, no judgment can be true. Thus not only in logic, but also in all other normative sciences the presuppositions are values, which neither exist nor subsist, but are merely valid.

In this view the distinction between the theories of reality and those of values is clear-cut. Idealism, if it deals with norms or ideals involved in our experience, would be a theory of value as opposed to a theory of reality. For ideals are values which are not existents or subsistents. But then on this view, reality would be what is just perceived or perceivable. Whatever is only inferable, or is known only as presupposed by our experience, cannot be real or existent. For ideals which are presupposed by our experience are treated only as values, which have no reality or existence. The same reason would make everything presupposed by our experience such a value. This line of argument would end in the thesis of positivism, for which sensations only can be existent. And the upholders of this theory would certainly not like to be called positivists. Nor can it be maintained that only certain presuppositions are to be regarded as such values, while the rest have to be treated as existents. For example, in Kant the forms of sensibility and the categories of understanding are treated as constituting existence, while the Ideas of Reason are treated as only heuristic. But such a distinction has no true ground, and would appear dogmatic. Hegel seems to be quite justified when he maintained that whatever is regulative of our experience also constitutes it. For, if there is anything without which our experience could not have been, that must have constituted our experience; and if our experience is an existent, the presupposition also must be an existent.

EXISTENCE AND SUBSISTENCE

It is not enough to say, as Windelband and Urban do,¹ that value is no stranger to being. It must have more than mere familiarity with being. It is certainly no stranger to being, because it is implied in being. But unless what is implied is also being, the being which implies it, and which without it would be nothing, would become other than itself by reason of the latter's contamination. That is, it will turn out to be a concept, a sort of limiting concept, presupposed by our reasoning. But the consequence would be that reasoning cannot have a ground to stand on. Being also would turn out to be a mere value, which is beyond ontological considerations. It is true, as Windelband tells us, that the Ought and the Is, value and reality, are different at the human level. But we do not, and should not identify reality with what is given us in our finite experience, or with what is apparent in the empirical world. Reality or existence can itself be a value, and value is existence also.

II

EXISTENCE AND SUBSISTENCE

For what exactly is our conception of reality or existence? Is it simply whatever is presented to us? Is it whatever is an object of our mind? If the latter, then the castle we build in the air must be real, for it is an object of our imagination. Even an object of imagination has a being of its own. Probably, a distinction will be drawn between being and existence, the first being attributed to all objects of imagination, geometrical figures, etc., which are pure abstractions and so conceptual constructs, and the latter being attributed to objects that are not imagined but presented to us, that is, to what are given. It is sometimes said that qualities apart from substances, universals, etc., subsist or have being,² while perceptual objects exist. It is deplored that Plato did not have words to distinguish the two meanings; and that he therefore held that Ideas only had existence or reality, while material objects had it only so far as they partook of the nature of Ideas. This distinction seems artificial and arbitrary, and does not serve the purpose. For, if, as many a modern philosopher maintains, the universal is in the particular, and if the particular exists, does not the universal also exist? It may be said that the preposition "in" here does not mean "spatially within." True, what-

¹ Urban: *The Intelligible World*, p. 156. ² Cp. the neo-realists of America.

ever be its meaning, does it enter the particular or not? If it does, it must be as existent as the particular. The problem is the old problem, whether the Ideas of Reason constitute our experience or not. It is curious that even those who hold with Hegel that even the Ideal of Reason is constitutive of our experience, maintain that the universals have no existence. If they have no existence, how can they constitute the particulars? If the universal is part and parcel of the structure of the particular, to say that the universal constitutes the particular, without being existent, is to drive in a wedge between constituting a thing by being existent and constituting it by being subsistent; and the dualism of subsistence and existence becomes a problem. Nor may we leave the two as separate, for we have to explain how a subsistent enters the constitution of an existent. One who says that there is here no problem may as well say that there was no problem in the idea of the interaction of mind and matter though the two substances were disparate.

That qualities simply are or subsist while things exist, and that there is difference between subsistence and existence, is understandable. How can the rose exist if its colour only subsists? Is not the colour also part of the rose? Can the rose exist apart from its colour? There seems to be no epistemological ground for saying that the rose exists while the colour only subsists. Just as the existence of the rose is given in the cognition "The rose is," the existence of the colour is given in the cognition "The colour is." If one is interested in taking the rose as a whole and in calling it one's object, then another may be interested in considering the colour separately and calling it his object. The colour is as much existent as the rose. Here therefore the common usage "things are" and "things exist" seems to be in the right. To be and to exist are the same in epistemology. If it is asked: How then can we distinguish between the being of the imaginary object and that of the perceptual, the answer is that our logic is not bound to make such classification. It has to distinguish between being and non-being, existence and non-existence, reality and unreality; but not between the being of the physical objects and of the mental or the vital. Moreover, if existence is different from being or subsistence, how is non-existence different from non-being or non-subsistence or both again from unreality? Any attempt to answer this question will give rise to endless hair-splitting distinctions, with which logic will have to be needlessly burdened.

Everything that belongs to, or enters into, the constitution of the real or the existent is existent or real.

The distinctions, though drawn, do not serve our purpose. On the other hand, they render the problem more complex. If all perceptual objects are to be treated as existent, do the objects of illusion exist? Or are they not perceptual objects? The illusory object is certainly not an object of imagination. The imagination necessary for what is called "perceptual individuation" is present in the perception of the illusory object as well as in that of what is called the real object, as otherwise the objects could not have been perceived as individual wholes. The illusory object is not an imaginary object; because, if it were imaginary, we would not have been frightened during the illusion of the snake, as no imaginary object frightens us. Hence, we have to say that to be simply perceived is not the same as to exist. If, on the other hand, we are to exclude all the elements supplied by imagination, in order to identify what is perceived with what exists, then the residue would be mere sensation. But most of the upholders of this view would always like avoiding positivism or sensationalism, towards which this argument and its reduction are heading.

Therefore, what really differentiates the illusory from what is usually called the perceptual object is reality and unreality, existence and non-existence, or being and non-being. We say that the illusory object, though perceived during the time of illusion, was not there, did not exist, was unreal. That is, we attribute non-existence, unreality, or non-being to it, while we attribute existence, reality, or being to the true object. All the words mean the same for us. Then we formulate the criterion to distinguish the real from the unreal, whether it be correspondence or non-contradiction. Here we should be definite about the terms and their meanings, and also about the purpose for which we are using them. We should not forget that we are formulating the criterion to distinguish not only reality from unreality, but also existence from non-existence, and being from non-being. That is, for us existence, being, and reality, which satisfy the criterion of truth, are synonyms. To call a fact that is not existent true is meaningless. Similarly, to say that something that does not exist, or is not true, is real is absurd.

III

EXISTENCE AND REALITY

It has become the fashion in European philosophy to treat a system which draws a clear distinction between existence and reality as superior to that which does not. It is said that the Being of the Eleatics, the Absolute of Hegel, etc., are real, while existence means the phenomenal world. These philosophers, especially the Eleatics, maintained that Being alone was real, while the world of our senses was unreal. But the question is put: Do the Eleatics mean by the unreality of the phenomenal world that it does not exist? The prejudice against treating the world as not existence prevails; and it is sought to draw a distinction between reality and existence. Being is real, while the phenomenal world is unreal but existent. Reality is what satisfies the demands of reason, and existence is just—but just what? Is it whatever we perceive? If it is, then illusory objects must have existence. Is it the sensations? Then sensations only must have existence, and not even the physical objects. To say that existence is the phenomenal world can mean anything or nothing in particular. For what is the phenomenal world? In Kant's philosophy, it is the combination of sensations and categories. Can the sensations by themselves have existence? We have no evidence to answer in the affirmative. Do the categories by themselves have it? Here too the case is the same. Kant tells us that what we call the objects that exist around us are combinations of sensations and categories. So if existence belongs to the physical objects, it belongs to all that enters into the constitution of the physical objects, as we have already said. If we say that sensations exist, we have to say that categories exist equally. It is significant that Kant limits the validity even of the categories to the phenomenal world. So validity is based on existence; it holds within existence, and is finally identical with existence. Validity is existence conceptually understood as a norm. Even existence is a norm of the truth and falsity of our ideas.

If, because without the categories the phenomenal world cannot be experienced as existent, we attribute existence to the categories; for the same reason, namely, because without the Ideas of Reason the phenomenal world cannot exist, we have to treat these Ideas also as existent. If, on the other hand, in order to exclude the categories and the Ideas of Reason from the

realm of existence, we treat the sensations only as existence, we lose all basis for the formulation of the criterion of truth and falsity. For sensations, simply as sensations, do not differ from each other; and there can be no distinction between true and false sensations, if the objects which they form are not distinguished into true and false objects; and true and false objects are existent and non-existent objects. The distinction between true and false objects is thus transferred to the sensations. The sensations by themselves cannot be a ground for the distinction.

Hegel drew a peculiar distinction between existence and reality, not generally adopted by the Western philosophical tradition. Existence is, for him, the world of interconnected things, while Reality is a lower category which is opposed to Negation. The Absolute, again, is the highest category that includes every other category. And because it is the highest all-inclusive category, we may say that the Absolute is both Existence and Being, the lowest category with which his dialectic starts. But the reverse cannot be true in the same sense. The Western idealist would, in general, call the Absolute by the name Reality, and attribute existence to the phenomenal world. As is evident, we are not adopting the distinction drawn by Hegel; we are for using existence, reality, and being in the same sense, as otherwise we shall land in confusion.

We get the conception of the Absolute only in trying to understand the phenomenal world. Even among the objects of sense-perception we distinguish between real existence and seeming existence, that is, between existence and non-existence, between reality and unreality. The distinction, therefore, between reality and existence is arbitrary and unreal. We set on the task of philosophy in order to distinguish true existence from false existence. False existence is really no existence, it is the true existence that is existence. Anything that appears like another thing is not really the latter. A false elephant is no elephant; and only the true one is an elephant. The division of existence into true and false is really no classification of existence; it is the division into existence and non-existence. Only because both the object of illusion and the true object appear to us as existing are we obliged to use the words true existence and false existence. Here there is another confusion: this false existence, which we usually call non-existence, is in fact not the non-existence which belongs to an imaginary object like a sky-flower. The imaginary is

admittedly non-existence; whereas the illusory is perceived as existence, though later on negated as non-existence. For logic and epistemology, true existence and false existence are not really the classification of existence, but its gradation. They form a grade of values.

IV

TRUE EXISTENCE AS A NORM

True existence is really the perfect or complete existence; it is what Lossky calls the fullness of being.¹ True existence is, again, existence of which we are certain. It is what is non-contradictory, not simply what is known as existence. For, otherwise, even the illusory would be existence as it is cognized as existence during illusion. But it is not non-contradictory, as it is contradicted later. But can we ever be theoretically or logically certain that what we call true existence, like the existence of the rope seen as a rope, will never be contradicted in the future? Always, the possibility of contradiction hangs over us. The conditions favourable to it are ever present. The subject is different from the object; at least, the subject feels that the object is different from it. This condition will be removed only when the object perceived is the same as the subject perceiving, or rather the same as the act of perceiving. For instance, the act of feeling pain is the same as the pain experienced. This is the peculiarity of such experience. It alone can carry its certainty with itself. That is why Descartes said *cogito ergo sum*, Kant postulated the intuitive understanding of God, and Hegel said that philosophy cannot begin until the stage of absolute consciousness, which is the highest stage of self-consciousness in which subject and object are moments in the same act of experience, is reached. But later philosophers felt that Hegel's programme was too ambitious; because man is not endowed with such consciousness, and his theorizing from that point of view may turn out to be no better than fancy. Such a consciousness is an ideal, it glimmers through our imperfect existence. But shall we treat it as a mere ideal, which is no more than a pious hope? No, we have faith that at least part of our cognitions are true. The chair on which I am sitting I do not take to be unreal, though it is not impossible to doubt it as Descartes did. I cannot give a theoretical proof, which

¹ *Value and Existence*, p. 99, English translation.

would in principle be final, for its existence. Yet if my perception here is to be true, the ideal postulated in experience must be true. Somehow the ideal existence must be operating through me. We should not forget that it is a postulate, and not a fanciful ideal. And a postulate, to which the existence of a thing has to be traced, must be as existent as the thing itself. The nature of this ideal enters into our idea of the criterion of existence. The criterion finds the fullest conformation to itself only in this ideal. Is this ideal not existence? It is and must be existence. It is what makes our imperfect existence existence at all; it is what lends our illusory existence even its seeming existence. Further, have we not started in order to trace out existence in our experience, which includes both existence and non-existence or rather in which true existence shines through appearance? And when we have found it, why change our front and say that we were in search of reality and not of existence? Besides, this change of front and the attempt to forget our past would land us in positivism and sensationalism, as pointed out above.

This discussion must have impressed on us that much confusion is begotten by the ambiguity of certain words. We use the word non-existence with reference to the illusory object as well as the imaginary and the self-contradictory like the hare's horn and the circular square. But logic, which must be based on ontology, as its aim is to enable us to differentiate between being and non-being, existence and non-existence, reality and unreality, must be precise in its use of these words; and even though it borrows words from common usage, it must fix their meaning when it discovers ambiguity. The aim of logic is to determine existence; and it has to approach its task from existence as perceived or known. As the object of illusion is perceived as existent during its experience just as much as the object of true cognition is perceived as existent during its own perception, logic cannot identify the seeming existence of the illusory object with the absolute non-existence of the imaginary and the self-contradictory. Similarly, as we have already noted, true existence and false existence are not two divisions of existence of the same grade; they are two grades of existence, with reference to ontology. We thus have existence, false existence and absolute non-existence.

IDENTITY OF EXISTENCE, REALITY AND VALUE:
RICKERT, LOSSKY AND URBAN

The view obtains among many European idealists that logic is above ontology. We have already noted the views of the German neo-Kantians, Windelband and Rickert. Urban follows them. He quotes Nietzsche's question, "Why should an irrefutable assumption (upon which all logic, or rather all logics, rest) necessarily be true?"¹ This is the same as asking, Why should the non-contradictory be true? Why this prejudice in favour of it? Urban disapproves of this modernism, displayed by Nietzsche, in philosophy, which is opposed to the assumption that truth is more valuable than appearance. But he tells us that it is a prejudice or presupposition of logic itself, and philosophy must accept its value.² But this means that the prejudice is a value, and that logic is a science of values and not of facts. He writes: "May it not be true, after all, that the old conception of logic as normative rather than ontological is sound, that it is the science of the norms or principles that must be acknowledged if intelligible thought and communication is to be possible?"

Though Professor Urban is opposed to the identification of value with being or existence, he is in favour of identifying it with reality. For the first reason he differs from Lossky, and for the second he disagrees with Rickert. He writes how he diverges from Rickert in a footnote. "The line of argument here presented . . . leads him (Rickert) to assert the unreality of value and to speak of it as *ein Irreales*. The position results from his identification of 'existence' with 'reality.' . . . As a result of this he is led to define metaphysics, not as the science of reality as a totality, but rather as one which has as its object the search for a higher totality which shall combine real existence and unreal values. Now, I agree that metaphysics is not a science of real being in the sense that it is concerned with 'value-free' existences. It has as its object 'die gesamte Welt, in der Wirkliches und Werthhaftes giebt, einheitlich zu deuten.' But we are not justified in calling value 'unreal,' or in defining metaphysics as a combination of real and unreal. The issue here may seem to be merely verbal, one of definition, but certainly much more than that is involved"³

¹ *The Intelligible World*, p. 83.

² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

But if the result of our above discussion has any truth, it shows that the prejudice in favour of the distinction between reality and existence is without justification, and undermines the position which Urban himself holds. For it would be reduced to some form of sensationalism as regards the phenomenal world. In his article on "Value" in the fourteenth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, he seems to make a nearer approach to our position, though an interpretation may be given to what he said there which, he may maintain, is still his old view. He writes: "Values 'exist' in the sense that they are operative and effective in or on human minds and in human actions, and find embodiment in the objective institutions of society. They are 'real' in the sense that they are valid, that is, they claim to be the true ideals as opposed to false ideals or fictions. They must, however, be real in a still more ultimate sense (metaphysical) in that they are the part of the nature of things, and not something merely added to existences. For values to be real in either of the first two senses they must be real in the third. For both must be so related to real existence that they must constitute the key to the nature of the real. Otherwise they become false ideals and futile fictions." In this passage Urban uses the words "exist," "real," "real existence," etc., in practically the same sense. He tells us that values are "part of the nature of things, and are not merely added to existence"; they must be "related to real existence," and "constitute the key to the nature of the real." Is Professor Urban here advocating that values are existence, or is he merely, in spite of himself, made to use an expression which conveys such meaning? Anyway, whether he is holding that existence is different from reality or not, this usage at least supports the view that the differentiation between existence and reality is artificial and arbitrary. Each is the same as the other. And apart from the common usage, we have given reasons why they should be identified, and shown what difficulties there would be in differentiating them.

VI

SCHILLER AND CROCE. HUMAN VALUE NOT IDENTICAL
WITH EXISTENCE AND REALITY

Professor Schiller writes that "the recognition of logic as a science of values entails a radical revision of the antithesis between fact

and value."¹ But for him, value is restricted to human value, and when the question of the objectivity of the standard of value is raised, he has naturally to find his answer in biology and psychology. But very few are prepared to accept these sciences as the final court of appeal on questions of value. Hence ideal values and ideal existence or reality have to be recognized. And it is ideal value and existence that can be identical. Each and every human value cannot be identical with existence. Values stand opposed to existence at the empirical level, only because existence here is not the true existence. Even if we differentiate between positive and negative value and treat both as forms of value in general, we find that the same thing has sometimes a positive value and at other times a negative value; so that we find it difficult to interpret existence in terms of value. If existence is what has either positive or negative value, what is false existence or absolute non-existence? We cannot say that they are what have neither positive nor negative value, for we know that very often the false existence has either. Logic is a science of value, for the reason that its aim is the discovery of true existence. It is not a science of each and every human value. Logic can be the ethics of thinking, *die Moral des Denkens* as Herbart puts it, just in the sense that it tries to find out the conditions of true and perfect existence, which is naturally an ideal and is therefore a norm.

It is for a similar reason that we find it difficult to accept wholeheartedly the position of Croce. We may endorse what Ruggiero says about the neo-Kantian theory of value. He writes: "The philosophy of value starts from the subjectivity of consciousness and attempts to establish the objectivity of science through the concept of value, failing to perceive that the view taken of the object has already presupposed it. And so, instead of creating a true objectivity, it merely spreads the concept of value over the objective fact already presupposed, like a veil of mist, a pure Ought-to-be hanging over that which actually is. The motive of this philosophy is idealistic, since it aims at resolving the concept of being into that of spiritual value; but it fails to push its analysis home and to grasp the conception of the concrete actuality of thought, in which being is truly resolved; and so, in its turn, value ends by being crystallized into a kind of being different from empirical being, an ideal abstract being,

¹ Article on "Value," *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

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that is to say, a pallid reflection of natural reality."¹ This is really the result of the neo-Kantian differentiation between value and being. Croce says: "The 'value' which is the object of logic is logical reality and fact itself; it is value and norm intrinsically as existing and working. It is now high time for the real logic to claim her own again; nor does she owe any consideration to the empiricists and the positivists. Concession in this direction, although merely verbal, would be a serious mistake. Let logic once more assert her claims to firm facts and cease to content herself—whether out of pride or modesty—with anything so unsubstantial as values."² It is evident from this passage that Croce wants logic to be a science of existence; and he shows no antagonism to identifying value with existence. But for him, this existence is not ideal existence; like that of the pragmatists and Schiller, it is empirical existence. There is certainly a difference between the two views, for Croce's existence is history, which is mind and is spiritual. Yet this is completely immanent in our experience, and Croce maintains that the judgment of value is identical with that of history.³ But if that had been really so, progress, and in short, history itself, would have been impossible. Only because value stands opposed to existence at our level do we bring about change in the latter; and that makes history.

VII

EXPLANATION, LAW, REALITY AND VALUE

However, the normative is not opposed to the ontological, nor is it ultimately different from the latter. The search for true existence is a search for the norm. The search after true existence is, again, the explanation of existence, which is the expression or the formula of our criterion of existence. This is true not only in logic and epistemology but also in science. What is meant by matter, for instance? Scientists started with the idea of matter as some solid, impenetrable, extended substance, and began the exploration of its laws. They maintained that these laws were merely descriptive and added nothing to the nature of matter. But as the scientists pressed on with their discoveries, the solid impenetrable matter vanished before their gaze like a mirage, so that they were confronted with the problem, what the thing was, the

¹ *Modern Philosophy*, p. 75.

² Urban: *The Intelligible World*, p. 117.

³ Croce: *Philosophy of the Practical*, p. 96, English translation.

nature of which they were studying. And they had to answer: "It is just what answers to our physical or mechanical laws."¹ But then what are the physical laws a description of? Are they the description of what they postulate? That is, are they the description of a hypothesis without which they cannot be true? If they are themselves hypotheses, is matter a unifying hypothesis of these hypotheses? If so, one can easily see the circle in the argument, and the falsity of the statement that scientific laws are mere descriptions. Science can be positivistic only provisionally, just as one can be realist only provisionally. We are driven to conclude that science, like mathematics, is a system of axioms, assumptions and deductions; it may start from being, but later leaves it to itself, and ends in the formulation of a hypothetical reality that has nothing to do with existence; or it is the discovery of an ideal being which is, of course, present in what we call actuality, and renders it an existence for us only by being present in it. The former alternative seems to be the view towards which some philosophers of science, like Levy, are tending. True to his mathematics, he tells us that science has nothing to do with truth and existence. Unlike the neo-Kantian Rickert, he would not accept that *das Seiende* is its problem. He writes: "Truth is a dangerous word to incorporate within the vocabulary of science. It drags with it, in its train, ideas of permanence and immutability that are foreign to the spirit of a study that is essentially an historically changing movement, and that relies so much on practical examination within restricted circumstances. If it is to say that the universe is ever changing, that a situation once gone never returns, then it is stupid to refer to the Laws of Science, based upon such simple permanencies as measuring rods and clocks, as if each could equally embody Truth. Truth is an absolute notion that science, which is not concerned with any such permanency, had better leave alone. The function of science is to find the scope of environment, the isolate, that would make a stated law applicable."² But is not this isolate an ideal situation created by the scientists through abstraction? It is certainly difficult to expect its repetition in nature, if, as it is allowed, nature is ever changing.

We are here reminded of Meyerson's criticism of scientific explanation. He maintains that scientific explanation aims at

¹ J. A. Thomson: *Science To-day*, p. 371.

² *The Universe of Science*, pp. 206-7.

discovering identities in the flux of nature. Flux does not satisfy reason, which deals with concepts that are static, or in the language of the modern logicians, the material of which is a content (of ideas) that is fixed. With this content it tries to reconstruct reality. But reality, which is the phenomenal world for the scientists, is ever changing. Therefore, if the ideal reality of reason were actual, it would mean the death of all change and becoming. That is, explanation can never be adequate to reality. The scientist is thus defeated in his aim; for, says Meyerson, the programme of science is the identity of thought and being.¹ It is to explain being that science starts, but it finds that failure is inevitable.²

Levy differs from Meyerson in his conception of the aim of science. He would have science do nothing with truth, existence or reality, and thereby avoids the conclusion that science is in principle foredoomed to failure. But thereby he would be turning science into a hypothetical system of judgments, or a hypothetical truth-system. But this tendency, when given full scope, will result in the production of such innumerable systems, all so removed from being that man will begin to wonder where he stands. The aim of the scientific discovery would then be the discovery and elaboration of the principles presupposed by a line of reasoning developed from certain assumptions, without caring to know whether the assumptions by themselves are real or not. This may be the poetry of intellect, but we can hardly be content with it. It may be said that it is the essence and meaning of scientific culture, that it is an end in itself to be valued for its own sake. But then, science cannot escape the charge often levelled against absolute idealism, that it is a consistent fairy-tale without reference to facts.

It seems therefore safer to accept the second alternative as the aim of science. Matter, for example, is there: it is not merely a hypothesis or formula. Only, our idea of it is at first not clear. The aim of scientific research is to make it clear. What is matter for us appears as matter, only because of the ideal matter discovered by science. It is presupposed by our gross conception of matter. It does exist, and makes the apparent existence of the latter possible. Without it, the latter cannot even appear as matter. It is not necessary for us to say that it does not exist,

¹ *Identity and Reality*, p. 410.

² See T. R. Kelley: *Explanation and Reality in the Philosophy of Émile Meyerson*, pp. 117-19.

or that it has no being. We may say that it is a value or norm for science. It is to know the nature of existent matter that science starts on its inquiry; and what it discovers therefore must be the nature of existent matter. Without the implication of being or existence, science can have no value: it would be mere intellectual gymnastics.

The ontological presupposition of science should not be dismissed as a mere prejudice. Meyerson's difficulty is due to his starting with the idea that reality is just the continual flux of nature. We may start with such an idea; but we must be prepared to modify it, whenever we feel the need to modify it in the course of our inquiry. Physics would not have progressed, if it had not left behind its primitive conception of matter. Just as within the seeming matter the physicist has discovered the true matter, the philosopher may discover the true reality within the seeming reality. The flux of nature becomes intelligible to us because of the ideal reality discovered by our inquiry. The inadequacy of explanation to reality will be felt only if we tacitly or openly assume that explanation means a mere description of things. True, Meyerson controverts the positivistic view of explanation; for positivism leads to sensationalism, which is not acceptable to many scientists. But he can pronounce that explanation is inadequate to nature only if he assumes that nature is just what description gives it to be and that a bare description of nature is possible. If explanation is the discovery of the elements of identity in the flux, then evidently out of those elements of identity the flux cannot be constructed. Nor can the flux be deduced from them. Further, though our concepts are static, it is not necessary that the entity corresponding to those concepts should be static. For example, the concept of motion may be static, but motion itself need not be static. The fixity of the concept means that the thing does not become something else. So we need not accept that the element of identity discovered by science is static. But still, it is not the same as the flux of nature. What we call an explanation of nature is the formulation of our idea of nature; and that idea is discovered within nature. It is our idea of true and perfect nature; and what we see as nature appears as nature because of the presence of the true nature within it. If it were not there, nature would not have appeared as nature. The explanation of nature is the discovery of true nature within what appears to us as nature. There must consequently be some discrepancy between

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the true nature and what appears as nature. The former is not the same as the latter, and does not account for the appearance of the latter. That is, it cannot explain why there is that appearance at all. But of course, we understand the latter, however imperfect that understanding may be, because of our idea of the former. If this is all that the explanation of the one by the other means, we may accept it.

Similarly, the view that philosophy tries mainly to give a synoptic view of the universe is wrong. It may present some picture of the universe. But that is not its chief aim. That reality cannot be reconstructed by putting together the different aspects which the sciences study, also shows that no complete synoptic view of the universe is possible. The aim of every explanation, whether scientific or philosophical, is chiefly to discover or point to the ideal reality that is involved in our experience. This point will be further cleared as we present the idealistic systems of India, and will be developed in the Conclusion, in the light of those systems. But we may note here that, as regards the aim of explanation, there is no difference between science and metaphysics. Only, the reality of the former is limited, and so is a part or abstraction from a whole.

VIII

LAW AND THE THING

This brief discussion of the nature of scientific explanation must have already suggested to us that what we call the scientific law is finally identical with the thing of which it is said to be the law. Matter, for instance, is no longer what is given to our senses, but ideal matter that is to answer certain laws. The laws are universal propositions; and so matter now reduces itself to a set of universal propositions. It is, in other words, a hypothesis, which is expressed as one or more universal laws. But as this matter is not ordinary matter that is given to our senses, but is what matter ought to be, the law which is an expression of matter is also an Ought. This conclusion is of course implied in our statement that the matter of science is ideal matter. That is, the law now is not only the truth but a norm. But as this matter is also to be regarded as existent, because it is what makes sensible matter matter, which would have been non-existent without it, existence is therefore a norm and that a law. The final equating of law to

norm and that to existence, reality, or truth, is the thesis towards which all idealism is directed. This is implicit even in Western idealism and can be developed. This was clearly perceived by the Indian idealists, as will be shown in the following chapters.

In J. A. Thomson's *Science To-day*, A. E. Heath writes: "It is clear that one result of the change towards greater abstractness in physics has been to widen the gulf between the structure revealed in its generalization and the observations from which they arise and to which they are referred." That is, matter, for instance, which is generalized is no longer the matter we see; it has become ideal, and has ceased to be what we call sensible. But can we treat it as non-existent? Certainly not; because, as we have said already, only due to its presence within the matter which we see, is the latter experienced as matter, and is used as matter. The real matter is existent, it is what makes the existence of sensible matter possible. Yet it is the latter's law and norm. Professor Heath writes: "It is often stated that materialism has been killed by modern physics. This report is 'grossly exaggerated.' Materialism is more alive than ever: but it now takes the form of asserting that, in the last resort, the course of nature is determined by the laws of physics." We may set aside the question whether materialism is dead or not. The relevant point is that what we call matter is to be known by the laws of matter, and we should not think that nature or matter is something placed before us ready made for our observation. It is what has to be discovered with the help of the laws. But where are the laws obtained from? And of what are they the description? Or are they the descriptions of anything at all? We see that the positivistic conception cannot here be defended. Its conception of law no longer holds. Though the scientist starts with the notion of law as the description of the behaviour of things; by the time he gives it a definite formulation, it ceases to be a description and becomes a norm.

Poincaré writes: "Without generalization prediction is impossible. The circumstances under which one has operated will never again be reproduced simultaneously. The fact observed will never be repeated. All that can be affirmed is that under analogous circumstances an analogous fact will be produced. To predict it, we must therefore invoke the aid of analogy—that is to say, even at this stage, we must generalize. However timid we may be, there must be interpolations. Experiment only gives us a certain

number of isolated points. They must be corrected by a continuous line, and this is a true generalization. But more is done. The curve thus traced will pass between and near the points observed; it will not pass through the points themselves. Thus we are not restricted to generalizing our experiment, we correct it; and the physicist who would abstain from these corrections and really content himself with experiment pure and simple, would be compelled to enunciate very extraordinary laws indeed."¹ But if we correct our experiment, there must be a standard of correction. But is this standard a description of something? Certainly not. Even experiment is isolating, and so meddling with phenomena, and so not simple description. And when we further correct the experiment, we are still less describing it. What we call a generalization or law has already become a norm.

If, even in the case of science, the truth of a thing is its law and that a norm, much more is it so in the case of philosophy. The subject-matter of philosophy is experience as such; it is not the object itself, or the subject itself, or this or that kind of object, or this or that aspect of the subject. The study of these belongs to the several sciences. When it is said that philosophy studies the nature of the world as a whole, it is often mistakenly thought that the philosopher takes the whole universe and all the infinite number of things it contains into his consideration; and it is criticized as too ambitious and preposterous a claim. The definition is of course misleading; but what the philosopher actually does is to study the nature of experience itself, which is the basis of all distinctions like those between subject and object, subject and predicate, etc. And when it is said that the special sciences study only a part of reality, it is meant that they study one kind of the object or one aspect of the subject. Now, as philosophy studies the nature of experience as such, which is really the source of all distinctions, the truth of that experience for philosophy must be the true existence, reality, law and norm of the whole of reality taken as one.

IX

We may now conclude this chapter by saying that idealism is a philosophy of value, but not a philosophy of mere value. That is, it

¹ *Science and Hypothesis*, p. 142.

is simultaneously a philosophy of value and a philosophy of reality. And reality is the same as existence or being. Philosophy cannot be anything else, because its very method of explanation is normative, as shown in the above sections. Even science is a theory of value; but the value it is in search of is different from that which metaphysics aims at finding out. Hegel therefore is right, so far as our present point is concerned, in saying that value is not different from existence, and that the philosophy of value is not different from the philosophy of the actual. For true existence is not the seeming existence; and as our search for the former proceeds, we are naturally constrained to alter our ideas about it. The opposition felt by many previous philosophers between logic and ethics was due to the false premise with which they started, namely, that logic deals with mere actuality or seeming existence and ethics with what ought to be of value, though logic was recognized by some to be a normative science. If its norm is ideal existence or reality, then it is value; and naturally there is difference between value and actuality, or true existence and seeming existence. Sorley, for instance, writes: "From 'is' to 'ought,' from existence to goodness, there is no way that logic has not blocked."¹ But surely logic is not opposed to the Ought. Its real Is is also an Ought; for it also has to differentiate between the true Is, which is ideal, and the seeming Is, which is what we call the actual. If the Absolute of logic were not an Ought, it would not have been possible at all for it to be identical with the Absolute of ethics, as Sorley would like it to be. Similarly, Lotze's attempt to solve the epistemological problem with the help of the concept of value proved itself to be unsatisfactory, as he assumed that logic and epistemology dealt with the Is. Both logic and ethics try to find out the true Is and therefore the Ought. Of course, it should not be supposed that this Ought can explain how the seeming world has come to be. In that sense, the Absolute cannot explain the phenomenal world, and the idea of the *summum bonum* cannot explain why there is moral evil in the world. To think that such an explanation is possible is to have a wrong conception of explanation. Such an explanation may be demanded, but it is in principle impossible to give it. The duty of the human being seems to be to know what is higher than himself and his surroundings and try to realize it. In vain does he long for an explanation why and how the lower has appeared at all.

¹ *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 182.

III

VEDĀNTIC IDEALISM

I

GENERAL NATURE

By Vedāntic idealism is meant the idealism based upon the Upaniṣads or the Vedānta. There are many idealistic systems that claim the Upaniṣads as their support. But of all these, Śāṅkara's Advaita is regarded even by Western scholars¹ as more true to the Upaniṣads than the others. Besides, most of the others have more or less a sectarian or local origin. The Vaiṣṇava systems like that of Rāmānuja and the Śaiva systems like that of Śrīkaṇṭha are first Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva and then Upaniṣadic. That is, their systems are given originally in the Pāñcarātra and Pāsupata Āgamas, which are different from the Upaniṣads; and one doubts whether it is not by the way, and in order to prove that they too are orthodox and thus attract adherents from the learned upper classes, that they claim the support of the Upaniṣads also. There are some, for example, among the Śaivas,² who attach higher value to their Āgamas than to the Upaniṣads, though there are others who treat both as of equal value.³ There is, however, no doubt as to the esteem in which Rāmānuja held the Upaniṣads, both the principal and the sectarian. The latter are spurious and late additions to the former, and are held as authoritative only by sectarian philosophers like the Śaivas, the Śāktas, etc. One can easily see that Rāmānuja's philosophy is a development of the views given in the Pāñcarātra Āgamas. It is for this reason that Śāṅkara is called the *smṛta*⁴ or the traditionalist interpreter of the Upaniṣads, while the others are not called *smṛtas*. This does not mean that the followers of Rāmānuja and the other *ācāryas* do not obey the injunctions of the *Smṛtis*. But they prefer calling themselves Vaiṣṇavas or Śaivas, and the followers of

¹ Thibaut: *The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya*, p. cxxii.

² Violet Paranjyoti: *Śaiva Siddhānta*, p. 5.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ See René Guénon's excellent book, *Man and His Becoming*.

Śaṅkara only are called *smārtas*. *Smārta* means the traditionalist, the tradition here being the tradition of the *Śruti*. In India it is accepted that Śaṅkara alone kept to that tradition.

The Upaniṣads are not the work of a single seer or author, and some of them belong to different periods. Their statements are uttered from different points of view and with different intentions, and hence they appear conflicting and contradictory. But still, it was felt that all the Upaniṣads were equally authoritative and true; and in order to reconcile them, Bādarāyaṇa wrote the *Brahmasūtras*, which are cryptic statements allowing diverse interpretations. So the task of understanding the Upaniṣads was not made easier but more difficult by the *Brahmasūtras*. But perhaps because of the antiquity of Bādarāyaṇa, it is assumed by all the commentators on the *Brahmasūtras* that his understanding of the Upaniṣads is the correct one, and not one of them dares to show that it is incorrect. But each commentator has his own theory, which he wants to palm upon Bādarāyaṇa, and hence the endless grammatical hair-splittings in the explanations of the *Sūtras*. However, Thibaut believes that though Śaṅkara's teaching is in agreement with the Upaniṣads taken together, Rāmānuja's is in accordance with the *Sūtras*.¹ If this view is true, it shows that Śaṅkara succeeded better than Bādarāyaṇa in reconciling the discordant utterances of the Upaniṣads, and gives strong support to regarding Śaṅkara as the really orthodox or *smārta* interpreter of the *Śruti*.²

It cannot be otherwise, for Śaṅkara could frame a concept which alone could solve the most glaring contradictions among the statements of the Upaniṣads. This concept is *Māyā*. It means the inexplicable; and as the explicable is what can be understood as the non-contradictory, *Māyā* means the self-contradictory. It signifies that the world is full of contradictions. Yet we cannot dismiss it as unreal, because it is experienced. Therefore a concept is required to connote this peculiar quality of the world; and that concept, according to Śaṅkara, is *Māyā*. Naturally, such a concept must be capable of comprehending within itself all the conflicting and contradictory statements of the Upaniṣads. That is why the

¹ Thibaut: *The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śāṅkarācārya*, Introduction.

² It is interesting to note that, in Śaṅḍilya's *Bhaktisūtras*, Bādarāyaṇa is quoted as an *advaitin*, which shows that some do not regard Bādarāyaṇa's understanding of the *Śruti* as the right one. (See II. 30, edited by J. R. Ballantyne.)

IDEALISTIC NOTIONS OF THE UPANIṢADS

advaitins say that to prove that Māyā is a self-contradictory idea is only to praise it and not to condemn it.

Śaṅkara is not the first to preach the Advaita. Even in the *Brahmasūtras* we read of one Kāśakṛtsna,¹ whom Śaṅkara interprets as holding the view that the finite self is identical with the Brahman. This means that the Advaita was preached even before Bādarāyaṇa. After him and before Śaṅkara, Bhartṛhari and Gauḍapāda preached it. There thus seems to be an advaita tradition, which Śaṅkara followed and expounded in a systematic form by writing commentaries on the Upaniṣads, the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Bhagavadgīta*, the three called together the *Prasthānatraya*.

II

IDEALISTIC NOTIONS OF THE UPANIṢADS

To attempt to understand what idealism the Upaniṣads by themselves, apart from the commentaries and the *Brahmasūtras*, preached will not be of much use for our purpose.² For, as we have already said, the Upaniṣads are not the work of a single man, and no single Upaniṣad by itself gives us a systematic exposition. It is doubtful whether even all the Upaniṣads put together can give a system, comprehensive enough to include the problems which any philosophical system is expected to include. Further, the various interpretations possible of any sentence or word by grammatical analysis will leave us in endless controversy and confusion. But the most important reason for leaving out the discussion of the Upaniṣadic idealism by itself is that whatever be the possible views actually expressed by the Upaniṣads, so far as they are not those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, etc., they have no influence on the Indian mind, and in that sense are non-existent. Our present interest is only in the actual idealistic systems that have been propounded in India.

We may, however, briefly touch some of the views of the Upaniṣads that are relevant to idealism. Some of the cosmogonic speculations of the Upaniṣads are quite naïve. Water, air, fire, space, and breath were regarded in turn as the source of the world. In the *Taittirīya*, we read that in the beginning this world was

¹ I, 4. 22.

² Ranade's *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, Deussen's *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, and Radhakrishnan's *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads* may be consulted in this connection for further information.

Non-Being, out of which Being was born.¹ In the *Chândogya*, we are told that this Being which came out of Non-Being became the egg of the universe.² But in the same Upaniṣad, the question is raised as to how Being can come out of Non-Being, and it is held that everything was Being at the beginning.³ But in the *Nāsadiyasūkta* of the Ṛgveda, it is said that there was neither Being nor Non-Being at the beginning.⁴ According to all these views, the source of the world is some impersonalistic principle, whether physical or abstract. It is even possible to say that the air, etc., of these views are not physical, but that in them the ultimate principle of the universe is understood symbolically and metaphorically. The *Nāsadiyasūkta* has reached the limit of our empirical thought when it says that the source of the world should be understood neither as Being nor as Non-Being. Do not the Śūnyavādin Buddhists say that Śūnya, which is their *paramārtha* or ultimate truth, is neither *sat* nor *asat*, neither Being nor Non-Being? Does not even Śaṅkara give the same meaning to his *Māyā*?

The source of the world has been understood in terms personal also by the Upaniṣads. In the *Bṛhadārāṇyaka*, the Ātman is said to be at the beginning of the world, and to have divided itself into man and woman, the two sexes of all beings.⁵ In the *Aitareya*, the Ātman is said to have first created the World-Person and then, through him, the whole universe.⁶ The World-Person is a sort of Demiurge or the Lower Absolute of Śaṅkara, that comes midway between the higher Absolute and the world. In the *Taittirīya*, the world is regarded as an emanation from the Ātman.⁷ In the *Svetāśvatara*, Īśvara or God is said to be the creator of the world.⁸ In the emanation theory, we have roots of the later *pariṇāmavāda*, that the world is due to the transformation of the Brahman.

Professor Ranade writes that the idea of Non-Being in the *Chândogya* later became the void of Buddhism.⁹ The roots of Śaivism are found in the *Svetāśvatara*, which identifies the source of the world with Rudra-Śiva. A passage in the *Kaṭha* speaks of two souls which enjoy the fruits of action, but which are different from each other like light and shade.¹⁰ A passage in the *Muṇḍaka* tells us that there are two birds sitting on the same tree, but only

¹ II, 7.

² III, 19, 1-3.

³ VI, 2, 1-4.

⁴ Rv. X, 129.

⁵ I, 4, 1-4.

⁶ I, 1, 3.

⁷ II, 1.

⁸ III, 2.

⁹ *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 180.

¹⁰ I, 3, 1.

one eats the fruits of the tree, while the other simply looks on.¹ These two passages are the basis of the absolute difference between the jīva and the Brahman preached by Madhva. The roots of Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Bhedābheda of Bhāskara, etc., are found in the *Svetāśvatara*. It postulates three ultimate realities, God, the finite soul, and the world, which together constitute the Brahman.² The passages in support of Śaṅkara are numerous. The *Kaṭha* says that one who sees plurality goes from death to death, and so our mind should know that there is no difference.³ The *Chāndogya* points out that reality is the Brahman and everything else is only name and form, just as mud is the reality of of the pot, which is only name and form.⁴ The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* declares that everything in the world is the Ātman.⁵ The same Upaniṣad declares that the Ātman contains no duality between subject and object, the perceiver and the perceived.⁶ The *Māṇḍūkya* tells us that the Ātman is non-dual, and is beyond the reach of our thought and senses.⁷ The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*,⁸ *Kaṭha*,⁹ and *Munḍaka*¹⁰ describe it in negative terms. It is what is not gross and what is not subtle, what is soundless and what is touchless, what is unpointable and ungraspable, and so forth. The main trend of the Upaniṣads is to regard reality as the self or as residing in the self. The *Svetāśvatara* speaks of it as residing in the mind (*svacittastham*) and also as residing in the self (*ātmaastham*).¹¹

The Upaniṣads regard ultimate reality sometimes as immanent, sometimes as transcendent, and sometimes as both. The *Svetāśvatara* says that it is present in fire, water, and in the whole universe.¹² The *Chāndogya* compares it to salt dissolved in water.¹³ The *Kaṭha* tells us that, just as the sun who is the eye of the universe is not touched by the defects of our vision, the reality which is the soul of the world is unaffected by its defects.¹⁴ In this passage as well as in those which are the basis of Madhva's dualism, transcendence is declared. The *Svetāśvatara* speaks also of both immanence and transcendence.¹⁵

Again, there are some passages which speak of the absolute identity of the jīva and the Brahman. The Mahāvākyas or 'logia like *tattvamasī*,¹⁶ "That thou art," and *ahambrahmāsmi*,¹⁷ "I am the Brahman," obviously mean identity. The *Svetāśvatara* com-

¹ III, 1, 1.

² I, 9 and 12.

³ II, 4, 11.

⁴ II, 4, 6-9.

⁵ II, 4, 13-14.

⁶ II, 4, 13-14.

⁷ 6, 7, 9.

⁸ II, 8, 8.

⁹ I, 3, 15.

¹⁰ I, 1, 6.

¹¹ VI, 1-12.

¹² II, 17.

¹³ VI, 13, 1.

¹⁴ II, 5-11.

¹⁵ III, 14.

¹⁶ *Chāndogya*, VI, 8, 7.

¹⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I, 4, 10.

pare the finite self to a swan going round and round on a wheel, which becomes immortal when it identifies itself with the Brahman.¹ The *Muṇḍaka* tells us that, just as a spider produces a web out of itself, the Brahman does the world.² The same Upaniṣad gives other comparisons. It says that, just as sparks come out of fire, so does the world out of the Brahman,³ and just as the rivers flow into, and disappear in the sea, the knower of the Brahman does in it.

The Upaniṣads contain the roots of the doctrine of Māyā later developed by Śaṅkara. The *Kaṭha* speaks of *avidyā*, and compares those who are in it to the blind led by the blind.⁴ The *Muṇḍaka* tells us that he who knows that the Supreme Person is the world, can untie the knot of *avidyā*.⁵ The *Chāndogya* differentiates between *vidyā* and *avidyā*, and praises the former.⁶ The *Śvetāśvatara* speaks of the world as Māyā in the sense of illusion,⁷ but the same Upaniṣad sometimes identifies Māyā with Prakṛti.⁸ It uses the word Māyā in the sense also of power, especially the power of the magician.⁹ In the *Bṛhadārāṇyaka* also, we come across the word in the sense of magical power.¹⁰

It is to reconcile these conflicting views and statements that Bādarāyaṇa wrote his *Brahmasūtras*, and Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and others their commentaries. We easily see that all the later Vedāntic systems are to be found in the Upaniṣads in germ, even Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā. As Professor Ranade says, the doctrine of Māyā is neither a fabrication of Śaṅkara, nor merely the outcome of Buddhistic nihilism, nor found full-fledged in the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads felt the mystery of creation, the inexplicability of the world. They saw that the world cannot be real at the level of the Brahman. And what they felt and saw they expressed in their own way. Their ideas are given a systematic form by Śaṅkara and his followers. But on one point all the Upaniṣads are almost unanimous, namely, that ultimate reality is of the nature of Self-consciousness.¹¹

¹ I, 6. ² I, 1, 7. ³ II, 1, 1. ⁴ I, 2, 4, 5. ⁵ II, 1, 10. ⁶ I, 1, 10.

⁷ I, 10. *Tasyābhidhyānāt yojanāt tatvabhāvāt bhūyascānte visvamāyānivyūṭti.*

⁸ IV, 10. *Māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt māyīnam tu maheśvaram.*

⁹ IV, 9. *Asmān māyī sṛjate viśvametat, tasmīn cānyo māyayā sanniruddhaḥ.*

¹⁰ II, 15, 9. *Indro māyābhi pururūpa iyate.*

¹¹ Self-consciousness means *ātma-jñāna* and not *ahaṅkāra*.

ROLE OF THE ŚRUTI

III

ROLE OF THE ŚRUTI

One great difficulty in appreciating the idealism of the vedāntins is their frequent reference to the *Śruti* as the final authority. The superficial reader may think that they are not rational but dogmatic, in that they treat the Scriptures as the final authority and give inference and perception only a secondary place. As their ideal is not obtained by a consideration of the actual but *ex cathedra* given by the Scripture, it appears more like the God of positive religion than like the Absolute of philosophy. Hence it may be thought that their philosophy is neither realism nor idealism, but a sort of dogmatism based on revelation. But to take such a view of them is to be unfair to them. True, there is much of the scholastic in their writings. But though the teachings of the Scriptures are accepted as infallible with regard to the nature of the ultimate reality, those teachings are supported by elaborate reasonings of their own, which are not always to be found in the Upaniṣads. In their commentaries, each of the vedāntins attacks all the others' views including Jainism and Buddhism; and the arguments advanced against these latter two are not quotations from the Upaniṣads, but logical arguments. And these arguments give us the clue to the rationality underlying their interpretations of the Upaniṣads. Here we can find the logical structure of their systems, which can stand even without the Upaniṣads. As I have said elsewhere,¹ we have to understand the authority of the *Śruti* as the infallibility of the higher intuition.

IV

ŚAṆKARA'S ADVAITA THE RESULT OF NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Many scholars are of opinion that Śaṅkara's Advaita is epistemological. The frequent utterance that everything is *manas* or mind,² the theory of one of the schools of the Advaita that creation is perception,³ and the constant reference to *rajju-sarpabhrānti* or the illusion of the snake in the rope, may lend support to this view. Further, Śaṅkara begins his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* with the statement that the world is

¹ *Thought and Reality*, p. 272.

² *Sarvam mana eva.*

³ *Dṛṣṭisṣṭivāda.*

adhyasta or superimposed on the Brahman,¹ and that this superimposition is unreal. The nature of the Brahman is consciousness (*chidātmaka*); and it is the only reality. But if we analyse the strands of Śaṅkara's thought as pure philosophy without accepting the truth of the Brahman from the Upaniṣads or *Sruti*, we can see that his idealism is based, not on epistemological, but on normative considerations. Śaṅkara accepted the truth of the Brahman from the Upaniṣads; and having done so, he felt that the world has to be explained as *Māyā* or superimposition on the Brahman. That is, if once the Brahman is accepted as the truth, then its relation to the world must be, according to him, the same as that between the rope and the snake in illusion. Just as the snake is an illusion from the standpoint of the rope, the rope and what we regard as the real world are an illusion from the standpoint of the Brahman. The significance of treating this world as illusion is that, just as the snake, in spite of being perceived as existing during illusion, is later known as non-existing even during the time of illusion and as, therefore, in no way affecting the existing rope, which is the truth unperceived during illusion, the world, if regarded as illusion, in spite of being perceived or experienced, in no way affects the eternal presence of the Brahman. It vanishes the moment it is known, just as the snake disappears the moment the rope is discovered. The world is regarded as *mithyā* or illusion, as otherwise, the *advaitin* thought, the eternal perfection of the Absolute cannot be saved. If it is real and forms part of the Brahman, the Brahman must be undergoing the vicissitudes of the world. That this is the significance of *Māyā*, and not that what we see is our imagination, is evident from the definitions of *mithyā* as given in *Advaitasiddhi*. The essence of all the definitions is that what is *mithyā* has the same *adhikaraṇa* (locus) as that of its own absolute negation;² and not that it is imaginary. This definition is common to both the snake and the world in their relation to the rope and the Brahman respectively. The locus of the snake is the rope. But after the illusion is gone, we say that the snake did not really exist even during illusion; we negate it in all the three tenses. The snake is thus experienced on the same locus where its absolute negation, that is, negation in the three tenses, is experienced. The same is

¹ Cp. *Asmatpratyayagocare viṣayini cidātmake yusmatpratyayagocarasya taddharmāṇām ca adhyāśaḥ tadviparyayeṇa viṣayīṇaḥ taddharmāṇām ca viṣaye adhyāśo mithyā iti bhavitum yuktah.*

² *Traikālikātyantābhāvasamānādhikaraṇatvam.*

true of the world with reference to the Brahman. For when once the Brahman is known, it is known also that the Brahman is existing all along and that the world was not there really at all. Thus the world is experienced on the same locus, namely, the Brahman, on which its absolute negation is experienced. The advaitin transfers only the logical relation found between the rope and the snake to the Brahman and the world. But he does not tell us that, just as we can neglect the illusory snake as harmless, we can neglect the world and its values as useless. So long as the "we" lasts the world is of importance for us; only when the "we" or the "I" becomes one with the Brahman, can we ignore the world, just as we ignore the snake after the rope is seen, but never before. That is why the advaitin refuses to call even the snake an *asat* or non-existent, though he calls it *mithyā*. It is of fundamental importance for understanding the Advaita to note the difference between *asat* and *mithyā*, though the words are used in the same sense in popular language and some systems of Indian philosophy. According to the advaitin, it is the imaginary that is *asat*, while the illusory or whatever is perceived as existent, though later negated as non-existent, is *mithyā*. The imaginary, like the sky-flower and the horns of man, is not experienced as existing. It is admittedly non-existent. But the illusory is experienced as existing, and is later negated as not existing. The advaitin wanted to express the relation between the Brahman and the world, and that relation he found in empirical illusion, and therefore used the words *bhrama* and *mithyā* with reference to both.

It is important to define here the meaning of the words existence, non-existence, etc., as used by the advaitin. For him, existence is the same as reality, and that identical with truth. *Sattvā* and *satyam* mean the same. But what is not existence or truth or reality is not merely absolute non-existence or unreality. Unfortunately, in popular language and many systems of philosophy, both Indian and European, what is other than the real is the unreal; and that is merely what is subjectively meant or imagined. *Mithyā* is other than the real; but still it is not *asat* or unreal. That is why the advaitin says that it is *anirvacanīya*, which is explicable neither as *sat* nor as *asat*, neither as both nor as neither. Hence when interpreting the Advaita in English, we are at a disadvantage for lack of a word with the connotation

* *Sadvivikṭatvam vā mithyātvam*. See *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 195.

of *mithyā*. We have been using the word unreal, which is very often misleading. Even the word illusion does not have this specific meaning in English. The word appearance may serve better; but it also is very often confused with the word illusion, as when it is said that the serpent is an appearance of the rope. But whatever word we use, we should bear in mind the logical and ontological difference between *mithyā* and *asat*.

Even in European philosophy, we find the need felt to distinguish between three levels of reality; and so difference is made between reality, existence, and unreality. The world of phenomena is said to be existent; the so-called ultimate reality is reality; and the imaginary, illusory, etc., is unreal. The three levels in the Advaita are *sat*, *mithyā*,¹ and *asat*. Reality in European philosophy is what is beyond all contradiction; but the advaitin would say that this is also existence or true existence. The existence of European philosophy is the *mithyā* of the advaitin. For the advaitin would say that whatever has contradictions within is *mithyā*, and as it is existence that makes an idea contradictory or non-contradictory existence is always beyond contradiction. Even European philosophers do not say that the phenomenal world is beyond contradictions. Yet they insist that it is existence. But there is an inconsistency in this view. For what is existence? The phenomenal world is of course experienced by us. But is "to be experienced" the same as to exist? If it is, then the illusory object must be regarded as existing, which few Western thinkers accept. On this score, the illusory object and the phenomenal world are alike. If, on the other hand, it is said that there is a contradiction in our experience of the illusory object, which is once experienced as existing but later negated as not existing, then similar contradictions are present even in the phenomenal world, which are recognized even in Western philosophy. If to be self-contradictory is not truth in one case, it is not so in the other. We have to search for something beyond contradictions in order to get at true existence. If what is beyond contradictions is reality, then reality is true existence. This is how the advaitin would argue. As regards their contradictory nature, both the illusory object and the phenomenal world are in a similar position; and so the advaitin calls both *mithyā*, just as, in Western philosophy, Kant calls both phenomena and the illusory object appearance, though distinguishing both. The advaitin also differ-

¹ This is cosmic *mithyā*.

entiares between the two, saying that the phenomenal world has pragmatic validity, while the illusory has none. It should, however, be noted that the differentia is not precise enough, as sometimes the illusory object too has influence on our practical life, and this is recognized even by the advaitin. No exact differentia is discovered even in Western philosophy. The advaitin calls the illusory existence *prātibhāsikasattā* or seeming existence, the phenomena *vyāvahārikasattā* or pragmatic existence, and the final truth *pāramārthikasattā* or true existence. However, there is something of the pragmatic even in the illusory object, and hence a clearer differentiation between the two seems to be necessary.

If now both the illusory and phenomena are self-contradictory and not true existence, then, so far as they are contradictory, the advaitin seems to be right in calling them both *mithyā*. And the practice of the Western philosophers of relegating the illusory to absolute non-existence seems to be logically and epistemologically unjustified. For, the non-existent or the *asat* is what is merely imaginary, and is never experienced, unlike illusion, as existing. But illusion is a different kind of experience from imagination. And as the distinction between existence and what only appears to be existent has to be drawn from the side of, and within the knowledge of existence, both these have to be treated as different from non-existence or imaginary existence. None can deny that the object of illusion is experienced as an object, while the imaginary one is known to be purely subjective. None is afraid of the king cobra, if imagined; but one is frightened, if it is an object of illusion. The objects of imagination too may be called objects, as they are there before our minds. But so far as logic and epistemology are concerned, we do and have to draw a distinction between them on the one hand, and the objects that we perceive on the other. Otherwise, the two sciences will be deprived of their very foundations; for them, even the objects of imagination will be said to have existence. Hence the words true, real, and existent must mean the same in logic and epistemology. These two sciences deal with true existence and false existence. And these two kinds of existence are differentiated within the sphere of things which are experienced as existent. In this sphere, non-existence has no place. We never raise the question of the true or false existence of a man's horn. Non-existence forms the limit below which the logic cannot go. It must

therefore be different from all those about which the question of true and false existence is put.

It is evident from the discussion that, though Śaṅkara's criterion of reality is obtained from epistemology, it is not the Berkeleyan criterion *esse est percipi*, and that to regard Śaṅkara as a subjective idealist is therefore a mistake. The fact that Śaṅkara obtains his criterion from epistemology does not make his idealism epistemological. Philosophical thinking appears only to decide the nature of truth; and it is but natural that the difference between truth and falsity is suggested first in perception. One therefore tries to find out the criterion or frame it there. If this is a sufficient ground for treating Śaṅkara's idealism as epistemological, one may call it so; but one should notice that it is not of the Berkeleyan type.

Further, unless the Brahman is known, we cannot treat the world as a superimposition upon it. In the illusion of the snake, the rope is known in the second act of cognition. The phenomenal world is generally an object of perception. But the Brahman is not an object of perception. Therefore, the illusoriness of the world is not known by us after the Brahman is known, whereas the illusoriness of the snake is known after the rope is known. A yogi who can have an intuition of the Brahman may know the Brahman before he knows the illusoriness of the world. But philosophically considering, that is, if Śaṅkara's position is to be supported logically, it is from the illusoriness of the world that we have to argue the truth of the Brahman. For, if to be contradictory is to be false, then all the categories of the phenomenal world like cause, substance, etc., are contradictory and so false. This has been demonstrated not only by the advaitin but also by Western philosophers like Bradley. But whatever is contradictory and false must imply something that is non-contradictory and true. This something is the Absolute or the Brahman. Thus it is from the falsity of the phenomenal world that we proceed to the truth of the Brahman. But our idea of the falsity of the phenomenal world is not a result of perception, but of normative considerations.¹ We analyse our ideas of the world, and examine whether they are self-consistent, or as Hegel puts it, whether their content corresponds to their notion. No idea of the world do we find to be self-sufficient and self-explanatory. This innate inconsistency or

¹ See the author's "The Empirical and Noumenal Truths in Śaṅkara's Philosophy." *Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference*, 1937.

self-contradiction in the phenomenal world is the reason for our treating it as not real; for somehow we start with the criterion that the real must be self-consistent and not self-contradictory. Call it a prejudice or postulate, we feel that existence, which determines the consistency or inconsistency of our ideas, can never be self-contradictory.

The criterion of truth is therefore normative, and the idea of the Brahman is obtained not epistemologically but normatively. But once the truth of the Brahman is admitted, the world of contradictions can be treated as a superimposition on the Brahman, just as the snake is called a superimposition on the rope.

V

The theory that creation is perception belongs to one of the schools of the Advaita, and is not accepted by all. It is of two forms.¹ According to one form, both Ignorance, Avidyā (Māyā) and the world are created by the mind of the jīva (individual) without the help of the sense organs and their contact with external things, in the same way as, in dreams, mind creates its objects. But then the difficulty is felt of explaining how the jīva, who is a product of Avidyā, can create Avidyā through his cognitive act. Hence according to the second form of the theory, it is maintained that the world of forms but not the original Avidyā is created by the jīva's perception. This theory corresponds to Berkeley's doctrine *esse est percipi*. There is another variant of this theory. For it, perception is not the same as creation, but is simultaneous with creation.² But this view can hold true only for those jīvas which experience their identity with the Brahman. And it can be held only when this identity is established, that is, when the truth of the Brahman and its identity with the jīva are acknowledged, just as the world can be regarded as a superimposition on the Brahman only after the Brahman is known. As the ancient advaitins accepted the authority of the *Śruti*, and took the truth of the Brahman for granted, they could weave out theories as to how the jīvas and the world can come out of the Brahman. We shall later on discuss whether such attempts are useful or futile. But

¹ *Siddhāntaśaṅkha*, Vol. II, pp. 71-2. (Edited by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, published by the Madras University.)

² *Dṛṣṭisamasamāyā vīṭvasyīriti*.

philosophically or logically considering the problem, we can treat the view as an extreme form, not necessarily belonging to the essence of the Advaita. For even among the upholders of the view, some have felt the difficulty of treating Avidyā as a psychic act of the jīva. Nor does the view that the *esse* of the world, and not of Avidyā, is the perception of the jīva seem to be more reasonable; for if the world is the product of Avidyā, or at least of Avidyā also, then it cannot merely be the perception of the jīva. The view also that perception and creation are simultaneous cannot be better defended. Even on this view, subjectivism of the type that every object is as it appears to the perceiver, and the impossibility of communication between the jīvas, cannot be avoided.

Such difficulties as the above led some advaitins to the formulation of the opposite theory, namely, that perception is of the created. This theory is called *syādiḍṣṭivāda*.¹ The object seen is independent of perception and is therefore real. This is robust realism, and yet in no way conflicts with the principles of the Advaita. For, in spite of its being real for the jīva, the world vanishes when the Brahman is experienced. It is only when we start with a view like this that we can arrive logically at the idea of the Brahman by treating the criterion of non-contradiction as the norm. If we are to accept the previous view, our dependence on the *Sruti* would be entire. But both views claim allegiance to Śaṅkara. For rational speculation, we must accept the present, as otherwise the objects of the world have to be given the same status as those of illusion and dreams, all being created alike by mind; but then we cannot form our criterion, which must be based on the distinction between the two. For, if the snake and the rope are both alike, then they would be only two different objects, and there can be no contradiction between them. Here it cannot be objected that, when there is conflict between two cognitions, both may be false as in the case of the contraries. For then the principle that falsity implies truth, and non-existence existence—which is fundamental to the Advaita and differentiates it from the Śūnyavāda of the Buddhists—could not have been obtained. The rope also may be an illusion, and some crooked stick may be the reality. But this does not falsify the principle that falsity implies truth. If falsity implies another falsity, and the second a third, then there would be no truth and so no falsity,

¹ *Drṣṭisamasamayā viśvaśyāṣṭiriti*, p. 72.

DEFINITION OF THE BRAHMAN

and to speak of *paramārtha* or ultimate truth would be without basis and meaningless. From nowhere can we get its connotation. Nor will it be possible to maintain then that all these cognitions are equally false and that the Brahman only is the truth underlying their falsity. For then the truth of the Brahman cannot be obtained from reasoning, but has to be taken for granted on the authority of the *Śruti*. If we are to proceed logically, the criterion must be framed at the empirical level itself; and it cannot be framed without accepting a reality like the rope. Complete reliance on the *Śruti* would segregate the advaitin from the rest of the philosophical world.

VI

DEFINITION OF THE BRAHMAN

Even the *Brahmasūtras* give a rational definition of the Brahman. The Brahman is said to be the source, etc., of the world.¹ But then, is our interpretation that it is the final criterion of truth and is presupposed by the falsity of the world not true? That this interpretation alone is true can be demonstrated by the peculiar causality attributed to the Brahman as understood by the advaitin. From the side of logic and epistemology, the advaitins do declare that the Brahman is the truth, and that it is non-contradiction or *abādhyatvam*. Even from the side of cosmology, it is said to be occupying the position of the first cause and the necessary being of the third and fourth antinomies of Kant. Like Kant, the advaitin notices all the difficulties connected with the ideas of the first cause and necessary being, and yet refuses to treat them as merely regulative ideas. They constitute our world, because the Brahman is not merely the efficient cause, but also the material cause of the world. They exist; and the existence of the world is really the essence of the Brahman, that glimmers through phenomena. Of course, they are not two but one. But though we understand the Brahman as both the material and efficient cause, its causality should not be understood in the ordinary sense. If the Brahman is an efficient cause, is there anything beside it, which is to be moulded into the form of the world? If it is a material cause, does it undergo transformation in order to become the world? The advaitin can accept neither that there is a second to the Brahman nor that it is a *pariṇāmī* and under-

¹ *Janmādyasya yatah.*

goes transformation. Therefore he propounds the doctrine of *vivarta* or causation without transformation.¹ The Brahman is both kinds of cause; and yet his nature is unaffected by the process of causation. Almost all other commentators maintain that the world is a *pariṇāma* or transformation of the Brahman; and when asked how it can retain its purity and integrity in spite of this transformation, they answer that the Brahman has a special power. Evidently, such an answer is not logical, and brings in the *deus ex machina*. But Śaṅkara avoids it by formulating a new theory of causation.

In spite of holding the *vivarta* view, the followers of Śaṅkara are not at one in explaining how the world has come out of the Brahman. As there is no second to the Brahman, somehow or other it itself must be the material of the universe. But how can it be the material if it is pure? The followers of *Vivaraṇa* maintain that the real cause of the world is the Brahman associated with *Māyā*²; the author of *Padārthatatvanirṇaya* holds that both the Brahman and *Māyā* are the material cause, but the world is the *vivarta* of the Brahman and the *pariṇāma* of *Māyā*; the author of *Śaṅkṣepaśārīka* holds that the Brahman is the material cause, while *Māyā* is only a subsidiary cause³; Vācaspatimiśra says that, though *Māyā* is an accessory, it does not enter the effect; and the author of *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* opines that *Māyā* only is the material cause. These differences of view are of interest to us because they prove the fruitlessness of the effort to understand how the world was created. It is a question that may be put, but is capable of no definite answer. That is why the author of *Śaṅkṣepaśārīka* says that even the *vivarta* view is not the final. He tells us that there are three ways of viewing the relation between the Brahman and the world. The first views the world as the *pariṇāma* or transformation of the Brahman. The last sees only the Brahman, and every duality is negated for it. Midway between the two comes the *vivarta* view, which is a mixed view.⁴ For *vivarta* is unreal transformation, and implies, like the highest view, that the world is not real, and, like the lowest, that the

¹ There are three definitions of *vivarta*. *Vastunah tatsamasattāko anyathābhāvah pariṇāmah tadasamasattāko vivarta iti vā, kāraṇasalaḥṣaṇo anyathābhāvah pariṇāmah tadvilakṣaṇo vivarta iti vā, kāraṇābhinnam kāryam pariṇāmah tadbhedam vīcāiva tadvyatirekena dūrvacam kāryam vivarta iti vā*. See *Siddhāntaleśa saṅgraha*, p. 10.

² *Siddhāntaleśasāṅgraha*, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12, *Dvārahāraṇam*.

⁴ *Vyāmiśradṛṣṭih*, Vol. II, p. 53. (Edited by Bhau Sastri Vazhe, Benares, Haridas Gupta and Co.)

world is a transformation of the Brahman. This shows that what we ordinarily take as the causality or the creativity of the Brahman is really not what we generally understand by the terms. Yet the idea of the Brahman cannot be dispensed with, if an explanation of the world is to be given. If an ultimate principle of the world is to be posited, it cannot be the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya, or the atom or Īśvara of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Prakṛti is non-sensient, and so cannot create sensient beings. The conception of the atoms is self-contradictory, as they are conceived to be without dimensions; and it is understandable how such dimensionless units can come together and produce the world of dimensions. The Īśvara of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is limited by the atoms, etc.; and his creation of happy and miserable beings out of them must be due to hatred and affection, which qualities render Īśvara a finite being like us.¹ Hence the Brahman, which is conscious and is the only reality, is the sole cause of the world. Hatred and affection cannot be attributed to it, because the jīva is the same as the Brahman and the Brahman cannot be said to hate any jīva, who is itself. Yet its causality is not what popular imagination pictures it to be, and ordinary understanding conceives it to be. We have to say that it is the basic principle of our explanation of the world. Yet we should not understand it as a static principle like a geometrical concept. It must be much more than a heuristic principle, as it must be the source of the world. But we cannot understand what that more is with the help of the concepts of creation, transformation, etc. That more is inexplicable.

We are sure of at least one thing, namely, that the definition of the Brahman is not epistemological. The question is raised how the Brahman, who is *nirguṇa* or qualityless, can be the cause, creator, etc., of the world; for to be a creator, cause, etc., are attributes. The same difficulty was felt by Kant in applying the categories of the phenomenal world to what lies beyond them. But these qualities, says the advaitin, do not belong to the essential nature of the Brahman, which does not really undergo transformation in the creative process. Hence they are only accidents or clues that direct our minds towards it. In the language of the advaitin, creativity, etc., the marks or signs that guide us towards the Brahman, are not its *svaṛūpa* or nature, but are only *taṣastha* or accidental. These marks do not express the Brahman's

¹ See Śaṅkara's Commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, II, 2, 37.

essential nature, but are the marks with the help of which we know it; they are incidental to our understanding of it. The qualities of the Brahman do not logically follow from the nature of the Brahman; but our thinking logically leads us to the Brahman. The concepts through which we understand the Brahman are necessary for our understanding, but are not essential for the Brahman. And because they do not logically express its nature, they are said to be incidental

But now, it can be maintained that these marks are his *taṭastha-lakṣaṇas* or accidents, only if we can prove that the world is *Māyā*, that is, not real like the Brahman and not organically related to it. For if it is real like the Brahman, it must naturally be a *pariṇāma* or transformation of it; and as transformation affects the nature of the Brahman, creativity becomes its *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*, that is, a mark of its essential nature. But then, how are we to know that the world is *Māyā*? We cannot answer, "Because creativity, etc., are only accidents." For, then, our position would be that the world is *Māyā* because creativity, etc., are accidents, and these are accidents because the world is *Māyā*. But this *anyonyāśraya* or mutual dependence of the two ideas is a fallacy in logic; and unless we accept from the *Śruti* that the Brahman without qualities is the only reality, we cannot prove that the definition that the Brahman is the creator, etc., of the world, is only a *taṭasthalakṣaṇa* or a statement of accidents. But if we are to proceed rationally, we have to prove that the world is *Māyā* first, and then conclude that the marks are only accidents. And there is no dearth of independent arguments in Śaṅkara's writings, especially in his criticisms of the rival theories, both orthodox and unorthodox, to show that the world is *Māyā*. In the writings of Śrīharṣa, Chitsukha, and Madhusūdana, these arguments are given a precise form and are made explicit. They are not absolutely new to Western philosophy. Some of them are the same as those found in Plato, Hegel, and Bradley.

VII

MĀYĀ

If *Māyā* means the not-real, is it not of negative character? That is, is *Avidyā* or *Māyā* a *bhāvapadārtha* or an *abhāvapadārtha*, a positive or a negative category? On this question, there is no difference of view in the Advaita schools. All assert that it is

bhāva or positive. The *Siddhāntaleśa* does not mention differences of view on this point. Now, the Brahman too is positive. Evidently *bhāva* or the positive is not the same as the *sat* or the existent in the Advaita. For the Brahman is both *bhāva* and *sat*; but *Māyā* or *Avidyā*, though *bhāva*, is not *sat*. So *bhāva*¹ means what has objectivity, while *sat* is what is not merely objective but also existent or real. Or we may say that the world is only empirically positive, and identify *sat* and *bhāva*. However, logically considering, *Māyā* must be said to have a negative aspect as well. In the illusion of the snake, the snake is regarded as *Māyā* after it is negated by the correct cognition, that is, by the cognition of the rope. We say that the snake is not the real thing. That is, it is what is other than the real though not the unreal. But unfortunately, as we have already pointed out, the word unreal in the popular language is used to denote both the absolutely unreal and the object of illusion; while in the Advaita the two are different. However, to say that a thing is *Māyā* is to say that it is contradictory or that it contains its own negation. The same is the meaning when we say that the world is *Māyā*. But this unreality of *Māyā* is meaningful with reference to another, namely, the Brahman. Hence there is difference between the *Śūnya* of the Buddhist and the *Māyā* of the advaitin. The word *Śūnya* has a double significance. It means the relativity or the unreality of the world and its own reality, though the *Śūnyavādin* does not assert that the *Śūnya* exists. Yet it is his *paramārthasatya* or ultimate reality. The word *Māyā*, though it means the unreality or contradictoriness of the world, does not mean its own reality. It does not signify that it is the ultimate truth. The question is put to the advaitin whether *Māyā* is real, in order to confront him with the dilemma that, if it is real, then there is a second reality besides the Brahman, and, if it is not real, then the world which is *Māyā* cannot be unreal, as the unreality of unreality must be reality. But the advaitin contends that to say that the world is *Māyā* does not imply that *Māyā* is the ultimate truth.² That the world is *Māyā* means that it is full of contradictions. When we pronounce something to be contradictory, we do so in the light of the presupposed idea of the non-contradictory. And the non-contradictory is different from the contradictory. Therefore *Māyā* cannot be the ultimate truth. But the *Śūnyavādin* maintains that

¹ Professor Hirianna suggests that *bhāva* may be interpreted as creativity.

² See *Advaitasiddhi*, pp. 207 ff.

to say that the world is Śūnya implies that Śūnya is the final truth, for Śūnya is the essence of the world. Thus Śūnya both negates the reality of the world and affirms its own reality. Māyā is not such a concept. That is why the advaitin insists that Māyā has to be negated in order to realize the Brahman. This insistence of the advaitin shows that Māyā does not imply that the world is already negated, but only that it is contradictory and yet experienced. This is further proof that Māyā does not mean unreality like that of a hare's horn. It is something that we confront and have to negate. The position of the Śūnyavādin is that the world is full of contradictions and therefore Śūnya. But Śūnya is both a conclusion from contradictoriness and a synonym for it.¹ But Māyā is not a conclusion from contradictoriness, but is only its synonym. Hence a conclusion has to be drawn, that there is truth behind Māyā, and that is the Brahman.

The negation of Māyā, some advaitins say, is the same as the Brahman. Some others hold that it also is Māyā or *anirvacanīya*, that is, it is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, nor neither. But Ānandabodhācārya maintains that it is not *anirvacanīya*, which is the above four, but is of a fifth kind.² The reason for the first view is that negation is ontologically identical with its basis, which is positive; and as the positive basis of the negation of Avidyā is the Brahman, the negation is identical with the Brahman. The reason for the second view is that, if that negation is identical with the Brahman, then just as the Brahman is eternal that negation too must be eternal; and if it is eternal, there is no need of the knowledge of the Brahman in order to destroy Avidyā. And the reason for maintaining the third view is that, if this negation is Māyā, then just as Māyā can have an end, then even the negation of Avidyā, which means liberation, will also have an end. But no advaitin is prepared to believe that *mukti* or salvation can ever have an end. Yet the difference between the views is not really fundamental; and even the first view can be easily defended by pointing out that the so-called negation of Māyā is not the negation of a real entity. The negation of a real entity on another real entity may give rise to the difficulty pointed out. Any number of illusory objects can be perceived and negated on a real object. The first view is practically the same as the second,

¹ See the discussions of Śūnya in the chapters on "Buddhistic Idealism."

² *Siddhāntaleśasāṅgraha*, p. 107. This view really belongs to Vimuktātman and not to Ānandabodha. See *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 85 (G.O.S.).

CAUSE OF THE WORLD

as this negation, like *Māyā*, is neither real nor unreal, and is identical with the Brahman only ontologically; which means that negation too has no separate reality. The existence of the phenomenal world is really the existence of the Brahman, that shines through the phenomenal world as its *sattā*; and, similarly, the existence of negation too is the existence of the Brahman. The objector to this view forgets that, for the Advaita, negation has no ontological validity. This point removes the force of the third objection also; for if negation as such has no ontological validity, the question of its coming to an end does not arise.

VIII

CAUSE OF THE WORLD

Māyā, as we have already noted, means the contradictoriness of the world. It is what is other than the real. It is what is experienced on the same basis as that of its own negation, which means that it contains its own negation within itself. But in spite of its contradictoriness, does it not spring from the Brahman? What other source can it have? There is really nothing besides the Brahman. Naturally the Brahman itself must be the source. What then is its relation to the Brahman? Though we know that the Brahman is the *vivarta-kāraṇa*, or the cause that does not undergo transformation, of the world; as somehow the world, so long as we are, exists along with the Brahman; the question rises in our mind, What is the relation between the two, which we are led to regard as existing together?

At the very outset, we may point out that the reasonableness of raising the question is disputable. The Brahman is the presupposition of the world or *Māyā*; and if this is all that we want to know by enquiring into the nature of the relation between the two, our enquiry has logical justification. But we have to note that though *Māyā* presupposes the Brahman, the latter does not presuppose *Māyā*. That is, the relation of presupposition is one-sided. But when we think of the simultaneity of the Brahman and *Māyā*, we may think of the presupposition as mutual. It is to warn us of such a mistake that the advaitin tells us that the relation also between the two is *Māyā*. That is, the nature of the relation is self-contradictory, which means that it is no relation as we generally understand that term.

But though logically *Māyā* means contradictoriness, it is not simply dismissed as an unreality, but is given a cosmic significance by the advaitin. It is not merely a logical entity like the proposition of some of the contemporary systems of logic, or an abstract formula like that of mathematics, but the universe itself. And some advaitins hold that it undergoes transformation like the *Prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhya and evolves the forms of the world. Others hold that, in conjunction with it, the Brahman forms the personal God *Īśvara*, who, with *Māyā* as his power or *śakti*, creates the world. He transforms his own *śakti* and makes it take on the forms of the world. Some who are more logical do not admit *Īśvara* at all except as a sort of concession to popular religion, and maintain that *Māyā* is an inexplicable entity which can be regarded neither as existent nor as non-existent. As it vanishes the moment the Brahman is experienced, it can have no relation to the Brahman; and so we need not explain the relation. Taking all these views and aspects together, we may sum up the various significances of the term *Māyā* in Professor Radhakrishnan's words. "(1) That the world is not self-explanatory shows its phenomenal character, which is signified by the word *māyā*. (2) The problem of the relation between the world and the Brahman has meaning for us who admit the pure being of Brahman from the intuitive standpoint and demand an explanation of its relation to the world, which we see from the logical standpoint. We can never understand how the ultimate reality is related to the world of plurality, since the two are heterogeneous, and every attempt at explanation is bound to fail. This incomprehensibility is brought out by the term *māyā*. (3) If the Brahman is to be viewed as the cause of the world, it is only in the sense that the world rests on Brahman, while the latter is in no way touched by it, and the world which rests on Brahman is called *māyā*. (4) The principle assumed to account for the appearance of Brahman as the world is also called *māyā*. (5) If we confine our attention to the empirical world and employ the dialectic of logic, we get the conception of a perfect personality, *Īśvara*, who has the power of self-expression. This power or energy is called *māyā*. (6) This energy of *Īśvara* becomes transformed into the *upādhis*, or limitations, the unmanifested matter (*avyākṛta prakṛti*), from which all existence issues. It is the object through which the supreme subject *Īśvara* develops the universe."¹

¹ *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 573-4.

If we analyse these different significances, we find that the idea of Māyā is utilized by the advaitin not only to get at the Brahman by ascending from the phenomenal world but also to explain the world by descending from the Brahman. The ascent to the Brahman is of course logical. It is the non-contradictory presupposed by the contradictory, the absolute presupposed by the relative, and truth presupposed by falsity; for anything is false only with reference to some truth, relative only with reference to an absolute, and contradictory only with reference to the non-contradictory. In the case of the serpent, truth is known first and then the serpent is declared to be false; while in the case of the noumenal truth, the contradictoriness of the world, and so its falsity, is known first, and truth is known later as implicitly present all along. Just as, in the perceptual illusion, the appearance of the serpent has its locus or *adhikaraṇa* in the rope, the world too, as an appearance, must have a locus in the Brahman. This ascent, we may even say, is a sort of deduction, just as Hegel's dialectic is a deduction of the Absolute from the category of Being. But unlike Hegel's dialectic, the descent from the Brahman is not logical, and can hardly be called a deduction. Neither the Brahman nor Māyā has a logical structure. The former is the highest limit of our logic, just as absolute non-being is its lowest limit. Logic can point to the Brahman, but does not comprehend it. Like Kant's Supreme Ideal of Reason, it is the final presupposition of logic, and naturally does not presuppose what presupposes it. Yet it is the foundation on which the whole superstructure of the world rests, for it is the true existence or *sat*. The apparent existence of phenomenal things is due to the true existence of the Brahman shining through them, just as the existence of the snake in illusion is really the existence of the rope underlying it. Hence the Brahman constitutes the world, as without it the world cannot be experienced as existent. Herein lies the difference between the Brahman of Śaṅkara and Kant's Supreme Ideal of Reason. From the pure Brahman nothing can be logically deduced. Nothing can be deduced from an ultimate presupposition. Nor can we deduce from Māyā the various categories of the phenomenal world. The nature of Māyā is contradictory, and from what is contradictory no deduction can be made. It may perhaps be thought that Māyā could have been treated as the Non-Ego facing the Ego, and, as in Fichte's philosophy, some deduction of the world could have been made. But

the Brahman is pure and infinite, and it could not have faced anything opposing it. Māyā vanishes at the level of the Brahman, and it is inconceivable how the Brahman could have faced it. The advaitin would say that Fichte artificially applied the two laws of thought, the law of identity and that of contradiction, to the Infinite or Transcendental Ego, and so was able to deduce the Non-Ego. These two laws are the laws of thought, but the Transcendental Ego is the highest limit of thought and is not within it. Who is to apply these laws to the Transcendental Ego? It cannot be that Ego itself, for it faces at that level no opposition, and so there is no need for the rise of these laws. If it is we, then it is the finite ego that applies the laws to the Infinite Ego; but the difficulty then is that, unless the laws were already applied to the Infinite Ego, the finite ego itself would not have been. If it is said that the Infinite Ego itself applies the laws to itself through sheer freedom, it is like saying that God created the world to enjoy Himself, that His creation is a play or *līlā*, and so forth. But none of these statements amounts to a logical deduction of the world from the Brahman or the Absolute. So even from Māyā the nature of the world can hardly be deduced. That is why, though, as regards the ascent, all the advaita schools are at one, they differ from each other in their accounts of the process by which the world of things has come into being. When it is asked, How can all the conflicting views be true? the *Siddhāntabindu* says that only the non-duality of the Brahman is the chief doctrine, and one can be indifferent to the rest. Yet they are incorporated by the *śāstra* or philosophy, because they suit different intellects in their search of the ultimate truth.¹ Hence every school of the Advaita refers with respect to the other schools, in spite of differences.

IX

AD HOC DISTINCTIONS: MĀYĀ AND AVIDYĀ, ĪŚVARA, SĀKSI, JĪVA AND THE BRAHMAN; ONE-NESS AND PLURALITY OF THE JĪVAS

In the process of descent, therefore, we are beyond philosophical reasoning, and are in the sphere, we may say, of Yoga or the prac-

¹ *Advaitātmatatvam hi pradhānam phalavatvāt. Ajñātātvaṁ ca prameyam śāstrasya. Jīveśvaravidhāgādīkalpanāstu puruṣabuddhīmātraprabhavā api śāstreṇa anūdyante tatvajñānopayogitvāt.* And the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* of Suresvara is quoted here. *Yayā yayā bhavet pumsām vyutpattiḥ pratyagātmāni, sā saiva prakriyā jñeyā sādḥvi sā ca vyavasthitā*, pp. 30-1. (Edited by P. C. Divanji, Oriental Institute, Baroda.)

tice of meditation and even popular religion. And no one of the accounts of the process of descent is completely satisfactory by itself. All conflict with each other, and though each tries to be self-consistent, it satisfies only a particular demand of reason or rather of the heart. Thus the distinctions between the Brahman, Īśvara, Kūṭastha or Sākṣi (Witness), and jīva, between Māyā and Avidyā, and between the powers of these, the *Vikṣepaśakti* (Projecting Power) and the *Āvaraṇaśakti* (Concealing Power), are all more or less *ad hoc* distinctions, which, if made from one point of view, may be ignored from another. We have already noted that some hold that the Brahman is the material cause of the universe, some that it is the *vivartakāraṇa* and Māyā the *pariṇāmikāraṇa*, some that the Brahman is the main material cause and Māyā only secondary, and some that Māyā alone is the material cause. We have said that this question should not have been raised, as the Brahman is not the cause of the world in the sense in which we understand the word. One simple reason for dismissing the question as useless is that the Brahman, as it is beyond time, could not have worked in time, whether as a material cause or an efficient cause. But every cause in the universe must work in time. It is considerations like these that made Kant assert that the application of the categories of our understanding to the noumena ends in antinomies, and creates the illusions of reason. The deductions from the transcendental, like the accounts of creation, can be only semblances of reasoning, because no reasoning is possible there. Even if we think of the transcendental ideal, not as God or creator, but as reason or ground, we cannot deduce, except through myths and metaphors, the world of phenomena from it, because we can understand it only as the ultimate presupposition of the world and not as presupposing the world. The *ad hoc* distinctions made by the advaitins are therefore of interest to us, only in that they show that, while some satisfy our understanding in some ways, others satisfy it in others; and final reconciliation between them can be made only by saying that one can be indifferent to all of them, for the distinctions too like Māyā are neither real nor unreal.

The logical significance of both Māyā and Avidyā is the same. That is why the two words are used as synonyms by some like the author of *Sanḥṣepaśārīraka*. But according to *Prakaṣārthavivarāṇa*, the parts of Māyā are called Avidyās. For *Tatvaviveka*, Māyā and Avidyā are the two forms of Mūlaprakṛti or original

matter, which has three Guṇas, Satva, Rajas, and Tamas.¹ Mūla-prakṛti with Satva predominating is Māyā, and with Satva overpowered by Rajas and Tamas is Avidyā. Others say that Mūla-prakṛti has two kinds of power. By one it screens or obscures truth, and by the other it creates or projects the illusory object. For instance, in the illusion of the snake, the rope has to be screened and the snake has to be created or projected. This snake certainly is not the snake seen somewhere else and remembered, for a remembered snake cannot terrify us. That is why even Śāṅkara's definition, which is not definitely logical but is psychological as well, and which runs that *adhyāsa* (illusion) is the appearance of a previously seen thing in another place and is of the form of remembrance, is made definitely logical by the later advaitins by omitting the reference to remembrance.² Hence the snake seen in illusion is inexplicable and new, and is thought to be projected by the projective power of Mūlaprakṛti. This Mūla-prakṛti as projective or creative is Māyā, and as screening or obscuring is Avidyā.

The question whether Māyā is one or many is also raised. Some say that, as it is inexplicable, that is, not logical, it may be regarded as one or many indifferently. For instance, Mādhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha*, while criticizing the Sāṅkhya conception of Prakṛti, which, as one, involves the liberation of all jīvas when one jīva is liberated on Prakṛti's ceasing to be active, says that this difficulty does not arise in the Advaita as Māyā can be both one and many.³ Some say that Māyā is one and is the *upādhi* or adjunct of Īśvara, while the Avidyās are many and are the *upādhis* or adjuncts of the jīvas. Some hold that Māyā is one and this oneness, when a jīva is liberated, does not entail the liberation of the other jīvas, just as a universal, which is present in all particulars, does not imply the destruction of all the rest when one particular is destroyed.⁴ But some others hold that, as the Avidyās are many, when one jīva is liberated on the destruction of one Avidyā, the other Avidyās keep the other jīvas in bondage. These views only show the fruitlessness of attempting to bring into the moulds of logic what is admittedly alogical.

¹ Satva, Rajas, and Tamas are generally translated by the words Goodness, Activity, and Darkness.

² *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 26. Śāṅkara's definition is *Smytirūpaḥ paratrapūrvadyatāvabhāsaḥ*. In its modified form, it is *Paratra parāvabhāsaḥ* or *mithyāvastusambhedaāvabhāsaḥ*.

³ Pp. 143-4.

⁴ For all these views, see *Siddhāntaleśasāṅgraha*, pp. 21 ff.

Similarly, between the *jīvas* and the Brahman two other principles are distinguished, namely, *Īśvara* (God) and *Sākṣi* (Witness). Some *advaitins* have no place for *Īśvara*, for they say that somehow the Brahman itself, as the *Brahmasūtras* define it, must be the creator of the world without itself being affected by the process of creation. But some, trying to make the process of creation more conceivable, and unable to understand how the pure Brahman can be the creator, say that the Brahman in conjunction with *Māyā* becomes *Īśvara*, who, like the *Logos* or *Demiurge* in Western philosophy, is the creator of the world. But this really does not solve the difficulty; for the conjunction or co-operation of the Brahman with *Māyā* is as inconceivable as the creativity of the pure Brahman. And we may as well accept the first view, which does not unnecessarily posit the second entity, *Īśvara*. Now, below *Īśvara* and above the *jīva* comes the *Sākṣi*, also called *Kūṭastha*. *Īśvara* is the lord of the universe, but the *Sākṣi* is the bare witness of the *jīva* and his actions. Naturally as a witness, it is unaffected by the latter.¹ According to *Kaumudī*, the *Sākṣi* is a form of *Īśvara*, and follows unaffected the *jīva* and his actions. But some say that *jīva* himself, in the role of the witness of his own actions, is *Sākṣi*, and that there is no other *Sākṣi* besides the *jīva*. Some hold that this *Sākṣi* is different for each *jīva*, while others hold that it is the same for all.

Then eventually is discussed the relation between the Brahman, *Īśvara*, *Sākṣi*, and *jīva*. The Brahman is by itself pure consciousness and becomes *Īśvara* when conjoined with *Māyā*. But what is the nature of this conjunction? On this point also there are different views. Similarly, on the relation between *Īśvara* and the *jīva* also there is no unanimity. On these points there are three main views, the *ābhāsavāda* or the appearance view, the *pratibimbavāda* or the reflection view, and the *avacchedavāda* or the limitation view. According to *Sureśvarācārya*, the Brahman screened by *Avidyā* appears as *Sākṣi*, and screened by *Buddhi* or intellect appears as the *jīva*.² *Sākṣi*, according to this view, occupies the place of *Īśvara* and is one for all. According to *Prakāṣārthavivaraṇa*, *Īśvara* is the reflection of the Brahman in *Māyā*, and the *jīva* is the reflection of the same Brahman in *Avidyā*, which is only a part of *Māyā*. It is difficult to say whether *Īśvara* is the whole of which the *jīvas* are the parts. For it is not

¹ See *Siddhāntaleśaṅgraha*, pp. 32 ff.

² For all these theories see *Siddhāntaleśa* and *Siddhāntabindu*.

maintained that the reflection of the Brahman in Māyā as a whole is constituted by the reflections of the same in the different parts of Māyā. For the author of *Tattvaviveka*, the reflection of the Brahman in the Satva aspect of Mūlaprakṛti is Īśvara, and the reflection in the Rajas and Tamas aspects of the same is jīva. The author of *San̄kṣepaśārīraka* holds that the reflection in Avidyā is Īśvara, and the reflection in the *antahkaraṇa* or mind is jīva.¹ All these are reflection theories. The author of *Citrādīpa* maintains that the Brahman is pure consciousness not limited by Māyā, Īśvara is the same reflected in the impressions left in Māyā by the intellects (*buddhis*) of the jīvas, Kūṭastha is the pure consciousness limited by the gross and subtle bodies of the jīva, and jīva is the reflection of the mind posited in Kūṭastha. This view is evidently a mixture of the reflection and the limitation theories. Some followers of the *Vivaraṇa* do not accept that both Īśvara and jīva are reflections, but that jīva only is reflection and Īśvara is the prototype of that reflection.² The difference between a prototype and an original is that the original Brahman, as pure, cannot be reflected; yet jīva as a reflection must have a prototype, and Īśvara serves as that prototype. Īśvara is conceived with reference to the jīva, and the Brahman is without that reference.

But some find it difficult to understand how the formless Brahman can be reflected in Māyā. Hence they advocate the limitation view. Māyā, though not real, limits the nature of the infinite Brahman, and the jīva is thus obtained. And what is not so limited is Īśvara. This view seems to be that of Vācaspati. *Siddhāntabindu* gives the view more definitely. The Brahman, as the object of Avidyā, is Īśvara and, as the *āśraya* or the locus of the same, is the jīva. As a locus, the jīva is limited or characterized by Avidyā, just as the colour of a thing becomes the character or mark of that thing. But Īśvara, as the object of Avidyā, is not so limited; for Avidyā is ignorance, and the object of ignorance is not limited or characterized by it.

But there are some who accept none of the above views. They say that the Brahman and the jīva are the same. Only, the former forgets its true nature and so regards itself as finite; but the moment the jīva knows his true nature, he becomes the Brahman. This view is the finally true view. For, it is of the essence of Māyā that it is removed by experience or realization.³ And what-

¹ *Dhīvūsanāsu*.

² The prototype is called *bimba*.

³ Cp. *Jñānanivartiyatvam* is *mithyātvam*.

ever is so removed cannot be ultimately real. But because this Māyā is experienced in spite of its not being real, attempts are made to understand through what relation to the Brahman it creates the finite minds. But in these attempts, concepts and images of our ordinary experience have to be translated to higher levels; and so no concept or image can be found to be satisfactory. For instance, even the limitation or characterization theory has its own defects. For how can the Brahman, which is pure and formless, be limited by Māyā? If it is said that the so-called limitation too is not real, then this theory enjoys no special advantage over the reflection theory. Even according to this theory, the reflection is not ultimately real. Nor has the appearance theory, which seems to be less vulnerable than most others, satisfied all the advaitins. For some felt that, if the jīva and the world are a mere appearance, then the effort to attain liberation by the experience of the Brahman need not be real. Nay, even the reflection theory is rejected for the same reason; and in order to think of the jīva as real, the limitation theory is accepted.¹

If essentially the Brahman and the jīva are identical, as the consciousness that is reflected or limited is one, the further question is raised, are the jīvas many or one? Many advaitins hold that the jīvas are many, and that only Īśvara, whether as the Lord or the Sākṣi, is one. Some even of those who hold that Māyā or Avidyā is one, maintain the plurality of the jīvas; for Māyā is of a contradictory nature, and any inconsistency in their position is easily accounted for by invoking its aid. But there is a school of the Advaita for which the jīva is one.² Some upholders of this view maintain that the body also of this jīva is one, and the plurality of bodies we perceive is like the plurality in dreams. Some others say that there is only one chief jīva called Hiranya-garbha, and that the many are his reflections; while some others think that, though the jīva is one, his bodies are many, and the seeming plurality of the jīvas is due to the plurality of the bodies. Evidently, these views arose to emphasize the one-ness of the Brahman; and we can easily see that the one true jīva of these views practically corresponds to the Īśvara of some of the above views. When these views are compared, their differences come to be mostly those of terminology.

There are other minor differences between the schools of the Advaita; but they cannot be dealt with here. Even the differences

¹ *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 20 ff.

that have been referred to, cannot be said to have been discussed; for the various bearings which these differences have on the other problems of the Advaita could not be treated. Our aim in referring to those views is to show that attempts of descending from the Absolute, like the accounts of creation, can be many, and will be found to be unreasonable at some point or other. Our reason can go from Māyā to the Absolute, but it ends at the very fringe of the latter. To understand the descent, therefore, is beyond the powers of reason. It can direct us from the world to God, but not from God to the world.

X

LOCUS OF MĀYĀ

Even the question whether Māyā is *brahmāśraya* or *jīvāśraya*, that is, whether it resides in the Brahman or the jīva, should not have been raised philosophically. It assumed importance not probably within the advaitin's fold, but because the critics of the Advaita pressed it. For if it is said that it resides in the Brahman the question is asked, How can the Brahman, who is pure and without a second, be a locus of something? If, on the other hand, it is maintained that it resides in the jīva, it is asked how there can be a jīva for Māyā to reside in before Māyā itself creates him? It is thought that on both alternatives the advaitin is non-plussed. And the advaitins themselves blindly committed the mistake of holding either alternative. The author of *Śaṅkṣepaśārvīrika* holds that Māyā or Avidyā is *brahmāśraya*,¹ that it resides in the Brahman. For is not the rope the locus of the serpent in illusion? If so, the locus of Avidyā too must be the Brahman. For, just as after the knowledge of the rope the serpent disappears, upon the knowledge of the Brahman the world vanishes. But the author of *Siddhāntabindu* tells us that Avidyā can only be *jīvāśraya*, that it resides in the jīva, for the Brahman which is pure cannot be the locus of anything. But to discuss this question, concerning what transcends our thought, is futile. We know that the jīva is a product of Māyā. So Māyā enters the constitution of the jīva. If this is the same as saying that Māyā resides in the jīva, we may think so. But if it means that the jīva must exist first before he can be the locus of Māyā, then he cannot exist at all. All that we can say is that, when the jīva analyses his

¹ Vol. II, p. 105.

IDENTITY BETWEEN THE BRAHMAN AND THE JĪVA

own nature, he finds that it is Māyā, which presupposes the truth of the Brahman. But he can never answer how Māyā came into being, and how it could have been before his own existence. All that transcends his thought. The question arises because of the prejudice of reason to account even for the unaccountable. And in spite of declaring that Māyā is unaccountable, some of the advaitins themselves fall a prey to this prejudice.

XI

IDENTITY BETWEEN THE BRAHMAN AND THE JĪVA

There is another important aspect of the Advaita, namely, the identity or non-difference of the Brahman and the jīva. This point has already been incidentally referred to, though not discussed. But to prove it from what has already been said is not difficult. If the Brahman is the sole reality, the nature of everything must essentially be the Brahman. That is, everything finite is *niḥsvabhāva*, without its own nature, as the Śūnyavādin say. Of course the advaitin differs from the Śūnyavādin by maintaining that, because nothing possesses its own nature, its nature is the Brahman, while the Śūnyavādin simply stops at *niḥsvabhāvatā* or naturelessness. Now, if everything is the Brahman, the jīva must also be the Brahman, as the jīva's own nature, like that of everything else, is not real. Śaṅkara accepts the identity of the two from the *Śruti*, with which he grammatically wrestles in order to extract from it the meaning of identity. As the later advaitins have clarified it, this identity means the negation of difference and not the identity which can be understood only with reference to difference. Because of the identity of the Brahman and the jīva, Śaṅkara's statement that what falls within the range of the object is a superimposition on what falls within the range of the subject, is interpreted as subjective idealism. To remove this misconception, it had only to be pointed out that the subject, which finds itself confronted by an object, is also a superimposition on the Brahman like the object. For instance, *Citrādīpa* views the jīva, experienced as the I, as a superimposition on the Sākṣi. Thus even the view that Īśvara is a superimposition on the Brahman, the Sākṣi on Īśvara, and the jīva on the Sākṣi, cannot be a wrong interpretation of the Advaita. Even in some extreme forms of the Advaita which have no place for Īśvara and Sākṣi, and for which there is no difference between

the subject and the object, the *jīva* is certainly not the final truth. The identity, on any of these views, is not the identity of the Brahman with the *jīva* as such, but with the *jīva* without his finitude.

Though Śaṅkara accepts the identity from the *Śruti*, he has, as we said, to defend his position by refuting rival theories. It is here that we find rational proofs for the identity. For if the *jīva* is different from the Brahman, then there would be two realities. And none maintains that *jīva* is infinite. But finitude implies dependence and therefore *niḥsvabhāvatā*, or absence of own nature—which means that the *jīva* cannot be real. Hence the true nature of the *jīva* must be the Brahman.

Yet more importance is given to the *jīva* than to matter by the Advaita; for, according to it, reality is *asmatpratyayagocara*, that is, reality is like the I. The nature of the Brahman is consciousness, which is found only in the *jīva* and not in matter or object. The conscious nature of the Brahman too need not be accepted merely from the *Śruti*. Śaṅkara contends that the cause of the world cannot be mere unconscious matter, because the Brahman must be the sole cause of the world, that is, both the efficient and the material. As no efficient cause can be insensient or *jaḍa*, the Brahman must be conscious. Śaṅkara does not advance the argument that matter which is insensient cannot produce mind which is consciousness. He says that, in the world, we see that from the sensient human body insensient things, like hair and nails, are born and from insensient rotten matter, like cow-dung, etc., insects and worms, which are sensient, are born.¹ But he tells us that pure matter by itself cannot plan out creation, and so needs the help of consciousness. Nor can we say that the cause of the world is two-fold, both matter and consciousness. The Brahman alone must be the cause, as otherwise matter may not conform to its activity. Therefore we have to admit that it is conscious. This is the basic argument of Śaṅkara against the Sāṅkhya theory of Prakṛti.

Now that the nature of the Brahman is shown to be consciousness, it should be treated as more akin to the *jīva* than to matter. Hence, if the Brahman as the ideal is to be realized, it is to be realized only within the *jīva* and not within matter.

¹ *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, II, 1, 6.

XII

ŚAṆKARA AND LOGIC: FINAL FORM OF THE ADVAITA AS
RECONSTRUCTED

It may be said that Śaṅkara very often, in his commentary, condemns *tarka* or reasoning, and our attempt to base the Advaita on reasoning without the support of the *Śruti* would be a misinterpretation. For instance, while criticizing the above Sāṅkhya theory, he says that the cause of the world, the Brahman, cannot be seen because it has no form; it cannot be inferred because it has no mark or character; therefore it can be known only from the *Śruti*. But what he understands by inference is of the form that always requires an example. He says that the unseen can be inferred only on the analogy of the seen.¹ The transcendental or presuppositional logic was not elaborated by his time, though he was making use of it all the while in his arguments. In this logic there is no demand for an example. Western philosophy owes to Kant and the post-Kantians a definite formulation of this logic. Because this logic was not deliberately used by Śaṅkara, whenever an example was demanded by his orthodox rivals he was falling back on the *Śruti* and condemning inference as *śuṣka* or dry. His orthodox rivals also did the same in similar circumstances. But in his criticisms of unorthodox systems like the Jaina and the Bauddha, Śaṅkara had to depend on reason; and his reasoning follows the method that implies or presupposes the truth of his conclusions. And his method is really nothing but the critical or transcendental method of Kant and the dialectical method of Hegel, with of course certain differences.² *Arthāpatti*, which is recognized by later advaitins as one of the *pramāṇas* or valid sources of knowledge, is in essence dialectical. *Arthāpatti* is the postulation of an entity by which alone a contradiction is solved. The modern student of the Advaita need not be discouraged and leave the subject with the feeling that it is after all dogmatic and is not worth philosophical study.

We may sum up, from the standpoint of pure philosophy and apart from reliance on the *Śruti*, the argument that leads to the Advaita. With the experience of illusion, we come to know that all that we see is not true, and that certain things, though experi-

¹ *Ibid.*, II, 2, 2. *Dṛṣṭāccādṛṣṭasiddhi*. Cp. also *Saṅkṣepaśāstrīyaka*, Vol. I, p. 99. *Upādhyabhāve na bhavedupādhimat, tatasthamajñānamupādhirīṣyate, pramāṇa-buddherna tadātmavastuni, svayamprahāse na tatotra mānadhih.*

² For a comparison of these, see my book, *Thought and Reality*.

enced as existing, do not really exist. Still, the difference between things which exist and things which only seem to exist can be made only among things which are experienced as existing. Then the attempt is made to formulate a criterion of truth and falsity; and this is found to be the criterion of non-contradiction. But now that our experience has become reflective, the question is raised whether the things which we say are real are truly so, that is, whether the things we experience involve a contradiction of their own nature. The criterion now is not simply epistemological, but also metaphysical. It is found that everything finite involves its own negation. But we started with the idea that to exist means to be uncontradicted; and what is experienced as existing, in spite of contradictions, must therefore be false existence or appearance. Consequently, the world of finite things, which involve their own negation, cannot be true existence. Hence true existence must be sought somewhere else. And as we found in illusion that false existence must be based on what we regard as true existence, the world which is now to be treated as false existence must be based upon something which is true existence. As this cannot be a plurality, because plurality implies finitude and finitude contradiction; it must be one. And this is the Brahman. This is naturally, for us who are finite, an ideal. Yet though an ideal, it is the true existence.

We thus see that, for the advaitin, it is the ideal or norm that is the true existence. Both logic and epistemology start with the avowed purpose of finding out the true existence, which they discover in the ideal. Therefore there is nothing derogatory in holding that pure existence is the truth of the universe. The world consists only of different forms of this existence. It is not empty. It is the ideal of logic and epistemology. It may contain much more than logic and epistemology can discover. But that more they cannot conceive. Logic and epistemology have to discuss what is true and what is not true; whether this truth is bliss or the good they do not consider. Hence it is illogical to condemn the Brahman of the Advaita as empty existence and so forth. Logic cannot decide what else the Brahman is. The very fact that the Brahman is the ideal shows that it is not bare or empty existence—which, in European logic, is more or less an attribute of things as in the judgments, "Matter exists," and "God exists"—but the fullest existence. It is not like empty colour that is not the colour of anything.

Even in European philosophy it is not according to all logicians that existence is a quality or predicate. It cannot be so for Bradley. Indeed, he distinguishes¹ between reality and existence. But what makes him draw the distinction is only the general European prejudice against the word existence. The existential judgments like "Matter exists," and "Chimeras do not exist," mean for Bradley that reality includes matter and excludes chimeras.² Here existence is for him reality and so the true subject, but not a predicate. And it cannot be really otherwise. Further, he asserts that the hypothetical judgment must have a categorical basis,³ as otherwise the relation of necessity between the antecedent and the consequent of this judgment would be without any basis. But the categorical, even the singular or the particular, is hypothetical in essence. The latter he calls an imperfect hypothetical.⁴ But if the truth of the categorical is hypothetical, and if the hypothetical cannot be true without a categorical basis, then reality must be of a nature which is both hypothetical and categorical, that is—it must be an identity of the two. This identity means nothing else than that truth is existence and that it is reality. Hence existence, for Bradley, is not a predicate of the subject. Further, the hypothetical is the universal, and that is the law. Hence law must ultimately be the true existence, which is the same as reality. This is almost identical with the Buddhistic conception of the Dharma or Law, and is the same as the advaitic conception of the Brahman. The advaitin too declares that the Brahman is the highest *sāmānya* or universal, it pervades everything and fills everything.⁵

It may perhaps be objected that the Brahman is not a universal as understood in European philosophy, on the ground that the universal in European philosophy is not the material cause of the particulars. The advaitin admits that it is the material cause, but adds that it is the efficient cause also. It is the material cause, because the being or *sattā* of the world is really the Being which is the Brahman. According to some Western logicians, the universal is either a mere name or a concept; according to some, it is a function, not a sense datum; and according to the others, it is a group of common qualities abstracted from the particulars. In the view of many idealists, it is a function. But this word is not associated with the sense of concreteness, and the doubt lingers

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 317.

² *Principles of Logic*, pp. 80 ff. and 120 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 86 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 102 ff.

⁵ *Anusūyāta, anugata.*

whether it is not after all an abstraction. But if we think of it as concrete, as Bosanquet wants to do, it is difficult to understand how it is not the material cause as well. That is why Plato considers the Forms as "Powers" also. However, all these universals are finite, and so are not self-explanatory or consistent in nature. For instance, the universal of horse must be different from its material. But if we take the single concrete universal, the Absolute, it must be the very substance of the universe. It is for this reason that the advaitin rejects every other universal as not true, and regards every finite thing as a form which the Absolute puts on. Then it is the forms that become particulars, and what is called particularity or pure existence really turns out to be the universal. And as all the finite forms are imperfect, they naturally look to the infinite as their perfection and support. And just as the Idea is the support, in Plato, of all the particular things—for without it they cease to be what they are—the Brahman is the support of the whole phenomenal world. Hence it is their final law, the true *dharma*. It is their ideal and essence. Just as Plato regarded the physical horse as an imperfect horse, and the Idea of the horse as the perfect horse and as the universal or the law of the horse; the Brahman is regarded as the ideal of everything finite and as its universal or law. That is why the realization of the Brahman is preached as the highest aim in life.

NOTE

Many advaitins use inference, *yukti*, *anumāna*, or *upapatti* (cp. Ānandagiri on Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās*, II, 1, and also the proofs given by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi*) to show that the world is *Māyā*. But all these proofs go no farther than pointing out that the world is *Māyā*; they do not give the positive argument that the Brahman is real. The reality of the Brahman has to be accepted mainly from the *Śruti*. But it is not impossible to discover a positive proof for the reality of the Brahman by the application of the principle that unreality presupposes reality. This argument is of course *arthāpatti* or a form of the transcendental argument.

Here we have to note another point. It is said that no *pramāṇa* or proof can reveal the existence of the Brahman. The Brahman is never a *pramāviśaya* or an object of an epistemic act. And as *pramāṇa* is *pramākarana* or what produces a true epistemic act, *arthāpatti* too, as a *pramāṇa*, should be regarded as incapable of producing the knowledge of the Brahman. It is true that, if by knowledge of the Brahman is

meant direct experience of the Brahman, then none of these *pramāṇas*, including even *arthāpatti*, can produce it. But of all the *pramāṇas*, *arthāpatti* has the advantage that it alone can point towards the Brahman. Scripture of course may do it, but it is not a thought process. The Brahman can never be perceived by our senses, and inference of the syllogistic type cannot prove its existence, because the Brahman cannot be brought under any universal major premise. *Arthāpatti* does not require a major premise, and it alone can prove that an indeterminate reality is involved in our experience, without which our experience cannot be understood (for a discussion of the nature of *arthāpatti*, see the author's *Thought and Reality*, pp. 223 ff. and 237 ff.).

Pramā or true knowledge at the finite level is a *vyttijñāna* or epistemic act. But our knowledge of the Brahman, if we have a direct experience of it, cannot be that, for the epistemic act belongs to finitude, to that level where there is distinction between subject and object. But in the direct experience of the Brahman, the subject must become identical with the object. So truth or *pramā*, at the level of the direct experience of the Brahman, cannot be a *vyttijñāna*, but must be identical with reality itself. But at the finite level, distinction has to be drawn between truth and reality. And truth may be regarded as belonging to the subjective side. It need not be maintained that the Brahman is reality and not truth. For the subject or consciousness is not extinct here, though it becomes identical with the object.

The idea, I think, will be clearer, if we understand by *vytti* or the epistemic process or epistemic act. *Vytti* is generally translated by the word psychosis, which is misleading, as psychosis is a technical term in psycho-pathology.

Hence the doctrine of the identity of the jīva and the Brahman, the concept of Māyā and all that it implies, were attacked, rejected, or modified. Some Vedāntins like Madhva did not care much to unify their ideas of God, world, and jīva. Their systems are pure pluralisms and realisms without qualification. But others could not completely dispense with the identity of these three ideas, and held some form of identity in difference between the three. These are called *bhedābheda-vādins* in Sanskrit. Their systems are included in our survey of idealism, because they have an ideal reality, which, though remaining unaffected, becomes this world. But this world is real, because it is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the real. The jīva who is liberated can see the ideal world. Yet the ideal reality is not one of the many realities existing side by side. It is eternally existing, and is this world itself seen from a different angle. Only, the jīva has to be retransformed (or a sort of involution has to take place) into his original purity, in order to experience the ideal world.

These systems also claim the *Sruti* as their authority and support. Yet they also have a logical structure of their own, which can be traced in their criticisms of rival theories. They give their own explanation of illusion, for they also try to formulate their criterion of truth on its basis. It is but natural that thinking starts when life is thwarted in its course by experiences that disappoint it. The question of truth should therefore arise when illusion is experienced. And it is felt by almost all schools of Indian thought, whether they are orthodox systems, which claim the *Sruti* as their source, or unorthodox like Buddhism, which rely upon perception and inference, that, if their systems are to be rationally explained, they must start with the explanation of illusion, when man first encounters the difference between truth and falsity. All of them feel that the clue for an understanding of truth must somehow be found in this experience. That is why the Buddhist Śūnyavādins maintain that the object of illusion is *asat*¹ or non-existence, for with the help of the criterion formulated on its basis, he can prove that the world is unreal. His theory is called *asatkhyātivāda*. The Vijñānavādins hold the

¹ If the Śūnyavādin is to be consistent, then his theory of illusion ought to be *śūnyakhyātivāda* or even *anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* as both Śūnya and *anirvacanīya* mean what is neither *sat* nor *asat* nor both nor neither. But in many treatises he is represented as holding *asatkhyātivāda*, and I have followed them. The difference between the Śūnyavādin and the advaitin is that, for the former, the object of illusion has no real basis, while, for the latter, it has. That is, *bhrama* is, for the former, *niradhiṣṭhāna* and, for the latter, *sadadhiṣṭhāna*.

ātmakhyātivāda or the theory that the object of illusion is only the perceptive consciousness projected. On this basis, they explain the whole world as only *viññāna* or consciousness, which assumes various forms. All those who contend that the world is real advocate the theory of *satkhyāti*, that the object of illusion is real, some of these saying that its reality is *laukika* or empirical and the others maintaining that it is *alaukika* or non-empirical. However, it is only those who advocate some form of monism that try to explain the world with the help of the criterion obtained from illusion. But systems which are merely pluralistic, though they have their own theories of illusion, need not base their theory of reality on their theory of illusion, as they do not have to unify their ideas on the basis of a single principle. But all monisms have to save their principle of unity by explaining everything that is experienced in terms of the same principle. And this is not peculiar to Indian monisms or idealisms alone. Even in the West, in the system for example, of Bradley, according to which all appearances have somehow to be included in the Absolute, it is maintained that error somehow belongs to reality, and so the object of illusion, though not real here, must be real somewhere else.¹ Supposing Bradley does not accept that error, at the perceptual level, belongs to reality, then he would be obliged to maintain that the world of appearances cannot belong to reality. Hence it is natural for all monisms to formulate the criterion of truth at the level of the perceptual illusion.

But then, though the critics of the Advaita dub it as illusionism and so forth, they are, so far as they are idealistic and monistic, playing into its hands. For what is the use of contending that the world is not an illusion, when the attempt is made to give the world the same status as that of the object of illusion? Is not the underlying desire to refute the theory that the object of illusion is *Māyā* or *anirvacanīya*, and to establish the theory that it is a form of *sat* or reality, or that it is a form of *viññāna* or consciousness, a desire to give the world and the object of illusion a similar status or place with reference to the unifying principle? When we call the object of illusion *anirvacanīya* as the advaitin does, or *alaukikasat* as some Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava monists do, or a reality "somewhere else" or "in a transformed state" as Bradley does, we are trying to explain the world in terms of the nature of the object of illusion. If we are justified in calling the Advaita illu-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 191-4.

sionism, then we have equal justification for calling the other systems of idealism also illusionisms. Only, all these will be different forms of illusionism. If the other Indian systems do not base their theories of truth on our perceptual experience, then the authority of the *Śruti* would be their only support, and they cannot claim that their systems are rationally justified. Hence they have to admit either that the determination of the nature of the object of illusion is the real foundation of philosophical structure—and this is not at all derogatory to its worth—or that their philosophy cannot have a rational justification but is formulated on the basis of the *Śruti*. In the latter case, philosophy would be the task of the grammarian, who can split the words of the *Śruti* in various ways and give different interpretations of the text; but they can hardly be amenable to reason based on our experience of things. So if we are to escape the charge of dogmatism, we have to admit that there is nothing derogatory or irrational in understanding the world in terms of illusion. The world need not be, and is really not this or that person's illusion. It may be regarded as cosmic illusion, only because no monism can avoid understanding it in terms of the nature of the object of illusion. We have to remove the problem of truth from philosophy altogether or admit what has been said. But the perennial problem of philosophy from its very beginnings is, as Hegel says, the problem of truth, whether in the form of epistemology or metaphysics.

It has of course to be noted that, in almost all the Indian monistic systems, the formulation of the theory of perceptual illusion comes after the discussion of metaphysical principles. These principles are accepted by each school from the *Śruti* and tradition. Śaṅkara starts his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* with a reference to illusion, but to the cosmic and not the perceptual. The reference to, and discussion of, perceptual illusion comes next. Generally the theories of perceptual illusion are discussed in what are called *prakaraṇagranthas*, that is, treatises on particular topics. This procedure is possible for the orthodox systems, because they had, to start with, the *Śruti* and their tradition (*sampradāya*) in order to enunciate their principles. Only when they are obliged to rationally justify their theories and refute those of their rivals do they discover the implications of their doctrines and discuss them incidentally or in separate treatises. The heterodox systems too have their own scriptures

like the sayings of their founder and their own tradition. But while reconstructing these systems, both orthodox and heterodox, the modern student of philosophy has to begin with ideas that developed very late in the schools, because therein can he find the rationality of the systems.

The systems of Vedāntic idealism differ from each other by holding either that the relation between the Brahman and the jīva is absolute identity or that it is a form of identity in difference. No Vedāntin except Śaṅkara treats the world as Māyā, which has no existence at the level of the Brahman. Hence all except him maintain that the object of illusion is a form of the real. Naturally, every system that treats the world as real holds some form of *satkhyātivāda*. But some of the systems do not possess sufficient literature, and what precise theory of illusion they hold is a matter of surmise and hypothesis, for there are different forms of *satkhyāti*. Rāmānuja and some of the Śaiva advaitins maintain that the object of illusion is real, though not empirically real. They call it *alaukika sat*, which is not *laukikasat* (empirical reality). Some Śaiva advaitins maintain that it is a *laukikasat*. Vallabha also holds this view; for, according to his school, the object of illusion is empirically real, seen somewhere else and remembered.¹ But it is not clear whether this view is to be called *akhyāti* or *anyathākhyāti*, that is, whether illusion is due to non-cognition of the difference between the remembered object and the perceived object, or due to mistaking the one for the other. About the views of others we have little or no definite information. It is to be noted that both *akhyāti* and *anyathākhyāti* are in accord with *satkhyāti*, whether the object of illusion is *laukikasat* or *alaukikasat*. According to *akhyātivāda*, the illusion of the snake, for instance, is due to the non-cognition of the difference between the rope in front and the snake seen somewhere else and remembered; while, for *anyathākhyātivāda*, the rope in front is seen as the snake seen somewhere else and remembered. In either case, the snake seen is a real one, is *sat*.

Though Śaṅkara is the only one who maintains that the object of illusion is not real, yet he is not the only non-dualist. Among those idealists who commented on the *Brahmasūtras* or at least claimed the *Śruti* as their support, there are some who are sectarian, that is, who are either Vaiṣṇavas or Śaivas, and others

¹ Giridhararāja: *Suddhādvaitamārtāṇḍa*, p. 17. *Anyatra vāstavikadṛṣṭasarpasya dṛṣye rajjau tṛtīyasya dṛṣṭuḥ sarpābhāsaḥ*.

who are non-sectarian. Śaṅkara and Bhāskara are non-sectarian: they do not identify their Brahman with either Śiva or Viṣṇu. Almost all the rest are sectarian. Of the Vaiṣṇavas, Vallabha and, of the Śaivas, Vasugupta and Abhinavagupta are the famous non-dualists or advaitins. Both Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism have their own Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaitādvaita, and Dvaita; that is, non-dualism, monism of the qualified Brahman, dualism-cum-monism or identity in difference, and dualism. Excepting dualism, all are more or less idealistic, for they try to explain everything in terms of their ideal reality. But it has to be noted that all the systems are not equally well developed. The Advaita literature of the Śaivas and the Viśiṣṭādvaita literature of the Vaiṣṇavas are extensive. But the works on the other schools are not many, though on the basis of these works a rational reconstruction of the systems is possible. For instance, in the case of Vallabha and Nimbārka, we understand less about their systems from their own writings than from the writings of their disciples, which too are not many.

Śaṅkara is not the first commentator on the *Brahmasūtras*, and so is not the first to give a systematic exposition of the Vedānta. Even before Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Brahmasūtras*, there were interpreters of the Vedānta like Āsmarathya, Auḍulomi, and Kāśakṛtsna. Before Śaṅkara, Bhartṛprapañcha, Bhartṛmitra, Bhartṛhari, and Brahmadatta are said to have written commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras* or the Upaniṣads or both. But almost all of them are lost to us. Yāmunaċārya mentions the names of Dramiḍa, Ṭaṅka, and Śrīvatsāṅka as belonging to the tradition of Viśiṣṭādvaita.¹ But their works too are not much known. As we are concerned in this work more with the lines of thought than with details, we can get almost all we want from the works that are extant.

No attempt is made to reconstruct each system in this chapter, as the task requires the writing of a book or books. Nor is it necessary to begin each system with a discussion of its theory of illusion, for all the schools reject the doctrine of Māyā, treat the object of illusion as in some way real, and, on its basis, maintain the reality of the phenomenal world. And of many schools, we have little or no information about their theories of illusion. Therefore only the metaphysics of each system is presented, and the way it achieves the conception of unity discussed. The aim of

¹ *Siddhitraya*, p. 5. (Haridas Gupta, Benares.)

this work is to survey the currents of idealistic thought and present their logical structure so far as possible.

II

THE ADVAITA OF ŚAIVISM. ŚĀKTA IDEALISM

The system that comes nearest to Śaṅkara's is the Advaita of Śaivism, which is often identified with the Kashmir school of Śaivism. It is also called the Trika, Spanda, or Pratyabhijñā school. The word Trika is explained in different ways. It is said that the system is called Trika for the reason that its authority is the triad of Siddha, Namaka, and Mālinī Āgamas or scriptures. A philosophical reason also is given, namely, that it includes within itself non-dualism, dualism in monism, and dualism. Other reasons also are given. It is called Spanda because creation is regarded by this system as a vibration of the single principle, Śiva.¹ And it is called Pratyabhijñā for the reason that, according to it, the realization of the Brahman by the jīva is only a recognition by the latter of his own true nature. At one time the Spanda and the Pratyabhijñā systems were thought of as different. But it is now found that they are the same and belong to the same tradition (*sampradāya*). The name of Vasugupta is generally associated with the Spanda and that of Abhinavagupta with the Pratyabhijñā systems. But the truth is that the works which bear the name of *pratyabhijñā* are philosophical elaborations of the Spanda works. The latter are more dogmatic, less inclined to

¹ *Tasmāt mama sphurati iti ko'rthah madīyam sphuraṇam spandanam āviṣṭa iti.* Abhinavagupta's *Vimarsinī* on Utpaladeva's *Īśvara-pratyā bhijñā*, p. 208. Vol. I. (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.)

See also Utpalacharya's *Spanda-prāṭīkā*, p. 30 (Viziznagaram Sanscrit Series).

Atikyāddhah prahṛto va kīṃkaromtiivā mṛsan

Dhāvan va yatpadam gacchet tatra spandah pratiṣṭhitah.

iti dviṣoḍḍīpitāmarṣo'tikyāddhah san prāgyatpadam gacchet yam vā sphāramālam bāte yāmasaunmukhyavrtīm spṛset . . . tadā kāntāhūtacittatayā yatpadam gacchet yāmasavasthāmārohati tatra tasmin pade spandah prāguktah ātmasvabhāvah pratiṣṭhitah sphuṭopalabhyatayā sthitah.

See also *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Krodhādāyante bhaye soke gahvare vāraṇe raṇe

Kutūhale ṣṣuddāyante brahmasattāsamīpajā.

Quoted from *Vijñānabhairava*.

All this shows that Spanda is of the form of some disturbance or agitation within the mind, but which the mind is able to fix and check. That is why it is compared to the mental state after anger, fear, battle, curiosity, etc., and not before. After these, the agent settles down, and is able to view them without being carried away by them, but before them, that is, at the beginning, he is carried away by them and is one with them. The significance probably is that Śiva, in spite of the world's being an agitation within him, is unaffected by it, and can remain pure.

argue, than the former. The Spanda works lay more emphasis on personal effort like worship, knowledge, and yoga or meditation for realizing the Brahman; while the Pratyabhijñā works treat these as of secondary importance, because the jīva is in truth already the Brahman and can become it just by the recognition of his own true nature. There are some, like Bhoja,¹ who are not Pratyabhijñāvadins, but uphold a kind of non-dualism, that does not yet completely identify the Brahman and the jīva. The categories of all these writers are the same. Bhoja maintains non-dualism but, unlike the Kashmir school, does not accept that in the liberated state the jīva and the Brahman are one and the same.

Kumāra, the commentator on Bhoja, elaborately argues against Śaṅkara's theory of illusion.² He anticipates the latter's argument that the world is Māyā or *anirvacanīya* because everything that is an object is Māyā like the object of illusion. Kumāra contends that the object of illusion is not *anirvacanīya*, but is *sat* or real. But he adds that it is not an empirical reality or *laukikasat*, but is an *alukikasat*, or a non-empirical reality. If it is said that its reality is negated by a later judgment, for instance by the judgment, "It is not a snake but a rope" in the illusion of the snake, he says that this negative judgment only differentiates the non-empirical reality from the empirical reality of the physical snake. If it is objected that, if the object of illusion were a non-empirical reality, the percipient would not have been frightened by it as he would be by an empirically real snake, Kumāra answers that the percipient is frightened because he does not grasp the difference between the empirical reality and non-empirical reality. He contends that the same difficulty is found in Śaṅkara's theory also. For one is affected by only an empirical reality and not by an *anirvacanīya* or inexplicable reality. Therefore even here the *anirvacanīya* snake has to be mistaken for an empirical reality, as otherwise the percipient would not have been terrified by an illusory snake. Thus though Kumāra does not accept the Naiyāyika view that an illusory snake is one seen somewhere else and remembered, on the ground that if the snake is really remembered there would be recognition,³ he has no objection to the

¹ His work is *Tattvapraśāsa*. (Published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series with Kumāra's commentary.)

² *Ibid.*, pp. 62 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 64. *Tacchabdollekhanaśūnyatayā rajatajñānasya smṛtirāpatvāsambhāvāt.*

theory of *anyathākhyāti* as held by Sāṅkhya, according to which an object is mistaken for another in illusion.¹ As regards the nature of the object of illusion, it is real though non-empirical. But there could not have been illusion, if it were not mistaken for another which is empirically real.

If we analyse Kumāra's argument, we find that it is not really so convincing as it appears at first sight. First, his assertion that the negative judgment, "It is not a snake but a rope," only differentiates between empirical and non-empirical reality, between *laukikasat* and *alaukikasat*, does violence to our own experience. For our feeling is that the snake *did not exist* even during the time of illusion, and not that it was an *alaukikasat*. To decide this point is of fundamental importance to all monisms. One cannot ask, What harm is there if our negative judgment is interpreted as asserting the *alaukikasattā* or non-empirical reality of the snake? For what is the ground of this interpretation? It cannot be our experience itself. For experience plainly denies the reality of the snake. If it is the metaphysics of our position, then this metaphysics must be openly admitted to have only a scriptural basis without being the result of reason. And our reasoning cannot stand in mid air. It must have some ground to stand on, and that must be categorical. That is, it must be our experience. Even Bradley felt, in spite of the importance he attaches to the hypothetical judgment, that reality is a construction from the This.² Without the This our metaphysical construction will be a sublime fancy.

If therefore we accept the truth of what our negative judgment says, then we have to treat the object of illusion as not real because the negative judgment denies its *sattā* or reality. Kumāra does not see the importance of the fact that the percipient is terrified by the illusory snake, because he says that the illusion is due to not noticing the difference between the empirical and non-empirical reality. But the mere non-noticing of difference never affects a percipient. For example, when I am looking at a piece of brass in correct perception and do not think of its difference from a piece of gold, this non-cognition of difference does not make me take the brass piece before me to the market for selling it as gold. Therefore Kumāra advocates the other view that one is mistaken for another. But what is this second thing for which the first is mistaken? Is it a thing seen somewhere else? Kumāra himself is

¹ *Tattvapraṇāsa*, p. 68.

² *Principles of Logic*, Vol. II, p. 660.

not prepared to give an affirmative answer. For if there is remembrance here, if the remembered thing is cognized as existing in front, there would be recognition. But our cognition in illusion is not of the form "This snake is the same as that." Whatever amount of recognition it may have is not more than what is required for any perception. For even in the perception, "It is a table," there is an element of recognition, though not explicit. If it is asked, How can Śaṅkara explain why the percipient is terrified by the illusory snake if it is *anirvacanīya* and not real, the answer is that in the judgment, "This is a snake," the snake, though *anirvacanīya*, is cognized as identical with the This, which is the subject of the judgment and is real. That is, about the This there is no illusion.¹ This answer does not need bringing in a remembered snake. Kumāra also may give a similar answer. But in perception what can be so identified with the This, which is indeterminate, must be something which is either real or neither real nor unreal. In the judgment, "This is a rope," both the rope and the This are perceived empirical realities, and because the This is comparatively indeterminate the two can be identified. But a non-empirical reality cannot be perceived to be identical with the This, which is an empirical reality. An *anirvacanīya* is neither real nor unreal, and so can be identified with the This. If it were absolutely unreal like the imaginary sky-flower, then indeed it could not be identified with the This. For the two ideas of reality and unreality, like the two ideas of empirical reality and non-empirical reality, conflict with each other, and

¹ On this point the followers of Śaṅkara differ. The above is the view that, as regards the subject or *dharma*, there can be no illusion. Illusion is only about the *prahāra*, *dharma*, or the predicate. *Dharmya msa sarvamabhvāntam prahāre tu viparyayah*. But there is the other view that, because judgment is a single act, and no This is known apart from a predicate, illusion has reference to both. But on this view, it cannot be explained why the perceiver of the snake is terrified by the *anirvacanīya* snake. Only if existence is perceived can anything affect us. But here both the This and the snake would be *anirvacanīya*, and therefore cannot affect us. It may be said that the existence of the Brahman is seen through them, and so we take them to be real and are terrified. But this can be said only if the existence of the Brahman is established before and without the consideration of perceptual illusion. And it can be established only on the basis of the *Śruti*. But as we have said, if we are to philosophically reconstruct the system, we have to start with the experience of illusion, and so cannot have recourse to this explanation. Besides, the judgment of the illusory snake is "This is a snake," and the second judgment is "This is not a snake but a rope." The This is common to both and the negative judgment uses the same This. Otherwise the negative judgment would be about a different subject, and cannot negate the first judgment. Consequently, we can never have truth. So though we do not have a separate cognition of the This, our illusion need not cover the This also. As the snake is identified (*ādātmyāpanna*) with the This, which is real, we are terrified by the former.

refuse to be identified. Only because we do not think of the *anirvacanīya* either as real or as unreal, can we identify it with the real.

It has to be noted, however, that the Śaiva advaitins are very liberal in their views on illusion. Abhinavagupta, in his *Vimarsinī* on *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*, maintains that illusion is due to *apūrṇa-khyāti* or *akhyāti*, that is, incomplete cognition or non-cognition. Illusion, according to him, arises because we do not notice the difference between what is perceived and what is remembered. As this non-cognition renders the perception incomplete, for a complete cognition includes also the difference of the rope seen in front from the snake seen somewhere else and remembered; illusion is also called incomplete cognition. Further, Abhinavagupta has no special objection to adopting any other theory of illusion.¹

However, the Śaiva advaitin by his metaphysical presuppositions is led to treat the object of illusion as real. The world, according to him, is real. It is due to the transformation (*parināma*) of *Māyā*. This *Māyā*, of course, is not the *anirvacanīya* of Śaṅkara. This is an evolute of the energy (*Śakti*) of the Brahman, which is the same as Śiva. The Śaivite does not say that, immediately one rises above *Māyā*, one becomes identical with the Brahman.² One has to pass through some stages of reality beyond *Māyā* before one realizes the Brahman. But all these stages are beyond logic, like *Īśvara* and the *Sākṣi* in the Advaita of Śaṅkara, for *buddhi* or understanding ceases to exist beyond *Māyā*. This, as well as the other systems dealt with in this chapter, are more or less accounts of creation, creation not in time, as time too is created, but as understood through some yogic process. This

¹ Cp. pp. 113-14. *Tadvaśena asaḍviparītanirvācyādikhyātayopi ucyantām.*

² The Śaivites speak of five stages of consciousness, the waking stage, the dream state, the state of deep sleep, a fourth and a fifth state. The last two states belong to the liberated. In the fourth state, *Māyā* as an object disappears for the soul. But in the fifth, the soul completely rises above *Māyā*.

Seyam jāgratsvapṇasusuptarūpa samsārāvasthā. Yedā tu uktagurūpadeśādīdisā tenaīśambhāvena svatantryāitmanā vyāpakatvanityatvādidharmaparāmarsam ātmani vidadhātā tatah śūnyādeh prameyādunmajya iva āsyate tadā turyāttāvasthā. Yadāpi parāmr̥ṣhatathābhātavaibhavanītyaiśvaryaīdidharmasambhedenaīvāhambhāvena śūnyādidēhadhātvantam siddharasayogena vidyate tadāśyām turyādasāyām tadāpi prameyatāmujjhatīva. Seyam dvayamāpi jīvanmuktāvasthā "samāveśa" ityuktā śāstre. Īśvarapratyabhī jñāvimarsinī, Vol. II, pp. 230-1.

But in the Advaita of Śaṅkara, the third and fourth stages seem to be identified, and we get four states in all. Because of this identification, so long as *Māyā* is an object of the soul's perception, so long as the soul sees the *śūnya* or the void of *Māyā*, it is not said to be liberated.

yogic meditation, though apparently subjective, is claimed to have cosmic significance, though unfortunately to test this claim we have no means which are generally regarded as logical.

The central and the sole principle of the universe, according to the Śaiva Advaita, is Śiva, who is pure consciousness. Some say he is pure bliss.¹ But as pure he is not the creator of the universe. Therefore he brings into operation his energy or Śakti. Śakti, then, is the second principle or category of this school. But really, Śakti is not different from Śiva. Kumāra says that energy and its possessor are not different, and so this system is Advaita.² In another place, he says that he holds the non-duality of the two, that is, the two taken together as one.³ Maheśvarānanda, who is definitely a follower of the Kashmir school, says that the same Śiva about to create the universe is said to be of the nature of Śakti.⁴ At another place he explains their identity better by an example. He says that just as the same picture can be perceived to be that of an elephant when viewed from one angle, and to be that of a bull when seen from another, the same entity is known as Śiva when understood from one view-point and as Śakti from another.⁵ For the Śaiva advaitins, it is this Śakti that undergoes transformation (*pariṇāma*) and produces the world. Śiva remains only a *nimittakāraṇa* or efficient cause, and so is unaffected by the creation of the world.⁶ But still, this efficient cause is not limited by the material cause, because the two are the same. It is also said that this Śakti is of the nature of bliss, while Śiva is of the nature of consciousness.⁷ The form of experience at the stage of Śiva is pure I. This is no judgment, because the Am is absent. But the form of experience at the stage of Śakti is "I am."

¹ J. C. Chatterji: *Kashmir Saivism*, Part I, p. 61.

² Commentary on *Tattvapraśāsa*, p. 17.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14. *Sarvasyāpivastuno devīdevātmakatvasadbhāvena ubhayādvittiyā-tāvacanopapattē itibhūmah.*

⁴ *Mahārīkhamāṇjari*, p. 40. (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series.)

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 74. *Ālekhyaviśeṣa iva gajavarṣabhayordvayoh pratibhāsam, ekasminnevārthe śivaśaktivibhāgakalpanām krmah.*

⁶ On this point too the Śaiva advaitins hold liberal views. Cp. Utpalācārya's *Spandaprādīpikā*, p. 4.

*Vastuno bhāvaśūnyasya tvagrāhyasya nirākṛteḥ
Kalpanāmātramavāitāt yacchivavyapadeśanam
Netiham vibhorvivarto'sti pariṇāmaśca na kvacit
Athavā dvayamapyastu tadāpyasya na khaṇḍanā.*

Quoted from Siddhanātha's *Abhedārthakārikā*.

Iti nirmalabodhaikarūpe bhedaparigrahaḥ

Vivartaparīṇāmābhyām dvābhyāmapyupapadyate.

Quoted from *Samvitprākāśa*.

That is, both the *vivarta* and *pariṇāma* theories are acceptable.

⁷ K. C. Pandey: *Abhinavagupta*, p. 241.

Yet in *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam*, we read that Śakti is consciousness.¹ This consciousness-energy creates the world. Creation means here the manifestation of what is already existing, and that too as a mirror shows the town which is reflected in it.²

Out of this Śakti comes Sadākhyā or Sadāśiva. Kumāra tells us that Śiva is pure consciousness and needs the use of energy in order to create the world. This energy is supplied by Śakti. It is of three kinds, *jñānaśakti*, *icchāśakti*, and *kriyāśakti*, that is, energy as consciousness, energy as will, and energy as action. When consciousness and activity are in a state of equilibrium and *icchā* or will (desire) is predominant, Śiva is Sadāśiva. This means that, at the stage of Sadāśiva, will seems to be manifest. Of course, this is not the will of the individual, but of the creator. The nature of experience at this level is of the form "I am this," but the This is not yet clear.³ After Sadāśiva comes the level of Īśvara. At this stage, Kumāra says, both consciousness and will are subordinate to activity.⁴ The form of experience of this stage also is "I am this." But here both the I and the This are equally clear.⁵ But some hold that the This element predominates here and the I becomes vague;⁶ it is only in the next stage, namely, of Sadvidyā, that the two terms become equally clear. But it is difficult to understand how the I, which is the form of the experience of the highest stage, could have become suddenly dim at the stage of Īśvara and become clear again at the next lower stage. There thus seem to be some differences of detail on this point among the Śaiva advaitins themselves. For instance, Kumāra, after Bhoja, tells us that in Īśvara the power of activity is predominant. But elsewhere we read that the power of knowledge dominates here.⁷ In the next stage, that is, Sadvidyā, the power

¹ Leidecker: *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam*, p. 21. *Viśvasya sadāśivādeḥ bhūmyantasya siddhau niṣpātteḥ prakāśane sthityātmāni pramātrvīśvāntyātmāni ca samhāre paraśaktirūpacitte vā bhagavati svatantrā anullaravimarśamayī śivabhāttārākābhinnā hetuḥ kāraṇam.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 26. *Prāk nirmlam viśvam darpaṇe nagaravat abhinnamapi bhinnamiva unmlayati. Unmīlanam ca avasthitasyaiva prakāṣikaraṇam ityanena jagataḥ prakāśaikāntmyena avasthānamuktam.*

³ *Cp. Ibid.*, p. 27. *Sadāśivatve ahaṁtācchādītasputedantāmayaḥ.*

⁴ Commentary on *Taittīyaprakāśa*, p. 81. *Nyagbhūtajñānecchātmaśaktidvaya-sāmye sati yadā kriyodreko bhavati tadā śivatatvam īśvarābhidānam bhavati.*

⁵ *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam*, p. 27. *Īśvaratātve sphuṭedantāhaṁtāsamānādhikarānyātmayādṛkviśvam grāhyam, etc.*

⁶ J. C. Chatterji: *Kāśmir Śaivism*, Part I, p. 69, also K. C. Pandey: *Abhinavagupta*, p. 242.

⁷ Pandey: *Abhinavagupta*, p. 242. For other differences of detail, see *Abhinavagupta's Pratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Vol. II, pp. 196 ff. Pandey's views are *Abhinavagupta's*.

of activity and will are subdued and that of knowledge predominates. This is the view of Bhoja and Kumāra.¹ This view is justified etymologically also, in that *vidyā* means knowledge. Bhoja calls it merely by the name of *Vidyā*,² and Kumāra quotes from other works, where it is called *Śuddhavidyā*,³ that is, pure knowledge. *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam* also uses the word *Vidyā*, but does not refer to the relation between the I and the This in "I am this." It merely says that the objectivity and subjectivity at this stage contain potentially the plurality of subjects and objects.⁴ But some think that at this level the power of action predominates.⁵

So far the creation is pure, and is not within time. That is, these manifestations are not successive. They are really the one Śiva, and their distinctions are due to the activity of Śakti.⁶

The creation below *Sadvidyā* begins to be impure and is called both pure and impure (*śuddhāśuddha*). From this point begins the duality between the subject and the object, the I and the This. This creation of mixed purity and impurity starts with *Māyā*. *Māyā* is the cause of all limitations. It is really the power of obscuring pure knowledge.⁷ At this stage consciousness perceives void or *Śūnya*. By now the unity of Śiva and Śakti is lost, Śiva becomes the mind or *chitta* and Śakti becomes *Māyā*. But this *Māyā* is still indeterminate, though containing potentially all the determinations.⁸ Hence it is said that as an object of consciousness it is *Śūnya*.⁹

It is interesting to note here how the Buddhistic idea of *Śūnya* was incorporated by Śaivism into its own philosophy. In Kashmir

¹ Cp. also Utpaladeva's *Īśvaraṇṇyabhijñā*, Vol. II, p. 197.

*Idambhāvopapannānām vedyaabhūmimupeyūṣām
bhāvānām bhodasāratvāt yathāvastuvalokanāt,*

the stage of *Sadvidyā* is called by that name.

² *Tattvapraśāsa*, p. 81.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁴ P. 28.

⁵ *Abhinavagupta*, p. 242. Also see *Abhinavagupta's Īśvaraṇṇyabhijñāvimarśinī*, Vol. II, pp. 201-2. This view is referred to by *Abhinavagupta* as *pare prāhu* or others said.

⁶ *Tattvapraśāsa*, p. 83. *Śaktivyāpṛatibhedāt tasyaiva kalpitā bhedā.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 114. *Svabhāvato mohasāñjanant.*

⁸ *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam*, p. 37. *Śūnyabhūmirāpi cittasamskāravatyeva.* From *Prakṛti*.

⁹ *Samskāraśeṣṭhṛtajñeyarūpā śūnyā ityucyate.*

Abhinavagupta's Īśvaraṇṇyabhijñāvimarśinī, Vol. II, p. 234.

Samvido vastūnām ca anyonyasaṅkocanaprāṇo anartharūpo'sau śūnyā ityucyate. *Saṅkocāvabhāsa eva ca māyīyapramāṇūthānam. Ata ekayā sṛṣṭiśaktiyā pramāṇyapramāṇameyollāsaḥ paramārthataḥ.* *Ibid.*, p. 66. *Tathāvidhe buddhyādnām dehādintilāntānām abhāvarūpe śūnyatvamucyate. Yataḥ tatra jñeyānām śūnyatā abhāvarūpatā samskāraśeṣatā. Iyameva hi sarvatra abhāvo nātu satām sarvātmanā vināśaḥ.* *Ibid.*, p. 235.

before the Śaiva Advaita appeared, Buddhism was prevalent; and its concepts became the common property of the thinkers of the time. But later they were absorbed by this Advaita and a place was given to them. Thus Buddhistic Śūnyavāda was depicted as having made some approach to the true philosophy, which this Advaita was said to be, but not as having seen the full truth.

This Māyā produces five *tatvas* or principles by means of which it sheathes Śiva and makes him finite. They are Kāla, Niyati, Kalā, Āsuddhavidyā, and Rāga. As regards the order in the evolution of these principles, there are differences of view. Some adopt the above order; others give it as Kalā, Āsuddhavidyā, Rāga, Kāla, and Niyati. They and Māyā are the six Kañcukas or sheaths. Kāla is time. Niyati is the causal relation between things, according to which certain things alone are caused by certain others and everything cannot be the cause of everything else. That is, the freedom of Śiva in creation is by now limited. This conception of Niyati corresponds to the Platonic conception of the Limit. Kalā is the power by which the mind or *chitta*, which is rendered inactive by the obscuration of Māyā, gains back some part of its activity. That is, it is what accounts for our limited activity. Āsuddhavidyā is what gives us our limited power of knowledge by clearing here and there the obscuration of Māyā. Rāga is attachment common to all finite souls. Bhoja differentiates between this Rāga and the one which is a property of *buddhi* or intellect, that is, between Rāga as a cosmic principle and that which is a quality of the finite minds.¹ Creation below Śuddhavidyā up to this point is both pure and impure (*śuddhā-śuddha*). From now onwards it is impure.

Having limited the nature of Śiva by means of these five principles, and having made him a *puruṣa* or finite soul, Māyā becomes Prakṛti or pure matter. The further account of creation in this system is the same as that of Sāṅkhya, except for minor differences. From Prakṛti Buddhi, from Buddhi Ahankāra (ego), from Ahankāra the five sense organs, the five organs of action, the five Tanmātras or subtle elements, and mind, and from the five subtle elements the five gross elements and things of the world are produced. Into a detailed discussion of this creation we need not enter.

All the Śaiva systems are called Pāśupata systems, because their three chief categories are Pati or Lord, Paśu or the jīva,

¹ *Tattvapraṇāśa*, p. 124.

and Pāśa or the bond. And the Āgamas, which these systems claim as their basis, are called Pāsupata Āgamas. In the dualistic systems these three categories are treated as completely different, but in the monistic they are unified somehow. But when we examine the method of unification, we find some differences. Some hold pure non-dualism, others qualified monism, and the rest some form of identity in difference.

In the Advaita, from Śiva down to Śuddhavidyā there is only the tendency to split into two. The split does not actually occur. But then comes the principle of Māyā. But what is this? Is it really the Śakti of Śiva? Māyā is called Māyāśakti also. It is also called Śivā, the feminine gender of Śiva. Abhinavagupta refers to a view, according to which *Ichhāśakti*, *Jñānaśakti*, *Kriyāśakti*, and *Māyāśakti* are the aspects of the original Śakti of Śiva.¹ So long as even the mere distinction in Śiva is not definite, Śiva is in the stages of Sadāśiva and Īśvara. So far *Ichhāśakti* or the power of will is active. But when the distinction is definite in the stage of Vidyā, though there is error as regards the object, there is no error as regards the subject; and at this stage *Kriyāśakti* or the power of action is predominant. But when there is error as regards the subject also, *Māyāśakti* or the power of obscuration is active. According to this view, the split occurs at the stage of Śuddhavidyā itself, but the nature of the I and its identity with Śiva is not obscured. However, between the obscuring aspect of Śakti and its other three aspects there is as much difference as between light and darkness. How does this obscuring power come out of Śiva, whose nature is pure consciousness? If it is his Śakti, how can it be identical with him? This difficulty is explained by saying that Māyā is the *nidrā* or sleep of Śiva. But the nature of *nidrā* is opposed to that of consciousness. And the first three aspects of Śakti are conscious. So whether we regard Māyā as one of the four aspects of the original Śakti or say that the original Śakti has only three aspects and Māyā is only an evolute out of the original Śakti, the question, how such obscuration comes out of pure consciousness, remains an unsolved problem. Or are we to say that Māyā is a second Śakti? Not only is its nature obscuration but also it is *nikhilajanakarmakhacitā*, impressed by the merits and demerits, that is, *samskāras* (impressions), of the unliberated souls.² And it is according to these *samskāras* that the impure creation is produced. This means that, if the *sams-*

¹ *Īśvarapratyabhijñānavimarsinī*, pp. 201-2.

² *Tattvaṇṇakāśa*, p. 115.

kāras were not there, the impure creation would not have been possible. But can these *samskāras* be part of Śiva? If *Māyā* is like *nidrā* or sleep, does it not disappear when consciousness appears? If it does, how can it be real or have a distinct reality of its own?

Māyā is said to be also one of the *Malas* or impurities, which are given by some as three and by others as four. If three, they are said to be *Āṇavamala* or cosmic ignorance, *Karmamala* or the impurity of Karma, and *Māyīyamala*¹ or the impurity of *Māyā*. But Bhoja tells us that there are four kinds of bonds, *Mala*, *Karma*, *Māyāsakti*, and *Tirodhānaśakti*² of Śiva. Thus according to Bhoja, *Māyā* is a bond and yet a Śakti of Śiva, while impurity or *Mala* is different from *Māyā*. *Tirodhānaśakti* is the obscuring energy. Anyway, whether *Māyā* is a Śakti or a *Mala*, it is difficult to understand how it can be real and belong to Śiva, who is admittedly of the opposite nature. When the *jīva* becomes one with Śiva, *Māyā* must cease to exist. If it does, it would be little different from the *Māyā* of Śaṅkara.

A word has to be said here about the Śākta idealism. Philosophically, there is no difference between it and the Śaiva Advaita. The categories are exactly the same. The difference lies only in the forms of worship and in the emphases on the feminine and the masculine aspects of ultimate reality.³

III

PĀÑCARĀTRA

Just as Śaivism has its own Āgamas or scriptures besides the Upaniṣads, Vaiṣṇavism also has its own Āgamas or Samhitas. These are a large number,⁴ but some of them are not available. It is interesting to note that some works which were Vaiṣṇavite at first were later recast in a Śaivaite form,⁵ so that, apart from the differences of terminology and some other minor points, the categories of both are practically the same. This philosophy is called Pāñcarātra, because it treats of five kinds of knowledge (*rātra*), namely, (1) *tatva* (cosmology), (2) *muktiprāda* (liberation), (3) *bhaktiprāda* (devotion), (4) *yaugika* (yoga), and (5) *vaiśeṣika* (the objects of sense). Later, the word *rātra* came to mean *tantra* and *samhitā*, doctrine and chapter. Other meanings also are

¹ Pandey: *Abhinavagupta*, pp. 182 ff.

² *Tattvapraśāsa*, p. 55.

³ See the works of Sir John Woodroffe, *Śāradātīlaka*, *Kulārnavatantra*, *Mahānirvāṇatantra*, etc.

⁴ See Schrader's *Introduction to the Pāñcarātra*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

given. In this philosophy Viṣṇu or Vāsudeva is the highest God. He is personal. His consort is Laxmī, which is described as Śakti and body. The relation between the two is inherence like that between attribute and substance.

The Pāñcarātra, like the Śaiva system, speaks of pure and impure creation. The Śakti of Viṣṇu has a double aspect, Kriyā or action and Bhūti or becoming, and these are called Kriyāśakti and Bhūtiśakti. Viṣṇu is not affected by this creation, because it is his Śakti that undergoes transformation (*pariṇāma*). At this stage the six Guṇas or qualities of Viṣṇu become manifest. They are *Jñāna* or knowledge, *Aiśvarya* or lordship, *Śakti* or ability, *Bala* or strength, *Vīrya* or virility, and *Tejas* or splendour. It has to be noted that these Guṇas are not the Guṇas of impure creation, which are Satva, Rajas, and Tamas. The former six Guṇas form the body of Viṣṇu as well as of his consort Laxmī.

Just as in the Śaiva system Śiva becomes Sadāśiva, Īśvara, and Śuddhavidyā when each aspect of his three-fold Śakti dominates over the other two, in the Pāñcarātra out of Viṣṇu and Laxmī emanate the three Vyūhas called Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha, when two only of the six Guṇas in each case become manifest and dominate over the rest. When *Jñāna* or knowledge and *Bala* or strength dominate, Viṣṇu becomes Saṅkarṣaṇa; when *Aiśvarya* or lordship and *Vīrya* or virility, Pradyumna; and when *Śakti* or ability and *Tejas* or splendour, Aniruddha. Vyūha literally means division and arrangement, and here the division and arrangement of the six Guṇas.¹ But during this arrangement, the impure world, which is at first in a subtle embryonic state, begins to be differentiated. At the stage of Saṅkarṣaṇa it is subtle and without any internal distinctions. It is said that Saṅkarṣaṇa carries the whole universe like a *tilakā-laka*, a dark spot under the skin. At the stage of Pradyumna, the duality of Puruṣa and Prakṛti first makes its appearance. But this Puruṣa is the Kūṭastha, which, according to the Pāñcarātra, is a sort of group soul and is compared to a beehive. Prakṛti is called Māyāśakti, Śakti, Bhagavacchakti, Mūlaprakṛti, Śaśva-dvidyā, or simply Vidyā.

At the stage of Aniruddha, Prakṛti and Puruṣa are further

¹ According to the *Mahābhārata* and Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, II, 2, 42 ff., Saṅkarṣaṇa is said to be the *jīvātman*, Pradyumna the *manas*, and Aniruddha the *ahamkāra*. But this doctrine is not what is generally accepted, because the Vyūhas are pure creation, but the *jīva*, *manas*, and *ahamkāra* are impure, and so the two cannot be identified.

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developed. Here the creation is mixed, in that it is both pure and impure. The Prakṛti of the Pāñcarātra is similar to that of the Sāṅkhya, except that the former contains not only the three Guṇas, Satva, Rajas, and Tamas, but also Kāla or time and Niyati or limitation (causal relation). This Prakṛti or Māyā, with its Kāla and Niyati, performs, with regard to the finite soul, the same function as that performed by its namesake in the Śaiva philosophy. At the stage of Aniruddha, out of him comes this Śakti, out of it Niyati, out of it Kāla, and from it Satvaguṇa, from it Rajoguṇa, and from it Tamoguṇa. Sometimes the mass of the three Guṇas is called Tamas, and it is not to be confused with Tamas which is one of the three Guṇas.

The creation that next follows is almost like that of Sāṅkhya, and is absolutely impure. Out of Prakṛti comes Mahat (the Great). But Mahat is not a synonym for Buddhi or intellect, as in Sāṅkhya. It has three forms, Kāla (time), Buddhi (intellect), and Prāṇa (vitality). So intellect is only one form of Mahat. These three forms correspond to the three Guṇas, Tamas, Satva, and Rajas respectively. And time here is a grosser form of Time mentioned above. Out of Mahat comes Ahaṅkāra. This too has three forms, the sātvic, the rājasic, and the tāmasic. In its sātvic form it is Manas, while it remains Ahaṅkāra in its tāmasic form. Rajoguṇa is present equally in both. Out of Ahaṅkāra come, from its tāmasic aspect, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements, and from its sātvic aspect, the five senses and the five organs of action, the rājasic aspect participating in both.

For the Pāñcarātra, the jīva, when liberated, does not generally become one with Viṣṇu, but only like him. However, the Pāñcarātra is pure monotheism, and the monistic tendency is clearly seen in its philosophy. It is idealistic, because it understands the world in terms of its ideal reality, Viṣṇu with his Śakti. And Śakti is not different from Viṣṇu, because it is his own energy, though not absolutely identical with him.

IV

INTRODUCTION TO BHEDĀBHEDA IDENTITY-DIFFERENCE SYSTEMS

No sectarian system has advanced towards the unification of the plurality beyond the Śaiva Advaita. The Vaiṣṇavas also have their Advaita, and the protagonist of this school is Vallabhā-

cārya. But as his system resembles very much that of the other Vaiṣṇavas, and as he, coming after many of them, incorporates their views, with some modifications, into his own system, it would be easier to discuss him after Rāmānuja, and we shall do so accordingly. Many of the other *acāryas* or teachers uphold both identity and difference in one form or another between the *jīva*, nature, and the Brahman. Bhāskara, Nimbārka, and Śrīpati openly declare that they preach the doctrine of Bhedābheda or identity-difference. Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha reject Bhedābheda outwardly, but try to retain both identity and difference in their own way.

In interpreting all these systems, it is usual to employ the phrase identity in difference. Mr. Joad, while reviewing Professor Srinivasachari's *Philosophy of Bhedābheda*, writes that *bhedābheda* means "roughly 'identity in difference.'"* Professor Srinivasachari too uses the expression identity in difference with reference to all forms of Bhedābheda, though pointing out fundamental differences between them. Professor Hiriyantha in the Foreword to the book writes: "The expression *bhedābheda* does not bear precisely the same significance in all the schools that make use of it, but it may generally be taken to indicate a belief that the *bheda* or 'distinction' and *abheda* or 'unity' can co-exist and be in intimate relation to each other." This is a safer way of speaking about Bhedābheda. But the concept, according to some teachers of the Vedānta, means identity in difference as understood in Western idealism.

In the West the concept is most clearly formulated and consistently applied by Hegel and his followers. It is a concept of speculative reason, which holds both the ideas of identity and difference transparent to each other. That is, reason, while holding the idea of difference, sees through it identity, and similarly, while holding the idea of identity, sees through it difference. Hegel tells us that only as abstract concepts are identity and difference opposed to each other. Concrete thought, on the other hand, perceives their unity. He writes: "In point of form Logical doctrine has three sides: (a) the Abstract side, or that of understanding; (β) the Dialectical, or that of negative reason; (γ) the Speculative, or that of positive reason."² "Thought, as Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctions from

* *The Aryan Path*, p. 40. January 1935.

² Wallace: *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 143.

one another: every such limited abstract it treats as having a subsistence and being of its own."¹ "In the Dialectical stage these finite characterizations or formulae supersede themselves and pass into their opposites."² "But when the dialectical principle is employed by the understanding separately and independently—especially as seen in its application to philosophical theories, Dialectic becomes Scepticism; in which the result that ensues from its action is presented as a mere negation."³ "The Speculative stage or the stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition—the affirmative which is involved in their disintegration and in their transition."⁴ Speculative reason sees identity imprinted on every element of difference, the whole in every part.

Evidently this is a concept of the spectator. Western philosophical tradition in general understands the philosopher as a spectator of eternity and all existence. But the standpoint of Indian philosophy, because of its predominant religious interest, is man's life in its processes, and not merely that of the spectator of these processes.⁵ The chief aim of philosophy is not merely a logical understanding of the universe; such an understanding is subservient to the realization of something higher, which is beyond logic. All the Vedāntic systems admit, in one form or another, an inexplicable entity which eludes logic.⁶ Still, some do not give up the attempt to press the Brahman into the moulds of logic. Thus an inherent contradiction presents itself in their systems. Hegel identified philosophy with contemplative life and placed it higher than even religion. But for the Indian philosopher, philosophy must end in religion, which consists not merely in the superficialities of cult, creed, and dogma, but in the sublimation and transformation of human life. Hegel treated religion not from the standpoint of one who is undergoing an experience, but as a concept or category, that is, from the standpoint of one who looks from outside at religion and therefore sees only its externalities. But for Indian philosophy, religious life is the highest, and philosophy has to stop before its portals and completely surrender itself. Because Hegel's standpoint is that of the

¹ Wallace: *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 143.

² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁵ See Radhakrishnan: *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 258. "We are not contemplating the world from outside but are in it." See also the author's *Thought and Reality*, pp. 248-9.

⁶ See commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra*, II, 1, 28. According to Nimbārka, this *sūtra* is numbered II, 1, 27.

unaffected contemplative life, he was able to view the Absolute as an identity in difference, in which the identity of the Absolute and the plurality of the world are held together in transparent unity. Whether the resulting system is true to facts or not, his method is consistent with his result. But the Indian philosopher is at a disadvantage concerning this point. His aim is something that transcends logic, and naturally his method is at variance with his aim. Some like Śaṅkara saw this clearly and accordingly constructed their systems. But others held on to thought and logic, and tried to bring down what is beyond. They tried to retain both identity and difference. We shall see how far they have succeeded in retaining both. We have already given reasons why we include them in our survey.

V

BHĀSKARA

Bhāskara is the earliest of the upholders of Bhedābheda, whose commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras* are available. According to him, the world is the transformation or *pariṇāma* of the Brahman just as curd is the transformation of milk.¹ Yet the nature of the Brahman is not thereby affected. It remains the same in spite of *pariṇāma*. It is therefore open to us to question how the world can be a *pariṇāma* of the Brahman. The objection is anticipated by Bhāskara himself. When milk is transformed into curd, it is no longer available as milk; but the Brahman, in spite of creation, has to remain itself. But Bhāskara tells us that the analogy between the transformation of milk into curd and of the Brahman into the world should not be carried on all fours. The Brahman possesses infinite power or energy (*śakti*) and makes this power undergo transformation,² so that it itself can remain what it is. *Pariṇāma* is, for Bhāskara, the throwing out of energy (*śakti-vikṣepa*).³ Naturally, between the energy and the agent who possesses it there can be no difference. Bhāskara says that Īśvara or the Brahman has two-fold energy, one that takes the form of the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) and the other that of the object of enjoyment (*bhogyā*).⁴ Thus as effect there is difference, but as cause all is one; just as ear-rings, bangles, etc., as such are different from each

¹ Bhāskarācārya's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, II, 1, 24. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 97. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 85. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 105, *Bhoktṛśakti* and *bhogyāśakti*.

other, though they are one as gold.¹ Bhāskara tells us that the world is also a peculiar state or condition (*avasthā*) of the Brahman.² Yet the finite soul or *jīva* is not a *vikāra* of the Brahman, for *vikāra* is actual transformation, just as in Sāṅkhya the world is a *vikāra* of Prakṛti. Bhāskara does not accept the supra-rational Brahman, but one which is determinate.⁴ The difference between the Brahman and the *jīva* is due to *upādhis* or limiting adjuncts, and is therefore not natural (*svābhāvika*); so that it lasts only until the *jīva* is liberated.⁵ But the non-difference or *abheda* between the two is natural⁶ (*svābhāvika*). As the difference is due to *upādhis* or limiting adjuncts and therefore external, it can be removed by contemplation of non-difference.⁷ But the *upādhis* are real unlike the *Māyā* of Śaṅkara. They are not false like the horns of a hare.⁸ They are forms of the Brahman's *śakti* or energy; and so both difference and non-difference between the Brahman and the *upādhis* are natural.⁹ For if this difference also is not natural, it must be due to some *upādhi* as in the case of the *jīva*. Then to explain one *upādhi* we must postulate another, then to explain the second we have to postulate a third, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus Bhāskara draws a distinction between the form of *bhedābheda* found between the Brahman and the *jīva* and that found between the Brahman and the inorganic world. If it is asked how a relation can be both difference and non-difference, which are contradictories, he says that they are not contradictories. The same thing of course cannot be both cold and hot, because the relation between the two is not that of cause and

¹ Bhāskarācārya's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, II, 1, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, p. 96. *Paramātmano'vasthāviśeṣaḥ prapañco'yam atah eva vastutvam.*

³ Bhāskara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, p. 134. M. M. Lakshmipuram Srinivasa-charya writes that the world is an *avasthā* or state of the Brahman according to Bhartṛprapañca, *vikāra* or actual transformation according to Bhāskara, and energy or *śakti* of the Brahman according to Yādavaprakāśa; Rāmānuja accepts the last view in a refined form. But Bhāskara seems to reject the view of *vikāra* as regards the relation between the Brahman and the *jīva*, and uses the words *śakti* and *avasthā* while explaining the relation between the Brahman and the material world. See *Darśanodaya*, p. 192.

⁴ Bhāskara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, p. 238. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81. ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁸ This is clearly a misunderstanding of Śaṅkara. He does not say that *Māyā* is unreal like the horns of a hare.

⁹ Sudarśanaśūri, the commentator on Rāmānuja's *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, says that both Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa accept the reality of the world. But according to Bhāskara, the relation between the Brahman and the *jīva* is identity on liberation and difference in bondage. So identity is natural, and difference is due to adjuncts and so not natural. But according to Yādavaprakāśa, both identity and difference are natural, because, for him, even after liberation the *jīva* is not absolutely identical with the Brahman. See p. 95.

effect. But the relation between the Brahman and the world is that of cause and effect; so the Brahman can be both different and non-different from the world just as cause is both different and non-different from effect.¹

So far as regards the essentials of Bhāskara's system. Now, how far are we justified in regarding it as a philosophy of identity in difference? The religious interest of Bhāskara is quite evident. It is in a process from something to something else. The finite self during its phenomenal existence is different from the Brahman; but in the state of *mukti* or liberation it is identical with it. There is thus a process from difference to non-difference. Naturally this relation cannot be identity in difference. For both identity and difference cannot exist at one and the same time. If the relation between the Brahman and the jīva were both identity and difference even in *mukti*, we could have said that it is identity in difference. In *mukti* even the *svarūpa* of the jīva, his individual form, is not left.² But the relation between the Brahman and the world is identity and difference at one and the same time, and so identity in difference. The physical world is the energy or the *śakti* of the Brahman, and this energy cannot be grasped without grasping the Brahman, and hence must be said to be identical with, and different from the Brahman. As a matter of fact, even the jīva is said to be the energy of the Brahman, its *bhoktrīśakti*. But he does not seem to be the effect of the Brahman. Bhāskara tells us that the Brahman exists in a three-fold form—as the cause, the effect, and the jīva. The separate mention of the jīva here shows that he is not included in the effect.³ Bhāskara further tells us that because the *bhogyāśakti* transforms itself into the physical world, the *bhoktrīśakti* stands as the jīva.⁴ So the jīva is not the result of transformation. He is the Brahman stupefied by the *upādhi* and limited by it. It seems that the view expressed by Bhāskara would have been clearer, had he treated the physical world as a *vikāra* of the *śakti* of the Brahman, which, becoming an *upādhi*, limits him, so that the jīva thereby formed would only be an *avastha* (state) and not a *vikāra* (change) of the Brahman. But Bhāskara uses the word *avasthā* with reference also to the world. Probably in Bhāskara's view, every *vikāra* is an *avasthā*, though

¹ Bhāskara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, p. 17.

² *Ibid.*, p. 231. *Brahmaṇi kalānāmavibhāgaḥ svarūpavyatirekibhāvo lavaṇasya iva samudraprāptau.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 7. *Brahma kārāṇātmanā kāryātmanā jīvātmanā ca trithā sthitam.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

every *avasthā* is not a *vikāra*. However, it is not really the conception of the relation between the energy and its possessor that led Bhāskara to postulate natural identity in difference (*svābhāvika-bhedābheda*) between the Brahman and the physical world. It is rather, as said above, the consideration that, if the difference between the two were not natural, it must be due to some *upādhi*, and we shall be led to postulate one *upādhi* to explain another, and so forth. Thus in Bhāskara we do not find a system which is through and through a philosophy of identity in difference; for he tried to be faithful to the general tradition of Indian philosophy, namely, that of explaining things from the standpoint of the experiencer himself, and not that of the spectator.

Further, if the world is a *śakti* or energy of the Brahman, it is difficult to understand how difference can exist between the two during the dissolution of the world. It can exist when the world is not dissolved, just as the difference between the world and the *jīva* can exist so long as the *jīva* continues to be finite. When the world is dissolved, the *śakti* that has evolved into the world must assume its original state, and, as a *śakti*, must be identical with the Brahman; just as the *bhoktṛśakti*, or energy of the Brahman as the enjoyer, becomes identical with the Brahman, when the *jīva* becomes rid of the *upādhis*. If it is maintained that the relation between energy and its possessor is not merely identity but also difference, then the same must be maintained with regard to the *bhoktṛśakti* also. There is no reason why one becomes identical and the other retains its difference. We have seen that the Śaiva advaitins maintain identity between the Brahman and its Śakti. And their pure creation is due to the disturbance of the equilibrium of this Śakti. This is of a three-fold nature—*Jñānaśakti*, *Ichhāśakti*, and *Kriyāśakti*. When these three are equal Śiva remains Śiva alone; but when each begins to dominate over the others, we have Sadāśiva, Īśvara, and Sadvidyā. Similarly, the Brahman of Bhāskara may have a two-fold *śakti*, the *bhoktṛśakti* and the *bhogyāśakti*; and when these are not separated and opposed to each other, they can be naturally identical with the Brahman. The objection that, if the *upādhi* or *bhogyāśakti* is naturally identical with the Brahman, then its difference at the empirical level must be due to another *upādhi*, can be answered by saying that it is not necessary to postulate another *upādhi*, as this *upādhi* itself is by nature mysterious and inexplicable, and what is by nature mysterious and inexplicable does not need an

explanation. Nor does Bhāskara make his system thoroughly rational without admitting the inexplicable into it. For, if it is asked, how can the Brahman remain pure and one when its own *śakti* undergoes transformation, he has to answer that its *śakti* is peculiar and so does not affect it. Even Bādarāyaṇa devoted a *sūtra* or aphorism in order to make room for some inexplicability.¹ So if the difference has to cease in the case of the *upādhi* also, it becomes *asvābhāvika*, not natural, as in the case of the difference between the Brahman and the *jīva*, and the *upādhi* becomes *anirvacanīya*. As we have already noted, Bhāskara has misunderstood Śaṅkara, in saying that his Māyā is unreal like the horns of a hare.

VI

RĀMĀNUJA

Rāmānuja explicitly rejects the theory of Bhedābheda in many places of his *Śrībhāṣyam*. But his Viśiṣṭādvaita is really a reinterpretation of Bhedābheda.² All commentators say that both identity and difference can be found between the Brahman and the *jīva*; but many hold that one is primary and the other secondary or unreal. Only when both are equally real and primary do we find identity in difference. Rāmānuja accepts three kinds of reality, the Brahman, the *jīva*, and the physical world. The latter two form the *śakti* of the former. Rāmānuja's theory is therefore a form of Śaktivāda like that of Yādavaprakāśa.³ And this *śakti* is a *viśeṣaṇa* or quality of the Brahman. But energy and its possessor cannot be separated, though they are not merely the same. Hence the Brahman is not indeterminate, but determinate, that is, particularized by *śakti* (*śaktiviśiṣṭa*). The relation between the two is that between the body and soul.⁴ The body of the Brahman comprises both the *jīvas* and the physical world. It is an instrument of his play (*līlā*). It has two states, the *śūkṣma* or the subtle and the *sthūla* or the gross.⁵ In the subtle state it is

¹ II, 1, 33.

² M. M. Lakṣmīpuram Srinivasacharya tells us that, according to Śaṅkara, identity between the Brahman and the *jīva* is real and difference not real; for Bhāskara, difference is due to *upādhis* and so vanishes, but identity is real; and for Yādavaprakāśa, identity is due to *śakti* or energy and difference due to individuality. Thus for all three, identity is primary and difference secondary. But for Rāmānuja, difference is primary and identity secondary. See *Darśanodaya*, p. 194.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 192. ⁴ *Śrībhāṣyam*, Vol. II, p. 162 (R. V. and Co.). ⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 408.

called Tamas or Darkness,¹ in which the world of forms and names is not explicit. The division into forms and names occurs only in the gross state. The Brahman with the subtle body is the cause of the world, and with the gross body the effect of itself.² In the gross state the Brahman becomes a plurality, and in the subtle state it is a unity. The world is due to *pariṇāma* or transformation. This *pariṇāma* does not affect the nature of the Brahman, because it is its body that undergoes the change, while as the soul of the body the Brahman remains unchanged. The affections of the soul cannot be attributed to the body, and the qualities of the body cannot be attributed to the soul.³ By regarding the *jīva* as the body of the Brahman both in the subtle and the gross states, we can retain both identity and difference. As the body the *jīva* is a mark or attribute (*prakāra*) of the Brahman. And as its attribute cannot be obtained apart from the Brahman, there is identity between the two; yet one is not the other, and so difference also holds between them.⁴ Thus the difference between the two is not merely due to *upādhis* or *Māyā*, but real, natural, and eternal.⁵ The body of the Brahman, which comprises both the *jīvas* and the inorganic world, is eternal, and in its subtle form is unconscious; so that we have to infer that, during the dissolution of the world when the *jīva* is transformed into the subtle body of the Brahman, he becomes unconscious. He is not a novel creation but eternal. Rāmānuja denies that the Pāñcārātra, on which his own philosophy is based, advocates the birth and therefore the beginning of the *jīva*.⁶ In the liberated state, the *jīva* regains his original purity.⁷ This pure state of the *jīva* is not destroyed even in the mundane world, but is only screened by *Avidyā*, which is of the form of *karma*.⁸ In *mukti* the *jīva* is identical with the Brahman only in the sense of inseparability.⁹ Then he experiences that he is the Brahman, not in the sense that he is the Brahman, but in the sense that he becomes like it in purity.¹⁰ Because of this difference even in *mukti*, the *jīva* cannot possess the power of creation.¹¹

Rāmānuja objects to the Bhedābheda of Bhāskara, because the

¹ *Sribhāṣyam*, Vol. I, p. 405. ² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 13. ³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 162.

⁴ *Op. cit.* ⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 402. ⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 2, 42. ⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 468.

⁸ Not the advaitin's *Avidyā*. Cp. *Ibid.*, p. 469. ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 472-3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, IV, 4, 7. This *sūtra* applies to all the *muktas* or liberated souls according to Rāmānuja; according to Śaṅkara, only to those who meditate on the *saguna* or determinate Brahman; and according to Bhāskara, only to those liberated souls who are yet in separation from the Brahman.

identity between the jīva and the Brahman, according to Bhāskara, is an identity of their form; but he is prepared to accept their identity, if it is like that of body and soul.¹ Rāmānuja's theory may so far be said to be a form of identity in difference. The reason for his dislike of the word Bhedābheda seems to lie in his desire to drag down a purely logical concept to the physical level, and understand it in terms accessible to imagination. However, his insistence on the inseparability (*apṛthaksiddhatva*) of the jīva and the Brahman reveals his inclination towards Bhedābheda. But it does not seem, according to his conception, that both identity and difference can be held together in transparent unity, as in Hegel. For identity, for Rāmānuja, is secondary and not primary like difference. True, the world along with the jīvas is the result of the transformation or *pariṇāmā* of the *śakti* of the Brahman, and so inseparable from it. And so far as difference and inseparability are emphasized even in *mukti* between the jīva and the Brahman, Rāmānuja is more an advocate of identity in difference than even Bhāskara, according to whom in *mukti* there is only identity. The process from the state of bondage to the state of liberation is a process from one form of identity in difference to another; but there is no process between identity and difference. In one passage,² Rāmānuja seems to say that creation is a process from identity to difference. But both in the evolved and in the unevolved stages the world and the jīvas constitute the Brahman's body; and the problem of the relation between the two persists always, and always the relation is both identity and difference. We may therefore conclude that there are really only two entities, the Brahman and its body, between which the relation is both identity and difference, as each cannot be obtained without the other. One of the terms of the relation, as Tamas, undergoes *pariṇāmā*; in the evolved state it is plurality; but in the unevolved, it is an identity. And because the Brahman's body in the unevolved state (Tamas), is the material cause of the evolved state, the relation between the two states is identity and difference. The idea of body-mind is nearer to our imagination than Bhāskara's *Bhedābheda*. Rāmānuja's philosophy, though he is fighting shy of the purely logical concept, is really a system of Bhedābheda. The concepts of what Hegel calls ordinary understanding, identity and difference, Rāmānuja opposes to each other, finds that they are incompatible, makes no attempt to

¹ *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, p. 97.

² *Śrībhāṣyam*, Vol. I, p. 402.

synthesize them, goes to the concrete example of body and soul, but actually sees in it both identity and difference and therefore their synthesis. Rāmānuja's eagerness to use a concrete example for solving the problem may give rise to a difficulty. According to the general Indian tradition, though the physical body cannot exist without a soul, it is not admitted that the soul cannot exist without a body. It may therefore be said that the body cannot exist without a soul, though the soul can exist without a body. Hence the relation of *apṛthaksiddhatva*, or inseparability, is not equal in both directions. With this agrees the general opinion that, for Rāmānuja, difference is primary and identity secondary. He himself accepts Bādarāyana's view that in *mukti* the liberated soul may or may not have a body.¹ So far Rāmānuja's system also cannot be a thoroughgoing identity in difference. If it is admitted that the soul can exist without a body, it can also be maintained that the Brahman can exist without his body; which means that the ground for difference vanishes.

Besides, the *jīva* in *mukti* does not really feel his identity with the Brahman, according to Rāmānuja, but perceives only that he is as pure as the Brahman, that the latter is really his soul, and that his thoughts and actions are controlled by it, though through its grace he can enjoy everything. That is, the *jīva* actually feels his difference from the Brahman. So from the standpoint of the *jīva* and his experience, Rāmānuja's position cannot be an identity in difference. For, who is to feel the identity between the energy and its possessor? It is only the external spectator. Thus far Rāmānuja's philosophy turns out to be a philosophy written from the standpoint of a spectator, and is a deviation from the general Indian tradition. There is a further difficulty due to Rāmānuja's understanding the relation between the *jīva* and the Brahman in terms of the relation between body and soul, one an unconscious and the other a conscious entity. It is not merely due to our carrying the analogy on all fours. The unconscious never thinks, and therefore cannot speculate about the relation between the conscious and itself. It is some outsider that can think of the relation. If the relation between the *jīva* and the Brahman were really identity and difference at one and the same time, the *jīva* should not be left in the position in which Rāmānuja places him in *mukti*. All that we say holds equally well against the Pāñca rātra conception of the relation between

¹ *Śrībhāṣyam*, Vol. I, IV, 4, 2.

Viṣṇu and his Laxmi, which assumes the forms of the world, as that between soul and body.

VII

NIMBĀRKA

Nimbārka's is one of the most thoroughgoing and consistent of the Indian philosophies of identity in difference. Like Rāmānuja, he is a Vaiṣṇava. His commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* is too short to give us an adequate idea of his difference from the other philosophies of Bhedābheda. We can get the details of his system from Śrīnivāsa's commentary upon it. Śrīnivāsa tells us that he is Nimbārka's disciple, and that he writes his own commentary at the teacher's command. The world, according to Nimbārka, is the *pariṇāma* or the transformation of the Brahman. The jīva also is included in the effect, and thus the Brahman is the cause of the jīva and the material world. As cause it differs from the other two; and this difference is primary. Yet the material cause cannot be separated from the effect; therefore there is identity between the two, and this identity too is primary. Hence the relation between the Brahman and the world, including the jīvas, is both identity and difference at once. And both identity and difference are real and natural.¹ Nimbārka's view thus differs from that of Bhāskara. Śrīnivāsa interprets Auḍulomi as holding the view advocated by Bhāskara, and tells us that this is mentioned just to benefit dull intellects.² He interprets Kāśakṛtsna in the next *sūtra* as holding the view of natural difference and identity.

The Brahman has two kinds of *śakti* or energy, the energy that takes the form of the enjoyer and that which takes the form of the objects of enjoyment. Both undergo transformation and evolve the jīvas and the physical world.³ Bhāskara too speaks of two kinds of *śakti*; but the jīva, according to him, does not seem to be the result of the transformation of the first form, and is the same as the Brahman conditioned by the second form of *śakti* acting as the *upādhi*. This accords with his conception that the identity between the jīva and the Brahman is natural (*svābhāvika*), and in *mukti*, is identity of form also (*svārūpya*), whereas the difference between the two is due to limitations. According to both Bhāskara and Nimbārka, *pariṇāma* is the throwing out of

¹ Nimbārka's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, p. 139. (Chowkamba Sanskrit Series.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 140.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

śakti (*saktivikṣepa*).¹ For Nimbārka, the Brahman is both identical with, and different from the *jīva* and the world naturally; yet it is not identical with them in form (*svarūpa*),² though it is different from them in form also.

Though the *jīva* is the effect of the Brahman, he is eternal, not created.³ Besides, in *mukti* the *jīva* is said to attain his original form of purity.⁴ He is said to be an *aṁśa* or part of the Brahman, but *aṁśa* means only energy.⁵ In *mukti*, though the *jīva* is said to be identical with the Brahman, he is not so in form (*svarūpa*).⁶ There he obtains all the perfections of the Brahman excepting the power of creation.⁷

In Nimbārka's philosophy, we thus see the conception of identity in difference is rendered more consistent than in many other Indian systems. Both identity and difference are given equal importance and are declared to be real and natural. Of course, identity in form (*svarūpaikyā*) is not admitted by him; for if that is admitted, there would be left no room for difference of any kind, as in *mukti* according to Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. Though Nimbārka has thus gained in consistency, he has deviated from the general Indian philosophical tradition. For, in *mukti* how can the *jīva* know at the same time both difference from, and identity with the Brahman? The difference is not only natural but in form also; and identity, though declared to be natural, that is, as belonging to the very nature, is nothing but inseparability.⁸ The *jīva* is a *jīva* only because of his form. And so long as he knows the difference of his form from that of the Brahman, it is difficult to understand how he can cognize his identity with the Brahman. If it is only an identity of substance as in the case of two pots made of the same earth, then this identity in Nimbārka's system would just be of the same nature as that between one *jīva* and another, for these also are of the same substance. So it can only be an outside intelligence that can bring together both identity and difference from two sides, and try to have the idea of their unity. Thus Nimbārka does not interpret the relation between the *jīva* and the Brahman in terms of the life process of the former, but only as can be understood by an external spectator. Nor can it be said that the *jīva*, as the *śakti* of the Brahman, feels his identity with it. For if the

¹ Nimbārka's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, p. 170.

² *Ibid.*, II, 7.

³ *Ibid.*, IV, 4, 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 3, 42.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 425. *Svarūpeṇa svābhāviķe vibhāge'pi . . . svarūpāvibhāgastu neṣṭah.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, IV, 4, 17.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

jīva, as the *bhoktṛśakti* of the Brahman, feels the identity of his consciousness with that of the Brahman, it is then difficult to conceive how he can feel the difference.

VIII

ŚRĪKAṆṬHA

Śrīkaṇṭha, who is a Śaiva commentator on the *Brahmasūtras*, calls his system by the name Viśiṣṭādvaita. He says that it can account for both *bheda* or difference and *abedha* or non-difference. The whole world along with the jīvas forms the body of the Brahman; and as the body is not separate from the soul and yet is not the same as the soul, both identity and difference hold between the two.¹ Yet the relation is not *bhedābheda*, because identity and difference are opposed to each other and cannot co-exist. The world with the jīvas is the manifestation of the *śakti* or energy of the Brahman, and the latter is always qualified or particularized by the *śakti*. This qualification or particularization is natural (*svābhāvika*), like the difference between the two. Just as the *śakti* cannot exist without the Brahman (*avinābhūta*), the latter also cannot be seen without the *śakti*.

The world and the jīvas are due to the transformation or *pariṇāma* of the Brahman. But really this is a *pariṇāma* of its *śakti*. *Śakti* is the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the world, and the Brahman the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*). In the state of dissolution, the world does not disappear altogether, but remains in a subtle state. The Brahman with its subtle *śakti* is the cause of the world, and with its gross *śakti* the effect.² In either case, it has a body, either subtle or gross. This *śakti* is called Cidambaram.³ Before creation, the world was in the form of Tamas or Darkness. But Jñānaśakti or the energy of consciousness began to act, dispelled Darkness, and the world appeared.⁴

The jīva is eternal and has no beginning.⁵ Śrīkaṇṭha does not accept the views of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara that the jīva is nothing but the Brahman conditioned by the *upādhis*, either false or real.⁶ In *mukti* the jīva attains the original state of purity. He does not become completely identical with the Brahman, that is, in form,

¹ Śrīkaṇṭha's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, Vol. II, p. 31. (Nirmayasagar Press, Bombay.)

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 135.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 566

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 2, 41.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 2, 43.

but comes to possess qualities like the Brahman's.¹ Śrīkaṇṭha does not allow the power of creation to the liberated souls. That power is a prerogative of the Brahman only.²

So far we see that the philosophical systems of Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja are identical in almost every respect. Consequently, the remarks we made on Rāmānuja's system apply with equal force to Śrīkaṇṭha's. But Appayya Dikshita in his *Sivārkamaṇi-dīpikā*, a commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, as well as in his *Sivādvaitanirṇaya*, tries to prove that Śrīkaṇṭha is an advaitin, in spite of the latter's explicit declaration that his system is Viśiṣṭādvaita. Apart from the interpretation of the *Sruti* texts, there are two important arguments of Appayya concerning doctrine. The first is that Śrīkaṇṭha advises the individual to meditate on the Brahman as *his own self* (*ātman*), whereas Rāmānuja advises that the Brahman has to be meditated upon as *the self* (*ātman*) of the individual, who is the body of the Brahman, and of whom therefore the Brahman is the self.³ The second is that Śrīkaṇṭha draws a distinction between the *nirāṇvaya* or unrelated Brahman and the *viśiṣṭa* or qualified or related Brahman. Taking the first argument, we find that it is a guess from what has not been said. Just like Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha says that one has to meditate on the Brahman as one's own *ātman*, but he does not add "because just as one is the *ātman* of one's body, the Brahman is the *ātman* of the *jīva*." But from this mere absence of mention in that place, we should not conclude that the *jīva* and the Brahman are absolutely identical for Śrīkaṇṭha. The passages in which he refers to their difference are overwhelming in number. It is true that Śrīkaṇṭha tells us that the Brahman grants its own form (*svarūpa*) to the meditator, though they are different from each other.⁴ But this passage is only misleading if taken by itself, and has to be interpreted in the light of views expressed in the commentary on later *sūtras* (aphorisms) of Bādarāyaṇa which describe the state of *mukti*. In IV, 4, 1 and IV, 2, 14, for example, Śrīkaṇṭha says that the *jīva* does not leave his form (*svarūpa*), but becomes like the Brahman. Appayya's clinching upon the Upaniṣadic sayings, *tattvamasi*, "That art thou," and *tvam vā ahamasmi*, "Thou art myself"—the one identifying the *jīva* with the Brahman and the other

¹ Śrīkaṇṭha's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, IV, 4, 1, and IV, 2, 14. ² *Ibid.*, IV, 4, 17.

³ See respective commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra*, IV, 1, 3.

⁴ Śrīkaṇṭha's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, Vol. I, p. 427

identifying the Brahman with the *jīva*—as implying complete identity, but not merely the sort of identity that is to be found between the soul and body,¹ is not really conclusive; for Śrīkaṇṭha holds that just as the *śakti*, including both the world and the *jīvas*, cannot exist without the Brahman, the latter too can never be found without its *śakti*,² so that the relation of inseparability holds in both directions equally. Accordingly, therefore, is the identity for Śrīkaṇṭha to be explained.

As regards the second argument, Professor Suryanarayana Sastri says that the *niranvaya* Brahman of Śrīkaṇṭha need not be the same as the *nirguṇa* Brahman of Śaṅkara, nor need it be for Śrīkaṇṭha higher than the *sagūṇa* or the *viśiṣṭa* Brahman.³ He tells us that in some Śaiva Āgamas meditation on the *niranvaya* Brahman is a preparatory stage for meditation on the *sagūṇa* Brahman. Śrīpati, a Viraśaiva commentator on the *Brahmasūtras*, rejects the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha and calls it Samyuktadvaita, dualism in which the terms are simply conjoined—probably like body and soul, according to the general Indian belief—the terms here being the Brahman and its Śakti. We may probably venture upon a guess that the *niranvaya* Brahman is the Brahman without the Śakti, while the related Brahman is the one with the Śakti.⁴ And because, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, the true Brahman is the latter, the former is an abstraction and is false, and occupies a lower position. The fact that Śrīkaṇṭha does not refer to *Śakti-viśiṣṭabrahman* or the Brahman qualified by Śakti in his commentary on the *sūtra*, IV, 1, 3, where he advises the individual to meditate on the Brahman as his own self, is perhaps due to his belief that the *jīva* can never become such a Brahman, but only a pure one like the *niranvaya* one. For the former possesses the power of creation, which is refused by Śrīkaṇṭha to the liberated souls. However, the argument cannot be conclusive on either side. But if we are to interpret his system as a whole, Śrīkaṇṭha must be declared to be a viśiṣṭādvaitin. It is possible, by a criticism of every philosopher, to point out presuppositions that could never have been made knowingly by him. And thus we can demonstrate that the Advaita is presupposed by Śrīkaṇṭha's system. But this is not the same as showing that Śrīkaṇṭha is an advaitin.

¹ Śrīkaṇṭha's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, see *Sivārhamanīdīpikā*.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 31.

³ *Sivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha*, pp. 37 ff.

⁴ *Anvaya* = relation.

Śrīpati is another Śaiva (Vīraśaiva) commentator on the *Brahma-sūtras*. He calls his system Bhedābheda, Dvaitādvaita, and Viśeṣhādvaita.¹ He does not accept the *nirviśeṣa* or the indeterminate but the *saviśeṣa* or the determinate Brahman.² The world along with the jīvas forms the *viśeṣa* or determination of the Brahman. It is really his Śakti or energy by which he is particularized. The jīva is at the same time a part³ of the Brahman. Śrīpati's language is here misleading, in that it makes the reader think that he is a viśiṣṭādvaitin like Rāmānuja. If the Śakti is the *viśeṣaṇa* of the Brahman, then as every quality qualifies, the Brahman would be qualified or *viśiṣṭa* by his *viśeṣaṇa* or quality, namely, Śakti. That is, Śrīpati's system would have to be regarded as Śaktiviśiṣṭādvaita. In spite of similarity of language, there is difference between Śrīpati and Rāmānuja. The former openly criticizes Viśiṣṭādvaita as Samyuktādvaita or joined dualism; for if the jīva were really an organ of the Brahman's body, the latter would be affected by the pains and pleasures of the former.⁴ Śrīpati mentions the name of Śrīkaṇṭha, who also held the view of Viśiṣṭādvaita, and disagrees with him.⁵ This shows that Śrīpati is opposed to this external conception of the relation between the jīva and the Brahman. The relation between the *danda* or stick and the *dandīn* or the person who holds the stick is certainly external, though the stick, so long as it exists in the latter's hands, remains a mark or *prakāra* which distinguishes him from those who do not carry sticks. But the relation between the two is not internal. And Śrīpati is in search of a more intimate bond between the Brahman and the jīva, and is therefore not satisfied with Viśiṣṭādvaita. So though he speaks of the Śakti as a *viśeṣaṇa* or quality of the Brahman, which is of course misleading, we have to understand that he means by this relation something different from, and more internal, than what Rāmānuja does. In fact we have seen that Rāmānuja treats their difference as primary and identity as secondary. Naturally, the relation between the two cannot be internal and is almost external. And many like

¹ *Śrīkarabhāṣyam*, Vol. II, p. 2. (Bangalore Press, Bangalore.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 3, 48. *Viśiṣṭaikavastuno viśeṣaṇamamaṁsa eva. Evam jīva brahmaṇoram-śaṁsītvam.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

Bhāskara, Nimbārka, etc., hold that the world is due to the Śakti of the Brahman, and believe in a *saguṇa* or qualified Brahman, the *guṇa*, quality, or *viśeṣaṇa* here being the Śakti. If we are to regard Śrīpati as a *viśiṣṭādvaitin* for the reason that he believes in a Brahman qualified by Śakti, then we have to regard Bhāskara, Nimbārka and many others as *viśiṣṭādvaitins*. The term *Viśiṣṭādvaita* has come to be used for all those systems which regard the relation between the Brahman and the world including the *jīvas* as that between soul and body, and we would only be confusing ourselves if we go into the etymology of the word and call Śrīpati a *viśiṣṭādvaitin*.

Like Nimbarka, Śrīpati tells us that both *dvaita* or duality and *advaita* or non-duality are natural¹ (*svābhāvika*). He disagrees with those who say that one is primary and the other secondary. Śrīpati mentions another view of *Bhedābheda* which is like Bhāskara's concerning the relation between the *jīva* and the Brahman, but unlike his as regards the relations between the Brahman and the physical world, and in which both identity and difference are declared to be not natural.² Of course, he does not accept this view. For him, the world is a *pariṇāma* or transformation of the Brahman. But it is really the Brahman's *Māyāśakti* or energy called *Māyā* that is transformed into the world, and so is its material cause, while the Brahman itself remains the efficient cause.³ This view is practically common to both Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava monisms.

The *jīva* is not born but eternal.⁴ The so-called creation of the *jīva* is nothing but the narrowing down of his consciousness; so that the creation of the physical world is of a different kind from that of the *jīva*.⁵ In *mukti* the *jīva* becomes identical with the Brahman, and attains his own original purity.⁶ This identity is not only natural but also of form (*svarūpa*).⁷ Herein lies the difference between Nimbārka and Śrīpati. For both, identity and difference are natural (*svābhāvika*). But according to Nimbārka, identity, unlike difference, is not of form, while for Śrīpati it is, like difference, of form also. If it is asked, How can both identity and difference hold if identity is of form also, Śrīpati's possible answer is that difference holds only in bondage and identity in *mukti*;⁸ so that identity and difference are not to be found simultaneously

¹ *Śrīkarabhāṣyam*, Vol. II, p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 186.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 478.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 174. *Samsāradasāyām jīva-brahmaṇor-bhedaḥ mokṣa-dasāyā-mabhedasā prapīḍyate.*

but at different times.¹ Curiously enough, in spite of this identity of form also, Śrīpati tells us that the *jīva* in *mukti* cannot possess the power of creation and remains secondary to the Brahman.² Thus difference seems to be carried into *mukti* also. On the basis of this statement, we have probably to interpret the identity of form between the Brahman and the *jīva* as similarity of form. Śrīpati does not seem to be sufficiently clear on this point. If identity comes to mean inseparability for Śrīpati, then there is no need for taking recourse to the idea of different times in order to reconcile the conflicting texts of the *Śruti*. Or probably, for Śrīpati, though the Brahman is identical, in form also, with the *jīva*, he can be different from the latter as an individual. But it is difficult to understand how things which are identical both in form and nature can be different as individuals. The snake, for instance, can be identical with the rope in form only in illusion, but not in true perception. Similarly two things even if they are of the same nature, as for instance two snakes, can be identified in form in illusion only.

So far as Śrīpati thinks that difference holds in bondage and identity in *mukti*, his standpoint is that of the *jīva* undergoing his life's experience, and is therefore in accord with the general Indian philosophical tradition. And as identity and difference hold at different times, this philosophy is not really identity in difference, though the author seems to think that it is so. He is anxious to give equal importance to the *Śruti* texts declaring identity as well as to those declaring difference.³ Still, there is an attempt to accommodate reason, as in the other commentators. Naturally, inconsistencies appear in one form or another. Śrīpati does not see that, by bringing the idea of different times, he is practically giving up *Bhedābheda* as a logical unity. And he tries to go beyond Nimbārka by saying that *Bhedābheda* is not only of nature but also of form, though it is inconceivable how such a relation is possible. It is only the assertion that the *jīva* in *mukti* cannot have the power of creation that saves for Śrīpati the element of difference in *mukti*, as otherwise, both the *jīva* and the Brahman being identical even in form, we cannot understand what element of difference there could be between the two to

¹ *Śrīkarahhāṣyam*, Vol. II, p. 338. *Kālabhedena samanvayāt*.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 4, 17. This *sūtra* according to Śrīpati applies to both *mūrtabrahmo-pāśakas* and *niranvayabrahmopāśakas*, that is, to the worshippers of both the undifferentiated Brahman and the one with form.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 273. *Vayam śrutipramāṇavādīnaḥ na yuktīm bahumanmahe*.

support Śrīpati's Svābhāvikabhedābheda. Further, the jīva in *mukti* cannot know the *bhedābheda* between himself and the Brahman. For he then loses his own form. Consequently, this relation is for an external spectator.

As regards the reality of Māyāśakti, our observations on the conception in Śaiva Advaita hold true here also. The advaitins assert that Śiva and Śakti are absolutely identical, while Śrīpati maintains that they are both identical and different. But both contend that Śakti is real. Our observations apply to the corresponding conceptions of Vaiṣṇava monism also.

X

VALLABHA

Vallabhācārya, the only Advaita commentator among the Vaiṣṇavas on the *Brahmasūtras*, is so sparing in his commentary that it is difficult to get all that we want from it. But there are introductions to his system by some followers of his school, like Harirāya's *Brahmavādasaṅgraha* and Giridhara's *Suddhādvaita-mārtāṇḍa*. Vallabha calls his system *Suddhādvaita* or pure Advaita to distinguish it from the Advaita of Śaṅkara, which he treats as *Asuddhādvaita* or impure Advaita, in that the latter Advaita is established by taking recourse to Māyā, which is impure. Giridhara writes that the Brahman even as the effect is pure and is unrelated to Māyā.¹ That is, the cause of the world is the Brahman, and the world as the latter's effect is also the Brahman. Hence there is absolute identity or *advaita* between the two, and no difference or *dvaita*. Thus by regarding the causal relation, which others treat as identity in difference, as pure identity, Vallabha is able to maintain his Advaita. He says that the Brahman creates the world by undergoing *pariṇāma* or transformation.² If it is asked whether the Brahman is not affected by the *pariṇāma*, it is said, No, for *pariṇāma* here is not change but manifestation.³ Manifestation is rendering an already existent object capable of being experienced.⁴ Here also we see that only

¹ *Suddhādvaitamārtāṇḍa*, p. 29. *Māyāsambandharahitam suddhamityucyate budhaiḥ kāryakāraṇarūpam hi suddham brahma na māyikam.*

² *Anubhāṣya*, I, 4, 26. (Published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal.) *Tasmāt brahmapariṇāmalakṣaṇam kāryamiti jagatsamavāyīkāraṇatvamiti jagatsamavāyīkāraṇatvam brahmaṇa eva siddham.*

³ Harirāya: *Brahmavādasaṅgraha*, p. 21. *Not svarupānyathākṛtiḥ but āvirbhāvah.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31. *Avirbhāvastu vidyamānasya vastuno'nubhavaaviṣayatāyogyatvam. Tadayogyatvam ca tirobhāvah.*

by understanding *pariṇāma* in his own way, is Vallabha able to retain the Brahman intact. The jīva is eternal and not born.¹ He comes out of the Brahman like a spark from fire. The world is created by the Lord for play, and along with the jīvas is an *aṁśa* or part, *dharma* or quality, of the Lord. The relation between part and whole, substance and quality, is absolute identity. This position is similar to the Śaiva Advaita, by which is maintained that the relation between Śiva and Śakti is absolute identity. And we have already seen that Nimbārka and others treat *aṁśa* as Śakti. Thus Vallabha would say that Śakti is part of the Brahman, and the relation between the two is absolute identity. The Lord creates the world just out of himself without taking the help of Māyā or *upādhis*. He is the only reality and this reality is always pure, either in the causal state or in the state of effect.

Rāmakriṣṇa defines Śuddhādvaita as the negation of the dualism of cause and effect without reference to another entity.² That is, according to Vallabha, there is no duality of cause and effect, they are absolutely one. According to Śaṅkara also, there is no duality, because, for him, the Brahman and the jīva are absolutely identical in their essence. But he is able to negate their dualism only with the help of the concept of Māyā. But Vallabha does not take its help. He thus differs from Nimbārka, who, though not accepting Māyā, holds that the cause and effect are both identical and different; and from Bhāskara, who holds that the jīva is different from the Brahman because of the *upādhis*, and that the *upādhis* are both different from, and identical with the Brahman. But he differs from Rāmānuja, who holds, without the help of Māyā, the identity³ of cause (the subtle body of Īśvara or the Brahman) and the effect (the gross body of the same); because, for Rāmānuja, matter, which is non-sensient, forms part of the body of Īśvara: but as the *Śruti* declares that everything is *ātman*, no non-sensient entity can be real for Vallabha. Further, for Rāmānuja, the difference between the jīva and the Brahman

¹ *Śuddhādvaitamārtāṇḍa*, p. 9. *Jīvasya nissaraṇameva ucyate natu utpattih.*

² *Śuddhādvaita-pariṣkāra*, pp. 39-40. *Atha śuddhādvaitasya kim lakṣaṇam iti cet itarasambandhānavacchinna-kāryakāraṇādīrūpadvītaprakāra-kajñānapratīyogitābhāvavatatvam iti gṛhāṇa. Atra hi dvītaprakāra-kajñānapratīyogikābhāvavatatvam ityanenaila ivarasambandhānavacchinna-pratīteḥ avacchinnaṁtaviśeṣaṇasya kim prayojanamiticit, satyam, kāryakāraṇādīdvītaprakāra-kapadārthasya māyikatvābhāvāya tadviśeṣaṇam. Śaṅkarācāryānām mate māyāvidyopādhyavacchinne-śvarajīvādīrūpakāryayorāśuddhatvāt, anyathā teṣām mate kāryakāraṇayoh śuddhatve dvītapattih.*

³ That is, according to Rāmānuja, the identity is between the *sthūladehaviśiṣṭeśvara* and *sūkṣmadehaviśiṣṭeśvara*.

is primary and the identity secondary; but, for Vallabha, difference is not at all real. And as the Brahman is without a second, there cannot be a *viśeṣaṇa* or quality to qualify it, as Viśiṣṭādvaita declares. If it is asked why, if the Brahman is the sole reality, do we perceive this difference between thing and thing, and between ourselves and the Brahman, Vallabha answers that this difference is due to our *avidyā* or ignorance,¹ and to our vision being enveloped by *māyā*.² Though the words *māyā* and *avidyā* are used, these do not connote the same meaning in this system as in that of the Advaita of Śaṅkara. They merely mean unreality, and unreality, according to this school, is not the same as *Māyā* or *upādhi*. If it is asked how the Brahman can be an object of worship if the identity between it and the jīva is so absolute, it is replied that the jīva is the Brahman only as its part, and is not identical with it as a whole.³ Thus there is a concealed difference between the two. The Brahman or the Lord detaches his parts from himself for play; and these parts, in order to regain their original relation with the whole, have to worship him.⁴

The Brahman has a shape or form, and is not formless.⁵ If it is asked how can the Brahman which is pure, which is neither gross nor subtle, etc., have a form, it is replied that this form is supra-mundane.⁶ Vallabha calls the Brahman *nirguṇa*,⁷ but he does not mean that it is quality-less and impersonal. He is not disposed to accept the view that the Brahman remains an efficient cause while allowing his Śakti or energy to be the material cause.⁸ The jīva after attaining liberation becomes equal to the Lord,⁹ but cannot create the world like him.

Vallabha's system is the highest that Vaiṣṇavism could give us. But in him the relation between the Brahman and the world remains partially unexplained. Had he admitted, like Śaṅkara, that this relation is inexplicable, that the relation of the world is due to an inexplicable entity called *Māyā*, it would have been unreasonable on our part to press this question. But Vallabha claims that creation is the *pariṇāma* of the Brahman. But how

¹ *Brahmavādasāṅgraha*, p. 10. *Abrahmadṛśam avidyayā bhāsata eva.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 1. *Māyāvṛtavilokanāt.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 16. *Aṁśatvenaiva tadrūpatā teṣām na aṁśinah.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18. *Tatrāpi puruṣottamāṁśānām teṣām līlārtham tato viyuktānām punaḥ sambandhena phalānubhavārtham bhājanasya āvaśyakatvāt.*

⁵ *Suddhādvaitamārtāṇḍa*, p. 8. *Sāhāram sarvaśaktyaiḥ, etc.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9. *Asthūlamanavṛtyādiṣu śrutiṣu niṣedāt katham sāhāratvam iti cet na, apānīpādatvamuktvā yajjavanagrhitvātmuktam tena laukikapāṇīpādādinīśedhaparam.*

⁷ *Ānubhāṣyam*, pp. 24-5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 4, 26.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26, also IV, 4, 17.

the Brahman can remain pure and whole in spite of *pariṇāma* is difficult for us to understand. Even if *pariṇāma* is only an *āvirbhāva* or manifestation of what already exists, the question how pure and perfect Brahman can contain misery and evil that belong to the world, remains to be asked. If the Brahman, on the other hand, does not contain them, wherefrom do they come? If they are not contained in the Brahman, but still are created out of it somehow, then their nature must logically be that of *Māyā*. When Vallabha says that the imperfection we see around us in the world, the alienation we experience from the Lord, is due to *avidyā*, he is practically admitting *Māyā*. For the real difference between the manifest and unmanifest states of the world is the presence of this imperfection and alienation in the former. What is created, or, in short, the world, is the imperfection and alienation. Essentially, the world and the Brahman are identical. The relation between the essence of the world and the Brahman is not the problem. The problem is about the relation between the world as we experience it and the Brahman. And to solve this problem, there seems to be no other way than taking the help of Śaṅkara's *Māyā*, and all that it implies.

XI

ŚUKA AND HIS THEORY THAT THE JĪVA IS ONE

It is interesting to note how the Advaita of Śaṅkara turned into a sort of dualistic Vaiṣṇavism, many of the followers of which were later on absorbed into the monism of Vallabha. There is one commentator called Śuka on the *Brahmasūtras*, whose views are followed by the occupants of the Smārtha Maṭha (monastery) of the Bhāgavatasāmpradāya or the order of the Bhāgavatas, in Mysore State. The important point to note is that these claim to be Smārthas or to belong to the orthodox tradition like the followers of Śaṅkara, in spite of their belonging to the order of the Bhāgavatas also. Further, these claim Padmapādācārya, a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, to have been once the head of their monastery. The order of the succession of the heads of the monastery is: Śukācārya, Govindabhaṅgavatpādācārya, Padmapādācārya, Viṣṇusvāmin, etc. But the Sringeri Maṭha, the chief monastery of the followers of Śaṅkara, also claims Śuka as its head, the order of succession being: Śiva, Viṣṇu, Brahma, Vāsiṣṭha, Śakti, Parāśara, Vyāsa, Śuka, Govindabhaṅgavatpādā-

cārya, Śaṅkara, etc. The commentator Śuka is said to be the incarnation of Śuka, the son of Vyāsa. Śuka, the commentator, is a dualist; yet he dispenses with the plurality of the jīvas, and says that, like the Brahman, the jīva is one. We read that, after a time, most of the followers of this sect were absorbed by Vallabha's school. And it is no wonder, because Śuka was practically paving the way towards Vaiṣṇava monism, which culminated in Vallabha. It seems that reaction against the non-dualism of Śaṅkara was felt within the fold itself, and probably some of his grand disciples, that is, the disciples of Padmapādācārya, admitted certain elements of dualism and *bhakti* into their own school, and thus formed the hybrid Smārtha sect of the Bhāgavatas. Naturally devotion implies duality. That is why the followers of Vallabha's creed are fewer than the followers of any other Vaiṣṇava sect. However, the development of Śuka's sect shows that, though from the purely religious and devotional point of view dissatisfaction was felt with Śaṅkara's non-dualism and Vaiṣṇavism spread as a protest, yet within the Vaiṣṇava fold itself reason became active and saw the untenability of dualism as the final truth of the universe.¹

XII

SCHOOL OF ŚRĪ CAITANYA

There is another important school, the importance of which has not been recognized in the academical circles in India. This system is called the Acintyabhedābheda or the incomprehensible identity-difference. Its founder is Śrī Caitanya, but the philosophical ideas of the school are expounded by Jīvaśvāmī in his *Tattvasandarbha*, *Sarvasamvādinī*, etc. Baladeva wrote a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* from the standpoint of this school, and he commented upon Jīvaśvāmī's works also. This school belongs to Vaiṣṇavism and originated in Bengal.

As the very name *acintyabhedābheda* suggests, the school contends that both identity and difference hold between the Brahman on the one hand and the jīva and nature on the other. Like some other Vedāntic schools, this too tries to reconcile both identity and difference with the help of the concepts of the thing and its power or energy. The Brahman has three kinds of Śakti:

¹ For an account of Śuka, see Hayavadanarao: *Śrīkaranhāṣya*, Vol. I, pp. 186 ff.

Paraśakti, Aparasakti, and Māyāsakti or Prakṛti. The last alone is *jaḍa* or insentient. "In the Śāstras Brahman is described as being both the operative and material cause of the world. He is the operative cause through his power called Paraśakti. He is the material cause through his other two Śaktis called Aparā Śakti and Avidyā Śakti, which work through the souls and nature (matter)."¹ Both identity and difference hold between the Brahman and the three Śaktis. The relation between the Brahman and Paraśakti is like that between fire and heat.² But as a matter of fact, there is no difference between fire and heat, and so they are identical; and yet we do distinguish between them, and the distinction is made by this school with the help of the concept of *viśeṣa*,³ which may be translated as the peculiar or the particular. Though substance and attribute are the same and denotatively identical, yet we distinguish between the two and the distinction is based upon some peculiarity which the two possess. Of course, in understanding this school, heat has to be taken as the power or activity, and not merely as a quality which connotes something static. Yet all the three Śaktis are regarded as *viśeṣaṇas* or attributes by this school. It is said that the three Śaktis may be called the parts (*aṁśas*) of the Brahman, because the latter is qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by them.⁴ But they are better understood in their dynamic aspect.

Paraśakti is the highest of the three Śaktis and controls the other two.⁵ Through it the Brahman becomes the efficient cause of creation. This Śakti is internal to the Brahman, while Māyā or Prakṛti is external.⁶ This latter Śakti transforms itself (*parīṇamate*) into the material world. It stupefies the jīva and keeps him in bondage; only when he overcomes it and detaches himself from it, does he attain liberation. Liberation is only the realization by the jīva of his original state of purity.⁷ This Māyāsakti is not unreal; and even after the liberation of the jīvas, it remains attached to the Brahman like a speck, though it cannot be a different entity.

In between the two comes the Aparasakti, with the help of which the Brahman creates the world of jīvas. This Śakti is naturally conscious and not insentient like Māyā. This school

¹ Baladeva's *Govindabhāṣya*, p. 208. (Sacred Books of the Hindus.)

² Jīvagosvāmī: *Tattvasaṅdarbha* with the Commentaries of Baladeva and Rādhāmohan Gosvami, p. 124.

³ Baladeva's *Siddhāntaratna*, p. 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁴ *Tattvasaṅdarbha*, p. 147.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

seems to understand the relation between the Brahman and the jīvas, in terms of the relation between whole and parts (*aṁśāh*). But then how are we to understand that the Brahman, which is naturally indivisible, has parts? To get over this difficulty the school formulates the concept of Aparāśakti.¹ Aparāśakti is really the peculiar power of the Brahman by which the one assumes the form of diversity though remaining one. The parts are not really parts of a whole, which is indivisible; but they somehow experience their separation from the unity, lose their sense of unity. The examples given of this relation are that of the sun and his rays, and the thing and the atoms (*paramāṇavaḥ*) that compose it.² But still the identity between the whole and parts is due to their common nature (*jāti*); and they differ as individuals. The followers of this school maintain absolute duality, though it is difficult finally to defend it logically in view of the fact that the individuals are treated as the Śakti of the Brahman, which is, again, said to be indivisible. Even in the case of the lowest kind of whole like a heap of stones, it is difficult to maintain that any stone which is a part of that heap is individually different from the heap. But Jīvagovāmi, Baladeva, etc., hold that the Brahman is an indivisible unity; and it is therefore all the more difficult to understand how a part of it, if it can have a part at all, can be individually different from it. Indeed, they admit the incomprehensibility by calling the Śakti concerned *acintyā* or incomprehensible. But an incomprehensible and therefore a mysterious Śakti can be made to account for much more; and there is no need of postulating so many Śaktis. For even a conscious Śakti, if we are prepared to treat its activity as incomprehensible, should be able to create unconscious matter.

We do see the reason why the school tries to treat the three Śaktis as distinct. God has to be both the material and efficient cause of the world; for the Upaniṣads declare that he is the only reality. But if, as a material cause, he undergoes *pariṇāma* or transformation, he would be affected by the creation; and therefore his Śakti is made to do it. He remains the efficient cause, and only controls the activity of the Śakti. But even as an efficient cause he must have some special power or Śakti, which is his own nature (*svarūpa*). But now, the world consists of both sentient and non-sentient beings, and so the same Śakti could not have created both. Hence we have one Śakti, the Aparāśakti, to create

¹ *Tattvasandarbha*, p. 146.

² *Ibid.*, p. 124.

sentient beings, and another, Māyā, to create insentient things. But the activity of all is unthinkable (*acintyā*). Here Śaṅkara would say that to make all these distinctions, and yet think of them as *acintyā*, is needless ado, and that it would do if we have one *acintyā* Śakti.

The closeness of the relation between the Brahman and the three Śaktis varies in the three cases. The relation between the Brahman and Paraśakti is the closest. It is understood in terms of the relation between fire and heat. That between the Brahman and Aparāśakti comes next, and is understood as that between whole and parts or the sun and his rays. That between the Brahman and Māyā comes last. There is something common between the Brahman and the above two Śaktis. But between it and Māyā there is very little in common. One is conscious and the other is insentient. There is as much difference between the two as between light and darkness. But still Māyā is said to be a Śakti or power of the Brahman and to be attached to it. This school is not in favour of treating the world as the body of the Brahman.¹

XIII

VIJÑĀNABHIKṢU

Vijñānabhikṣu, the well-known commentator on the *Sāṅkhya-pravācanasūtras*, wrote a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* also. As a Vedāntin he could not hold strictly to the pure dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, and to the pluralism of the Puruṣas as held by the Sāṅkhya. For the Upaniṣads declare that all is one and that there is no difference between the Brahman and the world. Vijñānabhikṣu, therefore, treats the Puruṣas and the Prakṛti as the Śakti of Īśvara, and says that between Śakti and the possessor of Śakti there is no difference.² Thus Īśvara is taken as one, and the Upaniṣadic statements in favour of Advaita are reconciled. Vijñānabhikṣu rejects the Nyāya theory of absolute difference between Īśvara and the jīvas.³ This does not mean that Īśvara and the jīvas are absolutely one or that there is no difference between one Puruṣa and another. In fact, for Vijñānabhikṣu, difference is more fundamental, and identity has to be explained as that which exists between father and son.⁴ The examples of air

¹ *Siddhāntaratna*, p. 12.

² *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, p. 262. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.)

³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

and its parts, and fire and its sparks, are also given.¹ There is mutual negation or difference² between the world and the Brahman, and yet the two are inseparable. That is, in spite of separability, there is inseparability.³ The Absolute of Vijñānabhikṣu would be somewhat like that of McTaggart. The jīvas are said to be parts (*aṁśāḥ*) of the Brahman; but to be a part means to be inseparable while being of the same nature⁴ as that of the whole.

True to his Sāṅkhya, Vijñānabhikṣu accepts *satkāryavāda*, or the theory that the effect exists in the cause. In fact, the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya has been bodily grafted on to this Vedāntic system, the difference between the two being that the Sāṅkhya has no place for Īśvara. Vijñānabhikṣu writes that in the Sāṅkhya, for which both the Puruṣa and Prakṛti are independent entities, the contact between the two was effected by the Puruṣa who was the first jīva. This is no final solution, for the question would be put: How could the first jīva himself have come into contact with Prakṛti? But according to this Vedāntic system, Īśvara does the work of the first jīva; it is possible for Īśvara to do it, because both the Puruṣas and Prakṛti together constitute the Śakti of Īśvara and are therefore dependent on him.⁵

Though Vijñānabhikṣu advocates *satkāryavāda*, yet curiously enough he maintains that the world is both being and non-being, *sat* and *asat*.⁶ But it is not explained clearly why the world is *asat* also.

The Brahman is not affected by the creation of the world, because the world is due to the transformation of the Prakṛti and not that of the Brahman. When the Upaniṣads declare that the world issues forth from the Brahman, they mean that it issues from it with the help of the *upādhi* or *Māyā* called Śuddhasattva, when it has the whole of Prakṛti and the jīvas absorbed into itself (*antarlīna*) and existing in an unmanifest state.⁷ So the Brahman is not the material cause (*upādāna* or *samavāyikāraṇa*) of the world. But the peculiarity of Vijñānabhikṣu's position is that, for it, the Brahman is not even the *nimittakāraṇa* or efficient cause of the world. It is what is called the *adhiṣṭhāna* or the *ādhāra*. *Adhiṣṭhāna* or *ādhāra* means support or locus. The Brahman is the support or locus of the world process. As such, it is unaffected by the process. It is the pure witness or Sākṣi of the drama of

¹ *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*, p. 50.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

² *Op. cit.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 23 and 103.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

creation.¹ According to Vijñānbhikṣu, there are four kinds of cause²: the material cause or *samavāyikāraṇa*, the *asamavāyikāraṇa*, which may be translated as the relational cause as, for instance, the contact of two parts in producing a whole and also the activity of the parts in coming together to form the whole, the *nimittakāraṇa* or the efficient cause, and the *adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa* or the supporting cause.

Now, what is the nature of liberation? The real nature of the Puruṣa is pure consciousness. And as the support and witness of everything, Īśvara is the self (*ātma*) of all the Puruṣas. When a Puruṣa realizes this truth, he loses the sense of egoity: he feels that so long he has been mistakenly thinking that he is the enjoyer, sufferer, etc., but in truth he has not been so and that he has been only the pure witness.

Vijñānabhikṣu does not maintain that the jīva in *mukti* becomes absolutely identical with Īśvara. He becomes only pure consciousness like him. This is, of course, the Sāṅkhya view that the true nature of the Puruṣa is pure consciousness, that it is a pure unperturbed witness of Prakṛti's dalliance, and that the Puruṣas form a plurality. And what has been said against the pluralism of the Sāṅkhya holds also against the position of Vijñānabhikṣu. For when the Puruṣas in the liberated state become pure consciousness devoid of all determinations, we have really no basis for differentiating between them. Moreover, Īśvara is said to be a pure witness; and in the liberated state the Puruṣa enters Īśvara and he also becomes a pure witness. Vijñānabhikṣu tells us that Īśvara is the *ādhāra* of the world by being a pure witness. But why not the Puruṣa, who is also a pure witness? He answers that before creation the Puruṣa could not have been a pure Sākṣi. But what about the liberated Puruṣas? The unliberated, we may accept, are not pure witnesses, as they are still within the bonds of Prakṛti. But the liberated must be treated as pure witnesses. If they are, then they too must be the *ādhāra*. But how many *ādhāras* can there be? If the liberated Puruṣa too is an *ādhāra*, he must enjoy the same status as that of Īśvara; that is, he must be the Īśvara. There can really be no principle of distinction between the two; and absolute monism, somewhat like that of Śaṅkara, would result. The way towards monism in Vijñānabhikṣu's position is so clear that, in spite of his attempts to remain a dualist, his thought, when once put in

¹ *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam*.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

the track cut by him. cannot stop short of absolute monism. Like Rāmānuja, Vijñānabhikṣu wants to give more importance to difference than to identity. But approaching from the Sāṅkhya, Vijñānabhikṣu, unlike Rāmānuja, treats Īśvara and the Puruṣas as pure witnesses. And this idea very clearly lends itself to a critical development of monism. So in spite of Vijñānabhikṣu's dualism, which his position is very often interpreted to be, the monistic trend of his system is quite apparent. The two points which have monistic value are his treating the Prakṛti and Puruṣas as the Śakti of the Brahman and the Puruṣas as pure witnesses like Īśvara, into whom they enter (*antarlīna*) when liberated. It is Vijñānabhikṣu's association with the Sāṅkhya that has created in the minds of many the impression that he is an out-and-out dualist and pluralist.

XIV

MONOTHEISM OF MADHVA

Of all the commentators on the *Brahmasūtras*, Madhva gives the least place to monism in his system. He explains away the Upaniṣadic passages advocating identity between the Brahman and the world including the jīvas and matter. His interest is mainly religious, in the sense of a belief in an Almighty God and worship and devotion to him. So naturally, the identity of the worshipper and the worshipped is abhorred by him. But from the standpoint of theology, the Upaniṣads and the *Brahmasūtras* are undoubtedly monotheistic, and monism is not far removed from monotheism. The God of monotheism is generally omnipresent and omnipotent; and therefore, though the world of finite souls and matter may be treated as different from him, he must be conceived as controlling it. That is, the world must be regarded as dependent on him. But this idea of dependence raises problems which, if pursued logically, would lead to monism. But the problems may be brushed aside lest they should evaporate away the object of worship.

Madhva found himself in a similar position. As a Vedāntin he had to be a monotheist and treat God as omnipresent and omnipotent. But he could not identify matter and finite souls with him. God had to control them; and this he does, according to Madhva, through his Śakti called Māyā.¹ This is his *svarūpaśakti*

¹ This Māyā, like the Māyā of many other systems, is not the same as Śaṅkara's Māyā.

or natural power, and is absolutely identical with him. Like Baladeva, Madhva distinguishes between this Śakti and God with the help of the concept of *viśeṣa*. Of course, Baladeva comes later than Madhva, and so might have borrowed the idea from him. This Māyāśakti corresponds to the Paraśakti of Baladeva. With the help of this, God enters Prakṛti and creates the world of forms. This Prakṛti performs a double function: it obscures the true nature of the jīva and screens off God from him. But yet it is dependent on God for its activity. In spite of the dependence of the world of jīvas and matter on the Lord, the relation between the two is not so close as it is in the system of Jīvagosvāmi and Baladeva. Still, the idea of dependence has just a little of monistic significance. For without some community of nature, their dependence is not possible. There is some reason for calling the system of Jīvagosvāmi and Baladeva idealistic. For even in Western idealism, matter, time, etc., are sometimes said to be real and essential elements of reality; and yet all these are peculiarly unified and the concept of an ideal reality is formed. A similar attempt is apparent in Jīvagosvāmi's system. But it is not found in that of Madhva. He is absolutely opposed to any attempt at unification of differences. And whatever monistic and therefore, in a sense, idealistic tendency we perceive in his philosophy is due to his monotheism.¹

¹ Some time ago, Mr. H. N. Raghavanendrachar of Mysore brought out a book, *The Dvaita Philosophy and its Place in the Vedānta*, in which he maintains, that, according to Madhva, there is only one principle of reality, namely, the Brahman. Madhva is not a dualist or a pluralist but an absolutist, the difference between him and Śaṅkara being that, while for the former the world with the jīvas is real, it is not so for the latter. The Brahman alone is the self-sufficient principle, and everything else depends for its existence on it. Thus Madhva represents a peculiar combination of realism and absolutism.

This interpretation of Madhva's system is new, and so far has startled many an orthodox student. Yet it is being well received, and rightly well received by some.

APPENDIX

THE IDEAS OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ

A presentation of the ideas of the *Bhagavadgītā* is almost as difficult as that of the Upaniṣads. But we have one advantage in the *Bhagavadgītā*, namely, that it is a single work unlike the Upaniṣads, and it is less difficult for us to discover some unity in its ideas. Like the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavadgītā* has many commentaries, each commentator trying to give his own interpretation to it and foisting his own system upon it. Consequently, one may feel it advisable to abstain from giving a presentation of its ideas, which, one may think, have to be understood in terms of the system of one of the commentaries. Or one may think it safer to point to the detached metaphysical tendencies, as we have done in the case of the Upaniṣads. But the Upaniṣads are many, each being the work or insight of one or many different seers; while the *Bhagavadgītā* is one, and in consequence we may have better chances of obtaining a unified view of its ideas.

The first glance at the work discloses that the *Bhagavadgītā* is not a metaphysical work, but one that prescribes the rules of conduct for those who aspire for higher life. The occasion for the work was the dejection of Arjuna in the battlefield of Kurukṣetra, who, seeing that he had to kill his own kith and kin, threw down his arms and said to Kṛṣṇa, who acted as his charioteer, that it would be better to go abegging or into the forest than slay one's own people for a kingdom. After this act of Arjuna, Kṛṣṇa began to explain to him the nature of duty, the aim of life, and, incidentally as it were, the nature of final truth. The primary concern of the *Gītā* is therefore with the conduct of our life and only secondarily with metaphysics. However, our present interest is in metaphysics; and in spite of the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and a number of others, we shall steer clear of these systems and putting together the ideas, so far as possible, barely as they are given and without any interpretation, try to find out their general trend.

There have been a large number of critical studies of the *Bhagavadgītā* by Western scholars. Garbe attempts to read the ideas of Sāṅkhya and Yoga into it. Deussen sees in it a degeneration of the monistic thought of the Upaniṣads. Keith believes

that it is some Upaniṣad adapted to the cult of Kṛṣṇa. But whatever be the origin of the work, its metaphysical ideas have a peculiarity of their own. The work, not being one on systematic metaphysics and so not being closely argued, is loose in its connections, and so allows different interpretations. And yet, because the words Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Prakṛti, Puruṣa, etc., occur in it very often, and because it does not lend itself to be interpreted naturally in terms of Śaṅkara's Advaita, Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita or Madhva's Dvaita, it is opined that it is a degenerate or inchoate form of this or that system. Certainly, the Sāṅkhya of which the *Bhagavadgītā* speaks is not the Sāṅkhya of Kapila or Īśvarakṛṣṇa; and its monism need not be that of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja or Bhāskara. We have seen many kinds of Indian monism, and the protagonists of all the schools claim the *Gītā* to be their authority. Because of the loose connections between its ideas, they lend themselves, though not naturally, to many interpretations. What is a technical word in some systems may be explained away by taking its etymological meaning in others. What are two substantives for one system may be regarded as a substantive and an adjective by another. Such differences in the method of interpretation may result in different systems. But if we are to interpret the *Gītā* in terms of any of these systems, the task need not be attempted, as those systems are given well-constructed in other works. We shall therefore attempt to understand its ideas without any prejudice for or against any of the well-known philosophies.

The first chapter describes the situation in which Arjuna feels dejected and Kṛṣṇa begins his grand discourse. Though the second chapter is called Sāṅkhyayoga, we rarely come across a conception corresponding to the Prakṛti of Kapila's Sāṅkhya. It is maintained that the beginning of all things is the unmanifested, the end is the unmanifested, but only the middle is the manifested.¹ Obviously, this unmanifested is not the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya, but is the Brahman itself. It is spoken of in the masculine gender, as indestructible and all-pervading. It is the unborn, the soul,² and the incomprehensible.³ Of course, we read in this chapter of the *tanmātras*⁴ or subtle elements of the Sāṅkhya, but nothing is said of the insentient Prakṛti. We read of *nirvāṇa* also in the Brahman.⁵

In the third chapter we read of Prakṛti.⁶ But it is not discussed

¹ II, 28.

² II, 20.

³ II, 25.

⁴ II, 14.

⁵ II, 72.

⁶ III, 27.

whether this Prakṛti is the same as that of the Sāṅkhya, whether it is identical with the Brahman or different from it, or is both identical and different. It is said that all our actions are being done by the Guṇas of Prakṛti, though we egoistically believe that we are the agents of our actions. These Guṇas remind us of the Rāga, which is one of the *kañcukas* in the Śaiva philosophy. It is also mentioned that the senses are higher than the body, the mind higher than the senses, *buddhi* or intellect higher than the mind, and the Brahman or the Lord higher than the intellect.¹

In the fourth chapter, we come across a peculiar idea. The Lord declares that he creates the world by entering his own Prakṛti through his own Māyā.² Here Māyā and Prakṛti are spoken of as if they are two different entities or principles. But yet they are spoken of as the Lord's own.

In the seventh chapter, two kinds of Prakṛti are mentioned.³ The lower Prakṛti is divided into a group of eight, the five elements, mind, intellect and ego. The higher Prakṛti is composed of the jīvas, and it supports the whole universe. It is quite possible that the Prakṛti and Māyā spoken of in the fourth chapter are identical with these two Prakṛtis, the higher Prakṛti being identical with Māyā. The Lord declares that he is everything, that nothing exists besides him,⁴ and that he is the beginning and end of all.⁵ But he says that the products of the three Guṇas originate from him, and yet surprises us by adding that the world, stupefied by the products of the three Guṇas, does not see that he is beyond them.⁶ Because he is veiled by Yogamāyā he is not visible to all.⁷ This Yogamāyā is a technical term in the system of Caitanya, as expounded by Jīvagovāmi and Baladeva. It is really the higher Prakṛti, with the help of which the Lord differentiates himself into the many finite souls and screens his identity with them. Though in the *Gītā* this relation is understood as identity, the school of Caitanya understands it as inconceivable identity-difference. But Śaṅkara does not seem to be much in favour of taking it as a technical term. He explains it as the union of the Guṇas or the concentration of the mind of the Lord.

In the eighth chapter, it is openly declared that the Avyakta or the Unmanifest is the Akṣara or the Unperishing.⁸ Out of this Avyakta all the individual things originate, and into it they return.⁹ This Akṣara is also called Paramapuruṣa.¹⁰

¹ III, 42. ² IV, 6. ³ VII, 4 and 5. ⁴ VII, 7. ⁵ VII, 6.
⁶ VII, 12-13. ⁷ VII, 25. ⁸ VIII, 21. ⁹ VIII, 9. ¹⁰ VIII, 8.

In the ninth chapter, the Lord again proclaims that the world is manifested by him,¹ that, though the world exists in him, it is not really there in him, and that this peculiarity is due to his lordly yoga or unifying power.² We have to understand that, when the plurality of the world is viewed as unified in him, it does not exist; but still as he is the only reality, the world must exist in him. This peculiarity is due to his power of yoga, which we may probably identify with Māyā. That is, plurality and unity ultimately rest on this peculiar power. We read of Prakṛti again,³ out of which the world comes and into which it enters. This Prakṛti is spoken of as his.

But then, what is the relation between the world and the Lord? In the tenth chapter, we read that the universe is only a part or *aṁśa* of the Brahman.⁴ But it is not clear whether this world is the world of jīvas or of insentient matter. It may be both.

In the eleventh chapter, Kṛṣṇa shows Arjuna the world aspect of his nature. And he shows it as the Lord of the Yoga,⁵ that is, with the help of his Yogamāyā. He declares that he is the Time,⁶ swallowing up the whole world of things. That is, the nature of reality in its temporal aspect, or in the language of Western philosophy, the Zeitgeist or Time-spirit, is shown to Arjuna. In this chapter, we come across the idea of the Lord as beyond both *sat* and *asat*, existence and non-existence, being and non-being.⁷ The Lord is described also as both the subject and the object.⁸

Though so far the Lord is identifying himself with Akṣara, in the twelfth chapter he tells us that he is beyond Akṣara.⁹ Akṣara is the Kūṭastha, whether it is the Sākṣi of the Advaita or the beehive-like unity of the Pāñcarātra. It is of course spoken of in the singular. It also is *avyakta* or unmanifest. But the attainment of final liberation through the worship of Akṣara or Avyakta is said to be more difficult than through the direct worship of the Lord himself.

In the thirteenth chapter, the distinction is drawn between the field (*kṣetra*) and the knower of the field (*kṣetrajña*), that is between the body and the soul. The body consists of the five Mahābhūtas or gross elements, ego, intellect, the unmanifested, the eleven organs, the five objects of senses, desire, hatred, pleasure, pain, aggregation, sentience and grasping.¹⁰ The important point to note here is that the Avyakta or the Unmanifested

¹ IX, 4. ² IX, 5. ³ IX, 7. ⁴ X, 42. ⁵ XI, 9.
⁶ XI, 32. ⁷ XI, 37. ⁸ XI, 38. ⁹ XII, 3-7. ¹⁰ XIII, 5-6.

is spoken of in the neuter. This is really the unmanifested state of the lower Prakṛti. The seer, he who gives the consent, the enjoyer, etc., of the body is the Maheśvara, the Para Puruṣa.¹ Thus the individual Puruṣa is identified with the Supreme Being. He is said to be one and undivided, but appears to be many² and divided; he is *nirguṇa* or without qualities, but enjoys all qualities³; and he is called neither *sat* or existence nor *asat* or non-existence.⁴ It is further said that both the Prakṛti and Puruṣa are without beginning.⁵ Even Śaṅkara says that the two are the two Prakṛtis of the Lord. In many Vedāntic systems we have come across two kinds of *śakti* or energy of the Brahman, the *bhokṣakti* and the *bhogyasakti*, energy as the enjoyer and energy as the enjoyed. These two correspond practically to these two Prakṛtis, though as regards the relation between them on the one hand and the Lord on the other there are differences between the systems.

In the fifteenth chapter, all the jīvas are said to be the *aṁśas* or parts of the Lord.⁶ That is, the Lord is conceived to be the whole of which the jīvas are the parts. And these jīvas experience themselves as separate from the Lord, and also regain their sense of unity with the Lord by virtue of the power of the Lord's Yogamāyā or the Māyā of his unity. This is a peculiar conception found in the system of Caitanya and his followers. But we have to be on our guard and should not identify the teachings of the *Gītā* in every detail with those of that system. We do not get the idea of *acintyābhedābheda* or inconceivable identity-difference, that marks off the system of Caitanya from the other Vedāntic systems. The *Gītā* speaks only of identity and of the relation of part and whole. The distinction between the two also is not emphasized whereas it is repeatedly said that in *mukti* the jīva enters *nirvāṇa* and becomes the Brahman, that the Puruṣa is Maheśvara himself and so forth. But again we have to note that there is no Māyā here as understood by Śaṅkara and his followers. The Māyā of the *Gītā* is the higher Prakṛti of the Lord; it is called Yogamāyā or Aśvaryam Yogam. It is through this Māyā that the Lord as the ultimate Subject divides himself into the plurality of the finite subjects, and screens from them their essential identity. The other Prakṛti is objectivity and is rarely called Māyā.

In this chapter also the relation between Kṣara, Akṣara and

¹ XIII, 22.

² XIII, 16.

³ XIII, 14.

⁴ XIII, 12.

⁵ XIII, 19.

⁶ XV, 7.

Puruṣottama is pointed out.¹ Kṣara is the finite jīva, Akṣara is the Kūṭastha or Sākṣi, and beyond the two is the Puruṣottama, the Supreme Person.

This brief sketch of the ideas of the *Bhagavadgītā* shows that the work is absolutistic, but the Absolute here is a person. So the idealism of the *Gītā* is personalistic, though not pluralistic. But the world of matter is not thought of as unreal, or as neither real nor unreal. It is said to be one of the Prakṛtis or natures of the Lord, who, however, is declared to be neither being nor non-being. The world of plurality is unified thus by the *Gītā* in its own way. We may conclude that the doctrine of the *Gītā* is an Advaita, though it is an Advaita of its own kind. And we have already seen upholders of Advaita for whom neither the doctrine of the unreality of the world nor of its *anirvacanīyatā* or inexplicability is true. There have been more kinds than one of Advaita in India, and the doctrine of the *Bhagavadgītā* is one of them.

¹ XV, 16-18.

BUDDHISTIC IDEALISM

I

GENERAL NATURE

Buddhism offers an excellent example of how a line of thought which starts as naïve realism or even materialism becomes an idealism of the highest speculative type by continuous and thoroughgoing self-criticism and reflection through centuries. If we take the history of European philosophy and consider a period with a sufficiently long span, we find several philosophies, one practically developing out of another along certain grooves marked out by certain accepted principles, until the tendency culminates and is consummated in an idealism of some outstanding comprehensive speculation. Such periods are epochs in the history of philosophy. The line of thinking inaugurated by the Sophists culminated in Plato; that begun by Descartes ended in Spinoza; that started by Leibnitz reached its climax in Hegel; that ushered in by Caird, Green, etc., attained its heights in Bradley; and that initiated by the realists is systematized in Whitehead. But the philosophy of no epoch is called by a single name. And the inherent oneness of thought of the philosophers who are struggling to analyse and clarify the same thought is therefore hidden to first observations. But all the Buddhistic schools claim to be the teachings of Buddha, and Buddhism in its development is a history of philosophy by itself. It is easier to see in its history how various strands of thought influence each other and develop. Christianity and the growth of its sects and its dogmas may be cited as a parallel. But we cannot say, with the same amount of justification as we have for Buddhism, that Christianity turned into a philosophy. It is rather philosophy, Platonic and Aristotelian, that made encroachments into the territory of the Christian religion and gave it a philosophy.

Buddhism first started as a religion, especially as an ethical religion. But its ethics was not aimed merely at making the life on earth disciplined and harmonious, and its religion was not

one that worked only for the betterment of life here. When it is said that Buddha's religion was practical, it should not be understood that he meant anything similar to what William James means by saying that the idea of God is true so long as it works. According to James, the test of religion has somehow to be found in our imperfect lives, which in truth are not competent to supply the criterion. The betterment of life means for Buddha its transformation. Ethics and, as a matter of fact, every act, aim at some transformation. But Buddha's religion aims at so thorough a transformation that the result, if achieved, would be above every imperfection. The central and the basic truths of Buddhism, called the Four Noble Truths, are *dukkha* or suffering, *samudaya* or cause, *nirodha* or cessation, and *mārga* or way. Unless one feels that there is suffering in the universe, that the suffering has a cause, and longs for the cessation of suffering, and is prepared to follow the way to the cessation of suffering, one cannot be serious with Buddha's religion. Its aim is emancipation from the misery of the world; and the misery, according to the general interpretation, appeared to Buddha as unavoidable so long as the self or ego lasted. As a rationalist, he did not preach the invocation of some God or Almighty to help and save the human beings, but said that suffering had a cause, which was really the cause of self-hood and the world, and that the way to the cessation of suffering was the destruction of the cause. As Buddha's interest lay in the cessation of human suffering, he was concerned more, according to the usual interpretation of Buddhism, with preaching the analysis of self, and of desire, which is the root cause of suffering, than with teaching the nature of the world. Professor Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya says: "Thus by eradicating the notion of 'I' (*ātman*) and 'mine' (*ātmiya*) the Buddha struck at the very root of '*Kāma*,' 'desire,' rightly described as *Māra*, 'death,' without the extinction of which none can aspire to the realization of NIRVĀṆA."¹ It is for this reason that the earlier schools of Buddhism preached only *puḍgalanairātmya* or the selflessness of the mind, and did not worry about the nature of the world. We do not consequently find in them systematic philosophy or inquiry into the nature of the world. But human reason cannot rest content with the analysis of human mind when the question before it concerns the transformation of human personality with its interconnections in the physical world.

¹ *The Basic Conception of Buddhism*, p. 95.

For, does the nature of the world conform to this transformation? This question suggests itself in one way or other, directly or indirectly. To show that the nature of the world does conform to this transformation later became the task of the Buddhist philosopher, who had therefore to enter upon an inquiry into the nature of the world. Hence the later Buddhist systems, that is, of the Mahāyāna, preached both *pudgalanairātmya* and *dharmanairātmya* or the selflessness of the soul and of the world. When the conformation of the physical world to the spiritual nature is taught, the teaching becomes idealistic. But in this process the original conception of the ideal is modified. It is no longer the ideal towards which only human beings struggle, but an ideal towards which the entire universe moves.

Though naturally the growth of the later schools, called the Mahāyāna, out of the earlier schools, called the Hīnayāna, is a development or evolution, yet in actual history it may seem a revolution, a Protestantism, a breaking off. Scientific thought or purely philosophical speculation can develop without much conflict; but any material change in religious thought affects our innermost convictions, gives us a shock, and disturbs the peace born of the satisfaction from, and faith in the ideas which are the prop of our life. Yet the history of Buddhism gives us no instance of sanguinary conflicts during the transition to the Mahāyāna from the Hīnayāna. The absence of such conflicts, in spite of schisms, is certainly due to the peculiar nature of Buddha's teachings, which laid so great stress upon *ahimsā* or non-injury.

Professor Stcherbatsky writes: "Professor O. Rosenberg calls it (Mahāyāna) a separate 'Church,' and compares its position with Roman Catholicism versus Protestantism. The difference is even more radical, since the new religion was obliged to produce a new Canon of Scriptures."¹ But la Vallée Poussin writes that the theories of the Mahāyāna are only adaptations of the Hīnayāna, and that there is really no Protestantism in the history of Buddhism.² Dr. Suzuki's view is the same as that of Stcherbatsky. Yet we can see that both views are true in a sense. In actual history, development or any modification of religion cannot take place without protest. But if we look at the principles, we find logical connection and natural evolution. But the evolution may advance so far from the original starting-point that the result

¹ *The Conception of Buddhistic Nirvāṇa*, p. 36.

² N. Dutt: *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, Foreword, p. v.

may appear new and of a different kind. This is actually the case with the development of Buddhistic thought. Professor Stcherbatsky sees radical pluralism in Buddha's original teaching. He writes: "Forsaking the Monism of the Upaniṣads and the Dualism of the Sāṅkhyas, he (Buddha) established a system of the most radical Pluralism."¹ "The picture of the universe which suggested itself to the mental eye of the Buddha, represented then an infinite number of separate evanescent entities in a state of beginningless commotion, but gradually steering to Quiescence and to an absolute annihilation of all life, when all its elements have been, one after another, brought to a standstill." "The Buddhist could promise nothing else than Quiescence of life and its Final Annihilation, a result which, taken by itself, was not very remote from what was offered by simple materialism."² Whether this was actually the teaching of Buddha, or of some later followers, may be questioned. But in either case, how far removed is the idealism and the absolutism of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika from this naïve pluralism and materialism? If misery is due to the persistence of self, and if self is nothing but a compound of certain elements, then the destruction of misery follows the destruction of self, which means the analysis of self into its component parts. This was how the early schools understood Buddha. The component elements were regarded especially by the Sarvāstivādins as eternal and existing. But this realism and materialism could not stand, when the attempt was made to make Buddha's teaching self-consistent, and consistent with reality. Particularly when the application of the Buddhistic doctrines of universal impermanence and causality (*pratītyasamutpāda* or dependent origination) were made thoroughgoing, the conclusion of universal *niḥsvabhāvatā* or *śūnyatā*, often translated as void or emptiness, of the Mādhyamika was unavoidable, though this Śūnya was identified with the Ālaya and Tathāgata-garbha by the schools of the Mahāyāna.

If we are to understand by Buddhism only what was actually taught in so many words by Buddha, we may not find any idealism in it, either in the sense of mentalism or in the sense that only the ideal is real. Buddha's ideal is Nirvāṇa, and he never committed himself, either positively or negatively, concerning its existence. Even as regards the existence of the phenomenal objects, he was neither a realist nor an idealist, though we can

¹ *The Conception of Buddhistic Nirvāṇa*, p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

find passages to prove either in the works of the Theravāda. Even about the Sarvāstivādins, who came some three centuries after Buddha's death, Professor Stcherbatsky writes: "Considering . . . that these would-be realists, like all Buddhists, denied the existence of soul or personality (*ātman*, *pudgala*), our uncertainty increases and the suspicion arises that the battle between the Sarvāstivādins and their opponents was fought on an altogether different plane, about a question which had little to do with our conceptions of realism and idealism."¹ The remark that it is neither our modern idealism nor realism applies, to a large extent, to the original teachings of Buddha. Buddha could not have viewed the problem in the way in which we do it. He might not have thought of the epistemological problem at all, though he could have spoken of the ideal life in Nirvāṇa. But later on in the Mahāyāna, this ideal was conceived to be the essence of the universe, and was spoken of as the *paramārthasatya* or final truth and identified with the Śūnya, Ālaya, and Tathāgatagarbha. The attempt was made especially by the Vijñānavādins to reconstruct the world from the standpoint of the Ālaya, and the result was absolute idealism.

We cannot say with certainty that Mahāyāna does not really represent Buddha's teaching, and that the actual philosophy of Buddha should be understood only with the help of the psychological, philological and historical methods. The use of these methods is not denied; but it has to be noted that the people directly affected by the teaching had as great chances of understanding Buddha's words correctly as we with the help of philology, etc. The words of Buddha were living language for them, while for us they form a dead one. Hence tradition that has a continuity cannot be overlooked. There is much truth in the saying that a system must be understood by what it refutes, that is, in the light of its rival theories, because then only can its peculiarity be grasped. But it is also true, on the other hand, that a philosopher, as Kant says, sometimes understands his own mind much less than his student. And it may be maintained that even Buddha did not understand his own thought fully, that is, he did not see its full implications. There is another possibility, namely, by going into the etymological meaning of his words, we may picture his ideas quite differently from what Buddha himself thought. This is a danger. The etymological meaning

¹ *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 4.

might have been modified even during his own time, so that he might not have used the words in their etymological meanings. So to a large extent we have to depend on tradition. It cannot be a philological law that the meanings of words will always conform to their etymology. An idea, because of its relation and association with other ideas, may have so changed its connotation as to be different from what it was at the start. Similarly, there is also the possibility of the tradition undergoing so great a change or development as to be disconnected with the origin. Yet in spite of these possibilities, we cannot ignore the law that any thought can be adequately understood only in the light of its later developments. These give us the deepest insight gained so far into it. Only when we find that tradition at a particular stage had deliberately broken off from the original, should we resort to philology. And where evidence to prove such a breaking-off is wanting, we cannot ignore the tradition. Even when the evidence is found, the tradition up to that point has to be taken into consideration. It is admitted, and will be shown later on, that the germs of the Mahāyāna are to be found in the Hīnayāna itself. Dr. Maedi writes: "The teachings of Śākyamuni are the seeds, those of Hīnayāna are the branches, those of Mahāyāna are the blossoms and fruits. Long after the seeds were hidden away, and when the time was ripe, the fruit appeared."¹ As we have seen, la Vallée Poussin holds that the Mahāyāna is not even Protestantism, but simply adopts the doctrines of the Hīnayāna. And though, as Stcherbatsky tells us, new canons of Scriptures had to be composed by the Mahāyānists, they did not reject Hīnayāna but absorbed it by being more comprehensive and consistent. As the words and the ideas of Buddha were discussed and passed on from generation to generation, newer and newer significance was discovered in them; and finally his teaching assumed the forms of the systems of the last schools of the Mahāyāna, at least of the Indian; for some of the Chinese and the Japanese included in it certain local elements.

II

BUDDHA'S ORIGINAL TEACHING

The earliest schools of Buddhism are called the Theravāda in Pāli, which is a corrupted form of the Sanskrit word Sthaviravāda,

¹ Quoted from N. Dutt: *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 58.

meaning the doctrine of the elders. What Buddha himself taught is very difficult to discern, and it has to be sifted from the works of the Theravāda. And even when discerned, it is difficult to say that the germs of the Mahāyāna are not to be found in it. McGovern distinguishes between primitive Buddhism and the Buddhism of the Theravāda. The former he tells us, was rather psychological and much less philosophical than the Theravāda. Its position was agnostic. This primitive Buddhism is not included by him in the Hinayāna. This Buddhism is more or less a body of rules concerning discipline and yoga. The doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*,¹ McGovern holds, was certainly known to it, but it seems to be applied only to the mind and not to the external world.

But there are other writers like Mrs. Rhys Davids, Dr. E. J. Thomas, and Professor Radhakrishnan, who maintain that Buddha was not really an agnostic, not a nihilist, and not even opposed to the *ātman* doctrine. Dr. E. J. Thomas writes: "To what form of the *ātman* doctrine the Buddhist canonical position was originally opposed is not clear. It might refer to some form of Sāṅkhya or the Jaina (Niganthas), but there is nothing in the use of the terms to show that Sāṅkhya was originally opposed, nor is it the *ātman* doctrine that forms the chief subject in the disputes recorded with the Niganthas."² He aptly points out that, among the rival views mentioned and criticized in *Brahmajālasūtra*, we do not find the Vedāntic theory of the *atman*.³ His conclusion is that the Upaniṣadic doctrine is not rejected by Buddha. Mrs. Rhys Davids goes even farther. She tells us, in her *To Become or Not to Become*, that there is even God for Buddha, that the Buddhism of Buddha was not Godless.⁴ In almost all her writings she maintains that the religion of Buddha had a positive end to attain, that he exhorted his disciples to become *more* and not to cease to exist, and that in many canonical works of the Theravāda are to be found references to a higher and a lower self. She contends that the preaching of Buddha assumed nihilistic form in the hands of his monastic disciples, who, with all their connections with the surrounding world cut off, ceased to think of the self. She writes: "... in the growing monasticism, not the immanent Self only, but the man, the minor self, was becoming

¹ See his *Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism*. The twelve-linked chain of causation will be explained later.

² *The Life of Buddha*, p. 203.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁴ P. 134. Cf. also *Dhammapāda*, Jarāvagga, 9.

a not real entity, albeit the Saṅgha as yet had not sunk to the nihilism of Buddhadatta and Buddhaghoṣa. Now, where your man is a vigorous growing sprig of the Divinely Real, you do well to weed the bed around him. But when there is no such slowly expanding long-lived plant, it follows that weeding becomes the chief, nay, the only task."¹ But then what is the significance of the *anātma* doctrine in the primitive Buddhism? Mrs. Rhys Davids writes: "It was the refusal to allow any place for this universal belief in a semi-material soul in his own system that is the most striking, and perhaps the most original, feature in Gotama's teaching. No other religion of which we have sufficient records to enable us to form an opinion on the point has been constructed without the soul."² Further, "see how truly Indian, and how unlike the Buddhism of Ceylon and Burma, are such lines as those in the Devadūta Sayings, p. 132 f., where the heeding of Dharma, the Divine monitor within, is hymned.

The Self in thee, O man, knows what is true or false;
Surely the noble Witness, Sir, the Self
You do misjudge, in that when sin is there
You do conceal the Self within the self.³

Here we feel we are reading an Upaniṣad.

The self in thee man knowest what is true or false.
Indeed, My friend, thou scornest the noble self,
Thinking to hide the evil self in thee
From self who witnessed it.⁴

Here there is the distinction between the good and the evil self. Though the highest self in these passages seems to be rather the moral witness than the Paramātman of the Upaniṣads, still we find a significant distinction. Moreover, in the same work, the dominance of the higher self is also spoken of."⁵ Furthermore, Gautama is represented as having never heard the doctrine that the actions do not belong to a self.⁶ A number of such other passages can be quoted; and on the basis of these, Mrs. Rhys Davids maintains that Buddha did not expound the doctrine that there is no self. Yet she tells us that the Indian conception of self is peculiar. She writes: "We have here the Indian, not the European way of rendering the word 'self'; in other words, we

¹ *Gradual Sayings*, Vol. II, p. viii.

² *The Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part I, Introduction to *Māhālisutta*, p. 188.

³ *Gradual Sayings*, Vol. I, p. xi.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 132.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 237.

have not myself, yourself, yourselves, himself; we have the pronoun rejected."¹ The Buddhist word for existence is *bhāva*, and *bhāva* means becoming as well as being. And becoming implies becoming something, *viddhi*, becoming more, becoming perfect. It is a way of growth.² There is an *artha* mentioned for the followers, which means a positive end in the primitive Buddhism.³ But later, for the monk, this end stood for Nirvāṇa, in the sense of absolute quiescence and nothing more.

Mrs. Rhys Davids points out that the eight-fold path is not found in the Book of Eights in the *Gradual Sayings*,⁴ which is an evidence to prove that it was a later addition by monks to the original teaching of Buddha. She says that in them there "is no crushing out of 'desire' such as is mandated in the Four Truths, and with which Buddhism has become closely associated. . . . For the Truths leave in no saving clause for the teaching of a healthier form of desire."⁵ "The rule in the Piṭakas is, that we never go far without stumbling on *aniccā*, *dukkha*, *anāttā*; 'impermanence, ill, not-self.' But in these three Nipātas we do not find the first, we have to hunt for the second, and of the third so far is the self from being a negative quantity, that we find him a Someone who may be given authority . . . , is to be awarded and made pure . . . , is an inner Witness. And I have called this an older music, older because it obviously could not have been the burden of a later melody."⁶

One interested may read Mrs. Rhys Davids' useful work, *Sākya or Buddhistic Origins*, and get a detailed idea of what she thinks the original Buddhism to be. We find that the rejection of the Self and the doctrine of the Four Truths cannot, according to her, belong to the original teachings of Buddha. And though McGovern thinks that the twelve-linked chain of causation must have been known to the primitive Buddhism, Dr. E. J. Thomas holds that it is difficult to decide either way. He writes: ". . . we have no reason to think that the formula is a part of primitive Buddhism, nor that it was invented as a whole. In the Scriptures we find several such schemes of causal relation differing both in the order of links and the number. In the *Digha*, where the fullest canonical treatment is found, it occurs once with ten and once with nine links. In the *Discourse on Fuel* the first seven links are omitted and the series begins naturally enough with the root cause of

¹ *Gradual Sayings*, Vol.

, p. x.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. V, p. ix.

³ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. x.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. xv

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. xvii.

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craving."¹ Further, "to decide how far the formula of the five Khandhas (*Skandhas* in Sanskrit) is primitive as the expression of the doctrine of non-soul is as difficult as in the case of the Chain of Causation. It is set forth in the second sermon which Buddha is said to have preached, but this sermon with its formal divisions and questions and answers has the appearance of being a product of Abhidharma method converted into a dialogue whatever may be the way in which the doctrine was first formulated, and it now forms with the Chain of Causation the chief theoretical basis of Buddhism."²

In face of these difficulties it is almost impossible to attempt any systematic presentation of Buddha's own views. We have therefore to begin with the first attempts at a system, namely, the Theravāda.

III

INTRODUCTION TO THE HĪNAYĀNA SCHOOLS

The significance of Buddha's silence to the question whether the *ātman* exists or not seems to be that it is a transcendental entity about which nothing can be predicated. If existence and non-existence are to be regarded as predicates, as it is done by many both in the East and the West, then they are applicable only to things of the empirical world, but not to the transcendental. That is why Buddha refuses to say either that it does not exist or that it exists. For instance, we read, in the *Kindred Sayings* in the dialogue between Sister Khema and King Pasenadi, that Buddha does not reveal either that he will exist after death or will not exist after death. This may be interpreted as that he exists, not as a particular I or He, but as some indescribable entity. There are four undetermined or rather undeterminable questions in Buddhism, namely,

- (1) whether the universe is eternal or not;
- (2) whether the universe is finite or not;
- (3) whether the vital principle (*jīva*) is the same as, or other than the body;
- (4) whether after death a Tathāgata exists or not.³

And it is possible to give affirmative or negative answers to these questions. The Buddhist schools differ practically on all these

¹ *The Life of Buddha*, p. 193.

² *Ibid.*, p. 403.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 201. Cp. the antinomies of Kant.

questions, besides a number of others concerning some practices and some forms of worship. These differences, both in theory and practice, arose because of the differences in meaning that can be put on the words of Buddha. Immediately after the master's death, a council¹ was called at Rājagṛha under Mahākāśyapa and Ānanda, and an attempt was made to codify the teachings. The followers of this code, we may say, are the Theravādins. For a century there was no schism, but differences were gradually being felt within the fold; and after a century at the second council at Vaiśālī, the Theravādins, under the leadership of Yaśonāma, ostracized the Mahāsaṅghikas, who were so called because the followers of this school, who met together and formed another council at the same time, were greater in number than the Theravādins. The differences between the two at first seemed to be on questions like whether Buddha permitted the acceptance of gifts in silver. But later on, differences of great philosophical importance developed between them; and it is said that the Mahāsaṅghikas were the forerunners of the Mahāyāna. However, a third council also is reported to have met during Aśoka's time, in which the *Kathāvatthu* (*Kathāvastu* in Sanskrit) was composed under the leadership of Tissa (Tiṣya in Sanskrit). In this council, the Vibhajjavādins came into prominence, and a number of schools were expelled. The Vibhajjavādins (as they were called in Pāli) were the Theravādins who used to divide the question and solve it; and they contributed little of metaphysical importance to the Theravādā. Yet, we may say, they contributed something to the method of debate and inference, which can be easily perceived by any reader of *Kathāvatthu*. It is more or less the disjunctive syllogism or, to be more precise, the dilemma, with the help of which they tried to refute their opponents. But the schools expelled are really of philosophical importance. The last great Buddhist council was held during the reign of King Kaniṣka at Puṣyapura, the modern Peshawar. In it, under one Vasumitra, commentaries called Vibhāṣās were written on the Buddhist Sūtras, and the Kashmir Sarvāstivādins, who followed those Vibhāṣās, came to be called Vaibhāṣikas. We hear of the name of the Sarvāstivādins even in the *Kathāvatthu*,² along with a number of other names like the Mahāsaṅghikas, the Vaitulyakas,

¹ The historicity of this and the third and fourth councils is still doubted.

² In the text of the *Kathāvatthu* the names of the schools are not given. They are identified by Buddhaghosa, the commentator, several years later.

THERAVĀDINS

the different schools of the Andhakas, the Vātsīputrīyas, the Uttarāpathakas, etc., who made really important contributions to the development of Buddhist thought. Vasumitra gives the names of eighteen Buddhist schools at the end of the second council. But not all these are of philosophical importance, as they differ from each other sometimes just in forms of worship. Dr. E. J. Thomas writes: "The outstanding divisions in earlier Buddhism as determined by the literature are the schools of the Theravāda, the Sarvāstivāda, and the Mahāsaṅghika, the last represented by the Lokottaravāda of the *Mahāvastu*. It was within the last two that the new tendencies and theories arose which produced the Mahāyāna schools."¹ We shall see how the development took place and shall also note, as the occasion arises, that there were permutations and combinations of the schools of the Hīnayāna with those of the Mahāyāna. The other important schools of the Hīnayāna are the Sautrāntikas, so-called because they followed the Sūtras themselves while the Vaibhāṣikas followed the Vibhāṣas or commentaries; the Andhakas, who contributed much to the appearance of the Mahāyāna by their liberal and deeper thinking; and the Satyasiddhi school. Vasumitra tells us that the Sautrāntikas were an offshoot of the Sarvāstivādins. These three schools form really the transition from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna, so far as their philosophical teachings are concerned. Of the schools of the Mahāyāna, the Mādhyamika, the Yogācāra, and the Tathatā school of Āśvaghoṣa are the most important. The last seems to have an Upaniṣadic ring in it. The works, again, said to belong to the Yogācāra differ from each other in their emphasis on the negative and positive aspects of reality; so that separate schools arose in China and Japan claiming one or the other book as their basis. We cannot say whether these works really belonged to different schools in India.

IV

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As differences grew within the fold, the Theravādins found it necessary to define their position, make their tenets and their dogmas definite. This led to some systematization of their views. Though they tried to keep nearest to the tenets of primitive Buddhism, they had to add a few points to it as a consequence

¹ *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 41.

of making it exact. Though they incorporated into their works the contrary statements of Buddha about the indefinables, their general tendency was to deny their existence. McGovern writes: "Where the primitive Buddhism has ignored, the Sthaviravādins denied, the existence of the Absolute."¹ What is often called the agnosticism of Buddha is interpreted by them practically as a sort of nihilism. One important point, which later acquired great philosophical importance, is the ideal of Arhatship or Pratyekabuddhahood which the Theravādins held before themselves. They did not preach the ideal of Buddhahood itself; for, though they did not hold that it was in principle impossible for the ordinary man to become a Buddha, they thought that it was rare that he could become one. They had the instance of Sumedha Brāhmaṇa becoming Sākyamuni and of someone else who would become Maitreyi Buddha. The Śrāvaka is one who with the help of a Guru or teacher attains Nirvāṇa. "The Pratyekabuddha's are those who desire to have self-control, quietude, and knowledge without the help of a teacher (anācāryakam) and seek their own parinirvāṇa after comprehending the hetu² and the pratyaya, i.e. the theory of causation. The Mahāyānist³ are those who strive to acquire the omniscience possessed by a Buddha without the help of a teacher and seek the powers of a Tathāgata⁴ in order to help all beings of the world to attain salvation."⁴ Here the difference is that the Buddha, who is the ideal in Mahāyāna, in compassion for the miserable creatures of the earth, does not enter Nirvāṇa, that is, does not attain his own salvation, but tries to save them; while the interest of the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha is self-centred in that they seek only their own salvation. The difference between the latter two is that the first depends upon a teacher, he is a Śrāvaka or a hearer; but the second does not depend upon a teacher. At first sight, this difference between the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna ideals seems to be only of ethical significance, but we shall see later that it has metaphysical importance as well. For in the fully developed schools of the Mahāyāna, it is maintained that Buddha is one and not many; and as every man can become a Buddha, the nature of every man in essence must be Buddha. That is, this line of thought resulted in absolute idealism.

¹ *An Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 13.

² *Hetu* and *pratyaya* mean generally cause and condition.

³ Buddha is called Tathāgata.

⁴ N. Dutt: *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 80-1.

We read that the first sermon of Buddha was on the four basic truths of Buddhism, namely, *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha*, and *mārga*, that is, misery, the cause of misery, the cessation of misery, and the way that leads to the cessation. Whether Buddha laid all emphasis on these four truths or not, the Theravādins regarded them as the foundation of their position, and subsequently all schools of Buddhism accepted them.

(1) Now, this, monks, is the noble truth of pain: birth is painful, old age is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, sorrow, lamentation, dejection, and despair are painful, not getting what one wishes is painful. In fact, the five groups of grasping (that is, by the five senses) are painful.

(2) Now this, monks, is the noble truth of the cause of pain: the craving, which leads to rebirth, combined with pleasure and lust, finding pleasure here and there, namely, the craving for passion, the craving for existence, the craving for non-existence.

(3) Now this, monks, is the noble truth of the cessation of pain, the cessation without a remainder of craving, the abandonment, forsaking, release, non-attachment.

(4) Now this, monks, is the noble truth of the way that leads to the cessation of pain: this is the noble Eight-fold Way, namely, right views, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration."¹

The second and the third of the four truths quoted in the above passage were developed into the twelve-linked chain of causation. In order to end pain, one has to know the cause of pain, and this cause was found by the Buddhists to be twelve linked. "Conditioned by ignorance activities² come to pass; conditioned by activities consciousness, conditioned by consciousness name-and-shape, conditioned by name-and-shape sense, conditioned by sense contact, conditioned by contact feeling, conditioned by feeling craving, conditioned by craving grasping, conditioned by grasping becoming, conditioned by becoming birth, conditioned by birth, old age-and-death, grief, lamenting, suffering, sorrow, despair come to pass. Such is the uprising of the entire mass of ill. This, brethren, is called (causal) happening."³ The cessation of pain is explained in terms of the same twelve-linked chain. "But from the utter fading away and ceasing of ignorance (comes) ceasing

¹ E. J. Thomas: *Early Buddhist Scriptures*, pp. 30-1.

² The word used here is *samkhāra* or *samskāra* in Sanskrit. It is sometimes translated as aggregates, sometimes as instincts, and sometimes as impressions or tendencies, but in the above book as activities.

³ *Kindred Sayings*, Vol. II, p. 2.

of activities; from ceasing of activities ceasing of consciousness; from ceasing of consciousness ceasing of name-and-shape; from ceasing of name-and-shape ceasing of sense; from ceasing of sense ceasing of contact; from ceasing of contact ceasing of feeling; from ceasing of feeling ceasing of craving; from ceasing of craving ceasing of grasping; from ceasing of grasping ceasing of becoming; from ceasing of becoming ceasing of birth; from ceasing of birth, old age-and-death, grief, lamenting, suffering, sorrow, despair cease. Such is the ceasing of the entire mass of ill."¹

Attempts have been made to find out and interpret the causal connection between the different links of the chain. Dr. E. J. Thomas writes: "Pischel holding that theoretical Buddhism rests entirely on Sāṅkhya-Yoga compared and mostly identified each link in the chain with a corresponding Sāṅkhya-Yoga term, and held that practically all was borrowed from Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The Sāṅkhāras are the vāsanās,² vinnāna is identical with the līṅgaśarīra, nāmarūpa³ with buddhi,⁴ upādāna with dharmā-dharmau⁵ and bhāva with samsṛti.⁶ All this is quite unprovable, as we do not know that the Sāṅkhya with these technical terms even existed when the chain was formulated. The Sāṅkhya terms state the stages of evolution from a primordial matter (*prakṛti*). This conception is not found in Buddhism, and Buddhaghōṣa expressly denies that ignorance is to be understood as an uncaused root cause like *prakṛti*."⁷ The comparison, as Dr. Thomas says, seems to be without support. Still, the causal connection between the various links can be understood. But we have to note that the Buddhist conception of cause is peculiar. There is nothing substantial in the cause that continues into the effect. Such a conception conflicts with the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, or Kṣaṇikavāda, which is a conceptual analysis of the idea of continual becoming. If the world is pure becoming, then nothing in it can exist for two consecutive moments or instants. So according to this theory, everything exists only for one moment and perishes the very next; so that the cause, which must exist at least one moment before the appearance of the effect, must have perished by the time the effect appears. So there is no substantial identity or any element of sameness between cause and effect. But still, Buddhism does not believe in any

¹ *Kindred Sayings*, Vol. II, p. 2.

² Tendencies created in the mind by actions, etc.

³ Subtle body.

⁴ Intellect.

⁵ Merit and demerit.

⁶ The constantly changing world.

⁷ *The Life of Buddha*, p. 193.

event happening without a cause. Hence what we call a cause is really a cause; only, it does not continue into the effect. But then how are we to understand the relation between cause and effect? According to the Buddhistic conception of causation, upon the cause being there the effect originates, depending upon the cause the effect appears. But does the effect originate out of the cause? This cannot be, on the Buddhistic view. Somehow the effect comes, but it comes only depending upon the cause. Thus in this theory we find scope for planting the doctrine of Śūnya. In fact, the works of the Theravāda contain references to the Void. Buddha, talking of the path, is reported to have said: "And what, brethren, is the path that goes to the uncompounded? Concentration that is void, signless and aimless."¹ Now, one may say that, on this view, the effect comes out of nothing or Void, though it depends upon an occasion for its appearance, the occasion here being called the cause. This doctrine is called *pratītyasamutpāda* or dependent origination. The cause is naturally the invariable occasion, or the condition and nothing more. Of course, without this condition or occasion the effect cannot appear; so there is an element of necessity. But this necessity does not depend upon an element of identity between cause and effect. The relation between the two is not even identity in difference. The Buddhists would say that it is not also difference. For instance, Nāgasena, in the *Questions of King Milinda*, asks whether a flame lighted from another flame is the same as the latter or different from it, and answers that it is neither the same nor different.² Again, we find in the dialogue between Sister Khema and King Prasenajit³ that the Tathāgata never revealed himself either as different from the five *skandhas*⁴ or as identical with them. And in this we may see germs of the negativistic logic of the Mādhyamika, namely, that reality is neither *sat* nor *asat*, etc. According to the Buddhistic doctrine of causation, we find that there can be similarity without an element of sameness. Only two steps can lead us from this to the idealism of the Vijñānavāda, as it is sometimes interpreted. It may be asked: If A and B are similar, are they similar because of a common quality or because of some L and M which are found in A and B respectively and are similar? If the first alternative is accepted, then the element

¹ *Kindred Sayings*, Vol. IV, p. 256.

² P. III (S.B.E., Vol. XXXV).

³ *Kindred Sayings*, Vol. IV, p. 268.

⁴ The five aggregates which constitute personality. They will be explained later.

of sameness is admitted; if the second, a similar question can be raised here too, namely, Are L and M similar because of similar properties or because of a common property? The Buddhists are averse to accepting any element of identity, and that is why they reject the Naiyāyika theory of the universal or *jāti*. If therefore they say that similarity is due to our mind, and then that all relations are products of the mind, the belief that there can be no things without relations, will lead the Buddhists to the doctrine that things are only forms of the mind, just as similar reasoning led Berkeley to his doctrine *esse est percipi*. And in support of epistemological idealism too, we find passages in the works of the Theravāda. In the *Kevaddha Sutta* we read

"There is not that earth, water, fire, and wind,
And long and short, and fine and coarse,
Pure and impure, no footing find.
There is not that both name and form
Die out, leaving no place behind.
When intellection ceases they all also cease."¹

In fact, this idealism seems to belong to the very conception of the twelve-linked chain of causation. Vijñāna or consciousness is the third link, and in the way of cessation it is pointed out how, depending on the cessation of consciousness, the other nine links cease one after another. Similarly, in explaining the process of the appearance of the world, it is said that, depending on consciousness, all the other nine links appear. The two links independent of consciousness are ignorance and the *samskāras*. So this idealism, we may say, is inherent in Buddhism. In the *Āṅguttara*, it is said: "Verily, I declare to you, my friend, that within this very body, mortal as it is and only a fathom high, but conscious and endowed with mind, is the world, and the waxing thereof, and the waning thereof, and the way that leads to the passing away thereof."²

Coming to our point, we see that the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* is intimately related to the doctrine of momentariness. Taking the twelve links of the chain, the final cause of suffering and, therefore, of the world, according to the Buddhists, is ignorance. Some interpreters of Buddhism hold that it is the ignorance of this or that individual; others that it is cosmic. Oldenberg writes: "The first links of the series—the ultimate

¹ *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part I, p. 284. (Sacred Books of the Buddhist series.)

² Quoted from the Introduction of Mrs. Rhys Davids to the above.

ground of earthly existence, ignorance, and the 'conformations' which develop themselves from ignorance—are in their nature much more difficult of comprehension by concrete explanation than the following categories."² This difficulty is certainly due to the two links being the causes of thought and the phenomenal world; and it is difficult for thought to understand the origin of itself. Yet Oldenberg objects to giving any cosmic significance to ignorance. "It is tempting," he says, "by the place assigned to the category of ignorance at the beginning of the whole line of causality, to allow oneself to be carried away by interpretations which see in this idea, as it were, a cosmological power working at the primitive foundation of things. . . . The philosophy of later Brahmanical schools speaks in similar fashion of *Māyā*, that power of delusion, which causes the deceptive picture of the created world to appear to the One, the Uncreated, as if it were the *beënt*."³ "Interpretations of this kind, which find in the category of ignorance an expansion for the deceptive Nothing appearing as the *beënt*, completely correspond in fact with the explicit utterances of later Buddhist texts."⁴ "We have taken this glance at this later phase of development of Buddhist thought merely with the intention of being put on our guard against assigning any of these ideas to ancient Buddhism and against framing any interpretation of the old texts, especially, of the formula of causality, influenced by such a process."⁵ Though Oldenberg is opposed to interpreting the first link of the chain as cosmic, he admits practically that this concept of early Buddhism contains the germ of the theory of cosmic ignorance as developed in later Mahāyāna. Oldenberg continues: "Whenever in the sacred Pāli literature this question is mooted as well as in the addresses which Buddha himself and his chief disciples are said to have delivered, as in the systematizing compilations of a later generation of dogmatists, the answer is invariably the same. The ignorance is not declared to be anything in the way of a cosmic power, not anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the range of earthly tangible reality. 'Not to know suffering, friend, not to know the origin of suffering, not to know the extinction of suffering, not to know the path to the extinction of suffering: this, O friend, is the cause of ignorance.' 'Not to know the four sacred truths as they are, I

¹ *Samskāras*.⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 239.² *Buddha*, p. 227.³ *Ibid.*, p. 237.⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

have wandered on the long path from one birth to another. Now have I seen them: the current of being is stemmed. The root of suffering is destroyed: there is henceforward no rebirth.'"¹ "The method and procedure of old Buddhist dogmatic is here clearly exemplified; when it tracks personality back on its way through the world of sorrow beyond that moment when consciousness clothes itself with 'name and material form,' that is, to the moment of conception, their thought is not on that account lost in the arcanum of pre-existence prior to all consciousness, but it makes this empirical existence take root in another equally empirical conceivable existence. That ignorance, which is stated to be the ultimate ground of your present state of being, involves that, at an earlier date, a being who then occupied your place, a being who has lived in not less tangible reality than you now do, on earth or in a heaven or in a hell, has failed to possess a specific knowledge, definable in certain words, and bound for that reason in the bonds of transmigration, must have brought your present state of being."² To put Oldenberg's conclusion briefly, some personality which was ignorant of the truths has brought about my being. But this conclusion seems to be absurd and is not in accord with the spirit of Buddhism. The cause and effect here cannot be two different personalities. Such a view is in direct opposition to the Buddhistic doctrine of *karma*, according to which the fruits of any action accrue to the individual. Even if we apply the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness to this phenomenon, we cannot say that the two persons are different; for, though not real, some spurious identity and continuity between the persons obtains. Apart from this difficulty, ignorance here cannot be that of any individual at all in the ordinary sense. It is true that in the works of the Theravāda we do not find a fully developed doctrine of cosmic ignorance or illusion; and to say that the Theravādins had such a doctrine would be wrong. But on the other hand, it is equally wrong to say that this ignorance is the ignorance of any individual. When consciousness itself has not appeared, it is impossible to think of the individual as a person. Nay, there is no person without *nāma-rūpa* or name-and-form. *Nāma-rūpa*, especially the *nāma-rūpa* of the chain of causation, does not stand in Buddhism for the name which an individual is given and the bodily form which he possesses, as Oldenberg seems to think, but for the combination of mind and body, which,

¹ *Buddha*, p. 240.² *Op. cit.*

as will be explained farther on, is called the person. It is true, as Buddhaghosa tells us, that ignorance should not be understood as the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya, not because ignorance is not the root cause of the world and so of the individual, but because the Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya is an eternal entity existing even after the individual realizes his own nature, whereas there is nothing eternal for the Buddhist in general except Nirvāṇa, and for some, Space. When it is said that ignorance of the truth causes *samsāra*, it is not meant that ignorance here is the ignorance of any individual, but that it is a cosmic veiling power which is responsible for the individual's not knowing the truth. Only in one sense may it be said that this ignorance is the ignorance of the individual, just as it is said by some of the followers of Śaṅkara that Avidyā is *jīvāśraya* or has its locus in the jīva. How is it that a particular truth is hidden from me? It is due to ignorance. But does it mean that another ignorance caused this ignorance? No, here the cause and the effect are the same. Even the Advaitin would say that ignorance is due to the ignorance of the fact that the world is due to ignorance. In some such way the individual is there, only because of his ignorance of the truth. If this ignorance vanishes, he too would vanish. So this ignorance is not merely his ignorance, but also the cause of his very individuation. And it is the latter aspect that is more important in the twelve-linked chain. In the Theravāda, if the individual realizes that he is nothing but an aggregate of the *skandhas*, etc., he simply ceases to be and attains Nirvāṇa; so that his particularity is the same as the ignorance of truth. It is true that the full significance of the theory does not seem to have been recognized by the Theravādins. But still it would be wrong, and leads to non-Buddhistic conclusions, if we adopt an interpretation like that of Oldenberg. The general opinion that the meaning of a theory should be understood in the light of its latest developments is not without truth, though we shall be wrong if we conclude from it that the latest developments were known to the earliest upholders. We may interpret, therefore, that ignorance is what constitutes individuality or particularity. Of course, there is no conception, in the Theravāda, of the Absolute, which being limited by ignorance constitutes the individual. Yet there is the idea of the Unconditioned, which later could have developed into the Absolute of the Mahāyāna. We read in the *Kindred Sayings*: "And what, brethren, is the Uncompounded? The destruction of lust,

brethren, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of illusion—this is called the Uncompounded.”¹ And the idea of the Uncompounded is one phase of the idea of the Unconditioned. For it is said that the way to the Uncompounded is “concentration that is void, signless and aimless.”² This idea of cessation as the Uncompounded might have developed later into the Mādhyamika Śūnyatā or Nirvāṇa, which is an *asamskṛta* or uncompounded *dhātu* or entity for the Sarvāstivādins.

We read in the *Kindred Sayings*: “Nescience concerning ill, its rise, its cessation and concerning the very going to the cessation of ill. This is called ignorance.”³ As regards *samskāras*: “These are the three activities, those of deed, speech, and mind. These are activities.” If we are to depend on this English translation, it is difficult to understand or explain the passage. If the passage really refers to the activities of deed, speech and mind, then already the individual is posited, and ignorance may be the ignorance of the individual about this or that truth. But as yet even consciousness or *viññāna* has not appeared, and without it the individual could not have been there. The translation of *samskāras* by activities is here misleading and confusing. They mean certain tendencies, instincts or *vāsanās*, which appear upon ignorance being there, and which set the individual’s speech, deed and mind, that is, speaking, acting, and thinking, the three kinds of activities, after he is formed in special grooves. These are not the tendencies of any individual; but like the Will of Schopenhauer, which is not the will of anybody, they are the instincts or habits which are to set the individual. We may say they are the laws or habits according to which the individual is created, and which become later the habits or laws of his own activity. As yet in the Theravāda, we do not find any philosophy of nature or the external world. Its interest was chiefly and solely in man and his emancipation. We, therefore, cannot say that these *samskāras* were understood by the Theravādins as the laws according to which the whole creation, including man and his surroundings, was made, and in obedience to which it moves. But the relation of the two conceptions can be easily perceived. And in the light of the second idea as a development out of the first, the significance of the first can be understood. Similar conceptions are found in the Nyāya and other orthodox systems. When the Naiyāyika is asked, How does God create the world after dissolution, he tells

¹ Vol. IV, p. 256.

² *Op. cit.*

³ Vol. II, p. 4.

us that in God's mind the plan of the universe prior to dissolution is left as an impression (*samskāra*), and according to that plan he produces the next creation. That is, the plan is really the *samskāras* left in the mind of God. Similarly in the Śaiva Advaita, we read that the Māyāśakti of Śiva contains within itself the *samskāras* of the jīvas, and according to them the new creation is made. But as there is no God or his mind in Buddhism, the *samskāras* come into being depending upon ignorance. Of course, it may be asked: How could the *samskāras* be there, if they are not left by the jīvas? But the counter-question may be asked: How could the jīvas act in the ways they do, if not led by their *samskāras*? This is like asking, Which of the two, the seed or the tree, is prior? And to make the confusion worse, the term *samskāras* includes not only the universal forms of activity, but also the idiosyncrasies of the individuals. But anyway, the *samskāras* previous to the formation of the individual himself cannot be the *samskāras* left by the individual. When the question is raised, How could God strike upon this plan of creating man and the universe, the only answer possible is because the tendencies to create in this way were left in the mind of God. This is certainly begging the question. Yet no other answer can the human intellect give. Similarly, if the Buddhist is asked the same question, he has to say that the present nature of man and his universe is due to *samskāras* or *vāsanās*. But of whose *samskāras*, and where do they exist? The early Buddhists could think of nobody and nothing. They said merely that the *samskāras* came into being upon ignorance being there. These *samskāras* are like habits which are not the habits of anybody. They are like universals or laws, seeking their particulars and embodiment. Dr. Thomas translates *samskāras* by aggregates.¹ We may say that a *samskāra* is that which effects an aggregate²: it is that under which things are grouped into an aggregate. The universal or *jāti* rejected by the Buddhist may be found here in another form. But we have to note that these *samskāras* too are not eternal for him.

Upon *samskāras* being there consciousness or *viññāna* appears. It seems to be more or less the locus which the *samskāras* discover for themselves. "These are the six groups of consciousness: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, smell-, taste-, touch-, and mind-consciousness. This is called consciousness."³ These are the

¹ *The Life of Buddha*, p. 193.

² *Kindred Sayings*, Vol. II, p. 4.

³ Cp. *saṅkhātam abhisankharonti*.

five forms of perception and mental apprehension. We have to note that no individual is spoken of, though we speak of an individual or person who is constituted by these. "Feeling, perception, will, contact, work of mind. This is called name. The four great elements, and the shape derived from them. This is called shape. This is the name and this the shape called name-and-shape."¹ We plainly see that name and form or shape here do not mean what we generally mean by the two terms. As Mrs. Rhys Davids says, name and form is a term meaning our dual organism, "name being resolved in the other Suttas into mental factors."² Here we have to note a point. In some Suttas we read that the dependence of name and form and consciousness is mutual. "Thus then is it, Ananda, that cognition, with name-and-form as its cause; name-and-form, with cognition as its cause . . ."³ In this Sutta, called the *Mahānidāna Suttānta*, nine links only of the causal chain are mentioned; old age-and-death—birth—becoming—grasping—craving—sensation—contact—name and form—and cognition.⁴ Among the links excluded are *samskāras* and ignorance. We do not know whether the highest place assigned to cognition is due to the appearance of some Vijñānavāda in germ. However, the last two links of the chain are regarded as mutually dependent, though not all. We read in the *Kathāvatthu* that the Theravādins believe in reciprocal determination, while the Mahāsaṅghikas believe in determination in one direction only. But we are not sure whether this reciprocal determination is limited to only some of the links or, even according to at least some of the Theravādins, it extends to the other links also. If it really extends to the other links, then their conception of causation cannot involve the time factor, for neither the cause nor the effect can be said to exist before or after the other, as each implies the other; and the distinction between cause and effect would be a sort of logical distinction between ground and consequent. And this doctrine of reciprocal dependence or mutual implication might have later on developed into the theory of universal relativism in the Mahāyāna, particularly in the Mādhyamika.

Sense is of six kinds. "The sense of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind. This is called six-fold sense."⁵ The distinction between the six kinds of consciousness and the six senses may be a bit con-

¹ *Kindred Sayings*. ² *Ibid.*, p. v. ³ *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part II, p. 52.

⁴ *Op. cit.*

⁵ Aung and Rhys Davids: *Kathāvatthu*, p. 294.

⁶ *Kindred Sayings*, Vol. I, p. 4.

fusing. But the six senses may be taken to be six organs or instruments of sensing, while the six kinds of consciousness may be taken as the results of sensing. Contact also is correspondingly of six kinds. "There are six groups of contact: eye-contact, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-,¹ mind-contact. This is called contact."² This contact is the contact of the sense organ with the thing, without which, it was believed, the object could not be known. "There are six groups of feeling, feeling that is born of eye-contact, feeling that is born of ear-contact, feeling that is born of nose contact, feeling that is born of tongue-contact, feeling that is born of body-contact, feeling that is born of mind-contact. This is called feeling."³ For the Buddhist, the feelings are qualitatively of three kinds; pain, pleasure, and an indifferent feeling which is neither pain nor pleasure. "There are six groups of craving; craving for things seen, for things heard, for odours, for tastes, for things tangible, for ideas. This is called craving."⁴ Craving is thirst, natural or unregenerate desire. "There are four graspings; grasping of desires, grasping of opinion, grasping of rule and ritual, grasping of soul-theory. This is called grasping."⁵ Grasping is *upādāna*, will, impulse, action. Birth and death need no explanation.

As personality is minutely analysed in the canonical works of the Theravāda, the doctrine of the five *skandhas* or aggregates is found even in them.⁶ But this doctrine is more systematically treated in the works of the Sarvāstivādins, and we shall deal with it while presenting their views. There is also another doctrine of truths, namely, *sarvam kṣaṇikam* or everything is momentary, *sarvam duḥkham* or everything is misery, and *sarvam anātmam* or everything is self-less.⁷ To these three truths another is added later, that is, *sarvam śūnyam* or everything is void, probably a Mahāyānist germ. But the first three are found in the works of the Theravāda. And there is an important difference in significance between the first four-fold truth and this. The four-fold truth is more simple, less sophisticated, and more directly and immediately concerned with the nature and ideal of man's life. But the three-fold truth is universal, applicable to both man and his surroundings, and has a cosmological significance. It must therefore have been formed when Buddhism became more reflective and philosophical, and felt the need of understanding the

¹ Body means touch.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 4.

³ *Kindred Sayings*, Vol. II, p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 134.

⁵ *Op. cit.*

⁶ *Op. cit.*

⁷ *Anguttara Nikāya*, iii, 134.

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external world also. We shall discuss this also while dealing with the Sarvāstivādins, for whom it must have greater importance than it has for the Theravāda; for, the Theravādins were interested only in man and his salvation, whereas the Sarvāstivādins included the external world also in their speculations.

V

VĀTSĪPUTRĪYAS

Of the schools that branched off from the Theravāda, we may take note of the Vātsīputrīyas, also called Vṛjiputrakas. According to both *Dīpavamsa* and Vasumitra, they come directly from the Theravādins. The point of philosophical importance for us to note about them is that along with the Sammitīyas, they hold that the *puḍgala* or soul is different from the five *skandhas*.¹ For the orthodox Theravādin, there is really no *puḍgala* or soul, though what Buddha actually declared seems to be that the soul was neither different from the *skandhas* nor identical with them. Of course, the Vātsīputrīyas and the Sammitīyas do not maintain that the soul is eternal, but that it is different from the *skandhas*, and so long as it lasts it can last as such. This is what we read in the *Kathāvatthu*.¹

According to Vasumitra, the Sammitīyas, like the Vātsīputrīyas, branch off directly from the Theravādins; and even according to *Kathāvatthu* it must be so, because both names are mentioned in it as holding this view. But according to *Dīpavamsa*, the Sammitīyas along with the Chandāgarikas, Bhadrāyanikas, and Dharmottariyas are sub-schools of the Vātsīputrīyas; in which case we may guess that all these sub-schools probably held the view. Anyway, our interest lies only in noting that there was such a view in Buddhism.

VI

SARVĀSTIVĀDINS

The next school of philosophical importance is that of the Sarvāstivādins. We read of this school in the *Kathāvatthu*, where it is mentioned that the Sarvāstivādins, unlike the Theravādins, held that everything past, present and future existed,² while the Kasapikas, a branch of the Sarvāstivādins, held that only part of

¹ P. 8.

² *Kathāvatthu*, p. 84.

the past, present and future existed.¹ These schools thus do not have much sympathy for the doctrine of momentariness, which is usually associated with Buddhism in general. The best account of the views of the Sarvāstivādins is found in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, which is made available to the Sanskrit-knowing public through the efforts of la Vallée Poussin and Rahula Saṅkṛtyayana. When expelled from Pāṭaliputra, the Sarvāstivādins established themselves in Madhura, whence they gradually spread towards Kashmir. During the reign of Kaniṣka, who is rightly called the Aśoka of the Sarvāstivādins, a council was held under the presidentship of one Vasumitra, who was curiously enough a Theravādin; and in it were composed, with the help of Aśvaghoṣa, the three Vibhāṣās or commentaries, called the *Upadeśaśāstra*, *Vinayavibhāṣāśāstra*, and *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra*. It is on the last of these that the famous work of Vasubandhu is said to have been based. And as the Sarvāstivādins of Kashmir followed the Vibhāṣās, they were called Vaibhāṣikas. They called themselves the Mūlasarvāstivādins or the original Sarvāstivādins, in order to distinguish themselves from the Sarvāstivādins of Madhura, whose only book available is *Aśokāvadāna*. But there seems to be little or no philosophical difference between the two branches.

The very name Sarvāstivādins means those that maintain that everything exists. In *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*,² these (called Vaibhāṣikas) are represented as epistemological realists and presentationists as regards their doctrine of perception. That is, according to them the objects exist as seen and are directly perceived. The presence of realism shows that the philosophical interest of the Sarvāstivādins is wider than that of the Theravādins. The former are more scholastic, and a fairly well systematized philosophy can be found in their writings. McGovern writes: "The Sarvāstivādins are to the Sthaviravādins what the Sthaviravādins were to the primitive Buddhism. The materialism and realism of the Sthaviravādins was made more explicit and categorical; the agnostic and psychological aspect was largely lost sight of. Buddhism thus became a definite and rigid philosophical system, instead of remaining a body of truths which were effective irrespective of metaphysics."³ Almost all that the Theravādins held was incorporated by the Sarvāstivādins into their system. Their chief aim

¹ *Kathāvatthu*, p. 101.

² P. 7.

³ *An Introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 14.

is to show that the *ātman* or soul is unreal, that it is a mere "name for a multitude of interconnected facts, which Buddhist philosophy is attempting to analyse by reducing them to real elements (*dharma*)."¹ Like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, who called everything a *padārtha*, Vasubandhu, the Sarvāstivādin, calls everything a *dharma*. *Dharma* is nothing but a *padārtha*. He defines *dharma*s as *avabodhopayoginah padārthāḥ*,² that is, those entities (*padārtha* literally means the meaning of a word and is often translated by the translators of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika works by the word category) which are useful for understanding. We shall not be far wrong if we translate the word *dharma* by category, because by classifying things under categories we understand the universe. These *dharma*s are of two kinds, the *asamskṛita* or simple *dharma*s and the *samskṛita* or the compound *dharma*s. The former are three: *ākāśa* or space, and the two kinds of *nirodha* or cessation, called the *apratisaṅkhyānirodha* and the *pratisaṅkhyānirodha*. The latter is the *summum bonum* of the Sarvāstivādins. Vasubandhu defines it as the separation of the constituents (of a compound).³ The commentary says that *pratisaṅkhyā* is *prajñā* or knowledge, and as the cessation is brought about by knowledge it is called *pratisaṅkhyānirodha*.⁴ The true characteristic of *pratisaṅkhyānirodha* is liberation. The essential characteristic of it is everlastingness. Its description is beyond the power of the tongue of man. It can only be realized by the self-experience of a perfect man. Generally speaking, it may be, for all practical purposes, designated as the highest good, eternally existing, which may be called also *visamyoga* or deliverance.⁵ This is the same as Nirvāṇa. But the important point for us to note is that, though the idea seems to be negative as it is the resolution of a compound into its constituent parts, it is said to be existing and eternal. It is like the existence of *abhāva* or negation. Though the idea of cessation itself is negative, the Vaibhāṣikas understand it as an entity and as positive. The commentary on *Abhidharmakośa* says that *mokṣa* or liberation is Nirvāṇa; and that is eternal, that is happiness, and therefore that is the highest.⁶

¹ Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 25. A good account of this school is found in this book as well as in Yamakami Sogen's *Systems of Buddhist Thought*.

² *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 2. (Kashi Vidhyapith, Benares.)

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3. *Pratisaṅkhyānirodho yo viyogah prthak prthak*.

⁴ Sankṛtyayana: *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 3. *Pratisaṅkhyā hi prajñā. Tayā hetubhā-tayā'yam nirodho bhavattī pratisaṅkhyānirodhah*.

⁵ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 165.

⁶ *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 230.

There is another important point to note in this connection. Almost all the Buddhist schools believe that truth is realized only in *samādhi* or meditation, in which one loses oneself. And the Sarvāstivādins believe in *śūnyatāsamādhi*¹ or the *samādhi* (trance) in Śūnya or void. This shows that here is already a possibility for the beginning of the Śūnyatā doctrine of the Mādhyamika. We have already seen that the idea is seen in the works of the Theravāda also. The Sarvāstivādins, like the Mādhyamikas, speak of the world also as Śūnya. There are many who believe that the Mādhyamika alone is the Śūnyavādin. Suzuki contends that the doctrine of Śūnya is not a monopoly of the Mādhyamika but also belongs to the Yogācāra. Dasgupta goes farther and says that the doctrine is one of the fundamental principles of all the schools of the Mahāyāna.² But we may say that, in one form or another, the doctrine belongs to almost all the Buddhist schools, including those of the Hinayāna. The *śūnyatā* doctrine is one form of the *anātma* doctrine, or is a corollary from it; and it is no wonder that more and more of its significance was seen, as Buddhism became more and more reflective. It is true that the other schools of even the Mahāyāna called the Mādhyamika the Śūnyavādin, and regarded him as a nihilist, in spite of the latter's protest against identifying him with an *ucchedavādin* or a nihilist. And as we shall see later, he is certainly not a nihilist.

Vasubandhu defines *apratisaṅkhyānirodha*³ as that *nirodha* which is due to the absence of knowledge, brought about by great impediments. The commentary on the definition says that when, for instance, the eye and the mind are fixed on some particular colour, then a number of other colours, sounds, smells, etc., though born, enter the past without being cognized; for in the same act a plurality of cognitions is not possible. This entering the past is their cessation, which is *apratisaṅkhyānirodha*. In other words, this is the non-actualization of a possibility because of non-perception. Both kinds of *nirodha*, along with space, are said to be pure or *anāsrava*, while the *samskṛta dharmas* are regarded as *sāsrava* or impure.⁴ All the *asamskṛta dharmas* are *nitya* or eternal.⁵

The classification of the dharmas into *samskṛta* and *asamskṛta*, Sogen tells us, is from the objective standpoint, that is, the uni-

¹ *Abhidharmakośa*. See Commentary.

² *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 128.

³ *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 3. *Utpādāntavighno'nyo nirodho'pratisaṅkhyayā*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Ibid., p. 20.

versal or impersonal standpoint. This means what we have already said, namely, that the philosophical interest of the Sarvāstivādins is wider than that of the Theravādins and includes the object also. The expression objective classification, which Sogen uses,¹ does not mean that the classification is done from the standpoint of the object apart from the subject, but that it is done from a standpoint for which both the subject and the object are two entities or two objects. The *samskṛta dharmas* are of four kinds, *rūpa* or matter, *citta* or mind, *caitta* or the mental, and the *cittaviprayukta* or the non-mental. We need not give the further classification of these four *dharmas*. But one point we have to note is that mind or *citta* here has come to be treated as different from *manovijñāna*, which is one of the six *viññānas*.² Vasubandhu says that mind is the seventh *viññāna*. Though it is called a *viññāna*, it is said to be the *āśraya* or locus of *manovijñāna*.³ Further, the commentator says that mind is the antecedent of all the six *viññānas*; and just as the same man is called the father and the son, and just as the same grain is rice and seed, so the same *viññāna* is different *viññānas*. This is probably a making way for the *Vijñānavāda* of the Mahāyāna.

From the subjective standpoint, things are divided into three classes: the five *skandhas*, the twelve *āyatanas*, and the eighteen *dhātus*. All are called *dharmas*. The *dhātus* are those elements that constitute the *santāna* or the continuity of our personality. The *āyatanas* are the bases of our cognition and fields of our activity. And the *skandhas* are the aggregates which compose the self.⁴ The *skandhas* are five: *rūpaskandha* or the aggregate of matter, *vedanāskandha* or the aggregate of feeling, *samjñāskandha* or the aggregate of ideas, *samskāra-skandha* or the aggregate of *samskāras*, and the *viññānāskandha* or the aggregate of consciousness. Personality thus, for the Buddhist, is an aggregate of matter, feeling, ideas, *samskāras*, and consciousness; and Nirvāṇa is attained by the reduction of the unity of personality into these components and thus ceasing to be, though this ceasing to be is said to be existent (*asti*). Again, the Sarvāstivādin maintains that Nirvāṇa is both existent and non-existent, both *bhāva* and *abhāva*.

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 112.

² *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 8. *Ṣaṇṇām anantarāttam viññānam yaddhi tanmanah.*

³ *Op. cit.* *Caṅsurviññānādānam santi caṅsurādayah pañca āśrayāḥ. Ṣaṣṭasya manovijñānasya tu na kopyāśrayah prasiddhah tadartham manasograhānam.*

⁴ For a detailed account of these, see Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*.

It is *bhāva* because it exists by itself, and *abhāva* because in it there is cessation, there is absence of passions, birth and so forth.¹

The *āyatana*s (bases) are twelve, the five *indriyāyatana*s or the bases of senses, the corresponding five *viśayāyatana*s or the bases of objects, the *manaindriyāyatana* or the basis of mind as the sixth sense, and the *dharmāyatana* or the basis of the non-sensuous object. Vasubandhu says that only this *dharmadhātu* is substantial, to which the commentary adds that it is the essence and eternal, it is true as an entity, and it alone exists.² This seems to be really making the way for monism and abandoning pluralism. Curiously enough, this *dharmadhātu* is said to reside in the eye.³

Abhidharmakośa also speaks of ignorance or *avijñapti*, which is interpreted by Dr. E. J. Thomas as unconscious action. It is an unmanifest *dharma*, which is the cause of the *mahābhūta*s (the great elements), earth, water, fire and air, and is a continuous stream.⁴ But again, curiously enough this *avijñapti* along with the *vedanāskandha* and the *dharmadhātu* is said to constitute the *samskāra*skandha⁵; so that the division of the self into the five *skandha*s seems to be overlapping. This seems to be of a piece with the view of the Andhakas that Nirvāṇa is one of the *samskāras*.

The *dhātus* are eighteen. These include the twelve *āyatana*s plus the five sense organs, and the *manovijñāna*. Or to put it otherwise, these include the six senses including the mind, the six *viññāna*s including the *manovijñāna*, the *dharmadhātu*, and the five sense objects. But if we have six senses and six *viññāna*s, we should have six objects of consciousness. If the sixth object is the *dharmadhātu*, then if we identify it with the mind which is said to be beyond *manovijñāna*, and then both again with Nirvāṇa we have the *Vijñānavāda* full-fledged; and it is already said in the commentary that the same mind can be *manovijñāna* just as the same person can be both father and son. The inconsistency may be due to the influence of Asaṅga, the *Vijñānavādin*, who was an elder brother of Vasubandhu. Probably at the time when Vasubandhu wrote his *Abhidharmakośa*, he was not prepared to

¹ N. Dutt: *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 190.

² *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 16. *Ēko dharmadhātoreva asti vastusatyam. Sāravatvat avināśitvāt.*

³ *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5. *Vikṣiptacittakasyāpi yo'nubandhah subhāsubhah mahābhūtānyupādāya sāhyavijñaptirucyate.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7. *Avijñaptiḥ vedanāskandah dharmāyatanaadhātusca iti ime trayah samskāra*skandhabhedāḥ.

accept Vijñānavāda from his brother, though he was conceding something to it, which concession introduced some inconsistency into his position. It is believed that Vasubandhu later accepted Vijñāvāda from his brother, and wrote many works on it, like *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. But Rahula Sankṛtyayana does not believe it, for he says that there were six Vasubandhus.¹

However, we see that the whole analysis of the self was practically aimed at explaining away the individual. Though the Sarvāstivādins do not maintain that personality exists, they hold that these *āyatanas* (bases) exist.² The self is only an idea (*vijñaptisat*). When Milinda asked Nāgasena whether those who were giving alms to the Buddhists were unreal, Nāgasena put a counter-question, asking the king to point out the chariot apart from the wheels, etc.³ This may be interpreted as that the chariot is neither different from the parts nor is the same as the parts. But the general tendency of the *anātmavāda* is to say that it is nothing more than the parts. Similarly, the so-called self is only a compound of the *skandhas* and has no reality apart from them. When asked again how the enjoyment of *karma* is possible if the soul is nothing but the elements which are every instant perishing, Nāgasena replies that the soul which is said to be newly born to enjoy the past *karma* is neither the new nor the old, just as the flame of a lamp lighted from the flame of another lamp is not merely the latter and yet is not different from it.⁴ That is, the question is answered by maintaining that there is a sort of rebirth without transmigration. And we may note here that the Sarvāstivādins carried their analysis of the four elements as far as atoms.

This account of the Sarvāstivādins is important for us, in that it shows that the school is still analytical. Professor Stcherbatsky tells us that Buddhist philosophy is pre-eminently analytical, and that its theory of causation is only a *saṅghātavāda* or the theory of aggregation. He writes: "It is a salient feature of Indian philosophy that its history splits into several independent lines of development which run parallel from an early beginning down to modern times. Each development has its own fundamental idea to start with, and the development makes every effort to keep faithful to the start. Thus we have the realism (*ārambhavāda*) of

¹ Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 5.

² T. W. Rhys Davids: *The Questions of King Milinda*, p. 43. (S.B.E., Vol. XXXV.)

³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁴ *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 15.

the Vaiśeṣika, the pluralism (*saṅghātavāda*) of Buddhism, the evolutionism (*pariṇāma-vāda*) of Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and the illusionism (*vivarta-vāda*) of Vedānta running parallel lines of development from the remotest antiquity, each with its own ontology, its own theory of causation, its own theory of cognition, its own idea of salvation, and its own idea of the origin of the limitation (*avidyā*) of our experience."¹ The *saṅghātavāda* can be traced right through the history of Buddhism up to its latest developments in Vijñānavāda, in which, as we shall show, it exhibits tendencies to become evolutionism. For does not a change in metaphysics affect the conception of causality also? Does not empiricism—which must be realism at the start, as it contends that our philosophy must be based upon observation of things and therefore believes in things apart from our perceptions—turn into epistemological idealism in the hands of Berkeley, and deny the very objects without positing the independent existence of which empiricism destroys itself? Similarly, *saṅghātavāda* could not remain pure *saṅghātavāda* in the schools of the Mahāyāna except in name. However, this doctrine is a corollary of the theory of *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is common to all schools, though it serves a different purpose, as we shall see, in the schools of the Mahāyāna on account of the change in their metaphysics.² It is not that they first developed their metaphysics and then applied it to the concept of causality; as we have already shown, the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* itself contains germs of later metaphysics. Their influence and application therefore can be mutual. Anyway, we find that, for the Sarvāstivādins, as it is for the Theravadins, upon the *skandhas* being together there is personality, and upon their dispersion personality ceases.

Another important doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins is their differentiation between *saṃvṛtisat* and *paramārthasat*. But the distinction is not that between phenomenal and noumenal existence, but that between the existence of an actual thing and that of a thing remembered but destroyed.³ This distinction is made probably because, as the Sarvāstivādins hold that everything, past, present, and future, exists, they had to differentiate between the existence of a thing actually being perceived and the existence of things that belong to the past and future. Anyway, if both are

¹ *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 67.

² Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, pp 140-1

³ *Abhidharmakośa*, p. 161.

sat, this *sat*, which comprehends both kinds, cannot be actual but ideal. For both past and future can only be ideally reconstructed from the present and, when reconstructed, affect the present also and turn it into the ideal. Thus the way is paved for the development of the idealism of the Mahāyāna. Of course, it should not be thought that, by the time *Abhidharmakośa* was written, there was no Mahāyāna or Vijñānavāda. It is believed that Vasubandhu's elder brother was a Vijñānavādin and was the pupil of one Maitreyinātha, who is generally regarded as the founder of the Yogācāra. We know that the Vibhāṣās of the Sarvāstivādins were written with the help of Āsvaghoṣa, the author of *Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra*, and so evidently a Mahāyānist. But at the time the Sarvāstivādins appeared on the scene, there was no Mahāyāna, neither the Mādhyamika nor the Yogācāra. Yet the Sarvāstivādins too, in their reflections, must have thrown out hints for the development of the Mahāyāna, and also might have been influenced, in some of their views, by the Mahāyānist doctrines either in their finished form or in their development. Yet after the development of the Mahāyāna, the Sarvāstivādins kept themselves aloof from it without following their thoughts to their logical conclusions. Still Sogen's statement¹ that *Abhidharmakośa* forms the stepping-stone from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna is not without justification.

We may now note the development which the doctrine of the four-fold truth underwent in the Sarvāstivāda. In it each of the four truths is subdivided into four, so that we get altogether sixteen kinds of truth.² *Abhidharmakośa* mentions that there are four kinds of *dr̥ṣṭi* or perception or attitude: *dukkhadr̥ṣṭi* or that everything is misery, *samudayadr̥ṣṭi* or that everything has a cause, *nirodhadr̥ṣṭi* or that everything ceases, and *mārgadr̥ṣṭi* or that cessation has a way. *Dukkhadr̥ṣṭi* is again of four kinds, that everything is pain, everything is transient, everything is empty, and everything is self-less. The four kinds of *samudayadr̥ṣṭi* are that everything is aggregation, everything is continuous origination, everything has a cause, and everything is dependent. The kinds of *nirodhadr̥ṣṭi* are that in cessation the *āsravas* or impurities

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 120.

² P. 166.

*Dukkhadr̥ṣṭi*hi: *dukkham, anityam, śūnyam, anātmakam*,
*Samudayadr̥ṣṭi*h: *samudayah, prabhavaḥ, hetuḥ, pratyayah*.
*Nirodhadr̥ṣṭi*h: *nirodhaḥ, śāntam, prañītam, nihsavaṇam*.
*Mārgadr̥ṣṭi*h: *mārgaḥ, nyāyah, pratipratītiḥ, nairyaṇīkam*.

For an explanation of these, see p. 198.

are destroyed; that in it there is peace, as hatred, attachment, etc., cease; that there can be no calamities in it; and that it is beyond the reach of the causes of suffering. The four kinds of *mārgadr̥ṣṭi* are that the path is the path to Nirvāṇa, that it has expedients, that it actually brings Nirvāṇa, and that it leads to final emancipation.

In this elaboration, the elaboration of the first truth assumes metaphysical importance. To the three truths of *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, namely, that everything is *dukkham*, *kṣaṇikam* and *anātmam*, is added another that it is *śūnyam*. This is not surprising, because, by the time *Abhidharmakośa* was written, the Mahāyāna had already appeared, and the importance of the concept of Śūnya must already have been recognized. But though the *dukkhasatya* was applied to all the objects by the Sarvāstivādins, it seems to be particularly applied to the subject or self. What is it that is *dukkha*? In *Abhidharmakośa*, it is the five *skandhas*. The *samudayasatya* is applicable to all the compound *dharma*s, as all compounds have a cause; *nirodhasatya* is applied to *pratīsaṅkhyānirodha*, because this is the true *nirodha*; and the *mārgasatya* is applied to all the *dharma*s of discipline and non-discipline.¹ We have to note, however, that, as the analysis of the self into the *āyantasvū* includes the objects of sense also and that into the *skandhas* the *rūpaskandha* also, to say that the *dukkhasatya* applies to self is only a matter of emphasis.

The last important point we have to note in *Abhidharmakośa* is that Buddha is called the Brahman.² That is, Buddha is given the exalted position given to the Brahman in the Upaniṣads. How and why Buddha is called the Brahman we do not know. But the point is interesting in view of the docetic doctrine that was developed in some other schools of the Hīnayāna.

N. Dutt tells³ us that even the Sarvāstivādins "encouraged the aspiration to Buddhahood and hence the life of a Bodhisatva, and the goal of Buddhahood was not merely Mahāsaṅghika or Mahāyānik." Further "the Sarvāstivādins had two Kāya-conceptions, viz. rūpakāya and dharmakāya, but they did not bear any Mahāyānik sense, though their conception of dharmakāya helped the Yogācārins in the formulation of the conception of the same."⁴ The Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins regarded the

¹ *Abhidharmakośa*, pp. 159-60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 181. *Brahmanā buddhena pravartitavā.*

³ *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*

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body of the Buddha as human. Only among the Mahāsaṅghikas was the docetic conception introduced. Yet the Sarvāstivādins admitted the distinction between the *rūpakāya* or the material body and *dharmakāya* or the body of law.¹ We may again bring before our minds the remark of Sogen that *Abhidharmakośa* is a stepping-stone from the Hinayāna to the Mahāyāna.

VII

MAHĀSAṆGHIKAS

The next school of importance is the Mahāsaṅghikas. At the time they parted from the Theravādins, they do not seem to have framed any doctrine of philosophical importance. In the *Kathāvatthu*, we read that they held the view that the Buddhas pervade in all directions.² They, however, seem to be very liberal in their practices; and allowed the receiving of gifts in silver, eating and drinking in brass vessels, and so forth. But many of the sub-schools that branched out of the Mahāsaṅghikas made important contributions to the development of the Mahāyāna. Of these, the school of the Lokottaravādins is the first. They held that the Body of Buddha was not mundane but *lokottara* or supramundane, which seems to be a development of the Mahāsaṅghika view referred to. At first, this doctrine was only docetism, which had a religious but no philosophical importance. But it led to the differentiation between the physical body of the Buddha, which was an appearance, and his divine body, which was reality. And this reality was later identified with the Dharmakāya of Buddha, that is, the Body of Law, which was treated as identical with the ultimate reality, the source of the phenomenal plurality, the Tathāgatagarbha or the Womb of the Tathāgata.

VIII

ANDHAKAS

Another school of importance which contributed most for the appearance of the Mahāyāna was that of the Andhakas. These belong to the Mahāsaṅghika branch, and were so-called because they lived in the kingdom of the Andhras. There were four sub-schools among the Andhakas: the Pūrvaśailiyas, the Aparāśailiyas,

¹ Cp. the Platonic distinction between the Idea and the thing.

² Aung and Rhys Davids: *Kathāvatthu*, p. 355.

the Rājagirikas and the Siddhārthikas. But the differences between them were not of much philosophical importance. The first two were so-called, evidently because they occupied the eastern and western hills of the country. The Rājagirikas were the inhabitants of a place named Rājagiri. We read of the Andhakas even in the *Kathāvatthu*; and their differences from the Theravādins are of great philosophical interest.

Buddhaghoṣa, in his commentary on the *Kathāvatthu*, writes: "The groups holding special views who arose later, to wit, Andhakas comprising the sub-groups of the Pubbaśeliyas, Aparāśeliyas, Rājagirikas, and Siddhitthikas, hold the opinion that the objects of mindfulness, namely, the body and the rest, were themselves (the conscious subject) mindfulness."¹ This view sounds like Vijñānavāda, for it is said that the physical body or matter is mindfulness. Further, the Andhakas held that "judging from the apparent continuity both of consciousness and Jhāna² and of sub-consciousness, a single state of consciousness lasted for a long time."³ That is, they were abandoning the doctrine of momentariness as regards consciousness or *viññāna*. This line of thinking might have led later on to the idea of the eternal moment⁴ of the original *Vijñāna*. For some of the Vijñānavādins of the Mahāyāna felt the logical need of applying the doctrine of momentariness to the primal *viññāna*, but hesitated to treat it as perishing. So they lighted upon the idea of an eternal moment or instant, which is above time like the eternal present of Royce.

The Andhakas with the Uttarāpathakas hold that all things are by nature immutable, because nothing (however it may change) gives up its fundamental nature; they hold also that all *karmas* are inflexible. This theory, we may imagine, might have suggested and led up to the view, *sarvam svalakṣaṇam*, everything is unique, and also to the epistemological theory that perception is indeterminate or *nirvikalpa*, that the object known is known only as different from others, as *svetarabhinna*, that is, that the That only of the object is known and not its What. But this theory, when further developed, destroys itself; for, if every object is cognized just as different from its others, then it includes a reference to the others within itself, and so loses its so-called uniqueness. And this line of thinking easily leads, as will be shown later, to the doctrine of relativity or *śūnyatā*. But another line of thinking,

¹ P. 104.

² *Jhāna* means meditation.

³ *Kathāvatthu*, p. 124.

⁴ See Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 41.

namely, that the That only of the object is known and not its What, might have led up to the doctrine of Tathatā, or that reality is only a That, or that it can be known only as such.

Another important doctrine of the Andhakas is that the Void or Śūnya is included in the *samskāraśkāndha*. Buddhaghōṣa writes: "The Void (or Emptiness) has two implications: (a) Absence of soul, which is the salient feature of the five aggregates (mind and body); and (b) Nibbāna itself. As to (a), some mark of 'no soul' may be included under mental coefficients (the fourth aggregate) by a figure of speech. Nibbāna is not included thereunder. But some like the Andhakas, drawing no such distinction, hold the view stated above."¹ The passage implies that, for the Andhakas, Nirvāṇa is precisely the same as the disappearance of the *ātman*; while, for the Theravādins, the two are different, though both can be called by the same word Śūnya. But the chief point is that, for the Andhakas, Nirvāṇa or Śūnya, as a member of the aggregate of *samskāras*, is inherent in man, which means that it is eternally accomplished and is waiting for man's realization. They have not, indeed, seen one inconsistency in this view. If Nirvāṇa is a member of one of the five aggregates, it is meaningless to say that it is the ceasing of the combinations of the aggregates. However, the Andhakas must have realized that the Śūnya or Nirvāṇa was to be found innate in man, and so they must have thought that it was one of the *samskāras*. Or they might have thought that just as *samskāras* propel man in his different kinds of activity, there was an inherent longing in man for Nirvāṇa, which is due to its attraction. This view, in spite of its inconsistency, is full of significance. And we may also remember in this connection that, for Vasubandhu, the Sarvāstivādin, ignorance and the *dharmadhātu* belong to the *samskāraśkāndha*.

The next point to be noted is that the Pubbaśeliyas held that attainment was unconditioned.² That is, Nirvāṇa was not conditioned by anything. This view can easily develop into that Nirvāṇa is eternally accomplished. And we may even guess from the above Andhaka view of Śūnya that the two ideas, namely, that of the unconditioned nature of Nirvāṇa and that of its being eternally accomplished, were actually identified by the Pubbaśeliyas. Further, the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas believed that the attainment of cessation was unconditioned.³

¹ *Kathāvatthu*, p. 335.

² *Ibid.*, p. 337.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

VETULYAKAS

We have already noted that for the Theravādins cessation was uncompounded. But as what is uncompounded does not have a cause or condition, it is but logical that it should be treated as unconditioned.

Another important point is that, according to the Andhakas, the Buddhas and their disciples can work wonders against nature,¹ a view akin to that of the Lokottaravādins, though not exactly the same.

The Andhakas were very liberal in their views and practices. They maintained along with the Vaitulyakas, we read in *Kathāvatthu*,² that even recluses can marry—a fact that puts us in mind of a Buddhist sect of Japan and Protestantism in Christianity. This shows that the Andhakas were practically leading a rebellion against the views and practices of the Theravādins. It is interesting to note that the Mahāyāna actually started in the Andhra country and Nāgārjuna lived there. True, Maitreyanātha, the founder of the Yogācāra, is said by some to have lived before Nāgārjuna in Kashmir. But others say that Nāgārjuna was prior to Maitreyanātha. However, the actual revolution in Buddhism took place in the Andhra under the leadership of Nāgārjuna. And the Nalanda university, a stronghold of Mahāyānism presided over by Nāgārjuna, was in the Andhra; for the modern Bihar, in which the university was situated, was actually part of the Andhra Empire at that time, and the present boundaries of the linguistic provinces of India did not obtain them. Furthermore, we read that the *Prajñā-pāramitās*, which emphasize perfection through knowledge—an attitude which is mainly Mahāyānist—and which marks the beginnings of the Mahāyāna, were possessed first in Prākṛt by the Pūrvaśailīyas and the Aparāśailīyas of the Andhakas.³

IX

VETULYAKAS

Mention may be made here of the school of the Vetulyakas. We read of them in the *Kathāvatthu* itself. We have already incidentally noted that they were liberal in their views like the Andhakas. The view generally associated with the Lokottaravādins, we find in the *Kathāvatthu* attributed to the Vetulyakas. They maintained

¹ *Kathāvatthu*, p. 353.

² *Ibid.*, p. 365.

³ N. Dutt: *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 41.

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that Buddha did not live at all in this world, that he visited this world only in a shape specially created,¹ and that Buddha himself did not teach the law but that his created shape did it.² Mrs. Rhys Davids writes: "Of other theories put forward, it has been suggested that the Vaipulyasūtras of the Mahāyānasūtras refer to the Vetulyakas of our Commentary. That the title of 'amplitude,' 'abundance,' bestowed on certain Sūtras, is convertible into, or from Vetulya, can scarcely be seriously maintained. Nevertheless, it is possible that the 'Great Emptiness' school, to whom the Vetulyakas are said to belong, may refer to a group which the vague term Mahāyānist served to cover. Śūnna, empty, to wit, of *svabbhāva*, essence or soul, came to serve, in Mahāyānist concepts as tantamount to *aniccā*.³ Again, the Vetulyakas appear in the controversies as Docetists, and Mahāyānism strongly tends that way."⁴

X

UTTARĀPATHAKAS

The Uttarāpathakas also contributed something of philosophical importance to the Mahāyāna. They held that "there is an immutable something called thusness (or suchness) in the very nature of all things, material or otherwise (taken as a whole). And because this 'thusness' is not included in the (particular) conditioned matter, etc., itself, therefore it is unconditioned."⁵ We may say that the Uttarāpathakas are the forerunners of the Tathatā school of Aśvaghoṣa. Mrs. Rhys Davids writes: "The vague, fluid term, Uttarāpathakas, must certainly have included groups that confessed Mahāyānist views, since among those debated is the peculiarly Mahāyānist hypothesis of Tathatā: 'thusness' or 'suchness.'"⁶ The doctrine later developed in the Mahāyāna takes the form that reality is a That undetermined by any What. To put it in other words, it is beyond all thought, but still is something, not nothing.

XI

SAUTRĀNTIKAS

The Sautrāntikas are one of the most important schools of the Hīnayāna, though unfortunately of the original Sautrāntikas we

¹ *Kathāvatthu*, p. 323.

⁴ *Kathāvatthu*, p. xlv.

² *Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

³ Desirelessness.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xlv.

have no works available. Though Śāntarakṣita, the author of *Tattvasaṅgraha*, and his commentator, Kamalasīla, call themselves Sautrāntikas, they are really Vijñānavādins, and we shall treat their views in the next chapter. That they call themselves Sautrāntikas shows that there was a time when hybrid schools between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna were formed, like the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra, the Sautrāntika-Mādhyaṃika, etc.¹ We do not get detailed accounts and treatises of these schools except that of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalasīla.

The Sautrāntikas, according to both *Dīpavamśa* and Vaṣumitra, originated out of the Sarvāstivādins. In fact, the Sautrāntikas are Sarvāstivādins in that they hold that everything exists. Yet the theories of the Sarvāstivādins are identified with those of the Vaibhāṣikas, while those of the Sautrāntikas are treated separately. The latter maintain, unlike the other Sarvāstivādins, that the existence of the objects of perception is inferred, not directly perceived. That is, in epistemology they accept the representative theory of perception, while the Vaibhāṣikas accept the presentative theory. As regards Nirvāṇa also, the Sautrāntikas differed from the Vaibhāṣikas. They held that it was unreal, that it was not an entity or existent, though they maintained that the world was real and existed. But for the other Sarvāstivādins, both the world and Nirvāṇa existed and were real. The name Sautrāntikas is derived from Sutrānta. While the Vaibhāṣikas based their views on Vibhāṣās or commentaries, the Sautrāntikas based theirs on the Sūtras themselves.

Just as Locke, in the history of European philosophy, served as a stepping-stone from direct realism to Berkeleyan idealism, the Sautrāntikas, in the history of Buddhism, formed a transition from the realism of the Hīnayāna to the idealism of the Yogācāra. And the transition is but natural. For if the existence of an object is always to be inferred from the idea, how can we obtain the *vyāpti* or the major premise which guarantees that there is an object behind every idea? Unless the major premise that every idea has an object behind it is obtained beforehand, we cannot conclude the existence of an object from an idea. But the major premise can be obtained only when we directly perceive the idea, the object and their relation. But on the Sautrāntika position, direct perception of the object is in principle impossible.

¹ For short accounts of these hybrid schools, see Bu-ston: *History of Buddhism*, 2 Parts, English translation by Obermiller.

And just as Berkeley, coming after Locke, dispensed with the idea of a material substance and maintained that objects were our ideas, the Yogācārins, developing the position of the Sautrāntikas, denied the existence of independent objects. It is probably because some of the later Sautrāntikas realized the untenability of their position that they called themselves Yogācārins and formed the hybrid school of Sautrāntika-Yogācāra. The reason for retaining the name of Sautrāntika might be to show that theirs was an orthodox school, that is, that they belonged to the Hīnayāna.

The earlier Sautrāntikas, Professor Stcherbatsky writes, must have been nihilists. He says: "The original works of the Sautrāntika school . . . are not yet accessible. The school probably contained a great variety of philosophical constructions. The later Sautrāntikas coalesced with the Mahāyānists and formed the hybrid school of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāras and the Mādhyamika-Sautrāntikas."¹ "It was known long ago that the Vaibāṣika and the Sautrāntika schools were engaged in a dispute regarding the nature of Nirvāṇa. The first maintained that it was something real (*vastu*), the second objected that it was nothing real by itself, that it was merely the cessation of all personal life."² "The Vaibhaṣikas did not maintain that Nirvāṇa was a kind of paradise, but that the annihilation of all life (*nirodha*), the essence of Nirvāṇa, was a reality (*nirodhasatya*, *vastu*), i.e. a materialistic lifeless reality. The Sautrāntikas, on the other hand, admit the existence of Buddha's Cosmical Body (Dharma-Kāya), i.e. they adhere to the Mahāyāna conception which consists in identifying Nirvāṇa with the living world itself."³ We know now little more about the Sautrāntikas. The position led up to by them is that there is no entity called Nirvāṇa behind the phenomena, and that the existence of the phenomena themselves is only inferred and not known directly. The position can easily be reduced to Śūnyavāda also, because the existence of the phenomena too can be proved to be unreal, as we have already shown; so that we have now neither the noumenon nor the phenomena that can be taken as existing, and nothing is left. And this Śūnya can be even a nihilistic concept unlike that of the Mādhyamika.

¹ *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 29.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-6.

XII

Yamakami Sogen gives an account of another school called the Satyasiddhi school,¹ which belonged to the transition from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna. The school derives its name from a treatise called *Satyasiddhīśāstra*, by one Harivarman. The Sanskrit original, Sogen tells us, is irrecoverably lost, and the tenets of the school are preserved for us only in the Chinese translation by Kumārajīva. Harivarman refutes the Sarvāstivādin view that the *skandhas*, which compose the individual, are eternal. "The substrata of each of the five *skandhas* appear eternal when considered as factors making up the *ātmā* which is but the combination of the five *skandhas*. But, in reality, the substratum of each *skandha* must be regarded as *śūnya*, because it admits of the possibility of further analysis, so that the so-called *ātmā* as well as the substratum of the *skandhas* (i.e. the noumenal state of the *dharmas*) must be void or *śūnyatā*."² The Sarvāstivādins maintained the *śūnyatā* or *nairātmya* doctrine only with regard to personality; only personality is not a *vastu*. But the elements that compose personality are *vastus* or real entities. But Harivarman maintained that they too are *avastus* or *śūnya*. That is, according to Harivarman, not only the ego but also the world is *śūnya*. This is in fact the Mahāyānist doctrine of *nairātmyadvaya* or the two kinds of no-self. Harivarman also distinguishes between the two kinds of truth, the *saṃvṛtīsatya* or empirical reality and the *paramārthasatya* or noumenal reality, and preaches that, though the *dharmas*, *skandhas*, etc., are real empirically, they are *śūnya* noumenally. This distinction plays an important role in the Mahāyāna. Yet Harivarman was not a Mahāyānist, though, it appears, he was called so by some.³ Sogen writes: "His work is full of the idea of conservatism as regards the *Buddha-Kāya*-view (adhering, as he did, to the historical *Buddha*, and not going as far as ideal *Buddha*), in spite of his strong opposition to the Nirvāṇa-view of the Sarvāstivādin."⁴ That is, on this point he did not go even as far as the Lokottaravādins and the Vaitulyakas, though Mahāyānism was as such recognized in his time.⁵ In spite of his *śūnyatā* doctrine, Harivarman called himself a Hīnayānist.

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, pp. 172 ff.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

XIII

TRANSITION TO THE MAHĀYĀNA

If we are asked, after noting the views of the sects given in this chapter, what particular concept or view philosophically differentiates the Hīnayāna from the Mahāyāna, we can think of no concept in answer. Śūnya, Tathatā, The Dharmakāya of Buddha, epistemological idealism, the reality of Nirvāṇa, the chief place given to knowledge or *prajñā*, liberality of practices, and even the ideal of Buddhahood—all these which play an important part in the theories and practices of the Mahāyāna are found in one or the other of the schools of the Hīnayāna. But in the Mahāyāna, they are brought into closer relation with each other and are made to form a system. Therefore, there is no hard-and-fast distinction, so far as philosophical views are concerned, between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. It could not have been otherwise. We have already noted that realism and idealism are not really opposed to each other, but that idealism is more comprehensive and includes and absorbs realism. The same thing happened in Buddhism also. The doctrines of the Mahāyāna are all found in the Hīnayāna; but they are found scattered, some in one school, some in another. It has to be admitted that the Hīnayānists did not see the full significance of these doctrines and their inter-relations. But the schools of the Mahāyāna had deeper insight into them and built them up into an organic whole.

VI

BUDDHISTIC IDEALISM—Continued

I

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter we have seen what ideas were being slowly formed and developed in the Hīnayāna schools out of primitive Buddhism. The idea of *śūnyatā*, the ideal of Buddhahood and Bodhisattvahood, the doctrine of the Dharmakāya, and the differentiation between the absolute and the relative truths, are common to all the Mahāyāna schools, and each of the schools unites them in its own way. The two impulses for the development of the Mahāyāna, says Dr. E. J. Thomas, lay in "the religious enthusiasm for the bodhisattva ideal" and "in the new treatment of the ontological doctrines latent in the dogmas of the impermanence and the non-existence of the self."¹ The ideal of *śūnyatā*, the doctrine of the Dharmakāya, and the distinction between the two kinds of truth are metaphysical. Indeed, the doctrine of Buddhahood and that of the Dharmakāya can be identified in the sense that, as the real nature of Buddha's body is Dharma or Law, to become Buddha is to become his Dharmakāya. The Bodhisattva is the Buddha at just a little lower stage of development. He is sometimes called the son of Buddha, and becomes Buddha a little later.

The Mahāyāna, as we have said, is a gradual growth. It is interesting to note that in the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the Prākṛt original of which is said to be first in the possession of the Andhra Buddhists, to a Hīnayānist monk called Subhūti is explained the nature of *śūnyatā*. The insistence on the knowledge of *śūnyatā* and the preaching of *śūnyatā* must have had much to do with the popularity of the Bodhisattva ideal and development of metaphysics. For the knowledge of *śūnyatā* must be reasoned knowledge, and to preach means to prove; and the enthusiasm to know and preach is intimately connected with the ideal of the Bodhisattva, who is said to live, without entering Nirvāṇa,

¹ *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 176.

for the good of the world. The aim of the Hināyānist was to attain Nirvāṇa. The Mahāyānist too could attain Nirvāṇa if he liked; but he did not think that Buddhahood was difficult for ordinary people,¹ and to become a Buddha meant to know the Dharma or Law, and disseminate that knowledge all over the world.

We have to note here that the ideal of Nirvāṇa is not opposed to that of Buddhahood, though the Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists scandalize each other on this point. Only, a Buddha does not care to attain Nirvāṇa, as he wants to preach the truth he knows. Nirvāṇa is the same as the Śūnya or Tathatā, and the Śūnya or Tathatā is the same as the essence or goal of the world; and so this ideal is naturally left open to the Mahāyānist.

II

PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀS

The *Prajñāpāramitās* constitute the first Mahāyāna literature that is known. They seem to be very extensive and possess elaborate commentaries. They seem to occupy the same place in the Mahāyānist philosophy and religion as the *Brahmasūtras* occupy in the orthodox Hindu philosophy. If we compare Buddha's original sayings to the Upaniṣads and the Mahāyāna systems to the Vedāntic systems, then the *Prajñāpāramitās* may be reasonably compared to the *Brahmasūtras*. Nāgārjuna wrote a work called *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* and Maitreyanātha composed a number of *Kārikās*, which are a form of commentary, called *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*. Nāgārjuna is a reputed Mādhyamika and Maitreyanātha is known as a Yogācārin and as the guru of Asaṅga. So the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature seems to be commented upon both by the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins, just as the *Brahmasūtras* are commented upon by the different Vedāntic schools. In them Buddha is represented as preaching to Subhūti, a sthāvira, the doctrines of *śūnyatā* and *niḥsvabhāvatā* or naturelessness. It may not, however, be possible to carry on all fours the comparison between the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Prajñāpāramitās*. Yet their relative positions in the growth of the two lines of thought have significant similarity.

So far, the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature that is known to the

¹ Kern: *Saddharmapundarika*, p. 59 (S.B.E.). For an account of the Bodhisattva ideal, see Hardayal: *The Bodhisattva Doctrine*.

scholars consists of *Ṣaṣasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, *Saptasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, the Larger *Prajñāpāramitānīdayasūtra*, the Smaller *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra*, and *Vajracchedikā*.

It has, however, to be noted that the *Prajñāpāramitās* seem to be more in accord with the *Mādhyamika* than with the *Yogācāra*. Haribhadra, the commentator on *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* and the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, openly refutes the doctrine of *Vijñānavāda*¹ and gives an elaborate criticism of it. He says that the *Vijñāna* of the *Vijñānvādins* is like *Māyā*,² which means that it is not the highest reality. He refers to the *Mādhyamika*,³ too, but appreciatively, not critically. This seems to be natural because the chief themes of the *Prajñāpāramitās* are *śūnyatā* and *niḥsvabhāvatā*. But if they support the *Mādhyamika*, it is really worth inquiring why Matreya-nātha, a *Yogācārin*, wrote a commentary on them. And none of the *Kārikās* given in the text openly advocates *Vijñānavāda*, though a few verses⁴ may be interpreted as *Vijñānavāda*. A critical study of the *Prajñāpāramitās* has not yet been undertaken. It may be undertaken with advantage by the Chinese and Japanese scholars, who have access to all the concerned texts either in *Sānskrit* or in translation. A critical study of the *Brahmasūtras* has been done long ago by the *Vedāntic* tradition itself and is now available for the interpreter, who cannot have a similar access to the ideas of the *Prajñāpāramitās*.

Maitreya-nātha says that the *Mahāyāna* is called so because of the greatness of the support (*ālambana*), of the greatness of the two kinds of knowledge, of the arising of the potency of knowledge⁵ and the skilfulness in expedients, and of the greatness of the activity of Buddha.⁶ That is, these doctrines have been considered great and, as the *Mahāyāna* preaches them, it is called the great vehicle. Haribhadra quotes, from the *Laṅkāvatāra*, the essentials of the *Mahāyāna*. They are the five *dharma*s, nature (*svabhāva*), the eight *vijñāna*s and the two kinds of selflessness (*nairātmyatā*).⁷

¹ G. Tucci: *Prajñāpāramitās*, Vol. I, pp. 374 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 393. *Samhṛtasakalavikalpam ābhavamanubaddham māyopamādva-yavijñānamātrāprabandhamāsādayanti yogtśāh.*

³ G. Tucci: *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 550.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 341, 345.

⁵ This is probably connected with the *jñānamārga* or the way of knowledge of the orthodox systems.

⁶ G. Tucci: *Prajñāpāramitās*, Vol. I, p. 102. *Ālambanamahatvam ca pratipatyord-vayostathā, jñānasya vīryārambhasya upāyakaśālasya ca, udāgamamahatvam ca mahatvam buddhakarmanah, etanmahatvayogādāhi mahāyānam nirucyate.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 89. *Pañcadharmāḥ svabhāvaśca vijñānānyasṭa eva ca, dve nairātmye bhavet kṛtsno mahāyānaparigrahaḥ.*

Pāramitās is the technical term for virtues in Buddhism. According to some, they are six and, according to the others, they are ten. The six *pāramitās* are charity (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), patience (*kṣānti*), energy (*vīrya*), meditation (*dhyaṇa*); and wisdom (*prajñā*). If they are ten, the four others are expediency (*upāya*), prayer or vow (*praṇidhāna*), strength (*bala*), and knowledge (*jñāna*). Of these, we see that *prajñā* or wisdom, which means the highest kind of knowledge, is one. According to Maitreya-nātha, this virtue is called *prajñāpāramitā* because it stands neither on this bank (*tīra*) of *samsāra* nor on that nor in the middle, for all the paths are the same for it.¹ Haribhadra writes that this is due to the fact that in truth we perceive neither *samsāra* nor Nirvāṇa.² That is, the highest wisdom lies in the perception of non-difference between the two, and therefore non-difference between all the *yānas* or vehicles. At another place it is said by Haribhadra that the *prajñāpāramitā* is a kind of knowledge, which reveals all the pure *dharma*s in one instant.³ At a third place it is quoted from Digṇāga to the effect that the *prajñāpāramitā* is a non-dual knowledge which is identical with the Tathāgata.⁴

The chief theme of the *Prajñāpāramitās*, as has been said, is *sūnyatā* (emptiness) and *niḥsvabhāvatā* (natureless-ness). Haribhadra repeatedly quotes that what is called *sūnyatā* is the same as *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent emergence), an idea which has been clearly demonstrated by Nāgārjuna. The reason given here is that there is no *dharma* (entity) which is devoid of the Dharmadhātu.⁵ This is of course the final reason, because the Dharmadhātu is the same as the Śūnya. As determinations like one and many are not real, things have no nature (*svabhāva*).⁶ To have a nature means to be characterized, and every character is a determination. But determinations are not real, and so things have no *svabhāva* (self-nature). Reality is beyond thought.⁷

Again, reality is identified with Tathatā (Such-ness).⁸ Tathatā, it is said, is the highest kind of knowledge (*bodhi*), and the highest kind of knowledge is Tathatā. Identity holds in both directions.

¹ G. Tucci: *Prajñāpāramitās*, Vol. I, p. 367. *Nāpare na pare tīre nāntarāle tayoh sthitā, adhvānām samatājñānāt prajñāpāramitā matā.*

² *Op. cit.* *Prajñākaruṇayoh samyakpratibodhena samsārantrvāṇopalambhāt.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 528. *Vipākāvasthāprāptānām anāśravasavadharmāṇām bodhāt jñānam prajñāpāramitā ityevam, etc.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28. *Prajñāpāramitājñānam advayam sa tathāgatah.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 218. *Yah pratītyasamutpāda sūnyatā saiva te matā, dharmadhātuvi-nirmukto yasmāddharmo na vidyate.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 372.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 272. *Rūpādibhiravijñānāt tadacintyamiṣyate.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 340, 431.

Interestingly enough, like the two kinds of *nairātmyatā* or selflessness, two kinds of Tathatā are distinguished, though ultimately they are identified; they are the *Tathāgatatahatā* or the Tathatā of the Tathāgata and the *skadhatatahatā* or the Tathatā of the *skandhas*.¹ But as everything, both the subject and the object, soul and body, are *śūnya*, Tathatā is ultimately one.

It is interesting to note here one point. Tathatā is really an abstract noun from *tathā* or such. But another abstract noun from *tathā* is *tathyam*, which has come to mean truth. *Amarakośa*, the author of which is a Buddhist, gives *tathyam*, *satyam*, *ṛtam*, and *samyak* as synonyms for truth.² Just as *tathyam* and *tathatā* are derived from *tathā*, *satyam* and *sattā* are derived from the word *sat* or existent, in the same abstract sense. Similarly, *tatvam* is derived from the word *tat* meaning "that." Though the Buddhists use the words *tathatā*, *tatvam* and *satyam* for their ultimate reality, they have objection to the words *sat* and *sattā*. But in fact all mean the same abstract thing, *tathatā* meaning suchness, *tatvam* meaning thatness, and *sattā* meaning existent-ness or existence. But by many, including the Buddhists, *tathyam*, *satyam*, and *tatvam* are used in the sense of truth or reality. For some reason or other, the Buddhists began with identifying *sat* and *sattā* with phenomenal existence and, therefore, with birth and death, and so do not call the highest reality by those words.³ But the advaitins have no such objection, as they did not start with such absolute identification. However, it is significant that, for all, the highest reality is either suchness or thatness, that is indeterminate existence.

Twenty kinds of *śūnyatā* are distinguished⁴ of which *paramārtha-śūnyatā* expresses the absolute reality. The significance of the other kinds of *śūnyatā* is that everything determinate is unreal because relative. Whatever be their number, only one *śūnyatā* means the ultimate reality and the others mean the unreality of the several determinations or phenomenal things. And for every phenomenon we have a *śūnyatā* like the *śūnyatā* of directions (*diśah*) called *mahāśūnyatā*, the *śūnyatā* of the *samskṛta-dharmas* called the *samskṛtaśūnyatā*, etc.

The process of involution and evolution of the world into, and from the state of *samādhi*, in which one is identical with the

¹ G. Tucci: *Prajñāpāramitās*, Vol. I, p. 340.

² *Amarakośa*, p. 39. (Govt. Central Book Depot, Bombay.)

³ *Prajñāpāramitās*, Vol. I, p. 499.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

highest reality, is also spoken of.¹ This idea is connected with the *pariṇāma* theory of the Vijñānavādins, which will be discussed later.

Haribhadra says that, according to some, Buddha's body is of four kinds, but for others it is of three kinds.² If four, they are the Dharmakāya, the Nirmāṇakāya, the Sambhogakāya, and the Svābhāvīkākāya. The Dharmakāya is the same as the Dharmadhātu, Tathatā, Śūnya, and *paramārthasatya*. The Nirmāṇakāya is that body which does wonderful good to the world.³ The Sambhogakāya is that which enjoys the Mahāyāna doctrine.⁴ By those for whom there are only three bodies the Svābhāvīkākāya is identified with the Dharmakāya. But Maitreyanātha differentiates between the two. He says that the Svābhāvīkākāya is that group of *dharma*s which have been purified and turned into the universal form, that is, which have become the oneness of all things; and this *kāya* is the source of the world.⁵ Evidently, this seems to be the highest for Maitreyanātha. The Dharmakāya is the knowledge of the oneness as realized at the *bodhi*, and a number of other virtues of a Buddha, probably a Bodhisattva. This seems to occupy a lower position than the Svābhāvīkākāya, just as a Bodhisattva occupies a lower position than that of a Buddha or *samyaksambuddha*.⁶

In this book, the Pratyekabuddha is called also a Khadga rhinoceros and a Bodhisattva the son of Buddha.⁷ Already the distinction is made between the Śrāvakayāna or the vehicle of the hearer or disciple, the Pratyekabuddhayāna or Khadgayāna or the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddha, and the Bodhisattvayāna or Buddha yāna, the vehicle of the Bodhisattva or Buddha, which means the Mahāyāna. But, in truth, there is one only *yāna* or vehicle. The first two *yānas* form the Hinayāna.

III

GENERAL NATURE OF THE MAHĀYĀNA SCHOOLS

The most important schools of the Mahāyāna so far known are the Mādhyamika, the Vijñānavāda, and the Bhūtatahatā. The first two schools have good literature, from which we can form an adequate idea of their views. It is difficult to say which developed

¹ *Prajñāpāramitās*, Vol. I, p. 302. *Samādhiṃ samāpāḍya tataḥ simhaviṣṇubhīṭam aṇuṣṭomam vilomam ca pratītyotpādamīkṣate.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 25-6 and 523. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 532. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 526. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 521.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 263. Cp. *Śiṣya Khadgaḥ jinaurasam.*

out of which, but there is a logical passage from the one to the other. The Mādhyamika lays emphasis on the Śūnya as the ultimate nature of things, while the Yogācāra contends that the final nature of things is pure *viññāna* or consciousness. It is possible to say that as pure *viññāna* does not contain any determination or *vikalpa* it must be *śūnya*, just as Hegel argued that the category of pure Being, for want of some determination, passes into Nothing; in which case we may hold that the Mādhyamika developed out of the Yogācāra. But it is also possible to hold the opposite view by contending that, as the Śūnya is equated to Nirvāṇa and so to bliss, there should be some consciousness to enjoy this bliss, and this consciousness is pure Viññāna. However, the schools might have developed simultaneously, criticizing and influencing each other.

The founder of the Mādhyamika school is generally identified with Nāgārjuna. Whether or not he was the actual founder of the school, there is no doubt that he was the first great exponent, and his famous work, the *Mādhyamikakārikās*, with the commentary of Candrakīrti, is the most important work of this school. To this school corresponds the Japanese Sanron sect.¹ The founder of the Yogācāra is said to be Maitreya-nātha, the teacher of Asaṅga, who was the elder brother of Vasubandhu. But the works of the two brothers are more known than those of Maitreya-nātha. These two brothers are the best propagators of this school, also known as the Viññānavāda. Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* and Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* are two of the most important works of this school. The latter seems to be the chief text of the Hosso sect of Japan.² Within the main Yogācāra or Viññānavāda there seem to be some minor differences or rather differences of stress.

After the *Prajñāpāramitās*, Aśvaghoṣa's *Mahāyānasraddhotpādaśāstra* seems to be the earliest Mahāyānist work of importance available. In it we come across both the ideas of *śūnya* and the pure *viññāna*; but both the ideas are more or less secondary to that of Tathatā or Suchness; they are rather attributes of the latter. The concept of ultimate reality in this book is more positive than in the two above schools. Probably both the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra derived inspiration from it, and developed the idea of each of the attributes to the extreme. Nāgārjuna is

¹ Steinilher-Oberlin: *The Buddhist Sects of Japan*, p. 37. English translation.

² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

said to have written a commentary called *Mahāyānaśāstrav-yākyā* on Aśvaghōṣa's work. The doctrines of the Keron sect of Japan correspond to the views of *Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra*; for the idea of the Bhūtatathatā, as the source and essence of the world, is common to both.¹ The Japanese Tendai also lays stress on this idea.

We read that the Chinese draw the distinction between the partly developed and the fully developed Mahāyāna.² The Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika schools are said to be partly developed; the Bhūtatathatā doctrine of Aśvaghōṣa and its development in the Tien-Tai and the Avatamsaka schools are claimed to be fully developed. Sogen says: "The Tien-Tai and the Avatamsaka schools are regarded as the two most beautiful flowers in the garden of the Buddhist thought. One is called the orchid in the spring and the other the chrysanthemum in the autumn; that is to say, they are the last and also the best products of Buddhist thought. It is the doctrines of these two systems that the Chinese schools, viz. the *Mantra*, the *Dhyāna*, and the *Sukhāvativyūha*, as well as the Japanese Nichiren school sought to realize by experiment and practice."³ In thus regarding Aśvaghōṣa's ideas as the fully developed Mahāyāna, the Chinese are probably committing a mistake in chronology; yet logically, we may admit, the Bhūtatathatā school comprehends both. The truth seems to be that the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra are partial developments or offshoots out of Aśvaghōṣa's ideas; that is, each has taken, stressed, and developed one aspect of his reality, so that they seem to be one-sided and the Bhūtatathatā school seems to be more comprehensive and so is regarded as fully developed. We are, of course, not to forget that the Mādhyamika seems to be very intimately connected with the *Prajñāpāramitās*.

Saddharmapuṇḍarīka insists on the truth of the oneness of reality and of *yāna* or vehicle. Though there are several *yānas* or vehicles, Buddha preached all of them only to suit the intellectual capacity of men. The Tendai and the Nichiren sects of Japan regard this work as their chief text.⁴ The conception of Nirvāṇa in *Sukhāvativyūha* is more popular and positive, and the Jodo and the Shinsu sects of Japan claim it as their chief text.⁵ The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, though said to belong to the Yogācāra, seems

¹ Steinilher-Oberlin: *The Buddhist Sects of Japan*, p. 59.

² Yamakami Sogen: *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 252.

⁴ Steinilher-Oberlin: *The Buddhist Sects of Japan*, p. 75.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

to be somewhat Mādhyamika also in outlook. It preaches that everything is mind or consciousness, but adds that even this conception is meant only for the lower intellect. While all these schools preach the oneness of reality, the school of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, as expounded in *Tattvasaṅgraha* and its commentary, is a sort of spiritual pluralism, in that, while preaching that the final essence of the world is pure *viññāna*, it maintains that this is not one but many.

It has to be noted here that, while many of the above works belong to different Mahāyāna schools in China and Japan, it is not known whether they actually formed the canonical works of different schools in India also. It may be that they did, and the Chinese and the Japanese schools were the continuations of similar schools in India. Or it may be that the differences in emphasis led to differences of view and practice, and then to differences between schools. No evidence seems to be available on this point, which can be decided only by scholars of Buddhism in China and Japan. The orthodox systems of India speak only of the Mādhyamika, the Yogācāra, the Vijñānavāda, the Ālaya-vijñāna, *pravṛttivijñāna*, and some theories of illusion like *ātma-khyāti*, perception like *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*, inference, etc. But some of these accounts are prejudiced, and a few wrong.

IV

BHŪTATATHATĀ SCHOOL OF AŚVAGHOṢA

The account of the Mahāyāna schools may be begun with that of the Bhūtataṭhatā school of Aśvaghōṣa. The doctrine of Bhūtataṭhatā, Sogen tells us, is explicitly explained in Aśvaghōṣa's *Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra*,¹ which is known in translation as "The Awakening of Faith." Suzuki says that the Sānskrit original of this work seems to be once for all lost, and we get it only in translation. The translation of Rev. Timothy Richard is rather too free, but is important in that he felt that he was reading a book on Christianity when he first read the book in Chinese, and was surprised to find that it could be a Buddhist work. Suzuki's translation from the Chinese version is scholarly, and is useful from the philosophical point of view.

Suzuki writes: "The three points constituting the gist of the Śāstra are: the conception of suchness (Bhūtataṭhatā); (2) the

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 252.

theory of the triple personality; (3) the salvation by faith or the Sukhāvati doctrine." "The conception of suchness assumes other names, namely, the Womb of the Tathāgata (*Tathāgatagarbha*), when considered from its embracing all possible merits, and the All-Conserving Mind (*Ālaya-vijñāna*), when it becomes the principle of evolution and is said to have developed from the teaching of Buddha as expounded in the old canonical sutras, such as the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Śrīmala*. Whatever the origin of the idea of suchness might have been, its 'absolute aspect' evidently foreshadows the *Sūnyatā* philosophy of the Mādhyamika school. It is very doubtful whether Nāgārjuna, as told in the Chinese tradition, was a personal disciple of Aśvaghoṣa, but it is highly probable that he was much influenced by him in forming his system."¹

The soul or quintessence of the world, we are told by Aśvaghoṣa, is Bhūtatahatā or the Suchness of all the *bhūtas* or beings. It is not only the essence but also the source of the world. It exists "in all things, remains unchanged in the pure as well as in the defiled, is always one and the same (*samatā*), neither increases nor decreases, and is void of distinction."² That is, it is beyond all determinations, and is the highest universal. It contains all the highest attributes and "all kinds of good work in the world, both phenomenal and supra-phenomenal."³ It is almost like the God of theism, who is the most perfect being conceivable. Yet it is not separate from the world; it is not absolutely transcendent. "In the one soul we may distinguish two aspects. The one is the Soul as the suchness (*bhūtatahatā*), the other is the soul as birth-and-death (*samsāra*). Each in itself constitutes all things, and both are so closely related that one cannot be separated from the other."⁴ The Bhūtatahatā is identified with the Dharmadhātu, an idea we came across in the Sarvāstivāda, and reality is treated as one whole. "What is meant by the soul as suchness (*bhūtatahatā*) is the oneness of the totality of things (*dharmadhātu*), the great all-including whole, the quintessence of the doctrine. For the essential nature of the soul is uncreate and eternal."⁵ We have here something like the Brahman of the Upaniṣads, which is the all-inclusive whole and the final truth of things.

Yamakami Sogen writes: "The Suchness (existence as such), *Bhūtatahatā*, is called by as many different names as there are

¹ *The Awakening of Faith*, p. 43.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-6.

phases of its manifestation. It is *Nirvāṇa* when it brings absolute peace to a heart egoistic and afflicted with conflicting passions; it is *Bodhi* or perfect wisdom, when we regard it as the source of intelligence; it is *Dharmakāya*, when it is called the fountainhead of love and wisdom; it is *kuśalamūlam* or the *summum bonum* when its ethical phase is emphasized; it is *Bodhicittam* or the heart of intelligence, as it is the awakener of religious consciousness; it is *paramārthasatyam* or the Highest Truth, when its epistemological feature is considered; it is *Madhyamārgam* or the Middle Path, when it is regarded as above the one-sidedness or limitations of individual existence; it is the *Bhūta-koṭi* or the essence of Being, when its ontological aspect is taken into account; it is the *Tathāgatagarbha* or the Womb of the *Tathāgata* when the analogy from Mother Earth (where all the germs of life are stored, and all precious stones and metals are concealed under the cover of filth) is drawn; it is *Mahāyāna* or the great vehicle when it embraces the soul of all living beings."¹ B. Steinilher-Oberlin writes: "The Bhūtatathatā of Buddhism is, after all, almost identical with the *substance* of Spinoza, the *absolute idea* of Hegel, the *will* of Schopenhauer, and the non-conscient of Hartmann."² It is so in a sense.

As the Tathatā or Bhūtatathatā is beyond all determinations, all determinations are false. They are due to "our confused subjectivity (*smṛti*)."³ This view implies that every perception is, to a large extent or even completely, recognition, and is in accord with the Buddhist theory that all cognition originates depending upon *samskāras*, *vāsanās* or impressions. Tathatā, which is the highest *sāmānya* or universal, is the only reality, and all particulars, which are forms of individuation, are only appearance.⁴ Truth is beyond all distinctions; even the distinction between the knower and the known, the speaker and the spoken, does not obtain in it.⁵ "Again, there is a two-fold aspect in suchness if viewed from the point of its explicability. The first is trueness as negation (*śūnyatā*), in the sense that it is completely set apart from the attributes of all things unreal, that it is the real reality. The second is trueness as affirmation (*aśūnyatā*), in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent."⁶ It is neither unity nor difference, nor both nor neither.⁷ But still the

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, pp. 253-4.

² *The Buddhist Sects of Japan*, p. 58.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁵ *The Awakening of Faith*, p. 56.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

conception is definitely positive, in that, in the above passage quoted, the Tathatā is regarded as containing all perfect attributes, though not containing any imperfect attribute.

The Tathatā is one and is not a plurality. In it there is really no distinction between mind and matter.¹ "Be it therefore known that all things in the world from the beginning are neither matter (*rūpa*), nor mind (*citta*), nor intelligence (*prajñā*), nor consciousness (*viññāna*), nor non-being (*abhāva*), nor being (*bhāva*); they are after all inexplicable. The reason why the Tathāgata nevertheless endeavours to instruct by means of words and definitions is through his good and excellent skilfulness (or expediency, *upāya-kauśalya*)."² As it is beyond comprehension, reality is called *śūnya*.³

If the world of determinations is unreal, can we and our striving for Nirvāṇa be real? No. "In order that this clinging may be eliminated, be it clearly understood that the essence of the five *skandhas* is uncreate, there is no annihilation of them; that since there is no annihilation of them they are in their metaphysical origin Nirvāṇa itself." Why are the *skandhas* unreal? Because "when we divide gross (or composite) matter, we can reduce it to atoms (*anu*). But as they will also be subject to further division, all forms of material existence, whether gross or fine, are nothing but the shadow of particularization produced by a subjective mind, and we cannot ascribe any degree of (absolute or independent) reality to them."⁴ Both spatially and temporally the division of anything can be carried until the thing becomes nothing.⁵

The origination of the world is due to ignorance. The Tathāgatagarbha is the sole reality, which is somehow defiled and becomes the Ālayaviññāna, the all-conserving mind or receptacle consciousness. But really there is no difference between the Tathāgatagarbha and the Ālayaviññāna. "[Thus when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation] it is called the all-conserving mind (*ālaya-viññāna*)."⁶ We may say that, when *considered* apart—not indeed when it is apart, which is impossible—from the world, reality is Tathatā or Tathāgatagarbha, but when considered as that which contains the world potentially and out of which the world evolves, it is Ālaya. Even the word Tathāgatagarbha connotes the relative aspect, in spite of its use in the pure aspect. Ālaya thus plays the same part as that played by Īśvara in many schools of the Advaita Vedānta. From

¹ *The Awakening of Faith*, p. 103.

² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

the Ālayavijñāna comes the Manovijñāna, which is the explicit ego-consciousness.¹

Suzuki writes: "The defilement which is the product of the evolution of the *ālayavijñāna*, is of two kinds, primary and secondary. The primary defilement is *a priori*, originating from the birth of mind. There is yet no distinct consciousness in it of the duality of the subject and the object, though this is of course tacitly asserted. Aśvaghoṣa calls the primary defilement 'non-interrelated,' meaning that there is no deliberate reflection in the ego to assert itself. The secondary defilement called 'interrelated,' on the other hand, explicitly assumes the ego in contradistinction to the non-ego, and firmly clings to this conception, which brings forth all selfish desires and actions on the part of the defiled mind. The former, being more fundamental than the latter, is completely effaced from the mind, only after going through all the different stages of religious discipline."²

"The defiled mind is called affectional hindrance (*kleśāvaraṇa*) because it obscures the fundamental wisdom of suchness (*bhūtata-thatā*). Ignorance is called intellectual hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), because it obscures the spontaneous exercise of wisdom from which evolve all modes of activity in the world."³ From this passage we may understand that ignorance screens the true nature of both the subject and the object. Ignorance is neither identical with, nor different from enlightenment,⁴ a view which is of a piece with the one that the world of appearance is neither identical with, nor different from reality. Aśvaghoṣa gives the example of water and waves to explain the relation between reality and the world. The waves are not different from the water, yet they are not the same as the water.

The evolution from the Ālayavijñāna is given thus. The *karmas*, which must mean here the impressions or the effects of action on the Ālaya, are disturbed in it. In consequence of the disturbance, the ego or the perceiver appears; then the external world, intelligence, memory, clinging, actions, and misery appear.⁵

Five different aspects are distinguished in the ego, according to which it is given five names. "The first name is activity-consciousness (*karma-vijñāna*) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or awakened).

"The second name is evolving-consciousness (*pravṛtti-vijñānā*,

¹ *The Awakening of Faith*, p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, p. 80, footnote.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-3.

i.e. the subject), in the sense that, when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world.

"The third name is representation consciousness, in the sense that the ego (*manas*) represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clear mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the five objects of sense, it represents them at once, instantaneously, and without any effort.

"The fourth name is particularization consciousness, in the sense that it differentiates between things defiled as well as pure.

"The fifth name is succession consciousness (i.e. memory), in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness (attention, *manaskāra*) it (*manas*) retains and never loses or suffers the destruction of any *karma*, good as well as evil, which has been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful as well as agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future; also in the sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by, and in imagination anticipates things to come."¹ These are the forms which the Ālaya assumes as it becomes the fully particularized ego.

We can find some Vijñānavāda even in Aśvaghoṣa. He writes: "Since all things, owing the principle of their existence to the mind (*ālayavijñāna*) are produced by subjectivity (*smṛti*), all the modes of particularization are the self-particularization of the mind." They have no more reality than the images in a mirror.² This is certainly a Vijñānavāda; but we have to admit that Aśvaghoṣa goes beyond *vijñāna*.

Aśvaghoṣa tells us that Tathatā and ignorance mutually affect each other. "A constant production of things defiled and pure is taking place on account of the inter-perfuming of the four different powers which are as follows: the first is the pure dharma, that is, suchness (*bhūtatathatā*); the second is the principle of defilement, that is, ignorance (*avidyā*); the third is the subjective mind, that is, activity consciousness (*karmavijñāna*); the fourth is the external world (*viṣaya*) of subjectivity, that is, the six objects of sense."³ "Now suchness is a pure dharma free from defilement. It acquires, however, a quality of defilement owing to the perfuming power of ignorance. On the other hand, ignorance has nothing to do with purity, because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness."⁴ That is,

¹ *The Awakening of Faith*, pp. 76-7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-5.

the world we experience is a mixture of purity and impurity, or to be more precise, is neither pure nor impure; because it is a product of the interperfuming of ignorance and Tathatā.

Āsvaghoṣa distinguishes between two kinds of truth, *paramārthasatya* and *samvrtisatya*, ultimate truth and empirical truth. Tathatā, Tathāgatagarbha, and Dharmakāya, which are the same entity, are *paramārthasatya*, and the world of objects is *samvrtisatya*.¹

Buddha's Dharmakāya is treated by Āsvaghoṣa as a meta-physical entity. He distinguishes between three kinds of body; or rather he says that the Dharmakāya has two aspects, the Nirmāṇakāya and the Sambhogakāya. "Now this activity (in another word, the Dharmakāya) has a two-fold aspect. The first one depends on the phenomena-particularizing consciousness, by means of which the activity is conceived by the minds of common people (*prthagjana*), Śrāvakas, and Pratyekabuddhas. This aspect is called the Body of Transformation (*Nirmāṇakāya*)."² "The second aspect (of the Dharmakāya) depends on the activity-consciousness (*karmavijñāna*) by means of which the activity is conceived by the minds of Bodhisattvas while passing from the first aspiration (*cittotpāda*) stage up to the height of the Bodhisattvahood. This is called the Body of Bliss (*Sambhogakāya*)."³ We may say that the Nirmāṇakāya is the physical body, and the Sambhogakāya the subtle body somewhat corresponding to the Ānandamayakośa of the Advaita Vedānta. But in the Sambhogakāya, activity does not completely cease. It is evidently the stage of Karmavijñāna of the Ālaya, and some vestiges of individuation still remain in it. It is somewhat like the Sākṣi, which at least some of the advaitins regard as different for each individual. With Sākṣi in a sense a sort of individuation already begins, though not developed.

Dr. Dasgupta writes that Āsvaghoṣa, in his conception of Bhūtatathatā, combines the conception of Nāgārjuna's Śūnya and that of the Upaniṣadic Brahman.⁴ Though Nāgārjuna was later than Āsvaghoṣa, we may admit that logically Āsvaghoṣa's concept includes both the ideas. According to tradition, Āsvaghoṣa was at first an orthodox Vedāntin, later converted to Buddhism by Parśva or one of his disciples. And he might have brought into Buddhism the Upaniṣadic conception. But we have

¹ *The Awakening of Faith*, p. 99.

² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 100-1.

⁴ *Indian Idealism*, p. 88.

also to remember that the idea of Tathatā was not new to Buddhism, that the Uttarāpathakas of the Hinayāna, as early as the *Kathāvatthu*, held that view, and that the *Prajñāpāramitās* also use that idea. Probably Aśvaghōṣa found in the doctrine of the Tathatā a view that satisfied the demands of his reason, and developed it.

Sogen writes: "The fundamental thought of the Mahāyāna consists of the idea of the identity between the real and the unreal. To speak in more philosophical terms, the phenomenal and the noumenal are the same and identical."¹ This identification we find clearly in Aśvaghōṣa. This is probably a modified Upaniṣadic idea; for, according to the Upaniṣads, the Brahman is the sole reality, and the existence of even the phenomenal reality must somehow be the existence of the Brahman itself.²

Another point for us to note is that the conception of ignorance in Aśvaghōṣa's system is almost the same as that of Māyā in the Advaita of Śaṅkara. And Sogen, in explaining the idea, quotes from *Sanḥṣepaśārīraka* and *Vedāntasāra*, which are works on the Advaita. In the *Prajñāpāramitās* also we come across this concept.

The Tien-Tai and the Avatamsaka schools of China, which originated out of the Bhūtatahatā philosophy of Aśvaghōṣa, little differ from each other philosophically. Both identify the noumenal with the phenomenal, the latter to a greater extent. The first takes the example of water and its waves, the second of the moon and its reflections. But both the examples are very common in the Advaita of Śaṅkara. The significance of these schools for us is that they show that the Mahāyānic thought is not always negativistic, but is rather positive in its conception of truth. For even though we cannot say what reality is, as it is beyond all determinations, it must at least be a That; otherwise, one cannot even point to it.

V

MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOL OF NĀGĀRJUNA

The Mādhyamika or the Sūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna is a direct result of the *Prajñāpāramitās*, and may also be regarded as a development of one of the two aspects, namely, that of the *śūnya*, of Aśvaghōṣa's philosophy. Aśvaghōṣa writes: "Again there

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 270.

² Cp. *Sarvamāhavidambrahma*.

is a two-fold aspect in suchness if viewed from the point of its explicability. The first is trueness as negation (*śūnyatā*), in the sense that it is completely set apart from the attributes of all things unreal, that is the real reality. The second is trueness as affirmation (*aśūnyatā*), in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent."¹ Viewing it in its first aspect, Tathatā does not contain any determinations of thought (*vikalpa*), and we may imagine that this aspect was regarded as negative by many Mahāyānists themselves. But Aśvaghoṣa did not elaborately prove that all things were *śūnya* or unreal. And the task was left to Nāgārjuna, who of all the Mahāyānists has the greatest name, so that Buddhism came to be identified in popular conceptions with Śūnayavāda. The positive aspect of Aśvaghoṣa's idea was developed by the Vijñānavādins in India, but much more by the Tien-Tai and other schools outside India. The reality of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* is definitely positive.

As a dialectician, Nāgārjuna stands second to none in the world, and can very favourably be compared with Bradley. Śrīharṣa, the foremost dialectician of the school of Śāṅkara, borrows largely from Nāgārjuna, and this fact has been recognized and acknowledged by almost all the Advaita scholars. Nāgārjuna's theme was that everything was *śūnya*; but *śūnya* meant, for him, what was neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither. Śrīharṣa's theme was that everything determinate was *Māyā*; but the connotation of *Māyā* was precisely the same as that of *śūnya*, namely, that it was neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither. Śrīharṣa therefore had to do little more than adopt the arguments of Nāgārjuna with a few modifications. And just as Bradley proves, through his dialectic, that everything is appearance, because none of the concepts with the help of which we understand the world is self-consistent and stable; Nāgārjuna shows that all the categories are self-contradictory and unstable and therefore not real; that is, they are *śūnya*. Just as Bradley distinguishes between appearance and reality, Nāgārjuna distinguishes between *saṃvṛti-satya* and *paramārthasatya*. There are of course certain differences, which will be later on evident.

The word *mādhyamika* comes from *madhya* or mean or middle: and the Mādhyamika claims that he follows Buddha's doctrine of the mean or middle path, by holding that reality is neither positive nor negative, that is, by holding neither the *śāśvatavāda*

¹ *The Awakening of Faith*, pp. 58-9.

or the doctrine of eternality nor the *ucchedavāda* or the doctrine of annihilation.¹ He is called the *Śūnyavādin*, because he advocates the doctrine of the *Śūnya*.

In the previous chapter, we have said that, in the history of Buddhism, the *Sarvāstivāda* logically occupies the same position as that occupied by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* in the orthodox systems, if we take Buddhism or the orthodox thought as a single line of development. And just as *Śrīharṣa*, in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, takes the categories of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, particularly as defined by *Udayanācārya* in his *Lakṣaṇāvali* and other works, one by one, and examines them in order to show that they are unreal; *Nāgārjuna*, in his *Mādhyamikakārikās*, takes one category after another, particularly of *Abhidharmakośa* or *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* or some other book of the *Sarvāstivādins*, and proves that it is self-contradictory. Of course, just as *Śrīharṣa* includes, in his criticism, the views of the other schools also like those of the *Mīmāṃsakas*, *Nāgārjuna* also includes the views like those of the *Sammitīyas* for refutation. So *Śrīharṣa*'s method of criticism too, we may say, is borrowed from *Nāgārjuna*, who is the earlier of the two.

The characteristically Buddhist doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* is the butt of attack of the very first chapter of *Nāgārjuna*'s famous work, *Mādhyamikakārikās*. He says that things that have a cause must be either real or unreal. If they are real, they do not need a cause, because they already are and do not need to be produced. If they are unreal, it is meaningless to speak of their cause.² Besides, as the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* itself implies, nothing can have its own nature, for it depends on something else for its origination. But if it does not have its own nature, how can we say that upon its being there something else originates? For nothing has its own being.³ Further, does the effect exist in each of its conditions taken separately or in all of them taken together? Certainly we do not find it in each of the conditions taken separately; and what is not found in any of them cannot be found in all of them. So it is not real.⁴

Similarly, there is nothing to be reached or achieved, and nothing that has been reached or achieved. If it is already achieved, the idea of achieving, that is, the verb achieving, is irrelevant to it; and if it is not yet achieved, we have no justifica-

¹ *Mādhyamikakārikās* with the commentary of *Chandrakīrti*, p. 504. (Edited by L. de la Vallée Poussin.) ² *Ibid.*, p. 82. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 86. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

tion for saying that it will be achieved; and what has to be achieved is not yet real and so is not. And because there is nothing which has been achieved, is being achieved, or has to be achieved; the act of achieving too is unreal. If the act of achieving is unreal, there is no one who achieves.¹ So also there is no goer, no going to, and nothing that has been gone to. The argument applies *mutatis mutandis* to all actions and agents of action.

But are we not seeing things with our eyes, hearing sounds with our ears, etc.? No. Eyes, ears, etc., are all unreal. How can there be an eye which sees other things, if it cannot see itself? This is not verbal jugglery. For, unless we prove that the eye exists, how can we prove that things exist because it sees them? And what is the proof of the eye's existence? How is its existence revealed to us? Certainly, not by the eye itself. It may be said that, just as the existence of fire cannot be denied on the ground that though it consumes other things it does not consume itself and that if its nature is consuming it ought to consume itself, the reality of the eye cannot be denied on the ground that the eye cannot see itself. But, says Nāgārjuna, the example is not enough; for, who admits the reality of fire? If we try to prove the reality of the eye on the analogy of fire, then we have to prove the reality of fire on the analogy perhaps of the eye. But the mutual dependence of the two analogies is not admissible. So the eye is not real; and hence seeing and the seer too are unreal. Hence there is nothing seen or to be seen. So also there is no ear, no hearer, no hearing, nothing heard or to be heard. Adopting the same method of argument, Nāgārjuna tells us, the reality of the other senses, etc., can be refuted.²

But is it not true that the *skandhas* (aggregates) exist? Nāgārjuna rejects their reality also.³ He takes the *rūpaskandha* (aggregate of matter), the *vedanāskandha* (aggregate of feeling), etc., separately and asks: Is the *rūpaskandha*, for instance, caused by something which is a *rūpa* (matter) or by something which is not a *rūpa*? If it is caused by the latter, then, as the effect is not found in the cause, we have to take *rūpa* to be uncaused. But there is nothing in the world which is uncaused. If the former, there is no need of the effect, because it already exists. But it is impossible for anything to exist even before it is caused. This argument really exposes the self-contradiction involved in the very idea of causation.

¹ *Mādhyamikahārikās*, chap. II.

² *Ibid.*, chap. III.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. IV.

Nāgārjuna next refutes the elements themselves.¹ They are earth, water, fire, air, space, and *viññāna* or consciousness. What is the special nature of space, for instance? If we know *ākāśa* or space before we know its definition (special character) which gives its special nature or differentia, then we can say that there is an object from which we have derived our definition or on which we have based our definition. But if we had known the object before the definition (special character), it means that we can know the object without knowing its special character. To give a similar argument, I could not have known the particular table without the help of the universal table. But I could not have got the idea of the universal, if I had not seen the physical object first. Thus Nāgārjuna would accept neither the Platonic theory of the universal nor the theory of the empiricists that the universal is derived from the particular. The conclusion he would draw is that neither the particular nor the universal is real.

Now, he says, the object is neither prior to the definition (*lakṣhaṇa*, special character) nor posterior to it. If it is prior to the definition it would be characterless, for then we must have been able to recognize the object without the help of its character given in the definition. If it is posterior to the definition (special character), then the definition must have been objectless, and can have no more than conventional validity like the definition of a duke. So there is no definition, no defined, nothing positive, nothing negative. Hence, concludes Nāgārjuna, those who see that things exist or that they do not exist, do not see the truth.²

Similarly, attachment, hatred, etc., are not true.³ The argument here is: Is the attachment prior to the mind, which feels the attachment, or is it posterior? If it is posterior, then mind by itself would be devoid of *kleśas* (affections) like attachment. If it is prior, the question is asked how there can be attachment if there is none to feel the attachment. So in either case, the idea of attachment and of all the other *kleśas* is self-contradictory, and they are unreal.

The idea of *samskṛtadharma*s or compound things does not stand examination.⁴ Every *samskṛtadharma* is said to have three marks, *utpatti*, *sthiti*, and *bhaṅga* or birth, stay, and decay. It is asked: Is birth itself a *samskṛtadharma* or not? If it is not, then like space, which is not a *samskṛtadharma*, it cannot be a mark of

¹ *Mādhyamīkākārikās*, chap. V.

² *Ibid.*, chap. VI.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁴ *Ibid.*, chap. VII.

a *samskṛtadharmā*; if, on the other hand, it is a *samskṛtadharmā*, then how can it be a character of *samskṛtadharmā*? Hence there is no birth, nothing that is born. Similarly, there is no stay, nothing that stays. And there is no destruction, nothing that is destroyed. Further, only something that is can be spoken of as having been born. But it has been shown that there is nothing that exists, or that does not exist. Birth, stay, and death are activities like going and achieving; and what has been said of the latter applies to these as well. Hence there are no *samskṛtadharmas*. And if there are no *samskṛtadharmas*, how can we speak of *dharma*s which are not *samskṛta*? So birth, persistence, and destruction are unreal like a dream.¹

Even *karma* and the agent of *karma* are unreal.² It has already been shown that no activity can be real. Hence the distinction between good and evil acts is unreal. If both kinds of acts are unreal, the fruit of the acts too is unreal. So the truth of the so-called *mārga* or way is also unreal.

Nāgārjuna then takes up the view of the Sammitīyas that there is a soul to which seeing, hearing, etc., have to be attributed.³ They ask: If the soul does not exist, then to whom do seeing, hearing, etc., belong? But Nāgārjuna asks, If such a soul exists prior to seeing, hearing, etc., by whom is it known? If it is said that it can exist without seeing, hearing, etc., then we may as well say that these can exist without the soul.

The opponent sees that Nāgārjuna is proving that everything is unreal because it is *niḥsvabhāva* or natureless, and that it is *niḥsvabhāva* because it depends upon something else for its existence. He therefore says that dependence upon something else does not involve naturelessness. For instance, fire depends upon fuel for its existence; yet fire has its own nature which is different from that of its fuel. So each of the above categories, though dependent upon something else, is not *niḥsvabhāva*. But, asks Nāgārjuna, is fire the same as fuel or is it different? If the same, the cause and the effect of the act of burning would be identical. If different, we must be able to obtain it without the fuel. Then we shall have eternal fire.³

Nāgārjuna next goes to prove that there is no *samsāra* or the

¹ *Mādhyamikahārikās*, p. 177.

² *Ibid.*, chap. VIII.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. IX. Here a point may be clarified. *Bhāva* means being, which is, according to the Buddhists, identical with becoming. *Svabhāva* therefore means one's own being; and *niḥsvabhāva* means absence of one's own being. As translated thus also, the idea fits well with the Mādhyamika system.

world of transience. Buddha is represented to have said that *samsāra* has neither beginning nor end, and yet exhorted his disciples to put an end to it.¹ But, asks Nāgārjuna, if *samsāra* has neither beginning nor end, how can it have a middle? That is, how can it be at all?

Similarly, *dukkha* or suffering too is untrue.² For there is none to suffer. The agent of suffering is unreal. *Samskāras* (impressions) are unreal, because Buddha himself has declared that they are *moṣadharmas* (false entities) and so false.³ Nāgārjuna could as well have said that, as mind itself is not real, there is nothing to which the *samskāras* can belong and they are therefore false. There is no relation between the knower, the known and knowledge; for there is no knower at all.⁴ There really exists nothing which is *svabhāva* or "own nature."⁵ For it is admitted that everything originates depending upon something else. But what depends upon something else cannot have its own nature. Any property that is produced in a thing by something else cannot be said to be the property of the thing. For instance, heat imparted to water by fire is not the property of water.

And there is really neither bondage nor liberation.⁶ For what is it that is bound? Do you say it is the soul? However intensively we search for it in the *skandhas* (aggregates), *āyatanas* (bases), and the elements, we do not find it. And whatever is born and dies the next moment is neither bound nor liberated. There can be bondage, only when the thing bound exists prior to the bondage. But nothing of that kind is known. And if there is no bondage, how can there be liberation? Candrakīrti adds, in the commentary, that only he who does not think of reality as Nirvāṇa, that is, who does not think of it at all, can attain Nirvāṇa.⁷

Nāgārjuna then examines the nature of *karma* and its fruit.⁸ He asks: Does *karma* continue to be until the fruit is generated? If it does, then it is not momentary and must be regarded as everlasting. If it is everlasting, it must be unproduced; and if unproduced, there is fear of man's suffering from *karma* which he does not do. Moreover, *karma* is of the nature of *kleśas* (affections), and the *kleśas* have already been shown to be unreal. If therefore *karma* is unreal, then the performer of *karma* too is unreal.⁹

¹ *Mādhyamikakārikās*, chap. XI. *Anavarāgra*.

² *Ibid.*, chap. XII.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. XIII. ⁴ *Ibid.*, chap. XIV. ⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. XV. ⁶ *Ibid.*, chap. XVI.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 299. *Naivam kiñcit vikalpayitum yuktam avikalpayataśca niyatam yathoditasamsārājavāṅkāntārātikramo nirvāṇanagarapurapṛāptiśca bhaviṣyattī.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, chap. XVII.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

The conception of the *ātman* also does not stand examination.¹ If the *ātman* is identical with the *skandhas* (aggregates), then like them it must have birth and death. If it is different from the *skandhas*, then it cannot be characterized by them. If there is no I, there is no Mine also. But again, if anybody *sees* that reality is neither the I nor the Mine, then too he does not see the truth. Buddha declared that the *ātman* is the truth, that *anātman* is the truth, and also that truth is neither. But then what is the truth? We say that there is Nirvāṇa, when what appears to be mind ceases. The truth is neither born nor is put an end to; it appears as if it is Nirvāṇa.² It is Buddha's declaration that everything is true, everything is false, everything is both true and false, and everything is neither true nor false.³ Then how are we to define reality? It is what is not dependent on another, what is unper- turbed, what cannot be explained by anything in the world, and what is indeterminate and non-dual. Reality is plural, reality is non-plural; reality is without an end, reality has an end: this is the eternal teaching of the Buddha, the Lord of the worlds.⁴

It is held by the Sarvāstivādins that time as past, present and future exists. But Nāgārjuna says that the present and the future happen depending upon the past. But whatever depends upon another must coexist with it. Then the present and the future must be found in the past itself. So the concept of time is self- contradictory and unreal.⁵

After examining a few more categories of the older schools, which we may pass over, Nāgārjuna criticizes the very idea of the Tathāgata itself.⁶ Buddha is called the Tathāgata because he reached or knew that which is the truth of things.⁷ Now, the objector may ask, What is the meaning of calling Buddha the Tathāgata, if there is no *samsāra* (transient world)? And because Buddha is the Tathāgata, *samsāra* is real. But Nāgārjuna says that there is really no Tathāgata. He is not the *skandhas* (aggre- gates); he is not other than the *skandhas*; the *skandhas* do not abide in him, or he in the *skandhas*. Then who and where is this Tathāgata? The truth of the world is Śūnya; is the Tathāgata also Śūnya? He should be called neither *śūnya* nor *aśūnya*, nor both, nor neither. He is spoken of, only for the sake of imparting knowledge.⁸ Reality is perfect peace; and how can we call it

¹ *Mādhyamikahārīkās*, chap. XVIII.

² *Ibid.*, p. 364.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 369.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 372-7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, chap. XIX.

⁶ *Ibid.*, chap. XXII.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 431. See commentary.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 444.

eternal or transient, or both, or neither?¹ It is by nature *śūnya* and no thought is possible in it. So it is impossible to say whether Buddha exists after death or does not exist after death. Candrakīrti says that just as it is impossible to paint pictures in the sky, so is it impossible to apply any determination to reality.² Those who try to expound the nature of Buddha, who is beyond every explanation, do not really see the truth. Whatever is the nature of the Tathāgata is the nature of the world; the Tathāgata is natureless, and the world too is natureless.³

Because the things of the world are not there, there can be no false knowledge (*viparyaya*). *Viparyaya* is the mistaking of the transient for the eternal. But there is not that transient thing, as everything is *śūnya*. When there is neither knowledge, nor the known, nor the knower, how can there be false knowledge? So false knowledge is not real.⁴

If everything is *śūnya*, the fourfold truth too is unreal; there can be neither misery, nor cause, nor cessation, nor the way to cessation.⁵ Nay, even the three gems called the *triratna*, namely, Buddha, Saṅgha, and Dharma (Buddha, the congregation and Law), are unreal. But then why did Buddha preach them? Buddha distinguished between the two truths, the empirical and the noumenal.⁶ The three gems are true only empirically, not noumenally. One who holds the view that noumenally everything is *śūnya*, can say that empirically the things of the world are real. The differentiation between the two kinds of truth seems to be necessitated by some objection like, If Buddha called the above the four noble truths and the three truths or jewels, on what ground can Nāgārjuna call the Śūnya above the truth?

Now, even the very idea of Nirvāṇa is refuted.⁷ If everything is *śūnya*, there is neither birth nor death; then whose Nirvāṇa is desired? If, on the other hand, everything is not *śūnya* and is eternal, then too there is neither birth nor death; if so, whose Nirvāṇa is wanted even now? Nirvāṇa is what does not decrease, what is not reached; it is what is not put an end to, it is what is not eternal; it is what does not cease and what is not born.⁸ *Samsāra* does not differ from Nirvāṇa; and Nirvāṇa does not differ from *samsāra*.⁹ It is neither positive nor negative, nor both, nor neither. There is no *abhāva* or the negative without *bhāva* or

¹ *Mādhyamikahārikās*, p. 446.

⁴ *Ibid.*, chap. XXIII.

⁷ *Ibid.*, chap. XXV.

² *Ibid.*, p. 447.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 521.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 448-9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 468.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

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the positive; and there is no *bhāva* without birth and death. And if Nirvāṇa is beyond birth and death, how can it be either *bhāva* or *abhāva*?

VI

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ŚŪNYA

In the above section we see that Nāgārjuna accepts from the Hīnayānists the analysis of the *skandhas* (aggregates), *dhātus* (roots), *āyatanas* (bases), *āryasatyas* (noble truths), etc., but says that they have only empirical validity. For Nāgārjuna, everything is *śūnya*, which is the same as the Tathatā or Dharmakāya. But Sogen tells us that this interpretation is wrong,¹ for Nāgārjuna himself says: It should not be said that the Tathāgata is Śūnya, or that he is *aśūnya*, or that he is both, or that he is neither; a name is given him only in order to give an idea of him.² But this passage can be differently interpreted. It may mean nothing more than that the Tathāgata is beyond all description, which meaning is equally applicable to the Śūnya, which is identical with Nirvāṇa. This also is beyond all concepts. Further, Nāgārjuna says that the *svabhāva* or nature of the Tathāgata is the same as that of the world.³ And while describing Nirvāṇa too, he says that the world is not different from Nirvāṇa and Nirvāṇa is not different from the world.⁴ If the world is identical with the Tathāgata and with Nirvāṇa, which is the same as the Śūnya, it follows that the Tathāgata is the same as the Śūnya.

The word *śūnya* has been variously interpreted and translated. Though at first it was thought that Nāgārjuna was a nihilist, as the word *śūnya* in its ordinary connotation means nothing; it is by now accepted by many that the Śūnya which Nāgārjuna is preaching is not nothing or pure negation, but is the same as the Absolute in European thought. Stcherbatsky translates *śūnyatā* by the word relativity. But relativity is imperfection, and therefore it follows that, in Nirvāṇa, *śūnyatā* ceases, as every imperfection ceases in it. If it does not, then relativity does not express the full meaning of *śūnyatā*, for Nirvāṇa is the Śūnya. Relativity may be the reason for holding that everything is *śūnya*, because nothing has its *svabhāva* or own nature (individuality). But while the Śūnya is identical with Nirvāṇa, we should not say that Nirvāṇa is identical with relativity. Relativity belongs to the

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 204.

² *Mādhyamikahārikās*, p. 444.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 449.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

phenomenal level. The mistake of our intellect is that, in spite of this relativity, it sees individuality, *svabhāva*, or *svalakṣaṇatā* in the phenomena.

There is a double significance in the word *śūnya*. It means the unreality of the determinations as well as the reality of indeterminateness. Of course, the second follows from the first. To be determinate means to be relative, to be *pratītyasamutpanna* (to have a dependent origination). Even *bhāva* or existence is relative according to Nāgārjuna, for there is no *bhāva* without death or destruction, which is an *abhāva* (negation). Every *bhāva* or positive thing originates by depending upon something else; and so its existence is relative to the latter. By itself it is therefore *śūnya*. But the *śūnya* is not merely the same as relativity. To be relative means to be unreal; but the *Śūnya* is not merely the same as untruth or unreality. It is the same as the *paramārthsatya* or the highest truth for Nāgārjuna. So the essence of Nāgārjuna's teaching seems to be that determinations, which are all relative, are unreal, and hence the truth of all determinations is indeterminateness. And as indeterminateness is emptied of all determinations, it is pure void or *Śūnya*. As existence is a determination according to the Buddhists, *śūnya* is neither existence nor non-existence. This *Śūnya* as indeterminateness is Tathatā, the same as the Tathāgata or the Dharmakāya of the school. As we have seen, Nāgārjuna goes even farther in his dialectic, and says that even the idea of the *Śūnya* is not adequate to express the truth, which is inexpressible. As the Tathāgata is the truth, he should be called neither *śūnya* nor *aśūnya*, nor both, nor neither. He is beyond every determination and name.

If, however, we are to think, as Sogen does, that the Tathāgata is beyond the *Śūnya*, then *śūnyatā* may be translated by the term relativity. For then, *śūnyatā* would not be the truth, and can mean unreality. But in that case, Nirvāṇa, which is real, cannot be the *Śūnya*. *Śūnya* would be a condemnatory word, and have only a negative significance. But on this interpretation, how are we to understand the two statements of Nāgārjuna that the nature of the Tathāgata is the same as that of the world and that the world is the same as Nirvāṇa? Sogen translates the word *śūnya* by unrestrictedness,¹ which means the nature of being without limitations, which is the same as indeterminateness. He writes: "The fundamental thought of the Mahāyāna school con-

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 195.

sists of the idea of identity between the real and the unreal. To speak in more philosophical terms, it professes to maintain that the phenomenal and the real are the same and identical."¹ But in what sense can they be identical? The empirical as such cannot be identical with the noumenal. Their identity means that the unreal has an essence behind it, and that is the real. Hence the Śūnya is the Reality; but it also means the unreality of the phenomenal. It is significant that the same word comprehends both ideas. However, the word *śūnya*, with its logical associations in the Mādhyamika system as well as with its associations in common parlance, seems to be causing confusion in the minds of even the best scholars. The result of this discussion is that Nāgārjuna should be interpreted as holding either that the world is *śūnya* or unreal and that there is beyond and behind this unreality or *śūnya* the indescribable Real, which is the Tathāgata; or that the nature of the Real or the Tathāgata is *śūnyatā* or indeterminateness, that the truth of determinateness is indeterminateness, and therefore determinateness as such is unreal. I feel that the latter seems to be the meaning of Nāgārjuna. But the problem may be left open to the scholars in China and Japan, who are better equipped, to decide.

Suzuki seems to be right, if the second interpretation is true, in saying that *śūnya* does not mean relativity but emptiness. Emptiness means indeterminateness. Neither emptiness nor indeterminateness should be understood as mere nothing, as Hegel and many other European and even Indian philosophers including one or two of Nāgārjuna's own disciples did. Though it is not asserted by the Mādhyamika that the Śūnya is the fullness of being, as fullness is a determination and the Śūnya is beyond every determination, he is explicit on one point that the Śūnya is not nothing. For nothing or *abhāva* too is a determination. Nāgārjuna is not a *nāstika* or an *ucchedavādin*, that is, one who preaches absolute annihilation. The very word *mādhyamika* means one who takes a middle course, the mean here being between *ucchedavāda* and *śāśvataavāda*. Hence, emptiness should mean something in addition to the unreality of the transient thing. Otherwise, Nāgārjuna will have to be interpreted, as Dr. Dasgupta does, as a blank phenomenalist who contented himself with saying that the world is nothing but a show of changing phenomena, which are born and destroyed every moment, a realm of

¹ *Systems of Buddhist Thought* p. 270.

moving shadows but on no screen. Taking Plato's example of the cave, the world would be like the shadows in it, but the shadows of naught, thrown by no fire, upon no wall. Dr. Dasgupta writes: "Āryadeva, another follower of Nāgārjuna, says that the Mādhyamika view has no thesis of its own to establish, for it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality or unreality. Then there is no ultimate thesis in Nāgārjuna. It is, therefore, neither idealism nor absolutism, but blank phenomenalism which only accepts the phenomenal world as it is but which would not, for a moment, tolerate any kind of essence, ground or reality behind it."¹ It is not maintained that Dasgupta's view is without any justification. I had occasion² to say that Nāgārjuna's philosophy reached only the concept of Māyā as found in the Advaita of Śaṅkara, which, like the Śūnya, Nirvāṇa, or Tathāgata, is neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither. But, as Dr. E. J. Thomas says, the relativity of the phenomenal world could be conceived only with reference to an absolute,³ though to add to our confusion this Absolute or Śūnya is spoken of by the Mādhyamika as beyond all determinations, not excluding those of reality and unreality, nay, even *śūnyatā* and *aśūnyatā*. If the dialectic of Nāgārjuna were not meant to point towards something like the method of *neti neti*, "not this, not this," of the Advaita, he would not have praised Nirvāṇa so much. We have noticed that Candrakīrti, the commentator on Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamikakārikās*, says that one attains Nirvāṇa if one does not attach any *vikalpa* or determination to it.⁴ Reality is not to be thought of even as Nirvāṇa.⁵ Nāgārjuna admits that it is *tatva* or reality,⁶ and gives us a definition of it, of course, in terms negative. It is what is not caused or dependent on another; it is that where all disturbances have ceased; it is what is never revealed by anything in the world; it is indeterminate; it is not many. But we have to note that, when it is said that reality is, the *Is* does not mean existence; for unfortunately by the Buddhists existence is initially identified with whatever is born and dies and is a determination. And Nāgārjuna wanted to be thoroughgoing in his dialectic, just as Pyrrho wanted to be thoroughgoing

¹ *Indian Idealism*, p. 79.

² *Proceedings of the Oriental Conference*, 1939, "The Advaita and the Buddhist Viewpoints."

³ *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 217.

⁴ *Mādhyamikakārikās*, p. 299.

⁵ *Op. cit.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 372. *Aparapratyayam śāntam prapañcāprapañcitam nirvikalpa-manānāritam etattattvasya lakṣaṇam.*

in his scepticism. However, we should add in justice to Dasgupta that the orthodox Hindu tradition understands Nāgārjuna as he does. But this tradition is not unprejudiced. Buddhist scholars, especially outside India, understand Nāgārjuna differently. N. Dutt tells us that there are a few followers of Nāgārjuna, including Bhāvaviveka, who understood *śūnyatā* as mere negation.¹ However, the whole controversy centres in the question whether the declaration that the whole world is *śūnya* can mean both that the world is unreal and that the Śūnya is real. If it does, then the idea of the Śūnya must be the guiding principle towards reality or *tattva* like the *neti neti* of the Advaita. And there is no harm in identifying the unreality of the world with the reality of some underlying principle, though this principle is declared to be beyond the concepts of reality and unreality. Even the advaitins identify the *atyantābhāva* or negation of the phenomenal world with the Brahman, for negation is ontologically identical with its basis. And Śrīharṣa, the greatest dialectician of the Advaita, maintains, like Nāgārjuna before him, that the advaitin has no determinate position to hold.

However, it is a final inconsistency in Nāgārjuna's position that is giving rise to this difficulty. For if there is a reality, that reality must exist. Existence itself does not mean relativity. We are dissatisfied with this world because it has only relative existence, not because existence itself is relativity; and when we think of Nirvāṇa or the Śūnya as the Absolute, we mean that it is the absolute existence. True, such an Absolute can only be Tathatā or Suchness for us, as it is beyond all determinations; but existence is not a determination. Every determination is a determination of existence; it is its transitory form. But this means that the existence of determinations is the existence of Tathatā, where the "of" is to be taken as "put in apposition with." The determinations come and go, and therefore are *śūnya*.

It should not, again, be understood that determinations are deduced from Tathatā or that they are caused by it. For, asks Āryadeva, if Nirvāṇa is the truth of the universe, and if that is the Tathatā and eternal, and if from that everything is produced, how can an impermanent entity be the effect of a permanent entity? Nowhere is such difference between cause and effect seen.² This means only that we are not to deduce the phenomenal

¹ *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 194.

² *Caṇḍatikā*, p. 43. (Edited by Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya.) *Utpannāḥ śāsvatābhāvāt kathamaśāsvato bhavet vailakṣanyam dvayorhetuṣphalayorna dṛṣyate.*

world from the noumenal reality. It does not mean that the phenomenal world is transitory, imperfect, and relative, does not point towards an eternal, perfect, and absolute existence. It is right that the Mādhyamika does not claim to explain how the world of things is produced¹; in this direction he makes no constructive effort. And this is quite reasonable; for it is preposterous to deduce the phenomenal world from something which is emphatically declared to be inexpressible. But this does not imply that what is inexpressible has no being or existence. Only because this reality is inexpressible does the Mādhyamika declare that he has no thesis of his own. For if he has to put forward a thesis, he has to give some determination; but that would be to contradict his own position that reality is beyond determinations. As his thesis is that reality is beyond determinations, he has to prove that no determination is true. And this he does with great depth of thought and ability. He never says that there is no truth. And he contends that everything determinate given as truth, including the four noble truths, by Buddha himself, is not ultimately true. When expounding these truths, the Mādhyamika says, Buddha had in his mind the lower intellects.

VII

INTRODUCTION TO THE VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS

The next school of the Mahāyāna, namely, the Yogācāra, is not satisfied without a constructive system which explains how the world has come to be and what its source is. They are not content with a mere pointing to the ultimate reality without also showing how the phenomenal world came out of it. This school seems to have some popularity in Tibet, China, Mongolia and Japan, where it has developed into a number of sub-schools.

The Absolute of the Mādhyamikas, their Śūnya or Nirvāṇa, is regarded as bliss, though it is said to be beyond consciousness. But the expression "beyond consciousness" came to be understood as "devoid of consciousness," and the state of Nirvāṇa was conceived to be unconscious. But how can there be bliss without consciousness? Hence the Yogācārins, differing from the Mādhyamika, asserted that Nirvāṇa was pure consciousness or *viśuddhavijñāna*. For this reason they are called the Vijñānavādins, and regard the Mādhyamika as *ucchedavāda*, in spite of

¹ Cp. *Mādhyamikahārikās*, p. 12.

the latter's protest. The Śūnya was understood by the Vijñānavādin in general as a negative state.

There are certain differences of view within the Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda. Suzuki writes: "The Ālayavijñāna of the Yogācāra is not the same as that of *Laṅka* and the *Awakening of Faith*. The former conceives the Ālaya to be purity itself with nothing defiled in it, whereas the *Laṅka* and the *Awakening* make it the cause of purity and defilement. Further, the Yogācāra upholds the theory of Vijñaptimātratā and not that of Cittamātratā, which belongs to the *Laṅka*, *Avatamsaka*, and *Awakening of Faith*. The difference is this: According to the Vijñānamātratā the world is nothing but ideas, there are no realities behind them; but the Cittamātratā states that there is nothing but Citta, Mind, in the world and that the world is the objectification of mind. The one is pure idealism and the other idealistic realism."¹ The tradition in China and Japan may support Suzuki's differentiation. But knowing that in Sanskrit Citta, Vijñapti and Vijñāna may mean the same, we feel that Suzuki's differentiation may not be true. The Vijñānavāda too, which Suzuki wants to differentiate from the teachings of the *Laṅkāvatāra*, tells us, as we shall see, that reality is beyond everything determinate, and that it should not be called by the name *vijñāna* even. For it also, reality is beyond the Ālayavijñāna. While Citta, in the sense of what gathers and piles up, is identified with the Ālayavijñāna or the storehouse of consciousness in the *Laṅkāvatāra*, in *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* pure *vijñāpti* or consciousness is said to be above the Ālaya.

However, in the conception of the Ālaya there seem to be some differences of view in the Mahāyāna. Max Müller, in his Introduction to the *Vajracchedikā*, quotes from an address delivered by a Buddhist priest of Japan at the Congress of Religions 1893 to the effect that the Ālaya is the highest reality. In this quotation we have Vidyāmātratā instead of Vijñaptimātratā. The *Laṅkāvatāra* speaks of two aspects of the Ālaya, the relative and the absolute, and, in the latter aspect, identifies it with Cittamātratā. Sogen tells us that, in the Bhūtatahatā school of Aśvaghōṣa, the distinction is made between Ālayavijñāna and Alayavijñāna, the first A of the former being pronounced long and that of the latter short; so that the meaning of the first is the storehouse or repository of consciousness and that of the second

¹ *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. xi.

is the never-lost mind or the never-disappearing consciousness, which is the Absolute.

It seems difficult to decide whether the *Laṅkāvatāra* belongs to the Yogācāra school or to some school of the Mahāyāna which was neither the Yogācāra nor the Mādhyamika. Suzuki writes: "In the *Laṅka* all the most fundamental conceptions of the Mahāyāna are thrown in without any attempt on the part of the compilers to give them a system."¹ "In a way the *Awakening* is an attempt to systematize the *Laṅka*, for all the principal teachings of the latter are found there developed in due order."² "There is no doubt that the *Laṅka* is closely connected in time as well as in doctrine with the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* generally ascribed to Aśvaghōṣa."³ If these statements are true, we have to say that the *Laṅkāvatāra* precedes, at least logically, the *Awakening*,⁴ out of which or after which probably developed the Śūnyavāda and the Vijñānavāda. There are a number of points common to both the Vijñānavāda and the *Laṅkāvatāra* on the one hand and to the Śūnyavāda and the *Laṅkāvatāra* on the other. Like the Mādhyamika it speaks of the Śūnya, but like the Vijñānavāda it teaches Cittamātratā. This is again the same as the Tathāgatagarbha. Even in the works of the Vijñānavāda we find mention of the Śūnya, Tathatā, Tathāgatagarbha, etc.; but in the *Laṅkāvatāra* we find equal emphasis on each.

Suzuki writes that the main thesis of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* is that Buddha has just one vehicle for all beings, and that Avalokiteśvara is a god of mercy, who will help anybody who finds himself in trouble; that of the *Avatamsakasūtra* is that the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra does not enter Nirvāṇa, until he is sure that the whole universe is liberated; that of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* is that the world is śūnya; that of the *Vimalakīrtisūtra* is that monastic life is not necessary for liberation; that of the *Śrīmalasūtra* is that the source of the world is the Tathāgatagarbha; that of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* is that faith in the Buddha Amitābha is enough to save human beings; that of the *Parinirvāṇa-sūtra* is that everyone is potentially a Buddha; but it is only

¹ *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. xli.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxxix.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ But the "Sagathakam" refers to one Nāgāhvaya, who appears to be the same as Nāgārjuna, as the destroyer of all one-sided views based on being and non-being. If the "Sagathakam" is not a spurious addition to the *Laṅkāvatāra*, then it is posterior to Nāgārjuna, and may be said to have attempted a synthesis of the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra tendencies. If, however, the *Laṅkāvatāra* is earlier, then we may say that the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra are developments out of it.

IDEAS OF THE LAṆKĀVATĀRA

the *Laṅkāvatāra* that preaches that liberation is impossible without self-realization.¹ It preaches dependence on one self, and throws the responsibility on the human individual. Because of its doctrine of Cittamātratā, it does not appear to be as nihilistic as the Mādhyamika. Its teachings seem to occupy a position somewhere between the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika. It is a sort of a synthesis of both like the *Awakening*. While the latter effects the synthesis with the help of the idea of Tathatā, the *Laṅkāvatāra* does so with that of Cittamātratā, and exhibits stronger leanings towards the Vijñānavāda. It too identifies reality with Tathatā like the *Awakening*.²

VIII

IDEAS OF THE LAṆKĀVATĀRA

The highest reality of the *Laṅkāvatāra* is Citta or Mind. "The more ordinary expressions given to the highest reality known as Citta are Tathatā, 'suchness' or 'thusness,' Satyatā, 'the state of being true,' Bhūtātā, 'the state of being real,' Dharmadhātu, 'realm of truth,' Nirvāṇa, the Permanent (*nitya*), Sameness (*saṃatā*), the one (*advaya*), Cessation (*nirodha*), the Formless (*animitta*), Emptiness (*śūnyatā*),³ etc." Though the meaning of Citta as *vijñāna* is retained, the word is used in two senses. In its relative aspect, it means Manas, Manovijñāna, and the five sense *vijñānas*, all of which are found in the philosophy of the Sarvāstivāda. In its absolute aspect, Citta is a synonym for the Ālayavijñāna. On the other hand, the Ālayavijñāna too is spoken of as having a relative and an absolute aspect,³ these aspects being the same as the two aspects of the Citta. But there need be no doubt about both the Ālaya and the Citta being spoken of as above dualism⁴ and beyond comprehension.⁵ Further, the relation between the world and the Ālaya is regarded as that between whole and parts; so that the two are neither different from each

¹ *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, pp. xxxvii-xxxix. The formula of the Shingon sect of Japan, the canonical texts of which are *Mahāvairocanaśāmbhōdhi* and *Vajraśekhara Sūtras*, is given as follows: "The self which is in man and things expresses itself from the exterior. All the activities of the world are but the radiations of the 'self.' One should study and meditate deeply the law of the Three Worlds, these Three Mysteries, and strive to understand what is meant by causality. One should then conform the rhythm of one's life to cosmic guidance which signifies the fulfilment of one's social, human and national duty." This passage hardly sounds Buddhist as popularly understood outside the Buddhist countries. See *The Buddhist Sects of Japan*, p. 109.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxviii. ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 34 and 231. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

other nor identical with each other. "Mahāmāti, it is like a lump of clay and the particles of dust making up its substance, they are neither different nor not-different; again, it is like gold and various ornaments made of it. If, Mahāmāti, the lump of clay is different from its particles of dust, no lump will ever come out of them. But as it comes out of them it is not different from the particles of dust. Again, if there is no difference between the two, the lump will be indistinguishable from its particles." "Even so, Mahāmāti, if the evolving Vijñāna are different from the Ālayavijñāna, even in its original form, the Ālaya cannot be their cause. Again, if they are not different the cessation of the evolving Vijñānas will mean the cessation of the Ālayavijñāna, but there is no cessation of its original form."¹ Yet true to the spirit of the Mahāyāna, the *Laṅkāvatāra* identifies Nirvāṇa with *samsāra*.²

To show that reality is beyond all thought determinations, the *Laṅkāvatāra*, like *Mādhyamikakārikās*, goes to the extent of holding that reality is neither the Śūnya nor Nirvāṇa. "In all things there is no self-nature, they are mere words of people; that which is discriminated has no reality; (even) Nirvāṇa is like a dream; nothing is seen to be in transmigration, nor does anything ever enter into Nirvāṇa."³ That is, if we understand Nirvāṇa with the help of our thought determinations, which discriminate between things; then Nirvāṇa must be understood as something other than *samsāra*. This discrimination implies duality; but duality is unreal. So no attempt should be made to comprehend Nirvāṇa. Buddha gives a number of conceptions of Nirvāṇa and declares all of them to be false. Similarly, even emptiness or *śūnya* is a concept, and so is not real and does not express the nature of reality. "Emptiness, emptiness indeed. Mahāmāti, it is a term whose self-nature is false imagination. Because of one's attachment to false imagination, Mahāmāti, we have to talk of emptiness, no-birth, non duality, and absence of self-nature."⁴ That is, Buddha would object even to negative descriptions of reality. He says that the Tathāgatakāya is beyond mind or Citta⁵ even and, like the *Mādhyamika*, that Nirvāṇa cannot be called by the name Nirvāṇa.

One important point we have to note, which Suzuki regards as the special feature of the *Laṅkāvatāra*, is the idea of self-realization. If there were no reality, no truth, self-realization

¹ *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 34.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

would not have been preached. "That all things are in their self-nature unborn, Mahāmati, belongs to the realm of self-realization attained by noble wisdom, and does not belong essentially to the realm of dualistic discrimination cherished by the ignorant and the simple-minded."¹ Suzuki tells us that this self-realization is practically a recognition of one's true and original nature and in Zen Buddhism "the experience is compared to the visiting (of) one's native home and quietly getting settled."² We are here reminded of the Pratyabhijñā system of Abhinavagupta. In the "Sagathakam," which Suzuki doubts belonged originally to the text of the *Laṅkāvatāra*,³ we find the *ātman* doctrine preached and the *anātman* doctrine refuted.⁴ "Those who hold the theory of non-ego are injurers of Buddhist doctrines, they are given up to the dualistic views of being and non-being; they are to be ejected by the convocation of the Bikṣus and are never to be spoken to." "The doctrine of an ego-soul shines brilliantly like the rising of the world-end fire, wiping away the faults of philosophers, burning up the forest of egolessness." "Trying to seek in fine ways for an ego-soul in accumulation of the Skandhas, the unintelligent fail to see it, but the wise seeing it are liberated." Suzuki writes in a footnote that these verses "seem to contradict the Buddhist doctrine of non-ego. It is not necessary to determine the purport of these verses, as they stand all by themselves without any explanatory prose. In fact these verses in the 'Sagathakam,' which have no direct connection with the main text, except those that are quite obvious in meaning, are mostly difficult to know precisely what they intend to signify." But the explanation for these verses may be that there was a trend developing within the thought of the *Laṅkāvatāra*, namely, that, as the reality is Cittamātratā, it is somehow identical with the soul or self in essence. And probably the doctrine of self-realization is also connected with this view. The world is not regarded in the "Sagathakam" as a shadow of nothing on nothing cast by nothing, but as a "sign indicative of reality."⁵ In the text of the *Laṅkāvatāra* itself, it is said that reality is eternal.⁶ "The ancient road of reality, Mahāmati, has been here all the time, like gold, silver, or pearl preserved in the mine; Mahāmati, the Dharmadhātu, abides for ever, whether the Tathāgata appears in the world or not; as the Tathāgata eternally abides so does the reason (dhar-

¹ *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 56.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.

³ *Ibid.*, p. xlv.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

matā) of all things; reality for ever abides, reality keeps its order, like the roads in an ancient city."

The question is raised in the *Laṅkāvatāra* whether the Ālaya, which is eternal, can be *kṣanika* or momentary. The answer is given by pointing to its two aspects, the relative and the absolute. "Mahāmati, momentary is the Ālayavijñāna known as the Tathāgatagarbha, which is together with the Manas and with the habit energy of the evolving Vijñānas—this is momentary. But (the Ālayavijñāna which is together) with the habit-energy of the non-outflows (*anāsrava*) is not momentary."¹ From the absolute point of view, all things are eternal.²

The *Laṅkāvatāra*, too, teaches the two-fold *nairātmyatā*. "Mahāmati, what is this two-fold egolessness? (It is the egolessness of persons and the egolessness of things. What is meant by the egolessness of persons? It means that) in the collection of the Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas there is no ego-substance, nor anything belonging to it; . . ."³ "Now, Mahāmati, what is meant by the egolessness of things? It is to realize that the Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas are characterized with the nature of false discrimination."⁴ That is, things really have no distinctions. As Aśvaghoṣa says, the truth is *saṃatā*.

Still Buddha is represented as saying: "It is told by me that all things are egoless; by this is meant, Mahāmati, that they are devoid of self-hood; hence this egolessness. What I mean is that all things have each its own individuality which does not belong to another, as in the case of a cow and a horse. For example, Mahāmati, the being of a cow is not of horse-nature, nor is the being of a horse of a cow-nature. This (exemplifies) the case of neither being nor non-being. Each of them is not without its own individuality, each is such as it is by its own nature. In the same way, Mahāmati, things are not each without its own individuality, they are such as they are, and thus the ignorant and the simple-minded fail to understand the significance of egolessness by reason of their discrimination; indeed, they are not free from discrimination."⁵ Outwardly, this passage appears to be saying something self-contradictory. If everything possesses its own nature, where is *śūnyatā*? How can we show that it is egoless or selfless? So *dharmanairātmya* or egolessness of things does not mean that the cow is not a cow or the horse is not a horse. It

¹ *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 206.

² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

means that though the cow is not the same as its parts, yet it is not different from its parts, which will be found, on ultimate analysis, to be of the same nature as that of the parts of a horse. Nay, if the analysis is carried to the farthest possible limit, it will end in nothing, as Harivarman, the founder of the Satyasiddhi school, showed.

The idea expressed in this passage seems to be connected with the Buddhistic theory of perception, according to which every perception is indeterminate. Every perception is of the form "That is different from its others." The perception of the book in front of me, for example, is not of the form "That is a book," but of the form "That is different from the rest." To put it in the language of the Naiyāyikas, perception has no *prakāra*; or to put it in the language of Western epistemology, we see only the particular not the universal of perception, only the That not the What. The *prakāra*, *vikalpa* or the What belongs to a later stage of intellection. So far we understand from this theory that perception takes in only the concrete thing, only the individual. As everything is itself, and not any other, including others of its own kind, this theory of perception seems to be so far justifiable. But if every cognition is of the form that what is perceived is different from the others, then the reference to the other would be included in the thing, and somehow the other would be present in the thing. But then if the thing necessarily points beyond itself by including its others, it loses its uniqueness; so that the statement that everything is *svalakṣaṇa* or unique ends in the view that everything is *niḥsvabhāva* or without its own nature, and therefore *śūnya*. That is, to say that every *dharma* is itself is to say that it is *nairātmya* or selfless.

The *Laṅkāvatāra* also distinguishes between the two kinds of knowledge, the relative and the absolute.¹ "There are three kinds of Jñāna—worldly, superworldly, and transcendental. Now, worldly knowledge belongs to the philosophers and to the ignorant and the simple-minded, who are attached to the dualistic views of being and non-being. Super-worldly knowledge belongs to all the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, who are attached to the notions of individuality and generality. Transcendental knowledge, which is free from the dualism of being and non-being, belongs to the Bodhisattvas and takes its rise when they thoroughly examine things of imagelessness, see into the state of no-birth and no-anni-

¹ *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 135.

hilation, and realize egolessness at the stage Tathāgatahood."¹ "Vijñāna is subject to birth and destruction, and Jñāna is not subject to birth and destruction. Further, Mahāmati, Vijñāna falls into (the dualism of) form and no-form, being and non-being, and is characterized by multiplicity; but Jñāna is marked with the transcendence of (the dualism of) form and no-form. Further, Mahāmati, Vijñāna is characterized with accumulation and Jñāna with non-accumulation."² Knowledge is of three kinds; the common-sense theory of things which sees birth and decay, a little more reflective theory which sees *saṃatā* in the particulars, and the highest knowledge which sees neither birth nor decay. Vijñāna, we may say, is knowledge which includes attachment also. The highest knowledge is called Prajñā. It is imageless, sees the root of existence (*pravicayabuddhi*), indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and inexpressible. The *Laṅkāvatāra* is here making the distinction between the *paramārthasatya* and *saṃvṛtisatya* in its own way.³

We find in this work three kinds of nature (*svabhāva*) distinguished,⁴ namely, *parikalpita*, *paratantra*, and *pariniṣpanna*. The first nature is the imagined particularity of things. In truth, there are no things, but through ignorance we imagine them. The second nature is their dependence upon something else. Everything is caused by something else, and is therefore dependent on it; so that there is really nothing in the world which is self-dependent and self-existent. If we analyse its nature, it disappears into nothing or *sūnyatā*. The third is the essential reality of things, their nature seen from the absolute standpoint.

As the world is neither different from reality nor identical with it, though the world is treated as Māyā, Māyā is said to be not without reality.⁵ All things are called Māyā, because they are unreal like a lightning flash, also because they are not born and yet appear to be.⁶ Though the general tendency of the *Laṅkāvatāra* is to regard the phenomenal world as neither real nor unreal, yet there is a slight inclination towards regarding it as both real and unreal. Though these passages declaring that the world is both real and unreal can be interpreted in the light of the general tendency, yet there are some who identify what is neither existent nor non-existent with what is both existent and non-existent. Some interpreters, too, of the Advaita conception of Māyā seem to

¹ *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*.

² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 113, 197, and 237.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

think likewise. In fairness to these interpreters, it may be said that, both in the *Laṅkāvatāra* and in the Advaita, the existence of the phenomenal things is really the reflection of the one reality. The *Laṅkāvatāra* gives the example of the reflection of the moon in water, and of the flower in a mirror.¹ The reflection or the *pratibimba* theory of the Advaita is well known. The former gives the example of the ocean and the waves also. But any way, the existence of the world is the existence of the Tathatā or the *Dharmakāya*. We read also of the mutual influence of the Ālaya and the Manas. And because the pure Ālaya influences the Manas, the latter feels like turning back or turning within and desires liberation.

In the *Laṅkāvatāra* seven kinds of *sūnyatā* are distinguished. "In short, then, Mahāmati, there are seven kinds of emptiness: (1) The emptiness of individual marks (*lakṣaṇa*), (2) the emptiness of self-nature (*bhāvasvabhāva*), (3) the emptiness of no-work (*apracarita*), (4) the emptiness of work (*pracarita*), (5) the emptiness of all things in the sense that they are unpredicable (*nirabhilāpya*), (6) the emptiness in its highest sense of ultimate reality realizable only by noble wisdom, and (7) the emptiness of mutuality (*itaretara*) which is the seventh."² The first kind of emptiness means that things which appear to possess the mark of individuality and generality do not really possess them and, when analysed, disappear into nothing. The second means that things which appear to be born and destroyed are not really born and destroyed. The third means that the *skandhas*, which, as an aggregate, appear to be performing acts, are Nirvāṇa itself, and so they are really not performing any work. The fourth means that there is no soul in the *skandhas*, and the agent of action is only the *skandhas*. So far as the soul is concerned, it is nothing but *sūnya*. The fifth means that things are due to false imagination, and the nature of this false imagination is inexpressible. The sixth meaning is given thus: "Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by emptiness in its highest sense of ultimate reality realizable by noble wisdom? It is that in the attainment of an inner realization by means of noble wisdom there is no trace of habit-energy generated by all the erroneous conceptions (of beginningless past). Thus one speaks of the highest emptiness of ultimate reality realizable by noble wisdom."³ The seventh means the emptiness

¹ *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. xxix.

² *Ibid.*, p. 65. ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-7.

which is relative; for instance, a lecture hall may be empty of elephants and tigers, but not of students and benches. Of the seven kinds of emptiness, six are the emptiness of things, which means their falsity from the absolute point of view. Only the seventh is the emptiness which is reality itself, which is identical with Tathatā, Tathāgatagarbha, etc. The conclusion we drew while examining the meaning of Nāgārjuna's Śūnya can be further clarified in the light of these distinctions.¹ The difficulty or the source of confusion is that both reality and unreality are connoted by the same term. It may be in accordance with the Mahāyānist view that Nirvāṇa is ultimately identical with *samsāra*. But that this identification leads to much confusion and misunderstanding cannot be denied. It may not be a defect in the reasoning of the Mahāyāna; it may be a defect of our thought itself. Or it may be the merit of our thought that it is able to come to the conclusion that reality lies at the very heart of the phenomenal world. But still it has misled many interpreters of Nāgārjuna's doctrine.

IX

ASAṄGA

The philosophy of Asaṅga, as expounded in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, is hardly distinguishable from that of the Advaita. He and his younger brother Vasubandhu are the protagonists of the Yogācāra school, also called the Vijñānavāda. The *Laṅkāvatāra*, because of its elaborate discussions of concepts like the Śūnya, can be easily recognized as a Buddhistic work; but *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, if the name of the work and the word Buddha that is often repeated in it are omitted, may be mistaken for a work on the Advaita.

Though Suzuki wants to distinguish between the Cittamātratā of the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the Vijñaptimātratā of the Yogācāra, the two are really one, as we have already pointed out. Asaṅga also writes that what appears to be subject and object is the Citta,² and that, when one realizes that the world is nothing but name and form, he stands on Cittamātra³ or pure Mind. The commentary says that Tathatā is the same as Citta.⁴ Asaṅga

¹ Cp. the twenty kinds of śūnyatā distinguished in the *Prajñāpāramitā*.

² *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, p. 63. *Cittamādvayaprabhāsa*. (Edited by Sylvain Levi.)

³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

uses the word *vijñapti* also. He says that when illusion is removed *vijñapti* becomes formless.¹ He uses the word *śūnya* also, and speaks of realization as *ātmalābha* or the gaining of one's *ātman*;² so that *pudgalanairātmyatā* or the theory that there is no soul becomes identical with *suddhātmatā* or the theory that the self is pure and above determinations, and for that reason *śūnya*. Asaṅga goes even farther and calls the ultimate truth *sat* or existence, and wonders why the foolish man becomes attached to the world, which is unreal, leaving out reality.³ He says that by longing for *sat* we lose nothing, because the world is identical with it; but the world by itself is unreal, and so our attachment to the world is only due to our stupidity. This identification of the real and the unreal is of course Mahāyānistic. Reality pervades everything like space.⁴ Asaṅga gives the example of the moon and its reflection in water,⁵ to show the relation between the noumenon and the phenomena. Another example given is that of pure and muddy water. The water both when pure and when muddy is the same. Pure water is the muddy water from which the mud is removed. Similarly, reality is nothing but the world from which distinctions like that between subject and object are removed. That is why *samsāra* (the transient world) and *Nirvāṇa* are identical.

In spite of this definitely positive conception of reality, the refrain of the Mahāyāna, that reality is neither positive nor negative, is not absent in Asaṅga's work. He says that *astitva* and *nāstitva*, existence and non-existence, are found only in *Māyā*⁶ and not in the ultimate truth. He writes that both *bhāva* and *abhāva* are *śūnya*⁷; and the man who has realized the perfect truth is called the *śūnyajñā*, because he realizes that both *bhāva* and *abhāva* are *śūnya*.⁸ But in the philosophy of Asaṅga, *śūnya* seems to express the unreality of the world rather than reality itself. The emphasis seems to be more on the positive aspect of reality. And in this sense, we may say that *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* is still less negative than the *Laṅkāvatāra*.

¹ *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, p. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 37. *Sūnyatāyām viśuddhāyām nairātmyāt mārgalābhataḥ buddhāḥ suddhātmalābhatvāt gatā ātmamahātmatām.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 58. *Kathamayamabhirūḍho lokamohaprahāro yadasadabhiniviṣṭhaḥ satsamantāt vihāya.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁶ *Op. cit.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24. *Arthān sa vijñāya ca jalpamātrān santiṣṭhate tannibhacittamātre, pratyakṣatāmeti ca dharmadhātuh tasmāt viyukto dvayalakṣaṇena, nāstīti cittāt parametya buddhīyā cittasya nāstitvamupaiṣi tasmāt, dvayasya nāstitvamupetya dhīmān santiṣṭhate tadgatidharmadhātāu.*

While Āsvaghoṣa uses the word Tathatā more frequently to mean ultimate reality, Nāgārjuna Śūnya, and the *Laṅkāvatāra* Citta, Asaṅga seems to think that the word Dharmadhātu is more appropriate; at least the use of that word is more conspicuous in his work. Dharmadhātu is definitely identified by Asaṅga with Dharmakāya, Tathatā, and Cittamātratā or Vijñaptimātratā.

Another important point that brings the Advaita of Śaṅkara to mind is Asaṅga's reference to *jñānamārga* or the path of knowledge.¹ As reality according to Śaṅkara is of the nature of pure consciousness, he preached *jñānamārga*. We know that the *Prajñāpāramitās*, though preaching that reality is void and beyond thought, emphasize knowledge or *prajñā*. This tendency is given a definite form and name by Asaṅga and is connected with one of the four noble truths, namely, *mārga*. Of course, like the other Mahāyānists, Asaṅga too tells us that reality cannot be known through *tarka* or logic,² a point common to both the Mahāyāna and the Advaita. He too holds that liberation or *mokṣa* is only a removal of ignorance,³ so that it is only the recognition of one's original nature.

The impurities, which in Buddhism are the *kleśas* (affections), the *samskāras* (impressions), etc., constitute our ignorance, which screens the truth as the clouds hide the sun and his rays.⁴ Asaṅga says that by Buddha-knowledge, that is, the knowledge of the true Buddha, the whole world becomes instantaneously known—a statement that reminds us of the Upaniṣadic utterance that upon the Brahman being known everything else becomes known. Asaṅga salutes Buddha as one who is free from all illusions and whose all-pervasive nature is known through knowledge.⁵ This verse may safely be interpreted as meaning that Buddha is to be known as pure consciousness pervading every inch of the universe. The interpretation will be in full accord with the philosophy of Asaṅga.

¹ *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, p. 35. *Tatprāptirnirvikalpāviśayasumahaṭo jñānamārgāt suśuddhāt.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 22. *Tataśchamokṣo bhramamātrasaṅkṣayah.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 184. *Sarvāvarāṇanirmuktah sarvalokābhībhū mune, jñānena jñayam te vyūptam muktacitta namostu te.*

Vasubandhu, the reputed younger brother of Asaṅga, must have been greatly influenced by his brother's views, in writing his *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. This contains two parts, the "Vimśatikā" and the "Trimśatikā." The commentary of the "Vimśatikā" gives Cittam, Manas, Vijñāna, and Vijñapti as synonyms¹—which too seems to go against Suzuki's differentiation between the Yogācāra and the Vijñaptimātratā. According to Vasubandhu, Cittamātratā and Vijñaptimātratā are identical in meaning. In the "Vimśatikā" Vasubandhu refutes the view that atoms or *paramāṇus* are the ultimate reality of the world, and establishes his own theory that the stuff of the universe is pure consciousness. If the *paramāṇus* are the material cause of the universe, they are either spatial or non-spatial. If they are spatial, they must be further divisible and cannot be atoms which are indivisible. If they are not spatial, they may be indivisible; but being non-spatial they cannot generate things which occupy space. Like the other Mahāyānists, Vasubandhu says that the reality assigned to the *āyatanas*, etc., by Buddha was meant for the lower types of intellect.

The "Trimśatikā" deals with the process of the evolution of the world, the nature of Buddha and so forth. Like Asaṅga,² Vasubandhu gives only a secondary place to the Ālayavijñāna. He calls it Vipākavijñāna.³ The highest reality is pure Vijñāna. Even to call it by the name Vijñāna, Vasubandhu says, is only to picture it. It is simply a *tat* or *tanmātra*, a mere That.⁴ He calls it Tathatā also, giving as the reason that it is the final truth of the *dharma*s.⁵ This Vijñānamātratā is some supra-mundane consciousness beyond mind and picturing thought.⁶ It is the pure element called *Dharma*, that is, Dharmadhātu, of Buddha and is the same as his Dharmakāya.⁷

Vasubandhu maintains that the world is due to the *pariṇāma* or transformation of the pure Vijñāna. But how can *pariṇāma* be

¹ *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 3. (Edited by Sylvain Levi.)

² *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, p. 7. *Yasya hi nacadhimuktistasya hina eva dhātuh samudāgata ālayavijñānabhāvanā*. See commentary. ³ *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26. *Vijñaptimātramevedam ityapi hyupalambhatah, sthāpayannagratah kiñcittanmātrenāvaśiṣṭhate*. The commentary says: *upalambhatah grahanatah citrikaranatah ityarthah*. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41. ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44. *Sa evānāśravo dhātuh acintyakuśalo dhruvah, sukho vimuktikāyo'sau dharmākhyo'yam mahāmuneh*.

given a place in Buddhism? *Parīṇāma*, as it is usually understood, is the transformation of the cause into the effect like the transformation of milk into curd. In this process the original milk is not lost but puts on a new form. But can this idea agree with the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness? Vasubandhu has reconciled both these doctrines and interpreted the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) in terms of *parīṇāma*. The commentary of the "Trimśatikā" asks: What is *parīṇāma*? and answers that it is to become another. It is the appearance of the effect simultaneous with the cessation of the cause, and occurring in a moment other than the moment in which the cause exists.¹ Because of the *vāsanās* or impressions left in the *Ālaya*, the ego and the material world, the subject and the object, are produced. It anticipates the objection that *Vijñāna* too is not real, that just as the object is said to be ultimately unreal the *Vijñāna* also may be said to be ultimately unreal. But the answer is given that *samvṛti* or empirical reality must have some material cause, and that material cause is pure *Vijñāna*. If *samvṛti* does not have a material cause, it will not come into being, and we shall have to say that the I-*Vijñāna* is unreal even empirically. The usage of the I cannot be without a ground; and though the I is false, its ground is real, and that is the pure *Vijñāna*. Everything that is known as an object is a product of imagination (*parikalpita*) and so does not exist. But as everything originates from the *Vijñāna*, the latter must be taken as substantially existing,² that is, existing like the Substance of Spinoza.

Here we have to note one important change that has already occurred in the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*. In *parīṇāma* the cause is born or rather reborn as the effect. But according to the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* as understood by the earlier Buddhists, it is not the cause that is reborn; it is the effect that comes into being by depending upon the so-called cause. This idea agrees well with the momentariness of things. But in the *parīṇāma-vāda* (doctrine of transformation), it is the *Vijñāna* that has to assume, in spite of its momentariness, the shape of subject and object. We may now say that the *Vijñāna* originates as something else; but this would be simply *samutpāda* and not *pratītyasamutpāda*, simple transformation (origination), not dependent origination. For what is there to be dependent upon? The effect, we say, originates depending on the cause, because the cause exists

¹ *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

one moment previous to the effect. But here the Vijñāna is itself the cause; and it cannot be said to originate depending on the effect, for in the commentary itself it is said that the effect comes into being one moment after the cause, and that it is absurd to say that the cause depends upon the effect as the effect is yet to be produced and is not yet. Though the commentary says that *pratītyasamutpānnatvam* (to be dependently originated) is the same as *pariṇāma* (transformation), it does not explain this difficulty. But we may infer that the dependence here is on the *vāsanās* or impressions of the subject and object.¹ But the process of evolution or the second of the four noble truths, *samudaya-satya* (the truth of causality), assumes here a different form. We shall have to say that Vijñāna, depending upon ignorance, becomes the *samskāras*, depending upon the *samskāras* mind or ego-consciousness, and so forth. The point, however, is not discussed in the commentary. But it is obvious that the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) is changing into a *pariṇāmavāda* (doctrine of transformation), and is about to oust from Buddhism the *saṅghātavāda* or the doctrine of aggregation. A good beginning has been made to oust the *saṅghātavāda* from Buddhism the moment the Mahāyāna postulated the oneness of the ultimate reality. Interesting philosophical developments would certainly have taken place, were not Buddhism expelled from its land of birth by the Muslims and to some extent by the Hindus as well. Just as many Vedāntins believe that the Brahman is the material cause of the world, Vasubandhu postulates the pure Vijñāna as the material cause of the universe.

The first product of *pariṇāma* out of this pure Vijñāna is the Ālayavijñāna, which is also called the Vipākavijñāna or the Vipākapariṇāma. It contains the seeds of the whole universe. The second product is *manas* or mind also called *kliṣṭamanas* or *kliṣṭamanovijñāna*. The third product is the six-fold object consciousness, that is, the consciousness of the objects of the five senses and the *Dharma*, probably identical with the Dharmadhātu. The Dharmadhātu here occupies almost the same place as that in *Abhidharmakośa*. This may be due to the author of the two being the same.

Vasubandhu distinguishes between three kinds of *svabhāva* or nature of things, *parikalpita*, *paratantra*, and *pariniṣpanna*.² As a product of imagination, everything is *parikalpita*; as caused by

¹ *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

an imagined cause, everything is *paratantra*; *pariniṣpanna* is the absolute nature of things. Between the three natures there is neither identity nor difference.

Corresponding to the three kinds of *svabhāva*, there are three kinds of *niḥsvabhāvatā* or naturelessness. They are *lakṣana-niḥsvabhāvatā*, *utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā*, and *paramārthanīḥsvabhāvatā*. The first is due to the things not really possessing the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) which they are supposed to possess and no definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of them is possible. The second is due to the fact that everything originates depending upon something else as its cause, and so does not possess its own nature. The third is due to the fact that the ultimate reality is only a That, and there is no What in it. Asaṅga also gives three kinds of *niḥsvabhāvatā*, the first being due to the fact that everything depends upon a cause for its existence and nature, the second due to the fact that their nature is not found when they cease to exist, and the third due to the fact that as all things are momentary, their nature does not persist.¹ The various kinds of *niḥsvabhāvatā* are to be noted for the reason that all of them can be turned into the proof for the *śūnyatā* of things.

XI

ŚĀNTARAKIṢṬA AND KAMALAŚĪLA

There is another school among the Vijñānavādins, which is a sort of pluralistic idealism. The upholders of this view are Śāntarakṣita and Kamalasīla, the authors of *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the commentary on it. While Asaṅga and Vasubandhu hold that there is only one Vijñapti or absolute consciousness, which divides itself into many centres, these two hold that, though Vijñapti is the ultimate truth, it is not one but many. For otherwise, if one man obtains liberation or *mokṣa* by his *vijñāna* becoming pure, others also have to be liberated, as the *vijñāna* of all is the same. There appears no direct criticism of Vasubandhu by Śāntarakṣita or Kamalasīla, and we find this pluralism in their examination of the Advaita theory of the Ātman.² Śāntarakṣita says that the advaitins have committed only a small mistake (*alpāparādhama*) by holding the doctrine of the eternity and oneness of consciousness.³ But if the question is raised whether the liberated *vijñāna*

¹ *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, p. 67.

² *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Vol. I, p. 124.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 123 and 550.

is still momentary and how we are to know that it is a plurality, we feel that this doctrine cannot stand. If pure consciousness too is momentary and everything momentary is unreal like the ordinary *bhāvas* or the phenomenal world, then this pure *viññāna* too must be unreal. Further, if reality is beyond all discriminations, then it must be above plurality and momentariness also. These questions are somehow not anticipated and answered either by Śāntarakṣita or Kamalasīla. If raised, they will probably answer that they maintain only the negative position that reality is neither eternal nor momentary, neither a one nor a many. But the advaitins also assert that their Brahman is beyond time and number, and that their eternity means "beyond time." However, there is some misunderstanding of each other's position by the Buddhists and the advaitins; and there is a desire to preserve the individuality of each and give the other a bad name, lest if the identity of their results is asserted many of their previous contentions should have to be modified. The difficulty in regarding the pure *viññānasantāna* or the series of consciousness as momentary is tacitly recognized by some who treat the moment of the pure *viññāna* as transcendental.¹ The idea seems to have some similarity to the eternal present of Royce—for the present is always a moment so that the eternal present comes to mean an eternal moment—according to whom the whole of the past, present, and future are the object of a single act of God's perception. The idea of the transcendental moment like that of the eternal moment is meant for lifting the moment or the present above time and divesting it of all associations with it. The same was the meaning of the advaitin in treating the Brahman as eternal.

XII

GENERAL ESTIMATE OF THE VIJÑĀNAVĀDA

In spite of maintaining that reality is beyond the positive and the negative, the Yogācāra, as we have seen, makes a constructive effort and tries to show how the world comes out of the pure *Viññāna*. It will not be true to say it deduces the world as Fichte does from the Absolute Ego and as Hegel does from Being. For the method of deduction by the two latter is logical or at least claimed to be logical, and it is said that the method carries its proof within itself. Probably, if the Yogācārin is told of the possi-

¹ Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 41.

bility of such a method, he will discountenance its application for the reason that pure consciousness, in the process of ascent to it, is reached by removing one impurity after another; but if the question is raised why and how the impurities come to be at all, the answer lies in Avidyā or ignorance. Certainly, though ignorance can be given ontological significance, we can make no logical deduction from it. However, once we admit its presence and the finitizing of the Absolute Consciousness or original Vijñāna, we feel the need for an object; and we may proceed like Fichte to deduce the categories of the phenomenal world, though even this is not really a logical deduction. Further, the idea of the Ālaya-vijñāna plays a role somewhat similar to the synthetic apperception of Kant; or, to be safer, it is a unifying consciousness. The *samskāras* or *vāsanās* (impressions, instincts) are more or less the categories, translated by Suzuki as habit-energies.¹ These supply the ways in which the world of forms is interpreted (*prajñāyate* or *viññāyate* in one of its meanings). But unlike the categories of Kant these *samskāras* include the individual idiosyncrasies as well. But anyway, the cosmic, the individual, the class, and social idiosyncrasies or habits are all brought together to a focus in the Ālaya, and the universe appears accordingly. To a certain extent the *samskāras* are similar to Bergson's memory, which is a sort of habit the *élan vital* carries in its forward movement. We have seen that Vasubandhu identifies the Ālayavijñāna with the Vipākavijñāna as the consciousness in which all the *vipākas* or effects of past *karma* are stored; and as such it is not devoid of egoistic character. Both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu posit a higher vijñāna than the Ālaya; and even the *Laṅkāvatāra* distinguishes two aspects of the Ālaya, the absolute and the relative. Sogen tells us that, probably in some Vijñānavāda schools, the *viññāna* higher than the Ālaya is called the Ādhānavijñāna, and that, in some Bhūtataṭhātā schools, the higher is called the Alaya in contradistinction from the Ālaya. Those who speak of the Ādhānavijñāna do not seem to identify the Ālaya with the Vipāka but treat it as lower than the latter.² Because of the differences in terminology it is not always safe to make general remarks on the Vijñānavāda. But yet the distinction we find in Kant between the transcendental ego and the empirical may be discovered even here. It has, however, to be noted that Kant does not hold that the transcendental ego contains within itself the material of

Studies in Laṅkāvatāra, p. 264.

² *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, p. 240.

the universe, though it contains its forms or categories. But for the Vijñānavādin everything is a transformation of the original Vijñāna according to the *samskāras* that are deposited in it. Stcherbatsky writes: "This store consciousness in this system occupies a position analogous to the Primitive Matter (*Pradhāna*) of the Sāṅkhya school. All the individual objects and ideas are regarded as its modifications (*pariṇāma*) by the Sāṅkhya. The Yogācāras likewise regard all separate ideas as modifications of their store consciousness. This represents a disguised return from the theory of a stream of thought to the doctrine of the substantial Soul. In a stream of thought, every preceding moment of consciousness is the cause of the next following one. This relation, called *samanantarapratyaya*, is now replaced by the relation of the store consciousness (*ālaya*) to its modifications (*pariṇāma*)."¹

One can easily see that this disguised return is in essence a return to some form of *satkāryavāda*, and the abandonment of *asatkāryavāda*; for to postulate the germs of the universe in the Ālaya can be nothing else. While discussing Vasubandhu's ideas, we have already noted what the interpretation of the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* in terms of *pariṇāma* means. There we saw that the commentary was not disposed to think that the *samsṛti* or appearance (world) can come out of nothing. This implies that the world comes out of *sat*, existence. The positing of the universe as a germ in the Ālaya has, at the back of it, the feeling, even though it may be denied, that the world cannot be an *asat* or non-existence before it was born. Thus both the cause and the effect are by now practically regarded as *sat* or existence, in spite of the distinction made between *samvṛtisatya* and *paramārthasatya*. It has, however, to be noted, in fairness to the Vijñānavādins, that the *satkāryavāda* has been carried only up to a point and not into the concept of the ultimate reality, that is, only up to the idea of the Ālaya and not beyond.

Besides, though the Ālaya may be treated as a *santāna* or series, the germs or *samskāras* or *vāsanās* which are transmitted from one momentary *vijñāna* to another cannot be momentary: they must be identities that continue as such at least for some time. The Buddhist example of perfuming, in which one cloth which is actually perfumed by us transmits its perfume (*vāsanā*) to others which are in contact with it, shows that, in spite of the cloths being different, the *vāsanā* that is transmitted is the same.

¹ *The Conception of Buddhistic Nirvana*, p. 32.

To maintain that the *vāsanās* or *samskāras* too are momentary will lead to an infinite regress, as it will necessitate the postulation of another *samskāra* within the series of the first *samskāra*, and so forth. Nāgārjuna would therefore regard both the *viññānas* and *samskāras* as unreal. But the Yogācārin with his constructive tendency is not prone to regard the *viññānas* as unreal. The Viññānavādin or the Buddhist in general regards *bhāva* or existence as a continual process of moments, while the forms of existence which are the *samskāras* have some stability. Oldenberg rightly remarks: "Where there is no being, but only becoming, it is not a substance, but only a law, which can be recognized as the first and the last."¹ Here we see some similarity to Whitehead's concept of process, in which the eternal objects, which are really the forms of existence, inhere, though, according to the Viññānavāda, both process and its forms are ultimately unreal, the only reality being Viññāna. But a process which is not the process of a form cannot be understood. We see process only when a form changes. And the attempt to treat form as stable or eternal, and existence as pure process or change, seems to be unreasonable, in that it introduces a new type of dualism between process and form. Form is identical (*tādātmya*) with existence. It can have no separate being of its own except in our minds. True existence, which is indeterminate and inexpressible, appears under various determinations; and because the determinations are appearances, the existence or *sattā* of the determinations or forms is the original true existence. This is the view of the advaitin; and we can discover a tacit acceptance of it by the Viññānavādin. For, even according to the latter, the pure original Viññāna is indeterminate, and appears under many determinations, which are ultimately false.

By some the Ālaya is compared to the sub-conscious of modern psychology. To the extent that both contain potential tendencies which will bear fruit in time there is similarity between the two. But the Ālaya, as Dr. E. J. Thomas rightly observes, is a metaphysical concept and is regarded by some Yogācārin as the ultimate reality. But modern psychology does not venture into metaphysics.

¹ *Buddha*, p. 252.

XIII

THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF THE VIJÑĀNAVĀDINS

One of the most important theories of the school of the Vijñānavādins is their theory of perception, according to which the object is not different from the consciousness of the object.¹ We find in it Berkeley's theory of *esse est percipi* in one of its most systematic forms. Yet the Vijñānavādins, like Berkeley, do not maintain that one can create one's object as one likes. Only, the analysis of our experience discloses, according to them, the identical nature of the two. However, the Vijñānavādins do not maintain that, because of this identity, only the perceiver is real and the perceived is false. They hold that both are false and the truth is Vijñāptimātratā or consciousness only, devoid of the characteristics of the subject and object, *grāhaka* and *grāhya*.

For, in truth, there is in Buddhism no subject, in the sense in which we usually understand the term. According to the Vijñānavāda, there is only a series of *vijñānas* or moments of consciousness, and they assume the various forms of subject, object, senses, etc. Therefore, though we find the doctrine *esse est percipi* in this school, we shall be misunderstanding it if we lose sight of its metaphysics. There is no subject whose consciousness becomes an object; but there is a consciousness which becomes a subject and an object, both being momentary. Therefore for the momentary subject the momentary object is "given"; he does not produce it. Berkeley started with the theory of perception and without a metaphysics; but the Vijñānavādin starts with a system of metaphysics, and, on it, constructs a theory of perception. And even in his theory of perception he tries to show that *vijñāna* alone can be real. We may feel that this attempt is unnecessary and misleading; but still if we forget the point we shall misunderstand him.

It is generally said that the Vijñānavādin's theory is psychological while that of the Mādhyamika is logical or epistemological. But this observation is only superficial, due to the misunderstanding that the Vijñānavāda is based on a theory of perception like the Berkeleyan philosophy. In European philosophy, the method of Locke, Berkeley and Hume is regarded by many as psychological. But the method of the Vijñānavādin is not the same. He

¹ For a detailed discussion of this view, see Śāntarakṣita: *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Vol. I, pp. 550 ff.

tries to establish the truth of pure Vijñāna not psychologically but dialectically, by showing that no concept of reality stands examination, that the pure consciousness that accompanies all these concepts cannot be denied, and that therefore it is the *upādāna* or the material cause of the world. Only because the final essence of the world is pure Vijñāna, is it maintained that his theory is psychological. It may be so for us with our notions of psyche and mind; but for him, his theory is an ontology. For him, there is nothing real corresponding to our mind. We are sure to miss the spirit of his system, if we do not keep this point in view.

XIV

IDENTITY OF THE IDEAL AND THE REAL IN BUDDHISM

As is common to all idealism, the ideal reality for the Buddhists is the true existence, though they would not call it existence. Everything else has only a relative existence. The ideal reality, as we have noticed, is the ideal not only of man's life but of the whole of nature. Nirvāṇa or the Śūnya, as the doctrine of Buddha, is proclaimed by nature too. Thus the opposition between the laws of morality and religion on the one hand and the laws of nature on the other, which has become one of the insoluble questions of modern European ethical thought, could not be felt by the Buddhist. For nature also is pointing towards the same ideal. It declares that its ideal is the only law or Dharma. There is no explicitly formulated theory in Buddhism that nature evolves into spirit and through it becomes Nirvāṇa. But we shall not be far wrong if we read the theory into it. If the original reality somehow assumes various shapes and becomes the world; and if the world, while disappearing, becomes the original reality; we have here two processes like the evolution and involution of the world from, and into the Prakṛti of the Śāṅkhya. When we connect this idea with the view of the Buddhists that the *pudgala* or soul is only a *saṅghāta* or aggregate of the *skandhas*, we feel that there is a possible line of thought according to which the *skandhas* can become the self and then the Śūnya or pure Vijñāna or Tathatā. The world then becomes the vale of soul-making and the road to the highest reality. However, this line of development is only a possibility, and the Buddhists are opposed to any doctrine of a continuous self.

XV

NIRVĀṆA AS THE DHARMAKĀYA OF THE BUDDHA

The most important point for us to note in understanding the Buddhist view of reality is their identification of Nirvāṇa with the Dharmakāya of Buddha. Nirvāṇa thus becomes practically the realization of one's true body, for everybody, according to the Mahāyāna, is a Buddha potentially. Neither the doctrine of Nirvāṇa nor that of the body of Buddha had at first any ontological importance. Nirvāṇa, for the early Buddhists, was, from the side of the *skandhas* a dissolution of their combination or *sanghāta*. They never worried themselves about the question, what becomes of the *skandhas* after their separation. For the Lokottaravadins, Buddha's body could not be human, for how could a human being preach such a divine truth? But the idea that Buddha's body could not be human led to the speculation about its actual nature. If it is divine, it must be the essential nature of the world, its Dharma. Then was formed the conception of the Dharmakāya. But every man, it was declared in the Mahāyāna, could become a Buddha through discipline and knowledge. If Nirvāṇa is the ideal of every life, then to enter Nirvāṇa means to become one with the Dharmakāya of Buddha; for the true nature of Buddha is the Dharmakāya or the Body of Law or simply Law. That is, Buddha is the Law of the world: he is the essence of the universe. We have come across the idea of Dharma-dhātu also both in the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. It is identified, in the latter, with the Dharmakāya of Buddha. Dharma-dhātu literally means the element of law; and though in *Abhidharmakośa* the conception seems to be rather crude, and in *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* also it is said to be an object of the sixth sense, in the Mahāyāna in general the concept is identified with the idea of the ultimate reality.

It is true that Nirvāṇa was not understood alike by all the schools of the Mahāyāna; but yet their idea of the Dharmakāya was changed according to their conception of Nirvāṇa. For the Mādhyamika, for whom Nirvāṇa is the Śūnya, the Dharmakāya also is the Śūnya. For the Yogācāra, both Nirvāṇa and the Dharmakāya are pure Vijñāna. For Aśvaghoṣa, they are the Tathatā. Further, the Hīnayānist Nirvāṇa is generally transcendental; it is something to be achieved, not yet actual. But for the Mahāyāna, it is not something to be achieved, but is eternally

achieved; because it is the essential nature of the world, and is identical with it. We may say, it is something to be realized, not to be produced. It is not absolutely transcendental, but is here itself, as it is the law of the universe. This is not to say that the world as we see it with all its imperfections is the reality. It means that reality can be, and has to be realized here itself. As we have seen, if cornered, the Mahāyānist would say that Nirvāṇa is neither different from the world nor identical with it.

Because Nirvāṇa is eternally accomplished and is identical with the Dharmakāya of Buddha or, if we do not refer to Buddha as a religious teacher and want to be strictly metaphysical, with the Dharmadhātu, and as every being is potentially a Buddha and is in essence the same as the Dharmadhātu, Nirvāṇa comes to mean self-realization. The idea of self-realization is prominent in the *Laṅkāvatāra* and Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*. Though they do not openly express it, all the schools of the Vijñānavāda uphold it in a sense. It is logically consistent with, and is a development of their position. The Shingon sect, for instance, in Japan openly holds it. The essential nature of everything is the self; so to realize one's essence is self-realization.

XVI

DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NIRVĀṆA

Not only did the Buddhists themselves understand Nirvāṇa differently, but also scholars have interpreted it in diverse ways. There are some who, in the beginnings of Buddhistic studies, understood it as pure annihilation¹ and therefore as nothing. They had their reason in the fact that the early Buddhists, namely, the Theravādins, meant by it the dissolution of the combination of the *skandhas*. But as the Buddhists themselves did not accept that Buddha was an *ucchedavādin* or preached annihilation, this view is now given up by many.² Stcherbatsky tells us that Nirvāṇa, according to Buddha, is simply the end of all *samskṛtadharma*s or compound things, and is a stonelike existence. This interpretation agrees with the conception of Nirvāṇa of the Sarvāstivādins, for whom Nirvāṇa is an *asamskṛtadharma* or an uncompounded thing. It is eternal; it is an entity or *vastu*, positive in nature but

¹ Cp. La Vallée Poussin, Oldenberg, etc.

² For instance, Keith, Mrs. Rhys Davids, Dr. E. J. Thomas, Dr. Radhakrishnan, etc.

stone-like without life and consciousness. It corresponds exactly to the state of the ātman of the Naiyāyikas in its liberated stage. But the Mahāyānist Nirvāṇa, Stcherbatsky says, is eternal life.¹ Though many Mahāyānists will have objection to the word "eternal" as Buddha was not a *śāśvata-vādin*, some describe it by the word *dhruva*,² which means stable and so eternal. The later Yogācāra conception is one of life and not of the stillness of death. True, the Vijñānavādins too apply the word *śūnya* to Nirvāṇa. But *śūnya* appears in their works as an adjective rather than a substantive. The Nirvāṇa of the *Sukhāvativyūha* and the *Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtras* is a popular conception with beautiful gardens, rivers, precious stones, etc.; but these works belong to the Mahāyāna, and it is difficult to prove that the Hinayāna or even Buddha preached such a doctrine. Mrs. Rhys Davids tells us that the path to Nirvāṇa, according to Buddha, is a way to the "more," the more of life and being, and not to annihilation. We have seen that even the Mādhyamikas protest against being identified with the *ucchedavādins* or nihilists. It is only a few like Bhāvaviveka that understood the Śūnya as mere negation; but the majority of the followers of Nāgārjuna dissociate themselves from those who hold that view.

XVII

METAPHYSICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DHARMA OR LAW IN BUDDHISM

Anyway, the majority of the modern scholars are of the opinion that Nirvāṇa, even according to Buddha, does not mean annihilation or negation merely, but is some reality which is to be realized. Nirvāṇa etymologically means absence of every movement and so perfect peace. This is the Dharmakāya of Buddha and the law of the universe. The word *dharma* has a peculiar meaning and is full of significance. Max Müller writes: "Dharma, in the ordinary Buddhist phraseology, may be correctly rendered by law. Thus the whole teaching of Buddha is called the Good Law, Saddharma. But in our own treatise³ *dharma* is generally used in a different sense. It means form (*eidos*), and likewise what is possessed of form, what is therefore different from other things, what is indi-

¹ *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 158.

² *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 44.

³ *Vajrachchedikā*, p. xiv. (S.B.E., Vol. XLIX.)

vidual, in fact, what we mean by a thing or an object." That is, the Buddhists have already noticed the identity (*tādātmya*) of the thing and its form, the so-called particular and the universal. Max Müller continues: "This meaning has escaped most of the translators, both Eastern and Western, but if we were always to translate *dharma* by law, it seems to me that the whole drift of the treatise would become unintelligible." Stcherbatsky tells us that the word *dharma* means elements.¹ But then what is *Dharma-dhātu*? Sogen writes: "Of the Sanskrit word *Dharma*, as used in Buddhist philosophy, we might say the same thing which has been said of its Latin equivalent 'res,' viz. that it is a blank cheque which has to be filled in in accordance with the exigencies of the context. '*Dharma*' means, in Buddhist Sanskrit, *law, rule, faith, religion, world, phenomena, thing, state, etc.*"² Mrs. Rhys Davids writes: "Again, *dhmma* is often translated, especially by men of Buddhist countries, by 'law.' If by this is meant that inward monition which St. Paul called the 'law' (*nomos*), where-with he fought his lower nature, the rendering is not amiss. But there is a tendency to read into it the newer idea of natural uniformity (popularly called the laws of science)."³ In another place, she writes: "And if *dhmma* or *dharma* be a term vital in a great religion, it will have this urge of the forward in it, not of the standing still, the maintaining. It is the force of the Ought in this word that we must get in translating. We have it in 'duty,' we have it in 'conscience'. Yet since neither term coincides with the 'oughtness' in *dhmma*, it is better not to render *dhmma* by the partly less, partly other of either of these terms. Moreover, the word *dhmma* has in the history of Buddhism its history. When Gotama, the founder of the Śākya-son's mission started to teach, the word *dharma* was there, though as yet little used. Deliberately, we are told, and told with utmost emphasis, he chose it to mean that immanent God-head of his day: the Thou art That of the Upaniṣads, Whom alone he held meet that he should worship."⁴ Evidently Mrs. Rhys Davids understands by the term the ideal reality that one ought to realize, and is opposed to understanding it as law in the sense of a 'description of the behaviour of things. That is, she would understand by it something like the moral law but not the natural law.

¹ *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 3 and 5.

² *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, pp. 113-14.

³ *Śākya or Buddhist Origins*, p. 169. ⁴ *Gradual Sayings*, Vol. I, p. viii.

Oldenberg writes: "Things or substances, in the sense of a something existing by itself, as we are accustomed to understand by these words, cannot . . . be at all thought of by Buddhism. As the most general expression for those things, the mutual relation of which the formula of causality¹ explains, the being of which, one might almost say, is their standing in that mutual relation, the language of the Buddhists has two terms: Dhamma and Saṅkhāra: one may give an approximate rendering of them by 'order' and 'formation.' Both designations are really synonyms: both include the idea that, not so much something ordered, a something formed, as rather a self-ordering, constitutes the subject-matter of the world."² Oldenberg's insight has discovered two important aspects of this idea, namely, that what *dharma* means is almost the same as *samskāra*, and that things are not ordered according to a law which is distinct from them, but that the two are identical (*tādātmya*) and so the ordering is really a self-ordering. It is like the universal producing the particulars that conform to it, so that there is really no distinction between the particular and the universal. The *samskāras* or the *vāsanās* or the elements of identity continue from one momentary existence to another of things, so that they become really descriptive of their nature and hence their laws in the sense of even natural laws. But as there is no real difference between the universal and the particular, the law and the thing, both are called *dharma*s by the Buddhists.

Dr. E. J. Thomas writes: "All Indian religions are dominated by a single conception, which goes back to pre-Indian times. In both Vedic and Old Persian it is expressed by the same word meaning 'law.' It is the view that all things follow or ought to follow a certain course prescribed for them. This course is based upon the actual nature and constitution of the existing world, through which the sun rises duly, the seasons return, and each individual part performs its own function. . . . From the later Vedic period we find this conception expressed as *dharma* covering every form of human action."³ That is, for Dr. E. J. Thomas, *dharma* is both a natural law and an Ought. It is a word which connotes both a norm and a description.

¹ That is, *prattiyasamūtpāda*.

² *Buddha*, p. 250. (The word *vāsana* also has the same meaning. Both *samskāras* and *vāsanās* are patterns of thought and actions. Functionally, they are the same, though the latter is more stable and lasting. In the Andhra Province previous birth's habit patterns are called, even in the current language, by both names.)

³ *The Life of Buddha*, p. 173.

This difficulty in understanding *dharma* is to be found not only in Buddhism but also in Hindu orthodox philosophy. *Dharma* means a law of nature; but it also means a social law, the *varṇāśramadharmā* or the rule of caste and *āśrama*; the moral or the Ought, e.g. the *dharma* of *ahimsa* or non-violence; good acts like charity, etc.; the nature of things like *manodharma* or the nature of mind and *vastudharma* or the nature of things. Bhimacharya Jaalakikar in his *Nyāyakośa* gives three main meanings of the word. It means the *adheyapadārtha*, anything that exists on something else and characterizes it. It need not be merely a quality like colour but a substantial thing as well. Secondly, it means a quality or property. It may be that by virtue of which man obtains prosperity or liberation; or a special cause of happiness, an unseen entity (*adr̥ṣṭa*) gained by the performance of one's duties; or meritorious acts like charity. Thirdly, it means that which prompts one to action. This is the view of the Mimāṃsakas. Of them, again, Kumārila thinks that *dharma* is sacrifice, etc. (*yāgādi*); and Prabhākara that it is merit called *apūrva*. The last is a peculiar quality which the agent gets by the performance of sacrifices, or a state into which the sacrifice enters before fructification. The first corresponds to the purely descriptive law, because the descriptive law is the description of some characteristics, qualities or properties. The third corresponds to the Ought; it is a law which is a religious or moral injunction. The second seems to combine the features of the first and the third, because it means some property acquired by obeying the Ought.

Is there nothing common to all these meanings? Why have the Hindus and the Buddhists alike used the word *dharma* in so many different senses? How could the disciples of Buddha understand him, if the word bore so many different senses?

We find similar phenomena even in Western thought. Does matter mean the same thing in the history of European thought? Do all the Western psychologists mean the same by the word mind? Or to take a more important idea, the idea of the real. By this word certainly all the Western philosophers do not mean the same thing. Nay, it does not mean the same thing even in the same philosophical system, for instance, of Bradley. Dewey finds not less than half a dozen meanings of the word in Bradley's philosophy. It may be true that the connotation changes as the philosophical system develops. But as the connotation changes, it must be admitted, the denotation also changes. For deeper

insight reveals that the thing is not what it appears to us. We are not here finding a new defence for the theory that connotation and denotation change in inverse ratio. It means that what we once thought our word denoted is no longer denoted by it, but something else. For instance, the word matter denoted at first something hard and visible; but now it denotes an invisible stuff in physics. If the first thing still continues to be seen by us, the name we at first gave it continues to be used for it also. Ambiguity arises, but is unavoidable. This is the case with many philosophical terms.

The objection to translating the word *dharma* by law, raised by Max Müller and Rhys Davids, will lose its point when it is shown that there can be no difference for the Hindu and the Buddhist between the descriptive law and the Ought. Max Müller wants to use the word "form" or "idea" in the Platonic sense. But for Plato, though the idea is an ideal, it is also the universal that is common to all particulars and is therefore their law. But we have to note that the Buddhist denies the reality of the universal (*jāti*), which Max Müller too knows.¹ When we see a dog, for instance, the perception is not of the form, "That is a dog," in which the dog appears as the universal or predicate (*prakāra*): what is seen is the concrete individual dog. The distinction between the subject and the predicate is our *kalpanā* or creation, and the universal dog is therefore unreal and imaginary (*kalpita*). So as form separated from matter is false and is no object, the Buddhist seems to have called both form and matter taken both together and separately by the name *dharma*. Our interpretation is supported by Oldenberg's perception of the connection between the ideas of *dharma* and *samskāra* and of the identity of order and the ordered.

Dharma literally means that which holds the object. We may represent the Buddhist as maintaining that the Dharmakāya holds the universe by being its Ought. It is that towards which the whole universe should move. Yet it is not a mere ideal; it is its true nature. That is, it is its law even in the descriptive sense of the word, for it is the *svabhāva* or real nature of phenomena. Nay, we may say that it is the highest universal or *sāmānya*, not in the Platonic sense of a form apart from matter or even distinct from matter, but as the truth of every form and matter. We find in the idea of the Dharmakāya the equation of the universal to the law and that again to the Ought. This is the distinctive

¹ *Vajracchedikā*, p. xv.

feature of Indian thought, not to be found so definitely enunciated in Western philosophy. But as we have pointed out in the second chapter, we can trace a line of thought even in Western idealism tending towards this idea. And unless this identification is made, the much-longed-for reconciliation between the sciences of life and those of nature cannot be accomplished. In fact, Plato's philosophy offered an instance of such identification, for his ideas are really ideals. But later the positivistic conception of science and its laws destroyed it, and introduced chaos into philosophical speculation. Philosophy, having lost connection with life, has become intellectual gymnastics; and we hear of constructions based upon this or that idea.

As law can mean both the universal and the Ought, the word *dhamma* is used, in Buddhism, to denote classes of events as well as the Ought. *Dharma* stands for entity; for instance, the Buddhists speak of *samskṛtadharmas* and *asamskṛtadharmas*, that is, the composite and non-composite things, so that *ākāśa* and *Nirvāṇa*, which are non-composite, are also *dharma*s, though they are called *dhātus* as well. Every entity that is determinate or indeterminate, with or without a form, is a *dharma*. But of these, the highest *dharma* is the Dharmakāya. Because of the peculiar identification of the true "is" and the Ought in Buddhist philosophy, we find the usage strange.

That the Buddhists, particularly Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu, call the highest reality Dharmadhātu is also significant. The highest reality not only seems to be the highest *dharma* but also the highest *dhātu* (element). Stcherbatsky writes: "Buddhist philosophy is an analysis of separate elements, or forces, which unite in the production of one stream (*santāna*) of events. The unphilosophic mind of common people supposes this stream to represent a personality or an individual (*puṅgava*). Viewed as components of such a stream, the elements are called *dhātus*. Just as different metals (*dhātus*) might be extracted out of a mine, just so does the stream of an individual life reveal elements of eighteen different kinds (*dhātu* = *gotra*)."¹ Then why is the Dharmakāya called Dharmadhātu? Is it because it is the highest element extracted from the phenomenal world? Or is it because it is the highest element out of which the lower elements come? If *dhātus* at first meant, for Buddhism, the component parts of the series of the stream of consciousness and so the material or stuff, then in the

¹ *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 9.

conception of Dharmadhātu we find the ideas of matter and form meeting. The highest reality in Buddhism, then, is not only the law of the world but also the material cause. Visubandhu explicitly says that the pure Vijñāna has to be postulated as the material cause of *samvṛti* or the empirical world. As Mrs. Rhys Davids says, *dharma* (we may add *dhātu* too) must have had its history in Buddhism. And though both ideas might have been used at first to denote something empirical, probably form and matter, formal and material causes, attribute and substance; it must have been discovered, as philosophical enquiry progressed, that the two ultimately mean the same thing. And as the Mahāyāna after the *Prajñāpāramitās* describes the ultimate reality as inexpressible, beyond thought and so forth, the real nature of *dharma* too is said to be beyond thought. While speaking of the final connotation of *dharma*, Stcherbatsky concludes: "But, although the conception of an element of existence has given rise to an imposing superstructure in the shape of a consistent system of philosophy, its inmost nature remains a riddle. What is dharma? It is inconceivable! No one will ever be able to tell what its real nature (*dharmasvabhāva*) is! It is transcendental!"¹ The central conception of Buddhism is *dharma*. But it is inexpressible, inconceivable, transcendental. This conception belongs even to *Abhidharmakośa*.

We have said, while discussing the views of *Abhidharmakośa*, that the word *dharma* may be translated by the word category. This translation does not conflict with translating *dharma* at other times by the word law. Students of European philosophy know that, in Hegel's philosophy, the lowest category develops into the highest, namely, the Absolute. Similarly, the conception of *dharma* as a finite entity may end in the conception of it as inexpressible.

A word may be said here also about the translation of philosophical texts from one language into another. As it has been pointed out in a previous chapter, the philosophical standpoint in every country and in every system need not be the same. And so we may not find in one language words corresponding exactly to the philosophical terms in another. The general tendency of the translator is to press the system translated into the terminology of some system with which he is familiar. And whatever does not fit in he calls inconsistent and unphilosophical. But it should

¹ *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 75.

be recognized that philosophy is also a growth or development from a particular standpoint and starting-point, and the concepts change in connotation as the system develops. Especially, concepts like reality, law, matter, mind, etc., do not mean the same in every philosophy; and even in the same philosophy they do not mean the same in the beginning and in the end. Because of the changed nature of the meaning of matter, materialism is becoming innocuous. Mind in many Western idealisms means both the finite mind and the supreme reality; and if it were to be translated into an Indian language, the translator would find a similar difficulty to that which the Western translator finds with *dharma*. This means that no translation can be literal, in the sense that it contains no interpretation. There can be no exposition without some comparison at least tacit. Concepts and words in one language generally have associations different from those in another. And unless the translator is also a philosopher, he can hardly render the full significance of the system translated. To attempt a merely literal translation is often to confuse the reader who may be new to the ideas and the text; and he may leave the book as an irrational and primitive attempt to understand the world.

The question why everything is a *dharma* does not seem to be much discussed. And only the Chinese and Japanese scholars who have chances of better acquaintance with the Buddhistic literature can elucidate the point. In the works I have read I have not been able to find a clear and elaborate discussion that can satisfy a student of philosophy. And what has been said here is my understanding in the light of the whole of the Indian idealistic thought. And Dr. Thomas's understanding agrees with the general trend of Indian philosophy. The differentiation by Max Müller and Mrs. Rhys Davids can hold, only if natural law cannot mean the Ought also. That there is connection between the two ideas we have shown in the previous chapters. We pointed out that the law or universal is a norm. Even ordinary perception is normative. To say "That is a horse" means the interpretation of the object in terms of the ideal horse. This view of perception is certainly Platonic; and for Plato, the ideas, though universals, are norms. There is nothing strange or unphilosophical in our interpretation.

One may wonder how pure indeterminacy like the Dharmakāya can be the highest law. But let us consider the idea of the uniformity of nature. This certainly is the idea of empiricism and

positivism. It was regarded as the presupposition of all the general propositions in logic for a long time. But later, it was found that nature was not uniform but a unity, and the presupposition of all general propositions was not the uniformity of nature but its unity. Uniformity means that everywhere nature is the same; but it has been pointed out that no two events in nature are alike in every respect. So the principle of the unity of nature was substituted for its uniformity. But this substitution means a transition from positivism to metaphysics. For what is this unity? It is the totality of real things, each implying the other; so that nature stands, in logic, as a single system. Without the assumption of such a unified system of reality, logic, it has been felt, cannot stand. No inference can be true, if such a reality does not exist. Or let that system exist or not, its truth has to be presupposed, if logic is to be valid. But we cannot stop at this point. For what is this system? It is nothing but the so-called objective or common world. The objective world is the common world, it is not merely the private world of the subject. Naturally, man has to start with objects as he perceives them. Because of our differences of standpoints and mental constitutions, the objects as perceived by the individuals are not precisely the same. That is, the percepts of all the individuals are not exactly identical. The particulars have to be universalized and constructed through interconnection into a system, which becomes the reality. Though the percepts are different for each individual, the universals are the same for all. Thus what we call a common world is a system of universals or universal judgments. The conclusion so far is strange enough, and is unexpected by the ordinary man; because the common world, for him, is not composed of universals or universal judgments, but is an aggregate of particular things. But this view is Bosanquet's and, we may say, on the whole representative of Hegelian idealism. That is, if the common world is the meeting-point of the experiences of all minds, then that meeting-point is really a system of universal judgments. This again means that the so-called common world is a system of laws, because every universal judgment is a law. That is, it is the law that is the real object. It is what is really objective, and the so-called particulars are more or less subjective or at least private. This is an astounding conclusion. If Bosanquet were a Buddhist, he would have said that the Dharmakāya is the only true objective reality and that it is a system of universals or universal judg-

ments. It is significant that the *Laṅkāvatāra*¹ compares the Dharmadhātu to the roads in a city, which must mutually form an interconnected system. But what we call the common world, the factor of objectivity in our experience, is the reality. What is subjective or private we are prone to treat as unreal like the objects of imagination, which are also private. But now that the common world is identified with reality, it becomes the source of the world as we see it, the Dharmakāya becomes the Tathāgata-garbha. In this discussion we find that what we call the common things or the common world turns out to be the law of the universe, and on further examination becomes the source of the universe. No wonder that the Buddhists used *dharma* to denote the things of the universe, the law of the universe, and the source of the universe.

The Dharmadhātu or the highest *dharma* of Buddhism is certainly not a system. And the comparison by the *Laṅkāvatāra* of reality to a system of roads has reference only to the lower aspect of the Ālaya. This aspect is relative to the world of plurality, and therefore it appears to be a system. The higher is simple Tathatā, though it is the source of everything; or, as Vasubandhu says, as the material cause of the world of things, it is the stuff of which things are made. It is what is fully common to all minds. Some of the *samskāras* (impressions, instincts), so far as they are not the idiosyncrasies of the individuals, are also common. And the lower Ālaya with such *samskāras* is therefore common to all. But such an Ālaya as is tainted by *samskāras* cannot be the ultimate truth. To contain *samskāras* is to contain determinations. And these determinations even in their potential state have reference only to the phenomenal world. Without reference to the phenomenal world, the *samskāras* have neither significance nor existence. And as distinctions are therefore unreal, the ultimate reality cannot be a system. True existence is inexpressible; it is beyond all determinations. As it is the *svabhāva* or own nature of everything, it is the law of all. That is how the Buddhists would conclude that the highest law of the universe would be indeterminate. In the larger *Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya Sūtra*, we read: "Emptiness is not different from form, form is not different from emptiness. What is form that is emptiness, what is emptiness that is form. Thus perception, name, conception, and knowledge also are emptiness."² That is, the final nature of everything is the

¹ P. 124. ² English translation by Takakusu, p. 148. (S.B.E., Vol. XLIX.)

Śūnya. According to the Vijñānavādins, it is pure Vijñāna. But for all, though it is the stuff of the universe, the ideal of the universe, the source of the universe, and the law of the universe, it is incomprehensible. *Dharma* is beyond thought, though it is all these. Nay, it is also the objects we perceive. For is not Nirvāṇa identical with the world?

Thus if the final unity of nature is the law of all laws, this unity, which is really the common world, which again boils down into a system of universal judgments, appears, on deeper examinations, to be the indeterminate Dharma as understood by the Buddhists. It is incomprehensible, but it is real. The nature of thought is such that it advances logically from uniformity to unity, and turns it into something beyond all determinations.

VII

CONTEMPORARY IDEALISM

I

MAHATMA GANDHI

Though Mahatma Gandhi is not an academical philosopher, one can best understand Indian idealism by studying his life and work. Though he does not give us a system of philosophy in writing, yet his life itself is a system of philosophy. In him does the statement that Indian Philosophy is a way of life and not merely a way of thought find a worthy illustration. For him philosophy is a way of life first and a way of thought next. His life systematized its plan of work and expressed it in practice, not exactly in theory. Philosophy as life reflected on itself is life that has become self-conscious, and his self-consciousness expresses itself now and then as a theory of his practice. Mahatma Gandhi did not start either as a poet or as a philosopher. Like Buddha he was urged on to experiment with truth by the evil present in the world, the inequalities and injustices meted out by man to man. Certainly he did not start his life without a philosophical background; and that background is Hindu Philosophy. But Hindu Philosophy is so vague and comprehensive a term that it may mean anything or nothing. It may mean some sectarian religion without any philosophy worthy of the name or it may mean a most thoroughly developed system. A number of philosophical ideas that are found in many Indian systems including Jainism and Buddhism are the common property of almost every Indian and are woven into the web of his thought and action. But the mere possession of these ideas does not make a philosopher. Mahatma Gandhi must have started with the same stock and gathered other ideas from Tolstoy, Ruskin, etc. But what makes his writings particularly interesting is not this philosophical background, but the fact that he rediscovered his philosophical ideas by the sheer necessity of his life demanding a plan of action with a theoretical justification. These ideas, like the idea of truth, are therefore not dead concepts for him but living forces

on the train to
Maganwadi
Wardha (C. P.)

25 11 39
Dear to Raju,
I have read your essay -
hurriedly of course. I think it
is a fair presentation of
my views. I do not use it for
Haripur. It will be little use.

verbalising myself. As it
is I sufficiently so that
work myself. modestly
forbids further extensions
return the essay.
yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi

that guide and demand obedience. Professor Radhakrishnan rediscovered our philosophical concepts and infused life and vigour into their petrified forms by approaching them from the living philosophers of the West and comparing them with the concepts of the latter. Mahatma Gandhi infused life into some of them by coming across them in the very course of his life, which is a struggle for the discovery of truth. The results of his struggle, the conclusions of his life, are not the results of an "ideal experiment" as Bradley would call it, in which theory is compared to theory, and concept with concept, but the results of actual experiment on his own life. As he is not an academical philosopher, he may not have given the full implications of his discoveries. But these implications can be developed, and his philosophy can be presented in a systematic form. It is beyond our present purpose to deal at length with his ethical and political ideas. We are mainly concerned with his conception of reality, that is, only with the metaphysical side of his teaching. Books have been written by eminent men praising his principles of *ahimsā* or non-violence and love, admiring him for preaching it, and comparing him to Christ and Buddha. Critics too of this principle are not wanting. Simply to follow either of them in praising or condemning the principle would only be the expressing of our own prejudices. If we are to understand the metaphysical basis of Mahatma Gandhi's own ideas, we must go deeper into his mind, and bring out his guiding ideas in a coherent form. Then only can we fix his philosophical position, and understand the real significance of *ahimsā* and why he lays so much emphasis upon it.

The real clue to his conception of reality is found in the pregnant word, *Satyāgraha*, which is generally translated by Truth-force. He writes: "Satyāgraha is literally holding on to Truth, and it means, therefore, Truth-force. Truth is soul or spirit. It is, therefore, known as soul-force. It excludes the use of violence because man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and, therefore, not competent to punish. The word was coined in South Africa to distinguish the non-violent resistance of the Indians of South Africa from the contemporary 'passive resistance' of the suffragettes and others. It is not conceived as a weapon of the weak."¹ In this passage there are two important points to note. First, Truth is soul or spirit. That is, the truth of the world is that it is spirit and not matter. Secondly, *Satyāgraha*

¹ *Young India*, Vol. I, p. 222. (Edited by Babu Rajendra Prasad.)

means some force only indirectly. *Satya*, means truth and *āgraha* means sticking on, holding on, or persistence. So directly, the word means persistence in truth; and because this persistence is thought to have a peculiar power, *Satyāgraha* is said to be Truth-force or the force of Truth. It is our duty to persist in Truth and not to yield to untruth; and it is the nature of Truth to assert and establish itself wherever untruth prevails. Truth is existence or being, and untruth is only apparent existence or being. However hard the latter tries to overcome the former, as existence is always existence and never non-existence, Truth must ultimately succeed. This is the significance of the saying, *dharma jayati*, or Truth always prevails. It is in the nature of things that truth must ultimately prevail, only because true existence is the final controlling factor both of our thought and action, however far they deviate from it. But unfortunately, the word *dharma* is interpreted as religion, rules of caste system, and so forth, and the philosophical significance of the saying is missed.

But how truth is to overcome untruth, whether by terminating it by destruction or by transforming and absorbing it, we have no right to decide. That is why Mahatma Gandhi says that for us violence is excluded, because man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth. Of course, he means absolute truth in detail. All knowledge of truth is not precluded, as otherwise we cannot persist in truth.

The passage preaches self-expression without aggression. But self-expression does not mean asserting oneself any way one likes. The true self is not the finite individual with his lust, whims, and passions. It is the Spirit, and there is only one Spirit in the universe. Mahatma Gandhi writes: "I do dimly perceive that whilst everything around me is ever-changing, ever-dying, there is underlying all that change a Living Power that is changeless, that holds all together, that creates, dissolves and recreates. That informing Power or Spirit is God; and since nothing else that I see merely through the senses can or will persist, He alone is."¹ All else is "illusion—*Māyā*. We are not, He alone is."² So our finite self with all its imperfections and weaknesses is false. And it is not the false self that is to express itself, but the true self. The expression or assertion of the false self is aggression, and the expression of the true self is *Satyāgraha*. Does this imply inactivity or

¹ Quoted from C. F. Andrews: *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, p. 43.

² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

passivity on our part? If it does, it would mean surrendering ourselves to untruth. The need for *Satyāgraha* arises when untruth becomes aggressive; and to remain passive is to allow ourselves to be conquered by it. But then, how are we to assert ourselves? Only as participating in Truth. Our duty is not to oppose ourselves, as finite, to untruth, but to know Truth and, so far as we know it, to assert it. To assert it is to assert our true Self. In spite of our being identical with Truth in essence, we, as finite, are not identical with it, and therefore we have no right to aim at the destruction of our opponents.

Mahatma Gandhi further tells us that Truth is not only God, but is also Love. For this reason, *Satyāgraha* is the force of love and not of hatred. God loves and does not hate; but we both love and hate. Hatred leads us away from truth. Hence we should not hate our opponents and destroy them by violence. Because God is Love, the fact that God destroys must mean, according to Mahatma Gandhi, that He destroys in Love, and not in hate. Mahatma Gandhi tells us that destruction or violence is the prerogative of God. But this destruction is not annihilation. No Hindu believes in the annihilation of even the finite self. Even in the extreme forms of monism like the Advaita, according to which the *jīva* becomes merged in the Infinite and becomes one with it in the state of liberation, the finite self, so long as it is finite, is never annihilated, but continues to take one birth after another according to its merit and demerit. Hence what we call destruction, punishment, etc., meted out to the *jīva* by God, when the former takes a particular line of action, is only thwarting and checking him in the hope that the *jīva* thus thwarted may reflect and realize his mistake. But still God allows the *jīva* the freedom between good and evil. Hence the conflict, and the need of *Satyāgraha*. For the *jīva* sometimes chooses evil, which means the assertion of his own particular self against Truth or the Universal Self. This assertion violates the universal order of things established by God. Conflict is consequently inevitable. And in this conflict we are not to assert our finite self, which again is false and will introduce a new conflict in place of, if not in addition to, the old one, but must hold on to truth and assert our true self, which is God Himself.

But does God exist? Mahatma Gandhi tells us that he has "no argument to convince through reason. Faith transcends reason."¹

¹ *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, p. 45.

But is this faith blind faith, which is the same as superstition? He writes: "That which is beyond reason is surely not unreasonable. Unreasonable belief is blind faith and is open to superstition. To ask anybody to believe without proof would be unreasonable as, for instance, asking an intelligent person to believe without the proof that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles." "True faith is appropriation of the reasoned experience of people whom we believe to have lived a life purified by prayer and penance. Belief, therefore, in prophets or incarnations who had lived in remote ages is not an idle superstition but a satisfaction of an innermost spiritual want. The formula, therefore, I have humbly suggested for guidance is rejection of every demand for faith where a matter is capable of present proof and unquestioned acceptance on faith of that which is itself incapable of proof except through personal experience."† The existence of God can be felt only through personal experience, and the experience can be had only after our mind is purified by prayer and penance. The point of philosophical importance which this passage contains is that belief in God is "the satisfaction of an innermost spiritual want." Mahatma Gandhi did not say in this passage "intellectual want." But now probably he will write so also. For in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* he says: "Of late, instead of saying God is Truth I have been saying Truth is God, in order more fully to define my religion. I used, at one time, to know by heart the thousand names of God which a booklet in Hinduism gives in verse form and which perhaps tens of thousands recite every morning. But nowadays nothing so completely describes my God as Truth. Denial of God we have known. Denial of Truth we have not known." God is generally felt to be necessary for religion; but truth is always felt to be necessary for reason or intellect. Logic cannot deny that there is truth, but it may deny God. Thus truth satisfies an intellectual want. That is, it is the presupposition of our reasoning itself. Reason cannot stand without the admission that there is truth. It may be difficult to prove the existence of God as God, that is, as an omnipresent, omnipotent, benevolent person, who creates, controls, and destroys the universe. But it is not difficult to prove the existence of God as Truth. For one who argues that there is no truth destroys the very basis of his argument, as no argument is convincing or need be taken seriously which does not claim to be true.

† *Young India*, Vol. III, p. 143. (Edited by Babu Rajendra Prasad.)

No student of logic can fail to understand the significance of the change from "God is Truth" to "Truth is God." No sane and sober man makes a judgment about a subject which is recognized to be unreal. A judgment about an unreal object is neither true nor false, and would have no more value than the prattle of a child. It can have no significance for logic, the subject-matter of which is the determination of truth and falsity. Hence every significant judgment presupposes an existent subject, and the judgment is about that subject. In the judgment "God is Truth," the existence of God is presupposed. But this existence may be questioned, when the predicate, Truth, would have to be referred to a non-existent subject, and the judgment would be without logical significance. But none questions that there is truth in the universe. When it is said that God is the same as that Truth, the judgment becomes significant, and practically amounts to the proof of God.

This proof is the old ontological argument in a new form. There is no doubt about Mahatma Gandhi's being an absolutist and a monist. For him, God is the only Truth, He alone exists. Everything else is *Māyā*. "We are all sparks of Truth. The sum-total of the sparks is indescribable, as-yet-unknown Truth, which is God."¹ The ontological argument in its old form runs: I have an idea of an all-perfect Being. If this Being lacks in existence, He cannot be perfect. Therefore He exists. The fallacy of this argument was exposed by many, especially by Kant, who pointed out that to have the idea of a perfect Being is not the same thing as the existence of that Being. Only when the idea is identical with existence can we infer God's existence from the idea we have of Him. The idealist philosophers who came after Kant maintained that the ontological argument as understood by Kant was misunderstood. It is true that to have the idea of a hundred coins in my pocket is not the same as to have them in it. But the Truth that is implied by our reasoning process must be existent. But do we see its existence, just as we see the existence of the paper and pen before me? Certainly not. Yet if we are to argue about anything we have to admit the existence of truth. Just as one who comes and talks to us cannot say that he does not exist, so one who reasons at all cannot say that truth does not exist. It is the regulative principle of our thinking. But what else is this regulative principle than existence itself? The difference between think-

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy.*

ing and imagination is that the former is based on being and is about being, while the latter is free from being. The object of imagination need not be; but the object of thought must be. That is why imagination works without reference to existence, while thought is grounded on existence. But what is always presupposed by thought cannot be made an object of thought. Hence this principle of Truth, though not actually perceived, cannot be denied existence. Here idea involves existence.

This Truth, Mahatma Gandhi declares, is the Law of the universe. He writes: "There is an unalterable Law governing everything that exists or lives. It is not a blind law; for no blind law can govern the conduct of living beings." "That Law, then, which governs all life is God. Law and law-giver are one."¹ This is really the central conception of all Indian idealism. For the Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Śūnya, Tathatā, etc., are the Truth; they are the same as the *Buddhakāya*, that is, the *Dharmakāya* or the body of the Law. It is this law that supports the whole universe; it is the essence of all things, their true nature. Every phenomenal thing moves towards the realization of its true nature. So all things are held together by this Law. It is really the centre of the universe. Just as the centre imparts unity to all points in the circumference, the Law imparts unity to the manifold of the universe. This conception is found in the Vedānta also. The Brahman as the final Truth is the *ādhara* or support of every appearance. It is the highest Law, universal or *sāmānya*. We can find this idea even in Rāmānuja's system. The Brahman as the soul is really the principle of unity of the parts of His body, which is constituted by the *jīvas* and the material world. Without that principle the body will decompose and its parts will fall apart. The same principle is the Law or *Dharma* from the standpoint of ethics and science, Truth or Existence from that of logic and epistemology, and God from that of religion.

This conception of reality is the answer to the question: Is *Satyāgraha* true to facts? For every moral injunction the question can be put: Is it according to reality? In non-philosophical language we ask: Is it according to nature? For it is felt that no moral law is binding upon us, if it is not based on the nature of things. For instance, it is not morally binding upon man to fly with his hands. It is not morally binding upon a eunuch to be a father. To this question Mahatma Gandhi comes out with an

¹ C. F. Andrews: *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, p. 43.

affirmative answer. For his idea of reality accords with his idea of *Satyāgraha*, Fichte long ago developed his system of philosophy in order to meet the demand that reality should be such as to meet the demands of the moral will. If the moral law is opposed to the natural law, the former cannot be binding on us. Hence the two spheres of morality and nature must ultimately agree with each other. Mahatma Gandhi can say that his *Satyāgraha* is true to reality, because it exhorts us to hold on to Truth and this Truth is the Law of the world, its essential nature. It is the only existence. Everybody who does not hold on to Truth is thereby heading towards non-existence. The nature of this Truth, Mahatma Gandhi says, is Love. Hence, if we are to realize the Truth, we should weed away hatred from our hearts. But this weeding away of hatred does not involve passivity, for mere passivity would be yielding to untruth and allowing it to triumph. Hence we have to assert Truth, which is Love, in face of untruth. Provided we are sincere, Mahatma Gandhi has no doubts about the result.

II

AUROBINDO GHOSE

Of all India's famous philosophers, Śrī Aurobindo Ghose is the only one who is known both as a yogi and as a philosopher. He first came into prominence as a politician during the time of the partition of Bengal, but later left politics and became a yogi. For many years he has been spending his time in seclusion,¹ which is now so complete that he gives interviews even to his disciples only once in a year, the only person who has the privilege of meeting him often being a French woman called the Mother of the Asram or monastery in which Śrī Aurobindo and his disciples are staying at Pondicherry. He is much respected in India and is regarded as one of her greatest sons.

Śrī Aurobindo does not give us a system of thought in the Western sense of the term, but it is not difficult for us to find in his ideas a system. Recently his ideas and articles have been brought together in the form of a book with the title, *Life Divine*. He writes: "I am a Tāntric. I regard the world as born of Ānanda (bliss) and living by Ānanda, wheeling from Ānanda to Ānanda. Ānanda and Śakti, these are the two real terms of existence."² A *tāntric* is generally a follower of the Śākta philosophy and is a

¹ Śrī Aurobindo is no longer alive. This section was written when he was alive.

² *Yogic Sādhana*, p. 83.

worshipper of Śakti, the feminine and energy aspect of the Absolute as Śiva; and Śiva, we have seen in a previous chapter, is regarded as Ānanda or bliss. Śrī Aurobindo is known as a great Śākta worshipper, and in his thought the influence of the Śaiva and the Śākta systems is very pronounced, though he is a student of the *Bhagavadgīta*, etc., as well. But it may be noted here that the *Gīta* is quoted from by all schools, and it is no wonder that Śrī Aurobindo too studies it. The aim of his yoga is to bring down the power of the Absolute in order to harness it to the service of man and establish the kingdom of God on earth. If our philosophy admits the possibility of the jīva becoming one with the Absolute, then he must be able to use the Śakti or the power of the Absolute. We are not here concerned with the actual practices prescribed or the religious side of Śrī Aurobindo's teaching but only with his metaphysics.

Śrī Aurobindo, like a true Śaiva or Śākta Advaitin, does not believe in Māyā as understood by Śaṅkara, but only as understood by the Śaiva or the Śākta Advaita. He writes: "Māyā is one realization, an important one which Śaṅkara overstressed, because it was most vivid to his own experience. For yourselves leave the word for subordinate use and fix rather on the idea of *Līla*,¹ a deeper and more penetrating word than Māyā. *Līla* includes the idea of Māyā and exceeds it; nor has it that association of the vanity of all things useless to you who had elected to remain and play with Śrīkrṣṇa in Madhura and Bṛndavan."² "All that is the play of His *caitanya*³ in His infinite being, His manifestations, and therefore all are real. Māyā means nothing more than the freedom of Brahman from the circumstances through which He expresses Himself. He is in no way limited by that which we see or think about Him. That is the Māyā from which we must escape, the Māyā of ignorance which takes things as separately existent and not God, no *caitanya*, the illimitable for the really limited, the free for the bounded."⁴ What Śrī Aurobindo wants us to know is that what we call insentient matter is really conscious. "Matter itself, you will one day realize, is not material, it is not substance but a form of consciousness, *guṇa*, the result of the quality of being perceived by sense-knowledge."⁵ "Matter, life, mind, and what is beyond mind, it is all Śrīkrṣṇa, the *Ananta-guṇa*⁶ Brahman playing in the world as the *Saccidānanda*." The

¹ Play.

² *The Yoga and Its Objects*, pp. 55-6.

³ Consciousness.

⁴ *The Yoga and its Object*, p. 57.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁶ With infinite qualities.

world is the effect of the Śakti of the Brahman or Śiva. And as the Śakti is identical with Śiva, the world is conscious like Śiva. We are here reminded of the *jñānaśakti* of Śiva in the Śaiva Advaita. The world, though Māyā, is ultimately a product of this conscious energy. Hence everything is essentially conscious. The material or physical nature is Māyā objectified, and so its conscious nature is screened from us. "The Spirit manifest as intelligence is the basis of the world. Spirit as existence, Sat, is one; as Intelligence it multiplies itself without ceasing to be one."¹

The Brahman is one without a second. Yet the world is not unreal. "The Upaniṣads do not deny the reality of the world, but they identify it with Brahman who transcends it. He is One without a second; He is the All. If all is Brahman, then there can be nothing but Brahman, and therefore the existence of All, *ṣarvam idam*, does not contradict the unity of Brahman, does not establish the reality of *bheda*, difference." "One particular self-expression may disappear into its source and continent, but does not and cannot abolish the phenomenal universe. The One is for ever, and the Many are for ever because the One is for ever. So long as there is a sea, there will be waves."²

Like most of the idealists of India, Śrī Aurobindo disbelieves in the power of the intellect to reach the highest level of reality. "European metaphysical thought—even in those thinkers who try to prove or explain the existence and nature of God or the Absolute—does not in its method and result go beyond the intellect. But the intellect is incapable of knowing the supreme Truth; it can only range about seeking Truth, and catching fragmentary representations of it, not the thing itself, and trying to piece them together."³ But in the East "every founder (as also those who continued his work or school) has been a metaphysical thinker doubled with a Yogi. Those who were only philosophical intellectuals were respected for their learning but never took rank as truth discoverers." "It is not by 'thinking out' the entire reality, but by a change of consciousness that one can pass from the ignorance to the knowledge—the knowledge by which we become what we know."⁴ Essentially true knowledge implies the identity of the knower and the known. When there is complete identity, knowledge is intuition. But our knowledge at the finite

¹ *The Ideal of a Karmayogin*, pp. 91-2.

³ *The Riddle of the World*, p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

level is discursive; it implies the distinction between subject and object. Somehow or other we have been excluded from the rest of the world and are limited. And in order to regain our contact with it and enter into communion with it, we develop senses, mind, etc. This idea reminds us of Kalā, one of the *kañcukas* or sheaths of the Śaiva Advaita. However, the knowledge we get by these processes, because of the difference between the subject and object, can never be perfect. Intuition alone is perfect knowledge. Yet reason is not absolutely useless. It is useful not only for our practical life, but also for guiding us towards the final truth.

If intuition, as the highest form of knowledge, implies the identity of knowing and the known, then the reality that corresponds to it must be an identity of subject and object. The opposites, subject and object, in the process of their unification pass through various stages, and each stage marks a new form of consciousness and a new kind of reality. Roughly, there are three kinds of reality or Supernals above our mind. "The Overmind stands at the top of the lower hemisphere and you have to pass through and beyond Overmind, if you would reach Supermind, while still above and beyond Supermind are the worlds of Saccidānanda."¹ The last is the Brahman of the Upaniṣads, the Śiva of Śaivism, and, we may add, the Viṣṇu of Vaiṣṇavism. The three Supernals are also called Īśvara, Sākṣi, and jīva. This means that the jīva is placed by Aurobindo above what we usually call mind or *manas*. In another place, these are called *Kṣara*, *Akṣara*, and *Puruṣottama*, after the *Bhagavadgīta*. This account of the Supernals differs obviously from that of the Supernals in the Śaiva Advaita.

Below our ordinary mind come matter and life. But from matter below right up to Śiva or the Brahman above, there is continuity. There is no break or interval. Everything is due to the Brahman's dynamic force, energy, or Śakti.

Just as there is an evolution of the world out of Śakti, there is an involution of it into Śakti. And this process is cyclic. The ideal of the jīva is to transcend the dualism of subject and object, and enter the Brahman or the realm of Saccidānanda. This process of involution is really an involution into the Brahman and not merely into his Śakti. For between the Brahman and his Śakti there is no difference.

In interpreting this process, Śrī Aurobindo very aptly makes use of the modern concept of evolution. He says that matter

¹ *The Riddle of the World*, p. 31.

evolves into life, and life into mind; and mind, of course through its own exertions, becomes the Brahman. This process, interpreted as evolution, has a rational appeal to the modern mind. Among the Western philosophers, Schelling advocated the theory that nature is not what is opposed to the mind, but what evolves into mind. For Aurobindo, this evolution is really the assuming by matter of its true nature. Matter is already conscious in essence. Its insentience is only a sort of appearance due to the veil of ignorance. The function of the Śakti of the Brahman is to evolve the forms of the world and then swallow them. But all the forms are not evolved at once and not swallowed at once. Certain things are destroyed, while certain other things are created.

But we have to note one important point here. What is evolution to the Western thinkers is really involution for Aurobindo. Not only for him but also for the Sāṅkhya and other Indian systems which have a similar line of thought, the so-called evolution is, from the standpoint of the highest truth, involution. It is the process of the return back into Śiva, Viṣṇu or Prakṛti. It is really the swallowing in of the world and its forms. It is in this return process that matter becomes life, life mind, and mind the Brahman. The real evolution is the evolution of the world out of the Brahman.

Another important point to note is that the so-called ideals of progress are not conceived as real at all by Western evolutionism. They are more or less ideas that are to guide our life. But according to Aurobindo, they are more real than our mind. But they too are not "the ultimate Reality, for that is too high and vast for any ideal to envisage; they are aspects of it thrown out in the world-consciousness as a basis for the workings of the world-power. But they are primary, the actual workings secondary. They are nearer to the Reality and therefore always more real, forcible and complete than the facts which are their partial reflexion."¹

One important doctrine of Śrī Aurobindo is that of the Superman. But this Superman is not only a world-ruler but also a self-ruler. He is not of the type of Napoleon and Alexander, the type which Nietzsche glorifies, because they are not self-rulers. When once it is admitted that the jīva can become one with the Brahman, it must be possible for the jīva to use its Śakti, so that he can use the power so obtained. But to get this power, one's own

¹ *Ideals and Progress*, p. 2.

ego or individuality has to be surrendered. Individuality is due to limitations. To assert one's individuality, therefore, is to intensify and strengthen the limitations. But one cannot get the power of the Brahman, unless one gets over the limitations. So one gets the power of the Brahman at the sacrifice of one's own egohood or selfishness. That is why the Superman is a self-ruler. But Napoleon and others were not self-rulers. They were extremely egotistic, self-assertive, and aggressive. They wanted to stamp their own finite individuality on the world, and therefore perished. They did not realize that they were simply instruments in the hands of the time-spirit. This is a peculiarly Hindu conception of the Superman. And Aurobindo believes that a race of supermen can come into being in the course of evolution.

III

J. KRISHNAMURTI

J. Krishnamurti is a religious genius discovered by Mrs. Anne Besant and introduced by her to the world as an incarnation. But of late he has severed connection with the Theosophical Society altogether. Now, he does not claim to be an incarnation, nor even to be a theosophist. He proclaims that he is a human being like any other human being, but has been able to realize the Truth through individual effort, a realization that can be had by any man who is seriously after it.

Mr. Krishnamurti tells us that he is regarded by the West as teaching Oriental philosophy and by the East as teaching the Western, but that he does neither but gives out what he individually felt and experienced. He is so iconoclastic in his statements, attacking tradition, authority, and the ideas of heaven, Church, etc., that he is taken by some for an atheist, individualist, and so forth. But if one tries to understand his talks as a whole, one finds that it is unfair to call him by any such name. And the real significance of his statements cannot be understood, unless the philosophy underlying them is understood. Unfortunately, neither Mr. Krishnamurti nor any of his disciples has given us a systematic account of his thought. Still, it is not impossible to get a connected picture of his thought from his speeches and talks. It is true Mr. Krishnamurti is trying to strike a new course of thinking and understanding reality. But the world is many centuries old, and reality and man are the same. And we can best appreciate

Mr. Krishnamurti's ideas when we are able to notice their similarity and dissimilarity to others. Mr. Krishnamurti is opposed to thinking in ways traditional, because his conception of reality, as we shall see, does not allow it. And his is one of the most systematically developed of the philosophies of anti-traditionalism. Except for a few outbursts against tradition and traditionalism there is, in India up till now, no philosophy of anti-traditionalism; and so far as my knowledge goes, Mr. Krishnamurti's is the only philosophy in India which we may call anti-traditionalism.

He says: "Then there are those who come here to compare what I have to say with the many schools of thoughtlessness (laughter). No please, this is not a smart remark. From letters I have received and from people who have talked to me, I know there are many who think that by belonging to special schools of thought they will advance and be of service to the world. But what they call schools of thought are nothing but imitative jargons which merely create divisions and encourage exclusiveness and vanity of mind. These systems of thought have really no validity, being founded on illusion. Though their followers may become very erudite and defend themselves with their learning, they are in reality thoughtless."¹ This teaching of Mr. Krishnamurti reminds us of the teaching of the Zen sect of Japan, from one of the writings of which we shall quote a fairly long passage, for that will elucidate much that Mr. Krishnamurti says.

"O you disciples who aspire after truth, if you wish to obtain an orthodox knowledge of Zen, take care not to deceive yourselves. Tolerate no obstacles, neither interior nor exterior, to the soaring of your spirit. If on your way you meet Buddha, kill him! (The Zen is a Buddhist sect!) If you meet the Patriarchs, kill them! If you meet the Saints, kill them all without any hesitation! That is the only way of reaching salvation.

"Do not allow yourselves to be entangled in any arguments whatsoever. Place yourselves above them and remain free. So many men come to me pretending to be disciples of Truth, who are not even freed from the vanity of a goal, of a prejudice that dominates them. Therefore when I see them I strike them down. Such a one has confidence in his arms? I strike them off. Another counts on his eloquence? I make him hush. Yet another believes in his foresight? I blind him.

"I have never seen one who was completely free—who was *the*

¹ *Talks in Latin America*, p. 7 (1935).

unique. Most of them have filled their minds very uselessly with the farces of old masters. What have I to give them? Nothing! I try to remedy their evil by delivering them from their slavery.

"O you, disciples of truth, strive to make yourselves independent of all objects. . . . Do you believe yourselves worthy of being called a monk of the Zen doctrine if you possess such an erroneous idea of it? I tell you: No Buddha! No teaching! No discipline! No demonstration! . . . Renounce this error. There is no exterior truth. And now you attach yourselves to the literal sense of my word so that it is much preferable that we should end this discourse, and that you should be nothing at all."

This passage is quoted from *Rinzairoku* by Steinilher-Oberlin in his *Buddhist Sects of Japan*.¹ And he wonders at the idea of a Buddhist killing the Buddha. At last understanding the significance of the passage, he writes: "At last its meaning became clear to me. This is what Rinzai meant to say: let him who aspires to the light of Zen shake off and discard all borrowed values—scholastic formulae, prejudices and modes with which he encumbered himself and which blind him, even were they presented to him under the features of Buddha. All that you have not found yourself, in your inner consciousness, by a personal and intuitive act, is but a vestment of hypocrisy with which you clothe your conscience. It is not Buddha. First liberate your spirit. Open your eyes, O moles! *Buddha is within you*."²

Quite similarly, even according to Krishnamurti, to think in terms of those systems is not the true search for truth. "True search begins only when there is release from those reactions which are the result of division."³ The division between the I and the You, which is made in Reality, does not actually belong to it. When the division is made the individuality or uniqueness of the I appears. Where there is duality, there must be conflict and mutual adjustment, which develops into patterns of thought and action. These become our thought mechanism and behaviour mechanism, and hold true only within the sphere of duality. They are in principle incapable of revealing Reality, which is beyond duality. So the I or the ego, institutionalized religions, tradition, authority, and everything that belongs to duality is an illusion; it is due to ignorance. "All strife is one of relationship, an adjustment between two resistances, two individuals. Resistance is a conditioning, limiting or conditioning that energy which may be

¹ Pp. 143-4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 144.

³ *Talks at Ojai*, p. 8 (1936).

called life, thought, emotion. This conditioning, this resistance, has had no beginning. It has always been, and we can see that it can be continued. There are many and complex causes for this conditioning.

"This conditioning is ignorance, which can be brought to an end.

"Ignorance is the unawareness of the process of conditioning, which consist of many wants, fears, acquisitive memories, and so on.

"Belief is part of ignorance. Whatever action springs from belief only further strengthens ignorance.

"The craving for understanding, for happiness, the attempt to get rid of this particular quality and acquire that particular virtue, all such effort is born of ignorance, which is the result of this constant want.

"So in relationship strife and conflict continue."¹

"So what is one to do, discerning that whatever action, whatever effort one makes only strengthens ignorance? The very desire to break through the circle of ignorance is still part of ignorance. Then what is one to do?

"Now, is this an all-important vital question to you? If it is, then you will see that there is, no doubt, a positive answer. For positive answer can only bring about further effort, which but strengthens the process of ignorance. So there is only a negative approach, which is to be integrally aware of the process of fear or ignorance. This awareness is not an effort to overcome, to destroy or find a substitute, but is a stillness of neither acceptance nor denial, an integral quietness of no choice. This awareness breaks the circle of ignorance from within, as it were, without strengthening it."²

Here we seem to be reading a Buddha delivering a sermon. All this duality, Mr. Krishnamurti tells us, is ignorance. And ignorance is dissolved by awareness. But what is the result attained? It is a stillness "neither acceptance nor denial, an integral quietness of no choice." Reality is pure life running its course; our individuality is created in it through ignorance. When it is dissipated, we become absolutely one with pure life, and the strife of the individual ends.

Can we have any idea of the nature of this life and its process? "Life—which is all things and which is eternally renewing itself—is passing from unconscious perfection in the lower kingdom of nature, through conscious imperfection in the present 'I'-conscious stage, to perfection, that is, to an entire, perfect realization of itself. In this and in this alone the very process of perfection consists: that the forms of life, at a definite stage—the human

¹ *Talks*, p. 11. (Omen Camp, 1937-8.)

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

stage—will by and by actualize and realize their latent perfection entirely and freely.”¹ The stage of the ego is imperfect, because it makes the distinction between itself and reality. “At the ‘I’-conscious stage, men think themselves separated from Reality, ‘Life,’ ‘Truth,’ which they consider to be something objective, something outside themselves, something they worship and which they call ‘God.’”²

Mr. Krishnamurti believes that it is natural for man to become one with this Life which is beyond dualism. “As a river must make its way to the sea, so must the individual make his way to reality.”³ Nay, nature itself sees that man finally dissolves his individuality, as if universal salvation is a predetermined fact. “It is impossible that humanity in the long run will be able comfortably to settle down and remain under any illusion whatever. Nature herself, in her own mighty, irresistible process of perfecting, urges man beyond any illusion towards an increasingly clear realization of actual facts, of the one, immortal, perfect Life within us, which, in the fulness of time, will disperse all illusions and eventually all forms of ‘I’-consciousness.”⁴ This is like believing in some divine destiny of evolution, that the forces of evolution themselves can bring about universal salvation. But elsewhere he says that “the whole destiny and function of Nature is to create the individual who is self-conscious, who knows the pairs of opposites, who knows that he is an entity in himself, conscious and separate.”⁵ Here whether the individual attains his salvation or not depends on himself and not on nature. And this seems to accord more with the general teaching of Mr. Krishnamurti, who says “realization of Truth, of Life, can only be achieved through your own strength,”⁶ and who discourages thinking in terms of some system or institutionalized religion.

This reality, Mr. Krishnamurti says, is infinity. “There is a movement, a process of life, without end, which may be called infinity. Through authority, imitation, born of fear, mind creates for itself many false reactions and thereby limits itself. Identifying itself with this limitation, it is incapable of following the swift movement of life.”⁷ This sounds Bergsonian.

The illusory I is dissolved through what Krishnamurti calls self-consciousness. That is, when we try to look within ourselves

¹ Lilly Heber: *Krishnamurti and the World Crisis*, p. 66.

² *Op. cit.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 48. Quotation.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86. Quotation.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 84. Quotation.

⁷ *Talks*, p. 9. (Ojai, 1936.)

and analyse our own egos, they disappear. "We find that what fundamentally matters is thoroughly to grasp certain basic facts in existence—the only immortal life, the supreme Reality; what fundamentally matters is: to be fully awake, tirelessly, in one's whole conduct of life. We find that it is this attitude which frees the individual from all limitations."¹ "To come back to the point with which I started, you cannot realize Truth along any path, through any system, through any learning or teacher, but only through the flame of self-consciousness."² This does not mean that reality is self-consciousness; it is beyond self-consciousness. "Consciousness is of the ego, and when we are rid of our consciousness there is Reality that is free of self-consciousness."³ That is, to be self-conscious is only a method of realizing truth. Did not many Buddhists preach that reality is beyond *vijñāna* even? This dissipation of self-consciousness is not annihilation. "I am not preaching total annihilation. You cannot destroy life, but that which is separate can become the whole. That is not annihilation, that is not destruction; but is true living, true being, true action, true love, and spontaneity of conduct; it is that perfect balance of love and reason which is the essence of experience."⁴

In self-consciousness what is really the root cause of our individuality, namely, the subconscious, is brought to the threshold of consciousness, and, when so brought, it dissolves. This implies that we are not always fully conscious of ourselves. That part of our self of which we are not conscious remains in the subconscious, and has to be brought to the light of consciousness. This requires strenuous effort.

So far Mr. Krishnamurti's teaching is mainly of religious interest. We may now raise the question whether ignorance is prior to the I and is its cause, or whether it is the ignorance of the individual and therefore requires the individual as a locus on which to exist. We do not get a definite answer to this enquiry from Mr. Krishnamurti's talks. He says: "The 'I' process is the result of ignorance, and that ignorance, like the flame that is fed by oil, sustains itself through its own activities. That is, the 'I' process, the 'I' energy, the 'I' consciousness, is the outcome of ignorance, and ignorance maintains itself through its own self-created activities; it is encouraged and sustained through its own action of craving and want. This ignorance has no beginning and

¹ Lilly Heber: *Krishnamurti and the World Crisis*, p. 36.

² *Ibid.*, p. 40. Quotation. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 41. Quotation. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42. Quotation.

the energy that created it is unique to each individual, which creates, in its self-development, its own materials, as body, discernment, consciousness, which become identified as the 'I.'"¹ But in another place he says: "Ignorance is the lack of comprehension of oneself."² He speaks of ignorance also as conditioning, as the mechanism of thinking and acting that results from the adjustment between the divisions that arise out of the one Reality; in which case ignorance is posterior to the I and is a sort of a quality of the I. The divisions between the I and the You do not seem to be caused by ignorance, but ignorance itself seems to be the result of the division. We came across a similar difficulty while interpreting Buddhism, and probably we have to adopt a similar interpretation here too. That is, the creation of division will have to be regarded as the same as the activity of ignorance; and this ignorance will gain strength through the habit mechanisms of thought and action, which will be formed through mutual resistance and adjustment of the divisions. Further, the appearance of the divisions is not the same as the appearance of the egos. The divisions assume the form of the egos after becoming conscious "through sensation, perception, and discernment."³

Mr. Krishnamurti accepts neither the mechanistic view of life, according to which man is a product of the environment, nor the view that the human ego is something divine and eternal.⁴ For, as we have seen, the I is really the supreme Reality become finite through certain limitations or conditionings, and so is not a product of mechanical processes. Yet it is not eternal, because the I-sense, though without beginning, vanishes when we analyse it.

In this account of Mr. Krishnamurti, we find that he is an absolutist, a monist, and an idealist. True, he tells us that Reality is beyond consciousness and self-consciousness, and that, in it, both these are dissipated and lost. But he repeatedly says that there is one supreme Reality, Truth, which he sometimes calls God,⁵ sometimes Life and other times energy. But like Buddha, he cannot describe it further. To describe it is to use concepts, which belong to the mechanism of thought, which is a result of the mutual adjustment between the divisions in reality, and which is therefore unreal and illusory. The concept of the I is a product of ignorance, and is therefore not adequate to reality. To under-

¹ *Talks*, p. 20. (Ojai, 1936.) ² *Ibid.*, p. 13. ³ *Seventeen Talks*, p. 29 (1936).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁵ *Talks*, p. 12. (Ojai, 1936.)

stand reality in terms of concepts is to understand it in terms of the I, a bubble which is to be pricked. To long for immortality itself is a false desire, for it is the desire to perpetuate the I. Similarly, to enquire whether the soul lives after death is motivated by this false desire. Reality is inexplicable; none can explain it. It is beyond the I and thought which belongs to the I. It has to be directly experienced by us.

It is no wonder that, with this metaphysics, Mr. Krishnamurti preaches against traditions, authority, systems of philosophy and institutionalized religion. He is not an individualist, because the individual is not ultimately real for him; yet he appears to be an individualist only because he preaches against all the above. In his thought, we get one of the best metaphysical bases for the revolt against tradition, authority, and established modes of thought. His metaphysics may not be absolutely new. But the way he connects it with the revolt he preaches, and the self-dependence he emphasizes seem to be his own. Did not Buddha long ago preach that reality lies beyond all *samskāras*, and exhort his disciples to go beyond them? The *samskāras* are the mechanisms of thought and action, the universal habits in thinking and doing. Even the so-called categories of thought may be interpreted as the habits of thinking. The *samskāras* include not only these categories but also the biases and the customs of people and the habits and idiosyncrasies of the individuals. Tradition may be not only the tradition of a people but the tradition of creation. The latter is the *samskāras* that are beyond the ego and are the condition of the ego. And Mr. Krishnamurti, like Buddha, preaches against the tradition of even these *samskāras*.

IV

Dr. Bhagavan Das is a theosophist and, as is usual with all sincere theosophists whose religion is universal without reference to caste and creed, he tries to see the same truth in all religions, and endeavours in his philosophy to reconcile the different systems. He dislikes to be a difference-maker and also, so far as possible, to give himself a label, because he sees an element of truth in every system. A book by him in Hindi is named *Samanvaya*, which means synthesis or reconciliation. In his *Science of Peace or Adhyātmavidyā*, the gist of which is given in his contribution to

the *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, we find a good account of his metaphysical views, in which he displays profound insight into the problem of idealism. His three important philosophical works are his *Science of Peace*, *Science of Emotions*, and *Pranava-vāda*. He is the author of a number of other works, of which those which are reorientations or reinterpretations of Hindu social conceptions such as *The Science of Social Organization or the Laws of Manu* and *Ancient versus Modern Scientific Socialism* are the most popular, being studied even by the laymen. He attaches at least as great, if not greater importance to the interpretations of ancient sociology as of philosophy and psychology. He thinks that metaphysics and psychology are sterile, if they cannot be, and are not applied to the administration of human affairs in all departments of life for the promotion of temporal as well as spiritual happiness, and made to govern the practice as well as the art of individual and collective social life. He is a thinker of wide outlook, patriotic in his feelings, saintly in his aspirations, and respected both for his learning and nobility of character.

Dr. Bhagavan Das writes that the great questioning which disturbs the course of the jīva's life running smoothly in this world is, What becomes of man after death? Does he continue to live in a different form or is he annihilated? This is the question that Naciketas put to Yama, the lord of Death and of Purgatory. The answer to it was preferred to the undivided sovereignty of the earth. What man wants is immortality, which he cannot find in the conflicting plurality of the world. He feels that it must lie in some basic unity which is the source of the world. What can that be?

The first answer that suggests itself to the jīva is the view called *ārambhavāda* or the theory that the universe had a beginning, and was created by an agency external to it. This view is only the popular account of the creation of the world by a personal God. But it does not satisfy reason, which wants to know the why and the how of creation. The next answer is the *parināma-vāda* or the theory that creation and destruction of the world are only evolution and dissolution effected by the interaction of the two factors, the sentient spirit and the non-sentient matter. These two are the same as the Self and the Not-self, the I and the Not-I. Nobody doubts the existence of the I, that is, that he is. But what is the I? Is it this or that, time or space, white or black? It is none of these, but none of these can be known without the I.

The I is the universal that is present in all the particulars. Yet it is different from them, as it can exist without any of these in particular. This is the Pratyagātma, the abstract universal Ego. Everything else is the Not-I, the Non-ego, or the Mūlaprakṛti.

Still, we are within the realm of duality. The Self and the Not-self are left without being unified. That is why the Sāṅkhya, which ends with the dualism of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, is philosophically unsatisfactory. Hence attempts are made to derive the Not-self, which is a plurality, from the Self, which is a unity. The Self accompanies the knowledge of everything, and without it nothing can be known. It is therefore the universal, eternal and infinite. And we do not enquire the why and the how of what is universal and infinite. So the enquiry has to be made with regard to the Not-self. The first attempt to derive the plurality from the unity is to be found in the Dvaita Vedānta or the Vedāntic Dualism, according to which the universal Self desired to be the many. But this answer does not satisfy reason, because desire is not felt without a want, and we cannot think of the Supreme as wanting in anything.¹ The next answer comes from the Viśiṣṭādvaita. "One substance, eternal, restful, changeless, Īśvara, has two aspects, is animate and inanimate, cit and acit, conscious and unconscious, Self and Not-self; and by its power, . . . , Māyā, . . . Śakti, causes an interplay of the two, for its own high pleasure which there is none other to question, without any compulsion from without."² But this answer too is not satisfactory, for how can we conceive the all-merciful Īśvara creating the world, which contains so much evil and suffering, for his pleasure? Again, what is the mysterious power Māyā that causes the interplay of the conscious and the unconscious? The last and final attempt is that of the Advaita. But Dr. Bhagavan Das tells us that the current Advaita is not the true Advaita, because, in it, the relation between the Brahman and Māyā, the Self and the Not-self, remains unexplained. "The last unexplained crux of the current Advaita-Vedānta is the connection between Brahman, the Absolute, and Māyā, the illusion of the world-process."³ "When pressed it, like Fichte, falls back upon the position that Māyā (Non-Ego, with Fichte) is wholly Non-being, instead of both existent and non-existent, and this we cannot bring quite home to ourselves." Instead of deriving the changing from the changeless, the current Advaita wholly negates the changing. Yet it is an

¹ *The Science of Peace*, p. 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

advance upon the Viśiṣṭādvaita. Of the Western thinkers who made a very close approach to this Advaita, Fichte occupies the highest place, because he started with the central principle, the Ego or the I. Dr. Bhagavan Das is not disposed to give Hegel a higher place than Fichte, because Hegel's approach is from outside or externality, he starts with the category of Being. The attitude of Dr. Bhagavan Das is truly Indian. But the defect of Fichte is that he has not been able to reconcile the I with the Not-I and held that "inasmuch as the Non-Ego is incapable of union with the Ego, Non-Ego there shall be none."¹ This pronouncement is the same as that of the current Advaita with regard to the world as non-being. Hegel, though his approach is external, is complementary to Fichte, for his philosophy fills the empty principle of the latter with content. But as Hegel's approach is external, this filling in is accomplished from without, not from within.

The true principle, therefore, must be internal, and yet should not merely negate the world of Māyā. Māyā should not be treated as merely non-being and so as unreal. True, it contains the element of non-being, as the principle is to be transcended by the true principle of unity. But it is not merely non-being, but both being and non-being. That is, its relation to the Ego should be both positive and negative. In Fichte as in the current Advaita, the relation is understood as only negative. The Ego is not the Non-Ego, the Brahman is not Māyā. These are their logia. But the true logion should both affirm and negate. Its form, says Dr. Bhagavan Das, is "The Ego—the 'Non-Ego'—Not," "The Brahman-Māyā-Not," "I-This-Not," *aham-etat-na*. In the first part of the logion, namely, I-This, the relation is positive, but by the addition of Not, this affirmation is negated. Thus it contains both affirmation and negation.

Dr. Bhagavan Das claims that this is the true meaning of the words *Om* and *Satyam*. "Aum (Om) must include within itself the Self, the Not-Self, and the mysterious relation between them which has not yet been discovered in any of the preceding answers—that mysterious Relation, which being discovered, the whole darkness will be lighted up as with a sun, the Relation wherein will be combined changelessness and change. If it does this, then truly is the Indian tradition justified that all knowledge, all science, is summed up in the Vedas, all the Vedas in the Gāyatrī,"²

¹ *The Science of Peace*, p. 71.

² Gāyatrī is a formula.

and the Gāyatrī in the Aum; then truly are all the Vedas and all possible knowledge there, for all the world-process is there."¹ The first letter of the sacred word, A, signifies Self; the second letter, U, signifies the Not-self, and the third letter, M, signifies the *everlasting relation, the unspeakable nexus*—of negation by the Self of the Not-Self—between them." How does Dr. Bhagavan Das derive this meaning from Aum? Aum is identified with the Brahman and the Brahman with *Satyam* or truth. In the *Chāndogya*, the word *Satyam* is explained thus. It consists of three letters, *Sa*, *ti*, and *yam*. *Sa* means the imperishable, *ti* means the perishing, and *yam* means their relation. So the Absolute should include all the three. And this conception is the true Advaita or non-dualism.

This I-This-Not, *aham-etat-na*, is the Supreme Self or the Paramātmā. "In strictness the Absolute is as much the whole of the Not-Self as the Self; but it is given the name of the 'Supreme Self' especially because the human jīva, as will be apparent from what has been said before . . . arrives *first* at the Pratyagātmā, the inward Self, the universal Self, and being established there it then includes the pseudo-universal Not-Self within itself, and thus realizes ultimately its identity with the Absolute, which it then calls the Paramātmā—the Supreme Self, because first seen through the universal Self, though now seen also to contain the Not-Self; and because the Self is the element, the factor, of Being in the triune Absolute."²

Dr. Bhagavan Das contends that the current Advaita confuses between the Pratyagātmā and the Paramātmā. Its *mahāvākyas* or logia like "I am the Brahman" or *ahambrahmāsmi*, and "That thou art" or *tattvamasi* fall short of expressing the true nature of the Paramātmā or the Absolute. They reach only the Pratyagātmā or the universal Self. So he coins a new logion, *ahametanna* or "I-This-Not," which goes higher than the above logia. The basis for this new logion is the meaning of the word *Satyam* as given in the *Chāndogya* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the meaning of the I as explained by *Devībhāgavata* and *Yogavāśiṣṭha*, and a passage from *Mahimnastotra*.³ By this coining, Dr. Bhagavan Das

¹ *The Science of Peace*, pp. 105-6.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 88-91. We have given the *Chāndogya* meaning of *Satyam*. According to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Sa* means being, *yam* means nothing, and *ti* means becoming or the false. This interpretation seems to be Dr. Bhagavan Das's own. The Upaniṣad only says that *sa* and *yam* are truths, and that the middle letter *ti* is an untruth. But what these truths are is supplied by Dr. Bhagavan Das. The *Devībhāgavata* passage runs: *sarvam khalvidamevāham nānyaḥasti sanātanam*.

does not want to depart from the teaching of the Upaniṣads, but maintains that their true meaning is conveyed by this logion. This only can be the Absolute, which is all-comprehensive. From this only can we derive both the self and the not-self. This only can be beyond duality, because it is the unity of both the self and the not-self. The universal Self by itself does not transcend duality, for as Self it always has to face the Not-self.

Therefore the Self, the Not-self, and their relation, each taken apart from the rest, fall within the sphere of duality, *dvandvam* or the relative. The Pratyagātmā of Dr. Bhagavan Das corresponds to Īśvara or the *saguṇa* Brahman or the Kūṭastha Śākshi of the Śāṅkarite schools. Dr. Bhagavan Das tells us that all these are practically synonyms for the Pratyagātmā. Paramātmā, of course, corresponds to the *nirguṇa* Brahman. The Pratyagātmā is common to all the jīvas. It is one. But curiously enough, Dr. Bhagavan Das tells us that it is this Pratyagātmā that is Saccidānanda or being, consciousness and bliss. Like Śiva in the Śaiva Advaita, the Paramātmā of Dr. Bhagavan Das has three moments—*jñāna* or knowledge, *kriyā* or action, and *icchā* or desire or will. These are its own nature, which is I-This-Not. First, the This has to be cognized before it can be negated. So there is knowledge. Then the I has to differentiate itself from the This. So there is activity. In between the two comes desire, namely, the desire to hold the This before itself and negate it. Out of these three moments come *sat* or existence, *cit* or consciousness and *ānanda* or bliss.

The This is the Mūlaprakṛti or Matter, which has three *guṇas* or qualities, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It corresponds to the Pradhāna or Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya and the Māyā of the Śaivas. The relation between the I and the This is Śakti or Negation. The relation is the relation of necessity, for it holds between the members of an indivisible whole. The I-This-Not is a unity, not a mere combination of three independent terms. "This necessity is the one law of all laws, because it is the nature of the changeless, timeless, spaceless, Absolute; all laws flow from it, inhere in it, and are

translated by Bhagavan Das as "I, not another, is (i.e., am) alone verily this eternal all." The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* passage is *akiñcinmātra chinmātra rūposmī gaganādanuh iti yā śāśvatt buddhissā na samsārabandhanī*, translated by Dr. Bhagavan Das as "I, pure consciousness, subtler than space, am not anything limited—such is the eternal *buddhi* (idea) that freeth from the bonds of *samsāra*, the world-process." The *Mahimnastotra* passage is *atadvyāvṛtyā yam cakṛitama-bhidhātte śrutirapi*, translated by Dr. Bhagavan Das as "Thou whom the dazzled scripture doeth describe as being the negation of what thou art not."

included within it. It is the primal power, the one force, the supreme energy, in and of the world-process, from which all forces are derived and into which they all return, being inseparable from it, being only its endless manifestations and forms."¹ This Śakti Dr. Bhagavan Das calls *Māyā*, accepting its meaning from the works on Tantra as both "is" and "is not,"² and not, as Śaṅkara interprets it, as neither "is" nor "is not." Dr. Bhagavan Das tells us that this Śakti is often wrongly identified with the *Mūla-prakṛti*. "... as negation is the nature of the relation between the Self and Not-Self, so this necessity, which inheres in the combination of the three and is not separable from any, may be regarded as the *power* of that nature of the Self and the Not-Self which makes inevitable that relation. This relation immediately follows from, or better, is only another form of that necessity, and the necessity is therefore treated as being more closely connected with this relation, i.e. Negation, than with the other two factors of the Absolute."³

This Negation in its affirmative aspect is the "energy which links together in an endless chain of causality the factors of the succession of the world-process, . . . the necessity of the whole which appears as the *cause* of each part, the relation of cause and effect between all the parts."⁴ But the same relation in its negative aspect forms the "*condition* or the conditions of the interplay between the Self and the Not-Self, the *conditions* in which the succession of the factors of the world-process appears and takes place." Cause and condition are only the positive and the negative aspects of one and the same thing. Causes are conditions which cease to exist when the effect begins to exist, and conditions are causes which persist throughout the existence of the effect as well as before and after."⁵ Self and the Not-self are neither of them cause and effect. But "the changes of cognition, desire and action, and of qualities, substance, and movement, of which they are the forum or the substratum, are causes or conditions, and effects or results, of one another in turn, and that the totality of these changes, being regarded as one effect and result, has for *one cause* the Śakti—energy, and for one condition the Negation, embodied in the third factor of the Absolute." This Śakti or energy has three aspects, attraction, repulsion and evolution (or creation, preservation and destruction). Negation proper, too, has three

¹ *The Science of Peace*, p. 150.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

² *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

aspects, space, time and motion. "The Negation, with respect to one limitless Self, in whose consciousness the Not-Self, the endless many, are co-existent, is negation *everywhere*, is the utter blankness of pseudo-infinite and Kūṭastha-seeming *space*. The Negation with respect to the Not-Self, the pseudo-infinite many, which find themselves realized in that consciousness turn by turn, is negated in *succession*, is pseudo-infinite and flowing *time*. The Negation with respect to Negation is the endeavour to affirm, to justify, the consciousness of the inseparable connection between Self and Not-Self *everywhere* and *always*; this can be done only in and by means of an endless motion, in and by which only space and time are joined together and realized, even as the Self and the Not-Self are realized in and by the Negation."¹

The jīvas or the finite individuals, says Dr. Bhagavan Das, are atoms. As opposed to the unity and limitlessness of the I, the This is a plurality and is limited. This limitation is of three kinds, spatial, temporal and mobile. That is, each unit of this plurality has some dimension, duration and movement. This unit is an atom. The atoms make up the Mūlaprakṛti. But this Mūlaprakṛti is inseparable from the Pratyagātmā. Thus each This is indissolubly connected with an I, and is therefore a jīva.

To enter into further details of the nature of the jīva is beyond our present purpose. That Dr. Bhagavan Das is an idealist there can be no doubt. For him, the nature of the Absolute is I-This-Not, and this is the highest law or Dharma of the universe. He calls himself an advaitin, and he himself makes clear the difference between his Advaita and that of Śaṅkara. He contends that Śaṅkara's Advaita has not gone far enough in its unification of the plurality, for it cannot explain the relation between Māyā and the Brahman. Māyā cannot be merely non-being as Śaṅkara would have it; it is both being and non-being. The principle of unity should include the world of plurality and not merely negate it.

One is tempted to trace the influence of the Āgamas of the Pāñcarātra and the Tantras of the Pāsupata and the Śākta on Dr. Bhagavan Das's system. He mentions now and then the latter; and, like a true theosophist, he incorporates elements from all. The atomic conception of the jīva is common to both the Śaiva and the Vaiṣṇava philosophies. But one should be careful to note the meaning of the words as used by Dr. Bhagavan Das. His

¹ *The Science of Peace*, pp. 174-5.

meaning of Māyā is akin to that found in the Śaiva and the Vaiṣṇava Āgamas. But it should be noted that, according to these systems, Māyā or the principle of Matter is *sat* or being generally, and not both being and non-being, as Dr. Bhagavan Das interprets it. In some Vaiṣṇava systems like that of Vallabha, Māyā is not a principle at all but is only another name for the mistake committed by the jīva in estimating his real nature. The attempt is not made by them to treat the mistake as a metaphysical principle. As Dr. Bhagavan Das incorporates elements from diverse systems, both of the East and the West, the terms come to acquire new meaning and significance. Of course, he is justified in giving his own meaning to his words.

But a student of Śaṅkara's Advaita would say that Dr. Bhagavan Das has been misled, in understanding Śaṅkara's Māyā as merely unreality, by the rival Vedāntic schools. Māyā does not mean for Śaṅkara unreality; it is *anirvacanīya*, neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither. Only because of its being neither real nor unreal is the identification of it with the Brahman, which we make, possible. If it were real, it could not have been identified with the Brahman, just as two real things like a book and a pen cannot be identified. By no act of cognition are two real things identified. If, on the other hand, Māyā were unreal, then also identification would be impossible, as we cannot identify a circular square with a real thing. But the identification of the world with the Brahman is necessary, as we experience the world as existing. That is, we want a concept that can connote such identification. Without identifying himself with a product of Māyā, jīva, who is essentially the Brahman, cannot feel that he is the limited being which he feels himself to be. In order to make the identification possible, Māyā has to be treated as neither real nor unreal. What we do not regard as either real or unreal, that about the reality of which we make no assertion, we may mistake for another thing that is real, but not that which we regard openly as real or as unreal. Nor can we, in a single act of cognition, treat a thing as real or unreal. But we can treat it as neither real nor unreal only because this act means merely the suspension of our judgment about its reality.

Further, if Māyā is both real and unreal, the logion, I-This-Not, becomes impossible. First, the I has to be identified with the This, and then this identification has to be negated. This identification is called superimposition in the Advaita of Śaṅkara.

However, whatever be the name, how can it happen if both the I and the This are real? I am to feel that the I in me is real and also that the This that faces me is real. But then, I cannot identify myself with the This, This is not the identification of a subject and predicate by a third party, but an identification by the subject of itself with its own object. Next, I am to feel that the I is real and the This unreal. But now too the identification is impossible. So long as I know that the This is real or that it is unreal, I, who regard myself as real, cannot mistake myself for it. But when it is neither real nor unreal, there is a chance of my mistaking myself for it. Why and how I do so is a matter of experience. Because the This is neither real nor unreal, when I know my true nature, the This vanishes. And this vanishing may be called the second moment of the logion, namely, negation.

Now, if the Absolute were to contain both the I and the This, can the position be non-dualism? One feels justified in calling Dr. Bhagavan Das a dvaitādvaitin, or an upholder of Bhedābheda or even identity in difference. For the Brahman or Absolute is really an identity of differences, the I and the Not-I, the two differences eternally identifying themselves with each other and contradicting each other. Nimbārka, for instance, holds that, between the Brahman and the world, the relation is both identity and difference; and both the relations are natural and real. That is, the Brahman is eternally identifying itself with the world and differentiating itself from it. Dr. Bhagavan Das's conception is very similar. It may be said perhaps that, according to the Śaiva Advaita, the This is thought of as not at all different from the Brahman, though others may treat it as both identical and different, and Dr. Bhagavan Das is at liberty to identify the two absolutely. But he does not do so; his logion does not mean absolute identity. There is difference also. In it, the I is eternally identifying itself with the This, and also eternally differentiating itself from it.

One more important point has to be noted. Dr. Bhagavan Das himself wants that the approach to the understanding of the philosophical truth should be internal. This is in accordance with the general Indian tradition. But when the jīva, as a This, realizes his oneness with the Pratyagātmā and becomes it—so far Dr. Bhagavan Das is a thoroughgoing advaitin—how can he know again the This, the nature and limitations of which must be cast off by the jīva when he becomes the universal Self, in order to be

identifying himself with it and differentiating himself from it, at the level of the Absolute? This question will have to be put if we are to stick consistently to the general Indian tradition. That is why Śāṅkara Advaita treats the universal Self as the Brahman, and the Kūṭastha as only a Sākṣi or witness unaffected by the merits and demerits of the jīva. Of course, the Kūṭastha also is essentially the Brahman, but as Kūṭastha he is the mere witness of the actions, etc., of the jīva. He is *saccidānanda* in essence, but not as such. Otherwise, the jīva will have to be regarded as *saccidānanda*.

The underlying motive of Dr. Bhagavan Das's formulating the logion is clear enough. It is the desire not to exclude Māyā or the world of plurality from the Absolute. The jīva may be casting off Māyā in his attempt to realize the Brahman. But can the Brahman be different from Māyā? Are Māyā and the world two different worlds existing side by side? Many misinterpretations have been made even by academical philosophers of the Advaita distinction between the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika* reality, as if Śāṅkara is pigeon-holing the two realities. They seem to think that all that ordinary logic says holds quite true, according to Śāṅkara, of the *vyāvahārika* reality, and the *pāramārthika* reality is known only on the authority of the *Śruti*. This is only a superficial understanding of the Advaita of Śāṅkara and of his immediate followers. Repeatedly do the Upaniṣads declare that the world is a part of the Brahman, that the Brahman is everything or *sarvaṃ khalvidam brahma*. Logic itself has to lead us to the conclusion that what appears as the world is really the Brahman, and Śāṅkara's logic does lead us to the conclusion. The insight of Dr. Bhagavan Das is deep enough not to have overlooked this important point. If the world and the Brahman are two realities, then the Brahman is limited by the world. If our Absolute is to be the only reality, then it must include Māyā also, as Dr. Bhagavan Das maintains. But then, can it be identical with Māyā? No. It must include it, only as an object to be eternally differentiated from itself. But this eternal differentiation implies eternal identification. This is the line of thought that led Dr. Bhagavan Das to his conclusion. Whether one accepts the conclusion or not, the difficulties to overcome which Dr. Bhagavan Das formulated the logion cannot be over-estimated. The answer which the Advaita of Śāṅkara gives to these questions is that the world of Māyā is only the world of forms. The Brahman is form-

less, and on it these forms are superimposed. Form is not different from matter, just as a bangle is not different from the gold of which it is made. Form is not a separate reality or existence. Its existence is the existence of matter. Similarly, the reality that we experience of this world is only the reality of the Brahman, which shines through it and on which the latter is superimposed. Hence the question, what would become of the form when it is cast off and how we are to relate that cast-off form with the Brahman, does not, and should not arise. Nobody worries himself to solve the question of the relation between the form of a bangle which, after being melted, is made into some other ornament, and the gold of which it is made. The bangle in one sense has ceased to be; but in another sense, as gold, it still exists. Similarly, *Māyā* or the world of forms has ceased to be; but its *sattā* or existence is the same as the Brahman and is never lost. Similar must be the case with the *Mūlaprakṛti* in Dr. Bhagavan Das's philosophy, for what is *Māyā* for Śaṅkara is *Mūlaprakṛti* for the former. Then *Māyā*, which is for Dr. Bhagavan Das the relation between the I and the *Mūlaprakṛti*, becomes nothing; for, after *Mūlaprakṛti* is absorbed into the I, the problem of the relation between the two ceases to have any meaning. This is what an orthodox advaitin may say of Dr. Bhagavan Das's central conception.

V

RABINDRANATH TAGORE

Tagore is one of the few philosophers who are great poets. And he is one of the few poets that have themselves given expression to their philosophy. His poetical works may be more widely read than his philosophical works, yet the former cannot be fully understood without the latter, which are their open sesame. The central theme of his poetry is the mystery of creation, which is also the subject-matter of philosophy. No high-class poet can be satisfied with things mundane, or with things as they are. Tagore is not satisfied with mere lyrical outbursts, which are impassioned cries against this or that imperfection in the world. He does not give us merely some scattered insights into this or that aspect of our experience. But like a true philosopher he sees the world as a whole, though from his own poet's point of view. Hence though he is a lyrical poet *par excellence*, yet in a very important sense he is a great epic poet. For, as in any great epic, in his works

taken as a whole, we see the picture of the whole life and world, depicted from his view-point.

Love and death are the eternal themes of poetry. Men are happy when they love, but tremble before death. This raises the problem for philosophy as well. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* the question, what becomes of man after death, is raised and the answer to it is valued as higher than even the undivided sovereignty of the earth. But what is the nature of love? If the nature of death, too, is the same in essence, or if the process of death can be turned into that of love, do not love and death ultimately become identical? Is not the fear of death then overcome? And does not death become as pleasant as love? That it does is what Rabindranath Tagore wants to prove. It is the basic idea of his works. No love is true unless the lover is prepared to sacrifice and surrender his self to his beloved object. It is therefore the same in essence as the death of his ego. Death is fearful when we value our petty individual self as superior to the universal Self, that is, when we do not love God; otherwise, it would be the same as love.

This is the truth of the cult of *bhakti* or devotion advocated by Vaiṣṇavism, as Tagore interprets it. The Supreme Being is a Person. He is full of love; his nature is love. He makes his advances in innumerable ways. Only, we have to understand them. Tagore's poetry depicts the various ways in which the Supreme Person expresses his nature.

We are concerned with the philosophical side of Tagore's ideas. His chief philosophical works are *Sādhana*, *Creative Unity*, *Personality*, and the *Religion of Man*. *Gītāñjali*, his famous work, is a philosophical poem. The theism of Rabindranath Tagore is said by some to be a borrowing from Christianity. But this opinion has been once for all disproved; for it was based on the wrong assumption that India had no theism of its own. The discovery of the importance of Vaiṣṇavism, besides that of Śaiva theism, among Hindu religions, with its cult of *bhakti* or devotion, gave the lie to it. It has of course to be admitted that the Brahma Samaj was to a certain extent influenced by Christianity. But the influence went only so far as to make the theistic elements of ancient Hinduism popular with the learned leaders of the Brahma Samaj. But Tagore does not belong to that branch of the Brahma Samaj over which Christianity had any influence. "He belongs to the Adi or original Brahma Samaj, which drew its inspiration from

the Upaniṣads and did much to counteract the anti-Hindu propaganda of some Christian missions."

Tagore is much influenced by Vaiṣṇavism, and he is a Vaiṣṇava in his own way. He calls his Supreme Person *advaitam*, and his philosophy is a sort of Vaiṣṇava Advaita or an Advaita in which *bhakti* or love plays the chief role. He does not seem to have any logical objection to the impersonal Absolute of Śaṅkara. He writes: "In India, there are those whose endeavour is to merge completely their personal self in an impersonal entity which is without any quality or definition; to reach a condition wherein mind becomes perfectly blank, losing all its activities. Those who claim the right to speak about it say that this is the purest state of consciousness, it is all joy without any object or content. This is considered to be the ultimate end of *Yoga*, the cult of union, thus completely to identify one's being with the infinite being who is beyond all thoughts and words. Such realization of transcendental consciousness, accompanied by a perfect sense of bliss, is a time-honoured tradition in our country, carrying in it the positive evidence which cannot be denied by any argument or refutation. Without disputing its truth, I maintain that it may be valuable as a great psychological experience but all the same it is not religion, even as the knowledge of the ultimate state of the atom is of no use to an artist who deals in images in which atoms have taken forms."¹ The impersonal Absolute may be the scientific truth, but as a poet and a human being Tagore would not have much to do with it. Man can take interest in the Absolute only if it is humanized. He says: "As our religion can only have its significance in this phenomenal world comprehended by our human self, the Absolute conception of Brahman is outside the subject of my discussion. What I have tried to bring out in this book² is the fact that whatever name may have been given to the divine Reality it has found its highest place in the history of our religion owing to its human character, giving meaning to the ideas of sin and sanctity, and offering an eternal background to all the ideals of perfection which have their harmony with man's own nature." So Tagore understands the Absolute as the Supreme Man,³ God humanized.⁴ It is personality, the Supreme Person. But what is this personality? "Limitation of the unlimited is personality; God is personal when he creates."⁵ That is,

¹ *The Religion of Man*, p. 117.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

² *Ibid.*, p. 205.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁵ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 37.

the Absolute, as Radhakrishnan puts it, when pressed into the moulds of thought, becomes a person. Obviously Tagore does not deny the truth of the impersonal Absolute. Only, he insists that, if it is to be understood by human beings, it must be understood as a person.

But like a true advaitin, Tagore maintains that the Absolute Person is the only reality. The finite has no separate reality. And what is the ideal of the finite jīva? It is absolute merging or dissolving in the Absolute. It is complete self-sacrifice without any residue, it is completely surrendering the individuality of the jīva. This is what the cult of love or *bhakti* preaches. By this process the jīva becomes absolutely one with the Supreme Person. "As science is the liberation of our knowledge in the universal reason, religion is the liberation of our individuality in the universal Person who is human all the same."¹ "The individual *I am* attains its perfect end when it realizes its freedom of harmony in the infinite *I am*. This is its *mukti*, its deliverance from the thralldom of *māyā*, of appearance which springs from *avidyā*, from ignorance; its emancipation in *śāntam śivam advaitam*, in the perfect repose in truth, in the perfect activity in goodness, and in the perfect union in love."² "Intellect sets us apart from the things to be known, but love knows its object by fusion."³ "Our soul can only become Brahman as the river can become the sea."⁴ "The highest wisdom in the East holds that it is not the function of our soul to *gain* God, to utilize him for any special material purpose. All that we can ever aspire to is to become more and more one with God."⁵ But in the sphere of religion, so long as God remains an object of love humanized, love implies unity as well as duality. "In love all the contradictions of existence merge themselves and are lost. Only in love are unity and duality not at variance. Love must be one and two at one and the same time. Only in love are motion and rest in one. Our heart ever changes its place till it finds love, and there it has its rest. But this rest itself is an intense form of activity where utter quiescence and unceasing energy meet at the same point in love."⁶

This shows that Tagore places love higher than knowledge as the way that leads to the Brahman. Knowledge involves the distinction between subject and object; and where there is no such distinction, there is no knowledge. But love aims at fusion

¹ *The Religion of Man*, p. 193.

² *Sādhana*, p. 85.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 154-5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

or union. The distinction between subject and object vanishes in it. Yet love is not without knowledge. "... he (God) can be known by joy, by love. For joy is knowledge in its completeness, it is knowing by our whole being. Intellect sets us apart from the things to be known, but Love knows its object by fusion. Such knowledge is immediate and admits of no doubt. It is the same as knowing our own selves, only more so."¹ "Want of love is a degree of callousness; for love is the perfection of consciousness. We do not love because we do not comprehend, or rather we do not comprehend because we do not love. For love is the ultimate meaning of everything around us. It is not a mere sentiment; it is truth; it is the joy that is at the root of all creation. It is the light of pure consciousness that emanates from Brahman. So to be one with this *sarvānubhūh*, this all-feeling being who is the eternal sky, as well as in our inner soul, we must attain to that summit of consciousness, which is love: . . . It is through the heightening of our consciousness into love, and extending it all over the world, that we can attain Brahma-vihāra, communion with the infinite joy."²

What does Tagore mean by saying that love is the perfection of our knowledge? Is it a mystic utterance, the *raison d'être* of which cannot be understood? It means that truth is a unity, and that knowledge, if it is to be true, must comprehend that unity. But this unity cannot be experienced, Tagore maintains, except through love. For love is the only form of experience that comprehends unity. Intellect, on the other hand, cannot do away with the distinction between the subject and object, that is, with duality. It of course aims at unity, that is, truth; but its natural limitations, the very condition of its existence, namely, the duality of the subject and object, preclude it from completely realizing its aim. So long as this duality lasts, the core of the object can never be entered into by the subject, and knowledge at this level cannot be beyond doubt. Like Descartes, it is always possible for us to doubt the existence of our object, to ask the question, Is it a dream or hallucination? But when the subject can penetrate the heart of the object, its very core and existence, it cannot and does not doubt the truth of the latter. But this penetration means identity and disappearance of duality. It means transcending the level of intellect. As Bradley puts it, thought, in order to attain its ideal of perfect truth, must become

¹ *Sādhana*, p. 159.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 106-7.

reality; but in order to become reality, it must destroy itself, for one of the conditions of its being is its distinction from reality, and this distinction has now to be transcended. That is, the form of consciousness at the level of intellect must be changed into that of intuition. The comprehension of unity is called intuition from the standpoint of knowledge, and love from that of human experience. As Tagore's philosophy aims at understanding the Supra-human in terms of the human, he calls it love.

Then what is the truth that our intellect can attain? What is truth for it? Tagore is not an academical philosopher, and so we do not get a definite answer to this question. But his utterances seem to support the coherence view, and remind us of Spinoza. He writes: "What is the truth of this world? It is not in the masses of substance, not in the number of things, but in their relatedness, which neither can be counted, nor can be measured, nor abstracted. It is not in the materials which are many, but in the expression which is one. *All our knowledge of things is knowing them in their relation to the Universe, in that relation which is truth.*"¹ Just as Spinoza tells us that true knowledge consists in understanding the modes in their relation to the one eternal Substance, Tagore tells us that true knowledge of things consists in knowing them in their relation to the supreme principle of unity. Of course, Supreme Truth, even according to Tagore, must be beyond coherence. As an advaitin, he has to admit that it transcends coherence. However, to press this technical question is to be unfair to the poet.

Just as Spinoza tells us that Substance is the only reality, and yet there is difference between man and mouse and the two are not equally Substance; Tagore maintains that though God is everything, everything is not equally God. That is, he admits degrees or levels of reality. In the empirical world man is the highest reality, because he approaches the Supreme Person closer than anything else. And it cannot be otherwise, because the Supreme Person is the Absolute humanized. Tagore mentions the Upaniṣads as his support, according to which "the key to cosmic consciousness, to God-consciousness, is in the consciousness of the soul."² One may detect a circle or *petitio principii* in this argument. For why is man nearer to God than any other thing? Because he conceives God in his own image. The same attitude is sometimes criticized as anthropomorphism. But

¹ *Creative Unity*, p. 6. Italics mine.

² *Sādhana*, p. 30.

Tagore would say that we, as human beings, cannot but think as human beings.

But if man is essentially identical with the Supreme Person and so infinite, why does he experience finitude? How are we to account for his finitude? Tagore says that it is due to *Māyā* or *Avidyā*. It is an appearance and is not ultimately real. He writes: "Logically speaking, the distance between two points, however near, may be said to be infinite, because it is infinitely divisible. But we do cross the infinite at every step, and meet the eternal at every second. Therefore some of our philosophers say there is no such thing as finitude; it is but a *māyā*, an illusion. The real is infinite, and it is only *māyā*, the unreality which causes the appearance of the finite. But the word *māyā* is a mere name, it is no explanation. It is merely saying that with truth there is this appearance which is the opposite of truth; but how they come to exist at one and the same time is incomprehensible."¹ But *Māyā* is not understood by Tagore as Śaṅkara understands it. For Śaṅkara, it is neither real nor unreal: it neither is nor is not. But for Tagore it both is and is not.² The followers of Vallabha sometimes use the words *Māyā* and *Avidyā* to denote that our difference from the Brahman is only an appearance.³ But this *Māyā* is for them not a metaphysical entity. It is just the ignorance that clouds our intellect and makes us see difference where difference is not. Tagore's conception resembles that of Vallabha, though the latter does not treat it as a metaphysical entity which both is and is not. *Māyā*, according to Tagore, has being, because finitude is experienced; but it is non-being also, because, when our infinitude is realized, it vanishes. Vallabha and his followers definitely reject Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Māyā* and *upādhi*, and maintain that, when they speak of the finitude of the *jīva* and his separateness from the Brahman, they do not mean *Māyā*.⁴ The world is not unreal for them, because it is the product of the Brahman. Unreality could not have come out of reality. Tagore certainly speaks of the world as unreal, as having no explanation and so forth. On this point also, his view differs from that of Vallabha. Tagore says that the separateness of our self from the Brahman is an illusion or *Māyā*, "because it has no intrinsic reality of its own."⁵ He pictures *Māyā* as the smoke that envelops fire and

¹ *Sādhana*, p. 95.

² *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 38.

³ Cp. *Āto'smatpratyayo bhrānto māyāvṛtavilokanāt*. Harirāya: *Brahmavāda-saṅgraha*, p. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-7.

⁵ *Sādhana*, p. 79.

presages it.¹ He speaks of it also as the process by which finitude is woven by the Supreme Person, just as an artist weaves the art-product out of his imagination.² Yet in spite of treating the world as unreal also, Tagore's position has some similarity to that of Vallabha. Anyway, his Māyā is not that of Śaṅkara's.

Though Tagore calls the world Māyā, he maintains that it is of greater interest to us than the pure reality of the indeterminate and impersonal Brahman. We are interested in the Brahman, not in its purity but as the Māyāvin or the agent of Māyā, the person who weaves the web of appearance. We are concerned with it as the artist who has painted the picture of the world. It is the drawing or painting that is of value for us and not the canvas³ on which it is done. The Brahman, as the ground on which the world is superimposed, has no value for us.

What is the relation of the Supreme Person to the manifold of appearance? He is the unity of the manifold. He is the creative unity, not merely the organic unity. It is the presence of this unity that turns the manifold into a rhythm and harmony. Just as a true poem is not a construction according to the rules of rhyme and metre, but an expression or creation,⁴ so also the world is not a construction but an expression or creation. That is, the world is not created according to certain previously formulated laws, but is an expression of a single unity that diversifies itself; and the laws automatically formulate themselves *pari passu* with creation. The so-called natural laws are the reflections of this unity in diversity, and the Supreme Unity is therefore the law of all laws. Tagore gives the example of a musical tune that expresses itself in various notes, and in which the notes have no meaning apart from the tune. Similarly, the world of the manifold loses its significance unless understood as the expression of an underlying unity.

If the Supreme Person is the law of all laws; if the so-called laws are the reflections of his unity in the manifold; then these laws will not be felt as restraining the activity and limiting the freedom of the finite human being, if he surrenders his individuality to the Supreme Person and becomes one with him. Becoming one with him means losing ourselves in him through love. As we have already pointed out, according to Tagore, it is through love only that we can experience truth or the final unity. That is,

¹ *Sādhana*, p. 80.

³ *Creative Unity*, p. 10.

² *The Religion of Man*, p. 141.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

we can transcend the restraint of law only through love. He writes: "It is only those who have known that joy expresses itself through law who have learnt to transcend the law."¹ Only when we transcend law through love can we experience our freedom. Freedom is not absence of all law, which is another name for chaos. It is to make the laws one's own through love. Joy, love, or unity expresses itself in various ways, which are the laws. The moment we realize the one-ness with the Supreme Unity, the laws become the forms of expression of our joy, and lose their unpleasantness.

To realize our oneness with the Supreme Person is the highest aim of our life, the greatest *dharma*. "We fulfil our destiny when we go back from form to joy, from law to love, when we untie the knot of the finite and hark back to the infinite."² But what is this *dharma*? It is truth, law, existence, norm and reality. Tagore says: "The Sanskrit word *dharma*, which is usually translated into English as religion, has deeper meaning in our language. *Dharma* is the innermost nature, the essence, the implicit truth, of all things. *Dharma* is the ultimate purpose that is working in our self. When any thing is done we say that *dharma* is violated, meaning that the lie has been given to our true nature."³ "Only when the tree begins to take shape do we come to see its *dharma*, and then you can affirm without doubt that the seed which has been wasted and allowed to rot in the ground has not been thwarted in its *dharma*, in the fulfilment of its true nature."⁴ Thus *dharma* is an ideal or destiny. The Supreme Man is the *dharma* of the finite man.⁵ But this is the law of all laws; it is what makes the so-called laws laws. Hence the ideal of man is the truth of the whole world. It is the ideal towards which the whole world moves.

The peculiarity of Tagore's Advaita is that, though it soars high and does not avoid the greatest speculative heights, it still wants to retain its hold on the lower levels of reality. Tagore is a mystic, but his mysticism is no bar to his interest in the temporal world. The value of his thought lies in the way he tries to reconcile the results of the Advaita with active interest in the practical world. The values of this world are not to be shunned. Asceticism and *jñānamārga* or the path of knowledge to truth are not the only ways of realizing the Brahman. So long as we are human, to

¹ *Sādhana*, p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, p. 106.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁵ *The Religion of Man*, p. 144.

ask us to renounce the world, to exhort us to avoid its experiences, is to ask us to jump out of our skin. Asceticism and indifference to the values of the world cannot enable us to realize the underlying unity. The desire to be aloof from the world leads only to duality. It is only love, which is active unification, that can make us realize our aim in life. Thus there is an interesting blend, in Tagore's thought, of the cult of *bhakti* with the Advaita. This is not an absolutely new feature of Indian thought. The philosophy of Vallabha, which has not received the due attention it rightly deserves from contemporary Indian thinkers, is an Advaita with *bhakti*. And Tagore's philosophy reminds us of Vallabha's. There are of course some differences, to which we have already drawn attention. But the general tendency is the same in both. Both feel that, logically, the Advaita is irrefutable; and yet both refuse to regard the world, which is a product of the Brahman, as unreal and uninteresting. God is the ultimate principle of unity, and love, even Vallabha would say, is the only form of experience in which differences are transcended.

VI

Of all the contemporary philosophers of India, Professor Radhakrishnan is the most widely known as a philosopher. Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore are also known throughout the world; but the former is known rather as a saint, moralist and politician, and the latter more as a poet than as a philosopher. Nay, we may even say that they are more widely known; because Mahatma Gandhi is the leader of a people and his saintly utterances have a wider appeal than the philosophical statements of Radhakrishnan, and Tagore is the author of poems that can interest every literate person. It is but natural that Professor Radhakrishnan, as an academical philosopher, is less known to the masses and less read by the literate. Yet the simplicity and beauty of the style of his writings and the fluency and eloquence of his speeches, which translate the audience into sublime spheres, have earned for him a name unsurpassed by that of any other academical philosopher of modern India. There are few scholars like him, who have grasped the spirit of the Eastern and Western thought alike. In spite of the opinion of many both in the East and the West that East is East and West is West and never the

twain shall meet, Professor Radhakrishnan maintains that the two can meet and have met. It is usual for some philosophers of the West to dismiss Indian thought with such remarks as that it is mysticism and is not rational, that it depends more on metaphors than on logic, and that it has more mythology than metaphysics. Similarly, in India there is the tendency to talk slightly of Western metaphysics as intellectual gymnastics, which even as such has not approached the logical subtleties of some Indian systems, and to say that Western philosophy, unless it gives up its modes of approach and aim and adopts those of the Indian, can have no salvation. In face of both these views, Professor Radhakrishnan declares that the spirit of man is the same everywhere. Some may say that he has attempted an impossible task in trying to prove what he declares, others that he has misinterpreted Indian thought. But the fact remains that he has succeeded in showing that the spirit of man is the same everywhere in spite of differences of outlook. The differences are only in the non-essentials.

Professor Radhakrishnan is known more as a liaison officer between East and West than as the founder of a new system of thought. This is certainly not the whole truth. However, the construction of independent systems of thought is the philosophical fashion of the West; but in India the follower of a great tradition is more honoured, and the founder of a new philosophy is suspected. That is why even original formulations here have sometimes been fathered upon some ancient teacher. Besides, one who is more or less an historian of philosophy can hardly be expected to develop an independent system. Even as an historian of philosophy, Professor Radhakrishnan has a peculiar task to perform, which is not at all easy. He has not merely to present Indian thought, but to present it in terms of the ideology of the West. His works not only present to the Western thinkers a new approach to the philosophical problems, but also have disclosed to the Indian thinkers new significance in their ancient philosophical concepts. The originality and depth of thought required to perform this task are in no way inferior to those displayed in founding a new system. Professor Muirhead in reviewing his *Idealistic View of Life* wrote: "If originality in philosophy as in poetry consists, not in the novelty of the tale, nor even in the distribution of light and shade in the telling of it, but in the depth with which its significance is grasped and made to dominate over

the details, his book certainly does not fail in this quality."¹ And Professor Muirhead's statement may be generalized and made applicable to all that Professor Radhakrishnan has written. His *Indian Philosophy* is not a bare presentation of the categories and arguments of the systems discussed. Such a presentation can be understood only by those who are acquainted with the originals, and therefore is not of much use for them; and it cannot be understood by those who do not have that acquaintance, and is therefore difficult for them. Professor Radhakrishnan so easily identifies himself with the standpoint of the system he is presenting that the concepts become fluid and their connections appear natural. And unless he himself begins to criticize the system, the reader takes the author to be presenting his own views. Vācaspati wrote in a similar way long ago, though he never criticized, in the same book, the system he was presenting. Besides, Professor Radhakrishnan's works are pregnant with suggestions for future developments. If ever Indian philosophy begins to attract the attention of the Western metaphysicians and not that of merely the antiquarians, if ever there is going to be a philosophical development out of both the Eastern and Western philosophies taken together, and if philosophy is not going to die out as a pseudo-science that has had its day and is no longer wanted, Professor Radhakrishnan's work will be greatly used in the future and will mark a distinct stage in the history of the development of world philosophy. Apart from the importance of the study of his works for the student of comparative philosophy, Professor Radhakrishnan has stuck to the great Indian tradition of the Vedānta in spite of a few differences from the ancient teachers, and has not rendered himself open to the charge of a frivolous hunt for novelty. In his writings we find no trace of the lightheartedness so often displayed by some who seem to think, "Well, it does not matter, I shall defend whatever I say and whatever I like; even for my misunderstandings and mistakes I shall find a philosophical justification and raise them to the status of a system." I do not say that Dr. S. Radhakrishnan is above mistakes and whatever he says is the final truth. So far as thought is concerned, there is a difference between mistakes honestly committed and those committed dishonestly. Even in the Advaita, we find different schools; but each school does not rebuke the other as dishonest or as having misinterpreted Śaṅkara. Yet, one

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, October 1932.

peculiar fact to know about Professor Radhakrishnan is that, though he himself is not the founder of a new system, it is he who pleads that philosophical construction should be protected in India. But important attempts can be made only when stock-taking is done with reference to Western philosophy.

Because of his genuine desire to reveal the true significance of the concepts of Indian philosophy, Professor Radhakrishnan makes his ideas transparent and style perspicuous. There is no attempt at mystification, and at unnecessarily confusing the audience and readers with logical subtleties and technical terminology and with the omission of connecting steps. The usual tricks of the second- and third-rate philosopher to pass as too great and profound to be understood are not found in him. His views and arguments may not have satisfied everybody. But his presentation is always clear and simple. He knows his ideas; and his readers can understand them.

Professor Radhakrishnan is an advaitin, but like Tagore he is an advaitin in his own way. Tagore's writings seem to have influenced a little the inner workings of Radhakrishnan's mind, at any rate in the early stages of his thought. In the latter's writings we do not find the same emphasis on *bhakti* as in those of Tagore; but the difference can be explained by the one being a poet and the other being an academical philosopher. But it would be unfair to say that Tagore determined Professor Radhakrishnan's thought. The logic of the Supreme Brahman or the indeterminate Absolute of Śaṅkara he finds unassailable. But he seems to feel that the criticisms of Śaṅkara by the rival schools are not without force. The negative aspect of Śaṅkara's teaching is not much to his heart. He writes: "The anxiety to be loyal as far as possible to both Buddhism and Vedāntism appears to be the explanation of much of the inconsistency of Śaṅkara's philosophy. God or the Absolute he cannot give up as a Vedāntin. But when with the Buddhist he admits that the finite is illusory, his Absolute becomes something in which all is lost and nothing is found again. . . . But there is no denying that the positive method Śaṅkara intends to pursue as a Vedāntin and the negative method he does sometimes pursue as an interpreter of Buddhism end in conflict and contradiction."¹ But of late, Professor Radhakrishnan's attitude to Śaṅkara has changed. What he once regarded as a contradiction he now treats as one-sided emphasis.

¹ *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*, pp. 116-17.

He writes: "The Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara try to express the nature of the ultimate being in negative terms. 'The eye goes not thither nor speech nor mind.' There is a danger in these negative descriptions. By denying all attributes and relations we expose ourselves to the charge of reducing the ultimate being to bare existence which is absolute vacuity. The negative account is intended to express the soul's sense of the transcendence of God, the 'wholly other,' of whom nought may be predicated save in negations, and not to deprive God of his positive being." "We would not be able to say even that it is 'wholly other.' There is in the self of man, the very centre of his being, something deeper than the intellect, which is akin to the Supreme."¹

A great pandit, a Mahāmahopādhyāya, once asked me whether it was not true that Professor Radhakrishnan steered a middle course between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. The pandit's guess has really a justification. Professor Radhakrishnan writes: "Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are the two great thinkers of the Vedānta, and the best qualities of each are the defects of the other."² That is, for a true philosophy the two are complementary to each other. Professor Radhakrishnan wants to retain the Absolute of both, the *nirguṇa* or the indeterminate Brahman of Śaṅkara and the *sagūṇa* or the determinate Brahman of Rāmānuja. Even Śaṅkara tried to give a place in his system to the *sagūṇa* Brahman. "The entranced self-absorption which arms itself with sanctity involves a cruel indifference to practical life hardly acceptable to average intelligence. Śaṅkara knows all this; and so gives a logical theism which does not slight the intellect, does not scorn the wisdom of the ages, and is at the same time the highest intellectual account of the truth. What is the relation between the absolutism of intuition and the empirical theism of logic, Śaṅkara does not tell us."³ Professor Radhakrishnan does not complain that Śaṅkara is contradicting himself here. But in the quotation from the *Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*, he openly points out a contradiction. It seems to be Professor Radhakrishnan's endeavour to point out a positive way from the lower to the higher Absolute and weave the two into a system. His chief aim seems to be to remove the elements of negativism from Śaṅkara's Advaita.

Professor Radhakrishnan does not want to call Rāmāṇja's

¹ *An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 101-2. ² *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 720.
³ *Ibid.*, pp. 657-8.

Absolute by the name of Absolute but by the name of God. He writes: "Rāmānuja's view is the highest *expression* of the truth though Śaṅkara would add that the real is larger and better than our thinking has room for."¹ Here we have to note that the word "expression" is italicized in order to convey that, according to Śaṅkara, final truth cannot be expressed. However, if it is to be expressed, Rāmānuja's is the only way. "We are impelled to transcend the world of change and finitude in order to reach a reality where the subject and predicate are absolute. The assumption of such a reality is the basis of all logical procedure. In judgment we try our best to bring out the full nature of reality by a series of predications. But a string of abstractions cannot do justice to the wealth of reality unless we assume that the ultimate reality is thought as such. It is the absolute judgment that is implicit in our mind from the first, that being and thought are one." That is, Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita is really the non-difference between the substance and attribute, subject and predicate, the two terms being equally real. That is why Rāmānuja's Absolute is the highest logical expression of reality. It is the Absolute pressed into the moulds of thought, the Absolute intellectualized, or as Tagore says, the Absolute humanized.

Rāmānuja's Absolute is an organic conception. "So far as the world is concerned, God is organic with it. It is impossible to detach God from the world. The Hindu theologian Rāmānuja regards the relation of God to the world as one of soul to body. He brings out the organic and complete dependence of the world on God."² Just as the subject and the predicate in a logical judgment have no meaning apart from each other and in isolation, God and the world, God and the jīva, have no reality apart from each other and in isolation. This means that, as God and the world are organically related to each other, each must be affected by the other. Professor Radhakrishnan does not say that Rāmānuja holds and admits that God is affected by the evil and the misery of the world, but that he cannot logically escape the conclusion if he sticks to his Viśiṣṭādvaita. "If the attributes form the essential nature of God, then the process of change in them must also affect his nature. Does all this mean that God is not absolute actuality, but is himself in the making? The distinction, finally, that the soul of God is the efficient cause and his body the material cause is untenable. We cannot take half a fowl for

¹ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 338.

² *Ibid.*, p. 338.

cooking and leave the rest to lay eggs.”¹ “What Rāmānuja does is to combine the two (unity and plurality), the Brahman and the world, into one Absolute, which is a concrete organic whole, all of whose parts or elements exist in and through a supreme principle which embodies itself in them. . . . One may well ask whether such an absolute experience is not an arbitrary fancy incapable of verification. We can combine words so as to make a plausible statement, but it is doubtful whether there is a corresponding reality. If the Absolute is supposed to be a transcendent changeless existence, it is a problem how such an absolute, which has no history, includes the time process and the evolution of the world. Unless Rāmānuja is willing to explain away the immutable perfection of the Absolute, and substitute for it a perfectly changing process, a progressing perfection, he cannot give us any satisfactory explanation of the relation of the soul of the Absolute to his body.”²

Hence Rāmānuja's Absolute is not really an Absolute. His attempt to include the world and the finite souls in it is doomed to failure. We have therefore to admit that there must be something higher than it, namely, Śaṅkara's Absolute. The latter alone can be the true Absolute; the former can only be the God of religion or the reality as a whole of our intellect. Both God and his world must vanish in the Absolute. “God, though immanent, is not identical with the world until the very end. Throughout the process there is an unrealized residuum in God, but it vanishes when we reach the end; when the reign is absolute the kingdom comes. God who is organic with it recedes into the background of the Absolute. The beginning and the end are the limiting conceptions, and the great interest of the world centres in the intermediate process from the beginning to the end.”³ We are again reminded of Tagore's view that we are interested in the Absolute not in its purity, but as the Māyāvin, that we are less concerned with the canvas than with the painting done on it. Further, “God as the universal mind working with a conscious design, who is at once the beginning of the world, the author of its order, the principle of its progress and the goal of its evolution, is not the God of religion.”⁴ “While the Absolute is pure consciousness and pure freedom and infinite possibility, it appears to be God from the point of view of one specific possibility which has become actual-

¹ *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 715.

³ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 340.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 716.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

ized. While God is organically bound up with the universe, the Absolute is not."¹ "God who is the creator, sustainer and judge of the world, is not totally unrelated to the Absolute. God is the Absolute from the human end. When we limit down the Absolute to its relation to the actual possibility, the Absolute appears as the supreme Wisdom, Love and Goodness. . . . We call the supreme the Absolute, when we view it apart from the cosmos. The Absolute is the pre-cosmic nature of God, and God is the Absolute from the cosmic point of view."² "The Hindu is aware of the fundamental problem and as early as the period of the Upaniṣads we find attempts to reconcile the doctrine of the changeless perfection of the Absolute with the conviction that God is also responsible for the changing world." "The way in which the relation between the Absolute and God is here indicated is not the same as that either of Śaṅkara or of Bradley, though it has apparent similarities to their doctrines. While the Absolute is the transcendent divine, God is the cosmic divine. While the Absolute is the total reality, God is the Absolute from the cosmic end, the consciousness that informs and sustains the world. God is, so to say, the genius of the world, its ground, which as a thought or possibility of the Absolute lies beyond the world in the universal consciousness of the Absolute. The possibilities or the ideal forms are the mind of the Absolute or the thoughts of the Absolute. One of the infinite possibilities is being translated into space and time. Even as the world is a definite manifestation of the specific possibility of the Absolute, God with whom the worshipper stands in personal relation is the very Absolute in the world context and is not a mere appearance of the Absolute."³ "The Absolute is joy; God is love. Joy is a self-existent reality, an absolute which does not depend on objects but only on itself."⁴

The gist of all these quotations is that God is not mere appearance of the Absolute as in Śaṅkara and Bradley, but is the very Absolute viewed from a particular point of view. The Absolute as pure is the matrix of infinite possibilities, of which one is actualized. When the Absolute is viewed from this actuality, it is God. But viewed apart from the actuality, it is the Absolute. That is, from this standpoint, God too becomes the Absolute. When we view the Absolute from our finite point of view, it appears to us as organic to ourselves and nature. Then its nature is love, for

¹ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 343.

³ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, pp. 281-2.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 344-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

love implies both duality and unity. But when God is realized by us, when the end is completely achieved, we and our God fade away into the Absolute. That is, God stands only so long as we and our logic stand. But when the object of both is achieved there is only the Absolute, and love is transformed into joy, in which there is no element of duality.

If we are to understand at all, we can understand only logically. As the Absolute is not a tangible object which we can study, what we are to understand must be the world, including ourselves. And this we have to understand as an organic whole. The structure of thought is organic, and consequently it presents the world as an organic whole. God, being organic to the world, must naturally be limited by it. He is a person with all the limitations the idea of personality necessarily involves. Professor Radhakrishnan does not accept Lotze's view of the personality of God, according to which the contrast between self and not-self, which personality implies, is not characteristic of divine personality. "If the being is a positive activity, this activity has meaning only when it is opposed or limited by conditions which are not created by itself. Whether or not the contrast between self and not-self is essential to personality, human or divine, life of a personal being is not possible except in relation to an environment. If God has no environment on which He acts, He cannot be personal. If God is personal. He cannot be the Absolute which has nothing which is not included in it in every possible sense of the word."¹ "In the course of the cosmic process, God accepts the element of the given, certain necessities which His will does not approve, though He is struggling to transform them through His creative effort. God appears to be finite in the process though His infinity reveals itself when the world-plan reaches its fulfilment."² "God can only be a creative personality acting on an environment, which, though dependent on God, is not God. Though the acting of God is not forced on Him from without, still it is limited by the activities of human individualities. The personality of God is possible only with reference to a world with its imperfections and capacity for progress. In other words, the being of a personal God is dependent on the existence of created order. God depends on creation even as creation depends on God."³

But if the Absolute is the only truth, how does the world come to be? Professor Radhakrishnan says that the world comes to be

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 282. ² *Op. cit.* ³ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

in and through the act of self-assertion by the divine self, the assertion being of the form "I am." But the moment the I is affirmed, the infinitude of non-being makes its appearance and confronts the I. At this stage we have God and the World facing each other. But the alienation between the two has to be overcome, the Not-I has to return to the I. The I in the process of return becomes a Me. And "when the created and the creator coincide God lapses into the Absolute."¹ If it is asked, Why does this Not-I appear when the I is asserted, Professor Radhakrishnan's answer is that it is Māyā, a mystery.

But this world is not unreal or pure non-being. Professor Radhakrishnan seems to be inclined towards viewing it as both being and non-being. "The being of which we have experience is not absolute being. Whatever falls short in any degree of absolute reality has in it admixture of non-being. In and through this mental hostility, the world exists. If there were no non-being, there would be no being."² This view reminds us of Plato and Hegel. It also shows that the modern interpreters of the Vedānta are prone to understand Māyā more as being and non-being after Hegel and Plato than as neither being nor non-being after Śaṅkara. That Professor Radhakrishnan, after a critical estimate of Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā, prefers the view that it both "is" and "is not," shows that he is dissatisfied with Śaṅkara's connotation.

How does Professor Radhakrishnan try to relate God to the Absolute positively, for not doing which he criticizes Śaṅkara? It is through his doctrine of intuition. God is the truth for our intellect, the Absolute for our intuition. Yet intuition is higher than intellect. And so its deliverance must supersede those of the intellect. There are various forms of knowledge: intellect, intuition, instinct, etc. Of all these, intuition occupies the highest place. Intuition is integral experience, intellect is discursive knowledge. Intellect involves the distinction between subject and object; in intuition the two are one. Yet intuition is not the same as imagination, in which too, one may say, knowing and the object known are identical. "The reality of the object is what distinguishes intuitive knowledge from mere imagination."³ "If the term 'knowledge' is restricted to what is communicable, what can be expressed in formulas and propositions, then intuitive insight as ineffable and non-propositional is not knowledge. But certainty

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 283.

² *Op. cit.*

³ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 143.

and non-communicability are the true test of knowledge, and intuitive experience has this test of assurance and certainty, and therefore is a species of knowledge."¹ It is not also instinct, though instinct has the directness and unity of intuitive knowledge, for intuition is conscious like the intellect.²

Yet intellect and intuition are not separate and discontinuous. "There is no break of continuity between intuition and intellect. In moving from intellect to intuition, we are not moving in the direction of unreason, but are getting into the deepest rationality of which human nature is capable." "Intuitive knowledge is not non-rational; it is only non-conceptual. It is rational intuition in which immediacy and mediacy are comprehended."³ In short, intuition is the basis and is presupposed by the intellect. "As it is the response of the whole man to reality, it involves the activity of reason also. The truths of intuition are led up to by the understanding and can be translated into the language of the understanding, though they are clearly intelligible only to those who already in some measure have immediate apprehension of them. Intuition is not independent but emphatically dependent upon thought and is immanent in the very nature of our thinking."⁴ "The proof of the validity of our intuitive knowledge is somewhat similar to Kant's proof of *a priori* elements. We cannot think them away. Their opposites are inconceivable. We cannot disbelieve them and remain intellectual. They belong to the very structure of our mind."⁵

Just as intellect and intuition are not different, but one is the completion of the other, the Absolute is not different from God but is his completion. The relation between the two is positive, but not negative.

There seems to be another line of thought running through Professor Radhakrishnan's account of intuition and his criticism of Rāmānuja, which is aimed at positively relating the Absolute to God and the world. But it is more or less an undercurrent and the point is not openly discussed by him with this aim. He finds fault with Rāmānuja for regarding the relation between the Brahman and the world as that of substance and attribute or subject and predicate, and for holding curiously enough that the relation between the two is non-difference and not inherence.⁶

¹ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 145.

² *Ibid.*, p. 153.

³ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 156.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁵ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 268.

⁶ *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 713.

The relation between subject and predicate, whatever that be, is a logical relation. And if logic has to be transcended, then both the terms of the relation must become equal. That is, both must be substances and both must be attributes, both must be subjects and both must be predicates. In other words, the distinction between subject and predicate, substance and attribute must vanish. The experience of such a thing is self-consciousness, in which both subject and predicate, subject and object, substance and attribute, are the self only. Consciousness may be regarded as the attribute, but it is the attribute of itself. Similarly, it may be regarded as the object, yet it is the object of itself. And this self-consciousness is the highest intuition.¹ The ideas out of which this line of thinking can be developed are there in Indian philosophy, though the argument was not advanced in this way. But it has been clearly developed in Western idealism. Professor Radhakrishnan, as the master of both the Western and Indian philosophies, could not have been uninfluenced by it. This argument is clearly positive, not negative. He himself says that the world which is at first a Not-I returns to the I and becomes one with it.² But what is the nature of the experience when the Not-I becomes the I? Surely, it is self-consciousness.

Professor Radhakrishnan believes that no *jīva* can attain salvation, unless and until all the other *jīvas* of the universe obtain their salvation. This view is held by some of the followers of Śaṅkara; and though the Mahāyāna Buddhism does not maintain that it is impossible for a *jīva* to attain salvation apart from the others, it exhorts all the enlightened ones not to enter Nirvāṇa until they see that the rest of the creation too is enlightened. However, all the followers of Śaṅkara do not accept the doctrine of the simultaneous salvation of creation. According to those who hold the view, Īśvara is the Brahman limited by Māyā and the *jīva* is the same limited by a product or part of Māyā, sometimes called Avidyā. There are further differences of view, but our point can be clear even if we do not dwell upon them. The main point is that what constitutes the *jīva* is a product or a part of Māyā, which enters into the constitution of Īśvara. Īśvara has to continue so long as the world lasts. So when a *jīva* overcomes his share of Māyā, he enters Īśvara only and continues there so long as Īśvara continues. That is, only his separateness from Īśvara is cancelled. But Īśvara has to continue so long as there is

¹ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 139. ² *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 283.

a single jīva with his part of Māyā, that is, until all the jīvas are liberated. So no jīva can obtain final *mukti* until all the other jīvas obtain it. Hence it is possible and necessary for the enlightened jīvas to help the unenlightened in their struggle for liberation. But the other followers of Śaṅkara say that this view need not be true; for the mysterious principle of Māyā can vanish with reference to the liberated jīva, while continuing to work with reference to those in bondage. And some of the followers of Śaṅkara do not admit Īśvara at all. Professor Radhakrishnan writes: "We find a large number of passages in Śaṅkara which indicate that while the released soul attains at the very moment of release a universality of spirit, it yet retains its individuality as a centre of action as long as the cosmic process continues. The loss of individuality happens only when the world is redeemed, when the multiple values figured in it are achieved. The world fulfils itself by self-destruction. The freed soul, so long as the cosmic process continues, participates in it and returns to embodied existence not for its own sake but for the sake of the whole."¹ In a way we may say that this view is a corollary from Radhakrishnan's view of God. The world cannot become one with the Absolute until it and God, the created and the creator, become identical. So long as the world lasts, God must continue to be God, and the jīva, as the creature of God, must remain with God until the latter enters the Absolute. But God can enter the Absolute only when there is no world, that is, when there are no more unliberated jīvas.

Now we may raise some points of controversy in order to fix the position of Professor Radhakrishnan. There is similarity between the positions of Tagore and Radhakrishnan. Both admit the Absolute beyond all description, and maintain that our interest is greater in this world and in the Absolute as connected with this world than in the Absolute as unconnected with the world. But Tagore's standpoint is that of a poet, while that of Radhakrishnan is that of a logician. The former's position is personalistic absolutism or, we may say, humanistic absolutism; for his religion is that of a poet, and he wants to humanize the Absolute and regard it as a person, and contends that human beings cannot understand the Absolute otherwise, though an impersonal Absolute may be logically true. The latter's position is logical or intellectualistic absolutism; his religion is that of the

¹ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 306.

intellect, and he wants to intellectualize the Absolute and treat it as God who is a person, and contends that our intellect cannot understand the Absolute otherwise, though an impersonal Absolute, which is beyond the reach of the intellect and is the object of intuition, is true. Both Tagore and Radhakrishnan are mystics, in that both feel the need and possibility of transcending theism and of absorption in the Absolute. Both regard our finite experience as both being and non-being, and this is the view of Dr. Bhagavan Das also. Not that all Indian systems treated the world as unreal. Many Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava systems treat it as real and as containing no element of unreality. But only a very few Indian systems view it as both real and unreal. The Advaita of Śaṅkara and the Mādhyamika of Nāgārjuna regard it as neither being nor non-being. Evidently these three contemporary thinkers are influenced in this conception of theirs by Western thought, especially by that of Hegel and the Hegelians. But we should not forget that the idea is not absolutely new to Indian thought.

Anyway, the God of Tagore is the truth of love and that of Radhakrishnan is the truth of logic. Not that the latter does not teach *bhakti* or love. He writes: "Salvation comes from the grace of God through *bhakti* or trust in God, and surrender to him. In all true religion we have faith in and experience of a living God who saves and redeems us from our sins. The love of God is more central than either his wisdom or his sovereignty."¹ But as a metaphysician, he thinks that logic can give the same truth. Even this much of faith in logic Tagore does not have.² Radhakrishnan, too, holds that logic has to be transcended. But what, according to him, can be given by logic, namely, the organic unity of God and the world, cannot be the result of logic according to Tagore.

Further, Professor Radhakrishnan has incorporated a kind of meliorism into his philosophy. He does not say that the finite soul effects the amelioration, but that God himself does it. God is really infinite, but appears to be finite until the world plan reaches its fulfilment; and during the process, he struggles to transform the imperfect world into the perfect. And as the liberated jīva cannot immediately become the Absolute but remains with God until all the jīvas are liberated, it is in his interest that he helps the liberation of the other jīvas. We have therefore to note that Professor Radhakrishnan's is a special kind of meliorism and not that of James. For the former's God is really infinite and success

¹ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 340.

² *Creative Unity*, p. 13.

is sure; while the God of James is finite and success is not guaranteed. So in Radhakrishnan, meliorism is only a passing phase. His theory of *sarvamukti*, we see, is of a piece with this view.

Does Professor Radhakrishnan's Absolute include the world or exclude it? The question has to be raised because he says that the Supreme considered apart from the world is the Absolute. He writes: "We may distinguish between God as distinct from the lesser spirits who derive their being from him and the Absolute which comprehends all conceivable existence. God, spirits and matter are the Absolute, and not God alone. Yet Rāmānuja identifies God with the Absolute, besides which and beyond which nothing exists."¹ In this criticism of Rāmānuja we find that the Absolute must include the world. That it must include the world seems also to be the motive of Radhakrishnan's criticism of Śaṅkara, that there is little of positive relation between the Absolute and the world in his system. The same motive seems to be at the basis of his viewing the world as both being and non-being. The world may be infinite non-being at first, but it is gradually turned into being through absorption by God. And as the world is neither completely the same as, nor absolutely alien to God, who is in organic relation with it, it is both being and non-being. Thus in Professor Radhakrishnan, we have three ontological levels, the level of being, that of being and non-being, and that of only non-being. For Śaṅkara, these levels are that of being, that of what is neither being nor non-being, and that of pure non-being. The difference between Śaṅkara and Radhakrishnan is evidently due to the difference in their conceptions of Māyā. What we say of Radhakrishnan holds true also of Tagore and Dr. Bhagavan Das, as the conception of Māyā of all the three is the same.

If, now, the Absolute is to include the world, how is this inclusion to be understood? Rāmānuja says that the world is the *viśeṣaṇa* or attribute or the body of God, and God is therefore in organic relation with it. Professor Radhakrishnan's God corresponds to the Absolute of Rāmānuja, and the former wants to transcend God. But by transcending God, the Absolute appears to leave the world out. Professor Radhakrishnan's language is somewhat vague here. Anyway, by being the principle of unity of the world God appears to include it. If what we say is true, then God must be richer than the Absolute. We are here reminded of

¹ *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 714.

Bosanquet's view expressed in his *Meeting of Extremes* that reality would be the richer for including unrealities like the objects of imagination, illusion, etc. But then are we to maintain that God is richer than the Absolute, and that the Absolute need not include the world? Professor Radhakrishnan concludes his *Idealistic View of Life* by saying that the Supreme considered apart from the world is the Absolute, and considered in relation to the world is God. But if the Absolute is to be considered apart from the world, is it to be considered to be poorer than God? Can it be really apart from the world? If it is really apart from the world, how are we to reconcile with this view the criticism of Rāmānuja that he identifies merely God with the Absolute, which must include both spirits and matter?

Professor Radhakrishnan's meaning seems to be that the way in which Rāmānuja tries to include spirits and matter in the Absolute is not satisfactory. The relation between these and God is that of subject and predicate, body and soul. So the inclusion is not complete. There is still alienation between the two terms. The spirits and matter, which comprise the body of God, should be so transformed as to become equal to their soul; so that there would be complete transparency between the two and the distinction would disappear.

If we are to understand the point thus, how are we to reconcile it with the statement that the Absolute is the Supreme considered apart from the world? Really, the Absolute is not apart from the world, but the world is absorbed in it. On this point Professor Radhakrishnan is clear. He says that, when the created and the creator become one, God lapses into the Absolute. So his meaning must be that the Absolute, which is pure, does not include the world so long as it retains its alien nature; but the world cannot be the world unless it retains this nature. If it is transformed and becomes pure like the Absolute, it ceases to be the world. So the Absolute does not really exclude the world; on the other hand, the world is assimilated to the Absolute. The point whether and how the Absolute includes the world is not discussed at length in Professor Radhakrishnan's writings. But what we say must be his meaning, if his statements that the supreme considered apart from the world is the Absolute and that the Absolute should include the world, have to be reconciled.

If the Absolute as pure cannot include the world as impure, can the relation between the two be wholly positive? Probably it

is the feeling that it cannot be wholly positive which is at the back of Radhakrishnan's assertion that the Absolute is the Supreme considered apart from the world. It would be no mystery if the Absolute creates the world by transforming itself, just as milk produces curd. The Absolute does not work even like a catalytic agent. It is also the material cause of the world, because there is nothing else than the Absolute to be the material cause. The mystery of creation lies in the Absolute creating the world while remaining itself unchanged in its perfection. The Absolute is apart from the world; yet it is the material, the substance, of the world. But we have no adequate example of this relation at our empirical stage. If the question is asked, What is the relation between the world and the Absolute? we have to come back to the answer of Śaṅkara that the Absolute is not the world as such. This negative relation, which Professor Radhakrishnan is trying to remove, seems to be unavoidable. If it is driven out of our system by one gate, it enters by another. Yet this negative relation does not imply that the world and the Absolute are different entities. The Absolute eternally includes the world in its transformed nature or in its essential nature. But after all, Professor Radhakrishnan's assertion that the Absolute is the Supreme considered apart from the world is only a way of speaking, and we are perhaps not to take it literally. There is no considering the Absolute apart from the world; the world simply disappears by being transformed and absorbed. The world may be one of the infinite possibilities turned actual that can be expected out of the Absolute. But this world owes its actuality to the Absolute. The being of the world is the being of the Absolute; and so its actuality is the actuality of the latter. The Absolute is not a source of mere possibilities, but of actualities as well. There is nothing other than the Absolute that can make one of the possibilities turn into an actuality. Actuality is due to it and is within it; and so it can never be considered apart from actuality. If any separation is made between the two, Professor Radhakrishnan's assertion that intellect and intuition are not separate but that one leads to the other will be contradicted. The difference between the Absolute and God is not even a question of two view-points in the sense of two perspectives. For then another difficulty will arise. If God and the world are due to our intellectual view-point, then the question will be asked how we could have appeared at all if God did not come to be at first. But it is said that God and the

world are due to *our* intellect. And it would be difficult to extricate ourselves from the circle.

It would be unfair and groundless to say that Professor Radhakrishnan definitely held the view criticized. He is not definite here. And we give the two alternative interpretations in order to show the difficulties in one. The Absolute should not be regarded as literally apart from the world. The world is not different from the Absolute, just as a bangle is not different from the gold of which it is made. Yet one is not the same as the other; there is a negative relation between the two. For the gold is not affected, even though the bangle is destroyed and made into some other ornament. The difference between the Absolute and the world is the difference of the perfect and the imperfect, the complete and the incomplete. And Professor Radhakrishnan means this difference and not separateness.

But now, what is the world with reference to the Absolute? Śaṅkara's answer, in brief, is that the Absolute is the real, but the world, though experienced by us, is neither real nor unreal. Śaṅkara does not say that the world is unreal; for, if it is real or unreal, it cannot be identified with the Absolute, which is its basis. And only because we identify the world with the Absolute, that is, with Reality, do we treat the former as real in our ordinary experience. The Absolute can be understood positively as the unity of the subject and the object; in it the object is sublimated and assimilated to the subject, when the world is transformed into the full being of the Absolute. But this unity or full being of the Absolute is eternal. As intuition, it is the basis of the intellect. That is why the realization of the Brahman is sometimes said to be recognition, not only by the Śaiva Advaita or Pratyabhijñā-vāda but also by many followers of Śaṅkara. But then, how are we to understand the relation between such an eternally perfect Brahman and the world? If the Brahman is something which results from perfecting the world, it can be understood only in positive terms. But if it is eternally present even during the perfecting process and is not a result to be brought about, then it is also an other to the Brahman. Yet it cannot be a different entity from the Brahman. The existence or *sattā* of the world is the existence or *sattā* of the Brahman. The world does not have a separate existence from that of the Brahman. When we experience the world we do not experience the Brahman as such. That is, we mistake the world for the truth which is the Brahman. If the

world were real, this identification could not have been made; nor could it have been made if it were unreal. In the same act of cognition, two things which are real, or one of which is real and the other unreal, cannot be identified and perceived as one. For this reason, Śaṅkara regards the world neither as real nor as unreal. Hence, with reference to the Brahman, the world can be understood only in negative terms. For the finite individual, the Brahman is positively achieved; for only when the finite is transformed into the infinite, can the Brahman be realized. This means that the relation between the finite and the Brahman in the direction from the finite to the Brahman is positive; while, in the opposite direction, it can be understood only in negative terms as neither is nor is not, as neither real nor unreal, and so forth. Or viewing it from another side, the finite implies the Brahman and therefore the relation from the lower to the higher is positive; but the Brahman does not imply any finite in particular and so the relation in the reverse direction can be understood only in negative terms. Of course, unreality is not the only opposite to reality, just as impossibility is not the only opposite of possibility. Unreality is what is admittedly unreal, just as impossibility is what openly contradicts the nature of reality. The possible is that the conditions for the existence of which are only partly known to be real and partly not known at all. And the not possible is therefore that no conditions for the existence of which are known, while the impossible is that the conditions for the existence of which openly come into conflict with the conditions of reality. Similarly, unreality is what is never experienced to be real; and so that which is experienced as real but is not reality cannot be either real or unreal. To understand the world in such negative terms does not mean that the world is a negative entity and has no positive nature of its own. All the advaitins treat *Māyā* as a *bhāvapadārtha* or a positive entity and not as an *abhāvapadārtha* or a negative entity. It means that we have to suspend our judgment about the reality or unreality of the world. Only what is neither can be mistaken for reality and can be experienced as reality, though it is not real. The same point can be understood in another way. The Brahman is the unity of the manifold. For any finite, it is the result of an effort, the result of a struggle. If there is a finite, there is also the infinite presupposed by the finite. But starting from the infinite, we have no grounds to say that it presupposes any finite. Thus our thought proceeds here only one

way, presupposition holds here only in one direction. This is so wherever the consequent is a unity of a manifold. For instance, death can be inferred from the taking of potassium cyanide, but from death the taking of potassium cyanide cannot be inferred. Every cause of death is possible, but nothing in particular can be asserted as actual. That is why it is said by Professor Radhakrishnan that the world is one of the infinite number of possibilities actualized. But from the Absolute this actuality cannot be inferred, because it is not particularly presupposed. And the possibilities from it are infinite, and so beyond our powers of inference. The systematization therefore which our thought adopts here is only a one-way systematization. The other way leads only to fallacies and contradictions.

Thus both the positive and negative moments are indispensable to absolutism. This does not mean, as Dr. Bhagavan Das, Hegel, etc., want to make out, that the Absolute itself contains both the moments. It is our system of philosophy that contains them. Professor Radhakrishnan's chief contribution to Indian absolutism is his making it clear that the Absolute can be reached positively, and not merely negatively as many orthodox advaitins seem to hold; and that reaching the Absolute positively does not contradict the main Advaita thesis. And he contends, not without justification, that Śaṅkara's writings themselves contain passages which depict the positive relation between the world and the Brahman. He seems to feel, like Tagore, that the emphasis which the general Advaita tradition lays on the negative relation between the Brahman and the world has a harmful influence on the outlook of the Indian mind. It created an indifference to the values of the world and a passivity that bred gloom. He thinks that spirituality does not mean escape from the world and its values but the transformation of them into spirit. Such an escape produces in our minds a sense of duality and so fear, but not unity, which is strength and fearlessness born of the knowledge of truth.

VIII

CONTEMPORARY IDEALISM—*Continued*

I

HIRALAL HALDAR

Professor Hiralal Haldar, sometime George V Professor of Philosophy in the University Arts College, Calcutta, was one of the teachers of the College who were best liked by their students. He was one of those who best understood their subject and conscientiously made every attempt to make the students understand it. His favourite subject was Kant, the post-Kantians and the neo-Hegelians. Whatever the students of Calcutta, during his professorship, understood of Kant and Hegel they owe him. And as most of the teachers of the department of philosophy in that university were his students, we shall not be far wrong if we say that it was his understanding of Kant and Hegel that was being transmitted to the students till very recently.

Professor Haldar is more famous for his knowledge of European philosophy, especially its idealism, than for his knowledge of the Indian. Many take him to be a Hegelian, though he does not accept all that Hegel says. Even as early as his *Hegelianism and Personality*, which was his doctorate thesis and which is published as an Appendix to his useful and masterly work *Neo-Hegelianism*, we find him criticizing Hegel. He accepts the latter's Absolute, but maintains that thought does not comprehend the whole of reality, and therefore cannot reveal all its details. "The truth, of course, is that human knowledge is not co-extensive with reality and the categories of Hegel's logic do not furnish a complete exposition of it."¹ As Spinoza tells us, thought is one of the attributes; but it cannot be co-extensive with all the rest. The only attribute we know is matter, and thought is co-extensive with it only. "The really valuable work which Hegel does is to demonstrate that the universe is an orderly and intelligible system with mind at its centre, but this does not mean that we know in detail what its constitution and contents are." Mind is

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 226.

not the only reality. "There is no such thing as an insulated mind contemplating only its internal states."¹ The object is as real as the subject. Each is inseparable from the other. It is true that this or that person does not know this or that object. But an object not known by any mind is impossible. Berkeley is right only so far as he emphasizes this aspect of our experience, but he is wrong in concluding that therefore mind alone exists and the objects are its mental states. Subject and object are real only so far as they are related to each other. Apart from their relations, they are mere abstractions. They are continuous with one another and constitute a single whole or unity. Yet they are different from one another. "Unity finds expression in difference and difference has its presupposition in unity. Undifferentiated unity and mere difference are the products of abstract thinking. In the concrete world unity and difference go together."² This unity is ideal and is therefore spirit, of which the world is an expression. This spirit distinguishes itself into the knower and the known, and duality and unity are its eternal and inseparable aspects. This is the Absolute, in which the distinction between subject and object is not lost. So idealism is not inconsistent with realism, for the object here is not treated as a mere state of the subject. But the Absolute too is Mind, though it is the unity of mind and its object. The Absolute Mind is one, but it is not a monadic unity. The finite minds also are real; the infinite is immanent in all of them.

But what is the nature of the object? Are the material things really material or spiritual in their essence? They may be objects of minds, but are they also minds? Dr. Halder maintains that they are minds in their ideal nature³—which means that, though the nature of experience involves always the distinction between mind and its object, the object too is in truth a mind, though it is an object at the same time of another mind. "The many cells that compose the body are the many bodies of the many selves unified in the one mind of the whole body which is the ideality of the body itself. It is a constituent element of the Absolute mind."⁴ The finite minds know just as much as they need of reality. They "carve out only a small section of the whole of reality. The things we experience are not the things as they are in the knowledge of the Absolute but selections made from them for the purposes of life."⁵

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 220.

² *Ibid.*, p. 229.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁵ *Op. cit.*

How is the unity of the Absolute experienced by us? Dr. Haldar says, Both through knowledge and love. He does not seem to feel like Tagore that knowledge has to be transcended before we can experience the unity. "Finite minds necessarily seek to be the infinite that they potentially are. . . . In their ordinary lives and achievements as finite beings in time they are seldom aware of their greatness, but sooner or later they are bound to be conscious of their true nature, to be united with the source of their being in knowledge and love."¹

Dr. Haldar calls his system realistic idealism, because in it mind has no place apart from the object, and the latter is not merely a state of mind. He feels that the two must be essentially identical, but holds that their difference too is as much true. But he does not raise the question, How is the difference to be experienced while the unity is being experienced? The unity may be the presupposition, while the actual experience is that of difference; but can the difference also be a presupposition, while the ultimate unity is being experienced? While we experience the distinction between the subject and the object at our finite level, some reflection reveals to us that unity is presupposed. But when the unity is the object of our experience, there can be nothing to reveal to us this difference. Further, if the Absolute contains within itself more than thought and its object; and if we do not know what that more is; we have really no grounds to say that, even after the thought and its object are fused into a unity, the distinction is retained. Unless we are confident that thought is co-extensive with the rest of the Absolute, and that the deliverance of thought is final, we cannot reasonably maintain that the distinction between the subject and the object is retained in the Absolute. But if we defend such co-extensiveness, we have to give up our position and accept Hegel's view that human knowledge is co-extensive with reality—which Dr. Haldar is not prepared to do. Then if our knowledge or thought cannot comprehend the whole of reality; though it presupposes the unity of the whole, the experience of that whole cannot be of the form of our knowledge or thought, which is discursive. It must be an integral experience in which thought is transcended. And where thought is transcended we have no grounds to say that the distinctions of our finite experience are retained.

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 232.

II

K. C. BHATTACHARYA

Professor K. C. Bhattacharya is known as a keen logician, and some who are in personal touch with him regard him as an original thinker. But unfortunately his works are not many, and no philosopher's originality can be adequately appreciated from a few articles and lectures. The significance of any new idea can be understood only when it is worked out in many of its details; but Professor Bhattacharya is averse to writing and publishing. Besides, even what he has written is not easy to read, and he makes little attempt to make his ideas understandable; so that many are repelled by his writings and leave them with the suspicion that they are being mystified. Though to adopt this attitude to his writings is not fair, yet one feels that the author could have made them less taxing to the sincere reader. In his style, as Dr. D. M. Datta says, he is just the opposite of Professor Radhakrishnan. While the latter's style is engaging, perspicuous, flowing and diffuse, the former is deterring, obscure, stiff and gnomic. Yet one who has the patience and perseverance to read and understand them will find that his ideas are not without value and importance. Though his peculiar standpoint as given in *The Subject as Freedom*, a small book comprising some lectures delivered by him, is not quite clear, yet it is made more understandable in his contribution to *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*.

Professor K. C. Bhattacharya is an advaitin; but like many other contemporary advaitins, he orients his thought to Western philosophy. He develops his ideas through a criticism of Kant. He is dissatisfied with the so-called agnosticism of Kant about the Ideas of Reason. To them none of the categories of the understanding is applicable, and therefore they are unknowable. The Ideas are postulated only as heuristic principles to regulate and systematize our experience; and they can never be thought of as constituting our experience. The I, the World as an object, and the Supreme Being as the sum-total of existence are neither known nor knowable.

It is at this point that Professor Bhattacharya joins issue with Kant. Do not the Upaniṣads and the Advaita based on the Upaniṣads declare that the highest aim of our life is the realization of the Supreme I or Ego, the Absolute or Brahman? Of all the knowables, they ought to be known. If they are not knowable,


would the Upaniṣads have declared them to be the most important of the knowables? True, they are not known by us, finite minds that we are. But still it is possible to know them; they are possible objects of knowledge. We *can* know them; otherwise the Upaniṣads would not have said that we *ought* to know them. Further, is not every man conscious of his ego or the I? Otherwise, how can he use the I with reference to himself? Professor Bhattacharya therefore maintains that the epistemological question should be re-opened. He writes: "With regard to the knowability of the self as a metaphysical entity, Kant holds that the self is a necessity of thought and is the object of moral faith, but is not itself knowable. My position is, on the one hand, that the self is unthinkable and on the other, that while actually it is not known and is only an object of faith, though not necessarily of moral faith, we have to admit the possibility of knowing it without *thinking*, there being a demand, alternative with other spiritual demands, to realize such knowledge. This is practically re-opening the epistemological question of the meaning of thought and knowledge."¹

Professor Bhattacharya differentiates between thinking and knowing, and holds that, though the self is unthinkable, it is knowable. "In taking the self to be unthinkable, I understand Kant's Idea of Reason to be not only not knowledge, but not even thought in the literal sense. The so-called extension of thought beyond experience and the possibility of experience mean to me only the use of the verbal form of thought as a symbol of unthinkable reality, such symbolizing use not being thinking." So according to him, any thinking about the I and the Absolute is only symbolic or verbal thinking and not real or literal thinking. And the Upaniṣadic statement that the self is beyond speech is interpreted by him as that it cannot be literally thought; for it is quite a common fact that we do speak and use words about the self and the Absolute. We have words even for falsities and superstitions, to say nothing of the self and the Absolute.

Speech is always symbolic, because words are not things. So everything true or false, real or unreal, subjective or objective is speakable. And it is with the speakable that philosophy should start. "The three believed contents—the subject, the positive freedom of the subject and the meant object—are all speakable and it is from the speakable that we have to start in philosophy."²

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 65. ² *The Subject as Freedom*, p. 24.

According to Professor Bhattacharya, there are four grades of the speakable. There is the primary distinction between what is only symbolically speakable and what is literally speakable. The literally speakable comprises what is spoken of as information and what is only spoken and not spoken of. Of these what is only spoken is spoken either as symbolized or as meant. Truth is only symbolically spoken, reality is literally spoken as symbolized and the self-subsistent is literally spoken as meant. None of these is spoken of as information, while fact is spoken of as information.¹ This classification or grading of the speakable is overlapping. And anyway, the distinction between what is symbolically speakable and literally speakable does not seem to be primary. If it were, the symbolically speakable should not have been classed under what is only spoken as an alternative of what is meant. As it is given in the passage, the classification would be as follows:



In this what is the difference between the symbolically speakable and the spoken as symbolized? Professor Bhattacharya is not clear on this point. As regards the difference between what is spoken and what is spoken of, he writes: "The self-evident is spoken, but is not spoken of. Of what is only spoken and contains a necessary reference to the speaking of it there are three forms as it is spoken in the objective, subjective or transcendental attitude."² The I, for instance, is self-evident, it is only spoken but not spoken of. And we may have three kinds of attitude to what is only spoken. Towards the I we have a subjective attitude; towards the world as a whole we may have an objective attitude;

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, pp. 71-2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 69.

and towards God the transcendental attitude. But any finite fact is spoken of. Professor Bhattacharya writes: "If fact is spoken of and the self-subsistent object is only spoken—both being spoken as meant, reality is spoken not as meant, but as only symbolized."¹ "What is taken as self-subsistent or real is literally spoken and understood. What, however, is taken as true is not literally understood."² These statements are further confusing. One is tempted to ask: Is not reality self-subsistent? If the self-subsistent is spoken of as meant, and if reality is self-subsistent, can it also be spoken of as meant? If, on the other hand, reality is not self-subsistent, can it be reality? If by reality is meant not some ultimate self-subsistent entity, but any finite object, then it would be the same as the fact, of which Professor Bhattacharya says that it is only spoken of. While reading these statements, one does not feel the ground under one's feet. Professor Bhattacharya's use of terms is uncouth and ambiguous. We are not sure of what he means and he never attempts to explain and expound his concepts clearly. For instance, he writes: "Metaphysics is unaware of the distinction between the self-subsistent and the real."³ But then how are we to understand that the former is spoken as meant, while the latter is spoken as symbolized?

About the fact and the self-subsistent, Professor Bhattacharya writes: "Fact and the self-subsistent are both literally spoken and in both the believed content is figured by being spoken. Fact is understood as independent of this figuration while the self-subsistent is presented as constituted by it."⁴ Probably Professor Bhattacharya thinks that the self-subsistent cannot be understood by the finite mind without the words that refer to it and figure it. "When a fact is spoken, there is a peculiar dualism in the understood content of the meant and the believed, the latter being meant as beyond meaning or as perceivable. When a self-subsistent is spoken, the dualism lapses, the meant and the believed being coincident."⁵ The meaning of this passage seems to be that when, for instance, I speak of the pen in my hand, the word means certain attributes which are distinct from the thing in the existence of which I believe. This distinction is necessary, as otherwise the word cannot be used with reference to another pen. In other words, the distinction is similar to that between

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 70.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

² *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

connotation and denotation, predicate and subject, *dharma* or *prākara* and the *dharmi*. But this distinction does not hold in the case of the self-subsistent; for in it the predicate, the connotation or *prākara* does not transcend the thing.

What is the distinction which Professor Bhattacharya makes between truth and reality? He writes: "The positive character of the Absolute, however, is expressible only by the negation of *I* (or more accurately 'what I am not') and as such is not literally expressible at all. If then we say that the Absolute *is*, we mean by *it* not reality but truth. Reality is enjoyed but truth is not."¹ But what is enjoyed, we gather from his writings, is the content of spiritual consciousness. He writes: "The content of spiritual thought is no object, nothing that is contemplated in the objective attitude, being subjective in the sense of being appreciated in the subjective or enjoying attitude."² Again, "where the reference to the subject is no part of the meaning of the object, the object is called fact and is dealt with in science. Philosophy deals with the object that is intelligible only with reference to the subject. . . . The object that has necessary reference to the speaking of it is the self-subsistent object for philosophy."³ Further, "in the consciousness of 'I am,' one appreciates the objective attitude of judgment as distinct from the enjoying attitude and understands it to be assumed only as a necessary make-believe."⁴ In all these statements we find that it is the *I* and the contents that are enjoyed. And also remembering S. Alexander's use of the term enjoyment, we may guess that for Bhattacharya reality means the *I* and its contents. It is Kant's first Idea of Reason. There is also another statement. "Reality is still literally speakable and may be taken to depend on the speaking for its revelation, though the speaking (which means the *I*) is not there empty subjectivity."⁵ This also shows that reality is the *I*, and is self-evident.

While reality is the *I* and its content, truth is the Absolute. "The absolute is not the same as the overpersonal reality that is enjoyed in religion. It means what the subject *I* is not, but the reality of religious experience while it is enjoyed and symbolized by *I* does not mean such theoretic negation of *I*."⁶ That is, the *I* and the Absolute are different. Now, while reality is literally spoken and understood, though not as meant but as symbolized—for in the case of the *I* there cannot be a distinction between

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 84.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

the meant attributes and the I—truth is not literally spoken or understood. "It is an entity that cannot be understood as it is believed, and is speakable only by way of symbolism."¹ Yet Professor Bhattacharya regards it as self-revealing. "What is believed in and understood as literally unspeakable may be said to be self-revealing."² One is tempted to raise here the question: If truth is self-revealing like reality or I, why is it not literally speakable? Further, is the Absolute meant or not? That is, is there not here the duality of meaning and the thing meant? Again, is not the Absolute self-subsistent? Or to go to the root of the matter, what exactly does Professor Bhattacharya mean by truth? He writes: "The Absolute is conceived rigorously as truth in (Advaita) Vedānta."³ But does not the Advaita also conceive it as Self? What is the real difference between reality and truth? And is that difference clear-cut? We do not find an answer to these questions in Professor Bhattacharya's writings; and without an answer to them, we cannot appreciate his position well.

The general definition Professor Bhattacharya gives of the self-subsistent is: "The object that has necessary reference to the speaking of it is the self-subsistent object of philosophy."⁴ But then, all the three ideas are in a way self-subsistent. Strictly, of course, the Absolute or the third Idea only of Reason can be self-subsistent. However, all the three are spoken but not spoken of. Truth is spoken, only symbolically not literally. Reality is spoken literally but not meant. The third is spoken literally but also meant. It is Kant's second Idea, the Idea of rational cosmology. "Object is what is meant including the object of sense-perception and all contents that have necessary reference to it. Object as meant is distinguished from the subject or the subjective of which there is some awareness other than the meaning awareness."⁵ That is, both the ordinary object and the Idea of rational cosmology are objects; but the former is spoken of while the latter is only spoken, though both are meant.

To give the classification in a different way, it is somewhat like this. There is at first the division of things into those spoken of and those only spoken. The first are the finite objects and the second the three Ideas of Reason. There is again the division between the meant and the unmeant or symbolized. The first group consists of the finite objects and the Idea of rational cos-

¹ *Op. cit.*⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77.² *Op. cit.*⁵ *The Subject as Freedom*, p. 1.³ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

mology, and second group the transcendental Ego and God. There is again the division between the literally speakable and the symbolically speakable. The first group consists of the finite objects and the first two Ideas of Reason; under the second division comes only the Absolute. What seems to be confusing in this division is that the ego is literally speakable but only as symbolized and not as meant; and in it both the symbolic and the literal speakings seem to overlap. This is perhaps due to the fact that in the judgment "I am" the I is literally spoken and the Am is symbolically spoken, according to Professor Bhattacharya. But in the judgment "The Absolute is," both the subject and the Is are symbolic.

The difficulty in understanding Professor Bhattacharya's meaning and classification of the speakable is largely due to the fact that he does not take into consideration the symbolic nature of all speech. Bradley tells us that every idea is a symbol; and we shall not be wrong in saying that, at least, every word is a symbol. The I, therefore, like the Absolute, is a symbol. And so far as speaking or communication is concerned, there is no difference between these symbols. It is true that the word is used by me with reference to my self only. But a similar self may be meant by me when I say He. When I say, "He is beating a dog," the He may refer to a finite physical thing, for immediately my imagination brings before me the picture of a physical body using a cane. But when I say, "He thinks that he is imaginative," I mean a mind similar to mine. There is certainly a difference in attitude or direction between the two. But this difference belongs to the ideas, and to the words only through the ideas. We do not come to such distinctions until we come to ideas and therefore to thought. Professor Bhattacharya could have drawn a clear distinction between speaking and thinking. For instance, he says: "'Object is' is no judgment, being tautologous as a judgment and 'I am' is no judgment because 'am' is only symbolism, but both are literally spoken because the subject is literally understood as positive. But the sentence 'the absolute self is' is not only no judgment but is not even literally spoken. Still it is not meaningless, and symbolizes what is positively believed, viz. truth. What is believed and is not literally speakable is truth."¹

Now to explain the passage. We can understand that "Object is" is a tautology; because, according to Professor Bhattacharya,

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 71.

the *Is* means objectivity, and to predicate objectivity of an object is a tautology. We can also understand why "*I am*" is not a judgment for Professor Bhattacharya. He writes: "In a judgment proper, the word '*is*' expresses only the objective attitude of the subject, but in this apparent judgment, '*is*' means an objective content which is self-subsistent but not fact. To express or formulate this content is still to retain the objective attitude. This attitude is explicitly dropped in saying '*I am*.' The content here is spoken and not spoken of, but it is explicitly understood as not objective or symbolized objectivity."¹ That is, the *Am* in '*I am*' is only a symbol of objectivity, which is probably wrongly attached to the *I*. In fact the *I* is not objective and therefore the *Am* stands here only for spurious objectivity, which is only a make-believe.

Here Professor Bhattacharya could have raised the question, Why, if the *I* is not objective and the *Am* stands for objectivity, the two are taken together as a judgment and are understood. The objective attitude, however spurious, could not have been identified with the subjective attitude involved in the *I*. It cannot be said that this is an error or a mistake; for according to Professor Bhattacharya himself, the *I* is self-revealing and no error can be committed about what is self-revealing. It seems therefore truer to say that the *Am* stands for existence whether in the judgment "*I am*" or in the judgment "*Object is*." Then "*I am*" would mean that the existence is subjective and "*Object is*" would mean that it is objective. To say that the verb "*to be*" means objectivity is not only opposed to the popular usage, but leads to other difficulties.

However, the above distinctions which Professor Bhattacharya makes are possible only when we deal with ideas and not with words. All speech is symbolic, and no distinction should have been made between the literally speakable and the symbolically speakable, between what is spoken of and what is only spoken, etc. The *I*, like the *That*, is a demonstrative and has direct reference to things. The *I* can be used by a person only for himself, while he can use the *That* with reference to a number of things. But difference can be introduced into the *I* also, if we introduce differences of time. And we are able to discuss all this, only because the *I* and the *This* are used as ideas, however different they may be from ideas like that of a horse. The *I* is a demonstrative in the subjective attitude, and the *That* in the objective

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 69.

attitude. Still they have a meaning, though, when the words are used, it cannot be detached from the things meant. That is, in their demonstrative reference, they are generally not used as predicates.

Of the four speakables, the first or the finite object is dealt with in science, and the other three are dealt with in philosophy. We therefore have a philosophy of the object, a philosophy of the subject, and a philosophy of truth.¹ In his *Subject as Freedom*, Professor Bhattacharya calls the philosophy of the subject transcendental psychology. "The facthood of the knowing function and of subjective function in general is believed though not known and is elaborated into a system of symbolisms in a new philosophical study which may be called spiritual or transcendental psychology."² "Kant's critical philosophy may be taken as a disguised form of spiritual psychology as thus conceived. The elaboration of the three modes of belief—theoretic, practical and aesthetic—is transcendental psychology, the spiritual equivalent offered by him for dogmatic metaphysic."³ Here Professor Bhattacharya tends to view philosophy, or at least a part of it, as transcendental psychology. And we see the tendency to prove, by the method advocated in what is called transcendental psychology, what is disproved in the metaphysics of Kant. And this transcendental psychology we find to be a descriptive study of our thought and its ideas with reference to the three transcendental objects, which Kant calls the Ideas of Reason. But we have to note that the occasion for such a study arises at all, only when we believe in their truth. And before we begin the exposition of this psychology, it is binding on us to prove their truth. But Professor Bhattacharya seems to have assumed their truth. Or does he think that they are above metaphysical dispute? For instance, he tells us that the I is above metaphysical dispute, because it cannot be "meant" by the word I.⁴ Does he hold the same or a similar view about the other Ideas of Reason? If philosophy, as Professor Bhattacharya tells us, is a self-elaboration of the self-evident, then there ought to be no metaphysical dispute about them also. But are the three Ideas really self-evident? We may say that almost all the metaphysical disputes are about these three Ideas. Apart from the question whether they are "meant" or "meant as unmeant" only, there are many who feel

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, pp. 69 and 73.

² P. 27.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁴ *The Subject as Freedom*, p. 17.

that their truth must be proved before one begins a psychological study of our minds' relation to them. Many people believe superstitiously in many things; and we may advocate a study of the relation of their minds to those objects. But these two studies cannot be the same. If it is proved that our ordinary thinking involves those Ideas, and when through self-analysis it is discovered that they are so involved, one may raise the question of the epistemological or psychological study of the relation of subject and object at that level. Another point we have to note is that, at this level, it is extremely difficult and even impossible to separate this psychological study from the study of the nature of analysis or criticism by which the three Ideas so implicit are discovered.

There is another point, and a very important one, we have to note in this connection. The I which is one of the three Ideas is not, for Kant, the empirical I which one may be said to be easily aware of. But Professor Bhattacharya, when he says that it is self-evident, that it is not meant, but "at least meant as un-meant," etc., seems to be referring to the phenomenal ego. The I, as one of the three Ideas, is the noumenal Ego, and is a limiting concept on the subjective side. And if it is self-evident, there could have been no dispute about it and its spontaneous activity. We would not have been ignorant of it and its activity, and there would have been no occasion for Kant's *Critique* at all.

Further, when we remember that the three objects are transcendental, we see that there can be here no psychology, but only epistemology. Or we may say that there is here no difference between psychology and epistemology. Nay, we may go further and say that there is here no difference between these two sciences and metaphysics. Metaphysics, even as ontology, is the science of being; and ultimately it is these three Ideas that have to be taken as the source of the being of the world. Whether we take the three Ideas as separate, as some interpreters of Kant want to do, or as finally merging into each other, as the other interpreters take them, we find that all the three are necessary to explain the being of the world.

Professor Bhattacharya wants to restrict the use of the term metaphysics to the study of the cosmological Idea, that is, the World as the object. He writes: "Metaphysics is philosophy of the object and involves theoretic consciousness in the objective attitude. There is properly speaking no metaphysic of the subject

What passes as such is either the metaphysic of the mind understood as a particular type of the object or is no metaphysic but a self-symbolizing form of spiritual activity."¹ The studies of the other two Ideas he calls Philosophy of Spirit and Philosophy of Truth. If this is merely a question of terminology, as every philosopher must be allowed to use terms which he finds convenient and appropriate, none should have any objection. But what troubles the reader is whether Professor Bhattacharya is not treating these, at least the first two, as absolutely separate. He talks of the object as self-subsistent, and says that "the object that has necessary reference to the speaking of it is the self-subsistent object for philosophy"²—which is a contradiction in terms; for how can anything which refers beyond itself be self-subsistent? Such use of words hinders the reader from following the argument. Now, if this object can be understood only with reference to the subject and yet be called self-subsistent, are we not also to say that the self or the subject too is self-subsistent? If both these are self-subsistent, is not the third Idea, namely God or the Absolute, also self-subsistent? Then are the three independent and separate? How are we to meet the objection that the self knows itself only in knowing the object and it can never know itself when it does not know the object? Moreover, how are we to explain Kant's statement that the passage from the first Idea to the second and then to the third is like the process in inference from premises to conclusion? And if the connection between the three Ideas is such, can we separate the three attitudes and say that the first is objective, the second subjective, and the third transcendental? In fact, all the three, as limiting concepts, are transcendental Ideas; and we shall not be wrong in saying that our attitude to all the three is transcendental. Of course, within this attitude some distinctions may be drawn. But they hold only to begin with, and cannot stand ultimately.

One is tempted to raise another question, Is Kant answered? Kant contends that the Ideas are unknowable not on psychological, but on critical grounds. They are unknowable because none of the categories applicable to the ordinary knowable can be applied to them. And he says that a new type of understanding is needed to know them, which he calls the intuitive understanding, and which, he says, God may possess but not we. And if Kant's

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

difficulties are to be solved, they have to be solved only with the help of the idea of the intuitive understanding; that is, by saying that such an understanding is involved and implicit in our own consciousness. Of course, we are not completely identical with it, but it seems to be working within us. Without postulating such an understanding, we cannot explain Kant's problem why the object conforms to our idea and *vice versa*. We have the conviction that, though in some cases they do not, in many they do. And the latter fact implies that the intuitive understanding, which idea can be and has been developed into that of the Absolute, is working within us.

Instead of this method, if we adopt simply the psychological, we can hardly answer Kant. The three Ideas of Reason are not the common objects of the finite mind or self. They are within the depths of its being; they grip it and transcend it. Or in plainer language, they include it. The world as a whole cannot be treated as excluding the mind that is thinking it; the transcendental Ego is what lends the mind the ego-character at all; and the Absolute or God, Kant plainly says, is the sum-total of being, including both the subject and the object. And where the finite mind itself is engulfed, there is hardly any psychological situation. So far as the finite mind is concerned, the three Ideas are heuristic principles, though Kant is wrong in concluding that therefore they do not constitute our experience. They do, and must constitute our experience, as many post-Kantians pointed out. But it is beyond the powers of the finite mind to know how they constitute our experience. In order to know it, the finite mind must transport itself to a stage where it can no longer exist as such. We may, if we like, study the relation of the finite mind to them as only heuristic principles. Then all of them would be nothing more than ideas; and the relation between them and the mind would be that between any idea held as an object and the mind as a subject that holds it.

Professor Bhattacharya's attempt reminds us of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, in which the nature of our consciousness at various levels of experience is studied. But it is not psychology, as the study involves the study also of the change which the object undergoes when it is transformed into an object of a higher stage. It is metaphysics, psychology and epistemology in one. And such a study cannot be otherwise.

A contemporary writer whom we may remember in this con-

nection is the phenomenologist, Husserl. One may feel like discovering some resemblance between Husserl's method and that of Professor Bhattacharya. Werner Brock writes: ". . . In Geometry, according to Husserl, we have a science in which one does not at all start from empirical facts, but from the intuition of certain ideal essences such as a point, line, triangle. And it is the conviction of Husserl and other phenomenologists that philosophy is likewise concerned with the intuitive apprehension and exact description of such essentials. This means that its primary task is to make clear in intellectual intuition what extended things, psychic experiences, volitions, really are as phenomena, of what their structural properties consist, how the individual features are to be differentiated and completely described. All this must be done in order to represent the full conceptual content which belongs to the phenomena of an extended thing, a psychic experience, a volition."¹ This phenomenological study means the study of a content intuited in pure consciousness, cancelling or ignoring the reality or existential aspect of it. Is such a study possible of the three transcendental Ideas? Can they be intuited by any mind in pure consciousness? Can they be thought of without reference to reality or existence? They are postulated only to solve the question of truth or existence. Their very connotation involves the idea of truth or existence. A phenomenological study of the admittedly transcendental seems to be in principle impossible; for, though we may think of the transcendental, we cannot intuit it.

It may be said that transcendental psychology means the study of the relation of the finite mind to the presuppositions of experience. If S is the subject and O the object of which it is immediately conscious, what is the relation, it may be asked, between S and P, P₁, etc., which are the presuppositions of the experience of O? But if S is not actually thinking of P, P₁, etc., there is no ordinary psychological relation. If S is actually thinking of them after discovering them through critical analysis, and accepts that, like the categories in Kant, they constitute the experience of O; then we may say that S, as thought, is *thinking them* and not *thinking of them*, for they are the necessities of thought and belong to its very nature and structure. Thought here is practically thinking itself. But when S is thinking of the Ideas of Reason, which also are presuppositions of experience;

¹ *Contemporary German Philosophy*, pp. 16-17.

we have to say that, as they transcend S, it is thinking of them symbolically, and not that it is thinking them. If this is what is meant by transcendental psychology, we may accept it. But this is not merely psychology but epistemology and metaphysics as well. And this does not prove the knowability of the Ideas themselves, but only the knowability of their symbols. When Kant says that we can use them as heuristic principles, he certainly admits as much, that is, that they can be known as symbols, though he doubts whether these symbols are symbols of actual entities. Kant can be disproved only when we can prove that these Ideas themselves, not merely their symbols, can be intuited, and that there can be kinds of intuition other than the sense intuition with its two forms of space and time. Professor Bhattacharya's contention that the three Ideas are self-evident may be taken to mean that they are intuited. But he is not explicit on the point. But if he takes them to be intuited, there can be no symbolization, nor meaning reference to the three Ideas. For instance, when I intuit a colour the colour intuited is not a *symbol* of the colour, nor does it *mean* the colour. There can be no distinction of that kind in intuition.

Corresponding to the four kinds of the speakable, Professor Bhattacharya says, there are four kinds of thought. He writes: "All forms of theoretic consciousness as involving the understanding of a speakable are sometimes called thought. Of these, as will appear presently, only one form is literal thought, the others being symbolic thought which should not be called thought at all. Four forms or grades of thought may be distinguished. They may be roughly called empirical thought, pure objective thought, spiritual thought and transcendental thought. Empirical thought is theoretic consciousness of a content involving reference to an object that is perceived or imagined to be perceived, such reference being part of the meaning of content. There are contents that are objective but have no necessary reference to sense perception and this consciousness of contents may be called pure objective and contemplative thought. The content of spiritual thought is no object, nothing that is contemplated in the objective attitude being subjective in the sense of being appreciated in the subjective or enjoying attitude. Transcendental thought is the consciousness of a content that is neither objective nor subjective."¹

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 67.

The distinctions which Professor Bhattacharya makes within the speakable should have been made and can be easily understood only here. As a speakable the finite object is literally speakable; and the same is literally thinkable. And the distinction which he draws between the speaking of a thing and simply speaking a thing can be easily appreciated here. I *think* of a horse because the physical horse is not part and parcel of my thought. But I may be said to *think* the content of my thought, because the content here is of the same nature as that of thought. This distinction can be more easily understood in terms of imagination. The object imagined and the process of imagining it are not two different things; so that imagining a mental image is a more appropriate expression than the imagination of an image. Nay, even in imagining the image, the image, which is called the object of imagining, may fairly be said to be an adverb modifying imagining, so that the expression would come to mean imagining in that form. And the idea of the image may be said to be the final cause of the process. However, when we are referring the I to the self, we *may* say that we are thinking the self and not thinking of the self. But we have to note that it would not be meaningless to say that we can think of the self too. Though thought is an activity of the ego, and also is, in a sense, the activity which is the ego; and though, so far as the present self has to be thought, *thinking* of the self is the same as *thinking* the self; when the self in the past and the future moments is the object of thought, we can say, with justification, that we are *thinking* of the self but not *thinking* the self.

But Professor Bhattacharya does not draw these distinctions with regard to thought. Thought is mainly of two kinds, the literal and the symbolical. The symbolical is again of three kinds accordingly as the attitude is objective, subjective, or transcendental. As we have already said, the three Ideas are transcendental; and the distinction between the subjective and the objective, though it may be started with, does not stand. Again, this distinction between literal thought and symbolic thought is a little confusing. We generally understand that every idea or thought that has reference beyond itself is symbolic. In this sense, as the three Ideas are beyond thought—and when thought thinks of them its ideas refer beyond themselves—we may say that thought here is symbolic. Similarly, when thought refers to finite objects, it is symbolic, as the ideas here too refer beyond them-

selves. If literal thought is that which does not use symbols, then this thought is not literal thought though Professor Bhattacharya calls it so. Literal thought would be such thought as thinks itself, that in which the ideas or thoughts do not refer beyond themselves, for instance, the thought of mere Being in Hegel's dialectic, or, as a more appropriate example, the thought of thought itself.

We may be told that Professor Bhattacharya does not mean by symbolic thought thought that uses symbols, but some way of knowing which is a symbol of thought; so that literal thought means the knowing of any phenomenal object, while the symbolic is the knowing of the transcendental. Unfortunately, Professor Bhattacharya does not clarify his ideas. Even if we suppose this alternative interpretation to be his meaning, it is difficult to understand why a knowing that is theoretical and discursive, that tries to relate one entity to another, is not thought but only its symbol. Even for this knowing, Professor Bhattacharya says, there is the difference between the subjective, the objective, and the transcendental attitudes. And a knowing that is capable of making these distinctions is still discursive. And every knowing that is discursive is thought, not merely a symbol of thought. If it is said that this knowing does not make these distinctions, then the distinctions between the three kinds of thought as well as between the three kinds of the spoken, which Professor Bhattacharya makes, vanishes. And thought here will be a knowing that will not be discursive but integral. Then there would be no judgment, and thought would come to a standstill.

Professor Bhattacharya tells us that, in the knowing of the three Ideas, there is no judgment. He writes: "There are no judgments, accordingly, in metaphysics and, paradoxical as it may sound, the metaphysical beliefs are not reached by inference. The elaborate parade of deductive proof in metaphysics is only a make-believe, unless proof is taken, as is sometimes taken, as the exposition of an experienced tautology. Metaphysical reasoning is only a *systematic exposition of symbolic concepts*, concepts that are implicitly taken as symbols of contents that are enjoyingly believed."¹ This passage requires explanation and, if its meaning is contrary to experience, criticism. Here Professor Bhattacharya tells us that metaphysical reasoning uses symbols. If so, and if our ordinary thought too uses symbols, is it not also to be called

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 79.

symbolic? Why are metaphysical judgments tautologies and its reasoning a make-believe? What is the meaning of enjoyingly believing in the contents of metaphysics? What is the difference between this belief and superstitious beliefs? Are the transcendental Ideas believed in without any reason? If we are led to them by some reasoning, then this reasoning uses judgments which cannot be tautologies. It may be that the three Ideas, being limiting concepts, are logical prejudices. Nietzsche asked whether it was not a prejudice that philosophers valued non-contradiction so much. It may be said that all such ultimate concepts, all heuristic principles, the proof of which lies in the fact that we cannot do without them, may be said to be believed in. But do we enjoyingly believe in them? In terms of Alexander's, I may be said to enjoyingly perceive my cognition. But I cannot be said to enjoyingly know the Ideas of Reason. I may enjoy my belief in them, but not the Ideas themselves. Further, if metaphysical reasoning is a systematic exposition, is it not a system of significant judgments and not of tautologies? There can be no system of tautologies. "The Idea of God as the sum-total of existence is the final presupposition of experience": is this judgment a tautology? "The I is in truth a limiting concept": is this a tautology? Are these not metaphysical or philosophical judgments? Are they, again, self-evident? If philosophy is a system of judgments, the judgments cannot be tautologies, because a judgment like "X is X" cannot be systematically related with a judgment like "Y is Y." But if we have judgments like "X is Y" and "Y is Z," they can be related; and they form a system because of the presence of both identity and difference between the subject and the predicate of the same judgment, and between judgment and judgment. Further, philosophical judgments are not exhausted by the three judgments "Object is," "I am" and "The Absolute is." The examples given above are also philosophical judgments; and a system of such judgments is philosophy.

What is the reason for saying that metaphysical judgments are not judgments? Professor Bhattacharya writes: "In a judgment proper, the word 'is' expresses only the objective attitude of the subject, but in this apparent judgment, 'is' means an objective content which is self-subsistent but no fact. To express or formulate this content is still to retain an objective attitude. This attitude is explicitly dropped in saying 'I am.' The content here also is spoken and not spoken of, but it is explicitly understood as

not objective and as only apparently objective or symbolized by objectivity."¹ As regards the Absolute also, he says that there can be no judgment.² Even in what he says here, one feels that one has to differ. Does "is" express existence or objective attitude? That it expresses existence is the usual view; but that it expresses objectivity is the view of Professor Bhattacharya. And because it expresses objectivity, the Am in "I am," and the Is in "The Absolute is," are only symbolic; and therefore the two are not judgments. But the "Object is" is also no judgment, because the judgment is a tautology as both the object and the Is mean objectivity. But when I say "The house is," do I mean merely that the house is an object and not myself, the subject? I mean that it exists and is not unreal.

One may agree with Professor Bhattacharya in saying that these three are no judgments, but not for the reason he gives. These are not judgments, because there is really no predicate here. For Professor Bhattacharya these are not judgments, not because there are no predicates here, but because the predicates are only symbols of objectivity. But if there is a content, though the predicate is a symbol, there ought to be a judgment. On the other hand, where there is no content at all for the predicate, there can be no judgment. The three Ideas are so fluid and volatile that they pass into each other; and their truth is their unity. As such they comprehend the whole of being; so that to say that any of the Ideas is, is almost like saying, Existence is. In this sense the three judgments are tautologies, or to be more precise, there is no predicate in these judgments. What we call the predicate coincides with the subject, and this coincidence is absolute. That is why we say that the Absolute is beyond thought. This should not be interpreted as meaning that we never think of it, as is usually done. It is for this reason that the criticism, if the Absolute is beyond thought, how can you think and speak of it? does not invalidate the view. We do think and speak of it, but only in the sense that, in it, the subject and predicate completely coincide.

Now, when we think of these Ideas, do we have them bodily in our thought? Certainly not. We think of them, as Professor Bhattacharya says, with the help of some symbols. Then these symbols mean those Ideas, refer to them. This means, when we speak of them we mean them. But Professor Bhattacharya says that the I and the Absolute are not meant, but only symbolically

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 69.

² *Ibid.*, p. 71.

understood. His language here is perplexing. There would be no meaning reference, only if the Ideas are bodily in our thought. But it is doubtful whether anybody holds the view that they are bodily in our thought, which is undoubtedly finite. Thought may imply them; but as they include thought, it cannot hold them in itself or before itself.

How then are we to show that the Absolute is knowable, which Kant denies? Professor Bhattacharya has struck upon the right method, namely, of pointing out that there are different ways of knowing and that the mode of knowing finite and phenomenal objects is not the only way of knowledge. It is also true that knowledge is not co-extensive with what he calls literal thinking. But that the Absolute is knowable cannot be proved, as Professor Bhattacharya thinks, psychologically, but only in ways by which Kant tried to deny it. Knowledge of the Absolute is implicit: it is only an implication. At our level, the Absolute cannot be explicit; and so a psychological study is impossible. What we have to do is to point out that the Absolute is in essence identical with the finite self, and that it is possible for the finite self to transcend itself and intuit and realize the Absolute. What Professor Bhattacharya also wants to prove is the knowability of the Ideas of Reason, not their knownness.¹ And where we deal with only possibility, it is unwarranted to use a psychological method which is descriptive of actual things.

The reader may get the impression that I am too critical while expounding Professor Bhattacharya's position. But his thought is almost like a citadel with impregnable fortifications. And only an all-round and systematic criticism of his terminology and ideas can enable us to know what it may contain. The reader has a just cause to complain if a word like self-subsistence is used of a thing in the sense of referring beyond itself, and symbolic thought sometimes when thought uses symbols and other times when it does not. It is only such criticism that may fix his position. Without it, it is difficult to discover what Professor Bhattacharya means. It may be that his thought contains more. But unless his thought is further developed, it is difficult to appreciate it.

But Professor Bhattacharya's is one of the very few attempts to reconcile the two statements that the Absolute is beyond thought and that still we think of it. Very easily the question is put: If it is beyond thought, how can you think of it? How can

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 65.

you speak of it even? The Upaniṣads too declare that the Brahman is beyond mind, beyond thought, beyond speech, and so forth. But are they not all the while thinking of it, in trying to prove that it is the only truth? Professor Bhattacharya feels the force of the objection, and wants to meet it by distinguishing between the different kinds of the speakable and the different kinds of the thinkable. We may not accept his answer, but we must admit the justification of his attempt. He seems to have overlooked the fact that there is no descriptive psychological relation at our level between the three Ideas and the finite self. These Ideas, as ideal entities, are never known by the finite self as such, and are not knowable by it if it remains finite. What it knows are ideas of those Ideas, and the Ideas as the entities. The chief difficulty, we may say, in Professor Bhattacharya's thought is that he has not noticed that, by the time the finite self is able to know the Ideas, it must have undergone transformation, which does not leave it in its finitude. But Professor Bhattacharya, all the while, seems to be maintaining that the finite subject itself can know the Ideas, and seems to be describing, on that presumption, the psychological relationship between it and the Ideas. Even to refer to the Sākṣi of the Advaita, in order to prove that the finite subject can know the three Ideas, will not be of much use. First, this reference can at most support the contention that the subject can know only the Idea of rational psychology and not the other two Ideas. And it requires more than psychological description to show that the second Idea is the same as the pure indeterminate objectivity of deep sleep, which is also an object of Sākṣi. It is very doubtful whether Kant means by the world as a whole anything like this, though it is possible for us to say that this, as the *Kāraṇaśarīra*, is really the world as a whole. Secondly, we should not forget that even the Advaita distinguishes between two subjects, one which is the pure witness and the other which, while being a witness, also enjoys and thinks that it is seeing, that it is enjoying, and so forth. We, as finite, are really the lower subject; and the truth of the higher has to be proved, and is not an object of our ordinary consciousness. And if we are able to rise to a state at which we are able to experience it, our finitude must, by that time, be dissolved. Professor Bhattacharya ignores this transformation altogether. And it is not enough to say that, if the subject undergoes such and such a transformation, such and such a kind of experience is possible. We have to show that

certain experiences *are* presupposed by our ordinary experience, and that they can be realized if certain transformations are undergone by the finite subject.

We may conclude by quoting a passage which gives the result of Professor Bhattacharya's view, that is, his conception of the Absolute. "What truth is not and is yet positive is the absolute freedom beyond being (the absolute freedom of will) and what is indeterminately either truth or freedom is absolute value. There is no sense in speaking of the absolute as the unity of truth, freedom and value. It is *each* of them, these being only spoken separately, but not meant either as separate or as one. The theoretic consciousness of truth, then, is the consciousness of truth as distinct from itself as freedom and from the identity-less self-distinction or value. The absolute as transcending the enjoyed reality of religion is positive being (truth) or positive non-being (freedom) or their positive indetermination (value). The absolute is conceived rigorously as truth in (Advaita) Vedānta. What is loosely called nihilistic Buddhism apparently understands the absolute as freedom. The Hegelian absolute may be taken to represent the indetermination, miscalled *identity*, of truth and freedom which is value."¹ "This triple absolute is apparently the prototype of the three subjective functions—knowing, willing and feeling."² What we understand from these quotations is that the Absolute as truth, as freedom, and as value, corresponds to the three subjective functions knowing, willing, and feeling. We are here reminded of Fichte's statement that, in Kant's philosophy, there are three Absolutes in the three *Critiques*. For Professor Bhattacharya, to speak of the Absolute as a unity of truth, freedom, and value, is meaningless, because the three Absolutes are not spoken as *meant*, that is, they are only symbolically spoken. This, again, is difficult to understand. When we think of the Absolute, say, as truth, we certainly think symbolically. But is there no meaning reference by the symbol to the symbolized? Or does the statement mean that the word has no connotation with the help of which the denotation is determined by us? Professor Bhattacharya says that the Absolute as truth is self-revealing³; and this may mean that the word and the thought-symbol here have no connotation, but refer directly to denotation. But is it true that we attach no meaning to the term Absolute? Is it self-revealing to us finite minds? Even as a heuristic prin-

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 83.

² *Ibid.*, p. 85.

³ *Op. cit.*

ciple in Kant's philosophy, it has a meaning. It is the sum-total of being, the final presupposition of our experience. It is the principle only with the help of which our experience in one of its phases can be organized. All this is the meaning of the concept. And it is not impossible and meaningless to relate the ideas of truth, freedom, and value. If three Thats without the Whats are given, I shall never be able to say whether they are identical or different. But if the Whats too are given, I may be able to say whether they are one or not. Not that I can always do it, but that the possibility of doing it is not excluded; and to do it will not be meaningless. In fact, the three Absolutes are unified by some post-Kantians and neo-Kantians.

All the three Absolutes are above religion. The Absolute as positive being is truth, as positive non-being is freedom, and as the indetermination between the two is value. The meaning of the last seems to be that, in what is absolute value, will and truth do not determine each other, that is, they are not opposed to each other; and the Absolute is the interdetermination between the two. The second Absolute is freedom, probably because in it the will is unthwarted; and as every determination there is a restriction on the will, it is absence of all determinations and therefore non-being. But this non-being is not simple nothing; it is positive. It is the *Sūnya* of the Buddhists.

III

SUFISM

Sufism is not of Indian origin, nor is it an absolutely contemporary phenomenon. It entered India with the Muslims, and has now become part of India's cultural heritage. Even Muslim writers say that it found its most congenial soil in India. Sirdar Iqbal Ali Shah writes: "Sufism, with its warm mystical yearning after union and fellowship with God, nowhere found a more suitable soil to thrive than India, where the very atmosphere was charged with a deep religious longing to find God, with the result that to-day it is established that fully two-thirds of India's Muslim population are under the influence of some one or other of the darwish orders."¹ Guillaume also writes: "Sufism travelled speedily from Iraq and Persia to India, where it found a congenial soil."² Mr. M. M. Zuhuruddin Ahmad says that Sufism is

¹ *Islamic Sufism*, p. 292.

² *Legacy of Islam*, p. 470.

not particularly a product of the Arabic mind, which is not so theoretical as to arrive at the idea of an absolute unity; it is the product of the Aryan mind, which is not satisfied with the original Islamic dualism.¹ No wonder, therefore, that Sufism thrives best in India.

About the founders of Sufism there are divergent views. Bjerregaard writes: "Sufism as an historic factor may be traced to a woman, Rabia." But he adds: "Another explanation of the historic origin and development of Sufism is given by the Sufis. The seeds of Sufism were sown in the time of Adam, germed in that of Nuh (Noah), and budded in that of Ibrahim (Abraham). It began to develop in the time of Musa (Moses), reached maturity in Isa (Jesus) and produced pure wine in Mohammad."² Zuhuruddin Ahmad tells us that Abdulla b. Maynun al-Qaddha was the original founder of Sufism, and Salman-i-Parsi and Uways-i-Qarni also started a similar movement. "The object of the movement started by Abdulla was political, for he wanted to destroy Arab supremacy (in Persia), while the traditional movement associated with the names of Salman and Uways was based upon love and devotion to God."³ But the Sufis contend that Sufism was an esoteric doctrine imparted to Ali alone by the Prophet.⁴ "Islamic Sufism started with the prophet himself and was followed by his companions to the letter. But in those days or even later, it was only a collective name for a set of practices, and had not developed in the form of dogmas or theories." Mansur gave it a practical turn by proclaiming that he was all truth; and Arabi and Ibn Sina turned it in to philosophy also.⁵ Of the Sufis, there is only one order called "the Naqshbandi which claims to originate with Abu Bakr instead of Ali."⁶

Sirdar Iqbal Ali Shah writes: "In accordance with the teachings of Al-Quran, Islamic Sufism is the name of every religion, creed or faith which has been preached from time to time in different countries and various tribes by teachers inspired by God. They came from one and the same source and taught one and the same truth. But the hand of Time, combined with want of efficient means in olden days to preserve those teachings intact, afforded occasions and opportunities for human interpolations and wrong interpretations."⁷ This conception of Sufism is broad and catholic.

¹ *Mystic Tendencies in Islam*, p. 167.

² *Sufism*, p. 6.

³ *Mystic Tendencies in Islam*, p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁷ *Islamic Sufism*, p. 38.

Zuhuruddin Ahmad says: "This doctrine is clearly stated by Muhyuddin ibnul-Arabi. According to this theory, there was no fundamental distinction between believers and unbelievers, and the former, therefore, had no reason to prefer their brethren in faith over others."¹ Sirdar Iqbal Ali Shah further writes: "Unity is the key-note to the conception of the Divine Being in Sufism. It denies all plurality of persons in Godhead and any participation of any being in the affairs of the world."² Philosophically this conception is not actually monistic but rather mono-theistic. It does not advocate unity of all existence, but is rather unitarian in its conception of God. But there are some Sufis who believe in the unity of existence, that is, that all existence is one and that is God. Zuhuruddin Ahmad says: "The Aryan Pantheism combined with a similar theory of Plotinus developed into the famous Sufi doctrine of the Unity of Existence. It was a fusion of the Islamic unity of God, of the universal Spirit (Brahmâtma) theory of the Aryans, and the Greek conception of the Unity of existing reality."³ "It is this central ideal of the absolute and abstract unity of God that forms a sort of nucleus to the doctrines of Islamic Sufism."

Many Sufis believe in the complete merger of the individual in the divine. Guillaume writes: "Some of the extreme Sufis believe that when the final nearness is attained the human soul becomes absorbed in the Divinity. This is called *hulul* (absorption) and sometimes *ittihad* (union). But this pantheistic conception is strongly repudiated by al-Sarraj and al-Gazzali; though often the word *wisal* and *waslat* are used to signify the closeness of the approach of the Divine Essence. Even when the Sufi talks of *fanf'il Allah* (annihilation in God) he does not mean to imply that the human soul becomes merged in the Universal Soul. Al-Gazzali's notion, like that of his great predecessor, is that the individual soul (*ruh*) at the Almighty's bidding emanates from a realm, the *alam ul-Malakuti*, nearest to the Divine Essence, and on its separation from the corporeal body reverts to its original home." According to some, this merging has three stages. The first is annihilation in the Shaikh, who is the religious teacher. The second is the merging in the prophet, and the third in God.⁴ But some do not believe in the necessity of the three stages, because God cannot be forgotten even in the first two.⁵ Some

¹ *Mystic Tendencies in Islam*, p. 162.

² *Islamic Sufism*, p. 47.

³ *Mystic Tendencies in Islam*, p. 161.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

Sufis, we have already read, do not believe in complete self-negation or in absolutely becoming one with God. Even after liberation some residue of the difference between God and the soul is left. "Complete resignation of one's actions, one's will and even of one's self to the will of Allah, was one of the cardinal principles of the teaching of Islam and it was duly appropriated by the Sufis. According to the original theory of Islam, a human being never lost his individuality and independence, while to later Sufis the highest development of self was identical with the merging of self in another self."¹ That is, Sufism is the result of the development of mono-theism into monism. And between the extreme monism of Sufism and the extreme dualism of Islam in its inception, we find various stages.

The idea of unity that runs throughout Islamic philosophy, Mr. Zuhuruddin Ahmad says, is of three kinds: the unity of personality, the unity of reflection, and the unity of existence. The first unity belongs to the purest type of mono-theisms. God who is the creator to be worshipped, is a personality. The third is the unity of existence, an idea which may or may not be pantheistic, though Muslim writers take it invariably to be pantheistic, and which belongs to the extreme type of Sufistic monism. The second was advocated and expounded by Mujaddid Ahmad Sirhindi. About it, Mr. Ahmad writes: "This theory like that of the 'Unity of Existence' was intended to solve the cosmological problem of creation and of the relationship of creator and creatures. Briefly stated, the theory was this, that the creator and the created were both real though different in their essence. One was real in its essence, while the other was real as the reflection of the other. The created things were real so far as they reflected the reality of the Infinite. They were real more or less in proportion to the clearness of the reflexion of the reality of their creator. Thus was reality itself graded. The measure and grade of the reflection determined the reality of each created thing. The diversity existed and played an important part in the universe, but all the created things had a uniform nature so far as they all reflected the same ultimate reality of the Creator."² This doctrine reminds us of the Advaita theory that the jīva is a reflexion of the Brahman. But the peculiarity is that the advaitin makes use of the doctrine for proving that the Brahman alone is real.

¹ *Mystic Tendencies in Islam*, p. 132.

² *Ibid.*, p. 176.

In Islam, whether Sufistic or otherwise, there was a tendency to regard God as beyond human comprehension. "The Caliph Ali condemned in emphatic language all anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity. "God is not like any object that the human mind can conceive; no attribute can be ascribed to him which bears the least resemblance to any quality of which human beings have perception from their knowledge of material objects. The perfection of piety consists in *knowing* God; the perfection of knowledge in the affirmation of His verity; and the perfection of verity is to acknowledge His unity in all sincerity; and the perfection of sincerity to deny all attributes to the Deity. . . . He who refers an attribute to God believes the attribute to be God, and he who so believes an attribute to be God, regards God to be two or parts of one. . . . He who asks where God is, assimilates Him with some object. God is the creator, not because He Himself is created; God is existent, not because He was non-existent. He is with every object, not from resemblance or nearness; He is outside of everything not from separation; He is the Seer, but no sight can see Him. He has no relation to place, time, or measure. . . . God is Omniscient, because knowledge is His Essence; Mighty, because Power is His Essence; Loving, because Love is His Essence. . . . not because these are His attributes apart from His Essence. . . . The conditions of time and space were wholly inapplicable to Him."¹ This reminds us of the *nirguna* Brahman of the Upaniṣads, which can be described only in negative terms. There are some, like Abu'l Hasan, who maintained that the attributes of God are eternal and also an addition to his Essence.²

As regards the relation between God, who is the ultimate reality, and the world, there are some differences of view. Ibnul Arabi declared that Existence is the Supreme Being or Essence.³ The world is a limitation of this Existence, which is called *Dhat*. There is another view that existence is superimposed on Entity which is not within the reach of "thought, guess, imagination and fancy."⁴ According to this view, Entity must be the ultimate truth, and existence a sort of predicate. There is also the view that the world is an emanation from the Deity and will ultimately be absorbed in it.⁵ "How the *Dhat* (in whatever sense it is taken) manifests itself and what relationship there is between the *Dhat* and the *Sifat* (attributes) and finally between *rab* and *abd* (the

¹ Ameer Ali: *The Spirit of Islam*, p. 416.

² *Ibid.*, p. 441.

³ *Islamic Sufism*, p. 117.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

creator and the created) is the theme of the theory of emanation (*Tannazzulat* or descent).¹ "To put the whole theory in a nutshell: the *Dhat* saw itself in *Sifat*; this was a *tazolli* (illumination). The *sifat* are like the mercurial coating of a mirror. This coming into being of illumination gave rise to duality. This illumination manifests itself as soul—When soul saw itself, it was *mithal*, the coating of the mirror of soul was body—for there can be no reflection without a coating. When the coating of the body and the gaze of the seer disappear, the seer (the Soul) itself remains. So also, finally, where the *Dhat's* gaze disappears, the soul disappears, and Absolutism alone remains."²

The relation between God and the world is understood in terms also of the relation between substance and attributes. "Reality of Existence being the sole theme in the path of Sufi, we must also note that Jami, in his *Lawaiih*, likens the universe with something that consists of accidents which all appertain to the Single Substance; and this he calls Reality underlying all existence, according to the author of *Fass-i-Shuabi*. This universe, he continues, consists of accidents, all pertaining to a single substance, which is the Reality underlying all existence."³ But there seems to be some dissatisfaction with this view. For if the attributes alone are given and not the *Dhat*, the *Dhat* reduces itself to a zero like Berkeley's material substance.

Three internal emanations or *Batini* of God are given: *La Bisharti-shay* or without condition of anything, *Bisharti la shay* or with condition of nothing, and *Bi-sharti shay* or with condition of a thing. "In the first case, the *Dhat* is above all conditions; imagination cannot soar up to it. In the second, its existence is implied without further assertion. In the third, something could be asserted about it."⁴ In these three stages there are no attributes; only in the fourth do they appear.⁵ We may understand this idea in the light of the distinction drawn by the Śaiva Advaita between pure and impure creation.

One important point that deserves special attention is that, in spite of the conception that the finite soul is an emanation from God, Sufism, and Islam in general, incorporates the biological conception of it as a product of evolution into its philosophy. This conception is rendered very beautifully by Jalaluddin Rumi in verse, which may be quoted.

¹ *Islamic Sufism*, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*, p. 148.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

SUFISM

Low in the earth
I lived in realms of ore and stone;
And then I smiled in many-tinted flowers;
Then roving with the wild and wandering hours,
Over earth and air and ocean's zone,
In a new birth,
I dived and flew,
And crept and ran,
And all the secret of my essence drew
Within a form that brought them all to view—
And lo, a Man!
And then my goal,
Beyond the clouds, beyond the sky,
In realms where none may change or die—
In angel form; and then away
Beyond the bounds of night and day;
And Life and Death, unseen or seen,
Where all that is hath ever been,
As One and Whole.¹

When these two doctrines, the doctrine of emanation and the concept of evolution, are combined, we have to understand that God as the universal Spirit assumes the form of the material substance, then passes through the mineral, the plant and the animal stages, then becomes man and suffers and enjoys for his actions, then becomes an angel and by further spiritual development, becomes Himself, who always was Himself in spite of the processes of ascent and descent. But then how can God remain pure, one and whole, in view of these processes? These are only a dream. The spirit has fallen asleep and has this dream. When it awakens, it simply laughs at its dream.

Awakened, he
Will laugh to think what troublous dreams he had,
And wonder what a happy state of being
He could forget and not perceive that all
Those pains and sorrows were the effect of sleep
And guile and vain illusion. So this world
Seems lasting, though it is but the sleeper's dream,
Who, when the appointed Day shall dawn, escapes
From dark imaginings that haunted him
And turns with laughter on his phantom griefs
When he beholds his everlasting home.²

¹ Quoted from Sir Mohammad Iqbal: "Is Religion Possible?" (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1932-3.)

² Quoted from *The Legacy of Islam*, p. 236.

The three important Sufi orders of India are the Chisti, the Naqshbandi and the Quadiriyya. According to the first, the state of mind in which the finite soul is at one with God can be produced through music. But according to the second, the feeling of Divine love cannot, and should not, be produced by music, which is prohibited by Islam. The third takes a middle course, and prohibits only such music as stirs up the lower animal passions in man.¹

IV

SIR MOHAMMAD IQBAL

Sir Mohammed Iqbal is better known as a poet than as a philosopher. But still he has given us a philosophy in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, *The Secrets of the Self*, and some articles, in all of which he shows himself to be a forceful thinker. Sirdar Iqbal Ali Shah calls him the most celebrated modern thinker of Islam. And though he addresses his thoughts only to the Muslims, they could as well have been addressed to all, including the Hindus and the Christians. He was for a long time popular with the Hindus as well, but later his religious enthusiasm became communal and he began preaching the Jihad or holy war against the unbelievers. But for that fact, his philosophy would have had a wider appeal and he would have been a potent force for unifying the two major communities of India. However, whatever be his communal views, his ideas are not without philosophical interest.

Though much influenced by Rumi, Arabi and other Sufis, he does not believe that Islam ever preached the complete annihilation of self in God. The ego, as a finite centre of experience, is not false. It is the fundamental fact of the universe.² Iqbal's sympathies are more with McTaggart than with Bosanquet. Yet the universe is not a finished whole: it is not yet a complete truth. It is ever advancing. After Bergson, Iqbal conceives reality as pure duration. "A critical interpretation of the sequence of time as revealed in ourselves has led us to a notion of the ultimate Reality as pure duration in which thought, life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity. We cannot conceive this unity except as a unity of the self—an all-embracing concrete self—the ultimate source of all our individual life and thought."³ Now, time, Iqbal

¹ *The Mystic Tendencies in Islam*, p. 130.

² *The Secrets of the Self*, p. xvii. English translation by R. A. Nicholson.

³ *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 75.

tells us, is an essential element in the ultimate reality.¹ He therefore disagrees with McTaggart, who maintains the unreality of time. "But the real time is not serial time to which the distinctions of past, present and future is essential; it is pure duration, i.e. change without succession, which McTaggart's argument does not touch."² So far, Iqbal is at one with Bergson. But he does not accept Bergson's strictures against thought. The latter conceived thought as a spatializing activity and as opposed to intuition, which only can reveal the true nature of reality. Iqbal maintains that, though outwardly thought spatializes and makes use of only mechanical categories, it has a deeper moment also in which it synthesizes the elements of our experience and goes beyond mechanism. Iqbal criticizes both Gazzali and Kant also for failing "to see that thought, in every act of knowledge, passes beyond its own finitude."³

Iqbal is anxious to prove that man should not abandon the world in order to realize the ultimate truth. If, as it is generally maintained, thought is connected with the world, and if the world has to be renounced for the ultimate truth, it implies that thought has to be left behind. And it is held that intuition alone, and not thought, can reveal to us the final truth. But Iqbal wants to show that neither the world nor thought should be left behind. It was a mistake of Gazzali, Kant, Bergson and a host of others that they have not noticed a deeper aspect of thought. "In its deeper moment, however, thought is capable of reaching an immanent Infinite in whose self-unfolding movement the variously finite concepts are merely moments. In its essential nature, then, thought is not static; it is dynamic and unfolds its internal infinitude in time like the seed which, from the very beginning, carries within the organic unity of the tree as a fact. Thought is therefore the whole in its dynamic self-expression, appearing to the temporal vision as a series of definite specifications which cannot be understood except by reciprocal reference. This meaning lies not in their self-identity, but in the larger whole of which they are the specific aspects. The larger whole is, to use a Quranic metaphor, a kind of 'Preserved Tablet,' which holds up the entire undetermined possibilities of knowing as a present reality, revealing itself in serial time as a succession of finite concepts appearing to reach a unity which is already present in them."⁴

¹ *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 77.

² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴ *Op. cit.*

Iqbal tells us that our self has two aspects, the external and the internal, which he calls the efficient and the appreciative. In its first aspect it enters into relations with the things of space. It is what the psychologist generally studies, and can be interpreted in terms of the laws of association. It is in its internal aspect that we get the clue to an understanding of reality. "It is only in the moments of profound meditation, when the efficient self is in abeyance, that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience. In this life process of the deeper ego, the states of consciousness melt into each other. The unity of the appreciative ego is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. There is no numerical distinctness of states in the totality of the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is, unlike that of the efficient self, wholly qualitative. There is change and movement, but this change and movement are indivisible; their elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character. It appears that the time of the appreciative self is a single 'now' which the efficient self, in its traffic with the world of space, pulverizes into a series of 'nows' like the pearl beads on a thread. Here is, then, pure duration unadulterated by space."¹

To sum up the position so far reached. Reality is pure duration. In it time is an element; but time as it is in Reality is not serial time; it is change without succession. The elements in it interpenetrate and fuse into each other, so that we cannot make the distinction between past, present and future. It is one eternal now. The consciousness that can reveal to us the nature of this reality, which Bergson calls intuition, and which, as creative, is will also, and which Kant, Gazzali and others regard as beyond thought, is not opposed to thought. It is thought itself in its deeper aspect. Iqbal is not unaware of the fact that thought, which is used in our ordinary practical life, is mechanistic and that as such it cannot reveal to us Reality in its purity. That is why he says at another place² that, lying close to our normal consciousness, there are potential types of consciousness which can "open up the possibilities of life-giving and knowledge-yielding experience." But this deeper consciousness is not opposed to thought; it is thought in its synthetic activity, by virtue of

¹ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 65.

² "Is Religion Possible?", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1932-3.

which the manifold fuses into one and serial time becomes pure duration and an eternal "now." This truth is given in religious experience. The pure duration does not exclude the manifold of thought, and so religion does not require a negative attitude towards the world. Reality is our self in its deeper aspect; and so our ego is not annihilated in Reality.

It is obvious that Iqbal ingeniously connects the idea of pure duration borrowed from Bergson with that of the eternal present of Royce and others. Speaking of the divine time, he says that it is what the "Quran describes as the 'Mother of Books' in which the whole of history freed from the net of causal sequence, is gathered up in a super-eternal 'now.'"¹ "Knowledge, in the sense of discursive knowledge, however infinite, cannot, therefore, be predicated of an ego who knows, and at the same time forms the ground of the object known. Unfortunately, language does not help us here. We possess no word to express the kind of knowledge which is also creative of its object. [Evidently Iqbal somehow missed here Kant's conception of the intuitive understanding.] The alternative concept of divine knowledge is omniscience in the sense of a single indivisible act of perception which makes God immediately aware of the entire sweep of history, regarded as an order of specific events, in an eternal 'now.' This is how Jalaluddin Dawani, Iraqi and Professor Royce in our own time conceived God's knowledge. There is an element of truth in this conception. But it suggests a closed universe, a fixed futurity, a predetermined unalterable order of specific events which, like a superior fate, has once for all determined the direction of God's creative activity."² That is, even to call the divine time an eternal Now is misleading. For the idea suggests a closed universe in which past, present and future are once for all determined. But reality is pure duration and full of immense potentialities. So the idea of creativity should be added to that of the eternal present.

This creativity is always a forward movement which never turns back. On this point Iqbal differs from Nietzsche, who advocates Eternal Recurrence. Iqbal maintains that this recurrence is one form of mechanism and determinism, and is opposed to free creativity. Recurrence means that the events of one cycle recur in the succeeding ones; and this means that the future is once for all determined. There can be creativity only when things are not previously determined. Nietzsche's view is "nothing

¹ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 105. ² *Ibid.*, p. 108.

more than Fatalism worse than the one summed up in the word 'Qismat.'"¹

The final reality, therefore, is an ego; it has to be understood as an ego. "Only that is, strictly speaking, real which is directly conscious of its own reality."² And "on the analogy of our conscious experience, then, the universe is a free creative movement."³ But then, what are the things created by the ego? It is only egos that can proceed from an Ego. The Ultimate Ego functions as ego-unities or ego-centres. "The world in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call an atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the 'Great I am.' Every atom of Divine Energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of ego-hood. Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of ego-hood until it reaches its perfection in man."⁴ Like Leibnitz and McTaggart, Iqbal believes that the world is through and through spiritual, and consists of only selves or monads. But we should note that these egos, according to Iqbal, proceed from God and had a beginning in time,⁵ and therefore God is given a far higher status by him than what he could get from the hands of Leibnitz and McTaggart.

Evidently, Iqbal believes in grades or degrees of reality. The true nature of reality is ego-hood. But we should not say that this ego-nature is as manifest in a particle of dust as in a worm, as manifest in a worm as in a man, and we may add, as manifest in man as in God. The true ego, for Iqbal, is our deeper self; and man cannot be always conscious of it but only in deep meditation. Probably, even then we do not go deep enough. However, there are grades of obscurity and clarity of this ego-hood and, if consciousness is the distinguishing mark of reality, there are degrees of reality. Material nature must be a sort of appearance.

Iqbal writes: "Now a self is unthinkable without a character, i.e. a uniform mode of behaviour. Nature, as we have seen, is not a mass of pure materiality occupying a void. It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the ultimate Self. Nature is to the Divine self as character is to the human self. In the picturesque phrase of the Quran, it is the habit of Allah. From the human point of view, it is an interpre-

¹ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 160.

² *Ibid.*, p. 100. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 69. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 99. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

tation which, in our present situation, we put on the creative activity of the Absolute Ego. At a particular moment in its forward movement it is finite; but since the self to which it is organic is creative, it is liable to increase, and is consequently boundless in the sense that no limit to its expression is final. Its boundlessness is potential, not actual."¹ Reality is a creative forward movement, and matter is the form of its activity. Because reality touches the serial time always only at one point, at that particular moment matter appears finite. But as matter is an aspect of the creative movement, it also is infinite like the latter, and is ever-increasing because advancing. But this does not mean that matter would become infinite in some future moment. Its infinitude lies in its potentiality and can never be actual.

There is therefore no duality of mind and matter in Iqbal's philosophy. "What then is matter? A colony of egos of a low order out of which emerge finite life and consciousness of a higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of complexity."² And similarly is the relation between body and mind interpreted. Iqbal accepts neither parallelism nor interactionism. "The system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts. This does not obliterate the distinction of soul and body; it only brings them closer to each other. The characteristic of the ego is spontaneity; the acts composing the body repeat themselves."³ That is, the soul or ego is creativity itself; it is simply an onward movement. But this movement has a pattern or habit, according to which the acts repeat themselves. And this is the body. So really there is no difference between soul and body, or mind and matter. Does not the Śaiva Advaita maintain that the world is the energy of the Absolute? Do not many other Vedāntic systems hold a similar view? So matter is not different from spirit; and, it could have been added, it should not be, and cannot be shunned. "The truth, however, is that matter is spirit in space-time reference. The unity called man is body when we look at it as acting in regard to what we call external world; it is mind or soul when we look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting."⁴

Though the whole world is composed of spirits and proceeds out of the Ultimate Spirit, Iqbal is opposed to pantheism. When reality is described as self-revealing and the metaphor of light

¹ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 76-7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

is applied to God, Iqbal tells us that it should "be taken to suggest the Absoluteness of God and not his Omnipresence which easily lends itself to pantheistic interpretation."¹ God is not infinite in the sense of spatial infinity. His infinity consists of the "infinite inner possibilities of His creative activity of which the universe, as known to us, is only a partial expression."² But at the same time, Iqbal maintains that the universe is no other to God, and that God and the universe are "only intellectual modes of apprehending the life of God."³ But this means that the universe is part and parcel of God. And pantheism must mean, according to Iqbal, the theory for which God is absolutely immanent in the world and is exhausted in it. But even in Hindu philosophy there is not a single school which believes in such pantheism. Even the *Bhagavadgītā* asserts that the world forms only a part of God,⁴ an idea which is borrowed from the Upaniṣads. And the infinity of God is not understood spatially, though his presence must be felt at every point of space. However, if there is really no difference between God and the world and the two are only two different modes of apprehending the same thing, is not God all-pervasive and so omniscient? Besides, if God can hold everything in an eternal Now, can anything be beyond his knowledge? These ideas do not seem to have been reconciled by Iqbal. In his anxiety to avoid pantheism, he has overlooked their irreconcilability. It is not necessary to deprive God of his omniscience, in order to avoid pantheism. Just as the eternal Now need not imply a block universe and absolute determinism, omniscience too need not imply them. Otherwise, for the same reason for which omniscience has to be given up, the doctrine of the eternal present also has to be given up.

Iqbal believed in a sort of meliorism, but with the certainty of the victory of man over evil.⁵ The final victory cannot be achieved for man by somebody else; he has himself to work for it. But he may be sure of success for the obvious reason that everything proceeds from God and the world is only a mode of his behaviour. This meliorism evidently differs from that of James for whom there is continual struggle between the forces of good and evil, and God is not omnipotent and infinite. He therefore

¹ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 89.

² *Ibid.*, p. 90.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁴ X, 42. *Viṣṭabhyāhamidam hṛtsnam ekāṁśena sthito jagat*. See the commentaries also.

⁵ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 113.

really depends on our help for subduing the forces of evil. But the help which human beings render in Iqbal's philosophy is not to a finite God, but to one who is infinite and omnipotent, and therefore is not pitched against forces as eternal and powerful as himself. The so-called evil forces are not really a second to him, for the world consists of nothing but egos which proceed from him. There is nothing alien to him in the world, and evil therefore must be unreal or an appearance for Iqbal. Iqbal does not discuss the point in detail, and it would not be fair to attribute to him views not actually held by him. But we may say that here is a problem not completely solved.

If God is the central reality and all the egos that constitute the world originate in him and therefore have to go back to him, where does meliorism come in? If success is sure provided we try, why not be optimistic instead of being merely melioristic? Iqbal's idea may be that even this world, of which evil is a necessary factor, may be bettered if human egos strive for it. If this is his view, some new problems crop up. There are many in Europe who hold such a view. Tennyson believed in a far off divine event, which would of course be an event in serial time. Of late, Samuel Alexander says that the world would evolve the Deity itself. Iqbal's view may not exactly be the same, because for him Deity comes first and not last. But it may be that he believes that the kingdom of God can be brought down to earth, and that the world can be made perfect if the human egos so will it. But the question here rises, why, if the world issues from God, it does not issue perfect, and, if God really wished that an imperfect world should issue forth from him, whether he would allow man to make it perfect. What are the grounds of our certainty that we shall succeed in making it perfect? Or are there any limits to the perfection which the world can attain? And what are they? These questions do not seem to have been raised by Iqbal, and it is difficult to say how he would have answered them.

Iqbal's motive in advocating meliorism seems to be that man should not remain inactive in the belief that the world is incurably evil or that it is the business of God to make it better and so success is sure. Of the philosophers in India, there is none who more emphasizes and condemns inactivity than Iqbal. Almost all contemporary Indian philosophers including Radhakrishnan, Tagore, Gandhi, Aurobindo Ghose, Tilak, Svami Vivekananda, etc., condemn the negative attitude to the world; but in this

condemnation and the exhortation to be active and to control the world of matter, Iqbal is one of the few who have gone to the extreme. Aurobindo Ghose believes in everybody becoming a Superman, provided he works for it. This Superman is a ruler of the world, though he is a ruler of his own self also. He is the man nearest to God, and he can make the Śakti or power of God work according to his will. Indeed, in order to attain this power, he must cease to be selfish. Aurobindo Ghose's yoga is therefore a yoga of the will. The Superman does not shun matter; he does not fly from nature. On the other hand, he conquers it and controls it. And there is really no shunning of matter, because matter is the energy of God. A very similar idea is found in Iqbal's writings:

It is sweet to be God's vicegerent in the world
And exercise sway over the elements.
God's vicegerent is as the soul of the universe,
His being is the shadow of the Greatest Name.
He knows the mysteries of part and whole
He executes the command of Allah in the world.¹

This vicegerent is really a sort of Superman who controls the entire nature, of course, in the name of God. And that he controls the world in the name of God shows that he is not egotistic and selfish. He is a ruler of the world just as much as he is a ruler of his own self. Iqbal writes:

Thy soul cares only for itself, like the camel:
It is self-conceited, self-governed, and self-willed.
Be a man, get its halter into thine hand,
That thou mayst become a pearl albeit thou art a potter's
vessel.²

And further he says:

If thou canst rule thy camel, thou wilt rule the world
And wear on thy head the crown of Solomon.³

But in order to become a Superman, one must be of strong character and must act:

The man of strong character who is master of himself
Will find fortune compliant.
If the world does not comply with his humour,
He will try the hazard of war with Heaven.⁴

¹ *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 79.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

But there need be no war with heaven. The man's end is not selfish; he is master of himself; and by being a master of himself, he has transcended himself. Only he has to act.

The pith of life is contained in action,
To delight in creation is the law of life.¹

But now, how are we to cease to be selfish? How are we to be rulers of our selves? Is it by complete self-surrender to God? Does love of God involve such self-surrender? Iqbal is opposed to every idea of self-negation. It is not self-negation but self-affirmation and self-assertion that he preaches. "Physically as well as spiritually man is a self-contained centre, but he is not yet a complete individual. The greater his distance from God the less his individuality. He who comes nearest to God is the completest person. Not that he is finally absorbed in God. On the contrary, he absorbs God into himself."² The self-affirmation is preached to such an extreme as to advocate the absorption of even God and not surrender to him. Life is an assimilative activity; and it assimilates even God. And good and evil are to be interpreted in terms of this assimilative activity. Personality is the tension we experience in this activity and "that which fortifies personality is good, and that which weakens it is evil."³ Thus while some preach that we should become one with God by complete surrender to him and by being absorbed by him, Iqbal preaches that we should become one with God rather by absorbing him, when our self-affirmation and self-assertion become complete. This is really a dangerous advice; and it can be rightly followed by only a very few. It easily lends itself to the interpretation that selfishness and self-aggrandizement form the pathway to reality. Iqbal must not have meant that; but it is very few that can see the truth underlying his words. Indeed, he felt that Hindu intellectualism and Islamic pantheism tended to deprive people of their capacity for action and infused into them a spirit of resignation miscalled contentment, born of weakness and self-abnegation. As an antidote to this spirit, Iqbal preaches self-assertion and stresses it so much that it appears to be almost self-aggrandizement amounting to the subjugation of God himself for one's purpose. But Iqbal could not have meant it; for he says:

Gain knowledge of Life's mysteries.
Be a tyrant. Ignore all except God.

¹ *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 89. ² *Ibid.*, p. xix. ³ *Ibid.*, p. xxii. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

Our duty to God and therefore the primacy of God is often repeated.¹ Yet on the whole, one cannot but say that there is over-emphasis on self-assertion, though it may be to counteract the mischief wrought by the spirit of resignation and passivity.

In accordance with his doctrine of self-assertion, Iqbal preaches a doctrine of vigorous and aggressive love. We have to love God; thereby we do not surrender ourselves to him but rather absorb him. Love is a unifying force; but by it we do not enter God's unity, but rather make him enter the unity of our selves. But if all absorb God's unity into the unity of their respective selves and thereby become identical with God, then all become identical; and probably we have to interpret Iqbal's assertion that the human ego is not annihilated in God, to mean that the ego continues to be the ego by becoming like the Ego of God. This point is not clearly stated by Iqbal. In what sense the absorption of God by the human ego has to be taken may be a matter for controversy, and we may leave it undecided.

Very often the love preached towards God is that of the weaker to the stronger sex. It is therefore a surrender of the whole personality, including will, thought and action, to God. And we rarely come across this love preached in the opposite direction. It is only in Iqbal that we find something like it. Iqbal does not say that God is a woman, and that our love for him must be what it would be towards a woman. But he preaches aggressive love, a love that compels the object loved into union. The lover is not to say: I am yours, do what you like with me; but, you are mine and attune your will to mine. Iqbal says:

The Fountain of Life is Love's flashing sword.²

It is very doubtful whether a poet like Tagore would ever have associated love with a sword. Of course, love conquers; it may conquer even the sword. But it is difficult to understand how it works with a sword. But after all, Iqbal may be making an over-emphasis.

If we are to affirm ourselves, are we to abandon our desires saying that they belong to the flesh and not to the soul? Iqbal does not preach looking down upon our material nature.

Life is latent in seeking,
Its origin is hidden in desire,
Keep desire alive in thy heart,
Lest thy little dust become a tomb.³

¹ *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 73.

² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

Desire is the noose for hunting ideals,
A binder of the book of deeds.
Negation of desire is death to the living.¹
Life is the hunter and desire the snare,
Desire is Love's message to beauty.²

Iqbal cannot be here advocating the indulgence of any and every desire. For he preaches duty to God, and the desires naturally must conform to this duty. Only to counteract the teaching of other-worldliness and the escape from things material, must he have been glorifying desire so much. Self-affirmation is possible only through our acting for the satisfaction of desires. And it is only for the satisfaction of desires that matter is appropriated and made part of self.

Self-affirmation brings not-self to light.

Iqbal, like Nietzsche, inveighs against the doctrine of self-negation as invented by the subject races of mankind in order to tame down the strong ruling races. True, the doctrine self-negation in some of its forms is false, and produced disastrous consequences. But the doctrine of self-affirmation too, if it means aggression and aggrandizement, will lead to equally disastrous consequences. Examples need not be given now when the world is passing through one of the most evil times. Had Iqbal been living now, he would have toned down his utterances. Even if the weaker races, with all their burden of poverty and misery, are not able to assert themselves; in the division of the spoils of aggression, the stronger races are sure to fall out, fight and perish. It is in principle impossible for them to come to an understanding in that division; for aggression is the principle which will be applied by them to each other, just as much as they applied it to the weaker races. And how that aggression can ever be love is beyond our comprehension. The sword of aggression produces always a double effect: it strikes both the striker and the struck. And though Iqbal's language lends itself to this interpretation, he could not have meant it. He wanted to preach a doctrine which would counterbalance the evil effects of the doctrine of self-negation, and so overstressed certain points. For we should not forget that the Superman of Iqbal, like the one of Aurobindo Ghose, is a self-ruler and not an egotist. And unless he is an egotist, he cannot really be a tyrant. The Superman is

¹ *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, p. 61.

a tyrant, only in the sense that he is ruthless in carrying out the word of God. He may rule the world, but for its good and not for his own self-satisfaction. His self is already controlled, and whatever satisfaction it derives it derives from carrying out the word of God. Education of the self consists in obedience, self-control and divine vicegerency.¹ Our interpretation must reconcile Iqbal's poetical utterances.

This emphasis on self-affirmation leaves on Iqbal's thought the stamp of individualism, though this individualism is tempered by the idea of obedience to God and absolute self-control. Iqbal adopts Rumi's idea of the evolution of man out of matter, and maintains that immortality depends on man's own efforts. He says: "If he (man) does not take the initiative, if he does not evolve the richness of his being, if he ceases to feel the inward push of advancing life, then the spirit within him hardens into stone, and he is reduced to the level of dead matter."² As in the philosophy of Aurobindo Ghose, matter, according to Rumi, evolves into plant life, then into animal life, and then into mind. But evolution should not stop with human beings. Man should rise higher and, through his own efforts, should become one with God. Or he may fall and become dead matter again, and again pass through the higher stages. "Personal immortality, then, is not ours as of right, it is to be achieved by effort. Man is a candidate for it."² That is, the world is the vale of soul-making. But when the soul is made, it depends on the soul itself whether to become immortal or not.

Though Iqbal is first a poet and then a philosopher, the insight he showed into the problem of time, the nature of thought and of reality is profound. He has been able to develop a fairly systematic philosophy of self-affirmation, which is really needed now by all the Asiatic peoples, though here and there his poetical expression is charged with over-emphasis. His idealism is personalistic and even absolutistic. And in spite of absolutism, he has made a serious attempt to preserve the individuality of the human ego.

¹ *The Secrets of the Self*, p. 72.

² *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 16.

CONCLUSION

I

CHANGE FROM THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE WORLD

The reader of the two chapters on Contemporary Idealism must have noticed several currents of thought. But all the most important writers agree that the negative attitude to the world, which has come to be associated with Indian philosophy, is the result of a false doctrine, which, being untrue to reality, has produced undesirable consequences. Not only these philosophers, but also many European interpreters¹ of Indian thought and culture have observed that the original writings of the ancient Brahmins, both philosophical and literary, are full of zest for life and enthusiasm for action. Their senses were alive to the rich variety of experience, and their minds were keen on the values of life. They worshipped their Gods for the pleasures of this and the other world. Even the philosophical poem, *Bhagavadgītā*, is meant to teach action. As Tilak maintains in his *Gītārahasya*, Kṛṣṇa could never have taught Arjuna, who was dejected by the idea of having to kill his own kith and kin, and whom Kṛṣṇa wanted to exhort to kill his enemies and be a hero and not a coward, the doctrine of inaction. Arjuna was ready to cease acting; he threw down his bow and arrows, and wished to go to the forest and live like a hermit. So there was really no occasion for Kṛṣṇa to preach inaction. And whatever his metaphysics, Kṛṣṇa must have preached not a negative but a positive attitude to the world. He tells us that the World knows as it were how to adjust itself. Reality, as the Time-Spirit or Kāla, is the real agent of the world-process. But it works through individuals. They are its instruments (*nimittamātrāḥ*). Whenever the forces of evil gain the upper hand, reality creates itself as a hero—call him an incarnation, prophet or superman—who will set matters right. If he becomes egotistic, and does not allow himself to be carried through the vortices of strife and turmoil; if he flinches like Arjuna and wants to retreat from action; then, he shows himself to be a coward, but the world-process does not stop. It selects some other individual as its instrument; some other will be the Superman, the hero of the time. And egotistic, attributing to himself the agency of the

¹ For instance, see Masson-Oursel: *Ancient India*, pp. xvi-xvii.

historical events, the former falls and misses the true nature of self and reality. The forces of evil, whose very nature is to work against the order of reality, must be put down. Reality must always assert itself. If it does not assert itself through one, it must assert itself through another. The man who abstains from action only creates a dualism between himself and reality. Only, he displays his ignorance and lack of enlightenment. Realization of reality is possible only through action and not by abstaining from it.

It is this aspect of the ancient Indian teaching that many of the contemporary Indian philosophers want to bring to the forefront. The escape from matter and material values creates the dualism of matter and spirit. But truth is not dual, it is one. So matter should not be treated as alien to spirit but as part of spirit. Matter has to be transformed into spirit, and material values have to be transformed into spiritual values through transvaluation. Both Tagore and Radhakrishnan assert that we are interested in the Absolute, not in its transcendent purity and sublimity, but only so far as it comes home to our business and bosoms. For Tagore, our chief concern is with the Absolute humanized, and, for Radhakrishnan, with the Absolute as intellectualized. Dr. Bhagavan Das finds fault with the traditional Advaita for not including the world of nature in the Absolute. Of the Muslim writers, Iqbal glorifies desire. Aurobindo Ghose preaches the doctrine of the Superman, who is to use the power of the Absolute for the betterment of the world. And Mahatma Gandhi applies his metaphysics directly to the affairs of the world. In spite of the ascetic colour which Mahatma Gandhi's utterances have, his is a philosophy of action and self-affirmation, the self-affirmed of course being the true self. No sane philosopher would preach the affirmation of self in its momentary fits of whims and passions, but only of the self in its true nature. Undoubtedly Mahatma Gandhi is trying to better the world, and is not preaching renunciation. True, he is insisting upon a discipline that is almost as rigorous as asceticism. But we have to remember that the Samurai, the hereditary military caste of Japan, are one of the greatest admirers of Buddhist asceticism, for they could adapt its disciplinary rules to their military life with the best advantage. Even in action one cannot be unflinching, unless one's will is thoroughly disciplined. However, the tendency towards a positive view of the world is apparent in all the contemporary thinkers.

Reference has already been made to the fact that Radhakrishnan, Tagore and Bhagavan Das treat Māyā as a combination of both being and non-being. The approach to the Absolute from the side of the world is an approach to a More, but not to a mere other, the realization of which involves the absolute negation of the world and its values. And because the Absolute is a More than the world, it can be thought of as conserving the values of the world and not as leaving them out. In short, the Absolute is the perfection of the world; it is its completion. So the world is not left out as an other, but is positively included or absorbed.

But we have to note the other side to this question. Signal service has been done by these three thinkers, each doing it in his own way, to Indian thought by pointing out that the idea of a positive approach to the Absolute is necessary and possible. Of all, Professor Radhakrishnan has proved that the idea is not inconsistent even with the traditional Advaita. The world is a combination of being and non-being, the Absolute is the fullness of being. Therefore whatever of positive value there is in this world must be preserved in the Absolute. And so the significance of understanding Māyā as both being and non-being is that it is possible to carry Māyā right into the heart of the Absolute. Non-being is nothing; and when the being part of Māyā is carried right into the Absolute, non-being raises no problem. But even if we understand the problem in this way, that is, as perfection and a path to the More, we have to note that the state of perfection is qualitatively different from the state of imperfection. The difference is not merely quantitative but qualitative as well. And, further, this process of perfection or completion is not only the becoming more, but also the recognition of an eternal presence. It is this that makes Śaṅkara describe the world in negative terms as neither being nor non-being and so forth, and posit a sort of negative relation between the Brahman and the world. But of course, in spite of this negative relation, the world has no separate being. That is why he understands the world as an expression of the Absolute, or as a form which the Absolute puts on and may give up without being in any way affected by either process.

II

SELF-NEGATION AND SELF-AFFIRMATION. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SUPERMAN

In spite of the positive approach to the Absolute and the emphasis on the idea of becoming more, both Tagore and Radhakrishnan preach self-surrender to God. The Absolute is the highest self of all. It certainly has to be realized. But the realization is possible only through self-surrender. The process from finitude to infinitude is a process of perfection; but yet this perfection is attained through self-negation. We have to surrender our whole personality to God. Our attitude to the world should not be negative. But with reference to God we should adopt a negative attitude to ourselves. The idea is the result of the perception that God or the Absolute, which is our innermost self, is an eternal presence. It is not something to be produced, but a truth to be recognized. We have to become one with it; and as it is the truth of our finite selves, they must lose themselves in it. The surrender is really the affirmation of our true Self. And so self-affirmation is possible through self-negation.

But opposed to every idea of self-negation stands the philosophy of Sir Mohammad Iqbal. We are not to surrender our selves even to God. The highest realization does not lie in allowing our selves to be assimilated by God, but in assimilating God himself to us. Our love of God does not mean entering the unity of God, but forcing God into the unity of our selves. We may become one with God either by becoming one with his unity or by making him enter our unity and thus absorbing him. But the latter alternative is more consistent with self-affirmation carried ruthlessly to the extreme.

The result of the modern positive attitude to the world and the doctrine of self-affirmation is the idea of the Superman. In Western philosophy, this idea is associated with the philosophy of Nietzsche, and is being connected with the doctrine of dictatorship. In India, Aurobindo Ghose among the Hindus and Iqbal among the Muslims are preaching it. But in either the Superman is not so aggressive as in Nietzsche. The Superman for Iqbal also may be a tyrant; but he is a tyrant, only because he ruthlessly enforces the will of God, not his own. He has no egotism. True, the Superman of Nietzsche lives dangerously, but only to brow-beat and terrorize others. He creates in the minds of people not

confidence but fear, not reverence but hatred. He has no higher aim in his life than forcing his own will on others and thus tyrannizing over them. But the Superman of Aurobindo and Iqbal act for the good of the world, for bringing the kingdom of God on earth. They are first their own rulers, and then become the rulers of the world. They are the ideal of every man, and every man can become a Superman. He does not shun the world but transforms it into spirit. Of course, the Superman of Iqbal is aggressive when compared to the one of Aurobindo.

III

TRADITIONALISM AND ANTI-TRADITIONALISM

Another current of thought running through contemporary idealism is that of anti-traditionalism developed by J. Krishnamurti. There have been many protests against established ways of thought and action in India. Caste system, priest-craft, ancestor worship, ceremonial rules, etc., have been disapproved by many. But so far, by none have these protests been developed into a philosophy of anti-traditionalism except by Krishnamurti. Thus we have both traditionalism and anti-traditionalism in India. However, no systematic philosophy of traditionalism has been developed by any Indian. Of late, its ideas that are current here are more or less borrowed from René Guénon and others. But though traditionalism as a theory has not been developed here, it has always been implicit in practice. But anti-traditionalism is an important phenomenon, the more so because it has been developed into a philosophy. The central idea of this philosophy is that, as the final reality is beyond all description and finitude, no idea that belongs to finitude can adequately express it, and no action that a finite being does can lead to it. All our thought and actions are controlled by our thought and behaviour mechanisms, which are the result of the mutual adjustments of the divisions created in the one reality. Both thought and behaviour mechanisms have a tradition, a history which is cosmic, racial, social and individual; and so reality lies beyond them. The traditional ways of thinking and acting can never lead us to reality. Was not the advaitin asked long ago by his rivals: If thought and the world are unreal, is not the proof that they are unreal false?

It is of course to be admitted that, in the extreme form, anti-

traditionalism is a one-sided doctrine. If thought is false, then not only its proof that thought and the world are false would be false, but also its discovery that there is an ultimate reality would be false. This shows that thought is not absolutely false, that it is in some intimate touch with reality, and that it has a deeper nature which is not false. Probably, the advaitin and the Buddhist would say that it is neither false nor true. Thought must be the expression, though an imperfect one, of the very reality. To call it an illusion must have a logical, and not merely axiological, significance.

The antidote to anti-traditionalism must certainly be traditionalism. And traditionalism is the strongest when the Absolute or ultimate reality is determinate. It is here that the Absolute would be the cosmos with its traditions, which constitute the preconceived plan in the mind of God, according to which the creation is made; it is here that we find fate, *Qismat*, or pre-determination, holding the greatest sway. On such a conception only of reality are the traditions given ontological status, eternity, and ultimate justifiability. To break a tradition would be to violate the law of reality, and is therefore of the nature of evil. Traditions then would have an absoluteness, for they are the determinations of reality and belong to its essential nature. And the deadliest wars, like the Thirty Years War, that convulsed the earth and defaced it, were fought for them. Traditionalism based on a determinate Absolute would be the moulding of everything in terms of a given determination, reducing everything to its terms and subordinating it to its purpose. The greatest ruthlessness and intolerance are possible on this conception. But the Indian mind is free from them, because its general innate belief is in an Absolute or God beyond determinations.

The traditionalism of India, as René Guénon rightly interprets it in his *Man and His Becoming*, is the traditionalism of the indeterminate Absolute.¹ But unfortunately, this traditionalism seems to be made a justification for each and every tradition in some quarters. The traditionalist in India is the *smārtha*, whose philosophy is the Advaita as Śaṅkara understands it. All those who are sectarian, who are either Vaisnavas or Saivas, are not called *smartas*. The Indian philosophical tradition insists on the intuition of an indescribable, indeterminate and supra-rational

¹ See also the author's article, "Traditionalism and Interpretation of Experience." *The Visva-Bharati Quarterly* (1939, February to April).

Brahman; and, however the systems differ, they must agree on this point. It is the conviction that determinations are not ultimately real that allowed the systems to accommodate each other. This attitude is instanced by the mutual respect which the schools of the Advaita tradition show each other. And as a general rule the Advaita schools are more tolerant towards the other schools than the latter are toward the Advaita. Buddhism and Jainism were disliked by the orthodox schools, only because it was felt that, by their refusal to accept the *Śruti* as their authority, they did not accept the original intuition as handed over by them. But still wars like those fought between the Catholic and Protestant confederacies were unknown in India.

So both traditionalism and anti-traditionalism in their extreme forms are neither desirable nor philosophically justifiable. The safest and truest theory would be the traditionalism of the indeterminate Absolute or anti-traditionalism of determinations.

IV

GRADES OF MONISM BETWEEN THE DUALISM OF MADHVA AND THE NON-DUALISM OF ŚAṆKARA

Between the absolute non-dualism of Śaṅkara and the absolute dualism or pluralism of Madhva, there are different grades of monism and dualism. While the Brahman and the world of *jīvas* and nature are absolutely identical in Śaṅkara, they are absolutely different in Madhva. But both are monotheists. And as a monotheist, Madhva keeps the *jīvas* and nature in complete dependence on the Brahman. It is only this dependence that is of monistic importance in Madhva. Just as Śaṅkara explains away the passages on difference in the Upaniṣads and takes the passages on identity literally, Madhva takes the former literally and explains away the latter. All the others try to retain both identity and difference in varying degrees. For Bhāskara, identity is primary (*svābhāvika*) and difference secondary. The two relations between the Brahman and the *jīvas* on the one hand and between the Brahman and nature on the other, are different. The *jīva* is different from the Brahman only in the state of bondage; during *mukti* they are absolutely one. But between the Brahman and nature, the relation is equally identity and difference. We already referred to the view mentioned in *Srīkarabhāṣya*, according to which the relation between the Brahman and nature is identical

naturally and different temporally, as in the case of the relation between the Brahman and the jīva. Similarly, there are systems which give more importance to difference than to identity. Vijñānabhikṣu, Baladeva and Rāmānuja give primacy to difference. In all the three, Śakti or the power of the Brahman is the principle of unity. And this Śakti includes both the jīvas and nature.¹ It may be one or two or three; but it belongs to the Brahman. Of all the three, again, difference is the most marked in Vijñānabhikṣu; the unifying Śakti does not predominate over differences. The unity is explained as what can be found between father and son, though the examples of the sun and his rays, the thing and its constituent atoms, too, are given. In Baladeva, difference is less marked than in Vijñānabhikṣu, because, following Caitanya and Jīvaśvāmī, he adopts the category of incomprehensible identity-difference between the jīva and the Brahman. For him, there are three Śaktis belonging to the Brahman, one for nature, one for the jīvas, and a third for controlling both. The relation between the Brahman and all the three is incomprehensible identity-difference. But still, the insistence on difference is very great, and Baladeva writes as if it is absolute. In Rāmānuja too, difference is primary and identity secondary. The two, Śakti as enjoyer and the Śakti as the enjoyed, together constitute the body of the Brahman. Rāmānuja understands the relation between the Absolute and the world as that between soul and body. He among the Vaiṣṇavas, and Śrīkaṇṭha among the Śaivas, hold this conception.

Nimbārka and Śrīpati give equal importance to both identity and difference. Between the Brahman and the world of jīvas and nature both identity and difference are natural (*svābhāvika*) and not temporary, assumed or unreal. And identity in difference holds true even in *mukti*. And because identity and difference hold equally in *mukti*, Nimbārka does not think that even as individuals (*svarūpa*) both the Brahman and the jīva are identical. But Śrīpati identifies them even in their *svarūpa*, form or individuality.

One important event in the development of the sectarian systems is their absolute non-dualism or Advaita. Both the Śaiva and the Vaiṣṇava traditions have their Advaita. The protagonists of the former are Vasugupta and Abhinavagupta and that of the

¹ Even according to Madhva, the jīvas and nature constitute the Śakti or energy of the Brahman.

latter is Vallabha. In the former, the concept of Śakti plays the part of the unifying principle, and it has absolute domination over difference. But yet the world is as real as the Brahman; and here they differ from Śaṅkara, who maintains that it is neither real nor unreal.

In Vallabha, no use is made of the concept of Śakti in spite of his sticking to the Advaita. Like the Śaiva advaitins, he maintains that the world is real, because only what is real can issue from reality.

V

DIFFERENT USES OF THE CONCEPT OF MĀYĀ

Another important feature to note of the Vedāntic tradition is the varied connotation of the word Māyā. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, it is used in the sense of magical power. In the *Śvetāśvatara*, it is used in the sense of illusion as well as Prakṛti. If the two ideas are combined, Māyā as the source of the world may be treated as cosmic illusion. But it is possible to interpret the term differently. For in that passage, though Māyā is taken to be illusion, it may also be taken to be *samsāra*, the world of birth and death; for in another place in the same Upaniṣad, Māyā is identified with Prakṛti. Anyway, Śaṅkara and his followers would interpret it as cosmic illusion, as what is neither real nor unreal and so forth. Whatever may be the actual meaning of the term in the Upaniṣads, the meaning given to it by the advaitin is clear. The Śaiva advaitin uses it, not in the sense of what is neither real nor unreal, but in the sense of the real. There is no element of unreality in Māyā. It is Prakṛti or the source of the material world, and belongs to the lower order of creation or evolution from Śiva. Even for the Pāñcarātra system, Māyā has the same significance; the only difference being that, for it, Māyā in its essence is not absolutely identical with Viṣṇu, while for the Śaiva system it is identical with Śiva. For Vallabha and his followers, Māyā is not a metaphysical principle at all; it only means the ignorance of the jīva, by which his intellect is clouded and he forgets his identity with the Lord. For Madhva, it is the *ṣvarūpaśakti* or the natural power of Viṣṇu, through which he exercises control over the world. It is absolutely identical with him, though distinguished from him with the help of *viśeṣa* or particularity. In the philosophy of Caitanya, Jīvaśvāmī and Baladeva, we have Māyā and Aparāśakti, the former being

another name for Prakṛti or the principle of matter, and the latter being the power by virtue of which the indivisible unity of the Lord becomes divisible into the jīvas and screens his underlying unity from them. Through the same, again, the jīva realizes his oneness with the Lord. In this philosophy, both Māyā and Aparāśakti are real, and are the Śaktis of the Lord. The element that is practically common to all these connotations is mysteriousness. In general, Māyā means a mysterious principle of creation and rarely, even in Śaṅkara, absolute unreality. And this is a point that all students of Indian philosophy, particularly the Western, should note. For very often they understand by Māyā what is absolutely unreal and worthless.

In Buddhism also, the word Māyā is used, but very often in the sense of what is neither real nor unreal or in the sense of what is both real and unreal. Among the contemporary philosophers, Radhakrishnan, Tagore and Bhagavan Das understand it in the latter sense. It suits Radhakrishnan's thought in general, because it marks a positive and easily tangible way to reality. The world is neither full reality nor absolute unreality, but is a mixture of the two. And it becomes more and more reality, when it becomes more and more complete. For Dr. Bhagavan Das, Māyā is the process of identification and differentiation between the Self and Not-Self.

VI

RELATION OF MATTER AND SPIRIT

The conception of matter as the Śakti or the energy of the Brahman reduces the opposition between matter and mind to almost nothing. Even in the absolute dualism of Madhva, Prakṛti or the material principle is dependent on God. It is completely pliable. In the systems of Baladeva, Vijñānabhikṣu, Nimbārka, Śrīpati and Bhāskara, it is both identical with, and different from the Brahman. In Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha, it is the body of the Brahman. In the Śaiva Advaita, it is absolutely identical with Śiva. And curiously enough, even according to Mādhavācārya,¹ a follower of Śaṅkara, Māyā is the Śakti of the Brahman. Then, according to Mādhava, Māyā would be neither real nor unreal, only when considered apart from the Brahman. In

¹ *Pañchadāśī*, II, 47 and 48. Mādhavācārya compares the Brahman and Māyā to fire and its power of heat.

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fact, our finite experience feels the world as apart from the Brahman; therefore the world is neither real nor unreal. But whatever reality we experience of the world is the reality of the Brahman reflected in the world. And of course it is because of this reflection that the contemporary thinkers regard the world as both real and unreal. However, the point is that, if Māyā is really the Śakti of the Brahman and the world is the expression of this Śakti, then there is really no opposition between matter and spirit. To treat them as opposed is to introduce dualism. In the Śuddhādvaita of Vallabha, there is no metaphysical concept of Māyā. Everything is the Brahman, because it proceeds from the Brahman direct. In all the Advaitas or non-dualisms, matter is essentially conscious, because it is the power of the conscious Brahman. In all the systems in which it is regarded as the Śakti of the Brahman, it is really an aspect of the Brahman, and the difference between the systems lies in whether they regard the relation between the Brahman and the Śakti as absolute identity or identity in difference.

In Bergson, matter is the *élan vital* spatialized and become uncreative. Body is the spearhead of the onward thrust of reality. Iqbal tells us that, according to the Quran, it is the habit of Allah. It forms one of the ways in which the ever-advancing reality expresses itself. And for many Vedāntic systems, it is the expression of the Brahman. This aspect of Indian thought has not been brought to the forefront by its interpreters so far. It will help remove the notion that, for Indian philosophy on the whole, matter is alien to spirit.

VII

DIRECTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUDDHIST IDEALISM

The general trend of Buddhist philosophy, like that of the Upaniṣads, is towards an indeterminate and supra-rational reality. But this tendency seems to have taken shape quite unwittingly and slowly. In the primitive Buddhism, there was little or no metaphysics. The Theravāda was not much interested in metaphysics, but only in decomposing the ego in order to escape beyond the reach of misery. In the later schools like those of the Adhakas, the Uttarāpathakas, etc., we have germs of the Vijñānavāda and the doctrine of Tathatā. And by most of the

Hīnayāna schools meditation on the void, on the uncompounded, etc., was prescribed. But then in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, we find the identification made of Śūnya, Tathatā and Dharmadhātu. And this idea of reality was developed with varied emphasis by the later Mahāyāna schools. The Mādhyamika laid stress on Śūnya, the Vijñānavādins on Vijñāna, Aśvaghōṣa on Tathatā, and Asaṅga on the Dharmadhātu. But for all, reality was indeterminate. Though the *Laṅkāvatāra* calls it Mind-only, it would not call it even by that term if possible. Similarly, though Vasubandhu calls it Vijñaptimātratā, he would prefer not calling it by any term at all. It is simply Tanmātratā or That-only. It is the same as saying that it is Tathatā or Suchness. The Buddhists in general would object to calling it *sattā* or existence, because existence and non-existence are determinations for them. But we know that to call it simple *sattā* is as good as calling it simple Tanmātratā or Tathatā. So we may conclude that the general direction of the Aryan mind is towards a reality which is beyond determinations.

But an interesting feature of Buddhism towards its end is that it began treating the world as a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the original principle. It started treating the whole, for example the self or ego, as an aggregate; and the escape from misery was sought by reducing this aggregate to its constituent parts. At first, it did not inquire whether these parts were real or unreal; but later in the school of the Sarvāstivādins, it asserted their eternity. Farther on, it noticed that even these simple parts had no reality, but that they were *śūnya*. But wherefrom could these parts have come? It might have been felt, at first, that they originated out of nothing. But human reason, even among the Buddhists, does not seem to be satisfied with such an idea. And when this śūnya was identified with Vijñāna, it was thought that Vijñāna underwent transformation or *pariṇāma* in order to produce the world. It is not maintained that the Vijñānavādins accepted the *pariṇāmavāda* (doctrine of transformation) exactly in the form in which we find it in the Sāṅkhya. But the change in the tendency is obvious. The theory was grafted on the Buddhist theory of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent emergence), and so there are slight differences, which have been noted in a previous chapter. But the idea that the world could not have come out of nothing entered the mind of the Buddhists too, and began to gain a hold there.

VIII

METAPHYSICS AND THE THEORIES OF ILLUSION

It is to defend the theory that consciousness, and not the material object, is real that the Vijñānavādins propound the doctrine of *ātmakhyāti* (illusion as perception of one's self). According to it, the object perceived in illusion is the self itself. The advaitins too do not accept it. But if the *ātman* is the sole reality for the advaitin, why does he reject it? If ultimately everything is the *ātman* or the Brahman, the advaitin also could have shown that, even in illusion, the object perceived is only the Brahman or *ātman*. But the advaitin does not seem to be prepared for such an absolute identification of the world with the Brahman. We have seen that, for the Mādhyamika Buddhist, the same word *Śūnya* signifies the reality of itself as well as the unreality of the world. He holds that the world is *Śūnya* and the *Śūnya* is the world. And consistently with his conception of reality, he holds the *śūnyakhyātivāda*¹ (illusion as perception of *Śūnya*). And in fact the *anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* (the doctrine that illusion is the perception of the inexplicable) of the advaitin is really no other. But the difference between the two is that the advaitins accept *sādādhīṣṭhānabhrama* or that the illusion has a real or existent basis, that unreality implies reality, while the Mādhyamikas accept *niradhiṣṭhānabhrama* or that no such reality is implied. That is, in spite of the assertion that the Brahman or the *ātman* is everything, the advaitin is not willing to go the whole length with the Buddhist in identifying the world with the Absolute. Otherwise, if the Brahman is the whole reality, he could have formulated a theory of illusion which would have been *brahmakhyāti*, the theory that the object of illusion is the Brahman itself. Even for the Yogācarin or the Vijñānavadin, the *ātman* that is said to have assumed the form of the illusory object is not the finite subject or ego, but the original Vijñāna which divides itself into the subject and the object. And the Brahman in the Advaita stands in the same position as that of this Vijñāna.

Even the Śaiva Advaita tries hard to prove that the nature of the material world is consciousness. The material world is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the Śakti of Śiva; and the Śakti is

¹ We have already referred to the opinion current in India that the Mādhyamika holds *asatkhyātivāda*, but said that *śūnyakhyātivāda* is more consistent with his position. M. M. Laxmipuram Srinivasacharya says that they do hold *śūnyakhyātivāda*. See his *Darśanodaya*, p. 295.

absolutely identical with Śiva, who is pure consciousness. So the objective world is, in truth, pure consciousness. Even then, the followers of this system of philosophy are not at all willing to accept the doctrine of *ātmakhyāti* (illusion as perception of one's self). Though, consistently with their position that the world is real, they accept the doctrine of *satkhyāti* (illusion as perception of a real entity) or that the object of illusion is real; they have no objection, we have seen, to accommodate the theories of *akhyāti* (illusion as non-cognition), *anirvacanīyakhāti* (illusion as cognition of the inexplicable), etc., which belong to the orthodox Hindu systems. The first reason, therefore, for their opposition to the doctrine of *ātmakhyāti* (illusion as perception of one's mind or self) seems to be that the doctrine belongs to a heterodox system, which does not accept the authority of the *Śruti*. Secondly, though they maintain that the world is a transformation of Śakti, which is wholly identical with the Brahman, they hesitate to make this identification wholeheartedly like the Buddhists. That is why they admit into their *satkhyātivāda* (doctrine that illusion is the cognition of a real entity), *anyathākhyātivāda* (doctrine that illusion is the mistaking of one object for another) of the Sāṅkhya as an element. We may therefore conclude that no Vedāntic system has gone as far as Mahāyāna Buddhism in identifying the final reality with the world. The latter sees the ultimate reality in this world to a far larger extent than any Vedāntic system. It is for this reason that some interpreters like Dr. Dasgupta¹ have been led to think that Nāgārjuna advocates pure phenomenalism without recognizing a reality behind phenomena. This is of course not a correct, though an honest interpretation. Was not Spinoza interpreted as a naturalist, as an atheist, and so forth? Even the Mādhyamika does not say that the world as we see it is real. If he does so, there would have been no occasion for his criticism of the categories of the phenomenal world. Nor is he satisfied with reducing the phenomenal world to simple nothing. He was rather anxious to prove that reality is not to be found anywhere else than in the heart of the phenomena themselves. Only, our point of view or vision has to change. The world may be an illusion; but the *adhiṣṭhāna* or the locus of illusion is not different from the object of illusion. It is at the very core of illusion: it is its very kernel.

¹ The author himself held this view at one time. See his "Advaita and Buddhist Viewpoints." *Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference*, 1940.

IX

THEORIES OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

It would be interesting to put together the various theories of causation held by the Vedāntins and the Buddhists, and note their similarities and dissimilarities. According to the view of the Naiyāyikas, which we may say is that of ordinary realism, the cause is of three kinds: *samavāyikāraṇa*, also called *upādānakāraṇa* or material cause, the *asamavāyikāraṇa* or relational cause or the relations by entering into which the parts constitute a whole,¹ and the *nimittakāraṇa* or the efficient cause. All these are accepted by the Vedāntic schools. But the *upādānakāraṇa* in the idealistic schools may be a *pariṇāmikāraṇa* or a *vivartakāraṇa*. The *pariṇāmikāraṇa* is that material cause which undergoes transformation in producing the effect, like milk in producing curd. But the *vivartakāraṇa*, like gold which is the material cause of some ornament, does not undergo such transformation. The nature of gold is not affected when it becomes an ornament; but that of milk is affected when it is changed into curd.

This is the general view. But Vallabha holds that the *pariṇāmikāraṇa* need not be a *vikāri*, that is, it need not be affected. But if it is not affected, it is practically the same as the *vivartakāraṇa*. It is probably the association of the idea of *vivarta* with the ideas of illusion and unreality of the world that prevents Vallabha from using the word *vivartakāraṇa* with reference to the causality of the Absolute.

In addition to these three kinds of cause, Vijñānabhikṣu mentions another called the *adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa* or *ādhāra-kāraṇa*. It is a cause that supports the transformation (*pariṇāma*) which takes place on it; and as it is only a support, it is unaffected by the transformation. With the help of the idea of *adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa*, Vijñānabhikṣu attempts to prove that the Brahman is unaffected by the transformation which its Prakṛti undergoes.

As regards the effect, broadly speaking there are two views: the *satkāryavāda* and the *asatkāryavāda*, that is, the theory according to which the effect is existent in the cause and that according to which it is non-existent in the cause. The upholders of the *satkāryavāda* argue that, if the effect does not exist in the cause

¹ It is interesting to note that the Naiyāyikas long ago recognized that the relations between the parts of a whole are also its constituents.

already, then any cause must produce any effect: we must be able to get oil out of sand. This theory may be divided into *pariṇāmanavāda* and *vivartavāda*. According to the first, the effect is existent in the cause; but the cause must undergo transformation (*pariṇāma*) in order to become the effect. For the second, the reality or existence of the effect is the reality or existence of the cause. But the effect is a peculiar appearance or form which is superimposed on the cause, or which the cause superposes upon itself. And this assuming of forms does not affect the nature of the cause. The former is generally associated with the Sāṅkhya and the latter with the Advaita.

The advocates of the *asatkāryavāda* contend that, if the effect already exists in the cause, there need be no activity of the cause to produce the effect; and we can have everything at all times without producing it. What is called *ārambhavāda* or the view that the effect has a beginning in time and does not exist in the cause previous to that moment, implies this doctrine. This *ārambhavāda* is associated with the Naiyāyikas. The Buddhist doctrine of *sanghātavāda* also implies it. According to this doctrine, the effect, for example the soul, is only an aggregate of the *skandhas* and has absolutely no reality of its own. The Buddhist doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* also, which has already been discussed, involves it. According to this doctrine, the effect originates depending on the cause, but not out of the cause. As the doctrine of *pariṇāma* does not at all agree with that of momentariness, the cause can never be said to become the effect. But no effect is possible without a cause. So the Buddhists struck upon the idea of dependent origination. But origination out of what? Nothing. The effect therefore cannot be said to have been existent in the cause before its appearance. But indeed a dialectician like Nāgārjuna or Nāgasena may say that the effect is neither existent nor non-existent before its appearance. For if it is said that it is existent, then it would be objected that there would be no need of the activity of the cause to produce the effect. If, on the other hand, it is maintained that it is non-existent, it may be asked: Then why does not any cause produce any effect? And we are not to forget that the Vijñānavādins tried to incorporate the doctrine of *pariṇāma* into their doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

X

Another important feature of Indian idealism is its grades of Supernals. The Absolute may be the final truth; and ultimately creation and every aspect of it may be attributed to it. But it was found inconceivable how an Absolute beyond description, pure and perfect, could be the cause of this world. And so various steps between the world with its impurities and the Absolute in its purity were thought of. Even in European philosophy, we know that a Demiurge or Logos was inserted between the world and God; and the direct cause of the world, it was said, was the Demiurge. In Indian philosophy there is no unanimity as to the number and nature of the steps between the Absolute and the world. Even in the Buddhist Vijñānavāda, we have an intermediate link between the original Vijñāna and the world. And it is the Ālayavijñāna. It is the same as the pure Vijñāna but charged with the *samskāras*. It is the Vijñāna with reference to the world, and plays the same part as that played by Īśvara or the lower Absolute in the Advaita, and by God in the philosophy of Radhakrishnan. Sometimes the higher Vijñāna too is called the Ālayavijñāna and a distinction is drawn between the higher and the lower Ālayavijñānas. Sometimes the higher is called Alaya and the lower Ālaya. And at other times the higher is called simply Vijñaptimātratā or Vijñāna and the lower Ālayavijñāna and Vipākavijñāna. But the motive in drawing these distinctions is apparent. Vijñāna may be quite pure; but it has an aspect with reference to the world, the aspect as the cause of the world. As the source of the impurities, it must have them in germ. It must be conceived with reference to those impurities; and as such it is contaminated by them and occupies a lower position than the original Vijñāna.

In the Advaita, we have three main supernals: the Brahman, Īśvara and Śākṣi. Indeed, some advaitins do not accept these distinctions but contend that the Brahman itself, though pure, can be the creator of the world, as the *Sruti*, whose authority cannot be questioned, declares so. But others who are not so bold in their convictions accept the distinctions with certain differences which have already been referred to in a previous chapter. The Brahman as pure cannot be the source of the impurities and imperfections of the world. So they must be traced

to some other principle, which is Māyā. The Brahman somehow associated with Māyā is Īśvara. He is called also the lower or *apara* Brahman. But the Brahman is the same as the jīva in essence. And yet it is not affected by the actions of the jīva. It is the pure witness of the jīva's actions, pains and pleasures. As such it is called Sākṣi. As unaffected by these, the Sākṣi is not impure like the jīva, who is affected by them. Sākṣi is the witness of the three states or *avasthās* of the jīva, namely, the waking states, dream and sleep. He is the same in all the three states, because he can compare them with one another.

In the Pāsupata and the Śaiva Advaita, between the Puruṣa or the finite self and Śiva there are three stages of pure creation. But if Śakti is taken as a separate *tatva* or category, we shall have four. But as she is treated as absolutely identical with Śiva, Śiva plus Śakti may be taken as one. Next we have Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Śuddhavidyā. In the Pāñcarātra or Vaiṣṇavism, we have correspondingly Viṣṇu with Laxmi, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Aniruddha and Pradyumna. The difference between the two series is that, in the Pāñcarātra, Laxmi is not absolutely identical with Viṣṇu. Both identity and difference hold between the two.

In contemporary philosophy, Aurobindo Ghose gives a different list of supernals. They are only three: Saccidānanda, the Supermind and the Overmind; or the Brahman, Īśvara and Jīva; or Puruṣottama, Kṣara and Akṣara. These supernals seem to be borrowed not from the Śaiva or the Śākta philosophy, but from the *Bhagavadgītā*.

XI

DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE ONE-NESS OF THE BRAHMAN

The reader must have noticed that all the Vedāntic systems agree about the one-ness of the Brahman. But in explaining or perceiving this one-ness, they differ from each other. Madhva sees the Brahman as a pure monotheist. Others go beyond, and make different approaches to monism. And the number of systems that retain both identity and difference is larger than those which retain only identity or difference. In Śaṅkara's philosophy we find more Buddhist influence than in those of the others. By most the unity is preserved in terms of a thing and its power. Only in the philosophy of Vallabha do we miss the idea of Śakti. He

makes use of the concept of whole and parts, and asserts that the relation between the two is absolute identity.

In Indian philosophy as many varied attempts have been made, 'as in European philosophy to get at a unifying conception. It may be put down that the words Absolute and the Brahman mean the same in the respective traditions. Just as Absolutism in the West means sometimes absolute monism, sometimes identity in difference, and at other times even pluralism as in McTaggart, we have in Indian philosophy the Brahman conceived sometimes as absolutely non-dual, sometimes as an identity of differences, and at other times as a plurality. It should not be understood that the philosophies of Vijñānabhikṣu and McTaggart are alike in every respect. But the general outlook is the same. For McTaggart God, if he existed, must be one of many selves. And though for Vijñānabhikṣu the Puruṣas and Prakṛti are said to constitute the Śakti of Īśvara, the Puruṣas are independent selves, and Īśvara is really the chief among them, though possessing the power of control over them and Prakṛti.

Among the modern European philosophers, Kant arrived at the idea of a unifying principle in his God with the intuitive understanding. This God later became the transcendental Ego in Fichte and Self-consciousness in Hegel. That the Brahman is conscious, either in the sense of *being* consciousness or in the sense of having consciousness, is accepted by all. Some treat consciousness as the Śakti of the Brahman, and others as its very being. But all say that the Brahman can be conscious of itself. In this sense, we may say that the Brahman is self-conscious. In the West, the idea of unity in terms of body and mind is not very popular with the philosophers. This conception, whether ultimately justifiable or not, enables the presentation of matter as such in the unity of the Absolute. It is maintained by many Hegelians that matter, time, etc., are elements in the Absolute and are not dissolved in it. But to say this is one thing, and to show how they are retained is another. The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha is able to show how matter forms a part of the Absolute. And the conception of matter as the Śakti or energy of the Brahman is also very significant. This idea is not to be found in Western philosophy. And had Western philosophy discovered it early, the uselessness of the controversy between materialism and spiritualism, mechanism and vitalism, as if they were absolutely opposed, would have been recognized long ago.

Really, matter is not opposed to spirit, but is a form of the activity of the spirit. Islam seems to have solved the opposition by calling matter the habit of Allah. Matter may not be the highest expression of the activity of spirit; but still, it is one of its expressions. And so it must be possible to transform matter into spirit by changing the form of the activity.

Of late, attempts are being made, in Western idealism, to understand the world in terms of imagination, etc., which are some of the functions or aspects of mind; and the world is said to be due to cosmic imagination, cosmic will, and so forth. And it is by interpreting the world in terms of imagination, etc., that it is sought to attain unity. But no such attempt was made in Indian philosophy. In the Śaiva Advaita, Śiva's Śakti is said to have three forms, *jñānaśakti*, *icchāśakti* and *kriyāśakti* or consciousness, will and action. And creation is said to be due to these three. It may be said that this Śaivism interprets the world in terms of these functions of mind. But then it does not interpret the world in terms of any one of them, but in the terms of all taken together.

Further, as regards the systems which accept both identity and difference, the problem of the relation between identity and difference has been raised in Indian philosophy in a way not imagined by Western idealists. It is without further reflection asserted in Western philosophy that the Absolute is an identity in difference, that the relation between the finite individual and the Absolute is both identity and difference. But the question is not raised to what extent they are true and in what form they can be true. It does not seem to be felt that here is a problem at all; so that some can dismiss the concept summarily as a self-contradiction, for identity and difference are contradictories and both cannot hold true of the same two things. It is to meet such objections that the Buddhist would say that the relation between the Absolute and the finite individual is neither difference nor identity. However, many Vedāntins raise the question, and have given interesting answers. Bhāskara maintains that the identity between the *jīva* and the Brahman is natural and real, and difference only due to some limiting adjuncts, which constitute nature. And between nature and the Brahman both identity and difference are natural and real. Thus we have a set of two relations here: one between the Brahman and nature and the other between the Brahman and the *jīva*. A similar lower status is given to nature by the followers of Caitanya. They say that matter or

nature is an external Śakti of the Lord, while the other is an internal one. For Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and other upholders of Bhedābheda or identity-difference, the jīvas are different from nature; but as regards the relation to the Absolute, they stand alike. The difference between Nimbārka and Śrīpati is significant here. Though both hold that identity and difference are both natural and real between the jīva and the Brahman, Nimbārka hesitates to say that they are identical in form (*svarūpa*). But Śrīpati holds that they can be identical even in form. This detailed clarification of the mixed theory of identity-difference is a feature not found in European idealism.

The idea of an indeterminate and supra-rational reality is more common to the systems of Buddhistic idealism than to those of the Vedāntic. We have said already that many scholars hold that the system of Śaṅkara is more in accordance with the Upaniṣads than the other Vedāntic systems. This may be taken as a proof that the Upaniṣads in the main agree with the Mahāyāna teaching, though Buddhism does not accept the *Śruti* as its authority. Scholars are not wanting who maintain that Buddhism as a philosophy originated in the teaching of the Upaniṣads, though it was not orthodox enough to take them as its authority. Being born in India in an intellectual atmosphere permeated by the Upaniṣadic ideas, Buddhism could not have been uninfluenced by them. But it is possible that the Vedāntic system-building started later than, and in rivalry with the Buddhistic systems. Buddhism, not accepting any texts as its authority, had to satisfy the intellect. So its chief aim was not to find a support for its views in some texts, but to be consistent. This motive naturally led to the building up of systems of metaphysics. The vogue had to be followed by the Vedāntins also, who, in spite of their *Śruti*, had to satisfy reason also. But their freedom of speculation being hampered by their allegiance to the *Śruti* and by their desire to mark off their philosophy from Buddhism, they could not, and did not accept an indeterminate reality which could be called only a *tat* or That, or Tathatā or suchness. And when Śaṅkara accepted the supra-rational reality, he was stigmatized as a *pracchanna-bauddha* or Buddhist impostor. And even the Śaiva Advaita of Vasugupta and Abhinavagupta avoided a supra-rational reality. But still having assimilated the best from Buddhism and Vedāntism, Śaṅkara's system stands supreme as a wonder in the philosophical world. And the fact that even foreign scholars discover

the greatest agreement between his teaching and that of the Upaniṣads, gives it the highest value even as a Vedāntic system.

XII

BRAHMAN AS THE HIGHEST UNIVERSAL AND AS THE MATERIAL, THE EFFICIENT, THE FORMAL AND THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE WORLD

If the Brahman is the ultimate unifying principle, it must naturally be a universal, and indeed the highest universal. There are many even in India who think that this statement is absolutely incorrect. For the advaitins, like the Buddhists, do not accept the reality of *jāti* or universal propounded by the Naiyāyikas. So to think of the Brahman as a universal, they say, is a complete misunderstanding. They may not say this openly, because some of the interpreters of Indian philosophy who adopt this view are well recognized as authorities. But yet with some self-satisfaction, it is privately pointed out as a great blunder. But this criticism betrays only a superficial understanding of both European and Indian philosophy. The universal even in European philosophy does not always mean what the Naiyāyikas mean by *jāti*. The idea of the universal has developed, for example, in Bosanquet, into what he calls the concrete universal, and identified with that of the true individual. For him, there is only one reality, the Absolute; and that is the only individual. And curiously enough, the distinction between the universal and the individual has been lost in his philosophy, and the two are completely, both in connotation and denotation, identified. This is a development that has already taken place; but the interpreter of Indian philosophy should have imagination enough to visualize further possible developments. The Vedāntic theory of the Brahman may not exactly correspond to Bosanquet's theory of the concrete universal. The Absolutes of Nimbārka and Śrīpati may correspond to it in many respects, because they are identities in difference like it. But the Absolutes of the other Vedāntins may not. Similarly, the Absolutes of the other absolutists, even in the West, are not exactly the same as that of Bosanquet. A little difference in the method of approach may result in a slightly different conception of the Absolute. But it does not prevent the Absolute from being the highest universal.

In this connection it may be noted that some of the foreign

interpreters of Indian philosophy are rather linguists than philosophers. Indeed the service done by them to Indian philosophy must not be underrated. The real impetus to the re-study of Indian philosophy comes from them. But in their interpretations they were led more by philological considerations than by the philosophical. For instance, because the two words Absolute and Brahman have different etymological derivations, they may say that they have no correspondence in their respective traditions. When once a reputed scholar sets afloat an idea, it initiates a dangerous vogue in philosophical interpretation and creates a sort of bias in its favour; to abandon which requires time and much labour. But a predominantly philosophical intellect would care more for the philosophical than for the philological import of the terms. It cares more for the logical connections between ideas, the part which an idea plays in a system, and so forth.

The Naiyāyikas call *jāti* by the word *sāmānya* also. And the Advaitins also call the Brahman *sāmānya*. They maintain that they have only one *sāmānya* and not many, and that is the Brahman. Of course, to call it the central principle does not mean that it is only an element in reality. It is the whole of reality and so all-comprehensive. And though it is the most comprehensive universal that is not an abstraction but is the sum-total of reality, it is not always a system of universals and so not concrete in the sense of such a system. All the Vedāntins maintain that it is too great for our thought. But some admit certain distinctions in it, like the *jīvas* and nature. These are not abstract universals, which, by forming a system, constitute the concrete universal as in Bosanquet. And even those Vedāntic systems which admit *jāti* as an eternal reality, treat it as one of the distinctions retained in the Brahman. So the Brahman is always more than what these universals can be by forming a system. Thus we have in Indian idealism in general, not merely what may be called an idealism of ideas in the sense of universals, but an idealism of ideal existence or reality. Even in those Vedāntic systems which include *jāti* or universals as eternally present in the mind of God, the Absolute or the Brahman taken as a whole transcends what these universals can constitute.

One significant point is that this Absolute is conceived to be the material cause of the world. This conception belongs not only to the Vedāntic but also to Buddhistic idealism. Ultimate reality, *paramārthasatya*, even as *Sūnya*, is said to be the *Tathāgata*-

garbha or the Womb of the Tathāgata, which is the source of everything. It is not only the Bhūtatathatā or the essential nature of everything but also its source. Similarly, in the Vedāntic systems the Brahman is not only the truth of the world but also its cause. Of course, this conception of the final truth as the material cause of the universe, gives rise to the problem as to how the eternal purity and perfection of the highest truth can be reconciled with the process which a material cause has to undergo in order to produce its effect. Various attempts are made to meet this objection, some with the help of the concept of Māyā, some with that of Śakti, and so forth. And whatever that be, all agree that the Brahman must somehow be the material cause of the world. The advaitins and many other Vedāntins give the example of gold and the ornament which is made of it. Gold is the material cause of all the ornaments that may be made of it; yet it is the universal that is common to all. There can be another universal that is common to all ornaments and that is the universal ornament, just as a chair is the universal of all kinds of chairs and individual chairs. The universal ornament is the universal of all forms that may be imposed on gold. These forms come and go, while gold remains the same. It is these forms that correspond to the *jāti*s of the Naiyāyikas and the ideas of Plato as they are commonly understood.

But from the fact that the Brahman is conceived as the material cause of the universe, it would be wrong to conclude that therefore Indian idealism, both Vedāntic and Buddhist, is materialistic in its outlook. Even in European philosophy every kind of psychism and spiritualism for which the stuff of the universe is mind or spirit would be materialistic, of course not in the sense that it conceives insentient matter to be the ultimate reality, but in the sense that it conceives reality to be the material of the world. The ingenuity of such interpreters overshoots its mark, in that they forget that, even in Western idealism, reality, whatever that be, is conceived to be the substance of the world. However, this reality is not conceived simply as the material cause, but also as the truth of the world, its fulfilment and completion. Every determination of the type of the ornament has its significance in a particular situation, and therefore gets it through dependence on determinations outside itself. An ornament is not really an ornament if it is a part of a dung-heap. For a cock pecking for worms and grains, a diamond has no value. For a jackal that eats corpses,

the ornaments that may be left on the bodies through love and affection are worthless and are no ornaments. All such determinations have their value and reality only in the totality of such determinations, which are interconnected. So the truth of these determinations, taken each separately, is their totality; and the reality of any determination is the reality of this totality.

But now, the question would be raised whether in the totality of such determinations each determination can retain its distinctness. Some say that it does, others that it does not. But all agree that the determinations, as constituting a totality or a systematic whole, acquire a new quality, and undergo some change through mutual fusion. This fusion is complete when even their distinctness is lost, but partial when it is retained. But anyway, we have something new, and that is reality. This reality is conceived in terms of completion or perfection. But what about the world we experience? Whence could it have come? As there can be nothing else besides reality, the world must have issued from it, call the process *vivarta* or *pariṇāma*. We arrive at the peculiar idea that the fulfilment of the world is its material cause.

This idea can be understood even in terms of the philosophies of Bradley and Bosanquet. For both, the Absolute is the highest universal, though it is not the abstract but the concrete. And that is the individual. It is the individual or concrete universal, because it is a system of ordinary universals. Though it is the highest genus, if we are allowed to use the expression, it includes within itself both the species and their differentiae. It is therefore all-inclusive, and so, both in connotation and denotation, it is wider than any of its species. And the things of the world undergo in it so much transfusion into each other that only their distinctions are left and not their differences. If that is the reality, why do we experience the plurality? Whence does it come? The Absolute is the all-inclusive and sole reality. They therefore must belong to it only. And as the appearances are the forms, reality must be their material.

So in every absolutism, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the truth of the world is its material cause. And it is the highest universal and therefore the formal cause as well. "The formal cause Aristotle defines as the substance and essence of the thing. Now the essence of a thing is given in its definition. But the definition is the explication of the concept. Therefore the

formal cause is the concept, or, as Plato would call it, the Idea of the thing. Plato's Ideas thus reappear in Aristotle as the formal causes."¹ The Ideas of Plato are certainly ideals or norms. But they are also thought of as the universals that are common to all particulars. So Aristotle understands the particulars as embodiments of definitions. The universals are the forms which the particulars put on, and are therefore to be seen in all particulars. And as the Absolute or the Brahman is the highest universal, it is the ultimate formal cause.

All the Vedāntic philosophers think of the Brahman as the efficient cause also—an idea not popular with the Buddhist philosophers because of its association with the idea of a personal creator, which is not acceptable to them. The Vedāntins, however, think that, unless the original cause is also intelligent, it could not have created this world, which is planned. And as there is only one reality, which is the material cause of the world, it must be the efficient cause also. Some Vedāntins distinguish between the material and the efficient cause. They say that the latter is the Brahman, while the former is his Śakti. And there are differences of view about the relation between the Brahman and the Śakti. But anyway, directly or indirectly, the Brahman is both the causes. And what we regard as the highest universal and ideal, turns out to be the efficient cause also.

This identification of the universal or ideal with the efficient cause is not foreign to European philosophy. We find it in Plato. Zeller writes: "The concept of Being must be reduced to that of Power. Ideas are described as something 'energetic,' in the *Phaedo*, where they are made the proper and only efficient causes of things; and still more definitely in the *Philebus*, where Plato ascribes to the highest cause (by which we can only understand Ideas) reason and wisdom; and thence deduces the adaptation of means to ends in the economy of the universe. We shall also find that the Idea of the Good is at the same time the highest efficient cause, the infinite Reason; and Aristotle, as we see from his writings, knew of no efficient cause as held by his master above and beside Ideas."² "If Ideas are the only true and primary Reality, an equally primary efficient cause beside and together with themselves is impossible. They are the efficient principle that imparts Being to things, and as this Being is of a kind that can only be

¹ W. T. Stace: *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, p. 269.

² *Plato and the Older Academy*, pp. 262-7.

explained by Reason working to an end, Reason must be conceded to them.”¹ “All things considered, we may say that the unity of the Platonic system can only be established on the supposition that Plato in his own belief never really separated the efficient from the logical cause, the Deity from the highest Idea, that of the Good. But it has already been shown that he identifies them, that he attributes efficient power and designing reason, sometimes to Ideas in general, sometimes to the highest Idea in particular. This is confirmed by the statement that in the oral discourses of his later life the supreme Unity is designated as the Good; for this supreme Unity must have been identical with God.”² In Plato thus the highest universal is the highest ideal, and that is the ultimate efficient cause.

Thus in Indian idealistic thought, all the four kinds of causes distinguished by Aristotle are identified to a greater or lesser extent. Buddhism does not generally have the efficient cause of the world; but as at least in the Vijñānavāda the highest reality is consciousness itself, we may attribute to it efficient causality also, provided we do not attribute to it any personalistic significance. It is for this reason that the highest reality is also called the highest Dharma or Law by the Buddhists. And this conception runs throughout almost the whole of Indian idealistic thought, both the Vedāntic and the Buddhistic. Tagore regards the Absolute as the highest law, of which what we call natural laws are only reflections. Dr. Bhagavan Das regards his Absolute, the formula of which is *ahametanna* or I-This-Not, as the highest law of the universe. The idea of the ultimate reality or existence as the highest law, the idea of the final identity of law and existence, seems to be a special feature of Indian philosophy. And further, as this law is also the efficient cause of the world, God himself is the law of the universe; and so, in the words of Mahatma Gandhi, law and law-giver are one.

XIII

FINAL IDENTITY OF THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR

The idea that the universal must be ultimately identical with the particular is not so current in Western philosophy. It is indeed pointed out that the universal cannot exist apart from the

¹ *Plato and the Older Academy*, p. 268.

² *Ibid.*, p. 285.

particular, that the particular is the embodiment of the universal. But it is not required that the two must ultimately be one, that ultimately there must be only one particular and only one universal, that the same thing must be the particular and the universal, and that whether we call it a particular or universal must be immaterial. But in Indian philosophy it is the same viewed from two different points of view. Viewed as the ultimate material cause, we may call it the particular; and viewed as the ultimate formal or final cause, we may call it the universal. That is why some interpreters, like Max Müller, of Buddhist works felt that reality, for Buddhism, is the particular; while others, like Suzuki, noted that it is the final universal. The former rely on the Buddhist doctrine that *jāti* is unreal; the latter on the doctrine that the ultimate reality is *samatā*. While the Vedāntins call the Brahman *sāmānya*, the Buddhists call their Tathatā *samatā*. *Sāmānya* is derived from *samāna*, and *samatā* from *sama*. But both *sama* and *samāna* mean the same. They mean equal, uniform, etc. So both the Buddhists and the Vedāntins unify, in their conception of the ultimate reality, the ideas of the particular and the universal.

Though the idea of this identity is not very prevalent in European thought, it is not absolutely alien to it. We know that the Absolute of Bradley and Bosanquet is a system of universals or universal judgments, and yet it is the individual. The two ideas are combined in the conception of the Absolute. And for this reason, finally, the Absolute as a system of hypothetical judgments turns out to be a system of categorical judgments finally. In Bradley's logic, no hypothetical judgment is true without categorical basis. But in truth, every categorical judgment is hypothetical. Even the singular and the particular judgments are imperfect hypotheticals. If we retain the position as such, we are involved in a vicious circle. The truth of a categorical is a hypothetical, but the truth of the hypothetical depends on the categorical. The solution of this difficulty lies in affirming their final identity. It may be that, after this identification, there would be neither the categorical nor the hypothetical judgment; judgment itself may be transcended. The Absolute as an individual is its categorical aspect, and as a system of hypothetical judgments is its hypothetical or universal aspect. And those aspects are absolutely one, and do not transcend each other in the Absolute. Hence the Absolute is both the particular and the universal.

The point may be understood differently. In the ordinary judgment, the subject and predicate point beyond each other. The subject as a That contains innumerable Whats, and the predicate is a What that refers beyond the particular That. If the subject and predicate are to be adequate to each other, then the whole of reality must be on the side of the subject as well as on the side of the predicate.¹ But when the subject and the predicate become the same, the judgment ceases to be a judgment and becomes the Absolute. The Absolute is unique, because the What here cannot refer beyond the That; so it is both a That and a What, that is, both a particular and a universal.

XIV

ULTIMATE VALUES IN EAST AND WEST

Thus the identification of law with existence, the universal with the particular, the material cause with the final forms a distinctive mark of Indian idealism. And this identification follows naturally from that of the Is with the Ought. The true Is is the Ought; the universal that is common to all particulars is the ideal for realizing which they struggle. And because the ideal reality is the material cause of the world, the Buddhists call everything in the world a *dharma*. It is a form of the Dharmadhātu or the Dharmakāya of Buddha. There is no other reality.

If now the true Is is identical with the Ought, is there no difference between Truth and Goodness? Even in European philosophy it is admitted that the Ought comprises Truth, Beauty and Goodness, that logic, aesthetics and ethics are all of them normative sciences. But in Plato, the view that the Idea of the Good is the highest Idea and the world has to be understood in its terms, is a bit ambiguous. If it means that the world has to be understood in terms of the ideal, we may accept it; but if it means that the world has to be understood in terms of one of the triad of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, then we cannot do justice to the other two. But again, if it means that the highest Truth is something which we ought to become, the meaning is in accordance with Indian thought; and ultimately Truth and Goodness would be one. In fact, all the three may be finally identical. But at the empirical level, they differ and therefore retain a difference in connotation.

¹ See Bradley: *Appearance and Reality*, the chapters on Thought and Reality.

The triad of norms in Indian philosophy is not Truth, Beauty and Goodness, but Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*. Buddhism would not have Existence but Truth, not *sattā* but *satyam*, and sometimes admits Consciousness (in Vijñānavāda) and sometimes not. The Hīnayāna sometimes does not admit even Bliss. But we have already noted that Existence is really the same as Truth, and that *sattā* and *satyam* mean the same. What is consequently common to both European and Indian idealisms is Truth or Existence. The others differ, though, we may say, they imply each other. For instance, Beauty and Goodness imply Consciousness and Bliss, and Bliss implies Beauty and Goodness and even Consciousness. But we may say that Truth implies the others also, because this Truth is not empirical existence but the fullness of being. However, if we combine all these, we shall have five: Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Consciousness and Bliss. And the Absolute answers to all the five. It is Truth, because it is the ultimate Existence; it is Beauty, because in it the particular answers exactly to the ideal; it is Goodness, because it is the identity of the material and the final cause; it is consciousness, because it is the Self-consciousness, in which the subject and object are transparent to each other; and it is Bliss, because it is the experience of unity which transcends all differences, it is the consummation of love, which is joy, pure and simple.

The Absolute is all these; but as we approach it from different orders of experience, we understand it differently. When we approach it from the side of logic, we understand it as Truth; from the side of aesthetics as Beauty; from the side of epistemology as Consciousness; and so on and so forth. But the Absolute is not all these indifferently. One criterion passes into another. Truth is the ideal Existence disentangled from appearances. Goodness is the same affirmed as the final cause. But as an Ought, Truth is the same as the final cause. And Beauty is the identification of the highest ideal and the particular.

It does not follow, however, that logic is the same as ethics or aesthetics. At the empirical level, our experiences of truth, beauty and goodness are different. Each has a peculiar quality of its own. And because we view the Absolute from the standpoint of these distinct experiences, we call it Truth, Beauty, and so forth. Otherwise, these distinctions would not have arisen at all.

Because Truth is an ideal Existence, we have said in a previous chapter that explanation is the tracing out of the ideal in the actual. Explanation, as commonly understood, is the interpretation of things in terms of something which is generally familiar, important or self-evident. So it is sometimes reducing a complex to the familiar, sometimes to the important, and sometimes to the obvious. But what is simple may not be self-evident and familiar, and what is self-evident may not be simple, and so forth. And when we become reflective, what is simple may be discovered to be in need of further explanation. What is important may be important for some purpose and unimportant for another. This fact leads to further attempts at explanation. Explanation therefore has to be pushed until it reaches an Absolute, which does not require further explanation. An Absolute is thus implied in the very idea of explanation. Interpretation of our experience in terms of what falls short of the Absolute can have only a relative value.

Explanation is sometimes said to be the fixing of the orders of reality and discovering the relations both within and between the orders. Even this idea of explanation is covered by our view. Explanation, according to the thesis of this work, is the tracing out of the ideal in the actual, the disentangling of the ideal Existence from the world. The lower orders of reality are intellectually lighted up as we advance higher and higher in tracing out the ultimate reality. This advance fixes the relations between the orders by studying their internal structures. It is never possible to reduce the orders completely to a common denominator. One is not precisely the same as the other. Colour, for instance, cannot be equated to sound. But each may be co-ordinated to the other. Similarly, life cannot be reduced to matter, though there is some correlation between the two. The qualitative differences between the orders excludes any such reduction. But yet the whole of the phenomenal reality may be treated as a series or gradations of such orders. Some of the orders form a horizontal series like colours, sounds, tastes, etc.; others constitute a vertical gradation like matter, life and mind. The highest reality is present in all these; it shines through all of them and confers unity on all.

It is sometimes thought that a thing is explained when its

causes are mentioned. This idea, though superficially very simple, is not so. To point out the cause of even a particular thing involves the enunciation of a general law, which is a universal proposition and is therefore the element of identity common to all occurrences. This is certainly an ideal element; and explanation now becomes the tracing out of this ideal element. It is an ideal element, not merely in the sense of a universal common to many particulars and picked up by thought, but also in the sense that it is the perfect rational element of which the particulars partake in different degrees.

We cannot stop with the conception of law. The idea of cause has become that of law. But the cause must now be understood to include all the invariable antecedents. As such it must be the totality of things. It must be the whole prior to the effect, but continuous with it. The But effect cannot be different from the whole, and, as an antecedent of a new effect, it will be included in the whole. So phenomenally considering, we may regard the world as continually advancing and manifesting newer and newer appearances. And this idea may be said to be presupposed by the idea of cause. The conception of an ever-advancing universe is closely connected with the idea of cause.

In the above development of the idea of cause, the totality of the invariable antecedents is really the all-comprehensive Absolute, which forms the ultimate ground of the effect. Whether this Absolute is considered to be rational and an identity in difference or as supra-rational and non-difference, the effect must come out of it and must be absorbed into it. Taken as a whole, the Absolute then is both the material and efficient cause of the world. And as it includes the effect also in its next phenomenal advance, we arrive in a different way at the Buddhistic idea that the world is not different from the Absolute.

But often philosophical explanation is not given in terms of cause as the sum-total of invariable antecedents. It is often an interpretation in terms of something. In idealism, it is an interpretation in terms of the highest that we have in our experience. And even this highest is further sublimated and translated to a still higher plane. In Western philosophy, the world is explained in terms of self-consciousness, imagination, etc. But in Indian philosophy, it has been understood in terms of illusion too. The fashion of understanding the world in terms of illusion was set by the Advaita. The other systems followed it, in order to meet its

LAST QUESTION ABOUT ILLUSION

objections and maintain the reality of the world. The natural result is that all understood the world in terms of illusion, but they understood illusion differently. So the differences in their understanding of the world are due to their differently understanding illusion and *vice versa*.

XVI

LAST QUESTION ABOUT ILLUSION

Incidentally, we may now clear up one point. Does illusion necessarily imply the mistaking of one existent thing for another existent thing or is it the perception of something unique and imperceptible? Most of the Indian systems accept the former alternative, while the Advaita of Śaṅkara alone propounds the latter. Though Śaṅkara's own language is here ambiguous,¹ the view of his followers is definite. We usually think that we mistake one thing for another. A rope, for example, is mistaken for a snake. The general view is that the rope is wrongly taken for the snake, which was once upon a time perceived. The advaitins, on the contrary, maintain that the snake of illusion is not the snake seen somewhere else and remembered, but a unique one. We have seen that those who advocated the theory that the object of illusion is an *alaukikasat* or non-empirical reality admit some form of *anyathākhyāti* or the theory that in illusion we take one thing for another; for if a non-empirical thing is not mistaken for an empirical thing, we would not have been affected by it. We have seen Kumāra, the commentator on Bhoja, contending that even the advaitin has to accept some form of *anyathākhyāti*; for, unless the *anirvacanīya* (inexplicable) serpent is mistaken for a real serpent, we would not have been frightened by it. But the advaitin would say that there need be no taking of one thing for another. We generally take one thing for another where both the things are regarded as real. I may mistake my friend A for my friend B, and both are real. Here it is a mistake in recognition, and my cognition here is definitely that of recognition. But in the illusion of the snake, the snake is not recognized as one seen previously. And so past reality is not a factor in the cognition of the snake. There is here no mistaking of one reality for another reality. In the judgment, "That is a snake," the thing seen is one, and the cognition does not refer to a past reality. The snake seen

¹ See his introduction to the first of the *Brahmasūtras*.

here is neither real nor unreal. But it affects us like a real because the reality of the rope shines through the snake. That is, the That which is the existential aspect of the rope is now identified with the snake, and for that reason the snake appears as existent and we are terrified. Here we neither take the rope for the snake nor a non-pragmatic or non-empirical snake for a pragmatic or empirical one, but identify the snake, which is neither real nor unreal, with the That, which is the existence of the rope. In the same act of cognition, except in the case of substance and attribute, no two realities can be identified. If the snake were real, that is, if the reality of the snake were different from that of the rope, the illusory judgment of the rope, "That is a snake," could never have occurred. If, on the other hand, the snake were unreal, it could not have been experienced, and could not have been identified with the That.

It may perhaps be said that it is not the snake having non-empirical reality that is taken for the snake having empirical reality, but that the non-empirical reality of the former is taken for the empirical reality of the latter. But this distinction introduces much complexity and confusion. We must have here, according to this solution, two Thats and two Whats. But our experience does not reveal so much complexity. And it is absurd to think that we can ever mistake one That for another That. So far as our discursive knowledge is concerned, a That by itself is an abstraction; and it is inconceivable that we ever mistake one That for another That. If it is taken along with the What, then we must have taken one determinate thing for another determinate thing. In the present case, we must have mistaken the non-empirically real snake for an empirically real one. But where is the latter to be found? Is it a snake that was once seen and remembered? But there is no factor of remembrance in the judgment, "That is a snake."

We may note a point here. A mistaken recognition too may be treated as an illusion. One may mistake a person A for another person B and make the judgment, "That is the same as A." Here too there is illusion. And it may be asked: How can two realities A and B be taken as identical by the same act of cognition? A and B are both realities. They are not merely related, but related as the same. True, in a mistaken recognition there are two realities. But here the aspect of recognition is clear and definite. And recognition always refers to a past reality. But in the illusion of

the snake there is no recognition at all. And as between-perceptual illusion and the illusion of recognition, the former is primary. Illusory recognition may be treated as based on illusory perception.

XVII

LIFE OF ACTION AND FEELING AN IMPLICATION OF
EPISTEMOLOGY

A general survey of the theories of truth must convince all readers that there can be no ready-made test which may be applied to each and every case of cognition in order to ascertain its truth. All the theories fail when the question of applying the test is raised. According to the theory of correspondence, the object exists outside the mind; and an idea is true if it corresponds to the object, and false if it does not. This theory agrees with its underlying metaphysics, that mind and matter are two disparate substances. But now the difficulty is, How are we to know whether our idea corresponds to the object, if the latter is outside the mind and so we have no access to it? We cannot merely stop here. We cannot say that, though the epistemological side of the theory is false, its metaphysical side is true. For we have to ask further: How can the mind have known at all that there is matter disparate from itself, if it really has no access to it? This question was actually raised by Berkeley, and the idea of matter was dispensed with. In the application of the test, the theory of coherence fares no better. If an idea A is to cohere with other ideas, then not only are these other ideas infinite in number, but also the idea of the coherence of A must cohere with the rest; and this line of reasoning will land in infinite regress. If it is said that the idea of the coherence of A with the rest is revealed not by a different idea but by the idea of the coherence of A itself, we may as well say that even the certainty of A is revealed through itself, though A may be made uncertain by another idea. It is for this reason that the advaitins maintain that the truth of an idea is revealed through the idea itself, while its falsity is revealed through some other idea. The basic fact here is that somehow or other truth must be revealed through cognition itself. And if we are to avoid infinite regress, we have to accept that the truth of a cognition must be known through the selfsame act of cognition. But a cognition may be rendered false by a second cognition; and so

any cognition is false not by itself but because of another cognition.

But here comes a difficulty. Can we ever be theoretically certain that a cognition will never be falsified in future? If this doubt is raised, it has to be admitted that we can never be sure. The conditions for such surety are that the perceiving process must be the same as the object perceived. Evidently our perceptions, except in the case of pain and pleasure, are not of that type.

What conclusion are we to draw from this fact? Theoretically considered, there is no final truth that can be attained by our finite thought. Our thought is not fitted to get at final certainty. We must have been endowed with thought, not in order to attain final truth through it, but to use it for some other purpose. Man is not merely an epistemological being. It is being increasingly felt by philosophers that epistemology is not the chief branch of philosophy. Whitehead, for instance, maintains that truth is not of primary importance. Man seems to be born not merely to think, but also to act and feel. Only in feeling does he have certainty. In pleasure, for example, the feeling of pleasure and the pleasure felt are identical. Generally none doubts whether one's pain or pleasure is true or not. For this reason, it is self-evident. And whatever theoretical satisfaction we have in this world must be due to some connection between thought and activity on the one hand and feeling on the other. So this world as such must be regarded as not completely suited to man. He has to transform it in such a way as to be completely at home in it. Fullest truth cannot be realized unless we are able to transform the world along with ourselves. Then the subject-object situation will not be what it is in this world. All this is implied in the theory of truth.

But what about the truth of the sciences? Are the concepts of matter, life, etc., on which the different sciences are based, false? Is there no matter, is there no life? Can we not be certain that there is matter, that there is life? In demanding that there should be matter, etc., in this world apart from our understanding them, we seem to be like children, who want to eat their cake and have it too. We have already noted in a previous chapter that matter, etc., are not entities which we are describing but hypothetical formulas we are constructing. And the curious thing is that we demand that the thing constructed should be independent of our construction. We make the demand, because we feel that the

presupposition of our knowledge is that it discovers things and does not produce them. Yet, on the other hand, we have noted, that if things are absolutely independent of the knowing mind, the agreement of our ideas to our objects cannot be explained. We have shown that Kant's intuitive understanding is involved in our conscious life. So matter, in one sense, must be independent of us, and in another must be due to a form of our own cognitive activity. And this form Kant calls the category. Physical sciences are possible, he tells us, because of these categories. That is, physical sciences are constructions according to these categories. How far is this view different from that of Levy that science is a social venture? Certainly not very far. Kant would say that science is a venture of the transcendental ego, while Levy would say, if the expression is allowed, of the social ego. The Buddhists would say that the sciences along with the objects are the construction or the creation of the ultimate reality according to *vasanās* or *samskāras*. These *samskāras* constitute the individual. They are the machinery that is the individual, just as the wheels, etc., of the watch form the watch. They are cosmic, racial and social, and even include the individual idiosyncrasies. The world of matter, for example, is a projection or creation according to one of these *samskāras*. The individual cannot but see matter, because it is one of his *samskāras*. It is in this sense given to him, just as much as his own finitude is given to him. And for this reason, if he demands that matter should exist prior to his knowing it, he misses it. It therefore appears to be a hypothesis that is at once a constructed and a given fact. Matter is an ideal construct, and mechanism is the method of constructing it. That is how there is a materialistic view of the world, a spiritualistic view of it, and so forth. Spirit in its outward vision (*bahirdṛṣṭi*) sees the world as matter; but in its inward vision (*antar-dṛṣṭi*) matter is transformed into spirit. What is required is a change of vision.

The material aspect of the world is the arena for action. That is why many systems, even including those of Buddhism, maintain that the reality of the world is the *vyāvahārika* or pragmatic reality. The Nyaya uses *arthakriyākāritva*, or usefulness for an end, as the test of reality. What can be the most easily transformed according to man's desires is matter. Life begins to show its individuality, but matter exhibits little of it. Man born in this world seems to be born for action, and not for a merely contem-

plative life. So far as this world is concerned, theory is for action and action for feeling. In feeling alone is man completely at home with himself. In this world as it is, he does not have complete certainty. And in order to have it, the world has to be transformed. So a life higher than the present one is pointed to by the theory of truth. Matter must be controlled and assimilated to spirit. When this assimilation is complete, there would be no more matter. Matter is an expression of the Spirit, and mechanism is the method or law of this expression.

XVIII

NATURE OF UNIVERSALS

We have seen that the *vāsanās* and *samskāras* can be cosmic, racial, social and individual. What we generally call the universal must therefore be all these. A universal that is cosmic must naturally have a longer and greater stability than the racial, the racial than the social, and so forth. And none of these can have an ultimate value. It is absurd to think that there is an eternal universal for things like horse, chair, etc. The horse may exist on the earth but not on the other planets, and that too for some time. The chair has come to be at one point of civilization. Such things appear and disappear at certain points of time. And they need not have eternal universals of which they partake. The cosmic *samskāra* of matter, according to which the material world is created, is certainly eternal with reference to man; but the *samskāra* of chair is what man acquires. He is himself the author of it. To posit an eternal universal for all these physical chairs is to unnecessarily increase the number of eternal realities. Even matter as a determinate universal is transcended in the final reality, and its eternity is only relative. We see no reason why spirit should always express itself as matter.

To raise the question of our knowledge of a universal like chair, and the priority of our knowledge of the universal to that of the particular, and thence to conclude the eternality of the universal, would not be of much use. Perception, it is true, is in some sense a recognition; it may be often the perception of the universal in the particular. But the first perception of a thing cannot be recognition. The question whether the universal is *a priori* or *a posteriori* engaged the minds of European philosophers for a

long time. If it is said that it is a *priori*, the question is asked: How is it that a child does not know what an elephant is before seeing it? If, on the other hand, it is said that it is a *posteriori*, the problem is raised: How do we know that a particular thing is a chair, if we are not already in possession of the idea of chair? Midway between the two, Berkeley held the type theory, according to which what we call a universal is a particular taken as a type. The universal is neither an abstraction from the particulars, nor an eternal reality prior to them, but a type. And so far as the empirical things like chairs, tables, etc., are concerned, Berkeley's theory has some cogency. This theory reminds us of the Naiyāyika theory of *sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti*.¹ According to it, after perceiving a single instance of, for example, a chair, we come to know of the plurality of chairs through the form which the knowledge of chair assumes. The Naiyāyika view of *jāti* or universal and our cognition of it is different. The *jāti* is known as subsisting in the particulars and is eternal, but this form need not be eternal. But in the cognition of plurality simply by extension from the particulars, there is a line of thinking that may be developed with advantage. It is possible to treat the universal as an idea of indefinite plurality. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the general proposition in inference, for instance, "All men are mortal," is not obtained by a study of all particulars taken one after another; but after seeing the mortality of one man, a cognition of all mortal men is obtained by extension. So if it is possible to obtain a universal proposition of the type "All men are mortal" from the particular proposition "This man is mortal," it must equally be possible to obtain the universal man from a particular man. Of course, the universal would then be not the *jāti*, but the idea of indefinite plurality.

When we are not prepared to accept an eternal universal like chair or table, our knowledge of such a universal must be a *posteriori* and not a *priori*. But even then, the universal would not be an abstraction from the particulars, but an extension from the particulars. But there are those universals which are the *samskāras* of our thought, which constitute its structure, and are the modes of its activity. Matter and mechanism may be taken as examples. These are as eternal as thought itself and disappear only when thought is transcended. Their eternity is naturally relative and not absolute. These universals are a *priori* because they belong to

¹ See *Kārikāvallī* with *Muktāvalī*, p. 48. (Guzarati Printing Press, Bombay.)

the nature of thought, and concrete matter, etc., we see are *a priori* constructs according to these universals.

There are different kinds of this priority and posteriority. We may be said to have an *a priori* cognition of categories like matter, cause, etc., but not of chair, pen, etc. But both cognitions appear only after the first perception of the particular. But again, a universal like that of a horse or elephant cannot be said to be *a priori* like matter; for it does not belong to the structure of thought. It is of course not a product of civilization, but a product of natural evolution. Horses are the particularizations of a universal that gradually formed itself in the onward process of evolution, and may transform itself into something else or become extinct. So its priority with regard to particular horses may be accepted. But with regard to our cognition of it, we cannot be said to be conscious of it before being conscious of its particulars. It is as much a concept of indefinite plurality as that of a chair. But the universal chair is still less *a priori*. It is difficult to say, except metaphorically, that nature contains any *samskāra* of chair, according to which particular chairs are produced. It is a product of civilization, and its universal is posterior to the particular. The *samskāra* of the chair is formed in our minds only after the particular. And as nature cannot be said to contain the *samskāra* of chair, it is both existentially and cognitively *a posteriori*. But when once the first chair is perceived, we may allow some priority to the universal with reference to the other chairs.

It has to be noted, however, that these distinctions are fluid and relative, but not hard and fast. Just as nature is considered to be a process of evolution, in a particular span of which the universal horse forms itself and expresses itself as the particular horses; civilization too may be considered to be a process of evolution at a particular point in which the chair appears and may be said to be the expression of the universal chair. But man, as he is, tends to treat the chair as an accident with reference to him. But the horse, though it may be treated as an accident with reference to nature, is as much a product of nature as man. The plan for producing the horse does not originate in his mind like the plan for producing a chair. Nature might have come across the former plan quite as accidentally as the man who made the first chair must have come accidentally on its plan. And in this sense, the plan may be treated as *a priori*. But yet the former plan, that is, of the

horse, belongs to nature; and the latter is only a concept. We are disposed to treat the former as real, while of the latter we say that it is only an idea. Hence while noting the fluidity of these distinctions, we have to admit their plausibility also.

XIX

CONFORMATION OF THE IDEAL TO THE REAL

In Indian philosophy, the conformation of the ideal to the real is not a problem at all. Particularly in the idealistic philosophies, the ideal reality is regarded as creative and as the material cause. And in every theism too where God is regarded as omnipotent and creative, the conformity of nature to the ideal does not give rise to a problem. The world comes out of the Brahman and returns to it. Conformity of the two is therefore beyond doubt.

In all philosophies where a difference is made between the actual and the ideal, existence and reality, reality and value, and so forth, the problem of the conformity is almost insoluble. But when the ideal is viewed no longer as different from the actual, but as the true actual or true existence, the problem vanishes. Nature must conform to the ideal now, because the ideal is its truth, its essence. And every thing does but conform to its essence. If it does not, it ceases to be itself.

In European philosophy, the difficulty of reconciling the natural with the moral law was felt by Kant, because neither God nor the transcendental ego was conceived by him as creative. Of course, God was assigned the intuitive understanding, but it was regarded as only a regulative ideal and not as constitutive. This defect was removed later by Fichte and other post-Kantians. The ideal was regarded not merely as a presupposition of our experience, but as much more than that. But later, Hegel felt worried when he found that the world was not through and through rational; for the fact came into conflict with his enunciation that the rational is the real and the real rational. But this difficulty is actually due to an inconsistency in his conception. The Absolute as the ultimate truth he regards as the real. But he still clings to the idea that the world as it appears to the finite intellect is equally real. The Absolute is the ultimate reality as disentangled from the world. But yet the world appears real because the reality of the Absolute shines through it. Hegel is thinking that the explanatory principle is expected to include

the material to be explained. But if the principle is to include the latter, there would be nothing left to be explained. As we have said, the principle is what is traced out in the latter; and though it gives unity to the divergent material, it does not include it as such. The all-comprehensiveness of the Absolute means that, at the level of the Absolute, the world is transformed and becomes one with the Absolute, and not that the Absolute includes the world as such. The conformation of the world to the Absolute then, means that it is capable of being transformed and made one with the Absolute, but not that it is already one with the Absolute. When we say that nature conforms to the moral ideal, we do not mean that the moral ideal is actually realized in nature, but that nature can be moulded in a way that agrees with the moral ideal. And as regards the theoretical conformation, it is the presence of the ideal in our actual, and not the complete equality of the two.

XX

THE ABSOLUTE AND SUPERPOSITION

If the actual appears to be real because of the presence of the true existence shining through it, if the true existence or reality is the ideal, whence then does the actual come? What is its relation to the true existence? Śaṅkara tells us that it is superimposition. Others tell us that it is the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the ideal. If it is asked, how can the ideal remain intact if it undergoes transformation? they say that the ideal as an agent has a power (*śakti*) and the world is a transformation of this power, not of the ideal itself. But Śaṅkara and his followers find it difficult to understand how to differentiate between an agent and his power in that way, and say that we cannot take half a fowl for cooking and allow the other half to lay eggs.

If the ideal is present in the actual, does it exist just as things exist in a box? The relation is certainly more intimate. The ideal is what makes the actual appear as existent; it is the latter's existential aspect or aspect of reality. The actual is therefore a form superposed on the ideal. The ideal appears as the actual: existence or reality appears as a form. The Absolute appears as the world. The latter is an expression of the Absolute. But this expression does not affect the Absolute. It may express itself in one way now and in another the next. And it remains unperturbed and full. But if the Absolute is the real, what are we to say of the

world? It is of course the expression of the Absolute, its appearance. Reality shines through it, and makes it appear as real. But when we experience this appearance, we do not see this Absolute. This means that we do take the appearance by itself. And if the Absolute is real, then the appearance is neither real nor unreal. The relation thus between the Absolute and the world is neither positive nor negative. This is akin to the view we came across while discussing the ideas of the *Laṅkāvatāra*, according to which the world is neither identical with the Ālaya nor different from it. The idea of superposition implies this relation.

But still as an ideal to be attained by the individual through real effort, the Absolute is positively related to the world. It is the fulfilment of the finite, its completion. And as an ultimate presupposition, it is absolutely depended upon by the finite. But in the reverse direction this absolute dependence does not hold. The Absolute does not depend upon the world, as the world depends upon the Absolute. The existence of the world is the existence of the Absolute. But the existence of the Absolute is not that of the world. So the relation between the two in the direction from the Absolute to the world is negative, not in the sense of opposition but in the sense of indifference. The idea of superposition covers both the positive and the negative relations. This does not mean that the Absolute is both identical with, and different from the world. For at the level of the Absolute the world does not exist. It is completely transformed, and is not to be distinguished from the Absolute. It is only for our philosophy, for our intellect, that there are two moments, positive and negative.

XXI

KINDS OF WHOLEs AND KINDS OF RELATION BETWEEN PARTS AND WHOLEs

The significance of the idea of superposition (*adhyāsa*) can be best understood from another side. As the Absolute is said to be all-comprehensive, it is regarded as a whole. But what kind of whole is it? There are many kinds of wholes. Roughly, we may take three: the aggregate, the mechanical whole, and the organic whole. In an aggregate the parts are absolutely independent of each other, both functionally and existentially. That is, they can exist and function separately from each other. The whole is therefore a loosely knit totality of the parts, and is completely

dependent on them. The Absolute certainly is not a whole in the sense of an aggregate. It is not a mere totality of the manifold.

In a mechanical whole, as in a watch, the parts depend on each other functionally, but are independent existentially. In order to function as parts of a watch, they must form that particular whole. And through mutual interaction and dependence they set the watch going. But when separated, though they do not perform those functions, they do not cease to exist. But the whole here, as in the above case, is completely dependent on the parts, though of course the parts are partially independent of the whole. The whole has no existence apart from the parts. It has no distinct nature or quality of its own. Therefore the Absolute cannot be understood as a whole of this kind. It can control the parts. The finite things depend upon it for their very existence.

In an organic whole, the mutual dependence of the parts and the whole is complete. The parts of an organism when separated rot and cease to exist. Indeed, they do not enter absolute non-existence, because there is no such thing as absolute non-existence. But we easily see the difference between the brass wheel of a watch when taken out of the mechanism and a part cut off from an animal. The latter not only ceases to function but also to exist. And the organic whole begins to show a peculiar sort of individuality. When some parts are removed from an organic whole, it tries to a certain extent to replace them, grow them, or create them out of itself. But in spite of this assertion of its uniqueness, the organic whole is completely dependent on its parts, just as much as the parts of it are dependent on the whole. The whole here possesses an individuality or uniqueness not exhibited by the previous wholes. It even shows certain signs of priority to the parts, in that it tries to replace some of them. But this is not yet very marked. It can be so, only when the whole can exhibit sufficient freedom from the parts. Organisms show some freedom, but it is too slight. As examples of organic wholes where even that much of freedom is not found, may be taken the aesthetic wholes like painting and sculpture. A painted picture or statue cannot by itself replace the parts if lost, and loses its aesthetic quality. Similarly, the parts too when separated from the whole lose it. However, the Absolute cannot be taken merely either as an aesthetic whole or as an organism. It is absolutely free from its parts, which freedom is not characteristic of the organic whole. Though the world is dependent on the Absolute, the Absolute is

not dependent on the world. Appearances come and go; but the Absolute remains complete and perfect. But whence do the appearances come, and where do they go? They issue forth from the Absolute, and into it they enter. So the Absolute produces the world out of itself, and absorbs it into itself. It is always full, nothing is added to it by creating the world. Yet the world is there on it. The relation between the two cannot therefore be organic. It is, Śaṅkara would say, the relation of superposition.¹ The creation of the world by the Absolute is the superposition of the world by the Absolute upon itself.

It is true that at the level of the Absolute there is no world. To speak of a relation between the world and the Absolute is, for that reason, meaningless. But in spite of this fact, the Absolute is regarded as the ultimate cause, both material and efficient, of the world. And though the advaitin refuses to call it a *pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*, he is not very much opposed to calling it a *vivartakāraṇa*. To regard the Absolute as a cause of the world, whatever kind of cause that may be, is to relate it to the world. For, though our intellect realizes that it is absurd to ask about the nature of the relation between the Absolute and the world, it still cannot resist the temptation to invent and define a relation between the two. And if we are to think of a relation, we have to think of it as having that peculiar connotation of one-sided dependence. The Absolute as the *vivartakāraṇa* is the cause that superposes the world upon itself. It is the cause that is completely prior to its parts, creates them out of itself without itself being affected by the creation, and in a way can set itself against its own parts.

XXII

SPIRITUAL WHOLES AND THE RELATION OF
SUPERPOSITION

While the idea of mechanical unity is applicable to matter and that of organic unity to life, that of a superposing unity is applicable to mind. Mind can create one idea after another out of itself. It is the unity of all the ideas, feelings, emotions, etc., that are said to belong to mind; and yet it is a unity that is conscious of itself, and can set itself against its own parts. It is quite con-

¹ For a more detailed presentation of this point, see the author's Presidential Address to the Logic and Metaphysics Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1938.

scious of its own freedom. But an organic unity is not capable of doing so. Because of this difference, the idea of an organic unity is inadequate to express the nature of mind. Mind may be regarded as a whole, but it is a whole that can consciously oppose itself to its parts, that produces the parts out of itself and absorbs them into itself, and in all this process retains its original unity. The finite mind may not exhibit so much freedom from the parts as the Absolute does from the world. Yet the difference is a difference of degree.

Between the whole as an aggregate, which is just the totality of its parts, and the Absolute which is prior to, and independent of its parts, there are different degrees of dependence and independence between the parts and the whole. In the lowest kind of whole, the parts are absolutely independent of the whole and the whole is completely dependent on the parts, while in the highest the parts are completely dependent on the whole and the whole absolutely independent of the parts. As we advance higher and higher, the parts become more and more dependent on the whole and the whole acquires greater and greater priority to, and independence of the parts. In the lowest, the parts are everything and the whole hardly impresses itself as a unity. In the highest, the parts hardly appear as parts of the whole. The whole has a distinct individuality of its own apart from the parts, which are superposed on it and do not constitute it.

XXIII

FINAL GOAL OF INDIAN IDEALISM

It is towards such freedom of spirit that Indian idealism points. Reality is the whole, but it is absolutely free from its parts. Yet the parts are not different from the whole. They have no existence apart from it. Their existence is its existence. That is why examples like the sun and its reflections, water and its waves, are given both by the Vedānta and Buddhism. By some this freedom is interpreted to be negative, the freedom to be aloof, the freedom to escape from the material world and its values. Though it is not impossible to interpret a few of the ancient writers thus, almost all contemporary writers stress freedom by conquest and assimilation. Spirit is to be free, not by escaping from matter, but by transforming and assimilating it to itself. This conquest of matter is the most marked in the philosophies of Aurobindo and Iqbal,

though the former is the more sober of the two. It is a mistake to think that this exhortation to conquer matter and assimilate it, is new to Indian philosophy and is an importation from the West. Only the Advaita of Śaṅkara and Buddhism in general may be interpreted to preach a negative attitude to the world. But all other systems, including the Advaitas of Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism preach transformation and sublimation of matter. But for some reason or other, probably because of their sectarianism, they do not appeal so strongly to the Indian intellect as the Advaita of Śaṅkara did. But it is, on the other hand, to be ungrateful to the West to say that Western thought has no part to play in this change of tone and stress in the philosophies of the contemporary thinkers. It helped, and will help in future too, to bring into prominence those idealistic systems which preached not an escape from the world, but its transformation into spirit.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

It is not necessary to know these dates for the purpose of understanding and appreciating the argument of the book, which is written in response to suggestions from many who often found it difficult to disentangle the philosophical ideas from the historical and philological material in the works of the orientalist. In India philosophical schools and systems did not develop generally out of one another, but simultaneously through mutual criticism. The only exception is Buddhism, in which we find a discernible historical growth of ideas and schools, the old schools continuing to exist along with the old ones. An attempt was made by Mādhavācārya, in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, to show that his own philosophy, namely, the Advaita, was a development out of the rest. But the development he showed is only a logical development, not chronological. Haribhadrāsūri's *Sarvadarśanasamucchaya* is a somewhat similar attempt. However, the following table may be of interest. The dates of ancient Indian philosophers cannot be exact; and scholars are not unanimous. Sometimes the results of their historical research differ by one or more centuries.

Abhinavagupta—10th century A.D.

al Gazzali—13th century A.D.

Appayadikṣita—A.D. 1600.

Asaṅga—4th century A.D.

Aśoka, Emperor of India—3rd century B.C.

Aśvaghoṣa—1st century A.D.

Bādarāyaṇa, author of *Brahmasūtras* or *Vedāntasūtras*—date uncertain—any time between 500 B.C. and A.D. 400.

Bhṛgavadgītā—200 B.C.—A.D. 200.

Bhāskara—9th century A.D.

Bhoja—10th century A.D.

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad—9th century B.C.

Buddha—600 B.C.

Caitanya—15th century A.D.

Gautama, author of *Nyāyāsūtras*—400 B.C.—300 B.C.

Harivarman—3rd century A.D.

Hīnayāna Schools—from the 3rd century B.C.

Jalaluddin Rumi—13th century A.D.

Kaṇāda, author of *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*—600 B.C.—500 B.C.

Kaṇiṣka—1st century A.D.

Kapila, founder of Sāṅkhya, earlier than *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣad of 4th century B.C.

Kāthāvatthu—200 B.C.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra—4th century A.D.

Madhusūdana—A.D. 1600.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

- Madhva—13th century A.D.
 Mahāvīra, founder of Jainism—6th century B.C.
 Mahāyāna compilations—200 B.C.—A.D. 200.
 Maitreyanātha, founder of Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra—date uncertain—
 seems to be earlier than Nāgārjuna.
 Menander—2nd century B.C.
 Mohammad—6th century A.D.
 Nāgārjuna, author of *Mādhyamikakārikās*—2nd century A.D.
 Nimbārka—13th century A.D.
 Pāñcarātra—as old as Vaiṣṇavism—5th century B.C.—Āgamas seem
 to date from 1st century B.C.
 Pāśupata—as old as Śaivism—5th century B.C.—Āgamas seem to date
 from 1st century B.C.
 Patañjali, author of *Yogasūtras*—2nd century A.D.—but ideas seem
 * to be far older.
Prajñāpāramitās—100 B.C.—A.D. 100.
 Prākāśātman, author of *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa*—A.D. 1200.
 Rāmānuja—11th century A.D.
 Rgveda (early)—2000 B.C.
 Śaṅkara—8th century A.D.
 Śrīharṣa—A.D. 1200.
 Śrīkaṇṭha—A.D. 1300—A.D. 1400.
 Śrīpati—16th century (?) A.D.
 Vācaspati—A.D. 900.
 Vallabha—15th century A.D.
 Vaśubandhu—4th century A.D.
 Vaśugupta—9th century A.D.
 Vijñānabhikṣu, author of *Sāṅkhyasūtras*—15th century A.D.

GLOSSARY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS

- abādhyatvam*, non-contradictoriness.
ābhāsa, appearance.
abhāva, negation, negative.
abhāvavapadārtha, negative entity.
abheda, non-difference.
ācāryas, teachers, examples of good conduct.
ādhāra, locus, basis, support.
ādhārākāraṇa, supporting cause.
adhikaraṇa, locus, basis, support.
adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa, see *ādhārakāraṇa*.
adhyāsa, illusion, super-imposition, superposition.
Advaita, Non-dualism.
Āgamas, Scriptures, generally sectarian scriptures as distinguished from the *Śruti* or Veda, which is a non-sectarian scripture.
akhyāti, non-cognition, absence of cognition.
alaukika, non-empirical.
alaukikasat, non-empirical being.
Alaya, non-perishing.
Ālaya, Receptacle, Storehouse.
anātmā, no-self, non-self, unreality of the self.
anirvacanīya, inexplicable.
anirvacanīyakhyātivāda, doctrine that the object of illusion is inexplicable as either real or unreal.
antahkaraṇa, inner instrument, inner sense, mind.
anyathākhyātivāda, doctrine that the object of illusion is a real object mistaken for another real object.
aparokṣānubhūti, direct or immediate experience.
apratisaṅkhyā, ignorance, non-cognition.
apūrṇakhyātivāda, doctrine that illusion is due to (the same as) incomplete cognition.
arthāpatti, postulation.
asamavāyikāraṇa, relational cause.
asat, non-being, unreality, non-existence, falsity.
asatkhyātivāda, doctrine that the object of illusion is unreal or non-existent.
āsrava, impurity.
āśraya, locus, support, basis.
aśuddha, impure.
aśūnyatā, non-emptiness, non-indeterminateness.
ātmakhyātivāda, doctrine that the object of illusion is the perceiver's own self or mind.
avaccheda, limitation, determination, determinant.

- avasthā*, condition, state.
avastu, non-entity, unreality, falsity.
Avidyā, Nescience, Ignorance, sometimes equated to *Māyā*.
avijñapti, ignorance, the unconscious.
avyākṛta, unmanifest.
āyatana, base, foundation, dwelling place.
bhāva, positive, the positive.
bhāvapadārtha, positive entity.
bheda, difference, distinction.
bhedābheda, difference-cum-identity.
bhedābhedavādin, upholder of difference-cum-identity.
bhogyasakti, energy as the object of enjoyment.
bhoktrāsakti, energy as the enjoyer.
Brahman, Infinite, Great, Absolute. Ultimate Reality.
bhrama, illusion, error, hallucination.
bhrānti, see *bhrama*.
bodhi, enlightenment, knowledge.
Buddha, Enlightened.
Buddhakāya, body of Buddha.
buddhi, reason, intellect, understanding, intelligence.
citta, mind.
darśana, sight, perception, vision, view, philosophical system.
dhamma, see *dharma*.
dharma, law, nature, rule, ideal, norm, quality, entity, truth, element, category.
Dharmadhātu, the original Law or Dharma, the Absolute Dharma.
Dharmakāya, the body of Law or Dharma.
dharmanairātmya, selflessness or essencelessness of the objects of the world.
dhātu, ore, element.
dhyāna, meditation.
doctrine of karma, doctrine that human action bears necessary fruit.
dr̥ṣṭi, view.
duḥkha, pain, suffering, misery.
Dvaita, Dualism.
Dvaitādvaita, dualism-cum-non-dualism.
guṇa, quality.
icchāsakti, energy as desire or will.
Īśvara, God, Cosmic Person, lower Absolute.
jāti, universal, genus.
jīva, individual, finite self, empirical self.
jñānasakti, energy as knowledge or consciousness.
kañcukas, sheaths, fetters.
karaṇa, instrumental cause, instrument.
kāraṇa, cause, reason.

GLOSSARY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS

- karma*, action, latent stage which ethical action enters until fructification.
- khyāti*, cognition, knowledge.
- kleśas*, affections, mental impurities.
- kriyāśakti*, energy as activity.
- kṣaṇika*, momentary.
- Kūṭastha*, He who (that which) lives in the mass or unitary state, see *Sākṣī*.
- lakṣaṇa*, definition, quality, mark.
- laukika*, empirical.
- mādhyaṃika*, middle-pather, upholder of the doctrine of the mean or middle path.
- malas*, impurities.
- manas*, mind.
- mantra*, incantation.
- mārga*, path, way.
- Māyā*, the mysterious, mystery, the inexplicable, illusion. See *Avidyā*.
- mithyā*, illusion, error, hallucination.
- mokṣa*, see *mukti*.
- mukti*, salvation, liberation, emancipation, spiritual realization.
- nairātmya*, selflessness, essencelessness, naturelessness.
- nāma-rūpa*, name and form, mind and matter.
- nāstika*, nihilist, negativist, atheist.
- niḥsvabhāva*, without own nature or essence.
- niḥsvabhāvatā*, naturelessness, essencelessness, emptiness of individuality.
- nimittakāraṇa*, efficient cause.
- niradhiṣṭana*, without a locus, support or basis.
- niradhiṣṭanabhrama*, illusion without a real basis.
- niranvaya*, non-relational.
- nirguṇa*, quality-less, indeterminate.
- nirodha*, cessation.
- nirvāṇa*, peace, non-agitation, salvation.
- nirvikalpa*, indeterminate.
- padā*, word.
- padārtha*, meaning of a word, concept, category, entity.
- paramāṇu*, atom.
- paramārthasat*, ultimate being, absolute reality.
- paramārthasatya*, ultimate truth, absolute truth.
- pāramārthikasattā*, noumenal existence, essential existence, ultimate being.
- pāramitā*, virtue.
- paratantra*, conditional, conditioned, relative.
- parikalpita*, imaginary, imagined, fabricated.
- pariṇāma*, change, transformation, evolution.

- pariniṣpanna*, absolute, ultimate, final.
- prajñā*, knowledge, wisdom, higher knowledge according to Buddhism, but reason or intellect according to orthodox schools.
- prakāra*, form, determinant, determination, universal.
- Prakṛti*, Primeval Matter, Nature.
- pramāṇas*, valid sources or instruments of knowledge.
- prātibhāsika*, seeming, apparent, illusory, hallucinatory.
- prātibhāsikasattā*, seeming existence, apparent existence, illusory existence, hallucinatory existence.
- pratibimba*, reflection.
- pratisaṅkhyā*, knowledge, cognition.
- pratītyasamutpāda*, dependent origination, causation as occasioning.
- pratyabhijñā*, recognition.
- pravṛtti*, kinesis, outward-going activity.
- pudgala*, person according to Buddhism, physical body according to Jainism and other schools.
- pudgalanairātmya*, selflessness of personality, essencelessness of soul or self.
- Puruṣa*, Person, Self, same as Atman, Cosmic or Universal Person or Self.
- Qismat*, Fate.
- rūpa*, form, matter.
- sādadhīṣṭhana*, having a real entity as the basis or locus.
- sādadhīṣṭhanabhrama*, illusion with a real object as its basis.
- saguna*, having qualities, determined, determinate, qualified.
- Sākṣi*, Witness, the unaffected perceiver of the actions and enjoyments of the *jīva* or empirical individual.
- Śakti*, Energy, Power, often identified with the feminine aspect of the Absolute or God-head.
- samādhi*, trance, concentration, meditation, collected or integrated state of mind or personality.
- samanantarapratyaya*, dependence on the immediate antecedent, causation as such dependence.
- sāmānya*, universal, common character.
- sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*, contact characterized by the universal, contact through the universal (contact of the mind with the plurality of denotation through the universal contacted in one object, similar to the contact of the whole denotation of a word through its connotation).
- satatā*, sameness, equality, equanimity.
- samavāyikāraṇa*, material cause, the kind of causality that is said by the Naiyāyikas to exist in a substance in its relation to quality and activity and also in the individual in its relation to the universal. The same causality is said to exist in the parts in their relation to the whole.

- sampradāya*, tradition.
samsāra, world, empirical existence, flow, flux.
samskāras, impressions, see *vāsanās*.
samskṛta, compounded.
samudaya, origination, birth, coming into being.
samvṛti, empirical world.
samvṛtisaṭ, empirical being, relative being.
samvṛtisatya, empirical truth, relative truth.
saṅghāta, aggregate, aggregation, combination, compound.
saṅghātavāda, doctrine that causation is only aggregation, involving no transformation.
sarvam, everything.
sarvānubhūh, the all-experiencer, omniscient.
sāsrava, having impurities, impure.
śāśvataavādin, eternalist.
saṭ, being, existence, reality.
saṭkhyātivāda, doctrine that the object of illusion is real.
saṭkāryavāda, doctrine that the effect is existent before its birth.
sattā, being, existence, reality.
sattva (*satva*), being, existent, the real, purity.
satyam, truth, reality, existence, being.
savikalpa, determinate, having a conceptual form.
skandhas, aggregates.
smārtas, traditionalists, the orthodox.
smṛtis, remembered texts as distinguished from *śrūtis* or heard texts.
 The *smṛtis* are the ethical codes and the epics, including the *Bhagavadgītā*.
Śruti, Veda, Scripture, the heard text.
śuddha, pure.
Śūnya, Void, Vacuity, that which is empty of determinations, Indeterminate, Inexplicable.
śūnyajña, knower of the *Śūnya*.
śūnyakhyātivāda, doctrine that the object of illusion is *śūnya* or void.
śūnyatā, emptiness, vacuity, inexplicability.
svabhāva, own being, own essence, own nature.
svalakṣaṇa, unique, peculiar, that the mark or definition of which refers only to itself.
svarūpa, own form, own nature.
svarūpalakṣaṇa, essential quality or mark, that the definition of which is its own form.
svetarabhinna, different from the others, that which is different from all the others.
tanmātras, subtle elements, those which are only themselves, ultimate potential forms of gross elements.
tarka, argument, logic, reasoning.

- taṭastha*, accidental, indifferent, unaffecting.
taṭastha lakṣaṇa, accidental mark or quality.
tathā, thus, such.
Tathāgata, one who has reached Thusness or the Thus, a title of Buddha.
tathatā, thusness, the Thus.
tatthyam, truth, what is thus.
tattvam (*tatvam*), thatness, the That, category, reality.
ucchedavādin, upholder of negativism, negativist, annihilationist, nihilist
upādānakāraṇa, material cause.
upādhis, conditions, limitations, also used by the Nyāya in the sense of a mere concept or conceptual form.
vāda, argument, doctrine, theory.
vāsanā, flavour, impression.
vastu, object, entity, reality.
vidyā, knowledge.
viñāna, mind, consciousness.
viñānavāda, doctrine that reality is mental or mind only.
viñāpti, see *viñāna*.
vikalpa, image, concept, false concept without a corresponding object according to Yoga, determination, determinant, form given to cognition.
vikāra, change, affection, modification, agitation, disturbance.
vipāka, effect, result, change.
viparyaya, see *bhrama*.
viśeṣa, particular, peculiarity, determination.
viśeṣaṇa, quality, character, determinant.
Viśiṣṭādvaita, Non-dualism of the qualified or determinate Brahman, qualified Non-dualism.
vivarta, change or transformation without being affected, appearance.
vivartakāraṇa, cause unaffected by change.
vṛtti, function, act, epistemic act.
vṛttiñāna, knowledge obtained through act of mind, cognition in which mental action is involved.
vyāvahārikasattā, the world of action and communication, pragmatic existence, empirical reality.
yāna, vehicle, conveyance.

INDEX

The present work is not merely an exposition but also an interpretation, which is a running comment on, and a comparative estimate of the Indian idealistic doctrines in the light of the Western and, implicitly and as a result, of the Western in the light of the Indian. This Index therefore attempts, within limits, to give cross references which would be of help to the future students of comparative philosophy. The author thanks Mr. J. W. Stannard of the Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois, for helping him in preparing the Index.

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