HISTORY OF INDIAN EPISODEMOLGY

(Being the Author's Thesis Approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the University of Cambridge).

By

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Preface

This book, which is being published under the title of History of Indian Epistemology, is the revised and enlarged text of my Thesis on Indian Epistemology approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Cambridge University, which was originally published in 1939 and is out of print now. I think the present title is more appropriate for this treatise as it gives a connected and systematic account of the origin as development of the Theories of Knowledge from the beginning of Indian Thought up to the modern times. It is based upon a first-hand study of such original texts as have been found important for this subject. As scholars of Indian Philosophy know, original Contributions to Indian Thought stopped centuries ago and therefore it is not possible to write upon what may be called modern development in Indian Epistemology, but, if I may strike a personal note in this connection, I have ventured to add a chapter at the end under this title in which I have given a summary of my own contribution to the Nature of Knowledge and Reality as contained in my Sanskrit Work *Tattva-darsana* published two years ago. This is the first book of its kind in Sanskrit which attempts a synthesis of the Indian and the Western Thought with the author's own contribution where possible. This work has already been read and appreciated by some of the prominent modern scholars of Sanskrit and Philosophy, and it is hoped that the chapter at the end based upon the same will be found interesting by the readers of this Treatise.

Although the main object in writing this work has been to provide a systematic account of the epistemological thought as it is to be had in the works of Indian philosophers, the attempt to achieve this by means of a direct study of the authors has necessarily involved a discussion of the interpretation of a number of Sanskrit texts, especially because a good deal of difference of opinion has existed with regard to their exact philosophical import. Hence, side by side with an exposition of the subject proper there will be found in this work such discussions pertaining to the nature and a significance of texts as are relevant to our enquiry.

It has not been my aim to enter into chronological controversies, and consequently I have eschewed them for the purpose of this treatise. In most cases I have followed the latest accepted views on Indian chronology; and where definite dates are not available, I have adopted such chronological order as has been suggested by the logical development of thought and has not been found improbable otherwise. Whenever I have happen to differ, however, from the usual view about the date of an important work or author, I have given reasons for having done so.

As regards the value of this work as an original contribution to the subject with which it deals, it may be said that, so far as I know, it represents the first systematic attempt to determine the origin and development of epistemological thought in Indian philosophy on the basis of the original Sanskrit texts, and to provide, in one place, an account of the views, on the subject, of the philosophers of the various schools so as to show their relations to one another in the history of this particular branch of study. In this treatise I have also made a serious effort to interpret the thought of some of the most important authors independently of their scholastic commentators, thus to avoid the common
pitfall of taking for granted that their interpretations were necessarily correct.

Besides the general treatment of the subject as a whole on the lines indicated above, the following are some of the main sections of this work which are original in the sense that they contain either matter first noticed and expounded as having a bearing upon the subject of epistemology, or discussions of certain views held by commentators and modern scholars on topics of epistemological importance with the object of arriving at a satisfactory solution of the problems concerned.

1. The philosophical back-ground of Indian epistemology in the early literature, including the Vedic, the Brāhmaṇic and the Upaniṣadic scriptures of the Hindus and the Prajñā-para-mitās of the Buddhists.

In connection with this subject the following views have been particularly discussed:—

(a) That some verses of Rgveda, I, 164 and X, 129 contain a doctrine of scepticism or agnosticism, the view held by Dr. Barua, Keith, Ranade, and others.

(b) That Rgveda X, 129, 5 signifies the recognition of a distinction between the words of appearance and reality,—the interpretation of the verse according to Deussen¹.

2. That the exposition of the theory of knowledge in the various Philosophical Sūtras may serve as an indication of their relative dates. In this connection, a discussion of the arguments given by Professors Jacobi and Woods for the late date of the Yoga-sūtras².

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1. The verse has been discussed by me in a separate article published in the JRAS, July 1929.

2. This section is published as an article in the JRAS, April 1930, under the title, The Date of the Yoga-sūtras.
3. That the doctrine of voidness (śūnyatā) as found in the Madhyamika-karikas of Nāgārjuna is one of absolute reality and not nihilism, or of relativity as held by Stcherbatsky.

4. A discussion of the significance of the terms citta, vṛtti, vikalpa and smṛti in the Yoga-sūtras, especially a criticism of the interpretation of vikalpa by the commentators as a forms of error.

5. The beginnings of the Nyāya epistemology as found in the Caraka Šaṁhitā.

6. The following points in the theory of knowledge according to the Vaiśešika-sūtras:—

   (a) Discussion of the significance of V. S. III, 1, 1 to III, 1, 19 with particular reference to the traditional view that they deal with the question whether sense-cognition is a true mark of the existence of soul or not.

   (b) Cognition of substance, attributes, actions, and relations.

7. The following topics in the epistemology of the Nyāya sūtras:—

   (a) A discussion of the significance of the definition of pratpaksā as given in the Nyāya Sūtras with reference to the interpretations of important commentators.

   (b) A discussion of the three kinds of inference mentioned in NS. I, 1, 5 with reference to the traditional views of the commentators and the interpretations of some of the modern scholars.

   (c) The nature of buddhi, according to the Nyāya and the Sāṁkhya, with reference to the controversy as to whether it is permanent or temporary.

   A discussion in this connection of NS. III, 2, 10 to III, 2, 18, which have been supposed to contain a discussion
of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. It is shown that they really contain a discussion of the nature of buddhi¹.

(d) A discussion of NS. IV. 2. 26 ff., which have been supposed to discuss the Buddhist doctrine of subjective idealism. It is maintained that they really refer to the cognition of the whole in relation to its parts.

8. The following points in connection with the theory of knowledge in the Samkhya-pravacana-sutra—

(a) Definition of prama and prama in SPS. I, 87 discussed with reference to the interpretations of the commentators.

(b) Significance of the definitions of Pratyakṣa and anumāna in the SPS.

9. Significance of the classifications of samānyya and viśeṣa in the Parikṣa-mukha-sūtra of Māṇikya Nandī, and the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkha of Deva Sūri

10. Vācaspati Miśra's real position with regard to the division of Pratyakṣa into nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka.

11. The nature of buddhi according to the Vṛṣṭikāra quoted in the Šabara-bhāṣya, and a discussion of the text 'tasmān na vyapadesvya buddhīḥ'...etc. (SB. p. 10)

12. A criticism of the interpretations of āpta śrutih in Samkhya-karika, 5, according to Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra, and an explanation of pramāṇa according to Vācaspati Miśra with reference to Dr. G. N. Jhā's translation of anadhigata-viṣaya under SK.

13. A criticism of the doctrine of knowledge (vidyā) and

¹ The subject has been discussed by me in an article in the JRAS, January 1930, under the title 'Discussion of the Buddhist doctrines of Momentariness and Subjective Idealism in the Nyāya-sūtras'.
ignorance (avidya) as expounded in the opening lines of Šaṅkara's commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras.

14. A critical and comparative study of the problem of 'Acquaintance' or 'Simple Apprehension', (the Appendix).

Besides the above, the other chapters also,—especially those on Praśastapāda, Diṇṇāga, Dharmakīrti, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Gauḍapāda, Šaṅkara and Rāmānuja,—will be found to contain a good deal of matter presented in such a way as to bring out the contributions of these authors in the history of Indian epistemology.

A list of the works which have been consulted in preparing this dissertation and to which there is a reference in the following pages is given separately. The reference in the texts have been invariably given either in the footnotes, or in the body of the work. Important texts have been always quoted in original; and, in most cases, an English translation has also been provided.

As regards the selection of the sources for the purpose of this thesis, it may be said that mostly such literature has been chosen as has been found to be of basic importance and to have constructive value. Consequently, works of a purely dialectical nature with no constructive doctrines or criticisms to offer have been excluded. Similarly, such commentaries or sub-commentaries and manuals have also been left out as are only a belaboured elaboration or a compendium of what has been already said in the original works or the earlier commentaries.

In accordance with the aim of this work, the treatment has been confined to such material from the sources as has been found to be of epistemological value. Details of formal logic, such as forms of syllogistic inference and the classification of fallacies, have been eliminated as outside the
scope of the enquiry. Similarly, grammatical topics, such as discussions about the meanings of words and sentences, have also been left out.

In the arrangement of the various sections, I have departed from the usual practice of dealing with all the authors of one particular school in one place irrespective of their position in the general development of philosophical thought and their relations to the thinkers of the other schools. There could hardly be any excuse for adhering to this unscientific method of exposition, especially when the aim is to study the origin and development of one particular branch of study as a whole, and not only as it grew in the various schools. I have not followed also the other alternative of dealing with the various aspects of the epistemological enquiry, such as perception, inference, etc., each in a separate section; for, although it is a good plan in itself, it is ill-adapted to the purpose I have in view, viz. to trace not only the development of the particular problems of the theory of knowledge, but also to study the epistemological position of the important authors as a whole, so as to determine what contributions they have made, and in what relations they stand to one another in the history of the subject. Besides, discussions concerning the texts of the various works, of which there is quite a large number in this dissertation, could not have been appropriately and effectively inserted under any arrangement other than that which has been adopted here, viz. that of having separate sections for the various works or authors, and considering their doctrines and the relevant texts in one place.

I have also found it necessary to depart from the usual English terminology in translating certain Sanskrit technical terms. My aim has been to translate the terms as literally as possible, so as to retain their original shade of
meaning, and thus also to make it possible to use consistently one and the same rendering for one particular term throughout the work. The peculiar significance of a term in any particular work or author, if any, having been explained in its context. To quote an instance, I have always translated 'pratyakṣa' as "direct knowledge" rather than 'sense cognition', 'perception', or 'intuition'; for while it is a more literal rendering of the term, it has also the advantage of being applicable to all kinds of pratyakṣa both sensuous and non-sensuous. Similarly, savikalpāka and nirvikalpāka are more correctly translated by 'reflective' and 'non-reflective' than by 'determinate' and 'non-determinate', or by 'mediate' and 'immediate', the terms which have been most used to express them. For a rendering of upāmāna I have preferred the phrase 'knowledge by similarity' to the usual word 'analogy', in order to avoid the implications of this term as used in European logic; or to 'comparison' which is neither a good translation nor a correct interpretation of upāmāna.

A complete list of the abbreviations used in the work is given in the end.

In the preparation of this dissertation I have had the benefit of guidance by Dr. E. J. Thomas, who was my supervisor at Cambridge. He has twice read the various portions of the Thesis, and his valuable criticisms have helped me a great deal in putting my thoughts into the form in which they are presented now. I am further indebted to him for his frequent suggestions with regard to the works on the subject by foreign authors and his readiness to help me in referring to them.
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PART I

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The Problem of Epistemology and its Treatment in Indian Philosophy.

Man finds himself in the possession of certain convictions which, roughly speaking, he calls knowledge. Further he finds that all his convictions are not of the same value, and that he has to distinguish them as true and false. The awareness of this distinction naturally leads him to enquire into the origin and validity of all knowledge. Such a study, which, in the words of the late Dr. Ward, is a 'systematic reflection concerning knowledge, and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science', is epistemology. It will appear that while the acquirement of knowledge is common to all men, a systematic reflection about it has been the concern of a few. Even among philosophers it is not all who have been alive to the problem of knowledge as a distinct branch of study. In the history of European philosophy, the beginnings of a systematic study of the theory of knowledge may be traced to Locke's enunciation of the enquiry in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding,¹ and a definite formulation of it to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.²

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1. I, 1, 2 and 4 (Pringle Pattison’s Edition).
2. Introduction (English Translation by Norman Kemp Smith, p. 46).
Indian philosophy, the first systematic treatment of the means of knowledge (the pramāṇas) is to be found in Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtras, which also deal with the objects of knowledge (the prameyas). Later, this study concerning knowledge came to be gradually separated from that of the objects of knowledge, and thus there came into existence works on pure logic and epistemology. This departure is noticeable first in the works of the Buddhist and the Jaina philosophers, and may be said to have taken place about the time of Diśnāga (about 450 A. D.). The logicians of the Nyāya School, who were most of them commentators on the Nyāya-sūtras for a long time, adhered to the old practice of treating epistemology as a part of metaphysics until the time of Bhāsarvajñā (about 950 A. D.), who included only the study of the means of knowledge in his Nyāya-sūtra. The New School of Logic (Navya-nyāya), however, founded by Gaṅgeśa (about 1250 A. D.), settled down to a very subtle and systematic study of the means of knowledge as an altogether independent and distinct branch of study; and for a few centuries epistemology came to be regarded in India as not only an important but an indispensable part of the philosophic discipline. This separation of epistemology from metaphysics in the New School, however, did not necessarily mean any substantial advance in the study of the subject itself. The epistemological position of Gaṅgeśa and his successors is not very different from that of his immediate predecessors in the old
Nyāya School. The most distinguishing features of the new School really consist in a subtle dialectic and a highly complex technicality.

As a science of knowledge, which it is accepted to be on all hands, epistemology has to be considered in its relation to such other sciences as metaphysics, psychology and logic, which also treat of the same subject. In spite of a comparatively indifferent attitude of modern writers towards defining the exact nature and status of epistemological enquiry, I think, in order to understand and appreciate the standpoint of Indian philosophers on this subject, and also in view of the fact that there has been a radical difference of opinion concerning this topic among some of the older thinkers of the West, it is necessary to enter briefly into what may be called a critique of epistemology.

To begin with, let us consider what the datum of epistemology is. Can we take knowledge as its datum or not? In other words, does the study of epistemology start with the recognition of the fact that there is what, roughly speaking, we call knowledge, or is it supposed to question the very existence and possibility of knowledge, and claim to begin its enquiry without any assumptions whatsoever? It will appear that Kant, who represented the development of a line of thought on this subject started in Locke, thought, in any case, as Hegel understood him, that a critical enquiry concerning knowledge is to be an altogether
preliminary study; and Hegel, disagreeing with Kant, repudiated such a conception of epistemology. 'A main line of argument in the Critical Philosophy', says Hegel, 'bids us pause before proceeding to enquire into God or into the true being of things, and tells us first of all to examine the faculty of cognition and see whether it is equal to such an effort. We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our troubles will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has won for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been to withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to a question of form. Unless we wish to be deceived by words, it is easy to see what this amounts to. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticize them in other ways than by setting about the special work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can be carried out only by an act of knowledge. To examine this so called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus not to venture into the water until he had learned to swim.'\(^1\) I need not add much to what has been said by Hegel in this criticism of a

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conception of epistemology which would start without assuming the existence of knowledge. The very possibility of an examination of knowledge rests upon the assumption that first there is knowledge; and in the very act of denying knowledge, even the most vehement sceptic or agnostic tacitly assumes that there is knowledge.¹ This fact was recognised by the philosophers of all the schools of Indian philosophy except those who represented the school of the Mādhyamika Buddhism, which held the doctrine that the whole world of experience, including knowledge and the means of knowledge, has only an illusory existence. Gautama Akṣapāda, the first systematic writer on logic in Indian philosophy, discusses the question whether it is possible to conceive the means of knowledge independently of knowledge and the objects of knowledge².

1. Cf. Bertrand Russell—‘When however, we speak of philosophy as a criticism of knowledge, It is necessary to impose a certain limitation. If we adopt the attitude of a complete sceptic, placing ourselves wholly outside all knowledge, we are demanding what is impossible, and our scepticism can never be refuted. For all refutation must begin with some piece of knowledge which the disputants share: from blank doubt, no argument can begin’; and again, ‘Some knowledge, such as knowledge of the existence of our sense-data, appears quite indubitable, however calmly and thoroughly we reflect upon it’—Problems of Philosophy, pp. 234-35.

2. Nyāya-Sūtra, II, 1, 8 to 11; I, 19.
He maintains that while the existence of the means of knowledge is proved by the fact that there is knowledge of objects, just as the existence of a (distant) drum is proved by the fact that there is sound produced out of it\(^1\), their validity is proved by the means of knowledge themselves. In this respect he compares the means of knowledge to a lamp which illuminates other things as well as itself.\(^2\)

An examination of knowledge, such as epistemology undertakes, provides, however, a method of metaphysical enquiry and criticism; and we find that, in the history of philosophy, whether consciously or unconsciously, it has been used as such. This is most true of our own times, when all metaphysical problems are attacked through an analysis of knowledge; and again, all philosophical criticism is usually based upon epistemological ground. The same conception is implied in the term ‘pramāṇa’ in Indian philosophy, which signifies both means of knowledge and means of proof. The beginnings of the analysis of knowledge in Indian philosophy, first psychological and then epistemological, were due to a need on the part of the thinkers to find means of proof for the beliefs which they had come to hold, for their own satisfaction, but still more, for producing conviction in others. This is evident from the fact that systematic logic in India took its rise from such rules and forms of debating as are found in some of the works of the early period.

\(^1\) Ibid. II, 1. 15.

\(^2\) Ibid. II, 1, 19.
Hence to regard epistemology as a mere formal analysis of knowledge is not only futile but also untrue to facts.

Considered from this point of view epistemology can be exactly distinguished from logic only in so far as the latter is treated in its purely formal aspect; otherwise they are substantially the same. In practice, however, we find that while works on epistemology confine themselves to a general treatment of the means of knowledge and the criterion of truth, those on logic undertake a detailed analysis and classification of the forms of knowledge and error, such as rules of definition and division, syllogistic inference, the classification of fallacies; although in this respect too the practice varies greatly. In Indian philosophy epistemology was always treated as a part of logic.

In order to discuss the validity of the various means of knowledge, epistemology has to depend upon an analysis of the mental processes leading to them, and hence it is intimately connected with psychology. It was because of this close connection between the two studies that in the earlier works of Indian philosophy an enquiry into the nature of the pramāṇas is of a mixed or rather confused nature; that is to say, the distinction between the psychological and the epistemological aspects of the enquiry is not quite clear.

To come to the details of the analysis of knowledge in Indian philosophy, it may be said that the means of
knowledge (the pramāṇas) which have been considered possible and have been discussed (not necessarily accepted by all the schools) are: (i) direct knowledge (pratyakṣa), including sense-cognition and other direct means of knowledge; (ii) inference (anumāna), (iii) knowledge by similarity (upamāna); (iv) verbal testimony (sābda), including scriptural testimony (śāstra or āgama); (v) presumption (arthāpatti); (vi) implication (sambhava); (vii) non-existence (abhāva); and (viii) tradition (aitihya). This is, however, the later stereotyped list. The first distinction in the analysis of knowledge, the signs of which are traceable even as early as some of the hymns of the Rgveda, was that between knowledge of things immediately present to the senses (pratyakṣa) and those remote from the senses (parokṣa). Of these the latter were supposed to be known by divine testimony, or by reflection. According to the early Jaina logicians, however, the distinction between direct and indirect knowledge was different. They called the knowledge derived through the senses indirect, and that by intuition direct. The later Jaina writers on logic, however, gave up this peculiar division, and accepted the ordinary classification of the Hindu logicians. In some of the texts of the early Hindu and Buddhist literature we can trace the development of a psychological analysis which, in course of time, helped to shape the epistemological doctrines as found in the later literature of the Sūtras and other works. One of the earliest lists, it may be the earliest, of the means of know-
ledge is to be found in the Taittirīya Āranyaka, where they are said to be (i) codes of law (smṛti); (ii) direct knowledge (pratyakṣa), meaning by this sense-cognition; (iii) tradition (aṅgikṣa); and (iv) inference (anumāna), a list which clearly belongs to an early period, for it includes tradition which was discarded later on by most of the schools as unreliable. The first treatment of the means of knowledge, which forms the nearest approach to the later systematic exposition of the same in the Nyāya-sūtras, is to be found in the Caraka-saṃhitā in which there is also a remarkable discourse on the limitations of sense-cognition and the need of having recourse to verbal testimony and inference. The classification of knowledge as found in the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra of the Jaina logician Umadvīti and the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra of Buddhism are extremely complex, cumbrous and confused; and contribute very little to the development of the future epistemological doctrines even of the Jainas and the Buddhists.

In spite of all the doubts and differences of opinion as regards the exact relations between one school and another about the time of Diśnāga and before him, one outstanding fact that can hardly be denied is that all the works of the Sūtra period, and those subsequent to them, bear the stamp of being influenced by the logic of the Nyāya and the Vaiṣeṣika schools, if not exactly of the Nyāya and the Vaiṣeṣika Sūtras. So far as I can see, the developed Buddhist logic as
found in the works of Nāgārjuna, and the Jaina logic as represented by Siddhasena Divākara, have no antecedents in their own schools such as might justify us in assuming that they had an independent growth in the line of their own literature. In fact, the whole terminology employed by the Buddhist and the latter Jaina writers on logic is that of the Nyāya and the Vaisēśika schools. Further a reference to logicians under the name of takkin or takkika in the Pāli Buddhist literature may indicate the presence of a logical school which was evidently non-buddhist, as the term takkin is used along with Vīmamsin (Skt. mīmāṃsīn)\(^1\); and whatever logical terms are found in the earlier Buddhist writers were evidently imported from some other school. On the other hand, in the early Hindu literature, both logical and non-logical, there are no signs to show that the Hindu authors were aware of the existence of any such thing as an early school of Buddhist logic or even the beginnings of it; and this should be an indication of the fact that there was no such school. That the logic of the Nyāya school was influenced by that of the Buddhist writers after Nāgārjuna, and more particularly and effectively after Diṇṇāga, is also a fact which can hardly be denied, and has already received acceptance at the hands of scholars. As regards the exact relations between one author and another, e. g., between Praśastapāda and Diṇṇāga, nothing can be said 'definitely; for, as Pro-

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1. Dīgha., 1, 16.
Professor Tucci has tried to show recently,¹ the authors who are supposed to have borrowed from each other, merely because of a similarity of terms or affinity of logical doctrines, may have derived their material from a common older source, of which we happen to be ignorant at the present time. After Diśnāga, the chronological order of the authors is almost definite, and in most cases exact dates are available. The one point to remember about the results of the influence of one school on another is that it was mostly the formal aspect of logic that was affected; the main

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1. Buddhist Logic before Diśnāga. JRAS, July, 1929. Professor Tucci has also tried to show in the same article that a number of Tarka-śastras existed before Diśnāga, and presumably even before the time of the final reaction of the Nyāya-sūtras. One of these, he thinks, was the work of a Buddhist writer, but about the authorship of the others he is not sure. I hope Prof. Tucci does not mean to imply that ‘Tarka-śastras’ in the plural number refers to some particular works bearing that title as a proper name, and presumably written by Buddhist authors. The more probable explanation would be that it is just a common name referring to a class of works on logic, and is synonymous with the equally familiar ‘hetu-śastras’ or ‘hetu-vidyā’. If so, the term ‘tarka-śastras’ is more likely to refer to that literature of the earlier period, which is known to be preliminary to the developed form of the Nyāya school, than to any works of Buddhist writers about the existence of which there is no evidence so far.
epistemological doctrines of each school remained unchanged. Each school adhered to its own doctrines, and modified its logical form only in so far as it was consistent with its intrinsic epistemological and metaphysical position, and at the same time helped it to keep abreast of the progress in the formal logic of the times.

Besides works which strictly belong to the category of logic there were others which owed their origin to a different class of literature, but which also contain valuable matter on epistemology. Such are some of the works of the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta schools. Not much epistemology can be found in the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta Sūtras themselves, but the later exponents of their doctrines like Kumārika and Prabhākara of the Mīmāṃsā school, and Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja of the Vedānta, have made distinct contributions to epistemological thought; and as they lived and wrote in times when the philosophical doctrines of the various schools had been more or less consolidated, and a zeal to defend them against the attacks of opponents was at its highest, some portions of their works contain acute metaphysical speculation, and show a fairly high standard of epistemological criticism.

Gaṅgeśa represents the culminating point in the development of the epistemological analysis in the Nyāya school; although in his hands the study became rather formal, and it continued to be so in the works of his followers for a long time. There grew up, however, after, Gaṅgeśa, another set of authors, who
tried to combine the logic of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika schools by writing short manuals, and reverted to the old practice of dealing with the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) along with the objects of knowledge (prameya). There is nothing original in these works and they only serve as compendiums of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophy.

A word may be added with regard to the epistemology of the Cārvāka school, especially because, for want of the original sources, it has not been considered in this work. The only sources of our knowledge of this materialistic system is the Chapter dealing with it in the Sarva-darsana-saṃgraha of Mādhvācārya and a few stray references in some other works.¹ From the account of the system in the SDS, we know that it accepted sense-cognition as the only means of knowledge. The other means of knowledge including inference were rejected on the ground that they could not establish a universal and necessary connection (āvinābhāva) and could, therefore, provide no ground for such universal propositions as ‘Wherever there is smoke, there is fire’. The usual idea of concomitance was explained as due to custom based upon past sense-cognition, or error.² This view was vehemently attacked by the writers of the other

1. These have been collected by Dakshinaranjana Shastri, in the Appendix to his works on the Cārvākas-Chārvāka-shaṭhti, Calcutta.

2. SDS. B. Indica, p. 5. It will appear that this view that
schools; and the discourse in the Caraka-samhita on the limitations of perceptual knowledge is a typical example of the argument adduced on the subject by the opponents of the Cārvaka school.

While the most usual view about the Materialistic school is that it admitted self-cognition only as the means of knowledge, a passage in the Nyāya-manjarī, which appears to be based upon the authority of some original work of the Cārvakaśas known to the author of the Nyāya-manjarī, indicates that the exact position of a thorough-going Cārvaka materialist was that it is absolutely impossible to determine either the exact number or the exact character of the means of knowledge (Pramāṇas) and the objects of knowledge (prameya).

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1. Nyāya-Maṇjarī, pp. 36 and 64; also quoted in Indian Thought, vol. V, p. 319, “aśakya eva Pramāṇa-samkhya-niyama iti suṣikṣita-cārvakaḥ” p. 36.

‘Cārvaka-dhūrtas tu athatas tattvam vyakhyāsāma iti pratijñāya pramāṇa-prameya-samkhya-lakṣaṇa-niyamaśakya-kāraṇīyatvat eva tattvam vyakhyātavān’, P., 64.
PART II

The Philosophical Background in the Early Literature.
The Philosophical Background in the Early Literature.

1. THE VEDIC LITERATURE.

It is evident that no epistemology as such can be found in the literature of the Vedic and the Upaniṣa-dic periods. What we do find is certain notions about the nature of the universe and an effort to analyse them, which in course of time led to the formulation of definite ideas about the nature of consciousness and the ways and means of acquiring knowledge. At first the analysis was mostly psychological; and it was only as late as the period of the Philosophical Sūtras that something like an epistemological viewpoint was positively attained. It will be helpful, however, to trace the origin and development of this epistemological consciousness from the very earliest indications of it in Indian literature.

(i) The Earliest Signs of a Distinction between Direct and Indirect Knowledge in the Rgveda.

The earliest texts which appear to be significant for our enquiry are some verses\(^1\) in Rgveda, I, 164;

\(^1\) The most important verses are: I, 164, 4 & 37; X, 82, 3 & 7; X, 129, 6 & 7.
X, 82; and X, 129. A study of these, as will be shown presently, indicates on the part of their authors a consciousness of the following facts: firstly, that there are two kinds of objects: (i) those that are immediately present to the senses; and (ii) those that are not immediately present to the senses, that is to say, those that are remote; secondly, that those which are immediately present to the senses are, of course, known through the senses; but those which are remote are not known by means of the senses; and hence there must be, if any, some other means of their knowledge; and, thirdly, that the knowledge of these remote objects can be had either by means of divine testimony, for nothing is remote to God, or by reflection. Thus it will appear that we find in the texts of these verses the germs of the distinction between what came to be known later on as direct knowledge (pratyaṅga) and indirect knowledge (parokṣa). It may be mentioned here that some of these verses, viz. I, 164, 4 & 37; and X, 129, 6 & 7 have been usually understood by scholars\(^1\) to signify a sceptical attitude on the part of their authors, and hence they have discovered a doctrine of scepticism, or even agnosticism in these hymns of the Ṛgveda. In X, 129, 5 Deussen read an indication of the fact that the author was conscious of a distinction between the world of appearance and that of reality, and that the verse contains a reference to the knowledge

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\(^1\) For instance, Barua *HPIP.*, pp. 16 & 29; Ranade, *CSUP.*, pp. 3 & 149; Keith, *RPV.*, II, p. 435.
of these two kinds of reality. This verse I have already discussed in a separate article in which I have offered an explanation of my own, and have tried to show that Deussens's interpretation cannot be accepted. The other verses I shall consider presently, and shall try to prove that they do not signify a sceptical attitude as they have been supposed to do by some scholars.

Let us first take verses I, 164, 4 & 37. A perusal

3. Ko dadarsa prathamam Jayamanam
asthanvantam yad anastha vibharti,
Bhagya asur asragatma kua svit ko
vidvarmsam upagat prastum etat. (I. 164, 4)
Na vijana mi yadi vedam asmi
nitya ah sannadhno manasa carami,
Yada magan prathamajah rtas-
yadidvaco aśnuve bhagam asyah. (I, 164, 37)

Who has seen that the boneless bears the bony when being born first? Where may be the breath, the blood, the soul of the earth? Who would approach the wise to make this enquiry?

I do not know whether I am like this; ignorant, prepared I go about; when I partake a portion of this speech, the first products of truth come to me.

It may be mentioned that Sāyaṇa’s rendering of the verses is slightly different, and that modern scholars have also differed from one another with regard to the exact significance of such terms as asthanvantam and anastha, but it is necessary to discuss all the details
of the hymn (I, 164) to which they belong will show that it is one of such discourses as served the purpose of introducing discussions on the occasion of a sacrifice—the brahmodyas as they were called—by raising questions about the nature of the universe. In the first of the two verses (I, 164, 4) questions have been asked with regard to the origin and the vital principle of the universe: firstly, Who has seen the universe (the bony—the created universe) being evolved out of interpretation here, as they are irrelevant to our enquiry.

In verse, I, 164, 4 Hillebrandt (Vedische Mythologie I, p. 338) interprets asthanvantam and anastha as signifying the moon and the sun respectively; and according to him it is said in the verse that the sun supports the moon—asthanvantam yad anastha vibharti. This interpretation is mainly based upon Hillebrandt’s supposition that the moon looks bony. But it will appear that in the second line of the verse there is a reference to the soul of the earth, and as in such other verses of the Rgveda as X, 90, 2; 3 and X, 121 the sun is spoken of as the soul of the universe, it is more likely that it is the sun who is meant by asthanvantam. This interpretation is still further strengthened by a text of the Śvetāṣṭāvatara Upaniṣad: hṛnyagarbham pasyati jāyamānam, etc., (IV, 12) which is evidently an echo of this same verse of the Rgveda, as so many other texts of the Fourth Chapter of the Śvetāṣṭāvatara are of Rgveda, I, 164. Similarly, the earth, which has been referred to in the second line of the verse, has been called ‘all-supporting’ and ‘mother-earth’ in such verses.
of its undeveloped state (the Boneless)? and, secondly, Is there any one who would go to a wise man and enquire what and where the vital principle (the breath, the blood, the soul) of this earth is? The poet philosopher here tries to understand the origin and the life principle of the universe on the analogy of an animal body. The bony body of an animal is delivered of the boneless womb, or is developed from a boneless state and is believed to have a vital principle—breath, blood, or soul. Now the question is whether any one can explain how this universe came into

as Atharva, XII, 1, 5 & 6, and it is that which is naturally signified by ‘anastha’.

Geldner (Der Rigveda Ubersetzt und Erlautert Gottingen, I, p. 206) follows Sāyaṇa interpretation of the verse.

A word may be said about my interpretation of sannaddhaḥ as ‘ready’ or ‘prepared’, which is a very usual meaning of this word. Sāyaṇa renders it as ‘one who is fettered by actions resulting from ignorance and desire’. This rendering, so far as I can see, is inappropriate; for, in the first place, it contains much more than the word sannaddhaḥ can mean: and in the second place, if it be accepted, the notion expressed by that word will be more or less a repetition of what is already signified by niṣṇyah which immediately precedes it. On the other hand, sannaddho manasaḥ makes quite a good sense if taken to mean ‘with a mind prepared (to learn)’; and it fits in very well with the context of the verse and the hymn.
being, and what and where its vital principle is. It will appear that such questions as mentioned above do not at all suggest an attitude of scepticism or agnosticism on the part of the author as they have been supposed to do by some scholars. Either they are simply meant to introduce a discussion, or at the most they indicate a confession of ignorance on the part of the individual who puts them. A study of the whole hymn shows that Dīrghatamas, its author, figures in it as an earnest and modest seeker after truth. He does not say (what would be scepticism) that it is impossible to find an answer to the questions concerning the universe, but confesses his own ignorance and also declares his readiness to be instructed by those who may be wise. For instance, in Rgveda, I, 164, 5 he calls himself ‘unripe in mind’ and ‘in spirit undiscerning’; in I, 164, 6 ‘one unknowing’, who would approach the wise to be enlightened. The same notion is found in I, 164, 37, where he says first that he is ignorant and goes about seeking knowledge, and then that it was through the divine speech that the truth first began to appear to him. The view that Dīrghatamas was a sceptic would be further seen to be untrue from the fact that in some of the other verse of this same hymn, for instance, I, 164, 20 and 46, he has even to say something positive with regard

1. pākah prochāmi manasa-vijānan.

2. acikutvaḥ cikituṣas cidatra kavin prrochāmi vidmane na vidvan.
to the nature of spirit and the material universe. In I, 164, 20, which is a well-known verse, he unmistakably refers, though metaphorically to the nature of the universal and the individual spirits and their relation to the material universe. In I, 164, 46 he emphasises the fact that it is one and the same being who is called by different names etc.

The fact that God is the repository of knowledge and that he is the source of enlightenment to man is further emphasised in X, 82, 3. Assuming that Prajāpati Paramēṣṭhin; the seer of X, 129, was also a sceptic like the Dīrghatamas of I, 164, Dr. Barua has held that Rgveda, X, 82 contains a refutation of his scepticism. It will appear, however, that it is as wrong to hold that the views contained in some of the verses of X, 129 represent a doctrine of scepticism as to say that Dīrghatamas was a sceptic.

Rgveda, X, 129, called the Nāsadiya hymn after the first two words in it, is the well-known cosmogonic hymn attributed to Paramēṣṭhin. It has been translated and commented upon by every Vedic scholar. It is not my object here to enter into all the discussions

1. Dvā suparṇāsayujā sakhdāyā samānam vṛksam parisavajāte, etc.

2. Ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti, etc.

3. Yo nah pitā janitā yo vidhātā
dhāmāni veda bhuvaṇāni visvā;
	Tam yo devānām nāmadhā eka
eva tam samprasānam bhuvaṇā yantyanyā.

4. HPIP., pp. 36 & 37.
about its philosophical significance. As already mentioned, I have discussed the meaning of X, 129, 5 in a separate article, and have considered therein the propriety of the interpretations by various scholars including that by Deussen. Here I propose to consider verses 6 & 7\(^1\) of the hymn and to show that they also represent the same trend of thought with regard to the knowledge of the universe as is to be found in some of the verses of Ṛgveda, I, 164 and X, 82 referred to above. I shall also try to show that they do not contain a doctrine of scepticism or agnosticism as they have been supposed to do by most of the scholars.\(^2\)

In these two verses, first a question is asked 'Who verily knows, and who can say whence this creation has come into being? etc., and then follows the answer, supported by a kind of argument, that as all beings, including the gods, came into being after the creation, it is only the creator who could have borne the universe before it was created, and who could

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ko addhā veda ka iha pravocat
   kuta ājātā kuta iyan visṛṣṭih,
   Arvāg devā asya visarjane-
   nātha ko veda yat ābabhūva
   Iyam visṛṣṭir yat ababhūva
   yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na,
   Yo 'syādhyakṣah parame vyomant
   so aṅga veda yadi vā na veda.
\item Barua, HPIP., p. 16; Ranade, CSUP., p. 3; Keith, RPV., p. 435.
\end{enumerate}
know how it was created. It will appear that these two verses also provide an answer to the questions contained in Ṛgveda, I, 164, 4. In X, 129, 4 it is stated that the sages found the bond of being (sat—the manifested universe) in non-being (asat—the unmanifested universe) by means of reflection.

Now a careful study of the verses considered above

1. Yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na; so aṅga veda yadi vā na veda
—These two clauses do not express doubt or ignorance, but mean, and that quite in accordance with idiom, that it is only He who bore it, and no body else, and it is only He who knows it, and no body else respectively. Those who translated them more or less as Griffith does viz., ‘whether he formed it all, or did not form it,’ and ‘He verily knows it, or perhaps, He knows not,’ are naturally apt to regard the verse as one expressive of doubt. But there is no evidence to show that in this hymn, or in any other cosmogonic hymns of the Ṛgveda, or even later, there is ever expressed a doubt with regard to the divine origin of the universe and the omniscience of God. Prof. Keith, who also thinks that these verses are expressive of doubt, has a significant remark to make, which will support the view expressed here. Speaking about X, 129 he says: ‘While much of its content is repeated in the latter philosophy, its spirit of doubt is wholly alien to the classical philosophical systems of India’ (RPV., II, 435). The fact is, as I have tried to show, that there is no spirit of doubt in this hymn. (Also compare Śāyaṇa’s interpretation of the verse which agrees with that of mine).

2. Sato bandhum asati niravindaḥ hṛdi pratiṣyā kavyo maniṣyā.
will show that consistently with the cosmogonic nature of the hymns to which they belong they raise questions about the nature of the universe, and then try to answer them. The answer mainly consists in asserting that as the creation of the universe took place at a time when neither men nor gods had come into existence, it is only the creator who knows about it; and it is only from him, that is to say, by means of divine testimony, that we can expect to have knowledge of it. In X, 129, 4 there is just a mention of the fact that the sages understood the cause of the universe by means of reflection, which appears, in this apparently late hymn, to have been regarded by its author as another means of knowing about things which are remote. The view that the verses I, 164, 4 & 37; and X, 129, 6 & 7 contain the doctrine of scepticism is evidently based upon the superficial consideration that they contain questions about the nature of the universe and sometimes a confession of ignorance on the part of the author. But simply to raise questions, or to confess ignorance, about something which is beyond the range of the senses, e.g., the origin of the universe, is not scepticism or agnosticism.

(ii) Conception of Mind as a Psychical Faculty in the Vājasaneyya-samhitā

XXX-IV, 1-6.

The development of psychological notions which, in course of time, led to the formulation of epistemological ideas, is traceable through the conception of
mind (manas) in the early literature. In the Rigveda for example, in X, 129, 4 we read of mind as the cosmical principle of which desire is said to be the creative energy\(^1\). In the six verses of the Vājasaneyasamhitā which I propose to consider here, mind appears as a distinctly psychical faculty. They contain, although in the form of a hymn, the most remarkable description of mind that I know of in the whole of the Vedic literature, and it is strange that they have remained unnoticed so far by scholars\(^2\).

The text of the verses with an English translation is as follows:—

\[ \begin{align*}
Yaj \ jāgrato \ dūram \ udaiti \\
\text{daivam} \ tādu \ \text{suptasya} \ \text{tathaivaiti} \\
Dūraṅgamam \ jyotiṣām \ jyotir \ ekaṃ \\
\text{tanne manah} \ ſiva-samkalpam \ astu-ṛ
\end{align*} \]

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve, which is divine; which goes out afar when I am awake, and which similarly comes back when I am asleep; that which goes far and wide, and is the light of lights.\(^3\)

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1. Kāmas tad agre samavartatādhi maaso retah prathamam yad āsīt.

2. It was only a few years back that I, while collecting material for this work, noticed them and submitted a paper on their significance to the All-India Phil. Congress, Bombay, 1927.

3. The six verses discussed here have also been supposed to be a part of what Schefelowitz has called the Šiva-samkalpa Upaniṣad, in which there are altogether 28 verses. As he also admits, the remaining other verses of the
Yena karmāny apaso maniśino
yajñe kṛṇvanti vidatheṣu dhiraḥ,
Yad apurvam yakṣam antaḥ praja- 
nām tan me manah śivasamkalpam astu.–2
May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve with the aid of which wise and brave men diligently occupied perform their duties pertaining to sacrifice and war¹; that which is a unique sacred thing in the heart of beings. 2

Yat prajñānam uta ceto dhrītiśca
yajjyoytir antar amṛtam prajāsu,
yasmān na rте kimcana karma
kriyate tan me manah śivasamkalpam astu–3
May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve,

Upaniṣad are of a different nature, and evidently a later addition (ZDMG., 1921, p. 201) It may be pointed out that the interpretation of manas as spirit by Scheftelowitz is rendered improbable by the fact that in this verse manas is described as going out during wakefulness and coming back during sleep, which could not be true of spirit. The further description of manas as given in the other verses also applies more appropriately to a psychical faculty than to a spiritual substance. These verses have also been translated and discussed by Weber in Ind. Stud. II, p. 51 ff.

1. Vidatheṣu may mean either ‘in assemblies’ or ‘in wars’, but the use of the word dhiraḥ, which I think is used in the sense of ‘brave’ here, suggests that the latter meaning is more appropriate. To take ‘dhiraḥ’ in the sense of
which is intelligence, feeling¹ and resolution—the eternal light in the heart of all beings; that without which nothing can be accomplished.—3

Yenedam bhūtam bhuvanam bhaviṣyat
parigrhitam amrtena sarvam,
Yena yajñas tāyate sapta-hotā
tan me manah śiva-samkalpam astu.—4

May that mind be of auspicious resolve, which, being immortal, holds the past, the present and the future all together: that with the aid of which that sacrifice is performed in which seven persons take part.—4

Yasmin rcaḥ sāma yajumṣi yasmin

¹ ‘wise men’ would not be so happy, as the world manṣino has also been used in the same sense. Similarly yakṣam in the sense of ‘sacred’ or ‘wonderful’ suits the context better than in the sense of ‘spirit’ which, as I have already pointed out, is not meant to be described in these verses. (See Hillebrandt’s Vedisch Yakṣa, Festabe Richard Von Garbe, pp. 17-23; also Hertel’s Die Ariche Feuerlehre, I).

1. In this verse the only word about the meaning of which there may be a difference of opinion is ‘cetaḥ’. It has been usually translated by some word or other which means ‘consciousness’ Cetayati samyag āyapayati tac cetaḥ—explains Mahidhara. Griffith translates it ‘intellect’. I have translated it ‘feeling’, for the word is frequently used to signify the emotional aspect of consciousness, and here this meaning quite fits in with the context, where knowing and willing are already signified by ‘praṇānam’ and ‘dhṛtiḥ’.
pratiśṭhitah ratha-nabhāvivārāḥ
Yasminś cittam sarvam otam prajā-
nāṁ tanme manāḥ śiva-samkalpam astu—5

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve, in which the Rg, the Sāma, and the Yajur Vedas are stuck up like spokes in the nave of a chariot, and in which the entire consciousness (thoughts) of beings is held together.—5

Suṣārathir aśvān iva yan manus-
yān nenīyate bhīṣubhir vājina iva,
Hṛtpratiśṭham yad ajīram jāviṣṭham
tan me manāḥ śiva-samkalpam astu.—6

May that mind of mine be of auspicious resolve, which leads and controls men, just as a good charioteer does the horses with his reins; that which residing in the heart of men is the swiftest, and free from decay.—6

A study of the above verses will show that in them all the essential characteristics of mind have been mentioned in one place, as if in a discourse on mental functions. Here mind appears as an entirely psychical faculty and the epistemological subject. It neither takes the place of soul or spirit, nor is it regarded as a mere physical sense-organ like the other sense-organs. It is one whole psychical unity with all the characteristics of the subject as the knower in relation to the object as the known. In the first place, it is described as ‘that which goes out afar’, and as the swiftest', the implication being that like the sense-

1. Verse, I above ;
organs it is unhampered in its activities by the limitations of time and space. In the second place, it is said to be intelligence, feeling and resolution\(^1\), which correspond to the tripartite division of mental life. This description given in the third verse is distinctly borne out by what is said in the other five. For example, in the first verse, mind is spoken of as ‘the light of all lights’, that is to say, that which illuminates the sense-cognitions.\(^2\) The same cognitive aspect of mental life is beautifully described in the fourth and the fifth verses, where mind is called the abiding and the unifying principle of knowledge—that which being eternal holds the past, the present, and the future, all together; and ‘that in which the Rg, the Sāma, and the Yajur hymns are stuck up like spokes in the nave of a chariot, and in which the entire consciousness of being is held together.’ The sixth verse brings out the volitional aspect of mind;—‘that which leads and controls men as a good charioteer does the horses with the reins.'\(^3\) Similarly, in the second and the third verses: ‘that

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1 Verse, 3 above.

2. Cf. Mahīdharaś commentary : ‘Yac ca mano jyotiṣām prakāśakānām stotrādindriyānām ekaṃ eva jyotiḥ prakāśakam pravartakam ityarthaḥ’. In later philosophical literature this quality of illuminating the senses is attributed to self or spirit.

3. This simile of the charioteer, the chariot, the reins, and the horses became very popular in later literature, e. g. Kāṭha. 1, 3, 3-4.
with the aid of which constant and wise men perform their duties pertaining to sacrifice and war; and 'that without which nothing can be accomplished'. Then at the end of each verse there is the prayer that the mind be of auspicious resolve.

Thus as we pass from the Řgveda, X, 129, which I discussed in the last section, to this part of the hymn in the Vājasaneya-samhitā, we find that notions about mind as a psychical faculty are assuming a systematic definiteness and its functions as such are classified under certain broad heads. It is interesting to see that Mahādhara, while commenting on these verses, distinctly treats manas as a psychical faculty and not as spirit or soul.¹

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The Beginnings of the Upaniṣadic Doctrine of Self and the Conception of Name and Form as Forms of Knowledge in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.

In the Śatapath Brāhmaṇa, X, 6, 3,² which is said to embody the views of a sage called Śāndilya,³ man is spoken of as a being possessed of understanding

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1. These verses are frequently used in India as a prayer for the uplift of one's mind.

2. Ātha khalu kratumayo 'yam puruṣaḥ......ha smāha Śāndilya evam etad iti.

3. Śāndilya is a familiar name, after which we hear of Śāndilya-vidyā. This particular passage is repeated in the Chāndogya, III, 14, 4 with a slight difference in
(kratumayaḥ). It is further said that the self, both universal and individual, has intelligence (manomayaḥ) and will (samkalpa). It is the duty of man, as a being possessed of understanding, to meditate upon the nature of self, and see that the individual self is identical with the universal self. One who realises this truth will be free from doubt. The ideas underlying this teaching are clearly a development of the notions found in the Vedic hymns already referred to, and in their turn they are the precursor of the more elaborate doctrines to be found later on in the Upaniṣads. The doctrine of the identity of the individual and the universal self emerges distinctly, and knowledge of the self is declared to be the key to the knowledge of the whole universe. If one knows the self, nothing remains to be known, and consequently, there is no room for doubt. It may be pointed out that this solution of the entire problem of knowledge at one bold

language. Śāṇḍilya-vidyā is mentioned in Śamkara's commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra, III, 3, 31. Then we have the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, which goes by the name of the same sage.

1. The word 'kratu' has also been translated as 'will', for example, by Max Müller (Chāṇḍ, III, 14, SBE.), but considering that there is a reference to meditation in the context, to take the word in the sense of understanding, as Eggeling also does, appears to be appropriate.

2. This teaching is also embodied in the Śāṇḍilya-sūtras, 31, where in the commentary a reference is made to the passage in the Chāṇḍ, III, 14.
stroke in metaphysics is the characteristic feature of all Vedic thought, especially of the Aranyakas and the Upaniṣads. It implicitly rests upon the ground that from the knowledge of the whole or the universal follows the knowledge of the parts contained in that whole, or of the particulars subsumed under that universal,—upon a kind of deductive inference. And Brahman or self is this whole or the universal. It is thus mainly a kind of metaphysical epistemology that we find in this literature, the psychological analysis being usually vague and unsystematic.

Before I pass on to the next section, I would like to notice briefly another passage in the same Brähmana (XI, 2, 3, 1), which is the earliest expression of the doctrine of name (nāma) and form (rupa). Later,

1. Atha brahmaiva parārdham agacchhat tat parārdham gatvā aikṣata katham nvimān lokān pratyaveyam iti, tad dvābhyaṁ eva pratyavaidd ṛupeṇa caiva nāmnā ca sa yasya kasya nāmastī tan nāma, yasyāpi nāma na asti yad veda ṛupeṇa idam ṛupam iti tad ṛupeṇa etavād vā idam yāvād ṛupam caiva nāma ca. Ye haite brahmaṇo mahats abhvē, sa yo haite brahmaṇo mahats abhvē veda mahad dhaivabhvam bhavati.

Here I may make a few observations on the translation of certain words in the text, for there appears to be a difference of opinion about their meaning. The first of these is pratyaveyam with its another form pratyavaidd. Eggeling translates the clauses containing these words in the above passage thus: ‘How can I descend again into these worlds? It then descended again by means of these two: Form and Name’, SBE., Vol., XLIV, pp.
it is mentioned in some of the *Upaniṣads*, and figures conspicuously in Vedāntic thought. The passage when divested of its allegorical part, contains the following statements:

27, 28; italics are mine). It will appear that this rendering is altogether inappropriate here; for, in the first place, the phrase *imān lokān*—to those worlds, clearly refers to the *parārdha* where Brahman is said to have repaired, and there would be no sense in the question; ‘How can I *descend again* into these worlds?’, and in the report that he descended again, when Brahman is said to be already present in those regions; and, in the second place, the idea of descending by means of form and name is altogether unintelligible. Perhaps a more acceptable, although incorrect, translation is by Muir: How can I pervade all these worlds? He then pervaded them with two things:—with form and with name (OST., Vol., V, p. 388). But the sense of pervasion does not fit in with the general context of the passage which is distinctly psychological. Śāyāna is much nearer to the sense when he explains *pratyaveyam* as *pratyekam prāpnyām*—how shall I *attain* each of them. It will appear, however, that the most suitable rendering of the phrases will be: How can I *know* each of these worlds?. He then knew them with these two: with form and with name. The root ‘*i*’ (*iḥ*) with the prefix ‘*ava*’ means ‘to know’, and the further prefix ‘*prati*’ makes the sense distributive. In a parallel passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (1, 4, 7) the world is spoken of as *avyākytam*—undifferentiated in the beginning, and then, it is said, that it is differentiated by the name and form—*tan nāma-rāpabhyam vyākriyate*. The same or similar, is the sense of the words ‘*pratyakeyam*’ and ‘*pratyavaid*’ in the passage of the *Satapatha*. 
(i) That every object is known either by its form, or name, or both.

(ii) That what may not be known by name, is known by its form.

(iii) That objects having name must also have form, but not vice versa; and hence form is more important for knowledge than name.

(iv) That form is something which belongs to mind; for it is by mind that one knows the form, and therefore, in a sense, mind itself is form.

(v) That name is something which belongs to speech; for it is by speech that one utters a name; and therefore, in a sense, speech itself is name.¹

(vi) That the whole universe is co-extensive with these two universal principles of form and name; and he who understands these attains a comprehensive and universal knowledge of the universe, and acquires a very superior personal merit.²

The above is a fairly close analysis of the original passage, which, unless the language and the thought contained in it be regarded as a matter of happy chance, certainly appears to be of some philosophical merit. It is like an oasis in the arid deserts of the Brahmanic literature, and an oasis, although rare,

1. etad vai idam sarvam yavad rupam caiva nama ca.

2. sa yo ha ete brahmaṇo mahati abhve veda mahad ha eva abhvan bhavati...
is not an impossibility after all. The cognition of things by name and form, the superior importance of form; the relation of form to mind, and apparently a recognition of these two as general principles of the universe and knowledge—all these indicate an acute power of analysis.

The doctrine of name and form, as has already been mentioned, is found in a number of Upaniṣads, and also in Buddhism. The one common idea underlying the various statements of the doctrine is that name and form constitute the principle of individuality. It is by its name and form that one individual is distinguished from another. According to those who hold the doctrine of absolute existence, the individuals lose their name and form as soon as they are merged in the absolute; for instance, in Brahman:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Yathā nadyāḥ syandamanāḥ samudre} \\
\text{\quad 'stam gacchanti nāmarupe vihāya,} \\
\text{Tathā vidvān nāma-rupād vimuktāḥ} \\
\text{\quad parāt param puruṣam upaiti divyam.}
\end{align*}
\]

(Mūndaka. III, 2, 8)

Just as the rivers flowing down merge in the sea having given up their name and form, so does a wise man attain the highest celestial being having become free from name and form.

In the Upaniṣads and Buddhism, however, the doctrine of name and form appears more as a metaphysical principle of individuality than as the epistemolo-
logical category of experience. In Buddhism nāma-rūpa usually signifies mind-and-body.¹

(iv) Further Advance in Psychological Analysis, and the Doctrine of Mind dependent Reality in the Aitareya Āranyaka.

In the second chapter of the Aitareya Āranyaka we find a further advance in psychological analysis, and also a clear enunciation of an idealistic doctrine, according to which all reality is mind dependent; in fact it is knowledge itself. A distinction is drawn between self as the real knower and mind as simply a sense-organ. The various mental states pertaining to knowing, feeling and willing are mentioned. Further the cognitive act is analysed into the knower, (prajñā), the intellect (prajñā), and cognition (prajñāna) including the object cognised. It is also maintained that all reality exists only in so far as it is known, and hence it is mind-dependent-prajñā-netram prajñāne-pratiṣṭhitam. The views expressed here have been attributed to Mahādāsa Aitareya, who is supposed to be either the author or the compiler of the Āranyaka.²

In II, 3, 2, it is explained how the self of man is more developed in respect of understanding and


². See Keith’s Introduction to Aitareya Āranyaka, pp. 15-26. According to him, the date of the Second Āranyaka must be somewhere about 600 B.C.
knowledge than that of other beings. 'The self is more developed in man,' says the author of the Aranyaka, 'for he is most endowed with knowledge (prajñānena sampannatamaḥ). He says what he has known; he knows tomorrow; he knows the world and the non-world; he desires the immortal by means of the mortal, being thus gifted. As for the other animals, their experience is confined to (the objects of) hunger and thirst. They do not speak out what they know, they do not know tomorrow: they know not the world and the non-world'.

Then the nature of the knowledge (prajñāna) is further described in II, 6. 'What is that self which is the object of our meditation? Which is the self? (It is) that by which one sees, by which one hears, by which one smells scents, by which one speaks, by which one discriminates between the tasteful and the tasteless. That which is the heart and the mind; awareness (samatā), comprehension (ajñānam), understanding (vijñānam), knowledge (prajñānam), retentiveness (medhā), insight (drṣṭīḥ), resolution (dhṛtīḥ), opinion (matiḥ), memory (smṛtīḥ), reflection (manīśā,

1. Sa hi, prajñānena sampannatamo vijñātam vadati, vijñātam paśyati, veda svastanam, veda lokalokān, madhyenāmytam īpsaty evam sampannaḥ. Athetareśām paśūnām āśana-pipāse evabhivijnanām, na ujjñātam vadanti na vijñātam paśyanti, na viduh svastanam na lokalokān ta etāvanto bhavanti yathā-prajñānam hi sambhavaḥ.
impulse (jūtih), will (sāmkalpaḥ), purpose (kratuḥ), life (asuḥ), desire (kāmaḥ), control (vaśaḥ), all these being the names of knowledge (prājnāna). Having thus described the psychical aspects of the self, the author proceeds to show the identity of the self and the universe, and declares that all reality depends upon knowledge. "That (self) is Brahman, Indra, Prajapati, all the gods, these five great elements: earth, air, ether, water, lights (fire); these and other small ones of a mixed nature, seeds of various kinds, those born of eggs, born from perspiration (heat), those germinated out of the ground, horses, cows, men, elephants, and all that breathes, whether it walks or flies, and that which moves not, all that is known by the intellect (prajñā); it is contained in knowledge (prajñāna); the world depends upon the intellect; is its seat or substratum (pratiṣṭhā); and knowledge is Brahman."

Commenting upon the above Professor Keith says: 'The question is whether this justifies an attribution to the author of the doctrine that knowledge alone exists. It is quite open to argue that we are only given the doctrine that the world is guided by knowledge, which leaves us with a final dualism. I think probably the author went further and intended to assert the origin of all from knowledge, cf. II. 4. If

1. While translating this passage I have had Keith's translation before me, but it will be found that I have differed from him in translating a number of terms. It is unnecessary to discuss at length the propriety of the various
so, he represents exactly the later Bhāgavata view, perhaps that of Bādarāyaṇa, of the nature of reality. The self, or god, is conceived as creating the material world as a reality, but the exact nature of the creation is left vague. The relation of brahman and ātman is likewise left vague, a mere identification such as may have been meant being of little value.”¹ Elsewhere,² referring to the Aitareya Arānyaka, II, 1, 3 and II, 4, 6, he says: ‘The doctrine of both Upaniṣads is purely pantheistic or cosmogonic (it is not possible, we consider, to separate these ideas in these early Upaniṣads).......To a Pantheist the world is the revelation of the divinity, to the Idealist it is the cloud which hides it. Indian Philosophy is not absolutely dominated by Idealism.’

Without at first giving any technical name to the

renderings, for the differences do not matter much so far as the general sense of the passage as a whole is concerned. I may simply say that in the last part of the sentence, I have treated prajñā and prajñāna as distinct from each other in sense, and have translated them as ‘intellect’ and ‘knowledge’ respectively. For the same reason, I have consistently translated ‘prajñāna’ as ‘knowledge’ throughout the passage. Also cf. Ranade, CSUP., p. 118.

1. The Aitareya Arānyaka, English Translation, p. 236.

2. JRAS., 1906, p., 493; the reference to p., 590 of the same in Keith’s Aitareya Arānyaka, p. 236 must be a misprint for p. 490.
philosophical views expressed in these passages, let us analyse their contents and see what conclusions we can draw from them with regard to the nature of reality and its knowledge. The following statements have been made:

That self (ātman) is the knower; it is the heart and the mind with all the psychical aspects or processes which can be attributed to them. (II, 3, 2; II 6; III, 2, 4).

Further, as the pure knower, It is not the object of knowledge,—sa yo ‘to ‘śruto ‘gato ‘mato ‘nato, ‘drśto ‘vijnato ‘nādiṣṭah’—that which is not heard, not reached, not thought, not subdued, not seen, not known, not defined (III, 2, 4).

That all the mental processes are only so many names of knowledge (prajñāna)—sarvāny evaitāni prajñanasya nāmadheyaṇi bhavanti (II, 6)

That the self is the whole created universe in all its forms,—form the gods down to inorganic things—esa brahmaisha Indra esa prajāpatih, etc. (II, 6).

That the whole created universe is known by the intellect (prajña), and is established in knowledge (prajñāna)—tat prajñā-netram prajñāne pratiṣṭhitam’ (II, 6).

That knowledge is Brahman, or vice versa,—pra-jñānam brahma (II, 6).

From the above statements, which are simply an analysis of the original texts, it is evident that accord-
ing to the author of the *Aranyaka*, all reality is knowledge. This he has said so often and in so many ways. Further, it is knowledge in the sense that it consists of either the knower, which is the self, or the psychical processes involved in knowing, or the objects known. In other words, all reality must be a reality in experience, and as a part of experience. This experiential character (if I may be allowed to use that word, for ‘empirical’ would not be correct) of reality, however, does not mean that reality, as we have it in the world of experience, has no objective existence. It is also plain that it is the self, which appears as the subject (*praṇā)*, as the faculties of knowing, and also as the objects known; and it is left open to regard it as something more and above these aspects of reality. It is a kind of cosmogonic pantheism that we have in the *Aranyaka,*—a pantheism which has not yet quite detached itself from the Vedic cosmogonic theism and is just on the border of a full-fledged idealism. It clearly recognises the mind-dependence of reality, and this recognition by itself, on its part, brings it quite within the class of idealism. It is an idealistic pantheism, so to say.

What is significant and epistemologically impor-
tant to note is that in this Āranyaka the whole experience—the subject, the process of cognition, and the object, is explained in terms of knowledge, and knowledge only, and thus one of the greatest difficulties of epistemology, viz., that of reconciling the disparity between the subject and the object does not arise at all. There is no trace of an antithesis between atman (self) on the one hand, and prakṛti (matter) on the other. Thus we have in the Āranyaka notions of epistemology which are based upon a consistent metaphysics. But what proof is there to show that the metaphysical assumptions are correct? The only answer is that there is none except the testimony of the scriptures, or the revelation. However, an account of the epistemological position of the Āranyaka would be incomplete, if it were not mentioned again that, according to him, human reason has the power of not only remembering the past, but also of looking into the future, of penetrating into that which is not immediately present to the senses. In other words, besides perception, reasoning and inference seem to be recognised as means of knowledge.

(v) The Development of the Doctrine of Illusory Existence and the Notions of Knowledge (vidyā) and Ignorance (avidyā) in the Brhadaranyaka and the other Upaniṣads.

The doctrine of the identity of self and the universe which we found to be emerging gradually
through the texts of the Śatapatha and the Aitareya Āranyaka was bound to result, as it actually did, in the doctrine that the world of experience is illusory. For if self is the only reality, this apparent plurality and its materialistic appearances must be false. Such is the view of most of the Upaniṣads, and we find it enunciated in the Brhadāranyaka by Yājñavalkya, a teacher of considerable reputation. Closely connected with this theory of illusory existence is that of knowledge and ignorance expressed by the terms vidyā avidyā which appear conspicuously later on not only in the Vedānta but also in the other schools. It will be found, as we come across these terms in the later literature, that they have been both used for ‘knowledge’ and ‘ignorance’ as understood in the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta, and ‘truth’ and ‘error’, as used in the ordinary epistemological sense in the other schools.

In the Brhadāranyaka II, 4 there is a dialogue between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī, in which the self is described much in the same way as in the Aitareya Aranyaka; that is to say, as that which is the cosmic principle of the universe, and by knowing which everything else in the world becomes known. ‘It is the self, which ought to be seen, heard, thought (mantavyah) and meditated upon (nidadhyāsītvah); for it is by seeing, hearing, thinking, and understand-

1. Isāvāsya, 9, 10, 15; Chānd. I. 1. 10; Brhad, 4, 3, 20; 4. 3, 10; Kaṭha, 2. 4, 5; Śvet. 5. 1; etc.
ing the self that all this (world) is known, says Yājñāvalkya. In the same dialogue the self is also described as the source of all knowledge and literature. It is said that all the Vedas, the legends (itihāsa); the purānas, the sciences, the Upaniṣads, poetry, aphorisms, comments and commentaries, have been breathed forth from that great being (the self)—‘Atya mahato bhutasya niḥśvasitam etad’. As the knower, the self is described as that which can never become an object of knowledge—‘whereby would one know that by which all this is known? Whereby would one know that which is the knower?’

The unity of all reality as of the nature of the self is declared in a dialogue between Yājñavalkya and the philosopher king Janaka. ‘By the mind only is it (the self) to the perceived. There is no plurality here. One who perceives this as diverse gets one death after another. This unknowable enduring being should be perceived as one; this unborn, great and enduring self, which is spotless and beyond space. It is by knowing it alone that a wise Brāhmaṇa should seek enlightenment. He should not devote himself to many words, for that is only a weariness of

1. Brhad. II. 4. 5; (cf. Aitareya Aranyak, II. 6; Chānd., VI. 12, Taitt. II. 1. 98; II. 6; Mund, I. 1. 6).
2. Ibid, II. 4. 10.
4. The meaning seems to be that for enlightenment study is
speech."

In another dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Gārgī the categories of time and space, along with the self as the ultimate category, have been recognised 'O, Yājñavalkya,' asks Gārgī, 'that which is above the sky, that which is between the two, the sky and the earth, these which the people call the past, the present, and the future,—across what is that woven warp and woof?' And Yājñavalkya says in answer that it is space across which all this is woven wrap and woof; and on being asked further as to across what space is woven in its turn, he says that it is woven across the imperishable—(Akṣara).\(^3\)

The above quotations represent the general trend of the Upaniṣadic thought as regards knowledge and reality. The chief remarkable point is the conception of self as the knower,—the epistemological subject, which never becomes an object, and which is not of much use, which idea was not uncommon with those who laid stress upon meditation, cf. Rgveda I. 164 39, Yastanna veda kīmṛcā karisyati; also, Chānd. III. 18. 1 ; VII, 16, 17, Katha, I, 2–22; I. 3–12. Muṇḍ. I. 13, I, 4, 5; Śvet. I. 10; Praśna, I. 16; VI. 5.

\(^1\) Brhad. IV. 19-21.

\(^2\) Ibid, III. 8.

\(^3\) Adopted from my article in JRAS, July, 1929, pp. 595-96.
endowed with all the psychical faculties usually attributed to mind in modern psychology. Mind, in most of the Upaniṣads, as also later on, comes to be regarded as simply a physical sense-organ possessed of the power of thinking, and depending for its quality and efficiency upon food.\textsuperscript{1} In some texts, however, it has been identified with Brahman or reality.\textsuperscript{2} Self is to be known by meditation, which usually signifies both reflection and mystic concentration. Knowledge of the real nature of self is true knowledge (vidyā); to take its appearance in the form of the created universe for reality is ignorance (avidyā). The doctrine of appearance and reality is thus positively found in most of the Upaniṣads.\textsuperscript{3} However, it is to be noted that this doctrine of appearance and reality, and that of the allied theory of knowledge and ignorance as found in the Upaniṣads, although identical with that in the Vedānta, is different from that to be met with in the Nyaya and the Vaiśeṣika schools, for it does not refer to the ordinary cognitions of individual things like a man or a post, but to the knowledge of the universe as a whole. But, as will be seen in the sequel, the theory of truth and error as found in the Philosophical Sūtras was not altogether uninfluenced by this conception of knowledge and ignorance as found in the Upaniṣads. In fact, so far as one can

\textsuperscript{1} Chand, VI. 5. i, vi, 5. 4; vi. 6, 1 and 2; VII, 26, 2.
\textsuperscript{2} Chand. III. 18. 1; VII. 3. 1.
\textsuperscript{3} E. G., Chand. V. I. 2-7.
see, it was this very conception which developed later into the epistemological notions of truth and error. One indication of this is to be found in the fact that the same Upaniṣadic terms, xiz., vidyā and avidyā continued to be used in order to express truth and error in the Sūtras. In some of the comparatively later Upaniṣads, for instance, in the Maitri¹, the use of such terms as pramāṇa prameya and anumiti is to be found.²

2. THE PRAJNÄ-PĀRAMITÄ LITERATURE.
The Doctrine of Voidness (śūnyatā) and the Denial of Knowledge in the Prajñāpāramitās.

Although the various texts constituting the Paramitā literature belong to an altogether different school, from the point of view of both the style and the essentials of their doctrine they may be truly called the Upaniṣads of Buddhism. They form the basis of the

1. VI. 14, ‘na vinā pramāṇena prameyasya upalabdhiḥ
   VI. 1. ‘Bahirātmakyā gatyāntarātmano ‘numiyate gatiḥ’.
2. In order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, I have thought it fit, so far as the subject of this thesis is concerned, to take Aitareya and Yajñavalkya as the representative philosophers of the Upaniṣadic period. References to important parallel passages in the other Upaniṣads have, however, been given in the foot-notes. That some of the Upaniṣads differ from one another in their metaphysical doctrines I duly recognise, but so far as psychological analysis or epistemological notions are concerned, they are much the same in all of them.
Madhyamika-kārikās of Nāgārjuna, and should serve as a useful introduction to the philosophy of that work, which has been variously understood and described by scholars as nihilism, negativism, relativity, and so on. The main doctrine of the Pāramitās, as also of Nāgārjuna's Kārikā, is voidness (śūnyata), which, I shall try to show, is not a theory of negation or nihilism, but one of absolute existence, very much corresponding to the Brahman doctrine of the Upaniṣads. The same earlier affinity between the Upaniṣads and the Pāramitās should explain the later similarity between the Vedānta and the Madhyamika School of Buddhism. In fact, the Vedāntists, especially of the school of Gauḍapāda, have been called Buddhists in disguise (pracchanna bauddhāḥ) by the followers of the other Hindu schools. But it will appear from a careful comparative study of the Upaniṣadas and the Pāramitās, that evidently the authors of the latter had followed the Upaniṣads both in style and thought with such modifications as were necessary to make their works conform to the essentials of the Buddhist doctrine. For instance, while describing the ultimate reality as an absolute existence, mostly in the Upaniṣadic sense, they only excluded the conception of self, because that would have been inconsistent with the Buddhistic doctrine. Similarly, it will appear that later on Gauḍapāda's position was much the same as that of Nāgārjuna with the exception that while Nāgārjuna described the absolute existence as voidness, Gauḍapāda called it self or Brahman.
Consistently with their doctrine that the whole world of experience is unreal, or rather illusory, the Prajñāpāramitās hold that no real knowledge is possible; which theory was more elaborately worked out, later on, by Nāgārjuna by showing that all notions about the world of experience were either relative or contradictory, and hence devoid of truth.

One of the important works of the Pāramitā literature is the Aṣṭasāhasrikā. The first chapter of this treatise deals with the ‘knowledge of all forms’—sarvākāra-jñātā, and it is maintained that consciousness (citta), the various skandhas, signs (lakṣāṇa), and the objects signified (lakṣya)—are all unreal, literally, devoid of the forms and characteristics which they seem to possess. In a dialogue between Sāriputra and Subhūti, the nature of consciousness is discussed, and following a statement on the part of Subhūti that consciousness is non-consciousness, and that its nature is illumination (prakṛitis cittasya prabhāsvarā), Sāriputra asks Subhūti to explain further what he means by consciousness, which, according to him, is non-consciousness. Subhūti, having first elicited from Sāriputra the assertion that the quality of non-consciousness (acittatā) does not admit of the predication of being (astitā), says that it is something which does not admit of any modification (avikāra) or variation (avikalpa). In another portion of the dialogue it is main-

1. Aṣṭa, pp. 5 and 6.
tained that the various skandhas\textsuperscript{1} viz., \textit{rūpa} (form and substance), \textit{vedanā} (feeling), \textit{saṃjñā} (cognition), \textit{saṃskāra} (disposition), and \textit{vijñāna} (knowledge) are devoid of their respective natures. Similarly perfection of wisdom (\textit{prajñāpāramitā}), omniscience (\textit{sarvajñatā}), signs (\textit{lakṣaṇa}) and the things signified (\textit{lakṣya}) are also devoid of their respective natures. And, to make the doctrine complete, it is maintained lastly that the nature of things is itself devoid of its own nature—\textit{svabhāvalakṣaṇenāpi svabhāvo vivahitaḥ}.\textsuperscript{9}

In Chapter, XIII (\textit{Acintyā-parivarta}) dealing with the ‘inconceivable’, the Lord says that all substances (\textit{sarvadhamāḥ}) are inconceivable (\textit{acintyāḥ}), incomparable (\textit{atulyāḥ}) ; such as cannot be counted (\textit{asaṃkhyeyāḥ}), and devoid of inequality or equality (\textit{asama-samāḥ}). Then by way of an explanation it is asserted that they are inconceivable, because the intellect cannot get at them (\textit{cittoparamatvāt}) ; they cannot be compared, because they are beyond comparison (\textit{tulanā-samatikṛantatvāt}) ; and they cannot be measured, and do not admit of counting and the distinctions of equality and inequality, because they are beyond measuring, counting and comparing.

\footnotesize
1. A rendering of the names of the \textit{Skandhas} into English always presents a difficulty, for they are used in various senses. Some of these have been noticed by Dr. E. J. Thomas in his \textit{The Life of Buddha as Legend \& History}, pp. 194-95.
2. \textit{Aṣṭa.}, p. 10.
The doctrines of suchness (tathātā) and voidness (śūnyatā) are expounded in Chapters XVI and XVIII respectively, and in spite of the paradoxical nature of the language, it is clear they represent a philosophy of absolute existence. Subhūti first asserts that the ‘suchness’, which really means the ‘in-itselfness’ of a thing, of the Tathāgata and his own are the same, and then goes on to say that the ‘suchness’ of all substances is the same as that of the Tathāgata; and, is, therefore, like that of his, beyond all change and variation, and also all-pervading. The identity of all ‘suchness’ is asserted in the most unequivocal terms when it is said that: that which is the suchness of the Tathāgata; and that which is the suchness of all the substances—these are one and the same suchness (ekāvaiśā-tathātā) which is non-dual (advaya), non-distinguishable as two (advayaidhikārā), not a suchness (advaya-tathātā); that suchness is not to be found anywhere (na kucacit tathātā); it is not from anywhere (na kutasācīt tathātā), and it does not belong to anyone (na kasyacit tathātā).

The doctrine of voidness is allied to that of suchness. It is dealt with in Chapter XVIII. In response to a request made by Subhūti to explain to him the


profound doctrine, the Lord said that the profound (gambhiram) and voidness were identical, and that whatever was without sign (animitta), unthought (apranihita), devoid of dispositions (anabhisaṃskāra), unproduced (anutpāda), without birth (ajātiḥ) ; non-existent (abhava); free from attachment (virāga), of the nature of restraint, (nirodha), cessation (nirvāna). and the ultimate (vigama) all that is the same as the profound. This profoundness, the Lord said, belongs to all things including the skandhas, and it appears from his description that it is the same as the suchness and voidness of things. For, he said 'with regard to these, O, Subhūti, according as there is the suchness of rūpa, (rūpa-tathata), so is there a profound rūpa, according as there is the suchness of vedanā. saṃjñā and saṃskāras, and as Subhūti, there is the suchness of vijnāna, so is there a profound vijnāna. O, Subhūti where there is no rūpa, that is the profoundness of rūpa; where, Subhūti, there is no vedanā, no saṃjñā, no saṃskāra, no vijnāna, there is the profoundness of vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāras and vijnāna. Having heard this discourse, Subhūti says: 'O Lord, it is wonderful that my attention has been turned away from the forms and substances (rūpataśca nivāritaḥ) by a subtle method (sūksmenopāyena) and nirvāna has been taught to me (nirvānam ca sūcitam). Similarly, my attention has been withdrawn by a subtle method from vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāras and vijnāna, and nirvāna has been taught to me.1 Another passage, in the same chapter,
which throws light upon the doctrine of voidness is as follows: 'The Lord said, O, Subhūti, those things which are void are also without destruction (akṣayāḥ); that which is voidness is also immeasurability (aprameyata); therefore, then, O Subhūti, there is not perceived any real distinction or plurality among these. These are mere (distinctions of) words—mere words as spoken by the Tathāgata: (that voidness is) 'that which cannot be measured, that which cannot be counted, that which is without destruction, that which is without cause, that which is beyond thought, etc.' Then it is further asserted that the character of all things is indescribable (anabhilapyāḥ) for the voidness of them is indescribable. At the end of the discourse Subhūti asks: 'O Lord, what is this, again, the highest perfect knowledge (anuttara samyak-sambodhiḥ) ?; and the Lord answers; 'Subhūti, it is this suchness which is the highest perfect knowledge. That suchness neither increases nor decreases.'

The larger and the smaller Hṛdaya-Sūtras and the Vajra-chedika are three other treatises of the Pāramiṭā class. The first two appear to be simply an abridgment of the doctrines of such bigger works as the Aṣṭa-sahasrika, and there is nothing new in them. In the Vajra-chedikā we come across some remarkable

1. Cf. Chānd. vi. 1, 4-6.
passages about the nature of the Tathāgata and his teachings, which distinctly show that the Pāramitā philosophy stands for the doctrine of an absolute existence, very similar to that of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta. The Tathāgata is said to represent the suchness of things (bhūta-tathātāyā etad adhivacanam), the nature of non-productiveness (anutpāda-dharmatāyāḥ), the cessation of form and substance (dharmaścchedasya) and that which is altogether unborn (atyantānuppannasya). The Tathāgata is not to be supposed as having gone anywhere, nor as having come from anywhere. Finally it is said that those who think that the Tathāgata can be seen by means of form (ṛūpa), or can be heard by means of sound, are engaged in a futile effort. It will appear that this description of the Tathāgata very nearly approaches the Vedāntic conception of the absolute self.

The following passage is another remarkable expression of a doctrine of absoluteness:—'And verily, again, O, Subhūti, the dharma which has been discerned, taught and thought out by the Tathāgata, admits neither of truth nor falsehood (na tatra satyam na mṛṣā). It is like this, Subhūti, that just as a man immersed in darkness would not see anything, in the same way, should the Bodhisattva, immersed in reality (vastu-patitaḥ), be looked upon, as one who gives away alms as one immersed in reality. And, O Subhūti, just as

a man immersed in darkness would not see anything, in the same way, should be Bodhisattva, immersed in reality (vastu-patitaḥ), be looked upon, as one who gives away alms as one immersed in reality. And O, Subhūti, just as a man with the eyes would see various kinds of forms on the passing away of night and the rising of the sun, in the same way should the Bodhisattva immersed in non-reality (avastu-patitaḥ), be looked upon, as one who gives away alms as one immersed in non-reality. The passage evidently contains the doctrine, according to which, reality-in-itself is an undifferented homogeneous absolute, a darkness in which all cows are black, as Hegel puts it, and this experience, according to the Vajra-chhedikā, one has when one is actually immersed in reality. The opposite of it is the world of plurality and heterogeneity, and it is so to one who is not immersed in reality. The real world of the wise man is compared to night, and the unreal world of the layman to the state of wakefulness. That the universe is further regarded as an illusion, a passing phantom, is evident from the last verse of the Vajra-chhedikā, which has been translated by Max Müller as follows:—

'Stars, darkness, a lamp, a phantom, dew, a bubble;
A dream, a flash of lightning, and a cloud—thus
We should look upon the world (all that was made)'

1. Vajra-chhed. XIV.
2. Cf. The Bhagavadgītā:
   "Yā niśā sarva-bhūtānām tasyām jāgarti saṁyati,
   Yasyām jāgrati bhūtāni sā niśā pasyato munēh."
3. Tārakā timiram dispo māyāvaśyāyabhudbudam.
Now to sum up, it will appear from the various quotations given above that according to the Prajñāpāramitās, (i) the suchness of things, that is, their intrinsic character (tathatā) is voidness (śūnyatā), and hence, all things of the world including consciousness (citta) and knowledge are devoid of the nature which they seem to possess (Aṣṭa I), (ii) the real nature of things is incomprehensible (Acintya) for it is beyond the reach of the intellect (Aṣṭa. XIII); (iii) suchness of things is an undifferentiated absolute existence (Aṣṭa. XVI); (iv) suchness, voidness and profoundness are identical, and these constitute true or perfect knowledge, they are also indestructible (akṣayāḥ) and immeasurable (aprameyāḥ); the same are nirvāṇa; everything else is a matter of mere verbal talk (abhilapyāḥ) (Aṣṭa. XVIII). It must be clear from this description of voidness, suchness, or nirvāṇa that they are not the name of non-being but of an absolute ultimate entity, which, in the Vajra-chchedikā, has even been identified with the Tathāgata, and hence there is no reason to call the philosophy of the Pāramitās nihilism or negativism. The doctrine of the illusory nature of the phenomenal world and the consequent denial of knowledge in the Pāramitās is essentially the same as the Māyā and the Avidyā doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta.¹ The former re-

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¹ It is usually maintained, and to a certain extent rightly too, that the conceptions of māyā and Avidyā, as found
appears in a developed form in Nāgārjuna, and the latter in Gaṇḍapāda and Śaṅkara.

in the earlier Upaniṣads, are different from those found later in Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, but it has to be remembered that the idea underlying the use of those terms both in the Upaniṣads and the later Vedānta, viz., the illusory nature of the phenomenal world, is essentially the same. Further in some Upaniṣads, which are not very late after all and much prior to Śaṅkara, e. g., in the Śvetāśvatara, Māyā is actually called prakṛti, which notion of Māyā would distinctly correspond to Śaṅkara’s.

In an article on the Philosophy of the PP. (JBTS. iv. iii) VB. quotes certain passages which show that according to the Prajñāpāramitā the appearance of the phenomenal world is due to a Māyā in the sense it is used in the Upaniṣads. The lord is said to have cited the example of a magician and to have declared that substances appear to have the various characteristics which they possess because of the character of Māyā ‘dharmataiśā sarvadharmāṇām māyādharmaṇām upādāya’. Similarly avidyā has been described, in the Upanisadic sense, as that cognition which perceives things, which are not existent, as existent—yathā Śāriputra na samvidyante tathā samvidyante evam avidyamānas tenocyante avidyayet’. Unfortunately VB. did not say from which Prajñā-pāramitā he got these passages, and I have been unable to trace them to their source.
PART III

Epistemology of the Philosophical Sūtras.
1. INTRODUCTORY

(i) The Philosophical Sūtras

The various shades of philosophical thought found in the early literature assumed definite shape in course of time, and gave rise to a number of schools. The doctrines of most of these were put together in works which have come down to us as the Philosophical Sūtras. Of the Hindu philosophical schools, it will appear that while the Mīmāṁsā, the Vedānta, the Sāṁkhya, and the Yoga owe their origin directly to the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, and the Upaniṣads, the Vaiṣeṣīka and the Nyāya, which represent a different type of thought, had their source in another kind of literature. That the texts of the Vedic literature form the basis of the doctrines of the Mīmāṁsā, the Vedānta, the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga schools is a fact which now requires no proof. And again, that there is no appreciable basis for the essential tenets of the Vaiṣeṣīka and the Nyāya schools in the Vedic literature is also evident and an admitted fact. This being so, it is only reasonable to expect that the doctrines of the Mīmāṁsā, the Vedānta, the Sāṁkhya, and the Yoga schools would have assumed a definite form earlier than those of the Nyāya and the Vaiṣeṣīka schools, and that they really did so is evident from frequent mention of these four schools
in the early literature of the post-vedic period, and almost an absence of reference in it to the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣka schools as such. Thus proceeding on the assumption that there was a tendency to put together the doctrines of a school in the form of Sūtras as soon as, or within a reasonable period after they had assumed a definite shape one may well expect that the Sūtras of the Mīmāṃsā, the Vedānta, the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga schools would have been compiled first and much about the same period, while those of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya schools would have followed later on. This expectation, however, seems to be belied by the fact that the present Sāṃkhya-sūtras have been proved to belong to a very late period, as late as the fourteenth century A. D.; and the Yoga-sūtras are now believed by a number of scholars, following Professors Jacobi and Woods, to be as late as the fourth or fifth century A. D. Now, while the gap of an early systematic work on the Sāṃkhya is filled up by the Sāṃkhya-kārika, or it may be explained by surmise that there was an early Sūtra work, either a shorter form of the present one or altogether different from it, which is lost, the Yoga-sūtras are all that we have as a systematic exposition of the Yoga doctrines, and there is no reason to believe that they were preceded by another work of a similar nature. The question, then, is whether the systematization of such an early school of thought as the Yoga would have been postponed until as late as the fourth or fifth century A. D.; and until after
the systematization of the doctrines of even the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya schools, which began later on, and the Sūtras of which definitely contain a reference to the Yoga doctrines of mystic intuition and concentration.

The arguments adduced for the late date of the Yoga-sūtras are mainly those given by Professor Jacobi in his article on the dates of the Philosophical Sūtras¹, and these I propose to consider presently.

Professor Jacobi's arguments may be summarized as follows:—

1. A discussion of the Buddhist denial of the external world in YS. iv, 15 f., indicates that these sūtras refer to the Buddhist doctrine of Vijñāna-vāda and hence Patañjali must be later than the middle of the fifth century A. D.

2. That the Patañjali of the Yoga-sūtras is different from the author of the Mahābhāṣya bearing the same name, and hence "the only argument for the great antiquity of the Yoga-sūtras is fallacious".

3. There are certain doctrines in the YS. which are not countenanced by the Śāmkhya and the early Yoga, and which hence have been adopted by Patañjali from other systems; and this fact indicates that the YS. belong to a late period. The doctrines alluded to are explained by Jacobi as follows:—

(a) The doctrine of sphoṭa has been adopted from the Vaiyākaraṇas; it is expounded in the Bhāṣya on YS. iii, 17.

(b) The doctrine of the infinite size of the antaḥkaraṇa seems to have been adopted from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It is given in the Bhāṣya on YS. iv, 10, and there ascribed to the "Ācārya".

(c) The atomic theory, which originally belonged to the Vaiśeṣika, is clearly referred to by Patañjali in YS. i, 40 (cf. Bhāṣya on iii, 44).

(d) The doctrine that time consists of kṣaṇas, which was first put forth by the Sautrāntikas, is clearly assumed in iii, 52, though the details are explained in the Bhāṣya only.

A CRITICISM OF THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS

The first argument is evidently based upon the assumptions that (a) there is a refutation of Vijñāna-vāda in YS. iv, 15 ff.; and (b) that it is the Vijñāna-vāda of Vasubandhu which is refuted. As regards the first of these it will appear that it is only the Sūtra, na caika-citta-tantram vastu tad aprāmāṇakam tadā kim syāt which lends support to the view that Vijñāna-vāda is refuted. There is nothing either in the preceding sūtra or the following one to indicate definitely that there is reference to Viññāna-vāda in this context. The Sūtra iv, 15, is: vastu-sāmye citta bhedāt tayor viviktāḥ panthāḥ, of which a faithful rendering into English will be, “because of the difference of the intellect (thoughts), the object being the same (or similar), the path of the two is different”. It will appear that neither the Sanskrit commentators nor modern scholars have faithfully followed the wording of the Sūtra in commenting upon it, or translating it into English1. The author of the Bhāṣya is prepossessed with the notions of Vijñāna-vāda and its refutation in this section of the YS., so much so that he starts a discussion on

1. E. g. Rajendarlal Mitra; “Even in the sameness of object the course (courses?) of the two are distinct, from diversity of the thinking principle.” Bibl. Indica edition; and Woods, “Because, while the (physical) thing remains the same the mind-stuffs are different, (therefore the two are upon) distinct levels of existence,” “Yoga System of Patanjali”, HOS.

In the above translations I find no justification for the renderings italicized by me.
the subject even in his comments upon the previous Sūtra; iv, 14: pariṇāmaikatvād vastu tattvam, which has not even the semblance of having anything to do with Vijñāna-vāda or its refutation, and hence the remark by Vāchaspāti Miśra tad evam utṣūtram bhāṣyakṛd vijñānātīrīkta-sthāpana-yuktim uktvā sautrīṁ yuktim avatarayati—, "so having thus gone beyond the sūtra in giving the reason for establishing something besides knowledge, now the author of the Bhāṣya introduces the argument as given in the sūtra itself," i.e. in iv, 15. The interpretation of the first commentator has since been followed by the later ones, and by modern scholars. It will appear, however, that the sūtra in itself is evidently intended to say that the same or similar object of a certain nature (according to the combination of the three constituents—gunaśa: sattva, rajas, and tamas) affects different minds differently because of the difference in the nature of those minds; the main point emphasized being not the diversity of minds but the difference of mentality. The term citta-bhedat in the sūtra may signify "difference of intellect (thoughts)" with reference to one and the same individual, or different individuals, as the case may be. For, one and the same individual may also be said to have different "minds" according as he happens to be in the mood of sattva, rajas, or tamas, and to be, therefore, affected differently by one and the same, or a similar object; and such a case also is evidently covered by the sūtra. This interpretation is confirmed by the context of the two previous sūtras, and is also supported by the example given by the commentators.

1. YS. iv, 13: te vyakta-sūkṣmāḥ guṇātmanāḥ; and iv, 14: pariṇāmaikātivād vastu-tattvam, in which an object is said to be composed of the three constituents of sattva, rajas, and tamas.
that the presence of a young woman affects different men in a different manner according to the character of those men. Similarly, Śūtra iv, 17: _tad uparāgapeksitvād asya vastu jñātājñātām_ simply asserts that a thing is known according as it produces an impression upon the mind or not; and there is no reference to Vijñāna-vāda in it, even according to the commentators. As has already been said, it is only Śūtra iv, 16: _na caika-cittāntṛaṁ vastu tad apramānakam tadā kim syāt_, "nor is an object dependent upon one intellect; that being not a proof, what would happen then?", which lends support to the view that there is a refutation of Vijñāna-vāda in this section, or in the Yoga-sūtra. Now, it is interesting to find that this _sūtra_ has not only been not commented upon by Bhoja, the author of the Rāja-Mārtanda-vṛtti, but evidently not treated by him as a _sūtra_ at all; for it does not appear in the editions of his _Vṛtti_ and Śūtra iv, 17, as found in the editions of the _Bhāṣya_, and Vācaspati Miśra's commentary has been numbered as _Sātra_ iv, 16 and so on. This omission of the _sūtra_ by Bhoja clearly indicates that the copy or copies of the _Yog-sūtra_ which he used did not contain this _sūtra_.¹ What could be the explanation then of the appearance of this _sūtra_ in the editions of the other commentators? Considering that Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra were the predecessors of Bhoja, it is improbable that he should not have known their commentaries, and should not have been aware of this _sūtra_, had it been regarded as a _sūtra_ in his time; and yet we have the commentaries on this _sūtra_ by both Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra in the editions that have come down to us. The only explanation of this discrepancy is that the clause _na caika-cittāntṛaṁ vastu_

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tad-apramāṇakām tada kim syāt was originally a line in the middle of the Bhāṣya on Sūtra iv, 15, immediately following the last sentence of what is now regarded as the Bhāṣya on iv, 15. viz. ta etayā dvāra sādhāraṇatyaṁ badhamānāh pūrvottara-kṣaṇeṣu vastu-svarūpam evāpahnuvate, and the Bhāṣya on iv, 15, really ended with the last sentence of what is now regarded as the Bhāṣya on iv, 16. Similarly, the comment of Vācaspati Miśra on iv, 15 and 16, according to the present editions also originally must have formed one entire comment on iv, 15; and it was in this form that the Yoga-sūtra and the commentaries of Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra must have been known to Bhoja. It was only later on that either by mistake or otherwise, this particular clause in the Bhāṣya came to be treated as a separate sūtra, and the commentaries were also divided accordingly. This mistake, or misinterpretation, could not have been possible in the case of Bhoja's commentary, for it is of an independent nature and does not usually follow or repeat the texts of the previous commentaries; and hence the edition of the Yoga-sūtra as found with his commentary may be regarded as authentic. This explanation of the discrepancy about Sūtra iv, 16, is rendered more than plausible by the further facts that: (a) the clause which is regarded as Sūtra iv, 16, now, does not read like a Sūtra at all; (b) it quite fits in with the context if it is regarded as a part of the Bhāṣya immediately following the last line of the present Bhāṣya on iv, 15; and (c) the present commentaries of Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra on iv 15 and 16, if treated as commentaries only on iv, 15, and read together, form one continuous whole without the slightest indication that those latter portions which are supposed to belong to iv, 16, could not have been a part of the commentaries on iv, 15.

It is rather curious that this discrepancy about YS. iv, 16,
which is so important for the point under discussion, has not been mentioned at all by either Professor Jacobi or Professor Woods.

If what has been said above about Sūtra iv, 16, be true, there is no reason to believe that independently of the commentaries the Yoga-sūtras contain a refutation of Vijñāna-vāda at all. Further, even if there were a reference to Vijñāna-vāda in any of the Yoga-Sutras, no argument has been given by either Jacobi or Woods to show that it is the Vijñāna-vāda of Vasubandhu which is meant. "We cannot it is true," says Professor Woods, "maintain that the Vijñāna-vāda here attacked by the Sūtra must be the idealism of Vasubandhu"; and then again he rightly admits that "there surely were idealists before him, just as there were pre-Patanjalian philosophers of Yoga". All this admission, coupled with the fact that the very authenticity of the sūtra iv, 16, is extremely doubtful, takes away the force of the whole argument for a late date of the Yoga-sūtras based upon the fact that there is a reference to Vijñāna-vāda in them.

Before I pass on to the next argument I wish to utilize this opportunity of pointing out one thing about references to Vijñāna-vāda in particular and other doctrines in general. It will appear that in the Philosophical Sūtra when a certain doctrine other than its own is mentioned or criticized the name of the author or the school of thought to which it belongs is seldom mentioned. It is only in the commentaries that specific names are mentioned, and it is found that whenever there is the slightest scope for interpreting a sūtra as referring to, and providing a criticism of, what may be called by the

2. Ibid., xviii.
general name of Nirālambana-vāda, the commentators are only too eager to put it down as containing an argument against the Vijñāna-vāda or the Śūnya-vāda of Buddhism. Now the fact that in most cases the Sūtras were composed or compiled much earlier than the date of the commentators, and that their authors have not mentioned any particular names while criticising doctrines different from their own, should be a warning against reposing an unqualified confidence in the interpretations of the commentators. This should be the more so because most of the early commentators lived and wrote their commentaries at a time when the Hindu-Buddhistic polemics were at their highest, and the Hindu writers were only too glad to use anything which they could lay their hands on as a missile against their opponents. Let us take, for instance, general references in the Sūtras to an idealistic doctrine such as has been called Vijñāna-vāda in Buddhism, even where they actually exist. The usual tendency is to suppose, often without any arguments or proofs, that they must be to Vasubandhu’s Vijñāna-vāda, although it is also admitted at the same time that there was Vijñāna-vāda in Buddhism even before Vasubandhu. Further, it seems to have seldom occurred to scholars that such sūtras may not refer to any particular school or author at all, and may simply have in view the idealistic position in general; or, again, they may refer to such idealism as is found in some of the early Upaniṣads. That besides the Vijñāna-vāda of Buddhism there was also an old Hindu theory of idealism, even of the type of the Buddhistic Vijñāna-vāda, in so far as the doctrine of mind-dependent reality is concerned, is a fact which has to be admitted, but which usually seems to be forgotten by scholars when discussing references to the idealistic doctrines in the Sūtras literature. For example, the philosophy of such an early work as the Aitareya Āraṇyaka is as good a Vijñāna-vāda as any other could be. All things of the world are des-
cribed as knowledge (prajñānam) and having their existence only in and through knowledge—sarvam tat prajñā-netram, prajñāne pratiṣṭhitam, prajñā-netro lokaḥ, prajñā-pratiṣṭhā, prajñānam brahma.\(^1\) Similarly the denial of plurality and the doctrine of absolute existence in such Upaniṣads as the Bhādāraṇyaka very much approximate the doctrine of illusory existence as found in the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism. Both these doctrines, as even they were to be found in Hinduism, would not be tolerated by such later realistic schools as were represented by the Philosophical Sūtras; and what wonder if, when the authors of the Sūtras discussed these, they should have had these Hindu doctrines only, or also, in view.

The second argument given by both Jacobi and Woods for the late date of the Yoga-sūtras is that the author of the Yoga-sūtras is different from that of the Mahābhāṣya. Now, even granting that this view about the authorship of the YS. be true,\(^2\) I do not see how this by itself can prove that the date of the YS. is late, or cannot be earlier than the fourth or fifth century A. D. The question of the date of the author of the YS. still remains undecided and open. It may be late, or it may be early.

The arguments 3 (a) and 3 (b) based upon the presence in the Bhāṣya of a reference to the doctrines of sphota and the infinite size of the antaḥkaraṇa are admitted by Jacobi himself to be weak, for no reference of this kind is to be found in the Sūtras themselves. Speaking of the first he says: "This theory is, however, not directly mentioned in the Sūtra, and its introduction rests entirely on the authority of the

\(^1\) Aitareya Āraṇyaka, ii., 6; Ait. Upaniṣad, iii, 3, 3.

\(^2\) However, see Dasgupta on this point, History of Indian Philosophy, i, pp. 231–2.
Bhāṣya,¹ and about the second: "It is given in the Bhāṣya on iv, 10, and there ascribed to the 'Ācārya'."¹ I have only to add that it is evident that these references prove nothing with regard to the date of the Sūtras.

The next arguments are 3 (c) and 3 (d), viz. that the atomic theory is referred to in YS. i, 20: paramāṇu-paramamahattvānto sya vaśkāraḥ and the doctrine of kṣaṇas in YS. iii, 52: kṣaṇa-tat-kramayoḥ saṁyamad vīvēkajāṁ jñānaṁ. In connection with these references Jacobi says: "The Sphotavāda and the Mano-vaibhava-vāda (1 and 2) may be later additions to the system, but the paramāṇu-vāda and the kṣaṇika-vāda must be ascribed to Patañjali and cannot be later than him."¹ Now again, even granting what Jacobi says here with regard to these references, I am unable to see how they can prove that the Yoga-sūtras belong to a late date, unless it could be shown that these doctrines belong to a late period. On the other hand, Jacobi's own statements in the article under discussion indicate, what is really true about them, that they can be traced back to quite an early period, in Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism. Speaking about the adopting of these doctrines by Patañjali he says: "That he did adopt them, directly or indirectly, from the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists, though of course not in their original form, presupposes that these doctrines had somehow ceased to be shibboleths of hostile schools, and that the general idea underlying them had been acknowledged by other philosophers too. We know that this has been the case with regard to the atomic theory which has also been admitted by Buddhists, Jainas, Ājīvakas, and some Mīmāṁsakas"¹ The conception of aṇu is expressly found in some of the earlier Upaniṣads also, e. g.

1. JAOS., xxxi, p. 28; italics are mine.
in Kaṭha ii, 20, anor anīyān, or in Mundaka ii, 2, 2, yad anubhyo' nu. Similarly, about what Jacobi calls kṣanika-vāda, and what really is the use of kṣaṇa in the sense of a moment, he admits that "the kṣanika-vāda, in an altered and restricted form, has been adopted by the Vaiśeṣikas", the Sūtras of whose school, according to Jacobi, are earlier than the Yoga-sūtras. Then, after having made all these statements, he concludes: "This adoption of originally heterodox doctrines by Patañjali therefore unmistakably points to a relatively modern time." Now, even if it be granted that Patañjali was the first to introduce these doctrines into the Yoga system, this fact does not prove that he belonged to a late date; for the doctrines of aṇu and kṣaṇa have to be admitted to belong to quite an early period, even on Jacobi's own statements, and they might have been imported into the Yoga at any reasonable time even before the fourth or fifth century A.D.; for instance at about the same time as they were imported into the Vaiśeṣika system.

Professor Woods' argument, based upon Sūtra ii, 52, of Umāsvāti's Tattvarthadīghama-sūtra does not prove anything definite. In fact, the TS. ii 52: aupapattika-caramadshottamapuruṣa-saṁkheya-varṣyugo' napuvartyāyuṣaḥ cannot be said to refer to YS. iii, 22: sopakaramam nirupakarmaṁ ca karma tat-saṁyamād aparānta-jñānaṁ aristebhyo vā. So far as the two sūtras are concerned they have neither the affinity of language nor of thought. The one (TS. ii, 52) discusses the period of life of the various kinds of beings, and the other (YS. iii, 22) attainment of a certain kind of

1. Also Chānd, iii, 14. 3; Brhad. iv, 1, 1, vi, 3. 13.
2. JAOS., xxxi, p. 28.
yogic merit, siddhi. What we find is that Umāsvāti in his own commentary on TS. ii, 52, uses the terms sopakrama and nirupakrama, which are also found in YS. iii, 22, and uses the illustrations found in the Yoga-bhāṣya of this Yoga-sūtra. Now there can be two alternative explanations of this: either (1) Umāsvāti had in his mind this particular Yoga-sūtra and the Yoga-bhāṣya on it while writing his commentary on TS. ii, 52; or, (2) he used the terms sopakrama and nirupakrama and the illustrations independently simply because they were known to him as apt and usual in connection with the topic which he was discussing, just as in logic so many of us use such familiar examples as “Man is mortal”, “Socrates is a man”, etc. Now, if the first alternative be true, it only proves that Umāsvāti was later than the Yoga-sūtras and possibly also the Yoga-bhāṣya; and the Yoga-sūtras might belong to any date before Umāsvāti, late or early. And, if the second alternative be true, which is more probable, it proves nothing with regard to the relation between Umāsvāti and the author of the Yoga-sūtras. Professor Woods, however, argues on the authority of Professor Stcherbatsky that, as Dinnāga (about A. D. 550, according to Woods’ estimate) does not seem to know anything of Patañjali, he could not be much earlier. As regards this argument, it has to be noted, firstly, that our knowledge of Dinnāga and his works is still very imperfect and incomplete; secondly, there might have been no occasion for Dinnāga to refer to Patañjali; and thirdly, the clear implication of this argument, if it be accepted, is that Patañjali was later than Dinnāga, and consequently the date of the Yoga-sūtras is to be pushed still further to about the seventh century A. D. ! This goes against Professor Woods’ own statement, in which he says: “The date for Siddhasena is set by Professor Jacobi (ZDMG, 60, 289, Leipzig, 1906 reprint, p. 3, Eina Jaina-Dogmatik) at the middle or end of the sixth century. Umāsvāti precedes him; and Patañjali
the philosopher would not be later than A. D. 400 and might be much earlier”.

It is evident that very little can be proved about the date of the Yoga-sūtras by alluding to the presence in them of such philosophical doctrines as can be traced back to a very early period, or again by referring to such authors or works containing references to the Yoga-sūtras as belong to a late period. The arguments based upon both these kinds of references leave a very wide margin both for the earlier and the later limits.

Besides references to particular authors or doctrines, another criterion for determining the relative dates of certain works will be a comparison of their philosophical position with regard to such problems as may be common to them. For example, for determining the relative dates of the Philosophical Śūtras, one such problem may be the theory of the means of knowledge (the pramāṇas). We know that of all the Philosophical Śūtras it is to be found in the most developed form in the Nyāya-sūtras, and also that all the works which we definitely know to be later than the Nyāya-sūtras, and which have dealt with the pramāṇas, show evident signs of being influenced by the theory of the Nyāya-sūtras. On the other hand, the theory of the pramāṇas as found in the Śūtras of the other schools is clearly of a primitive nature. The Mīmāmsā and the Vedānta Śūtras hardly contain anything which may be called the theory of the pramāṇas; the Yoga-sūtras are a little
better; and the position of the Vaiṣeṣika-sūtras appears to be just preliminary to the theory as found in the Nyāya-sūtras. Take, for instance, the definition of direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) as given in the various Sūtras. It will appear that the definition of pratyakṣa as given in the Sūtras other than the Nyāya is simply psychological, viz. that knowledge which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, indriyārtha-sannikarṣatpannam jñānam, and it is only in the Nyāya-sūtras that the conditions avyapadesyam (non-inferential, literally that which is not the result of a sign or mark), avyabhicāri (non-discrepant), and vyavasāyātmakam (definite) have been added, and then these have formed the basis of later definitions. Similarly it is in the Nyāya-sūtras that the three kinds of inference: pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa are first enunciated, and these are found in some form or other in most of the later works or logic. In the Vaiṣeṣika-sūtras we just find in Sūtra, IX, 2. 1, what appears to be a preliminary statement of this classification of inference in the Nyāya-sūtras. The Sāṃkhya kārikā definitely assumes the three kinds of inference as given in the Nyāya-sūtras. The case of the Sāṃkhya-sūtras in this respect is rather curious for although they have been proved to belong to a very late period, the definitions in them of the means of know-

1. Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 4
ledge (pramāṇas), direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are of a peculiar nature. While one would have expected that these definitions in the Śāṅkhyā-sūtras would have borne the marks of the latest developments in the theory of the pramāṇas, they show resemblance neither to the definitions of the pramāṇas in the Nyāya-sūtras and the later works nor to those given in the other Sūtras and the Śāṅkhyā-kārikā. All these facts about the theory of the pramāṇas in the Philosophical Sūtras go to show that (1) the Nyāya-sūtras are the latest of all the Sūtras except the Śāṅkhyā; (ii) the Mīmāṃsā, the Vedānta, the Yoga and the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras are earlier than Nyāya-sūtras and probably succeeded one another in the order in which they are mentioned here; (iii) the Śāṅkhyā-kārikā is later than the Nyāya-sūtras; (iv) the Śāṅkhyā-sūtras in the present form decidedly belong to a late date because of evidence other than that of the theory of the pramāṇas; but the peculiar nature of the definitions of the pramāṇas suggests a very probable hypothesis that these definitions originally belonged to an early Śāṅkhyā work most probably earlier than the Nyāya-sūtras, which is either lost, or has been incorporated in the present Śāṅkhyā-sūtras. From the point of view of the epistemological development of thought the

1. Śāṅkhyā-sūtras, 1, 87
2. Ibid. 1, 89
Nyāya-sūtras form a very definite and convenient landmark for determining the relative position of the other works, and unless there be other reasons to prove the contrary, the chronological order suggested by the epistemology of the various Sūtras may be accepted as fairly correct. It will further appear that the conclusions arrived at by this method are also in accordance with the expectation that the Sūtras of the Mimāmsā; the Vedānta, the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga schools should have been, in the ordinary course, compiled earlier than those of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya.

The same criterion may be applied to some of the early works of Jainism and Buddhism also. It will appear that Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra and the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra are earlier than the Nyāya-sūtras, for neither of them shows any signs of being influenced by the logic of the Nyāya-sūtras; and in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra the query about future logicians and the answer to it given in the prophetic style indicate that the Nyāya school was yet in the process of formation and had not attained the stage represented by the Nyāya-sūtras. Nāgārjuna’s works, specially those on logic, definitely presuppose the philosophy of the Nyāya-sūtras, and hence he must be later than the Nyāya-sūtras.
(ii) The Development of the Nyāya Epistemology.

As has already been pointed out it is in the Nyāya-sūtras that we first find a systematic treatment of the means of knowledge. The doctrine of the Nyāya-sūtras was, however, the result of a series of previous developments in the earlier literature. The dialogues and discourses which were the characteristic features of the Upaniṣadic period naturally resulted, in course of time, in the formulation of definite methods of debating and forms of reasoning; and these gave rise to a science, which was originally called ānvīkṣikī—the science of enquiry, then tarka-vidyā—the science of debating; or hetu-vidyā—the science of reasoning; and ultimately, Nyāya-śāstra the science of logic. Ānvīkṣikī began as a science of general enquiry, which included in its scope both metaphysics and logic. Later on it assumed a more specific form and became the science of pure reasoning. This transition in its connotation can be discovered in the texts of such important works of the period as the Mānava-dharma-śāstra¹, the Mahābhārata², the Rāmāyaṇa³,

1. MDS', Hetu-śāstra, II. 11, Vāda, VI, 50; Tarka II, 106, 111; Ātma-vidyā, VII. 43.
2. MB. Sānti-parva, 180, 47; 210, 22; 246, 18; Aśva-medha, 85, 27.
3. Rām, I, 13, 23;
and the Artha-śāstra\textsuperscript{1} of Kauṭilya. It is rather significant with regard to the nature of ānvikṣikī and also of the systems with which it is identified, that in the Artha-śāstra, the Sāmkhya, the Yoga and the Lokāyata are said to be ānvikṣikī-Sāmkhyam yogo lokayatam cetyānvikṣiki. (I, 2) and it is further described as the light of all the branches of studies pradāpāḥ sarvavidyānām.\textsuperscript{1} Thus it will appear that by the time of Kauṭilya\textsuperscript{2} ānvikṣikī had come to be regarded mainly as the science of logic, and not much later on, it actually became the Nyāya-śāstra. The fact that the name ānvikṣikī had been applied to the Sāmkhya, the Yoga and even the Lokāyata indicates the rationalistic character of the science probably as against the dogmatic nature of the other schools of thought. And we actually find that because of this rationalistic bent, the study had already fallen into disrepute with those who regarded the scriptures as the ultimate and unquestionable authority.\textsuperscript{3}

Along with a mention of ānvikṣikī, tarka-vidyā or hetu-vidyā we find in the literature of this period the use of certain technical terms signifying what came

\begin{itemize}
  \item[1.] Aś., 1, 2, 7. (N. B.) For most of these references I am indebted to V B.’s H I L.
  \item[2.] Indian tradition would put the AS’. in the fourth Century B. C. on the assumption that it was written by Cāṇakya during the time of Candra-gupta. According to most of the European scholars, however, it should belong to the third Century, A. D. See Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Vol. III, pp. 517—24.
  \item[3.] MDS., II, 11; MB, Śanti. 180, 47.
\end{itemize}
to be known as pramāṇa—means of knowledge, and tantra-yukti—forms of argumentation. The terms smṛti, pratyakṣa, aitihya and anumāna are found as early as the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.¹ In the Mānava-dharma-Śāstra, pratyakṣa, anumāna and śāstra are mentioned²; while in the Rāmāyaṇa, aitihya anumāna and śāstra are described as the source of enlightenment. In the Mahābhārata, pratyakṣa, kṛtānta (anu-māna), aitihya and āgama are mentioned, and it is said that according to the materialists pratyakṣa is the only reliable proof. Similarly such terms as vāda, prayojana, chala, tarka, jalpa, vitanqā, nirṇaya and yukti are found in the Mānava dharma-śāstra, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa³. Kautūlya mentions thirty-two technical terms called tantra-yukti in his Artha-śāstra, and these are repeated in the Caraka⁴ and the Sūrūta⁵ Saṃhitās with this difference that in the Caraka-saṃhitā the number is thirty-four. It is not necessary to go into the details of the meaning and the use of these terms here. What is important to note is that the presence of these terms in the lite-

1. I, 2; 1; The verse is as follows:—
   Smṛth pratyakṣam aitihyam, anumānam catuṣṭhayam,
   Ītairāditya-mandalam sarvair eva vidhāsyate.
2. MDS'. XII, 105.
4. Siddhānta-sthāna, XII.
5. Uttara-tantra, LXV.
rature of the period, which does not yet represent systematic philosophy, shows how the whole system of logic and epistemology was just in the melting pot. So far as the earlier literature of the period is concerned, for instance the Mānava-dharma-śāstra, the Mahābhārata, and the Rāmāyaṇa, we find in it only an occasional mention of the means of knowledge or forms of argumentation. In the Caraka-sāṃhita, however, there are a few sections in which we find a fairly systematic treatment of the nature of knowledge including a logical definition of the pramāṇas and a psychological analysis of experience\(^1\). Besides a mention of the logical categories referred to above, we also find in this literature a distinct and frequent reference to the existence of the schools of the materialists, the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, which, it appears, had already acquired prominence.

(iii) The Beginning of Jaina and Buddhistic Epistemology.

About the same period as the Nyāya arose the schools of Jainism and Buddhism as the result of the teachings of the two great masters—Mahāvīra and

\(^1\) See infra Part III, 3 (ii).
Gautama Buddha. But just as we do not find any systematic treatment of Hindu logic and epistemology until the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya-Sūtras, there is no sign of a regular system of logical doctrine in the history of Jainism until the time of Umāsvāti, and in that of Buddhism until Nāgārjuna. In the early works of both these religions we just find a mention of certain logical terms and rules of argumentation much in the same way as in the literature of Hinduism. For example, there is a description of nāya or the relativity of knowledge in the Bhagwati-sūtra; the Sthānaṅga-sūtra, and the Prajñāpanā-sūtra; and a classification of the means of knowledge (pamāna) and knowledge (ñāna) in the Sthānaṅga-sūtra and the Bhagavati-sūtra. Similarly the terms vitarka, tarka, pākṣa and chala, the various kinds of example (naa), the expedients in as a debate (vivāda), and the defects of a debate also find a place in the Sthānaṅga-sūtra. In the history of Buddhism there is practically no logic in the Pāli literature. In the Tipitaka, however, we find a classification of knowledge and also a reference to the existence of a certain class of logicians called takkika. In the Brahma jāla-sutta there is a reference to certain Śramanas and Brāhmaṇas who were takki and vimāṇsi. In the Milinda-panñha, Milinda is spoken of as one versed in niti or nyāya. An explicit reference to logic as a distinct study begins only in the Sanskrit literature of Buddh-

1. Dīgha Nikāya, I, 16.
2. Milindapañha, p. 3.
ism, when in Lalita-vistara\(^1\) it is mentioned under the name of hetu-vidyā.

(iv) Relation between the Hindu and the Non-Hindu Schools on the Subject of Epistemology.

It will appear from the following chapters that the works of the period of the Philosophical Sūtras—both orthodox and heterodox—contain reference to the doctrines of the various schools, although not to those of any particular works or authors. In the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra of Umasvāti there is a reference to the six means of knowledge (pramāṇas) admitted by the Mīmāṃsā school. The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra refers to the teachers of the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya; and the works of Nāgārjuna clearly presuppose the Nyāya epistemology in their refutation of the validity of the means of knowledge. Similarly, most of the Hindu Philosophical Sūtras presuppose the existence of heterodox doctrines such as those of the Materialists, the Jainas, and the Buddhists; and the Vedanta, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Nyāya-Sūtras definitely contain a discussion and refutation of these. Throughout the history of Indian

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1. XII, p. 179 also quoted in HIL p. 243.)
epistemology the orthodox and the heterodox schools have influenced one another in the development of thought, although it is not possible now to determine exactly the priority or posteriority of particular authors or works during this period. In order to make a beginning, however, it will be consistent with the development of thought as we find it in the works of various schools during the period that the earlier Jaina and Buddhist epistemology be considered first and the epistemology of the Hindu schools afterwards.
2. THE EARLIER JAINA AND BUDDHIST
EPISTEMOLOGY

(i) The Beginnings of Jaina Epistemology
in Umasvati's Tattvadhigama-Sutra.

The TS. begins with the assertion that the path to
emancipation consists of (acquiring) right conviction
(Samyag-darsana), right knowledge (samyag-jnana),
and right conduct (samyak-caritra). (I, 1).

Knowledge (jnana) is classified as Mati, Sruta,
Avadhi, Manah-paryaya, and Kevala (1, 9). These
are called the means of knowledge (pramanas).
The first two, that is, Mati and Sruta, are called indi-
rect(paroksa), and the rest direct (pratyaksa). (I, 11
& 12)

Mati is either knowledge obtained through the
five sense-organs (indriya-nimitta), or without the aid
of the sense-organs (antindriya-nimitta), which latter
may be either reflective knowledge (mano-vrtti), or
general undifferentiated knowledge (ogha-jnana)—(I,
14, and the Bhasya). The terms mati, smrti, sanjna,
cinta and abhinibodha are said to be synonyms (1, 13)

1. I have followed the editor of the TS. (Bibl. Indica) who,
in a foot-note, explains ogha as samanyam apravibhaktarupam. (p. 16)
mati knowledge is further sub-divided into avagraha, īha apāya, and dhāraṇā.

Avagraha is explained as an indistinct (avyaktam) apprehension and grasping of objects as they are in themselves (yathā-svam) by means of the sense-organs. Avagraha, grahaṇa, ālocana, and avadhāraṇa are said to be synonyms.

Īhā is a desire to know more particularly and definitely about an object, after it has been indistinctly perceived first (avagṛhīta), Īhā, īhā, tarka, parikṣa, vicāraṇā, and jījñāsā are said to signify the same thing.

Apāyā is the determination by means of reflection of the nature of the perceived object with regard to its perfection or imperfection (samyag asamyag iti) merits and defects (guna doṣa vicāraṇā). Apāya apagama, apanoda, apavyādha, apeta, apagata, apaviddhā, and apanutta are synonyms.

Dhāraṇā is the (final) cognition of the object as it is, and forming a definite notion about it in the mind. Dhāraṇā, pratipatti, avadhāraṇa, avasthāna, niścaya, avagama, and avabodha are the same.

1. Tatāvyaktam yathā-swam indriyair viṣayaṇām ālocana-vadhāraṇam avagrahaḥ, TS. p. 17.
3. Avagṛhīte viṣaye samyag asamyag iti guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā-dhyavasaṣṭāpanodo pāyaḥ, Ibid., p. 17.
4. Dhāraṇā pratipattir yathā swam matyavasthānam avadhāraṇam ca.
The above kinds of knowledge may be further differentiated according as the objects perceived are many, or of various kinds, perceived quickly or slowly, and so on. (I, 16). They pertain to the objects of sense—(arthasya)—(I, 17).

The knowledge of vyañjana, which, as will appear from its description, evidently signifies an invisible object, can be had only through avagraha with the limitation that it cannot be perceived by sight nor by mind. (I, 18 & 19).

It is said that thus avagraha is of two kinds. (i) of vyañjana, and (ii) of artha. Of these the first does not take place through sight and mind, but it is possible through the rest of the four senses. Knowledge of the class ūha and the rest pertains only to artha.

The term vyañjana in I, 18 and the Bhāṣya is very obscure, and it has not been explained directly. It has been usually translated as (intermediating) sensation, or as indeterminable object; neither of which seems to represent the exact meaning of the author. Although the term has not been defined, it appears from the author’s own commentary on Sūtra, 1, 18 and 19, as explained above, that a distinction has been drawn between such objects of cognition as can be perceived by means of all the senses including

2. Ihayāstū arthasyaiva., p. 18.
4. TS. p, 27.
mind and those which can be perceived only by means of the four senses of touch, taste, smell and hearing. The former have been called artha and the latter vyanjana. The underlying idea in regarding knowledge called īha and the rest as applicable to artha only, and avagraha as applicable to both artha and vyanjana is that it is only the visible objects that admit of such determination and definiteness as is achieved by īhā and the rest, and invisible objects admit only of such indeterminate knowledge as is signified by the term avagraha. According to the author, these invisible objects cannot also be the object of mind or reflection.

Śrūta knowledge is preceded by mati knowledge (1, 20). It is of two kinds: (i) That which is external to the Aṅgas (aṅga vāhyam), and (ii) that which is included in the Aṅgas āṅgā-praviśṭam). And these are further sub-divided into a number of classes Śrūta, āptavacana, āgama, upadesa, aitihya, āmnāya, pravacana, jina vacana are all synonyms.

The difference between mati knowledge and śrūta knowledge is that while the former pertains to the objects existing at the present time, the latter pertains to the object existing in all the three times, and is also more pure (viśuddhataram). Further while mati knowledge is the result of the activity of the self as the knower, and is obtained either through the sense-organs or without them, the śrūta knowledge, which is based upon mati knowledge is the result of communication from some reliable authority (āptopa-
deśad bhavati).

Avadhi knowledge is not defined at all either in the Śūtras or the commentary. It is said to be of two kinds: (i) that which belongs to gods and the denizens of the hell, in whose case it is innate, and (ii) that which belongs to man and other beings, in whose case it is acquired (I, 21—23). The latter kind of avadhi knowledge is further sub-divided into six kinds according as it lasts for a short time or long time, or as it tends to increase or decrease, etc. In the commentary on I, 26, while comparing avadhi knowledge with manah paryāya, the author says that avadhi knowledge has for its objects only some aspect of material substances; and this assertion is repeated I, 28. Further it has already been classed as direct knowledge. Thus it appears that avadhi is a kind of direct knowledge of material substances.

Manah-paryāya is of two kinds: (1) rju-mati, and (ii)vipula-mati. The difference between the two is that the latter is purer (viśudda-tara) than the for-

1. p. 31.

2. It is interpreted by Jaini as visual or direct material knowledge (TS. SBJ., p, 39); as knowledge of the remote or past (Outlines of Jainism, p, 59); and as visual knowledge, direct knowledge of matter, limited as to (subject-matter), place, time and nature, i.e. without the help of the senses (Jaina Gem Dictionary, p. 29).


mer and while the former might cease (pratipatati), the latter cannot (na pratipatati), I, 24, 25. Manah-paryāya is compared with avadhi knowledge as follows:

(a) Manah-paryāya is purer than avadhi, for the material objects which are known by the possessor of avadhi knowledge are known in a purer form and mentally (manogatāni) by the possessor of manah-paryāya.

(b) While manah-paryāya is confined to the universe inhabited by human beings, avadhi can extend to the whole universe.

(c) While avadhi knowledge can belong to all beings, whether of disciplined lives or not, and in all condition manah-paryāya can belong only two men with disciplined lives.

(b) While manah-paryāya has for its object material substances in all their aspects, avadhi has these only in a limited number of aspects.

Kevala knowledge is perfect (paripūrṇa), complete (samagra), unique (asādhārana), absolute (nirapekṣa), pure (viśuddha), all-comprehensive (sarva-bhāva-jñāpaka), that which has for its object both the world

1. Manah-paryāya again has not been defined. It has been called mental knowledge’ (TS. (SBJ.), p, 40) ; and ‘mind-reading knowledge (O J. p. 64) ; direct knowledge of another’s thoughts about matter (J. G. D. p. 66).

and the non-world (lokaloka viśaya), and infinite ananta-paryāya),—I, 30, and the Bhāṣya).

Summing up the author says that the objects of mati and Śruta knowledge are all the substances, but in all their aspects (asarva-dravyeṣu asarva-paryāyeṣu; of avadhi only material substances, but not in all their aspects (rūpiṣveva dravyeṣu asarva-paryāyeṣu; manah-paryāya) is a purer and infinitely subtle knowledge of the material substances known by avadhi; and kevala has for its object all the substances, and in all their aspects (sarva-dravyeṣu sarva-paryāyeṣu ca) (1, 27—30, and the Bhāṣya).

Of the above four kinds of knowledge, mati śruta and avadhi can be erroneous. Error (viparyāya) is that which is the opposite of knowledge, and consists in a failure to distinguish between that which is and that which is not (sad-asator aviśeṣad); as for example, to perceive a horse as a cow, and vice versa. (I, 32, 33, and the Bhāṣya).

Such is the classification of knowledge as found in the TS. and its commentary by the author of the Sūtra himself. The terms employed are peculiar to the Sūtras, and their exact significance is far from being clear. The first point to be noted is that what is perceived through the senses is regarded in this earlier Jaina logic as indirect (parokṣa), and that which is perceived without the medium of the senses as direct (pratyakṣa). In this particular work, mati knowledge pertains to the objects of the senses, and is either perceptual or reflective,—the latter also covering know-
ledge by inference. Śrūta is knowledge by testimony. Avadhi, manāḥ-paryāya and kevala are forms of direct knowledge with such distinctions as have been explained above. Avagraha and the rest three kinds of mati are the various degrees of sense-cognition according to its clearness and definiteness.

The nayas have been described as the various ways of determining the nature of an object of perception, and have been classified in the usual way. It is not necessary to go into a detailed explanation of these; for, in the first place, their meaning is obvious and in the second place, they are of little importance from the epistemological point of view.

The author of the Ts. and the Bhāṣya is aware of the existence of the school of philosophy which holds that the pramāṇas include inference (anumāna), knowledge by similarity (upamāna), scriptural testimony (āgama), implication (arthāpatti), probability (saṃbhava), and negation (abhāva). It is maintained that all these are included in the mati and śrūta knowledge, for they are based upon a contact between the sense-organs and the object. (Bhāṣya, I, 12). This fact indicates that probably Umāsvāti, while referring to these pramāṇas, had the Mīmāṃsā school in mind. He does not show any signs of knowing, or being influenced by the Nyāya school, and hence, as has already been suggested, he seems to have lived before the compilation of the Nyāya-sūtras. Siddhasena Divākars, the next important writer on Jaina logic and epistemology, is much later than Umāsvāti,
and as we shall see, he is distinctly influenced in his doctrines by the works of the Hindu and Buddhist writers.

(ii) The Doctrine of Knowledge and Reality in the Lāṅkāvatāra-sūtra.

In spite of the fact that the LS. is believed to belong to a comparatively later date (about 300 A.D.) the language and the thought of the work are not very different from those of the Prajñā-pāramitās. Although the LS. is mainly a work of the Vijñāna-vāda, it is not altogether devoid of the doctrine of Śūnya-vāda; for while it is maintained that the world is only knowledge (Vijñāna) or consciousness (citta) on the one hand, it is also emphasised in several passages that knowledge and consciousness themselves are just as illusory as the objects of experience. In fact the doctrine of voidness (śūnyata) is clearly taught in some of the passages. Similarly the doctrine of appearance and illusion (samvrti) and that of reality

1. E. g. Chap. II, verse, 136 ; citta-mātram yadā lokam prapaśyanti jinatmajah, etc; also verses, 139, 140 ff.
2. LS. (BI) Chap. II, pp. 73. ff. especially verse 137 Deśemi śūnyatām nityam īśāvatoccheda varjitām, Saṃsāram svapna-māyākhyam na ca karma vinasatyāti.
and truth (paramārtha) is distinctly found in this work\(^1\), and what is still more interesting is the presence of the notions of samāropa and apavāda\(^2\) very similar to the latter adhyāsa doctrine of the Vedāntā. The fact that the classification of knowledge in this work, as will be seen presently, does not show any signs of the influence of the Nyāya school, and that there is a reference to the tārākikas and the naiyāyikas and their future\(^3\) just in the same way as in the older literature, goes to indicate that the LS. must be earlier than the Nyāya sūtras, and I am inclined to think that its date is not much later than that of the Prajñā pāramitās.

The classification of knowledge (vijñāna) is found in a few passages of Chapter II. It is very complex and contributes little to the subsequent epistemology of Buddhism. It may be worth while, however, to state briefly what this classification is, especially because, so far as I know, it has not been presented in English in its exact form. It occurs in a discourse between the lord and Mahāmati-

According to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, there is a

1. Ibid., II, 187, Saṃvrti paramārthāśca tṛtiyam nāsti hetukam, etc.
2. LS., verse, 191:
   Nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ para-tantras ca vidyate,
   Samāropapavādāḥ hi vikalpanto vinaśyati
   Also cf. verses 149—160.
3. Ibid., Chap. II, versés, 2:
   Naiyāyikāḥ katham brūhi bhavisyanti anāgāte.
permanent basic consciousness called the ālaya-vijñāna, out of which all forms of knowledge arise. It
does not disappear with the disappearance of the
various forms of consciousness. The ālaya-vijñāna,
as it is in itself, is called sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa. Two of
the forms of the ālaya-vijñāna are called the khyāti-
vijñāna and the vastu prativikalpa-vijñāna. The
former is said to be the effect of the consequences of
inconceivable innate impressions (acinty-vāsanā pari-
ṇāma hetukam), and forms the subjective factor in
experience; while the latter is the result of sense-
impressions and the activity of the subject. Vijñāna
is again called pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa and karma-lakṣaṇa,
which are evidently transitory states of consciousness
as distinguished from the sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa, which is
permanent and abiding. Pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa vijñāna is
said to be both different and non-different from the
ālaya-vijñāna. It is different from it in so far as
it is a transitory form of the ālaya-vijñāna, and it is
non-different from it in so far as it is caused by it.
It appears to be the name of sense-cognitions. No
definition or description of Karma-lakṣaṇa vijñāna is
given1. It is said that there is no cessation (nirodha)
of sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa-vijñāna, but there is a cessation
of karma-lakṣaṇa vijñāna. Karma-lakṣaṇa vijñāna
may mean that knowledge which is the result of pass
deeds. ‘Just as Mahāmati’, says the lord, ‘a lump

1. Vidyābhūṣaṇa translates the term as ‘reminiscence’ or
‘impression’ (i.e. past acts or states of knowing), in his
edition of LS., p. 44.
of clay is neither different (anya) nor non-different (ananya) from the particles of clay, so also gold is neither different nor non-different from a gold ornament. O, Mahāmati, if the lump of clay were different from the particles of clay, it would not be made of them; but as it is made of them, it is not different from them. On the other hand, if it were non-different from them, there would be no such distinction as between the particles of clay and the lump of clay. Similarly, Mahāmati, if pravṛtti-vijnānas were different from the ālaya vijnāna of the character of jāti (ālaya-vijnāna-jāti lakṣaṇād), they would have for their cause that which is not ālaya-vijnāna (which is absurd). On the other hand, if they were non-different (from the ālaya-vijnāna), the cessation of the pravṛtti-vijnāna would be the cessation of the ālaya-vijnāna: but there is no cessation of the sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa. Therefore, O, Mahāmati, there is no sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa-nirodha of vijnānas but karma-lakṣaṇa-nirodha. On the disappearance of the sva-jāti-lakṣaṇa, there would be the disappearance of the ālaya vijnāna; and if the disappearance¹ of the ālaya-vijnāna is admitted, this doctrine would not be different from that of cessation held by the Tirthakaras; for the doctrine of the Tirthakaras is that on the ceasing of the apprehension of the object, there is the cessation of the cognising activity (vijnāna-pravṛtiy-

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¹ I have adopted the Tibetan version 'nirudhyamane' instead of 'nirūpyamane', (p. 39). The reason is obvious.
uparamah)\textsuperscript{1}, and on the cessation of the cognising activity, there would be the cessation of the beginningless activity of cognition (anādi-kāla-prabandha-vyuccatti). The Tirthakaras describe the activity of cognition as due to cause, and do not attribute the visual knowledge (caksur-viṃśa), which appear because of colour and light, to anything other than cause. And the cause, Mahāmati, is the primordial matter (pradhāna), the spirit (puruṣa), time (kāla) and the verbal testimony (anupravādaḥ).\textsuperscript{2}

The above quotation will bear out my interpretation of the various kinds of knowledge expounded in the LS. It is not quite clear which school of teachers is meant by the Tirthakaras. The description of their teachings as given above is applicable in a considerable degree to the Sāṃkhyā system.

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1. I have adopted ‘Vijñāna-pravṛtty-uparamah’ according to the Tibetan version instead of Vijñāna-prabandhoparamah’ (p. 39).
(iii) The Illusory Nature of Knowledge & the Doctrine of Absolute Reality in the Mādhyamika-kārikās of Nāgārjuna.

The only Sanskrit work of Nāgārjuna available to us is the Mādhyamika-kārikās. It is a work more on general philosophy than on logic and epistemology. There are a few sections, however, which indicate Nāgārjuna’s attitude towards the problem of knowledge. The general philosophical position of the Mādhyamika-kārikās appears to be much the same as that of the Prajñā pāramitās, but the work suffers from a kind of verbal jugglery, which inevitably makes the thought obscure and confused. It is for this reason that there has been a good deal of difference of opinion with regard to the exact nature of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. It has been supposed to be a doctrine of nihilism by some, and that of relativity by others. It will appear, however, as will be shown presently, that the real doctrine of the Mādhyamika-kārikās is that of phenomenal existence (samvṛti) and real existence (paramārtha). The former is shown to be false or illusory by demonstrating that the notions pertaining to it are relative or contradictory; and the latter is characterised as devoid of
all attributes and relations. The means of knowledge (pramāṇas) as belonging to the phenomenal world are also regarded as illusory.

The Third Chapter of the Kārikās deals with the examination of the senses, and there an attempt is made to prove that there is no sense in maintaining that the various sense and their functions are real. It is argued that as the sense of sight cannot see itself it cannot see anything else (III, 1), and as neither the sense of sight sees, nor does that which is not the sense of sight, there is nothing which sees, and so there is neither the seer nor the object seen (III, 4, 6). Then follows a Kārikā which explains how knowledge is produced. It is as follows:

Pratītyā mātāpitarau yathoktaḥ putra-sambhavaḥ
Caksu-rūpe pratītyaivam ukto vijnāna-sambhavaḥ.

Just as the birth of a son is spoken of as due to the father and the mother, so is the production of knowledge spoken of as due to (the contact of) the eye and the object.

The Vidyābhūṣaṇa, while explaining the meaning of this kārikā says: ‘The purport of the aphorism is that the objects signified by the terms father, mother and son, and the act signified by the term ‘production’ are not real, the existence of each being dependent on that of others. So also the eye, the colour, the seen and the act of seeing are merely relative terms, having no reality in themselves’11. It will appear

1. JBTS., Part III, 1896, p. 5.
that so far as the text of the Kārikā goes, it does not admit of the interpretation that the eye, the colour, the seen and the act of seeing are merely relative terms having no reality in themselves. What is meant to be explained in this particular verse is the production of knowledge—vijñāna-sambhavaḥ, and when it is read along with, and interpreted in the light of, the next two verses in the same Chapter\(^1\), it appears that what the author says is that knowledge is produced by the contact of the sense—organs with the object. This is confirmed by the comments of Candra-kirti on these verses. He says: Thus knowledge arises on perceiving that which is to be seen (draṣṭavyam) and the act of seeing (darśanam). Contact with the object of sense is the result of the three\(^2\) combining together. Feeling (vedanā) arises along with the contact with the object (sparsa-sahajā) and it is the cause of desire. Therefore, because of the existence of their effects (kārya-sad-bhāvād) that which is to be seen and the act of seeing exist (draṣṭavya-darśane vidyete)\(^3\). The meaning of the Kārika evidently is that just as the existence of a son can be supposed only on the assumption that there

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1. III., 8 and 9. These do not appear in the text and translation as published by Vidyābhūṣaṇa in the JBTS. and form the last verses of Chapter III in the edition of Bibl. Buddhica, IV.

2. That is to say, draṣṭavya, darśana and vijñāna.

are parents, so the existence of knowledge can only be admitted on the assumption that there are the object seen and the act of seeing. In other words, the existence of the object of sight and the act of seeing are presupposed by the existence of knowledge. What applies to the sense of sight, also applies to the other senses (III, 9).

Now unless the verses III, 8 and 9 be later interpolations, the conclusion of the author with regard to the senses, in this chapter anyhow, is not that they are not real, or that they are merely relative notions, but that while they, their functions, and their objects cannot be perceived directly, they are inferred from the existence of their product—viz. knowledge.

The Fourth Chapter deals with the skandhas, of which the first-rūpa is selected for discussion. Evidently two points are emphasised: firstly, that the forms (rūpa) and their cause go together; secondly, neither can it be said that the effect is like the cause, not that it is unlike it. It is distinctly stated

1. Cf. Candra-kīrti’s introductory sentence to his comments on verse 7: ‘atraḥa vidyete eva draṣṭavya-darṣane tat-kārya-sad-bhāvād’—‘So it is said here that the object to be seen and the act of seeing do exist, because of the existence of their product.’ MK Bibl. Buddhica, p. 118.
2. Rūpa-kāraṇa-nirmuktam na rūpam upalabhyate
   Rūpenāpi na nirmuktam dṛṣyate rūpa-kāraṇam, IV, 1.
3. IV, 6. It will apper that Vidyābhūṣaṇa’s translation
that no form can be conceived to be without a cause–niskāraṇam punā rūpam naiva naivopa-padyate (IV,5). What applies to rūpa also applies to the other skandhās (IV,7).

Now while it appears from the arguments in Chapter III and IV that reality and causation are not denied altogether, and that the principle of causation is rather emphasised in both of them, in Chapter V, which deals with the examination of the physical elements (dhātu-parīkṣā) we find an explicit denial of being (bhāva), non-being (abhāva), characteristics (lakṣaṇa) and that which is characterised (lakṣyam)¹. That this denial refers to the phenomenal world is evident from the last verse of the Chapter in which it is said that those ignorant people, who perceive being and non-being, do not see the blissful nature of things (sivam) where there is a cessation of perceivability (draṣṭuvyopāsaman)².

and explanation of IV, 7 and 8 are different from the comments of Candrakīrti. The latter’s interpretation is quite consistent with the context and the language of the text, and it is evident that the former’s is incorrect. I think it unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the comparative merits of the two explanations, as the verses have no direct bearing upon the subject of this thesis.

1. V, 5, 6, 7.

2. Here again there is a difference of reading between Vidyābhūṣaṇa’s (J BTS.) and De La Vallée Poussin’s editions, and also a difference of interpretation between
The Ninth Chapter deals with being in relation to the various senses. The question to be considered is whether there is being (bhāva) prior to the senses, or after them, or it is not at all. As against the argument that seeing, etc. cannot be possible unless there is some being prior to the senses, it is said that it is inconceivable that something should exist prior to the functions of the various senses. For, in the first place, if it be granted that an entity can exist prior to seeing etc. it might also be granted that seeing etc. can exist independently of being; and, in the second place, it is impossible to speak of the existence of a thing unless it is known by means of some sign or signs. Everything exists only as in relation to something else. Similarly, it is further maintained that being cannot be supposed to exist either simultaneously with or after the senses. Consequently, it does not exist at all 'na vidyateti nāstīti nivṛtīstatra kalpanāḥ.'

The same conception of the relative dependence of being and the senses is expounded in the Tenth Chapter by the example of fire and fuel, which also depend upon each other for their existence.

Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Candraṅīrti. In fact the text and translation as published in the JBTS. appear to be defective in a number of ways. Besides unsatisfactory readings, the verses from Chandrakīrti's commentary are mixed up with the Kārika texts, and are apt to be taken as the Kārikās themselves, the more so as Vidyābhūṣaṇa apparently treats them as such,
In the Twenty-third Chapter which deals with misapprehension (viparyāsa), the illusory nature of the various objects of the sense is clearly expressed in the eighth Kārikā which is as follows:

\[ Rūpa-Śabda-rasa-sparśagāndhā dharmāsca kevalāḥ, \]
\[ Gandharava nagarākārā marīci-svapna-sannibhāḥ. \]

Forms, sounds, tastes, touches, smells and objects of thought are only of the shape of a city of Gandharvas, and like a mirage or dreams.

And as these are only imaginary they do not admit of the distinctions of śubha (lit. auspicious) and aśubha (lit. inauspicious)—XXIII, 9.

It will appear from the passages quoted and referred to above, and also from the rest that the Mādhyamika-kārikās, on the whole, aim at showing the inconsistent and illusory nature of the phenomenal world and maintaining that the ultimate reality is beyond comprehension and description. In other words, it is a reasoned continuation of the same line of thought as we find in the Prajñā-pāramitās. The philosophy of Nāgārjuna as contained in the Mādhyamika-kārikās has been called nihilism and, recently, the doctrine of relativity, but it will appear that it is really neither the one nor the other, it is a doctrine of absolute existence. What we find in the Kārikās is an attempt to show the illusory or unreal nature of the phenomenal world by bringing out the antinomies of empirical relations, and to emphasise that the ultimate and true reality can be only that which is free from these. What Nāgār-
juna says about the phenomenal world has been erroneously regarded by some as the doctrine of nihilism with regard to the nature of all reality; and what he employs as a method, viz., to show that all things of experience exist as only in relation to one another, and that these relations lead to all kinds of inconsistencies and antinomies, has been regarded by others as the doctrine of relativity. Nāgārjuna would not say or admit that all is unreal, or all has a relative existence only. On the other hand, there are some explicit passages to show that, according to him; the real is the absolute, and therefore beyond the categories of being and non-being and the rest of the empirical relations. In other words, Nāgārjuna’s doctrine is the same as that which maintains the distinction of the worlds of samvṛti and paramārtha. This is clear from the following verses of the Kārikā:—

_Dve satye samupāśritya Buddhānām dharma-deśanā, Loka-samvṛiti satyam ca satyam ca paramārthatah. Ye 'nayor na vijñānanti vibhāgam satyayordvayoh, Te tattvam na vijñānanti gambhiram Buddha-śāsane._

XXIV, 8 and 9.

The teaching of the doctrine of the Buddhas is based upon two kinds of truth; that which is truth with regard to the conditional world and that which is true in the highest sense.

Those who do not know the distinction between these two kinds of truth do not know the profound truth in the teaching of the Buddhas.
In fact to call the doctrine of Śūnyatā a doctrine of relativity, as Stcherbatsky does, and following him others have done, is a contradiction in terms. A good deal of confusion has arisen by mixing up Nāgārjuna’s views about the nature of the phenomenal world (samvrti jagat) with those about the real world (pāramārthika jagat), and even in the case of the phenomenal reality relativity is more of a method with Nāgārjuna than a metaphysical doctrine. It is a method employed to show the illusory and inconsistent nature of the world of experience. The ultimate reality according to him, as according to his predecessors of the same school, is characterised by śūnyatā which is the most expressive name for a thorough going absolute existence, an existence which has been described as prapañcopsaśamam śivam—that auspicious condition in which there is a cessation of all phenomenal existence or as darśtavyopasaśamam—one in which there is a cessation of all perceivability. Such doctrine of absolute existence as this should be the last thing to be called the

1. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp. 42—43. “Since we use the term ‘relative’ to describe the fact that a thing can be identified only by mentioning its relations to something else, and becomes meaningless without these relations, employing at the same time that the thing in question is unreal, we, safely, for want of a better solution, can translate the word ‘śūnya’ by ‘relative’ or ‘contingent,’ and the term ‘śūnyata’ by ‘relativity’ or ‘contingency.’”

2. M.K., I. I.

doctrine of relativity. That the doctrine of relativity
is not the ultimate creed of Nāgārjuna and Mahāyā-
nism appears to have been seen by Stcherbatsky at
times, but he seems to be too prepossessed by the
notion that śūnyatā is the doctrine of relativity to hold
any other view.¹

Consistently with his absolutism Nāgārjuna does
not admit the validity of the pramāṇas. This is clear
from his other works bearing directly upon the sub-
ject, such as Pramāṇa-viheṭana (or Pramāṇa-vi-
dhvaṃsana), Vigraha-vyāvartani-kārika and Upā-
yakauṣalya hṛdaya-sāstra. The Sanskrit originals of
these works are lost, and only Tibetan versions are
available.²

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1. Speaking of the principle of relativity Stcherbatsky says:
   ‘This principle, the pivot of the system, is called upon
   in order to destroy all theories and to replace them,
as we have seen above, by direct mystic intuition, not in
order to replace it by a new theory. As a theory it is
just as bad as the old ones, it is even much worse. “If
something non-relative” says Nāgarjuna, “did really
exist, we would then likewise admit the existence of the
relative, but there is absolutely nothing non-relative, how
then can we admit the existence of the relative (or the
truth of Relativity)” CBN., p. 49.

3. The Earlier Hindu Epistemology.
   (iii) Epistemology of the Yoga-sūtras.

   I have already discussed the date of the Yoga-sūtras, and have tried to show that they appear to be earlier than the Nyāya-sūtras, and also the Sāṃkhya-Kārikās. Thus it will appear that they contain the earliest exposition known to us of the Sāṃkhya Yoga epistemology. The Yoga-sūtras begin by defining Yoga as the inhibition (nirodha) of the activity (vṛtti) of the intellect (citta). In order to correctly understand the epistemology of the YS. it is important that the exact significance of 'citta' and 'vṛtti' should be understood. A study of the use of 'citta' in the various Sūtras shows that its connotation in the YS. corresponds to that of 'buddhi' in the Sāṃkhya. This is evident from the use of 'citta' and 'buddhi' in the YS., iv. 20. 'Cittāntara-drśye buddhi-buddher atiprasaṅgaḥ smṛti-saṃkaraśca', and of buddhi in YS., iv. 21. 'citer-apratisaṅkramāyās tadākara-pattau svabuddhi-saṁvedanam', where the two terms are synonymous. In

1. 'If one cognition be cognisable by another, there will result an excessive series of one cognition after another and also a confusion of memories.

2. There is a consciousness of its own cognition when the cognition takes the form of the non-moving intelligence (citiḥ), (which is identified with puruṣa).
fact these are the only two sūtras in which the word 'buddhi' is to be found in the YS., the other term 'citta' being used elsewhere. What is to be remembered about 'citta' is that, like 'buddhi' in the Sāmkhya, usually it denotes the cognitive faculty, but at times it also signifies cognitive acts. The other term 'vr̥tti', which is often used with citta in the compound 'citta-vr̥tti', means 'activity'; citta vr̥tti being the activity of the intellect.

The activity of the intellect is said to be five-fold, viz., that pertaining to the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), wrong cognition (viparyaya), imagination (vikalpa), sleep (nīḍā) and memory (smṛti).

It will appear that the above classification is peculiar to the YS., and does not show any signs of the influence of the Nyāya vaiśeṣika epistemology. It is also of the primitive type.

1. It will appear that such English rendering of 'citta' as 'mind-stuff' adopted by Woods or 'thinking principle' employed by Rajendralal Mitra are not quite intelligible. The term 'intellect', when the cognitive faculty is meant, and 'cognition' when the act of that faculty is intended, are the more straight-forward translations of 'citta'.

2. Here again such renderings of 'vr̥tti' as 'fluctuation' by Woods, or 'modification' do not seem to be quite appropriate, for they really express the result of the interaction between 'citta' and its object through vr̥tti rather than the activity of the citta itself.
The *pramāṇas*, according to the *YS*. are direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāṇa*), and scriptural testimony (*āgama*)—(*YS.*, 1.7). These are simply mentioned and not defined. The list is the same as that found in the *Śaṃkhya-kārikās*, with this difference that in the *SK*. we have ‘*drṣṭa*’ for ‘pratyakṣha’ and ‘*āptavacana*’ for ‘*āgama*’.

*Viparyaya* is defined as wrong cognition *mithyā-jñāna*) which is based upon a form of the object which is not its own—*atadrūparatīṣṭham* (*YS.*, 1.8). An example of *viparyaya* will be the perception of a rope as a snake.¹

*Vikalpa* is that notion which follows the knowledge of words—*śabdajñānupāti*, and is devoid of an object—*vastuśūnya*. The commentators, all of them, understand by ‘*vikalpa*’ that notion which is the result of predicating an attribute of a subject in a proposition which does not express the real nature of the object denoted by the subject. The example which has been given to illustrate it is: ‘The true nature of the spirit is intelligence’—*cāitanyam puru-

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1. Here again the term ‘*viparyaya*’ has been translated variously into English. Both Rajendralal Mitra and Woods translate ‘*viparyaya*’ as ‘misconception’, which word is apt to suggest that ‘*viparyaya*’ does not include the error of sense-cognition, and simply refers to an error of judgment. The word is not peculiar to the *Yoga-sūtras* and is always used in the sense of wrong cognition as opposed to right cognition.
ṣasya svarūpam.' It is said that although the proposition verbally conveys the sense that the attribute of intelligence belongs to the spirit, the spirit being intelligence itself ‘citir eva puruṣah’—YB., the notion resulting from the verbal proposition has no truth corresponding to it, the term 'vastu' being evidently taken in the sense of truth or real fact. It is maintained that this kind of notion expressed by the term 'vikalpa' is not included in either pramāṇa or viparyaya. It is evidently for this reason that Woods following the interpretation of the commentators,¹ has translated 'vikalpa' as a 'predicate-relation.' Now the question is whether 'vikalpa' is to be treated as a form of error, as the commentators treat it, or it is to be taken in the sense of imagination. The language of the Sūtra and the context strongly suggest that it is imagination which is meant. There is no reason why viparyaya should not be taken to cover all kinds of error mithyājñānam, including the kind of error which, according to the commentators, is meant to be expressed by vikalpa. The definition of vikalpa as given in the Sūtra says that it is something which follows the knowledge of (the meaning of) words, and is devoid of an object; that is to say, it is a notion associated with the use of words without the presence of the object referred to by them. There is nothing in the text to indicate that the notion is of the nature of an error, or that the object referred to should not be real in the sense that it should not be

¹ Yoga System of Patañjali, (HOS.)
existent. All that is meant is that the object is not present along (co-existent) with the notion. Such knowledge, it will appear, corresponds to what we call imagination in modern psychology.

The definition of sleep (nīḍrā) is: abhāva-pratyaya-yālambana vṛttir nīḍrā (YS., I, 10)—‘Sleep is that activity which rests upon the notion of non-existence.’ The commentators emphasise the point that the word ‘vṛttih’ has been particularly used in the Sūtra to draw attention to the fact that sleep is a positive activity and not the absence of activity. The content of this activity is the notion of non-existence, that is to say not an absence of consciousness, but an awareness of non-existence, the existence of which becomes evident on waking.

The definition of memory is given in rather obscure language. It is: anubhūta-viśya-asampramoṣah smṛtiḥ (YS., I, 11), the chief difficulty about which is the exact meaning of ‘asampramoṣah.’ The Bhāṣya does not comment upon the text at all; Vācaspati Miśra explains it as ‘non-stealing’ (asteyāḥ), while Bhoja in vṛtti renders it as ‘retention in the intellect by means of an impression’ ‘samkāra-duvārena buddhāvupārohaḥ.’ Woods, following the interpre-

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1. ‘pramāṇādibhir anubhūte viśaye yo ‘sampramoṣah asteyāḥ sā smṛtiḥ’. Memory is the non-stealing with regard to an object which has been cognised by means of pramāṇas and other means; that is to say, that which is due purely to impressions (samskāras) is memory.
tation of Vācaspati Miśra, translates the Sūtra as ‘Memory (smṛti) is not-adding-surreptitiously (asam-pramoṣa) to a once experienced object.’ Now it will appear that of the two renderings as given by Vācaspati Miśra and Bhoja, the one by the latter is the more straightforward and natural. Vācaspati Miśra’s rendering is based upon a rather far-fetched notion, and simply emphasises the fact negatively that memory is exclusively due to past impressions, while Bhoja’s interpretation lays stress upon the factor of retention which is the essence of memory. The definition as given in the Sūtra would thus be ‘Memory is the retention (lit. not letting go) of an experienced object.’

An object is known or not known, according as it is reflected or not reflected in the intellect, (YS., IV, 16). As regards the question how the intellect is cognised, it is said that the intellect cannot cognise itself, for firstly, it is not the principle of knowing, but only an object which is knowable (YS., IV, 18); secondly, it cannot be occupied with both the object and itself at the same time (YS., IV, 19); and thirdly in case it be said that one cognition might cognise another cognition, there will be a regress ad infinitum, which is undesirable (YS., IV, 20). The intelligence of the puruṣa (citiḥ), however, becomes aware of its own cognition (buddhi) when it assumes its form (tadākārāpattau) in the act of cognition,¹ (IV, 21).

¹. Here I have accepted the interpretation of the Bhāṣya and the Tattvavaisārādī. Bhoja’s interpretation according
The intellect is able to perceive things when it is reflected upon by both the seer and that which is to be seen, that is to say, when it is connected with both the self and the object to be perceived (YS., IV, 22).

That true knowledge is acquired by the practice of yoga, and that this knowledge is different from that obtained by the ordinary means called the pramānas including testimony is clearly indicated in YS., I, 48 and 49. It is said that as the result of yoga, the intellect (prajñā) becomes cognitive of truth (rtambhara—lit. truth-bearing), and that this yogic intellect has objects for its cognition different from those that are cognised by it through testimony and inference, for those objects are of a special nature.¹

Before I close this section on the YS. I want to point out that in the YS.² the term avidyā is used in its Upaniṣadic sense of ignorance with regard to the true nature of reality and not in the sense of error, which meaning also it acquires in the Vaiśeṣika³ and

to which it is said in the Śutra that buddhi knows itself when it is reflected in the intelligence of the puruṣa, is evidently wrong, for it inconsistent with the Yoga doctrine, according to which buddhi or citta is altogether devoid of intelligence and hence precluded from knowing anything by itself.

1. According to the Bhāṣya 'viśeṣartha' means particular objects as opposed to those which are general. But there is no reason to hold the view that, according to the author, the Yogic intellect cognises only particular objects, nor is there anything in the text of the Śutra to suggest that meaning.
the Nyāya Sūtras. The term *viparyāya* is used for error. This is another indication of the fact that the YS. are one of the earlier Sūtras.

The YS. may also be regarded as the first systematic exposition of the nature of mystic intuition, which came to be recognised by almost every later school and as providing thus an epistemological basis for the doctrine of appearance and reality.

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3. VS., IX, 10—12.

1. NS., IV, 2.4.
(ii) The Beginnings of the Nyāya Epistemology as found in the Caraka-Saṃhitā.

It is interesting to find that the Hindu medical writers like Caraka and Suśruta did not consider the treatment of their particular subject complete without devoting some sections of their work to the problem of knowledge and reality. In the Caraka-saṃhitā, especially, one finds a brief account of a complete system of philosophy. The Saṃhitā as it has come down to us has evidently passed through the hands of a number of medical writers beginning with Ātreyya, who was probably the original author of the treatise, and who is believed to belong to about the Sixth Century B.C. It was revised by Caraka who is known to have been a physician at the Court of Kaniṣka, in about the Second Century A.D., and it is after his name that the treatise is now known. Further additions to it were, however, made by another medical writer called Drīḍhabala, who must have lived, according to Hoernle’s estimate, in about the Eighth Century A.D.¹ He added the last two books and some Chapters in the Sixth Book. The

¹ Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, I, Osteology-Introduction. pp. 7—16; Also Keith, History of Sanskrit Classical Literature pp. 506—507.
philosophical sections of the Samhitā are mostly found in the Sūtra-sthāna First Book) the Vimāna-sthāna (Third Book) and the Śarīra-sthāna (Fourth Book), which, in any case, can be taken to be not later than the Second Century A. D. the date of Caraka. It is evident from the philosophical doctrines of the treatise that they belong neither to such an early period as the Sixth Century B.C., which is supposed to be the date of Ātreyā, nor again to such a late period as the English Century A.D., the probable date of Dr̥ghabala. They may, therefore, quite reasonably be taken to belong to Caraka, who really seems to be the author or compiler of the major part of the Samhitā, and that is also why it goes after his name.

While the philosophical position of the C.S. as a whole as will be shown presently, accords with that of the Nyāya school, the author appears to be quite conversant with the terminology and the notions of the Sāmkhya and the Vaiśeṣika schools. He freely employs such Sāmkhya terms as vyakta, avyakta, prakṛti, puruṣa, sattva, rajas, and tamas, etc.¹ Similarly, he mentions and defines the Vaiśeṣika categories of dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānyā, viśeṣa and sama-vāya.² The fact that Caraka's definitions on the whole are not elaborate as those of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya Sūtras indicates that he was prior to the compilation of these Sūtras, although he appears to

1. Sarīra—, I.
2. Sūtra—, I.
have belonged to a period when the doctrines of the various schools had assumed a fairly definite shape.

Professor Dasgupta, however, thinks that the VS. must be earlier than the CS., for the CS. quotes a VS. and the list of Guṇas in it includes the six attributes absent in the VS. but found later on in the Nyāyā-vaiśeṣika manuals. I have not been able to trace the reference to the VS. in the Caraka-samhitā (Śarīra, 39) as given by Professor Dasgupta, but his argument based upon the inclusion of the later six Vaiśeṣika Guṇas in the list of the CS. seems to be quite plausible. There are some facts, however, which suggest that the author of the CS. was not aware of the VS. and its author. In the first place, in the opening verses of the Sūtra-sthāna names of a large number of sages are mentioned as those who have been the traditional inheritors of the knowledge contained in the CS., but the name of Kāṇḍāda is absent even where we ought to have expected it, that is in connection with the mention of the doctrine of dravya, guṇa, karma, etc., for the first time in the verses, Sūtra-sthāna I. 27 and 28, which are as follows:—

Maharṣayas te dadṛṣur yathāvaj jñāna-caksusā,  
Sāmāṇyam cā višeṣam ca guṇān dravyāṇi karma cā-27  
Samāvāyam ca tājjñātva tantroktam vidhimāsthitāḥ,  
Lebhire paramam śarma jivitam cāpi nirgadam—28.

In the second place, the statement ‘samāvāyam ca tājjñātva tantroktam’ which alludes to Samāvāya

as *tantrokta* in the above verses indicates that the source of this list of the categories, according to the author of the CS. is not VS. but some other books which probably dealt with the rules of debate. This is confirmed by the fact that this list of the six categories appears as a part of the various factors of debate mentioned in *Vimāna*. VIII. 24, where also the various means of knowledge are mentioned. It is clear that these categories in the CS. are not treated as metaphysical in the sense in which they are in the VS. Further, the definitions of these as given in the CS. *Sūtra* I do not show any definite signs that the author of the CS. was aware of the definitions of these as given in the VS. On the other hand, the description of *Sāmānya* as that which is the cause of increase, and of *Viśeṣa* as the cause of decrease in *Śaṅkara*. I. 43 is very peculiar and, so far as I know, has no basis in the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine. The verse is as follows:

*Sarvadā sarva bhāvānām sāmānyam vṛddhikāraṇam, Hrāsā hetur viśeṣaśca pravṛttir ubhayasya tu.*

Although the metaphysical doctrines of the CS. have been discussed, the epistemological aspects of its philosophy have not been considered so far, and it is these which I propose to bring out here. Of the sections dealing with the philosophical problems, the *Śaṅkara-sthāna* is the most interesting and important. It opens with a number of questions, asked by Agni-veśa, about the nature of reality and its knowledge, and these are followed by answers to them as given
by the sage Punarvasu, who appears to be one of the prominent teachers of the doctrines contained in the CS. Having first asserted that those who are conversant with the self (ātman) say that it is inactive, self-dependent, self-controlled, all-pervading, puissant, as also knower of matter and the witness of everything, along with other questions Agnivesa asks the following with regard to the nature of the knower and the known.

Which is prior, the knower of matter, or matter? Here is a doubt: Without the prior existence of matter which is to be known, it is not reasonable to hold that there should be a knower of matter. If again, matter be prior, the knower of matter cannot be regarded as eternal. (Śarīra., I, 6—7).

Then speaking of self as one 'possessed of omniscience, aloof from all things, freed from connection with everything, existing above, tranquil and the soul of every being,' it is asked, 'What are those indications by which it can be known—kair lingair upalakṣyate (Śarīra., I, 12).

Punarvasu, in answer to the above and the other

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1. For translation I have freely adopted Avinash Chandra Kaviratna's English translation of the Caraka-samhitā, with such alterations at times as I have considered necessary. It may be noted however that the numbers of verses as given in the translation differ very much from those in the original Sanskrit edition of the Nirñayasāgara Press, Bombay, which I have used and to which references are given here
questions, deals with the matter of all the forms of reality and his statements which are scattered over, and have been repeated in several sections and verses, may be summed up as follows:

All besides the unmanifest (avyakta) is known as the objective world (kṣetra), and the unmanifest is the knower of this world (kṣetrajña)—(Śar., I. 64). That which is manifest (vyakta) is of two kinds: (a) that cognisable by the senses; and (b) that beyond the senses, but which can be grasped by inference (Śar., I. 61).

The manifested reality which constitutes the born self (puruṣa) consists of twenty-four elements or principles, viz., the five physical elements, the intellect, the unmanifest, self-consciousness, the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, mind, and the five objects of the senses. Of these, twenty-three (excluding the unmanifest) have been called the objects of knowledge, while the unmanifest is the knower of these (Śarīra., I, 62—64).

It is from the unmanifest that the puruṣa attains to the condition of being manifest, and from the condition of being manifest he once more reverts to that of being unmanifest. When dissolution comes, he is once more dissociated from the various forms of manifested reality, the union of which with him is the result of desire. (Śarīra., I, 66 and 67). Desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, activity, consciousness, volition, understanding, memory and self-consciousness,
these are the indications of the great self (*paramātmānaḥ*).  

All things are of two kinds: existent (*sat*) and non-existent (*asat*); and these can be examined in four ways: (1) Testimony or words of trustworthy teachers (*āptopadeśa*); (2) direct knowledge (*pratyākṣa*, in the sense of sense-cognition); (3) inference (*anu-māna*); and (4) argumentation (*yukti*). These are explained as follows:—

Testimony. The *Veda*; whatever else is not contrary to the import of the *Veda*, and has been affirmed by the observant, whatever has been approved by those called righteous; and all the declarations of the scriptures calculated to benefit the world, constitute testimony which is trustworthy. (*Sūtra*, xi, 25).

Direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). That cognisance which takes place and displays itself vividly at the moment, in consequence of the soul, the senses, the mind, and the objects of the senses being all united together, is said to be direct knowledge. (*Sūtra* xi, 18).

The various factors in direct knowledge are further explained as follows:—

The senses. There are five senses, five materials that constitute the senses (the five physical elements); five resting places of the senses (the sense-organs);

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1. *'paramātmānaḥ'* here is evidently not used in its usual sense of God, but in the sense of a soul (*Jīva*)
five objects of the senses (colour, taste, sound, etc.); and five kinds of cognitions obtained through these senses. (Sūtra., VIII, 1). That particular sense into whose composition a particular element (earth, fire, etc.) enters, follows or apprehends that particular object which has that particular corresponding element for its essence, the reason being that both partake of the same nature and the one is invested with power over the other (Sūtra., VIII, 10).

Mind. Mind is regarded as something different from the senses. Its functions pertaining to its objects depend upon the soul. (Sūtra., VIII, 1). The attributes by which one may define mind are the presence and absence of knowledge, since, though the soul, the senses, and their objects might exist in a state of juxtaposition, yet when there is no attention on the part of the mind, there can be no knowledge, it is only in consequence of the mind being present that knowledge arises. Subtlety and oneness have been regarded as the two attributes of mind (Śarīra., I, 16 and 17). It may be supposed that there is more than one mind in one and the same person in consequence of the variety that is observable in the objects of the mind, in those of the senses, and in the resolutions of the mind, as also in consequence of the union of all the three constituents, sattva, rajas and tamas with the mind. In reality, however, there is no multiplicity of minds in one and the same individual. If the mind were more then one it could simultaneously attend to more than one object. (Sūtra.,VIII,3).
The mind is unconscious and active. It is the supreme soul that makes it conscious. When the soul becomes united with the mind, it is then that actions are imputed to it (Śarīra., I, 74). Since the soul is ended with consciousness, therefore is it regarded as the actor. In consequence of its being unconscious, the mind, even though active, is said not to be the actor. (Śarīra., I. 75). The senses become capable of grasping their respective objects only when they are led by the mind (Sūtra., VIII, 34). Mind thinks about objects (VIII, 13).

Conditions of perceptual knowledge. The self is the knower. In consequence of its union with the organs its knowledge springs. When those organs become stained, or are not united with it, knowledge does not arise (Śarīra., I, 53). Of one competent to behold, no vision arises in a stained mirror, or in a turbid water. After the same manner, if the mind happens to be obstructed, no knowledge can arise. (Śarīra., I. 54).

Limitations of perceptual knowledge. The question of the limitations of perceptual knowledge arises in connection with the problem of existence after death, and the discourse, a part of which is reproduced here, is remarkable both for its acute reasoning and terseness of expression. 'Hence arises the doubt' says the author, 'as to whether, there is a state of existence after death or no such existence. Respecting this topic, however, he that is endowed with intelligence should cast off unbelief and that
conduct which is likely to spring from unbelief. The reason for casting off unbelief is this; the portion of things that are addressed to the direct cognisance of the senses is small; while the portion that is beyond their direct cognisance, but in whose existence faith is placed in consequence of the declarations of the scriptures, of immediate inference, and of reasoning, is great. The very senses by whose aid we become cognisant of objects within their direct sphere are themselves beyond their cognisance. As regards the forms again, of all existing objects, it is known that if these be very close to the senses, or very distant from them, or covered by other objects, or if the senses be weak and deranged, or if the mind be otherwise engaged, or if any of those objects be mingled together with others of their class, or if any of them be overwhelmed by something of superior energy, or if any of them be very minute, they cease to be directly cognisable even though they are before the senses. Hence, if it be affirmed that only those objects exist that are addressed to the direct cognisance of the senses, and those that are not so addressed do not exist, it would be a statement unsupported by reason. (Sūtra, XI, 5—6).

The importance of the physiological basis of perception is also realised when it is said that in consequence of the excessive use, the absence of use and the impropriety of the use of the senses in relations to their objects, the senses including the mind falling away from their normal condition, become obstructive
to the perceptions of which they are the respective sources or channels. In consequence again of a judicious correlation of the senses with their objects, they preserve their normal condition, and maintain in their normal condition the perceptions or knowledge respectively derived through them. (Sūtra, VIII, 11).

Inference (anumāna). Inference, which is based upon previous direct knowledge, is of three kinds, as having reference to the present, the past, and the future. For example, the existence of concealed fire inferred from smoke, the fact of sexual congress from conception, and beholding that fruit is produced from seeds, men of intelligence infer future fruits of a similar nature from similar seeds (Sūtra., XI, 19 & 20).

Argumentation (yukti). This is a peculiar means of knowledge in the CS. and its meaning is not very clear. The following verse contains the clearest description of yukti that we can get in the work:

Buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhāvān bahu-kāraṇa-yogajāṁ,
Yuktis trikāla sa jñeyā trvargāḥ sādhyāte yayā.  
Sūtra., I. 23.

In the above verse ‘bahu-kāraṇa-yogajām’ is evidently a misprint for ‘bahu-kāraṇa-yogajān’. The cognition which perceives things as the product of the combination of a number of causes is known as yukti belonging to the three times, by which the triad is achieved. The text gives as instances of yukti
the facts that crops grow because of water, ploughing, seed and the weather, or that conception takes place because of the combination of the six elements (ṣaḍ-ḍhātu-samaṇyogād)—Sūtra., I. 21.

The syllogistic form of inference is also recognised and explained in the Šaṃhitā under the Technical Terms where ‘pratiṣṭhā’, ‘upanaya’, ‘hetu’, ‘draṣṭānta’ and ‘nigamana’—the five parts of a syllogism are defined and illustrated much in the same way as in the Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama. In the same section ‘aupamya’—knowledge, by similarity, and ‘aitihya’—tradition are also mentioned as means of knowledge. (Vimāna., VIII. 24).

It would be of no great use from the point of view of our enquiry to go into the details of the definitions of the various technical terms. It is to be noted, however, that most of them, together with the examples given to illustrate them, are the same as those given in the Nyāya-sūtras.

The next important point to be noticed in connection with the analysis of knowledge as given in the CS. is a recognition of the various factors which constitute the subject (adhyātma) in experience. It is said that the mind, the functions of the mind, the intellect (buddhi) and the soul constitute, in brief, the substances and qualities that are known by the name of ‘adhyātma’ (Sūtra., VIII, 8.).

Now after having given a complete analysis of the philosophical position of the author of the CS. on the
basis of the statements, which are scattered over a number of sections of the work, I would point out that the doctrines contained therein are distinctly in the same line with, and a development of those that we find in the Vedic literature of the previous period. The two fold nature of the self—the one pure and the other cosmic, the two kinds of reality—the existent or manifested and the non-existent or un-manifested, the instruments of knowledge and the analysis of experience the distinction between the soul, mind and the intellect, the knowability of that which is beyond perception by reasoning through inference, and by testimony, are all substantially the same as we found in the Śota-patha Brāhmaṇa¹ the Aitareya Arānyaka² and the Brhadāranyaka³ and the other Upaniṣads, and the traces of which we can discover ever in the hymns of Dirghatmas, Viśvakarman and Paramesṭhin. The psychological and the logical analysis is, however, much advanced—more acute and systematic, and one can really feel that in the sections to which I have referred, the author has definitely and consciously tried to consider the problem of reality and its knowledge, not only in its bearing upon the nature of the ultimate principle of the universe, as the authors of the Vedic period did, but also with reference to the objects of ordinary experience. As has already been remarked the sections

¹. This work, Part II, (iii).
². Ibid., II, (iv).
³. Ibid., II, (v).
in the Samhita dealing with the philosophical problems are distinctly indicative of the fact that the foundations of the systematic period of Indian Philosophy had already been laid. With regard to the general nature of the Caraka philosophy it may be said that it represents a metaphysical system which has an appearance of the Sāṃkhya because of some of the later Sāṃkhya terms which it employs but, which, in reality is as much of Vedic theism as any other system could be. The epistemological aspect of CS. is distinctly of the type of the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣikā school, although crude and such as appears to be preliminary to the more developed doctrine of the Vaiṣeṣika and the Nyāya-sūtras. That it is so will be seen clearly when we come to discuss the epistemology of these two works.
(iii). **Theory of Knowledge in the Vaiṣeṣika-sūtras.**

Like most of the Philosophical Sūtras, the Vaiṣeṣika-sūtras also start on their enquiry with a view to find the means of obtaining the supreme good. It is said that it is the knowledge of the essential nature of substance (dravya), attribute (guna), action (karma), generality (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa), and inherence (samavāya), which brings about the supreme good. It is also added that this knowledge is the result of a special merit on the part of the knower (dharma-viśeṣa-prasūtad), and is obtained by an observation of the resemblances and differences of the categories.¹ A comparison of this enunciation of the nature and the contents of enquiry in Vaiṣeṣika-sūtras with that of the NS.² indicates that while the subject of the VS. is mainly physical and metaphysical, that of the NS. is logical and epistemological; although the metaphysical treatment is also included under ‘the objects of knowlege’ (prameya). Considered

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from the epistemological point of view, the VS. definitely appear to be prior to the NS., for their treatment of the means of knowledge is not so elaborate as that in the NS. Definitions of direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) in the VS. are still of a primitive type, although it is also evident, e.g. from the description of inference, that certain logical notions in the VS. are just preliminary to those of the NS. This comparison of the VS. with the NS. from the point of view of the theory of knowledge—confirms the view, which has come to be accepted for other reasons also, that the VS. are earlier than the NS.¹

The most important topic in the epistemology of the VS. is the cognition of substance, and it will appear that its treatment is marked by a high standard of philosophical analysis. It forms the chief argument for maintaining the reality of substance as something independent of cognition. There are no signs, however, to show that the argument is meant to be a refutation of any particular school of subjective idealism.

According to the VS. there are strictly speaking only two means of knowledge: direct knowledge (prat-yakṣa), and inference (anumāna). Knowledge by similarity (upamāna), verbal testimony (śabda), presumption (arthāpatti), implication (samabhava) and non-existence (abhāva) are regarded as only modes of inference.

¹. See Ui, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, Introduction.
We do not find any pointed definition of direct knowledge in the VS. like the one we have in the NS. However, it is clear from the description of direct knowledge as given in a number of sūtras, especially in III, 1. 18—ātmendriyārthasannikarsād yan nispādyate tad anyat, that one form of it is regarded as the product of the contact of an object with the sense organs and the soul. The agency of mind as a faculty of attention and volition is also recognised (III, 2. 3). Knowledge is ultimately a quality of the soul, as in the NS.

There appears to be a good deal of confusion about the interpretation of certain sūtras which are supposed to explain cognition and also the inference of the existence of the soul. VS. VIII, 1. 1.—dravyeṣu jñānam vyākhyaṃ, has been taken by the commentators to mean that 'cognition has been explained while dealing with the subject of substances,' and they think it refers to Sūtras, III, 1. 2—indriyartha-prasiddhir indriyarthe-bhyo 'rthāntarasya hetuḥ and III, 1. 18 already quoted above. Then the whole section from Sūtra III, 1. 11 to III, 1. 19 is supposed to deal with the question whether sense-cognition is a true mark of the existence of the soul or not. Now the difficulties which present themselves in accepting the traditional interpretation are as follows: (1) texts of the sūtras, especially those of III, 1. 3 to III, 1. 8, do not at all admit of the interpretation put upon them by

1. prasiddhāḥ indriyārthāḥ.
2. Pravṛtti-nivṛttiśca pratyaga ātmani dyṣte paratra lingam.
the commentators, and this is evident from the many assumptions which they have to make with regard to the nature of the pūrva-pakṣa and the uttara-pakṣa; (2) the marks (liṅga) of the inference of the soul are distinctly enumerated elsewhere in III, 2-4 and the whole subject of proof of the soul is discussed in the subsequent sūtras, and hence we already have a section in the VS. which is entirely devoted to this subject; (3) If the Sūtra III, 1. 1 to 1. 19 be taken to refer to a discussion about the inferential mark of the soul only, the reference in Sūtra, VIII, 1. 1 that 'cognition has been explained while dealing with the topic of substances' (dravyeṣu) will hardly be justifiable. The reference, if right, clearly shows that in these sūtras the subject of cognition has been discussed with reference to substance in general, and not with reference to any particular substance. Further, if Sūtras, III, 1. 2 and III, 1. 18 only be taken as an explanation of the nature of cognition, it will appear that they by themselves hardly contain any such explanation. Personally I think the Sūtra, VIII, 1. 1 does not refer to this section at all, and I shall give my reasons for holding this view in the sequel. Faddegom has noticed the enigmatical nature of the sūtras in this section, but in the absence of a better alternative, he accepts the traditional view that they deal with the proof of the existence of the soul.

It will be seen from the following interpretation, of the sūtras that they really deal with the value of

what may be called, in modern phraseology, the sense-data for the knowledge of substance by inference. A distinction is evidently drawn between the objects of the senses (indriyārtha) and objects of cognition in general (artha). The meaning of artha is explained in VIII, 2. 3 as substance; attribute and action—'artha iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu'. The objects of the senses are the well-known five qualities of colour, taste, smell, touch and sound, either singly, or in combination with one another.

Now it is said in Sūtra, III, 1. 1 'prasiddāh indriyārthāh' that the objects of the senses are quite familiar.\(^1\) In Sūtra, III, 1. 2 indriyārtha-prasiddhīr indriyārthebbyo arthāntarasya hetuḥ—it is stated that this well-known familiarity with the objects of the senses is the mark of (the existence of) an object different from the object of the senses.

Now here no particular kind of object is mentioned, but it is said that familiarity with the objects of

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1. It is important that the exact significance of 'prasiddhiḥ,' should be understood. 'Cognition' or 'experience' with or without the adjective 'universal' does not express the sense of 'familiarity' which is chiefly meant to be expressed here. It is not the cognition of the objects of sense, but a familiar association of the same with certain objects which is regarded as of value in them for serving as a mark of inference. A realisation of this point will further show the untenability of the view which regards these sūtras establishing the existence of the soul on the ground of the cognition of objects. Compare the Sūtra.
the senses is the mark of an object different from the objects of the senses. These other objects could, therefore, be substance (dravya) and action (karma); but as action, by its definition, does not possess qualities—eka-dravyām aguṇam; etc. (I., 1. 17), it is only substances of which it is said that familiarity with the cognised qualities forms a mark, and these may be either the soul or any of the rest.

In Sūtra III, 1. 3—‘so napadeśaḥ’—‘saḥ’ can only refer to ‘hetuḥ in the previous sūtra, and so the mean-of the sūtra is ‘that familiarity with the objects of the senses as a mark is no mark (of a substance). The reasons for this objection are given in the following three sūtras. Firstly, because the cause (of the objects of the senses, i.e., of the qualities) is not known—kāra-njñānāt (III, 1. 4); secondly, because, among the effects, some have (the quality of) knowledge, while others do not have (the quality of) knowledge—‘kāryeṣu jñānāt (III, 1. 5) and ‘ajñānāccha, (III, 1. 6)’. What is said by way of an objection to pūrva-pakṣa is that familiarity with the objects of the senses

III, 1. 14. ‘prasiddhi-pūrvakatvād apadeśasya’ in which it is said that an inferential mark is preceded by the existence of familiar relation, and Sūtra III, 1. 15, ‘aprāsid-dho’ napadeśah, etc.’ that which is not familiar is not an inferential mark.

1. Cf. Candrakirti Tarkālankāra, who treats these two aphorisms as one and explains it to mean that because cognition is found in one kind of effect e.g. the body and is not found in another kind of effect, e.g. jar, etc.
cannot serve as a mark of any substance, for the cause of these qualities is not known; and if it be said that the nature of the cause can be inferred from the nature of the effects, the difficulty is that some of them have knowledge, while others are without it. The main point in the objection is that unless a certain mark is previously known to be associated with a certain object, it cannot serve as a mark of any definite object. It cannot be said definitely whether cognised qualities are the mark of the soul, or of any of the other substances; for we do not know what their cause is. And as regards the effects among material things, some e.g. the bodies, have (appear to have) knowledge, while others, e.g. a jar etc., are without it and so it cannot be said for certain that material substances like bodies cannot be the cause of these qualities.

Then, in case it be said that the mark is something different (from being the effect of a particular kind of cause), it is further urged that (such a mark) is no mark ‘anyad eva hetur ityanapadeśah’; for any one thing cannot be the mark of any other thing—‘arthāntaram hi arthāntarasya anapadeśah. That is to say, nothing can arbitrarily serve as a mark of anything else. The mark and the object of which it can be a mark must stand in some definite relations to each other, and these are discussed in the following sūtras from III, 1. 9 to III, 1. 17, the last three of these containing a classification and examples of false marks (anapa-padeśa). Then it is pointed out in III, 1. 18
that what is known by the contact of the soul, the senses and the objects is different from a false mark—‘tad-anyat’, and hence it can serve as a mark of the existence of the substances with which it is known to be associated. Thus it will appear that the whole section really deals with the value of sense-data for inferring the existence of objects, and is also calculated to establish a metaphysical realism as against a subjective idealism which would maintain that all that we have is simply ideas as the result of cognition or against a scepticism which would hold that there is no proof of the existence of any substance spiritual or material behind or beyond the sense-impressions.

The above interpretation easily fits in with the language of the sūtras and the general context, while it is evident that the traditional interpretation is extremely strained, and works out only by a number of assumptions and insertions which are altogether unwarranted by the text and the context of the sūtras. As Faddegon observes, the commentators, in the interpretation of these sūtras, have been actuated by the idea of finding in the VS. a parallel to the section in the NS. which aims at showing that cognition cannot belong to the body and in doing so they have extremely distorted the natural meaning of the texts.

It will appear that a detailed discussion of the subject of cognition is started in the Eighth Book, which begins with the Sūtra, ‘dravyeṣu jnānam vyākhyātam’. It has been mentioned that this has been taken by the commentators to mean that the
subject of cognition has been explained in dealing with the subject of substances, and they think it refers to Śūtras III, 1. 2 and III, 1. 18, which I have already quoted and discussed above. This interpretation, I think, is incorrect, for in the first place, neither in Śūtras, III, 1. 2 and III, 1. 18, nor in any of the others, do we find an explanation of cognition as such. The subject discussed in that section, as has been shown, is really the value of the sense-data as marks of inference and in the second place, the language of the text of the sūtra suggests more that the reference is to the explanation of cognition with reference to substances which is going to be undertaken in the Eighth book, rather than to a previous explanation which is to be found nowhere at all. The locative case in ‘dravyeṣu’ does not mean ‘in the course of dealing with substances’, as the commentators take it, ‘with reference to substances’ just as it does in ‘jñānanirdeṣe’ in Śūtra, VIII, 1. 3—‘jñāna-nirdeṣe jñāna-niṣpatti-vidhir-uktah’, and ‘dravye’ in Śūtra VIII, 1. 7—‘dravye dravya-guṇa-karmāpekṣam’. Further the past participle ‘vyākhya-tam’ has been used in the sense of ‘being explained with reference to the explanation of cognition of substances that follows in the chapter, rather than in the sense of ‘has (already) been explained.’ A parallel use of a past participle in this sense is to be found in the third sūtra of the same chapter, which has been quoted above, where ‘uktah’, even according to Saṅkara Miśra, is used in the sense of ‘incipient
action’, and what follows confirms this interpretation. That the Sūtra, VIII, 1. 1. refers to the discussion which follows in the chapter is further confirmed by the initial word of the next Sūtra, ‘tatra atma mana-
ścāpratyakṣe’—of these (that is, among the substances ‘dravyeṣu’) soul and mind are not known by sense-
cognition. The commentators have altogether neg-
lected or missed the force of ‘tatra’, in the Sūtra.

After having introduced the subject of particular kinds of cognitions in VIII 1. 3, the explanation follows; and it will be found that a fairly deep insight into the nature of cognition is evidenced in this section of the VS. The following statements are made:

When qualities (guna) and actions (karma) are cognised the substance is the cause of their cognition. That is to say, according to the VS. the substance to which the attributes and actions belong makes an impression upon the mind through the sense-organs, and hence is a cause of cognition. Behind the sense-
data there is a substance as the cause of their cogni-
tion (VIII, 1. 4).

It is also from substance that we have the cogni-
tion of generality (sāmānyya) and particularity (viṣeṣa), for they, respectively, have no generality and particu-
larity (VIII, 1. 5)\textsuperscript{1}. Generality and particularity have been described as notions depending upon cognition ‘sāmā-nyaviṣeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam (I, 2. 3). The

\textsuperscript{1} ‘tata eva jñānam’ should be translated according to the text as ‘it is, also from that that there is cognition,’ and not ‘it is the cause of the cognition’ as several commenta-
tors have done.
meaning is that the notions of generality, e.g. substanteness, and particularity, e.g. earthness, are not cognised like other qualities, but are known by an observation of substances in which they are found exemplified.

The cognition of substance, attribute and action depends upon the cognition of generality and particularity (VIII, 1. 6). A substance, an attribute, or an action can be definitely cognised as this particular substance, this particular quality or this particular action only when their generality and particularity are distinctly marked out.

The cognition of a substance is dependent upon the cognition of substance, attribute and activity. For the cognition of substance it is necessary that its attributes and activity should be cognised, but a cognition of these by themselves will not constitute the cognition of a substance. They should be cognised as belonging to a substance, and hence the cognition of substance also has been included as one of the conditions (VIII, 1. 7). It might be noted that the example given by Śaṅkara Miśra to illustrate the meaning of this sūtra. viz. ‘A white cow with a bell is going’ is not a happy one; for it by the cognition of substance as a condition is meant that there should be cognition of some particular object, like the bell, in connection with the substance to be cognised, it will appear that this need not be so; for the individuality of a substance can very well be marked out by its special attributes, and another substance like a bell need not
always be present in combination with the substance to be cognised.

That a particular substance is not regarded as the cause of the cognition of another substance by the VS. is clear from VIII 1. 10—'dravyeṣu anitaretara-kāraṇāḥ', which says that among the substances one is not the cause of (the cognition of) another substance; for each of them, in case a number of substances are cognised in succession, is cognised because of its own cause, and the cognitions follow one another because of the sequence in their causes and not because one substance is the cause of that which follows it in cognition. (VIII, I. 11).

In the case of attributes and actions, as they themselves do not possess other attributes or actions, the cognition of them does not depend upon the cognition of any other attributes or actions. In other words, they are cognised directly (VIII, I. 8). However, in the case of the cognition of a substance as possessing a certain attribute, e.g. a white object, the cognition is due to the presence of whiteness as a co-existent quality in the substance and the cognition of this whiteness (VIII, I. 9).

Relations, such as found in 'this man,' '(something) done by you', 'feed this man,' depend upon understanding, that is to say, they do not belong to the objects in themselves (VIII, 2. 1); and this is so because they exist only in so far as they are cognised, and do not exist when they are not cognised (VIII, 2, 2).
Non-existence is also cognised by contrast. The non-existence of that which has ceased to exist is cognised by the absence of the past perception of it and the remembrance of the past; the non-existence of that which has become existent is cognised by the perception of its existence and the memory of its previous non-existence; and similarly the cognition of the non-existence of one thing in another thing e.g. of a cow in a horse. That which was never produced is absolutely non-existent. (IX, 1. 6. 10).

A special kind of direct knowledge (prātyakṣa) is possible in the case of Yogins and those who have practised Yogic concentration, according to which even the soul can be known directly by being presented to the mind. To them other substances together with the attributes and actions are also revealed in their intrinsic nature. (IX, 1. 11-15).

From these sūtras it is evident that, according to VS., there is a distinction between the appearance and the reality of things—both spiritual and material. The appearance is open to the ordinary means of cognition, while the reality is disclosed only to the specially disciplined minds. The fact that while describing the direct knowledge of soul and other substances, also the actions and attributes of these have been mentioned as knowable directly by the disciplined minds shows that, according to the VS, there is a distinction between the appearance and the reality of attributes and actions as well. In other words, the reality behind its appearance is not attributeless; and
this doctrine, although peculiar and difficult to understand, is nevertheless consistent with the conception of a substance that it should possess attributes and actions. The recourse to a Yogic mind for the acquirement of true knowledge both in the NS. and the VS. is rather significant; and the implications of this doctrine, so far as I know, have not been realised. While in the NS. there is simply a mention of the fact that true knowledge is acquired by the practice of Yoga, in the VS. we have sufficient details to show that, according to it, behind the world of appearance there is another world of reality, and that while the former is cognisable by the ordinary means of knowledge, the latter is revealed directly (without the medium of the senses) to those who have acquired special powers of concentration. To say that, in the NS. for example, the only distinction between true and false knowledge in view is such as is to be found in the correct perception of a post and the wrong perception of it as a man, is evidently wrong; for certainly one does not require the discipline of a Yogic practice to dispel such an error of perception as that of perceiving a post to be a man.

Inference is called cognition by means of a mark (laingikam), and is characterised by such relations as (i) this is its effect (ii) this is its cause, (iii) this is its conjunct, (iv) this is its contradictory, (v) this is its co-existent (IX, 2. 1). The inference

1. Asyedam kāryam, kāraṇam, samyogi, virodhi, samavāyi, ceti laingikam.
based upon these marks is drawn by means of the premises of an argument (IX, 2. 2).1

It will be shown in the section dealing with the NS. that these distinctions of inference in the VS. correspond to the three kinds of inference as described in the NS., viz. pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa.2

Memory is explained as the result of a special contact between the soul and mind, and of past impressions (IX. 2. 6). Dreams are also explained likewise3.

(It may be noted that IX, 2. 5—asyedam iti buddhyapekṣitvāt, which has been taken by the commentators to mean that knowledge by similarity (upamāna). presumption (arthāpatti), implication (sambhava), etc. are included in cognition by inference, for they depend for their origin upon the cognition ‘it is its’, evidently does not mean all this, and simply contains an argument in support of the statement made in the previous Sūtra, IX, 2. 4 that ‘hetu, apadessā, līṇa, pramāṇa and karaṇa are not different from one another in this respect that all depend upon the cognition ‘it is its’, that is to say, upon a relation. This is another instance of a strained interpretation by the commentators.)4

Doubt is explained as the result of the cognition of the generality (sāmānya) of an object and the non-

1. Asyedm kārya-kāraṇa sambandhāś cāvayavād bhavati.
2. Cf. Jayanārāyaṇa’s Vivṛtti on IX, 2. 1. which also compares these with the three kinds of inference in the NS.
3. Cf. NS. IV, 2. 34, smṛti-samkalpavacca svapnaviśayā-bhimāṇaḥ.
4. Cf. Faddegon, Vaiśeṣika System, p. 310, who, I find after I had noted this point independently, also has to make the same observation on the interpretation of this Sūtra.
cognition of its particularity (viṣeṣa), together with the remembrance of the particularity; e.g. when an object appears to be like something, or unlike something which has already been seen, and we are not sure what exactly is. Doubt arises from both knowledge (vidyā) and ignorance (avidyā); that is to say, knowledge of the general nature of the object of perception and ignorance of its particularity. For instance, in the case of doubt with regard to a tall thing as to whether it is a post or a man, the tallness, which is the common property of a post and a man, is perceived, while the particular characteristics of a post or of a man, which will distinguish the one from the other, are not cognised.

It is to be noted that in the VS. the terms ‘vidyā’ and ‘avidyā’ are used in the sense of knowledge and error also respectively with regard to the ordinary object of perception. Vidyā is defined as knowledge free from defect or error—aduṣṭam vidyā (IX, 2. 12); and avidyā as defective knowledge—tad duṣṭa-jñānam (IX, 2. 11). This defective knowledge is attributed to the defect of the sense-organs, or that of the past impressions—indriya-duṣṭat saṃskāra-duṣṭaccāvidyā (IX, 2. 10). As has already been pointed out, the use of the terms ‘vidyā’ and ‘avidyā’, in this sense, appears to be a new departure in the VS.

1. VS., II, 2. 17 “sāmānya-pratyakṣād viṣeṣāpratyakṣād viṣeṣa-smyṭesca saṃśyaḥ” Cf. NS. II, 1. 22.
2. VS., II, 2. 18 and 19.
(iv) Epistemology of the Nyāya-Sūtras.

As I have already said, and as one can see from the literature of the preceding period, the NS. represent a system, which was the result of a gradual development of the logical tendencies of the thinkers who lived during the post-Upaniṣadic period, and it, in its turn, became the basis of logic and epistemology as found in the later period. Thus the NS. occupy a very important place in the history of Indian epistemology. In them we find a reference to the views of a number of schools of thought, although no special names are mentioned, and this absence of particular names had led to a good deal of speculation on the part of the commentators with regard to the nature and significance of these allusions. Some sections of the Sūtras have been supposed to refer to Buddhist doctrines, and to contain their refutation, and on the basis of these references inferences have been drawn by modern scholars with regard to the date of the NS. I shall have to say something about the nature of such sūtras in the sequel. At first I propose to deal with the theory of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) in the NS.

According to the NS., there are four means of knowledge, and these are: direct knowledge (pratyakṣa, in the sense of sense-cognition), inference (anumāna); knowledge by similarity (upamāna); and verbal testimony (śabda)¹.

¹. NS. I, 1. 3
In the course of critical examination of the theory of the means of knowledge an objection is raised that direct knowledge and the rest cannot be regarded as the means of knowledge, for they cannot be shown to operate in any of the three distinctions of time. For, _firstly_, if the means of knowledge be conceived to operate prior to the object cognised, it cannot be maintained that direct knowledge results from the contact of the senses with the object cognised; _secondly_, if the means of knowledge operate after the object cognised, the existence of the object is not proved by means of them; and _thirdly_, if they operate simultaneously with the objects cognised, then, in as much as each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no sequence among cognitions, that is to say, the cognitions of various objects must be simultaneous, and this would be inconsistent with the character of mind, which can attend to only one thing at a time.¹

The above objection is answered as follows: If there be no means of knowledge, then the denial of them also cannot be established, for that cannot be shown to exist in any of the three distinctions of time. If what is denied, that is to say the means of knowledge, does not exist, its denial also cannot exist. Further, if there be no means of knowledge to establish the existence of a thing, there will be nothing to establish the denial of the means of knowledge.

¹. _NS._, II, I, 8-11.
On the other hand, if the denial of them be estab-
lished on the basis of some means of knowledge, the
existence of the means of knowledge also gets
established *ipso facto*. Besides, it is not true to say
that the means of knowledge cannot be shown to
operate on the cognised object in any of the distinc-
tions of time, for the existence of a cognised object
and the operation of the means of knowledge can be
proved in the same manner as that of a musical ins-
trument by means of its sound. In other words, the
existence of the means of knowledge is inferred from
the fact that there is actually knowledge of the cog-
nised object.¹

The following objections are further raised: (a)
that if the means of knowledge are proved by other
means of knowledge, these, in their turn, must depend
for their proof upon still others, and thus there will
be an infinite regress, and (b) that if for the cognition
of the means of knowledge, other means of knowledge
are not needed, then just as the cognition of the
means of knowledge would be accomplished without
the other means of knowledge, so would the cognition
of the object also.² These objections are met by the
assertion that the apprehension of the means of know-
ledge is similar to that of lamp-light, that is to say,
just as the lamp-light illuminates other objects and the
lamp itself, so do the means of knowledge: they are
the means of the cognition of things, and also of

¹. *NS*. II, 1, 12-16.
². *NS.*, II, 1, 17 and 18
themselves.  

Before considering the definitions of the various means of knowledge, I would like to make a few observations concerning their general nature as it has been described in the NS. We do not find any definition of pramāṇa in the NS. The pramāṇas have simply been enumerated and explained. In so far as they prove the existence of an object, as it were by illuminating it, they have been compared to a lamp. It is to be remembered, however, that the term ‘pramāṇa’ is an ambiguous term, and may mean either (a) the means of knowledge, or (b) the form of cognition, or again (c) the means of proof; and it is freely used to express any of these2. The discussion of the nature of the means of knowledge with reference to the objects of knowledge as stated above is not very clear. The main object in introducing it appears to be to emphasise the important fact that the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge go together, and that they are inter-dependent for a proof of their existence. If it is the very essence of the means of knowledge that they have reference to some object, it is absurd to ask whether they are prior, or posterior to the objects of cognition. The assertion, however, that if the means of knowledge be


2. Cf. G.N.Jhā, Sadholal Lectures, p.28; also F.W.Thomas, Aristotelian Society Proceedings 1921-22 p. 29, where he calls the pramāṇas the “means to truth”.
supposed not to exist, their denial also is not possible, is clearly based upon a confusion between an existential proposition and a factual existence. For the denial of a mere existential proposition, e.g. that the means of knowledge exist, it is not necessary that there should be first a factual existence of them.

Direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) is defined in NS., I, 1. 4: ‘indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam’. Before translating the Sūtra it is first necessary to discuss the exact significance of the terms avyapadeśyam, avyabhicāri, and vyavasāyātmakam used in the definition. To me the Sūtra appears to contain one of the most remarkable definitions of direct knowledge by means of sense-cognition that I know of, and also, at the same time one which has been most misunderstood by the commentators and other later writers. The first part of the definition, viz., indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam—‘knowledge produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the object’, is the usual form of the definition of sense-cognition as found in the earlier literature. It is the last three epithets which form the characteristic feature of the definition in the NS. The first of these is ‘avyapadeśyam’, about the meaning of which the commentators have differed from one another.

Vātsyayāna, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra have all of them discussed the meaning of ‘avyapadeśyam’ in their commentaries. The first two of these
hold that it means ‘unnamed’, while the third maintains, or rather explains the view, that it is impossible to have a sense-cognition which is not connected with a name, and that the word ‘avyapadeśyam’ means that which is not the result of an inferential mark.’

Vātsyayāna says that ‘the name is not operative at the time of the apprehension of the object, it is employed only for the sake of expression (vyavahārakāle tu vyāpriyate). Therefore the cognition of an object produced by the contact of sense-organs with it is non-verbal (aśābdam).’

Anticipating Vācaspati Miśra’s explanation of ‘avyapadeśyam, Uddyotakara said: ‘Some commentators explain that the qualification ‘avyapadeśyam’ is added with a view to exclude inferential cognition. This is not right. Why? Because the definition already mentions the qualification ‘produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.’ As a matter of fact, inferential cognition does not proceed from the contact of the cognised object with the sense-organ; hence the definition could not apply to inferential cognition.

The following extracts from Vācaspati Miśra’s NVTT clearly bring out his interpretation. First he

1. Dr. Rüben in his recent edition of the Nyāya-sūtras (Leipzig, 1928) appears to follow this, ‘nicht im Worte zu fassen’, but he gives no discussion.
2. NB., I. 1. 4.
3. That is to say even without the qualification avyapadeśyam.
shows that all sense-cognition must be connected with name. He says: 'every object has a name; there is nothing that is devoid of name; this establishes the identity of the thing with its name; the name is not the means by which the object is known; as the object cow, when perceived, is perceived as 'this is cow', where there is a distinct co-ordination between the *this* and the *cow*, both of which are in the same case; thus things being identical with the name, the perception of things must involve the perception of the name also; hence there can be no perception devoid of verbal expression. Next he explains how *avyapadeśyam* has been used in the *sūtra* to exclude inferential cognition: When, from the contact of the sense-organ with objects we infer the motion of the sense-organ, the inferential cognition of this motion is also 'produced by the contact of the sense with an object', as it is from this contact that the inferential cognition proceeds. And it is with a view to exclude such inferential cognitions from the category of sense-cognition that the qualification '*avyapadśyam*' has been added. '*Apadeśa*' is the statement of the reason or premise; '*vyapadeśa*' is the correct statement of the premise; '*ayaadeśyam*' is that cognition which is obtained from the said '*vyapadeśa*' or the statement of the premise; and '*avyapadeśyam*' is that cognition which does not follow from the statement of the premise; thus then '*avyapadeśyam*' is equivalent to 'non-inferential'\(^1\).

1. Both the extracts are also quoted in *Indian Thought* under NS, I, 1. 4.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL SUTRAS

Now in order to determine the meaning of ‘avyapadesya’ according to the author of the NS. we have to consider the use of ‘vyapadesa’ and ‘apadesa’ elsewhere in the older literature, and then the significance of the form ‘avyapadesya’ as found in this particular aphorism. The term ‘apadesa’ occurs in the Tantrayukti as given in Kauṭilya’s Artha-sāstra. Then we find it in the Vaiseṣika-sūtra IX, 2. 4 in which it is said that hetu, apadesa, liṅga, pramāṇa and karma are not different from one another in sense: hetur apadeso liṅgam pramānam karanaṃ ityanarthāntaram. It is actually used in the sense of an inferential mark in VS. III, 1. 14—prasiddhi pūrvakatvād apadesasya. Its contradictory ‘anapadesa’ is used in VS. III, 1. 3, III, 1. 3, III, 1. 7 and III, 1. 8 in the sense of that which is not an inferential mark. In VS. IX 1, 1 and IX, 1. 3 we find the word ‘vyapadesa’ itself: ‘kriyā-gua-vyapa-de ābhāvād prāg asat’ and ‘asataḥ kriya-guṇa-vyapa-deśābhāvād arthāntaram. In the NS. themselves, besides ‘avyapadesya’, which has been used only once in the aphorism under consideration, ‘apadiṣṭa’ and ‘apadesa’ have been used in other aphorisms. The meaning of ‘apadesa’ in all its form is ‘name’, ‘mark’ or ‘sign’, including the inferential sign called ‘hetu’ or ‘liṅga’.

It will appear that the controversy of the commentators over the meaning of avyapadesya is based upon a failure to understand the correct nature of the definition of direct knowledge as given in the NS. In the first place, it is wrong to think that the three
epithets *avyapadeśyam*, *avyabhicāri*, and *vyavasāyātmaṇam* are meant to express something in addition to what is said in the phrase ‘*indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam*.’ They simply bring out what is implied in that phrase; that is to say, the whole clause is an analytic proposition. Thus, even though the phrase ‘*indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam*’ might exclude inferential knowledge the term ‘*avyapadeśyam*’, in the sense of ‘non-inferential’ will not be out of place in so far as it brings out the implication of that phrase. In the second place, the term ‘*avyapadeśiyam*’, as we have seen, may mean that which is not the result of both name and inferential mark.; and this meaning would be quite consistent with at least one view of the nature of direct knowledge, viz., that which regards it as both non-descriptive and non-inferential—knowledge corresponding to our modern conception of ‘simple apprehension’ or ‘acquaintance’, and which came to be known as *nirvi-kalpaka pratyakṣa* later on. Vācaspati Miśra’s objection to Vātsyāyana’s and Uddyotkara’s interpretation of ‘*avyapadeśyam*’ is evidently based upon the view that there cannot be any non-descriptive knowledge, which, although, one which is held by some of the thinkers even in modern times, there is no reason to believe, was held by the author of the NS. On the other hand, as will be shown presently, the other two epithets also ‘*avyabhicāri*’ and ‘*vyavasāyātmaṇa*’ indicate that direct knowledge, as defined in the NS. corresponds to what is called ‘simple apprehension,’ or
'acquaintance' in modern terminology.¹

Even if we consider the three epithets as indicating the nature of direct knowledge over and above what is said in the phrase 'indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpānām jñānam', the term 'avyapadesyam' in the sense of 'that which is not the result of a mark or sign' will serve the purpose of distinguishing between sense-cognition on the one hand, and inference and verbal testimony on the other. For it will appear that in inference and testimony also there is a contact of sense-organs with their objects, although not with the particular object which is said to be inferred or known by testimony. But all that is said in the sūtra is 'the contact of a sense-organ with its object'—'indriyārtha-sannikarṣa', and this by itself will not exclude inference or testimony from the definition. In the knowledge of fire by noticing smoke, there is the contact of the eye with the smoke; and the knowledge of fire is the result of this contact of a sense-organ with its object. Similarly, in knowing, on the testimony of the reports which appeared in the papers, that the king was ill, there was the contact of my eye with the words of the reports that I read in the papers, or of my ear with the words of the report which might have been read out to me by some other

¹. In my paper on 'Is there Acquaintance or Simple Apprehension?' I have discussed the nature of this kind of knowledge from the point of view of both European and Indian philosophers. (See the Appendices)
person; and the knowledge of king’s illness was the result of such a contact. The knowledge of fire by inference, or of king’s illness by testimony as described above, however, is the result of a certain mark or sign—‘apadesa’, or ‘vyapadesa’ which is meant to be excluded from the definition of pratyaksa; and hence the condition that it should be avyapadesyam.

That ‘vyapadesyam’ was used in earlier literature to denote that which is the result of an inferential mark, and that pratyaksa was regarded by some early philosophers as ‘avyapadesyam’ in the sense that it is not the result of an inferential mark is conclusively corroborated by a passage in the Šabara-bhāṣya under MS., I, 1. 5, where it is shown that while all cognition is known by inference as the result of a mark in the form of the cognised object, and is, therefore, ‘vyapadesya’, pratyaksa is direct apprehension of an object and hence ‘avyapadesya’.

The next term to be considered in the definition of direct knowledge is ‘avyabhicāri’, which means ‘non-discrepant’, and has been taken to signify that direct knowledge is non-erroneous. ‘Atasmins tad iti tad vyabhicāri; yat tu tasmins tad iti tad avyabhicāri pratyayam iti’, says Vātsyāyana in Bhāṣya on NS., I, 1. 4. Although the connotation of avyabhicāri—‘non-discrepant—

1. Na ca rtha-vyapadesam antareṇa buddheḥ rupopalambhanam; tasmaṃ nāvyapadesyā buddhiḥ, avyapadesyam ca nāpratyakṣam—SB., (BI.), p. 10. This text has been discussed by me under Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, Šabara-bhāṣya.
pant' is not strictly the same as that of abhrānta—'non-
erroneous', which term was later on used by Dharma-
kirti in his definition of direct knowledge, there is no
reason to believe that the author of the NS. did not
use it in the sense of 'non-erroneous'; for the term
avyabhicāri' appears to have been quite freely used as
an equivalent of 'abhrānta' by quite a good number of
early authors\(^1\). The main object in laying down the
condition that direct knowledge should be 'non-erro-
neous' is to emphasise its epistemological nature as a
pramāṇa as distinguished from the mere psychological
process of sense-cognition as it was defined to be
by the earlier authors.

The third term: 'vyavasāyatmakam' also explains
one of the essential characteristics of direct knowledge,
viz., that it is definite; that is to say, what is perceived
directly is of a definite character so far as it goes. For
every example, if I hear a sound, it is bound to be of a
definite pitch and of a definite quality, although I may
not know nature of its source.

Thus the definition of pratyakṣa in the NS. would
be: 'that cognition which is the product of the contact
of the sense-organs with the object; which is non-
inferential and non-descriptive; non-discrepant and
definite'. This corresponds to the later nirvikalpaka
pratyakṣa in Indian philosophy, and to 'simple appre-
hension' or 'acquaintance' in the systems of some
modern thinkers, with this exception, which I think

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1. Śabara-bhāṣya—pp. 7 and 8.
is correctly made, that according to the definition in
the NS. pratyakṣa is said to be definite, while, the
nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa has been supposed to be vague'
in character.

Those who drew a distinction between the nirvi-
kalpaka and the savikalpaka pratyakṣa later on have
tried to find a support for this division in the definition of pratyakṣa in the NS. by suggesting that the term
‘avyayadeśyam’ implies the nirvikalpaka, and ‘vyavaśā-
ymbakam the savikalpaka pratyakṣa. The construc-
tion of the sūtra, however, does not in the least admit
of the interpretation; for evidently ‘avyapadeśyam’
and ‘vyavaśāyātmakam’ do not signify two alternative
characteristics of pratyakṣa in the Sūtra.

In the course of an examination of the nature of
direct knowledge in the NS. an objection is raised that
all sense-cognition is a case of inference; for it takes
place by means of the cognition of only a part of the
cognised object.¹ This is met by the assertion that
only so much of the cognition is direct knowledge as
is cognised directly'.² This statement is a clear indi-
cation of the fact that, according to the author of the
NS., direct knowledge is only that sense-cognition
which is simple apprehension, or mere acquaintance
with the sense-data. All complex perception, such as
was called savikalpaka pratyakṣa later on, and is called

¹. NS. II, 1. 30. pratyakṣam anumānam ekadesā-grahanād
upalabdheḥ.
². Ibid. II, 1. 31. ‘Na, pratyakṣena yāvat tāvadapyupalamb-
bhāt.
knowledge by description in modern philosophy, has an inferential element in it.

Inference is defined as that which is preceded by direct knowledge, and is said to be of three kinds: pūrvavat, sesavat, and sāmānyatodṛśta.\textsuperscript{1} Much ingenuity has been spent by the commentators upon the interpretation of ‘tat pūrvakam’ and the three kinds of inference. There is no difficulty about the meaning of ‘tat-pūrvakam’ for in the preceding sūtra we have a definition of direct knowledge (pratyakṣa),\textsuperscript{2} and ‘tat’ naturally refers to that. Whether it is one act of direct knowledge that precedes an inference, or more than one, does not matter. The terms ‘pūrvavat’ and ‘sāmānyatodṛśta’ are really obscure; and the explanations given by the commentators, as will be seen presently, are conflicting and inconsistent.

To take Vātsyāyana only, who is the earliest commentator known to us, the explanation of the three kinds of inference, according to him is as follows:

(1) ‘The pūrvavat inference is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause; e.g., ‘when we see clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain.’

The sesavat inference is that in which the cause is inferred from the effect; e.g. ‘when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, the stream is full and the current swift, we infer that there

\begin{enumerate}
\item अथ तत्तुर्वकं त्रिविधमुमानं पूर्ववन्देयवत् साधारणतो हृद्ध च \textsuperscript{1} \mathtt{Br} २०१ \textsuperscript{2} Garga १ सू ५.
\item व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षाम्.
\end{enumerate}
has been rain at the source' (up the river).

'The sāmānyato drṣṭa inference; e.g., we have observed in all cases that we see a thing in a place different from where we saw it before, only when it has moved; and this is found to be so in the case of the sun; therefore, we infer that the sun moves, or has moved, although we cannot cognise it directly.

'Or (another explanation may be as follows): —

The pūrva-vat inference is that in which out of two things as cognised by sense on some former occasion, the one that is not perceived (at the time of inference) is inferred from the sense-cognition of the other; e.g. when fire is inferred from smoke.

The word 'ṣeṣavat' means remainder; hence, the ṣeṣavat inference is that in which with regard to an object some of the likely properties being denied (eliminated), and this elimination being not applicable to other likely properties, we have the cognition of those that remain (thus uneliminated); e.g. with regard to sound we find that it is an entity (sad), and is transient (anityam); and as these two properties are found to be common to substance (draṇya), qualities (guṇa), and actions (karma) only, their presence is sound distinguishes it from the remaining categories of generality (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa) and inference (samavāya). Then their being a doubt as to whether sound is a substance, or a quality, or an action, (we reason as follows): Sound cannot be a

1. All of which three are entities (sad) but eternal (nityam).
substance, because it inheres in a single substance (eka-dravyatvāt); it is not an action, because it is the cause of another sound (śabdāntara-hetutvāt); therefore sound is seen to be quality which is the only alternative left by elimination.

The sāmānyatodrṣṭa inference is that in which the relation between the probans (hetu) and the probandum (sādhyā) being imperceptible, the imperceptible probandum is inferred from the similarity of the probans to something else; e.g. when the self is inferred from desire; desire, etc. are qualities, and qualities always inhere in substance; therefore that which forms the substratum of these⁴ is the self (atmā).²

After Vatsyāyana, uddyotkara has still more ingenuous explanations to offer. According to him, the three kinds of inference may mean: firstly, (1) inference by agreement (kevalānvaṭī) (2) inference by difference (kevala-vyatireki), and (3) inference by agreement and difference (anvaya-vyatireki); or secondly, they mean the conditions of all inference: (1) Pūrvavat—that the probans (hetu) should be invariably accompanied by the probandum (sādhyā); (2) Śeṣavat—that the probans (hetu) must have been noticed as invariably accompanied by the probandum (sādhyā)

1. That is to say desire, etc.

2. In translating the Bhāṣya I have mainly followed Dr. Jhā’s English Transl. (Indian Thought) with such alterations as I have considered necessary.
in other cases (ṣaṇa); and (3) sāmānyatodrṣṭa, which is ‘sāmānyataḥ’ and ‘adrṣṭa’—that the probans (hetu) not common to the probandum (sādhyā) and that which is not-probandum (sādhyābhāva). It is further said that the implication of ‘ca’ in the sūtra is that (a) the inference should not be opposed to sense-cognition (pratyaṅga), and (b) it should not be opposed to the scriptures (āgama; thirdly, the three kinds of inference may denote what the Bhāṣya has said in the first explanation, although the example of the sun as given by Vātsyāyana to illustrate the sāmānyatodrṣṭa does not meet Uddyotakara’s approval. According to Uddyotakara, sāmānyatodrṣṭa is that general case in which the relation between the probans and the probandum is not causal, and yet the inference is valid, For example, from the appearance of cranes at a certain spot it may be inferred that there is water near it.

Uddyotkara has still more explanations to offer, and after him Vācaspati Miśra too has his own. They are so many, so varied, so divergent, so long, and in some cases, so of the the text of the NS. that neither is it possible, nor is it worth while, to mention all of them.

All modern scholars, like Garbe,¹ Jacobi,² Keith,³

2. Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1895, p. 204.
3. ILA., pp. 88-90.
and Rüben,¹ usually follow Vātsyāyana’s first explanation of the three kinds of inference, although several of them have noted the unsatisfactory and uncertain nature of the interpretations of the commentators.

According to Garbe’s interpretation, inference is of three kinds: it may proceed from cause to effect (pūrvavat), or contrariwise (īsavat), or it may proceed from the general concept (sāmānyatodṛśta) in such a way that one infers a characteristic observed in the case of one object also in the case of another object which falls under the same concept. The last kind of inference was formerly regarded by Garbe (in Samkhya Philosophie) as inductive, but later on (in Samkhya und Yoga) be accepted Jacobi’s view that it is deductive. Keith has followed Vātsyāyana’s interpretation, although he points out the incoherence of Vātsyāyana’s explanation of sāmānyatodṛśta with the examples given in NS. II, 1, 37 and 38. Rüben translates sāmānyatodṛśta as inference by analogy, which phrase represents more his interpretation of this kinds of inference than a translation of the term sāmānyatodṛśta.

What strikes one most about these interpretations is that they are not, in most cases, in accordance with the significance of the technical names given to these inferences and the examples cited in the examination of inference in the NS.² The inge-

². NS., II 1. 37 and 38.
nious explanations given by the various writers may be all very good as the possible forms of inference, and yet they may not represent the view of the author of the NS. For example, Uddyotakara’s attempt to show that these names do not represent three different kinds of inference, but three conditions of all inference, is certainly not accordance with the meaning of the NS. where it is distinctly said that inference of three kinds: ‘tri-vidham anumānam pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmā-nyutodṛṣṭam ca’. The various alternative and divergent explanations of the commentators are a distinct proof of the fact that they could find nothing as a sure guide of the determining of the exact significance of the three kinds of inference according to the author of the Nyāya-sūtras, I venture to offer an interpretation of my own, which I think is consistent with the examples given in the Nyāya-sūtras II, 1. 37 and 38, and has its support in Vaiśeṣika-sūtra IX, 2. 1, which contains the marks of inference according to the author of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. The three examples cited in the course of the examination of inference should naturally refer to the three kinds of inference enumerated along with the definition of inference and the marks of inference mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra should be a better guide to the interpretation of the three kinds of inference given in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras than an exposition of the same subject by writers and commentators who were far more removed in time than the author of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, and who were influenced in their writings by schools of philosophy
more divergent in their doctrines than the Vaiṣesika school. Let us first consider the terms themselves. Uddyotakara has raised the question of the meaning of these in the Nyāya-vārtika. He says: "The term 'pūrvavat' has been used. What is the denotation of 'pūrvavat' then? Does it denote an effect or a cause? If 'pūrvavat' means that which has an antecedent, then it denotes an effect (kārya) and in that case it becomes a contradiction to say that it (pūrvavat) denotes an inference from a cause to effect. We do say (hold) that 'pūrvavat' is that which has an antecedent (purvam asyātīti pūrvavat), but it does not signify an effect. What is it then (which it signifies)? It means cognition (jñānam), that there is an antecedent object to cognition (jñānasya purvam viśayāḥ); and thus pūrvavat signifies the inference of an effect. Similarly, ivaḥ, etc. apply to the cognition of their objects. Or, the affix in pūrvavat may be taken as 'vati' (denoting 'similarity' and not 'possession' as matup), the meaning being that an object is cognised by inference just as it was known by inference, and hence it is known as before (pūrvavad dīśto bhavati).  

The above attempt by Uddyotakara at determining the derivative meaning of the various terms is unfortunately as vague and rambling as that at explaining the various types of inference denoted by them. 'The aphorism in which the terms occur is: Athā tat-pūrvvakam tri-vidham anumānam pūrvvavat ivaḥ samānya-

1. NV. p. 852.
todṛṣṭam ca. Here the plain syntax is that the three words: pūrvavat, ṣeṣavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭam qualify anumāna the meaning being that inference (anumāna) is that which has an antecedent (pūrvavat), that which has a remainder (the implication by antithesis being ‘that which has a consequent’-ṣeṣavat), and that which has been commonly seen (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa) as the object of cognition. Uddyotakara also admits that ‘pūrvavat’ means ‘that which has an antecedent’, but then his interpretation that it might refer to the inference of an effect is unjustifiable both from the point of view of the text of the sūtra and the general context. The other interpretation, which he puts forth following Vātsyāyana, that ‘pūrvavat’ signifies a cognition by inference similar to one previously obtained by sense-cognition is in no way applicable to ‘pūrvavat’ inference only, for all kinds of inference by their very nature and definition are pūrvavat in that sense; that is to say, they are based upon, and are according to, a connection between the probans and the probandum previously cognised by sense-cognition. It will appear that the plain and straightforward interpretation suggested by me finds its support not only in the Nyāya-sūtras themselves, but also in a few reliable authorities outside them. Now in the Nyāya-sūtra II, 1. 37 the first two examples are those of embankment (rodha) and damage (upaghāta) with a view to show that the swelling of a river may be due to an embankment and not to the falling of rain, and the carrying off of eggs by ants may be due to a
damage to their nest rather than it be an indication of the approach of rains. In other words, the first example refers of the inference of an antecedent—of a cause, from the observation of a consequent—of an effect; and the second, to the inference of a consequent—of an effect, from the observation of an antecedent. The carrying of eggs by ants may be taken as an antecedent sign of the rain, but whether it can be reckoned as a cause is questionable.¹ The first of these is, therefore, pūrvavat and the second sesavat. It will appear that in the Vaiśeṣika IX, 2. 1—‘asyedam kāryam kāraṇam saṁyogi virodhi samavāyi ceti-laiṅgikam’, we have a mention of three kinds of inferential marks in the order of (1) this is an effect of this, (2) this is a cause of this, and (3) this stands in the relation of conjunction, contradiction and inference to this.

It will be seen that the pūrvavat and the sesavat inference in the Nyāya-sūtras correspond to the first and the second in the above Vaiśeṣka-sūtra, The relations of conjunction, contradiction and inference as mentioned in the VS. evidently refer to the relation of co-existence both in its positive and negative aspects and we shall see that the saṁānyato-drṣṭa of the Nyāya-sūtra, is much the same. The terms means ‘that seen or known by common experience’, that is to

say, an inference based upon a well-known relation of co-existence or the absence of co-existence. For instance, to take the example given in NS. II, 1. 37, 38 from the screaming of a peacock we infer the presence of a peacock, for the screaming of a peacock and a peacock are known to co-exist.¹ Thus it will appear that while the purvavat and the sēsavat refer to the relations of antecedence and consequence respectively, the samānyatodṛṣṭa refer to that of co-existence or concomitance. This interpretation fits in with the examples of inferences given in the Nyāya-sūtras themselves, and also with the description of the inferential marks in the VS. IX, 2. 1.² The Vārtika, while commenting upon NS. II, 1. 37, curiously enough admits that the examples

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1. To take the screaming of a peacock as a sign of the approach of clouds or rain, as some have done, would not be a specific example of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, for that may as well be an example of sēsavat. In the Sūtra itself we have simply ‘sādṛṣṭa’.

2. Also cf. Vṛtti on II, 1. 37 where it gives an alternative explanation which exactly corresponds to that given by me. ‘Or, in the Sūtra containing the definition purvavat is that whereby an antecedent probandum is inferred; Sēsavat—that whereby a consequent probandum is inferred; and Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa—that whereby a present or concomitant probandum is inferred’.

Also cf. Caraka-Saṃhitā, Sūtra-sthāna XI, 19, 20 where inference is classified as referring to the present, the past and the future. The discussion about the reality of the distinctions of past, present and future in NS. II, 1,
given the Sūtra illustrate the three kinds of inference mentioned in NS., I, 1, 5. It says: what inference is has already been explained in Sūtra, 1, 1. 5. The following are the examples of the three kinds of inference pūrvavat, and the rest ( enumerated under Sūtra, I, 1. 5): (1) The full river (leading to the cognition its having rained up the river); (2) the running about of ants with their eggs (leading to the cognition of coming rain); and (3) the scream of the peacock (leading to the cognition of the presence of the peacock). It will be found, however, that this interpretation here is inconsistent with its comments upon NS., I, 1. 5.¹

39-43, immediately following the examination of inference also lends support to the same interpretation of the three kinds of inference.

1. Dhruva in a paper: Trividham Anumānam or A study in Nyāya-sūtra I, 1, 5 (Proceedings of the First Oriental Conference, Poona) first shows the unsatisfactory nature of the explanation of the three kinds of inference as given by the commentators including Vātsyāyana, and then tacitly assumes that Vātsyāyana’s explanation was correct. About Vātsyāyana’s explanation he says first ‘The two sets of explanations together with their illustrations are so radically different from each other that the writer evidently seems to be groping in the dark for the real meaning of the Sūtra’ (p, 253), and then at another place, he asserts: Vātsyāyana, when he says that Pūrvavat and Šeṣavat may mean, respectively, inference from
In the examination of the definition and classification of inference an objection is raised that the conclusion of an inference may be vitiated by the existence of the plurality of causes, or the similarity of a co-existent sign. For example, the swelling of a river may be due to a local embankment instead of the falling of rain up the river; ants may be carrying off their eggs out of fear because of damage to their nest; and lastly, the supposed screaming of a peacock may be only a mimicking of the same by some man. These objections are answered by the assertion that the real grounds or signs of inference are different from the false ones; or in other words, the plurality of causes is denied, and it is maintained that the relations of cause and effect, or those of the marks of inference and that which is inferred, are reciprocal; and therefore, of a unique nature.

Knowledge by similarity (upamāna) is defined as the cognition of an object by means of its resemblance to something well-known; as for example, to know that a certain animal is *bos gavaeus* by virtue of its resemblance to a cow, which is a well-known cause and inference from effect, is doubtless in possession of the real meanings of the terms as used in the Śūtras, (p. 262). Professor Dhruva, curiously enough, neglects altogether the examples of inference as given in the *NS.* II, 1. 37 and 38, and does not explain how and why one of the explanations as given by Vātsyāyana may be accepted as correct.

animal.

In the examination of knowledge by similarity as a means of cognition the following objections are raised:—

(a) That knowledge by similarity does not provide any sure basis for right cognition in so far as neither a complete similarity, nor a considerable similarity; nor again a partial similarity can establish the identity of an object.¹

(b) Knowledge by similarity is not different from inference, for both of them seek to establish the existence of something unperceived by means of that which is perceived.²

The above objections are answered by the assertions: (a) that knowledge by similarity depends upon a well-known similarity—‘prasiddha-sādharmyād upamāna-siddheḥ³, and not on degrees of similarity; and (b) that in cognition by similarity it is not that some-

¹. NS. II, 1. 44.
². NS., II, 1. 46.
³. To translate this text as ‘through similarity in a high degree’, as Vidyābhūṣāna has done, NS (SBH., p. 35) is evidently wrong both from the point of view of the language and the context. For ‘similarity in a high degree’ is not different from ‘considerable similarity’ mentioned in NS. II, 1. 44, and the answer to the objection contained in that śāstra means to suggest a different kind of similarity as the basis of similarity viz. prasiddha-sādharmya—a well-known similarity.
thing unperceived is cognised by that which is perceived, but that the object known by similarity is also perceived, and hence knowledge by similarity is different from inference. Further, the use of ‘so’ (tathā) in the act of comparing shows that it is different from inference (where the word ‘because’ would be used).  

It will be seen that knowledge by similarity has not be recognised as an independent means of knowledge by several schools. The essential value of knowledge by similarity appears to consist in a definite identification of an object as so and so called by a certain name. So far as mere sense-cognition is concerned, it can certainly be complete without a comparison—a bos gavaeus can be completely cognised as some thing without comparing it with any other object, but the definite knowledge that it is this particular animal would depend upon the act of comparison with reference to some kinds of similarity.

Verbal testimony is defined as the assertion of a reliable person and is said to be of two kinds: (1) that which refers to things seen, and (2) that which refers to things unseen.

In the examination of verbal testimony an objection is raised that it is only a case of inference, and

1. NS. II, 1. 45, 47, 48.

2. Cf. Tātparya on NS., II. 1. 46—“So that in cognition by similarity, the cognition of the perceived bull gives rise to the cognition of the animal bearing the name of ‘gavaya’ which is not perceived”. 
not a separate means of knowledge; for just as in inference, so in verbal testimony, something unperceived is known by means of a sign or a mark, which is the word, and that the relation between a word and that which it signifies is of the same kind as that between an inferential mark and that which is inferred.¹

In answer to the above objection it is denied that the relation between a word and what it signifies is of the same kind as between an inferential sign and the object inferred. The former is said to be conventional as distinguished from the later which is natural. Further the ultimate ground of verbal testimony is to be found not in the word itself, but in the reliability of the person from whom it proceeds.²

A further objection that the testimony of the Veda is unreliable because it is vitiated by the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology is answered by the assertion that these are not defects of the Veda, but that untruth is due to some defect in the act, the sacrificer, or the materials of sacrifice; that the so-called contradiction is not contradiction but an assertion of certain alternatives, and that the so-called tautology is a repetition on purpose.³

It will be seen that like knowledge by similarity verbal testimony also has not been recognised as an

1. *NS.*, II, 1. 49-51; 54
2. *NS.*, II, 1. 52, 53, 55, 56.
independent means of cognition by some schools of philosophy.

The NS. thus admits direct knowledge, inference knowledge by similarity, and verbal testimony as four independent means of knowledge. Tradition (aitihya) is regarded as included in verbal testimony; and presumption (arthāpatti), implication (sambhava), and none-existence (abhāva) are treated as cases of inference.¹

The various factors involved in sense-cognition are the soul, the mind, the senses and the object of cognition. It is the soul to which knowledge belongs: the mind and the senses are only the instruments of acquiring knowledge.²

The soul is defined as that which is characterised by desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition.³ It is shown that the soul is different from the senses and the body by a number of arguments, the chief of them being that it acts as a uniting and permanent factor in knowledge, which neither the senses nor the body could do.⁴ The materialistic view that desire and aversion belong to the body, inasmuch as activity and forbearance are seen to belong to it, is met by the assertion that these belong to the body in the same sense as they belong to such implements as an

1. NS. II, 2. 1-12.
2. NS. III, 2. 19-42.
3. NS. I, 1, 10.
axe and so on. Further, we do not find these in such material things as pots, etc.¹

Mind is that which is characterised by the non-production of simultaneous cognition.;² For the same reason it is one and atomic (anu).³

The senses and their objects are defined in the usual way. They are material and composed of the various elements which they respectively perceive.⁴

Buddhi, according to the NS., is identical with apprehension (upalabdhi) and knowledge (jñāna). This is a temporary mental act rather than a permanent faculty as the Sāmkhya school regards it to be. This topic is discussed at length in a section of the NS. where the Sāmkhya view about buddhi is criticised.⁵ The one point in connection with all controversy about the nature of buddhi between the Nyāya and the Sāmkhya, which was usually overlooked by the disputants in the past, and which is, I think, overlooked even now, is that the dispute between the Nyāya and the Sāmkhya is really about two different things called by the same name. The buddhis (cognitions) of the Nyāya are really equivalent to the functionings (vṛtti) of the buddhi (the intellect) of the Sāmkhya, and about the correspondence of these there can hardly be any dispute be-

¹ NS. III, 2, 37-40.
² NS. I. 1. 16.
³ Ibid. III, 2, 57-60.
⁴ Ibid. III, 1, 63, 64.
⁵ Ibid. III, 2, 1-49.
ween the two schools. Thus a good deal of this controversy about buddhi is merely verbal and irrelevant, and it is futile to go into its details at length.

Two sections of the NS, viz. Sūtras, III, 2, 10 to III. 2, 18, and IV. 2, 26 and the following sūtras, which respectively deal with the temporary nature of cognition (buddhi) and the cognition of the whole (avayavī) in relation to its parts, have been regarded by the commentators as dealing with the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism respectively. I have discussed the whole subject in a separate article,¹ and have tried to show that the interpretation of the commentators and the views of modern scholars based upon them are unjustifiable.

The whole of the Second Chapter of the Fourth Book deals with the acquirement of true knowledge, and the result of the whole discussion is that (1) cognitions (upalabdhi) may be right or wrong; (2) that a wrong cognition is destroyed by the appearance of right cognition ‘mithyopalabdhi vinaśas tattva jñānat’²; (3) a wrong cognition is detected by seeing a contrast between the real object and its counterpart³, e.g. by seeing the distinction between a real man and a post that appeared to be a man. And then as the question finally turns upon the way to acquire true knowledge,

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1. Discussion of the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism in the Nyāya-Sūtras, JRAS January, 1930.
2. NS., IV, 2, 35.
3. NS., IV, 2, 37.
the subsequent sūtras suggest various means of developing the powers of one's mind, which include practice of meditation and academic discussions.

To sum up, in the NS. we find a systematic and critical exposition of direct knowledge, inference, knowledge by similarity, and verbal testimony. Direct knowledge in the NS. is yet only sense-cognition, and, as I have tried to show, of the nature of simple apprehension, very much like the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa of the later works. The definition and classification of inference are clearly a development of the doctrine of inference as found in the Caraka-Samhitā and the VS. The exact significance of knowledge by similarity and verbal testimony is brought out in explaining how they are different from inference. The pramāṇas are regarded as means of knowledge, or forms of cognition, or again as means of proof; but I am inclined to think that it is the first meaning which is the most usual. The possibility of doubt and error is admitted. Doubt arises out of a conflicting sense-datum or testimony, and is removed by definite cognition. The presence of error is detected when a contrast is revealed to us between a false appearance and the true reality of an object; e.g. when one finds that what one took to be a man was really a post. But this is evidently arguing in a circle. The question, 'What is true reality, and how to be sure that one knows it?' Still remains to be answered. The whole world may be a life-long dream; and, therefore, as unreal as the dream
world of our sleep. The Nyāya-sūtras do not offer any further criterion of truth beyond the pramanās, but enjoin a life of moral and intellectual discipline; e.g. Yoga practices and academic discussions, which alone, according to it, can give powers of philosophical insight.

Before I close this chapter on the NS. I would say, and this has been felt by a many a scholar now,¹ that the original philosophy of the NS. has been grossly obscured by the confusion created by the distinguished commentators beginning with even the first of them, Vātsyāyana or Pakṣila-svāmin, and it needs the devoted labours of a competent scholar to dig it out and present it in its original form. Certain assumptions on the part of the first commentator have simply been accepted by the subsequent writers, and as certain anomalies due to those assumptions could not be explained, fresh assumptions have been made and new theories have been put forth to overcome the difficulty. Examples of some of these have been given in this chapter, but many more can be found by a more intensive and independent study of the whole work.

CHAPTER V.

Epistemology of the Sāṁkhya system as found in the Sāṁkhya-kārikā and the Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra.

The two main works of the Sāṁkhya system are the Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra attributed to Kapila. Although the SPS. is believed to belong to a very late date, one curious fact about it, which one cannot help noticing, is that its definitions of right cognition (pramāṇa); direct knowledge (pratyākṣa) and inference (anumāṇa) are of a very peculiar nature. They are different from those given in any other work including the Sāṁkhya-kārikā, and do not indicate any signs of the influence of any of the authors who are supposed to be earlier than the SPS. This peculiarity of the definitions together with the fact that the commentators do not appear to be quite sure of the exact significance of the sūtra, which contains the definition of pramāṇa, probably because a definite traditional meaning had been lost to them, strongly suggests that the sūtras in question are the relics of an ancient work on the Sāṁkhya which was earlier than the Sāṁkhya-kārikā and even the NS.¹ The Sāṁkhya doctrine of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) as

¹. Cf. Weldon, American Journal of Philology, 35; (1914) p. 34 ff.
contained in the Sāmkhya-kārikā was developed by Gauḍapāda in his Bhāṣya on the SK. and still more by Vācaspāti Miśra in his Sāmkhya-tattva kaumudi. But the SPS, which is supposed to be later than either of these, does not show any signs of the influence of these developments in the Sāmkhya theory. On essential points the epistemological position of the SPS. is the same as that of the SK.; and to treat the theory of knowledge as contained in the SPS. as posterior to Gauḍapāda and Vācaspāti Miśra seems to be altogether preposterous. Hence I have thought it fit to deal with the epistemology of the SK. and the SPS. in one place. That I am not altogether unjustified in holding that some of the sūtras pertaining to the theory of knowledge in the SPS. might belong to an early period will be seen in the sequel. I shall deal with the SK. first.

The Sāmkhya-kārikā of Isvarakṛṣṇa.

Like most of the philosophical treatises in Indian Philosophy, the SK. also starts with the assertion that desire for knowledge arises out of the need of ending misery. It is further pointed out that a scientific knowledge of the unmanifested, and the manifested nature, and of the knower (the spirit) is preferable to any other kind of knowledge, such as revelation or popular opinion.1

A pramāṇa is defined as that by which an object is proved to exist; and it is of three kinds: sense-

1. SK., 2.
cognition (drṣṭa); inference (anumāna) and reliable testimony (āpta-vacana). The rest of the pramāṇas accepted by other schools are regarded as forms of one or other of these.

Sense-cognition is a definite knowledge obtained through the sense-organs. Inference is cognition based upon the relation of the mark and that to which that mark belongs, and it is of three kinds. Reliable Testimony is the word communicated by trustworthy persons (āpta-śrutīḥ).

Objects beyond the senses are known by means of the inference called Sāmānyatodrṣṭa; and the transcendent reality, which is not cognised even by this, is proved by reliable testimony.

The causes of the non-apprehension of objects by means of the senses are excessive distance, extreme proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, inattention, minuteness of the object, obstruction, predominance of objects other than that to be perceived, and inter-mixture of the object with similar objects.

The intellect (buddhi) emanates from nature (prākṛti) and is defined as 'determination' (adhyava-

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1. SK., 4.
2. Viz. pūrvavat, īśavat, and sāmānyatodrṣṭa.
3. SK., 5. 'āpta-śrutīḥ' need not mean 'true revelation' as Gangānātha Jhā, following the Tattva-kaumudi translates it, and considering the rationalistic attitude of the Kārikā it is better to translate it literally as 'the word of a trustworthy person.' Cf. Kārikā 2 and 6.
4. SK, 6.
5. SK., 7.
sāya). It is said that virtue (dharma), knowledge (jñāna), dispassion (virāga), and power (aiśvarya) are its forms when it is of the nature of sattva; and the reverse of them when it is of the nature of tamas.¹

In the above description of the intellect, the term 'adhyavasāya' has been variously translated. The best alternative is to take it in its usual meaning of 'determination', for it fits in with the functions of the intellect as the faculty which determines both knowledge and action. This is evident from the description of buddhi which follows in the karika. As in the other schools, so here, the acquirement of knowledge has been regarded as purposive, as something which leads to action with a view to achieve the highest goal. Hence, it is said that if the intellect is prompted by 'sattva' it leads to virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power; and if prompted by 'tamas' to the opposite of these. The intellect in the Sāmkhya is material, and hence characterised by the three constituents (gunas) of matter. The enumeration of virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power is evidently not based upon any principle of logical division, and the words have their ordinary meaning.

The next internal sense is egoism (ahaṅkāra) which is defined as self-consciousness (abhimāna). From consciousness proceeds self-consciousness, but it has to be remembered that both of them are the evolutes of matter. From egoism proceed the eleven

1. SK., 23.
sense-organs and the five subtle elements (tanmātrāni). It is evident that in this process of evolution, although the psychical functions are recognised, they are regarded as the result of and as dependent upon a physical evolution of the primordial matter.

The Kārikā follows the usual classification of the sense-organs, and regards mind as a sense-organ of double nature—viz. as one both of knowledge and action. It is the organ of reflection. Although one, it appears to be many and diverse because of the particular modifications of the guṇas—’guṇa parināma-viśeṣāt’

The phrase ‘guṇa-parināma-viśeṣāt’ here is rather ambiguous. Does the word ‘guṇa’ here mean the special Sāṃkhya constituents of sattva, rajas and tamas?; or does it signify the ordinary qualities of rūpa, rasa, gandha, etc.? Gauḍapāda has taken it to mean the latter; for he says: ‘so mind becomes various from its connection with the eye or any other organ, being identified with it, and being diversified by the modification of the function of sight, and the rest of the organs’.

Vācaspati Miśra also appears to hold the same view. But, howmuchsoever plausible this interpretation may be, considering the peculiar sense in which the words ‘guṇa’ and ‘parināma’ are used in the Sāṃkhya system, it is highly improbable they have been used here in a different sense. Further the view that mind should

1. SK., 27.
2. Translation from Davies’ Hindu Philosophy, p, 64.
appear many and different because of the particular modifications of the three constituents guna-parinama-viseṣat is only consistent with the general Sāṃkhya doctrine that the diversity and individuality of things is determined by the peculiar and particular modifications of the three gunas.

There are altogether thirteen organs, viz. the three internal organs of buddhi, ahaṅkāra and manas; and ten external organs—five sense-organs and five organs of action. Of these the three internal organs are applicable to all kinds of objects, and in all the three distinctions of time; while the others are of use only with reference to the object of sense and those which pertain to the present. The intellect is the most important of all, and it is to it that the external sense-organs present their respective objects.¹

The above is all that one can find in the SK. itself by way of the analysis of knowledge; and it is evident that there is not much of epistemological value in it. The SK. is mainly a treatise on metaphysics. There is a mention of five forms of error²—viparyaya-bhedāḥ; but, if we accept the interpretation of the commentators, they are not logical errors, but forms of a wrong attitude towards the world.

It must be noted, however, that this particular notion of error, expressed variously by the terms, 'avidyā', etc. is not only present in the VS. and the

1. SK., 32-36.
2. SK., 47.
NS, but forms in them also, the main and ultimate antithesis to knowledge.

The Theory of Knowledge in the Sāṃkhyā-pravacana-sūtra.

As I have already pointed out, in spite of the fact that the SPS. has been regarded as a work of late date, the theory of the means of knowledge as found in it points to the great probability that the sūtras pertaining to this topic belong to an earlier work. As in the other works, so here also, the problem of knowledge is raised in connection with a discussion of the various ways of obtaining salvation.

Knowledge (pramā), and the means of knowledge (pramāna), have been defined in a rather obscure sūtra; dvayaor ekata-rasya vāpi asannikṣārthā-parichittiḥ prama, tatt-sādhakam yat tatt tri-vidham prama-mānam, which has been interpreted differently by Aniruddha and Vijñāna-bhikṣu. According to the former, ‘dvayaḥ’ refers to sense and object, in the case of sense-cognition; and ‘ekata-rasya’ to a mark or a word, in the case of inference or verbal cognition. In place of ‘vā api’, he reads ‘ca api’ and takes ‘asannikṣārthā-parichittiḥ’ to mean ‘the determination of objects not previously determined’. Thus the meaning of the first clause, according to Anirudh-

1. SPS., I. 87; in place of ‘vāpi’ another reading is ‘capi’.
2. Indriyārthayor vidyamānayoḥ pratyakṣe.
3. aparicchinnārtha-parichittiḥ.
dha, is: Pramā is the determination of undetermined objects as the result of both (the sense and the object), (in the case of perception), and of either of the two (a mark or a word, (in the case of inference or verbal cognition). According to Vijñāna-bhikṣu, 'dvayoh' refers to buddhi and puruṣa and 'asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchittih' means 'the ascertain-ment of objects which are not present in, or known to (buddhi and puruṣa). The definition of 'pramā' in the sūtra, according to Vijñāna-bhikṣu, is thus the ascertainment of objects which are not already present in, or known to both (buddhi and puruṣa), or either of them.

Now my objections to the above interpretation are as follows: Firstly, the interpretation of 'dvayor-ekatarasya', according to both Aniruddha and Vijñāna-bhikṣu is entirely arbitrary. Neither the language of the present sūtra, nor a use of the same or of a similar phrase elsewhere, lends any support to the interpretations of the commentators which are themselves entirely different from each other, and are an indication of the fact that both the commentators had nothing by way of a reliable tradition or authority to go by. According to Aniruddha's interpretation, the sūtra contains a definition not only of pramā, but also of all the three pramanās. It is to be noted, however, that a definition of the respective pramanās is given subsequently in sūtras, I, 89, 100 and 101;

1. 'dvayor buddhi-puruṣayoh'.
2. 'asannikṛṣṭaḥ pramatary anārūḍho nādhigatah iti yāvat.'
and the present sūtra is meant only to give a general definition of pramāṇa and all that Aniruddha has to assume and insert in interpreting 'dvayor ekatarasya' so as to make the phrase applicable to the particular pramāṇas is as uncalled for as it is unwarranted by the text of the sūtra. Vijñāna-bhikṣu's interpretation that the phrase refers to buddhi and puruṣa, or either of them, and that pramāṇa is that which belongs to both of them or either of them, is evidently not in accordance with any definite view of cognition including that of the Sāṃkhya; and the various explanation of pramāṇa and pramāṇa, which he gives in his Bhāṣya, are indicative of the fact that he himself was not quite sure of the exact definition meant to be given in the sūtra. It is evident that according to the Sāṃkhya doctrine, the act of cognition (vṛtti) belongs to buddhi, and this, in its turn, is illuminated by the intelligence of puruṣa. Cognition cannot result without the co-operation of both the buddhi and the puruṣa. Where then is the room for interpreting the sūtra so as to mean that cognition belongs to either both of them or one of them? Secondly, although there could be no objection to the statement

1. The text of the Bhāṣya beginning with 'atra-yadi pramāṇānirūpam phalam and ending with 'paramparayaiva sarvatheti bhāvaḥ'.

2. Cf. The Bhāṣya "śa ca vṛttir arthoparakta prativimba-rūpena puruṣārūdhah satī bhāsatā puruṣasyāpariṇāmitayā buddhivat svato arthākāratvāsambhāvāt".
that cognition is the ascertainment of that object which is not already present or known to the mind, ‘anadhigatārtha gantr pramāṇam’ as Aniruddha calls it, it is difficult to see how the compound ‘asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchitīḥ’ means the same here. The interpretations of ‘dvayor ekatarasya and ‘asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchitīḥ’ depend upon each other, and for the meaning of the whole clause it has to be decided in what grammatical relation the second phrase stands to the first.

Dvayoh and ‘ekatarasya’ literally mean ‘of both’, and, ‘of one of them’ respectively. There is no mention of any two objects in any of the immediately preceding or the following sūtras to suggest what two particular objects might have been referred to in the sūtra under consideration. However, the very expression ‘dvayor ekatarasya’ has been used in two other sūtras, viz. I, 75—pūrva-bhāvitve dvayor ekatarasya hāne ‘nyatara-yogāḥ’ and III, 65—‘dvayor ekatarasya vāudāsīnyam apavargaḥ’, in both of which the phrase, at the commentators themselves agree, clearly refers to puruṣa and prakṛti. Now this parallelism strongly suggests that also in this sūtra under discussion the phrase might refer to ‘puruṣa and ‘prakṛti’ and we have to see whether this interpretation of the phrase can be justifiable consistently with the use of the other terms in the sūtra and an intelligible definition of pramāṇa. The next phrase is ‘asannikṛṣṭārtha-paricchitīḥ’, which I take as a Bahuvrīhiḥ compound to
mean 'that ascertainment or determination in which the object (of cognition) is not in contact with or is not directly presented (to the senses)', the phrase being governed by 'dvayor ekatarasya', and case in apposition with 'pramā'. The meaning of the whole clause will thus be: 'pramā' is an ascertainment of both (puruṣa and prakṛti), or of one of them (either puruṣa or prakṛti) in which the object (to be cognised) is not directly presented (to the senses). Now this, I think, forms a fairly intelligible definition of pramā from the Sāṃkhya point of view. The whole object of knowledge, according to the Sāṃkhya, is the ascertainment of puruṣa and prakṛti, and this act has been called pramā in the sūtra. That this is the meaning here is further corroborated by SPS, I, 102, which, at the end of the present section dealing with pramā and pramāṇas, says that the subject of pramāṇa has been explained here because it is by means of pramāṇa that both (puruṣa and prakṛti) are proved—'ubhaya-siddhiḥ pramāṇat tad upanaśah. Further, neither puruṣa nor prakṛti is directly presented to the senses; and hence the act of cognition, through which their existence is ascertained, is defined as asannikṛṣṭārtha' with reference to them, although the pramāṇa, which brings about that ascertainment—tat sādhakam, may be, as it really is, in the case of all the forms, that in which there is a contact of the sense-organs with the objects of the manifested universe.\footnote{Cf. The Bhāṣya on SPS., I, 103—atra hi pratyakṣa—}
tārtha’ would further distinguish the ordinary human cognition of puruṣa and prakṛti from such direct knowledge of the same as is possible to the Yogins. This is the best sense that I can make out of the sūtra consistently with the language of the text and the Sāṅkhyā doctrines. The main difficulty is to find a suitable interpretation of ‘asannikṛṣṭārtha’, which according to the ordinary usage of the terms, ‘sannikarṣa’ and ‘arthā’, should mean ‘the object not in contact’. This sense quite fits in with the interpretation according to which the reference in the sūtra to the cognition of puruṣa and prakṛti; they being signified by the phrase dvayor ekatarasya’. It is to be admitted that such a definition of pramāṇa is rather unusual, but it would not be incorrect, if it is remembered that right cognition strictly interpreted according to the notions of the Sūtra period should pertain to the ultimate and intrinsic forms of reality—viz. puruṣa and prakṛti in the Sāṅkhyā. The use of the word ‘paricchitibhiḥ’ in the sūtra, which strictly means ‘limitation’, instead of the usual term jñānam is also significant, and lends support to the view that what is meant by pramāṇa in this Sūtra is what has been called viveka ‘discrimination’ elsewhere in the SPS, that is to say, knowledge which defines the

siddham etc. which says: ‘after apprehending the fact, which is proved by sense-cognition, namely, that a house and such other things exist for the sake of the body, etc. on the basis of the manifested nature (pradhāna) inference is drawn about the existence of puruṣa who is different in nature from it.’
limits between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.

That which leads to right cognition has been called *pramāṇa*, and this is of three kinds: direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*). These include the rest which are regarded as separate *pramāṇas* by some of the other schools.¹

It is rather striking that as in the case of the definition of *pramāṇa*, so also in the case of the definitions of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāṇa*, the language used in the *SPS.* is very different from that used in the earlier works including the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, and one begins to think that the significance of the definition is not the same as of those in the other works. The definition of *pratyakṣa* is 'yat sambaddham sat tadākāro-llekhi vijñānam tat pratyaksam' (I. 89), which translated literally will mean: 'that knowledge, which being connected (or related), portrays the form thereof, is *pratyakṣa*'. The special feature of this definition seems to be to emphasise two points: (1) that the knowledge called 'pratyakṣa' is regarded more as an act than as a product, which is the implication, for example, in the *Nyāya* definition; and (2) that it is the form of the object (*tadākāra*) which is cognised, and not the object itself; and it is probably for this reason that instead of employing some such words as 'artha-sannikarṣa' etc. which denote a contact of the object cognised, the term

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¹ *SPS.*, I, 88.
‘sambaddha’ has been used in this Sūtra, and asannikrṣṭārtha-paricchittih has been included in the definition of pramāṇa as given in I. 87. It is maintained that this definition of pratyakṣa is not faulty with reference to the pratyakṣa of Yogins; for, in the first place, it is not meant to be applicable to it, that perception being not external; and in the second place, even in the Yogic perception, there is a peculiar relation of the Yogin’s mind to the object perceived (I. 90 and 91).

Inference is defined as knowledge of that which stands in a certain relation, on the part of one who sees (knows) that relation—‘prati-bandha drśāḥ prati-baadha-jñānam anumānam’. Here again, the terms ‘pratibandha’ and ‘pratibaḍḍha’ used in the definition are peculiar to the SPS., while the inclusion of prati-bandha-drśāḥ emphasises the essential feature of inference that it ultimately depends upon the mental activity of a person who knows the relation of the vyāpaka (expressed by the major term) and the vyāpya (expressed by the minor term).

Verbal testimony is defined in the usual way as the word of a reliable authority.

As has already been pointed out, it is said that an exposition of the pramāṇas has been given, because it is through them that puruṣa and prakṛti are proved.1 It is further stated that this proof ultimately depends upon the sāmānyatodṛśa inference, which proceeds on the basis of the principle of causation.

1. SPS., I, 102.
The definition of buddhi², ahaṅkāra³, manas⁴ and the indriyas⁵ are the same as given in the Sāmkhya-kārikā; and the same functions and importance are attributed to each of them as in the Karika.

The nature of reality and illusion is discussed with reference to the views of the Buddhists, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Vedāntists and Naiyyāyikas; and what has been called sad-asad-khyāti is maintained to be the right doctrine, according to which an object is real ( sad ) or unreal ( asad ) according as it is not proved to be false, or proved to be false by subsequent experience ( V. 52 to 56 ).

What strikes one most in the SPS. is the importance attached to śruti (scriptures), which is regarded as the highest unimpeachable authority—śrutyā siddhasya napatāpas tatpratyakṣa bādhat (I. 147)—‘that which is proved by the scriptures is not to be denied, for it supersedes ( the authority of ) sense-cognition⁶; and then again ‘nija-śokty abhivyakteḥ svataḥ prāmāṇyan’—there is the self-validity (of the Vedas) because of the manifestation of their own

1. Ibid., II, 13.
2. Ibid., II, 16.
3. Ibid., II, 26.
5. The commentators have interpreted the Sūtra a little differently, but the sense emphasised here is not affected, and so I do not enter into a discussion of their rendering.
power.¹

The SPS. is one with the other systems in regarding knowledge (jñāna) as the means of salvation—'jñānān muktih' and in further holding that this knowledge, which is also called discrimination (viveka), is acquired by the practice of yoga and renunciation (VI, 29).

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1. Aniruddha takes this sūtra to refer to all the three pramāṇas, but considering that the immediately preceding sūtras contain a discussion about the authority of the Vedas the context demands that the reference here is also to the same subject.
PART IV.

EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE SCHOLASTIC PERIOD.
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The Philosophical Sūtras were followed by a number of commentaries and sub-commentaries, which, though they apparently aimed at only explaining their meaning, added much to what the Sūtras had contained, and not infrequently, also altered their original significance. The reasons for those additions and alterations on the part of the commentators were twofold: firstly, they wanted to insert fresh matter on certain subjects with a view to keeping their own systems abreast of the developments in the other systems and secondly, they were anxious to find an authority in the original authors for whatever they had to say by way of refutation of the doctrines of their opponents. An example of the first of these is to be found in the fact that the epistemological theories of Mimāṃsā and the Vedānta had their origin in the works of the commentators on the Mimāṃsā and the Vedānta Sūtra; and of the second in that most of the refutation of the Buddhist and the Jaina doctrines in behalf of the Hindu Schools is the work of the commentators on the Philosophical Sūtras.

During the period under consideration while the Buddhist logic and the Jaina logic are evidently the result of the influence of the Hindu logic of the previous period, they, in their turn, are the occasion of some of the scholastic developments in the later
logic and epistemology of the Hindu writers. The positive theory of epistemology as found in Diṅnāga and Dharamkīrti is a contrast to Nāgārjuna's denial of the means of knowledge, and is certainly a fresh departure in Buddhist philosophy. That the Hindu and the Buddhist writers did influence each other is evident from such affinity of doctrines as is to be found between Praśastapāda and Diṅnāga. Similarly, such facts as the introduction of epistemological discussions into the Mīmāṃsā system by Prabhākara and Kumārila; or into the Vedānta by Gauḍapāda, Saṃkara and Rāmānuja; or again the development of a more theoretical and exclusive treatment of logical and epistemological subjects in the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika School, which ultimately led to the creation of the New School of logic (nāvya-nyāya), were all the result of the existence of strong schools of the Buddhist and the Jaina logic during this period. The following sections dealing with the important authors of each of the schools will bear out the truth of these remarks.

1. THE LATER BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY.

(i) A Positive Theory of Buddhist Epistemology according to Diṅnāga.

Ācārya Diṅnāga, the Buddhist logician may be said to have inaugurated a new era in the history of logic and epistemology in so far as, by treating the theory of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) as a subject by itself, he departed from the usual
practice of the previous Hindu schools of dealing both with the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge (prameya) together. In the history of Buddhist epistemology itself, his positive theory of knowledge presents a striking contrast to Nagārjuna’s denial of the means of knowledge. None of Diṅnāga’s works exists complete in Sanskrit; but several are preserved in Tibetan translation; and a few Sanskrit fragments are found in the works of the Nyāya Commentators. The account of Diṅnāga’s epistemology as given here is mainly based upon the Sanskrit fragments.

According to Diṅnāga, there are only two means of knowledge: direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna); for knowledge by similarity (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda) are, according to him, cases of either direct knowledge, or of inference. Knowledge by similarity is shown to be a case of verbal testimony, and this, in its turn, of direct knowledge, or of inference—pratyakṣagamabhyaṁ nopamānam bhidyate, etc. The position of Diṅnāga on the subject and its refutation by Uddyotakara are found as follows in the Nyāya-vārtika:

1. A summary of some of these has been given by VB. in his HIL.

2. These have been collected by H. N. Randle in his monograph on Fragments From Diṅnāga (Royal Asiatic Society publication); and some of them have also been noticed by Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his HIL.

"Knowledge by similarity is not distinct from sense-cognition and testimony. How so? Because when a person sees both the cow and the gayal, in that case, it is by sense-cognition that he apprehends that this is like that, and when he is told that the gayal is like the cow, in that case, it is just on the hearing of this that the knowledge arises in his mind that some of the qualities of the cow are found in the gayal and others are not; as otherwise the word ‘like’ would not have been used by the speaker; and he apprehends a preponderant sameness of the qualities of the gayal with those of the cow. For this reason, knowledge by similarity is not distinct from sense-cognition and verbal testimony. On this account of the matter, what the person apprehends is (in the latter case) the resemblance of the cow to the gayal, or (in the former case) the existence of the gayal (as qualified by resemblance to the cow)."

'What understanding the Buddha shows of the nature of the pramāṇa' says Uddyotakara. 'The Sūtra really means that as a result of apprehending the resemblance of the gayal to the cow, the person realises the relation of the name 'gayal' to this particular object. Therefore, what is urged is irrelevant and arises from ignorance of what the Sūtra means'. This criticism of Diṅnāga's view on the subject is characteristic of the Nyāya School which maintains that neither sense-cognition nor verbal testimony by

1. Nyāya-sūtra, 1, 1, 6.

2. Transl. as in FD., pp. 49 and 50, with slight alterations.
itself will enable a person to identify the animal gayal as gayal.

The following quotation found in the NVT, with regard to verbal testimony has been identified by Vidyābhūṣaṇa from the Tibetan versions as being a passage in the Second Chapter of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya¹: Ṛpta-vakya-visamvāda-sāmānyād anumānatā, ‘it (verbal testimony) is of the nature of inference, because it is based upon the common character of corroborativeness belonging to the words of a reliable person’. Vācaspati Miśra commenting upon the NV. in connection with this subject says: ‘Here Diśnāga, not putting up with (the view which regards) verbal testimony as a separate pramāṇa, attacks the definition² by means of a dilemma which is this: ‘Reliable testimony means either the reliability of a trustworthy person, or the truth about an object. If it means the reliability of the person, then knowledge is obtained by inference; if it means the truth of the object, this is obtained by sense-cognition, for the truth about a thing is known (only) when a person apprehends the object by means of sense-cognition.’

According to Diśnāga direct knowledge (pratyākṣa) is that which is other than imagination (Kalpa-nābodham), and is unconnected with name, genus, etc. (nāma-jāty-ādy asamytam)³. It will appear that this definition of direct knowledge omits the usual

1. HIL. p. 288; FD., pp. 17 and 18.
2. As given in NS. I, 1, 7.
3. This description of direct knowledge as found in Chap.
condition of the contact of the (five) sense-organs with the objects of cognition, which is found in the earlier definitions of direct knowledge. This omission has evidently been made in order to include in the definition such forms of direct presentation as mental cognition (mano-vijñāna), self-consciousness (atma-samvedana) and mystic cognition (yogi-jñāna), which came to be distinctly recognised by Dharma-kirti as forms of direct knowledge in his Nyāyabindu. Further, the condition in the definition that direct knowledge is other than imagination restricts its application, in the case of sense-cognition, to knowledge by mere presentation, such as was called nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa by the later Nyāya logicians. In fact, it was some such definition of direct knowledge as is found in Diṅnāga which must have provided the Hindu logicians an occasion for distinguishing direct knowledge as non-reflective and nondescriptive (nirvikalpaka) and reflective and descriptive (savikalpaka). This definition of pratyakṣa has been vehemently criticised by Uddyotakara in his NV. I, 1, 4. It will appear though that most of his criticism is off the point. For example, Uddyotakara observes: “Secondly (as regards the definition itself), if the expression ‘alpanāborūṇham’ is meant to denote direct knowledge (pratyakṣa), then the defi-

I of the Tibetan version of Pramāṇa-samuccaya has been rendered into Sanskrit by VB. (HIL. p. 277) as follows:

Pratyakṣam kalpaṇābodham,
Nāma-jāty-ādy-āṣaṃyutam-
nition involves a self-contradiction. And, if direct knowledge is not denoted by the phrase *kalpanāboḍham*, then the use of the phrase is altogether useless. Further, the statement: ‘*pratyakṣam kalpanāboḍham*’ is in the form of a sentence. Now, what is expressed by this sentence? If it is direct knowledge which is expressed by it, there is the same self-contradiction. How so? Because direct knowledge is actually expressed, ex-hypothesi, by the phrase *kalpanāboḍham* and yet it is called ‘inexpressible’ (*na abhidheyyam*); who else except the Buddha can make such a statement? If, on the other hand, the phrase does not mean sense-cognition, then the assertion: *pratyakṣam kalpanāboḍham* becomes a mere utterance of (meaningless) words’. The whole of this criticism is misdirected. It is based upon a confusion between the statement which constitutes the definition of direct knowledge and the act of cognition to which it refers. The definition of direct knowledge is not the act of cognition, and the fact that the definition is expressed in language does not mean that the act of cognition is thereby denoted by name or language and hence a contradiction arises as Uddyotakara would have us believe.

Although Uddyotakara strongly criticises Diṇṇāga’s definition of *pratyakṣa* for its laying down

1. That is to say, *pratyakṣa* has been defined as that which cannot be expressed by a name, and yet it is expressed here by the phrase ‘*kalpanābodham*’.
2. Now speaking about the definition as a whole.
the condition that it should be unconnected with name, he has nothing to say against the definition of pratyakṣa as contained in NS., I, 1. 4, which also, according to him, anyhow, requires that direct knowledge should be unnameable—avyapadesyam.¹

According to other fragments which presumably belong to Diśnāga,² direct knowledge is described as that which determines its object (paricchedākam), represents the individual nature of that object (viṣaya-svarūpānūvidhāyi) and is cognised or proved by itself (ātma-samvedyam, or pratyakṣenaiva siddhyati).

While criticising the definition of direct knowledge as given in the Nyāya-sūtras,³ Diśnāga maintains, against Vātsyāyana, that the author of the Nyāya-sūtras did not include mind (manas) among the sense-organs⁴, and the omission to do so is inconsistent with regarding pleasure and pain as objects of cognition. This is expressed in the following couplet which is found in NVT, I, 1. 4., and has been identified by VB. by means of the Tibetan with a verse of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya⁵:

1. Yad idam anupayukta-sabdārtha-sambandhasya viṣaya-bhedānūvidhāyi vijñānam, tat pratyakṣam. etc. NV. (B. Indica) p. 38.
2. FD., p. 9–N V. and NVT.
3. Viz. indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jñānam, etc.
5. VB., HIL., p. 280; FD. p. 13.
Na sukhādi prameyam va mano vāstindriyāntaram,  
Aniśedhād upattam ced anyendriya-rutam vrthā.

Either pleasure, etc., are not objects of cognition;  
or else, mind is an additional sense-organ. If it be  
maintained\(^1\) that it has been taken as a sense-organ  
( because in the NS. ) there is no denial of it as such,  
then the mentioning of the other sense-organs is use-  
less.\(^2\)

The following fragment\(^3\) found in NVT. refers to  
the Vaiśeṣika account of direct knowledge as given in  
VS. IV, 1. 6 "yadi rūpaṃ eva cākṣusam tato na dra-  
vyaṃ cākṣusam syāt tathā ca mahad-āneka\(^4\) dravya-  
samavāyād rūpāc copalabhaddir iti dravya-cākṣuṣa-  
tvābhidhānanam vyāhanyate"—if colour only is the  
object of sight, then substance cannot be the object  
of sight; and thus there will be a contradiction in  
the assertion of the visibility of substance which has  
been made in the sentence: 'tathā ca mahad-āneka-  
dravya-samavāyād rupāc copaladbhiḥ'. As has been  
pointed out by the NVT., according to the Vaiśeṣika,  
only those substances, viz. earth, water and fire, are  
cognised\(^5\), which possess colour; not that only colour

1. As has been maintained by Vātsyāyana in his NB.
2. That is to say, the other sense-organs could as well have  
   been left unmentioned.
3. FD. p. 16.
4. VS., IV, 1. 6 reads mahatyaneka etc. according to all  
   the editions that I have been able to consult. Cf. Praś  
   astapāda, p. 186 ( Vizianagram S, S. ), NVT., p. 129.
5. The word in the text is 'upalabdhiḥ', which literally  
   means 'apprehension'.
is cognizable. That is to say the substance is cognised along with and through its colour, although it will be true to say that it is only colour which is seen (cākṣuśam). There is a clear distinction between visibility (cākṣuśam) and apprehension or cognition (upalabdhi), which does not appear to have been made either by Diśnāga, or his critics, while considering this text.

In the NV. the text: ‘apare tu bruvate nāntarīya-kārtha-darsanam tad vid̄o’ numānam,”—others again say the cognition of a thing is (the instrument of) inference for one who knows that it is inseparably connected² probably refers to Diśnāga’s definition of inference. In Chapter, II of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Inference is divided into two kinds: inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and inference for others (parārthānumāna). Inference for oneself is defined as the knowledge of an object obtained through a mark or sign which has three characters: (1) effect (kārya) that is to say, the mark may be an effect of that which is inferred, (2) identity (svabhāva), the mark may be in essence identical with the thing to be inferred, (3) non-cognition (anupalabdhi) the non-cognition of a mark may be indicative of the non-existence of that which is to be inferred.

According to Diśnāga, who takes the usual example of fire and smoke, it is neither the fire, nor the connection between the fire and the hill, which is

1. NV., p. 56, quoted in FD., p. 21.
2. HIL., p. 280.
inferred; it is the fiery hill which forms the object of inference. His argument is that the connection between fire and smoke is already known, (that is to say, before the inference), and there is nothing new to be inferred. As regards the inference of the connection between the fire and the hill, he says that only the hill is visible, and not the fire, and hence there can be no conclusion about the connection between the two. Hence, it is the fiery hill which is inferred.

The above contention of Diñnāga is not right for the following reasons:

(1) What is inferred in a particular case is not the connection between smoke and fire in general, which, Diñnāga says, is already known; but the connection between the particular column of smoke, which is seen at a particular time and place, and the fire which is the cause of it.

(2) In order to establish a connection by inference it is not necessary that both the objects which are connected with each other should be visible. If both of them were visible, it would be a case of sense-cognition. Hence on seeing the smoke arising out of a particular hill, the presence of fire on that hill can be inferred.

(3) I do not see the distinction which Diñnāga proposes to draw between the hill as considered in connection with fire and the fiery hill. If the inference of fiery hill means simply the fact that from the observance of smoke it is inferred that the hill has
fire on it, then it is the same thing as to infer a connection between the hill and the fire—which inference Diśnāga does not admit. If by ‘fiery hill’ is meant the hill as seen to have fire, the case would be one of sense-cognition of both the hill and the fire, and not that of inference.

Inference for others (pararthānumāna) is the demonstration to others of what has been cognised by oneself—pararthānumānam tu svādṛśārtha prakāśanam.

The Pramāṇa-samuccaya further deals with the various possible forms of syllogistic inference, which it will be out of place to mention here.

(ii) Theories of Direct Knowledge and Inference in the Nyāya-bindu of Dharma-kirti.

The next important development in Buddhist epistemology is to be found in Dharma-kirti’s Nyāya-bindu. The special feature of this work is the fourfold classification of direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) which includes three kinds of non-sensuous direct cognition. The influence of the Nyāya school on the epistemology of this work is evident from the fact that, in the definition of direct-knowledge, the condition that it should be non-errorneous (abhrānta), which was absent in Diśnāga’s definition, has been

1. Cf. NVT. 1., 1. 5. p. 120.
2. Quoted in the Ślokavārtika Tīkā, p. 252., HIL., p. 282; FD., p. 28.
3. HIL., pp. 282-287.
included; and the test of the reality of a thing (vastu) has been accepted to be the same as that in the Nyāya school, viz., that it could serve some purpose—arthakriyā-sāmarthyam.

The Nyāya-bindu¹ is a small work consisting of three chapters. The first chapter deals with the nature of direct knowledge. It begins with the assertion that all the objects of man’s life are accomplished by means of right knowledge (samyag-jñāna), and inference (anumāna). Of these direct knowledge is defined as that which is non-reflective (kalpanā-poḍha) and non-erroneous (abhrānta); the term ‘kalpanā’ being explained as ‘the cognition of an appearance which might be connected with words’—abhilāpa-saṁsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ².

1. The work is available with its commentary Nyāya-bindutikā in Peterson’s edition (Bib. Indica), and Stcherbatsky’s edition in the Bib. Buddica Series. I have used Peterson’s edition for reference.

2. Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa understands ‘kalpanā’ to mean error (HIL. p. 310). He says: ‘Preconception refers to the experience of false images which appear real as if they were capable of being addressed and touched; e. g. the shadow of a tree may appear as the tree itself, or a rope may appear as a snake’. It is clear from Dharma-kirtī’s own explanation of kalpanā that he does not mean by it ‘false images’ but a cognition which can be expressed by words. Cf. NBT. p. 10, abhilapayate ‘neneti’ abhilāpo-vācakaḥ śabdaḥ; then ‘abhilāpa-saṁsargāya yogyo’ bhidheyabhāso yasyām pratitau sā tathoktā.
The examples of error are such as arise from darkness, quick whirling motion, journey by a boat, and shaking, etc. This definition of direct knowledge is the same as that given by Diṅnāga with the addition of the condition that it should be free from error.

Then follows a classification of direct knowledge. It is said to be of four kinds: (1) sense-cognition (indriya-jñāna); mental cognition (mano-vijñāna); self-consciousness (ātma-samvedana), and mystic cognition (yogi-jñāna).

There is a disparity between the construction adopted by Peterson in the published Sanskrit text of the Nyāya-bindu and that followed by the author of the Nyāya-bindu-ṭika. It is rather curious that Peterson, who edited both the text and the commentary for the first time and in one and the same volume, should not have noticed this disparity between the construction of the text which he had adopted and that followed by the commentator. In order to make the disparity clear, and discuss the interpretation of the text in question, it is necessary to quote the Sanskrit original as it is published in Peterson’s edition.


The construction followed by the author of the NBT. as follows.

Tac caturvidham. Indriya-jñānam; sva-viṣaya...janitam tan mano-vijñānam; sarvam citta-caittānām ātma-samveda-nam; bhūtārtha...yogi-jñānam ceti.
Now the definitions of the four kinds of *pratyakṣa* would be different according to the reading adopted in the text. It is evident that Peterson did not attempt to divide the passage in question into all the possible sentences, for he has only two divisions of the passage, and these include four definitions. Further to treat *‘indriya-jñāna’* as a part of the following compound *‘sva-viṣaya’* etc. is clearly a mistake, and we should read *‘indriya-jñānam’*. Hence, the unsatisfactory nature of the text in this edition is evident; and a mere disparity between the construction found in this text and that followed by the commentator would be no argument to question the definitions as understood and explained by the author of the *NBT*.¹

The following are the definitions of the various kinds of direct knowledge according to the *NBT*.

1. *Sense-cognition (indriya-jñāna)* is that which belongs to the senses, or which depends upon the senses.²

2. *Mental-cognition (mano-vijñāna)* is that which is caused by an immediate and cognate condition³ (in continuation) of a sense-cognition supported by an object, which is immediately contiguous to the

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1. Stacherbatsky follows the *NBT*, in determining the division of the text for the purpose of defining the four kinds of inference.
3. ‘*sāmanantara pratyayena*’ which is thus explained by *NBT*. ‘*samas* cāsau jñānantareṇa anantaracāsūvavyavahitatvena sa cāsau pratyayaśca hetuvat sāmanantara-pratyayaḥ.”
object which is its own (i.e. of the sense-cognition). This definition is explained by NBT. to mean that mental cognition is the grasping of an object the next moment after, and in continuation of the object of sense-cognition,\textsuperscript{1} and further that it is regarded as pratyakṣa (of the nature of mano-vijñāna) after the sense-organ\textsuperscript{2} has ceased in its operation; for so long as it is in operation the cognition depends upon the sense\textsuperscript{3} only.

3. Self-consciousness (ātma-samvedana) is all that which belongs to citta and caitta, the former being explained by the NBT as that which simply grasps the object—artha-mātra-grāhi; and the latter as those, such as pleasure etc. which grasp particular (mental) conditions. ‘caittta-viśesāvastha-grāhīṇāḥ sukhaḍayaḥ’. The commentator further asserts that there is no state of citta in which the cognition of self would not be pratyakṣa, and that form of cognition by which the self is known is pratyakṣa called ‘ātma-samvedanam’—yena hi rūpeṇātmā vedyate tad rūpam ātma-samvednam pratyakṣam.

4. Mystic cognition (yogi-jñāna) is that which is produced by the extreme limit of mediation upon the

\begin{enumerate}
\item “tathā ca satāndriyajñāna-viśaya-kṣaṇād uttara-kṣāne ekasantāntārabhūto gṛhitāḥ” NBT. p. 13.
\item The text of the commentary mentions only the eye caksuḥ.
\item “etac ca mano-vijñānam uparata-vyāpāre caksuṣi pratyakṣam iṣyate. Vyāpāra-vati tu caksuṣi yad rūpajñānam tat sarvam caksurāśritam eva” NBT. p. 13.
\end{enumerate}
nature of reality. According to NBT, the extreme limit of meditation is that stage where reality just falls short of being revealed fully¹.

The above are the definitions as explained by the author of NBT, and, following him, by the later writers. If we are to follow the Sanskrit text as found in Peterson’s edition, what is taken to be the definition of mental cognition (mano-vijñāna) by the author of the NBT. would be the definition of sense-cognition (indriya-jñāna), and it is not clear, anyhow from the text, what in that case would be the definition of mental cognition and self-consciousness. It is evident, however, that what has been treated by Peterson in his text as the definition of sense-cognition is not so; for the words: ‘indriya-jñānena samānāntara-pratyayena janitānām tat’—‘that which is produced by a cognate and immediate sense-cognition’² clearly indicate that the definition or description contained in this clause refers to something other than sense-cognition, viz. that which is produced by sense-cognition, and it is mental cognition (mano-vijñānam) which is meant.

1. ‘sampūrṇāvasthāyāh prāktanyāvasthā sphutābhātva-prak-arṣaparyantā ucyate’. NBT. p. 15.

2. Although the NBT. does not take ‘samanāntara pratyayena’ as an adjective qualifying ‘indriya-jñānena’, it recognises that sense-cognition is said to be the cause of mental cognition according to this description—‘tad aneaika-santānāntara-bhūtayor evendriya-jñāna-mano-vijñānayor janya-janaka-bhāve manovijñānam pratyakṣam ityuktam bhavati’ NBT., p. 13.
The object of direct knowledge is an entity as possessed of its own nature (sva-lakṣaṇa). An entity is said to be possessed of its own nature, when its proximity or remoteness makes a difference to its apprehension\(^1\), that is to say, when it is actually presented. This is also called real existence (paramārtha-sat), for a real thing (vastu) is that which can serve some purpose—artha-kriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇa-tvād.

This direct knowledge is the result of pramāṇa; for it consists of the apprehension of the object; while the pramāṇa itself is correspondance (of cognition) to the object, for it is through it that the apprehension of the object is established\(^2\).

Such is the definition, the classification and the nature of direct knowledge as contained in the First Chapter of the NB. With regard to the definition of direct knowledge, as has already been pointed out, the condition that it should be free from error (abhrānta) has been added to Diṅnāga’s definition of the same. The explanation of this addition is evidently to be found in the realistic position of Dharma-kirti, according to whom, things are truly real, and can, therefore, be also perceived as such by means of the pramāṇas. The definition of pratyakṣa given here agrees in the respect with that of the NS., according

2. Artha-svārūpyam asyām pramāṇam tad-vāśād artha-pratiti-siddher iti.
to which also **pratyakṣa** is to be non-erroneous (**avya-bhicāri**). In respect of the test of reality and the relation between cognition and the object cognised too, Dharma-kirti’s position is the same as that of the *Nyāya* school, viz. that an object is real in so far as it can serve some purpose, and it is cognised correctly in so far as the cognition corresponds to the object. In other words, it is a theory of representative perception which the author of the *NB* holds. Cognition resembles the object by which it is produced; as far example, that which is produced by blueness resembles blueness. This resemblance is called its form (**ākāra**), as also its appearance (**ābhāsa**)—says Dharmottara, the author of *NBT*. while commenting on the text. The main difficulty of Dharma-kirti’s position is the same as that of any theory of representative perception, viz. the unsupported assumption that cognition corresponds to reality.

According to Dharma-kirti, while direct knowledge reveals the individual nature of an entity (**sva-lakṣaṇa**), inference has for its object the general nature (**sāmānaya-lakṣaṇa**) of it. This is evidently so, because in inference, the object is not presented, and whatever is known about it can be only of a general nature.

1. *Yasmād viśayāj jñānam udeti tad-viśaya-sādṛṣṭam, tad bhavati, yathā nīlād utpadyamānām nīla-sādṛṣṭam, tace sādṛṣṭam ākāra ity ābhāsa ity apivyayadīśyate. NBT.* p. 18.
Inference is of two kinds: (1) that for oneself (svārtha), and (2) that for others (parārtha).

Inference for oneself is the cognition of the object to be inferred by means of a middle term, which possesses three characteristics. These are as follows:

(a) That it should be present in the object denoted by a minor term (anumeyesattvam).

(b) That it should be present only in such objects as are of the same nature as that denoted by the major term (sapakṣē eva sattvam).

(c) That it should be absent from such objects as are of a different nature from that denoted by the major term (asapakṣē cāsattvam eva).

For example, in the following argument:
The hill has fire on it,
Because it has smoke on it,
Like a kitchen, but unlike a lake,

the inference is based upon (a) the presence of smoke on the hill; (b) the presence of smoke only at such places, like a kitchen, where there is fire, and (c) the absence of smoke from such places, as a lake, where there is no fire.

The Later Jaina Epistemology.

Like the later Buddhist epistemology, the Jaina epistemology also of the scholastic period shows evident signs of the influence of the Hindu schools.
The definitions and classifications of the various kinds of knowledge as found in the works of such important Jaina logicians as Siddha-sena Divākara, Māṇikya Nandi and Deva Śūri present a remarkable contrast to those in Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthadhiṣṭhigamamsūtra of the previous period. The definitions of direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) and indirect knowledge (parokṣa) as found in these later Jaina works are altogether different from those given by Umāsvāti, and are in accordance with the definitions of these kinds of knowledge as given by the Hindu logicians. Direct knowledge comes to be defined as that which pertains to objects presented to the senses; and indirect knowledge that which has to do with objects beyond the senses. Similarly, the usual classification of knowledge in these later Jaina writers is more in accordance with the terminology found in the works of Hindu logic than with that found in the TS.

(i) Later Jaina epistemology as found in the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara.

The first work in which we find the later modified epistemology of Jainism is Siddhasena Divākara’s Nyāyāvatāra. It is a short treatise containing in outline the logical and the epistemological views of its author.

The work opens with defining pramāṇa as that knowledge which is free from obstruction (bādha-vivarjita), and which illumines itself and other things
(sva-parābhāsi). In accordance with the objects known by means of pramāṇa, it is either direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) or indirect knowledge (parokṣa).

Of the above, direct knowledge is that which takes cognisance of objects which are not beyond the senses; and indirect knowledge is that which is of a different kind. It will appear that the definition of direct knowledge as given here is the opposite of that found in the earlier Jaina works, which called knowledge obtained through the senses indirect.

Inference is that knowledge which determines the major term (sādhyā-niścāyaka) through a mark (linga—the middle term), which is inseparably connected with the major term. Like direct knowledge (samakṣavat), being a means of knowledge, inference is also free from error (abhrānta).

Verbal testimony is defined as knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance, express reality not inconsistent with what is established by direct knowledge.

Scriptural testimony (śāstram) is the knowledge possessed by a reliable person, which is not to be transgressed (anullaṅghya), which is not contradictory to that established by direct knowledge, which communicates truth, which is universal (sarva) and which is destructive of the evil path.

1. NA., 5.
2. NA., 8.
3. NA., 9.
By its very definition and nature a pramāṇa is to be taken as free from error. It is a contradiction to say that pramāṇa is erroneous (bhrānta).¹ As it is not proved that the whole word of appearance is a matter of error, it is evident that pramāṇa, as determining itself and other things, serves to establish the reality of both.²

Direct knowledge and inference are sources of both knowledge for oneself (svārtha) and for others (parārtha). Like the acts of direct cognition and inference, the statements which express them are also called by those names, for they are means of communication to others.³ It will appear that this division of inference has also been imported into Jaina logic from the Hindu logic.

Then after the nature of syllogistic inference and the fallacies incidental to it have been explained in detail, the author draws a distinction between the ordinary means of knowledge and the absolute direct knowledge (kevalam pratyaksam), which latter is defined as that which is free from all obstruction (sakalāvaraṇa-muktātma), and which constantly illuminates the essential nature of all things (sakalārthatma-satata-pratibhāsanam)⁴.

The result of the means of knowledge is the removal of ignorance (ajñāna-nivartana), of absolute

1. NA., 6.
2. Ibid., 7.
4. NA., 27.
knowledge (kevalasya) bliss and equanimity, and of the rest (kind of knowledge) the notion of selecting or rejecting an object (ādāna.hāna-dhīkh).¹

The doctrine of naya is introduced by the twenty-nineth verse. It is said that an object has various aspects, (anekāntātmakam), and all of them are the object of all-sided knowledge, while one particular aspect of it is the object of (knowledge called) naya. In other words the nayas are the ways of looking at an object from a particular point of view.

Knowledge which determines the complete meaning of an object from the point of view of the various nayas, or in other words, which looks at an object from all the points of view, is called Syād-vāda-śruta. The nayas and syād-vāda are explained in detail in the commentary Nyāyāvatāra-vivrttiḥ.²

The soul is described as the knower (pramātr); that which illumines itself and others (svānya-nirbhāsin); the doer, the enjoyer, the changing (vivṛttimān); that which is proved by its own self-consciousness (sva-samvedana-samsiddha); one different in nature from the earth and the other elements.³

In the last verse it is said that the system of pramāṇa etc. is without a beginning or an end, (anādi-
nidhanātmika) which according to the commentator, implies that the world is eternal.

The next two important works on Jaina logic and epistemology during this period are the Parikṣāmukha-sūtra of Māṇikya Nandi and the Pramāṇā-naya-tattvālokālāṅkāra of Deva Sūri. Both of them are written on similar lines, and differ in certain respects from Siddhasena Divākara’s Nyāyāvatāra in their theory of knowledge.

(ii) Theory of Knowledge in the Parikṣāmukha-sūtra of Māṇikya Nandi.

Pramāṇa is defined as that definite knowledge of an object which was not definitely known to oneself previously.¹ It takes the form of such a sentence as ‘I know the jar by myself,’² which implies the apprehension of an object, the agent, the instrument and the act (of cognition).³ Like a lamp it illumines both itself and other things.⁴ It will appear that this definition and description of pramāṇa exactly corresponds to that of the Nyāya School as found in the NS. and Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-bhaṣya. The condition that the object of knowledge should not be known to oneself

1. I, 1. Svapurvārtha vyavasayatmakam jñānam pramāṇam, The ‘apurvārtha’ is explained in I, 4 as ‘uniscito pūrvārthaḥ.
previously (svāpūrvvārtha) in the definition of pramāṇa here is just an equivalent of ‘knowledge of that which is not known’ (anadhigatagantr) used by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers later on.

Pramāṇa is divided into direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) and indirect knowledge (parokṣa) just as in the Nyāyāvatāra; and these are also defined in the same way. Indirect knowledge (parokṣa) is further subdivided into memory (smṛti); recognition (pratyabhijñāna); argumentation (tarka); inference (anumāna); and scriptural testimony (āgama).

Memory is of the form of ‘that is so’, and is due to the awakening of past impressions; for example, the recollection: ‘He is Devadatta’.

Recognition is the ascertainment of an object (samkalanam) by means of perception through recollection (darśana smaranaṇakāraṇakam), and takes such forms as ‘this is the same’ (tad evedam); this is like that (tat-sadṛśam; ‘this is different from that’ (tadvīlakṣaṇam); ‘this is the counter-part of that, ‘etc. (tat-pratīyogītyādi’; as for example, ‘this is the same Devadatta’; ‘the gayal is like a cow’; ‘the buffalo is different from a cow’; ‘this is far from that’; ‘this is a tree’, etc. It will appear from this definition of recognition that it includes what has been called knowledge by similarity (upamāṇa) in the Hindu schools.

1. III, 2.
2. III, 3, 4.
3. III, 5 and 6.
Argumentation, which is called tarka or ūha, is the knowledge of pervasion (vyāpti jñānam) based upon the presence or absence (of one thing in relation to another), and takes the form: 'If this is, that is, (If A is, B is); 'If this is not, that is not, (If A is not, B is not ); 'as for example, If there is smoke, there is fire; If there is no fire, there is no smoke.' It will appear that this kind of reasoning is equivalent to what in Western logic is called a hypothetical—catagorical syllogism, in which a conclusion is obtained by (a) affirming the antecedent, or (b) by denying the consequent, in the minor premise. For example:

(a) If there is smoke, there is fire;
   There is smoke;
   There is fire;

or
(b) If there is smoke, there is fire;
   There is no fire;
   There is no smoke.

Inference is the knowledge of the major term (sādhyā) by means of the middle term (sādhana). The canon and the various parts of a syllogistic argument are defined in the usual way.

Scriptural testimony is that knowledge of objects which depends upon reliable utterance, etc.; for specially qualified persons, etc. (viśiṣṭādayāṇi) are the

1. III, 7 and 8.
2. III, 9; 'sādhanāt sādhyā-vijñānam anumānam.'
cause of the cognition of the real nature of objects because of inspiration due to their natural capacity.¹

The objects of knowledge are either general or particular in character.² The general are of two kinds: cross-wise (tiryaṅ) and vertical (ūrdhvata).³ The cross-wise general is a homogeneous attribute in a number of individuals of the same species; e. g., cowhood in a number of cows.⁴ The vertical general is a homogeneous substance in a number of prior and posterior transformations in it (parāpara-vivarta-vyāpida-ravyam), e.g., clay in different things made of clay.⁵

The particular is also of two kinds: successive particulars (paryāya), and dissimilar particulars (vyatireka). The successive particulars are those which appear one after another is one and the same substance e.g. pleasure and pain in the soul⁶. The dissimilar particulars are those dissimilar forms which appears in different objects; e.g. cows, buffaloes, etc.⁷

1. III, 94 and 95.
2. IV. 1. sāmānya viśesaṁta taḍartho viṣayaḥ.
3. The terms ‘cross-wise’ and ‘vertical’ as translations of ‘tiryaṅ’ and ‘ūrdhvata’ have been suggested to me through a paper by Prof. F. W. Thomas on ‘An Indian Doctrine of Perception and Error’ in ASP., 1921-22, pp. 31 and 32.
4. IV, 4.
5. IV, 5.
It is clear that the two kinds of 'generals' refer to the generality of attribute and of substance respectively; and the two kinds of 'particulars' to the particulars in one and the same substance, and those which represent different substances. The former kinds of particulars would thus be attributes as distinguished from the latter which would be substances.

This division of generals and particulars is, therefore, evidently based upon the distinctions of substance and attribute rather than upon any other principle. It appears to be introduced for the first time into Jaina epistemology by Maṇikya Nandi, probably because of the influence of such Hindu writers as Prabhākara and Kumārila, who also discussed the subject in their works at about the same period. In PMS., VI, 56 and 57, in connection with

1. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's renderings of the two kinds of generals (HIL., p. 192) as homogeneous (tiryak) and heterogeneous (urdhvata) are neither correct translations of the terms, nor are they indicative of the right interpretations of them. To speak of a 'heterogeneous general' is a contradiction in terms. Similarly his description of the particular called 'paryāya' as 'relating to action' such as pleasure, pain etc., experienced by the soul' as absolutely unjustifiable; for there is nothing in the text to suggest that this kind of particular pertains to action, and, further it is absurd to talk of pleasure and pain as actions.

2. This subject has been further discussed in the next Chapter in connection with a similar division by Deva Sūri in his Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra.
a discussion about the number of pramāṇas, there is a reference to the Lokāyatika, the Buddhist, the Saṃkhya, the Yoga, the Prabhakara, and the Jaimini Schools, which would indicate that the author of the PMS was in close touch with the developments in the Hindu schools of logic and epistemology, and had them in mind while writing this work.

(iii) Deva Sūri’s Pramṇa-naya-tattvālokālānīkāra.

The definition and classification of knowledge in PNT. are very similar to those in the PMS. of Māṇikya Nandi and also to those in the TS. of Umāsvāti and the Nyāyāvatāra of siddhasena Divākara. Pramṇa is said to be definite knowledge which illumines itself and other objects, and is opposed to the super-imposition of one thing on another (samāropaparipanṭhi). Knowledge is either direct (prat-yakṣa) or indirect (parokṣa). Of these the former is called clear and vivid (spaṭṭa) and the latter not clear (aspaṭṭa). Direct knowledge is divided into knowledge in the ordinary sense (samvvyāvahārika) and knowledge in the highest sense (pāramārthika). The direct knowledge in the ordinary sense is further subdivided into the sensuous (indriya-nibandhana) and the non-sensuous (anindriya-nibandhana). Both of these again are of the nature of avagraha, īhā,
avāya, and dhāraṇā, which as has already been explained in the chapter on Umāsvāti’s TS., are four grades of cognition according to the definiteness of knowledge. The direct knowledge in the highest sense depends for its production exclusively upon the soul (utapattāvātma-matrāpekṣam), and is of two kinds: (i) vikala (limited and defective), which includes avadhi and manāḥ-paryāya; and (ii) sakala (complete and correct) equivalent to kevala. It will be seen that this division of direct knowledge is a combination of the classifications of knowledge as found in the Nyāyāvātāra and the TS., with this difference that while sensuous knowledge is regarded as indirect in the TS., it is called direct in this work.

Indirect knowledge is classified as memory (smarana); recognition (pratyabhijñāna); argumentation (tarka); inference (anumāna); and scriptural testimony (āgama); and these are explained in the same way as in the PMS.

Superimposition (samāropa), which is the opposite of knowledge, is defined as the cognition of a thing in another which is different from it. It is of three

1. II, 6.
2. II, 18.
3. II, 19-23. Avadhi and manāḥ-paryāya have been defined in the same way as in TS.
4. III, 1, ff.
5. I, 8. atasmins tad adhyavasāyaḥ samāropa iti
kinds: (i) error (viparyaya); (ii) doubt (saṃśaya) and (iii) uncertainty (anadhyavasāya).\(^1\) The example of error is the cognition of silver in mother of pearl; of doubt—whether the object is a post or a man; and uncertainty while a person is passing by, just an awareness that something (like arrow) has been touched\(^2\). It will appear that the definition of samāropā is strictly applicable to viparyaya only; that is to say, to the case of an actual error in cognition. In the case of doubt or uncertainty there is no superimposition of a thing on another different from it; and hence they should fail outside the scope of ‘viparyaya’ as it has been defined here.

Scriptural testimony (āgama) is defined in the same way as in the PMS.

In PNT, also the objects of knowledge are distinguished as general (sāmānya) and particular (viśeṣa)\(^3\). The former is divided into cross-wise (tiryak) and vertical (ūrdhvatā); and the latter into (a concomitant) attribute (guṇa) and successive attribute (paryāya).

The cross-wise general is a homogeneous development in each of a number of individuals; for example, cowhood in a spotted cow and those born from her\(^4\).

1. I, 9.
2. I, 14, 15, “Kim ity ālocana-mātram anadhyavasāyāḥ; yathā gacchat tṛṇa-sparśa-jñānam iti”.
3. V, 1.
The vertical general is a substance common to the prior and the posterior transformations of it; for example, gold persisting in a bangle; a bracelet; etc. The distinctions of the two kinds of 'general' in this work also are based upon the principle of attribute and substance respectively.

1. V, 5. पुर्वापरा-परिनामा-साधारणम द्रव्यम उर्ध्वतासमानयम का० तका-कामण्यद्य-अनुगामी-कान्हनावत।

2. In a paper on 'An Indian Doctrine of Perception and Error' (ASP. 1921-22, pp. 31 and 32) Prof. F. W. Thomas, refers to this distinction in the Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokā-laṅkhāra, V. 3-5, and observes thus: 'In thus discriminating two kinds of universal, of which one depends upon difference of individual and the other upon difference of time, the Jains would seem to have the support of a passage in Mr. Bradley's Logic (I. C. VI, 44 30). It will appear from Prof. Thomas's own translation of the sūtras, however, that the two kinds of generality refer to the generality of attribute and substance. His rendering is as follows:

'Generality is of two kinds, cross-wise generality and vertical generality.

Crosswise generality is a similar development in several particulars; for example, 'oxness' in bodies spotted and brindled.

'Vertical generality' is substance common to prior and posterior developments, for example, 'gold' persisting in armlet, ring, and so forth'.

Thus it is not 'the difference of individuals' which forms the distinguishing feature of crosswise generality; for in a case of vertical generality also there is a 'difference of individuals'. Armlets, rings, etc made of gold are as distinct individuals as spotted and brindled oxen. Similarly, in the case of vertical generality, it is not the
The division of particulars into guṇa and paryāya is different from that in PMS. where they are divided into paryāya and vyatireka. The paryāya is common to both the works, and is defined in the same way, viz. as successive particulars such as pleasure and pains in the soul paryāyas tu krama bhāvi yathā tat-raiva sukha-duḥkhādiḥ (V, 8). The guṇa particulars of the PNT. are, however, different from the vyatireka of the PMS. They are are defined as concomitant attributes; for example, consciousness, individuality, power, etc., in the soul—guṇaḥ saha-bhāvi dharma yathātmani vijnāna-vyakti-saktiādiḥ (V, 7). Thus this division of particulars is based upon the principles of concomitance and succession; and appears to refer to attributes only. It is, therefore, not so satisfactory as that in the PMS. which includes both particular attributes and substances.

difference of time which really matters but the persistence of one and the same substance (dravya), e. g. gold, through a number of things made out of it; although there will be a difference of time also if one and the same lump of gold is considered in relation to different forms into which it is moulded successively. It is evident, however, that this kind of generality will apply also to a number of gold ornaments existing at the same time, simply because all of them are made of gold. The examples of the two kinds of generality; viz. oxness in a number of oxen; and 'gold, persisting in armlet, ring and so forth' respectively clearly indicate the principle of classification. In the definition of the vertical (urdhvatā), the very word 'dravyam, is used—'purvāpara-parināma sādhāraṇam dravyam', etc.
3. Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Epistemology

(i) Analysis of Knowledge in Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-bhāṣya.

I have already discussed Vātsyāyana’s interpretations of the Nyāya-sūtras dealing with the theory of knowledge in the chapter on the Nyāya-sūtras. Vātsyāyana has not much to say on the subject of epistemology independently. He, however, supplements the treatment of the doctrine of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) in the NS. by giving an analysis of cognition, defining right cognition, and discussing briefly the comparative value of the various means of knowledge.

According to Vātsyāyana, the means of knowledge have reference to an object (arthavat), for it is only when objects are cognised by means of them, that it is possible to make an effort to achieve them. He analyses knowledge into: (i) the knower (pramātṛ), who is prompted to action by a desire to acquire or discard an object; (ii) the means of knowledge (pramāṇa), that by means of which the object is known; (iii) the cognised object (prameya); and (iv) the form of cognition (pramiti), which constitutes the knowledge of the object (arthavat-vijāna). It is asserted that a knowledge of the real nature of an object depends upon these four factors.

1- ‘Pramāṇato’ riha-pratipattau prevṛtti-sāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam.
In answer to the question as to what constitutes right knowledge it is said that it is to know an existent (sad) as existent, and not the contrary of it; and to know a non-existent (asad) as non-existent, and not the contrary of it. This is followed by an explanation that a non-existent is perceived by means of its absence; for if it were present, it would have been perceived through the means of knowledge as the existents are.

Under NS. I, 1, 3, the applicability and the relative value of the various means of knowledge are discussed, and it is said that, while in some cases more than one of them can be applied; e.g. in the case of the soul, in others only one of them is applicable; e.g. in the case of thunder. Direct knowledge, by which sense-cognition is meant, is said to be the most convincing of all; for even after employing inference, knowledge by similarity, and verbal testimony, there is always a desire on the part of the cogniser to know the object directly.

Vātsyāyana's interpretation of NS. III, 2, 10 to III, 2, 18, which deal with the nature of cognition, and IV, 2, 26 ff. which discuss the cognition of the whole in relation to its parts, have been discussed by me in a separate article in the JRAS in which I have maintained that these two sections of the NS. do not deal with the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism respectively as

1. sataśca sad-bhāvo, satascāsad-bhāvaḥ, etc.
2. JRAS., January. 1930.
Vātsyāyana and, following his other commentators have held.


The Praśastapāda-bhāṣya is the earliest known commentary on the VS. Unlike Vātsyāyana’s Nyāya-bhāṣya on the NS. the PB. does not closely follow the NS. Although it claims to expound the doctrines of the VS., it had added much to the matter found in the original work, and, therefore, it is usually considered as a work by itself. Another name for the PB. is the Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha.

The section dealing with the theory of knowledge in the PB. opens with almost a quotation from the NS. I, 1, 15, which asserts that the terms ‘budhi’ ‘upalabdhi’, ‘jñāna’ and ‘pratyaya’ all are synonyms. Cognition (buddhi), it is said, although of a manifold nature according to the objects cognised, may be divided into two kinds: right cognition (vidyā) and wrong cognition (avidyā). Then each of these is of four kinds:

Right cognition is direct knowledge (pratyakṣa), inference (laiṅgika), memory (smṛti), and inspired knowledge (as of the sages-ārṣa).²

1. Buddhir upalabdhir jñānam pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ. PB. p. 171. Cf. NS., 1, 1. 15: Buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthānāntaram.

2. In the PB. the four kinds of wrong cognition (avidyā)
Direct knowledge\(^1\) is defined as mere undifferentiated apprehension consequent upon the knowledge of the generic and the specific properties of an object\(^2\). This is free from other means of knowledge. Another alternative definition of perception is given thus ‘that non-erroneous and non-inferential knowledge of things which is produced by the mutual contact of four, viz. soul, mind, sense-organs and the object’.\(^3\) Direct knowledge may be either ordinary or mystic. The former is obtained through the sense-organs; and the latter by the direct contact of the soul and mind with their objects.

Inference is that knowledge which is produced by noticing a sign or mark. This definition is the same as found in VS.

Then the inferential mark or sign (liṅga) is defined as that (i) which is associated with that which is to be inferred (yadunumeyena sambaddham); (2) which is known to be found in all positive

are explained first. The use of ‘vidyā’ and ‘avidyā’ in the sense of knowledge and error is to be positively found here.

1. The word ‘pratyakṣa’ is explained as tatrākṣam aṅgam pratyakṣam pratityutpadyate iti pratyakṣam. Cf. Vātsyāyana NB. on NS. I, 1, 3, ‘aṅgaśyaśaśaśya prativiśayam vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam’.


3. Athāvā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭaya sannikarṣād avitatham avyapadesyam yaj jñānam utpadyate tat pratyakṣam pramāṇam.
instances (i.e. in instances where the probandum is to be found) (prasiddham ca tatr anvite); and (3) that which is not found in negative instances (tad-abhāve ca nastī eva).

An inferential mark which does not conform to the above condition is fallacious, and Praśastapāda, while explaining the fallacies, refers to VS. III, 1, 15. This reference also clearly shows that the allusion to Kaśyapa in this connection is to the author of the VS.

According to Praśastapāda, inference is of two kinds: (1) drśta and (2) sāmānyato drśta. Drśta inference is that where the species of the known instance (prasiddha) and that of the probandum (sādhyā) are identical. For example, having observed that a dewlap is to be found only in a cow, on seeing a dewlap in another animal elsewhere, it is inferred that that animal must also be a cow.

1. Aprasiddho ‘napadeśo ‘san sandigdhas’ cānapadeśaḥ (PB. p. 204).

2. PB. p. 200—viruddhāsiddhā-saṃdigdham aliṅgām kaśyapo ‘bravīt’. Some writers like Keith (ILA. p. 94) have regarded the reference to Kaśyapa in this verse as covering the subject of both the valid and the invalid marks of inference. But considering that the name is mentioned in the second of the two verses, which gives a classification of invalid marks only, the reference to Kaśyapa is evidently with, regard to this topic only. This is confirmed by Praśastapāda’s later reference to the author of the Sūtras (ity etad evāḥ sūtra-kāraḥ), (PB. p. 204), exactly in connection with the same topic.
Samānyatodṛṣṭa inference is that where the species of the known instance and that of the probandum are entirely different from each other, and the inference is based upon the presence of a common nature which can be inferred by means of the inferential mark. For example, having observed that the conduct of a farmer, a tradesman or a soldier is purposive, it is inferred that the conduct of those who observe the injunction prescribed for the various castes and orders (varṇāśramaṇam) must also be purposive.

It will appear that the drṣṭa and the samānyatodṛṣṭa inference of Praśastapāda are meant, as he himself explains in the Bhāṣya, to cover the inferential relations mentioned in VS., IX, 2, 1; the drṣṭa inference being apparently meant to correspond to the pūrvavat and the seṣavat inference of the Nyāya-sūtras and the pratyaksato drṣṭa-sambandha of the Mīmāṃsā as explained in the Śabara-bhāṣya; and the samānyatodṛṣṭa to the inference bearing the same name in the Nyāya-sūtras as explained by Vātsyāyana. The example of drṣṭa inference, however, as given by Praśastapāda is not happy; for it suggests that the drṣṭa inference is knowledge by similarity; the animal which is cognised as a cow being itself perceived through the senses. In the case of an inference about the existence of fire on a hill on the other hand, it is only the smoke—the mark, which is perceived. His example would, however, be correct,

1. PB. p. 206.
if only the dewlap of the animal could be visible, and the phrase deśāntare ‘pi sāsnāmātra-darśanād’ probably signifies that. But the appearance of only dewlap without the other parts of the body is not at all a normal experience.

Then inference is further distinguished as inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) and inference for others (parārthānumāna). It is usually assumed that Praśastapāda was the first to make this distinction. Inference for oneself consists of two premises and a conclusion as follows:—

Wherever there is smoke there is fire; (apadeśa)
There is smoke on this hill ; (anūsandhāna)

.: There is fire on this hill ; (pratyāmnāya)
Inference for others consists of five propositions:
Wherever there is smoke, there is fire; (apadeśa)
As for example, in the kitchen ; (sādharmyena

nidarśana)

And wherever there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a pond ; (vaidharmyena nidarśana)
There is smoke on the hill ; (anūsandhāna)

.: There is fire on the hill ; (pratyāmnāya).

Of the above terms apadeśa corresponds to hetu ; anusandhāna to upanaya ; both the kinds of nidarśana to udāharana; and pratyāmnāya to nigamana of the Nyāya School.

Verbal testimony, knowledge by similarity, presumption, implication, non-existence, tradition, all these are shown to be cases of inference; for in all
of them, it is maintained, cognition is the result of some mark.\(^1\)

Wrong cognition (avidyā) is also of four kinds: (1) doubt (saṃśaya); (2) error (viparyaya); (3) uncertainty (anadhyavasāya); (4) dream (svapna). Of these the first two are explained in the same way as in the NS. and the Nyāya-bhāṣya. Uncertainty means failure to determine the exact nature of an object, and may pertain to perception or inference. Dream is explained as knowledge arising from the contact of the mind and the sense-organ without the presence of objects.

Memory is defined in the usual way; and what has been called ārṣa-jñāna and put down as the fourth form of right cognition is substantially the same as the yogi-jñāna which has been described as a kind of direct knowledge.\(^2\)

In the above account of the various means of knowledge according to Praśastapāda the following points are worthy of notice:—

(1) Praśastapāda gives two alternative definitions of direct knowledge (pratyakṣa). In the first of these he refers to the cognition of the generic and the specific properties of the object of cognition, which we find both in Māṇikya Nandi’s PMS. and Deva Sūri’s PNT. and in fact in the works of all later writers, especially in those of Prabhākara and

2. *PB.*, pp. 256 and 258.
Kumārila. In the second definition, he expressly includes soul (ātman) and mind (manas) as factors in cognition, which were absent in the definition of pratyakṣa as given in the NS., and which omission had provided Diṅnāga an occasion to criticise Vātsyāyana in this connection. Further the omission of 'the contact of sense-organs with the object' indriyārtha-sannikarṣa in the first definition is analogous to the same omission in the definitions as given by the Buddhist and the Jaina writers beginning with Diṅnāga, and is certainly a fresh departure on the subject in the Nyaya-vaiśeṣika School. As has already been pointed out, this modified form of the definition of direct knowledge is meant to include such other kinds of pratyakṣa as mental cognition, self-consciousness, etc.

(2) The classification of inference as drṣṭa and sāmānyatodrṣta is intended to be an improvement upon a mere description of the various kinds of inference as contained in the VS., IX, 2, 1 and three kinds of inference enumerated in the NS. although these two kinds of inference in the PB. are meant to cover the same distinctions as specified in the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya Śūtras. The division of inference into svārtha and parārtha is also a fresh departure in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of knowledge, and is found in the works of all later logicians beginning with Diṅnāga.

(3) The division of wrong cognition (avidyā) into four kinds, viz. doubt (saṃśaya), error (vipar-
yaya); uncertainty (anadhyavasāya); and dream (svapna), appears to find its echo in Deva Śūri’s division of superimposition (samūropa) into error (viparyaya); doubt (saṃśaya) and uncertainty (anadhyavasāya).

(iii) Classifications of sense-contact and inference; and the theory of verbal knowledge in Uddyotakara’s Nyāya-Vārtika

Uddyotakara’s comments on the NS. dealing with the definition of sense-cognition and the classification of inference have already been discussed in the chapter on the NS. and his criticism, of Dinīga. Besides these comments and criticisms, the following topics discussed by Uddyotakara in his NV. are important for our purpose:—

(i) His explanation of the different kinds of contact of the sense-organs (sannikarṣa) in sense-cognition.¹

(ii) His classification of inference as (a) anvayin; (b) vyatirekin; and (c) anvaya vyatirekin.²

(iii) His theory of verbal knowledge.³

(i) The contact of the sense-organ with its object is of six kinds: (a) conjunction (samyoga); (b) conjoined inherence (samyukta-samavāya); (c) conjoined inherent inherence (samyukta-samaveta sam-

1. NV., I, 1, 4.
2. NV., I, 1, 5.
3. NV., II, 2, 55 and 65.
avāya; (d) inheritance (samavāya); (e) inherent in-
nerence (samaveta-samavāya); (f) the relation of
qualification and the qualified (viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-
bhāva). For example, (a) when a jar is cognised,
the contact of the eye with the jar is a case of con-
junction (saṃyoga); (b) when the colour of the jar
is cognised, the contact of the eye with the colour,
which inhere in the jar, is a case of conjoined in-
herence (saṃyukta-samavāya); (c) when ‘colournes’s
is cognised, colourness is that which inhere in the
colour which, in its turn, inhere in the jar; hence
this is a case of conjoined inherent in-
herence (saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya); (d) when sound is
perceived, it is a case of inherence (samavāya), for
the sound inhere in the ear-cavity; (e) when sound-
ness is cognised, it is a case of inherent inherence
(samaveta samavāya), for soundness inhere in the
ear-cavity; (f) when the non-existence of an object
is perceived by means of the particularisation of a
spot which could be occupied by it, it is a case of
the relation of qualification and the qualified
(viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva).

(2) According to Uddyotakara, inference is
knowledge based upon relation between the middle
term (liṅga) and the major (parāmarśa) term aided
by a remembrance of that relation—’smṛty-anugṛhito
liṅga-parāmarśo anumānam’. For example, the
knowledge that the hill has fire on it is based upon
the relation between smoke and fire and the rememb-

1. NV., pp. 47, 48.
rancel of that relation. While explaining the three kinds of inference mentioned in NS., I, 1, 4 as has already been said, Uddyotakara called them (a) anvayi. (b) vyatireki and (c) anvaya-vyatireki, which names have been variously translated into English. Anvayi is that inference in which the 'the probans subsists in the subject and other objects of its kinds, vivaksitataj-atija-vrititv sati, and there is, in regard to it, nothing in which the probandum is known to be absent; e.g. when one, who holds that all things are transient, argues that sound is transient, because it is a product; for there is nothing in which the probandum (here, transient character) does not exist. Such an inference would be best called inference by agreement. Vyatireki is that inference in which the probans subsists in the subject; where there is nothing besides the subject in which the probandum is known to be present, and where the probans does not subsist in anything where the probandum is absent—vivaksitavyapakatve sapaksabhave sati vipaksavrittih, e.g., the living body is not without a soul, for if it were soulless, it would be lifeless. This kind of inference should be most suitably expressed by inference by difference. Lastly anvayatireki is that inference in which the

1. Vidyabhasa in his HIL., (pp. 130, 131) calls them exclusively—affirmative, exclusively-negative and affirmative-negative respectively. Ganganatha Jha translates them as the universal-affirmative, the universal-negative, and the universal affirmative-negative. (NS. Engl. Transl. in Indian Thought; NV., I, 1, 5).
probens subsists in the subject and other objects of its kinds, and does not subsist in objects which are of a different kind, (that is to say, those in which the probandum does not exist)—vivakṣita-taj jātiyopapattau vipakṣāvṛttiḥ, e.g. sound is transient because while possessing generality and particularity (sāmānya-viśeṣavattve sati) it is cognised by the external sense-organs of human beings like ourselves, like a jar. Here the qualities of sound are to be found in transient things, and are absent in non-transient things, and the inference is drawn upon this basis of agreement and difference of qualities. Hence the proper name for this kind of cognition will be inference by agreement and difference.

Uddyotakara calls the inference by agreement vīta and that by difference avīta. The terms recur

1. There is evidently a mistake in Gaṅgānātha Jhā's English Transl. (Indian Thought. NS., p. 163), of the NV. where it defines the anvaya-vyatireki inference. The translation is: 'The Universal Affirmative Negative is that in which the probans, which subsisting in the subject and other objects akin to it (wherein the probandum resides), subsists in those where the probandum is known to reside'. Here the portion underlined is just the opposite of what is ought to be, viz. 'does not subsist in those where the probandum is not known to reside—vipakṣāvṛttiḥ. The foot-note, in which Dr. Jhā explains the example, represents the correct meaning.

2. NV., p. 126. Uddyotakara explains the distinction between vīta and avīta thus: 'tatra sva-rupenaṁarthaparicchedakatvam vīta-dharmaḥ; avītaḥ punaḥ para-pakṣa-pratīṣṭedhenaiva pravartate'.
in the Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudi of Vācaspati Miśra, where vīta is explained as a positive inference covering the pūrvavat and 'sāmānyātodṛṣṭa'; and avīta as a negative inference equivalent to the 'ṣeṣavat of the Nyāya-sūtras.

Another important topic discussed by Uddyotakara under NS., II, 2, 55 and II, 2, 65 is the theory of what has been called verbal knowledge, that is to say, of the denotation of words. How does a word, which consists of a number of letters, come to denote a thing; and, then what is the nature of this denotation? The sphaṭa doctrine of the grammarians and the apoha theory of the Buddhists are refuted. It is important to draw a distinction which is evidently overlooked by several writers between such verbal knowledge and what has been called verbal testimony as a means of knowledge. The former simply deals with the theory of language, and has to do with the significance of words irrespective of the truth or falsity of what they denote; while the latter is treated as a regular pramānyā, which is concerned with the validity of knowledge conveyed by words. Even in the original works of Sanskrit writer the two topics seem to be mixed up; but the distinction between them is clear.

Also see Jacobi, Fetheke Garbe Richard von Garbe, p. 8, ff.; Keith ILA., pp. 90 and 91.
(iv) Distinctions of the non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) and the reflective (savi-kalpaka) direct knowledge, and the explanation of the theories of error in the Nyāya Vārtika-tātparya-tīkā of Vācaspati Miśra.

Besides Vācaspati Miśra’s comments upon the texts of the NS. the Bhāṣya and the NV., which have already been noticed in the chapter on the NS., the special feature of his commentary on the NV. on the subject of epistemology is his distinction, for the first time in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, between the non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) and the reflective (savi-kalpaka) direct knowledge (pratyakṣa). In this work he also explains the various theories of error as held by different schools.

While introducing the subject of the two kinds of direct knowledge referred to above, Vācaspati Miśra observes that the authors of the Nyāya-bhāṣya and the Nyāya-vārtika did not mention and explain this distinction because they considered it to be too evident. There is no reason, however, to believe that this assertion of V M’s is true. He further declares that he has introduced the distinction of the two kinds of knowledge in his commentary following his own preceptor named Trilocana¹. It is difficult to say exactly with whom this division of direct

¹. NVTT. p. 87.
knowledge began. The earliest author we know of as making this distinction is either Prabhākara or Kumārila, whoever may be earlier. I have shown that the definition of direct knowledge as given in the NS. is really applicable to the kinds of knowledge called nīrvikalpaka later on, and the definitions of direct knowledge as given by Diśnāga and Dharma-kīrti clearly exclude such knowledge as is associated with reflection and the use of language. Now those later writers, who could not deny the existence of such direct knowledge and still wanted to maintain that sense-cognition associated with reflection and language is also direct, naturally drew this two fold distinction of nīrvikalpaka and savikalpaka. Prabhākara and Kumārila especially emphasise the point that the reflective sense-cognition (savikalpaka pratyakṣa) is also direct knowledge, and they evidently do so against the theory of the Buddhist logicians, according to whom only the non-reflective cognition is direct knowledge.

In the history of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School, Vācaspati Miśra explains the twofold distinction of the non-reflective direct knowledge (nīrvikalpaka pratyakṣa) and the reflective direct knowledge (savikalpaka pratyakṣa), and tries to find support for it in the text of NS. I, I, 4. According to him, the term vyāvasāyātmaka in this sūtra denotes the reflective direct knowledge (savikalpaka pratyakṣa); that is to say, ‘that which is definite or certain’, point-
ing to something specified by its genus and name; while the word ‘avyapadeśya’, which means ‘that which cannot be expressed by words’, refers to the non-reflective direct knowledge (nirvikalpaka pratya-kśa), for it is not specified by a genus, and is, therefore indefinite. As has already been pointed out while discussing the definition of direct knowledge in the chapter on the NS. there is no justification whatsoever for holding the view that the terms avyapadeśya and vyavasāyātmaka in NS. I, 1, 4 refer to two kinds of direct knowledge; and none of the commentators before Vācaspati Miśra has interpreted them in that way.

It will further appear that Vācaspati Miśra has also explained how a sense-cognition cannot be considered apart from its expression in language, and how avyapadeśya in the NS. I, 1, 4 means ‘that which is not the result of an inferential mark’. Now there will be a flagrant inconsistency, if this interpretation of avyapadeśya and the distinctions of nirvikalpaka and the savikalpaka knowledge be both considered as representing Vācaspati Miśra’s own view. The fact is that so far as one can see from his commentary, neither of these interpretations is

1. NVTT, p. 84.
claimed by him as his own. Vācaspati is too much of a faithful commentator to put in any of his own notions. What he has done in commenting upon the NV. is that he has simply brought out the meaning of the Bhāṣya and Vārtika. Thus his explanation of how direct knowledge can be regarded as always associated with some name is merely a statement of the position of the objector referred to in the Bhāṣya and the Vartika when it is said: ‘With regard to this direct knowledge produced by the contact of the sense organ with objects’ the Bhāṣya has represented an objector as putting forward the objection that ‘every direct knowledge is called after the name of its object, etc.’ Similarly, his explanation of how ‘avyapadesya’ means ‘that which is not the result of an inferential mark’ is simply a comment upon the NV. when it says: ‘some (commentators) explain that ‘avyapadesya’ is added with a view to exclude inference. This is not so, etc.’

While commenting on NS. I, 1, 2 in connection with the distinction of right cognition (pramā) and wrong cognition (apramā), Vācaspati Miśra explains the various theories of error (viparyaya) according to the different schools. These may be classified as

(1) Ātma-khyāti, usually held by the Yogācāra

1. NV. p. 38 tāc cendriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam viṣaya-nāmadheynabhidhiyate iti bhāṣyam.
2. Ibid. p. 38, 39, ‘apare tvavyapadesyam ity anenānum-anam nirākurvanti, tāc ca naivam’.
School of Buddhism, according to which, a concept which exists only in the mind wrongly appears as a real thing in the external world; (2) Asat-khyāti, where an unreal thing, e.g. a piece of silver, which does not exist, appears as real, although it is only a piece of shell which exists; (3) Anirvacanīya-khyāti, where an object is cognised in such a way that it is possible to define it as either real or unreal; e.g. when a piece of shell cognised as silver, what is cognised is neither the piece of shell nor a piece of silver; (4) Akhyāti, that wrong knowledge where the distinction between that which exists really and that which is cognised is not perceived. The illusion is partly remembrance and partly apprehension; but owing to the fact that this act of remembrance is not consciously taken note of at the time false apprehension, the illusory perception also appears to be as true and valid as a correct perception. This theory is held by the Prabhākar School of Mīmāṃśā. (5) Anyathā-khyāti or viparīta-khyāti, held by the Nyāya School, according to which wrong cognition consists in mistaking one thing for another, e.g. a piece of shell is mistaken for a piece of silver. The peculiar qualities of the object which actually exists, and of that which is wrongly perceived, are not noticed. A certain feature, or features, common to both is noticed; for example, the glow common to a piece of silver and a conch-shell; and by the accidental

1. I. IP. p, 121.
remembrance of a piece of silver in seen the past, the present object of perception is also taken to be a piece of the same metal. This fact of remembering a piece of silver, however, is not taken note of at the time of the illusion. The theory holds that in addition to a failure to distinguish between the object, which actually exists, and that which is wrongly perceived, in every illusion there is also a positive false identification of the one with the other, for example, of a piece of silver with a piece of conch-shell. The Akhyāti theory of the Mīmāṃsā School does not recognise this last positive element 1.

Jayanta’s Nyāya-maṅjarī (880 A.D.)-a commentary on the NS. and Sṛidhara’s Nyāya-Kandalī (990 A.D.) on the Praśastapāda-bhāṣya are not other important works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School during this period subsequent to Vāchaspati Miśra. Neither of them has any constructive value. They are full of polemics against the Buddhists. The Nyāya-kandalī contains a refutation of some of the Mīmāṃsā doctrines of epistemology as found particularly in Prabhākara and Kumārila.

The Mīmāṃsā Epistemology.—As has already been observed, it is in the work of the commentators on the MS. that we find the origin and development of the theory of knowledge according to the Mīmāṃsā School. Of these Śabararavāmin is the oldest commentator whose work, the Śabara-bhāṣya, is available

1. IIIP. p. 120, 121.
now; although it is evident from the quotations from the work of a Vṛttikāra in the Śabara-bhāṣya that it is not the first commentary on the MS. Śabarasaṃvāmin was followed by Kumārila and Prabhākara, who further developed the epistemological doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā School. A study of these authors, as will be seen presently, shows that while the existence of the theories of knowledge in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Schools must have provided a stimulus for the origin and growth of a theory of knowledge in Mīmāṃsā, this, in its turn, had its influence in determining the subsequent epistemology of the Jaina and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. For instance, in the quotation from the Vṛttikāra in the Śabara-bhāṣya, the definition of direct knowledge and classification of inference show distinct signs of the influence of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School; while the discussion with regard to the view that cognition is identical with its object, or that cognition exists independently of an external object, is expressly undertaken with reference to the Buddhist doctrines of Śūnya-vāda and Nirālambanavāda. On the other hand, the distinction of the two kinds of direct knowledge the non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) and the reflective (saviikalpaka), which was adopted later on by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, is known to us to exist first in the works of Kumārila and Prabhākara. Similarly, the discussion of the nature of the general (sāmāṇya) and the particular (viśeṣa) with reference to the theory of cognition is first found prominently in the
work of the same two authors.

With regard to the relative dates Kumārila and Prabhākara it is difficult to say which of them was really senior to the other; but a comparative study of the epistemological doctrines of the two suggests that Prabhākara may have written his works after Kumārila. For instance, if Kumārila had been posterior to Prabhākara one would expect him to particularly refer to such of Prabhākar’s views as were different from his own, e.g. the non-acceptance of abhāva as a means of knowledge on the part of Prabhākara; or again the doctrine of Tripūṭi-pratyakṣa, which has been particularly emphasised by Prabhākara and his followers. As in my treatment of the Mīmāṃsā epistemology here I have dealt with the Prabhākara School as a whole, it has seemed most suitable that the chapter dealing with the theory of knowledge according to this school should come after that dealing with Kumārila. It is well-known that according to tradition Prabhākara was a pupil of Kumārila.

(i) The Theory of Knowledge in the Sabarabhāṣya of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras.

The fourth aphorism of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra¹ contains a kind of definition of direct knowledge (pratyā-

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¹. Sat-samprayoge, puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhi janma tat pratyakṣam animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvāt. It may be mentioned that Kumārila, in his Śloka-vartika, objects to regarding the first part of the sūtra as a definition
kṣa) and declares that it cannot be the means of knowing duty (dharma) for through direct knowledge that only is known which is present. Direct knowledge is that apprehension which is produced by the contact of the sense-organs of man with something which exists. It is maintained by the commentators that inference (anumāna), knowledge by similarity (upamāna), and presumption (arthāpatti) are also implied in the MS. which contains the definition of direct knowledge, as they depend upon direct knowledge. Verbal testimony (śabda) and non-existence (abhāva) are referred to in MS. 1. 1. 5. Thus, according to Śabarasvāmin and Kumārila, six means of knowledge are recognised by the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, viz., direct knowledge, inference, knowledge by similarity, verbal testimony, presumption and non-existence. Of these it is only the verbal testimony which can be relied upon for knowing duty: It may be noted that the definition of direct knowledge as given in the MS. itself is analogous to those found in the earlier works; for in it also direct knowledge is defined simply as that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the object, and this fact should confirm the view, which is already held,

of direct knowledge; for, according to him that would make a defective definition, which one would not expect from the author of the MS. The Vṛttikāra, quoted by Śabara, has, however, taken it as a definition of direct knowledge, and, in any case, this is all that one can find in the MS. about the nature of direct knowledge.
that the MS. are earlier than the NS.

The Bhāṣya, however, by means of a quotation from the Viśṭākara, elaborates the definition of direct knowledge as given in the Sūtra, and asserts that freedom from error is one of the essential conditions of direct knowledge is not erroneous; that which is erroneous is not direct knowledge—yat pratyakṣam na tad vyabhicarati, yad vyabhicarati na tat pratyakṣam. Further it explains the distinction between right apprehension and wrong apprehension as follows: when the mind is obstructed by the eye, etc., or the sense-organ by darkness, etc., or the external object because of minuteness, etc., then there is wrong apprehension; for right apprehension is (only) when there are no obstructions (anupahateṣu hi samyak-jñānam); and the mutual contact of the sense-organ, mind and the object is the cause of right apprehension. When they are defects about these, the apprehension is false. But how does one know about it? One knows about it when a right cognition is obtained by the removal of the defects (doṣāpagame sampratipatti-darśanāt). But then how to discriminate between what is defective and what is not? (The answer is) that if on careful investigation we do not find any defect, in the absence of any proof (for the presence of a defect) we presume that there is no defect. Therefore, only that apprehension is false (asamīcīnāḥ pratyayaḥ), and none other, which has defective cause (yasya ca duṣṭam kāraṇam) and where it is perceived that it (the apprehension) is false (yatras ca
Another important section of the Śabara-bhāṣya on the subject, which is also supposed to be an extract from the commentary of the Vṛttikāra is that directed against those who would identify cognition with the object cognised. They would say we do not find any distinction of form (ākāra bhedam) between the object and its cognition, and it is our cognition which is directly apprehended (pratyakṣa ca no buddhiḥ). Therefore we see that there is no object apart from it. ‘This would be so’, says the Vṛttikāra, if cognition be of the form of the object (yady arthākā rā buddhiḥ syāt); but our cognition is without a form (nirākāra); it is the external object which has form; and it is that as related to the external world (bahir-deśa sambaddha) which is directly apprehended; for direct apprehension has some thing for its object (artha-viśayā) and not another cognition, and the reason for this is that it is momentary (kṣanikā) and, therefore, would not last until the appearance of


2. I agree with Jacobi (JAOS, xxxi) in holding that all the passages beginning with vṛttikāras tu anyathēnām grantham varṇayāmcakāra’ on p. 7, and ending with bādarāyana grahaṇam uktam’ on p. 18 of the Śabara-bhāṣya, are quotations from the Vṛttikāra. The editor of the Bhāṣya also holds the same view, as it evident from his footnote p. 18.
another cognition. If it be said that it (cognition) is known as it is being produced, and makes known another object, like a lamp; this is not so, for, no one apprehends cognition without an object being known (first), and when it (the object) is known, one knows (cognition) by inference (jñāte tv anumānād avag-acchati); therefore, it is not right to maintain that it is known simultaneously (with the cognition of the object). Verily, we say that an object is known only when cognition is produced, and not until it is produced; and, therefore, cognition is produced first, and the object is known afterwards; yes, it is true that cognition is produced first, but not that it is known first. Sometimes it happens, however, that although an object is known, it is said to be unknown¹. The form of cognition is not apprehended without an object serving as a mark-nārthav yapa dešam antarena buddheḥ ṛupopālambhanam. Therefore there is no cognition which is not (apprehended as) the result of a mark or sign, and nothing is non-pratyakṣa which is not the result of a mark or sign; and hence cognition is not pratyakṣa².

It is further argued that if it be maintained that

1. 'bhavati hi kadācid etat yat jñāto py arthaḥ san ajñātak ity ucyate'. The significance of this assertion in the present context is not quite clear.

2. The text as published in the B. I. edition vol. I, p. 10 is 'tasman na vyapadesya buddhiḥ, avyapadesiyam ca napratyakṣam, tasmād apratyakṣā buddhiḥ'. The editor suggests in a footnote that for nāpratyakṣam we should
cognition and the object cognised are identical, it will mean the non-existence of cognition, and not of the object which is existent and directly apprehended (pratyakṣaya satāḥ). And it is not true that they are identical; for cognition, which is without form, is inferred, while the object, which has form, is read ‘na pratyakṣam’. It is evident that the reading suggested by the editor is incorrect; for if it be adopted the text would mean: ‘that which is’ ‘avyapadesya’ is not ‘pratyakṣa,’ which, whatever be the meaning of ‘avyapadesya’ is just the opposite of what ‘pratyakṣa’ has been usually understood to be. As the text stands, it means ‘that which is avyapadesya is not non-pratyakṣa’, that is to say, it is pratyakṣa, and this is quite correct according to the well known definition of ‘pratyakṣa’ in the NS., and elsewhere. However, while this clause, as it stands in the text, is correct, the one preceding it, viz. tasmān na vyapadesya buddhiḥ is certainly incorrect; and should read as ‘tasmānna avyapadesya buddhiḥ; for, as it stands, it means: ‘therefore, cognition is not the result of mark or sign’, which is opposed to the view of the author expressed in the immediately preceding clause, which gives the reason for what is meant to be asserted in the present clause, viz., ‘the form of a cognition is not apprehended without an object serving as a mark’ and in another clause before that in the same paragraph, viz., no one apprehends cognition without an object being known (first), and when it (the object) is known, one knows (cognition) by inference’. It is evident what the author means to say is that there is no cognition which is not (apprehended as) the result of a mark or a sign, and this will be expressed by taking the text as tasmān na avyapadesya buddhiḥ’.
directly apprehended. Hence, apprehension has an object for its cause (arthātambanāḥ pratyayah). It is seen that the apprehension of cloth, which has a definite cause is possible only when the threads are cognised. Otherwise, it could happen, that sometimes the cognition of threads might give rise to the apprehension of a jar also, even in the case of a person who does not suffer from any defect in his sense-organs. But this does not happen, and hence an apprehension is not without a cause, and for the same reason, direct knowledge is not erroneous. The theory that cognitions are without an external object as their basis like the cognitions of a dream—sarva eva nirālambanāḥ svapnavat pratyayah, is refuted by pointing out that there is a difference between the cognitions of a dream and those of the waking state in so far as the former entirely vanish on waking up, while the latter do not.

According to the Vṛttikāra, in the ŚB., 'inference is the cognition of an object not in direct, contact and forming one of the two sides to a known relation, one of which is directly apprehended. It is of two kinds: (1) That based upon a directly-apprehended relation (pratyakṣato drṣṭasambandha), and (2) that based upon a commonly-known relation (sāmānyato

1. ŚB. p. 10.
2. ŚB., pp. 8 and 9. The theory criticised here, although no name is mentioned, appears to be Vijñāna-vāda.
3. Anumānam jñāta-sambandhāyaṁ ādeśa-darśanād ekadesāntare 'sannikṛṣte' rthe buddhiḥ, ŚB. p. 10.


*drṣṭasambandha*). An example of the first will be the cognition of fire by apprehending smoke, and that of the latter one's being reminded of the sun having moved from a certain position, by virtue of one's previous knowledge that a person—say Devadatta, could get to another place only by having moved from his previous position.

Scriptural testimony (*śāstram*) is the cognition of an object not in sense-contact by means of the knowledge of words\(^1\).

Knowledge by similarity (*upamāna*) also (which means) resemblance, produces knowledge of an object which is not in sense-contact, e.g. the perception of a gayal reminds one of a cow.

Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is the surmise about an object on the ground that something which has been seen or heard cannot be possible otherwise\(^2\); e.g. the surmise that a person, say Devadatta, must have gone outside, a fact which is not directly apprehended on finding that he is not at home and on the assumption that he is alive.

Non-existence (*abhāva*) characterised by the absence of any other means of knowledge denotes something which is not in sense-contact and does

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1. *śāstram sabda-vijñāṇaḥ assanikṣṭe 'rthe vijñānam'. S.B. p. 10,

2. *Arthāpatti api drṣṭaḥ śruto vā 'rtho nyatha nopapadyate ity artha-kalpana,*
exist (lit. 'is not'—naśti).

The definitions of the various means of knowledge and the examples according to the Vṛttikāra, as given in the Śabara bhāṣya, clearly indicate similarity to those found in the Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya of the NS., especially the example of the sāmānyato drṣṭa inference. This shows that the Vṛttikāra belonged to a period when the usual examples of the various kinds of pramāṇas had already come into vogue, and Vātsyāyana, illustrating the NS., simply adopted them from such authors as the Vṛttikāra. The definition of knowledge by similarity as given in the ŚB, is different from that of the Nyāya School, in so far as it is supposed to refer to what is not present to the senses and is similar to what is actually perceived. The refutation of the views that objects are identical with cognition and that cognitions exist independently of external objects clearly refers to a definite established doctrine which denied the existence of external objects. The language of the Vṛttikāra suggests that the refutation refers to the Nirālambana-vāda\(^1\) and the Śūnya-vāda\(^2\).


(ii) The Mīmāṃsā Epistemology according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

The Mīmāṃsā theory of knowledge as developed by Kumārila is to be found in some sections of his Śloka-vārtika, which is a commentary on the Tarkapāda of the Šabara-bhāsyā. He discusses the nature of direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) under MS. 1. 1. 41. That the original sūtra did not contain a satisfactory definition of pratyakṣa as a means of knowledge (pramāṇa), and that Kumārila tried to find a basis of his own definition of direct knowledge in this sūtra is evident from Kumārila’s own treatment of the subject in the Śloka-vārtika. At first he tries to show that this sūtra does not contain a definition of direct knowledge, for, in so far it is too wide and applicable to erroneous cognitions also, it would be faulty in its present form, and the respected author of the MS. could not have formulated a faulty definition9. Later on, however, he finds an alternative interpretation, according to which the sūtra may be regarded as containing a definition of direct knowledge. He says that ‘sat-samprayoge’ in the sūtra instead of being taken to mean simply ‘on the contact with reality’, should be interpreted to signify, on the

1. ‘Sat-samprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhi-janma tat pratyakṣam animittam vidyamānopalambhanatvād iti’.

2. MŚV. verses, 1-37; (pp. 132-145).
right (sam) functioning (prayoge) with reference to reality or objects (sat)'. Thus the definition of direct knowledge will be that knowledge obtained by a person, which is the result of the right functioning of the sense-organs with reference to their objects.¹ Such a definition will exclude such erroneous cognition as that of silver in mother-o’-pearl.

Kumārila, probably for the first time in the history of Hindu epistemology, introduces the distinction of the two kinds of direct knowledge thus: 'At first, there is cognition, which is mere apprehension (ālocana-jñānam) and non-reflective (nirvikalpakam), which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb; and is caused by the mere object (suddha-vastu-jam) (V. 112. p. 168.) At the time of such a cognition neither particularity nor generality is perceived; it is only the individual object, which forms the substratum of both these (tayor ādhāra bhūta), which is cognised. (V. 113, p. 169). It is maintained, however, that both the particularity (viṣeṣa) and generality (sāmānyā) of an object are implicitly present even in the non-reflective cognition as forming the character of the object; although the knower perceives the mere object only, that to say, as devoid of these characteristics² (V, 118, p. 171).

2. 'Nirvikalpakā-bodhe pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunāḥ, Grahanam lakṣaṇākhyeyam jñātrā suddham tu gṛhyate
   (K. 118, p. 171)
Such an object is not cognised as particular (asādha-ranatvena), for in the cognition other objects are not excluded; nor is it cognised as general (sāmānyam iti nāpi), for there is no inclusion of other objects in such a cognition (viśeṣānugamā 'kṛpteh') (V. 119). Subsequent to this, that cognition also by means of which the object is characterised by such attributes as generality, etc. (jātyādibhiḥ) is to be regarded as direct knowledge (pratyakṣatvena sammatā), (V. 120, p. 172). It is emphasised that all cognition which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, whether it be non-reflective or reflective is to be regarded as direct knowledge (pratyakṣa), and that which is not the result of sense-contact is not to be called direct knowledge (K. 124, p. 173). The point in emphasising this is that the fact in the reflective direct knowledge there are other factors besides that of mere sense-contact does not preclude it from being pratyakṣa. It is further maintained that the general character, etc. perceived in reflective direct knowledge are to be treated as an integral part of the cognised object, and not as something simply imposed upon it by the understanding 'sthitam naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvam vyaktito hi naḥ' says Kumārila K. 141, p. 178), which Pārthasārathi Miśra explains thus in his Nyāya-ratnākara. The three (categories) viz. the general character, etc.¹, are

1. The other two being attribute (guna) and action (karma).
not altogether different from the individual. It is a matter of universal experience that an individual cow is perceived only as possessed of the generic character of cowhood and this cognition could not be so if the general character were altogether different from the individual. In fact, it is this cognition (of the generic character as a part of individual) which is the only proof of the generic character. This cognition reveals the individual as always possessed of the generic character, and as there is nothing to contradict this identity between the generic character and the individual, it is really true and not false.

As against an alternative explanation, such as given by the Vaiśeṣika School, that there is an inseparable relation (samavāyā-sambandha) between the generic character and the individual, it is argued that no such relation can exist between entities which are always found to be inseparable, nor can such relation exist between entities which do not exist yet (anispanna—lit. not accomplished), and if they already exist (nispattau), then there is inseparability.

As regards the nature of substance it is maintain-

1. ‘Gaur iti gotvātmikaiva vyaktīḥ pratyayate’; p. 178.
3. ‘paramārthikam eva tadātyām iti nāprāmāṇyam iti.
ed that it is not an aggregate of properties like a forest which is a mere collection of trees. It is that to which the properties belong; which persists in and through the qualities which appear and disappear, and which can be apprehended before the cognition of the properties (K. IV. 152). Hence the substance which is perceived as possessing a certain generic character, etc. is not to be regarded as unreal or of a different form (K. 153, p. 182).

The reality of substance is further maintained by denying that a thing is cognised only as identical with the word which signifies it. The thing and the word although related to each other, are essentially different from each other, and the notion of a thing can be produced through cognition independently of the word (K. IV. 172 ff, esp. 175, 176, pp. 188-189). It is pointed out that the cognition of the character of a cow is in the form of a dewlap, etc., and that of the name cow (Sansk. go) in the term of the letters ‘c’ etc. (in Sansk. ‘g’ etc.), while the act of cognising both these is without a form. Hence all these three are different from one another (K. IV. 185, p. 191). Further if the form of a thing be identical with its

1. Āvirbhāva-tirobhāva-dharmakesv-anuyāyi yat.
2. ‘Yatra vā jñānam prāg dharma-grahanād bhavet’. Jhā has evidently missed ‘yatra vā jñānam’ in translating this verse—see Ślokav, Engl. Transl. p. 94.
name, the various things denoted by one and the same word would be identical, which they are not (K. IV. 186 pp. 191—192).

This description of the nature of substance by Kumārila is evidently in defence of the reality of substance against the view of those who would identify it with either its qualities, or its cognition, or again its name. No particular names of schools or thinkers, whom Kumārila might have had in mind, have been mentioned.

While Kumārila admits non-reflective direct knowledge (nirvikālpa pratyakṣa) as preliminary to the reflective one (svāvikālpa), he insists that the latter should not be denied the name of direct knowledge, as the Buddhists have done, simply because there are other factors in it besides sense-cognition, such as memory, etc. ‘It is no command of a king or the Veda’, says Kumārila, ‘that only that (cognition) is pratyakṣa which takes place before remembrance’. All cognition which is produced from the contact of the sense-organs with the object, whether before or after remembrance, is to be regarded as pratyakṣa².

Kumārila begins his exposition of the doctrine of inference with a consideration of Śabarsvāmin’s definition of inference in his Bhāsyā viz. ‘Inference is the cognition of an object not in direct contact, and

forming one of the two sides to a known relation, one
of which is directly apprehended.” He says that
the ‘known relation’ (jñāta-sambandha) mentioned
in the definition refers to the invariable concomitance
of the character of the mark (liṅga—the middle term)
with that which possesses the mark (liṅga—the
major term); and it is through the middle term that
the major term is proved. (K. V. 4, p. 348). The
object of inference, according to Kumārila, is the
thing denoted by the minor term as qualified by the
attribute signified by the major term; e.g. the place
as associated with fire (K. 47–48, p. 359).²

Kumārila objects to Śabara’s classification of
inference as (1) that based upon a directly appre-
hended relation (pratyakṣaṇa dṛṣṭa-sambandha), and
(2) that used upon a commonly known relation
(sāmānyato dṛṣṭā-sambandha); for he says that all
inference is equally based upon some observed rela-
tion in particular cases, and that a general proposition
such as that which forms the major premise is, in all
cases, arrived at by a repeated observation of parti-
cular similar instances. The relation between motion
and the change of position in the case of the sun³ is
as much based upon the direct apprehension of the
cases of motion and the change of position in the

1. anumānam jñāta sambandhasyaika-dēṣa-darśnād ekadeśān
tare ‘sannikṛṣte’ rthe buddhiḥ ŚB. p. 10.

2. Tasmād dharma-viśeṣasya dharmīnaḥ syāt prameyatā sā
dēṣasyāgni-yuktasya.

3. Which is an example of the sāmānyato dṛṣṭa inference.
case of particular persons such as Devadatta and others, as that between smoke and fire on the mountain\(^1\) is upon the direct apprehension of the concomitance of the two in such particular placed as the kitchen etc. (K. V. 138–140, pp. 390–391).

Kumārila devotes a long section of the Šloka-vārtika to the discussion of verbal testimony as a means of knowledge. As against such Buddhist logicians as Diñnāga and Dharamkīrti, and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers he maintains that verbal testimony is distinct from inference; for it is devoid of the three conditions of inference (trairūpya rahitatvena), and the object of inference is different from that of verbal testimony (tādṛg-viśaya-varjanāt), (K. V. 98, p. 378). He points out that what is meant by verbal testimony as a means of knowledge is not cognition by means of a word, which may be the object of inference, but the meaning of a sentence, and this cannot be the object of inference\(^2\), for it is not arrived at by means of invariable concomitance (K. 108-110. pp. 432-433).

Following Śabaravāmin, Kumārila also maintains that the object of knowledge by similarity is neither the objects remembered, e. g. the cow, nor the object perceived e. g. the gayal, nor the mere similarity

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1. This being an example of the pratyakṣo dṛṣṭa inference.
2. Pramāṇam anumānam vā yady api syāt padānumitiḥ
   Vākyārthasyāgamārthatvād doṣor nāgama-vādināṁ. (V. 108 p. 432).
noticed in the object perceived e.g. the horns in the
gayal, but the object remembered as qualified by
similarity, e.g. the cow as qualified by similarity to
the gayal, or similarity as associated with the object
remembered\(^1\). The reason for this view is that in so
far as the identification of a gayal is due to the infor-
mation given by another person that it is similar to
a cow, it is a case of verbal testimony; in so far as the
gayal and the marks of similarity are actually cognised
by the senses, it is a case of sense-cognition; and in
so far as a person is reminded of a cow, it is a case of
memory. It is only the cow as qualified by similarity
which is not cognised by any other means; and hence
it is the object of knowledge by similarity.\(^2\). Knowl-
dge by similarity is not a case of inference; for simi-
arity is not known as a property before it is cognised
through resemblance and hence it cannot provide a
middle term, which is essential for all inference.\(^3\).

Presumption (\textit{arthāpatti}) is the supposition of
something unseen (\textit{adrṣṭam}) in order to avoid a
contradiction which would be involved in accepting
a cognition obtained by any of the six means of

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Tasmād yat smaryate tatsyāt sādṛṣyena viṣeṣitam,
Prameyam upamānasya sādṛṣyam vā tadanvitam.}
(V. Up. 37, p. 444).
\item \textit{Viṣeṣṭasyānyato ‘siddher upamāna-pramāṇatā.}
(V. Up. 38, p. 445)
\item V. Up. 43, (p. 446).
\end{enumerate}
knowledge\(^1\). Accordingly, Kumārila gives instance of presumption based upon sense-cognition, inference, verbal testimony, knowledge by similarity, etc. For example, the presumption that fire has the property of burning things is based upon the cognition that it burns things that the sun has got the power of moving from one place to another is based upon the inference that it has actually moved from one place to another, and so on\(^2\). The stock example of Devadatta or Caitra that he must be out in case he is alive and not to be found at home, is a case of presumption based upon negation. It is shown at length that presumption is an independent means of knowledge, and not a case of Inference, the main argument being that in the case of presumption we cannot find a suitable middle term. For example, in the above instance of the presumption that Devadatta must be out in case he is alive and not at home, it is maintained that, the house as qualified by Devadatta’s absence cannot be predicated as a property of that which is denoted by the minor term (viz. Devadatta) for at the time of making such an assertion Devadatta is not recognised as qualified by absence in the house\(^3\). The presumption that one must be eating

\(^{1}\) “Pramāṇa śatka-viśiṣṭo yatrārtho nānyathā bhavet, Adṛśaṁ kalpayed anyaṁ sārthāpattir udāhyta. p. 450. (V. Arthāp. 1).

\(^{2}\) (V. Arthāp. 3-7, (pp. 451-452).

\(^{3}\) Tad-abhāva-viśiṣṭam tu gṛham dharmo na kasyacit, Gṛhābhāva-viśiṣṭas tu tadāsau na pratīyate—p. 453. K. 12.
at night in case one is fat and does not eat during the day is a case of verbal presumption (śrutārthāpatti), and it is shown that it is neither a case of verbal testimony nor of inference¹.

The next means of knowledge recognised by Kumārila is non-existence (abhāva). It is the only mode of knowledge to establish the existence of a thing where the other five means of knowledge fail. None-existence is of four kinds: (1) prior non-existence (prāg-abāva), e.g. the non-existence of curd in milk; (2) non-existence after destruction (prādhvamsābhāva), e.g. the non-existence of milk in curd; (3) mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva), e.g. the non-existence of a horse in a cow, and vice versa, and (4) absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva), e.g. the non-existence of horns on the head of a hare². It is pointed out that if non-existence be not accepted as a means of knowledge, we shall have to grant the existence of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of the jar in a piece of cloth, of horns in a hare, of intelligence in the earth, etc., of shape in the soul, of odour in water, of taste in fire, and so on.² Further, if the classification of non-existence into prior non-existence etc. be not accepted as true, it will not be possible to draw a distinction between a cause and

1. p. 463, K. 51 ff.
an effect. The same classification also shows that non-existence is to be regarded as a real entity (vastu), for an unreal entity cannot admit of such classification. A further proof of the fact that non-existence is a real entity like a cow is that it can be apprehended as applicable or non-applicable to things and is the object of cognition.

Following Śābarasvāmin Kumārila admits the six means of knowledge explained above. Implication (sambhava) is regarded as a case of inference, for it is maintained that in such cases as the inclusion of the notion of ‘one hundred’ in that of ‘a thousand’, the knowledge is due to an invariable concomitance (aviyuta-bhāvāt), and, therefore, the cognition is inferential. As regards tradition (aitihya) it is pointed out that a good deal of it is found to be untrue, and hence, it is not a valid means of knowledge; and whatever tradition is true it is a case of scriptural testimony.

2. ‘Na cāvastunā ete syur bhedās tenāsya vastutā’.
Kumārila undertakes a long dialectical refutation of the doctrine that cognition have no external objects as their basis (nirālambana-vāda). He begins his criticism of the theory by declaring that 'proof and non-proof (pramāṇaturvāpramāṇatva); virtue and vice together with their consequences; the assumption of the objects of injunctions, enlogistic passages, mantras and names, etc., will be out of place if cognitions were to be regarded as devoid of objects. Therefore, those who want to acquire merit should try to examine the problem of the existence and non-existence of things by means of the accepted means of knowledge.

As against the view that the external world may be supposed to have an illusory reality (samśruti) and that thus it will serve all the purposes of a real external world, Kumārila pertinently points out that there can be no reality about illusory reality and hence, it cannot be a form of reality; if it is real, it cannot be illusory; and if it is illusory, it cannot be real. Whatever does not exist, is not real; and that which exists is real. Reality cannot be assumed to be of two kinds: that which is real and that


which is false.

The reality of the external word is maintained against both the subjective idealists of the Yogācāra School and the Śūnya-vāda School of the Buddhists by mainly examining the nature of cognition and pointing out: firstly that in all cognitions there is present the distinction between the cogniser, the cognition and the object cognised, and that one and the same thing cannot be all the three; secondly, that cognition is not cognised by itself, but that it is inferred through the object which is cognised; and thirdly, if the idea of an object were identical with the object, the object would be present along with the idea of it in memory.

Kumārila argues that all the various means of knowledge should be regarded as self-valid; for if self-validity does not belong to them as an inherent

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1. Tasmād yan nāsti nasty eva yat tvasti paramarthaṁ
   Tat satyam anyan mitheyti na satya-dvaya-kalpanā, p. 219, K. 10.

2. Long and complex dialectical arguments are put forth by Kumārila under Nirālambana-vāda and Śūnya-vāda of Sloka-vārtika against the Vijñāna-vāda and the of Śūnya-vāda schools of Buddhism, which it is unimportant to reproduce here; for they have no constructive value, and they are mainly an expension of the much briefer and clearer refutation as given in the Śabara-bhāṣya.
power, it cannot be had from any other external source\(^1\). If validity of cognition be regarded as something dependent upon the verification, there will result a regress \textit{ad infinitum}; for the cognition of each such verification will stand in need of another verification, and so on.\(^2\) Therefore, cognition is to be regarded as valid simply by virtue of its being a means of knowledge, and it is to be set aside as invalid only on the discovery of a discrepancy in its cause\(^3\).

Invalidity (\textit{aprāmāṇyam}) is of three kinds: (1) falsity of cognition (\textit{mithyātva}); (2) non-perception or ignorance (\textit{ajñāna}); and (3) doubt (\textit{saṃśaya}). Of these the falsity of cognition and doubt are positive entities, and hence (\textit{vastutvād}) they are due to some defect in the cause of cognition (\textit{duṣṭa-kāraṇād}); and non-perception or ignorance is simply due to the absence of the cause or conditions of cognition. Invalidity is discovered through the cognition of its contradictory, that is to say of the real object; e. g. the invalidity of the cognition of silver in the mother-o’pearl is discovered by the cognition of the mother-o’pearl\(^4\).

The nature of generic character, which is called

1. \textit{Svataḥ sarva-pramāṇānāṁ Prāmāṇyam iti gavyatām, Na, hi svato satī śaktīḥ kartum anyena śakyate}, p. 59, K. 47.
3. p. 61, K. 53.
jāti, ākṛti\(^1\), sāmānya, or śakti, is discussed under direct knowledge (pratyākṣa), Akṛti and Vanavāda. The main point emphasised about it is that it is to be found in the individuals, and is perceptible by the senses like other particular qualities. In fact the individual and the generic characters are inseparably related to each other, and the cognition of the one would not be possible without the other\(^2\). All individual objects are cognised as having a twofold aspect—one that which distinguishes them from other objects—the specific character; and the other that which brings them under a common class—the generic character; and this twofold aspect would not be cognised if it did not belong to those objects. It is argued that if an object be perceived merely as a particular, there would be no idea of the generic character; and, on the other hand, if the generic character, alone were perceived, there would be no ground for perceiving the particular\(^3\). A large number of generic characters beginning with that of being are found in an individual object, and they are different from the specific characters such as the possession of a dewlap, etc. in the case of a cow.\(^4\)

1. Jātim evākṛtim prāhuḥ; p. 546 also sāmānyam ākṛtir jātiḥ śaktir va so bindhiyatām, p. 550.
2. Anyo nyāpeksitā nityam syāt sāmānya viśeṣayoh. viśeṣāṇām ca sāmānyam te ca tasya bhavanti hi. 9 p. 547.
(iii). Epistemology of the Prabhākara School of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā

No original work of Prabhākara has been published so far. The only first-hand source of his philosophy is the Brhatī, a manuscript of which is to be found in the Library of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, and which has been used by Dr. Gangānātha Jhā in his exposition of the Prabhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Next to the Brhatī is the Prakaraṇa-paṅcikā of Śālikanātha Miśra, a work which is still the main source of the philosophy of the Prabhākara School.

According to the Prabhākara School, knowledge is of two kinds; valid and invalid. Of these the first is called cognition (anubhūti), and the second memory (smṛti) which is different from cognition in so far as it is produced entirely by the impressions left by a previous cognition (pūrva-vijñāna-sāṃskāra-mātrajam). Following his predecessors in the Mīmāṃsā School, Prabhākara also held the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge. ‘It is strange, indeed’, says he, ‘how a cognition can

Sāmānya-mātra-bodhe tu nir-nimittaviśeṣadhiḥ. 6 p 546.
Pinde sattādi-jatīnam bahūnām samavetatā
Ṭabhyo viśiṣyate gotvam sāsnādibhir asaṃśayam, 3, p. 614.
1. ‘pramāṇam anubhūtiḥ; na ca smṛteḥ prāmāṇyāpattir iti darśayati, sā smṛter anyā’. P. Paṇcikā, p. 42.
be said to apprehended an object and yet be invalid\(^\text{1}\).

While discussing the view of \textit{Vijñ\=ana-v\=ada} that cognitions are directly perceived, and that they are identical with the objects of cognition, Prabh\=akara also, following \textit{\=Sabara-sv\=amin}, maintains that cognitions are not perceived directly, but that they are known through inference. In this connection he draws a distinction between an object of direct cognition (\textit{sa\=mundvedya}) and an object of indirect cognition (\textit{prameya}). The former being an object, the form of which is immediately apprehended through the sense-organ; and the latter that which is cognised indirectly without its form being immediately apprehended. For example, fire as perceived by the eye is \textit{sa\=mundvedya}, and as inferred through the perception of smoke is \textit{prameya}\(^\text{2}\).

Prabh\=akara differs from his predecessors with regard to the number of the valid means of knowledge in so far as he rejects ‘non-existence’ (\textit{abh\=ava}) as a separate \textit{pram\=a\=na}. Direct knowledge is defined by Prabh\=akara as direct apprehension (\textit{s\=ak\=s\=at-pratiti\=h}), which involves the cognition of three factors: (1) the apprehended object (\textit{meya}); (2) the apprehending subject (\textit{m\=a\=ty}); and (3) the act of

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1. \textit{Br\=hati, MS}, p. 3, quote in \textit{PPM}, p. 21; also \textit{P. Pa\=ncik\=a}, pp. 32 ff.

2. \textit{Br\=hati, MS}, p. 7 ff; \textit{Rjuvimal\=a} pp. 54-61 (quoted in \textit{PPM}, p. 26); also of, \textit{P. Pa\=ncik\=a}, pp. 63 and 64.
apprehension (pramāṇa). This analysis of sense-cognition into three factors has been called 'triputi-pratyaksā-vāda; which is regarded as particularly distinctive of the Prabhākara School. A corresponding analysis of cognition is found, as we have already seen, in Vātsyāyana's Nyāya-bhāṣya on NS. I, i, i,—"arthavati ca prāmāṇe pramāṇā prameyam pramitir ity arthavanti bhavanti", but it is not maintained by Vātsyāyana that the apprehending subject is cognised directly in the act of cognition itself.

According to the Prabhākara School, direct knowledge pertains to substance, generic character and qualities. The division of direct knowledge into non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) and reflective (savi-kalpaka) in the Prabhākara School is the same as in the Bhāṭṭa School. The difference between the two schools as regards the nature of non-reflective perception is that while according to Kumārila, the particular and the generic character, although present implicitly, are not perceived at the first moment; according to Prabhākara, they are perceived, but not as particular and generic characters; for the object cognised is not yet compared with other objects.

1. P. Pañcikā, p. 52, 'pratyakṣasya višeṣamāha, meya mātṛ-pramāṇsu sā'.
3. MŚV. IV, 113.
4. P. Pañcikā, pp. 54 and 55.
This view, it will appear, is practically the same as Kumārila’s; and that it is not really meant to be different from Kumārila’s view is evident from the assertion in the Prakaraṇa-paṅcika: “nirvikalpakam asāmānyā-viṣeṣa-viṣayam,” non-reflective (knowledge) is that which has not the particular and the generic characters as its object’, which is just parallel to the text of the Śloka-vārtika: “na viṣeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīm anubhūyate,” at that moment neither the particular nor the generic character is apprehended. It will appear that later on Rāmā-

2. In ŚV. IV, 113.
3. The text of P. Paṅcikā which suggests that there is a difference between Prabhākara and Kumārila on this subject is: ‘tasmāt sāmānyā-viṣeṣau dve vastunī prati-padyamānām pratyakṣam prathamam upapadyate kintu vastvantarānusandhāna-śūnyatāyā sāmānyā viṣeṣa-rūpatā na pratyayate’. But here also it is clearly said that the properties are not cognised as specific and generic, and hence the text practically does not mean anything different from what Kumārila has said in MŚV IV, 113. G. N. Jhā thinks that there is a real difference between the two schools, when he says (PPM. p. 38) “Here in also lies the chief difference of the Prabhākara from the Bhaṭṭa view etc....”

Keith appears to favour the view I have expressed here. He says (K. Mīmāṃsā, pp. 25, 26). ‘There does not appear to be any very real difference between the view of Prabhākara and that of Kumārila, through their verbal expression differs...”
nuja\textsuperscript{4} has described non-reflective direct knowledge in the same way (Chapter IV, iii) as we find it in the Prakaraṇa-paṅciṅkā.

All knowledge implies a subject (mātr) which is cognised directly; for no cognition or remembrance of an object is possible without a subject, which is the self.\textsuperscript{3} In all cognitions there is present the consciousness ‘I know’, not that ‘something else knows’\textsuperscript{3}.

The definition and classification of inference as given by the Prabhākara School are essentially the same as those formulated by Śabarasyāmin and accepted by Kumārila\textsuperscript{4}. There is a difference, however, between the Bhaṭṭa and the Prabhākara Schools as regards the nature of the object of inference; for, according to the former, it is something not previously known\textsuperscript{5}; while, according to the latter,

1. Rāmanuja’s Śrī-bhāṣya.
3. sarvā hi pratītir evam upajayate ‘ham jānāṃtti, na punar jānāttiti kācid buddhir āsti. P. Paṅcikā, p. 56.
it is something already known\(^1\). According to the Bhaṭṭa School, although the general concomitance between smoke and fire is known, the particular fire existing at a certain particular spot, e.g. on the mountain, is not previously known, and it is this fire which is the object of inference.

Verbal testimony is called scriptural testimony (sāstram) in the Prabhākara School, and is defined as the cognition of an object, which is not in contact with the sense-organs, through the interpretation of words\(^2\). Only the testimony of the Vedic texts is regarded as reliable; for the words used by a man are always liable to convey erroneous information\(^3\). In this respect there is a difference between the Bhaṭṭa and the Prabhākara School; for the former classifies verbal testimony as (1) human (pauruṣeya) and (2) non-human (apauruṣeya), and regards both of them is reliable\(^4\).

The Prabhākara School agrees with the Bhaṭṭa School with regard to the definition and nature of

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2. Na sāstra-vyatiriktam śabdam asti śabdāddhi yad vi-
jñānam asannikṛṣte tac chāstram syāt; na ca veda-vyat-
rekeṇa tat sambhavati;...laukikam hi vākyam nārthe
svyam nīscayam āpādayati laukika-vacāsām antra-
bhūyishhatvād artha-vyabhicārasya sāṃkitvāt. P. Pañ-
cikā, p. 94.

knowledge by similarity

Presumption (artha patti) is defined as that assumption without which a certain known fact cannot be seen to be consistent. According to the Prabhakara School, knowledge by presumption differs from inference in so far as the ground of presumption is doubtful, while that of inference is devoid of doubt. When a certain person, say Devadatta, is not found at home, it is doubtful whether he is alive, and is therefore out; he may be dead. According to the Bhatta School, there is no doubt in the ground of knowledge by presumption; for if it be doubtful, it will not be possible to have knowledge by presumption; at all. If it be not known for certain that a person, who is not at home, is alive, there cannot be any reason to believe that he is out.

Non-existence (abhava), which is accepted by Kumara ila as a means of knowledge, is rejected by the Prabhakara School on the ground that the means of knowledge can be considered only with reference to some object to be cognised—'sarvam pramānam prameyāvinā-bhāvi'. As there is no object of cognition in the case of cognition by non-existence, it is


2. P. Pañcikā, pp. 113-118.

"Vinā kalpanayārthena drṣṭenānupannatām.
Nayatā drṣṭam ārtham yā sārthapattis to kalpanā."
not to be regarded as a means of knowledge.\(^1\)

The Prabhākara School agrees with its predecessors in rejecting implication (sambhava) and tradition (aitihya) as means of knowledge.

That the problem of the nature of generic character (jāti) was regarded important by the later Indian philosophers is evident from the discussions concerning it in the works of almost every one of them. We have already seen what Kumārila and some of the Jaina thinkers had to say on the subject. In the Prakaraṇa-pañchikā,\(^2\) we find a classification of the various views held by philosophers about the nature of the generic character. It is said that (1) according to same, the generic character is simply a fiction (vikalpa-vilasita); (2) according to others, although it is real, it is not different from those things which form its substratum (āśrayebhyo abhinnām anuman-yante); (3) according to a third class of thinkers, it is different from its substratum, and is cognised by inference (bhinnām apy anumeyām āhuk); while (4) according to a fourth class of philosophers, it is both different and not different from the things which form its substratum (bhinnābhinnām icchanti). According to Prabhākara, says the author of the P. Pañcikā, the generic character is different from its substratum, and is the object of direct knowledge. It is the product of reflecting over previous forms of

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2. Ibid, p. 17 ff. ‘Bahudha jāti-viśaye vivadante vipaścitaḥ’, etc.
things\(^1\); that is to say, it is the result of comparison. Prabhākara and Kumārila agree in so far as both regard the generic character as something perceivable by the senses; and they differ from each other in so far as, according to Kumārila, the generic character is not different from the particular things which form its substratum\(^2\). According to the Prabhākara School, the generic character is found in each individual of a class, and is eternal. It does not appear or disappear with the appearance and disappearance of the individuals. It is only the relation of the generic character with the individual which is established when the individual comes into existence, and ceases when it is destroyed.

The argument that the external world is not real for it is like the world of dreams is refuted by Prabhākara thus: 'We are justified only in assuming from a well-known effect a cause that would make the effect possible, and not one that would destroy it; what we find in a dream in that there is cognition of an external object; this effect can justify us in assuming—not indeed the absolute non-existence of the external object—but the real existence of such an object, as without this the cognition would be an impossibility. As a general law we know it to be

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1. \(\text{Jātir āśrayato bhinnā pratyakṣa-jñāna-gocarā.} \)
\(\text{Pūrvākāra-vāma-rṣena prabhākara-gūrov matā.} \)
\(\text{P. Pañcikā, p. 17.} \)

2. \(\text{MŚ. Ākṛti, 52–62, and Vana-vāda, 75–76.} \)
true that that without which something else is not possible is the cause of this latter; from this it follows that the cause of dream-cognition is some object in the external world. It is not exactly clear against which particular school this refutation of the doctrine is directed, though we know that the doctrine refuted here is identical with that of Śūnya-vāda of Buddhism.

It is pointed out in the Prakṛaṇa-paṅcikā that the term ‘pramāṇa’ is ambiguous. It may mean either cognition (pramiti) itself, or it may signify the means of cognition (karaṇa). In case it is the first, the result (phala) of pramāṇa is the taking or the rejecting etc. of an external object. If it is the second, it means the contact of the mind, the sense-organs, and the object; and the result is the cognition itself. This applies both to direct knowledge and inference.


2. ‘Mānatve samvido bāhyam hāna-dānādikam phalam’. P. P. p. 64.

3. Apeksikam ca karaṇam mana indriyam eva vā. Tad-artha-sannikarṣo vā mānaṁ cet pūrvakam phalam. P. Paṅcikā, p. 64.

4. P. Paṅcikā, p. 82.
The Development of Sāṃkhya Epistemology in Gaudapāda’s Bhāṣya and Vācaspati Miśra’s Sāṃkhya-tattvakaumudi on the Sāṃkhya-kārika.

The Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge was developed by Gaudapāda and Vācaspati Miśra in their commentaries on the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, especially by the latter. There is no external evidence to prove or disprove the supposition that the Gaudapāda, the author of the Bhāṣya on the S.K., was the same person as the author of the Māṇḍūkya—kārikā bearing that name; but the thought, language and style of the two works suggest that it is very improbable that they were written by the same person. It is a well-known fact now that Gaudapāda’s Bhāṣya is mostly based upon an earlier commentary on the SK. called the Māṭhara-vṛtti, the date of which is believed to be about 500 A. D. The Bhāṣya must, however, be earlier than the Sāṃkhya-tattvakaumudi of Vācaspati Miśra, for it does not show any knowledge of the comments of Vācaspati Miśra on the Sāṃkhya-kārikās, and is decidedly of a primitive style.

(i) Gaudapāda’s Bhāṣya on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā.

Under SK. 4, Gaudapāda refers to the Mimāṃsā list of the six means of knowledge (pramāṇas), and states that according to the Sāṃkhya presumption

(arthāpatti) is included in inference; and implication (sambhava), non-existence (abhāva), guess (pratibhā), tradition (aitihya) and knowledge by similarity (upama) are included in verbal testimony.

The only point worthy of consideration from the point of view of the theory of knowledge in Gauḍapāda’s Bhāṣya is his explanation of the three kinds of inference. He says: ‘Inference is said to be of three kinds: sēsavat, pūrvavat, and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa. That which has a previous (instance) is called pūrvavat-pūrvam asyāstīti pūrvavat; for example, rain is inferred from the appearance of clouds, because of the previous experience (pūrvadṛṣṭitvāt); sēsavad, for example, having found that a drop of water from the sea is salt, (it is inferred) that the rest (of the sea-water) must also be salt. Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa;—having observed that they have shifted from one place to another, it is inferred with regard to the moon and the stars that they must be moving like (a person, say) Caitra: Just as having noticed that a person named Caitra has got from one place to another, it is inferred that he must be moving; so in the case of the moon and the stars also (that they

1. This is an uncommon term found in Gauḍapāda’s commentary. He explains it thus: pratibhā yatḥā daksīṇena vindhyasya sahyasya ca yad uttaram prthivyāṁ āsamudrāyām sa pradeśo manoramaḥ, evam ukte tasmin pradeśe sobhanā guṇāḥ sāntīti pratibhotpadyate. The Bhāṣya, Colebrooke and Wilson’s edition, Bombay 1897, p. 25.
must be moving). Similarly, having seen that the mango tree is in blossom at one place, it is inferred by means of \textit{sāmānyato drṣṭa}, that mango trees must be in blossom at other places also. This is \textit{sāmānyato-drṣṭa}. What next is meant by saying that inference is based upon a mark (\textit{liṅga}) and that which bears the mark (\textit{liṅgi})? That (inference) is based upon a mark (\textit{liṅga-pūrvakam}), in which the bearer of the mark (\textit{liṅgi}) is inferred by means of the mark; for instance, a mendicant by means of his staff. That (inference) is based upon the bearer of a mark, in which the mark is inferred by means of that which bears the mark, e.g. having seen a mendicant it is inferred that the triple staff (\textit{tri-dāṇḍam}) must belong to him	extsuperscript{1}.

It will appear that in his explanation of the three kinds of inference while Gauḍapāda agrees with some of the Nyāya commentators with regard to the meaning of \textit{pūrvavat}, he has his own peculiar interpretations of \textit{seṣavat} and \textit{sāmānyato-drṣṭa} which very much resemble such explanations of them as are found in \textit{Māṭhara-vṛtti} and \textit{Anuyogadvāra}, both very early works	extsuperscript{2}. This is another indication of the fact that the author of the Bhāṣya belonged to an early period.

Gauḍapāda’s explanation of ‘\textit{āpta-ṣrutiḥ}’ as

1. SKGB. pp. 29, 30.
āptāśca śrutisca āptaśrutiḥ is evidently wrong; for the text in Kārikā (5) is clearly ‘āpta-śrutiḥ’ and I do not see how the compound can be expounded in the way Gauḍapāda has done. He explains ‘āpta’ as meaning preceptors like Brahman and others ‘āptā acāryā brahmādayaḥ’, and ‘śruti’ as signifying the Veda- ‘śrutir vedāḥ’. The meaning of ‘āpta-śrutiḥ’ is given in the Kārikā itself that it signifies the utterance of a reliable person āpta-śrutir āpta-vacanam tu.’ We shall see that Vācaspaṭi Miśra’s explanation of ‘āpta-śrutiḥ’ is different from that by Gauḍapāda, although both have tried to include the authority of the Veda as a form of Verbal testimony.
The theory of knowledge in the Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudi of Vācaspati Miśra.

The Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudi is VM’s commentary on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, and is more important as a work on the Sāṃkhya than even the original work of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

Under K. IV. VM explains a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) thus: Pramāṇa is that by which a thing is measured (known), and hence it is the cause of right cognition (pramāṇa). It is a functioning of the intellect, which is free from doubt and self-contradiction, and has for its object something unknown. This knowledge belongs to some person; the result of it is right cognition; and the means of acquiring

1. Pramāṇa prati karanatvam avagamyate.
2. Tac cāsandigdhāviparitānadhyagata-viśaya citta-vṛttih. Dr. G. N. Jhā translates this sentence thus: ‘This definite right notion is a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful, self-contradictory or unknown.’ It will appear that ‘anadhi-gata-viśayā’ does not mean ‘that free from the contact of all that is unknown’ as Dr. Jhā’s translation puts it, but ‘that which has for its object something not (already) known, which condition, as is well-known was included in the definition of cognition by the later writers on logic in order to exclude memory; and here too the last sentence in the paragraph ‘et ena saṃśaya-viparyayasyaṃṛtisādhaneśv apra-sangah’ clearly shows that ‘anadhigataviśayā’ is meant to exclude memory (smṛti).
it is the pramâna. This description of pramâna precludes the application of the name to such cognition as is the result of doubt, error and memory.

The various factors in cognition are explained thus: The element of buddhi is without consciousness, for it is material; and for the same reason its determinations (adhyavasâya) are also devoid of consciousness like a jar, etc. Similarly, pleasures, etc. also, which are the various modifications of buddhi are also insentient; while the puruṣa, who has no relation to pleasures, etc. is sentient. This puruṣa appears to be possessed of cognitions and pleasures, etc. (jñâna sukhâdimân iva) on account of these being present in the element of buddhi and thus reflecting themselves in the puruṣa, while the buddhi and its determinations, although insentient in themselves, appear as if they are sentient on account of the reflection of the puruṣa.

The next point worthy of notice in the STK. is the division of inference into ‘vîta’ and ‘avîta’. Vîta is that inference which affirms something on the basis of agreement. This is of two kinds. (i) pûrvavat, and (ii) sâmânyato-arśta. Of these, the pûrvavat is that which has such an object for its inference the characteristics of the species of which are

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1. STK. (G. N. Jhâ’s edition) p. 10.
2. ‘Anvaya-mukhena pravartamânam vidhâyakam vîtam’.
already known,¹ e. g. the inference of fire on a mountain from the existence of smoke, where the characteristics of fire (as a species) are already known from one’s experience of it in the kitchen. The sāmānyato-dṛśṭa is that which has such an object for its inference the characteristics of the species of which are not known²; e. g. the inference of sense-organs from the cognitions of colour, etc., where although one has the idea of general causation from such experiences as the cutting of a tree with an axe, the particular cause of the perception of colour etc. viz. the sense-organs, has never been perceived before.

Avāتا is the sēsavat inference which is explained thus: ‘sēṣa’ is that which remains; and the inferential knowledge which has this remainder for its object is called ‘sēsavat.’ Then quoting Vātsyāyana it is said that ‘the cause in question being eliminated, and the other alternatives being found irrelevant, the idea of the remainder is ‘pariśesa’³. An example of this kind of inference is given under SK. IX, where it is proved that ‘the cloth is not different from the threads, since it is a property characteristically inhering in the latter. An object differing in essence from another can never inhere in it; as the cow does not inhere in the horse; but as the cloth is inherent

1. dṛśṭa-sva-lakṣaṇa-sāmānya-viśayam yat tat pūrvavat.
3. ‘prasaktā-pratisedhe, anyatráprasaṅgat śiṣyamāne saṁpratyayāḥ pariśesaḥ’.
in the threads, it is not different from it in essence. It will appear that the essential characteristics of \textit{vīta} and \textit{avīta} inference according to Vācaspati Misra, as explained here, are the same as those according to Uddyotakara; that is to say, one is based upon agreement, and the other upon difference.

As regards verbal testimony, after having explained how it comes after inference in order, VM. says that it is self-evident (\textit{svataḥ pramāṇam}); for it is free from all discrepancies and doubts on account of its proceeding from the \textit{Veda}, which is not the work of a human being. For the same reason, knowledge which is the result of the texts of the \textit{Smyths} and the \textit{Purāṇas} etc., which are based upon the \textit{Veda}, is also true.

It is to be noted that the self-validity which VM. attributes to the knowledge of the \textit{Veda} and its dependent scriptures does not represent the view of the author of the SK., as it is inconsistent with \textit{Kārikā} II where it is said that 'the revealed knowledge is like the obvious, since it is characterised by impurity, decay and excess'. In his comment on this \textit{Kārikā}, VM. has explained this condemnation of the Vedic

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1. \textit{anvaya-mukhena pravartamāṇam vidhāyakaṁ vītam}; \textit{vyatireka-mukhena pravartamāṇam nīṣedhakam avītam}. STK. on SK. 5 (p, 12).

2. \textit{d, ṛṣavatādānuḥravikāḥ sa hy avisuddhiḥṣayāviṣayacyuktāḥ}. 
authority by saying that it refers only to the ritualistic portion of it; but there is nothing in the text of the Kārikā to suggest that it is so. Further in Kārikā V, ‘āpta-ṛutiḥ’ is explained as ‘āpta-vacanam’ the utterance of a reliable person, or as VM. explains it, ‘true utterance,’ which fact indicates clearly that by ‘ṛutiḥ’ the author of the Kārikā did not mean the Veda and the dependent scriptures. VM. himself has explained ‘ṛutiḥ’ as knowledge of the meaning of a sentence produced by words’ śrutiḥ vākya-janitam vākyārtha-jñānam.

It is shown that verbal testimony is not a case of inference by pointing out that when the meaning of a sentence is the object of cognition (prameya), the sentence or the word does not serve as a mark (liṅga); for it is not its property (na tu tād-dharmaḥ); nor does a sentence, while signifying something, stand in need of the cognition of a relation such as is needed in the case of inference.

After having explained direct knowledge, inference and verbal testimony VM. proves how the rest of the pramāṇas treated by some other schools of thought as separate from these are included in them. Knowledge by similarity, he explains, is a combination of verbal testimony, inference and direct knowledge; for the knowledge produced by the statement: ‘The gayal is like a cow’ is a case of verbal testimony; the knowledge that the word ‘gayal’ signifies an animal resembling the cow is a case of inference; and
lastly, the cognition of resemblance of the animal called gayal to a cow is a case of direct knowledge. Presumption (arthāpatti) too is not a distinct means of knowledge; for, to take the usual instance, the fact that a person, say Caitra, must have gone out if he is alive and not found at home, is a matter of inference; a particular finite object, when not found in one place, must be found elsewhere.

Non-existence (abhāva) is shown to be a case of direct knowledge; for the negation of a jar at a certain spot is merely a particular modification of that spot characterised by the absence of the jar. All forms of existence are changing every moment except the power of consciousness (citi-saktī); and as all of them are perceptible by the senses, there is no object which does not fall within the scope of direct knowledge. Therefore, there is no need of postulating any other form of pramāṇa.

Implication (sambhava) is a case of inference; for the knowledge, for example, that lesser weights are included in the greater ones, is based upon the general known principle that greater quantities contain smaller ones.

Tradition (aitihya) is no mode of knowledge; for it is simply a rumour, the origin of which is not known and hence it is not reliable.

The objectivity of the material world is proved
under SK. XI as against the subjective idealists, who say that there is nothing besides knowledge (vijñāna). It is maintained that the manifested world (vyaktam) is objective (viṣayah), that is to say, perceptible and something external to knowledge. For the same reason it is ‘common’ (sāmānyam), that is to say, it is perceived in common by many persons. If it be accepted that everything is only knowledge, then as knowledge is not common, that is to say, it is not shared by different individuals, material things also would not form the object of common experience. But this is not so; for, says VM., we find the glances of a dancing girl form the object of attention to many people at a time.

Under Kārikā XXVII, while discussing the nature and functions of mind as a sense-organ, VM. explains the distinctions between non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) and reflective (saviкалpaka) direct knowledge pointing out that it is mind which supplies defi-

1. Tri-guṇam aviveki viṣayaḥ sāmānyam acetanam prasava-dharmi.
   Vyaktam tathā pradhānām tad-viparītastathā ca pumān.
   It will appear that all that is said in the Kārikā is that matter both manifested and unmanifested (pradhāna) forms the object of knowledge (viṣaya) as opposed to the spirit, which is the subject, and the Kārikā by itself does not appear to aim at a refutation of vijñāna-vāda. It simply draws a distinction between the characteristics of matter and spirit.

2 tān praty āha ‘viṣaya’ iti, viṣayo grāhyaḥ; vijñānād vahir iti yāvat; ata eva “sāmānyam” anekaiḥ puruṣair grhitaṁ ity arthaḥ, STK. p. 27.
niteness to the object of perception and distinguishes it from other objects. He says: 'First there is only the presentational knowledge which is indeterminate, like that of a child or of those who are deaf, etc. produced by an undefined object (mugdha-vastujam). Subsequently, the object is invested with its properties, genus, etc., and this cognition which introduces these is also regarded as direct knowledge (pratyakṣatvena sammatā). This reflective function which belongs to mind distinguishes an object from others of the same and different species, and forms the characteristic feature of mind.¹ This description of the two kinds of knowledge exactly corresponds to that found in Kumārila's Mimāṃsā-sloka-vārtika.

The Vedānta Epistemology according to Gaudapāda, Saṃkara and Rāmānuja.

Unlike the other schools of philosophy the epistemology of the Vedānta as found in these important authors is of a divergent nature. In fact, so far as their doctrines of knowledge are concerned they may have as well belonged to three different schools. Gauḍapāda practically adopts the epistemology of the Mādhyamika School in so far as he denies knowledge and reality in the ordinary sense. Saṃkarācārya makes an attempt to find a middle way between a complete denial of the knowledge and reality of the external

¹ STK. pp. 46, 47.
world and an unqualified acceptance of its reality by propounding his peculiar doctrine of māyā and avidyā. Rāmānuja undertakes a trenchent criticism of Śamkara’s theory of illusion and maintains that both knowledge and its objects are real. In doing so he gives an analysis of the various means of knowledge, especially of the non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) and the reflective (savikalpaka) direct knowledge. Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja criticise the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism.

(i) The doctrine of illusory existence and illusory knowledge according to Gaudapada.

Gauḍapāda, whose work was the precursor of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta, has been called the first systematic writer on the Vedānta metaphysics. His Māṇḍūkya-kārika is in part a commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and in part an original treatise expounding the philosophy of absolute reality. As has already been noticed by the students of the Kārika, both the language and the thought of the author bear ample evidence to the fact that he was greatly influenced by the writings of Buddhist writers, especially of those who belonged to the Mādhyamika School. In fact some of his Kārikās bear striking resemblance to the Mādhyamika-kārikās of Nāgārjuna, and except for the fact that Gauḍapāda has substituted ‘Brahman’

for Nāgārjuna’s ‘Śūnyatā’ there is hardly any difference between the philosophical positions of the two.¹

The work is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is mainly an interpretation of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, and in his Gauḍapāda explains the four aspects of self. Firstly, as the vaiśvānara ātman the self as conscious of the world in the state of waking; secondly, as the taijasa ātman, the self as conscious in the state of dream; thirdly suṣupty ātman, the self as in the state of deep sleep when there is no determinate knowledge, and the self stands in its own pure consciousness and pure bliss; and fourthly, the self as beyond all perception, relation, comprehension, definition, expression, etc., that which is characterised by the extinction of phenomenal reality (prapañcopaśamam). This last is the true nature of self. In the second chapter, Gauḍapāda explains how the world of experience is unreal. He attributes the perception of all phenomena to illusion (māya). In fact, there is no relation of cause and effect, nor is there any bondage or liberation. The third chapter elaborates the same idea of illusory appearance as due to māyā. The fourth chapter is mainly devoted to the discussion of the relation of cause and effect, and it is pointed out by means of a dialectical form of argument, very much like that found in the Mādhyaṁika-kārikās, that there is only the appearance of change and production in things, and that the

¹. Cf. JRAS. 1910, pp. 136 ff.
ultimate reality is unproduced, unchangeable, non-substantial and completely unmoved.¹ There is no analysis of the various means of knowledge in the Māndūkya-kārikā, the reason probably being that these are regarded as illusory.

The world of waking experience is shown to be as unreal and illusory as that of dreams—' svapna-jāgarite sthane hy ekam āhur manīśinah.' (II. 5). Just as the objects experienced as real in a dream are found to be illusory on waking up, so the objects experienced as real in the state of wakefulness are found to be unreal by those who wake up in the state of absoluteness. Having raised the question as to how the world of experience has come into being, how it appears to be diverse, and how the illusion is to disappear, Gauḍapāda says in quite unmistakable terms that it is ātman which conjures up all the diversity by means of its own magical powers, and it is the appearance of true knowledge which dispels this plurality and illusion:

Kalpayaty ātmanātmānam ātma-dehaḥ sva-māyayā
Sa eva buddhyate bhedaḥ iti vedānta-niścayaḥ²

II. 12.

That one whose self is its body, by itself conjures up its own self by means of its own magical power. It is that again which knows distinctions (among things). Such is the established doctrine of the Vedānta.

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2. Also cf. II, 13 and ff.
Aniścitā yathā rajjura andhakāre vikalpitā
Sarpa-dhārādibhir bhāvais tadvad ātma vikalpitāḥ

II. 17.

Niścitāyāṁ yathā rajjvāṁ vikalpo viniśvatate,
Rajjur eveti cādvaitam tadvad ātma-viniścayaḥ

II. 18.

Just as a rope, being not distinctly perceived in darkness, is falsely imagined to be such things as a snake, a stream of water, and so on; in the same way is the self imagined to be (different from what it is).

Just as on a rope being definitely perceived as such, the false image disappears, and there appears the single perception that it is a rope only; similarly, on the self being definitely ascertained as such (the plurality of existence disappears).

It will appear that while scholars have prominently noticed the other sections of the Kārikā which bear resemblance to Buddhistic philosophy, the particular section from which the above verses have been quoted has received little attention. I regard these verses important in so far as they clearly and conclusively establish the fact that Gauḍapāda, as he appears in the Kārikā, is as good a Vedāntist as his successor and well known champion of the system, Śrī-Śaṅkara-cārya. In so far as Gauḍapāda recognises Brahman as the universal cosmic principle, he is as distinctly a Hindu philosopher and different from a Buddhist as any one can be. That there is very great resemblance between the monistic Vedānta as found in some of the Upaniṣads and as developed
later on to its fullest extent by Gauḍapāda and Saṃkarṣācārya on the one hand, and the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism on the other, no one will deny, but the distinction too between the two systems is unmistakable in so far as the one clearly recognises the existence of self, while the other as clearly denies it. Now Gauḍapāda, in his Kārikā, makes use of most of the points common to Mādhyamika Buddhism and the Vedānta in so far as they support the proof of the illusory nature of the mental and the material world; but, at the same time, sticks to the fundamental position of the Vedānta that self is the ultimate reality.

The fourth chapter of the Kārikā, called the Alātabānti ‘Putting out the Fire-brand’, proves the illusory nature of the mental and the material world with all its relations of substance and attribute, cause and effect, etc., and in doing so most of the dialectical arguments of the Mādhyamika-kārikās of Nāgarjuna have been repeated. The chief points about Gauḍapāda’s doctrine of knowledge and reality as found in the Kārikā are: (1) That the world of waking experience is as unreal and illusory as that of dreams; (2) That the objects of experience are in no way different from the ideas of the same; (3) That these ideas themselves are illusory. In accepting (1) and

1. The Kārikā is full of verses speaking of Brahman and ātman as the ultimate reality. Besides those quoted above cf. III. 1-12.
(2) Gaudapāda agrees with the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra Schools respectively; and in maintaining
(3) he goes beyond the Yogācāra doctrine. There is a good deal of repetition and ambiguity about Gauda-
pāda's arguments, just as we find in those of the Mādhyamika-kārika. It is clear, however, that they are mainly based upon the relation of cause and effect. He starts with the premise that dreams are unreal. They being unreal, their cause which is to be found in the world of waking experience must also be unreal. The world of waking experience being unreal, the ideas of it must also be unreal. Thus all the relations, including that of cause and effect, must also be unreal. The verses like the following are typical of Gauda-
pāda's arguments:

Asaj jāgarite dṛṣṭvā svapne paśyati tanmayaḥ,
Asat svapne 'pi dṛṣṭvā ca pratibuddho na paśyati

IV. 40.

Nāsty asadd-hetukam asat sad-asadd-hetukam tathā,
Sac ca sadd-hetukam nāsti sadd-hetukam asat kutāḥ.

IV. 41.

Having seen unreal objects when awake, one sees the same in dreams being invested with them (tanmayaḥ); and having seen unreal objects in dreams also, one does not see them when one wakes up.

The unreal has not for its cause the unreal; likewise the real has not for its cause the unreal; the real has not for its cause that which is real; and then how can the unreal have for its cause that which is real?
In the above verse the statement that the real has not for its cause that which is real is evidently based upon the denial of the principle of causation altogether. The last statement, viz. that the unreal cannot have for its cause that which is real, is the main argument employed by Gaudapāda to prove the unreality of all knowledge and being on the basis of the universally accepted unreal nature of dreams.

(ii) Samkara’s Theory of Knowledge and Reality.

We do not find a systematic treatment of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) in any of Śaṅkara’s works. His theory of knowledge can, however, be deduced from some portions of his works, especially his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, II, 2. The background of Śaṅkara’s whole philosophy, and so also of his epistemology, is the well-known distinction between the world in the ordinary sense (vyāvahārika-jagat), and the world in the highest sense (paramārtha-jagat), corresponding to which there are ignorance (avidyā) and knowledge (vidyā) respectively. This doctrine of twofold reality is not at all peculiar to Śaṅkara; for, as we have seen already, it is found in such Buddhist works as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra

1. LS. II, 187, where the terms saṃvṛti and paramārtha are used. Dr. E. J. Thomas has drawn my attention to the presence of the same distinction also in Kathāvatthu-Pakaraṇa-Atthakathā (JPTS. 1889, p. 10)—“Sammutisacca paramattha saccāni vā ekato katvā pi evam āha".
and the Mādhyamika-kārikās of Nāgārjuna. It is also present in the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā of Gaudapāda. What is peculiar to Śaṅkara is his conception of māyā which, according to him, is something positive (bhāva-rūpa) and yet inexplicable (anirvāc-anīya). It is the cause of the world in the ordinary sense; and the disappearance of it through enlightenment unveils true reality, which is Brahman. It will appear that while Śaṅkara’s position with regard to the nature of ultimate and true reality is the same as that of Gaudapāda, he differs from him and the Mādhyamika School in so far as, while maintaining the illusory character of the phenomenal world, he still holds that it is not unreal in the sense that it is identical with knowledge, or does not exist at all. This rather paradoxical doctrine Śaṅkara is able to hold, although as we shall see presently, inconsistently with his fundamental position, because of his peculiar conception of māyā. To him māyā is a positive entity, and hence the phenomenal world of which it is the cause has also a positive existence. But as māyā is also illusion, therefore, the world of ordinary experience is also illusory.

1. MK. XXIV, 8 and 9, where the terms ‘loka-samvṛtisatyam’ and ‘paramārtha-satyam’ have been used (This Thesis p. )

2. IV. 57, Samvṛtyā jāyate sarvam śāvataṃ nāsti tena vai, Sadbhāvena hy ajam sarvam ucchidas tena nāsti vai.
Now all the above doctrines are, in the first instance, based, according to Śāṃkara, upon the authority of the revealed scriptures, especially the upaniṣads, and this in fact is sufficient to establish their truth. Reasoning by itself is no sure guide to truth, and has to be employed only to prove the truth of that which is already vouchsafed by the revealed testimony. Accordingly, we find that in order to establish his own constructive tenets of philosophy, Śāṃkara constantly and assiduously refers to the scriptural texts for proof, and it is only against his opponents that he uses argumentation.

In the analysis of cognition Śāṃkara holds a position very similar to that of the Sāmkhya; for according to him also, it is the self which knows, and it is the intellect which acts, and the functions of the two are confused because of the reflection of the one on the other. It is because of the self that knowledge is possible. It is known by itself and does not form an object of knowledge like other objects. It is the ego characterised by the sense of I¹. Cognition results from the conjunction of the self, the internal organ (antah-kāraṇa), the sense-organs and the object. Under Ved. S. II, 3, 32 Śāṃkara explains how this internal organ is variously called manas, buddhi, vijñāna and citta according as it functions in one way or another, and how its function being atten-

1. Ātmabodha 25, 27, 28, 33, 34.
tion it is an indispensable factor in all cognition. It is called manas, when its function is doubt, etc.—‘saṃśayādi-vṛttikam mana ity ucyate’ buddhi when its function is certainty etc.—‘niścayādikam vṛttir iti’.

Śaṁkara raises the problem of knowledge and error in the opening lines of his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras by pointing out that in ordinary experience man fails to distinguish between two such opposite entities as the subject (viśayin) and the object (viśaya); and that this superimposition (adhyāsa) of the qualities of the one upon the other is due to ignorance (avidyā)⁴. Superimposition he defines as the apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing—‘smṛti-rūpah paratra pūrva-drṣṭāvabhāsaḥ’ or simply, as ‘the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing’—‘anyasya anya-dharmāvabhāsaḥ; as for example, ‘mother-of-pearl appears like silver’; or ‘the moon although one only appears as if she were double’. ‘This kind of superimposition’, says Śaṁkara, ‘learned men consider to be ignorance (avidyā) and the ascertainment of the true nature of an object by discrimination they call knowledge (vidyā)⁵... ‘It is on this mutual superimposition of

1. Tathāpy anyonyasmīn anyonyaṭmaktam.................................loka-vyavahārah.

2. ‘tad-vivekena ca vastu-svarūpāpayadhāraṇam, vidyām āhuḥ’.
self and non-self (atmānātmanoḥ) that all such practical conventions as the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge are based¹, as also all scriptures, whether those concerned with injunctions and prohibitions, or with salvation. But how is it that the means of knowledge such as perception, etc. and the scriptures should treat of that which is dependent upon ignorance? The answer is that the operation of the means of knowledge is not possible unless there be first a notion of the subject; and this is not possible without the erroneous notion that the sense of 'I' and 'mine' belongs to the body and the senses, etc. For, without the employment of the senses, sense-cognition and the other means of knowledge cannot operate; and without a substratum (adhiṣṭhānam antarena)² the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act without considering the body as superimposed by the nature of self. Nor can, in the absence of all that (superimposition), self, which, in its own nature; is free from all relations (asaṅgasyātmanoḥ), become a knowing subject. And without a knowing subject, there is no scope for the operation of the means of knowledge. Hence, sense-cognition and the other means of knowledge, as also the scrip-

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1. sarvā-pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra laukikāḥ pravṛttāh.

2. This should be the body, although the Bhāmati takes the word to mean ‘superintendence or guidance’ and this would be attributed to the soul. See Thibaut's Transl. I (SBE) p. 7 (note).
tures treat of those objects which depend upon ignorance”.

The purport of the above paragraph is that the ordinary human knowledge, which is the result of the pramāṇas, pertains to the world in the ordinary sense which has only an illusory existence, although within this phenomenal existence also we have distinctions of knowledge and error, e.g. the perception of a rope as a snake. That Śaṅkara regards the world in the ordinary sense as illusory and the result of error just in the same way as a snake, while there is a rope only, and also as something which can be sublated by the appearance of true knowledge, is clear from all his writings here and elsewhere. Hence, his position in this respect is in no way substantially different from that of Gaudapāda, and he cannot consistently draw a distinction between the world of dreams and that of ordinary experience, in so far as both of them are illusory according to his own admission. His observation while commenting on Ved. S. II. 2. 29, that the things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness, while those of which we are conscious in our waking state are never negated in any state is not consistent

1. I have adopted Thibaut’s translation here and elsewhere with such alterations as appeared to be necessary.

2. ‘Naivam jāgaritopalabdham vastu stambhādikam, Kasyāmcid apy avasthāyām bādhyate’.
with his well-known view that the world in the ordinary sense is the result of avidyā or adhyāsā, which can be removed by true knowledge. All that Śāṅkara can say consistently with his position is that the world of waking state is relatively real; and Gauḍapāda was right when he said that the world of dreams is as real or as false as the world of waking experience real in so far as there is all the appearance of reality, false in so far as it is negated by another experience\(^1\).

Analysis of cognition according to Śāṅkara is to be found in his criticisms of the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism in his commentary on Ved. S. II. 2. His refutation of the first of these is based upon his epistemological arguments for the permanence of the knower (upalabdhr), and that of the second upon the invariable presence of an objective reference in all sense-cognition.

His arguments against the doctrine of momentariness may be summarised as follows:

(i) The philosopher, who maintains that all things are momentary only, would have to extend that doctrine to the knower (upalabdhr) also. That is, however, not possible on account of the remembrance which is consequent on the original perception—‘upalabdhim anūtpadyamānaṁ smaraṇam eva anu-smṛtiḥ’. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made
the perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences: 'I saw that thing, and now I see this (same) thing', if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vaiśāśīka (the Baudhā) has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentariness.

(ii) Should the Buddhist maintain that the recognition of the subject as one and the same takes place on account of the similarity of different self-cognitions, each, however, being momentary only it is to be noted that the cognition of similarity is based upon two things; and that, for this reason, the advocate of universal momentariness, who denies the existence of one permanent subjectable mentally to grasp the two similar things, simply talks deceitful nonsense when he asserts that recognition is founded on similarity only.

(iii) Should it be said that the cognition 'this is similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent upon the apprehension of the earlier and

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1. This and the following paragraphs are in the main extracts from Śaṁkara's commentary itself; and the English translation has been mostly adopted from Thibaut's Translation (SBE) with slight alterations.
later momentary existences—'na pūrvottaraksana dvaya-grahaṇa-nimittam', this is to be refuted by the remark that the fact of different terms—viz. 'this' and 'that' being used, points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to that' would be devoid of meaning; we should, in that case, rather speak of 'similarity' only. Further, the hypothesis of 'mere similarity' being cognised does not explain the ordinary recognition of things, for, in recognising a thing, we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that.

(iv) While it may be admitted that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that, or merely is similar to that, for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds, with regard to the knower (upalabdhr) there is never a doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it is rather distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.

Śamkara's refutation of Vijñāna-vāda that there are no external objects and that only ideas are real is again based mainly upon epistemological grounds. It is contained in his commentary on Ved. S. II. 2.
28.31. The main arguments are as follows:

(i) The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post, or a wall, or a piece of cloth, or a jar; and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. 'Why should we pay attention' says Śaṅkara, 'to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?

(ii) If it be said that the subjective idealist does not affirm that he is conscious of no object, but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, the answer is that the existence of a thing as something apart from consciousness has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. No body, when perceiving a post or wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts, and walls, and the like as objects of their perception. This is clear from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal object of cognition appears like something external.
(iii) If it be said that the assertion that the idea is like something external does not mean that there is really something external, for external things are impossible, the answer is that the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa); while, on the other hand, the operation and non-operation of the means of knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by direct knowledge, or some other means of knowledge; impossible is that which is not so apprehended. Now, the external things are, according to their nature, apprehended by all the means of knowledge, and are therefore real.

(iv) That the idea is distinct from the thing is further true for the following reasons:

(a) The fact that ideas have the form of objects, which is admitted by the subjective idealist, can be explained only on the assumption that there are objects apart from the idea which are the cause of that form. Similarly, the fact that there is an invariable concomitance of idea and the thing shows that they are related to each other as cause and effect.

(b) When there is a perception of two objects,

1. ‘asati viṣaye viṣaya-sārupyānupattepāḥ, bahirupalabdhes’ ca viṣayasya; atā eva sahopalambha-niyamopi pratyaya-viṣayayor upāyopaya-bhāva-ketukāḥ.
e.g. of a white and a black cow; or of two qualities of one and the same object, e.g. the smell and the taste of milk; or again, when we have the perception of a jar and also a remembrance of it, we can see that there are two kinds of ideas involved in these acts, viz. the general ideas of a cow, milk and a jar; and the particular ideas of a white and a black cow; of the smell and the taste of milk and of the jar perceived through the senses. These latter, that is, the particular ideas refer to the existence of things.

(v) If it be said that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike, the objection is that the two sets of ideas cannot be treated on the same footing, for they are different in character. The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. Similarly, the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of magic or illusion are negated by our normal consciousness. Those things on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state. Further the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the presentations (darśana) of the waking state are immediate cognition (upalabdhi). The distinction between remembrance and immediate cognition is directly known by everybody in so far as the
is characterised by the absence of the object, while the other by the presence of it.

(vi) If it be said, as the Buddhists hold, that the variety of ideas can be explained by the variety of mental impressions (vāsanā-valicītryāt), without any reference to external things, the objection is that the variety of impressions cannot be explained without admitting the existence and perception of external things. How could various impressions originate, if no external things were perceived?

In case it be said that the mental impressions do not need an external cause, but that they are caused by one another in beginningless series, the objection is that such a view would lead to a baseless regress ad infinitum and would make life impossible (vyavahāra-lpoinā syāt).

Besides the existence of external objects of experience, Saṅkara establishes the existence of self also on the ground that there should be a permanent uniting substratum to the various mental impressions and ideas. He says: 'For unless there exists one conti-


2. arthopalabdhi-nimittā hi pratyartham nāna-rūpa-vāsanā bhavanti, anupalabhyamāneṣu tu artheṣu kimnimittāvicītrā vāsanā bhaveyuh”. Commentary on Ved. S. II. 2, 30.
nuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future, an absolutely unchangeable entity (kūṭastha) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition etc., which are based upon mental impressions dependent on place, time and cause.¹

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(iii) Analysis of Knowledge in the Śrī-Śhāśya of Rāmānuja and his Criticism of Śaṅkara’s Doctrine of Knowledge and Reality.

The Vedānta as taught by Rāmānuja is known as Viśiṣṭādvaita—Modified Monism; and he differs from Śaṅkara on very essential points. While according to Śaṅkara, the ultimate reality called Brahman is a homogeneous impersonal absolute, and the world of experience an illusion; according to Rāmānuja Brahman is a personality which comprehends within itself all the plurality of the world of experience, which, as a manifestation of Brahman, is real and not illusory. Further, Brahman, instead of being attributeless, has all the qualities of perfection. It is both the cause and the content (effect) of the world¹. As there is no such antithesis as between true reality and false reality in the system of Rāmānuja, there is also, according to him, no corresponding opposition between knowledge and ignorance such as we find in Śaṅkara’s philosophy.

In the introduction to his commentary on Ved. S. I. 1. 1. Rāmānuja examines Śaṅkara’s Vedānta at considerable length; and in the course of doing so deals with some epistemological topics of importance.

As against those who like Śaṅkara maintain that

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¹ Cf. Vedānta-dīpa—'sūkṣma-cid-acid-vastu-saṁśriḥ paramātmā kāraṇam, sa eva pramātmā sthūla-cid-acid-vastu-saṁśriḥ kāryam iti', Śrī B. pp. 4 and 5.
the ultimate and true reality is mere being without attributes (nirviṣeṣa vastu), Rāmānuja maintains that such attributeless reality is inconceivable, and cannot be proved to exist by any of the means of knowledge. His arguments might be analysed as follows:

1. The objects proved by the various means of knowledge (pramāṇas) are all characterised by attributes and hence no object devoid of attribution can be proved to exist by means of them.¹

2. If it be said that mere being does not depend upon any means of knowledge for its proof, but that it is immediately intuited by one’s consciousness (svānubhavasiddham), the answer is that even in such an intuition the notion of attributes is always present both in the case of consciousness itself and the object intuited². It is the nature of consciousness that it is self-illuminating and has the characteristic of illuminating other objects, and hence it is not mere (attributeless) being³. Similarly, whatever is intuited by consciousness is characterised by some determination—‘This is so’, and consequently it also is not devoid of attributes (viṣeṣa).⁴

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¹ saviṣeṣa-vastu-viṣayatvāt sarva-pramāṇānām. Śrī B. p. 28.
² so ‘py-ātma-sākṣika-saviṣeṣānubhavād eva nirastath. Śrī B. p. 28.
³ dhiyo hi dhītvam svayam-prakāśatā ca, jñātur viṣayapra-kāśana-svabhaṭvatayopalabhēḥ. Śrī B. p. 28.
⁴ Idam aham adarśam iti kenacid viṣeṣaṇaviṣeṣaṭyat-vāt sarvesāṃ anubhāvānām.
3. To take the case of direct knowledge (pratyaśa), it will appear that both the reflective (savikalpaka) and the non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) direct knowledge have for their objects things characterised by attributes. That in cases of reflective direct knowledge things are always cognised as possesses of some attributes is admitted by all. It will appear, however, that even in the case of non-reflective direct knowledge things are cognised as possessed of their individual attributes. ‘Non-reflective direct knowledge’ says Rāmānuja, ‘is the apprehension of an object as devoid of some attributes, but not as devoid of all attributes; for a cognition of that kind is, in the first place, not found ever to take place; and in the second place, it is impossible. All cognition takes place as characterised by some qualification—‘This is so’ etc., for no object can be cognised apart from such individual configuration as e.g. the triangular face, dewlap, etc. (in the case of cows). Thus the non-reflective direct knowledge is the apprehension of the first individual (instance) out of a number of things belonging to the same class—‘eka-jatīya-dravyeṣu prathama-piṇḍa-grahaṇam’; while the reflective direct knowledge is the apprehension of the second individual (instance), the third and so on—‘dvitiyādi-piṇḍa-graha-

1. Nirvikalpakam nāma kenacid viśeṣena viyuktasya grahaṇam na sarva-viśeṣa-rahitasya, tathābhūtasya kadācid api grahaṇādārśanāt, anupapatteś ca. Śri B. p. 29.
nam savikalpakam ity ucyate'. Thus in the cognition of the first instance, there is no apprehension of the pervasiveness of (the generic character of) cowhood etc.; and it is only when the second instance, or the third and so on, is cognised that there is an apprehension of the pervasiveness (of the generic character). The cognition of the second and the subsequent instances has a determinate character, because it is characterised by the pervasiveness of (the generic character) cowhood, etc. in the configuration of a thing as a result of the connection (of the present cognition) with the first cognition, which (pervasiveness of the generic character) can be ascertained only on the cognition of the second instance\(^1\). The cogni-


According to Thibaut (Engl. Transl. SBE.) and Vivṛtti (BSS), the word 'piṇḍa' means 'individual', while according to Raṅgācārya, it means 'outline-perception'. From the use of the phrase 'eka-jātiyā-drayeṣu'—'from among a number of things belonging to the same class', and the subsequent explanation of the two kinds of direct knowledge it will appear that 'piṇḍa' should mean 'individual instance' in this context. Raṅgācārya's rendering would have been correct, if by non-reflective direct knowledge the author had meant the apprehension of a thing at the first moment of cognition, as the other philosophers do, but he evidently means by it the apprehension of the first instance.
tion of the first instance is indeterminate, for in that there is no (cognition of) pervasiveness of cowhood, etc. in the form of the configuration of the object as characterised by the dewlap, etc.; and not because there is no cognition of the generic character in the form of configuration (of the thing); for the generic character etc. also in the form of configuration is not different (in so far as its cognition goes) from objects cognised by sense. And as without its configuration it is impossible to have the cognition of a thing, even in the cognition of the first instance of it, it is its configuration which is cognised as the thing of such and such a nature. In the case of the cognition of the second and the subsequent instances, it is the configuration, the thing possessing the configuration and the special characteristic of the pervasiveness of (the generic character of) cowhood, etc. when are always cognised, and, therefore, their cognition is

The terms 'anuvṛtti' and 'anuvṛttītvam' have presented a difficulty to the translators. Thibaut interprets it as 'extension' or 'continuation', while Raṅgacārya renders it as 'continued persistence' or 'the property of continued persistence'. These renderings, as will appear from the translations of the passage by these authors, do not make an intelligible sense. Vivṛtti's explanation: 'anuvṛttītvam caika-rupenaḥkatrāvasthitvam'—'Anuvṛttītvam' is the pervasiveness of the same form (lit, by means of the same form) in a number of instances—appears to be the best and correct, and the same I have adopted.

1. 'samsthānām eva vāstu ittham iti grhyate'.
determinate. Hence, sense-cognition has never for its object that which is at attributeless\(^1\).

Like direct knowledge, inference and other means of knowledge also pertain to the cognition of things as characterised by some attribute or attributes. For, inference is based upon what has been already cognised by direct knowledge, and all judgements of knowledge indicate a distinction between the thing denoted by the subject and its character denoted by the predicate. ‘In all cases’ says Rāmānuja, ‘whenever we cognise the notion of an attribute and the substance to which it belongs, the fact that they are entirely distinct from each other is clearly evident from the very act of apprehension’\(^2\).

After having discussed the nature of the pramāṇas so as to show that all reality cognised through them appears as possessing some kind of character, Rāmānuja refutes the view that the plurality of things

\(^{1}\) ‘Viśeṣa’ has been translated as ‘difference’ by Thibaut. The context of the whole passage will show, however, that is ‘attribute’ which the term denotes, for the author establishes the ‘viśeṣatva’ of things maintaining that they are always cognised as possessing some attribute or other. Raṅgācārya has translated the term as ‘attribute’ and this rendering is also supported by the Viṁśi—e. g. ‘viśeṣa-rahitasya vastuno rūpādyabhāvan nā tatra pratyakṣaṁ kramate’ p. 33.

as it is found in ordinary experience is unreal. He says that this doctrine is based upon a failure to understand correctly the notion of that which is to be sublated (bādhyā) and that which sublates (bādhaka) and the act of sublating the one by means of the other\(^1\). It is only when there is some contradiction about the existence of things in relation to one another, e.g. one and the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at one and the same place and time, or one and the same thing cannot be both a snake and a rope, that there is room for one thing being sublated by another. But it is not so in the case of such things as a jar, a piece of cloth, etc., and hence all of them are real without any contradiction. For the same reason consciousness and being are also not the same. That the two are distinct from each other is proved by experience; for one stands as subject to the other, which is its object\(^2\).

As against the view held by Śaṅkara’s School that sense-cognition itself, which testifies to the existence of things, is false, because it is based upon illusion and is contradicted by scripture, Rāmānuja maintains that sense-cognition cannot be regarded as illusory simply because it is contradicted by scripture. For, in the first place, there is no reason to believe that

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knowledge obtained through sense-cognition is necessarily fallacious; and in the second place, if it be said that it is false, because it is contradicted by scripture, it is to be noted that, according to Śaṅkara, scripture itself belongs to the phenomenal world of illusion, and hence it is no better than sense-cognition as a means of knowledge. Further, if it be said that the knowledge obtained through scripture is not false, because it is not contradicted by any other authority, the objection is that the mere fact that some knowledge is not contradicted by any other authority can be no guarantee of its truth. This Rāmānuja illustrates by a simile: 'Let us imagine' says he, 'a community of men suffering from defective vision due to darkness, without being aware of this defect, and dwelling in some remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men possessed of sound vision. As all of them are assumed to be suffering from the same kind of defective vision, all of them will equally perceive, say, a double moon, and there will be no other perception (pratyaya) to contradict it. But all the same, however, it is not true that their cognition is not false, or that the double moon is not false\(^1\). Similarly there is no guarantee that the falsity of sense-experience and undifferentiated Brahman as taught by scripture is necessarily true. Following the same line of argument Rāmānuja maintains that Śaṅkara's

\(^1\) Sri B. p. 55.
doctrine of avidyā is false. He hits at the right point when he says that there is no analogy between self appearing as the phenomenal world and a shell appearing as a piece of silver. For he says ‘apprehension (khyati), activity (pravrtti), sublation (bādha), illusion (bhramatva) are possible only when one thing appears as another, and it is not possible to imagine something which is altogether unperceived and groundless; for such a thing, when imagined, would be inexplicable. Silver, when it is perceived, is not inexplicable; on the other hand, it is perceived as real silver. Were it perceived as something inexplicable, there would be no room for either error or its negation, or again for an effort (to get it). The whole difficulty about Śaṅkara’s doctrine of avidyā is that it is regarded by him as something objective and yet such as can be removed by knowledge, which is by its nature subjective.

The essential characteristic of consciousness, according to Rāmānuja, which distinguishes it from other things is that it is capable of illumining itself to itself on the basis of its own being serving as an object. For in the case of other things such as a jar,

1. As avidyā is.
4. anubhūtītvam nāma vartamānātā-daśāyām sva-sattyaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānātavam.
etc., although they are objects of consciousness, they
do not illumine themselves to themselves; that is to
say, they do not appears as objects to themselves. As
against Śaṅkarācārya, Rāmānuja maintains that con-
sciousness can be an object of knowledge; for example,
it is so when another person infers about the existence
of consciousness in another person on the basis of
certain outward signs of speech or action; or when
one's own past states of consciousness become an
object of one's cognition.

Having proved that consciousness can appear as
an object Rāmānuja proceeds to show that it is not
eternal but changing. One consciousness (anubhūti)
lasts so long as its object is cognised, neither before
nor after it; otherwise, if consciousness were eternal,
all things would be cognised eternally and all at once.
On the ground of this changing nature of conscious-
ness he further maintains that there must be, besides
consciousness, another permanent agent to which the
different cognitions belong and which could explain
the facts of memory and recognition. This he calls
self (atman), the existence of which, he says, is direct-
ly known to everybody in the form of 'I'; for example
when one says: 'I know the jar'; I understand this
matter', etc.¹ Just as consciousness implies the exist-
tence of self as the agent or the subject, it also nece-

¹ 'Ghaṭam aham jānāmi, imam artham avagacchāmi ghaṭam
aham samvedmīti sarveśāṁ ātma-sākṣikāḥ prasiddhaḥ'. Śri.
B. p. 39.
ssarily implies the existence of an object; for consciousness is inconceivable as apart from an object, and it is its very nature that it makes some object known. Further, it is itself known only through an object which is cognised by means of it.¹

Rāmānuja's criticisms of the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and subjective idealism in his Commentary on Ved. S. II, 2. 2 are substantially on the same lines as those of Śaṅkarācārya and hence need not be repeated here.

From what has been said above it will appear that the chief contribution of Rāmānuja to the philosophical thought in India was his criticism of Śaṅkara's theory of false reality and false knowledge. While trying to maintain that there is nothing like mere being Rāmānuja makes a careful analysis of direct knowledge and its two divisions, viz. non-reflective direct knowledge (nirvikalpaka) and reflective direct knowledge (savikalpaka). His explanation of the distinction between the two is different from that given by another writers in so far as he restricts the non reflective direct knowledge to the cognition of the first individual instance out of a number of things belonging to a certain class, and also in so far as he denies that there is no cognition of the attributes con-

¹ Na ca nirviṣayā saṁvit kācid asti, anupalabdheḥ; viṣaya- prakāśana-svabhavatayarivopalabdher eva hi samvidāḥ svayam-prakāśata samarthitā. Sri B. p. 36.
stituting the generic character of the object cognised for the first time. According to Rāmānuja, what distinguishes non-reflective direct knowledge from reflective direct knowledge is not the absence in the former of the cognition of the attributes of the object cognised whether generic or specific, but a failure to see, on account of its being the cognition of the first instance, that the generic qualities cognised in that object are possessed by it in common with other objects of the same class. For instance, to take his own example, even in the cognition of a cow for the first time by a person, the generic feature of the animal, e.g. the dewlap and triangular face, etc., will be perceived along such as colour, size etc., but they will not be known to be the generic qualities of a cow for the simple reason that no other cows have been perceived as yet.

Rāmānuja’s criticism of Śaṅkara’s doctrine of illusion might be regarded as unfair and off the point, in so far as the claim may be made that Śaṅkara did not deny the phenomenal existence of the world, but on the other hand, maintained the reality and permanence of external things as against the Buddhist doctrines of subjective idealism and momentariness. True, but it is equally true that Śaṅkara’s reality, permanence and diversity of the external world are illusory after all, the result of avidyā, something to by sublated by the ultimate and the only reality of Brahman on the arising of vidiya or true knowledge;
and in so far as Śamkara holds this doctrine of illusion Rāmānuja's criticisms of it are not irrelevant at all. In fact, once Śamkara holds and admits that the phenomenal world is only an illusion, the only alternative left open to him, and to all those who hold views similar to his, is to keep silent on the nature of reality. Rāmānuja rightly emphasises the point that in so far as we know the world by means of the various means of knowledge, it is real and diverse; and as there is nothing to contradict this experience of ours, there is no reason to believe that it is false. In the case of scriptural testimony too, Rāmānuja maintains that, in the first place, it does not lend support to Śamkara's doctrines; and in the second place, even if it did so, the scripture itself, according to Śamkara, belongs the illusory world, and hence its testimony is untrustworthy.

(iv) The Doctrine of mind-dependent existence, and a restatement of Gaudapāda's position in the Vedānta-muktavali of Prakāśānanda.

A consistent exposition of the logical consequences of the illusion-theory of Gaudapāda is to be found in the VSM. of Prakāśānanda. We have seen how Śamkarācārya failed to reconcile the reality and permanence of the world of experience with the doctrine
of illusion which he had adopted from Gauḍāpāda, and how consequently he was criticised on this subject by Rāmānuja. The author of the VSM. holds a complete and consistent doctrine of mind-dependent existence in so far as he declares without any reservations that things exist only in so far and so long as they are perceived (drṣṭi-mātra); that fresh objects are cognised in recognition; and that there is no difference whatsoever between the world of dreams and that of waking experience. It must be remembered, however, that this doctrine is typically Vedantic in so far as all appearance, even such as is present in cognition, is regarded as illusory and Brahman is considered to be the only reality.

A good summary of the doctrines of the VSM. is to be found in verses 18-23\(^1\), which it will not be out of place here to reproduce with a translation:

Pratyetavya-pratītyoṣ ca bhedah prāmāṇikah kutaḥ  
Pratīti-mātram evaitad bhati viśvaṁ carācaram—18

Whence is there is a distinction capable of proof between cognition and the cognisable? This universe, moving and non-moving, appears as mere cognition. 18.

Jñāna-jñeya-prabhedena yathā svapnam pratiyate,  
Vijñāna-mātram evaitat tathā jagac-caracaram—19.

As a dream is cognised with a distinction between

\(^1\) VSM. pp. 51, 52 (Reprint from the Pandit, Benaras).
cognition and the cognisable', even so is the moving and non-moving world which is mere cognition (cog-
nised with a distinction between cognition and the cognisable)—19.

_Tantar bhide paṭo yadvac chūnyya eva svarūpataḥ_  
Ascending, he (saying) thus: ‘even so is the world which is mere cognition (cognised with a distinction between cognition and the cognisable)—20.

Just as a piece of cloth is void in its real nature when there is separation from the threads; so is this world a mere appearance when there is separation from the self—20.

_Rajjur yathā bhrānta-dṛṣṭyā sarpa-rūpā prakaśate_  
Just as a piece of cloth is void in its real nature when there is separation from the threads; so is this world a mere appearance when there is separation from the self—20.

_Atmā tathā mūḍha-budhyā jagad-rūpaḥ prakaśate—21._

As through erroneous vision a rope appears to have the form of a snake, so through a deluded intellect the self appears to have the form of the world—21.

_Atmany eva jagat sarvam dṛṣṭi-mātram satattvakam_  
Just as a piece of cloth is void in its real nature when there is separation from the threads; so is this world a mere appearance when there is separation from the self—20.

_Udbhūya sthītim āsthāya vināśyati muhur muhuh—22._

As through erroneous vision a rope appears to have the form of a snake, so through a deluded intellect the self appears to have the form of the world—21.

_It is in the self that the whole world with all its elements, which exists only in so far as it is seen, takes its rise, stays and perishes again—22._

_Pūrṇānandādvaye śuddhe pāpma-doṣādi-varjite_  
As through erroneous vision a rope appears to have the form of a snake, so through a deluded intellect the self appears to have the form of the world—21.

_Pratibimbam ivabhāti dṛṣṭi-mātram jagāttrayam—23._

In that which is perfect bliss, one without a second, pure, and free from sin and other defects, the threefold world, which exists only in so far as it is seen, appears like a reflection—23.

1. Although there is really no such duality.
The doctrine contained in the above verses is seen more clearly in the discussion in the preceding sections of the work. I shall deal here with only such portions as are concerned with the \textit{drṣṭi-mātra-vādā}
the view that the world exists only in so far as it is perceived. That our author does maintain this view is proved beyond doubt by verse to which contains an objection of an opponent to the doctrine:—

\begin{verse}
\textit{Ajñāta-sattvak neśṭam ced vyavahāraḥ katham bhavet, }
\textit{Na hy adarśana-mātrenā viśaṇṇo nāśa-miścayāt—}\textit{10}
\end{verse}

If uncognised existence be not accepted, how can one get on in the world? For no one grieves for an object through thinking that it is destroyed, merely because it is not seen.

The discussion on the subject is started as the result of the assertion that in the state of emancipation there is no unperceived order of duality (\textit{anunbhāya-
mānam dvaitam}), and in the above verse the first objection to the theory of \textit{drṣṭi-mātra} is put forth.

The essential answer to the above objection is contained in the assertion that so long as error lasts or a man remains under the influence of illusion the usual belief in the existence of things continues. A man does not grieve for an object which is not perceived for he continues to believe in its existence, just as a man believes in the existence of things in a dream. ‘Nor can it be urged that there is a difference between the states of dreaming and waking, in that the former is destroyed by waking knowledge; for in neither case, while the error lasts, in any nega-
tion (of either state) admitted. Nor is there consequence in holding that there is a negation of error on the application of evidence; for none would say that, when the error has been removed, there can be any further dealings with the erroneously surmised object.

In reply to the further objection that in case the existence of things be admitted only in so far as they are perceived there can be no recognition of things (as identical with those cognised previously), as for example, of the world of waking experience as identical with that cognised before one went to sleep, it is said that all such recognition is due to error, and is similar to the illusory perception of a rope as a snake by a number of persons at the same time. “When a man passes from waking consciousness into the state of dreamless sleep from which he again awakes, his present consciousness relates to a different series of objects; and as for his recognition it is simply due to error.”

The perception of things by means of the sense-organs in the state of wakefulness, which is supposed to differentiate such cognition from that of dreams is

1. p. 28, ‘na ca tatra bādho’stiti vaiśamvam, bhramāvasthāyām kutrāpi bādhasyānangikārāt, etc.

maintained to be as illusory as that in the state of dreams.

Lengthy dialectical arguments have been given to show that there is no difference between cognition and the objects cognised into which we need not enter here. It is evident that the basic principle of the VSM is the illusory nature of the world of experience and the position of the author of this work is much the same as that of Gauḍapāda. It is to be noted further that although such expressions as ‘pratīti-mātram’, ‘vijñāna-mātram’, ‘arṣṭi-mātram’, etc. clearly indicate that the author of the VSM held the doctrine that things exist only in so far as they are perceived, this principle is not of much consequence in his system as a whole; and what he ultimately wants to establish is the essence of things is the absolute Brahman. In other words, it is not so much an idealistic theory of existence which he holds as that of a spiritualistic absolutism, and this can be said of almost all Vedānta philosophers who have been usually regarded as idealists.

1. *Indriyānāṃ kāraṇatve bhave <i>codyam</i> tadā tava Svapna-bhrame yathā teṣām anvaya-vyatireka-dhiḥ. 14.*
V. Treatment of Epistemology as a separate subject in the new school of Logic (Navya-nya ya).

The characteristic feature of the New School of Logic is that it confines its treatment to the theory of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas) as a subject by itself. This practice of considering the means of knowledge separately from the objects of knowledge (prameya) had already its precedent in the works of such Buddhist logicians Diṅnāga and Dharamkīrti, or Jaina writers as Māṇikya Nandi and Deva Sūri; and it was in fact due to the influence of these that the Hindu authors departed from their usual custom of dealing with the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge together. This departure in the method of treatment, however, simply means that the theory of knowledge came to be regarded as a distinct subject. It does not signify that the New School held the view that the theory of knowledge could be discussed without assuming the objects of knowledge. Neither the existence of knowledge nor that of the object of knowledge was ever questioned by these logicians. Hence the change in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatment of the subject, with the advent of the New School, is more of a methodological rather than logical or epistemological nature.

The first Hindu logician who dealt with the theory of knowledge as a subject by itself in his work
was Bhāsarvajña, the author of the Nyāya sāra. Next to him was Gaṅgeśa, the author of the Tattva-cintāmaṇi, and the reputed founder of the New School of logic. The main tendency of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians of the later period was: firstly, to make such modifications in their theories as were found necessary in the light of the criticisms by the philosophers of the other schools and as could be made consistently with the essential tenets of their own; and secondly, to refute such doctrines of their opponents as they found impossible to subscribe to. An instance of the first we have already seen in the case of the modified definitions and classification of direct knowledge (pratyakṣa) in the works of the later writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. An example of the second is to be found in the refutation of such doctrines of the Māṁsā School as the self-validity of knowledge (svataḥ-prāmāṇya) by logicians like Śrīdharā and Gaṅgeśa, the authors of the Nyāya-kandali and the Tattva-cintāmaṇi respectively.

From the point of view of epistemology it is unnecessary to enter into a detailed survey of the doctrines of the New School of Logic. There is absolutely nothing new or remarkable in the Nyāya-sāra of Bhāsarvajña beyond the fact that in the history of the Nyāya School it was the first work to treat the theory of knowledge as an independent subject, and that he did not accept knowledge by similarity
(upamāna) as a separate means of knowledge. The Nyāya-sāra is not treated as a work of the New School either, although there is no reason why it should not be regarded as really the first work of that school. As regards the Tattva-cintāmanī it will appear that a good deal of the epistemological matter found in this work, including the refutation of the Mīmāṃsā theory of knowledge, is already present in such previous work as the Nyāya-kandali of Śrīdhara; and so far as I can see the usual claim for the Tattva-cintāmanī that it is an epoch-making work can be substantiated on no other ground than that in the history of Nyāya School it was the first systematic and elaborate work which confined its treatment to the theory of the pramāṇas alone. For the sake of completeness of the treatment of the subject I shall give here in outline the main points in the theory of knowledge as expounded by the author of this work.

Gaṅgeśa accepts the usual four means of knowledge of the Nyāya, viz. direct knowledge (pratyakṣa); inference (anumāna); knowledge by similarity (upamāna); and verbal testimony (śabda), and deals with each of them in the four sections into which the Tatt-

1. This work is a commentary on the Prāṇastapādabhāṣya; and I have not considered it necessary to devote a separate section to it. Reference to the treatment of certain topics common to the NK, and the TC, have been given in the footnotes in the following pages.
va cintāmaṇi is divided¹.

Cognition is classified as right cognition (pramā) and wrong cognition (apramā), and these are defined in the usual way². In this connection the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the self-validity (svataḥ-prāmāṇya) of knowledge is criticised mainly on two grounds: firstly, that the validity of knowledge is conditional in so far as it depends upon the requisite conditions of a correct sense-cognition, inference, etc.; as for example, upon the absence of obstruction or defect in the sense-organs in the case of sense-cognition; and the presence of the right premises in the case of inference; and secondly, that we are sure of the validity of our knowledge only when our knowledge leads to a successful activity prompted by it³.

While dealing with the nature of direct knowledge (pratyaksā) Gaṅgeśa criticises the definition of pratyaksā as given in the NS.⁴ on the ground that firstly, it is too wide in so far as, because the mind is

1. TC. I, p. 538.
4. NS. I. 1, 4—indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam pratyaksam, avyapadeśyam, avyabhicāri, vyavasāyāt-makam.
also a sense-organ, it includes the inference of soul, and remembrance; and secondly, it is too narrow in so far as it excludes cognition by God. According to him direct knowledge is that which is not caused by another cognition—jñānakaranakam jñānam iti tu vayam. We have seen already that the condition of the contact of the object with the sense-organs (indriyarthasannikarsa) had been deleted from the definition of direct knowledge much earlier by the Buddhist and the Jaina logicians and also by Praśastapāda in one of his alternative definitions of pratyakṣa. Gaṅgeśa's definition, however, is remarkably expressive of the essential nature of direct knowledge viz. that it is free from every other kind of, and all previous knowledge.

Gaṅgeśa criticises Prabhākara's doctrine of the three-fold direct knowledge—the Tri-puṭi-pratyakṣa on the ground that it is not true that we are acquainted with the apprehending subject (pramāṇa) in the act of sense-cognition itself. In this connection he draws a distinction between the (first) determination

1. TC. I, p. 539 ff. ātmānumiti-smṛtyor jñāna-mātre cātivyapteḥ ātmano 'rthasya manasendriyena saṃyogād utpatteḥ.

2. TC. I, p. 552.

3. TC. I, p. 788, tatrātmā kaḥtrtvena, jñeyam karmatayā, jñānam kriyātvena bhāsate, to jñātr-jñeyo eva-viṣayam jñānam anubhūyata iti tri-puṭi-pratyakṣa-vādinaḥ.
(vyavasāya) and the after-determination (anu-vyavasāya) in the act of cognition. The first determination consists of the cognisance of the object as a mere ‘this’ —‘nanu idam iti vyavasāyah’ ; and the after-determination which follows the first consists of the cognition ‘I know this’—tad uttaram idam aham jānāmīty anu-vyavasāyah. It is shown thus that it is only at the anu-vyavasāya stage of cognition that there is consciousness of the self or subject; and this cognition is mental, and not sensuous.

Direct knowledge is divided into the non-reflective (nirvikalpaka) and the reflective (savikalpaka) in the usual way; and the definitions of these two kinds of knowledge are essentially the same as those given by the previous writers.

1. TC. I, p. 789.


Inference (anumāna) is defined as the instrument of that inferential knowledge (anumiti) which is the result of the knowledge of the middle term as being in invariable concomitance with the major term, and as abiding in the minor term. It is maintained that inference is a means of knowledge distinct from sense-cognition. A number of definitions of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) are discussed at length, and the nature of the various parts of a syllogism is explained in detail. The classification of inference into (i) kevalānvayi, (ii) kevala-vyatireki and (iii) anvaya-vyatireki; or again into (i) svārtha and (ii) parārtha is the same as in the works of the previous writers. Arthāpatti is shown to be an act of inference.

Knowledge by similarity (upamāna) is defined in the same way as by the previous Nyāya logicians, viz. that by means of which through resemblance an object is identified as bearing a certain name. It is shown again in the usual way that knowledge by similarity is not a case of sense-cognition or inference. The Mīmāṁsā view on the subject is criticised.

Verbal testimony (śabda) is defined as that means of knowledge which is the result of a true

1. TC. II, p. 2 Tatra vyāpti-viśiṣṭa-paśka-dharmatā-jñāna-janyam jñānam anumitis tat-karaṇam anumānam.
2. TC. II. p. 21 ff.
4. TC. II. p. 689.
5. TC. II. p. 645.
knowledge of the meaning of words according to usage\(^1\). Gaṅgeśa does not appear to draw any real distinction between verbal testimony in the sense of reliable authority and verbal knowledge in the sense of meaning conveyed by words. In fact it is the latter which he discusses at length in the chapter on śabda, and hence most of the treatment is grammatical rather than epistemological.

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Modern Developments

It is really not possible to write anything on the Modern Developments in the History of Indian Epistemology, as there has been no original contribution to Indian Philosophy for centuries. In modern times scholars like Dr. Radhakrishnan, Dr. Das Gupta, Professors Ranade and Belvalkar, Prof. Bhattacharya, and a few others have written works on Indian Philosophy in English, which are either historical in nature or expositions of the old systems of Indian Thought and they have their own value so far as they interpret these in modern terminology. But they do not fall in line with or make contributions to Indian Philosophy itself as it has come down to us through the original works in Sanskrit, Pali or Prakrit. The only book written and published recently on the Nature of Knowledge and Reality in Sanskrit is the present author’s own Treatise called Tattva-Darśana which has attempted a synthesis of the Indian and the Western Thought with the writer’s own contributions where possible. The text of this book has been written in the form of simple Sūtras (aphorisms) with the author’s own commentary on the same. We therefore venture to give a brief summary of the chapters of this book dealing with Epistemology and also the English

Translation of some portions of the Text and Commentary for the benefit of our readers. We hope they will find these interesting.

**Tattva-Darsana by Acharya Jwala Prasad.**

The First Part of Tattva-Darsana deals with Knowledge and Reality and consists of Nine Topics which are as follows:

- **First Topic**—The Nature of Philosophy.
- **Second Topic**—The Valid Means of Knowledge.
- **Third Topic**—The Nature of Knowledge.
- **Fourth Topic**—Relation between Language and Knowledge.
- **Fifth Topic**—Objects of Knowledge.
- **Sixth Topic**—The Nature of Objects of Knowledge.
- **Seventh Topic**—The ultimate principle of the Universe.
- **Eighth Topic**—The Nature of the World.
- **Ninth Topic**—The Nature of Deity.

In the First Topic it is said that the aim of Philosophy is to ‘show truth’ and that Truth is known by the Valid Means of Knowledge. Therefore it is necessary to expound the Valid Means of Knowledge. This exposition follows mainly in the Second and the Third Topics, the English translation of which with that of the commentary on the same is reproduced here for giving a detailed and clear idea of the epistemological position of this book. The text and commentary of the First Topic are also given below by way of introduction of this subject.
FIRST TOPIC

The Nature of Philosophy.

Now the nature of Philosophy is being explained 1.

Now the nature, the subject, and the aim of Philosophy are being explained.

There are several sciences in literature which expound different subjects. Philosophy is one of them. What is its subject, and what is its aim?—this is being explained in this Topic.

Philosophy is that which shows truth. 2.

The science which explains truth, that is the real nature of an object, is Philosophy.

What is this world? What is its cause? What is its fundamental principle? What is its real nature? All these questions fall within the scope of Philosophy. A proper discussion of the subject is undertaken in this science. ‘Ānviksiki’ is another name for Darśana (Philosophy) and this has been said to be a lamp to all the branches of knowledge by the learned, as has been said in the Arthaśāstra of Kautilya—“Virtue (Dharma) and vice (Adharma) are dealt with in the Vedas, wealth and non-wealth in Economics (Vārtā), the lawful and the unlawful in Political Science (Daṇḍaniti), Ānviksiki (Philosophy) benefits people by discussing the merits and demerits of these sciences with arguments, it helps them to keep their mind steady during prosperity and adversity, and gives them skill in their intelligence and speech.”

“A lamp to all the branches of knowledge and means to all action,

A support to all the virtues—such is the Ānviksiki”.

Therefore, this science of Philosophy is that which dis-
cusses the subject of all sciences, shows truth and benefits people of the world.

The thoughtful have a desire to know truth. 3.
The thoughtful among men have a desire to know truth, that is to say, to know the real nature of an object; and this desire to know truth is natural to them.

The origin of Philosophy is that (desire to know truth) and its aim is truth. 4.
That desire on the part of the thoughtful to know truth is the origin of Philosophy and its aim is the knowledge of truth.

Except the Philosophy of Atheism, the aim of Philosophy in all other systems of Philosophy has been said to be salvation. This view is in accordance with their own doctrines and need not be accepted by all.

Truth is the real nature of an object. 5.
The meaning of the Sūtra is quite clear.

And that is known by the Valid Means of Knowledge (pramāṇa). 6.
That real nature of an object is known by the Valid Means of Knowledge such as perception and others.

Therefore, the Valid Means of Knowledge are being explained. 7.
Therefore, the definition of the Valid Means of Knowledge and their various kinds are being explained in detail in the Second Topic.
Here ends the First Topic dealing with the Nature of Philosophy.

SECOND TOPIC

The Valid Means of Knowledge.
That by means of which truth, or true nature of an object, is known, is the Valid Means of Knowledge. 1.
The means by which truth, i.e. the real nature of an object, is known as the Valid Means of knowledge.

The Valid Means of Knowledge does not require any other proof, like a lamp, and on account of the defect of regress ad infinitum. 2.

The Valid Means of Knowledge is self-evident. Just as a lamp shows other objects and also itself, the Valid Means of Knowledge proves the existence of other objects and also its own existence. Further, if the Valid Means of Knowledge should require another proof for itself, there will be the defect of regress ad infinitum; for one Means of Knowledge will require a second, that a third and the third a fourth proof, and thus there will be infinite progress.

Perception (Pratyaksa), Direct Knowledge (Anubhāti) and Reasoning (Tarka) are the three Valid Means of Knowledge. 3.

Perception is knowledge resulting from the presentation of an object to sense-organs, e.g. the knowledge of a pot or cloth results from the sight of a pot or cloth.

Direct knowledge is that which results from the presentation of an object to mind and is devoid of sense-cognition e.g. the knowledge of such states of mind as one's pleasure and pain, or such knowledge as 'I am', 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy' 'I am angry', etc.

Reasoning is knowledge in which an unknown object is known from some known object by means of a known relation (between them). That (Reasoning) is of various kinds such as inference, Knowledge by Similarity, etc. e.g. having seen smoke somewhere, the knowledge that there must be fire there.

An explanation of the Means of Knowledge is being given in detail in the sequel.

Other Valid Means of Knowledge such as Inference,
Knowledge by Similarity, Testimony, etc. stated in the other systems of Philosophy, are included in these. 4.

Other Valid Means of Knowledge stated in the other systems of Philosophy, such as Inference, Knowledge by Similarity, Testimony, etc. are included in perception. Direct Knowledge and Reasoning. Therefore, they are not being enumerated separately in this work of Philosophy.

It is only after the co-existence of smoke and fire has been seen previously that the existence of fire is deduced from (the existence of) smoke.

The knowledge of a gayal, which results from its resemblance to a cow, is obtained thus: Having previously seen a cow by perception and having heard that gayal is like a cow, when one sees an animal like that in the forest, it is argued by one that it must be a gayal. Therefore, this knowledge results from Perception and Reasoning only.

Similarly, Testimony also is not a separate Valid Means of Knowledge; because having heard or read a word or words, its meaning is inferred. Further Testimony is not always a Valid means of knowledge, because Testimony other than that derived from a reliable source is liable to be false.

Perception is knowledge resulting from the presentation of objects to the sense organs. 5.

Now the nature of Perception is being explained Knowledge which is produced by the presentation of objects to the sense organs is Perception. Because knowledge is not obtained through the organs of action, therefore "that obtained through sense-organs" has been stated here. Similarly, knowledge is not produced by a mere nearness between the objects and the sense organs. Therefore, the words "produced by presentation" have been used here. For this reason the definition of Perception as given in the Nyāya Sūtras is inappropriate.
The sense-organs, which are five, grasp their objects only in combination with mind. 6.

The five sense-organs, grasp their respective objects only in combination with mind. Without (the association of) mind, by a mere nearness between the objects and their sense organs, knowledge of those objects never results.

Therefore, Perception is knowledge resulting not merely from nearness of objects to the sense-organs, but from presentation of objects to the sense-organs. 7.

The meaning of the Sutra has already been explained, Presentation of an object to the sense-organs is accompanied by the action of mind. But (a mere) nearness of an object to its sense-organ is not like that.

For the same reason Perception is reflective, inferential and describable—it is not non-reflective—except in consciousness in the first moment of a newly born child. 8.

As knowledge by perception is accompanied by the action of mind and mind is a reflective organ, the knowledge (by perception) is also reflective (Svikalpaka) and not non-reflective (Nirvikalpaka). It is also inferential and describable, for reflective knowledge is accompanied by inference and can be described in words. It is only consciousness of an object in the first moment of a newly born child which can be non-reflective, non-inferential and indescribable. After that all perception is reflective.

It is only Perception free from the defect of obstruction to the presentation of objects to their sense-organs which is a Valid Means of Knowledge. 9.

It is only Perception which is free from the defects of sense-organs and objects which is valid as means of knowing truth. The defects of sense-organs are their debility, disease, etc., while the defects of objects are obstruction, darkness, distance etc. And these (defects), being an obstacle in the way of pre-
sentation of objects to the sense organs, render the perceptual knowledge defectives.

Knowledge resulting from the (direct) presentation of objects to mind and devoid of sense-cognition is Direct Knowledge. 10.

Different from Perception, devoid of sense-cognition and resulting from (direct) presentation to mind, is Direct Knowledge (anubhūti). That knowledge is in the form of consciousness of one’s own self and cognition of states of mind such as pleasure, pain, etc. ‘I am angry’, ‘I am satisfied’, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am unhappy’,—knowledge like this, which is devoid of sense-cognition and free from reasoning, is called Direct Knowledge here.

Reasoning is knowledge of the unknown (resulting) from that which is known. 11.

Reasoning is knowledge of unknown from some known object, by means of a known relation.

Where knowledge of the unknown results from what is known through some known relation (between them)—that is Reasoning (tarka), That is of different kinds, such as Inference, Knowledge by Similarity, and Testimony, etc.

Reasoning based upon (invariable) concomitance (Vyapāti) is Inference. 12.

And concomitance is between cause and effect, or between the whole and its parts 13.

Concomitance between the whole and its parts is either among classes or among individuals. 14.

Invariable co-existence is concomitance, Where by means of the relation of that (concomitance), knowledge of the unknown is derived from that which is known—that is Inference. And concomitance is either the co-existence of cause and effect or relation between the whole and its parts. Relation
between the whole and its parts is either among classes or among individuals.

'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire'.—this is a case of concomitance of effect and cause. Therefore, having seen smoke at a place, it is inferred that there must be fire there.

"All men are mortal, therefore Devadatta is also mortal".—this is a case of the inference based upon concomitance in a class. Whatever qualities are found in a class are also found in its parts—this is the concomitance here.

Having seen somewhere only the foot or tail of an elephant, when it is known that the animal must be an elephant—this inference is based upon concomitance between the individual and its parts. Whenever there is such a foot or a tail, that belongs to an elephant this is the concomitance here.

In all cases, where a certain subject in thought comes within the scope of inference, knowledge of the particular results from that of the general or the universal.

Only Inference based upon concomitance is a Valid Means of Knowledge. 15.

"Wherever there is smoke, there is fire"—only an inference like this based upon concomitance is a Valid Means of Knowledge. Where there is no concomitance, or too wide concomitance, or defect of conditional concomitance, the inference is not valid.

"Wherever there is water, there is smoke"—this is a case of non-concomitance.

"This man is white, therefore he is an Englishman"—this is a case of too wide concomitance, because it is not only Englishmen who are white, but people of other countries are also white.
"Where there is fire, there is smoke"—this is a case of conditional concomitance, because without the presence of wet fuel there is no existence between fire and smoke. Here the presence of wet fuel is the condition.

Because concomitance is based upon agreement or upon difference, Inference is either by agreement or by difference, or by both. 16.

Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, there must be fire on this smoky hill—in this case the inference is by agreement, because the concomitance is based upon agreement.

"Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke, therefore, in this pond, because there is no fire, there is no smoke"—in this case the inference is by difference because the concomitance is based upon difference.

"Wherever fire is accompanied with wet fuel, there is smoke; wherever fire is not accompanied with wet fuel, there is no smoke"—in such a case the inference is by agreement and difference, because it is based upon agreement and difference.

The three kinds of inference stated in the other schools of philosophy are included in these, therefore they are not being enumerated here separately. The examples of three kinds of inference given in the Nyāya Philosophy have the defect of (wrong) concomitance. Having seen clouds in the sky, (to infer) that there will be rain—this (example of) Antecedent Inference (pūrvavad anumāna) is defective because of non-concomitance, because: "Wherever there are clouds, there is rain,"—this is not a case of invariable concomitance, therefore, having seen clouds in the sky, it is not possible to infer that there will be rain. Similarly, "Because there is a flood in the river, there must have been rainfall on the banks of the river"—this example of the Consequent Inference (śesavad anumāna) has the defect of too wide concomitance. Flood in
a river can be caused also by the melting of snow on the mountains which from its source. In the case of Inference by Generalisation (sāmānyato drastānumāna), from a known (seen) effect, there is inference of a cause which is unknown (unseen), for example, having seen in the sky that the sun changes its position, it is inferred that the sun moves, because the position of objects does not change without their movement. Here also, as is known to the students of Geography, the cause of the change of position of the sun in the sky is the daily rotation of the earth and not the movement of the sun—and therefore in this example, there is too wide concomitance.

Positive Inference (Vīta) and Negative Inference (avīta) also are included in the Inference by agreement and that by difference. Therefore they have not been stated separately here.

Inference about a sub-class (species) or about a particular (individual) from the general is Deduction (Nigamana). 17.

Where from the general (sāmānya) is inferred knowledge about a sub-class (upasāmānya) or about a particular (vis'esa) that is deductive Inference.

For example,

- All men are rational,
- Indians are men,
- Therefore, Indians are rational,
- Here the inference is from the general about a sub-class.

Again—
- All Indians are civilised.
- Devadatta is an Indian.
- Therefore, Devadatta is civilised.
- Here the inference is from the general about a particular (individual).

Deductive Inference usually consists of three parts (propositions). 18.
Usually Deductive Inference consists of three parts (propositions), and the parts (propositions) are:

1. That which states the concomitance. 2. That which states that in which the concomitance is found, and 3. That which states the conclusion.

That which states the relation of concomitance is called the "Proposition stating concomitance" (Major Premise—Vyāpati—vācaka-avayava). For examples, Wherever there is smoke there is fire’’.

The sentence in which the object with concomitance is stated, is the Proposition stating the object of concomitance (Minor Premise-vyāpya-vācaka-avayava). For example, ‘This hill has smoke on it’’.—here the hill is the object of concomitance.

Where the proved relation between the concomitant (vyāpaka) and the object of concomitance (vyāpya) is stated, that proposition is the conclusion (siddha-vacaka-avayava). For example, “Therefore this hill has fire on it’’.

Inference is either for oneself or for others. When it is for oneself, it consists of three parts as explained above. And when it is for others, it has five parts, which are as follows:

1. PROBANDUM—for example, This hill has fire on it;
2. PROBANS—for example, Wherever there is smoke, there is fire;
3. EXAMPLE—for example, As it is in the kitchen, etc.,
4. APPLICATION—for example, This hill has smoke on it;
5. CONCLUSION—for example, Therefore, this hill has fire on it.
There are three terms in the three parts (propositions) 19.

In the three parts (propositions) stated above, there are three terms. And these are:—(1) that which states the concomitant (Major term—vyāpaka-vācaka-padam); (2) that which states the object of concomitance (Minor Term—vyāpaka-vācaka-padam); and (3) that which states the mark or sign (Middle Term—linga-vācaka-padam).

Whatever is smoky, is fiery,
This hill is smoky,
Therefore, this hill is fiery.

Here ‘fiery’ is the term stating the concomitant (Major Term); ‘this hill’ is the term stating the object of concomitance (Minor Term) and ‘smoky’ is the term stating the mark or sign (Middle Term).

On account of the difference in position of the parts (propositions) and the terms, inference consisting of three parts has several forms. 20.

On account of the difference in position of the parts and the terms as stated above, inference consisting of three parts (syllogism) has several forms. Difference in the position of the parts is only in the case of the Major and the Minor premises. Difference of position of the terms in propositions is only of the Middle Term which is either the subject or the predicate.

In a sentence, that about which something is said is the subject (uddes’ya), and the term which expresses that is the Subject Term (uddes’ya-vācaka-padam). What is said about the subject is the predicate, and the term which expresses that is the Predicate Term (vidheya-vācaka-padam).

Inference of the general from the particulars is Induction (udgamanam). 21.
And that is based either upon the concomitance of cause and effect or upon the attributes of objects. 22.

Where having observed the concomitance of certain common qualities in particulars, there is inference about the character of the general—that is Induction; for example, "Wherever there is fire, there is observed heat (in it); therefore, fire has the attribute of heat".

"Whichever men have been observed, have been found to be rational; therefore, all men have the attribute of rationality".

This kind of inference is not merely based upon enumeration, but it depends either upon the concomitance of cause and effect, or upon the attributes of objects. An inference merely based upon enumeration, and devoid of concomitance, is defective, for example. "All the parrots that I have seen are green; therefore, all the parrots are green". This inference would be invalid, if some other persons might have seen parrots which are white. Here the green colour of parrots is not an invariable and natural attribute of theirs, as heat of fire, or rationality of men.

Observation (Preksaṇa), Experiment (Prayoga) and Hypothesis (Kalpanā-tarka) (reasoning based upon assumption) are its means (of inference) 23.

The means of inference by Induction are these: Observation which consists of scrutiny of the attributes of objects; Experiment which consists of examination of attributes of objects with a particular aim under particular circumstances and with special means and methods; and Hypothesis which consists of examination and verification of a particular assumption with regard to the relation of cause and effect in a particular case.

For example, water is cold; fire is hot; the sun is full of light;—this is Observation. What is the cause of smoke, or whether wet fuel is the cause of smoke or not?—in order to
find out this, one makes fire without wet fuel and sees that there is no smoke; and then again one makes fire with wet fuel and finds that there is smoke—this is Experiment. Having seen a dead body somewhere, it is surmised that poison may be the cause of death; then it is argued that if poison be the cause of death in this case, there must be poison present in the stomach or in some other parts of the body of the dead person; and subsequently if, after an examination of the body, poison is found in it, it is concluded definitely that poison is the cause of death—this is Reasoning by Hypothesis.

Of these Agreement and Difference are the chief methods of investigation. 24.

Of these, that is of Observation, Experiment and Reasoning by Hypothesis, Agreement and Difference are the chief methods of investigation in the examination of the relation of cause and effect, and in the scrutiny of attributes of objects.

The co-existence of attributes or of objects is Agreement, and the contrary of that, that is, the absence of their co-existence is Difference. In the examination of cause and effect either one of these or both of them are used. For example, having seen the co-existence of fire with wet fuel and smoke at several places, it is argued that wherever there is fire with wet fuel, there is smoke, and therefore fire with wet fuel is the cause of smoke—here the Method of Agreement has been used.

Where having observed at several places the co-existence of fire with wet fuel and smoke, and at other places the absence of their co-existence i. e. of fire and smoke, it is argued that where there is wet fuel with fire, there is smoke, and where there is no wet fuel with fire, there is no smoke; therefore fire with wet fuel is the cause of smoke—here both the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference have been employed.

Deduction and Induction are inferences dependent upon each other. 25.

Where the inference is about the particular from the
general—that is Deduction; and where the inference is about the general from particulars—that is Induction. These two are dependent upon each other; for in Deduction the general, which forms the basis of inference, is the result of Induction. For example, having observed a number of (particular) men who are rational, it is inferred that all men are rational. And again in the case of Reasoning by Hypothesis in Induction, deductive inference is used—for example, having formed a hypothesis that the cause of death of a certain person is poison, in order to test that hypothesis it is argued that wherever poison is the cause of death, these kinds of particular symptoms of death are observed; those (symptoms) are seen in this case or not; therefore (accordingly) poison is or is not the cause of death in this case,—here deductive inference is employed in Induction.

Reasoning based upon the meaning of sentences is Education (Anugamana). 26.

Where on the basis of meaning of a certain sentence, meanings of other sentences are inferred—that is Education. For example, from the meaning of the sentence: ‘All men are rational’, it is argued that: “Some rational beings are men”, or “No man is irrational”, or again “No irrational being is man”. All this will be explained in detail in the topic dealing with the relation between thought and language.

Reasoning based upon similarity is Analogy (upamāna). 27.

Where from resemblance between the known and the unknown, some knowledge about the unknown is derived—that is Analogy. It is usually fallacious. It is only when resemblance is based upon the relation of cause and effect, that Analogy is valid, for example, Devadatta died after eating poison; therefore Yajñadatta also, who has eaten poison, may have died. Where resemblance is not based upon the relation of cause and effect Analogy is not valid; for example, This black horse has a swift speed; therefore the other horse also, who is black, must be of
swift speed—this kind of inference is wrong, because merely from the resemblance of black colour, the inference of swift speed does not follow.

THIRD TOPIC

The Nature of Knowledge.

Knowledge is grasping (the nature of) an object, and its instrument is the intellect (Buddhi). 1.

Knowledge is that action in which the grasping (of the nature) of an object takes place. Its instrument, i.e. the means of acquiring it, is the intellect. The intellect is that faculty of consciousness by means of which the nature of an object is grasped.

The intellect has two forms: Experience (Anubhava) and Memory (Smrti). 2.

The intellect, which is the instrument of knowledge, has two forms: Experience and Memory. The definitions of these follow.

The intellect in the forms of Perception, Direct Knowledge and Reasoning is Experience. 3.

Experience is that in which knowledge is obtained through Perception, Direct Knowledge or Reasoning. That kind of knowledge has been already explained in the Topic dealing with the Valid Means of Knowledge.

The intellect which has its basis in the impressions of (left by) previous Experience is Memory. 4.

Memory is that faculty of revival of knowledge in consciousness which has its basis in the impressions of (left by) previous Experience in the forms of Perception, etc. In that, although the object is absent, its knowledge is revived in the intellect, for example, I had seen Devadatta with Yajñadatta yesterday on the bank of the Yamunā—this is Memory, the contrary of that is forgetfulness.
Knowledge obtained by Experience is usually mixed with Memory. 5.

Knowledge obtained by Experience has usually in it the element of recognition; and in recognition there is the memory of previous Experience. Therefore often, particularly in the case of Perception, knowledge obtained by Experience is mixed with Memory. This is Devadatta, and this is Yajñadatta; this is water, and this is fire;—in perceptions such as these there is the revival in memory of knowledge experienced previously; and that is the cause of recognition such as: This is Devadatta; that is Yajñadatta; this is water; and that is fire. Even in the case of an object which is perceived for the first time, there is the revival in memory of qualities like colour, taste, smell, etc. experienced previously and recognition of the same in the (present) object of perception. Similarly in the case of Direct Knowledge and Reasoning there is the revival in memory of knowledge obtained previously through Experience:

Knowledge is either Valid or Invalid. 6.

Valid knowledge is that in Experience, or in Memory, which accords with the nature of an object. The contrary of that is invalid knowledge.

Valid Knowledge is either with regard to existence (bhāvatmakam) or non-existence (abhāvatmakam). 7.

Valid knowledge with regard to existence is that which relates to an object which exists, for example, knowledge of a conchshell which exists. Valid knowledge with regard to non-existence is that which relates to an object which does not exist, for example, knowledge of the non-existence of a conchshell which does not exist. Similarly in the case of Memory, there is valid knowledge with regard to existence when there is revival of an object (in memory) exactly corresponding to that as perceived previously, while there is valid knowledge with regard to non-existence when there is revival (in memory) of the non-existence of an object which was not perceived previously.
Invalid Knowledge is of three kinds: Non-perception of the existent (bhāvābhāvatmakam). Perception of the non-existent (abhāvabhāvatmakam), and Erroneous perception of the existent (anyathā-bhāvatmakam). 8

Invalid knowledge of the form of Non-perception of the existent is that in which an object is not perceived although it exists, e.g. the non-perception of a snake although it lies on the road. The cause of that is the defect of sense-organs, or obstruction of an object through darkness or long distance, etc., or inattention.

Invalid knowledge of the form of Perception of the non-existent is that in which there is perception of an object although it does not exist, e.g. perception of a snake although it does not exist, the hearing of a sound although there is none, etc. In the state of wakefulness, that is usually due to derangement of mind as in the case of a person who has a deranged or insane mind, or one who is suffering from disease like high fever etc., and also in dreams when that is caused by the revival of mental impressions accumulated in the past.

Invalid knowledge of the form of Erroneous perception of the existent is that in which there is erroneous perception of an object which exists, e.g., when a conchshell is perceived as silver. This also is caused by the defect of sense-organs or the obstruction of objects.

Knowledge belongs to an individual, and its validity is proved by its steadiness in one's own mind and its correspondence to the knowledge of others (other minds). 9.

Whatever knowledge is produced, is in an individual, that is, it is in an individual mind. The truth or falsity of that is proved by its steadiness in the individual's mind and by its correspondence to the knowledge in other minds. Whatever knowledge is true, remains fairly steady in the mind and its validity is established by its being confirmed by other minds.
When some one perceives a thing as a conchshell and wants to make sure whether his perception is true or not, he scrutinises it and finds that it is a conchshell only and nothing else this is steadiness of the object in the mind. If even after this there should remain any doubt with regard to the perception of the object as a conchshell, he inquires from others: "Is this a conchshell or anything else?", and when others also confirm that it is a conchshell only and nothing else, the truth of that knowledge is established. The contrary of that is false knowledge, that is the knowledge of an object which does not remain steady in the mind, or which is not confirmed by the mind of others, is false.

The falsity of knowledge in dreams is also proved in the same way, because that knowledge is not steady in one's own mind, nor does it correspond to the knowledge of other minds. The knowledge of a person with a deranged or insane mind is also of the same kind, that is, there is no steadiness about it, nor is there any confirmation of the same by other minds. After a person is awake, knowledge of a dream and its object disappear, and therefore they are false. Similarly knowledge which belongs to the mind of a deranged or insane person only and not to others is false.

Knowledge is valid so long as it remains steady in one's own mind and corresponds to the knowledge of other minds. 10.

Here the question may be... What is the (true) validity of knowledge after all? If some knowledge is accepted as true first, and then later on it may turn out to be false, what knowledge is really true? Knowledge of a dream at first appears to be true during the state of dream, while later on it turns out to be false after one is awake. What proof is there that even the knowledge of the state of wakefulness may not be false? It is said here that there is validity of knowledge so long as it remains steady in one's own mind and it corresponds to that of
other minds. It becomes false only after it has been proved to be false.

The Validity or Invalidity of Knowledge in Memory is of the same kind as that of Experience. 11.

The validity of knowledge in memory consists in the revival of the same in memory exactly in the same way as it was previously in the experience of an object. The contrary of that is its invalidity. Thus when there is steadiness of knowledge in memory in one’s own mind and correspondence of it to that of other minds, that is valid. When Devadatta remembers that he saw Yajñadatta yesterday on the bank of the Yamuna in the morning, and on there being a doubt about it, he remembers it again and again and inquires from Yajñadatta and others who were with him whether that was true, and when they also confirm that it was really true, that knowledge in memory is proved to be valid.

(Here ends the Third Topic dealing with the Nature of Knowledge.)
APPENDIX I

Is there 'Acquaintance' or 'Simple Apprehension'? ¹

In this paper I propose to take up a discussion on the subject at the point it was left in Dr. Broad's paper published in 'Problems of Science and Philosophy' (Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. II, 1919). In the four papers, which form the symposium on the subject in this volume, the main basis of discussion is the Hon. Bertrand Russell's theory of 'knowledge by acquaintance,' which is altogether rejected by Dr. Hicks and Dr. Edgell, and partially supported by Prof. Moore and Dr. Broad. The kind of immediate awareness which is meant to be expressed by the phrase 'knowledge by acquaintance' has, however, been advocated by other writers even before Bertrand Russell, the foremost of whom, I think, is the late lamented L. T. Hobhouse. He discusses this under the title 'Simple Apprehension' in the first two chapters of his 'Theory of Knowledge,' and tries to meet such objections to it as were urged, for example, by T. H. Green, or are urged, at present, by Dr. Hicks. Among contemporary British thinkers,

¹. This paper was originally read by the author at a meeting of the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club during the Easter Term of 1930.
besides Prof. Moore and Dr. Broad, another advocate, of this kind of immediate experience is Prof. Stout, who also calls it Simple Apprehension. What is also interesting is that this theory of immediate awareness has been advocated by some of the mediaeval Indian philosophers, and we find some very suggestive and parallel notions in the definitions and descriptions of such experience as given by these thinkers of the Orient independently of the philosophers of the West.

It will appear that some of those who have advocated the theory of knowledge by acquaintance or simple apprehension, or the same, or a similar theory under a different name, believe that there is such an experience as consists of a mere cognisance on the part of the subject of an object, which is merely presented to it. In other words, they believe in the existence of a subject-object relation which consists of mere cognisance and mere presentation of an object. For example, consider Hobhouse, who, as I have already said, is one of the foremost among the modern thinkers who have discussed and advocated the theory of immediate experience in this sense. He says: 'Thought relations never constitute a content of immediate apprehension. Such contents do stand in manifold relations which are unfolded by judgements about them; but the apprehension of them is not the thought of their relations, nor does it depend for its existence in consciousness upon these relations. The judgments themselves would have no meaning if they did not
refer to the data as apprehended. Apprehension, therefore, does not depend on any hitherto assigned mental activities. And again: 'I conclude, then, that the consciousness in which we are directly or immediately aware of the content present to us, a state which I venture to call apprehension, is a primitive or underived act of knowledge'. Prof. Stout speaks of this immediate experience in similar language. 'Simple apprehension', says he, 'is the term which seems most suitable for naming this bare presence of an object to consciousness without indicating any more special relation in which the mind may stand to this subject'. Bertrand Russell too, inspite of his frequent use of the phrase 'knowledge by acquaintance' means by it the same kind of experience as is meant to be expressed by 'simple apprehension' in the works of Hobhouse and Stout, that is to say, he really means 'acquaintence' and not knowledge based upon acquaintance. He has, in fact, used the very term 'acquaintance' at times to express this. For example, in the following statements: 'We shall say that we have acquaintance with any thing of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths'; and again, "All our knowledge, both knowledge of

1. Theory of Knowledge, p. 31.
2. Ibid, p. 35.
4. Problems of Philosophy, p. 73. (italics are mine)
things and knowledge of truths, rest upon acquaintance as its foundation\(^1\). Among the Indian philosophers Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school and the author of the Nyāya-Sūtras, defines direct knowledge (Pratyakṣa) as that which is the result of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, which is not inferential, not discrepant from its object, and definite. Later on, in the school of Hindu Logic, direct knowledge was divided into two kinds: (1) non-reflective and non-descriptive; (nirvikalpaka), corresponding to ‘simple apprehension’; and (2) reflective and descriptive (savikalpaka), corresponding to ordinary perception. The Buddhist philosophers admit only the first kind of cognition as direct knowledge, for they say that the second kind of cognition is also inferential. That this first kind of cognition corresponds to ‘simple apprehension’ or ‘acquaintance’ will be clear from Kumārila’s description of it. ‘At first’, says he, ‘there is cognition\(^2\) which is mere apprehension (ālocana-jñānam); free from reflection and description (nirvikalpakam); that which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb; and is caused by the mere object (śuddha-vastujam\(^3\)). Similarly, Bhāsarvajña describes this kind of direct cognisance as ‘that

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1. Problems of Philosophy, p. 75 (italics are mine)

2. Kumārila, as also most of the other Indian philosophers, regarded such experience as knowledge.

3. Ślokavārtika, IV. 112.
which manifests the mere form of an object (*vastuvāparūpamātrāvabhāsakam*); for example, such cognition as produced at the first glance at an object (*prathamākṣasamīnātāyam*)

Another significant definition of direct knowledge, in the history of Indian philosophy, is that given by Gaṅgeśa the founder of the New School of Indian Logic. He defined it as the direct apprehension which is not the result of (previous) knowledge.

Thus we find a number of European and Indian philosophers agree in holding that there is a kind of direct experience in which the object is *merely* presented to, and taken cognisance of, by the subject. In order to decide whether this view is correct or not I think the crucial point to consider is whether there is, or there can be, a cognisance of the various qualities which constitute the sense-data (called an object), such as a red patch, an extended patch, or a hard patch, etc. without thinking at the same time that it is red, it is extended, or it is hard; or even that we know a red patch, an extended patch, or a hard patch. And if there is, or there can be such a cognisance, when and under what conditions does it take place? It will appear that it is really a satisfactory answer to this latter question which will establish the validity of the claim to the existence of such cognisance as

2. Tattvācinīmaṇī, Bibl, Indica, p. 552.
is alluded to in the first question; and it will further appear that although all the advocates of such direct experience agree in admitting that there is, and there can be, such a simple cognisance as described above, they differ with regard to its exact status in relation to cognition. There are, firstly, those who seem to think that such direct experience is not to be had in adult life, and that it is simply a factor in the complex cognitive act revealed by analysis. Hobhouse, for example, says: 'For our purpose it is indifferent whether an act of apprehension ever exists by itself in the sense of forming the whole state of consciousness for the time being. We are contending merely that such an activity is to be found on analysis in many of our mental states; that it is a condition of knowledge; and that by itself it takes us a certain distance and no further.'¹ On this point Bertrand Russel also agrees with Hobhouse. He says: 'Knowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths, though it would be rash to assume that human beings ever, en fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some truth about them.'² Secondly, there are others who think that such immediate experience as is expressed by the terms 'acquaintance' or 'simple apprehension', and which consists of simply a subject-object relation, does exist at the first moment of con-

¹. Theory of Knowledge, p. 36. (italics are mine)
². Problems of Philosophy, p. 72. (italics are mine)
tact of the object with the sense-organs as a condition and substratum of the later cognition which may be called 'knowledge by acquaintance'. This seems to be the view held by Prof. Stout and Dr. Broad, and by most of the Indian philosophers. 'It is a precondi-
tion', says Prof. Stout, 'of the cognitive attitude, the feeling attitude, and the conative attitude that there should be something before the mind with which they are concerned', and the 'bare presence' of this 'something' to consciousness he calls simple apprehension¹. Similar is the view of Dr. Broad, according to whom, if I understand him rightly, there is acquaintance every time a fresh object, or parts of an object, comes into contact with the sense-organs. 'Indeed', says he, 'the following seem to me to be plain facts: (a) That when I suddenly look at a landscape or hear a gun fired, I enter into a special kind of relation with a visual field or a noise; that this relation probably begins to subsist before I begin to judge or discriminate; and that, at any rate, it is present in full force at a time when my acts of discrimination and judgment have hardly begun to enter the field; (b) That when I have discriminated and recognised various parts of the landscape, one at least of the relations which I have to these parts is of precisely the same kind as that which I originally had to the whole. And this relation is what I understand by acquaintance with sense-data². The same conception

appears in the works of a number of Indian philosophers, 'At first', says Kumārila, 'there is cognition which is mere apprehension (ālocanajñānam), which resembles the cognition of a child or the dumb, and is caused by the mere object (śuddhavastujam). And, according to Bhāsarvajña, this cognition, which manifests the mere appearance of an object, is such as is produced at the first glance (prathamākṣasannipātajam). Rāmānuja, another well-known Indian teacher, seems to think that it is only when a particular sense-datum is presented to an individual for the first time in life that there is such an immediate experience as we have called 'acquaintance' or 'simple apprehension'; otherwise, in all cognition, there is present the subject-predicate relation of the form 'This is so'.

It is rather difficult to convince another of the truth of what one finds in one's own experience. All that can be done is to appeal to certain facts, which may or may not be seen by others as one sees them. Some facts, however, to which I should appeal in connection with the problem under consideration are as follows:

(1) Before I know, or can know, an object as 'This is A', 'This is B', or even as 'This is something' (which I do not exactly know), there should first be a presentation of the sense-data of A or B, or of the something as mere sense-data, and the mere cognisance of these at the first moment of their presentation in what is meant by acquaintance or simple apprehension. That is why such cognisance was
called by Indian philosophers as that caused by the mere object (śuddhavastujam). This distinction between the object as it is presented at the first moment and as it is perceived later on should come home more clearly by considering the fact that there is no reason why the object as it is presented at the first moment of the contact of the sense-organs with the object in adult life, should be different from what it would be like to a child at the first moment of its perception, it being granted, of course, that the sense-organs of the child are structurally similar to those of a grown up person, and function in the same way so far as the mere apprehension of the sense-data is concerned. A red patch, as it is in itself, should appear as such even to a child the first time it is presented to it, although the child would not be able to perceive it as 'This patch is red'.

(2) All such judgments as 'This is red'; 'This is green', etc. which are symbolical of a descriptive perception involve the identification of a familiar notion e. g., of redness or greenness with a particular sense-datum 'red' or 'green', which ought to be present, presented and taken cognisance of first as the condition of such identification.

(3) So far as I can see while acquaintance with sense-data is altogether non-inferential, their perception as having a certain character and the descriptive judgment, which follows from it, are inferential. The patch which is presented to my sight is perceived as red because I am familiar with other patches having that appearance as red.
From what I have said above with regard to the nature of acquaintance it should be clear that I do not mean by it a vague or primitive kind of knowledge as some have characterised it to be. What is known by acquaintance may represent a thing vaguely or distinctly, but so far as the presented sense-datum goes it is bound to be definite. When I hear a voice, I may not be able to make out whose it is, or may not be sure whether it is, or is not, of a particular friend of mine whose it might be, but the voice, whatever it is, is definite in its own character. Similarly there is no question of acquaintance being a primitive kind of knowledge. In so far as it is a mere presentation and mere cognisance of sense-data, devoid of all interpretation, it is the same in the case of a child and in that of an adult; in the case of a primitive savage and in that of a civilised man of our modern times.

So far I have considered the nature of acquaintance with sense-data only. A further question is whether there are other kinds of acquaintance also, and if so, what they are. What have we to say to the following observations of Bertrand Russell in this connection? ‘We have acquaintance in sensation’, says he, ‘with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense-thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner-sense. Further it is probable, though not certain, that we have acquaintance with self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards things. In addition to
our acquaintance with particular existing things; we also have acquaintance with what we shall call universals, that is to say, general ideas such as whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, and so on.1 By a happy coincidence an Indian philosopher of about the 7th Century, Dharmakīrti, has also included more than the acquaintance of sense-data in his definition of direct knowledge (pratyakṣa), and has classified it into four kinds; (1) Sense-apprehension (indriyajñānam), corresponding to acquaintance with sense-data; (2) Mental apprehension (manovijñānam), corresponding to Russell’s acquaintance with the data of the inner sense; (3) Self-consciousness (acquaintance with self); and (4) Mystic intuition (yogijñānam).

The essential and common characteristics of all these kinds of direct knowledge are: firstly, that they do not admit of description (Kalpanābodhām), that is to say, there is no subject-predicate relation in them; and secondly, that there is no mistake about them (abhrāntam). Now I shall make these two classifications of direct knowledge, which are very similar to each other, the basis of my further discussion of the subject.

After a sense datum has ceased to be presented I can have an image of it in my mind, and there is as much acquaintance with it as there was with the original sense datum; and hence memory images may be said to be known by acquaintance. Similarly, that I am acquainted with all my feelings and emotions is also evident from introspection. In the case of

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1. Problems of Philosophy pp. 80, 81.
memory, I think, we have to draw a distinction between the remembrance of concrete sense-data and that of mere abstract facts. When we remember a mere fact, to me it appears it is not the fact but the remembrance of that fact with which we have acquaintance; and hence, Russell's statement that we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner sense will not be strictly correct. In fact, I think, in memory, we never have acquaintance with things which have been data either of the outer sense or of the inner sense. What we have acquaintance with is either the image of concrete things, or simply the remembrance of abstract facts. Along with the remembrance of abstract facts it happens, however, that there are also some images of concrete things associated with them, for example, along with the memory of the fact that yesterday I read about the disturbances in Bombay there may also appear, and they usually do appear, the images of the page of the paper in which I read the news, some pictures which appeared on that page, and so on. That besides acquaintance with the external and the internal data, we have also an ever-present immediate consciousness of the existence of a subject or self to which this acquaintance and the other mental processes belong, is also a fact which, I think, may be granted.

A rather more complex question than the others is whether we can claim acquaintance with universals; and if we can, with what kind of universals and in what sense? 'It is obvious, to begin with', says
Bertrand Russell, 'that we are acquainted with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard etc. i.e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are learning to be acquainted with whiteness'. Similarly he claims to have acquaintance with what he calls time-relations and space-relations, and also with resemblance. Now the question is: In what form are we acquainted with these universals? Are we acquainted with such universals as whiteness, redness, blackness, etc., in sense-presentation, or otherwise? Some philosophers, for example, in the history of Indian philosophy, Kumārila, Prabhākara and Rāmānuja, seem to think that they are present as a part of the sense-data; while others seem to hold that they are simply exemplified in the sense-data. It will appear, however, that we are acquainted with these universals neither in sense-representation nor otherwise as purely abstract notions. Whatever we have in sense is a particular sense-datum,—a particular red-patch, or a black-patch. We simply identify our notion of redness or blackness with the particular instance of it in sense-representation. Redness or blackness as universals cannot be said to be presented in sense, nor are we acquainted with them as sense. Nor can there be an acquaintance

1. Problems of Philosophy, p. 158, 159.
with them as abstract notions, for, so far as I can see, the content of abstract notions remains altogether unrepresented and uncognised until they are analysed, and all analysis implies something more than mere acquaintance. In fact, it is questionable whether there is anything at all like a purely abstract notion of such simple sensible qualities as redness or blackness. What we have of these by generalisation is a sort of generic image, and it is this with which we are acquainted. Whenever I think of redness independently of a red patch presented in sense it is a sort of generic image of redness which is presented to my mind, and I may be said to be acquainted with this in the same sense as with a particular red patch presented in sense. The same may be said of space and time relation. What is presented in sense is so many particular situations in space. By generalisation we get generic images of 'right' and 'left'; 'above' and 'below', etc., and it is these generic images with which I am acquainted when I think of space relations independently of objects in sense experience which stand in these relations. Similarly, with regard to time relations, in sense we have only particular sequence, and out of these by generalisation we get generic images of 'before', after', etc., and it is these with which I am acquainted when I think of time relations independently of particular sequence presented in sense. As regards more abstract and complex universals, such as brotherhood, virtue, etc., I do not think we even have a generic image of these or
an acquaintance with it. All that we can get is a sort of image of an indifferent concrete instance of brotherhood, virtue, etc. All that I say is that we cannot be said to have acquaintance with them as such abstract notions.

The question whether acquaintance is knowledge or not is, as Dr. Broad says, mainly a verbal one. If by knowledge we mean only that which consists of a subject-predicate relation, acquaintance is not knowledge; but if we use the term 'knowledge' in a wider sense so as to include even mere awareness or cognisance of a sensum, acquaintance is knowledge. By most of the Indian philosophers it has been regarded as a mode of knowledge.

All knowledge based upon acquaintance and having acquaintance as one of the factors at the time cognition may be called knowledge by acquaintance. It is also knowledge by description. It corresponds to the second kind of direct knowledge in Indian philosophy, viz., that which is reflective and descriptive (savikalpaka).

I agree with Dr. Broad when he says that acquaintance is incorrigible, or as the Sanskrit term 'avyabhicāri' literally means: 'that which is not discrepant'. It cannot be different from what it is as presented to an individual at a particular moment. By its very nature it is free from the distinction of truth and error, for it is not of the nature of a judgement.
APPENDIX II.

List of abbreviations used in this work.

Ait. Aitareya Upaniṣad.
ASP. Aristotelian Society Proceedings.
AŚ. Artha-śāstra (of Kautilya).
Asta. Asta-sāhasrikā.
Brhad. Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad.
BSS. Bombay Sanskrit Series.
CBN. Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.
Chānd. Chāndogya Upanisad.
CS. Caraka-Samhitā.
C. Samhitā. Caraka-Samhitā.
CSS. Chowkhandha Sanskrit Series.
CSUP. Constructive Survey of the Upanisadic Philosophy.
FD. Fragments from Dinnāga.
HIL. History of Indian Logic.
HIP. History of Indian Philosophy.
HOS. Harward Oriental Series.
HPIP. History of Pre-buddhistic Indian Philosophy.
IIP. Introduction to Indian Philosophy.
ILA. Indian Logic and Atomism.
IP. Indian Philosophy.
JASB. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
JBTS. Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JGD. Jaina Gem Dictionary.
JPTS. Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JRAS. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
K. Kārikā.
Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.
Mahābhārata.
Māṇava-dharma-śāstra.
Mādhyaṃkika-kārikās.
Mīmāṃsā-sūtras.
Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārtika.
Mundaka Upanisad.
Nyāyāvatāra.
Nyāya-bhāṣya.
Nyāya-bindu.
Nyaya-bindu-tīka.
Nyāya-kandalī.
Nyāya-sūtras.
Nyāya-vartika.
Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tīka.
Outlines of Jainism.
Original Sanskrit Texts (Muir’s).
Praśastapāda-bhāṣya.
Parīkṣa-mukha-sūtra.
Pramaṇa-naya-tattvālokalankāra.
Prajñā-Paramita.
Prakaraṇa-paṇcika.
Prabhakara School of Purva-mīmāṃsā.
Rāmāyaṇa.
Religion and Philosophy of the Veda.
Sacred Books of the East Series.
Sacred Books of the Hindus.
Sacred Books of the Jainas.
Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha.
Saṃkhya-kārika.
Saṃkhya-kārika-gaudapada-bhāṣya.
Saṃkhya-pravacana-sūtras.
Saṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī.
Śabara-bhāṣya.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sr. B.</td>
<td>Śrī-bhāsyā.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Śvet.</td>
<td>Śvetaśvatara Upanisad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taitt.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TC.</td>
<td>Tattva-cintāmaṇi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS.</td>
<td>Tattvārthadīghaṇa-sutra.</td>
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<td>VB.</td>
<td>Vidyabhusaṇa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ved. S.</td>
<td>Vedanta-sutras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viz. SS.</td>
<td>Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VM.</td>
<td>Vācaspati Miśra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VS.</td>
<td>Vaiśeṣika-sutras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSM.</td>
<td>Vedanta-siddhanta-muktavali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YS.</td>
<td>Yoga-sutras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZDMG.</td>
<td>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.</td>
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APPENDIX III

List of Works Consulted.

N. B. (1) The following list contains the name of only those works to which there are references in this Thesis.
(2) The transliteration of Sanskrit titles as given by the editors has been preserved.

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