Confrontation with Pakistan
By the same author

The Untold Story, 1967
CONFRONTATION WITH PAKISTAN

53536

Lt-Gen B.M. Kaul
Dedicated to the optimists among us who see opportunity in every difficulty, defying pessimists who see only difficulty in every opportunity.
Acknowledgements

I am grateful, for varied assistance, to Trevor Dricberg, Helen and Phillip, Tathi, Usha, K.P. Mushran, Rajinder Puri, Dhan Raj, Kishori, Anuradha, Chitralekha, Chander, Keshi, Vimla, Prema, Devi Dutt, Anil and Asha. My thanks are also due to well-informed friends who would like to remain anonymous.

B.M.K.
Preface

I PLACED CERTAIN facts before the public in my first book, The Untold Story, which it had a right to know. In the process I infuriated various persons whose pretentions and myths I exploded. Instead of dealing with the issues of national importance which I had brought to light, many tried to sow confusion by raising irrelevant matters or distorting what I had said. For example, it has been said by some of my detractors that I had blamed everybody but myself for the NEFA debacle. This is not correct. I had, in fact, said that while I was prepared to share the collective responsibility, as an officer of the Indian Army, it would not be right to single me out for blame.* It has also been said that I had maligned Nehru. This again is not true. After praising him highly,** I also pointed out some of his failings. Can this be called maligning?

As truth usually hurts, some criticized my statements and questioned my motives, while others demanded my head on a platter. It mattered more to them that I should be persecuted in some way than that something be done about the important issues I had raised in my book. Persons of this kind think only they are right. Their maxim is: Heads we win, tails you lose. They arrogate to themselves the monopoly of being patriotic. They try to intimidate others into silence.

There are many friends and well-wishers who have stood by me all along. But there are others† whose opinion about me is

*See The Untold Story, pp. 425-7.

**I said on page 308 of the The Untold Story: “There was hardly another man as free from fear and hatred as he. I admired him as a peerless patriot.” Again, on page 317: “Nehru had done more for his country than anyone since Asoka or Akbar.”

†For instance, whatever Krishna Menon may say about me now, the following is an extract from a letter he wrote to me on 13 September 1963: “So far as I am concerned you are a brave man and the best officer I have known... No one knows better than I do the injustice done to you and the country by not recognizing a gallant man...”
not the same as it used to be. I suppose this is the way of life.

Since the publication of *The Untold Story*, several books have appeared on the same topic from other persons. I single out two for discussion in my present work because I feel it is in the national interest to expose their tendentious statements. The public have now before them my word as well as the comments and views of other authors. It is for them to judge where the truth lies. Although some of these authors covered the same ground as I have, there have been no loud protests that they had infringed the Official Secrets Act.

Without discussing the major points of national importance I raised in *The Untold Story*, many of my critics deliberately created confusion by raising a hue and cry that I had violated the Official Secrets Act, as if with my background and lifelong service in the military and other spheres I did not know better than to divulge secrets detrimental to the interests of my country. In this matter, of what is or is not secret I need no guidance from vociferous critics speaking from privileged and other forums.

The Official Secrets Act, of which we have heard so much lately, was framed by the British long ago to penalize nationalistic Indians who divulged information which led to the furtherance of the cause of our freedom. "Secret," as understood today, is something by the divulgence of which the interests of our country are harmed. Certain things may, of course, be kept secret from the public in an emergency, but it is not in our long-term interests to keep the public in the dark indefinitely.* The British had to hide a great deal from our people. But what has our government to hide from us, for long anyhow?

Churchill published his monumental work on the World War II soon after its conclusion. In this work he quoted from and referred to many secret documents and decisions so that the public should have full and accurate knowledge of various important happenings.

Talking of the Official Secrets Act, Chanchal Sarkar, in his

*The study team on defence matters told the Administrative Reforms Commission, as reported in *The Statesman*, New Delhi, 30 June 1970, that India's defence suffers from oversecrecy to the point of keeping the nation in the dark.
book, *Challenge and Stagnation*,† quotes the distinguished British journalist Hugh Cudlipp on the subject: "It has been said that the language of the Secrets Act is wide enough to make it a criminal offence for a messenger at the Home Office to inform a reporter that the Under Secretary is in the habit of taking six lumps of sugar in his tea."

In the present work, as in my last, no reference has been made to our future military plans nor to anything which may be harmful to our national interests and nothing which should not be revealed to our people. Nor did I have access to any official documents and records. I have collected and pieced together from permissible sources, information on the operations between India and Pakistan in 1965. I have written about them at some length in the hope that if we are faced with a similar situation again, as we may well be, we should deal with Pakistan— weaker than us militarily and smaller in size—more suitably than we have done so far. Pakistan also blundered and failed to fulfil its aims, like us, in 1965.

It is my belief that we are not progressing satisfactorily in socio-economic developments and administration at home and in foreign policy abroad today mainly because of certain inherent defects in our character. Let us see how they crept in.

India has had a great historical past and a rich cultural heritage. Two major religions of the world, Hinduism and Buddhism, were born in this country. The symbol zero and the decimal system were invented by our mathematicians. The science of algebra spread to the West through the agency of our scholars. Astronomical calculations, devised by us over a thousand years ago, are still used in this country for working out the position of the sun and the stars.

Our epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* are unsurpassed; dramatists and mystics like Kalidasa and Kabir and rulers like Ashoka, Vikramaditya and Akbar are without parallel; and wise men such as Buddha and Gandhi, the like of whom we may not see for centuries, and Nehru, have lent lustre to our country.

†Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1969.
We have survived through the ages, despite numerous upheavals. As the Urdu poet Mohammad Iqbal says:

_**Yunan-o-Misr Roma sab mit gae jahan se,**  
_Kutch chiz hai jo baqi nam-o-nishan hamara._

(While great old civilizations of Greece, Egypt, and Rome are no more, the fact that we still endure means that we have something in us.)

We have been repeatedly invaded not only from across our land barriers but also from the sea. The Huns, Aryans, Greeks, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, Afghans, Portuguese, French, and the English have left imprint of their culture and traditions on the ancient civilization of this land. Our culture is therefore composite, an amalgam of many civilizations.

Our greatness waned slowly over the centuries, and because of disunity and other frailties of character we allowed ourselves to be conquered more than once. Our European conquerors inflicted heavy penalties of death or imprisonment on us if we did not support their rule. Loyalty to the country was treated as treason and disloyalty to them. Definitions of lofty ideals underwent a change.

As foreign rulers were not here for our benefit, they exploited us economically. Consequently, we became impoverished and, in turn, developed dishonest practices. To survive under foreign masters, who believed in the doctrine of Divide and Rule, we went to any lengths to win their favours and placed personal interest above the country’s. This weakened India. Subjected to continuous malnutrition, hot weather, and living under unhygienic conditions, we became mentally and physically enfeebled. This made us lethargic and apathetic.

The British made little effort to educate us or develop our country except strategically in their own interests. After 200 years of their rule, only 10 per cent of us could read or write any language. Lord Curzon said once that he wanted only a handful of Indians with British minds but native clothes to help their Raj to govern India. Illiteracy led to ignorance, incompetence, and superstition. The British taught us few trades and gave us only petty
employment. As we were denied positions of major responsibility, we lost confidence in ourselves.

Our biggest weakness is indiscipline. I am reminded of a story which Sun Tzu relates about a certain Chinese Emperor who lived nearly 2,000 years ago and whose subjects were extremely indisciplined. He tried all possible ways to improve them but in vain. At last he thought of setting an example in full view of the public of those who defied his orders.

The Emperor accordingly paraded some girls and gave them certain orders to fulfil through one of his dignitaries, warning them first that if they disobeyed they would be punished severely. The girls, taking this threat lightly as it had never been carried out in the past, giggled when the orders were given and disobeyed. This happened in the presence of a large crowd. The Emperor had the orders repeated, with the same warning. The girls continued to giggle and disobey. When this happened the third time, he had the head of one girl chopped off. This stunned everybody present. Now that an example had been set, the orders were repeated for the fourth time and were obeyed implicitly. From then on, after an example had been set, all his orders were carried out by his subjects in a disciplined manner and, consequently, as he was a sagacious ruler, his people flourished thereafter.

Heads cannot be chopped off so easily in a democracy in 1971 but exemplary punishment can be given to defaulters who retard the country’s progress by indiscipline, dishonesty, and incompetence. No softer methods will improve our code of behaviour and character and we shall continue to be confronted with indiscipline in all walks of life, much to everybody’s frustration.

We lack a sense of urgency and enthusiasm. Nothing happens speedily. Lethargy seems to have eaten into our bones. We are not running “to keep a date with destiny” but only marking time till destiny descends upon us. We allow delays in everything: in reaching our place of work or play or social functions, in catching trains, in keeping appointments, in attending to our correspondence, and even in taking urgent decisions.

Temperamentally, we are unpunctual. This shows a disorderly state of mind. It also shows that we are casual, put our own
convenience above that of others, and lack self-discipline. Such lapses are inexcusable as many weaknesses stem from them. Ever so often, the Union Home Ministry issues circulars stressing the importance of punctuality in attending office. But each day a large number of people, including peons, clerks, and officers, come late and slip away early. Few of them work hard during office hours, wasting much time in idle chat, frequent refreshments, and display a general lack of urgency. If half an hour is allowed for lunch, people take 90 minutes. They have little sense of responsibility. High officials shirk taking action either because they are not firm enough or because they have some chink in their armour. The present-day privileges of appeal for government servants from the administrative decisions of their superiors may be a democratic practice but certainly instils indiscipline.

When our highest political leaders assemble for meetings of the All-India Congress Committee (and similar bodies), their photographs in newspapers show them lying about in loose garments, resting on pillows, in uninspiring rather than alert postures. There are no pens, pencils, files, notes, or other signs of activity around them, showing a state of orderliness and that they are getting on with some business. Instead, there appears to be a relaxed and lethargic atmosphere as if they are attending a qawwali (sing-song) session or a picnic rather than discussing national affairs. This presents a poor image to the nation as a whole.

We protest at the slightest provocation. Agitation in our country assumes different shapes: sitdown strikes, hunger-strikes, fasts unto death, “peaceful” processions shouting militant slogans, or gheraos. This was the form of revolt we generally practised against the British and it is boomeranging on us today.

Lack of initiative is another of our failings. Few of us believe in self-help. That our progress compares favourably with that in some other underdeveloped countries is poor consolation when we know that we are not doing as well as we should. We pay little attention to detail and to small things, often accepting the wish for the deed. This leads to wishful thinking and vague generalities.

As La Fontaine said once: “Be advised that all flatterers live
at the expense of those who listen to them." Many amongst us are experts in flattery, giving praise and presents when none are due or called for.

For instance, some officials give not token but expensive presents to departing seniors which they can usually ill afford. Occasions are invented by interested parties to give such presents only to get on the right side of certain officials, who receive trophies for even the longest drive in golf!

Most of us in various walks of life are afraid of expressing an opinion fearlessly or taking bold actions. We hold opinions only so long as they do not harm our self-interest according to our timid calculations. This gives us an overcautious mentality which eventually influences our general behaviour and conduct.

We have many contradictions in our character. While we teach our children to speak the truth, we teach them in the same breath to make lame excuses to their teachers for being late in paying their fees. After cleaning our houses, we dump the dirt and garbage in front of our neighbours' houses. We consider ourselves superior to those who are ahead of us materially or morally and choose to sermonize to them. Although we believe in Maya and say that what we see is not real and hence believe in renunciation, we in reality accept all the good things of life without murmur. We live in a world of make believe and self-deception which has naturally affected our behaviour in all walks of life.

We do not attach importance to our word and hence often do not keep our promises. We talk lightly and find lame excuses for our omissions. We do not realize that we are judged by the yardstick of reliability. If we are true to our word, we gain in reputation whereas nobody relies on a man who breaks his word. We do not treat a promise as a word of honour which once made has to be always kept despite all impediments.

We condemn or praise people without verifying facts. In the process, some first-rate men of high integrity and ability remain unrecognized and lesser lights flourish.

The caste system has been one of our greatest curses. Segregation of Harijans in our society is severer than any colour or other bar against a racial or religious minority in the world. Whatever laws
we pass, an untouchable remains an untouchable for the vast majority of us. In rural areas, this plays havoc with the morale of the people and interferes with most of their endeavours. Villagers often vote in elections on the slogan: ye h hamari zai ka hai (he is one of our caste). For a weak and backward people, this is a tremendous folly.

Deeds, not words, are our need. Having analyzed our shortcomings, we must devise concrete ways of surmounting them and remould our character. The many weaknesses in our attitudes enumerated here have become chronic through long historical processes and need drastic remedies.

Most of us make little contribution to social advance except fault finding. Our leaders in turn not only want to be thanked for what they have done for their country but also to be rewarded.*

Pakistan shares with us our shortcomings and need not therefore rejoice in our self-criticism.

We all know that we are an old civilization with a great past. But as Caesar said to the Greeks: “How often will the glory of your ancestors save you from self-destruction?” Also to draw comfort from sermons and slogans will not solve our problems.

Nehru delivered a stirring speech to the Constituent Assembly in New Delhi at the time of Independence and said: “Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny. We made a pledge, a vow. Now the time has come to redeem it...trackless centuries are filled with India’s striving and grandeur of her success and her failure.”

The questions one might ask today are: What have most of our leaders done in furtherance of these sentiments? And how have they tried to redeem the pledges and vows they made in 1947?

We must not continue to live in a state of delusion but make a serious effort instead to overcome the many defects in our character. Only when we register a marked improvement in our moral standards and manage to infuse some spirit in our people and succeed in stirring them up, will our ability to solve our numerous difficulties be acquired.

*Kennedy once reminded his countrymen in a speech: “And so, my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.”
problems become greater and the speed of our progress accelerated. We will then forge ahead and take an honoured place in the comity of nations in the not too distant future.

Due to many reasons,* but specially as a result of the developments in East Bengal, confrontation with Pakistan may become inevitable. In this book, I have attempted to examine this question at some length.

This book could have been completed earlier but for the disturbance caused in my life by the death of my son-in-law, Squadron-Leader A. Sapru, in an air crash in the prime of life and the many baffling problems which have faced me and my family since 1967.

A/16 West End
New Delhi-21
20 July 1971

B. M. KAUL

*US President Richard Nixon announced before an astonished world (on 16 July 1971) that he was "pleased" to accept the invitation of the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to visit China (Peking) where hardly any American was allowed entry only a year ago. This visit was arranged in secret talks held in Peking between Kissinger, Nixon’s assistant for national security affairs, and Chou En-lai. Kissinger dashed off secretly to Peking from Pakistan by feigning illness in Nathiagali near Rawalpindi. Nixon explained after his dramatic announcement that he had taken this action because of his profound conviction that all nations would gain from a reduction in tensions. Kissinger, who talked for twenty hours with Chou En-lai during 9 and 11 July, was not discussing merely weather! This ominous development does not auger well for India nor for the USSR whose fears of a Sino-American collusion should be confirmed now.

USA has perhaps been prompted by the following considerations to come closer to China: (a) To reduce USSR’s influence in South East and West Asia and India and increase its own. (b) To exploit Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian rift. (c) To strengthen Pakistan both as a counter to India and USSR, as Pakistan is friendly to China and USA both. (d) As USA does not want Bangla Desh to sever from Pakistan, it wants to boost Yahya Khan’s regime militarily and economically.

China is anxious to attain a world status; also, the threat of war with the Soviet Union underlined for China the dangers of isolation and the need to seek new friends where ever they can be found.

Our Government should not take a month of Sundays to make an assessment but take speedy action, as time is of great consequence. We should soon come to a concrete arrangement with the USSR to meet this new threat.
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PART 1

The India-Pakistan Conflict

No one is forced into war by ignorance, nor kept out of it by fear. The fact is that one side thinks that the profits to be won outweigh the risks to be incurred and the other side is ready to face danger rather than accept an immediate loss.

THUCYDIDES (471-400 B.C.)
The rift between India and Pakistan stems from the Hindu-Muslim discord which led to the division of the country. So Kashmir is not the root cause of trouble between these two countries. If this problem was solved, some other will take its place. So long as the Hindus and Muslims do not become more accommodating, both in Pakistan and in India, and adjust their major differences, the two countries will always remain at each other’s throats.
CHAPTER ONE

Bone of Contention—Kashmir

THE PEOPLE OF India and Pakistan have shared each other’s culture and traditions for centuries. Pakistan became a separate entity only after it was carved out of India in 1947. Partition resulted in widespread bloodshed and bitterness and highly exaggerated and warped mental attitudes, an amalgam of fears, apprehensions, suspicions and hatred. This artificial bifurcation, created by the British who had planted among us the two-nation theory, paved the way for many future misunderstandings between the two countries.

The British had long practised their policy of divide and rule, first leaning towards the Hindus soon after the revolt of 1857, and then towards the Muslims when they thought the Hindus had become somewhat difficult. This accentuated Hindu-Muslim discord and finally resulted in the Muslim demand for a separate State. The British had fanned Hindu-Muslim hatred all along. They had hoped that widespread communal disturbances would weaken the forces of nationalism and postpone the transfer of power. This would only show how incompetent the “natives” were to govern the country, blessed by benign British rule for so long. British military officers, on the eve of Partition, predicted wishfully that the Indian Army they had forged would be destroyed under Indian command.

Britain’s transfer of power, according to Hodson, one of Mountbatten’s advisers, came too late to avoid partition, how much too late is difficult to assess. Perhaps only a year, perhaps ten years or more. If Britain had relinquished power sooner, the forces holding Hindus, Muslims, and others together at the centre would have had a better chance of success, and the rising forces of division would have been forestalled. The partition of India was the result of our leaders’ failure to appreciate the
realities of the deteriorating relations between Hindus and Muslims in the preceding years, the force of Jinnah’s appeal to the Muslims, and the complacent attitude adopted by our leaders towards the Muslim League. Many problems arose as a result of Partition, and Kashmir became a major cause of trouble between India and Pakistan.

Frank Moraes, one of Asia’s eminent editors, may be quoted here:

The irony of Pakistan is that in attempting to divide India she divided herself. Jinnah was caught in the inexorable logic of the situation he had created. If India was to be divided, then logically so were Bengal and Punjab with their majorities and minorities riding the razor’s edge. “By cutting off the head, we shall get rid of the headache,” said Nehru in a metaphor which, while surgically absurd, was politically valid. Jinnah was left with two Pakistanis dangling in his hands. He was left in his own words, with “a motheaten, truncated Pakistan.” But better Pakistan divided than no Pakistan at all, he decided. If the establishment of Pakistan was meant to create two separate cohesive entities with so-called Hindu India on one side and Muslim Pakistan on the other, it has failed to do so on both sides. Partition did not solve the problem. It bisected it.

Before dealing with the Pakistan War of 1965, I shall examine here the general background of Kashmir, which provides a good example of how indecision and gullibility have landed us in an unending mess.

The mountainous state of Jammu and Kashmir—slightly larger than England and Scotland—surrounded by four countries, Tibet, China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, covers some 85,000 square miles and has a population of over four million, three-fourths Muslim and the rest Hindu. It is rich in minerals and agriculture is the main occupation of its people. It has a plateau of green fields and blue lakes over a stretch 85 miles long and 20 miles wide.

In 1947, the arrangements for the transfer of power provided that the 565 princely States could accede to either India or Pakistan, based on geographical contiguity, and become an integral part
of either. Jammu and Kashmir,¹ contiguous to both, delayed its decision: hence the trouble.

Pakistan, which claimed Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of religion, put political and economic pressure on Kashmiris to opt in favour of merger with that country. When this method failed, Pakistan used force to achieve its ends.

Pakistan gave “leave” to over 3,000 regular army officers and men and incited over 15,000 tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier Province to wage a *jehad* in support of their “oppressed” Kashmiri Muslim brethren. In reality, Pakistan gave these marauders freedom to indulge in loot, arson, and rape. It supplied them with weapons, vehicles, and petrol. This force fought under the outstanding and colourful leadership of Brig Akbar Khan, who assumed the pseudonym Gen Tariq. (Four years later the reins of government in Pakistan nearly fell into the hands of a group including Brig Akbar Khan, Brig Latif, a spirited, capable, and dedicated person, and Faiz Ahmed Faiz,² a renowned Urdu poet and a brilliant man in many other ways. But luck deserted them at the last minute.)

Akbar’s men were armed with modern automatic weapons, wore military uniforms, came in regular formations and used modern tactics. They entered Muzaffarabad on 20/21 October 1947 and were in Baramula six days later. The same day, the Kashmir National Conference, consisting mostly of Muslims led by Sheikh Abdullah,³ prevailed upon Maharaja Hari Singh to request India to accept the accession of Kashmir and come to its assistance and repel the invader.

India agreed and Kashmir, thus voluntarily—and not motivated by political indoctrination—became an integral part of India. Kashmir was, however, informed that India would seek the approval of the people of Kashmir as soon as law and order prevailed and the territory cleared of aggressors. The Indian Army then flew into

¹The State offered to enter into a standstill agreement with both countries.
²I knew Akbar and Faiz well.
³Abdullah said at the time: “It was obvious also that this invasion was meant to coerce the people of Kashmir to act in a particular way, namely, to accede to Pakistan.”
Kashmir, just in the nick of time, repelled the raiders from the doorstep of Srinagar back to Uri and rescued the State from the clutches of Pakistan.

As a reprisal against Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir, India could have attacked the bases of the invaders, and this would have led to an all-out war between the two countries in 1947. India could have defeated Pakistan decisively on ground of its own choice instead of getting involved in a pointless war at a high altitude. But Nehru was convinced at the time that such a step was unnecessary as, according to him, Pakistan would collapse financially soon if it fought against a “strong” country like India for more than a few months. (As if the super-powers would not have stepped in to maintain the balance of power in Asia, as elsewhere.) Therefore, through evaluating the situation wrongly and acting incorrectly, India invited on itself many difficulties for years to come.

Pakistan disowned responsibility for the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir. Instead, it blamed the state’s Dogra ruler, Hari Singh, whose repressive measures against the people of Kashmir, it alleged, had driven his Muslim subjects, who favoured accession to Pakistan, to revolt against him. If this was so, the “rebels” would not have allowed Indian troops to land in Kashmir in October 1947 and continue their military operations without sabotage. Moreover, the Pakistani aggressors would have been welcomed by the local population instead of being stoutly resisted.

When we complained against Pakistan’s aggression in Kashmir to the United Nations, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, emphatically denied that his country was assisting the invaders or had committed aggression against India. On the contrary, he said that, solely to maintain friendly relations between the two countries, his government had done everything possible to discourage the tribal invasion of India by all means at its disposal short of war.

Gen Sir Roy Bucher, India’s Commander-in-Chief during

4Far from discouraging the tribesmen in October 1947, Jinnah issued an order to his Commander-in-Chief to invade Kashmir!
the 1948 war, used to ring up Gen Gracey, Pakistan’s Commander-in-Chief, frequently and exchange with him operational information of various kinds. These two foreigners, in different camps, were fighting a war, which was a matter of life or death to us, in a friendly “spirit.” Bucher disallowed an air strike suggested by Maj-Gen K. S. Thimayya⁵ on a large concentration of Pathans in the Poonch sector in 1948, although they were bound to pose a threat to us later if spared.

Bucher’s plea was that Pakistan might take this reprisal against the Pathans very seriously and declare war on us. And our naive government believed him and spared the Pathans. Brig J. N. Chaudhuri, Director of Military Operations, and Lt -Col S.H.F.J. Manekshaw,⁶ his G.S.O.I., were Bucher’s proteges. Both served their master well in key appointments at Army Headquarters, running the Kashmir war between them. Bucher was Manekshaw’s guest in the Chief of Army Staff’s House in Delhi for quite some time (with government permission) early in 1970.

The Security Council passed a wishy-washy resolution, asking India and Pakistan to do all they could to improve the situation. It also sent out a commission to these two countries in July 1948 which learnt to its surprise from Pakistan that its troops had been fighting in Kashmir since May that year!

Though Pakistan declared that none of its regular army units had moved into Jammu and Kashmir before May, Lt-Gen Russell⁷ believed that such troops were in Kashmir from as early as January 1948. Later, Pakistan tried to make out that sending troops to Jammu and Kashmir was necessitated by considerations of self-defence. But facts proved that it had occupied by force as large a part of the state as its military strength permitted and not in self-defence.

Yet President Ayub Khan, while referring to the war in Kashmir in 1947, said at a public meeting in Jakarta on 7 December 1960: “Thus began the problem of Kashmir, where the Muslims were

⁵GOC, Kashmir.
⁶The present Army Chief.
⁷India’s military adviser soon after Partition.
fighting for freedom. Naturally, we, in Pakistan, went to their aid...."

The Security Council should have asked Pakistan to vacate its aggression in Jammu and Kashmir. This it has not done to this day. The Security Council had no business to treat both India and Pakistan as aggrieved parties, having directed, in one of its important resolutions, that all Pakistani forces should vacate the territory they had occupied. It also gave every consideration to the aggressor, Pakistan. We should never have referred this question to the Council at all.

Nehru at first did not agree to such a move, insisting that the raiders should be driven out of Jammu and Kashmir before this was done. But the Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, brought Nehru slowly round. On 20 December 1947, the Indian Cabinet decided to appeal to the UN. India's stand was that Pakistan, the aggressor, must vacate its aggression. But the equation of India, the complainant, with Pakistan, the accused, confused the basic issue raised by India.

The Security Council allowed Pakistan's representative, Zafrullah Khan, to conjure up and digress on matters like "genocide" of Muslims in India, the accession of Junagadh, and developments in Hyderabad. As B. L. Sharma says in his book, The Kashmir Story, Pakistan had not considered any of these matters important enough for reference to the Security Council previously, but now that India had lodged its complaint they seemed to have suddenly assumed great importance.

Zafrullah described the Pakistani raiders in Kashmir as volunteers or liberators whose number, he told the Council, was small and that to prevent them from entering Kashmir would have involved Pakistan in war with the Pathans. He further said the raiders were provoked by the Maharaja of Kashmir's campaign of "extermination" of his Muslim subjects. Pakistan's aim was to nullify Kashmir's accession to India by hook or crook. Hence all this rigmarole.

*The Security Council's refusal to treat Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir as a separate issue but as part of the India-Pakistan problem encouraged Zafrullah Khan to drag in extraneous issues.
The Security Council had its limitations and, thanks to the emphasis on this by the Americans and the British, failed to bring the fighting to an end quickly or to implement any of its proposals, including the withdrawal of the invaders from Jammu and Kashmir. When Pakistan was threatened with the failure of this military gamble, it accepted the ceasefire on 31 December 1948.

We were politically unwise in accepting the ceasefire in view of our successes at the time in the Uri, Tithwal, and Kargil sectors. Again in 1965, a ceasefire and surrender of the militarily important territory we had conquered was an admission of weakness on our part and cannot be justified, especially in the face of our bold statements earlier. It is not easy to comprehend why we should permit the UN to continue laying down, as they have done since 1949, what forces we should have in Jammu and Kashmir and how we should deploy them.

Why could we not force the issue arbitrarily—as the Israelis have done despite world opinion and various pressures—and have our own way in Jammu and Kashmir, where we are victims of aggression? Also, how gullible our people are to have stomached silently the way we gave up Haji Pir Pass and other chunks of territory our soldiers had secured in the national interest at so great a price in 1965.

Many UN efforts to settle the problem of Jammu and Kashmir failed because they were not impartial. The attitude of various powers such as the USA, Britain, and the USSR in the Security Council on the Kashmir issue was not based on ignorance of facts but was the result of their foreign policies. (The Chinese invasion of India in 1962 taught the Americans and the British, who had opposed us hitherto on Kashmir, to be more cautious.)

There were meetings between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan from time to time. They considered, for a while, whether the wishes of the people of Kashmir could be ascertained by a fair and impartial plebiscite under a UN administrator from a small country. This proposal, as directed by the final UN resolution, eventually fell through because Pakistan refused to withdraw its nationals and irregular forces from occupied Kashmir.
To achieve its object of seizing Kashmir by force of arms Pakistan joined the Western military blocs and reached an understanding with the USA for military aid in 1954. Consequently, all talks between India and Pakistan about demilitarization became futile. It was said that this military aid was merely meant to help Pakistan defend itself against Communist aggression and to ensure peace in South Asia.

Pakistani spokesmen mentioned, from time to time, with tongue in cheek, the possible quarters from which they expected aggression. President Eisenhower assured India that if the aid given to Pakistan was misused and directed against India in aggression, the USA would frustrate such an attempt. The events of 1965 disproved this. The US military aid agreement put Pakistan in a position of strength when it discussed Kashmir with India. Later, in order to pressurize India, Pakistan joined the SEATO and the CENTO, which discussed Kashmir in their deliberations with a pro-Pakistani slant.

The Security Council had mixed views on the introduction of an international force into Kashmir as suggested by Pakistan. Some of its members thought such a force should be created only if India agreed. Others felt it might cause complications. The Soviet Union vetoed the proposal.

Pakistan harped on its strategic interests in Kashmir and the Kashmiris' right of self-determination in the same breath. In 17 years of armed truce, spanning the two shooting wars, Pakistan never gave up its obsession with Kashmir. Nor has it done so since September 1965. In this long cold-war period, apart from the antics of patching up various anti-Indian blocs, Pakistan provoked a series of border clashes which resulted in considerable loss of life and property. In 1958, after creating a facade of peaceful parleys with India, Pakistan attempted to send military personnel disguised as civilians on raids across the ceasefire line. They were, however, apprehended in the process and brought to book.

Ayub Khan's attitude towards India was similar to that of his predecessors. Pakistan created a climate of alarm and fear near the ceasefire line. Despite these acts of aggression, it kept approaching the Security Council for "justice" at suitable opportunities. Some-
times meetings of the Council, which had assembled at Pakistan’s instance, as there was supposed to be a grave emergency in Kashmir, dragged on indefinitely and were adjourned for weeks, an indication of no urgency of any kind. This turned the meetings into a farce.

It is interesting to note how Ayub Khan neutralized the advantage India had in controlling the waters of the five Punjab rivers, the upper courses of which lie in our territory. This he did by agreeing to Nehru’s thesis that disputes other than Kashmir between India and Pakistan should be settled even if Kashmir continued to be a contentious issue. Accordingly, he assumed a conciliatory posture and contrived to persuade us to sign the Indus Water Treaty in 1961 with pressure on New Delhi from the World Bank and “friendly” Western countries. He was thus able to ensure a continued supply of irrigation water to the arid plains of West Pakistan. This concession by India amounted to losing a trump card which we could have used to great advantage, especially during the war in 1965.

Another concession extracted by Pakistan from India was the right to occupy the whole of the Dera Baba Nanak bridge, only half of which was with it earlier. According to the Radcliffe Award and the Thimayya-Keyes Agreement, a line running through the middle of the river Ravi here constituted the de facto India-Pakistan border. But after 1962 Pakistan persuaded India to accept the old boundary between Gurdaspur, Sialkot, and Amritsar districts as the de jure border.

Today, according to this agreement, Pakistan occupies a belt of territory on our side of the river from the bridge to about eight miles from Gurdaspur. We occupy a small strip of land on the Pakistan side near Jassar village. If we had not made this concession to Pakistan, imagine the golden opportunity we would have had to send our forces, including armour, across this vital bridge speedily in 1965, and appear in the rear of Lahore and Chhamb instead of making a long detour from Ramgarh in the Sialkot sector.

When Pakistan was disillusioned with the West, it turned

*In the UN, out of a total of 258 occasions when voting took place between 1952 and 1962, Pakistan voted with the Western powers 165 times.
towards the Communist countries. Negotiations began with China on demarcating the Jammu and Kashmir and Sinkiang borders. But when Pakistan talked of a plebiscite in Kashmir and at the same time negotiated on its border with the Chinese Government its relations with the Western countries suffered a setback.

Pakistan not only refused to withdraw its illegal forces from Jammu and Kashmir but also violated the ceasefire line constantly. Against this background, India told the Council that Pakistan’s demand for a plebiscite had no meaning.

Pakistan told the Western countries, on one hand, that it was their ally and wanted arms to fight communism. On the other, it told the Chinese that if they attacked India it would be their ally. It gave away 2,000 Square miles of Kashmir territory—to which it had no claim—to China. And with US military aid, it built large cantonments along the western border of Jammu and Kashmir and constructed or extended airfields at Skardu and Gilgit.

Pakistani leaders have continued to make aggressive speeches against India all along, talking of genocide of Muslims and Islam in danger and threatening to repeat the invasion of Kashmir if this question was not settled satisfactorily. Ayub said he had no intention of keeping American arms in cotton wool. Though Pakistan invaded Kashmir in 1947, Ayub had the audacity to say in his book Friends, Not Masters that it was India which involved Pakistan in Kashmir. Several Pakistani newspapers have said that the bloodshed by Pakistanis must be avenged by sharpened steel and molten lead and have often advocated a jehad against India.

In March 1965, President Liu Shao Chi said in Peking that so far as China was concerned friendship with Pakistan was a long-term policy and was by no means a matter of expediency. Yet Ayub had said a little earlier: “Pakistan has openly and unequivocally cast its lot with the West. We do not believe in hunting with the hound and running with the hare.” And Z. A. Bhutto, Ayub’s Foreign Minister, said in 1965: “We have moved forward in our relations with China but we have not moved backwards in our relations with the USA.”
Bone of Contention—Kashmir

The alliance between China and Pakistan has been forged on the initiative of Ayub Khan, and yet it was he who had waxed eloquent earlier against the danger of the push from the north. Whatever may be the background, Pakistan is today friendly with the USA, the USSR, and China, and has received military and economic assistance from them all.

Having secured 2.5 billion dollars worth of tanks, jet fighters, and other formidable weapons from the USA (and other Western countries) and having received assurances of Chinese support, Pakistan struck India in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, carried out a massive armed infiltration of Kashmir in August 1965, and invaded Jammu and Kashmir the following month. But these ventures failed and Kashmir kept eluding Pakistan’s grasp as before, as will be seen in the succeeding pages.

Addressing a meeting of the Muslim League Council in Islamabad in 1965, Ayub said that India had attacked Pakistan in September and asked the nation “to become prepared to face the critical situation ahead and render all sacrifices for national honour.”

Nehru not only built up but also pampered Abdullah and handled the Kashmir situation weakly. His successors have mounted other miscalculations. We have been incorrectly advised on Kashmir for years on end by many so-called experts on this State who were either mediocre or had little understanding of this complicated problem or, having been overwhelmed by the generous hospitality of leaders in Kashmir, tendered us biased advice. The affairs of Kashmir are therefore as far from solution today, basically, as they were 20 years ago.

There are people in Kashmir who support neither India nor Pakistan. To them the interests of Kashmir mean little as they are out to exploit the key position of the State to their personal and maximum advantage. There are others who are pro-Pakistan simply because they share the same religion. There are still others who want Kashmir to be an independent State so that it can have a bargaining position. The rest are for India.

As Kashmir is an integral part of India, we should not condone anti-national activities in that region, whatever the considerations,
as we have done many times in the past. We are spending a vast amount of money in the State for military and political purposes without reasonable results.

At the time of Partition, not only Maharaja Hari Singh, representing the State, but also Sheikh Abdullah, representing the people, voluntarily acceded to India. There should have therefore been no question of holding a plebiscite in the State. Our correct stand should always have been that Kashmir, an integral part of India, is not negotiable. We vacillated on this point till long after 1947. Now that we have taken a firm stand on this issue, internationally as well as at home, we should allow no agitators, in or out of Kashmir, to hold us to ransom.

Though our government keeps saying from time to time that things in Jammu and Kashmir are under control, the fact that subversive elements are growing stronger is proved not only by their constant espionage, sabotage, and similar activities but also by the manner in which we exterminated Sheikh Abdullah from Kashmir recently and then banned the Plebiscite Front.

The recent discovery by the Kashmir police of a Pakistani spying called *Al Fatah* and the skyjacking of an Indian plane from Jammu to Lahore (in which act the Pakistani authorities and *Al Fatah* were in collusion) has once again brought to light the danger to the security of Jammu and Kashmir, and also of India, from the anti-Indian elements which we have been unable to curb in that State since 1947. This makes one wonder if the many agencies in the State dealing with security have done their job effectively, and if so whether the State authorities have ever taken suitable action on their findings.

What happens to the spies we capture in Kashmir from time to time? Are they given salutary or only token punishment? Some of these men should be hanged to set an example. Only then will others be discouraged.

India should deal with the situation in Kashmir strongly so that normal conditions prevail and the Kashmiris are able to prosper speedily. But to go on in the present way amounts to neglecting a festering sore.

India should make up its mind about Kashmir once and for all.
If we mean to keep Kashmir—our legitimate territory—we should never let its problems get the better of us, as we have done all along, govern it resolutely and make no phony concessions to "keep peace" from time to time.

There is one man who can deal with the situation in Kashmir effectively, and his name is D.P. Dhar. He is not only brilliant and courageous but also has profound knowledge and understanding of world affairs. I have seen him in critical situations in the past displaying superb initiative and determination. No weakling can handle Kashmir. Only strong and fearless men like Dhar can. In my opinion, he should be inducted into our Central Cabinet in charge of a vital portfolio which includes responsibility for Kashmir.

We have allowed affairs in Kashmir to drift into a mess. We have also permitted Pakistan to invade our territories twice in Kashmir and once in Kutch in the last 23 years. What is more, despite being a more powerful country with bigger armed forces, we have been unable to defeat Pakistan as we should have done. Let us analyze this in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
CHAPTER TWO

Relative Strength

One of the first casualties in all wars is truth. Some give exaggerated accounts of events because the vision is fogged, and others magnify their exploits to build up their own reputations.

We are aware of the great sacrifices our armed forces made in the brief but vicious fighting which took place with Pakistan in 1965. But now that our guns have been silent for more than five years and books and articles have been published in India giving details of this war, I am writing about it so that the people, many of whose kith and kin laid down their lives in it, should know the facts. I will give here instances of where we did well, as also where we could have done better, so that we can take a balanced view for future reference.

Our leaders took up a posture before the war which amounted to saying that under their “dynamic” and inspiring control India’s defences had been so strengthened after 1962 that if we were attacked by Pakistan or China or both we would be able to take them on. No doubt the defence budget had mounted from Rs 300 crore in 1962 to over Rs 800 crore in 1965.\(^1\) We had received considerable quantities of weapons and equipment from abroad after 1962, but these alone could not, however, make our forces strong. They had to be trained for war along with their newly acquired material. This required some time. They also had to acquire elan. Actually, though the forces had doubled in size and even with the additional material made available, individual units and formations still had deficiencies of various kinds. Luckily for us, the Pakistan Army also suffered from similar maladies.

\(^2\)Approximately Rs 1,200 crore in 1970.
At the time of Partition, the British Indian Army was divided between India and Pakistan in the proportion of about 3:1. Despite this disparity and by enlisting the support of the turbulent Pathans, Pakistan attacked Jammu and Kashmir two months after Partition to exploit the disturbed situation in that State. The war which followed weakened both countries in many ways and ended in victory for neither side but in a stalemate.

Pakistan did not have enough resources to attack us for some time thereafter, though it continued thinking in those terms. It began adopting an aggressive posture after receiving military aid from the USA from 1953-54 onwards. By 1959, Pakistan had become much stronger, whereas having received little aid from anywhere our armed forces had not gained very much in strength. The balance between the armed might of India and Pakistan began to tilt more in favour of our neighbour, at least in quality, with the substantial aid she received from the USA in the shape of sophisticated aircraft, tanks, artillery, and radar equipment. Our early warning system remained weak and our tank and air fleets comparatively outdated. India put too much faith in US assurances that this equipment was meant to contain the Communist threat. This faith was shaken good and proper in 1965 when Pakistan used it against us.

In 1965, the Indian Army was about 800,000\(^2\) strong, consisting of 16 divisions of full strength (nine of which were mountain formations) and four of reduced strength. It had about 1,000 armoured fighting vehicles, including reserves, and about 2,500 pieces of artillery. The Air Force had about 900 aircraft of all types including a few MiG-21, and combat aircraft numbered about 550. It had a small Navy.\(^4\)

The strength of the Pakistan Army was about 250,000, including about eight divisions, and in addition there were a large number of Mujahids, Razakars, and other irregulars. It had approximately 800 armoured fighting vehicles, including modern Pattons.


Pakistan's artillery strength was less than that of India but it had, on the whole, better guns. Its Air Force consisted of about 200 combat aircraft, including F-86 Sabrejets, a squadron of F-104 Starfighters and B-57 Canberras. It had a small Navy.\(^5\)

India had more than three to one superiority over Pakistan numerically, though Pakistan had superior equipment. But after considering the fact that a portion of India's Army and Air Force was deployed against the Chinese, the odds became roughly two to one.

Though we gained an edge over Pakistan in the war, we failed to score a military decision and allowed the operation to drift into a stalemate, failing to defeat Pakistan, which was less powerful, with less resources and armed forces much smaller than ours. In a three-week war we spent nearly Rs 500 crores and lost Rs 50 crores worth of equipment and incurred other financial losses difficult to compute but not less than Rs 200 crores in non-combat damage alone.

My aim here is neither to underestimate our own or Pakistan's efforts nor to exaggerate them but to evaluate our respective gains and losses correctly so that we in India can profit by our past mistakes and are able to deal suitably with any threats to our security in future.

\(^{1}\text{Ibid.}\)
CHAPTER THREE

Prelude in Kutch and Kashmir

The prelude to the India-Pakistan conflict was the disagreement between the two countries over Kutch. Pakistan claimed Kanjarkot in the Rann of Kutch—an expanse of marshy wilderness—as its territory. After some unsuccessful diplomatic activity, matters came to a head when Pakistan’s 51 Infantry Brigade moved sometime in March 1965 from Malir, a cantonment near Karachi, to the Kutch-Sind border. This brigade suddenly attacked a contingent of our Central Reserve Police at Sardar Post, three miles southwest of Kanjarkot, at dawn on 9 April 1965. The post commander, Sardar Karnail Singh, was captured by the enemy in this battle. After their first attack, which the police resisted stoutly, the Pakistani’s sent in a second wave with armoured cars which compelled us to withdraw to Vigokot. Later that day, the Indian Army appeared on the scene and occupied the post, which they found unoccupied by the enemy.

India’s stand was that Kanjarkot Post should be vacated as it had been set up by Pakistan a few weeks earlier and there was no post in the disputed area before March 1965. On 16 April, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister ruled out any possibility of the post being vacated as it was in Pakistani territory.

Pakistan then concentrated the 8 Infantry Division facing our brigade and attacked Point 84, 30 miles east of Kanjarkot, Sardar Post, and Vigokot simultaneously on 24 April, forcing us to withdraw. On 25 April and 26 April, Pakistan attacked Biar Bet, which we lost partially, retaining only its southern tip. The Pakistani forces were unable to capture Sardar Post and Vigokot. Then there was an undeclared truce, which Pakistan broke on 25 May by attacking one of our military patrols in the Biar Bet area.

¹Consisting of 18 Punjab, 8 Frontier Force Rifles, and 6 Baluch.
The Indian forces repulsed this attack. Sporadic fighting continued till June 1965, when President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri agreed to a ceasefire, which took place on 1 July as proposed by the British Prime Minister Wilson. Many in India looked on this truce as a betrayal by Shastri. The Pakistanis took it as a sign of weakness on India’s part.

Later, the dispute was entrusted to an international tribunal. Pakistan claimed nearly 3,000 square miles of territory in the Rann of Kutch, but the tribunal awarded on 19 February 1968 over 300 square miles to Pakistan and the rest to India although there was conclusive evidence that the entire territory clearly belonged to us. This is the price one has to pay when one keeps appealing to foreign organizations or powers to adjudicate. The new border in the Kutch area gives a great advantage to Pakistan, which obtained a number of bets (high ground) while our side is mostly swampy and low-lying. Patrolling by us in this area is therefore difficult.

Our reference of the Kashmir case to the Security Council should have taught us a lesson. In referring the Kutch issue to an international tribunal we erred again. Its award should be another eye-opener to us. Let us hope that we do not refer in future, any of our disputes to international bodies, which are part of the game of power politics.

By deploying our troops in a particular way at the time, the Army high command must have disclosed our concentration areas to the enemy. It is not otherwise understandable how Pakistan exploited our weakness in the Chhamb sector a few months later.

In the three-week Kutch campaign, which was inconclusive, both India and Pakistan claimed victory. Indian leaders talked, even then, of having fought a battle of attrition, as they were to do again later. And after many provocations by Pakistan in the past we signed a truce which Pakistan broke soon after.

Romesh Thapar wrote from Delhi in the Economic and Political Weekly of Bombay on 15 May 1965:

From what I can gather, the inaction was dictated by an Army Staff which sought to rationalize its lack of preparedness by a
continuous harping on the dangerous side-effects of a confrontation. In fact, ballots of a kind were conducted at Army Headquarters to locate the hawks and to persuade them to become doves. The first indication received of something amiss in the calculations of observers was when it was learnt that there had been separate briefings by Army Headquarters for foreign and Indian correspondents. In private, the foreigners were told that the Army was curbing the politicians. The Indians came away with the news that the politicians were curbing the Army. The provocative nature of the briefings have birth to the story that Army resignations were in the offing, including that of the still passive Defence Minister.... The growing paralysis at Army Headquarters—heightened by an inexplicable interest in the transfer and retirement of senior officers—was reflected on the Kutch front. A group of correspondents visiting the area was told by the local commanders that air cover was being derided, that tanks were withheld from the front, and that forward strikes had been prohibited. A defensive strategy was being adopted on the plea that the topography of the Rann of Kutch favoured the Pakistanis, although the local command refused to accept this very limited view. This part of the story was published piecemeal, both here and abroad. But, and here’s the rub, the responsibility for inaction was placed on the politicians at the Centre. Time was running out for a punishing counter-attack in Kutch. At this point, the Army Staff, sensing the angry mood within Parliament and the Defence Services, began to ask the loaded question whether the country was for “total” war or not. The projection of a choice of this kind was obviously intended to reinforce the status quo even at India’s expense. The country had demanded earlier that the armed forces punish the Pakistanis on the Kutch front, for such punishment was least likely to lead to an escalation of the conflict. The Army Staff demanded freedom to hit elsewhere. This freedom was granted. Now the Army Staff warned against a “total war” and its consequences. The implications were clear and now there is little to stop the gossip in the living rooms of Delhi.... A people cannot be galvanized by talk alone.
They must be able to get a glimpse of what the future holds and be inspired by the firm belief that nothing will be permitted to dim that future. If "Operation Poppycock" does not open our eyes, possibly nothing will.

Lt-Gen K.S. Katroch was commanding the corps in Jammu and Kashmir. He was a theatre commander with a rather complex and more difficult job than corps commanders elsewhere. He had to deal with a difficult State, always in turmoil and half of it under enemy occupation. He had the following additional problems: (a) two enemies, the Chinese in Ladakh and the Pakistanis from the Pakistan side, including Azad Kashmiris from occupied Kashmir; (b) a counter-insurgency problem the whole time; and (c) difficult and mountainous terrain, poorly developed communications and only a highway link with India and no railway system.

Between 16 May and 7 June, when Pakistan launched several attacks in the Kargil sector in Kashmir, we occupied, at considerable cost, some vital areas in order to safeguard our lines of communication. Later, we made yet another compromise by relinquishing these positions after the Kutch agreement and on an academic UN assurance. Pakistan took India's withdrawal as another sign of weakness and inability to force military issues. Even after all this, our leaders miscalculated and hoped that there would be no war, but their hope was belied when Pakistani infiltrators invaded Jammu and Kashmir in August 1965 and Pakistan's regular forces struck us in Chamb-Jaurian in September.

"Azad Kashmir" has a population of about one million and consists of 5,000 square miles of territory under Pakistani occupation. It has three administrative units: Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, and Poonch. But Pakistan governs the territory from Rawalpindi.

Bhutto said on 10 August 1965: "The responsibility for whatever is happening in Kashmir could not by any stretch of imagination be attributed to Pakistan." Actually, as early as January 1965, Abdul Hamid Khan, "President" of "Azad Kashmir" told the *Pakistan Times* of Lahore after meeting Ayub that he thought Ayub "would take more drastic steps to bring about the liberation
of Kashmir." He said in March: "The Kashmiris, in starting their jehad in 1947, did not consult anybody and they will not do so now."

Two facts are worth noting. In May 1965, General Musa, C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, visited his troops along the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir, and *Dawn* of Karachi quoted him as saying: "All steps have been completed to deal with any eventuality." The same month the "Azad Kashmir" administration ordered universal military training for its citizens between the age of 16 and 45. These "freedom fighters," it was said, "were straining at the leash." In June, the Pakistan Government made it compulsory for employers to release all military reservists and a Mujahid force was set up as a part of the Pakistani Army. Plans for an attack on Kashmir were finalized by the first of that month, whereas the Pakistan India agreement for arbitration in the Rann of Kutch dispute was signed on 30 June 1965. How seriously therefore should India take future agreements with Pakistan?

Pakistan lullled us into a false sense of security by outwardly lying low after the truce of Kutch, having assessed our reaction and pinpointed our weaknesses in this short conflict of April-May 1965. While our high command remained blind to this ruse and was off guard, allowing our forces to relapse into peacetime postures, the Pakistanis were secretly preparing to strike in Kashmir in August and take us by surprise.

The Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in 1965 came in two ways: infiltration and conventional operations. About 10,000* infiltrators—the Pakistanis called them "freedom fighters"—who were really fully armed Pakistani soldiers in civilian dress under Maj-Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC 12 Division, slipped across the 470-mile-long ceasefire line on 5 August 1965 through many gaps and trails across the Himalayas.

The infiltrators had eight commands with names like Gibraltar,

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*We first thought only 1,000 infiltrators had crossed into Kashmir. Later we thought there might have been two or three thousand. We kept underestimating this threat.
Ghaznavi, and Salah-ud-Din, each of eight companies of 110 men trained in guerilla warfare and commanded by regular army officers. They were equipped with light automatic weapons, had excellent wireless communications, and were mobile. Their aim, apart from sabotage, was to indoctrinate the Kashmiris so that they would revolt against India.

They carried extra arms to be issued to the non-belligerent Kashmiris (except the martial Punchis), who were to be trained in their use. Their pattern was to fire from a distance by night to cause confusion and panic among the local folk and retreat when challenged. Their red-letter day was 9 August, as Abdullah was arrested 13 years earlier on this day. The day previous there was to be a hartal, when a procession in the memory of Pir Dastgir, a Kashmir saint, was to be taken out in Srinagar. Pakistani infiltrators had planned to mingle with this procession and later capture the radio station and airfield. They were then to form a new government.

A group of infiltrators called Tariq functioned between Dras and Kargil. It was a part of this force which damaged and nearly demolished the Wayul bridge, about 12 miles from Srinagar on the Leh road on 17/18 August. The Qasim and Khalid forces operated in the Kishanganga area. They moved through Razdani Pass and reached Bandipur. The Khalid force came from Karen and encircled Handwara. They destroyed the Kazilpur bridge and attacked Chaukibal. They daringly entered the headquarters of a Kumaon battalion and killed its commanding officer, Lt-Col Goray. They also operated from Chinari, Rawalkote, and Kotli. Babar Force infiltrated in the Chhamb and Kalidar area. Ghazi Force raided Narian Camp in the Jammu sector and reached Budil. One of its parties tried unsuccessfully to reach Ramban to cut the Jammu-Srinagar road. They reached Rajouri, Thana Mandi, and Mendhar and caused havoc in these areas.

It was unfortunate that such a large number of infiltrators managed to slip across our border, supposed to be so vigilantly guarded, and that we had no advance knowledge of their plans to do so, particularly when we had been crying wolf for years. The full extent of this operation dawned on us much later. Though the
infiltrators met with some success through acts of sabotage, their much-vaulted invasion to “liberate” Kashmir had failed. In some areas, such as Budil in Riasi Tehsil, it took us some effort, however, to liquidate the Pakistani administration the invaders had set up.

They did not receive the warm support they expected from the Kashmiris, who on the whole remained passive and did not rise in revolt as Pakistan had hoped they would. But there were exceptions. Certain villages and groups of Kashmiris, including some civil officials and politicians, are alleged to have supported their efforts at sabotage and to have helped the infiltrators with guides, porters, food, and shelter. This allegation should have been investigated and the culprits punished. We killed 1,500 infiltrators in all and captured several hundred. The rest fled back home.

When we were first provoked by Pakistani infiltrators, who attempted to cut the strategic road between Srinagar and Leh, our troops crossed the ceasefire line in the Kargil area on 16 August and captured three Pakistani posts. There had been similar clashes in this area in May, when we gained these heights by force of arms but gave them up because of diplomatic pressure. When Pakistani aggression in various shapes continued, we crossed the ceasefire line again on 24 August and captured two important Pakistani posts in the Tithwal area.

On 12 August, a large number of infiltrators crossed the ceasefire line in the Uri sector, but our troops pushed them back. A week later they came again, but with no better luck.

On 24 August, two of our units crossed the ceasefire line in the Tithwal area and took two strategic hills, while we captured another position similarly in Bhamber. About the same time, the Pakistani Army took up positions near Keran, Mirpur, Uri, Mendhar, and Chhamb.

Because of certain impromptu actions on the part of the Pakistani and Indian Army Chiefs and a series of miscalculations of their powers of deterrence, based more on bravado than on high strategy, one awkward situation escalated into other. Neither of these Chiefs could foresee the consequences of their rashness at the time.
The Haji Pir Pass area was a stronghold of infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley and supposed to be impregnable. As we were being constantly harassed and provoked from this area by the Pakistanis, we decided to retaliate. Though the enemy was heavily entrenched in this position, with barbed wire entanglements and mines around, our regimental officers and men launched a hazardous assault with great courage on 25 August 1965. Brig Z. Chand Bukshi attacked the pass with the first Battalion of the Para Regiment commanded by Maj Ranjit Singh Dayal. He led his men in this operation stoutly and captured Sankh after bitter fighting by the morning of 27 August, climbing all night. He then captured Sar and Lediwali Gali. A little later, Dayal and his men reached Hyderabad Nala. They had to climb another 4,000 feet to reach the coveted pass. They went through the gruelling task in heavy rain and climbed an adjoining hill, from where they stormed the enemy and captured Haji Pir Pass on 28 August. The next day, the Pakistanis vainly counterattacked.

Lt-Col Sampuran Singh, commanding a Punjab battalion, was ordered to capture Bedore Peak, which overlooked Haji Pir Pass. He attacked this position on 29 August but was halted twice by heavy enemy fire. Sampuran Singh then led the next attempt himself by night and reached his objective by dawn.

Dayal was awarded the Mahavir Chakra and Sampuran Singh the Vir Chakra for gallantry in these battles. Bukshi was awarded the Mahavir Chakra.

The Indian Army then occupied the important feature Ziarat, nearly five miles from Haji Pir Pass, which was handed back to the Pakistanis in February 1966 after the Tashkent Declaration.

One fact is worth noting. We permitted the Pakistanis to take the initiative in many moves and we only reacted to various situations created by them. For instance, it was only when they sent large bodies of armed infiltrators into Kashmir that we (a) captured three Pakistani posts in the Kargil area in the face of their attempts to cut the Srinagar-Leh lifeline on 16 August; and (b) cleared the Uri-Poonch bulge on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line and occupied Haji Pir Pass on 30 August.

This process continued. For instance, when the Pakistan
attacked us across the international border in Chhamb-Jaurian on 1 September we retaliated by using the Air Force. When we were unable to contain Pakistan’s armoured thrust in the Jaurian sector, we retaliated in the Lahore sector. When their Air Force attacked our airfields on 6 September, we did the same the following day to theirs.

Our troops here were ordered to link up with the Haji Pir picquet. Many positions on the track to Haji Pir were occupied by the Pakistanis. One of our brigades advanced towards Kahuta and occupied an enemy position. Lt-Col Khanna, commanding a Sikh battalion, gallantly captured the strong Raja picquet. He was posthumously awarded the Mahavir Chakra. A Dogra battalion fought bravely and captured the Chand picquet. Maj Megh Singh of Rajputana Rifles ably commanded a special force for sabotage in the enemy’s rear and was awarded a Vir Chakra. Our forces then advanced to the Kahuta bridge.

On 5 August, information reached the Galuti bridge headquarters about the presence of infiltrators in the area from across the border. A party was sent under Capt C.N. Singh to stop their advance. He was killed in the encounter. On 23 August, the Pakistanis attacked our posts at Mendhar, and on 14 September they attacked our brigade headquarters in this area by air. Maj Prem Dass was killed in this section.

An important battle took place on OP Hill, occupied by the Pakistani infiltrators. We attacked this feature but failed to capture it. After the ceasefire, when fighting for this hill continued, our troops regained a foothold on it at heavy cost. Many inhabitants of this area crossed over to Pakistan.

In the Jhangar and Naushehra area, inconclusive fighting continued during August and September 1965. Infiltrators entered Chhamb from bases in Pakistan. They started crossing into our territory near Chhamb-Deva after 5 August. On 15 August a force was being concentrated by us in the Deva area to prevent further Pakistani infiltration. The enemy then began shelling our forward picquets. Brig B.F. Masters was killed and our forward picquets withdrew. On 16 August, some battalions of infantry and medium regiments of artillery were inducted into this
area, raising our infantry strength, and the lost positions were regained by 25 August.

On 28 August our forward troops in this sector saw suspicious Pakistani armoured and other troop movements not far from them. Besides, we had been warned by some UN observers a few days earlier that Pakistan was massing forces in this sector, as admitted in a press conference by our Army Chief on 24 September 1965. These observations on our part and warnings by not only the UN observers but also our own informants, well in advance, were pompously ignored at all military levels. We took few precautionary measures and what reinforcements we brought to this front came too late. In fact, we withdrew some forces from this sector though an attack appeared to be imminent.
CHAPTER FOUR

Operation “Grand Slam”

As a reprisal against our capture of Haji Pir Pass and other territories, and also because the infiltration campaign had failed, Pakistan played its last trump card. Its troops took the initiative once again on 1 September, launched operation “Grand Slam” and attacked us with a brigade of infantry supported by two regiments of medium tanks (about 80 vehicles and 4,000 troops of all arms) across the junction point of the ceasefire line and the international border in Chhamb. We had only about 1,000 men and 15 tanks in defensive positions in this area at the time as we did not anticipate an attack here.

In July 1965, a UN official said on his return from West Pakistan that, while the Pakistanis were assembling a massive tank force in Punjab, the Indians were asleep. By about 1600 hours that day they had pushed our forces back to Munnawar Tawi. On receiving this alarming news, government permission was sought to use the Air Force in this operation, for without this the enemy’s thrust forward was not likely to be stemmed. By about 1730 hours orders had been issued to one of our forward air stations to strike the advancing enemy in Chhamb. By 1800 hours, IAF fighter aircraft were airborne against them.

The Pakistani plan was to capture the town of Akhnoor along the river Chenab in the first swoop and cut our lines of communication from Jammu to Poonch. They then planned to seize Jammu town and get astride the Jammu-Srinagar highway. The move towards Akhnoor was also made to tempt Indian armour to join battle with its own and thus deplete India’s overall armoured strength, giving an edge to Pakistan over India. On 5 September, the enemy captured Jaurian,1 near Akhnoor, where one of our

1By doing so, the enemy occupied 190 square miles of Indian territory, from which we could not dislodge them while the war was on.
newly formed divisions was being hastily assembled. The Pakistani armoured column was six miles from Akhnoor on 6 September.

The armour Pakistan brought into this sector was part of the 6 Armoured Division (the existence of which came to us as a surprise) earmarked also for the protection of Sialkot. When Indian troops crossed the international border in the Punjab sector on the morning of 6 September, the enemy reacted immediately and called a halt to the offensive towards Akhnoor and withdrew the bulk of its armour from here back to the Sialkot sector.

After the Pakistanis had attacked us in the Chhamb sector on 1 September, it became evident that if we wanted to stem the enemy offensive we should, instead of reinforcing the sector with armour, attack the enemy in Punjab as a precautionary measure against further aggression. The Army got government permission to go ahead and launched attacks on 6 September and 8 September in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors respectively, as also across the Rajasthan border, in order to divert the attention of the enemy from Jammu and Kashmir.

The Punjab battlefield lies within 400 miles of the Russian border to the north and about the same distance from the Chinese military positions in the northeast. Russian and Chinese interest in this conflict was therefore a little more than academic. The United States and Britain also had a major security interest in the hostilities. This conflict could well have become a war involving more than one great power.

Lt-Gen J.S. Dhillon, the able Corps Commander in this sector, was to dominate Ichhogil Canal, an obstacle the existence of which we had known for about 15 years, running north to south and about 50 (now about 70) miles long, from the Ravi to the Sutlej. It has concrete walls for most of its length, and its western banks are slightly higher than those on the eastern side. It has an average width of 90 to 120 feet and is 15 feet deep. It is a prepared position covered by well-sited concrete pillboxes, tank hides, gun emplacements, and bunkers and has 12 cement concrete bridges across it.

Posterity is entitled to ask what the Indian high command hoped to achieve by attacking in this sector. Was it territory? If so,
none of any consequence was captured. Was it attrition? If so, despite our large-scale attack in this sector on 6 September, Pakistan threw our forces back at Wagah the same day and launched a major thrust in the Khem Karan area three days later and had plenty of punch left just before the ceasefire, as was evident from the way they captured our territory. If we inflicted considerable losses on enemy equipment, we also suffered in no small degree. So what did we achieve? It is relevant to quote Liddell-Hart here: “In face of the overwhelming evidence of history, no general is justified in launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy (who is) firmly in position.”

At 0500 hours on the morning of 6 September, we attacked in this sector with three divisions of infantry; Maj-Gen Gurbaksh Singh in Khem Karan on the left, Maj-Gen Sibal in Khalra in the centre, and Maj-Gen Niranjan Pershad in Wagah on the right. Our independent Armoured Brigade under Brig Theograj was then in support. Against us we had two divisions of enemy infantry and one division of armour, all in well-prepared positions on ground of their own choice. We and the enemy had about six tank regiments each, but we had an edge in infantry in this sector. The enemy was superior in artillery. Each of our divisions was short of about one infantry brigade.

On 6 September, at 0500 hours, India struck Pakistan across the international border with one infantry division under Niranjan Pershad which advanced from Wagah towards Ichhogil Canal. 1 Jat reported having captured Bhaini-Malkapur. 3 Jat cleared Dial by 0800 hours. 15 Dogra, who were to pass through, were delayed hours 0730 hours onwards. There was intense enemy air activity and many of the F echelon vehicles were destroyed. 3 Jat took the enemy by surprise, captured the major obstacle of the Dograi bridge on Grand Trunk Road and, despite the damage caused to the bridge by the enemy, 200 of its men crossed Ichhogil Canal over it and neared the Bata shoe factory at Jalloy by 1000 hours.

Brig Rikh, the brigade commander, could not link up with 3 Jat, and this battalion withdrew under pressure from enemy armour. If only he and his division had stood firm, held on to this bridge...
and built up here, he would have carried the day. The enemy therefore promptly reoccupied the territory vacated by us and blew up this vital bridge. Niranjan Pershad had planned to firm in and to move up one of his brigades and pick up his troops from the Ichhogil Canal area. But his corps and Army commander came up to him at 1500 hours that day and ordered that the brigade (the Corps reserve) be directed to Bhasin on a new task.

On 7 September, Niranjan Pershad was ambushed by the enemy near Ichhogil Canal, and in trying to escape left his brief case containing some personal papers. The enemy exploited this incident over their broadcasts, and this earned Niranjan Pershad considerable notoriety. He was then relieved of command of his division and retired from service. This officer served under me in operations against the Chinese in NEFA in 1962, and I found him fearless under fire.

One version of this episode is that long before these operations Niranjan Pershad had been arguing with his superiors against splitting up his division in a critical situation. He had also argued against sending his troops on widely separated tracks. It was found later that one of them, Pul Kanjri-Bhasin, on which his superiors intended to send his troops, existed only on maps. When on 6 September his superiors split up his division by taking out one of his brigades, Niranjan Pershad stated in writing that this would have serious repercussions.

When this brigade was out of touch with everyone on 7 September, its F and B echelons tried to locate it. Niranjan Pershad then decided to look for it himself as one of the vital chunks under him was missing at a crucial juncture. In this effort, he went towards the Pul Kanjri bridge, where the brigade should have been. He then saw some movement near Ichhogil Canal. On getting close to the canal he was suddenly greeted with rifle and light machine-gun fire and grenades were hurled at him. He escaped, but 12 men and four jeeps were left behind and captured by the enemy. One of these jeeps had Niranjan Pershad's memo pad (no diary or secret papers as alleged) containing notes on the representation he had made against remarks of his superiors in his annual confidential report, and the enemy exploited this to the full.
India suffered a severe reverse on the Wagah front against the enemy's main defensive position. This, according to one version, was due to several reasons:

(a) Niranjan Pershad had asked for four hours of darkness on Ichhogil Canal to dig in. His division was moved in daylight instead and exposed to enemy fire.

(b) His division was depleted by one brigade, diverted on a mission which proved fruitless in the end and against his advice. The remainder of his division was split up in penny packets and hurled against objectives over 10,000 yards apart.

(c) The enemy was given complete freedom of air, six of their aircraft operating virtually from dawn to dusk, picking and choosing their targets, on which they worked havoc.

There is another version of this episode. According to this:

(a) Niranjan Pershad withdrew his division from the canal area contrary to the orders of his superior authorities, who had directed him to hold on to his position there.

(b) His men reached the canal on the morning of 6 September without digging tools.

(c) It was not practicable to give Niranjan Pershad four hours of darkness on the canal for digging in. It was necessary for his troops to advance beyond his concentration/assembly area by night. This in fact happened and he went beyond the forming up point at 0500 hours on 6 September. It therefore became imperative, for his very existence, to dig in on the canal in daylight to the best of his ability. He did not do this as his men had no digging tools. He could not say they were lost as a result of enemy air activity over his echelon as this came later. Exposure to enemy fire, especially from the air, is a natural feature in war.

(d) Many divisions have to be split up in operations in emergencies. There was one on the Wagah front. Ideal situations are seldom available in war.
While we were facing this precarious situation, rumours were afloat in Delhi that we had already reached the outskirts of Lahor. The battle here was ding-dong and in 17 days of fighting we advanced only about six miles.

But just before the ceasefire, 3 Jat and its commanding officer, Lt-Col Desmond Hyde, covered themselves with glory. Dograi was on our side of Ichhogil Canal, on Grand Trunk Road, which the enemy had occupied with odd troops of 16 Punjab, 3 Baluch, 8 Punjab, and 18 Baluch, totalling two companies each about 100 strong. There were about two more enemy companies nearby. The village of Dograi was extensively tunnelled and strewn with concrete pillboxes. We attacked in two phases on the night of 21/22 September.

In phase 1, 13 Punjab, supported by divisional artillery and a squadron of tanks, attacked the enemy but scored only a partial success. In phase 2 the Jats, after a gruelling night march, enveloped the enemy and took it completely by surprise. Though the Pakistanis put up stout resistance, our men, after determined hand-to-hand fighting, captured Dograi on 22 September about 0300 hours. The enemy counterattacked fiercely on 22 September with infantry and armour, but the Jats repulsed this onslaught. They killed about 300 Pakistanis and took about 100 prisoners, including Lt-Col Golewala of the 16 Punjab who was hiding under a tank.

The officer who stood out among all others was Hyde. It was due to his resolute and courageous leadership that the Jats did so well against stiff enemy opposition and staged an impressive victory. For this action he was awarded the Mahavir Chakra. Maj Tyagi, a fearless officer holding an emergency commission, won a similar award for conspicuous gallantry and died of wounds sustained in this battle.

We had a brigade in the Dera Baba Nanak area. When it got orders to attack on 6 September, its leading battalion crossed the bridge of the same name into Pakistan territory but was soon thrown back to our side. The bridge once again fell into Pakistani hands. News came later that an enemy combat group of about two troops of tanks had rushed across the bridge into our territory. This turned
out to be an exaggerated report, as is usual in wars. Assuming that this information was partially correct, and some enemy armour had managed to slip across the bridge, we had the resources to deal with it.

Orders were then issued to counterattack and recapture the bridge. The following day our troops recaptured a part of this obstacle. On 8 September the Pakistanis attacked and damaged the bridge, though only partially, rendering it ineffective for use by heavy traffic. This prevented us from advancing towards Narowal or Pasrur through Dera Baba Nanak and disrupting rail communications between Lahore and Sialkot. It also blocked the possibility of a Pakistani thrust towards Gurdaspur and Pathankot, our key railhead for Jammu and Kashmir.

If only we had put a division across this bridge and assaulted in the Sialkot sector with one division less, as there were hardly any prepared enemy positions here, we might have had a breakthrough and appeared behind Lahore and on the flank of Sialkot. We would also have driven a wedge between the two sectors.

The corps commander ordered Maj-Gen Sibal, commanding a division, to capture Burki, a Pakistani position near Ichhogil Canal, on our side and about 12 miles from Lahore. The leading brigade of the division was held up at a bridge on the Hudiara drain on the 6th morning by one enemy company. Sibal, after some qualms, and pressed by Dhillon, attacked this enemy stronghold. The enemy abandoned the position and blew up the bridge. It took our formation 24 hours to negotiate the drain. Further delay in the capture of Burki was caused by the unexpected and well-laid-out pillboxes near the enemy positions. Burki was eventually captured on 10 September after a hard-fought battle in which 4 Sikh and 16 Punjab did well.

As regards the left flank, Dhillon had told Gurbakhsh Singh that when he advanced from Khem Karan towards Rohi Nala and Ichhogil Canal, in the vicinity of Kasur only five miles from Khem Karan, he should create a firm base before he launched his

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*The enemy had a comparatively small—one battalion—but well-fortified garrison here against which we deployed much bigger forces.*
assault. Gurbaksh Singh did not do this and went forward on 6 September with six battalions, leaving behind only one as his reserve, with the result that he was compelled to fall back three miles on our side of Khem Karan by the 7th evening as the enemy reacted quickly with armour and infantry.

Gurbaksh Singh then busied himself reorganizing his defended sector with a much-depleted division in the area of Valtoha. The Army Commander visited this divisional position soon after and directed Gurbaksh Singh to strengthen his defences by throwing anti-tank mines all round unconventionally and holding on for all he was worth. In the meantime, the enemy armour had made contact with us in a bold action and overran a part of one of our infantry battalion positions.

The enemy carried out on 8 September a reconnaissance of our position in force with two squadrons of Chaffes and Pattons. On the night of 8/9 September the enemy sent another armoured reconnaissance party to probe our defences. Unseen by our troops, tanks shot up our position by using infra-red sites. On 9 September, our Armoured Brigade, commanded by Theograj, was placed by the corps commander under Gurbaksh Singh’s division. It was deployed in a horseshoe formation, with Centurions on the most-threatened flank. Later that night, the enemy sent further armoured reconnaissance parties to probe the flanks of the divisional defended sector. That night our artillery did some good shooting.

The enemy’s crack I armoured Division then struck us in the early morning of 10 September in what turned out to be the biggest and the most crucial battle in September 1965. Its forward elements reached the outskirts of Dibhipura and Mahmudpura behind our right flank by 1100 hours that day.

Government should by now be aware that in the midst of this grim crisis on 10 September Army Chief Chaudhuri asked Harbaksh Singh whether our forward positions should not be readjusted and established behind the Beas as the enemy Armoured Division might breakthrough. This would have meant pulling back our corps in this area nearly 40 miles from the front line, evacuating vital areas like Ferozepur, Khem Karan, Tarn Taran, Khalra, Wagah, Amritsar, and Dera Baba Nanak. Such action was not necessary at
that juncture as the battle of Assal Uttar, near Khem Karan, was still being fought and by no means lost and there should have been no cause for panic. Thanks to the leadership and determination of Harbaksh Singh, who resisted the Army Chief’s counsel, India was saved from a disastrous situation. The decision of this commander to make a resolute stand at Assal Uttar proved right, as by the 10th evening the Pakistani forces suffered a severe reverse.

The Pakistanis had obviously come with overconfidence and the basic presumption that the Indian forces would withdraw in the face of their determined attack. Although they had made a reconnaissance on a day earlier, they had obviously not studied the ground on which they had to operate carefully, nor had they cleared many mined approaches on which their tanks had to advance later.

Moreover, their infantry failed to continue following closely behind the armour, because of our shelling, and to assist the armoured assault. Their Pattons took cover in the nine-foot high, thick-standing sugarcane and cotton crops where their visibility was reduced to 1,000 yards or less—within our tank range—and lost their extra advantage. In concentrating thus, they also presented themselves as sitting targets, a situation of which our tanks, recoilless guns, and bazookas took full advantage.

If only they had dispersed and used the guns of their tanks with uninterrupted views they would have done much damage to us. Many tanks got bogged down in the soft soil in the low-lying areas in our territory. The low Patton tanks, weighing about 45 tons each, carrying a 90-millimetre gun with a range of 2,000 yards, with infra-red driving capability which can provide visibility up to almost a hundred yards at night, and with a speed of about 30 miles an hour, did not fare well as the Pakistanis failed to employ them properly. They were not given enough room to manoeuvre and the Pakistani crews were often not quite familiar with their tanks, which had hardly done any mileage.

*The Pakistanis did not use this facility and never employed their tanks in battle at night, a folly of limitless magnitude on their part as they would have scored a great advantage over us by doing so. None of our tanks had this facility nor the means to detect it.*
Many of them, when captured, had run as little as 300 kilometres, a standard totally inadequate for troop training. Tank crews need long and detailed training. Some of these Pattons, when captured, appeared so new that even the original US markings on them had not been erased. They had been obviously lying in cotton wool.¹

The gun histories of the captured Pakistani tank crews showed meagre gunnery training. The weapons system of a Patton relies on a computer, which controls guns for effective firing. The crews did not feed correct information to their computers, with disastrous results. Thus the Patton electronics, which should have been an asset, became a liability.

We had organized improvised defences in this area. The Pakistanis could have outflanked us, but instead of dispersing they came in concentrations, again presenting excellent targets in the very lines of approach along which we had sited our defences. Thus, despite its superior equipment, Pakistan paid a heavy price for its poorly trained crews whose morale cracked up when all did not go well, who got jittery in the face of our fire and abandoned their battleworthy tanks in many cases. We had a field day as the Pakistanis fell into our hastily organized traps. They could have avoided them, but in their folly plunged headlong into them.

During the battle of Assal Uttar, there were some units which took a heavy toll of the enemy, fighting valiantly with their backs to the wall. But there were others which could have done better.

When Pakistan’s Armoured Division Commander, Maj-Gen Nazir Ahmad, found his armour not making much headway, he became restless and came to the forefront of the battle, along with his Commander of Artillery, Brig Shammi, and Brig Iqbal to give pep to his men. But our artillery, which knew they were coming forward, having intercepted one of their wireless messages, scored a direct hit on the jeep in which the two brigadiers were travelling at the head of their men. Shammi was killed and Iqbal wounded.

¹Ayub had said some years before that he had not received military aid from the USA to store away in cotton wool.
in the thigh. We got hold of Shammi's body but Iqbal escaped. It is understood that Nazir was later relieved of his command.

The performance of the two forward battalions in this operation 18 Rajputana Rifles and 4 Grenadiers, is worth recording. They displayed great tenacity and determination and beat back every armour attack. It was here that Havildar Abdul Hamid of 4 Grenadiers won the Param Vir Chakra, the equivalent of the Victoria Cross, for destroying three Pattons. He lost his life in the effort.

The role of 4 Sikh in this battle deserves mention. After this battalion's victory at Burki, it was moved to the Khem Karan sector for a special mission to establish a position behind the enemy. The battalion, commanded by Lt-Col Anant Singh, had not slept for almost 48 hours. It was represented that they should be sent on this task after they had had a little rest. Under the circumstances, this was not possible. The battalion was accordingly launched on its hazardous task, despite fatigue, the same night. After the men had been on the move for four hours or so, their endurance began giving way and they stopped for a short break, not knowing that an enemy tank harbour was near. Before they could do anything about this they were surrounded by the enemy, who inflicted some casualties and captured Anant Singh and some of his men.

The battle of Khem Karan concluded on the 10th night. It had been a matter of touch and go. As we discovered on capturing some papers from Pakistani officer-prisoners, their master plan was to smash their way through Khem Karan, capture Beas, after cutting Grand Trunk Road at Jandiala Guru, and "stroll up to Delhi," as they thought we had no defences worth the name beyond that point. We had captured about 30 Pakistani tanks intact, destroyed about 50, and damaged about 20. Apart from the sacrifices of all ranks, particularly of our young officers, in this battle, we should thank God for his mercies and the enemy for their mistakes for saving us from a grim situation.

While our fate hung in the balance and some of our commanders

5We lost 21 square miles of territory in the Khem Karan area to Pakistan which, all the same, suffered the biggest defeat of the war there.
were using all their professional skill, improvisation, and personal leadership to stem Pakistan’s bid to effect a breakthrough in the Khem Karan area, Delhi was buzzing with rumours, among those who know little or nothing about war, that we had captured, or were about to capture, Lahore. We had made repeated attempts to recapture our lost territory in Khem Karan, but in vain. On 12 September, our corps ordered the recapture of the railway station of Khem Karan, which it felt was lightly held by the enemy. A battalion of Gorkhas attacked this position, only to discover that it was held by almost a brigade of infantry. The Gorkhas had to withdraw. On 13 September, the enemy captured some areas near Ranian and Lopoke and came within about 15 miles of Amritsar at a time when the optimists on our side were claiming to be entering Lahore. We recaptured these areas within three or four days.

A typical example of how we fought on an *ad hoc* basis will be seen in what took place in the Fazilka-Sulemanki area. A brigade under Brig Bant Singh was hastily moved from Rajasthan to take up positions in this area on 6 September. This brigade arrived in time but without its essential equipment of guns and ammunition. This resulted in the loss of about three miles of our territory from Asifwala to the Pakistan border. We got it back when the Tashkent Agreement was implemented in February 1966.

Our aim in the Lahore sector was to dominate Ichhogil Canal, but we failed to do this.

The strong corps in the Sialkot sector was under Lt-Gen P.O. Dunn. Its rapid concentration and employment of armour on a large scale took the Pakistanis—who were dreaming of capturing Jammu—by surprise. There were four divisions, two of which were new and truncated, under this corps: the Armoured Division under Maj-Gen “Sparrow”

*Maj-Gen “Sparrow” Rajinder Singh was asked by a group of journalists how we should deal in future with the enemy who had become so familiar with our tactics in tank warfare in this grim battle. “Sparrow” quipped: “There are 52 cards in a pack. India has played only one card so far—the two of clubs! There are fifty-one more cards in our hand!”*
Thapan, and the fourth under Maj-Gen Ranjit Singh. This corps launched its attack on the Pakistani forces opposing it early on the morning of 8 September with a view to splitting them between Lahore and Sialkot sectors.

The division under Thapan assaulted two miles beyond Suchetgarh and secured a lodgment in Pakistani territory, at Kundanpur and Unchawains, astride the main Suchetgarh-Sialkot road. The division under Rajinder Singh failed to fulfil its aim. Much was expected from this powerful formation, but thanks to meddling by the high command in Delhi it was never employed in this battle suitably and hence was unable to stage the necessary breakthrough to achieve a decision.

The division under Ranjit Singh did not get much chance to fight as a formation because its brigades were grouped for operations under other divisions. None of our divisions here captured or even encircled Sialkot, although we had trained our formation located in peacetime in the vicinity for such a contingency when attacked by Pakistan on this front.

I will recapitulate here the whole armoured battle even at the risk of some repetition so as to give a coherent account in one place. Towards the end of August, Pakistan’s armour was deployed as follows:

(a) 1 Armoured Division in the Chhanga Manga area in a forest near Lahore.
(b) 6 Armoured Division in the Kharian area.
(c) One armoured regiment from 6 Armoured Division in the Sialkot sector.
(d) Two armoured regiments in the Chhamb sector.

In addition to this each Pakistani infantry division in Lahore and Sialkot sectors had its own armoured regiment, and these regiments totalled four.

On 1 September, Pakistan attacked us across the international border in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector with two armoured regiments

Suchetgarh and Sialkot are about eight miles apart.
from 6 Armoured Division and got to six miles west of Akhnoor by 5 September. India attacked across the international border in the Lahore sector in retaliation on 6 September in three different prongs. Pakistan reacted in the following manner:

(a) Two armoured regiments from the Chhamb-Jaurian area were ordered to reinforce the Lahore sector. While this move was under way, India commenced operations in the Sialkot sector on 8 September. To counter this, Pakistan reinforced its only armoured regiment in the Sialkot sector with two armoured regiments moving from Jaurian to the Lahore sector.

(b) Pakistan deployed approximately two regiments of armour in the Lahore sector to contain our ingress into its territory.

(c) Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division moved forward from Multan and reached the Kasur sector by 7 September on hearing of our action the previous day.

Our divisional armour went across the international border along with the infantry towards Kasur on the morning of 6 September. It was unable to advance across the Rohi drain because of enemy opposition and was driven back to the Valtoha area by the night of 7/8 September. We then lost Khem Karan.

Pakistan's 1 Armoured Division carried out a reconnaissance in force in the Khem Karan sector on 8/9 September, and we became aware of this armoured threat and decided to hold the Valtoha-Chima line. On the evening of 8 September, our independent Armoured Brigade was placed under the command of our infantry division and moved into battle position at night. The Pakistanis launched their 1 Armoured Division against Valtoha on 9 September. We had six armoured regiments in this sector against an equal number on the Pakistani side. The rest of the story has already been told.

Our 1 Armoured Division concentrated by 6 September. Tanks of this formation covered over 60 miles on their tracks to reach their concentration area, without waiting for their transporters.
The division spent 6 and 7 September in the concentration area for replenishment and refitting after this long approach march. Since surprise and battle worthiness are conflicting considerations, it is a moot point whether a large formation like this division, which aims to achieve major strategic results, should be concentrated hastily at the last minute, covering long distances in its approach march.

Our armoured division, with its great striking potential, crossed the international border in the early hours of 8 September. Our Armoured Brigade advanced to secure Phillaura—a distance of 10 to 12 miles—and cut the axis Zaffarwal-Phillaura. Before 1000 hours on 8 September, two regiments of this brigade were in the vicinity of their objective, Phillaura, after encountering on the way hostile locals and enemy air attacks in which one of our outstanding sportsmen lost his life. Here, our leading tank came under enemy fire from as close as 800 yards. In retaliation, we destroyed three enemy tanks.

To counter an expected enemy armoured threat from the direction of Zaffarwal, the regiment was ordered to take a position in Pindi Bhago village. Some confusion arose in wireless messages because units mistook the name of the village for orders to withdraw (bhago). No enemy threat materialized, however, and the regiment went into harbour in the Sabzpir area. One of our armoured regiments met with stiff enemy resistance on the outskirt of Gadgor, where we destroyed three enemy tanks and suffered some losses ourselves.

At this juncture, information was received that two enemy Patton regiments were likely to threaten our leading elements at Gadgor from the east. We therefore decided to pull back to Sabzpir. Our Armoured Brigade remained in Sabzpir on 9 and 10 September. This delayed our advance unduly, and at the same time we sustained many casualties from enemy artillery and air sorties although neither of the two enemy Patton regiments made their appearance as apprehended.

On 11 September, one of the regiments in this brigade advanced to capture Libbe. Just east of Libbe five enemy Patton tanks were encountered by our tanks and three were destroyed and one captured, while one got away. At this point, information was
received that about 12 enemy tanks were moving towards us from the direction of Alhar. The stage was now set for a battle.

In this area, tall sugarcane crops were standing. The distance between the opposing tanks was less than 100 yards. A tank battle then commenced, entailing heavy losses on both sides. The enemy repeatedly counterattacked Libbe in the next two days without success as our armoured regiment stood firm. The regiment received orders to capture Wazirwali on 13 September. It encountered eight enemy tanks on the way, but after damaging some of them it got near to Chhawinda.

While the Armoured Brigade was engaged in the battle for Phillaura on 8 September, our Lorried Brigade advancing to secure Maharajke and Sabzpir got stuck in Ek Nadi. This would not have happened had it carried out a proper reconnaissance of the area. It was wrong to launch these two components of our Armoured Division on divergent and not parallel axes. The Lorried Brigade went ahead only on 9 September, and this could explain the Armoured Brigade's inability to advance beyond Sabzpir for two days.

After a reconnaissance, the commander of 1 Armoured Division decided on 11 September that our Armoured Brigade should resume its advance and outflank Phillaura from the west, which it did. The same day, the infantry of the Lorried Brigade, assisted by armour, secured Phillaura. As the enemy had pulled back from here for the main battle at Chhawinda, the Armoured Brigade resumed its advance the same day in order to invest Chhawinda from the west while the Lorried Brigade attacked it from the north. One of our armoured regiments was to provide flank protection in the west so as to prevent enemy reinforcements coming from Sialkot and joining up with the defences at Chhawinda or interfering with our attack. On 13 September, the Armoured Brigade crept forward to take a stance preparatory to its attack on Chhawinda. The rest of the corps was regrouping at this time.

Chhawinda was attacked by the corps twice. First, on 14 September, but without success, as our Armoured Division failed to envelop this position although enemy opposition could not be called heavy. The same evening, one of our armoured regiments
was ordered to pull out from Jassoran and Butur Dograndi and harbour in the Alhar area, where it stayed till the ceasefire. We, however, got control of the Sialkot-Pasrur railway line, including Alhar railway station, on 14 September. On 15 and 16 September, the corps launched a fresh attack on Chhawinda with Maj-Gen Ranjit Singh’s division.

On 16 September, a regiment of the Armoured Brigade, with a battalion of Garhwalis under command, advanced and captured Jassoran. It was then ordered to support the Garhwalis in their attack on Butur Dograndi, which was captured. On 17 September, our Armoured Brigade was engaged with the enemy armour, which consisted by now of three armoured regiments, two of which had come from the Jaurian area. Chhawinda was attacked the second time by Ranjit Singh’s division on the night of 18/19 September, but we failed to capture it despite our repeated piecemeal and hurried efforts, suffering heavy casualties in the process in spite of having forces far superior to the enemy here.

The advance of 1 Armoured Division did not progress as fast as we had hoped, despite little enemy opposition. In fact, it kept milling around. The corps had displayed little enterprise in its advance against the enemy till then despite the odds of armour here being 3:1 in our favour to begin with.

A Garhwal battalion deserves special mention. It fought under the most unfavourable circumstances in the battle of Chhawinda. It later came under severe bombardment by enemy heavy artillery, despite which it captured Waziranwali. When the battalion advanced towards Batur Dograndi, it suffered heavy casualties because of determined enemy artillery and other fire. It reached Jassoran on 16 September and continued its advance till this was stemmed by the intensity of Pakistani artillery and small-arms fire, which killed, among many, the commanding officer, Lt-Col J. E. Jhirad.

Hungry and tired, the battalion kept on fighting. By the 17th morning it had taken up a defensive position. Most of its wireless sets had gone out of order. No reinforcements arrived. Soon after, the enemy counterattacked. The Garhwalis stood firm. The enemy launched a second counter-attack with tanks, infantry,
and artillery. The Garhwalis were now running short of ammunition. One armoured regiment which should have come to their rescue was late, as the enemy had halted it en route. The resistance of the Garhwalis grew steadily weaker till they were compelled to withdraw. In this process Maj Khan, their second-in-command, was killed by an enemy shell. They had fought well but lost.

Great acts of heroism were performed by some of our officers and men in battles here. For instance, Lt-Col A. B. Tarapore of the Poona Horse was awarded the Param Vir Chakra posthumously and Maj Bhupinder Singh the Mahavir Chakra.

We were halted more than once when we failed to identify our own troops in battle and must be careful in future, especially as India and Pakistan will employ similar equipment against each other. In future operations, we should ensure that infantry supporting armoured formations or units is mounted on armoured vehicles, with adequate communications. It should also not be necessary for armoured units to surrender a part of their communications equipment to supporting infantry deficient in it as happened in this area. Infantry supporting tanks should be familiar with them, but in this operation our infantry was not.

We should as far as possible avoid last-minute grouping of units and formations in which each hastily assembled component does not know the other, as this makes for poor teamwork and coordination. We should have learnt this lesson in 1962 but made the same mistake again in 1965.

Our 1 Armoured Division\(^8\) was involved in a 15-day battle with the enemy commencing on 8 September and in which both sides employed about 400 tanks. We damaged some and destroyed about 50 enemy tanks and lost about 50 ourselves in this battle which ended in a stalemate and ceasefire on 23 September. The enemy air was active in this operation whilst ours was not. Our employment of armour, in spite of its being en masse, lacked elan in battle, and we failed to capture purposeful

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\(^8\) An armoured division consists of about 12,000 men and 200 tanks and costs about Rs 50 crores yearly to maintain. It consumes during fighting 350 tons of fuel and 150 tons of ammunition per day.
objectives—important communication centres like Pasrur, Chhawinda, Zaffarwai, Narowal, and Sialkot.

We also failed, on the whole, to seize important points in our assault on the enemy or to dominate ground. Our armour managed to advance only about 20 miles in 15 days in this vital sector. This was not due to any lack of valour on the part of our regimental officers or men of the armoured formation but because our High Command failed to create the necessary tactical conditions for a successful breakout from a large armoured thrust.

Four of our divisions, including one armoured, were pitted against three of the enemy, who had only one armoured regiment here to begin with. The enemy reinforced this one regiment with two more soon after. Ironically, this operation was a pet baby of Gen Chaudhuri, the “tank expert.” But, alas, a golden opportunity was allowed to slip away in this sector as little initiative was taken and things were allowed to take their own course. If only we had exploited our initial superiority in armour in time and had displayed less inertia, we would have staged an impressive victory here and brought rightful glory to the Army. Our hope was to split the enemy forces between the Lahore and the Sialkot sectors. This we failed to do.

Our divisional “offensive,” or the diversionary move in the Barmer area on 8 September, did not make much headway or fulfil its aims. Actually, Pakistani troops occupied some of our posts in Rajasthan territory. They attacked Jamnagar aerodrome by air on 6 September. On 7 September, the Pakistan Navy attacked Dwarka and caught us napping. The enemy air then shifted its attention to Jodhpur where, in spite of the existence of our Air Force training centre, our anti-aircraft defences left much to be desired. The Pakistan Air Force visited Jodhpur more than once. That we did not suffer greater damage there was due to our good luck and the enemy’s inaccurate bombing.

On 8 September, our troops advanced from Gadra Road across the border towards Gadra town. We had a brigade located there, and it should have moved two days earlier. This delay prevented us from surprising the enemy. Hence our attack was not fully successful. We resumed our advance from Tamlot, five miles
from Gadra Road, and our objective was Khokrapar. The Pakistanis put up stout resistance and our advance was halted at Sakarboo. The position mentioned above lay roughly as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Munabao</th>
<th>Gadra Road</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khokarpur</td>
<td>Tamlot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gadra town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakarboo</td>
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Delays in mounting our offensives did not help. When we sent a company of infantry to relieve enemy pressure at Munabao, it could not reach its destination in time. It was mauled *en route* in an enemy skirmish and had to withdraw to Sakarboo. Our raid at Dali, southwest of Gadra, was also unsuccessful. Later, the Pakistanis vacated Dali and Jasse ke Par.

The *ad hoc* manner in which we mustered troops for attacking the enemy, without studying the terrain or collecting intelligence, had its repercussions. Hardly had our advancing troops gone three miles over enemy territory from Gadra Road towards Gadra town in hastily commandeered civilian transport when our fleet got bogged in sand. Had proper reconnaissance been done, the condition of this column would have been different.

On 9 September, the Pakistani Rangers attacked our post at Buttewala. When our ammunition was exhausted, Constable Punam Singh, though seriously wounded, crawled up to the enemy dead, collected ammunition from them and continued fighting till he was killed. The same day the Pakistanis raided Longewala unsuccessfully. On 10 September, the Pakistani Rangers opened fire on Munabao. Our post withdrew a few furlongs to the rear. The Pakistanis then occupied some of the posts we had vacated, including Panchla, 20 miles north of Munabao. They also captured Sanchu in Bikaner district. They attacked Asu Tar without success. We lost Dali, Jogibera, and Akali posts after the ceasefire. The Pakistanis captured Panchla before and Rohri after 23 September.
We captured Sundra, but the enemy counterattacked and recaptured it from us. They occupied Maijar, which we took from them later. Lt-Col P. K. Lahiri and Capt Jagat Singh of the Garhwalis were awarded the Vir Chakra for action here. In Jaisalmer, the Pakistanis occupied Ghotaru. From here, they raided the Bakhri Tibba, northwest of Ramgarh. Later, though our forces ousted them from Ghotaru, we did not occupy this position. Instead, we took Shahgarh, but were soon compelled by the enemy to withdraw to Ghotaru.

We lost several of our posts, including Achri Tibba, Raichandwala, Gajjewala, Fattuwala, Sanchu, Bhurasar, Ballar, Bakra, Siasar, Gulluwala, Khajjuwala, Vishrok, and Gaora, to the enemy. Some of them changed hands later. We, however, retained the important post of Tanot despite many Pakistani attacks. We occupied Sadewala but lost it later. Sanchu post changed hands more than once.

The Pakistanis attacked Q-head Madira and Renuka as well as Hindumal Kot, Naggi, and Khaka, but failed to get them. Our appreciation of enemy strength, which invested a large number of our border posts in the Rajasthan area, was erratic. We withdrew from many of these posts prematurely to areas which we tried to hold in strength. The enemy, consisting of Mujahids and Rangers, then literally walked into some posts and captured them without firing a shot. Had we stayed on, these Pakistani paramilitary forces would never have had the success that came their way here.

Addressing the Congress Parliamentary Party on 11 September 1965, Prime Minister Shastri warned Pakistan clearly that India would have to take counter-measures if Pakistan continued its provocative attacks in eastern India. The Pakistanis used its small air force in Barrackpore, Kalaikunda, and Bagdogra against our far superior air force in that region. They employed their limited military forces against us in Gitalda, a hilly area and in enclaves in the face of our much larger forces. But India never translated Shastri's warning into action. We should remember that threats should never be made if they are not to be implemented.
Operation "Grand Slam"

East Bengal, Pakistan’s truncated second wing, separated from its western counterpart by about 1,000 miles, is situated in a heavy monsoon region with numerous rivers and nalas. Although more heavily populated than the western wing and providing the larger share of the government’s total revenue, it is Islamabad’s much-neglected and exploited sector. As a consequence, although the people of both wings have a common religion, regionalism is so strong in East Bengal that its inhabitants are closer to those of West Bengal.

There was only one Pakistani division, incomplete in artillery and without armour, and one squadron of F-86 Sabres in East Bengal in 1965. The rest of the army and air force was deployed in the western wing. Against this small enemy force located in a province about the size of Czechoslovakia, we had much superior military and air strength, in addition to the even larger forces we deployed to cope with the Chinese threat in well-prepared mountain positions on the northern borders under Eastern Command.

In spite of this superiority and Shastri’s warning, these enemy forces kept our larger forces successfully tied down through sporadic and sudden land and air raids. A small portion of our force was ultimately moved into the western sector, but too late to be of any use. This had the following consequences:

(a) We did not exerce economy of effort in the subsidiary East Pakistan sector.

(b) We did not attain the requisite concentration of forces to tip the balance in our favour decisively in our main effort in the western sector.

Thanks to our military leadership in Delhi (Chaudhuri) and Eastern Command (Manekshaw), at the time deploying a larger force than necessary in the East Pakistan sector, and hesitating to hit the enemy there, we missed a signal opportunity.
CHAPTER FIVE

Battle in the Air

Air power is today the supreme expression of military strength. The basic strategy of such power is offensive action. For this, establishment of a favourable air situation and close cooperation with the land battle are essential. Let us see how we followed or departed from these maxims in the 1965 war.

Though Pakistani troops attacked our territory in the Chhamb sector in strength on 1 September and we had sufficient provocation to spring a surprise on them, attack their airfields, and knock out as many of their aircraft as possible on the ground (as Israel did to the United Arab Republic in June 1967), and thus achieve air superiority, yet we remained on the defensive till 6 September. If we quote “too many commitments” as an excuse for this, surely we could have laid down appropriate priorities. Pakistan took the initiative and carried out a lightning raid on Pathankot airfield on 6 September, knocking out many of our aircraft. Only after this did we carry out retaliatory raids on their airfields.

On 1 September at 1730 hours, one of our Air Force stations got last-minute instructions to engage all enemy armour west of Mannawwar Tawi in the Chhamb Sector, where the Pakistan Army had thrust forward into our territory. The strike was to be led by Vampires followed by Mysteres. They were to remain over the target for only a few minutes. The first wave consisting of four Vampires carried out a leisurely attack on Pakistan territory and returned intact. The next four Vampires went out the same way, but all four were shot down by Pakistan Sabres, which were waiting for them this time. Nobody knows why slow-moving Vampires were ordered out on this strike without air cover when we had faster jets like Hunters and Mysteres available and not committed elsewhere. Vampires were not employed in battle thereafter as our blunder was realized.
On 2 September, some of our Gnats\(^1\) went into action in the Chhamb sector and shot down one Sabre. In the heat of the battle, a Gnat pilot went too far into enemy territory in a dog fight, lost his way and force-landed in it. On 3 September two formations of four Gnats escorted a section of Mysteres in the Chhamb sector. The first formation was led by Sq-Ldr J. W. Greene and included Flt-Lt N. S. Pathania. The second was led by Sq-Ldr Trevor, Keeler. They had a thrilling dog fight with Pakistani Sabres one of which they shot down despite a F-104 Starfighter hovering around. Both formations flew low and reached the Chhamb area. One Sabre chased our aircraft, which were flying at 30,000 feet. Greene and his formation made a right turn to intercept the Sabre.

Pathania, our rearguard, spotted it on his right and reported to his leader. The Sabre turned round and came for Pathania without seeing Keeler and his boys, who had caught up in the meantime. When Pathania saw the Sabre going for him, he informed Greene, who put his formation in a right hand turn. Keeler, who was behind Greene’s formation, was making for Pathania. Greene turned further right. The Sabre was outside of the turn and hence its distance from Pathania increased. Keeler caught up with the Sabre, which was sandwiched between the two formations. And then less time than it takes to tell, the Sabre was destroyed. This was the first Pakistani fighter shot down by us in the war.

Immediately after this incident, one F-104 Starfighter appeared in the sky 3,000 feet above Greene’s formation. Pathania, who saw it, told Greene on his wireless and the latter started for the F-104. Two more Sabres started chasing our jets. Pathania manoeuvred into a favourable position behind one of these Sabres. Then, at altitudes between 8,000 and 25,000 feet, an engagement between Gnats and Sabres took place in which we turned the tables on the Pakistanis.

\(^1\)J.R.D. Tata, head of the big business house of the same name and Chairman of Air India, saw a Gnat aircraft at the Farnborough Air Show in Britain in 1954 and recommended it to our Defence Ministry as the answer to its search for a suitable fighter plane which could be produced at home economically. Lord Mountbatten also wrote to Nehru several times strongly recommending Gnat manufacture in India. Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal played an important part in this enterprise.
On 4 September, four Gnats under Greene, with pathania as No 4, went towards Akhnoor. Six miles short of their destination, they saw four sabres attacking our troops. Greene, Sandhu, and Murdeswar went for the three sabres and pathania for the fourth. The latter, on seeing pathania, tried to escape but was shot down in flames near Akhnoor. Keeler and pathania were awarded the vir chakra. On 5 September, the Pakistani air force carried out its first attack on our defence installations and the airfield at Amritsar, but did not have much success.

On 6 September, the sun was going down and pilots were sitting near their flight office at Pathankot airfield sipping tea when four Pakistani sabres suddenly appeared above them and carried out a front gun attack with two F-104 starfighters keeping guard above. The sabres caused havoc for about 10 minutes, which seemed interminable. They inflicted considerable damage on our fighter aircraft on the ground and on our runway.

Prior warning of this attack had been received but little action was taken till it started. Pakistan's radar cover, thanks to American help, was much more extensive and efficient than India's radar shield. The Pathankot episode is an apt example. The Pakistanis charted the flight of Indian fighter aircraft leaving Pathankot on 6 September, including their return. As the Indian planes touched down, their aircraft bore down on them, giving them no time to scramble or disperse. The moral is that we must improve our radar facilities, particularly during night flying.

The same afternoon, four sabres came in two sections to attack the airfield at Halwara, deep within our territory, in broad daylight. At that moment four Hunters in two sections were carrying out a combat air patrol over the airfield. As no prior warning of this enemy attack was available, one section of Hunters was surprised. An interesting air battle followed. Flt-Lt Pingle and Flying Officer Gandhi were flying in aircrafts which were on the down-wind of the runway. They were surprised by the leader of the Pakistan sabre section and Pingle was shot down. The Pakistani pilot then

*On the 6th night, after the Pakistani raid on Pathankot, Indian canberra bombers carried out their first attack on Sargodha and Chaklala. Other attacks took place elsewhere later.
blundered by coming right in front of Gandhi’s Hunter and was promptly shot down by Gandhi. Simultaneously, the No 2 of the Pakistani Sabre section got behind Gandhi’s Hunter and shot it down. But he in turn was shot down by our anti-aircraft fire and went into a headlong dive to his death. Both Pingle and Gandhi, however, ejected to safety. Pingle subsequently earned the Vir Chakra for bringing down a Sabre in a later battle. Gandhi got the Vir Chakra for the same feat in this battle. In the meantime, the second Sabre section, finding things too hot, turned about and headed home. The second Hunter section, led by Flt-Lt Rathore with Flying Officer Neb as his No 2, spotted the fleeing Sabres and gave chase. The Pakistani aircraft were momentarily lost to our pilots as they were flying very low, but they revealed their positions inadvertently by strafing the ground to get rid of their ammunition and kicking up much dust. Rathore and Neb lost no time in getting behind these tempting targets and shot them down. Rathore, an experienced pilot, got his kill in no time, but Neb had to give a long chase before having his prey. We identified from the wreckage on our territory that the Sabres were led by a squadron leader. Since they lost all their raiding aircraft, this battle had a demoralizing effect on the Pakistani pilots. They did not attempt a similar daytime raid on our territory again.

On 7 September, we lost two Hunters in a raid over Sargodha, and later two Hunters and one Gnat were destroyed on the ground at Halwara by a night-bombing raid in moonlight. Our fighters operated regularly from here in support of our forces in the Lahore sector. One of our air formations went on a “search and destroy” mission near Raiwind in Pakistan on 8 September and blew up an enemy goods train carrying tankers and other equipment as a result of some good shooting. The officer who led this mission, Flt-Lt Menon, was awarded the Vir Chakra.

On 9 September, Sq-Ldr B.K. Bishnoi led a sweep on enemy tanks in the Khem Karan area. In this raid, Flt-Lt Parulkar was wounded in his arm by ground light-arm fire but got back safely. Some of our fighters went from Adampur into enemy territory on 6 September and instead of attacking their airfields or aircraft
parked on the ground, engaged opportunity targets—goods trains and army installations. After Pakistani raids on a number of our airfields later that day, we took retaliatory steps on 7 September, sent our fighter formations from Adampur to attack the well-defended Sargodha complex, including Bhagtanwala and Jhumra, but they were unable to engage anything worthwhile and returned to base after damaging the airfield. They refuelled and went back on the same mission later. Others followed suit and claimed destruction of some enemy aircraft on the ground, apart from causing considerable damage to many enemy hangars and installations.

Our planes had to go as the crow flies and were not able to carry out any tactical "routing." This enabled the enemy to mount "flying umbrellas" over the route and catch our returning aircraft, which were unable to offer any battle as they were operating on their extreme range. For the fighters, this was a suicidal mission as the enemy must have been alerted after our first raid. We lost two fighters and two pilots. Sq-Ldrs Handa and Jatar were awarded the Vir Chakra.

The runway at Adampur was once temporarily put out of action by a Pakistani B-57 bomber night raid and a few of our aircraft were damaged on the ground. Our fighters, however, inflicted considerable damage to enemy men and material en route. Sq-Ldr Denzil Keeler, along with Flt-Lts V. Kapila and Maya Dev and Flying Officer Rai, fought the enemy Sabres with their Gnats over Chhawinda. Keeler's section was providing cover to four Mysteres which were going to give close support to our troops. The combat started at an altitude of 1,500 feet. Kapila destroyed one Sabre and Keeler another. Then the Gnats and Sabres fought at treetop level to our advantage.

Pakistan had not attacked Ambala by air till 17 September. That night, however, two enemy B-57 bombers came over at 0130 hours. One of them scored direct hits on the officers' ward in the military hospital and the Sirhind Club, located 300 yards from the Air Force officers' mess, where many officers were spending the night and had a narrow escape.

On the night of 19/20 September, another Pakistani raid on Ambala destroyed the cathedral. One of the bombs fell on the
old flying control building. On both these nights, none of the Pakistani bombers were damaged by our anti-aircraft fire. Nor was an air raid warning sounded by our air defence organization till after the enemy raid commenced on the night of 17/18 September.

In spite of the attacks on our Punjab airfields on the evening of 6 September by Pakistan, our aircraft at Kalaikunda presented easy targets to enemy air attacks on the morning of 7 September. They raided the airfield twice, when we thought the weather unfit for flying, and knocked out some of our aircraft on the ground. The second time, when four Sabres came, two of our Hunters were already airborne. In the air battle over Kalaikunda, they shot down one of our Hunters but lost two Sabres.

As our combats with Pakistan aircraft were mostly confined to low altitudes, much help could not be taken from radar. Consequently, contact with enemy aircraft was established only visually. This possibly led to some of them escaping as they were not spotted in time. The enemy did not like our Gnats because they could outturn their aircraft and were difficult to spot in the air by virtue of their smallness. There were, however, two opinions among our pilots about the value of this aircraft.

India dropped no paratroops in Pakistan. Pakistani paracommandos belonging to SG 19 were based in Peshawar, and two companies were dropped in sticks of 60 to 70 near our forward airfields at Pathankot, Adampur, and Halwara, for sabotage and to destroy or put out of action aircraft on the ground, airfields and military installations. If they were successful in this mission, they were to be picked up by their compatriots from the captured airfields and flown back home. In case of failure they were advised to follow the rivers or canals downstream, as all of them would lead them towards the Pakistan border.

In Pathankot, they were dropped five miles away from our airfield, but in Adampur and Halwara they landed very near their targets. Their plans for destruction of our aircraft and installations were, however, frustrated by elements of the Punjab Armed Police, village volunteers, and the Territorial Army. In all, about 180 commandos were dropped, of whom 36 were killed in encounters with the armed police and the rest captured alive, except five who
probably escaped across the border. A leading role in their apprehension and destruction was played by Ashwini Kumar, at present Inspector General, Border Security Force, a matchless individual with infinite courage. He hastily mustered a mixed force of armed and district police as well as of village volunteers and students and frustrated the enemy plans. Many of the villagers voluntarily rounded up the enemy paratroopers as the lure of capturing their sophisticated weapons was irresistible.

The ground defences of our airfields could have been better. Slit trenches were not always dug near them. Insufficient military personnel were made available for this purpose to the Air Force, which consequently had to make do with its own lean resources. The Punjab Armed Police was called in later. There was an air of complacency till enemy action began.

In order to make up the full strength of our squadrons, senior fighter pilots employed either as instructors or as staff officers were called to duty for flying. This had two drawbacks:

(a) However experienced a pilot may be on the type, he is not in full fighting form if he has been either on the staff or flying a slower machine as an instructor for some time.

(b) There was a mixture of fighter pilots in squadrons which were a hotch-potch from different units. In some cases, they had never flown together, a prerequisite for a good team of fighter pilots, in which leaders and wingmen must know each other's capabilities. This resulted in some avoidable accidents as they were not in current flying practice on type. The same handicap applied to the Pakistanis.

Briefings given to our pilots could have been more detailed. There were occasions when pilots in ground support role had difficulty in identifying enemy troops and tanks on the ground as targets were located in areas where much close infighting was taking place and the troops and equipment of the two sides could not be easily distinguished. This did not make the operational task of our fighter pilots easier.

Because of the uneven flow of communications, information
from battle areas fed to our pilots by ground liaison staff often reached them late. As a result, pilots attacked targets from which the enemy had moved away.

Our Air Force had varied tasks. It was busy guarding its own airfields against enemy attacks by constant combat air patrols, attacking enemy airfields and installations, and also generally trying to establish air superiority. It therefore did not have sufficient resources left to give the Army the close air support it required.

Tactical air centres in the field had remote control over operational sorties and this became a bottleneck, preventing quick air support to infantry. The Air and Army Commands worked in good spirit on the whole, though without purposeful coordination.

Fighter and bomber pilots displayed conspicuous determination, courage, and resourcefulness in this war. We can be justly proud of these stalwarts. Transport pilots, Air OPs, navigators, radar men, anti-aircraft teams, and ground technicians did more than the duties demanded of them.

The tactics of fighters engaging the enemy at treetop level—requiring great professional ability—were developed during this war. This rendered the Pakistani F-104s partially ineffective. Both air forces were mainly used in ground close support for interdiction of supplies and troop movements and for reconnaissance missions.

The Pakistani airfields were well-placed and enabled their aircraft to be economically employed. Indian airfields, on the other hand, were either too near or too far from the front line. Pakistan scored over us by having strings of airfields in depth. They were therefore capable, at the end of a day’s fighting, of staging through their frontline airfields and giving close support to the army en route, and at the same time of moving their aircraft to the sanctuary of the airfields well behind their lines. Their widely dispersed and numerous airfields posed a problem in planning our bombing raids, as the location of their aircraft was anybody's guess. They had the advantage of knowing that our aircraft were confined to a few forward airfields, where they were bound to find targets. Was this situation compelled only by geography? Pakistan’s dispersal and camouflage was good, thanks to massive US aid.
Both sides flew low to keep under the radar screen. They suffered roughly equal losses of aircraft in combat despite our larger Air Force. This was because, apart from our indifferent strategy, we allowed Pakistan to take the initiative and launch simultaneous air attacks on our Punjab airfields.

The Pakistani fighter aircraft proved vulnerable to low-level defences. Pakistan had American F-104 aircraft whereas we had our Russian MiG-21s, both capable of a speed of about 1,450 miles an hour. But as most of the fighting took place at comparatively lower altitudes, the fastmoving F-104s and MiG-21s could not be utilized fully. The Sabre jets\(^*\) proved to be no better than our Gnats. Our Mysteres and Hunters did well.

It has been said that the Pakistani pilots were scared of ours in combat. This might have been so in some odd cases, but generally they displayed the same boldness in battle as our pilots did.

Once we had committed ourselves and decided to involve our superior air power to battle on 1 September, there should have been no bar to the Air Force seizing the initiative and being used, from that day on, in attaining superiority by mounting pre-emptive (surprise) air attacks on Pakistani airfields, destroying as many of their aircraft on the ground as possible. We thus lost from 1 to 6 September, valuable time and opportunity to cause extensive damage to the Pakistan Air Force. It is surprising that even after our Army crossed the Pakistan border in the Wagah sector on 6 September, we held back our Air Force from counter-air operations, strafing and destroying enemy aircraft on the ground and thereby attaining air superiority. It is only when Pakistan launched simultaneous fighter attacks on our Punjab airfields on the evening of 6 September that we brought out our fighters against Pakistani airfields on the morning of 7 September in hastily prepared attacks.

Our anti-aircraft defences need refurbishing, as the 1965 conflict showed up our many deficiencies in this set-up. Vital installations, bridges, airfields, and radar stations need strong protective radar rings around them. (All this, I hope, has been done.)

\(^*\)Sabre and Gnat speeds are almost equal, but the Gnat is faster at higher altitudes and its rate of climb and acceleration is superior.
As land and air battles are an integral part of each other, it is imperative that we destroy the hostile air force at the earliest to gain air superiority over the battlefield. To cripple as many aircraft as possible and render runways useless for a time, our Air Force must know that apart from a bold plan, the crux is in obtaining the highest technical level of efficiency which enables maximal utilization of its planes and in the calibre of its pilots. There must be no gulf between ground staff on the one hand and flying personnel on the other, both branches being welded together into one close family. The Indian Air Force, which has some fearless and competent pilots, should watch its step in future. It must inflict the first surprise on the enemy in the next round, or we may not get away with it again.

"The most fearless of them all is Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal, D. F. C., our present air chief, a notable leader with high professional merit and integrity and perhaps the best chief we have had since 1947.

Pakistan has strengthened its Air Force considerably and has acquired many modern aircraft, including a few Mirage IIIs from France which have a speed of 1,430 miles per hour at 36,000 feet and a radius of 560 miles (up and down), allowing for combat also. The Mirage-III proved its worth in the UAR-Israel conflict. It is a versatile interceptor and can carry guns, rockets, and bombs in close support, specially at low level, where missiles suffer from limitations."
CHAPTER SIX

Stalemate

Both India and Pakistan fought this war conventionally. It started with fanfare on both sides that each would teach the other a lesson. If Pakistan’s aim was to defeat India militarily and capture Kashmir by force, this remained unfulfilled. Pakistan was overconfident of victory over India and its assessment that the Indian Army was incapable of resisting its assaults proved a major miscalculation.

If India’s object was a battle of attrition, this also remained unrealized, as confessed by Army Chief Chaudhuri in a press conference on 24 September 1965, in which he said he did not want to jump to the conclusion that the Pakistan Army’s striking power had been badly blunted. Nor did we succeed in capturing any significant area of Pakistani territory.

The fact that both armies had some sting left was proved by the manner in which they kept mounting attacks and counterattacks against each other until the last minute of the war, and the deep penetration of each Air Force into the other’s territory till just before the ceasefire. All the same, each side was unable to expel the other from its occupied positions and had to stomach a stalemate in the end.

India, despite superior strength and favourable opportunity, failed to capture vital points like Lahore, Sialkot, and Ichhogil Canal. It failed to inflict a staggering blow to Pakistan, militarily or economically. It failed even to demoralize Pakistan. What, then, was the concrete achievement in 1965? The same question applies to Pakistan. Negatively, we only frustrated Pakistan’s attempt to capture Kashmir and Kutch by force. But as a stronger and bigger country, and especially after three years of intensive defence preparations from 1962 to 1965, we should have defeated Pakistan in this war. In one of the last articles he wrote, “Strategy
of a War," Liddell Hart says: "Strategy, without an instrument, is evidently a futile procedure." Thanks to Mao Tse-tung, as also the scapegoats of the 1962 conflict, such an instrument was available for the first time to India in the shape of a much larger and more modernized army than ever. But where was the needed strategy for success? We had made no formidable fortifications in our territory, like Ichhogil Canal, mainly because of financial and psychological reasons, even though we had 17 years to erect such a barrier in the likely line of enemy advance.

Instead of concentrating its superior forces at a selected point and breaking through, India scattered its attacks in penny packets over a front extending 800 miles from Barmer to Kargil. They were seemingly spectacular but strategically unsound. Hence they failed to penetrate the Pakistani defences sufficiently anywhere. How could we be strong everywhere? Nor did India make much use of the surprise sprung on the enemy in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors. For example, we captured intact the vital bridge over Ichhogil Canal on Grand Trunk Road, near Wagah, and crossed it to Jallo on 6 September, without exploiting this success. Instead, we allowed the enemy to drive us back. We did the same at Dera Baba Nanak Bridge and let another opportunity slip out of our hands by allowing the enemy to recapture a part of it. But for such lapses, and our indifferent master plan, the story of these operations would have been different. Neither side pressed home its attacks. Their moves could be predicted by each other and suitably countered. Hence there were no decisive engagements except that at Assal Uttar.

Little ground changed hands in this war, the front line remaining almost static once battle was joined. Each side was unable to weaken the enemy's striking force. Neither advanced much and most actions—like the whole war—eventually ground to a stalemate. Although India had an edge over Pakistan in military potential, like Pakistan it showed neither the will nor capacity to fight on its own for long. India's armour in the Sialkot sector was not launched correctly, did not operate boldly enough and lacked coordination with the infantry.

Pakistan had planned this war years ahead but lacked prepara-
tion and training for unrelenting struggle. India knew of Pakis-
tan's intentions but did not give sufficient forethought to meeting
the challenge and was forced by Pakistan's initiative to plunge
headlong into war at the last minute. Pakistan was in a more
favourable position for a speedy limited operation, having shorter
supply lines and deploying its forces against only one enemy.
We had to do this against two.

Since the war in 1965, Pakistan has dug two more anti-tank
ditches between Ichhogil Canal and the western border with India.
A large number of pillboxes, embankments, and hurdles have
been constructed on a wide front extending from Sialkot to Kasur.
It appears that its main aim on the Lahore front will be to contain
future Indian attacks. On the northern Rajasthan front, Pakistan
will probably mount an attack with its newly raised corps in
Multan. It is for this manoeuvre that they have built a new
bridge south of Multan over the Panj Nad so as to outflank our
forces concentrated in Punjab.

We did well in some battles, but in others our attacks did not
go far enough. Our troops stood up better to heavy shelling by
enemy artillery as the war went on. We used our artillery without
achieving dominance in vital areas. We regrouped our armour too
frequently, and this caused many delays in our breakout operations,
during which the enemy inflicted punishment on us both from the
air and the ground. Our men used their simpler and older tanks
more competently than the Pakistanis handled their newer ones.
We must get used to digging in and preparing our defences better.

One of the observations of the NEFA Enquiry Committee,
announced in 1963, was that senior commanders had interfered
with their juniors during operations. Whatever the truth of this
conclusion, it is interesting to note that many senior commanders
also interfered with their juniors during the 1965 operations without
sticking to the proper chain of command. For instance, our
Army Chief in 1965 gave certain operational directions telephoni-
cally to GOC I Corps, directly and without going through his
immediate superior and only stopped this practice when the Army
Commander objected to undue interference.

As usually happens in war, honours and awards were given
to some very deserving officers, while some awards were unpopular. Senior officers got proportionately more decorations for gallantry than their juniors. This rightly caused comment.

We found some inherent weaknesses in our forces in this war similar to those noticed in the war with the Chinese in 1962. The advantage this time was that we had a weaker foe in Pakistan and were much better prepared than in 1962. All the same, our officer cadre, on the whole, showed better professional military knowledge and qualities of leadership than their Pakistani counterparts.

Our higher military leadership was blamed by some for the debacle in 1962. This also failed with few exceptions in 1965. Our forces were said to have been under "a new and inspiring" leadership from 1962 to 1965 and reshaped with much modern equipment, considerably reorganized and increased in strength. Despite all these factors, India failed to defeat Pakistan, a much smaller country with armed forces inferior in strength. The fact was that the inherent defects in our national character and leadership were more or less the same in 1965 as in 1962.

The morale of our people and forces remained high. All departments of government worked fairly well, especially the railways, and nearly 1,500 civilian truck drivers collaborated magnificently with the Army as did the Punjabi peasants. The general public too gave our forces spirited and courageous support.

Ground defences against air attacks were poor on both sides. So were radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns. India and Pakistan made conflicting claims of their territorial gains. India claimed nearly 700 square miles of Pakistani territory and admitted Pakistan had occupied 250 square miles in Kashmir and Rajasthan. Pakistan claimed to have occupied about 1,600 square miles of Indian territory and conceded that India had occupied 450 square miles of its territory.

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1Pakistan had announced from the rooftops from time to time that, irrespective of their endeavour to be faithful to India, Muslims were still suspected, much maligned and subjected to discrimination in their day-to-day life. Despite this contention and the predictions that in the event of hostilities with Pakistan, the loyalty of the Indian Muslims might waver, they were steadfast in September 1965.
Pakistani troops counterattacked ours promptly, supported by sustained and accurate artillery fire, but their infantry seldom pressed home these thrusts. Pakistani patrols were not sufficiently aggressive, nor did they fight for information. Whenever they vacated a position, they left a small delaying party with automatic weapons to cover the withdrawal of the main body.

Pakistan selected villages in certain areas and converted them into strongholds with underground shelters interconnected by a system of tunnelling and provided them with suitable tank and artillery support as well as recoilless rifles and medium machine guns. The enemy deployed its observation posts well and infiltrated in some cases deep into our areas and this paid dividends. No extensive mine warfare was employed by either side. The enemy's signal security was poor. We intercepted many messages and gained vital information.

As announced in Parliament, India suffered 12,500 casualties in this war—2,700 killed, 8,400 wounded, and 1,500 taken prisoner, or reported missing. Pakistani casualties were certainly not less than 12,000, including about 3,000 killed. Pakistan lost about 300\(^2\) tanks, of which we captured 50 intact, and the rest were immobilized, or otherwise damaged. Our losses\(^3\) in armour were about 150. More losses were incurred by Pakistan because it handled its sophisticated tanks incompetently. Out of about 800 odd tanks the Pakistanis possessed at the commencement of this war, they were left with about 500 at the ceasefire. In the air, the losses on each side were almost equal (about fifty each).

The Korean armies suffered 800,000 casualties and the United Nations forces 150,000 in the 1950-53 war in Korea. India and Pakistan committed to battle in the three crucial weeks in 1965 less than one-fifth of the forces employed in Korea. But if the Indo-Pakistan war had continued for three years, as did the Korean war, they would have had about 400,000 casualties.

\(^2\)On many occasions, credit was taken for the destruction of the same enemy tanks by more than one arm, air, armour, artillery and infantry. We therefore genuinely thought we had destroyed more enemy tanks than in fact we had.

\(^3\)By losses I mean tanks which were captured intact or damaged beyond repair in our territory or theirs. Damaged tanks which could be repaired are not included in this count.
Both India and Pakistan have admitted none of their reverses and have harped only on their successes. Unfortunately, the war stopped without a decision, and in such a situation it is usual for each side to claim a near-victory. Indians and Pakistanis are chips of the same block and hence shared many shortcomings and mistakes in this war.

Pakistan has learnt one lesson: whatever India's handicaps, it would never be easy for Pakistan to score a victory over India single handed. Neither India nor Pakistan is, however, capable of fighting a long war on its own.

By enlisting China on its side, Pakistan has strengthened its position. India must—apart from strengthening itself to the maximum—also choose suitable allies who can assist in dealing with Pakistan or China, or both, effectively. What is more, India must learn to take the initiative, as victory in war can only be won by attack. Defence is a temporary measure to gain time for building up sufficient strength to allow the offensive to be launched or resumed or to hold the enemy at one point while attacking him at another. Above all, when provoked, India must develop an aggressive spirit to force a decision, regardless of odds and costs, without resorting to ceasefire and allowing intervention by the big powers. Our experience of the past 20 years is that little can be expected from negotiations.

Many nations miscalculated the outcome of the India-Pakistan conflict. India believed it could defeat Pakistan, which in turn was convinced it would win against India. Britain, the USA, and China thought for different reasons, that Pakistan would win. The Soviet Union observed a discreet silence. In view of the absence of a decision in this conflict, all except the Soviet Union have turned out to be wrong.

If top commanders are chosen by government with care, they can turn the tide of war from defeat to victory, given normal luck and resources. Requisite yardsticks for those who are to fill key appointments should therefore be clearly understood by their selectors, who should not only examine their confidential reports in dossiers but should take into account their good work in practice and their personal all-round experience.
This war showed that our young officers fared better against heavy odds than their seniors and deserved a special word of praise. The higher political and military direction left much to be desired. There were, of course, exceptions. Wherever orders were issued with determination and clarity, they were obeyed and usually resulted in success. When this was not done, the results were far from flattering. In this war, Lt-Gen Harbaksh Singh received no worthwhile directions from Army Headquarters but influenced the battles favourably, wherever possible, by his personal leadership and courage. But for his sound judgment and example we might not have achieved even an honourable stalemate.

This campaign tested our war machinery, the capability of our leadership at all levels, the fighting ability of our men, and the efficiency of our weapons and equipment. It also revealed our weaknesses in tactics as well as organization and administration. Above all, it gave us operational experience and confidence in ourselves. It united our country temporarily and inspired many to make sacrifices. It taught us not to depend too much on foreign powers. It showed that our resources, especially our economy and finances, were unable to cope with a major war for long. The fact that nobody came to our help when we were in trouble exposed the hollowness of our diplomacy.

If anybody rejoices at our self-criticism, let him take a look at affairs in Pakistan, which are deplorable, judged by any standards. Lack of unity, indiscipline, corruption, incompetence, and lethargy are widely prevalent in that country. If the Indian High Command faltered in the war in 1965, the Pakistanis, who had an edge over us in planning, blundered more than once even under a military dictator. If India achieved little during these operations Pakistan gained nothing either, despite its initial advantage of offensive action and surprise over us. Its aim to “liberate” Kashmir was never fulfilled. Its infiltrators failed, and so did its half-hearted paratroopers. Akhnoor and Dera Baba Nanak were never captured.

The Pakistani success in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector was never exploited as they dithered after a weak thrust. The plan of attack on India was audacious enough, but its execution was poor despite
new and powerful US equipment. Pakistan had no concept of how to use infiltrators and paratroop commandos, although it tried to ape the North Vietnamese and the Chinese without their spirit or competence.

Pakistan also used its armour unsoundly, rashly first and cautiously later. It made three mistakes:

(1) The initial attack in the Chhamb-Jaurian area was meant to draw the Indian armour but failed.
(2) Employment of armour in the Kasur sector was without proper reconnaissance and lacked timely support from infantry.
(3) Its armour rushed forward, without waiting for infantry, to fight the Indian armour at Phillaura and Chhawinda.

Generally speaking, Pakistan used its armour unimaginatively, in unsuitable terrain and without adequate infantry and artillery support. Tanks fought in slow motion. Although the bulk of its forces consisted of infantry, whose task was to achieve the crucial break-through supported by other arms, the brunt of the battle was borne by the armour.

In their training exercises, the Pakistanis thought their tank crews had handled Pattons well, although they had done little mileage. But training is one thing and war quite another. In the operations against India, the Pakistani tanks forged ahead, without taking heed of their open flanks or screening their advance with proper reconnaissance elements. If armoured infantry had accompanied the tanks in battle, they would have created valuable lanes of fire in the requisite areas, particularly in fields, making victory certain. But their absence cost the Pakistanis dearly.

As Pakistan's thrust in Jaurian was weak, it petered out and Akhnnoor was never captured. The moment we attacked in the Sialkot area, Pakistan pulled out most of its forces from Jaurian, thus flouting the principle of "maintenance of aim." Pakistan failed at Khem Karan as its attacking force lacked correct balance and did not employ reserves. The erroneous belief that the Indian Army would put up no resistance and run away was never fulfilled. The senior commanders failed Pakistan miserably. Maj-Gen
Nazir Ahmad let his country down badly and lost a great opportunity by his blunders at Khem Karan. He carried out no proper reconnaissance, made no wider hook, went bulldozing blindly, and brought defeat and shame to his country. Lt-Gen Rana was sacked like Nazir Ahmad for his failures as GOC 1 (Pak) Corps. Gen Musa, Pakistan’s C-in-C, met the same fate after the war as he had failed to train his troops adequately and had captured no objective of any consequence.

Having started the war, Pakistan caved in quickly, achieving only a stalemate, and signed a ceasefire agreement at the first opportunity. Bhutto’s 1,000-year-war pledge to his nation was buried unceremoniously at Tashkent. Pakistan should remember that the next time it undertakes such an adventure it may meet a worse fate.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Ceasefire

Contestants in a war agree on a ceasefire when they are unable to force a decision. What provoked the war remains unsettled, but both sides heave a sigh of relief on reaching a compromise. As Abraham Lincoln said: "Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions are again upon you."

Shastri said on 6 September 1965 that India would not go from one ceasefire to another, and "whatever be the position, we have to stick to our guns." In the face of this bold resolution, we should not have agreed to a ceasefire so readily. We should not have forgotten that violations of the earlier ceasefire by Pakistan had been almost a daily affair in Jammu and Kashmir from 1948. Government should have anticipated that sooner or later the big powers would impose their will upon us through the United Nations to stop fighting. We should therefore have refrained from making such a dramatic statement, from which we had to retract later.

Both India and Pakistan were anxious to accept a ceasefire, as proposed by U Thant, from 14 September onwards and eventually did so on 22/23 September. By this time, both sides wanted to call it a day, though outwardly they kept up the posture that they were on the verge of victory.

The Chinese provided a farcical interlude by giving us an ultimatum\(^1\) on 16 September to demolish within 72 hours 50 military structures we were supposed to have built on the Tibet side of the border with Sikkim near Nathu La. I think they had no intention of getting involved in a major conflict and did this to

\(^1\)This ultimatum worried Britain. Washington wondered whether Peking was serious. Moscow accused Peking of aggressive intent. No nation gave India much support.
hustle the Security Council into a quick ceasefire. That is why they extended their ultimatum by another three days and, finally, when they saw clear signs of a ceasefire coming, withdrew it on the plea that “as India had obeyed the Chinese and dismantled their illegal military structures on the Sikkim border, China would not punish her this time.” The same day India and Pakistan accepted the ceasefire proposal of the Security Council. Before 1965 China had proposed more than once, a joint inspection of the alleged structures near the Sikkim-Tibet border, but India did not agree. Having disagreed before, why did our government in its reply to the Chinese ultimatum readily say that “if there were any such structures, they should be demolished” (by the Chinese)?

Though we should never be necessarily afraid of ultimatums, at the same time we should not threaten others unnecessarily. It is widely known that the government had decided to parade a captured Patton in the streets of Delhi while the fighting was on. Washington tried through diplomatic channels to dissuade us from taking this action, but in vain. We virtually said:

The Americans gave Patton tanks to the Pakistanis knowing that they would be used against India. Now that we have captured these lethal gifts, which had not done so well in war against us, this shows US equipment in a poor light. If the USA had lost face, it serves them right. As the US has let us down, we have every right to expose and humiliate it.

Sentimentally, this was a correct reaction, as it was based on facts. But it was diplomatically immature conduct for a country not out of the woods yet. While maintaining our self-respect, we should have thought ahead and shown greater restraint. Ironically, the Chinese ultimatum came a day later. Despite much tall talk earlier, we merely said in reply that “these structures should be demolished if they exist.” Then we made a complete somersault in relation to the US. Instead of parading the captured Pattons, we sounded Washington in the hope that in the event of Chinese aggression the USA would come to our assistance! Washington replied in guardedly diplomatic language. We should not forfeit
the sympathy of any country by showing off and should always do what is in our national interest and behave rationally.

In the wake of the India-Pakistan conflict, memories of Nehru stirred in my mind. Nehru had warned Pakistan years ago in unmistakable terms that an attack on Kashmir, an integral part of India, would be treated as an attack on India. Nehru’s attitude was absolutely clearcut whenever anybody threatened India’s safety, as it was in 1962, though his zeal to defend Indian soil was greater than his implementation.

Our publicity could have been handled better during the conflict. We often allowed news to appear in our press before it had been fully verified. For instance, Delhi newspapers reported that Pakistan’s air chief, Air Marshal Nur Khan, had done so badly that he was removed from his post. We discovered later, however, that far from doing badly he had done so well in the Pakistan Government’s opinion that not only was he decorated but also had the distinction of leading on 23 March 1966 a diamond formation of Chinese MiG-19s recently acquired by Pakistan at a parade in Rawalpindi.

The following bannerlines were allowed to appear in our press about Lahore or Sialkot, neither of which we ever captured:

**Lahore** (only 16 miles from our western border)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>September</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Indian Army reached the outskirts of the city after smashing through its defences before sunset on 6 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>IAF shatters Pakistani air defences (around Lahore)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The ring around Lahore is tightening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Army crosses the Ravi in Dera Baba Nanak Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Our forces 5 or 6 miles from the centre of Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>IAF completely dominates air space over Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Final battle for Lahore any day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Army patrols across Ichhogil Canal (where did they go, then?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ceasefire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sialkot** (less than 7 miles from our border)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>September</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jawans drive towards Sialkot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>More gains in the Sialkot area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Steady advance in the Sialkot area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Heavy fighting in the Sialkot area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sialkot more than half encircled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
End of 48-hour lull in the Sialkot sector
Came the ceasefire and Lahore and Sialkot were still in Pakistani hands

The _Statesman_ military observer wrote on 17 September 1965: “If the claims made by India and Pakistan in their successive communiques were added up, it would be found that the tanks and air forces of both India and Pakistan have been destroyed twice over....”

When our journalists clamoured to cover battles from close quarters, they were denied this opportunity on the excuse that the Army was preoccupied with fighting and hence unable to conduct them to see the operations. Many suspected that this excuse was given as the war was not going on as well as claimed. Pakistan permitted journalists to see the fighting closely despite operational preoccupations. Many gallant journalists keep losing their lives in quest of news, as in Vietnam and elsewhere. There were no firsthand accounts by Indian journalists of our battles in 1965 because the press was kept away from the frontline, and this was a great pity.

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2 Pakistan made similar claims.
3 There were many instances in this, as in other wars in the past, where the practice had crept in of tampering with documents like telephonic logs, signal messages, war diaries, and situation reports either to cover up mistakes or build up reputations. The aim was to start or prevent a witch-hunt.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Compromise

The big powers attempt to play a decisive role in world affairs when their interests are involved or when they see an opportunity to derive some political advantage. The Soviet Union tried to do this by inviting India and Pakistan to discuss their differences at Tashkent in Soviet Asia. In assuming the role of honest broker, Premier Kosygin was taking a big risk, for if the talks had failed Soviet prestige in the Afro-Asian world would have slumped. India and Pakistan accepted the Russian proposal with an outward show of reluctance but were inwardly anxious to get out of the untenable positions they were placed in.

Everybody doubted the success of this conference in view of the deep-rooted suspicions and hatred which existed between India and Pakistan and their rigid attitudes on Kashmir. Shastri and Ayub reached Tashkent on 3 January 1966. Soon after their arrival, Kosygin paid them courtesy calls, each lasting more than an hour. Both leaders were advised to avoid discussing major issues at this meeting, which the Russians regarded as the first of a series of bilateral discussions under their aegis. Thus began the first major Soviet peacemaking initiative in Asia.

The first meeting took place on 4 January. Shastri called for a no-war pact between India and Pakistan and pleaded that each nation should respect the other’s territorial integrity. Ayub rejected this proposal until “concrete steps” could be taken to solve their “basic problem” — Kashmir. Shastri at first refused to have Kashmir placed on the agenda, but later agreed to discuss but not negotiate on it. On 5 January, India agreed to discuss the India-Pakistan conflict, but the Pakistanis still insisted that Kashmir be included as a specific item on the agenda.

An impasse was reached. On 6 January Kosygin had a series of meetings with Shastri and Ayub, which the Russians insisted
were held at the request of the two parties. On 7 January, Shastri and Ayub met without their aides. Ayub is reported to have agreed to the "non-use of force" to settle disputes with India instead of a no-war pact. Bhutto opposed this concession and the impasse continued. On 8 January, Shastri and Ayub were invited by Kosygin to a ballet. Things looked grim.

On 9 January, though Kosygin met Ayub and Shastri separately three times, the deadlock continued. Both sides offered little hope of a compromise and announced that they would return to their respective countries. Two days later, the conference looked like ending without a formal communique. On the 10th morning, Indian newspapers reported the failure of talks, but were soon to proclaim how great a success and diplomatic triumph the Tashkent Declaration was for all concerned.

Only after Kosygin undertook a desperate salvage operation lasting 14 hours did Ayub and Shastri agree. The Tashkent Declaration was signed on the evening of 10 January and with this Kosygin established the Soviet Union as a a major power in Asia. What made his triumph more significant was that two members of the Commonwealth of Nations had accepted the good offices of a third nation which was not a member of the Commonwealth on territory that was outside the Commonwealth. Nine hours after the declaration, 61-year-old Shastri died of a heart attack at Tashkent.

The agreement stipulated that the combatants withdraw their armed forces not later than 25 February to the positions they held before 5 August 1965. Prisoners of war were to be repatriated immediately and diplomatic relations resumed. Measures were to be considered for restoring economic and cultural relations and to discuss the refugee problem further. Meetings were to be continued at the highest and at other levels, on matters of mutual concern. The need to set up joint India-Pakistan bodies which would report to their respective governments on what further steps should be taken was recognized.

Both sides agreed to exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations in accordance with the UN Charter. They affirmed their obligation under the Charter not to use force and to settle
their disputes through peaceful means despite Bhutto’s sulking. They considered that the interests of peace in their region, particularly on the subcontinent, were not served by the continuation of tensions between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed and each side set forth its position.

Both sides compromised,\(^1\) contrary to their earlier boastful statements, making substantial concessions and claiming major diplomatic victories. Ayub’s stand was that if India did not withdraw from Haji Pir, Pakistan would stay on in the captured Indian territory. India therefore agreed to give up Haji Pir, in capturing which much Indian blood had been shed, and retention of which would have prevented further infiltration and resumption of guerilla warfare.

India also gave up its demand that Pakistan acknowledge its responsibility for the infiltrators and agree to prevent fresh guerilla attacks. Pakistan failed to get India to admit that Jammu and Kashmir was still in dispute. India and Pakistan reached limited agreement at Tashkent ostensibly because of Kosygin’s “friendly persuasion.”

The agreement was followed by a meeting of the Indian and Pakistani commanders, who disengaged their troops by 1,000 yards by 30 January. Withdrawal to the prewar positions was completed by 25 February with the minimum of friction. On 3 February, exchange of prisoners began. But soon after, mutual political bickering started and vitiated the Tashkent Declaration.

The future of the Declaration appeared dim when Ayub declared at Hamburg on 16 November 1966: “It settled nothing. All it did was to enable the two countries to disengage their armies from each other.” This is not what he said after the Declaration was signed and great hopes were aroused for India-Pakistan amity. This was a typical instance of Ayub’s double-talk.

\(^1\)India and Pakistan had speedily signed a ceasefire agreement owing to their dwindling stocks of ammunition, fuel, and spares as a result of supplies being cut off by the USA and Britain soon after this war began. The Soviets merely called upon both countries to display restraint and understand the grave consequences of resuming the armed conflict.
The conflict in fact further intensified the deeprooted hatred between the two countries. Both sides are now involved in an arms race. Pakistan is flirting with China, Russia, and the Western countries simultaneously, and India is wooing the Russians as also the powers in the West. This must lead to another clash between them sooner or later.

Moscow, despite Tashkent, continues to supply arms to both sides, thus tending to make them increasingly dependent on one Big Power and to provoke a second round of conflict instead of reducing tension.
CHAPTER NINE

The Enemy Speaks and Our Version

AN ACCOUNT of the India-Pakistan War of 1965 in Kutch and Kashmir was given by Gen Mohammed Musa, Pakistan’s Commander-in-Chief at the time, and was published in Dawn, Karachi, on 6 September 1969 as follows:

THE BATTLE FOR THE DEFENCE OF PAKISTAN: STIRRING SAGA OF QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY

"In defence defiance"—Winston Churchill.

"I was encouraged to write this article by the announcement in Dawn of 25 August in which it was indicated that the newspaper intended to bring out a special supplement to mark the Defence of Pakistan Day and to pay tributes to the heroic defenders of the motherland.

"To provide some background material to the main battles following India’s aggression on 6 September 1965, I would like to start with the one our forces were constrained to fight in the Rann of Kutch in 1965. India claimed a portion of the Rann, which formed part of Pakistan and which has since been awarded to her by the Kutch Tribunal. To back up her political ambition, she directed her forces in the area to creep forward and occupy as many of our important localities as they could.

"The Government of Pakistan, having failed to dissuade India to give up her false claims by other means, decided that force be used to eject the occupiers out of these places. As it was going to be our first real encounter with the Indian Army, we decided to deploy a slightly bigger force than was, perhaps, needed to achieve our mission. My intention was to ensure that, in this—our first battle—our opponents must get a humiliating military defeat so that, in the future they don’t take us for granted, or turn a covetous eye on our territory."
"The Infantry Brigade which was sent there initially under the command of Brig (now Maj-Gen) Azhar fought gallantly and contained the enemy till it was reinforced. The expanded force was placed under Maj-Gen (now Lt-Gen) Tikka Khan.

Difficulties

"Broadly, his plan was to hold the intruders in the Sardar Post region, which lies in the northwestern corner of the Rann, and to use his striking force, commanded by Brig (now Maj-Gen) Janjua, for attacking the enemy in the Biar Bet area. The deployment of the latter entailed considerable administrative difficulties. But, being determined to strike a hard blow at the intruders, the force was not in the least deterred by such hardships. It moved forward by night over a difficult terrain and attacked the defenders of Biar Bet at dawn.

"I don't think the enemy expected that our troops would undertake such a difficult and long approach march in the dark and must have been surprised to find them attacking from an unexpected direction. However, when dawn broke out, they fled in panic and left behind large quantities of war material. Foreign observers who visited these places also returned with the impression that the Indian Army did suffer a serious setback in its first encounter with the defence services of Pakistan.

"Shortly after this defeat the late Mr. Shastri, the then Prime Minister of India, declared that his country would take revenge at the place and time of her own choice. Maybe it was an empty, though boastful, threat meant to browbeat Pakistan politically. It did not produce the desired effect, because no one in this country had any sleepless night. The defence forces became more determined to repeat their Rann of Kutch performance should India decide to implement their Pradhan Mantri’s declaration.

"However, we decided to move a portion of our field Army to its concentration areas in both wings and to alert the field formations, which normally lived in cantonments such as Lahore, Sialkot, and Jessore, adjacent to the border. As tension between the two countries grew, we tightened up our security precautions. Practically the whole of the field force was moved forward from their
peacetime locations. These were precautionary steps to deal with any move India might make against Pakistan to divert the attention of her people from the Rann of Kutch defeat.

"In August 1965, Azad Kashmir Mujahids in sheer desperation raided certain areas in occupied Kashmir. Their patience was exhausted because the Kashmir issue had remained unsolved due to Indian intransigence since the partition of the subcontinent. India's army of occupation, which was nearly five times bigger than their opponents, retaliated by attacking the troops on the ceasefire line. In a few places, they even crossed it to a limited extent.

"These moves not only posed a serious threat to Azad Kashmir but would also have endangered the integrity of Pakistan. We, therefore, and also in order to fulfil our undertaking to the people on this side of the ceasefire line, decided to reinforce the Azad Kashmir army with contingents from the Pakistan Army.

"I feel this decision was unavoidable. We could not leave the people of Azad Kashmir and their forces at the mercy of the occupiers of their homeland; nor could we take any risk in regard to the defence of the country. Our self-respect and security were at stake and we thus had to face the situation squarely.

**Thrust Contained**

"Gradually, the Indian Army increased its pressure along the whole of the ceasefire line with the object of capturing Azad Kashmir on the pretext that it was the base for 'raiders.' By and large, their main and powerful thrusts against the vital and strategically important objectives were blunted. We contained them on the ceasefire line and launched a powerful counter-offensive from the Bhimber side across Jammu Tawi on the night of 31 August-1 September to capture Akhnoor and the bridge across the Chenab river.

"The Indian Army held the Chhamb Valley strongly. Their positions were elaborately prepared, barbed wired, and heavily mined. In many places, their automatic weapons were located in concrete pillboxes, which could be used for observation also. They could not afford to loose Akhnur, as its capture would have enabled us to literally throttle their forces in the valley.
New Commander

"At night, our counter-offensive force crossed the ceasefire line and reached Jammu Tawi by about noon the next day. Till then, the force was commanded by the late Maj-Gen Akhtar Malik, who was to hand over command to Maj-Gen (now our President) Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, as was originally planned, after our force crossed the river. For this purpose, Maj-Gen Akhtar Malik's successor and his headquarters had been moved to the battlefield so that they remained in the picture and could take over the conduct of operations without loss of time.

"I flew to the area in a helicopter and was present when the new commander took over. I felt my presence might be necessary, to give, if required, decisions on the spot. President-General A.M. Yahya Khan did not require any guidance or decision.

"He had studied the initial battle, the terrain and had already carried out an appreciation of how the enemy might react to his advance beyond the river. After carrying out certain adjustments, he directed his force to resume the advance. I returned to the GHQ and brought Maj-Gen Akhtar Malik with me so that he could proceed to his own headquarters and conduct the fighting in other parts of the ceasefire line.

Gallant Fight

"The enemy fought stubbornly. By then, the garrison defending the valley had been strengthened. Moreover, he used his Air Force (for the first time) after we crossed Jammu Tawi and created a threat to Jaurian. But, undaunted and very well led, our force fought their way forward gallantly. They captured Jaurian, which was heavily defended and where, it seemed, the enemy intended to stop our advance eastward. They were unsuccessful.

"The fall of Jaurian paved the way for the attack on Akhnoor, for which the force commander began his preparations. Unfortunately, he could not launch it due to India's naked aggression against Pakistan on 6 September.

"The way Indian Army troops fell back and abandoned their elaborately prepared positions in the face of our advancing force
left us in no doubt that the latter would capture Akhnoor although
it would have got involved in a very desperate battle with its
defenders. The force commander himself and all those under his
command were, very naturally, disappointed, because they were
certain of winning this battle also.

**Main Price**

"Akhnoor was the prize they had worked and fought for under
very adverse conditions. They had reached within a few miles of
the city, which one could see through binoculars from their
forward positions.

"When India used her Air Force against us in the Chhamb-
Jaurian battles, it indicated her state of desperation and lack of
confidence in her ground force to save Akhnoor. It also led us to
believe that the war in Kashmir might spread outside this dis-
puted territory. Anyhow, on the first day, they sent four fighter
aircraft against which our Air Force sent two. Each one of our two
pilots shot down two enemy planes, a superb performance which
must have shaken the attackers.

"In the evening of 4 September, while working in our control
room, we listened to the news broadcast by All India Radio. Among
other items, the announcer gave out that their Prime Minister had
stated in the Lok Sabha that afternoon that the Pakistan Army were
moving forward from Sialkot towards Jammu. To say the least,
we were surprised, because no such move had even been com-
templated by us. It was a blatant and naked lie, meant, perhaps, to
deceive not only the people of India, but also the outside world.

"I suspected that, with the fall of Akhnoor almost in sight,
Mr Shastri might have evil intentions against Pakistan, for which
he was preparing the ground, and, therefore, directed the Chief of
the General Staff (Maj-Gen Sher Bahadur) to alert the Army
and to get it moved to its battle locations. The Director of Military
Operation despatched an operational immediate signal to all con-
cerned, on the receipt of which they began to move forward.

"I might here mention that, in sending this order to the Army,
we took a big risk. If we had not so acted, the field Army would
have stayed where it was, and we would have been caught
unprepared when the invasion took place. On the other hand, the move towards the border of the Army would have confirmed Mr Shastri’s statement.

"After weighing the pros and cons of the two courses, we concluded that the risk entailed in keeping the Army in its concentration areas were unacceptable from the military viewpoint.

"It will be recalled that as tension grew between Pakistan and India, we retained the field army in its forward concentration areas, where it remained throughout the summer and rainy season as a precautionary measure.

"These areas were not too far back; thus, the Army was able to reach their battle positions when India launched her ignominious, undeclared and blatant aggression against our homeland at about 3-30 A.M. on 6 September. She thought we would be caught by surprise and her forces would meet no opposition in securing their objectives, which included the city of Lahore, despite Gen Chaudhuri’s denial that they intended to capture it on that day. Hence, perhaps, the confident and boastful promise by him to meet his officers at Lahore Gymkhana in the evening, and the announcement by a foreign radio that Lahore had fallen.

"The attack in West Pakistan was launched on a wide front—from Shakargarh to Fazilka. Their main thrusts were directed against Lahore and, later in the day, towards Kasur. All along the front, they met stiff opposition from our gallant forces and their advance was stopped on BRB (Ikhhogil) Canal after they had suffered heavy casualties. The fact that, in some localities, they were engaged in improving their positions did not, in the least, discourage them from taking on the attackers.

**Attacks Blunted**

"None of the places the enemy intended to capture fell. In Lahore, there was not even any sign of panic. Its brave defenders bled the enemy almost to death. In fact, except once or twice in one or two places, the enemy could not cross BRB Canal throughout the war, despite repeated and large-scale attacks by them. Those who got across were immediately pushed back.

"On the Lahore front, the enemy attacked along the two main
roads—Wagah-Lahore and Hariate-Lahore. On each of these approaches they had one infantry division supported by armour. The aggression on the Hariate road was delayed for about eight hours by the troops manning our advanced position a few miles away from the border. It consisted of one rifle company (approximately 100 men) armed with their personnel and a few anti-tank weapons.

"The company commander, Capt Shafqat Baluch, was wounded, but he remained in the field till his company was ordered to withdraw. This operation alone should show the predicament in which the enemy found themselves. That a force of about 100 human beings delayed the attackers' progress for so long is likely to have had an adverse effect on the enemy's morale, opened their eyes and must have made them think of the fate awaiting them on our main positions.

**Enemy Repulsed**

"Despite the enemy pressure and ceaseless efforts to make a dent in our position, our troops remained in occupation of the area they were in, even on the far side of the canal, till the end of the war. They ignored the threats to which they were exposed. Moreover, the force commander, Maj-Gen Sarfaraz Khan, launched a fairly powerful counterattack across the BRB, as a result of which the invaders on that front were driven back up to Wagah. Unfortunately, however, due to shortage of troops, we could not exploit this praiseworthy action.

"The enemy's advance on the Kasur front by about one infantry division and one armoured brigade was halted on the BRB Canal. He made several attempts to cross it, but did not succeed, despite the fact that, in this sector of the front, initially, we had a weak force stretched along the canal for about 15-20 miles. Further, it faced serious threats from two directions—Khem Karan and Ferozepor, from where it could be outflanked. The Senior Tigers (First East Bengal Regiment) made a name for itself by putting up a gallant fight. Its officers and other ranks were awarded the largest number of gallantry medals compared to any other units.

"As soon as the enemy advance came to a halt, Maj-Gen (now Lieut-Gen) Abdul Hamid attacked Khem Karan and captured it,
against determined opposition, with a small force. This operation entailed crossing of the same canal (BRB) which the enemy failed to negotiate with much larger forces throughout the war. Besides, shortly after Khem Karan fell, we launched a counter-offensive with our armoured division. The division had already crept forward and was ready to cross the canal, which it started doing on the night of 7/8 September, using an existing masonry canal bridge. Our engineers had inspected these bridges and were satisfied that our tanks could get across them.

"Unfortunately, however, after about 1/3rd of the division crossed the BRB, the bridge was badly damaged by a tank. The operation was discontinued, to our utter disappointment.

Another Bridge

"The force commander, Maj-Gen Abdul Hamid, and the armoured division commander Maj Gen Nasir, consulted us about their future course of action. Both of them, particularly Gen Hamid, were anxious that they be permitted to build another bridge themselves and resume the counterattack. We agreed, and our decision was endorsed by the Supreme Commander, although surprise had been lost and the enemy spared no effort, from the air and on the ground, to prevent us from constructing it. These attempts of the enemy proved abortive, as the bridge was built and the remainder of the division went across and started to advance towards its objective.

"On the whole, the terrain was suitable for tank warfare, but the force was badly handicapped by paucity of infantry to deal with the large number of the enemy's anti-tank weapons, located and concealed in very well-prepared positions. A tank is exposed to such weapons, and cannot, by itself, dislodge them as the infantry can. Further, the enemy used his armoured bridge (armed with Centurion tanks) defensively. Like their anti-tank weapons, their tanks were also well-hidden and protected. A canal on our left flank was breached and flooded the area over which our tanks were to advance. Due, mainly, to these reasons, our counter-offensive did not make headway within the time we expected. Meanwhile, the aggressors’ main offensive was launched on the
Sialkot sector, and we were constrained to pull out the bulk of our armour from Khem Karan for use in the Sialkot area.

"India could not tolerate the presence of the Pakistan Army there till the ceasefire came into force. She did her best to drive it out. Somehow, it appeared to be like a thorn in her side. She was sensitive to it. Maybe, she felt it would pose a threat to Amritsar and the rear of her divisions opposite Lahore.

"In the Sialkot sector, the enemy had one armoured division, based on Samba, and three infantry divisions, one of which was always available to support their armour. Thus, quantitatively, they were much stronger than the force we had there.

"Initially, the invaders attacked Sialkot with approximately one infantry division to capture the town or, if it failed, to contain its garrison. This attack failed, but their subsidiary aim was achieved, by and large. Later, he moved forward with his main striking element along the Samba-Chhawinda-Pasrur road, with the object of crossing the MRL south of Pasrur and then get to GT Road. As we were fairly certain of the attackers' intention, the corps commander (Lieut-Gen B. Rana) disposed of his troops to meet it.

"The enemy attacked Sialkot several times and all these attacks were repulsed. But he was able to make headway on the Samba-Chhawinda road by sheer force of numbers till his advance was held up in front of Chhawinda.

"By all military logic, he should have broken through, our dispositions and reached GT Road within a few days, because of (a) the great disparity between the opposing forces, (b) the fact that his armoured division had additional and powerful infantry support, whereas ours relied on its own measure infantry resources, (c) the terrain up to Shakargarh to the east and GT Road to the south was ideal for armoured warfare, and (d) he had the initiative to an extent, being the aggressor.

Desperation

"Despite these favourable factors, he did not even capture Chhawinda, against which he struck his head day and night for nearly a fortnight.
"A small contingent, commanded by Brig (now Maj-Gen) Abdul Ali, faced relentless assaults on it as a rock. Its position looked like a honeycomb due to the heavy shelling by artillery and tanks and air attacks. In these desperate efforts, the enemy suffered heavy casualties and losses in equipment. One foreign correspondent described the battlefield opposite Chhawinda as 'the graveyard of Indian tanks.'

_Aim Achieved_

"Why did Gen Chaudhuri, who boasted of being an expert in armoured warfare, use his armoured division on a very narrow front—between Zaffarwal and the eastern flank of the force defending Sialkot?—I don't know. With this powerful formation, which had more infantry support than it perhaps needed, he could carry out wide encircling moves.

"I believe he was asked this question in Delhi by a journalist. He stated that he was constrained to adopt this technique because both his flanks were threatened. It is a pity that the questioner did not know how serious these threats were.

"We did deploy on his flanks a tiny force to make him more cautious. They themselves, by vigorous and daring patrolling, perhaps gave the impression that they were larger in size than they actually were. Considering the overwhelming force the enemy hurled against them, the effects of these small detachments would have been like a fleabite. But we achieved our purpose.

"The deployment of the enemy armour on a restricted frontage compelled us take it on where it was operating. This strategy led to fierce tank versus tank battles. Sometimes, up to about 300 tanks fought in this manner. Our resources precluded encircling manoeuvres, which should be adopted, whenever it is feasible, when armour is used on a large scale. Both sides suffered tank losses, but, thanks to the superb performance of the PAF, the enemy had to lick a much bigger wound. Hence, perhaps, the statement by the foreign journalist to which I have referred.

"The aggressors, perhaps being certain of defeating us in the Chhawinda-Pasrur area, had brought forward to Samba their bridging equipment. We came to know of this daring move and
decided, in consultation with the PAF, to destroy it. Four aircraft were detailed for this mission. The enemy vehicles were packed together like sardines and our brave pilots, regardless of the serious danger to which they were exposed, performed their role with unbelievable results. A large proportion of the bridging material which our opponents had planned to use for the crossing of the canals south of Pasrur was set on fire.

**Retaliation**

“On the Fazilka front, our troops commanded by Brig (now Maj-Gen) Akbar, launched offensive operations when aggression took place and pushed the enemy back several miles inside his own territory. The commander himself, his officers and men were anxious to follow up the invaders, but as it might have involved us heavily in that region we suggested to them not to overstretch themselves.

“The enemy, having recovered from the initial shock, retaliated and kept on attacking our troops whenever, and wherever, they could. They must have found themselves in an awkward situation, in that, having had the initiative from the start, they failed to stop us from occupying their territory up to a depth we could afford to go.

“They could not find an excuse for explaining away such a disgraceful performance. All their exertions to drive us back proved ineffective. We remained in occupation of the areas captured by us up to the time when both sides withdrew as a result of the ceasefire agreement.

“Further south, India launched what was generally described even by a foreign radio station as the ‘second front’ with the object of capturing Hyderabad and other lower regions of the former province of Sind and the port of Karachi. Their advance on this front was not only stopped; our troops drove the enemy back and vigorously followed them till they captured Monabao railway Station.

“Although the enemy reinforced his force, we had to remain content with the contingent we had there until we were able to assist it. The commander (Maj-Gen Azhar) and all those under
his command were keen to continue their advance, but we dissuaded them from getting sucked in deeper in that sandy region, particularly when the much-publicized 'second front' had failed. They reluctantly agreed.

"North of Monabao, opposite Reti and Rahimyar Khan, a Hur Lashkar raided and occupied several enemy posts. We exploited their gains and sent a contingent of our Rangers to their assistance. As the force expanded and more areas were captured by us, it was reorganized and placed under the operational command of Brig (now Maj-Gen) Khuda Dad, who at that time was Director-General, West Pakistan Rangers. The enemy reacted violently to our occupation of their posts, which included a well-known fort, but could not drive us out, although in the southern part of this desert front they recaptured two small outposts.

"There appears to be some misunderstanding about the ceasefire which came into effect on 23 September, 1965. I might try to clarify it. The ceasefire proved reasonably effective only in the former province of Punjab. In Kashmir and Rajasthan, fighting not only went on for several weeks thereafter but was also intensified by India in certain areas. Naturally, we had to counter it.

"One morning, the commander of the UN observers came to see me in this connection with a message from General Chaudhuri to say that if we did not stop fighting in Rajasthan India would react more vigorously. The UN observer chief seemed perturbed and frankly told me that the violation of the ceasefire might lead to what he described as a 'second round,' and it might take place in Rajasthan.

"I asked him to tell the Indian C-in-C on my behalf on his return to Delhi that Pakistan was not afraid of another round and was prepared for it. Let Chaudhuri start it. He got further confused by my remarks, as he was genuinely anxious to get the two sides to observe the ceasefire agreement.

"In East Pakistan, India did not take any offensive action with her land forces. We were, however, fully prepared to fight it out had they attacked us there. She resorted to air attacks on Tejgaon and one or two other places. The PAF immediately retaliated and inflicted heavy losses on the intruders. With a few
fighter aircraft, the squadron leader in Tejgaon conducted a daring raid on the airfield near Calcutta and destroyed several enemy aircraft on the ground.

"In the air, the IAF was numerically about six times stronger than the PAF and had adequate radar cover and other operational facilities close to the border. Undaunted by such enemy preponderance over them, the PAF won the air battle within the first few days of the invasion. On one single day—September 7—they destroyed nearly 45 enemy planes in the air and on the ground as far as I remember.

"Besides fighting the air battle, the PAF provided, whenever required, badly needed close support to the Army. It seemed to be on its toes all the time. Its performance, while employed in this role, was staggering, as our gallant pilots risked their lives by resorting to very low-level attacks on the enemy tanks, guns, bases and troops, in order to inflict maximum losses on them.

"I find it difficult to describe the manner in which they drove the enemy air force out of the sky. Air raids on our bases did not bother them. I, personally, and I know that the whole Army, had nothing but praise for the PAF's superb leadership (under Air Marshal Nur Khan), courage of its officers and men, their stamina, professional competence, and devotion to our cause.

"True to their tradition of being a 'silent service,' the Pakistan Navy carried out its mission quietly and proved a really effective guardian of our seashores. Although heavily outnumbered by its opponents, it did not allow them to come anywhere near or cast a covetous eye against our territory.

"On the other hand, the then Naval C-in-C, Vice Admiral A.R. Khan, on his own initiative, ordered the raid on the Indian coastal fortification of Dwarka. His decision to bombard it was tantamount to taking the bit into his mouth and running away with the rein.

"We did not know that such a daring operation had been undertaken till it appeared in the press the day after it was launched. For us, in the Army, it was morale-boosting news. Naturally therefore, we were delighted."
"The Navy relentlessly patrolled the sea throughout the war and remained constantly prepared to take on the enemy if he dared to interfere with its activities. The mission given to it entailed great hardships on and risks for their crew. But its officers and men could not care less and spared no pain or effort in performing their onerous responsibilities. Their devotion to duty, professional skill, and patriotism were impressive.

High Morale

"The people of Pakistan in general, and the residents of the border areas in particular, also deserve great admiration for their contribution to, and sacrifice for, the defence of their homeland. They made it in their own way. In no place, regardless of its close proximity to the front line, was there any sign of panic. People stood firmly as a rock behind their fighting forces and went about their business fearlessly. The civil administration functioned normally and was not involved in evacuating civilians from the towns, since none left their homes. Their high morale and defiant attitude towards the invaders were inspiring.

"Those who lived in the areas which were overrun by the enemy suffered heavily. Most of them were constrained to leave their homes for the interior and left behind practically everything they possessed. But, very few of them ran away in panic or worried much about the losses so sustained by them. On the other hand, they faced these hardships defiantly and cheerfully and helped our regular forces in whatever way they could in the circumstances they were placed.

Dedicated Work

"We were in close touch with the Supreme Commander, who, in order to keep abreast of the developments in the battlefield, used to visit our control rooms personally for briefing and for giving us an overall political and strategic direction.

"At GHQ, practically the whole staff in general and those directly connected with operations in the battlefield in particular, worked round the clock till the end of the war. Their devotion, to their tasks, determination to make whatever contributions they could
to defeat the invaders, the hardships they suffered due to the tremendous pressure of work and lack of rest created great confidence throughout, and a deep impression on the field army.

"Those who were employed in the Directorate of Military Operations under Brig (now Maj-Gen) Gul Hassan seldom got any real break from their delicate responsibilities. The very nature of their functions precluded it.

"They had to study battles, keep a constant watch on the movements of the opposing armies, carry out quick appreciation of enemy intentions on the various fronts and of the steps our forces should take to deal with their opponents, issue orders, and receive reports which sometimes poured in from the frontline. Sleeplessness, pressure of work, constant vigilance, and fatigue did affect them physically, but quietly and confidently they went on with their work. For me, it was a great pleasure to work with them.

"Space doesn't permit me to mention, in more detail, the equally praiseworthy performance of the staff of other branches and directorates, such as the intelligence, signals, etc. They also conducted their duties with zeal, devotion, and determination under abnormal pressure.

"The Medical, Supply and Transport, Electrical, and Mechanical Corps and other services and field engineers never failed in looking after the field force. Working day and night, they ensured that whatever the troops in the front needed in the way of rations, water, ammunition, replacements of damaged equipment, etc., must reach them in time, and it did. Very often, they were exposed to ground and air threats, but such dangers did not make them deviate from their responsibilities. Without their patriotic efforts, the army in the field could not have defeated the enemy onslaught on it.

"Our casualties were evacuated from the front as quickly as our medical resources and battle conditions allowed. There was no avoidable delay in sending them back for treatment. In the initial stages, there was no time to expand the Medical Corps. The peacetime staff in our hospitals was suddenly faced with additional work. Casualties were attended to systematically. Very soon, arrangements were completed to cope with the extra load.
Doctors, nurses, and other medical corps staff took pride in attending to our casualties.

Casualties

"As regards the number of casualties, we estimated that the ratio was about 1 to 6. The stench of enemy dead bodies in certain areas was almost unbearable. To a great extent, our estimate is supported by Mr Frank Anthony’s statement in the Lok Sabha, in which he criticized the Indian Army High Command for providing incorrect figures. According to him, only in one sector of the front opposite BRB Canal, Indian casualties were 400 officers and 10,000 other ranks (Dawn, 25 May 1969). The IAF losses in aircraft were proportionately even greater—approximately eight times more than ours.

"In summing up, I would like to emphasize that:

"(a) India did not take Pakistan by surprise, although she violated international law, by invading us without any declaration of war. Pakistan’s forces were prepared to, and did, take on the invaders. In this connection, I recall the question a foreign journalist asked me. He wanted to know whether I was surprised by the aggressor’s moves. I suggested that he should put his question to General Chaudhuri to ascertain if he expected to find the Pakistan Army opposing his advance all along the front on which he attacked.

"(b) The great disparity in the sizes of the opposing forces was made up by our Services with their superior professional skill and defiant posture. It was, in a way, quality versus quantity.

"(c) Despite heavy enemy pressure, we launched two major and one fairly powerful counterattacks. Of the former, one was directed against Akhnur and the other towards Amritsar through Khem Karan. Even if one of the counter-offensive forces had reached its objective, the aggressor would have been placed in a much more serious predicament. The latter was a local one which pushed the enemy back to Wagah from BRB Canal. These operations have been explained in detail in the article."
“(d) When the ceasefire came, we were in occupation of Indian territory approximately three times larger than that they had captured in Pakistan. The areas in their possession on the far side of BRB Canal and in Sialkot were valuable, but so were Chhamb Valley, Khem Karan, and the territory beyond the Sulaimanki headworks which we possessed. I have left out the areas in Kashmir and Rajasthan both sides captured during and after the ceasefire.

“(e) Our martyrs gave their lives to save Pakistan. In the case of leaders, they were killed in the places where they should have been with units/sub-units under their command, commensurate with their ranks and functions. May God bless their souls.

“(f) I consider myself fortunate in being associated in a way with our Defence Services in general and with the Pakistan Army in particular in the fight for the security of our homeland. I am unable to express adequately in words the heroic deeds of all ranks of the Army. Their faith in God, courage, physical toughness, stamina to face indescribable hardships, professional efficiency, devotion to our cause and to their duty and determination with which they fought are borne out by the results they achieved.”

**OUR VERSION**

(a) The following report in the *Tribune*, Ambala, of 26 September 1965 of the press conference on the India-Pakistan war by Gen J.N. Chaudhuri and Air Marshal Arjan Singh at New Delhi on 24 September 1965:

690 SQUARE MILES IN OUR CONTROL
FIGHTING A REAL SUCCESS: CHAUDHURI

“It was disclosed to a press conference here today by the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen J.N. Chaudhuri, that India was in occupation of 690 square miles of Pakistani territory in the various sectors where fighting had taken place recently. Gen Chaudhuri estimated that Indian territory under the occupation of Pakistan would be 250 square miles.
“Gen Chaudhuri and Air Marshal Arjan Singh, Chief of the Air Staff, gave a summing up of the 22-day fighting and answered several questions. They were loudly cheered by pressmen, both Indian and foreign, when they entered the press conference hall in Vigyan Bhavan.

“As a result of the last 22-day fighting, Gen Chaudhuri said that in Kashmir the Indian armed forces were in occupation of three posts across the ceasefire line in Kargil, 20 square miles in Tithwal, about 200 square miles in the Uri-Poonch area, 180 square miles in the Sialkot area, 140 square miles in the Lahore sector, and about 150 miles in the Rajasthan area.

‘Pakistan was in possession of 190 square miles in the Chhamb area, 20 square miles in Punjab, and a number of posts in the Rajasthan desert. The posts in Rajasthan were intruded into during the last two or three days. The General said that their occupation of territory ‘did not mean much.’

‘Gen Chaudhuri said that in the last 24 hours there had been a number of ceasefire violations by Pakistan. Attempts had been made by Pakistan to occupy areas which had not been occupied by her before. These were being suitably dealt with. Gen Chaudhuri said that it was a difficult and dangerous situation when fighting was stopped suddenly and the armies of both sides were close to each other. Until a proper ceasefire observer group was set up, the violations might continue.

Second Front

‘Replying to questions, Gen Chaudhuri said that it was not possible to relieve the Pakistani pressure in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector in Jammu without opening a second front in West Punjab or elsewhere.

‘Asked about the future of Patton tanks and Sabre jets used by Pakistan, since a large number of them were knocked out by the Indian forces, Gen Chaudhuri said that all military equipment could really be used effectively. Some of the Sherman tanks used effectively by India were built in 1942-43. He implied by his answer that much depended on the personnel that used the equipment and the training they had received.
"Asked whether the Pakistan war machine had been badly mauled in the last 22 days of fighting, the General said that it would be a great mistake on his part to write off anybody as ineffective. It would also be a criminal folly on his part to think that anybody was ineffective.

"The Chief of the Air Staff said that air-to-air missiles had been used by Pakistan but since the air battles took place in lower altitudes—20,000 feet or below—they were ineffective. He added that the Sabre jets used by the Pakistan Air Force were also not effective in air battles at lower altitudes.

"Air Marshal Arjan Singh said that the Indian Air Force proved superior to the Pakistan Air Force because of the greater experience of the Indian pilots and the lower altitudes in which the air battles were fought. Aircraft like the Gnat were very effective in such air battles. When a correspondent asked whether India used ground-to-air missiles, the Air Marshal said: 'Not that I know of.'

"The Air Marshal said that India started the air battle in the Chhamb sector with nine MiGs supplied by the Soviet Union. Eight of the MiGs could still be seen in one of the Indian air bases. He ridiculed the Pakistani claims of damage inflicted on the IAF. He said if these claims were to be accepted then the Indian Air Force would be non-existent. India used only half of its Air Force to support the Army and air strikes. Only the planes belonging to the Western Air Command were used against Pakistan. Not a single aircraft was withdrawn from the Central or the Eastern Air Command, he said. According to the Air Marshal’s assessment, Pakistan started the operation with 104 Sabres and 24 B-57s. He felt that more than half of their aircraft had been damaged.

"The General said 'I have no comment' when a correspondent asked whether one Pakistan soldier was equal to three Indian soldiers as contended by some foreign correspondents in their despatches. The General was confident that India would be able to deal with the raiders effectively in Jammu and Kashmir.

"Dealing with the criticism why Indian forces did not capture Lahore or Sialkot, Gen Chaudhuri said that the Indian Army
never wanted to go into Lahore or Sialkot. It wanted to engage the Pakistan Army as much as possible and destroy it. He said that the Indian forces could have shelled Lahore airport if they wanted to.

"Referring to another criticism that deep thrusts had not been made into Pakistan territory with the help of tanks, the General said that the areas in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors were interspersed with big and small canals. There was also a lot of subsoil water in those areas. These were the reasons why deep plunging thrusts by tanks were not possible, nor did the Indian Army intend to make such thrusts.

"Answering the criticism why India did not have heavy tanks in the Chhamb-Jaurian sector, the General said, firstly, India did not have as many tanks as the Pakistanis. Secondly, by virtue of the ceasefire agreement, India could keep only a certain number of troops in Jammu and Kashmir. For Pakistan it was easier to bring their tanks and troops from their cantonments in Sialkot, Kharian, and Gujarat without much difficulty.

**Strategy**

"Explaining the strategy of the Pakistanis in the Chhamb sector, the General said that they wanted to run through to Akhnoor and then from there to Jammu. In such an event, they would have bottled up all the Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir and cut off the Indian lines of communication and achieved the object which the infiltrators till then had failed to achieve.

"Referring to the front which India opened in Rajasthan in the Barmer sector, the General said that the object was to keep the Pakistani forces that had taken part in the Kutch operations tied down there itself and prevent them from rushing to the help of the Pakistanis in the Lahore sector.

**Indian Aim**

"Dealing with the criticism why Indian forces did not occupy Lahore, Gen Chaudhuri said: ""We never really wanted to go to Lahore. We knew perfectly well that Lahore was very well defended. It had a canal system and a bunker system which would use
up a large number of troops. Also, entry into Lahore itself would achieve very little and a large number of troops would have been tied up in the area. The Indian aim was to cause attrition on the Pakistani superiority in armour. Pakistan at that time had two strong forces. One of these consisted of an armoured division and two infantry divisions. Another strong force was in the Sialkot sector defending Sialkot and obviously out to attack Jammu and Kashmir, if necessary. This force, too, consisted of an armoured division and two infantry divisions. Therefore, it was necessary to deal with that side as well, and consequently on 8 September, India put in a diversionary attack a fairly strong one, in the Sialkot sector with the intention of constraining the troops there.

"Asked why the Patton tanks proved ineffective, Gen Chaudhuri said: 'Frankly speaking, it is puzzling us a good deal. I am an old tank man myself. But the fact remains that a large number of Pakistani tanks were destroyed.'

"The General said that India used five types of tanks and the heaviest was the British-made Centurion—same as the American Patton but without the automatic devices. The Centurion tanks did adequately against the Patton. India had some Russian tanks but she did not use them. The General confirmed Pakistani reports that Lt-Col Anant Singh and some of his men had been captured by Pakistani forces. He said that there was a night attack by the Fourth Sikh Battalion commanded by Anant Singh. Unfortunately, this attack was not a great success and Lt-Col Anant Singh and 120 of his men, who ran into an ambush, were captured."

(b) The following account of the Lok Sabha debate on 24 September 1965 was published in the Indian Express, New Delhi, of 25 September:

DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS MUST CONTINUE
COUNTRY WARNED OF DANGERS AHEAD;
INFLTRATORS WILL BE THROWN OUT: SHASTRI

"The Prime Minister, Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri, warned the nation today, in winding up the daylong debate in the Lok Sabha on the UN Security Council resolution, of the 'dangers ahead' even after
the ceasefire that has just ended the armed hostilities between India and Pakistan. In giving the estimate of the ceasefire problems, he said: 'The defence preparedness must continue and the nation should not drop its guard.' He said further difficulties and complications might arise when we consider the subsequent steps. He drew pointed attention to the Pakistani threats of 'a bigger conflagration' engulfing the subcontinent.

"The Prime Minister declared that India would never allow any arrangement in Kashmir in which there would be possibilities in future of further Pakistani infiltration. He warned that if Pakistan did not own its responsibility and withdraw its infiltrators from Kashmir India would have no alternative except to 'deal with these infiltrators and force them out.'

"Mr M.C. Chagla, Union Education Minister, who presented India's case at the Security Council meeting, assured the House that it need not be under any misapprehension about the modalities of the ceasefire. He said the Security Council has been told in unmistakable terms that 'we shall not agree to any (troop) dispositions which will leave the door open for further infiltrators.' Mr Chagla declared: 'Despite all the idealism and justice on our side, India must become strong and powerful for her influence to be felt in the councils of the world.'

"The Lok Sabha adjourned sine die today after paying homage to the heroic officers and men of the armed forces and the airmen of the IAF who laid down their lives so that the country could remain free.

"The suggestion that the House stand up for a minute in silence came from the Prime Minister, who declared that the entire country had stood as one man to meet the aggression from Pakistan and it was this which gave strength to the nation. The six-hour debate served the major purpose of demonstrating to the world that whatever the differences among the different parties they were one in demanding that nothing should be done which would enable Pakistan to launch aggressions with impunity. In fact, the debate, which X-rayed the pros and cons of the Pakistani aggressions enabled members to look ahead and say that the country must become a power, self-reliant in every sphere on the economic, military and food fronts.
"In a day of stirring speeches, the exposition of Mr M.C. Chagla, who presented India's case before the Security Council, stood out prominently. Mr Chagla maintained that the Security Council resolution was a diplomatic reverse for Pakistan and that implicit in it was condemnation of Pakistan as an aggressor.

"Mr Chagla assured members that there need be no apprehension about the modalities of the withdrawal of armed personnel from the truce line. The Security Council had been told unequivocally that 'we shall not agree to any (troop) dispositions which will leave the door open for further infiltrators.'

"Since the resolution of Mr Bhagwat Jha Azad demanding that India should quit the Commonwealth was also before the House, the 'double-crossing tactics of the UK' came in for pointed attack. Mr Azad, who exhausted all the adjectives to run down the British (a nation of mean shopkeepers, etc.) said he would accept a substitute resolution which called for expelling Britain from the Commonwealth.

"Professor Hiren Mukherjee (Communist), who described Mr Harold Wilson as wearing the 'sheepskin of socialism' said, the British Prime Minister could 'put it in his pipe and smoke it' if he thought he could still push India around like a 'burra sahib.'

"The Prime Minister told the House in reply to the debate that he heard only one voice, the voice of patriotism, to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, no matter who the invader was. 'This is the voice of the sovereign will of the people,' he said. Mr Shastri referred to his call for unity and said unity of heart had been achieved in the fullest measure and demonstrated effectively in the critical days of the hostilities. This had been the biggest source of strength. Mr Shastri said the ceasefire had come about despite the intransigence of Pakistan. 'It is likely that when we are considering subsequent steps, further difficulties and complications may arise,' he warned and pointed to the bellicose utterances of President Ayub and his Foreign Minister Mr Z.A. Bhutto, who have threatened that the subcontinent may be engulfed in a bigger conflagration."
"The Prime Minister declared that he had made India's position absolutely clear in his letter of 14 September to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant. He had clearly told him that the resolution applied to both the regular forces and the infiltrators from Pakistan.

*Infiltrators*

"Pakistan must discharge all the responsibilities of withdrawing the infiltrators from Jammu and Kashmir. However, they continue to disclaim all responsibility for the infiltration, despite the report of the Secretary-General himself. If Pakistan persists in its attitude, India must deal with the infiltrators effectively and force them out,' Mr Shastri said amidst cheers. He added firmly that India would not allow any chance for the sort of infiltration to develop in the future. About Jammu and Kashmir, Mr Shastri said India's stand was firm and clear. 'This State is an integral part of India, a constituent unit of the federal Union of India. There is hardly any case for the exercise of self-determination. They (the people of Kashmir) have exercised their right of self-determination in three general elections,' he said amidst prolonged cheers.

"The Prime Minister acknowledged the unstinting support given to the government but cautioned that danger was ahead even after the ceasefire had become effective. He said defence preparedness must continue and the nation should not drop its guard.

"Referring to references to the Soviet Union during the debate, Mr Shastri said that country was sincere in its posture as a champion of peace as it knew of the horrors of war. The Soviet Union wanted to have a try at improving the relations between India and Pakistan, and India had welcomed the attempt. Since the diplomatic front had come in for a good deal of criticism, Mr Shastri put up a limited defence saying that 'on the present occasion' each one of the missions abroad had remained alert and vigilant. They had done a good job in keeping the governments to which they were accredited informed of the developments. But Mr Shastri said the attitudes of some governments were not dependent on the information given by missions of India as they had preconceived notions and prejudices.
"Mr Shastri, turning to the home front, said that the pace of defence preparations should be kept up since the forces would have to remain all along the frontiers. The country should be prepared for a good deal of sacrifice so that defence preparedness could continue. Indeed, the nation should be prepared to accept privations.

"Mr Shastri hinted that economic development might have to be slowed down and yield place to defence preparations. The nation should address itself to this task with faith in itself. 'Self-reliance must be the watchword,' he said.

"Before concluding, Mr Shastri requested the Speaker to convey the gratitude of the nation to the armed forces for the splendid work they had done in preserving India's integrity.

"Mr Hiren Mukherjee, leader of the Right Communist group, gave a broadside to the USA and the UK for their partisan attitude in favour of Pakistan and said the role of both these countries had been a 'long, sordid, dirty and dismal story.'

"The House cheered him when he declared that if aggression came from Pakistan or her ally China, or there was an attack on India's interests or integrity by 'Pakistan's wily patrons from the West with their CENTO and SEATO and other vile instruments of international banditry,' India would meet the challenge.

"Mr Mukherjee said both Pakistan and her Western allies and China had all united in putting pressure on India for accepting Rawalpindi's blackmail conditions, but the valour of the Indian Army had proved superior to the sophisticated machines from the imperialists. 'Our, jawans have literally massacred the much-vaunted Patton tanks,' he said amidst cheers.

"Mr Mukherjee said that Pakistan and her allies would have to live down the shame of using napalm bombs on civilians, bombing of civilian localities and the shooting down of a civilian plane carrying the Chief Minister of Gujarat and his wife. Many parts of the world did not know of the atrocities committed by Pakistan, and India should tell them about these and also bring out the sordid fact that it was by this criminal action that the so-called civilized countries, the UK and the USA, stood.
"Mr Mukherjee complimented the Defence Minister’s gesture to East Pakistan by assuring it that India would not open a front there in spite of the aggression. President Ayub shouted from the housetops that Islam was in danger, and yet there had been communal peace in East Pakistan. Mr Mukherjee said Badshah Khan had raised his banner against President Ayub and demanded that India should bend its energies to end Ayubism.

"Dr R. M. Lohia (Socialist) said he warmly welcomed the speech of Mr Chagla who spoke like a judge for the best part of his speech but acted the jawan for five minutes when he said that a country could command respect only if it was a power. He said the Security Council was in many respects behaving like the League of Nations. The Council would turn a blind eye to what happened in Vietnam, or what the Soviet Union did to Hungary. It would only interfere with small nations

"Dr Lohia said India had its heart turned towards the Soviet Union while physically it was tagged to the UK. This should go. He reminded the House that Jordan, which played the game of Pakistan in the UN, was a creation of the British. He wanted India to change its policy and turn its attention to Afghanistan, Nepal, Malaysia, the Soviet Union, and the USA, which were likely to be friendly.

"Mrs V. L. Pandit (Congress) complimented the leadership of Mr Shastri, who had shown guts in dealing with Pakistan. She had shared the general apprehension about the outcome of the UN resolution but had now become encouraged after hearing Mr Chagla. In the ultimate analysis, it was the strength of the soldiers and the airmen and not armour as such that counted.

"Mrs Pandit said there was nothing sacrosanct in a particular policy. If the policy of the country had to be reassessed it was just the thing to do in a changing world. Ceasefire was no peace. At best it was an uneasy peace. Until the world branded Pakistan an aggressor there was no meaning in relaxing the nation’s efforts. India should step up her defence production, increase food
production and ensure that stronger and tougher specimens were
turned out among its citizens.

"Mr Mohammed Ismail (Muslim League) wondered what kind
of resolution the Security Council has passed. It had not branded
Pakistan as the aggressor. The word 'self-determination' was
bandied about. Self-determination for whom, Mr Ismail asked.
If it was for the Kashmiris, they had already expressed them-
selves. Mr Ismail asked amidst laughter what kind of observers
the UN had if they could not say who the aggressor was and
who the victim.

"Acharya J. B. Kripalani (Independent) said the valour and
heroism of the jawans and the airmen reminded him of Rajput
bravery and chivalry. He hoped that India would be worthy of the
sacrifices made by them.

"There could be no status quo in a changing world, Mr Kripalani
said, and added that rethinking of the foreign and home policies
was imperative. There was no harm in India calling itself a non-
aligned country, but it should keep alive its diplomatic strategy
and tactics in a fluid condition. There should be no permanent
enemy and no permanent friend and only friends in need.

Power Politics

"Mr Kripalani attacked the UN for having become a centre of
power politics. If the theory was to prevail that Kashmir as a
predominantly Muslim State should go to Pakistan, would the UN
accept responsibility for the 50 million Muslims of India, he asked.
He was against any talks with Pakistan unless it was made clear
that nationality was not coexistent with religion. The present
ceasefire line was not a scientific one, having been drawn to placate
world opinion.

"Mr Kripalani said India should befriend Israel, which it had
shunned. Israel had the knowhow and had solved problems similar
to the ones which India had faced.

"Mr Peter Alvares (PSP), who initiated the discussion, demand-
ed that there should be no disengagement or withdrawal of troops
to the old ceasefire line till the military experts were satisfied that
it had been made physically impossible for Pakistan to send
infiltrators of armed personnel into India. He was sorry that there had been a shift as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.

"Dr L. M. Singhvi (Independent), Mr A. C. Guha (Congress), Mr P. K. Deo (Swatantra), and Mr U. M. Trivedi (Jana Sangh) supported government's action and demanded that there should be no withdrawal to the 5 August positions."
CHAPTER TEN

International Forces

Given below are the estimated strengths of the American, the Russian, and the Chinese Armies and Air Forces so that we can understand what a strong, modern defence set up is. Also given are details of the Indian and Pakistani forces to show what may be pitched against us in battle in the foreseeable future. These estimates are based on data given in *The Military Balance, 1969-70*, and *1970-71*, of the Institute for Strategic Studies, London. In addition, details are given of the British forces so that we may be able to assess the developing pattern in the Indian Ocean region.

From these figures the reader will be able to comprehend how strong certain countries are and how important it is for us to keep strengthening ourselves, quietly, in the context of present-day world tensions, without boastful public statements such as are made periodically by some of our politicians.

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

| Population | 205 million |
| Defence budget estimates, 1970-71 | $71,791 million |
| Total armed forces | 3,161,000 |
| Strategic offensive forces | |
| Landbased missiles—490 Minuteman-I and 500 Minuteman-II, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (I.C.B.M.) are operational, 54 launchers (6 squadrons of 9 missiles each) of the Titan-II Liquid-fuelled ICMB remain in service. |
| Army | 1,363,000 |
| 16 operational divisions, 5 Independent |
infantry and airborne divisions, 5 armoured cavalry regiments, 7 special forces groups, 38 surface-to-surface missile battalions, and about 200 independent aviation units. The army operates about 11,000 aircraft, including 9000 helicopters

Reserves. Army National Guard consists of some 400,000 men capable in about five weeks, on mobilization, of providing 8 divisions, 21 separate brigades. Army Reserve has an average paid strength of 260,000 and acts chiefly as a reinforcement pool 810,000

6500 combat aircraft, with 400 reserves; the Air National Guard has about 1,500 aircraft

SOVIET UNION

Population
244 million

Budget
17.9 billion roubles ($39,800 million)

Total armed forces
3,305,000

Strategic rocket force
350,000

Army
2,000,000, plus 230,000 paramilitary forces, 157 infantry divisions, including 50 tank and 7 airborne divisions, plus 2,100,000 reserves

The 157 divisions are located as follows: East Germany 20, Poland 2, Hungary 4, Czechoslovakia 5, European USSR (west of Urals and north of Caucasus) 60, Central USSR (between Urals and Lake Baikal) 8, Southern USSR (Caucasus and West Turkestan) 28, and in Sino-Soviet border area 30, of which 3 are in Mongolia

Air Force

480,000

10,200 combat aircraft
### International Forces

#### NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE USA/USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delivery system</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>1,074*</td>
<td>1,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRBM/MRBM</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other land-based missiles</td>
<td>(750)</td>
<td>(400)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>280</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other naval missiles</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>362</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long range bombers</td>
<td>2,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other aircraft</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>2,200</td>
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<td><strong>Approximate total</strong></td>
<td>7,502</td>
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</table>

*US Secretary Melvin Laird is reported to have said in Washington on 2 November 1970 that the USSR had 1,400 ICBMs, 350 more than the number possessed by the USA.

**CHINA**

**Population**

750 million

**Budget**

US $4,800,000,000

Estimates of the Chinese budget vary: Japanese military authorities put it at as much as $7,250 million

**Total armed forces**

2,780,000

**Army**

2,450,000

- 108 infantry divisions
- 20 artillery divisions
- 5 armoured divisions
- 3 cavalry divisions
- 2 airborne divisions

**Total**

138 divisions

4 army divisions are located in Sinkiang and 4 in Inner Mongolia; there are about 10 divisions in Tibet

In addition, security and border troops number 300,000; civilian militia is 200
millions, with an effective strength of 7
million

Air Force
180,000
2800 combat aircraft
There are about 25 airfields or airstrips in
or around Tibet.

China probably has a stockpile of 100 hydrogen bombs or
hydrogen missile warheads and has already developed ICBM
capability. It is expected to develop shortly missiles carrying
atomic warheads with a range of 5,000 miles beyond its borders,
bringing all Indian cities within range. At present they have a
range of over 1,500 miles, sufficient to do us damage.

BRITAIN

Population
55,775,000
Total armed forces
390,000
Defence budget,
1970-71
£2380 million ($5712 million)
Army
190,000
19 armoured and armoured reconnaissance
regiments, 52 infantry battalions, 3 par-
achute regiments, 6 Gorkha battalions,
28 artillery battalions and 13 engineer
regiments; they are organized in 2
armoured, 12 infantry, one parachute,
and one Gorkha brigade

Air Force
113,000
720 combat aircraft

PAKISTAN

The following estimates shown in the Military Balance (1970-71)
of the Institute for Strategic Studies regarding the Pakistan Army
and Air Force are an understatement in many respects.

Population
128 million
Budget
3,000 million rupees ($625 million)
Total armed forces
324,500 (excluding 200,000 frontier corps,
tribal levies and others)
International Forces

Army

300,000
2 armoured divisions, 1 independent armoured brigade, and 11 infantry divisions

Air Force

15,000
270 combat aircraft

Note 1: Pakistan has built up its forces further, according to my personal assessment, and I estimate the latest strength as follows: (a) Regular forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) 400,000; (b) POK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir forces) 40,000; and (c) Paramilitary forces (Frontier corps, lightly armed tribal levies and local defence units) 225,000. Total: 665,000.

Note 2: (a) Pakistan has 20,000 Mujahids and approximately one million Razakars for "civil defence." (b) Guerilla forces. According to a statement by our Defence Minister in the Lok Sabha on 25 March 1970, Pakistan has set up an organization for sabotage and subversion in Jammu and Kashmir. It has trained and armed a large number of Al Burq (lightning) in guerilla tactics in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Al Burq is the militant wing of Al Mujahid. It is trained by Chinese instructors in sabotage and subversion. Its members are taught to speak the local dialects and masquerade as fakirs, maulvis, granthis, and pandits. Volunteers (students, teachers, and demobilized military personnel up to the age of 35) are recruited at Friday meetings in mosques in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and West Pakistan. Efforts are being made to seek the help of a number of countries in West Asia, including the United Arab Republic, in collecting arms and money.

PAKISTAN
(My estimate based on various published sources)

1 Tanks
(a) USA

Pattons 355
Shermans 390 (not all in proper condition)
Chaffes 200

945
(b) China

T-34  80 (old Russian tanks China has given Pakistan)

T-59  250 (Chinese version of the Russian T-54 China has given Pakistan)

330

(c) Soviet Union

T-55  150 (similar to T-54 tanks China has given Pakistan)

(d) Captured from us in 1965

14 (AMX)

Total 1439 (800 in 1965)

2 Divisions

Infantry  14 (there were 8 in 1965)

Armoured  3 (there was 1 in 1965)

Total 17

3 Combat Aircraft

(a) USA

Star fighters (F-104)  15

Sabre jets (F-86)  165

Canberras (B-57)  32

212

(b) France

Mirage-III  84

(c) China

MiG-19  100

(d) USSR

IL-28 light bombers  26

(e) Miscellaneous

25

Approximate Total 447 (200 in 1965)
The *Times of India*, New Delhi, of 18 September 1970, reported that Pakistan was in the process of buying 30 Mirage-V multi-mission aircraft capable of low-level navigation and all-weather ground attack.

**Note 3:** (a) Pakistan has, according to a recent assessment, acquired an extremely sophisticated communication system. It has also recently acquired 300 armoured personnel carriers, 7 B-57 bombers, and a squadron of F-104 Star fighters. Pakistan has about 25 squadrons equipped with dual-purpose fighter-bombers. Against this, some of the IAF aircraft are obsolete (Mysters and Hunters need early replacement). Even MiGs have little endurance. The Indian armed forces are larger in number than those of Pakistan, but they have to guard a long frontier with China in addition to that with Pakistan. (b) The Pakistanis are convinced that their armoured operations against us failed in the Punjab theatre in 1965 because the infantry, which must follow up the armour, failed to do so as it lacked armoured personnel carriers to transport it over the bullet-swept forward areas in battle. Hence Pakistan’s recent deal with the USA for 300 armoured personnel carriers.

**INDIA**

| Population | 550 million |
| Budget     | 11,001 million rupees ($1,466.8 million) |
| Total armed forces | 930,000 (excluding police, border guards, and other paramilitary units) |
| Army       | 800,000 |
|            | 13 infantry divisions |
|            | 10 mountain divisions |
|            | 1 armoured division |
| **Total**  | **24** |
|            | 1 independent armoured brigade |
|            | 6 independent infantry brigades |
|            | 2 parachute brigades |
| Trained reservists | 100,000 (including 44,000 Territorial army) |
| Border Security Force: | 100,000 |
**Tanks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Soviet Union</td>
<td>T-54 and T-55</td>
<td>450</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PT-76 (amphibian)</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>600</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) USA</td>
<td>Shermans</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stuarts</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>300</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Britain</td>
<td>Centurions</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) France</td>
<td>AMX-13</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) India</td>
<td>Vijayanta</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1490</strong></td>
</tr>
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**Artillery pieces**

- 3,000

**Air Force**

- **Combat aircraft**
  - 90,000
  - (a) Britain
    - Hunter F-56
    - Gnat Mk-I* (150)
    - Vampires
    - **Total**
    - 350
  - (b) Soviet Union
    - SU 7
    - MiG 21
    - **Total**
    - 260
  - (c) France
    - Mystere IV
    - **Total**
    - 60
  - (d) USA
    - Canberras
    - (B-1 light bombers)
    - **Total**
    - 50
  - (e) India
    - HF-24 Marut
    - **Total**
    - 25

*Made under licence in India.*

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Military Lessons

I HAVE REPRODUCED in full in Chapter Nine an article by General Musa published in the Dawn, Karachi, 6 September 1969. This is followed by a report in the Tribune, Ambala, 26 September 1965, of a press conference given by General Chaudhuri and the Air Chief, Air Marshal Arjan Singh, in New Delhi on 24 September 1965, and a report in the Indian Express, New Delhi, 25 September 1965, of a debate in the Lok Sabha the previous day on the Security Council resolution on ceasefire. The study of these reports would inevitably lead intelligent Indians to conclude that we cannot live in a world of make-believe but should examine closely the course of history, especially military history, and draw lessons from it. Some of the military lessons we should learn from the events of September 1965 and similar conflicts earlier, are summed up below. If we grasp their full significance, we shall probably be spared the folly of repeating the same mistakes when similar situations arise in the future.

The First Indo-Pak War (1947-1948)

The 14-month-long first India-Pakistani war of 1947-48 was of a limited character, though it was fought bitterly. Neither India nor Pakistan were strong enough to fight for long as a result of World War II. Therefore, when the two countries clashed in October 1947, they fought in spasms and signed a ceasefire agreement in the end.

Each side was headed by a British C-in-C. Caring little for national or international considerations, and imbued only with a desire to serve the vested interests of the British Raj, these commanders were constantly in touch with each other telephonically comparing notes.
Despite handicaps, the Indian Army was superior to that of Pakistan in 1947-48 and should have won the war. Instead, it allowed operations to slip into a stalemate. This was because India remained on the defensive and was hesitant nearly all through. Its planners in South Block, New Delhi, were of little timely assistance to our troops.

Although the advantage in the air lay with us, our few offensives never got into swing for lack of punch and logistic support. The real stake lay in whether we could retain the whole of Jammu and Kashmir as a bulwark of Indian defence astride Central Asia, but of this point the High Command in New Delhi showed little conception.

By seeking the intervention of the Security Council, and starting a tradition of ceasefires (one in 1948 and two in 1965) instead of fighting to the bitter end for a righteous cause no matter what the odds, the Indian leaders got bogged in the quagmire of international power politics, from which the country has yet to drag itself out. A high military command whose eyes are glued on the UN or similar bodies for justice as in our case can never generate confidence and pursue field operations successfully in Kashmir or anywhere else.

India sent to the Jammu and Kashmir operations ad hoc formations, units and individuals piecemeal instead of well-trained groups like brigades or divisions together. We repeated this mistake in 1962 against the Chinese. There was therefore a lack of coordination and team spirit, with obvious disadvantages.

In an area like Kashmir, there should have been a Supreme Commander like Mountbatten for the Southeast Asian theatre in World War II—in charge of all political, military, and economic affairs. Instead, there were many heads in charge of different departments pulling in different directions.

Although we had air supremacy, we used our aircraft in penny packets. If we had knocked out major enemy targets on the routes leading into Jammu and Kashmir, such as the Domel and Palandri bridges and Mirpur, we would have relieved the pressure against us on certain battlefields.

The logistical backing of our fighting troops was inadequate,
and as a result balanced forces could not be committed to battle. Our fighting forces were not provided with adequate intelligence about the enemy, and this resulted in many unpleasant surprises. Lastly, no worthwhile directive was given to our forces in Jammu and Kashmir in 1948 by either our military High Command or by our political leaders in Delhi.

The Korean War, 1950-1953

The USA and the UN were psychologically unprepared for the war in Korea, having recently disbanded the world's most powerful military machine. American soldiers were mentally not motivated to fight on for long. They were always thinking of home and comfort. Also, this war, from the US point of view, was too far from home base, which created many operational and administrative problems. The Chinese met with many successes because they resorted to improvisation in battle, apart from fighting spiritedly, whereas the US forces depended too much on conventional equipment and methods.

The Chinese camouflage and concealment was of the highest standard despite the air supremacy enjoyed by the Americans. They repaired their damage very rapidly and escaped much destruction. Importance of night attack, infiltration tactics, and improvisation was emphasized time and again in these operations. Austerity scales of logistics, as observed by the Chinese, including rations and clothing, scored over the luxury scales available to the US troops. Unconventional warfare, including commando raids and ambushes, scored over stereotyped and orthodox warfare. American patrolling was limited and not deep enough, and sufficient information about the enemy did not become available. This brought many surprises. The theory of the Chinese "human waves" against well-sited defences and modern firepower was exploded. The North Koreans and the Chinese displayed a grim will to fight. Even Chinese women participated in almost every department of their forces.

When the Inchon landing was declared an impossible operation by all experts, Gen MacArthur's outstanding leadership accomplished this task. Command of the sea proved to be an essential
prerequisite to largescale operations. MacArthur’s dismissal before the operations completely established civilian supremacy over the military.

To operate from a long distance, as the Americans tried to do in Korea, against a big power like China on a limited scale, without using atomic weapons and without going for the enemy bases, was an impossible task and resulted in a stalemate.

India-China War, 1962

In 1962, China had some 10 divisions based in Tibet. This force was almost equal to the total strength of the Indian Army at the time, and commanded good mobility and efficient central direction. Three to four divisions operated in Ladakh as well as in NEFA, with often a brigade pitched against a battalion of ours, maintaining a superiority of three to one. Long preparations had preceded the massing of troops and material against India, including a regular hive of intelligence in the northern border areas. The Chinese soldiers were acclimatized to high altitudes. The enemy had laid out a network of highways as a result of years of enterprise which proved a great asset to them.

The requirements of the Chinese soldier were few. His uniform was warm and padded and his food simple enough to be carried in a sling around his belly. The Chinese had trained their units in mountain and guerilla warfare, close combat, night warfare and had provided their troops with adequate logistics. As in Korea, each Chinese rifleman in the attacking wave in NEFA was supported by two others carrying his urgent logistical requirements. Earthmoving machinery and automatic saws were carried by a special labour corps which accompanied the troops and also performed other support functions. They managed to get their guns and heavy wheeled transport over high elevations. The 16-mile road from Bum La to Towang, built in a fortnight, was no mean achievement and an excellent piece of engineering.

The war came as a result of many miscalculations on the part of India. We lacked almost everything China possessed. Above all, we lacked a national Cabinet trained in grand strategy and in
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planning and conducting a war. The bulk of our forces were pinned down on the India-Pakistan border, so that insufficient forces could be poised against possible Chinese aggression. Our troops were unfamiliar with the terrain in NEFA and unacclimatized. They were not sufficiently trained in guerilla, jungle, or mountain warfare.

There were few good roads, if any, through the high mountains which could be relied upon for uninterrupted logistical support for a fast build-up of our men and material. Air transport was limited and conditioned by weather. The old-type rifle of the Indian soldier was no match for the more modern Chinese weapons. We had vastly inferior forces pitted against the Chinese not only in numbers but also in weapons and equipment. We had little intelligence about Chinese aims and objectives at the time. Only a few of our formations and units fought stubbornly enough, and not one Chinese body or prisoner fell into our hands.

Instead of an impartial national commission of inquiry, as would have been appointed in any other democratic country, an official and restricted committee investigated the reverses suffered by the Indian Army on the Ladakh and NEFA fronts. With the advantage of hindsight and directed by the new military “leaders” who wished not only to exhibit their own proficiency and enhance their military reputations but at the same time to malign certain personalities whose evidence they did not record, the Committee reviewed various aspects of these operations. Unfortunately, its proceedings were shelved by the government. Some traitors in our administration, civil and military officials, divulged not only the findings of this enquiry but also other national secrets to Neville Maxwell—who was correspondent of the Times (London) in New Delhi at that time—in the hope that he would, as he did, build up their image at somebody else’s expense. This committee failed to draw public attention to our faulty national policy and defence control. Defence Minister Chavan made a statement on the NEFA operations in the Lok Sabha on 2 September 1963, listing the causes of our failure under five heads; training, equipment, system of command, physical fitness of troops, and
capacity of commanders to influence men. He made no reference, however, to the many failures on the part of the government.

**The Second Indo-Pak War, 1965**

Before the commencement of the hot war in 1965, infiltration and subversion in Jammu and Kashmir were organized systematically for the first time by Pakistan. This was part of a military strategy cleverly evolved to implement political policy after the manner of the Communists in Korea and Vietnam. The Pakistanis have been studying the Israeli and the Vietnamese method of softening the opposition by guerilla warfare and delivering the *coup de' grace* by their regular forces and will use this knowledge in their next round with India.

This conflict brought out certain vital facts; that God is irrevocably on the side of big legions; that the world respects military strength; that dependence on other countries is dangerous; that we must be as self-sufficient as possible; that we should never again allow a foreign power to settle our affairs, as every nation cares primarily for its own interests in its dealings with others; and that a hasty ceasefire does not solve but only postpones the day of reckoning.

**Six-Day Israel-UAR War, 1967**

The lessons we should learn from this War are:

1. A united, disciplined, and efficient nation with a population of about three million tore apart 30 million disorganized Arabs in less than 100 hours. This miracle was due to outstanding leadership, sound plans, speedy implementation, determination and courage displayed by a first-class national armed force.

2. The Israelis were fighting for survival. They knew that if they lost, their country would be destroyed together with all its inhabitants.

3. In his dedication to Lost Victories, the German General Von Manstein avows that he could never have accomplished anything in World War II without the spirit of the German soldier. Many spirited actions were performed by the Israeli soldier in
this war spontaneously and without being told, and this led to remarkable achievements.

(4) As aptly stated by Liddell Hart: "Natural hazards, however formidable, are inherently less dangerous and less uncertain than fighting hazards. All conditions are more calculable and all obstacles more surmountable than those of human resistance."

(5) The organizational flexibility of the Israeli combat teams stood them very well. Instead of being of fixed size and rigid pattern, their composition varied with their different tasks and with the changing developments of battle.

(6) The Israeli Air Force destroyed its Arab counterparts and gained air superiority over the battlefield speedily. It did this by destroying most of the enemy aircraft on the ground and rendering their runways unserviceable in less than three hours, through high technical skill, maximum utilization of its planes, and the high calibre of its pilots and their valour.

(7) The effective and determined employment of Israeli armour resulted in carrying out different ranges of combat missions. For instance, their armour broke through fortified enemy localities, made encircling movements over mountainous and desert terrain, normally considered uncrossable by armour, while utilizing to the maximum degree the elements of fire and movement and pursuing a retreating enemy in order to block his route of withdrawal.

(8) The Israelis deployed their armour in larger concentrations by using its shock power and mobility significantly. Their armour dashed forward with elan and without affording protection to its flanks and rear, deriving full benefit from deep penetration into the enemy rear and causing the collapse of his power of resistance. Emergence of the armour at unexpected places and times forestalled enemy efforts to counter such moves.

(9) The greatest surprise was sprung by the Israelis by constantly throwing their opponents off balance.

The War in Vietnam

A small but united, courageous, and disciplined nation like North Vietnam has had the baptism of fire for the last twenty-five years. During this period the North Vietnamese people fought with
determination, through unconventional techniques of guerilla warfare, far more powerful adversaries on whom they inflicted crushing defeats. They have proved how a highly motivated nation can keep resisting indefinitely, and triumph against the heaviest odds.

Obviously, the Pentagon has learnt no lessons from the stunning defeat Marshal Giap, the legendary leader of the North Vietnamese forces, inflicted on the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

*Lessons of War with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965)*

There are six basic lessons we must learn from the war with China in 1962 and that with Pakistan in 1965. These are:

(1) In the event of a confrontation with any other power in the future, we must be prepared to stand on our own as none else would like to be embroiled in our problems unless their own interests dictate that they do so.

(2) If we want assistance from other countries against China and Pakistan in a future war, last-minute negotiations would be futile. Only long-term action shapes the international postures of the countries concerned. Our foreign, defence, and economic policies should therefore be formulated and correlated years in advance. Men of the highest calibre should be placed at the helm in these three areas of policy-making.

(3) Our external and internal intelligence services should be reorganized, manned and equipped adequately so that they may collect and disseminate political, economic, and military intelligence correctly and speedily. They should be given sufficient finances and government backing for this purpose.

(4) Our forces should be given systematic military training of a type suited to the tasks assigned to them, and they should be positioned suitably and in good time. Last-minute hasty preparations and movement of troops and equipment serve no useful purpose, especially against a powerful foe which has taken the initiative. We should make timely and determined use of the Air Force to gain the upper hand.

(5) It is no good getting involved in wars in future and signing a ceasefire agreement after a few days of fighting. This results in unnecessary waste of money and life. If we decide to fight and
can extract a decision by doing so, we should resist international pressures for a ceasefire.

(6) We should anticipate rather than follow events in future and keep our potential enemies at bay through diplomatic action, thus giving us time for manoeuvre. We should study the pattern of behaviour and ways of warfare of our possible enemies and train our forces accordingly. Our leaders must mobilize our total resources and inspire the nation and the fighting forces with the will to fight till success crowns their efforts.
PART II

National Affairs

And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name.

—Genesis xi, 4
CHAPTER TWELVE

Crisis in Leadership

Most of our present troubles can be traced to indifferent leadership. So long as we do not elect good leaders at different levels, our country will not progress. The main ingredients of leadership are character, the personality to inspire confidence in others, knowledge, initiative, determination, honesty, decisiveness, patriotism, and the capacity for sacrifice.

Knowledge is useful only when backed by experienced judgment, sound common sense, dependability, shrewdness, the right sense of timing, and simplicity of approach. Initiative depends on how much ahead of situations one can think in advance. A good leader prepares for all foreseeable contingencies and ensures that the unexpected never takes him by surprise. By taking the initiative, he makes certain that he is never off balance and compels his opponents to make mistakes. In this process, one must curb the style of one’s subordinates or steal their thunder.

A leader must make swift and sound decisions which are in the national interest without vacillating, and must adhere to them. He should never put his own interests before those of the nation. Only then will people follow him in prosperity and adversity alike. He must also grasp quickly the essentials of a problem and make it clear to all concerned what his intentions are and then ensure resolutely that his subordinates implement his orders.

A leader must organize his followers efficiently and select others under him impartially and on merit. He should never tolerate incompetence or dishonesty, which must be dealt with mercilessly as they can result in considerable harm in many ways. He should select the right men and women for the right job and should be flexible enough to accept and utilize the ideas of others. He should give an inspiring lead to his team and set a high example of courage and character.
Courage makes a leader stand up to various pressures from unfavourable events, unscrupulous and powerful adversaries and from members of one's own team. It enables him to take full control in a challenging situation which he combats resolutely. Contests are always a battle of wills between opposing leaders. Will-power in leaders is therefore essential to achieve success.

When all is at stake, the irresistible will of the leader alone produces superhuman effort, enabling speedy and correct decisions, implicit actions and eventual success. Qualities of mind are wasted in a leader who succumbs to adverse circumstances or pressures. Ever so often, moderation and compromise, timidity and playing safe, lead to failure. Audacity in a sound leader, on the contrary, pays rich dividends.

A leader should have faith and conviction in his mission. He should be able to put first things first even in the hardest of trials. His mental vigilance must remain unwavering under all circumstances. He should never endeavour to act beyond the capacity of his means. He must guard against his weaknesses and capitalize his strong points. Only then will national interests remain safe. Only then will he never let his people down.

There are some ambitious individuals among us today who pose as patriots and have dreams of ruling India one day. The Government, perhaps, is unable to see through these impostors as they are lying low at present. Some of our leaders are, in fact, relying on their superficial postures of reliability in a crisis, not realizing the game they are playing. Some of them pose as Caesars but are really men of straw and will wilt under real stress. They relish being surrounded by pliable courtiers and give them high positions they do not deserve. They have hints dropped in the right quarters that the assignments held by them should increase in importance in some way. They stir up campaigns against their adversaries and build up their own images by various contrivances. They inspire articles in the press and organize whispering campaigns to that the country is mismanaged and suggest, by inference, that the answer lies in leadership, with them at the helm.

Politics and administration are inseparable as the latter is meant to give effect to politically determined programmes and
policies. But politics also concerns itself with the pursuit of power and activity which stretches beyond the legitimate confines of administration.

Before the advent of Mahatma Gandhi, the politically conscious groups among Indians consisted of educated and intelligent individuals. With his arrival on the scene, many such persons came under his spell, but his following was considerably augmented by the accretion of educationally backward and less intelligent people, not many of whom subscribed to the ideals of the Mahatma.

It was from the ranks of such men and women that the second line of post-Independence leaders and the backbone of today's political parties has been formed. Some key positions in the government went to first-rate men but most of them were awarded to mediocre politicians who pressed their claims to the fruits of victory after Independence. They lacked the qualities of leadership and were men of straw though they posed as men of steel.

They lived in a world of their own creation, made certain assumptions which had no relation to reality, were not far sighted and had acquired the habit of lip-service. They interfered with the administration, particularly in the States, and demoralized it. If young politicians showed promise, instead of building them up their senior colleagues pulled them down in every possible way lest their own positions be threatened.

They thought they were infallible and their status went to their head. They craved cheap popularity and took frank advice as criticism. As time went on, they lost touch with the masses and forfeited their confidence. Most of them set a poor example at the helm of affairs, lacked courage, drive, resourcefulness and were reluctant to take decisions. Despite all these failings, many of them governed this country. But as Count Oxenstierna said: "Dost thou not know, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed?"

The government of a country is supposed to be representative of the people. Judging from the quality of the men and women who run our government, they represent, with few exceptions, the incompetence, dishonesty and lethargy in our system but
show little signs of our good qualities. We first choose wrong men for important positions. Then we allow them to concentrate power in their hands. They then treat the people who have elected them with scant respect. Their personality cult eventually reigns supreme.

Government has made little effort since Independence to eradicate our basic troubles—poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, incompetence, lethargy, corruption—and is thriving on empty slogans such as "liquidation of monopolies, imposition of ceiling on urban property, grabbing of land by the landless, and abolition of privy purses and ICS privileges." This amounts to governing on slogans and stunts or, in simpler language, deceiving the people.

Instead of making the country prosperous through rapid industrialization, our leaders talk of liquidating monopolies. If Government begins to encroach on the individual's legitimate and personal assets by restricting urban property, there is nothing to prevent it from freezing the personal, legitimate savings of an individual if they exceed a certain amount in the name of socialism.

If the government goes back on its pledges to the princes (despite the recent Supreme Court ruling), and the ICS, there is no guarantee that they will not do the same with other civilian employees and members of the armed forces even in respect of their pensions. Also, if the government does away with the privileges of the princes, it should take similar action regarding the many privileges enjoyed by ministers, members of Parliament, and certain politicians. A rule of austerity must apply equally to all. But in practice this does not happen. This sort of duplicity increases the sense of insecurity which already prevails widely in the country.

*Mrs Gandhi*

My remarks here apply to ministers and politicians in general. I am aware, however, that there are exceptions. For instance, there is our present Prime Minister. Many assessments are being made of her at home and abroad today. Her opponents complain that she has concentrated in her hands enormous governmental authority, which is not compatible with democratic
principles, and that she lusts for power, which she wants to retain at all costs.

Given good workers and luck which Mrs Gandhi has had in abundance, she is taking things in her stride. Whatever her faults, and all human beings have some failings, she has proved to be a determined leader, capable of taking quick decisions. She has built around herself an excellent team of workers.

Mrs Gandhi must, however, be careful not to flirt with lawless elements which may one day prove to be her own and the country’s undoing. She inherited a host of perplexing problems which she boldly attempted to solve, and she can do so only with virtually dictatorial powers. In some instances, she has succeeded while in others she has failed—but not for lack of trying or courage.

Mrs Gandhi should therefore be judged by the efforts she is making to tide over our difficulties, despite many hurdles. As Booker T. Washington said: “Success is to be measured not so much by the position one has reached in life as by the obstacles one has overcome whilst trying to succeed.”

Mrs Gandhi has had overwhelming success in the 1971 mid-term elections. She has made a pledge with the nation that she would Hatao Garibi (Remove Poverty). To do this she will have to keep the level of prices of foodstuffs, clothing, and other necessities of life (e.g. rent) down to a reasonable level, reduce corruption and unemployment and let the man in the street enjoy a decent standard of life. If she succeeds, she will have achieved more than any other leader in our country since Independence. But if she fails in these fields, she can be justly accused of having made hollow promises to her people and may have to pay the price of such a default. If the trust of the people—who have voted her into such tremendous power over their fates—is betrayed, their disillusionment would be great and their resentment severer than most of us can dare to think and may justifiably take any shape.

Mrs Gandhi is relying on a set of political colleagues most of whom have feet—and often heads—of clay and who are devoid of loyalty, dedication, and prudence. She has other impediments in her way, not all of her own making, which she is valiantly attempting to surmount. But no excuses will be held valid if she fails to
keep her pledges. With so much power in her hands, she can choose promising lieutenants to implement her policies. If she fails to improve the lot of the poor, and they penalize her, she has only to blame herself.

Our ministers, who so often call upon the people to be democratic, are themselves frequently autocratic in their actions. They also enunciate many principles, not remembering that it is not principles that give breath to man but man who gives breath to principles.

An important quality in a minister should be courage—the manliest of all virtues—the highest form of which is to ignore what others say of you, so long as you are on the right path. This is aptly described by an inscription on the portals of a college at Aberdeen: "They say; what say they? Let them say!"

Mahabharata¹ says: "A country without a strong ruler is an invitation to chaos. A strong ruler punishes law-breakers. Fear of punishment is a step to peace, for people can then go about their duties... undisturbed." Our government has not been able to take effective action to control rising prices, decline in political morality, growth of corruption, the steady deterioration of discipline, widespread lawlessness and violence (with the culprit remaining unpunished and the resultant discontent in the country). How then, is our Government strong?

Our ministers are disinclined to hear the truth about themselves, nor do those who serve under them have the courage to point out their faults. As Bharavi said in Kiratarjuniya: "What a companion is he who does not tell his master what needs to be told to him for his benefit? What a master is he who does not listen to what is said for his benefit? Prosperity is attracted to a country [which has] harmony between the master and his functionaries..." Advice is seldom welcome to our leaders. As the Earl of Chesterfield said in a letter to his son, "Those who want advice the most, always like it the least."

A minister has, in addition to the work of his specific portfolio,

¹Astika Parva in the Adi Parva, Section 41, verses 27 and 28, translated by P. Lal.
to attend to parliamentary affairs, nurse his constituency, remain available at all times to the requests of those who voted him to power and participate in numberless formal and informal functions he is invited to. Unless he is constantly advised by experienced civil servants and other experts, and not by courtiers, he cannot function effectively.

While there are a number of upright and honourable men among them, ministers as a class have come under a heavy cloud of suspicion. Their ethical attitudes are not what they should be. They do not abide by the pledges they give and slip out of them when they can. Popular faith in them is shaken.

Most ministers either take too long or decide matters in undue haste without the requisite consideration. They do not make available enough time to read papers put up to them on all sorts of subjects. Ability to seize the gist of a long statement by reading through it speedily, perhaps only once, is acquired by experience. Most of our ministers lack this art. They slide through life in one of two ways, either believing or doubting everything. Both ways save them from thinking.

Constant reshuffles of the Union Cabinet show a lack of mutual confidence between the Prime Minister and some of her colleagues, which in turn shows lack of solidarity within the party. This has brought into play some Rasputins according to whose dubious advice—and not under that of the Cabinet as a whole—the government formulates many national policies.

Our ministers and some politicians frequently announce that socialism is their creed. N.A. Palkhivala, a patriotic, outspoken and brilliant intellectual, was reported by the press to have commented on this on 23 January 1970 as follows:

Our constitution aimed at making India the land of opportunity. Our politicians have converted it into a land of opportunism. They have made socialism the opiate of the people. Socialism has become a word comprehensive enough to cover the entire spectrum of economic folly—a plethora of harmful state controls, periodic bouts of nationalization and the pursuit of policies which ensure unemployment and economic retrogression.
True socialism means the investment of human and material resources in an imaginatively planned manner which can contribute to the vitality and progress of the nation, keep it in the mainstream of self-generating growth and development, raise the standard of living of the masses and bring forth the maximum gifts of each for the fullest enjoyment of all. The translation of such socialism into action demands intellect and knowledge, character and dedication of the highest order. But there is the other type of cheap socialism, which feeds on slogans and promises and thrives on the gullibility of the people.

Will Durant, after a lifelong study of various civilizations, summed up the lesson of history which has great significance for India: 'Democracy is the most difficult form of Government, since it requires the widest spread of intelligence and we forget to make ourselves intelligent when we make ourselves sovereign....'

A cynic remarked that you mustn't enthrone ignorance just because there is so much of it. It may be true, as Lincoln supposed, that 'you can't fool all the people all the time,' but you can fool enough of them to rule a large country.

Civil servants and other government officials and experts in the private sector acquire special knowledge of their particular subject after years of toil and going through the mill. While one cannot expect ministers voted to power in a democracy to have the knowledge and experience of civil servants, it is absolutely essential for them to be honest, able, and incorruptible and to possess sound judgment and determination to do justice to their heavy responsibilities. Only if a leader had these qualities can he select subordinates correctly and enjoy the confidence of the masses. How many of our leaders have these qualities?

It should be incumbent on ministers, on assuming office, to work hard and learn as much of their jobs as possible. But most of them are not in the habit of carrying out a deep and thorough study of the problems they face. They make bold statements raising hopes in the public mind which cannot be fulfilled. They fritter away their energies and time in much trivial and fruitless activity. They have not organized their lives efficiently. They
are therefore always in a hurry and keep complaining that they have no time. The result is that, with a few exceptions, they keep muddling through.

Our ministers generally sponsor schemes and take decisions which are motivated by personal considerations and are not always in the interests of the country. They are surrounded by advisers and staff who seldom differ from them and press their real views boldly as they are not prepared to spoil their good relations with their boss and risk their careers. The country suffers in the process.

A minister is an expensive item as he costs the Indian taxpayer Rs 448,000 a year—over Rs 37,000 a month—as N. Dandekar disclosed in the Lok Sabha recently. In no country are ministers and high officials so accessible to foreigners of little consequence as here. When our nationals, other than VIPs, go abroad from India and try to seek interviews with anybody important, they do not have an easy passage. In India, we frequently find our important personages pleased to know a foreigner wishes to see them, regardless of his personal standing or whether he has anything important to discuss. They grant foreigners interviews too easily amidst important national commitments for which they do not have enough time.

Instead of working long hours to study and solve our numerous national problems, our ministers waste time receiving dozens of their opposite numbers from abroad at Delhi airport. As a rule, they should give no time to this sort of protocol. When ministers, leave on tours abroad, or return, various officers on their staff, busy men, run to and from the airport. This ritual is quite unnecessary. In Britain, when a foreign Prime Minister comes or goes, the British Prime Minister does not receive him or see him off but is represented by a protocol officer. Why can’t we follow this good example?

Government adopts contradictory and superficial attitudes in many matters. On one hand, it talks of economy and austerity and on the other allows money to be wasted on many infructuous schemes and on the maintenance of overstaffed offices. Conferences, seminars, and conventions ad nauseam are held without taking concrete and speedy action on their conclusion.
There are occasions when rank inefficiency or other irregularities are detected, but stern action is not taken lest the personal positions of ministers are jeopardized.

The Chief Ministers, the Congress Parliamentary Party, big business and the major foreign powers would rather have a weak and pliable Prime Minister of India than a strong one so that they may retain and increase their influence in the country.

The Prime Minister should be a strong and respected personality, honest, decisive, and determined. He must know what to say, when to say it and when not to say anything, and should have the gift of concentrating the attention of his compatriots on vital issues.

Writing on the politicians of today, Acharya J. B. Kripalani, a veteran statesman, said in the *Indian Express* of 11 May 1970:

Today he feels he is not bound by any laws, rules, procedure or convention. He can set at naught every ordinary rule of decency.... He is free to vote not on party lines but in consonance with his suddenly awakened conscience.... Ministers are free to refuse to answer questions which they find inconvenient.... They are free to suppress Truth and suggest falsehood.... They are free to overstaff their departments with relatives.... They are free to grant licences, permits and quotas to their party men.... or for a consideration. Their subordinates are free to lose files and letters through sheer procrastination and negligence.... Politicians in power are free to... criticize others for the very irregularities they themselves have committed in a large measure. They are free to topple stable ministries, through the piracy of members, offering ministerial jobs and even monetary considerations.... There is no need to keep the ten commandments of Christ or any other religion. The only commandment that is valid today is: 'Be not detected.'

Character is not their strong point. They are little men trying to do big things. They seem to have arrogated to themselves the monopoly of patriotism and suffer from the delusion that they
alone understand what is good for the country and the people. Do they know where they are going? Are they giving sufficient attention to important issues or are they wasting their time on the unimportant? Have they fixed targets and are they reaching them purposefully?

Our need of the moment is integrity, discipline, and unity which result in hard and honest work. Unity and discipline go together. It is with discipline that we can remain united and with unity that we can become disciplined.

Patriotism does not consist in carrying out the whims of a few to whom we owe personal loyalty. It is not the people who need prodding but politicians who must be gingered up. Sacrifice and charity begin at home. Let our leaders tell us what tangible sacrifices they have made for the country, apart from going to jail as political prisoners before they ask the people to do likewise.

The government does not provide sufficient incentives to suitably qualified, bright young men. Consequently, some of the best among them in education, medicine, science, technology, and business management choose to migrate and settle in other countries. Our leaders are liable to betray us in critical times. They first exhort us to action, but when spirited individuals come forward and stake their lives in the name of the country our leaders disown them.

There are many instances of this but I shall quote only two. Our national leaders made spirited public appeals from time to time to thousands of Indians in mass gatherings to rid Goa of foreign rule by “do or die” tactics, but when band after band of Indian patriots in fact tried to cross the border, resisting all opposition, the same leaders at the last minute counselled caution. Only when conditions in Goa became intolerable were the armed forces called upon to intervene in 1961.

Then there was the case of those who staged the naval revolt in 1946. Although this upsurge had shaken the British Government and was on the same lines as the INA upheaval, which they supported, our leaders at the highest levels advised the naval rebels in 1946 to surrender at a crucial juncture, which they did. This story is borne out by Pran Nath Nayyar, a participant in this
revolt, in a press report published in the *Indian Express*, New Delhi, of 16 February 1970. Here were some of our patriots disowned by their leaders once again.

Government is often "surprised" by certain situations and complains of being stabbed in the back by one country or another. Actually, rulers should never be surprised by the actions of any person or country or by any situation. Chanakya said nearly 2,000 years ago in the *Arthashastra* that a king who cannot anticipate his enemy's moves and complains that he has been stabbed in the back should be dethroned. This is true even today.

To sum up, our present day politicians, with odd exceptions, are, irrespective of party, self-centred, observe no known codes of conduct and set a poor example of leadership to young and old alike, generating frustration and demoralization. They are engaged constantly in unseemly wrangles and bickerings, washing their dirty linen publicly and betraying disloyalty repeatedly.

It is relevant to mention here some of the home truths Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, the Pathan leader who spent 15 years in jail before Independence and a similar number after in Pakistan, uttered on his recent visit to India:

Indians are in the habit of shouting slogans but do not listen and learn. Those who do not put into practice the ideals they preach cannot achieve their objectives.... The rich have become richer and the poor poorer since Independence in India. There are very few persons here concerned with the welfare of the country.

India cannot advance through going about with a begging bowl and considering loans given by foreign governments as national income, bartering away its dignity and self-respect. ... The Indian leaders, driven by selfish motives, are exploiting their people for votes which they want for position and power. Few in India enjoy various comforts of life while millions are deprived of even essential needs.

Why, after 23 years of freedom, are we unable to stand on our own feet? The leaders in this country today lust for power and money and have placed self above service. They have
little interest in the people, who are the most important factor. Government has failed to bring about an appreciable improvement in the living conditions of the poor and downtrodden.

The strength of a country lies in its unity and patriotism. Genuine unity was always based on equality. But people in India are so class-conscious. Although India has adopted socialism as its goal there is not a trace of socialism in the lives of those who rule India or their opponents. All political parties, whether in power or in opposition, are composed of those who do not care for the people but are eager to capture power. Socialism, which is a way of life, a way of thinking, cannot be built by lip-service alone and by constructing skyscrapers but means wiping the tears of sorrow from the faces of the oppressed.... It does not merely means installing a government which swears by socialism emptily.

If a leader should emerge once more in India who is of the people, who knows them, who goes to them and asks what they want and who obeys their will, the country could be saved. But there is no such leader in India today.

Bhartrhari, a renowned King of Ujjain, a seat of Hindu culture in mediaeval India, is credited with having written three sets of 100 verses on different subjects. Among the verses on Niti (Polity), he said:

Na Natah na vitah na gayakah,
(We are not actors, nor pimps nor musicians)
Na para-droha-nibaddha-buddhayah,
(nor persons intent on doing harm to others)
stana-bharanamitah Nayoshitah,
(Nor are we damsels bending low under the burden of breasts)
Nṛpa-sadmani Nama ke vayam?
(who then are we indeed in the Royal Palace)?

Unless you have the above qualifications, you do not thrive in high circles even today.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Crisis in Administration

Our system of administration is not organized as much for the benefit of the poor as to serve the interests of the rich. For instance, poor people travel long distances, putting themselves to considerable inconvenience, to appear in courts and similar government offices but cannot get a hearing, let alone a decision, from the appropriate officers unless they bribe or influence peons, clerks, and others. If they do not resort to this step, they are made to linger on, day in and day out, and are often unable to see the dignitary.

India is the only democracy which has officials like collectors or deputy commissioners with dictatorial powers. They are bureaucratic heads of district administrations, a legacy of the imperial past, and in effect minor dictators.

Relations between the Centre and the 17 States, each with a nominated Governor and an elected legislature, are far from satisfactory. The Governors are constitutional heads, answerable only to the President of India and are there to uphold the Constitution. In addition to the States, there are 10 Union Territories, not all of which have territorial councils. The States, most of whom represent a language-culture group, enjoy much more autonomy and power than the union territories.

The Centre not only enjoys financial control over the States but can intervene directly and assume power in the event of external aggression or internal disorder, the breakdown of the constitutional machinery or when financial stability is in jeopardy.

There are many among us who wish to have the President’s powers revised, amend the Constitution, and introduce a presidential form of government. There are others who maintain that the President can disregard the advice of the Prime Minister under certain circumstances. This apprehension led the
present Prime Minister in 1969 to prevent the selection as President of a person with whose political views she did not agree.

Civil services have on the whole worked before and after Independence under stress with ability. The “heavenborn” Indian Civil Service has produced some brilliant administrators, as good as, if not better than, any in the world. Members of the Indian Administrative Service are following in the footsteps of their ICS predecessors worthily. They have shown considerable ability and confidence in running the government machinery, which the politicians resent. Many defects have crept into their character. But what is more disturbing is, generally speaking, the suspicion and lack of team spirit between them and ministers.

There may be some dishonest, incompetent, pompous,¹ and rank-conscious civil servants in different departments who evade responsibility and shelter behind rules and regulations. There are, on the other hand, some brilliant officials who are dedicated, impartial, and of unimpeachable character. Our leaders are, however, fond of finding fault with civil servants on the slightest excuse.

Instead of backing them as Sardar Patel used to, they undermine their prestige. Ministers usually conduct their relations with them as between master and servant. They pose as patriots and treat the civil servant as one who has “tarnished” his record by serving an alien regime before partition and should now be put in his place. Before 1947, even those Indians who administered the country well and impartially were accused by most of our “nationalist” leaders as being “subservient” to the British authorities and of suppressing our national movement.

Ironically, the British described the same officers as “dangerous nationalists.” This was not fair. These men were carrying out their duties to the best of their ability. There might have been some exceptions, but as a rule they were men of honour. After Independence, conditions were disturbed and people were in a state of confusion. There was a breakdown

¹It is this class that has been described as neither Indian nor civil nor a service.
of law and order and restoration of normalcy was no mean achievement.

Little credit has been given to our career administrators for what they did in these trying conditions. They are only blamed for what they were not able to do. The more the politician has succeeded in discrediting these instruments of administration, the more has the Government machinery itself been weakened. This is an unfortunate process of self-annihilation.

The politicians are pressing that the terms and conditions of service of the ICS, wrongly called their privileges but guaranteed by the Constitution and based on the contractual obligations of government, should be withdrawn. Either members of the ICS should have been given the option to accept modified terms at the time of Partition or retire. The obligations incurred by the government should be honoured. Having utilized the ICS men fully and when only about a hundred of the tribe remain, the last of whom will retire by 1979, our leaders have forgotten their splendid services in the past and are parting from them without grace. What is more, they have put free India on its feet administratively and we could not have done without them.

Why are our leaders sniping at those who have rescued us from many an awkward situation? Is it fair that the ICS should be humiliated in this fashion? What sanctity will anybody attach to any safeguards our Constitution or Government may provide or to commitments made to others in future? In any case, a deeper study will show that this is basically an ethical matter and not of much economic significance.

The Governor of the Reserve Bank, on behalf of the Government, has signed that he promises to pay the bearer on demand the value of the paper currency note which he holds. If tomorrow, the economic or political situation in India changes, can Government be justified in refusing to honour this promise on any grounds? If not, why is it not keeping the promises it made to the Princes (or the I.C.S.) at the time of Partition? This amounts to something like dishonouring a currency note.

Repudiating solemn pledges on the plea that conditions in the country had changed (conditions always keep changing in life)
means that all pledges and treaties made by the Government be dishonoured. If so, what confidence can people have in the present Government? Members of various Services will suffer from a sense of insecurity about their future.

The police have on the whole carried out their thankless task well since 1947 under circumstances which have been often more than provocative, powerful elements among the politicians and the Government trying to influence them or interfere with their functions in various ways. Some of them have, however, been infected with vices widely prevalent in the country though the bulk of them do commendable work.

Malfunctioning of the police stems from inherent faults in the criminal law introduced by our erstwhile British rulers. Whereas under the law in Britain, a statement made to a police officer is admissible in evidence before a court, for some peculiar reasons they did not enforce this in India. The police thus resort to unauthorized practices to circumvent this deficiency in our law such as extorting confessions, fabricating evidence, and reluctance to register cases of crime. Again, the powers even the lowest police official enjoys under the law and the responsibilities he has to discharge bear no relation to the emoluments he gets. So there is a tailormade situation where temptation gets the better of moral values.

Very often large bands of policemen are drafted to provide security to VIPs or similar arrangements instead of concentrating on detecting crime. There should be a separate force for such ceremonial duties, leaving the police to perform their legitimate tasks.

If the police are given minor magisterial powers to deal with routine cases of indiscipline, people will have a healthy respect for law. Usually, the man on the spot is the best judge of a situation.

It is alleged that the police do not know how to manage hostile crowds without excessive force. Our crowds are generally ill-disciplined mobs, thanks to our politicians, who often incite them to hold the majority at ransom. Police are not always backed-up by the politicians. In fact, when they take stern action, unnecessary
enquiries are demanded, take place and censures awarded, weakening this arm of the law.

When they show restraint, they are branded weak by the same politicians. This will one day demoralize the police force completely and it will then cease to be an effective instrument in the hands of Government. In that event, the Army will be called upon to deal with law and order problems, which will be good neither for the Army nor the civil power nor for democracy.

Our judiciary is a stabilizing factor in our lives as was proved by the fearless verdict in the case of princely privy purses recently. If our politicians are allowed to curb the powers of the judiciary, many of the former's misdeeds will go unchallenged. Our judges are generally independent and extremely able. But our judicial system may be criticized for several reasons. Litigation is expensive and dilatory and cases drag on for years. There are instances where a case is postponed time and again, is not heard for months or years and sometimes litigants die before it is settled. Our complicated legal system is beyond the understanding of the vast majority of people. To prove the truth, one has to tell lies, and to disprove a lie one has to tell more lies. Imagine how much this sort of thing has undermined our moral values.

The Accounts Department has extremely complicated rules which delay decisions on the pay and pensions of a large number of government servants. The Revenue Department functions in the same way. The British administered this large country through a small group of officials to extract the maximum revenue for the imperial government. We have shown little initiative since Independence to change this arrangement and have continued with an out-of-date system of accounts, forgetting that we are no longer ruled by a foreign power but are partners in our nation's life. Our cumbersome and complicated accounting and financial procedures are inappropriate to our purpose. This is only one aspect of our antiquated administrative machinery which requires a major overhaul.

*The Home Minister declared recently in Parliament that on 31 December 1969 there were 383,000 cases pending in 16 High Courts.*
A glaring example of inefficiency and lack of consideration for the public is the telephone system. Telephone exchange personnel should be more polite. Because of shortage of staff and often incompetence, it takes long to get a defective telephone put right. Because of defective equipment and faulty lines, even local calls are at times inaudible. It takes hours to get through a long-distance call, which you do not always hear clearly.

While there are no fewer than 450,000 applicants for telephones on the waiting list throughout the country who will have to wait up to ten years for a connection, 14 per cent of the connectable capacity in exchanges of more than 1,000 lines remains unutilized.

The railways have a difficult task, which they are doing well on the whole. There is, however, room for improvement in ensuring punctuality of trains. Attention should also be paid to ticketless travel, pilfering goods, discourtesy by railway staff to the average passenger and malpractices in berth reservations and booking goods. Effective measures should be taken to reduce the number of accidents and overcrowding on trains.

Another matter which the railway authorities must rectify is the premature closing of gates at the numerous level crossings throughout the country. Their gatemen stop traffic on busy roads long before the arrival of a train, wasting the valuable time of hundreds of people. Repeated complaints on the subject remain unattended.

The authorities have allowed some anomalies to flourish on our roads far too long. For instance, not to hurt the susceptibilities of any faith, they have allowed even dilapidated places of worship to remain as obstructions in the alignment of highways. This practice is now being widely misused.

One of the worst examples of our administration's incompetence is its inability to take effective steps to prevent flooding of roads in the rainy season, particularly in cities. After every heavy shower, pools of water swirl over roads because of defective drainage and paralyze traffic. A larger number of cars and other vehicles conk out in the middle of the flooded roads. Government has no right to call itself progressive for allowing such a state of affairs to persist for 24 years after Independence.
Roads are unevenly surfaced. They remain dug up, awaiting repairs, for months at a stretch. Many which are repaired sink soon after a little rain. Drums lie about, posing a threat to fast-moving traffic. The warning red light at road crossings is usually invisible or flickers dimly. Holes in pavements menace unsuspecting pedestrians. If a new bridge has to be built or put under repairs, the work goes on incompetently for months.

Traffic indiscipline on our roads—which mirrors the nations' general behaviour—presents a difficult problem. To cope with increasing and faster vehicles, roads need broadening and better surfaces. Fast and slow traffic move together. One often sees carts carrying long iron rods amidst this stream, posing a serious menace. Instead of being treated as an offence, this practice remains unchallenged.

Some naive drivers of heavier vehicles paint on the back of their vehicles "Horn please" or slogans such as "Sat Guru Teri Aut" (God, I take shelter behind you). Then, after a few drinks, they step on the gas and hope for the best. They go about our highways and on the crowded roads of cities driving rashly, causing death and destruction. As they are lightly punished, or get away scot free, they are not cured of their dangerous habits. If only deterrent punishment was given to the culprits, they would sober soon enough.

All India Radio's budget is only about Rs 60 million a year. The Japan Broadcasting Corporation has an annual budget of Rs 2,250 million. No wonder AIR's progress is not faster. It gives too much time to official and ministerial news and says too little about sports and peoples' lives and problems. The junior news broadcasting staff are poorly paid and hence competent individuals are not attracted to the organization.

Owing to indifferent telecommunications, news broadcasts are not up-to-the-minute. There is little difference, if any, between the international news in our morning papers and the AIR morning broadcasts.

The television service commenced in 1959 for viewers within a range of 30 kilometres, but although 12 years have passed its radius has not increased much. The agricultural programmes are boring
to audiences which are mostly non-agricultural in the immediate vicinity of Delhi. When TV spreads to the rural areas, this programme will have some meaning.

Japan has 33 million radio sets and India only 10 million. Japan has 28 million TV sets and India, with more than five times Japan’s population, only 8,000, all near Delhi.

We are spending much effort in a field which can enlighten our masses speedily to our advantage. But because of indifferent planning and not providing sufficient finances to improve broadcasting and television, we are retarding the progress of a powerful medium of instruction and information.

Politics has entered sport. Our politicians do not try to understand the requirements of our sportsmen nor do they give them full encouragement. Sportsmen are not always selected on merit to represent India internationally. Insufficient attention is paid to their training. We have therefore seldom done as well as we should in cricket, tennis, athletics or swimming and have lost our world crown in hockey. Lack of adequate funds retard the progress of our sportsmen.

One way to improve in any field, particularly in sport, is by acquiring more experience under difficult conditions and in hard competitions. This could be gained by sending more sports contingents abroad to countries which excel in certain sports. Financial stringency, a favourite bogey of our administrators, should not come in the way of such trips. Too many non-playing elements, lacking the requisite knowledge, control our sports or accompany our teams abroad.

Professor C. Northcote Parkinson said in a talk in Delhi, reported in the press on 15 March 1970, that he wanted India to make a bold leap forward and meet the basic needs of the people, instead of trying to achieve the dreamy ideal of a socialistic pattern of society. He said what the people wanted was a home, wages, something to eat and a hope for the future, and not just the slogan of a Socialist Pattern. They also wanted to retain their freedom of thought and action. Over-taxation and interference (in various walks) from Government will not show result. He enunciated three principles to help management in its pursuit of "excellence
of work.” The first was to avoid over-staffing in the office. If this went on, the staff would keep growing till bankruptcy is reached. The second principle was decentralization in the organization. He said two countries conspicuous by their over-centralization to the point of insanity were Britain and France. The third principle was to avoid frustration at home.

Our standards in various spheres are falling. For instance, our public works take much longer to be completed than they should. This is perhaps due to lack of finances and planning, poor material supplied by the contractors (who get in by citing the lowest tenders), insufficient supervision and certain malpractices. Whatever the reasons are, public works take far too long to complete.

If we get any job done, its workmanship is unsatisfactory and materials used are sub-standard. If we send things for repairs, they are poorly carried out, often their genuine parts being replaced by spurious ones. When we get a badly tailored shirt back from a tailor, we get a rebuff from him that the fault lies with our physiognomy, not with the art of the tailor.

Government fail to take determined action against culprits guilty of a variety of malpractices or crimes, for fear of repercussions. Defaulters include those who wield political or monetary pull and influence (which they can use against our Ministers in the next elections). This fear is adversely affecting the capacity of our Ministers to administer.

When there is an urgent need to build an over-head bridge across a busy railway crossing, Government refrains from dictating to the State or Municipal authorities concerned to expedite this work, lest it loses their support (even if their lack of action results in considerable inconvenience to the public). It all boils down to the question of votes (and their chairs) which our leaders are not prepared to lose. They have become slaves to these fears and hence ineffective, and the country is harmed in the process.

The plight of an average Indian without influence, is unenviable. When he goes for some work to a major government hospital, passport or some other office, he has to wait for hours, unnecessary red-tape driving him crazy. He keeps running from pillar to post and is greeted with lack of attention, apathy, slackness,
uncooperative and even rude behaviour. Those who should be on
duty at the counters are missing from their posts and when they
come, they work in a leisurely fashion. The best friend of Shri
"Nobody," dealing with government or municipal agencies—
peons, clerks and above—is not the public relations man but
"speedy-money."

The behaviour of many in different walks of life is steadily
deteriorating. If one travels by train, one is treated casually
by petty railway staff; if one employs a worker on a particular
job, one has either to stomach much misbehaviour on his part or
one is left in the lurch; even one's domestic servants are not only
rude but also undependable. There are some bus conductors and
drivers who are courteous and cooperative. But there are others
who are not only ill-mannered but have many annoying habits.
One is of tapping (familiarly) women passengers on the shoulder
to demand fare; and other, as recently stated by Rukmani Bhat-
tacharya in the press, is of our buses sometimes halting a few yards
away from a bus stop and as people run to reach it, moving off,
the conductor and the driver watching with malicious delight, as
the frustrated passengers are left behind. The recent clashes
between the D.T.U. staff and the students were mainly due to the
uncooperative attitude of the former.

The standard of our officers everywhere has deteriorated con-
siderably. This puts a heavy burden on the small band of good
who, in addition to their own onerous duties, have to overwork
to make up for their colourless and indifferent colleagues.

There are good officials in every department, but alas! they
are far too few. Most officials are supercilious or indifferent
in their dealings with members of the public; not answering their
letters, being brusque with them during interviews; taking little
action on their legitimate representations; and keeping them
waiting unnecessarily even after giving them appointments.

Appleby, an American expert in Public Administration, when
invited by us to India some years ago, said:

In our democracy, we believe that Government are there to
serve the people. In India some Civil Servants, and most Minis-
ters, think they are there to rule the people. It is this ATTITUDE which among other things results in maladministration. They also lack a sense of urgency, are slaves of rules and red-tape and treat urgent matters casually. There are endless meetings and discussions without positive results, Files move leisurely around them and they hesitate in taking a decision.

Most branches of our administration, specially at the lower level, are neither honest nor efficient. It is common knowledge that unless you grease the palm of certain individuals, and "look after them" in one way or another, little happens. The result is that apart from general demoralization, respect for authority is not only disappearing but it is also held in contempt. Among other consequences, security of life and property is not what it used to be and law and order in the country is deteriorating. It is ironical that things should have come to such a pass within twenty years or so of our self-rule.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Our Twin Curses: Corruption and Communalism

"O Liberty, Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name."
Mme Roland on the way to the scaffold

Corruption and misuse of power are our biggest curse today. Admittedly, they have been present in all societies since time immemorial. But its magnitude has increased beyond reason in different spheres of our public and private life since 1947. It starts at the apex of our political and administrative machinery and percolates down to the bottom. Many of our leaders who were penniless in 1947 are rich men today.

In their excellent book, Political Corruption in India, Surendra Nath Dwivedi and G.S. Bhargava have brought to public notice some glaring cases of dishonesty, among them the Jeep Scandal, the Mudgal episode, and the Mundhra deals which have been thoroughly examined and attested. Acharya J.B. Kripalani, in a foreword, quotes a Persian proverb which says that when the ruler of a country takes even a pinch of salt without payment his officers loot the whole country.

In India, small fry are often singled out for punishment for corruption while the misdeeds of the influential ones are condoned. Corruption affects our daily lives. Our rations are adulterated and our medicines spurious, endangering health and often causing death. Hoarding, blackmarketing, and adulteration are the results of lack of honesty and vigilance on the part of the administration.

If the history of other countries is a guide, corruption and nepotism ultimately result in revolutions. The French and the Russian revolutions, as also the fall of the Chiang Kai-shek Government in China were due mainly to widespread dishonesty in the country. According to The Chinese Revolution (Thames & Hudson), "While
most of the people had to put up with great hardships and suffered from shortages of even essential goods, members of the government and high officials lived in comfort, thereby further contributing to the sagging morale of the population as a whole. To get rich quickly was the supreme goal."

John B. Monteiro has written a classic on this subject in which he gives telling examples of widespread corruption in all walks of our life. He traces how this evil existed in India even before Independence, but mainly in the lower grades of the administration. Then came freedom and expenditure on a much vaster scale, offering greater "opportunities" than ever before to unscrupulous officials who, despite defying all rules and regulations, get away with it because of the disinclination of government to deal firmly with such men.

When there was no redress of public grievances, the ranks of the corrupt individuals swelled. Though government was against corruption in principle it was not against corrupt individuals with the requisite influence and protection, against whom complaints were ignored. Many of these men managed to secure important appointments in different spheres at home and abroad.

The complicated procedures of our administration as well as the shortages of commodities compelled the average Indian without influence to resort to paying "speed money" to obtain facilities, including licences and permits. Failure to oblige those concerned results in long delays or their work not being done. For instance, sponsoring incompetent or talentless artistes to visit foreign countries, evasion of the income-tax laws, tampering with ballot boxes in elections and hoarding are some malpractices which are widely prevalent. It is not always government servants who take the initiative in such matters. The public also tempts them in order to evade various legitimate payments. There can be no corrupt officials without men willing to corrupt them.

Talking of the difficulty in detecting corruption Chanakya says in Arthasastra.

All undertakings depend upon finance. Hence foremost attention shall be paid to the treasure. There are about 40 ways
of embezzlement... Just as it is impossible not to taste honey or poison when it is on the tip of the tongue, so is it impossible for a government servant not to eat up at a bit of the king's revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be detected either as drinking or as not drinking water, so government servants employed in their government work cannot be found out while taking money.

It is possible to mark the movements of birds flying high in the sky, but it is not equally possible to ascertain the movement of government servants of hidden purpose.

Exemplary punishments are not given by the authorities in case of dishonesty. The guilty are let off lightly which sets a bad example for others. Many ministers shield their subordinates guilty of corruption because they lack the courage to be firm or they are not honest themselves. The present machinery of investigating charges of corruption against ministers is laborious. A long time elapses between the initial charges and the final enquiry. This period is often used to hush up the matter and destroy evidence. And when the enquiry does take place at long last, the "honourable" minister is exonerated.

The Santhanam report said in 1964: "There is a widespread impression that failure of integrity is not uncommon among ministers and that some ministers who have held office have enriched themselves illegitimately, obtained good jobs for their sons and relations through nepotism." This deterioration in our moral standards is retarding our progress in many ways. Corruption or similar evils can be eradicated from our system by those at the helm of affairs setting the right example. Also by deterrent punishment meted out speedily, without fear or favour, to those whose dishonesty is proved.

Communal discord and frequent riots lead to much bloodshed and increasing hatred between Hindu and Muslim. This is happening in spite of the lip-service our leaders pay to secularism. Unless all communities in India learn to live in harmony and consider themselves one nation they will pose great dangers to our
unity and national character.

A report in *The Statesman*, New Delhi, dated 15 May 1970, about a debate in the Lok Sabha a day earlier on Hindu-Muslim riots at Bhiwandi near Bombay and extracts from the speeches and writings of some prominent public figures portray a cross-section of opinion on this subject.

The Jana Sangh leader, Atal Behari Vajpayee, pointed to the danger of pampering Muslim communalism. Every time there was a riot, the authorities lost no time in blaming the Hindus, he said. This had led to a certain militancy among the Hindus. While he did not personally approve of such militancy, he feared that closing their eyes to it would not help.

Analyzing the causes of the frequent communal clashes, he wondered if one of the reasons for them could be that the Muslims saw no future for themselves in India and had succumbed to a do-or-die mood of desperation. Or did a section of them have links with Pakistan and allow itself to be used to malign the image of India? Or were some Muslim leaders, the mullahs particularly, keen that Muslims should not identify themselves with the mainstream of India’s life?

*The Statesman* reported Vajpayee as saying that for 800 years the Hindus had been browbeaten in their homeland. They would have no more of it.

Mrs Gandhi asserted that by his speech Vajpayee had done a great disservice to the country and to the minorities. With his arms upheld in the manner of Hitler, she said Vajpayee had used the occasion to launch an attack on the Muslims in particular and all minorities in general. What had happened in Bhiwandi was not something for which any of us would like to shirk responsibility. We must face the fact of what starts these riots. It was not throwing a stone by a child or something similar that started riots but speeches like the one delivered by Vajpayee. She remarked on the coincidence that when people belonging to the Jana Sangh and RSS visit a place a riot breaks out there soon after.
Corruption and Communalism

Referring to the demand by some members that Vajpayee’s remarks be expunged, she said she was glad the Chair had not done so. “Let the future generations read for themselves what was in the minds of the Jana Sangh leaders and behind Mr Vajpayee’s naked fascism.” Mrs Gandhi said it was a clarion call to Hindu communalism to assert itself and that this challenge would be met. Vajpayee challenged her to produce one shred of evidence to support the claim that the Jana Sangh leaders were responsible for communal trouble.

When Mrs Gandhi was speaking of the secular character of the Indian nation, Mrs Tarkeshwari Sinha, a member of the Opposition Congress, reminded her that as President of the undivided Congress Party in 1960, she had brought about the ill-starred alliance with the Muslim League to topple the first Communist Ministry in Kerala. That opportunist action had doomed the secular pretensions of the Congress, Mrs Sinha said.

Nath Pai of the Praja Socialist Party thought that communal violence could not be completely isolated from the general atmosphere of violence in the country. Yet if it was violence of the Naxalite type, the Government sat silently with folded arms. The weakened authority of the Centre was responsible for the general state of violence. One reason for Hindu-Muslim disunity was the Congress tactics of telling the Muslims that if they did not vote for it they would endanger their own security.

Writing in the *Indian Express* of 18 May 1970 under the heading “Exploiting the Minorities” and referring to the debate on minorities in Parliament on 14 May, Frank Moraes said:

These selective approaches to similar situations are beginning to raise doubts... whether the minorities, on the plea of being protected, are not really being exploited for narrow political ends by certain interested quarters. No party or group can fairly or convincingly pose as the special protectors of the minorities.... When the Prime Minister of a country takes it upon herself to be the guardian angel of the minorities in a sensitive
and highly inflammable situation, she cannot complain if a spokesman for the majority, like Vajpayee, trots out chapter and verse to confound her. The Jana Sangh leader, citing 23 official investigations into communal conflicts over the past 18 months, revealed that 22 of them had laid the initial blame at the door of the minorities. Between the political crossfires, the minorities suffer. They are the sacrificial victims of contending political rivalries.

Moraes wrote again in the Indian Express of 15 June:

The new Congress, very caste-conscious during elections, and with Akali, DMK, Muslim and Harijan allies, can hardly project itself as a party free from communal motivations or affiliations. Whether Mrs Gandhi likes it or not, she is one of the two prime projectors of communalism in the country.... The Union Government is caught in the coils of its own contradictions. The Prime Minister denounces the RSS and the Jana Sangh while her Government issues a stamp to commemorate the...Hindu Mahasabhite, V.D. Savarkar, and bestows on an RSS luminary, Hans Raj Gupta, who is also Delhi’s Mayor, the Padma Bhushan.

Discord and mutual hatred has existed between the Hindus and Muslims for centuries. We saw it at its worst in 1947, when about 100,000 Hindus and Muslims were killed in the wake of Partition. Hatred between Hindus and Muslims resulted in the breakup of India and the creation of Pakistan.

Tension between Hindus and Muslims is therefore inherent in the very basis on which India and Pakistan came into being as Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority states. Our leaders thought that bifurcation of this subcontinent would be a cure for the Hindu-Muslim rift, but it has turned out worse than the malady.

Pakistan considers itself the custodian of the Muslims living in India and says it has a right to speak or lodge complaints on their behalf. As many Muslims in India are in touch with their relatives and friends living in Pakistan they are influenced by each other’s feelings. So long as relations between India and Pakistan
are strained Hindu-Muslim discord will continue. We see it erupting in our midst every now and again with much bloodshed and destruction.

Mutual intolerance and lack of trust between Hindus and Muslims is the main cause of their differences. The first thing we must do therefore is to inculcate tolerance among all communities, and especially among Hindus and Muslims. We should also ensure that the Muslims should become a part of the mainstream of Indian life.

At the time of the Inquisition in Europe, Catholics burnt Protestants as heretics, and in the massacre or St Bartholomew’s Day in France they committed untold atrocities on the Protestants. Yet today Catholics and Protestants live together in comparative harmony except in Northern Ireland, where religious feuding is the result of political differences. Hindus and Muslims can do the same if our leaders make a determined effort to achieve this. Some steps they should take to improve relations are:

(a) History and school books should be rewritten. At present many of them emphasize the wrong things.

(b) Although all festivals and processions should be permitted, members of any community who interfere or cause provocations on such occasions should be punished severely.

(c) Acts of intolerance should be discouraged.

(d) Anti-Hindu and anti-Muslim slogans should be banned and defaulters dealt with suitably.

(e) Acts of bigotry by Hindus, Muslims, or other communities should be eliminated ruthlessly.

(f) In areas where communal riots break out prohibitive penalties should be imposed on the residents. Everybody will then prevent rather than encourage such happenings.

(g) Exemplary action should be taken against (i) those guilty of inflammatory speeches or writings; (ii) officials who are slack in discovering or dealing with communal trouble; and (iii) politicians who interfere with legitimate actions of the police or the executive to deal with such troubles.

Emphasis on tolerance and action against communal trouble will eliminate antagonism, between various communities who will then
begin to think of themselves as Indians. This spirit of tolerance will be in line with the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi and will improve our conduct in many other respects also.

Our leaders must stop placating or provoking various communities to win votes and to ensure self-preservation. They must also stop making a mere show of secularism. When communal riots break out they should take the most exemplary steps to deal with them and not merely visit the affected areas and console the victims of violence, hold hurried post mortems and finally order judicial enquiries which drag on for months and on whose findings nothing is done.

The Muslims in India feel insecure. Government should take steps to improve their morale and remove this feeling. For example, just as we are raising Army regiments of persons belonging to a particular ethnic group like the Nagas, we should raise units of Muslims and other minorities to infuse greater confidence in this community.

The 60 million Muslims in India are not really a minority except in name in view of their large number—more than the total population of Britain. They cannot, in any case, be ignored and must be accommodated in our body politic. They, as also the other minorities, should be dealt with fairly, and their handicaps and disparities removed. We should improve their economic lot and give them a larger share in many of our activities in the public and private sector. They should enjoy equality but no special privileges.

The Preamble to our Constitution guarantees "social and political justice, liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship and equality of status and opportunity as also fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation."

After playing fair by the Muslims and other communities, Government must demand from them in return unstinted loyalty. They should be told that they must bear their responsibilities as equal members of the Indian community. But if any of them still regard themselves as a separate entity, incite trouble, and defy our national policies we should take swift, severe and deterrent action. This will have a salutary effect on wrongdoers.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Towards a Rational Foreign Policy

Our country! In her discourse with other foreign nations, may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong.

Stephen Decatur

Nehru was a peerless patriot and had many qualities rarely seen in man. This architect of modern India did more for his country than anybody else since Ashoka or Akbar. But, like other men, he had frailties. He made our foreign policy, but he did not devise a system to carry out an expert study of areas and countries of special interest to India and draw logical conclusions from current events. He merely kept feeding his subordinates with his own reactions to international matters. Our diplomacy, therefore, developed piecemeal.

Nehru believed he understood international affairs better than anybody else in India and could conduct our diplomacy without much assistance. He did not pay sufficient attention to the selection of diplomats for even important posts. Thus, many with indifferent backgrounds slipped in and deserving ones were ignored. Some good men were chosen by chance.

Nehru often gave long discourses to our ambassadors without giving them enough scope to have their say. He did not feel the need to be briefed by them. He treated them, although he had chosen most of them himself, as if they were novices on probation even after they had acquired some experience. None of them asserted themselves as either they did not have the requisite stature or because they held him in awe.

Nehru supported the African, South Asian, and other nationalist movements. He projected India’s image as a progressive force by aligning himself mainly with leftist forces and administering shock
treatment to the self-complacent vested interests of the West. He made the Eastern powers more respectable by espousing their cause and made the West respect him by his constant voice of dissent. In this he, by accident, chose Krishna Menon as his instrument.

Nehru personified the spirit of rebellious dissent from the West, and nonalignment was a direct result of his realization of the inadequacies of both systems and of the inherent danger of aligning with either. Nonalignment also provided a greater bargaining power to a weak nation. It helped India attain a world position which was out of proportion to its militaty capabilities. It also created a third force in world affairs.

He knew how to operate this policy, and it worked well for about 12 years (1947-59). But as nothing succeeds for ever and as the power equation changed internationally, this policy became out-of-date. It therefore started becoming less effective from 1960 onwards. If we had become stronger internally in the previous decade, we would have been able to cope with the changing situation. But the pace of progress envisaged in the first two Five Year Plans was not fast enough and their implementation was even slower.

Nehru's successors have neither strengthened India sufficiently nor have the requisite skill to devise new formulae to meet new challenges. Hence our diplomacy is at sea today.

The Chinese intrusion, which first came to light in 1958 and culminated in the massive attack in 1962, revealed our inability to safeguard our territorial integrity. This was because we had till then concentrated only on building up a welfare society and economized on defence expenditure, refraining at the same time from accepting military aid from friendly countries. Some of us think of nonalignment and nonviolence—with which we fought for our freedom—as inseparable. We may have nonalignment as a policy, but it is not wise for us to rely on it under all circumstances. This policy is all right in peace but all wrong in war, when it cannot work. A country can keep away invaders not only because it is strong but also because it can, if pushed, build up a suitable combination of supporters and allies against an aggressor. In any event, who can stand alone in the world today?
Nonalignment does not mean we should not enter into military arrangements when our security demands. As Nehru said in his address to the American Congress in 1949: "We cannot be neutral when peace is threatened or justice denied. To be neutral in such cases would be the negation of all we stand for." Nonalignment should not mean neutrality.

We seldom anticipate events and do not plan our policies after careful thought. We often make hasty pronouncements on important matters and get into untenable positions. Although nonalignment is not a policy of weakness or timidity, in applying it to concrete situations we are often influenced by one great power or another. We do not restrain ourselves from unnecessarily criticizing countries from whom we are receiving considerable aid. Instead of remaining wide awake, we are usually caught with our pants down. We do not train our diplomats to evaluate situations objectively. Some of them think that a knowledge of etiquette is more important than diplomacy.

We have been accused of not keeping our promises. We should therefore build up our country all round in the next few years and, if necessary, freeze our foreign policy in the meantime. Our credibility and our prestige will increase once we are strong. Our diplomacy should be defined positively once we have proved our mettle in world affairs.

There is no coordination between our foreign, defence, and economic policies and we do not consider all these aspects together to assess various situations with a national bias. We exaggerate the importance of the "international angle" to the detriment of our own interests and do not evolve and develop our home policies or ensure their correct and speedy implementation.

We often pretend to be strong when we are not and adopt postures in international affairs in sheer bravado, landing ourselves in situations from whence it is impossible to retrace our steps. We sometimes make statements on the spur of the moment—betraying our emotional reaction—and commit ourselves, when by remaining silent we could retain the initiative. Finally, diplomacy should come to our rescue more often than it does at present.

We should, if possible, have friendly relations without powerful
neighbours. At the same time, we should be careful of them. As Chanakya said, most nations cast covetous eyes on those situated next to them.

When we attained Independence in 1947, we proclaimed from the housetops that we wanted no foreign aid. We could take this stand because we had substantial resources of foreign exchange in the form of sterling balances. When they were soon exhausted, we began to borrow on a huge scale. One way of augmenting our resources of foreign exchange is to make our policy towards foreign private investment more realistic. Another way is to increase our exports substantially.

No one disagrees with the view that ultimately we must be self-sufficient, but till that is possible, accepting aid from abroad—without strings—does not mean that we hurt our self-respect, jeopardize our freedom or compromise our thought or action in any way. The USSR, for instance, took aid freely from the capitalist powers after the revolution in 1917. Even after it acquired considerable strength, it received in World War II immense quantities of aid from the USA in aircraft, weapons, chemicals, raw materials, and grain. Yet when we seek or accept such aid from other countries to build up our resources for the prosperity of our people, we are criticized as though we belong to a lesser breed and are bartering away our honour and sovereignty.

Despite massive foreign aid from different countries year after year, our shortages in the commodities concerned continue. Only superficial development takes place as much of the foreign aid we get is squandered or misappropriated by those who handle it. Why can’t we learn to tighten our belts and do with a little less? Why can’t we work more, eat less and submit to state restrictions which lead to economy? We acquire machines with greater capacity than our requirements, which keeps some of them idle or results in waste. Our purchase and development programmes should be planned properly and be related to our needs.

If countries like West Germany and Japan have made great progress in recent years through foreign aid without jeopardizing their freedom, why cannot we do the same? Yet, we should remember that the Japanese and the Germans are dedicated people
with character and used aid to full advantage without losing their national pride in the process.

There are some countries which have been widely corrupted in the process of receiving generous foreign aid as they lack character and self-respect. As we are not overflowing with these qualities ourselves, we have not made full use of the aid we have received. Individuals connected with aid projects have often lost their self-respect by accepting favours from benefactors.

Although we depend on the super-powers for one thing or another, many of our countrymen advocate an “independent” foreign policy. By this I suppose they merely mean that we should have the freedom to go out of our way and criticize the whole world. This sort of uncontrolled censure of others to prove our independence does not work. Foreign policy must be based on our vital national interests and should pursue their advancement. Studied discretion is necessary in this effort. When we talk of “national interests,” we should remember that they revolve around one main consideration: the anxiety of the people for the security of their hearths and homes. Towards this end they enhance their stature and influence.

The preservation of our national interests may sometimes make force inevitable. But since the earliest times the role of force in this process has been debated. Some have sought to eliminate it while others have tried in vain to impose curbs and controls on its use. As conflicts among nations increased with the passage of time, armed forces were accepted universally as an inescapable necessity for both external and internal security.

In fact, military expenditure of the world multiplied from generation to generation and stood in 1969 at 180 billion US dollars. Our foreign, defence, and economic policies cannot be divorced and should therefore be pursued in complete harmony. One of our major foreign policy aims should be to avoid war. But if driven to it this policy should ensure that we enlist more powerful support than our enemies do.

We should not think, as we seem to do occasionally, that relations between countries depend on the personal affinity which exists between their leaders. The basis of foreign policy is, or should
be, self-interest. If our self-interest happens to coincide with that of other countries, friendly relations develop. If they clash, steps should be taken diplomatically to reconcile mutual differences. The process becomes easier if certain individual leaders of the countries concerned happen to agree.

But we give the impression that the world should be guided by our interpretation of events. When we think this is not happening, we display our independence in world affairs, make statements concerning countries which, though true, may prove prejudicial to our own interests in the long run. We do this regardless of the overall picture of a particular situation which prevails in the world. We forget that foreign policies are never framed on pure sentiment.

Our government sometimes injects into the senior ranks of our diplomatic service outsiders, including discredited politicians, when outstanding career diplomats are available for difficult assignments. This harms both the country and the service.

Although we have some excellent diplomats representing us abroad, there are at the same time many who are chosen for considerations other than merit—past "services," seniority, pedigree, or being goody-goody. Such men fail to project India's image with dignity either because they do not take enough pride in our country, are inherently incompetent, or exaggerate our shortcomings in the presence of foreigners, which weakens our position.

Their ability and conduct also leave much to be desired. They are therefore unable to represent our policies in a positive manner and with sophistication. We have to use our ambassadors as more than mere messengers. Many of them are experts in their profession. The rich experience of such men should therefore be utilized more and their advice sought often in matters they have taken a lifetime to learn.

We often take up unrealistic postures internationally. We should rationalize our diplomacy and not adopt rigid attitudes when situations around us are fluid. Despite our pampering certain countries, none of them, except Malaysia, condemned
Pakistan when it attacked us in 1965. This was one more sign of fruitless foreign policy.

Though it is true that we should not have permanent friends but only permanent interests, this does not mean that our relations with certain major powers should fluctuate erratically between warm cordiality and cold hostility for reasons which appear petty in the larger context. We forget the harsh realities of life in our fits of temper and trivial differences often undermine our basic agreements. We must understand that, whether we like it or not, we have to live as an integral part of an international society and should adjust ourselves to this situation.

*India's Relations with other Powers*

It is a law of human nature that the strong dictate to the weak. The aim of the great powers, the USA, the USSR, and China, in respect of India is the same—to strain its economy and weaken its national structure to enable them to dictate to us what suits them most. Pakistan has an inferiority complex in relation to India and keeps making abortive attempts to score over us in every field. Japan will remain cautious till it becomes as strong militarily as it is economically today.

Let us now see how we should adjust our relations with the USA, the USSR, China, Japan, and Pakistan.

*USA*

The USA is anxious to have a reliable and strong ally in Southeast Asia. It is disillusioned with Pakistan for flirting with the USSR and China and is not sure which way Japan may lean in the future despite its massive help to these two countries in different directions in the past. The USA also wants an ally in proximity to the USSR and China, both of whom are potential foes. If the USA can eventually have China as its ally—which seems unlikely at present but which the development of world forces may make possible one day—it may wish to strengthen this combination further by acquiring Indian or Pakistani cooperation. In fact, the USA is helping Pakistan in order to counter India's friendship with the USSR and to exploit Sino-Soviet differences. India,
in turn, has much to gain from the USA. It can accelerate its development plans through American friendship.

If the USA and China do not come together and India and China remain as hostile as they are today, American friendship for India, in the economic and particularly in the military fields, will be invaluable. It will also increase our bargaining position in relation to the USSR. We should therefore, in our self-interest, cultivate positive friendship with the USA.

USSR

The Soviet Union is the greatest welfare State in the world with over 30 million old-age pensioners and a free health service and a gigantic system of free education. Soviet achievements in all fields are generally outstanding. Its people are on the whole very patriotic and efficient.

When the USSR was building up China economically in the early 1950s, it also started building up India simultaneously as it did not want China to be the sole influence in Asia. China protested at the time against the Soviet build-up of India. Now the USSR is building up Pakistan as a counterweight to India. As India is likely to become, in the near future, one of the strong powers in Asia, the USSR wants to build up Pakistan as a balancing force and to make India and Pakistan equally dependent on Moscow. It will therefore keep on helping India and Pakistan at the same time in the hope that both will be with it against the USA and China.

The Soviet Union gave considerable aid and knowhow to China in the economic and other, including nuclear fields in the early fifties. When China started becoming stronger, it pressed for a self-integrated system precluding dependence on the USSR. This the Russians did not allow. China resented this as it did not relish the idea of being at the mercy of another power, especially as it wanted to become a super-power in its own right eventually.

The USSR and China started falling apart on this account. Moscow slowly withdrew its support to China in several fields, until their differences, with the passage of time, have reached the present magnitude. The moral is that while we should welcome
Russian support we should not allow ourselves to be tied to its apron-strings lest we have no options left. If we assert ourselves, as we should, the USSR is likely to react strongly and withdraw its support from us, as it did from China for the same reason. We should be mentally prepared for this eventuality.

Whatever Moscow may say on the subject of India-USSR friendship, it should be remembered that it has refused to revise its maps, which show large chunks of Indian territory as part of China, and has provided substantial military equipment to Pakistan.

We should realize that the USSR is giving us assistance in various fields in its own interests, as all other countries do. As we are not strong enough in our dealings with the USSR, it exploits us on many occasions, believing in the maxim that a hooked fish needs no bait. Whereas we should never throw our weight about unnecessarily with the USSR or any other power, we should take a firmer, and judiciously tough stand and lay down our terms for friendship with Moscow or for anybody else. If we need the Russians, they need us too, and USSR is not the only country which can give us the help we require. For instance, if it does not give us a steel plant, planes or tanks, we can get this assistance from elsewhere—West Germany, Japan, Britain, France, USA.

We should not worry on the score that the USSR, or any other country for that matter, may resent some particular line of action we take. Whoever helps us in our need will demand a price of some sort as the USSR does. We should quietly pursue the policy which suits us most. Pakistan, despite being aligned, receives aid from the leading world powers, with all of whom it has good relations. No country gives charity to another. Countries give aid because it is in their interest to do so.

So long as we act independently; and do not toe Moscow’s political line—China’s main grouse against us—and even if we continue receiving Russian economic and military aid, we can at the same time improve our relations with China and other countries.

Pakistan

When India became free in 1947, many of our leaders had illusions about its inherent strength and the “key” position it was
supposed to hold because of New Delhi’s “sagacious” foreign policy. Actually, India suffered from a number of handicaps and was weak in many respects. It was, however, bigger than Pakistan, with a greater potential and could have made greater progress. This irked the Pakistanis, who therefore raised many disputes with India, including their claim to Kashmir. Pakistan attempted to force a decision in its favour by attacking Kashmir in 1947.

In 1965, India and Pakistan fought two wars with each other again. Both ended in a stalemate. Their mutual hostility, however, continued and Pakistan maintained a vigorous political offensive against India in the United Nations. It later began threats of a “second round” unless the question of Kashmir was settled amicably. President Ayub Khan told his National Assembly that it was dangerous for Pakistan to rely heavily on any single source of supply for military equipment as in the past.

Pakistan has been busy cultivating various powers. Its Western alignment earlier provided a series of challenges for Russia. From bases in Pakistan, American air power could dominate the industrial heart of the USSR. Pakistan’s alliance with Turkey brought together two powerful Muslim countries bordering the Muslim Asian republics of the USSR.

Ayub probably dismissed Bhutto from his Cabinet to placate Washington. At the same time he dismissed his pro-West Finance Minister Mohammed Shoaib to placate his communist allies or to demonstrate his independence of the USA.

By the autumn of 1966, India-Pakistan relations had deteriorated further. Sino-Soviet relations were also far from good. Pakistan was coming closer both to the USSR and China. The Chinese began emphasizing the importance of nuclear arms in world affairs. The arms race between India and Pakistan continued. Both countries kept looking hopefully for help of various kinds from abroad, especially from the USSR.

A significant change has come in the Soviet attitude to Kashmir. When Ayub and Bhutto went to Moscow on a State visit in April 1965, the Soviet leaders were particularly cordial to them and described Pakistan in a public statement as “a people fighting for
their right of self-determination." This change of attitude synchronized with the strengthening of Sino-Pakistani friendship and further deterioration in Sino-Indian relations.

Pakistan's diplomatic standing in Moscow has greatly improved since 1965. Yet in 1958, Ayub said, in respect of the USSR:

I maintain that coexistence with the Soviet Union is not possible because the circumstances on which coexistence is based do not exist. If communism were to prevail in our part of the world, we should have the status of a satellite. The Russians have different treatment for different countries.

It is worth noting that whenever India asked the USSR about its policy on arms supply to Pakistan, the reply was that the question did not arise. In 1967, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firuyubin denied that the USSR was supplying arms to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Gromyko assured India that the arms the USSR was supplying to Iran had no chance of being diverted to Pakistan. But they were. When India asked the USSR to confirm or deny whether it was supplying arms to Pakistan, Moscow did not reply. Pakistan has received about 150 T-55 tanks, 130-mm guns, and spare parts for MiG aircraft from the USSR.

The Statesman, New Delhi, reported on 29 May 1970, that the Soviet Union proposed to supply Pakistan SU-7 fighter bombers and missile boats. The USSR has issued no contradiction of this news but India says it is not true. New Delhi is confident that the USSR will give no more tanks or combat aircraft to Pakistan. Only the future will tell. So far, Moscow's stock reply to New Delhi's protests has been that it will never allow Pakistan to use Soviet arms against India. We have heard this before from the USSR and also from the USA years ago.

Now, one of the reasons given by the USSR for providing military aid to Pakistan is that this would wean it away from China. The USA had given a similar reason for aiding Pakistan. But with what results?

Russia is friendly with Pakistan because China is becoming stronger day by day and hence more belligerent, threatening the security of South Asia and of the USSR itself. Moscow therefore
wants to have along the southern border of the Soviet Union neutral, if not friendly, countries like Pakistan. Russia's attitude on Kashmir is directly related to its desire to help Pakistan in different ways.

The Soviet Union's appreciation of Pakistan's progress is mounting steadily. For instance, on 21 March 1970, Tass praised President Yahya Khan's administration for what is called "efforts to stabilize the domestic economy and set the foreign policy course on independent lines."

India and Pakistan have acquired substantial quantities of modern weapons and equipment from abroad, especially in the last five years or so. But this kind of competition seldom leads to peace.

Ayub said in 1966 that friendship between China and Pakistan was not based on expediency. "The policies of the two governments are based," he said, "on principles, one of which is the right of the peoples to self-determination." The same year, China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi said in Peking to Pakistan's Commerce Minister Ghulam Faruque: "Chairman Mao has said that we should support whatever the enemy opposes and oppose whatever the enemy supports."

Despite Pakistan's friendship with China, a spokesman of the US State Department said in Washington on 12 April 1967:

We have also decided to remove present US Government restrictions on the kinds of spare parts which may be sold to India and Pakistan for previously supplied equipment. Henceforth, we will be prepared to reconsider, on a case-by-case basis, all requests for export permits covering the cash purchase of spare parts.

Thus USA was trying to treat both countries alike. Yet it must have known that spares for lethal weapons would assist in putting into action much of Pakistan's weapons and equipment damaged in 1965. India would not benefit similarly as it had not so many US weapons. The sale of US weapons indirectly through other countries was also permitted, and Pakistan had reportedly obtained sufficient cash from China and Saudi Arabia for this purpose.
Towards a Rational Foreign Policy

There are indications in early July 1970 that Washington had already revoked the ban on the sale of military hardware to India and Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan has acquired 300 armoured personnel carriers, seven B-57 bombers and a squadron of F-104 Star or F-5 Freedom fighters. In addition, Pakistan may get a replacement of 100 Patton tanks.

India is unwilling to avail itself of this opportunity because of its expectations of supplies from Moscow. These moves would therefore result in increasing Pakistan’s effective military strength. At the same time, it would retard a settlement of the problems between the two countries through negotiations and incite mutual tension.

The State Department argues that if the USA does not meet Pakistan’s requirements for armament, Russia and China will, as they have done already. The USA is unlikely to wean Pakistan away from Peking and Moscow, as Moscow is unlikely to wean Pakistan away from the USA or China.

Peking is watching these moves closely. It will not let Pakistan slip out of its hands so easily. Nor will the USA, having once invested two and a half billion dollars on the Pakistani armed forces and more now. The same applies to the USSR.

Pakistan keeps putting pressure on different countries to give it military aid. For example, when asked to comment at a press conference in April 1970 on rumours that the Americans had decided to let Pakistan buy 100 tanks from Turkey at a nominal price, Yahya Khan said: “We want American tanks and we also know that the Americans are reconsidering their policy about the arms sale since July last year. If they take too long to decide, I will buy these tanks from elsewhere, and if the Americans then say I could have their tanks, I will say ‘No, thank you’.”

The USA is between the devil and the deep sea. If it helps Pakistan militarily, it alienates the sympathies of some other countries. Despite such help, experience has shown that Pakistan does nothing to serve USA’s interests and woos USSR and China too. If USA denies Pakistan this assistance, it will get closer to USSR and China.

The Indian Express of 16 October 1970, reported US Senator
William Saxby as telling the Senate that the value of the arms (300 armoured personnel carriers, 18 F-104 Starfighters and 7 B-57 bombers) the USA would sell Pakistan was not worth only 15 million dollars as the Administration averred but at least $150 million at market price. This discrepancy was due to the Pentagon’s deflated pricing policy for surplus arms.

US Secretary of State, William Rogers, assured Mrs Gandhi in Washington that the proposed sale would constitute a “one-time exception” to the arms embargo applicable to both countries (Indian Express, 29 October 1970). But no reliance can be placed on such assurances which have been broken before.

Saxby also mentioned the two and half billion dollar aid the USA had given Pakistan earlier, in the shape of 700 tanks, around 20 squadrons of F-86 Sabre jets and 104 Starfighters, artillery, and a variety of other equipment. “And what did this ally do for us?” asked Saxby. “Where did it join in fighting anti-communist battles? It forced us to unceremoniously close down the only facility it had given us—the U-2 base in Peshawar.”

Saxby concluded: “Today, the leaders of Pakistan openly proclaim that they visualize no threat from the Soviet Union or from China and is getting arms from both. In other words, China and Russia are repeating our folly in Pakistan. But there is no reason for us to emulate them.”

It is interesting to note that in a letter to the New York Times, Pakistan’s Press Attache in Washington threatened that his country would use American arms to “force” India to settle the Kashmir issue. He said Pakistan needed more arms to discourage possible adventures of India’s rulers. A nation’s ability to defend its rights or thwart aggression sometimes had brought contending parties to the negotiating table. With or without arms purchases, he said Pakistan had not been in a position to force India to the conference table for meaningful negotiations on Kashmir and other outstanding problems. With the help of friendly countries like the USA, he hoped Pakistan might yet be able to do so.

The biggest criticism of US military aid to Pakistan has come from Chester Bowles, former Ambassador in India. According to a report in the Indian Express, New Delhi, of 21 January 1971,
he disclosed before a Congressional committee in Washington on 19 January that the initiative for third-country sales of tanks and other equipment to Pakistan came in each case from the USA. Bowles spoke on the basis of authentic and direct information and not hearsay.

Bowles' account is the most cogent and coherent picture of the history of American military involvement on the side of Pakistan that anyone has so far made public in Washington. According to him, the rationale of US interest in Pakistan's military strength might be traced to a book, *Wells of Power*, written by a British Civil Servant, Sir Olaf Caroe, which came to the attention of the State Department in 1950. As Caroe pointed out, in British colonial days the stability of West Asia and Southeast Asia largely depended on three elements: British diplomacy, the British Navy, and the Indian Army.

After the British withdrawal from India and the establishment of Nehru's policy of non-involvement in 1948, the Indian Army had been neutralized. Hence Caroe argued that a substitute must be found, and Pakistan was the most likely possibility. In 1953, Secretary of State Dulles, exasperated by India's non-aligned foreign policies, favoured the proposed build up of Pakistan's armed forces.

On 25 February 1954, President Eisenhower approved the arms agreement with Pakistan. In a public letter of explanation to Nehru, he said:

> What we are proposing to do, and what Pakistan is agreeing to, is not directed any way against India, and I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against any other, I shall undertake immediate and, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations, to thwart such aggressions.

In the late 1950s, as the validity of the US assumption that Pakistan could be counted on as a loyal ally in case of a Soviet or Chinese attack came into question, a new element was introduced to justify the USA's commitment to Pakistan. This was
the development of a large military base at Peshawar.

According to Bowles, as the Pentagon and State Department placed greater and greater emphasis on the importance of the Peshawar air base, the capacity of the Pakistan Government to influence United States’ policy in South Asia increased correspondingly. When the Chinese attacked India in the fall of 1962, the USA promptly came to India’s assistance with some $60 million in military equipment. But when India asked for $100 million a year for five years to modernize its military forces, a bitterly fought contest occurred within the US Government.

In November 1963, when the USA was about to respond favourably to India’s request, President Kennedy died. In May 1964, when the USA was again on the eve of a favourable decision, Nehru died. Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that the Indian Government, which had been waiting impatiently for US support for 18 months, would turn to the USSR for the military assistance it quite reasonably felt was essential to discourage and, if necessary, defeat a Chinese attack.

By mid-August 1964, it had become clear that those who opposed military aid to India for fear of jeopardizing the US base in Pakistan had won the debate. Ironically, the heavy political as well as military price the USA paid for the indispensable Peshawar base was in vain. In 1968, in an effort to please the USSR, Pakistan refused to renew the US agreement and the latter was forced to move out the following year.

Bowles went on to say that the brief but tough India-Pakistan war began in August 1965, when some 5,000 Pakistani guerillas invaded the Kashmir Valley. A month later, when it became clear that this covert effort had failed, a Pakistani armoured brigade, equipped with American tanks, artillery and machine guns and supported by American planes, crossed the India-Pakistan frontier in the Jammu area and moved to cut off communications between northern India and the Kashmir Valley.

The Indians launched a diversionary thrust farther west. Two Indian divisions moved across the Punjab border and headed for Lahore. The Chinese, who welcomed the conflict and were alarmed over the progress made in the negotiations for a cease-
fire, sent India an ultimatum over an alleged violation of their border by Indian troops. But India ignored the Chinese warning, and after intensive negotiations a ceasefire was arranged.

The Indian Government, press, and public were, Bowles said, predictably bitter over the use of American equipment by Pakistan. According to him, in April 1967, the USA once again resumed shipments of arms to Pakistan. In New Delhi, it was jocularly referred to as "America’s tanks for peace" programme. To meet Pakistan’s request for more tanks, the US Government asked first the West Germans, then the Belgians, next the Italians, and finally the Turks to "sell" 100 American tanks to Pakistan for a nominal price.

In March 1970, a year after Bowles left India, the Pakistan request for the tanks was renewed, and according to press reports this time the response of the new Nixon Administration was favourable. It was senseless performance. Why should a new Administration with a relatively clean slate seriously consider a proposal that simply repeated the blunders of its predecessors?

There was considerable opposition in the US Congress and Bowles added his protest in a guest editorial in the New York Times. Again the decision was delayed, but six months later in October 1970 agreement was reached. According to press reports, it permitted Pakistan to purchase one squadron of B-57 bombers, the only conceivable purpose of which could be to bomb Indian cities, and a sizable number of armoured personnel carriers which could only be used on the flat plains of Indian Punjab.

Bowles ended up by saying that the American’s old rationale, first that US arms to Pakistan were required to block a most unlikely Soviet push into West Asia and later that it was required to enable the Americans to retain their Peshawar military base, no longer made sense. Consequently, a new rationale to fit the situation was produced, and that was that the Americans must provide arms to Pakistan because the Russians and the Chinese were doing it.

Pakistan’s success and India’s failure in foreign policy lay in
the ability to have waged\(^1\) a war against us in 1965, a possibility against which we had striven hard and long. There is no change in Pakistan's hostile attitude towards us, though some of our naive leaders seem to mistake meaningless utterances by odd Pakistanis now and again as indications of such a change. Our leaders have given plausible arguments in support of our role at the Islamic Conference at Rabat in 1969, which was really a slap in the face to us engineered by Pakistan. Why can we not also play our cards skillfully in diplomacy? At some stage, we must learn to act with finesse or firmness, as necessary.

Pakistan has done well in the field of diplomacy. It has established close relations with the USSR and China and after some time, not unfriendly relations with the Western powers, from whom it has received considerable aid of various types. It has been improving its relations with the USSR with the primary aim of weakening Moscow's support to India. Pakistan occupies an important position strategically in relation to the USSR-China. It is therefore natural for the other big powers to seek its friendship.

We have yet to learn that no country is a friend forever. All countries keep their national interests foremost in their policies and foreign relations keep changing periodically. Our belief that the Russians will not give much military aid to Pakistan has already been belied, and it is only our imagination that the Chinese are fettered with too many of their internal difficulties to violate our borders once again.

**INDIA-USA-USSR-PAKISTAN-CHINA**

India condemned the crossing of the 38th Parallel by UN troops in Korea in 1950. About this time, China occupied Tibet and made uncalled-for attacks on New Delhi and Nehru personally.

\(^1\)According to the *Statesman*, New Delhi, dated 20 October 1970, Bhutto's claim that he engineered the 1965 war has brought forth a rejoinder by Air Marshal Asghar Khan who said: "Bhutto is wrong when he says he wanted war with India. It is we [military leaders] who wanted the war." In fact, Bhutto also said: "If Jinnah was wrong in starting the war against India, than I am equally wrong."
Nehru opposed US military aid to Pakistan, rejected Eisenhower's similar offer to India, and rebuffed the USA on the question of Jammu and Kashmir in many ways. The Soviet Union then reacted to Nehru's friendly gestures.

Nehru disapproved Washington's bid to dominate parts of Asia and sympathized with the revolution in China as evidence of a nationalist awakening in Asia. As he saw no danger of democratic values and institutions being subverted by friendly relations with Moscow he adopted a pro-Soviet posture. This was accentuated by US military aid to Pakistan in 1953-1954. The USSR then gave positive support to New Delhi on Kashmir and Khrushchev made his famous declaration in Kashmir that Indians had only to shout across the Himalayas and the Soviet Union would come to their help.

Nehru disapproved of the Soviet treatment of the East European countries as well as of the suppression of civil liberties in various ways in the USSR. Relations between India and the USA showed signs of improvement in about 1960 when the Soviet Union began to make overtures to Pakistan, which, consequently, started drifting away from the USA. The US decision to give limited assistance to India in 1962 proved to be the death-knell of the Pakistan-American alliance. This gave the Soviet Union a suitable opportunity of assuming an important role in Asia. Three years later, Kosygin offered mediation in the India-Pakistan war of 1965 as soon as Washington stopped military aid to both India and Pakistan.

Moscow's desire to improve relations with Pakistan was part of a new policy aimed at carving out an exclusive role for itself among its southern neighbours. Also, China's emergence as a great power posed the danger that it might fill the vacuum resulting from the US' posture in Asia. Pakistan reciprocated to the Russian wooing as the Soviet Government changed its stand on Kashmir. When Pakistan later realized that its Russian friendship would not be developed at the cost of India, it intensified its efforts to be friendly with the Soviet Union and China, hoping that one day it might become a bridge between them and this would reduce India's importance internationally.
During this period, Pakistan continued to draw closer to the Soviet Union, which decided to provide lethal arms to it despite vigorous protests from various agencies in India which accused Moscow of seeking parity between India and Pakistan as the Anglo-Americans had done in the past. This placed a heavy strain on Indo-Soviet relations, as other factors had threatened them from time to time, notably the Indian criticism of Soviet armed intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

We not only failed to win the India-Pakistan conflict in 1965 but in a way lost the peace as well. A major consequence of this war was that we allowed the Soviet Union to appear on the national scene almost as a suzerain power within two decades of having, with great difficulty, liquidated the British Raj after more than two centuries.

The Tashkent effort in 1965 was a triumph of Soviet diplomacy. Moscow consolidated its friendship both with India and Pakistan without appearing partisan. It acquired a new position in Asian politics. Until then it had tried to sneak into our affairs. Now we openly invited it to deal with a vital matter concerning our nation. The fact that we did not ask the UN, the USA, Britain, or anybody but the Russians to deal with this matter gave them a tremendous amount of prestige internationally. Ironically, it made us dependent on the USSR more than ever and left us little leverage in our foreign policy.

According to the Statesman, New Delhi, dated 28 October 1970, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was not satisfied with Washington’s explanation of its decision to resume arms supplies to Pakistan. This was implicit in her remarks on her arrival in Delhi the day before at the end of a foreign visit. When a correspondent inquired whether she was referring to the argument that US help to Pakistan was intended to wean it away from China, she replied that the American answer was the same as India used to receive from the Soviets.

Mrs Gandhi saw a “sameness” in the attitude of the USA and the USSR towards Pakistan. When asked whether the two countries were going together on arms supply to Pakistan, she replied: “They say that they do not go together, but separately they do the same
thing." India's policy of nonalignment, coupled with its struggle for economic independence, might have provoked the USA to sell arms to Pakistan. The US Administration should know the effect of its policy of arms, how it once encouraged Pakistani aggression against India and might encourage it again.

The US Assistant Secretary of State for South East Asia, Joseph Sisco, protested through the press on 30 October 1970, against India's interpretation of US military aid to Pakistan. If India filed a request for arms, it would be entertained on par with Pakistan. But, as in 1954 in a similar situation, India is protesting without asking for US military aid.

The present developments indicate that the timing of American arms aid is designed to enhance the influence of the Generals in Pakistan who, with their feudal background, Washington hopes will become friendly one day. But Democratic Senator Frank Church has warned the Nixon Administration that the risks of another India-Pakistan conflict had increased as a result of this decision.

For reasons of their own, the two super-powers are building up Pakistan militarily, unmindful of the serious consequences of their action to peace and stability in Asia. Closing the US cultural centres, the visit to India of Madame Binh, a member of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and Delhi's periodical pronouncements on Vietnam might have provoked the USA to give Pakistan such lethal equipment as F-104 Starfighters and B-57 bombers, and persist in maintaining armed parity between India and Pakistan.

Because of its pro-Indian policies, the Soviet Union lacks a popular base in Pakistan, which China enjoys there because it is militantly anti-Indian. As an alternative, the Soviet Union therefore keeps on the right side of the Pakistani armed forces, which wield political power. It is therefore certain that Russia will continue to supply arms to Pakistan and hence effectively maintain its influence on that country's politics.

Another factor which may bring Pakistan and the USSR closer is the manner in which India is trying to normalize relations with China. Any rapprochement between these two countries will
upset Moscow's Asian strategy. In such an eventuality, Pakistan would willingly provide the requisite foothold to Russia in this sub-continent. It is to be seen whether in this tightrope-walking the Soviet Union has better luck than the US and Britain.

China

China is a huge country, larger than the USA, with a population of about 800 million today which will soar above 1,000 million by 1980. It has vast resources, an ancient culture of its own and an inheritance of Western thought. It has had several shocks and has seen many wars and revolutions in the last 125 years or so which brought death and destruction to millions. It has had several rude awakenings in which it learnt the hard way that revolution was a means to destroy the enemy and that it could not be carried out "gradually, carefully, and politely." It brought death to one's near and dear, for nearly 10 million died in the civil war in 1927-1934 in battle or because of hunger and disease.

The Communist Government which assumed power in China on 1 October 1949 had the advantages of totalitarianism. Because a small group of men exercised absolute command, it was able to implement various policies unchallenged. Millions flocked to the Red banner, some because they were loyal but the bulk to escape death or starvation or to salvage their wealth.

The Reds then proceeded to indoctrinate the masses. Every part of the population was dealt with: peasants, workers, youth, women, students, and anti-epidemic campaigns were promoted. "Education" cultivated the ideology of service to the people. In an effort towards mass education the written language was simplified. Night schools were started for millions of adults. Corruption was rooted out ruthlessly. Every aspect of Chinese society—

*The Tai Ping rebellion 1854-1865; China's defeat at the hands of "little" Japan in 1894; the Boxer uprising of 1900, when a handful of foreign forces drove the Imperial Court out of the capital city.

*The First Revolutionary Civil War 1921-1927, the Second Revolutionary Civil War 1927-1937, War of Resistance against Japan (Phase 1) 1937-1941, War of Resistance against Japan (Phase 2) 1941-1945; and the Third Revolutionary Civil War 1945-1949.
political, cultural, military, diplomatic, educational, industrial, and agricultural—was revolutionized. The people were made to work hard and underwent untold suffering.

China has a dictatorship capable of implementing its national policies effectively. Consequently, though there is suppression of liberty of speech and action, China has made conspicuous all round progress. It is today, by right, one of the great powers of the world.

Writing in the 1969 summer issue of *Orbis*, published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, Harry Gobler said that China was the only nuclear power with a serious prospect of coming into conflict with the US or the Soviet Union or both. Furthermore, a clash between any two of these would not necessarily involve the third. It also seemed highly likely, that in a Sino-Soviet clash the US, and in a Sino-American clash, the Soviet Union, would not voluntarily involve itself. It would rather stand aside and reap the fruits of abstention.

It should be noted, however, that these three nuclear powers will soon be joined by another super-power, Japan. Although these four are aware of each other’s strength, and each, for that reason, is not likely to get involved in a confrontation with the other, they may team up and come to a clash. I have said earlier that China and the USA may be driven into each other’s arms by circumstances against the USSR and Japan.

Experts on East Asia think the USA should adjust itself to the growing might of China as a world power. According to A. Doak Barnet, a leading American specialist on China, the Soviet Union was not likely to initiate a major military attack on China because the constraints are substantial. The USA should not approve any hostile Soviet activity against China as it already has vast superiority in an anti-ballistic missiles system and should not

*I doubt if anyone in India knows China, the Chinese people, and their way of life as well as does V.V. Paranjpe, at present working in our Foreign Office. Apart from being a fearless thinker, Paranjpe is not only an outstanding scholar of Sanskrit but also has a superb command over the Chinese language. He knows the top Chinese leaders intimately. What is more, he understands the Chinese mentality and their psychology thoroughly.*
frighten China into thinking that it was planning a strike. This is unnecessary for the defence of the US or of American interests in Asia.

China's main nuclear installations are so scattered that no attacker can hope to eliminate them without risk of a prolonged war. Nobody would therefore be tempted to launch a pre-emptive attack on these installations to counter any military moves Peking may be planning.

The main Chinese nuclear testing ground is at Lop Nor, in Sinkiang, and its nuclear production plants are at Aksu and Urum chi. A strike on them is unlikely to cripple China's nuclear potential unless it also destroys the major installations, which are located further east at Baiyen, Lanchow, and Paotow, and this is far-fetched.

The Russians have a mighty armed force, but it suffers from some handicaps. Its tanks and artillery are more modern and massive than those of the Chinese and its air force superior. The Soviet Union preponderates equally in nuclear striking power, with tactical and medium-range ballistic missiles deployed within the reach of Chinese targets.

China, on the other hand, has, apart from its nuclear arsenal, far greater manpower and a formidable infantry force with good equipment. According to the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, whereas the Soviet Union cannot deploy more than 30 divisions, or 270,000 men, in the immediate neighbourhood of the Chinese frontier, China can deploy more than one million men in reply to a Russian deployment without denuding its southern borders. Further, the Russians must be careful that if they take on China, somebody does not stab them in the back from Europe. An all-out war between the USSR and China is therefore unlikely.

The Soviet leaders designate the USA, the chief capitalist power, as the supreme enemy. Although they seek a temporary adjustment with Washington they are convinced that the Soviet Union, with its development of modern armaments, is the only power in the world capable of destroying the USA. The US, on the other hand, thinks it is the only power able to contain communist expansionism.
The Soviet-Chinese rivalry and the American-Soviet conflict are different in many ways. The Soviet and US frontiers are far apart, whereas the Chinese and the Russians have a common frontier of over 4,500 miles. The disparity of military strength between the Soviet Union and China is much greater than between the US and the Soviet Union. The Russians and the Chinese have been antagonistic to each other for centuries and are equally uncompromising as they both feel that truth is on their side, and both are equally conscious of their authority and power. All the same, there have been efforts recently, especially on the part of the Russians, to settle their many disputes with the Chinese peacefully.

How deep are the rifts between the USSR and China is illustrated by the following anecdote. When Kosygin decided to meet Chou En-lai in an effort to improve relations between the two countries, he flew to Peking after attending the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in 1969. Instead of being taken to the city, he was kept at Peking airport, where he met Chou for two hours. Kosygin asked Chou after the preliminary courtesies how long he thought it would take to solve their various differences. After scratching his head, Chou replied, with a faint snigger: "A thousand years." Kosygin protested and said he had hoped that they would be able to see some results of their efforts in their lifetime. "Well," said Chou, "on second thoughts it might take 900 years."

Although Sino-Soviet understanding seems unlikely at present, it is not altogether impossible, remembering that alliances in history have been forged between former enemies because of a variety of fears. A Peking-Moscow understanding will have ominous international implications, for Washington in particular, which will lose much of the manoeuvrability of diplomatic action it enjoys in the world today. With the massive Soviet nuclear shield and other armed might behind it, and its own growing nuclear capability, China will menace peace in different parts of the world. If this combination comes off, the USA and Japan may get together. Many unexpected alliances come into being by force of circumstances.

China achieved in 1962, its limited objective of conquering
territories considered necessary to defend Tibet. It demonstrated its military strength to the world by swiftly seizing these areas on the Indian border. India was humbled but did not collapse as China hoped. The USSR remained silent for weeks before voicing lukewarm support for India. But it never condemned the Chinese invasion.

China colluded with Pakistan in the war against India in 1965. Thereafter, it began intruding into Indian territory again. On 26 November 1965, its troops occupied positions along the Thagla ridge and at Namka Chu in NEFA in a massive operation reminiscent of 1962. India protested. On 9 December, Chinese forces probed Indian positions in Ladakh. On 10 December, China struck around Longju in NEFA. On 12 September 1967, the Chinese clashed with our forces in the Nathu La area in Sikkim, from which, as mentioned earlier, many highups in New Delhi drew comfort because of our supposed success. Since then it has, on the whole, held its hand so that it can keep its intentions hidden from us. Now that our relations with Pakistan are deteriorating, China is bound to start provoking more incidents along our northern border and may strike again if necessary. False, it may simulate action in certain areas to divert us from concentrating our resources against Pakistan.

The Chinese are making thorough preparations for a major confrontation. They are likely to create greater tensions in our border areas and as time goes on keep us guessing when they may inflict a blow. They have developed a network of communications along the India-Tibet border and virtually compelled Nepal to build a road from Kathmandu to Kodari Pass.

This road, with bridges fit to carry medium tanks, is of strategic importance to China as it is in line with its communications along the India-Tibet border. It links up with the Tribhuvan highway from Kathmandu to Raxaul on the Indian border. Thus, for the first time in history, the Indo-Gangetic plain, with India's capital on one flank and a major port, Calcutta, on the other, and our industrial complexes like Jamshedpur and Bhilai in the rear, is directly accessible to China.

The Chinese intelligence organization has systematically intro-
duced agents into India, especially in the border areas. It has established a network to convey necessary information back home. Its agents note, as do those of Pakistan, our military build up and movements and are helped in this task at times by unscrupulous people in this country. Its military machine makes do with an austere scale of rations and is expert in improvisation. Its administrative set-up is also austere.

The Chinese character is very complex. Before acting, they become silent and inscrutable, as they did in 1950 prior to getting involved in the Korean War. When they make statements or extend threats, this means they will take no action. China has aggressive designs against us and will select the time to concentrate superior forces—as in 1962—at vital points in the terrain that suits them best and try to break through.

China will by military pressure compel India to divert to defence an unduly high proportion of its resources, thereby undermining India’s political and economic stability. Apart from posing a military threat from Tibet, it will try to create rifts between India and Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, and enhance its own influence in these areas. It will provoke people in the Mizo Hills and Nagaland against us.

We should remember that China has an army of 138 divisions and an air force of about 3,000 combat aircraft plus formidable guerilla and other irregular forces. As soon as it suits Peking and circumstances become generally favourable, China will either attack us on its own or threaten us in collusion with Pakistan.

The common aims of China and Pakistan are: (a) To keep the threat of war alive by striking constant aggressive attitudes towards India. (b) To create unrest and disunity in India by (i) sabotage and subversion of various types wherever possible, for example, the Naxalites; (ii) subverting the Nagas and Mios and encouraging them to seek independence; and (iii) inciting our minorities.

The Daily Telegraph, London, of 22 April 1970, quoted a good example of the growing collaboration between China and Pakistan. Chinese military equipment and arms are being stockpiled in the strategic town of Gilgit, near which one Chinese division is located. In addition to the old caravan route between Gilgit and Tibet,
which has been widened to carry heavy traffic, another motorable road has been constructed to establish a direct link between Mor Khum in northern Kashmir to Khunjerab Pass on the Kashmir-Sinkiang border.

The entire road runs through Indian territory under Pakistan's illegal occupation. The road extends the Chinese road network into northern Kashmir and poses a threat both to India and the USSR. Although it is ostensibly designed to promote trade with Pakistan, previous experience shows that roads built by the Chinese are more often designed for war.

China's nuclear strength is growing rapidly. Its first atom bomb was exploded in 1964, after an investment of more than 1.5 billion dollars in constructing a uranium concentration plant at Lanchow in north-central China. In addition, it set up several chemical separation plants for uranium and thorium extraction. In 1967, China tested its first hydrogen bomb. This was its sixth nuclear test. The seventh was of a low-yield nuclear bomb.

Ralph E. Lapp, a renowned US physicist, has predicted that China would have an arsenal of 100 H-bombs or hydrogen missile warheads and would have developed intercontinental ballistic missiles sometime in 1970, and achieve operational ICBM capability by 1972. Sure enough, last year China fired its first 380-pound space satellite, double the size of the first Russian Sputnik, into earth orbit, indicating that it had finally achieved the capability of launching ICBMs. China has thus joined the international space club.

The USA and the USSR have made giant strides in developing nuclear weapons. Other countries like Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and West Germany have the means and expertise to progress in this field in future.

China may well have about 75 landbased ICBMs in the next five years and may be able to deliver missiles with atomic warheads up to 5,000 miles or more even now or pretty soon. It can add about 50 bombs to its stockpile every year. Almost all Asian countries are within the range of Chinese missiles at present, and the USA and Western Europe will come under this threat soon.
Apart from the military implications of China's space achievements, it will also gain many political advantages internationally. The minds of the Chinese leaders are set on a global strategy. They want their country to wield influence internationally and be a model of communist ideology. Apart from claiming the disputed territories along India's northern border, it probably also hopes to control the Indian Ocean one day. It encourages tension between India and Pakistan in the hope that they go to war with each other and that this leads to India's disintegration. As Russell Brines, an American journalist, says, China has strengthened its strategic position in the Himalayas vis-a-vis the USSR, Pakistan, and India by its campaign in 1962.

China supports Pakistan for two reasons: (a) To spite India and, through India, the USSR. If it undermines India, this has a similar effect on the USSR, which was once trying to boost India for its own reasons. (b) To spite the USA, to which Pakistan was militarily aligned in a way. It was a notable diplomatic feat for China to wean away Pakistan from the USA.

Pakistan is militarily aligned to USA, one of China's enemies. It condemned China some years ago for aggression in Korea. Pakistan and China have different ideologies. One has a feudal, theocratic, and reactionary regime, the other is a communist state. The Sino-Pakistan entente is a classic example of political opportunism and expediency.

Lin Piao, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, said in April 1969 at the 9th Party Congress, that China would support all revolutionary struggles of the people of Asia, mentioning nine countries where such struggles were going on. He included India but excluded Pakistan, implying that no such struggle was going on in that feudal State. He hinted that China may have to stage a revolutionary struggle and subvert countries not on its side.

It is in our national interests that we keep China's forces of subversion at bay and normalize our relations with this powerful country. But we should not let our relations with other great countries deteriorate at the same time.
Japan

In the past, the world was divided into two power blocs, the USSR and the USA. Today, China has joined the super-powers. Japan has already acquired this status economically and will assume a similar status militarily, as well as in the nuclear field in the near future. Though the USA thinks Japan will be its ally in the future, Japan\(^\text{5}\) is likely to disillusion it on this point. Japan may join another powerful country, the USSR or China, and form a formidable combination.

We should try to build up good relations with Japan. This would require considerable diplomatic skill. Till now we have made little effort in this direction. By friendly relations with India, Japan could strengthen its influence in Southeast Asia. Indo-Japanese understanding and cooperation would contain Chinese expansionism in Asia. India should cultivate good relations with Japan for these reasons:

1. Japan's economic miracle has many lessons for India.
2. Its annual aid to India may go up to four billion dollars by 1975.
3. It is the third largest producer of steel, second largest manufacturer of electronic equipment, and the world's leader in shipbuilding. It is the most formidable technological power east of Suez.
4. It is the largest importer of Indian iron ore.
5. With Japan on our right side, we will have a better bargaining power with the West and other countries in many matters.

Our foreign policy should depend on the alignment of various forces which may emerge in world politics in the near future. Possible alignments are: (a) the USSR and China against the USA and Japan; (b) the USA and the USSR against China and Japan, or (c) China and the USA against the USSR and Japan.

(a) China and the USSR have similar ideologies but there is a

\(^{5}\)There is much anti-US feeling in Japan today. Although they have learnt much and received many things from USA, the Japanese now contend that they do not depend much on that country and are able to produce whatever the USA can, and better.
basic conflict of national interests. Moreover, as Japan is revanchist and has many scores to settle with the USA as well as the West generally, this combination is unlikely. Countries with a contiguous geographical border like China and the USSR are usually hostile to each other.

(b) Japan and China have had longstanding feuds and deep-rooted mutual hatred. Hence friendship between the two seems difficult. The USA's main enemy today is the USSR and vice versa. The USSR and the USA are super-powers with conflicting aspirations. There cannot be two swords in one scabbard. Their coming together is therefore improbable. The USA and the USSR have attempted to divide the world and share its benefits, but as many of their interests clashed this arrangement has not worked so far.

(c) There is growing collaboration between the Japanese and the Russians. China and the USA may therefore be forced into an entente of necessity.

In view of these considerations, we should base our foreign policy farsightedly and not haphazardly. India must understand, whether it likes it or not, that the powerful state of China is important not only in Asia but also in the world and that the USA, the USSR, and Japan wield similar power. We should remember that unless we have either negative or positive power for war or peace, we shall remain at the mercy of certain powers and will not be able to negotiate effectively with China, Pakistan, or any other country.

There will be many readjustments in relations among China, Japan, the USA, and the USSR in the present decade. In this process, we cannot play a pivotal role in any way because of our weaknesses in many respects. We should not therefore waste time and effort in this period in trying to pose as a great power and influence world affairs as "the largest democracy in the world."

*A noted Japanese told me in Tokyo in 1954 that his countrymen had good memories and remembered well the devastation the USA and some other Western countries brought upon them in World War II. He said with feeling that his country would have its revenge some day. This was when Japan was not as strong as it is now. One can imagine what Japanese opinion is on this subject today.*
Instead we should, with our gigantic population and national resources, utilize this time to strengthen ourselves in various directions, mobilizing and modernizing our defence and economic affairs so that respect for India in the comity of nations may increase and it may occupy a position of equality with the leading nations in the world.

Only then shall we be able to hold our head high, and our voice will begin to be heard. Only then shall we attain a bargaining position on the chessboard of international politics. If a nation aspires to be influential in world affairs without adequate strength to back its claims, it is in danger of being exposed to humiliation when challenged to fulfil this role.

We should have learnt by now that in this cruel world of reality respect is given to strength and not to goodness. Nations, like individuals, are heard if they can do good to their friends and harm to their enemies. If they can do neither, despite their nobility, they may be admired by a few but are ignored by most. The USA and the USSR are respected by the world today not because of their ideologies but because of their economic and military power.

1Our diplomatic representatives often imagine that their “effective” presentation of our point of view can influence most foreign countries. Take, for instance, our Foreign Minister’s visit abroad in June 1971 regarding the influx of refugees from East Bengal into India, the burden they will inflict on us and the possible repercussions. On his return he reported to his government how successful his tour had been. Ironically, the press came out with the startling news a day later that USA had sent to Pakistan three ship-loads of military hardware, followed by more later. As this was contrary to USA’s public stand on the subject India suggested that the Nixon administration stops these ships en route. The State Department replied, however, that it would be legally impossible to do so. This should teach us that no country is likely to change its foreign policy towards another, just because of our “convincing” arguments.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Strategy of Defence

Let him who desires peace prepare for war.

—Vegertius

Clauzevitz defined war as the continuation of politics by other means. Our statesmen should therefore make it their business to understand this serious affair. They can acquire knowledge of the complexities of war only by deep study, to which there are no shortcuts. Only then will they acquire confidence and get a firm grip on matters of defence. At present, they are content with sketchy knowledge of these subjects, much to our detriment.

A nation should always have well-defined strategic as well as other goals. According to Liddell Hart, it can sum up its strategy in one word, concentration, meaning concentration of strength against weakness. He enunciates six positive and two negative maxims under this head:

Positive. (a) Adjust your means to your ends—to sense what is possible. (b) Keep your object always in mind. (c) Choose the time of least expectation. (d) Exploit the line of least resistance. (e) Take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives. (f) Ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible, adaptable to circumstances.

Negative. (a) Do not throw your weight into a stroke while your opponent is on guard. (b) Do not renew an attack along the same line or same form after it has failed once.

National Policy

We must, at the outset, understand our national aims. As a sovereign independent republic, India has set itself five clear goals: (a) Promoting a socialistic welfare state within parliamentary democracy with rule of law. (b) Fostering unification and integration
of the nation. (c) Generating rapid industrial and economic development towards reasonable standards of living for the common man. (d) Concurrently maintaining the security of the union's land, air and sea spaces. (e) Promoting international peace, amity and the welfare of mankind so as to establish our rightful place in the world.

On one hand, we must protect our frontiers suitably; on the other, we must remove poverty and illiteracy from our midst. To accomplish these tasks, it is necessary for us to have a sound national strategy, balanced defence forces, and dynamic leadership.

In evolving a practical national strategy, the prerequisite is therefore a balanced calculation of risks and priorities between our prime requirement of rapid modernization and of national security without diffusion of effort.

Strategy is linked with all aspects of governmental activity: politics, defence, diplomacy, and economics. It determines the policy of a government in practice towards the achievement of its desired ends. It has to be kept up-to-date constantly. Modern wars are often the result of a series of miscalculations. A particular strategy should be evolved in relation to one's national aims and resources. Sound intelligence and good higher leadership are necessary for successful strategy.

In a democracy, military requirements often have to compete against other civilian projects for financial approval. To be able to fix correct priorities and keep the armed forces in a state of preparedness for all eventualities, there is urgent need for the Prime Minister as well as the Defence Minister and Finance Minister to have a greater understanding of military matters than they have at present.

Our armed forces must be strong even in peace, as fruitful friendship between different countries can only emerge if one is strong. Mao Tse-tung says: "In this world, friendship exists between one cat and another, not between a cat and a rat."

Our leaders should therefore never select as service chiefs, pliable and "safe" men, although they may remain hand in glove with them. They should, while selecting higher commanders, pay
less attention to their "reputations" and pliability and more to their patriotism, qualities of leadership, and concrete professional achievements. "Safe" men breed similar types under them at the expense of better leaders who are overlooked. If our leaders select "yes men," this may affect leadership in the forces as a whole and lead to adverse consequences such as loss of innocent lives and prestige in war.

In deciding its foreign policy, a government must first consider what defence commitments it is able to undertake. A country usually fails to achieve its aims because its ends and means are out of step, because its representatives send into battle, in spite of ample warning, inadequately equipped, insufficiently trained, and mentally unprepared troops. The responsibility for this must fall upon opportunists in high positions who, due to lack of integrity and in order to earn cheap popularity with politicians, and to climb in their own careers take actions contrary to the dictates of their conscience and against national interests.

Apart from agro-industrial revolution to achieve self-sufficiency, urgent measures are required to provide better rail and air transport systems and more construction of border roads, dropping zones, landing grounds and airfield complexes and establish well-stocked advance bases served by sound communications.

A clear cut and precise directive on defence policy in relation to the China-Pakistan threat must be given by the government to the Chiefs of Staff. From this alone will follow our overall short-term and long-term defence plan, together with sufficiently detailed military plans and preparedness.

The strength of the Army should be doubled, with proportionate mountain formations, and with weapons and equipment capable of the most effective firepower. There should also be sufficiently large armoured and motorized formations to enable deep penetration into sensitive enemy areas. To influence issues at appropriate moments and to meet unknown contingencies, our armed forces should have adequate reserve formations of all types which are initially uncommitted in operations. Lastly, highly trained and sufficient forces, including parachute troops, should be available to support our defending or attacking forces in certain eventualities
against China and Pakistan.

To gain superiority in the air, the Air Force must be further strengthened and its close support to the land forces ensured. Its strategic strike or bombardment capability must be improved. This warrants priority for a proper bomber force with missile capability. Transport aircraft and helicopters should be mustered in large numbers to meet the logistic requirements of the army and airborne forces.

Our civil defence schemes and air-raid precautions must be rehearsed and kept in trim. A new spirit should be infused in our forces as well as in the nation as a whole.

*Higher Direction of War*

The political and higher direction of our wars has been faulty since 1947. This is because our so-called defence dignitaries have not made it their business to study higher strategy suitably. Novices cannot run this dangerous and complicated affair.

Our Defence Ministers, as of course their other Cabinet colleagues, should, apart from being confidants of the Prime Minister, also be men whose merits have already made a mark in some important field. They should, whilst selecting the service chiefs and other higher commanders, pay less attention to the reputations, dossiers and pliability of candidates and more to their patriotism, qualities of leadership and concrete professional achievements.

Our Defence Ministers spend most of their time attending to parliamentary activity, their constituents, and other extraneous or ceremonial matters and devote little time to operational and strategic affairs. They should make an appreciation, through the assistance of their service chiefs, ministry officials, and expert committees dealing with many special subjects affecting defence, examine the significance of certain trends, the implications of some of our and of the enemies’ moves, and reflect upon the special strategic problems confronting us in our border areas and elsewhere, and study the various courses open to us and to the enemy.

They should examine which countries threaten our security, look into our military and economic resources (state of equipment,
training, and logistics) compared with those of our enemies. They should ascertain which countries are likely to assist them in war against us and should take steps in advance to counter these moves. They should, among other things, evolve a suitable strategy and technique, apart from developing a new spirit in our services, to deal with the enemy in consultation with the service chiefs.

The parts to be played in the total mobilization by the Ministries of Finance, Economic Affairs, Defence, External Affairs, Industries, and Railways should be coordinated by the Prime Minister, who alone is in a position to lay down priorities for all concerned, avoiding much delay and non-utilization of national resources.

*Policies*

Defence and economic experts, in consultation with our diplomats, should put their heads together to consider what steps are necessary in each field in furtherance of our defence policies. Then the ministers concerned should devote their undivided attention to this important matter.

We will have to take special psychological steps affecting our border tribes and troops, apart from special military measures, to cope with our tasks in these areas. Our defence planners should constantly examine whether they are maintaining priorities in urgent operational and production matters and if the ratio between combat and logistical forces is proportionate to our current and foreseeable needs.

The government should not adopt a defensive attitude, which influences all its actions and robs it of the spirit without which it will never be able to spring a surprise on the opponent—an essential ingredient of victory. It should bear in mind that while a posture of defence is a good expedient, this should never be practised as a matter of habit. It should not, of course, become unnecessarily bellicose, as some governments do occasionally to show their supposed strength, and indulge in brave words which often land them in awkward situations. Our government should, instead, behave more realistically and strengthen our armed forces, and the nation as a whole in addition. It can only do this by ensuring that our forces are well equipped, well trained,
and well led. They should have tremendous hitting power with nuclear weapons, for this would save us considerable expense on unnecessary expansion of manpower and on other redundant conventional heads.

The government should give up talking of fighting China (with an army of 138 divisions) and Pakistan single handed. It should, after doing its best to become self-sufficient, explore ways of reaching agreements through skilful negotiations with powerful friendly countries willing to assist us suitably in time of war and, if necessary, for a consideration, as nobody does anything in practice for nothing. This will discourage our potential foes from taking liberties with us. On this subject, Chanakya has said: "When a king finds himself unable to confront his enemies single handed, then he should make the expedition in combination with other kings."

Our foreign policy-makers might note that in World War II the United States and Britain made common cause with the Soviet Union to defeat Nazi Germany.

The government should lay down its defence policies and a full discussion should take place at the Cabinet level. This august body should study its agenda carefully and grasp the purport of the briefs placed before it. At present its members often consider even vital matters hastily and in a slipshod manner instead of burning midnight oil over them. They are often in a rush about relatively unimportant matters at the cost of their important duties. If there are disagreements among them on matters of national importance, the Prime Minister should not allow decisions to be postponed, as often happens, but should dictate action to her colleagues. Nobody should be permitted to deviate from the final decision or arbitrarily stem its progress later. This applies particularly to Finance. In other words, all concerned should be compelled to implement Government decisions implicitly.

The service chiefs should be given the requisite directives within the framework of which they should be asked to make plans to defend the country. They should implement them sincerely and keep their forces in readiness for all eventualities. Government should make sure that the strategic theories our military experts
expound make sense. They should also make sure that legitimate
direction of policy by them is not erroneously characterized as
interference by the forces or anybody else. The government
should retain overall control and not allow the forces to dictate
actions which might nullify our national aims. At the same time,
there should be no undue interference by the government in the
legitimate duties of the Chiefs of Staff.

The government and the service chiefs should foresee rather
than follow military situations. Nor should the latter be
afraid of representing their views to the government strongly.
The government should not attempt to teach the chiefs their jobs
nor should the chiefs try to teach the government its functions.
Soldiers are meant to fight wars, which statesmen cannot do,
and statesmen to govern the country, which soldiers should
not attempt. A team spirit should exist between the Defence
Ministry and Defence Finance on one hand and the headquarters
of the Defence Services on the other. At present they often give
the impression of being at loggerheads.

There was a time when the government did not allot sufficient
funds for even vital defence needs, nor was adequate attention
paid to important defence matters. Then the pendulum swung
to the other extreme. When we suffered severe reverses at the
hands of the Chinese in 1962, our politicians had a rude awakening.
As some of them faced the danger of losing their jobs for past
negligence they were now in a panic to strengthen the armed
forces post-haste. They therefore tried to jump many hurdles
relating to questions which should have taken years to solve.
Shortcuts were sought for long term measures.

This attitude was however a pleasant departure from their
normal slumber. For some time after 1962, Finance and Defence
officials virtually approved all the recommendations of Service
Headquarters lest the blame for the nation’s lack of military
preparedness be pinned on them. But as time went on, compla-
cency descended once again and Finance resumed its traditional
attitude of blocking, hindering, and delaying. There are undoub-
tedly some officers in Finance with imagination and outstanding
ability, but how many are they? Generally, officers in decision-
making capacities in this department develop what appears to be a sadistic mentality or creed and split hairs over urgent proposals, only a fraction of which they approve, the rest falling by the wayside. They indulge in academic and infructuous arguments in prolonged and inconclusive meetings and in notings on files which go backwards and forwards. Their scrutiny is unreasonable and results in inordinate delays, affecting vital issues.

These financial pandits dabble in military matters and harp unduly on their financial aspect and on precedents. The operational angle appears to them the least important of all considerations. They arbitrarily slash inescapable expenditure on many projects which by reduced finances just cannot function. Admittedly, Service Headquarters do not always put up to Finance and the Defence Ministry well-considered proposals regarding the size and shape of our forces and other important matters. When such is the case, the services should be reminded of the need to be more precise and be asked to submit their cases after adequate homework. Whilst redtape should be reduced to the minimum, all steps should be taken to prevent wasteful expenditure.

Organization

To enable Service Headquarters and the Ministries of Defence and Finance to work in complete harmony, and not at cross-purposes as happens today, it is necessary to establish an integrated defence headquarters. This would avoid duplication of work and lead to speedier decisions and greater efficiency. We must develop our sources for collection and processing strategic intelligence, which includes precise information on subjects ranging from economic, commercial, military, transport, communications, industrial potential, and other ancillary subjects allied to the total war effort of a nation. The broader the spectrum, the more information there would be from which defence experts would be able to gauge an enemy's potential.

Strategic information is quite different from ordinary intelligence about an enemy's war machine, for which we have a small organization. Military intelligence, and the Intelligence Bureau, have done a good job, on the whole, considering the paucity of
financial and statistical resources on which they can draw. This is like expecting a computer to function effectively without feeding it with essential information.

It is said at times that an increasing outlay on defence affects the country's development plans adversely. Yet if we do not spend enough on defence and remain comparatively weak, our very existence may be threatened by unscrupulous aggressors. We have to develop our economy in such a way that it can cope with our growing military expenditure.

Because of our huge defence budget, it is necessary to organize the economic utilization of national enterprise which should be planned by competent defence and science experts, industrialists, economists, technicians, and technologists. We should fix the machinery and processes of execution and priorities. They should supervise the implementation of our development plans, ensure that the public and private sectors cooperate fully in this effort, prevent waste and remove obstacles, bottlenecks and other delaying factors. Defaulters should be punished to set an example.

Indigenous resources and potentialities should be utilized and supplemented from external sources as necessary. We should increase our foreign exchange earnings. Taxation should be revised to encourage increased earnings, with incentives to save and invest.

More than one Army Chief of Staff has advocated to the government in the recent past that our Armed Forces should be headed by a Chief of Defence Staff, as in the USA and Britain, with the rank of Field Marshal. China, Japan, and the Soviet Union do not have this system. Admittedly, it has merits but we should not adopt it merely because it prevails in certain other countries whose practice in military affairs we are inclined to follow at times. Before we introduce anything new, we must ensure that it not only suits our conditions but is also indigenous in its conception.

We have set up an Institute for Defence Studies at Delhi, which has a highly competent staff under the brilliant K. Subramaniam. It will be in the long term interests of the services if their three chiefs could cooperate and spare experts in weapons and equipment to be seconded to this Institute so that they are able to make correct evaluations of the forces of foreign countries.
Britain and the USA have worldwide commitments. They have Chiefs of Defence Staff who can participate in the discussions of the NATO, CENTO, and similar other organizations and who are available to discuss nuclear matters with their Defence Ministers, busy men, with little time for discussions with three Chiefs. There is, on the other hand, no such need in India, as we neither have global commitments nor possess a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, our Defence Minister, though busy, has enough time to discuss anything he wants with his three chiefs at frequent meetings.

We have short term as well as long term requirements in defence. Political conditions in India are likely to remain unsettled, unstable, and uncertain for some years, during which our Armed Forces are likely to remain in a state of flux. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, especially the two younger services, should grow maturer during this period. If we put a maestro over them in these troubled and unstable times as an overall chief, he may assume too much power. He may also not be able to do as much justice to the three defence wings as separate chiefs for each of them and issue ill-considered orders in respect of any of them, much to its detriment. If a joint chief is thrust on them in this formative period, this might retard the growth of the smaller services.

Ambitious aspirants to the post of Joint Chief of Staff have organized whispering campaigns in support of this idea and have inspired journalists and other writers to contribute articles in support of this “reform.” They have even propounded the theory that under the present system the Army Chief has more chances of attempting a coup than a Joint Chief of Defence under the revised system. They are putting up papers to the government on this proposition as Mountbatten once advocated to Nehru. They are also obliquely blaming the politicians for not taking this step as, according to them, the politicians do not understand the advantages of having a combined chief.

Considering the above arguments, and also the fact that we are unlikely to become a nuclear power for some time, we should not let too much power concentrate in any individual’s hands amidst
so much instability. I say this because I know there are many who will be tempted to misuse this power in the present conditions. We have no shrewd men like Churchill among our politicians, who should therefore not be given such a powerful adviser in whose hands they might become mere tools.

The Navy and Air Force will take some years to become maturer and develop suitably and it will be some time before we have a nuclear arsenal of some consequence. By then, our country should have acquired some stability. Only then should a major reorganization involving the creation of a post of Chief of Defence be carried out. For the present, apart from selecting suitable Chiefs for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and an equally suitable Defence Minister at the head of our three services, the status quo should prevail.

Instead of dabbling in fancy ideas, we should carry out a genuine and realistic reorganization of our defence setup. We should introduce a proper higher defence control organization as the government’s advisory body on grand strategy. It should evolve a national defence policy in keeping with our foreign policy, anticipate the various threats to our security, and determine steps to meet them. It should decide the shape, size, and the quality of our armed forces, with their training facilities and logistical requirements. It should also ensure that the morale of our forces is kept at a high pitch. Its control should remain in the hands of our political leaders. Our Prime Minister must know what our national strategy is. The political chiefs must select the best men as service chiefs, who should be given full powers to implement their professional plans without interference.

Our existing Defence Control Organization, static for over 20 years, requires a change to bring it in line with the tempo of modern events. Perhaps a council could be evolved which takes into account the country’s total economic, financial, and other resources, balancing of priorities of civil and military requirements, and ensuring national preparedness in an emergency. Each service should have its own minister and chief. Each should have a planning and scientific adviser in addition.

The present Defence Committee of the Cabinet should be
replaced by a national security council with much wider powers and fields to explore. The head of this organization should be the Prime Minister and its members should be the Defence Minister; the minister of each service; the chief of each service; the intelligence chief; the Foreign Secretary; the Defence Secretary; the Home Secretary; and the Finance (Economic Affairs) Secretary.

The function of this council will be to make plans for defence preparedness. The Prime Minister's word will be final in this council, which will have its own secretariat.

**Nuclear Preparedness**

A matter of supreme importance to foreign and defence policies is whether we should have a nuclear arsenal. While China is rapidly developing devastating power to cause large-scale destruction of our territories, and many other countries are going ahead in this field, our public posture is still not to use atomic energy for warlike purposes.

Although we are capable of developing nuclear weapons, we refuse to do so because (a) we are working for universal and general disarmament and our capacity to work for it will diminish if we enter the nuclear arms race; (b) we cannot afford nuclear armament and hence should concentrate on economic development; and (c) we are dedicated to peace and hence are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons because it increases the risk of war.

We have, under provocation, already fought wars in the past and have been driven away, under compulsion, from our peaceful pursuits. Why then should we, "in the name of peace," refrain from having nuclear weapons which we need so badly for self-defence?

Some say that as India lacks the capital resources to acquire nuclear capability it should depend on the superpowers to help it in their own interests even in the absence of nuclear guarantees.

India has already commissioned one atomic power station and is building two more. It has a chemical separation plant and a rocket launching station and expects to launch a satellite within five years!
This is wishful thinking. We must be prepared for a contingency in which nobody comes to our rescue and we have to fight our battles alone. It is to be noted that China, France, and the Soviet Union introduced and kept on pursuing their nuclear programmes when their economies were in poor shape.

No useful purpose will be served by having a modest nuclear-weapon capacity. Half measures are ineffective. We have no option and must have an effective deterrent against threats to our security in the shape of the atom bomb, not only for military reasons but also as a status symbol.

Nuclear costing in India and elsewhere is based on different factors, including labour. It can be either for a small and comparatively crude weapons programme or for a really credible deterrent. A reasonable estimate by certain experts of the cost of India’s acquiring a fully nuclear force is about Rs 4,000 million a year spread over the next 15 years. Opinions may differ on this calculation, but approximately this amount should be feasible in three well-thought out five-year plans in which financial allotments are appropriately made and through which economic resources are suitably developed. In any event, the question should not be what it will cost to acquire a nuclear force but rather what is the threat that necessitates this step.

Our security problems have to be judged in relation to the threats we face from particular countries. India faces not only a conventional but also a nuclear threat from China. As soon as China has enough nuclear weapons, it will not hesitate to use them against us. Our conventional forces will be effective against it only if they are backed by nuclear weapons. We are late in this field, but can make up for this delay through a crash nuclear programme.

As nuclear energy can also form the base of industry, its utilization for peaceful and warlike purposes goes hand in hand, as all other scientific inventions do. We can afford to spend for this purpose, not by slovenly methods of planning and implementation.

Its potentialities include the excavation of harbours, canals, and mountain passes.
but by overhauling our economic capacity energetically. We can also save enough funds for such a programme by cutting expenditure on conventional items.

War is an inevitable human activity at the present stage of social and cultural development and will occur periodically, as it has been since the dawn of history, whether atomic energy is developed by us as one of its means or not. In the last 5,000 years, there have been 15,000 wars, averaging three a year. As Richard Burton has said: "Peace is the dream of the wise, but war is the history of man."

The belief that proliferation increases the risk of war is therefore untenable. Moreover, even if we do not have nuclear weapons we shall not prevent wars. To do nothing in this respect and wait for something to happen and then react by last-minute action and improvisation will only lead to disaster.

We can enter the nuclear field with our present technical skill and knowledge, but we should also tempt talented Indian scientists and engineers now working abroad with suitable incentives to work in this realm at home. Once we embark upon a nuclear weapons programme, we must implement it efficiently and not fall short of our targets, as we often do in other vital spheres. We have already lost much valuable time, in which China has forged ahead of us in nuclear development. If we waste any more time, the gap between us and China may never be filled.

Nobody, least of all the super-powers, will relish the idea of India possessing nuclear weapons. They will discourage us from this step by all means, including the threat of stopping economic aid and military supplies. We should accept this challenge, seeking the help we need from elsewhere if necessary, especially when there are other powers which have nuclear knowhow. We will also have to make a mighty effort towards self-reliance and step up the rate of economic growth considerably. Nuclear strength will give us more independence in foreign policy and will improve our negotiating capacity with other countries.

It is because we are weak and have many shortcomings that we are at the mercy of the great powers and are held to ransom by even small countries at times. When we become strong and get
over our frailties, no challenges will frighten us. We will then be able to live with hardships and war, like Vietnam and Israel independently.

India can learn much from North Vietnam about wiping out corruption and incompetence and the way in which it has stirred up the people to stand up and fight mighty forces successfully for years at end. The North Vietnamese have not allowed the Russians or the Chinese to wield much influence over them. They take aid from both but advice from neither. They retain their independence under their own patriotic, determined, and competent leaders.

Our defence machinery requires constant vigilance and expert knowledge of not only military but also many other subjects. Only men of outstanding all round ability and dedication will be able to do justice to this important department. (H.C. Sarin, our Defence Secretary till recently, has been shifted to another ministry on the ground that he had been in his assignment too long. It was forgotten that there are certain posts which require expert knowledge which can come only after long experience. Sarin has been replaced by K.B. Lall who was Secretary, Foreign Trade, also on the ground that he had been in his previous job long enough. Both these officers are brilliant members of the I.C.S. But by disturbing them from their respective domains, in which each was acknowledged as an expert, the powers-that-be have, apart from displaying their authority to uproot two most effective secretaries, have achieved little else.)

"The Fulton Committee report (1968) mentioned that "the Civil Service is no place for the amateur... and must be staffed by personnel who are truly professional (experts)...Frequent moves from job to job... gave the 'generalist' administrative proficiency in operating the government machine...but many lacked the fully developed professionalism that their work now demanded."
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The Armed Forces

They must have the defects of their qualities.
Honore de Balzac

I served 30 years in the Army and thoroughly enjoyed it. If I had the choice of living my life once more, I would be a soldier again. I think military life compares favourably with its civilian counterpart. It is the answer to almost all one's prayers. It gives one a chance to stake one's life in the defence of one's country, to keep secure the lives of fellow citizens and make many sacrifices for their sake. This gives one great pride. Materially, it affords many privileges, a clean, healthy, and adventurous life. It also affords unique opportunity of comradeship.

The armed forces are part and parcel of our national life. As such, they should not remain separate as they did under the British. Their affairs—except subjects such as future military plans—need to be discussed at public forums, both to educate our people about military matters and to improve the functioning of our forces.

A nation maintains an army, navy, and air force not only to safeguard its territorial integrity against foreign aggression but also as a sheet-anchor to the government at the time of internal calamities. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen leave their homes for prolonged periods of national service. Their day-to-day life, even in peace, demands more sacrifices, hardships, and hazards than in other occupations. Men of the Air Force, who get inadequate flying bounties, perform particularly dangerous duties at all times and their casualty rate is high. Our servicemen go through exacting training in peace in order to prepare themselves for their arduous life, separated from their families without suitable compensation, and often impair their health in the process. In war, they undergo untold sufferings. The least the government can do for them is therefore
to keep them contented so that their morale remains high. This can be achieved by giving them and their families adequate accommodation and other amenities and a better standard of living, with higher pensions and insurance cover for all risks. Duties entailing much privations deserve special consideration and sympathy. Instead, when our servicemen are seen in glittering uniforms and accompanied by fluttering flags, martial bands, and impressive weapons and equipment, envy rather than admiration is aroused in certain quarters.

Military men are a special category, whether one likes it or not. Millions of them perished in World War II and lie buried under the ruins of cities and villages or were killed by the enemy in battles waged for political reasons. Men in uniform should not be treated at par or below others who serve the country. The official order of precedence equates civilians with much less service and experience with senior officers of the Defence Services. For instance, a Brigadier with 25 years service or more is bracketed with a deputy secretary of only 15 years service. A lieutenant-colonel with over 20 years service is equated with an Under Secretary who may have only one-third his service.

Military personnel bear exceptional burdens and render extraordinary services, and they therefore deserve not only special terms of service but also honoured recognition in various ways. On them depends the stability, and the very existence at times, of governments. They should certainly not be pampered but must receive special consideration. In the prevailing conditions in India, they are the only group which retains high discipline and is capable of maintaining or restoring order on a national scale.

The gap between the emoluments and amenities of officers and other ranks as well as between their standards of living should not be too wide, as at present. China, Israel, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and the United States have already taken action to lessen this gap in their armed forces. The Indian officer as compared to the other ranks gets higher pay and allowances and lives in far better accommodation, has messes with a retinue of servants and excellent food besides many other facilities. The soldier, on the other hand, suffers in comparison in these respects. Greater
camaraderie should develop between officers and other ranks to weld them into a well-knit team. The officer presents himself as a sahib, a superior being, to his men today. He does not take enough interest in the professional and private life of his men. If the service conditions of officers and soldiers are brought nearer each other, there would, on the other hand, be better emotional integration between the two.

Soldiers, sailors and airmen can only serve for a limited number of years. They are released at a comparatively youthful age because they are unable to endure the rigours of service when they grow older. At present, most of them find rehabilitation in civil life difficult. If these trained and disciplined assets in whom the talent for leadership has been developed could be found suitable work in different walks of life, this would tone up the nation’s efficiency and general discipline. It would also boost the morale of the men in uniform, who could contemplate the future without the haunting fear of insecurity and penury.

There should be constant and critical but legitimate comment—apart from praise—on our defence effort in the press and other forums, as is the case in democratic countries, to keep our strategists on their toes. The public must be taken into the confidence of the military high command more than it is at present so that mutual confidence and respect can be generated. As we may face a military conflict of much larger proportions in the foreseeable future, our soldiers and statesmen should learn to speak with one voice in public and in private.

Though our forces have lived under constant strain and many handicaps since 1939, their morale—man to man—is better than those in other walks of Indian society today. They will, however, do well to bear the following advice in mind: (i) Sanctity should be attached to one’s word. A promise should be kept by all means at one’s disposal. (ii) Operational reporting should be accurate. (iii) Though jealousy is inherent in human character, it should be guarded against. (iv) All ranks should stand by each other despite provocation and work as comrades in a well-knit team. (v) Orders should be carried out implicitly without argument. Arbitrary interpretations of orders, which is against their spirit,
should be avoided. (vi) Officers should never pamper their subordinates to win cheap popularity. If this is done, subordinates are apt to develop a casual attitude which does not improve their efficiency. Welfare is not out of place but should not be overemphasized. Nor should anybody be bullied. (vii) The power and authority of a commanding officer and more senior commanders—which used to be near-absolute and beyond question once—has been curtailed over the years. There is much talk of "democracy" in our society and "democratic" practices have crept into the armed forces today. Unless the powers of our commanding officers are restored, discipline will not be easy to maintain. (viii) The present-day jawan is better educated and more enlightened than his counterparts some years ago. His duties are more onerous and he is technically better qualified. He therefore expects a better standard of leadership, terms of service, and living conditions. There is a great consciousness today among the ranks of their rights and privileges. This should be borne in mind when dealing with them. (ix) The officers, commanders in particular, should give a lead to those under them in every field. They should be strict in the observance of discipline, sympathetic to their subordinates but not solicitous. In the code of conduct, professional ability, courage, team spirit, physical fitness, impartiality, and honesty, the officers should set an example worthy of high military traditions which those under them can emulate. (x) Senior officers should spend sufficient time in guiding and instructing their subordinates, pointing out their shortcomings and eradicating them. They should take pains in bringing up the younger set. (xi) Accelerated promotion and advancement should be given to those with merit, over the heads of others, if necessary. The promising should be given incentives when young. We will then produce, in time, military leaders like Giap and Dayan. (xii) Senior officers should always represent to their higher military bosses or to the government with sufficient emphasis, and without thinking of their own careers, the difficulties of their subordinates or their frank reaction to measures of training or to urgent organizational and operational matters. (xiii) Senior officers, in particular, should resist the temptation of playing up to politicians.
Our forces require a reorientation of outlook and a new spirit. Unfortunately, our leaders themselves do not excel in these qualities. The forces also need more manpower, modern weapons and equipment, and better terms of service. The government ignores the fact that soldiers serve under very trying and hazardous conditions and argue that these are part of their normal duties. They equate the terms and conditions of service in the armed forces with those of the civil services and say the forces are no privileged class, a favourite cliche of our leaders.

The fact that we were unable to deal suitably with Pakistan in the 1965 war despite being a bigger country with greater resources, makes it clear that there is something radically wrong with the manner in which we are running our national affairs.

While better conditions of service and relations between various ranks leads to cohesion, it is also necessary to be militarily strong. Military strength is acquired through a long and laborious process in which a nation first attains political stability, formulates its national policies, fixes priorities of tasks, builds up the will to defend itself, strengthens its economy, develops its industry, raises and trains a well-equipped armed force, and consolidates its position internationally. We have not done this satisfactorily.

We have lived in a make-believe world and followed various policies haphazardly. We underestimated threats to national security from time to time, but got a rude shock in 1962 when the Chinese caught us napping. In treating the stalemate in 1965 as a victory for ourselves and defeat for Pakistan, we indulged in further self-delusion. We continued this attitude of mind even after 1965 and said that under the "new and spirited leadership" we would be able to deal with any threat to our security suitably. In fact, we were saying then, and do even today, that we have improved our defence forces sufficiently to contain not only Pakistan and China individually but both at the same time! To crown it all, and as a proof of our assertion, our leaders kept publicizing from different forums, from time to time, our various supposed feats of strength against our foes.

One example of this occurred when we were putting up barbed
wire in 1967 at Nathu La near a stone we had erected to commemorate Nehru's visit some years earlier while the dispute about the demarcation of the boundary between China and India was on. The Chinese demanded that we should remove the barbed wire or they would shoot. As we claimed that this barbed wire was being erected in our territory, we ignored the Chinese threat. While a group of Chinese and Indian troops were arguing about this point, a Chinese soldier suddenly opened fire on our troops from a small arms automatic weapon.

We concentrated artillery in support of our infantry troops. In reply, the Chinese opened up a heavy barrage at our guns. A battle then ensued in which the commanding officer of our infantry battalion was wounded within the first few minutes and evacuated. We later took disciplinary action against some who should have behaved better in this encounter. No Chinese dead were found on our side, though the military authorities concerned conveyed stirring accounts to Delhi of how we had inflicted "heavy" losses on the enemy. Many Chinese trucks were supposed to have been seen carrying away their dead and wounded. On the other hand, the Chinese took away our dead and returned them to us ceremonially, to our embarrassment, later.

Only a skirmish had taken place at Nathu La, but Delhi had been told that a resounding victory had been scored over the Chinese in this "battle." In fact, a certain commander, who had fought no battle in the last 25 years, implied that his "strong" leadership and firm handling alone had saved a delicate situation. Actually, he was "controlling" this skirmish from hundreds of miles behind the danger zone.

The national press headlined this story. The government, including the Prime Minister, was briefed suitably and impressed. There were mixed feelings in the Army. Those who did not know rejoiced. But those who knew sniggered at the way the authorities had been led to believe that the commander in question had played a dominant role. This "hero" was then given a high national award and elevated in rank later. But such self-deception is neither good for our political and military health nor for our progress in the long run. Here is an example of how some people
in high positions indulge in unscrupulous self-advertisement and how we choose to believe in myths.

What we need therefore is to emulate the example of nations like the North Vietnamese and the Israelis and build up our forces as they have done. When we become spirited and strong like them, we should begin to talk. In the meantime, we must keep mum. Even now we should learn our lesson, as bigger trials than in the past await us. Bold statements will not do. Only real strength is the answer to external challenges.
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Land and Sea Frontiers

Land Frontiers

There are some aspects of our defence problems which need a closer study. Let us first look at our neighbours.

Tibet

Tibet is a backdoor to the markets of China. Britain and Russia vied with each other during the 19th century, in intrigue and espionage in Tibet. British agents undertook several secret survey assignments there, while the Russians (for instance, the Czar's agent Dorjiiev) tried to draw the Dalai Lama into the Russian fold. Today, China is doing the same, but through force of arms.

Nothing has influenced India's security problems and foreign policy more than the developments in Tibet after independence. In 1950, Tibet, with a population of more than three million, was invaded and occupied by China. In 1959, the Dalai Lama sought asylum in India. In 1965, Tibet was turned officially into a province of China and part of its territory was merged with the neighbouring provinces of Szechuan and Kansu. The Chinese have inflicted mass killings, emigration, and forced expulsion on the Tibetans for years. This region is now under China's military heel, practising the communist way of life, comprising "unity, class struggle, and socialist revolution."

The Tibetans are not Chinese, coming as they do from mixed Mongol and other Central Asian stocks. In the past, they have been conquered only by the Mongols, whose yoke they eventually threw off. The Manchus held them in their grip but loosely, and during the Chinese Civil War and the Second World War they were neutral. Under the India-China Treaty of 1954, we accepted China's suzerainty over Tibet, but this was contrary to historical precedents. China has occupied this territory and turned
it into a military base directed against the Himalayan states and India.

Apart from stationing troops, China has built a number of airfields, a network of roads, and huge dumps of war material. India has also developed its logistics in the Himalayas and moved up its forces to forward positions. But there is one important difference in these build-ups. From the Himalayas, the dividing line, the heart of India is much nearer and more vulnerable than the heart of China. A new geopolitical situation has thus developed, as a result of which the geography of Tibet demands a fresh look.

Tibet has an area of over 400,000 square miles. It is bounded on the north by the Chinese Province of Sinkiang, on the south by Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, with 800 miles of mountainous Indian territory, on the west by Ladakh in Kashmir, and on the east by China. Tibet is roughly divided into three broad geographical regions: firstly, the Chang Thang Desert plateau, 1,000 miles long and 500 miles broad in its maximum dimensions, lying between the Kun Lun mountains and the Tsang Po valley, cold and wild, with an elevation of over 16,000 feet, called by Sven Hedin "the most massive range on the crust of the earth." Secondly, there is the Tsang Po Valley, in which lies Lhasa and many other important Tibetan towns, overlooked by the greater part of the Himalayas. Thirdly, Tsaidam and Amdo and the upper courses of some of Asia's largest rivers lie in eastern Tibet. From the point of view of our security, Chang Thang and not the Himalayan range is the true barrier between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent.

The Han Chinese have been infiltrating into Tibet largely through Tsaidam and Amdo and along the upper Yangtze Kiang, but never across Chang Thang. In point of fact, Lhasa is nearer Delhi than Peking. The routes into Tibet from India across the Himalayas are by no means as forbidding as those from China. The neutralization of Tibet is thus a prerequisite for India's defence in the north. This may be beyond the conception and capacity of our present political leaders or military resources, but one day, either through diplomatic skill or by military means, Tibet will have to be neutralized.
Nepal

Nepal enjoyed nominal independence during British rule in India. In 1950, India signed a treaty with Nepal which has not fared well. Nepal has adopted the posture of a neutral sovereign State trying to build up a foreign policy of its own. But the Chinese wield a not inconsiderable influence in that country. They have built a highway from Kathmandu to Kodari which links Nepal directly with their military base in Tibet. Through their engineers, technicians, and other experts, the Chinese inducted their “friend-ship” into Nepal with the utmost guile. On the other hand, despite India’s overtures and concrete economic and military aid, it has not been able to befriend Nepal as much as it should have liked to. Meanwhile, through their actual presence and aid programmes, other countries such as the USA and the Soviet Union have also developed interests in Nepal. While the kingdom’s security is of paramount concern to India, to a growing degree, it has also acquired an international character. It would be realistic to take note of this fact and examine it in a broad sense rather than exclusively in the setting of India and China.

We must have cordial relations with Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, even on terms which are to their advantage. We should help strengthen the defence capacity of these territories by all means. We must convince these Himalayan kingdoms of our military strength and effectiveness in defence generally and our ability to help them in whatever way necessary.

As regards Burma, the important consideration from our point of view is the security of the India-Burma frontier zone, particularly in the light of the rebellious activities of certain tribes. The long-range common problems are twofold: the security of India’s northeastern region in conjunction with Burma’s northern region, an area sensitive to guerilla warfare; and the security of the Bay of Bengal.

Sea Frontiers

When we go into our security problem in greater detail, we find that India is faced with various threats. Hitherto most of them have materialized from across our land frontiers. But of late a
major threat has begun to emerge in the Indian Ocean from the great powers, which are competing with each other for dominance in this region. We should therefore exercise not only the greatest vigilance but also take suitable diplomatic and military steps to safeguard our territorial integrity in the face of this new challenge.

India objects to any foreign power threatening its security, be it Britain, China, the Soviet Union, or the United States. We must therefore prevent, if possible, any power from dominating the Indian Ocean. If we are unable to do so on our own, we may be driven to join hands with one of the great powers in our national interests to meet this situation.

The Indian Ocean covers an area of over 25 million square miles and is the third largest water space in the world. Apart from providing useful sealanes to world markets for the rich resources situated in the three continents of Africa, Asia, and Australia, it is a strategic link between the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans. Although this vast sea space was named after our country, and though India forms a bridge between the West and East Asia, only other powers have so far dominated this ocean. After Britain\(^1\) was compelled to withdraw from this area sometime ago, the USA and the USSR have been showing considerable interest in this region. Japan and China, though unable to compete with these two super-powers at present, have their own dreams of extending their influence in this region and India must not underestimate this threat.

In accordance with international conventions, no country has an exclusive right on the high seas, which are shared by all for purposes of trade, naval manoeuvres, and fishing. Of course, while fishing small vessels of different nations also look around for intelligence of the ocean, weather, and movement of ships. A nation can, however, object if ships of another country use its territorial waters.

Nine countries have island bases in this ocean. They are Australia, Britain, Burma, France, India, Indonesia, South Africa,

\(^1\)Britain has recently been showing a renewed interest in the Indian Ocean, this time in cooperation with the USA.
the USA, and the USSR. Fishing rights are enjoyed not only by the countries of the region but also by China, Japan, Korea, and the USSR. It can claim the largest number of military alliances—ANZUS, SEATO, CENTO, one each between the USA on the one hand and Thailand, Ethiopia, and Australia on the other and similarly between Britain and Malaysia, Mauritius, South Africa, Muscat, and the Maldives. The British have a dominating position in the Persian Gulf area through several bases.

Apart from Australia and South Africa, which are both white and located on its flanks, the brown or black countries whose shores are washed by this ocean are in various stages of economic underdevelopment and hence militarily weak. This ocean is also unique in that it is the only one with a land frontier all along its northern shores. Any power which succeeds in maintaining and controlling naval bases on the islands which dominate these shores can therefore block the trade routes between Africa, Asia, America and Europe.

Admitting the possibility that Chinese warships might be active in the Indian Ocean, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh once pointed out that our territorial waters had been extended from five kilometres to 19 kilometres from the coast.

As India’s lifelines are concentrated in the Indian ocean, it is of great economic and strategic value to us. India’s coast is vulnerable to sea and air attack and can be safeguarded only if bases in places like Socotra, Gan Island, Aden, Mauritius, Diego Garcia, and Singapore are in friendly hands. The thoroughfares which provide ingress to this ocean are the Cape of Good Hope, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Straits of Malacca, the Sunda Straits, the Timor Sea, and the Tasmanian Sea.

They control the entire complex of trade routes from the Americas, Europe, West Africa, and the Mediterranean to the vast South Asia and Southeast Asia region and beyond to China and Japan. The Suez-Aden-Colombo lane is the most heavily travelled route, with 100 million tons of cargo passing over it annually. There is an alternative route round the Cape of Good Hope, but this is very costly and time consuming. Although there was
a great hue and cry when the Suez Canal was blocked in 1967, most countries are now reconciled to this and have resorted to alternative arrangements.

North of the Indian Ocean lie two richest oil bearing areas of the world, Kuwait and the Gulf sheikdoms and Saudi Arabia and Iran. On its east are numerous small nations which have recently emerged from colonial bondage and are faced with subversive movements inspired by the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA or Communist agencies. Among them are Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Tanzania, and Zambia. We can ill afford to be isolated from most of these countries as they are vital to our strategic and economic interests.

The possibility of China acquiring influence in the future in this ocean cannot be ruled out. Its long-term plans are to outflank our Himalayan frontier by gaining a foothold in East Africa, Pakistan, and Southern Yemen and also by direct ingress into the ocean. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are ideally situated to cover our flanks to the east, from which direction we are likely to be threatened.

There are three sectors of the ocean which will be crucial to us in any future war. One of them comprises the area of West Asia, on which India depends for petroleum and for passage of its exports and imports. While the dependence on oil may decrease with the discovery of new oilfields and that on trade with the introduction of bulk carriers, something should be done to frustrate Pakistan’s design of forming a Muslim bloc and thus vastly improving its position in relation to India in this region.

The Soviet dreams of reaching ice-free seas square with its current actions in this region. Should the USSR decide to cooperate with China’s long-term drive from the east into the area through Southeast Asia, the former would be providing from the West one prong of this enveloping movement which would meet in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Nor can we ignore the increasing threat from Anglo-American and Anglo-South African bases in this area.

Southeast Asia is the second important sector. The Chinese are striving hard not only to dominate this area but through it
the whole of Asia. One step towards this end is to dominate India from across the Himalayas. Failing this, China is likely to carry out an outflanking movement, alone or with the help of the USSR, into the warm waters of the ocean through the soft underbelly of Southeast Asia.

The third sector comprises the numerous islands in the Indian Ocean like Ceylon, Madagascar, the Maldives, the Andamans and Nicobars, the Laccadives, the Chagos Archipelago, Aldabra, the Seychelles, Socotra, Mauritius, Cocos, and so on. Their importance is not immediately apparent as some of them are at present in friendly hands, but it will be emphasized when this situation changes.

**USSR**

The known strength of the Soviet Navy is:

Personnel: 475,000

Ships: 1,575 surface crafts and submarines.

Surface ships include: 2 ASW helicopter cruisers with a new surface-to-air missile system; 5 Kresta class and 4 Kynda class cruisers with Shaddock surface-to-surface cruise and Goa surface-to-air missiles; 11 Sverdlov class cruisers, one with Guidelines surface-to-air missiles; 4 other cruisers used for training; 6 Krupny class destroyers with surface-to-surface cruise missiles; 4 Kildin class destroyers with surface-to-surface cruise missiles; 15 Kashin class destroyers with Goa surface-to-air missiles; 2 Kanin class destroyers with Goa surface-to-air missiles; 27 Kotlin class destroyers with two Goa surface-to-air missiles; 45 Skory and modified Skory class destroyers; 100 other ocean-going escorts; 275 coastal escorts and submarine chasers; 100 Osa and 30 Komar class patrol boats with short range cruise missiles; 300 fast patrol boats; 165 fleet minesweepers; 130 coastal minesweepers, and 80 landing ships and landing craft.

Submarines: 290 conventionally powered and 80 nuclear powered.

**Note 1**: Vice-Admiral H.G. Pickover of the US Navy disclosed on 14 January 1971, that the USSR has 350, including 85 nuclear submarines against the USA’s 142, including 91 nuclear.
**Note 2:** 10 Y class nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile submarines, each equipped with 1688 N-6 missiles for submerged firing are now in service.

Naval Air Force: 2 (18,000-ton) helicopter cruisers; 500 bombers, and 500 other aircraft and helicopters.

As Britain is no longer the maritime power it was and as the USA is reducing its Asian commitments, the USSR is likely to dominate the Indian Ocean soon. The Russians began this effort a few years ago in the form of extensive flag-showing tours by surface ships and submarines, space recovery and other special space-monitoring operations, large-scale naval exercises after fishing, oceanographic, hydrographic and intelligence movements, all backed by judicious doses of economic as well as military assistance to selected countries in the region. The highlight of these efforts was the Soviet diplomatic breakthrough at Tashkent in January 1966, when it seized the opportunity presented by the India-Pakistan hostilities to influence increasingly relations between the two countries.

The Russians are likely to argue that the Indian Ocean can no longer be regarded as the monopoly of Britain and the USA and that the Soviet Navy has an equal right to use these high seas. The Russians have more submarines, many of them with electronic spy equipment, in the Indian Ocean than any other country. Of the total number of foreign ships which passed through the Indian Ocean in 1970, 8,000 belonged to the Western powers and 5,000 to the USSR and other Communist countries. This preponderance is cited by USA and Britain in defence of their new presence on the island of Diego Garcia. This is also cited as an excuse by the British to explain the reversal of their earlier policy to withdraw from east of Suez and to justify their sale of arms to South Africa. Fishing in troubled waters, as they usually do, the Chinese may treat this as a plausible explanation for concentrating attention on Zambia, Zanzibar, and Southern Yemen and deciding to establish diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.

Westerners say the main reason for the increasing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is not so much the desire to
pose a challenge to Anglo-US interests as to support India against China, and particularly to counter the growing Chinese influence in both Asia and Africa. They say that China is now the Soviet Government’s real long-term problem. In the past two years, while the USA has been striving to disengage from Vietnam, Russia has increased by some 15 divisions its troops stationed along the Sino-Soviet frontier.

An event of much geopolitical significance was the recent completion of a highway to link the Soviet Union with the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan and Pakistan up to Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, where the Russians have obtained fishing rights to begin with. This road is likely to be used for the present not as a link with a naval base but merely for the delivery of food, naval stores or fuel to Russian units cruising in the western half of the Indian Ocean, or possibly for the replacement of submarine crews or marine commandos. This road is a much shorter and quicker route than the long sea haul from Vladivostok.

The Russians have, however, to walk warily here. The Pakistanis, who continue their flirtation with China, would frown if this road is put to any strategic use against China. So would we, if it is used to transport military supplies to Pakistan which might later be used against us. The Russians, with friendly leftwing governments in Sudan, Somalia, and Southern Yemen, already control the southern end of the Red Sea. If the present political postures change, Socotra, which has an airstrip capable of development, could give them a more secure command of communications and satellite-tracking centre than Aden. This would give the USSR control of a section of foreign territory seldom visited by anybody else and therefore secure from espionage and guarded by Soviet marines. In due course, this area could be developed into a full fledged naval base capable of operational use in an emergency.

The Soviet Navy showed its flag off the Somali coast earlier this year. It has set up a string of small buoys along the East African coast, possibly as navigational aids for its rapidly growing force of nuclear submarines, and also a set of mooring buoys for large ships, along the African coast opposite Madagascar and as far south as
Durban. The Western powers were concerned to hear not long ago of an announced agreement between Mauritius and the USSR for the use of Mauritian ports by Soviet fishing and merchant ships and for landing rights at Plaisance airport near the capital, Port Louis, for Aeroflot.

This could mean swift replacing and recreational facilities for submarine crews operating in the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean, opportunities for air reconnaissance and, if the agreement was stretched, the obstruction of the US and British naval radio stations. This agreement was followed rapidly by trips to the area by the Commander-in-Chief of the US naval force in the Mediterranean in his flagship and from a British assault ship. They were said to be "routine operational visits." This agreement has remained a dead letter so far because of British protests to Mauritius.

The recent leftward swing in Ceylon has brought to power a government which is pro-Chinese for various reasons. This has disturbed the Russians, who wish to develop naval facilities in Colombo. They have bunkering facilities in Singapore, from which they now ship more Malaysian rubber than any other customer. The USSR has a special Indian Ocean fleet consisting of several ships, including cruisers and destroyers equipped with missiles, scientific research ships and even nuclear-class submarines. The stationing of this fleet has been accompanied by a comparable increase in the number of Soviet merchant, fishing, and spy vessels.

The US Government seems to take with a pinch of salt the oft-repeated Indian assertion that it wishes the ocean to be free of the Soviet as well as American presence. Mrs Gandhi's statement on her visit to New York in 1970 that India had given the USSR no naval foothold on the Indian soil has not allayed Western fears. Strategic experts in the West entertain serious misgivings about the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and India's capacity to prevent the implementation of any future plans the USSR has in this area. They feel that India is showing partiality in dealing with the USSR.

Some fear that the Soviet Union is likely to enlarge its presence
in Indian ports. This is what happened in Alexandria. Some years ago, the Russians posted a handful of technicians there to service Soviet vessels. The offer of repair facilities was apparently intended only to suit the UAR’s convenience, but Soviet influence grew steadily as time went on, and it is now reported that the USSR is building a deepwater port on the Egyptian coast between Alexandria and the Libyan border.

China

The known strength of the Chinese Navy is:

Strength: 150,000, including 1,600 naval air force and 28,000 marines.

Ships: 965 ships, submarines and other craft; 1 G-class submarine with ballistic missile tubes; 29 fleet submarines; 3 coastal submarines; 4 destroyers; 9 destroyer escorts; 15 patrol escorts; 24 submarine chasers; 10 missile patrol boats; 50 minesweepers; 45 auxiliary minesweepers; 200 motor torpedo boats and hydrofoils of less than 100 tons; 300 motor gunboats; and 275 landing ships/craft.

The Chinese are also trying to gain a foothold in the Indian Ocean. They are understood to have sought naval facilities from Pakistan in the eastern wing. Their submarines and fishing boats first appeared in the Bay of Bengal in the early 1960s. Peking’s efforts to obtain a footing through subversion in Malaysia and in Indonesia have failed so far, but Zanzibar is now its strategic island in this ocean. It is from here that its navy will monitor the first firings into the Indian Ocean of China’s ICBM. China is also trying to get a military naval base in Tanzania with the long-term view of threatening white South Africa and its Cape Lane.

China’s entry into the Indian Ocean causes more concern to Russia than to the Western powers. China’s ICBM is directed less against Britain, France, and the US than against India, the Soviet Union, and perhaps South Africa. Outflanked by the USSR in West Asia, in the ocean region China now has a definite stake, especially among the emerging nations in Africa. Here, where there is a struggle of black versus white, China can in
turn outflank Moscow and bring the nonaligned Asian powers ridicule.

USA and UK

The known strength of the British and the US navies is:

Britain

Strength: 87,000 including marines.
Ships: 157 ships, submarines and other craft.
Surface ships include: 3 nuclear-powered Polaris submarines, each with 16/A missiles; 3 nuclear-powered fleet submarines; 21 diesel-powered submarines, 2 aircraft carriers; 2 commando ships; 2 assault ships; 1 cruiser; 5 guided-missile destroyers equipped with surface-to-air missiles; 2 other destroyers; 27 general-purpose frigates; 21 anti-submarine frigates; 3 anti-aircraft frigates; 4 aircraft-direction frigates, and 44 mine countermeasure vessels.

Ships undergoing refitting, conversion or in reserve are: 1 aircraft carrier; 1 Polaris submarine; 1 nuclear-powered submarine; 6 other submarines; 2 cruisers; 3 guided-missile destroyers; 5 other destroyers; 2 general-purpose frigates; 6 anti-submarine frigates; 1 anti-aircraft frigate; and 10 mine countermeasure vessels.

The Royal Marines number 8,000.

USA

The strength of the USA Navy is:

Manpower: 694,000.

Ships: 980 ships, submarines and other craft. 16 attack carriers, 4 anti-submarine carriers; 103 submarines, including 44 nuclear-powered; 239 surface ships for anti-submarine warfare, fleet air defence and coastal bombardment (Vice-Admiral Pickover of the US Navy disclosed on 14 January 1971, that USA had 142 submarines, including 91 nuclear, whereas USSR had as many as 350, including 85 nuclear); 8 guided-missile cruisers (1 nuclear-powered); 2 guided cruisers; 30 guided-missile frigates (2 nuclear-powered); 29 gun missile destroyers; 123 gun/ASW destroyers; 6 guided-missile destroyer escorts; 36 destroyer escorts;
5 radar-picked escorts; 97 amphibious assault ships, including 7 helicopter-landing platforms; 42 landing craft; 54 ocean minesweepers; 185 logistic, operational support and small patrol ships; 216 shore-based patrol aircraft; and 5 transport/liaison squadrons (total number of aircraft in the active inventory of the navy is about 8,000).

Marine Corps: 294,000. In July 1970, this corps consisted of three divisions, each of 20,000 men, and three air wings with 1200 combat and support aircraft. There are 14 fighter squadrons of F-4 Phantoms, armed with Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles. Reserves number 47,700.

Britain dominated the Indian Ocean for about three centuries. Its aim was to defend its valuable Indian Empire and to safeguard the sea-lanes to its colonies. India’s independence at the end of World War II saw the end of British naval supremacy in the ocean, although for some years the British diehards made several attempts to return through the backdoor.

According to reports in the press on 16 December 1970, Britain and the USA were in the process of building a naval satellite communications centre on the island of Diego Garcia, 1,000 miles south of Kanyakumari in the middle of the Indian Ocean. The station would be the first American installation in an ocean which touches most of the nonaligned developing nations of the third world. It was to be staffed by 250 personnel and would cost the USA about $20 million to build. Britain would make a modest contribution to the cost. It was to handle military traffic and serve as an intelligence listening post in that key region where Soviet naval activity had been increasing.

The Diego Garcia facility was not intended, according to the Americans, to serve as a naval base as such. However, the 1966 Anglo-American agreement which was the basis for the joint development of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) islands, provides for an airstrip and ship anchorage to serve as a base. Both British and American vessels and aircraft, some equipped with nuclear weapons, could be expected to call there. This evoked our government’s displeasure, which it conveyed to London and Washington.
The Pentagon asked for starting funds for the facility in 1969. White House interest rose significantly after the Jordanian civil war in September 1970 and President Nixon’s visit to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, where the Russians too have a major naval presence.

A study, according to the *Los Angeles Times*, found no need for a large American military presence in the region in the foreseeable future. The emphasis was to be on political activity to counter whatever growing influence White House credited the Russians with in the region. American sources discounted as a trial balloon the London *Times* report that Prime Minister Heath would sound Washington on the possibility of a joint naval force to which “many countries might be willing to contribute.” But according to the *Los Angeles Times* an end to the Vietnam war could see increased visits to the Indian Ocean by ships of the US Seventh Fleet.

In an interview with an American weekly, Heath said the Russians “clearly intended to expand their influence in the Indian Ocean and to maintain a continuing naval presence there.” American officials do not, however, see the Soviet threat as immediate. But, unlike Britain, the USA does not have a major shipping lifeline running through these waters.

Heath said on 11 January 1971, that the proposed British arms supply to South Africa was limited to the maritime defence of the country’s trade routes in the Indian Ocean and that in the judgment of the British Government there had been a great expansion of Soviet power in the Indian Ocean against which safeguards were necessary. He said it was an established fact that the Soviet Union had been able to achieve in five years what the Czarist Empire had not been able to do in 150 years to extend its reach to the warm waters of the ocean. He asserted that the British Government had a responsibility in this context which it intended to fulfil.

He said he respected the policy of nonalignment India and other countries pursued but that Britain, an aligned country, regarded the development of Soviet power in the Indian Ocean as “a serious matter.” He believed the Soviet Union was following
an expansionist policy in West Asia, the Persian Gulf area, and the Indian Ocean, and Britain wanted safeguards against this in a variety of ways.

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore saw no reason for a flutter over the passage of two Soviet naval vessels—the cruiser Alexander Suvorov and destroyer Blesuyashly—through the Straits of Malacca on 15 January 1971. Answering questions from news correspondents about the implications of the two ships passing Horsburgh lighthouse, 60 miles south of Singapore, when the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference was in session, he said the straits were a part of the high seas and one of the principal sealanes of the region. Since there was no commotion when ships of the US Seventh Fleet passed through the straits, there was no reason why the movement of Soviet ships should cause one.

Mauritian Foreign Minister Gaetan Duval told Reuter in an interview in January 1971, that Mauritius would offer Britain a naval base as an alternative to the controversial Simonstown base in South Africa. He hoped that with this offer there would be no need for Britain to supply arms to South Africa, that it would help resolve the differences between Britain and other Commonwealth members, and that it would stop the disruption of the Commonwealth on this account.

Britain had said it needed the Simonstown base to counter what it called the growing Soviet naval presence in the ocean and contended that it would therefore have to fulfil its obligations under a 1955 agreement to supply arms to South Africa in exchange for base facilities. Addressing the British Parliament 10 days after the Mauritian offer, Heath said Britain was free to act on its arms sales to South Africa in defence of its own interests.

Addressing the 31-nation conference, External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh stressed India’s opposition to the British decision to set up in the Indian Ocean military bases or the like, including the most recent decision to install, jointly with the United States, certain facilities at Diego Garcia. According to him, the philosophy behind the decision was obsolescent. He said the assumption of a big power of the role of policeman in the Indian Ocean would only result in rivalry in the area. Britain’s plans to build a com-
munications base with the United States on Diego Garcia would only bring into the ocean other big powers which might also want to assume a similar role.

Nations which bordered the ocean should try to stop the entry of the big powers. Past experience had shown that when these powers gained influence in a region, smaller States in it were more than likely to be subjected to pressure, which was not in the interest of peace and normal conditions. A nation might want to defend its trade routes or commercial sealanes, but the days of gunboat diplomacy were over. All nations had trade interests and all wanted to maintain their sealanes, including India. But there was no need for a fixed base of a military nature to be set up for this purpose.

Swaran Singh spoke at the second day's session of the conference after Heath had told the Commonwealth leaders that the Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean and Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean had "dangerous portents." Heath dwelt on the "aims and realities" of Soviet power, arguing that the Russians were out to push the frontiers of their influence to every part of the world's oceans and continents, and in particular into the Indian Ocean.

According to him, Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean was negligible five years ago, but in 1970 it had deployed 30 combat ships, 10 submarines, and 25 auxiliaries in the area and had acquired naval repair and maintenance facilities, and even air bases, in the UAR. Heath argued that the realities of Soviet power compelled Britain to seek to counter the menace this represented to the free flow of goods along the trade routes of the world, on which the existence of the British people depended.

Frank Moraes, Editor-in-Chief of the Indian Express, wrote in January 1971 that en route to the Commonwealth conference Heath had released what looked like a calculated time-bomb in New Delhi. Moraes said Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had been active in concentrating the Indian people's attention on the developing Anglo-American naval presence in the Indian Ocean, but very little had been heard of the Russian presence. According to Heath, Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean had increased,
was increasing, and did not look like diminishing. But Indians have heard singularly little about this. In the days of the British Raj from Curzon to Linlithgow, the threat to India from the Russians was through the Khyber Pass. This led the British to neglect India’s eastern frontiers in the Second World War when the Japanese threatened, and to some extent, percolated through these frontiers.

India did not want either the Americans, the British, or the Russians to dominate the Indian Ocean, Moraes wrote. But this did not mean that India exercised a monopoly over it. Our interest in the Indian Ocean was both geographical and historical; geographical in the sense that its situation gave it a naval and military significance which we understood; historical because we had lived alongside this ocean for many centuries and it was part of us.

The American presence in the Indian Ocean was first noticed when the issue of the creation of a vacuum arising from the British withdrawal from this area and when a cold war began in earnest between the USA and the USSR. The Americans have created several military alliances in this region in the last two decades or so. While danger from the rivalry of the super powers in the Indian Ocean exists, India had occasion to appreciate the value of a friendly foreign presence in the area when the first consignment of much-needed arms and equipment came from Britain and the USA after the war with China in 1962.

Similarly, in the wake of the operations against Pakistan in 1965 and after the Soviet-sponsored Tashkent Declaration, the USSR’s mounting influence on India came in the form of military hardware bought in local currency and transported through the sealanes of this ocean. In our time of need, this was welcome assistance in keeping hostile neighbours at bay. But the presence of the USA and the USSR in the Indian Ocean is meant to offer aid on a large scale with still bigger strings to underdeveloped countries in the vicinity, with the intention of obtaining not only politico-economic influence but also a hold for establishing bases through backdoor methods.

The USA maintains its massive Sixth and Seventh Fleets, based in the Mediterranean and the Far East respectively, which both
suitably flank the Indian Ocean. Its strike command, including nuclear submarines, can always speedily feed dry strategic demands at short notice. The Anglo-American bases include Chagos Archipelago, with anchorages at Diego Garcia and perhaps at Aldabra, Farquhar, and Desroches. Similarly, there are US naval units in Ethiopia, Mauritius, and Bahrein. In this context, the awesome capabilities of nuclear submarines such as Polaris and Poseidon and underwater weapon systems must not be disregarded. Soon, such submarines and ICBMs based in the Indian Ocean area could command the entire land mass of both the USSR and China. This also explains why South Africa, an obvious Western ally in a crisis, is being supplied with naval weapons recently by Britain to combat the increasing Soviet presence. These are some of the realities of the cold war, and neither the USA nor the USSR can now be persuaded to quit the Indian Ocean unless India plays its diplomatic cards skillfully and strengthens itself suitably.

The guarantee of peace on the high seas, as the Statesman wrote on 22 December 1970, is the same as that of peace on land: the unthinkable consequences of a nuclear confrontation. Rather than repeat unexceptionable but unproductive platitudes, India should readjust its policies to changing realities.

**Japan**

The strength of the Japanese Navy is:

- Manpower: 38,000.
- Ships: 159; 1 guided-missile destroyer; 26 destroyers; 1 frigate; 10 submarines; 10 coastal escorts; 8 motor torpedo boats; 2 minelayers; 39 coastal minesweepers; 3 tank-landing ships; 1 medium-landing ship; 6 landing craft; 42 small landing craft; and 200 naval aircraft.

Japan is rapidly expanding its fleet and will soon show its flag effectively in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

**Pakistan**

The strength of the Pakistan Navy is:

- Manpower: 9,500
- Ships: 30; 1 cruiser; 6 destroyers and frigates; 3 destroyer
escorts; 4 submarines, including 3 Daphne class hunter-killers from France; 4 patrol boats; 8 coastal minesweepers; and 2 small patrol boats. In the recent package US aid deal, Pakistan has been offered four patrol aircraft.

Pakistan is a member of the SEATO and the CENTO and has secret understandings with Iran and Turkey, co-members of the Regional Council for Development. It has short coastlines both on our eastern and western sides. Lying at the northern extremities of the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea respectively, these coastal areas are very disadvantageously situated. Their narrow necks make Pakistani outlets to the major trade routes of the Indian Ocean difficult in times of hostilities should India care to take advantage of this situation. On the other hand, if India is on the defensive, these naval launching pads with bases in Chittagong and Karachi could be employed offensively by Pakistan—in collusion with China and other partners or independently—to stifle our crucial lifelines abroad.

Joint naval exercises have taken place between Iran and Pakistan, and Turkey and Pakistan. The chances are that Iranian, and probably Turkish naval help would be available to Pakistan in case of another armed clash with India. Iran has its own disputes with Iraq and would in turn sorely need the help of the Pakistan Navy if there is a confrontation between the two countries. Iraq may not view with equanimity Iran’s fishing in the troubled waters of Kurdistan.

The situation created with the threatened vacation of the Persian Gulf by Britain may sorely tempt one or both these powers to attempt to dominate this oil-rich area. There are many imponderables, but it seems almost certain that a naval confrontation between the major powers now using the Indian Ocean will become inevitable in the future. We should not forget that the sea-lane to the Persian Gulf has to be kept open if India is not to be starved of petroleum. Before 1947, the principal task of the small Royal Indian Navy was to ensure the safe transit of oil from the Persian Gulf.

Pakistan’s need for naval reconnaissance arises from India’s strength in submarines. Pakistani naval planners, noting the
infrastructure we are building up, intend having an anti-submarine arm of some strength. Our counter is the investment on Visakhapatnam base facilities and depot ships to facilitate long stretches of duty on the high seas.

Pakistan is building its navy in many ways. As already stated, apart from the submarine \textit{Gazi} gifted by the USA before 1965, it has now bought three new hunter-killer submarines from France. These must have cost a packet. In addition, Islamabad has opted for maritime reconnaissance aircraft from the USA—the market value of each of which is as much as that of a submarine—at a bargain price. The US package—one squadron of F-104s or F-5s, some Canberra bombers and 300 armoured personnel carriers—was “sold” to Pakistan for only 15 million dollars.

We do not so far know which maritime reconnaissance aircraft USA proposes to “sell” but the three types in the American inventory not only reconnoitre but are also capable of delivering depth charges to deal with a sighted submarine. In addition, they have bombs and torpedoes which can be used against unarmed surface ships.

Certain powers are helping Pakistan, to the detriment of India, in the Indian Ocean area. Pakistan is reciprocating. For instance, it may give base facilities to China, and this would have a bearing on military strategy in the area.

\textit{India}


The strength of the Indian Navy is:

\textbf{Manpower: 40,000}

\textbf{Ships: 57; 1 (1,6000-ton, aircraft carrier; 4 submarines; 2 cruisers; 11 destroyers, including 5 of the Soviet Petya class; 5 antisubmarine frigates; 3 anti-aircraft frigates; 10 patrol boats; 4 coastal minewinders; 2 inshore minesweepers; 1 landing ship; 3 landing craft; 9 seaward-defence boats; 35 Seahawk attack aircraft; 12 Alize maritime; and 10 Alouette helicopters for patrol.}

Basically, our navy’s function is to guard our sea frontiers, meet threats to our maritime interests and prevent our potential enemies
from cutting the lines of communication to India, including our island territories. Our naval role has generally been dictated to maintain a balance of power in the Indian Ocean area.

India must accept the unpalatable fact that both the USSR and the USA have not only the capability of deploying their navies in this area at will, but also show every sign of doing so. The US Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, comprising 190 ships and 750 aircraft, can move into the Indian Ocean speedily, not to speak of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Last year, 10 Soviet warships were in the Indian Ocean, and there is little doubt about the Soviet entry into this area. Although the Soviet Union has no defined naval base in the Indian Ocean at present, the laying of mooring buoys near Mauritius, Seychelles, and Malagasy—plus the stationing of survey vessels and a fishing fleet—clearly betrays this desire. We should prepare for the new geopolitical situation these developments will create by replacing most of our ancient fighting ships by smaller, faster vessels with a power punch instead of protesting in international forums against big-power presence in the ocean.

The Indian Navy has no reconnaissance aircraft other than retired Super Constellations taken over from Air-India. These have range but less firepower than available to Pakistan. Whether we should spend our limited amount of foreign exchange on giving our fleet the new ships it badly needs or on such ancillaries as reconnaissance aircraft is a vital issue. The Navy’s capital budget has increased rapidly from 1966-67 and it now stands at Rs 390 million—five times as much as five years ago. Even so, there is a tremendous squeeze on resources because the cost of the smallest fighting ship, a frigate, is around Rs 200 million. The Navy has therefore to evaluate carefully its future requirements, keeping clearly in mind the priorities it should follow. Since it cannot have everything at once, it must stagger additions and replacements in a suitable manner. There is need for planning with a time perspective of 10 to 15 years.

Before a decision can be taken on the type of ships we require, we should remove the misconceptions in the Navy as well as in the country about the role of this wing of the armed forces in
defence. This is reflected in a study published by a group of naval officers a year ago, arguing that India should assume responsibility for policing the Indian Ocean. Our parliamentary debates also imply at times that India should actively concern itself about developments in the ocean.

Our pious wish that the ocean remain a zone of peace will not stop China, the USA, or the USSR from deploying their navies in this area as they think fit. Further, we should realize that once the two major problems on the flanks of the ocean, Suez and Vietnam ease, greater attention will be paid by certain powers to our "little fishpond."

Big-power competition in the Indian Ocean is not unwelcome to Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who argues that there is no need to worry about it since the rivals would cancel each other out. Although New Delhi takes a different view, it is quite clear that its anxiety is mainly about the political and economic implications of this competition which tends to isolate small but key neighbours and is apt to make unwilling powers of others. As India’s Navy will take some time to become sufficiently strong, we should enter into suitable arrangements with one or the other of the big powers to ensure that our interests in the ocean are safeguarded.

The presence of the US Seventh Fleet off East Asia is perhaps useful in inhibiting the Chinese Navy from venturing into the Indian Ocean. But the situation is likely to become unfavourable to us if Peking acquires base facilities in Pakistan or in Africa. We should also expect a naval threat from Pakistan in collusion with some other power.

On military and commercial considerations, India must, apart from guarding its port and coastal installations and their approaches, protect its island territories, even though some, like the Nicobar archipelago northwest of Sumatra, are uninhabited and provide a parallel of sorts with Aksai Chin. At present we import a large amount of petroleum, and imagine therefore the consequences if an enemy were to sink tankers or the cargo carriers en route during a war. Few foreign nations would then risk their ships or crews to bring essential material to us and our economy would
suffer.

It is therefore necessary that we have a strong force to defend our sea frontiers and create confidence among foreign ship owners. For this purpose we need two separate fleets, modern, balanced, composite, and three-dimensional, one for the Arabian Sea and the other for the Bay of Bengal. They should include an aircraft carrier, a guided-missile ship, submarines, frigates, and auxiliary vessels like fast patrol boats. This would mean expanding our Navy considerably, but the task can be phased out appropriately. It would be no great loss if India is unable to replace capital ships like the cruisers Delhi and Mysore, which are ready to be retired. Our aircraft carrier, once supposed to be the fountain from which our naval strength flowed, is also a fast-wasting asset. Its aircraft are obsolete and replacements difficult to find.

In replacements, the emphasis now is on fast, small vessels, supported by naval anti-submarine helicopters, with a powerful punch. The decision to build all-purpose frigates and such helicopters within the country is a sound one, but their rate of production must be stepped up. The purchase of Soviet rocket boats, presumably of the kind that sank the Israeli submarine Ilat, fills one kind of need. But what about the patrol boats we have been talking of building ourselves?

Negotiations with the Soviet Union for design know-how have been dropped, while those with a British firm do not appear to have made much progress. Nor is it clear whether the Navy has made up its mind on the kind of patrol boat it should acquire. The sooner attention is turned to these concrete and specific tasks, the better it will be for the Navy and the country. But to equip India with greater sea power to reduce effectively foreign adventurism, it is important that we become self-sufficient in warship design and build such crafts speedily in our own dockyards.

The Indian Ocean is an area in which, legally, anybody can operate so long as our territorial waters are not threatened. Till India can wield decisive influence in world affairs, our short-term interests lie by and large in the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, and the sea belt extending to the Equator. Our ultimate aim
should be to ensure that our sea and air routes through the ocean, which are our life-lines, are not interrupted, that our own security is not endangered, and that the entire region enjoys freedom from tensions and conflicts. If we take a panoramic view of the countries situated along the great arc of the Indian Ocean from its South African flank on one side, up to the Suez, then along the Middle East through the land mass of the Indian subcontinent to the Far East, up to the Philippines and then again down to its Australian flank on the other side, we notice various tensions being stirred up.

When Marshal Zhukov visited our country in the mid-1950, he is supposed to have told a group of our naval officers at Visakhapatnam that those who invaded India through the northern passes were assimilated in the mainstream of Indian life, but those who came by sea remained as conquerers. Though the Marshal was making a point at the expense of the Western powers, there is considerable long-term truth in his statement.

India would be unwise to ignore the historic significance of this warning. Formal postures and slogans apart, India should try to evolve schemes of regional cooperation in economic and security matters as soon as possible because mere joint industrial ventures, without adequate combined defence, is meaningless and only results in isolating us from our many neighbours. Concurrently and expeditiously, our long-term naval and maritime capacity must beenhanced vastly so that we are not mere spectators in the game of the great powers in the ocean named after us.
CHAPTER NINETEEN

Threat from China and Pakistan

China

China considers India a potential rival in various fields for leadership in Southeast Asia which it is trying to assume. Therefore, it is determined to denigrate India and present a superior image of itself to the world (a sentiment shared by Pakistan). That is why China attacked India in 1962, and that is why it may do us further harm in the future. As her aim is shared by Pakistan, generally, these two countries have joined hands against India.

In view of the fact that Pakistan may attack us in collusion with China, we must stretch and test our diplomacy and make advance arrangements with some friendly countries to cope with such a situation. Whatever we do, we must not allow China or Pakistan to take the initiative against us on next occasion. Instead, we should take the first step ourselves with suitable allies, once China or Pakistan creates provoking circumstances.

Ping-Pong Diplomacy

China is making every effort to develop good relations with as many countries as possible but specially with the USA so that she can enter the UN and therefore not only isolate India further but also have a greater say in world affairs. If China succeeds in this effort, India will share the serious consequences of this development with the USSR and Japan. India should, therefore, lose no time and discuss with the USSR and Japan, common measures to be taken in respect of China. Also, by doing so, India will have a leverage with China. At present we have none.

Though one should not read too much in the thaw between China and the USA, it is clear that the door between the two countries has opened a little and affords them a platform of
goodwill after a long, long time. Being weary of confrontations all over, the American public is delighted with the development which may lead to better relations between China and the USA.

The Chinese gave red carpet treatment to a ping-pong team invited to visit China in April 1971. This brought about an instant improvement in relations between the USA and China. It also balanced up China’s deteriorating relations with the USSR. As China has a superior table tennis team to that of the USA, her victories over the Americans boosted up their own morale at home and also created a good impression when this news travelled across to the USA.

Chou En-lai told the American ping-pong team that their visit to China had marked an “important” step in improving relations between Washington and Peking, and that the visit had opened a new page and would certainly meet with the support of the people. (This was so different from the “capitalist and imperialist dogs” as the Chinese called the Americans not long ago.) He announced that steps would be taken soon to exchange journalists between the two countries. Without calling them “reactionaries” and “expansionists,” Chou En-lai said that time had come for the two hitherto enemy countries to come to terms to the satisfaction of both.

Ralph Harrison, chairman of the technical committee of the International Table Tennis federation said on 18 April 1971, “Everyone in our team wanted to stay in China longer and some sentimental members of the team were crying when they were leaving.”

Present Nixon announced on 14 April 1971, in an effort to make the best of a thaw in USA-China relationship, the following six steps to improve relations with Peking: (a) Export of certain non-strategic goods to China now to be permitted. (b) The current US trade embargo against China was to be relaxed. (c) The USA currency control to be relaxed to permit the use of dollars by China. (d) Restrictions were to be ended on US oil companies and providing fuel to ships or aircraft proceeding to and from China. (e) US vessels and aircraft may now carry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports; and US-owned
foreign flag carriers may call at Chinese ports. (f) The USA will expedite visas for China.

The Chinese Army

The Chinese army is nearly three million strong (138 divisions) organized into approximately 40 field units. Each unit consists of three infantry divisions with a proportionate amount of armour. The strength of a Chinese division is about 12,000 men. The army has good tactical mobility. China is divided into 13 military regions of which three, including Tibet, are "direct control" regions where the senior officer commands the armed forces as well as the militia.

While the Chinese undoubtedly have a colossal military machine, we are concerned with the forces they can deploy against us at any time. They have at present the means to maintain in Tibet about 300,000 troops consisting of five or six well-equipped and acclimatized mountain divisions plus numerous task groups for offensive roles. They have earmarked another four to five divisions for defensive, garrison or lines of communication duties. Apart from their many domestic problems, for which they want troops, they also have to man the long border with the Soviet Union to meet their commitments there.

The Chinese have positioned only limited forces against us in Tibet because of our multiple defence problems and our defensive attitude. Because of good logistics, they are in a position to move speedily and concentrate superior forces against us at a particular point without much risk. They have become bolder and stronger after acquiring a nuclear arsenal.

What air threat can the Chinese offer us from across the Himalayas? India greatly over-estimated this menace in its appreciation of Chinese capability in 1962, for they face numerous problems on this account. They possess, 2,800 combat aircraft, but their commitments are many. Moreover, they have their logistical problems in Tibet where, for instance, they require extremely long runways at high altitudes for their aircraft to take off. The problem is further aggravated because aircraft cannot lift their full payloads in high altitudes and must therefore carry reduced
loads of bomb or equipment. This affects their operational capability adversely. It must be noted, however, that the Chinese have improved their logistics considerably since 1962 by building a network of roads right up to the India-Tibet border and by constructing quite a few new airfields, including one near Ladakh and another near the Chumbi Valley, capable of taking jet aircraft with a powerful radar network all along the border.

It is difficult to say what concrete shape the Chinese promises to Pakistan may take in practice. It is unlikely that when Pakistan attacks us again, China will throw her troops against us in combat on a large scale (for fear of wider repercussions). But we must be prepared for the Chinese forces to make a limited entry into Ladakh where due to its remoteness and proximity to Kashmir, neither the USA nor the USSR may want to get bogged down and eventually land in a world war in the process of helping us. China may indulge only in psychological warfare against us and may adopt aggressive postures in Ladakh, NEFA, and Chumbi Valley (Siliguri corridor), and compel us to tie up the bulk of our forces against them in those areas. In addition, by subversion, they may incite Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal (and the Naxalites in West Bengal) against us, thus aggravating our difficulties.

The threat from China arises from its (a) enormous resources accruing from size and population, and sizeable military power; (b) well-tested guerilla technique of warfare; (c) nuclear arms; and (d) collusion with Pakistan.

There is no doubt that to counter this threat a strong military and economic power, backed by a sound foreign policy is the basic prerequisite. Our military power has to be constituted, among other things, by appropriate fighting techniques and manpower as well as by weapons and equipment. But military strength alone will not be enough to deal with China. Nor indeed would it be enough to find a solution in terms of the Colombo proposals, which are concerned mainly with the demarcation of a boundary and only touch the fringe of the India-China problem. India has also to build up its image at home and abroad.

If China and Pakistan attack us together, we must have advance arrangements with some friendly countries to cope with such a
situation. Whatever we do, we must not allow Pakistan to take the initiative against us on the next occasion. Instead, we should take the first step ourselves, once Pakistan creates provoking circumstances.

**Pakistan**

Pakistan has attacked us three times since 1947 in order that it is able to dictate her terms to us but has failed each time. It is waiting for a suitable opportunity to do this again in the foreseeable future.

Although Pakistan has failed to defeat us so far, it is wrong to say that we inflicted a crushing blow on Pakistan (wishful thinking on our part) in 1965. In fact, the war that year ended in a stalemate. Pakistan was thus peeved as success eluded her once again and hence it may want to settle scores with us in the future. Therefore, it collected arms from all over the world (the USSR, the USA, China, France, and elsewhere) and increased the firepower of her modern forces considerably. It also conspired with China, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia so that with their support, it could not only capture Kashmir—which still remains “a point of honour” with it but also be able to crush India and dictate her terms in all fields.

The hawks in Pakistan led, by Zulfikar Ali Khan Bhutto, Lt-Gen Peerzada, Principal Staff Officer to President Yahya Khan, Lt-Gen Gul Hassan, Chief of the General Staff, Maj-Gen Umar, Chairman, National Security Council, Maj-Gen Akbar Khan, lately Chief of the Inter-Service Intelligence Committee, and Mohamed Ahmad—a man of great personal charm and ability—Chairman, Pakistan’s Planning Commission (which runs the country’s economy), have been advocating that Pakistan must fight India soon in collaboration with China. They were also responsible for pushing Gen Yahya Khan into bloody action in Bangla Desh in order to preserve their privileged and powerful positions.

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1France is supplying Pakistan not only with Mirage-III aircraft but also sophisticated Daphne-class submarines. West Germany, apart from trying to give Pakistan some of the latest US tanks, is also supplying her with Cobra anti-tank missiles.
One of the ways in which the military junta can keep ruling Pakistan is to wage war against India and have a good reason for another lease of life. India must, therefore, remain prepared for a war with Pakistan in the near future.

Pakistan will seek to lull New Delhi into a state of neglectful complacency and false sense of security through a planned peace offensive combined with fomenting internal trouble. We are often misled by what appears a move towards reconciliation. We must remain alert, see through this game of Pakistan, and take suitable and timely steps.

Pakistan has strengthened its armed forces considerably since 1965, when it had only one corps. Today it has four. Its standing army is about 400,000 and its para-military forces (Frontier Corps, tribal levies, rangers, and others) number 225,000, and the forces raised in occupied Kashmir about 40,000 making a total of 665,000 men under arms. In addition, there are 200,000 Mujahids and over one million Razakars for civil defence, besides guerilla forces of an undetermined size. Pakistan has three armoured divisions and some independent armoured units with 1,400 tanks (about 400 of which are not in top condition), and about 450 combat aircraft. Two new divisions have been raised by Pakistan; 17 in place of 9 and 33 in place of 16. A third, I understand, is being raised and should be ready in the next few months. This will give Pakistan 14 infantry and 3 armoured divisions, making a total of 17. This means it has almost doubled its striking potential since 1965.

The Chief of the Pakistan Army is General Abdul Hamid. He has four corps under him. One is at Kharian, comprising one armoured and four infantry divisions, under Lt-Gen Irshad Ahmed Khan. The second is in Multan with one armoured and three infantry divisions under Lt-Gen Wasi-ud-Din. The third is in Dacca with one armoured brigade and four infantry divisions under Lt-Gen A. A. Niazi, and the fourth is at Lahore with one armoured brigade and three infantry divisions under Lt-Gen Bahadur Sher. The location of the third armoured division is not known. Pakistan has two more infantry divisions, one in Peshawar and the other at Muree.
In addition to China, Pakistan has found another ally in Iran. The latter is giving equipment to Pakistan from its own stocks which it has acquired from the West. Iran is also obtaining Soviet military equipment and may pass it on to Pakistan likewise. Iran may give about 100 Chieftain (or Patton) tanks to Pakistan after getting replacements for them. The Pakistan Air Force may use Iranian bases in a war with India. Pakistan has perhaps made a secret arrangement with Iran and Turkey by which aggression against one of them will be regarded as aggression against all the three.

Pakistan and Iran have been holding periodical joint air and naval exercises for some time. In fact, the Shah of Iran referred on a recent visit to Pakistan to this arrangement. He is reported to have advocated in a banquet speech the need for similar close association between the armies and navies of the two countries. It is therefore quite on the cards that Iran will put its aircraft, naval ships, tanks, ammunition, airfields, and spares at the disposal of Pakistan in the next round of conflict between India and Pakistan.

To divert the attention of the people from deteriorating political and economic conditions, rising prices, and the falling value of its rupee, and to seek a mandate for continuing in power and fish in India’s troubled political and economic waters, Pakistan’s military regime may be tempted to embark on yet another aggressive adventure against India. Pakistan may wait till its men have been trained in using their new equipment and then carry out a surprise attack of a limited nature and short duration, intensive and decisive, with its regular and irregular forces in Kashmir/Punjab/Rajasthan simultaneously in the campaigning season of either autumn 1971 or the spring of 1972. This gamble may succeed or may bring the disgrace of defeat to Pakistan, for this time India may not sign a truce. That Pakistan is on the brink of a war against us can perhaps be deduced

*Pakistan has, at present, three armoured divisions. If the Chinese oblige and “time” permits, they are likely to raise the fourth by the spring of 1972. They will also acquire more fighter aircraft by then from either China or elsewhere.
from the following facts:

(a) A massive army-air force exercise was held under Lt-Gen Wasi-ud-Din, GOC II Corps, in January/February 1971 in the Multan-Panchnad area in which 1 Armoured Division and a brigade of 6 Armoured Division along with 10, 11, 16, and 18 Infantry Divisions from II and IV Corps took part. The Pakistani forces practised various operations of war, but particularly negotiation of opposed major water obstacles, and appeared to take an aggressive posture against India through southern Punjab or northern Rajasthan. President Yahya Khan and Gen Abdul Hamid supervised this exercise attended by all the top brass from the eastern and western wings.

(b) A joint Pakistan-Iran naval exercise took place in the second week of February 1971 near Karachi. Similar naval and air exercises have also taken place in the recent past, with Iran and Turkey acting as Pakistan’s arsenal.

(c) Abdul Qayum Khan, “President” of “Azad Kashmir,” said in February 1971 that those who say the Kashmir problem is solved must be warned that the freedom fighters inside Kashmir cannot liberate it on their own. He added: “I will send a big Mujahid force to Kashmir for this purpose some time in 1971 (or 1972).”

Maj-Gen Akbar Khan, lately Chief of Pakistan’s Military Intelligence said on 5 May 1971, that war between India and Pakistan was imminent. This may either be prophetic or merely an attempt to divert the public attention from the Bangla Desh developments. Gen Akbar talked of heavy troop movements and injection of arms and personnel into East Bengal by India.

Just before the operations in September 1965, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, one of Pakistan’s bright commanders, was put at the helm of 12 Infantry Division at Murree, in charge of guerilla warfare in Jammu and Kashmir. Late in June, this year, Pakistan put another of its bright officers (and a hawk), Major General Akbar Khan (lately Director Inter-services Intelligence) in command of 12 Infantry Division, mentioned above. This does not show, as some seem to think, that he has been sidetracked by Yahya Khan as the former was getting too powerful. If this was so, Akbar
would have been relegated to a comparatively unimportant assignment and not to a key Command in the field. If the past is any guide, Pakistan has taken this action as a prelude to yet another adventure to settle scores with India within the next few months.

Much depends on the concrete military moves by China against us and the way it translates her many pledges to Pakistan into practice. If it repeats its performance of 1965, with much noise and little action, then we should defeat Pakistan. But if China, with her superior forces, decides to put her troops against ours in this fray, then what may happen is anyone's guess. Much will also depend on how the USSR and the USA react in that instance.

The bulk of Pakistan's armour, aircraft, and infantry are located in cantonments and air fields very near the Indo-Pakistan border up to which it can move, without many logistical problems, speedily and without attracting much attention. As they are unlikely to be detected in this process of forming up, they can spring a surprise against us, in contrast to India whose armour, infantry, and aircraft are located relatively farther away from the border and can be detected, whilst concentrating from the rear to the forward areas.

A special Pakistan corps is poised between Montgomery-Multan and a bridge has been constructed not long ago over river Sutlej across which Pakistan may plan to mount an invasion on our territory, backed up by an air blitzkrieg and attempt a quick victory before India can reinforce or the UN or the super-powers can intervene.

Having secured its own sensitive areas (Lahore/Sialkot) with many obstacles with fixed defences, some built since 1965, and suitably backed up by guerilla warfare in certain areas, her regular forces may pose a threat at several of our sensitive areas. The idea will be to keep us guessing, compel us to dissipate our defences and then to speedily concentrate her forces

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3Pakistan is training thousands of guerillas to be let loose in Kashmir and perhaps in the Punjab.
at our most vulnerable point, hoping for a speedy victory. We must guard against such a possibility. The only course for us is to take the initiative and frustrate Pakistan’s plans to our detriment.

India has superior forces but has to deploy much of its total strength of troops and air force against China Pakistan will, therefore, have parity with the balance of our forces. But if it takes the initiative and attacks India at a point of her own choice, creates a local superiority, and springs a surprise on us before we are able to reinforce this sector speedily enough, it can score an advantage over us. This is most unlikely if India plays its cards well and mounts a diversionary attack on Pakistan speedily elsewhere.

Considering that we may have to deploy a large portion of our forces along our northern and northeastern borders to contain the Chinese, Pakistan may have an edge over us, specially psychologically, in the next round of conflict. We must, therefore, place sufficient forces at vulnerable points and not give it the additional benefit of hitting us first. We should, in fact, forestall Pakistan’s moves and turn the tables when provoked.

A serious threat to us is the constant internal subversion which continues to be mounted against us by China as well as by Pakistan. In addition to the armed forces that they will be in a position to deploy against us, we must take into account the para-military forces they have trained and armed for subversive activities in Kashmir. This is a menace which many are inclined to underestimate and which cannot be solved only by military means. This requires well-coordinated psychological, political, and economic action. Subversion is a game that both sides can play. India should, therefore, also exploit the unrest of the tribesmen in the North-West Frontier Provinces and Baluchistan as well as in the eastern wing against Islamabad. We must go all out in this effort as half-hearted attempts are bound to fail.

Guerilla warfare as practised by the Naxalites is the most suitable form of violence in the current political and technological condi-
tions which China and Pakistan will exploit. This technique can be successfully prosecuted in difficult terrain and in areas where there is economic instability or political discontent. Since the guerilla's aim is to wear down superior enemy forces, time is always on his side. This must therefore be remembered while dealing with them. Immediate action should be taken to win over the local population by every means available and alienating their sympathy for the guerillas. Counter-insurgency operations therefore assume great importance in this context.

People who preach sermons of peace to us should remember that Pakistan has invaded our territory three times in the last 23 years: Kashmir in 1947, Kutch in early 1965, and Kashmir later the same year. It may mount another offensive against us soon. But Pakistan and India should realize that they both have their limitations. They are not capable of fighting each other for long on their own as they depend so much on foreign powers because of their own limited resources. These limitations prevented them from exploiting their successes in 1965.

When, for instance, Pakistan captured Jaurian, it hesitated unduly instead of capturing Akhnoor swiftly, which it could have done then but not later. Pakistan showed the same caution at Khem Karan, despite a brilliant plan of attack. India was equally hesitant when it attacked in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors. It crawled, without making much advance on either front. The war ended in a stalemate. The same thing happened after the fighting in Kutch a few months earlier. The Kashmir operations also petered out without a decision on 31 December 1948.

India and Pakistan should not permit the super-powers to use them as their tools. It suits these powers to provoke India and Pakistan in different ways so that they should weaken each other by periodical fighting and continue depending on them. Is it difficult to see through this game?

The Russian spy, Oleg Penkovsky, who defected to the West, has made the following disclosure:

When I was working on the Pakistani desk, even then the plans

*Indian Express*, 16 June 1970.
for sabotage activities and their objectives in Pakistan were completed. They included damaging the sources of water supplies, dams, poisoning of drinking water, and so forth in order to spread panic among the population. At the same time, there already existed printed propaganda material misinforming the public that all these acts of sabotage were perpetrated by Indians and Americans. This was to intensify the feelings between India and Pakistan.

We have heard of wars which lasted for years or for months. But there are few wars which big countries have fought, after rattling their sabres for long, lasting only 16 days as the India-Pakistan conflict did in 1965. At the end of this period, both combatants frantically agreed to a ceasefire as they could not fight much longer. The UAR-Israel war in 1967 lasted less than a week. But are we comparing ourselves with the UAR in size or strength? So India and Pakistan should realize that the world, instead of cheering, jeers at their antics from time to time. Both countries deficient in so many respects should build up their economic strength and make their people prosperous instead of impoverishing them through periodical wars which will never solve their problems.

Instead of building themselves up as two powerful nations, India and Pakistan have been trying to destroy each other for over 20 years. In mutual wars, they are sacrificing the flower of their youth. Thousands of gallant and talented young men have been and will continue to be killed and maimed. Out of their graves will grow more hatred against the “invaders” on both sides and the spirit to avenge these martyrs. Our future generations will wage wars again, resulting in the loss of more valuable lives. Where will this vicious circle end?

Why can’t India and Pakistan show greater tolerance towards each other, give concrete evidence of goodwill and become friends?

Many of our diplomats make a careful study of what our “official” thinking in Delhi is, toe the line and give the same version to our powers-that-be, more or less, about the events in the
country to which they are accredited. They speak, irrespective of what the facts are, in "their Masters voice" endorsing the official view. Our authorities also reciprocate and call such diplomats "sound."

Whatever our diplomats at Islamabad may feel, they have told our government, as late as April 1971, both in writing and verbally, that Pakistan is more afraid of India than India is of Pakistan. They also believe that Pakistan, due to the recent developments in Bangla Desh, will not take any military steps against India in collusion with China unless India makes a military move first! And our powers-that-be have swallowed this pill. This is living in a make-belief world, as in reality both Pakistan and China seem to have an avowed plan of a confrontation with India in the near future.

Why Pakistan Must Fight India?

Pakistan has long dreamt of regaining the old glory of the Mughal Emperors who invaded and conquered the Hindus. They have been systematically trying to cultivate the myth of Muslims being the superior race and born rulers as contrasted with the "docile" Hindus who are born to be ruled. Hence Pakistan has attempted to humiliate us three times since 1947 and has failed each time. This has resulted in a loss of face with its own public, and internationally. In order to enhance its image, and teach us ["Kafirs"] a lesson, it must make another attempt to score a victory over us.

The international climate is favourable to Pakistan at present with its unholy alliances with China, Iran, and Turkey (the USSR and the USA not being hostile). This may not remain so for long. It must, therefore, strike whilst the iron is hot and settle scores with us.

Not only out of spite, but also in order to divert the attention of its people from the disturbed political and economic conditions which prevail both in Bangla Desh as also in its Western wing, it may provoke a war with India. But it will be a big gamble. If it wins in this war, it may retrieve her sinking ship. But if it loses (which is likely), then it will be Pakistan's death.
Time is on India's side as it is a bigger and a more stable country with larger resources. So Pakistan must act now or never. But if it hits India alone, now or ever, chances are that it will come to grief.
CHAPTER TWENTY

Bangla Desh

Certain unexpected and momentous developments in East Bengal from March 1971 onwards have upset Pakistan's apple cart, for the time being at least. Let us see how this happened.

After the successful completion towards the end of 1970 of the first general election in Pakistan on the basis of adult franchise, reports from reliable sources indicated that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the undisputed leader of over 70 million East Bengalis, had arrived at a political settlement with Yahya Khan in which both of them would have shared political power in Pakistan, the former as Prime Minister and the latter continuing as President. But when this settlement is said to have taken place late in December 1970 these two leaders did not make allowance for the mischief-making capacity of Bhutto.

Drunk on his own great popularity with the rank and file of the army, dominated by West Pakistanis, he sabotaged the negotiations between Yahya and Mujib and killed the tender plant of democracy which had just sprouted in Pakistan as he did not want to play second fiddle to Mujib in a united Pakistan.

It is reliably learnt that in February 1971, when talks were afoot between the leaders of the two wings of Pakistan regarding the induction of parliamentary democracy, three hawks among the top brass of the army, Lt-Gen Peerzada, Lt-Gen Gul Hassan, and Maj-Gen Akbar Khan, marched into Yahya's office, thumped on his table and demanded indefinite postponement of convening the National Assembly, which was to have been inaugurated in Dacca on 3 March 1971. These men also drove Yahya to the extreme measures he has taken to quell the democratic movement in East Bengal.

In bowing to this pressure Yahya made a big political blunder because the hawks had grossly underestimated the will and the
courage of the Bengalis to resist their Pakistani masters. Significantly, on the same day Bhutto told a massive, milling crowd at Lahore that the National Assembly would have to be postponed till an agreement was hammered out between the leaders of the west wing and Mujib on his six-point formula for meeting the aspirations of the people of the east wing. Of these points what seems to have upset Bhutto most was the one regarding foreign trade. For the eastern province this meant greater understanding with the adjoining Indian States of Assam and West Bengal. While Bhutto and the hawks wanted a confrontation with India "for a thousand years to come," Mujib wanted better understanding and cooperation.

Circumstances and fate then took their inexorable course. East Bengal went ablaze with anger and frustration, knowing that the Western Wing was determined to deny it the fruits of the overwhelming victory of the Awami League in the general election. Mujib adopted a rigid posture on the basis of his six points when Yahya went to Dacca with an extended hand of "conciliation," which in fact was a mailed fist with the thinnest covering of velvet. As he feigned his diverse moves for peace, Yahya was really buying time for the arrival of military reinforcements for his beleagured garrison in Dacca from West Pakistan.

Reinforcing this front became difficult because of the Indian ban on overflights after the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to West Pakistan in January 1971 and its subsequent destruction there. This resulted in the Pakistanis being compelled to fly round Cape Comorin over the Bay of Bengal to Dacca and to sail round Ceylon to Chittagong or fly over the inhospitable wastes of Tibet and thence via Burma and Thailand, where their planes refuelled. More than three weeks were needed to refurbish their limited military resources in East Pakistan.

Having earlier replaced the East Pakistan Governor, Admiral Ahsan, with Lt-Gen Tikka Khan, Yahya broke off the parleys with Mujib. Branding Mujib a traitor, Yahya unleashed a reign of terror on 25 March against the Bengalis, whose only crime was their legitimate demand for democracy.

The systematic genocide perpetrated in East Bengal amounts
to a blatant denial of democratic rights. It has few parallels in history and among them are the widespread devastation caused by the bloodthirsty hordes of Genghis Khan or Timur. This inhuman butchery stirred the conscience of the entire world but not of the West Pakistani military junta, who in a few days destroyed forever the Pakistan of Jinnah's dreams and the illusion that a nation could be built of two pieces of territory more than 1,000 miles apart on the basis of a common religion.

The strategy Yahya adopted in East Bengal was to take its political leaders and people by surprise and crush them by a campaign of organized terror before they could prepare for armed struggle. But far from being crushed, the orgy of death and destruction unleashed by Yahya's butchers only gave rise to an upsurge to establish an independent Bangla Desh.

Yahya has blundered in Bangla Desh and his repressive measures against an innocent people fighting for their rights will recoil on him. It is only a matter of time before the ruling junta in Pakistan forces Yahya to step down in favour of another military dictator, perhaps Abdul Hamid or Gul Hussan, for the poor image he has created at home and abroad and for mishandling Bangla Desh and bringing Pakistan to the verge of economic ruin and political disintegration.

East Bengal is quite different from West Pakistan. It has a different cultural tradition, a vigorous nationalist background, and a different language. The first signs of unrest in the province appeared as long ago as 1948 when the West Pakistanis tried to impose Urdu on the Bengalis as the national language of Pakistan. Many acts of discrimination against the Bengalis and their economic exploitation widened the rift between the two wings steadily. When the Bengalis heard that by 1965 President Ayub's family had assets valued at Rs 250 million, not including money in foreign banks, while their own poverty persisted, their anger was pronounced.

Ayub was under the influence of the Pir of Dewal Sharif, a fraud who hypnotised him into believing that the Pir was in direct communication with God. Before he took an important decision Ayub invariably consulted this Pir, who in turn obtained what he said was God's sanction. He once told Ayub that every word Ayub
uttered was put in his mouth by God and whatever he did was in accordance with God's will. This confused Prof Tanvir Ahmad Khan, a graduate from Oxford who wrote most of Ayub's speeches!

Through the Pir's blessings, Ayub's eldest son, Capt Gauhar Ayub, now runs three large industries. His second and favourite son, Shaukat Ayub, is a director of 32 firms. Ayub has bought a farm in Sardinia and has a large bank balance in Geneva, the fruit of his many shady arms and other deals.

When the people of East Bengal heard of this and similar affairs, they made up their minds to demand autonomy within Pakistan. But when Yahya did nothing to remove the poverty of the Bengalis and his regime continued to exploit them and he let loose a reign of terror in March 1971, they declared themselves independent.

The head of the Provisional Government of Bangla Desh, Tajudd-Din Ahmed, has been able to form definite groups in the Mukti Fauj (Liberation Army) to conduct guerilla activities against Yahya's army of occupation. There is every evidence to show that resistance in Bangla Desh against the Pakistani authority is likely to continue. With experience of warfare the Bengalis will become more and more adept in guerilla tactics and will, not in the very distant future, repay the West Pakistanis for the arson, looting, rape, and murder they have perpetrated in Bangla Desh.

Pakistan's raison d'être, which had kept its two far-flung wings together, was a common hatred of India. This has also proved its Achilles' heel. The revolt of East Bengal has blown skyhigh the theory on which Pakistan was founded, that there were two nations in India, Hindus and Muslims.

The new situation in Bangla Desh has thrown up a tremendous challenge to all those who cherish democracy. For its own people the immediate problem is that of waging a relentless war of attrition against the erstwhile colonizers from West Punjab. The battle is unequal as the invaders are heavily armed with sophisticated military equipment while the liberation forces lack transport, means of communication, rations, and possess outdated weapons. But their greatest asset is their patriotism, and for this their invaders have no matching weapon.

Two forces are at strife in Bangla Desh: the masses, who want
equality of treatment and justice and democracy pitched against a reactionary, discriminatory, and dictatorial leadership. However long this struggle lasts, the masses are bound to win in the end.

In February 1971, Pakistan had about five brigades and two armoured regiments plus 17,000 men of the East Pakistan Rifles and 20,000 Ansars and Mujahids (militia) in East Bengal. By 15 March, while Yahya kept up the facade of negotiating with Mujib, military reinforcements were pouring in from the Western Wing via Ceylon. By 20 March, about 15,000 additional troops had reached East Bengal. Before Yahya broke off his talks with Mujib he was able to disarm most of the men belonging to EPR and the militia on one pretext or another. He was helped by the West Pakistanis in these organizations, amounting to about one-third of their strength. By 1 May, the Pakistani forces, including the Rangers and Tochi Scouts and two squadrons of the air force, numbered nearly 80,000.

The surviving members of EPR, the strength of which before 25 March was 17 battalions each 800 strong, the East Bengal Regiment, consisting of 4 battalions in Bangla Desh, which won more decorations for gallantry in the 1965 war than any other Pakistani army unit, Ansars, Mujahids, and the police, totalling 20,000, constitute the hard core of the freedom fighters. They have been joined by a large number of extremists and are helped by the total non-cooperation of the civil administration in an area of about 50,000 square miles.

Maintaining control over this area will need a vast number of troops. The 80,000 troops already in East Bengal, if spread widely, are bound to leave many gaps extremely vulnerable to guerrilla warfare and commando raids, in which art the liberation forces are not fully trained yet but which they will master in course of time. The monsoon will be a retarding factor for both the liberation forces and the Pakistani troops. Food shortage will also be a handicap for both. Spies and quislings are a great menace to the liberation forces.

The so-called see-saw battle between the Pakistani Army and the liberation forces was partly based on facts and partly on exaggerated press reports. By the end of April 1971, Pakistani troops
dominated all the urban areas in Bangla Desh but the liberation forces continued their acts of sabotage all over the territory. The longer these operations go on, the worse it will be for India. China will perhaps play a double game. It is keen to ensure that the present balance of power in the subcontinent is not upset to the disadvantage of Pakistan because a weakened Pakistan would lose its value as a counterweight to India.

At the same time, China is likely to keep up its "revolutionary associations" and surreptitiously support the liberation forces, leadership of which is passing already from the hands of Mujib's men into those of extremists who are ideologically closer to Peking. This movement may eventually link up with that in West Bengal when China begins to take a substantial interest in political developments in the eastern part of the subcontinent, its aim being to unite the two Bengals to form a larger Bangla Desh. They have their men in both the wings of Bengal, but will not order them to strike until they are sure that conditions are ripe for a communist takeover. Further, the Chinese are doing their best to widen the gulf between the USSR and Pakistan not only by supplanting the Russians as principal givers of military and economic aid but by discrediting them politically.

Pakistan has embarked on a deliberate policy of eliminating the 10 million Hindus in East Bengal so that the Western Province, with a population of 67 million, would have an edge over the Eastern Wing the population of which has already been reduced from 75 to 66 million. This sort of genocide should have moved the conscience of the world and compelled them to take some action! Pakistan is trying to destroy the Bengalis as the Nazis tried to destroy the Jews. Yet, when our Foreign office approached the Arab governments as well as some others in West Asia for support to halt the Pakistani atrocities, none of them were prepared to do so. On the other hand, Turkey told India that it was interfering with the internal affairs of Pakistan and Tun Abdul Razak, the Malaysian Prime Minister, said conditions in East Pakistan had returned to normal.

The big powers regard Pakistan as a balancing factor in this part of the world. They cannot therefore allow India to grow too
strong and hence have so far not raised their voices against the
genocide in East Bengal loudly enough to be effective. China, the
USA, the USSR, and as well as Britain, which has large economic
interests in both wings of Pakistan, have said that the happenings
in East Bengal are the internal affairs of Pakistan. None of them
has condemned Pakistan outright for the atrocities.

Moscow is in a dilemma. It would not like to abandon Pakistan
to Peking. Hence it is competing with China in wooing Pakistan.
At the same time New Delhi is pressing it to choose between India
and Pakistan. Moscow would rather not make a choice at this
stage and wants to keep its options open.

Both the Americans and the Russians will not intervene in
Bangla Desh because they realize that if one super-power comes
in the other will follow. If at any time the existence of the military
regime in Pakistan is threatened as a result of the civil war in the
east, it will blame India for the uprising and provoke a war.

Washington is bent on improving its relations with Peking
to lever an opening for US businessmen into the growing Chinese
market and is thus reluctant to follow policies contrary to those
of China. At the same time it does not like to be at variance with
Moscow unless there are compelling circumstances for such a step.

Because neither the USSR nor the USA can take a concrete
stand on Bangla Desh and both maintain this as an internal affair
of Pakistan, Peking has come on the stage as an interested party.
It has promised “support” to Yahya against the Indian “expansionists”
but is silent about Bangla Desh, thus leaving the door open for coming to terms with the Bengalis in due course if they
succeed in their quest for freedom.

Peking, which has “warm and friendly” relations with Islamabad,
uttered not a word on the happenings in Bangla Desh for a fort-
night after 25 March. This studied silence turned to positive
support when Prime Minister Chou En-lai pledged resolute assis-
tance to Yahya and blamed India for interfering with Pakistan’s
internal affairs. Declaring unity the basic issue, he said it was
important to differentiate between the broad masses of the people
and “a handful of persons” who wanted to sabotage the unity
of Pakistan. In coming out in determined support of Pakistan,
Peking wants to ensure that Islamabad did not succumb to pressures from Moscow or Washington and come under the influence of either. This is the culmination of the anti-India policies which China has pursued for long, and a determined attempt to bring Pakistan more and more into its orbit.

Peking’s attitude is a far cry from its oft-proclaimed revolutionary principles on national liberation movements and the rights of nationalities to self-determination. The Chinese statement supporting Pakistan on Bangla Desh said the Chinese Government and people would always vehemently support the Pakistanis in their just struggle to safeguard their national independence and sovereignty.

Mao has on the other hand repeatedly said that wars waged by oppressed people are just and those waged by oppressive forces are injust. The struggle in Bangla Desh should from this definition be just. How does the Chinese Government get over this hurdle? By calling about 70 million Bengalis “a handful of persons” Peking is blatantly ignoring the aspirations of a great many oppressed people who are determined to do away with Pakistani colonialism and exploitation.

The Indian Attitude

Our Parliament passed a unanimous resolution on 31 March 1971, which concluded with the following words: “This house records that the historic upsurge of the 75 million people of East Bengal will triumph. The House wishes to assure them that their struggle will receive the wholehearted sympathy and support of the Indian people.” More than once our Prime Minister has uttered warnings in her public speeches that India could not remain a silent spectator of the events in Bangla Desh. What was the meaning of these statements?

The government has not recognized Bangla Desh lest this may provoke Pakistan to wage war against us. But if we were not prepared for war to defend what we believed to be right why did Parliament promise support to Bangla Desh? And what did our Prime Minister mean by saying that India could not remain an onlooker?
One might ask why the Government of India failed to give military aid to Bangla Desh for a just cause when it so readily sent troops and military equipment to Ceylon. Were we not interfering with the internal affairs of a foreign country and helping to crush what might have been a movement of protest against the legitimate grievances of the Ceylonese?

The genocide in Bangla Desh and the consequent influx of millions of refugees into India has made it imperative for us to take strong action. It should have been clear to us that there was bound to be a political vacuum in Bangla Desh, with the certainty of serious repercussions on the stability of West Bengal. This factor alone should have compelled us to act positively. Pakistani bullets were landing in our territory from Bangla Desh and this was sufficient provocation for us to act. Then why did those who should be bolder develop cold feet?

If our Army had gone into East Pakistan in aid of the liberation forces soon after 25 March, we would have had overwhelming advantages. We would have found under two divisions of Pakistani troops engaged in putting down the civil war. It would have been the correct campaigning season. We would have caught the Pakistanis disembarking from ships along the coastline, without unloading facilities. The civil population, hostile to Pakistan, would have been emotionally with us and would have welcomed us for coming to its aid. But this action would have been possible only if there had been some anticipation on our part of the growing crisis in East Bengal and if we had advance plans for action. Actually, we did little except indulge in academic discussions and make empty gestures of sympathy.

When suggestions were made in certain quarters that India should strike in aid of the liberation forces soon after 25 March, certain personages hummed and hawed and said that if we took armed action this would bring China in against us. But why should that have deterred us, remembering the boast that India was so well prepared militarily that it could take on China as also Pakistan. We missed a great opportunity, the like of which may not come our way in the foreseeable future. We could have liquidated a substantial chunk of the Pakistani Army in Bangla Desh and this would
have weakened Pakistan considerably reducing a major threat to our security. But we have missed the bus.

As Pakistan has now inducted troops in East Bengal whose total strength stood at more than four divisions on 1 May 1971, we are at a disadvantage with them operationally. If we had hit Pakistan in March or April 1971 we would have fought a war in the most favourable conditions. Now the initiative has passed to the enemy, who will choose the time and place which suits him most to hit us. Those who fear that recognition of Bangla Desh might lead to war should ask whether not recognizing it will prevent one.

Although West Pakistani troops gained control of all the towns in Bangla Desh by 1 May they find it hard to administer the territory in the face of the widespread hostility of the people and with insufficient forces. Pakistan can hold the Eastern Wing only by force and its administration will be constantly harrassed by the popular forces. As Nehru said once: "You can imprison men's bodies behind barbed wires but you cannot imprison their minds."

The people of East Bengal are hostile to Pakistan mainly because of economic exploitation and other discriminatory behaviour. Here is a classical situation for guerilla warfare, Bangla Desh facing the prospect of a prolonged struggle of this kind against a foe determined to stay on, whatever the cost.

The war of liberation must be waged unconventionally, but the Bengalis are not fully trained for this at present. The Pakistani military action will perhaps wipe out the Awami League leadership, but control of the liberation forces may then pass into the hands of the extremists. The success of the freedom fighters depends not only on the measure of their own sacrifice and patriotism but also on those who share these high ideals outside the confines of this new State.

Let us not forget, however, that ranged against 20,000 ill-equipped Bengalis freedom fighters are more than four formidable divisions of a regular army. But the inhuman manner in which the West Pakistanis have brought the peace of the grave to Bangla Desh has only made it certain that the tenuous link
between the two wings has snapped for ever.

The Pakistani regular forces¹ deployed under Martial Law Administrator (Lt-Gen Tikka Khan) on 15 May were:

_Dacca_: HQ Eastern Command or III Corps, commander Lt-Gen A. N. Niazi; 14 Infantry Division, commander Maj-Gen Khadim Hussain.

_Rangpur_: 16 Infantry Division, commander Maj-Gen Nazar Hussain Shah.

_Jessore_: Infantry Division (9?), commander Maj-Gen Mohammad Nawaz Malik.

_Chittagong and Comilla_: One Infantry division, commander Maj-Gen Mohammad Rahim Khan.

Of the 110 infantry battalions (and a few more raised recently) of the Pakistan Army, 47 are deployed in East Bengal. There are three armoured (tank) regiments spread over the province. The aviation fuel depot is at Narayanganj. Two fighter squadrons, eight C-130s, and one squadron of helicopters are in Bangla Desh. Two destroyers, two frigates, and 12 smaller vessels of the Pakistan Navy are off the coast.

Pakistani Army has established control over the 75 important towns in 18 districts of East Bengal and secured the ports of Chittagong Khulna, and Chalna but will take long to dominate the 65,000 and odd villages there.

The developments in East Bengal are bound to have significant repercussions in West Bengal and elsewhere in this country. If the struggle is long drawn out, its leadership of the revolt will pass into the hands of the extremists who may join similar groups in the adjoining States of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Nagaland, and the Mizo Hills. China will then fish in troubled waters.

¹Due to what has happened in East Bengal, Bengali officers in the Pakistani Army are, at present, under a cloud. As there are quite a few of them, the morale of the officer cadre has been affected. As a corollary, I ventured to say that the senior-most Bengali officer, Lt-Gen Wasi-ud-din, who is commanding a key Corps in Western Pakistan at present is likely to be shifted elsewhere soon.
Our publicity of the events in Bangla Desh since 25 March leaves much to be desired. Our press, duly briefed, announced without verifying that Lt-Gen Tikka Khan had been shot by the liberation forces. Graphic accounts were given of the dramatic manner in which he was supposed to have been killed. A few days later, the same papers without any explanation, declared that he was alive and was governing the province. Our press announced that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had gone underground and was masterminding the operations of the liberation forces when he has been a prisoner in a West Pakistani jail (Mianwali) from the outbreak of the fighting.

However highly motivated, people do need food, of which there is an acute shortage in East Bengal. Hence there are growing instances of betrayal by personnel of the Mukti Fauj on the verge of starvation who are bought over by the Pakistanis to work against the liberation forces.

The Bengali has a fighting spirit and individual courage, as amply shown in the terrorist movement against the British, and the Naxalite activities today. He has shown some promise against the West Pakistanis in Bangla Desh from 25 March. But much greater efforts will be required from the Bengali population in the coming months before the superior Pakistan Army can really be made to feel the pinch.

Pakistan has accused India of sending into East Bengal armed infiltrators and supplying arms and ammunition to the freedom fighters. Eventually attributing its reverses to Indian intervention, it may resort to war against India before it loses East Bengal altogether. So Pakistan is now between the devil and the deep blue sea and her options are very limited indeed!

The West Pakistani military junta is now engaged in a policy of selective depopulation of East Bengal and its aim is to destroy or drive out those it considers undesirable—Hindus and Muslims hostile to Islamabad—and is pursuing it with devastating effect. Yahya Khan wants to reduce East Bengal to a state where it would not be able to raise its head again. He thought the Bengalis would not have dared to rebel against Islamabad without help and encouragement from India. He should know,
however, that he cannot keep about 70 million people in servitude for long when they have nothing but hatred for the West Pakistanis.

The idea behind the systematic slaughter of Hindus is apparently to induce Hindu refugees to spread reports of their extermination in the hope that communal passions are inflamed in India and lead to riots which embarrass India internationally and create serious law and order problems.

Refugees

Over seven million refugees had crossed into India by 1 July 1971. Among them were a large number of spies and agents provocateurs planted by the Pakistanis. Perhaps in the coming months another three million may follow. Almost 90 per cent of the total are Hindus. The 1965 war with Pakistan cost India Rs 500 million in 22 days, averaging over Rs 2 million a day. The refugees will thus cost India the same as to fight a war. India must take stern steps against Pakistan for shifting this economic burden upon us.

The wishful desire of many that Pakistan’s economy will collapse speedily is unlikely to come true. There are hardly any examples in history of countries which the super-powers allowed to “disappear” economically. They will help to prop up the economy of Pakistan when it shows signs of breaking up under the strain of civil war.

To summarize, the weak points of the Pakistan Army in Bangla Desh are:

(a) The military junta will find it difficult to maintain operations from several thousand miles distance.

(b) The urban areas have come under the Pakistani forces but the rural areas are likely to hold out.

(c) The monsoon will reduce the mobility of the forces.

(d) The vast destruction of rail and road communications and bridges and non-cooperation almost everywhere by the civilian population, who are determined to free themselves from ruthless domination, will cause considerable disruption.
The weaknesses of the liberation forces are:

(a) The Mukti Fauj is ill-trained in guerilla tactics.

(b) The activities of the liberation forces are uncoordinated because of indifferent leadership, poor communications, and lack of other resources.

(c) The monsoon will affect the liberation forces more adversely than their foes as they have few means of communications and transport at their disposal.

(d) Pakistan is bribing the impoverished population of Bangla Desh who are short of food and many of them are acting as fifth columnists.

(e) Acute food shortage, followed by famine, will come soon and hit the liberation forces badly.

(f) Epidemics will also break out in the near future.

(g) A large number of people are fleeing to India, and this may demoralize those left behind.

(h) “Bangla Bandhu” Mujib is a prisoner in West Pakistan, and in his absence the leadership in East Bengal is passing on to the extremists.

Both Mujib and Yahya miscalculated. Mujib never thought Yahya would take such ruthless action and Yahya never thought that the Bengali revolt would be so intense.

In conclusion, the Pakistan Government will for the time being be able to suppress the people of Bangla Desh by force of arms as the Russians subdued the people of Czechoslovakia. A struggle for power is going on in West Pakistan in the higher military and political circles. Bhutto is demanding a transfer of power to the elected representatives of West Pakistan soon. There are serious rumblings in Bhutto’s own party, where even his deputy is in revolt.

If Bhutto succeeds with the aid of the younger army officers in ousting Yahya he will introduce limited democracy both in West and East Pakistan and show that Yahya is the villain of the piece. After removing Yahya, Bhutto will establish a loose confederation between the two wings, with Mujib at the head of East Pakistan and himself at the head of West Pakistan. But if Yahya wins this struggle for power, there is likely to be a revolt in both wings!
The only course available to Yahya may be to wage war with India. But whether Pakistan has a war with India or not, one thing seems certain: once leadership in East Bengal passes into the extremists' hands, as is already happening, East and West Bengal, inspired by China, may become an enlarged Bangla Desh. China would wield great influence in these two regions under one banner and would thus gain ultimately at the expense of both India and Pakistan.
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

Maxwell's War on India

India is threatened by China and Pakistan from outside its frontiers, and by hunger from within. When we should be trying to think clearly how we can solve these critical problems, there are certain individuals who try to sow confusion and cloud the judgement of our people. Two recent examples are India's China War by Neville Maxwell and The Chinese Betrayal by B.N. Mullik. I shall deal with Maxwell in this chapter and with Mullik in the next.

Many Indians do not behave rationally and have an inferiority complex when dealing with Westerners. They deride the country in their presence and even divulge official secrets to them, presumably to earn the sahib's favour, or for more substantial inducements. Westerners in turn fully exploit this weakness and use every possible means under the guise of friendship to extract all sorts of information to which they would normally be denied access.

Neville Maxwell, correspondent of the Times, London, therefore served his country well, but India not so well when he represented his newspaper here from 1959 to 1967. He manoeuvred access to some very confidential information which some of our senior civil servants and soldiers seem to have gladly placed at his disposal.

Some of these culprits were ironically rewarded later with high State assignments abroad or at home. Thanks to them, Maxwell has produced his extremely partial and prejudiced book with the provoking title India's China War. It is full of distortions and perverted half-truths intended to bolster his theory that India was the aggressor against China in the exchanges which culminated in war between the two countries in 1962.

The British have always drawn comfort from their supposed impartiality when, in fact, their views are coloured. Maxwell
indulges in similar self-delusion. One of India's Viceroy's, Curzon, said once: "It will be well for England, better for India and best for all, if it is clearly understood...that we have not the slightest intention of abandoning our Indian possessions and that it is highly improbable that any such intention will be entertained by our posterity." Our erstwhile masters therefore must have with few exceptions gleefully said to themselves when they left in 1947, as did Shakespeare in Julius Caesar:

Mischief thou art afoot,
Take thou what course thou wilt

Maxwell has followed this advice faithfully in compiling this book. He boasts: "I have drawn on material from unpublished files and reports of the Government of India and the Indian Army. I was given access to these by officials and officers who believed that it was time a full account was put together and who trusted me (sic) to write it fairly." Maxwell has used this highly confidential information, often verbatim, to build his case against India.

Maxwell devotes a chapter of 30 pages in this book to Peking's views on the dispute with India. Yet, having stayed in India for more than seven years, he gives no space to New Delhi's views.

The Pakistan Times of 19 October 1970, published an article by the British historian A.J.P. Taylor on "The Heirs of British Raj" in which he eulogizes Maxwell for his "magnificent book on every count." According to him, it is "complete and final and a historical achievement of the first rank."

Taylor ends his article thus: "In Back to Methuselah, Bernard Shaw foretold that the Chinese would run the world one day. If their behaviour as recounted in this book is any guide, there could be no better outcome for mankind." I sincerely hope the British are the first nation to have a taste of Chinese rule.

When some of our ambitious and self-centred dignitaries became aware that Maxwell was writing a book, they saw a signal opportunity for denigrating those whose image they wished to demolish for presenting themselves in a better light. Towards this end, these place-seekers divulged many official secrets to Maxwell, whom
they used as their tool and who readily obliged by expressing their views as his own. They hoped that this would win them public support and be a stepping-stone to greater heights in the future.

It seems that Maxwell was given access to the contents of even the top-secret Henderson Brooks report, which has been kept away to this day even from our Parliament. Who are the disloyal men who divulged this confidential material and virtually betrayed our country? What was their motive? A foreigner can hardly be expected to serve our national interests and it must have been then to serve their own interests.

What is the government doing to punish the guilty? One way of tracing them is to list those who have been praised profusely in Maxwell's book and question them. The truth would then be out. It is not right to denounce critics of the government's policy and actions who do not pry into secret documents but comment for the good of the country and keep quiet about this scandalous affair.

Maxwell's mischief lies in cunningly mixing truths with half-truths, facts with fiction, leaving out relevant and telling details to emphasize a point he wants to make and recording statements out of context and twisting facts. His one aim in writing this book seems to have been to blacken India and defend China. In pursuing it, he has made statements which are factually incorrect and which cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. I cite a few examples.

Maxwell sees no merit in India's case on the Himalayan border issue. But even Alastair Lamb, the first Briton to pick holes in the Indian case, is inclined to admit privately that even if faulty from the British point of view, India had a case, as it was presented with full historical evidence while China put forward no positive case at all.

Maxwell believes India's forward policy on the border was ill-advised. He holds India, not China, guilty of various acts of provocations. This is a travesty of facts. India had no choice. If it had not challenged China, Chinese troops would have advanced up to the claim line and India, militarily weaker, could have done nothing about it.

Peking would have presented New Delhi with a fait accompli,
and this would have demoralized the people of India. If, on the other hand, India had openly challenged China, it ran a big risk of getting involved in a war. So India was between the devil and the deep sea. Instead of taking a sympathetic view of India’s plight Maxwell chooses to find fault with our policies. Does he think we should have acquiesced in the aggressive Chinese moves and surrendered our right to defend our territory and let another power grab it just because it was more powerful?

Relations between India and China had deteriorated steadily for some years. Chinese incursions into our territory escalated in this period. India protested repeatedly, but in vain. The Chinese crept forward and established posts in areas where we were not present, especially in Ladakh. They also became increasingly belligerent. Some senior Army officers began spreading the impression in various public circles at this stage, that although they were prepared to stem the tide of the Chinese advance Nehru and Menon would not let them do so.

The military High Command had, many years earlier, rejected the idea that we should establish a claim on our territory, as China was doing, by erecting symbolic posts along the border, particularly in Ladakh. They had expressed their inability to accept this proposal because of various logistical reasons and also because they were against having such posts in “penny packets.” Meanwhile, the government did not take adequate action to make up the various deficiencies from which the Army suffered. The result was that China occupied our territory unopposed. Sections of Indian opinion reacted by advocating strong action against the intruders.

Nehru was aware of the handicaps from which our armed forces suffered, as a result of which he was unable to defend Indian territory suitably. He was therefore anxious to take some action, short of war, to appease popular resentment at what was felt to be the government’s laxity. Nehru was always kept informed of border violations by China or other neighbours of India. Till the autumn of 1961, though he was perturbed at the increasing number of Chinese violations, he never thought of practical retaliation, though he warned the Chinese more than once of the consequences of their actions.
Nehru had a meeting in his office in the autumn of 1961 with Krishna Menon, Gen P. N. Thapar, Chief of Army Staff, and me. We showed him on a map pieces of Indian territory the Chinese had captured not long before. Nehru decided that we set up posts asserting our sovereign rights over the occupied territory. He was told that because of the superior Chinese military forces arrayed against us across the border we had no hope of meeting their challenge in these regions. If we established more posts, we would not be able to sustain them logistically. Further, China, with its superior operational and administrative capability could make such small posts untenable. We already experienced great difficulty in maintaining the few posts we had established there.

A discussion followed, the upshot of which I understood to be that, since Nehru considered China was unlikely to wage war against India despite our difficulties, we should enter into a battle of wits with China to assuage public opinion. If the Chinese advanced at one point along the border, Nehru thought we should advance at another. This would prevent the Chinese to a certain extent from having a free run in our territory.

Thus, very soon, we had established numerous posts which symbolized our administrative jurisdiction and were intended to ensure that the Chinese did not repeat the Akasi Chin experience in other parts of Ladakh or in NEFA.

Maxwell harps on the theme that the Chinese took a reasonable attitude with India in the border dispute and India adopted an unrealistic posture of toughness with the powerful Chinese. Also, that India's claims to the disputed territory were not as good as those of the Chinese. He thinks that when New Delhi demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese from this territory, it was not acting fairly. He completely ignores Nehru's proposal for mutual withdrawal of China and India from their respective lines in the western sector to de-escalate tension in the region.

If Maxwell's logic was followed faithfully, countries like Britain, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland would have been gobbled up by bigger European powers long ago. All India was doing, after negotiations with China had shown little result, was to stand up against the onslaught of an unprincipled and relentless foe to the
best of its ability.

Maxwell asserts I told him in October 1962 that the forward policy had been my conception and I had sold it to Nehru over Menon’s head. I never said anything of the kind to him. Nobody in his senses would ever claim sole authorship of an important policy or claim to sell ideas with such vast implications to the head of a government. I have related in my book *The Untold Story* how, according to my understanding, Nehru had evolved this policy. That book appeared three years before Maxwell’s and he had read it before he wrote his own. My version of events has not been contradicted by the government to this day. Maxwell misquotes me and distorts facts. Menon, Thapar, and I were all present at a discussion with Nehru where a decision was taken to pursue such a policy.

After giving a perverted account of my career in his book, Maxwell implies that Menon manoeuvred my promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general. This is absolutely untrue. He ignores what I wrote in my book, that I always had accelerated promotions throughout my service in the Army, from long before Menon became Defence Minister, indeed even during the rule of Maxwell’s compatriots before 1947. The following letter from the British Commander-in-Chief in India, Field Marshal Auchinleck, to our Defence Minister, Baldev Singh, will support this:

New Delhi,
4 October 1946

My dear Defence Minister,

I would like to suggest to you, for the post of Liaison Officer (between the Army Chief and the Defence Minister) Lt-Col B. M. Kaul, who is at present acting as Assistant Adjutant-General at the General Headquarters. This officer has been through the Staff College, is extremely intelligent, and has considerable experience. He is in my opinion a very good officer and likely to go far. I personally would be very glad to have him as your liaison officer to me ...

Yours sincerely,

Auchinleck

*Field Marshal*
I was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel at the age of 30 with nine and a half years service in 1942, to the rank of Brigadier at 36 when I had only 15 years service in 1948, to Major-General at 43 with 23 years service in 1956. So when I was elevated to the rank of Lieutenant-General after 26 years service at the age of 47, Maxwell should not histrionically attempt to give the false impression that my advancement in service was due to Menon’s contrivance.

Another blatant distortion by Maxwell is the insinuation that a case was fabricated against Manekshaw in 1961-62 in the atmosphere of a witch-hunt. In this book, Maxwell uses this expression, which Manekshaw also used in his representation to the government. Maxwell feigns great concern for Manekshaw, not because he loves him dearly but because this pose helps to establish one of the themes of his book.

Maxwell cloaks two facts, which I presume he must have known because more than one of our officials, since rewarded rather than punished by the government, gave him access to highly confidential information on these and many other matters. One fact is that the first step against Manekshaw was not taken at Army Headquarters but by the Intelligence Bureau of the Home Ministry, which brought to the notice of AHQ and Nehru certain utterances and actions by Manekshaw. As a result, an enquiry was initiated on Nehru’s orders. The second fact Maxwell suppresses is that the government conveyed to Manekshaw, with the knowledge of Nehru, its “displeasure.”

Maxwell is not right when he describes Manekshaw as one who has little time for politicians, judging from the way he has got on famously with some top politicians with whom he has had the opportunity to come in contact (Indira Gandhi, Morarji Desai, and Chavan).

Maxwell quotes Lt-Gen L. P. Sen as having asked Menon to appoint Manekshaw corps commander in place of Umrao Singh in October 1962. This statement is absolutely incorrect. Sen made no such request to Menon on this occasion. Thapar will vouch for this.

Maxwell says India’s seizure of Goa, its legitimate territory, amounted to a dual attitude on its part to the use of force. He
Maxwell's War on India

Forgets that even Gandhi accepted the use of force in certain compelling circumstances. India had every right, as a sovereign country and for patriotic reasons, to rid Goa of a foreign power which had occupied it by force of arms, especially when repeated negotiations to settle this issue peacefully had failed.

Maxwell twists facts when he says Army Headquarters, specifically ordered which troops should move and when, giving routes and areas in which posts were to be established. Such decisions would normally have been left to the discretion of lower formations. He says directions on patrol and siting posts were given by me and my officers of the General Staff in consultation with Mullik and Hooja and frequently with Foreign Secretary M. J. Desai. From the beginning, it was decided that the posts were to be so sited as to dominate the Chinese positions.

As facts stand, I decided, as it was my duty to, the general areas where there were enemy threats and where we were to establish certain posts in NEFA, in consultation with Lt-Gen Umrao Singh, General Officer Commanding, 33 Corps. I told him directly to carry out this task in view of the urgency of the matter, but with information to Eastern Command.

I did not decide the exact location of these posts, nor did I give detailed instructions about their composition. I did lay down that patrols should be led by resolute officers, particularly because the terrain in their vicinity was not easy and as they were likely to encounter various unforeseen difficulties. I also laid down that the patrols should be self-contained for rations and other purposes but gave no instructions about the routes they had to follow. The local commanders were to decide this.

What was wrong if I gave such instructions which a senior General of my designation in any army would have given to his subordinates in similar circumstances? This was no interference with anybody else's duties but normal performance of my own, emphasizing what points I thought were important. Lastly, Maxwell's moan that our posts were designed to dominate the Chinese positions is the limit. When one establishes a military post, it is common sense that it must dominate enemy positions, wherever possible.
Maxwell says the Indian Army disregarded the McMahon Line and established a post at Tse Dong (Dhola) on the southern bank of the Namka Chu, thus taking the first step in a complex of confusion. Maxwell is stating a half-truth. He should have explained to his readers that the terrain in NEFA, as also in Ladakh, is difficult, that maps of these areas were not accurate, and that we established no post in either area in territory we did not think was ours.

Actually, Capt Mahbir Pershad of 1 Sikh, an excellent officer, later killed in the operations against the Chinese, was chosen to establish a post at a point on our side of the McMahon Line. It was raining when he reached the proposed site and the maps he had were not absolutely accurate, as no maps of difficult mountainous terrain are anywhere in the world. To pinpoint any place in such terrain is never easy and one can only be approximately right. So he planted a post at a place which, according to the best of his belief and understanding and according to the map available with him, was our territory and on our side of the McMahon Line. There was no habitation in this piece of land which we knew as Dhola and the Chinese as Tse Dong.

Maxwell says Thapar apparently accepted the government order to throw the Chinese out of the Indian territory they had forcibly occupied without demur. In fact, Thapar made it clear to the government that in view of the many prevailing weaknesses of our forces, any armed action against the Chinese in NEFA might have unfavourable repercussions in Ladakh which the Army might not be able to cope with. Maxwell contradicts himself when he reports that Thapar’s warning to the government of Chinese retaliation in the western sector to Indian eviction operations in the east was rejected at a meeting at the Defence Ministry on 22 September. He adds that Thapar requested that the order be put in writing. Maxwell is therefore quite wrong when he says that Thapar accepted the order without demur.

Maxwell is equally wrong when he says: “Thapar just seemed to swim with the tide, transferring his interest elsewhere.” All those who worked with Thapar will agree with me that he is a man of independent disposition who cannot be stampeded into action
against his better judgment.

According to Maxwell, Thapar had been assuring the civilians in the government that the eviction operation was feasible and could be accomplished quickly. This is quite untrue and Maxwell is again at his old game of twisting facts. First, Thapar never said the operation could be carried out speedily. Secondly, he himself was given assurances of its feasibility by Sen, who only wanted more time and never on a single occasion stated categorically to Thapar that this operation was not militarily possible.

Maxwell says that Brig Dalvi, who was taken prisoner by the Chinese in NEFA in 1962 and wrote *Himalayan Blunder* on his release, resigned in protest at decisions in NEFA. I categorically contradict this. Dalvi never put in his papers for what happened in NEFA. Dalvi's immediate superiors will vouch for this.

Maxwell asserts that I volunteered to command the new 4 Corps in NEFA in October 1962. He goes wrong here again. I was offered this assignment and accepted. Thapar told me that if I did not want to accept it, he would take a suitable stand with the government. My answer was that I could never think of declining this honour when the nation's security was threatened.

Maxwell quotes me as telling my companions in the aircraft which took me to Tezpur on 4 October 1962 that the newspapers would headline my appointment the next morning and that if I failed in my mission the government might well fall. This is a figment of his imagination. Which of my companions on this journey is prepared to vouch for this statement?

Maxwell says I told a brigade major (Kharbanda) at Lumph: "Retrieve or starve." Not even my bitterest adversaries could accuse me of such callousness. Maxwell also says that I curtly overrode the Major's reservations about supplies. If this was so, he would surely never have written to me in a letter I still possess dated 16 November 1962 from Ramgarh:

My dear General,

You will please excuse me addressing you thus; however
knowing the keen interest you take in 7 Infantry Brigade, I have taken the liberty...

The advance parties have all arrived safe and sound and are busy taking over accommodation. Ramgarh as you know, is a very nice cantonment. Plenty of accommodation and playing fields. For the short duration of our stay we will be very happy.

The men as usual are in fine fettle and their morale is just as high as ever. As and when we are re-equipped, each and every man is keen to complete the task that we initially set out to do.

We are proud to be under your direct command. As you know those of us that have come out, are an organized, disciplined body of men ready and capable of carrying out a task. However, we will hope that a latter date no change is made and we continue to remain under your command.

Yours most sincerely,

R. O. Kharbanda
(Brigade Major 7 Infantry Brigade)

If I had told the writer of this letter in a desperate situation "retrieve or starve" or if I had curtly overruled him in the same situation, would he have written on his own such a warmly worded and complimentary letter?

Maxwell describes as unusual my sending signals direct to Army Headquarters with copies to Eastern Command. He terms this as short-circuiting the usual channels. He forgets to mention that it is a time-honoured military practice during operations to send signals direct to superior headquarters, with copies to intervening formations so that the highest authorities should have a clear view of the operational picture at the earliest. I did nothing more or less than this.

Maxwell alleges that I ordered my troops to hold on to Tsangley without taking into account the difficulties inherent in the situation there. He is guilty of suppressing facts here. As I wrote in The Untold Story, when Menon visited 4 Corps Headquarters on 17 October he emphasized to me in the presence of Thapar that it was politically important for us to hold Tsangley. I told him, also in the presence of Thapar, that whatever its political
significance, militarily this was impossible unless he provided additional resources of men and material. I argued at length against the possibility of holding Tsangley, but in vain. It was only when I was overruled by Menon that I issued a written order to Niranjan Pershad, the gist of which was:

Your difficulties about holding Tsangley were represented to the Chief of the Army Staff and the Defence Minister but were turned down. You will therefore continue to hold the line River Namka Chu. It is imperative that you reinforce Tsangley.

The decision to defend TselA rather than Bomdila was taken by Army Headquarters in consultation with Sen during my illness when Harbaksh Singh officiated for me for four days or so. Maxwell takes exception to my message to Pathania on 17 November. He should have been briefed by his military informants that I told Pathania at about 2100 hours on the night of 17 November, over the telephone, that he was to stay on at TselA and fight it out at least for the night of 17/18 November and that I would discuss the question of his withdrawal the next day, if necessary. Thapar overheard this conversation and can vouch for it even today.

I sent Pathania the following signal that night on his repeated reports telephonically that his position had become untenable and that he should be allowed to withdraw:

(1) You will hold on to your present positions to the best of your ability. When any position becomes untenable, I delegate the authority to you to withdraw to any alternative position you can hold. (I gave him this choice as I was a hundred miles away from him. This, however, did not entitle him to withdraw without a fight!)

(2) Approximately 400 enemy have already cut the road Bomdila-Dirang Dzong. I have ordered Commander, 48 Brigade, to attack the enemy force tonight speedily and resolutely and keep this road clear at all costs. You may be cut off by the enemy at Senge Dzong (behind TselA), Drang,
and Bomdila. Your only course is to fight out as best as you can.

(3) 67 Infantry Brigade less one battalion will reach Bomdila by morning 18 November. Use your tanks and other arms to the fullest extent to clear lines of communications.

In describing the episode of the Henderson Brooks Committee report, Maxwell conveniently overlooks the fact that I was not given an opportunity to appear before this committee—lest I bring out inconvenient facts—until I insisted with Chaudhuri that this be done, so that I could give my side of the story. Maxwell also fails to record, although he must have read it in *The Untold Story*, that Henderson Brooks had told me that his orders were not to record my evidence. Chaudhuri sent me to Henderson Brooks only to keep up appearances!

Maxwell is wide off the mark when he says that Chaudhuri *removed* me from command of 4 Corps. In fact, I decided to ask for premature retirement voluntarily before Chaudhuri initiated action in this respect. Nehru tried to persuade me to withdraw my request for retirement, as his letter to me published in *The Untold Story* shows, but I did not agree. Chaudhuri only acted as a post-office in this episode and processed my request for retirement and obtained government sanction speedily.

Maxwell himself quotes Nehru’s letter to me dated 18 December 1962, which speaks for itself:

My dear Bijji,

I am sorry that you are retiring. I tried to induce you not to do so but as you were determined on it, I could not do anything about it. The events which have led to your retirement are sad and have distressed many of us. I am sure, however, that you are not specially to blame for them. A large number of people and perhaps just the circumstances were responsible for them. I am sure that a man like you, full of energy and patriotism, should not merely rest without doing anything use-
ful for the country. Perhaps a little later you can find this useful work.....

Yours affectionately,

Jawaharlal Nehru

To sum up: two things stand out in Maxwell's book. First, the many misleading and fabricated statements in his book establish the unreliability of one who has taken upon himself to record contemporary Indian events. Secondly, the lack of integrity and disloyalty to the nation among those senior military and civil officials who divulged State secrets to a foreigner are deplorable.
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Mullik’s “Last Word”

According to the publisher's blurb on the jacket of The Chinese Betrayal by B.N. Mullik this book is supposed to be the last word on the long and sorry sequence of events that led to fighting in 1962. This is an extravagant claim. Actually, the book is a hodge-podge of fact and fancy, and all this adds up to the author's saying: "I told you so." I have been kind to Mullik in my writings so far, but after I read this book and noted his comments on the Army I am compelled to bring certain facts about him to public notice.

Mullik submitted the manuscript of his book two years ago to Maj-Gen D.K. Palit, who runs a publishing house. After reading it, Palit was unwilling to publish it as it stood then. For Mullik to say therefore in the preface that he is grateful to Palit "for having carefully gone through chapters 20 to 26" amounts to misleading the public into believing that Palit agreed with what Mullik had written in these chapters. But Palit severely criticized the book, to which Mullik had, according to Palit, added many embellishments (after showing it to him) in an article in the Hindustan Times of 11 April 1971.

The refrain which runs through this 600-page piece of verbosity, a tribute to hindsight, is that for 14 long years Mullik advised Nehru and that Nehru's decisions in various matters, based on this "sagacious" advice, were always right. Mullik might have been very wise but nobody can be right always. The main point Mullik tries to establish is that whereas the Intelligence Bureau, of which he was head, was always aware of China's evil intentions towards India and sent information about this to all concerned from time to time, the military authorities neither assessed this information properly nor disseminated it to various components of the Army. Also, by failing to take note of this information, Army Headquarters
adopted a policy which the forces in the field were not capable of carrying out and the blame for the adventure in the Thagla-Dhola area in the NEFA in 1962 fell on the Army and not on the statesmen.

Mullik has made many misleading and incorrect statements, but the biggest distortion of facts is his assertion that the decision to fight in NEFA was taken by the Army and was not a political decision. Mullik bases his statement on a discussion at a meeting in Delhi on 17 September 1962 at which he was present. But he has omitted, by design or oversight, to mention the discussions held at an earlier meeting on 14 September. I have given an account of this meeting in The Untold Story and D.R. Mankekar has done so in The Guilty Men of 1962. Surely, Mullik must have known what happened at this meeting and must have read both these books to refresh his memory of this meeting. Mullik twists facts when he says the decision to evict the Chinese from the NEFA was military and not political. He has apparently done so because the truth does not jive with the purpose of his book.

As I have said in my book, Gen Thapar made it clear to Defence Minister Menon on 14 September that in view of the prevailing weaknesses in the Army, armed action against the Chinese in NEFA was liable to have repercussions in Ladakh, which the Army might not be able to cope with. In fact, the late Lt-Gen Daulat Singh, GOC-in-C, Western Command, said at this meeting, in the presence of Menon and Thapar, that if the Chinese attacked in Ladakh they would annihilate us because of their overwhelming all-round military superiority, as they in fact did in October/November.

Lt-Gen Sen said, he, as GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, would be incapable of dealing with the Chinese in NEFA owing to the comparative weakness of his own forces if they came in strength, as happened later. But it was Menon's and hence government's view that, irrespective of consequences, the time had come for India to give, or appear to give, the Chinese a crack at least at one place along the Indian border. The reason he gave was that encroachment of our territory by the Chinese could no longer be tolerated and a line had to be drawn somewhere. Whether this
was the real reason or whether this action was planned as a sop to
incensed public opinion is a question which Menon can best answer.
In face of what happened at this meeting, which none of those
present can honestly deny, how does Mullik say that the decision
to fight the Chinese on this front was military?

The following facts are at variance with Mullik’s version of
events. Nehru was returning from abroad on 2 October. Thapar
told Menon he had decided to inform Nehru of his grave fears of a
strong Chinese reaction if the Army attempted to evict them from
the Thagla area. Thapar told me on 3 October that Mullik saw
him a little before Nehru arrived with the specific purpose of per-
suading, or perhaps warning, him not to mention this matter to
Nehru. According to Thapar, because the government had decided
to evict the Chinese from the Thagla bridge, Mullik felt that unless
Thapar supported this decision the Nehru Government would fall.

Thapar refused to accept Mullik’s “advice.” If Thapar had been
ready to do as Mullik wanted, why was it necessary for Mullik
to reinforce his request with this argument? Thapar also told me
on 3 October that it struck him at this point in his talk with Mullik,
that the Intelligence Bureau chief had come to him as the emissary
of Menon. Thapar thought that there was no question of the
government falling on this issue but there might be a demand for
Menon’s removal from Defence, and possibly for the heads of a
few civilians, including that of Mullik himself, for ignoring military
apprehensions about the adverse consequences of a confrontation
with the Chinese in the north.

If instead of trying to persuade Thapar not to mention his fears
to Nehru, Mullik had, as head of Intelligence, backed Thapar,
Nehru would have taken more note of what Thapar and Sen told
him on the morning of 3 October about the danger involved in this
decision. But they failed without this support to convince Nehru
who was misguided by both Menon and Mullik on this point, and
this led to Nehru accepting this decision which Mullik insists on
calling a military one.

On reflection, it is clear that Mullik was sent to Thapar by Menon,
who along with Mullik was anxious to emphasize to Nehru the
acclaim he would get from every political party, and hence the
people of India, for adopting a "tough" line with the Chinese and ordering the Army to throw them over Thagla Ridge. This was how Nehru took a political decision on this issue, despite Thapar's advice to the contrary. I am convinced Nehru would have agreed with Thapar if he had not been wrongly advised by Menon and Mullik.

Mullik makes the point that the decisions at a meeting in Tezpur on 17 October were taken by the Army without pressure from the government. As I have narrated in *The Untold Story*, Menon emphasized to me at this meeting, in the presence of Thapar and many others, that it was politically important for India to hold on to Tsangley as it was situated near the trijunction of India, Bhutan, and Tibet. I replied that whatever the political significance of Tsangley, this was militarily impossible unless I was given more men and materials. Thapar agreed with this contention of mine. Menon, however, overruled me and ordered that Tsangley be held. This again was not a military but a political decision and a glaring example of interference on political grounds in military matters.

Mullik says in his book that Menon, Sarin, and he withdrew from the meeting on 17 October so that the Generals could take their own decision on Tsangley free from civilian interference. This is a figment of his imagination. The trio were present throughout this meeting except for intervals for meals or refreshments or for their own brief consultations. If they absented themselves from the meeting why did they take the trouble to come all the way from Delhi to be present at it?

It is an undeniable fact, which will be supported by other participants in the meeting, that Menon overruled me, in spite of my insisting that it was difficult to hold on to Tsangley with the inadequate forces and resources at my disposal, and ordered that it be held on political grounds. Mullik's anxiety to blame the Army and absolve the statesmen must have had a motive in line with his earlier posture that the government would fall unless the Chinese were evicted from Thagla Ridge. Mullik has allowed his imagination free rein on this question, as he has done many times elsewhere in his book.

Mullik declares that the attitude of Army Headquarters was to
avoid a quarrel with China. The army would have been prepared to take the Chinese on, if only it had adequate number of troops and sufficient modern weapons and equipment available. Mullik fails to mention that the government was anxious to avoid a quarrel with the Chinese. Nehru realized that the preponderance of Chinese forces on the northern border dictated a policy of caution. As early as 13 September 1959 Nehru handed down this strategic and tactical directive: “We must avoid actual conflict...not only in a big way but in a small way and avoid any provocative action.”

Regarding Aksai Chin, Nehru said: “For the present we have to put up with the Chinese occupation of this sector. I think it is unlikely that the Chinese forces will take up any aggressive line on this frontier.” Conflict control remained effective in 1960, 1961, and 1962.

The orders to the troops in NEFA were that if they encountered the Chinese on the way to Dhola in September 1962 they were to persuade them to go away and not fire except in self-defence and that too only when within a range of 50 yards. Mullik admits that in 1961 Nehru ordered our troops not to fire except in self-defence.

The Army had, in the meantime, pointed out in eight letters to the government, signed by the Chief of Army Staff and addressed to Menon and mostly drafted by me, that neither in arms and ammunition nor equipment nor general staff reserves was the Army ready to conduct operations, particularly against China. The General Staff also prepared a paper on the “Army of the Foreseeable Future,” the urgent part of which was put up to the Defence Minister. But neither he nor anybody else sanctioned most of the military needs listed in this document.

Mullik says the Army was not compelled to fight in unsuitable terrain such as Namkachau Valley by government and that the posture India took against the Chinese in 1962 was not based on a political decision but on the Army’s own. People whose memories function normally will recollect that many members of Parliament used to taunt the government in 1961-62 for not taking sufficiently strong action against the Chinese, who had occupied large chunks of our territory. Influenced by these taunts, the government ordered the Army to fight in the Namkachau Valley near Thagla.
It is a matter of common knowledge that there were many highly placed persons, like Mullik, who pushed the government into adopting a stance against the Chinese not in keeping with the many weaknesses and deficiencies from which the armed forces suffered. Not only Foreign Secretary M. J. Desai but also the Defence Minister told the Army at official meetings that time had come to give a crack to the Chinese at least in one place to show that we meant business. This was a political and not a military attitude.

For instance, Menon said at a meeting in New Delhi on 30 September at which Thapar and many other senior officers and officials were present that government policy was to make an impact on the Chinese in NEFA before they settled down for the winter.¹ Mullik can write volumes on this point but can never convince anybody who was present at the decision-making meetings at the time that it was the statesmen, as advised by Mullik, and not the soldiers who must accept the blame for taking on the Chinese in 1962.

When Thapar saw Nehru on 2 October 1962 and pointed out that we were going to use force against the Chinese for the first time and that this was bound to have repercussions, Nehru said he had good reason to believe, presumably on the basis of a briefing by Mullik, that the Chinese would not take strong action against us. This was the government’s and probably Mullik’s belief even as late as 2 October.

I do not accept Mullik’s version² of the meeting in November 1961 and reiterate that Nehru was under great pressure as a result of vociferous protests, particularly from Opposition members of Parliament and the public, for strong action against the Chinese. It was mainly for this reason that he took the attitude he did in 1961 and 1962.

There is no doubt that the statesmen wanted to avoid a serious confrontation with the Chinese, else they would not have told the Army to shoot only in self-defence. Surely Mullik must have been a party to this order. How can he therefore say now that the Army

¹*The Untold Story*, p. 363.
had a complex vis-a-vis the Chinese? Is this not another proof of Mullik’s anxiety to please the wielders of power in New Delhi?

Nehru decided in 1954 that a system of checkpoints should be spread along our entire northern borders, more especially in the disputed areas. In 1959, with the Tibetan revolt against the Chinese the Dalai Lama’s flight to India—and the disclosure that the Chinese had built a road across the Aksai Chin plateau, our northern border became live. The Army then deployed its own checkpoints in addition to the Intelligence Bureau posts.

Mullik differs from my interpretation of “symbolic posts” mentioned at the November meeting I have referred to earlier. He thinks I have used this term to justify the opening by the Army, under my orders, of many small posts in Chip Chap Valley in Ladakh. Mullik also thinks Nehru wanted the posts “effectively” occupied. How does Mullik define “effective” when Nehru himself issued a directive that “effective conflict” must be avoided in every way? Besides, government’s instructions to the Army in 1961 and 1962 were that it was not to fire except in self-defence. How then could these posts be “effectively” occupied? The term symbolic is therefore nearer the truth than Mullik’s interpretation.

Mullik says that the checkpoints in Ladakh and other parts of the border with Tibet were manned by the Intelligence Bureau from 1950 to 1959, after which the Army shared this duty. The Bureau opened its first post at Leh, in Ladakh, with only four men. There were 30 posts by the end of 1952 in these locations: Ladakh—7; Punjab and Himchal Pradesh—4; Uttar Pradesh 6; Sikkim—5; and NEFA—8. A total of 108 men were at these posts, averaging three to a post. Could such a small number be in “effective” control?

There were 38 posts by the end of 1959 with a total of 1,334 men. By the end of 1962 the number of posts had risen to 77 with 1,590 men, averaging 20 men per post. In this vast area, could so few posts manned so scantily and under Mullik’s command be in effective and not symbolic control? Neither could the military posts, not much better manned, perform a miracle.

I have described Nehru in _The Untold Story_ as one who had many qualities rarely seen in men and who had done more for
India than anyone else since Asoka or Akbar. In face of this praise, how could Mullik write that it was inexcusable for me to have accused Nehru of “bad faith.” I have never made such an accusation against Nehru in any context. Hence this charge is absurd.

Mullik says Menon and I saw Nehru off at Palam airport when he left for Colombo on 12 October and that some responsible persons present overheard me tell Nehru that I would be able to clear Nam-kachau Valley of the Chinese. On the strength of this assurance Nehru is supposed to have made the now well-known statement: “I have told the Army to throw the Chinese out.” I, in fact, never went to the airport to see Nehru off or for any other purpose on that day. Is this the kind of intelligence that Mullik gathered?

How could I, who had told Nehru only the night before at his residence at Teen Murti Marg of my difficulties in the valley, say something totally contrary the very next day? And how could Nehru make an important statement that morning publicly, contrary to the picture I had presented to him only a few hours earlier? Further, who were these “responsible” persons who overheard this imaginary conversation? Would Mullik care to name them? I, in turn, can furnish an alibi to prove that I never went to Palam airport on 12 October. If he cannot prove his point, this story is concocted, probably in collusion with some astute politician.

When I asked for leave in August 1962, as I had not had any for several years at a stretch and because my daughter was ill, Menon rejected my application after it had been sanctioned by the Chief of Staff because in his view I could not be away “at that juncture.” I wrote back to him officially that if Nehru could be away in Britain and Finance Minister Morarji Desai was also abroad at the same juncture and Menon himself could also plan to be away at the UN, there was no reason why I should not be allowed to go on leave within India, subject to recall, at short notice if necessary, especially when my daughter was ill. Only then was I given leave.

Hence for Mullik to distort facts and to say I went on leave mainly because I had a violent disagreement with Menon over procurement of military equipment is a total fabrication. On the question of equipment, I had only urged Menon that we should
procure the best available in our national interests and not depend for supplies on any particular country to the exclusion of others. It is therefore wrong for Mullik to say that I recommended American equipment and none other.

On one hand Mullik calls me a brave officer and adds: "If Kaul would have gone to the front once again, he might have been able to galvanize into action the men who had lost all their zeal to fight." On the other hand, he says it was unwise to send me back to my command as I must have been demoralized. Mullik says that when he came to see me in my illness in October 1962, he found me in low spirits, especially after the Chinese attack on our positions on 20 October.

Strangely, Cabinet Secretary Khera has also made a similar statement in his book *India's Defence Problems*. If Menon had also written a book on this subject I am pretty certain he would have made a similar observation! If this was their honest opinion, was it not their duty to tell the Prime Minister of my supposed state of mind? And if they had done so would the Prime Minister have insisted on my return to Tezpur on active service again?

Mullik claims to have met me on 10 November and suggested that as the Chinese were moving up to Poshingla, in NEFA, in strength I should deploy more troops to guard that pass. Further, he says he told me that unless the Chinese were stopped there the security of the entire 4 Infantry Division would be in jeopardy. This is an attempt to be wise after the event without the slightest foundation. Mullik said nothing of this kind and never predicted the Chinese would make a direct bid for Bomdila through Poshingla. In any event, I had insufficient troops to guard the pass and had asked for additional forces. Mullik is thrusting a prophetic role upon himself, as he does elsewhere too.

Anonymity plays an important part in the British intelligence services. Very few outsiders know who are in them what jobs they are doing and their activities. But in India, even today, the opposite is true. Mullik, who was trained by the British, should not have made the mistake of writing a book like this and divulging what part the Director of the Intelligence Bureau plays in the government.
During 1948-1962, did we have any reliable system of our own for obtaining inside information about Peking’s intentions regarding India? Mullik evidently depended mostly on wireless intercepts, aerial photographs by U-2 aircraft of the US Air Force, and other titbits passed on to us intelligence by British and American intelligence agencies. Mullik’s own intelligence sources were few and not all entirely reliable.

He managed to compile a sketchy form of tactical information regarding Chinese military strength and activities in the border areas from this material but could not make a satisfactory assessment of their intentions or military priorities. Moreover, there was no link between the information he collected through his own meagre sources and what was passed on to him by his foreign sources. Ironically, American and British intelligence were as ignorant about the Chinese moves as our own people. Mullik’s assessment of their intentions and priorities were therefore mostly based on guesswork and seldom on reliable evidence.

In his article “When India Slept, China Stabbed” in the Illustrated Weekly of 16 May 1971, A.G. Noorani has correctly stated that Mullik’s estimates of the Chinese intentions proved hopelessly wrong. Maxwell comments in India’s China War:

Mullik’s opinion that China would not unleash any massive retaliation if India used force against the Chinese below Thagla Ridge surely shored up the determination of the civilian leadership to push their operation against the Chinese in NEFA. Curiously the confidence that no strong Chinese reaction should be feared overrode even the Intelligence Bureau’s own reports of concentration of Chinese troops at points just behind the McMahon Line. These reports and assumptions of Mullik proved disastrously wrong.

When checked, as Noorani says, China proved quite willing to wage war, even if it was a limited one. Thus, Mullik was responsible for this costly “oversight.”

There is another illustration of Mullik’s incorrect assumption based on unreliable information which he conveyed to the gov-
ernment and which cost it dear. When the Chinese established their posts in Chip Chap valley, Foreign Secretary M. J. Desai said, as reported by D. K. Palit in an article in the *Hindustan Times* of 11 April 1971, “that an effective method of stemming the Chinese advance in Ladakh would be to give them an occasional knock during our encounters with them in our territory and to engage them in a short offensive action aimed at inflicting casualties and for taking prisoners.”

Army Headquarters demurred and referred this “policy” to Menon because it contravened the Prime Minister's directive of 13 September. Desai then asked Army Headquarters to get an assessment from the Intelligence Bureau. The bureau's assessment arrived at Army Headquarters on 26 September. Among other things it said “where a dozen men of ours have been present, the Chinese have kept away.” This of course did not mean that the Chinese would always keep away in such circumstances in the future! This is where Mullik made a big miscalculation and where his evaluation and advice to the government proved wrong. The government genuinely believed the Chinese would not retaliate even in the future. This is why India came into a headlong collision with the Chinese in 1962, and for this the only agency to blame is the Intelligence Bureau headed by Mullik.

The man who was responsible more than anybody else for persuading the government, despite the weaknesses and shortages from which our Army suffered, to take up a tough posture against the Chinese in 1962 was B. N. Mullik, cosily seated in his air-conditioned room in South Block for 14 years, often listening to doubtful sources of intelligence about the Chinese, to which he presumably added his own frills and then presented as “reliable” information to the government.

When Mullik succeeded in influencing the government to order the Army to take strong action against the Chinese in September 1962 he had nothing to lose. If the Army did well he would be hailed as a prophet. If it did badly he could always accuse it of incompetence, as he has done in this book. To say the least, this was a highly irresponsible attitude on the part of the head of the Intelligence Bureau.
Mullik’s “Last Word” 293

Mullik claims he predicted a Chinese attack on India as early as June 1962. How did he suddenly discover such a posture on the part of the Chinese, when only a few months earlier, his assessment was that “where a dozen men of ours were present, the Chinese have kept away”!

Mullik was aware of the poor state of the Army’s equipment, about which I kept him fully briefed all along, and its unpreparedness to meet an attack. He also knew our maps were not entirely accurate and showed Thagla Ridge incorrectly. Yet he failed to raise his voice against the decision to drive the Chinese out of the Thagla area which the Chinese could have called provocation and used as an excuse to carry out their aggressive intentions.

Mullik says that soon after Menon’s resignation a senior Minister told him that he had let down his country by being in league with Menon. Readers should judge from the foregoing whether the Minister had some justification for making such a remark.

Mullik contends that it was not the inadequate strength or equipment which led to the debacle in 1962 but only the mental attitude of the top Army brass. Why then was its strength nearly doubled soon after 1962 and why was so much more new equipment procured? He says that it was the Army’s reluctance to take on the Chinese which was mainly responsible for its lack of preparedness for a confrontation and not the government’s lack of understanding of the seriousness of the military threat it faced and its unwillingness to have an Army and Air Force of suitable size and quality to deal with the situation.

I will mention here a note prepared late in 1958-59 by Army Headquarters and put up to the government which underlined the increasing Chinese activity on our northeastern border and seeking sanction to raise more troops with modern equipment to prepare our defences suitably against this possible threat. The note came back from the government with the remark that the Army Headquarters need not waste time worrying about a Chinese threat. The government could not have said this without consulting Mullik as Intelligence head. Is Mullik therefore trying to create a wrong impression on this point wilfully.

Generals do not decide on their own against which aggressor
they should get ready to defend their country, nor can they prepare suitably unless they are given the necessary directives and resources. According to Mullik, the Government was fully aware in 1959 that China was on the warpath. Nevertheless Menon failed to give any directive to Army Headquarters or to the Chiefs of Staff to prepare for defence against the Chinese if Government decided to settle the border dispute by force. Such a directive in 1959 was all the more necessary in view of the remarks made by the government in reply to the Headquarters note about such a threat.

National aims have to be decided by the government and conveyed to the forces as directives. Was this done until 1962? Instructions from time to time to fill a few gaps on our borders with Army or police posts did not constitute a directive to prepare to meet an attack, nor could this defence have been prepared without considerable reorganization of the Army and the Air Force. Mullik has failed here to distinguish between grain and chaff.

If our troops fought the Chinese handicapped by shortages in numbers, arms, ammunition, equipment, and rations, if they had antiquated weapons in battle, if they were issued canvas shoes instead of marching boots, if they lacked warm clothing and shivered at high altitudes in subzero temperatures, who was to blame? If the government did not comprehend the threats to our security from 1948 to 1962, and if insufficient funds were allotted for military requirements owing to a wrong assessment of the situation, whose fault was it? Certainly not of the Generals but of the statesmen whom Mullik tries to defend in this book but whom he incorrectly advised all along.

Soon after 1962 India thought it necessary to double the strength of the Army and raised several mountain divisions suitably trained, armed, and equipped. Mullik is accidentally right in saying that if India was to prepare to face the Chinese in 1962 it should have started this process in 1958. This is one of the few correct statements he has made, but he has omitted to mention even here that a recommendation made in 1958/59 by Army Headquarters, with the approval of Thimayya who was Chief of Staff, that we start preparing for this threat was turned down by the government. This singular omission on the part of the government, or Menon, cannot
be argued away by Mullik's saying that relations between Menon and Thimayya were strained or that a proper system of decision-making did not exist at the time.

When I found that Menon was not reacting to my repeated representations to obtain the requisite equipment for the forces and when I thought that time was running out, I approached certain key Secretaries to the government in desperation and asked them if they could do something in this vital matter. Mullik refers to one of these approaches and comments that the "600-crore" demand by the Army was too high. This comment seems ridiculous when equipment worth much more was procured after 1962.

Mullik wonders what happened to the military demands and that they must have been merely an arithmetical exercise without any detailed thought to the threats developing against India. These demands could only be processed through the Defence Minister. I, therefore, put them up to him with the approval of the Army Chief. Mullik knows, but has omitted to mention, that Menon never passed these demands to Finance or to the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. Menon sat on them. I told the Foreign and Finance Secretaries about this and that they should take remedial action if they could. These demands related specifically to our responsibilities in relation to the threats from China and Pakistan. They were not therefore merely an arithmetical exercise as Mullik thinks.

Mullik ventures opinions on many matters about which he has limited information. He compares type of fighter aircraft procured for the IAF at the time, knowing little about their performance.

Mullik defends Krishna Menon and General Chaudhuri in this book when he has more than once levelled severe criticisms against both in my presence, within the hearing of others (and to which he makes no reference in this book).

H.C. Sarin attended most high level meetings in which Mullik was present, as mentioned by Mullik himself in this book in many places. Yet he has quoted Sarin only once and that also when it suits him. Even here he has divulged something (passing of a slip of paper which Sarin did in confidence) which amounts to a breach of faith on Mullik's part.
Mullik criticizes my recommendation to the government that it should import parachutes but omits to mention that reports had come from Ladakh and other border areas of grave shortages and that the rate of production of parachutes in India was too slow. Nor does he mention that there were many instances of Indian-made parachutes not being of sufficiently good quality. When they were released from aircraft with their loads many fell far away from their targets and some did not open at all, resulting in much hardship to the troops. In any event, the total quantity required fell far below the needs of the Army. Hence my request for imports.

Mullik may be an encyclopaedia on matters of intelligence but makes a clumsy effort at playing the same role on strategy and trying to teach soldiers to fight battles. For instance, he says the real trouble was that up to 1961 the attitude of Army Headquarters had been to avoid a quarrel with the Chinese so far as Ladakh was concerned. According to him, the Army’s argument was that the terrain was not suitable for Army and it must choose its own ground. Mullik adds that battles are fought on frontiers, suitable or not, and that no country would meekly allow its frontiers to be overrun by an enemy and choose a battleground in the interior. All soldiers know that battles are not fought wherever the enemy attacks, including frontiers, that one tempts the enemy, after resistance at the frontiers, to come to a selected “killing ground”—an area of one’s choice to which one withdraws—and then inflict the maximum damage.

If Mullik had only read military history carefully he would have seen a good example of this in World War II. When Hitler attacked the USSR, the Russians withdrew from their frontiers far into the interior and fought the main battles, such as that of Stalingrad, on ground which suited them most and which they had selected beforehand.

One question the reader might like to ask the government: how was Mullik—a retired (and hence an unentitled) officer—allowed to refer to many top secret documents and records in the Intelligence Bureau office (and other offices) whilst he was writing this book? And how has he divulged secret matters from these files?

The government was obsessed with the misconception that whatever action we took in Ladakh, the NEFA, or anywhere else along
our border the Chinese were not likely to react strongly. This idea had been planted by Mullik in the mind of Nehru and in the government as a whole and this proved our undoing in 1962. For Mullik to blame the Army for our reverses that year and gloss over the lack of judgement on the part of some politicians, whom he advised mostly, is a poor attempt to camouflage his own errors. Perhaps the fact that Mullik continued to enjoy certain privileges and perquisites until about a couple of months ago, seven years after retirement, may well have prompted him to write his book, which is far from being "the last word" on the subject.
CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Halting the Economic Drift

Instead of adopting a positive economic policy, the government wants us to believe that socialist slogans will accelerate our development and remove poverty. Important economic decisions are postponed because of political expediency. The government controls and intervention in economic affairs creates uncertainty and makes long-range planning difficult for the private sector. Expansion and diversification plans are therefore withheld.

Instead of indulging in platitudes, the government should arrest rising prices by speedy and strict measures. Prices of essential commodities should be controlled and defaulters given exemplary punishment, irrespective of political considerations, which should be widely publicized throughout the country. They should, in addition, be publicly humiliated for exploiting the poor.

Poverty is the greatest degradation of man. The poor, who form the great mass of India’s 550 million, are underfed, under-clothed, and live in such crowded, filthy conditions without any facilities that their lives are brief, painful, comfortless, devoid of leisure, peace, and dignity. Removal of poverty is therefore the most important function of the government, and instead of talking emptily of socialism it should provide concrete opportunities for the poor to improve their lot.

If, however, there is no promise of relief from unemployment, hunger, and privation, widespread discontent and disorder will become inevitable. The government should therefore reduce the gap between the rich and poor and increase the country’s wealth, through vigorous steps in agriculture, industry, and trade. This will make us prosperous and improve our standard of living.

We should take urgent steps to arrest the alarming growth of population, giving material incentives to those with small families and imposing penalties of various kind, including heavier taxa-
tion. More important perhaps is the need to mobilize social support for voluntary restraints on large families, to be followed, if this fails, by compulsory sterilization. The failure of the ambitious and costly family planning programme is not due primarily, as the government spokesmen are fond of saying, to lack of a simple, foolproof system of birth control but to inability to mobilize public support for the need to keep down births as a major plank of nation-building. This sense of national commitment for the programme is missing, just as it is missing in other priority national programmes.

The public sector must be strengthened, especially in basic industries. While concentration of wealth and profits should not be encouraged, the government should at the same time refrain from imposing rigid curbs and controls on trade and industry. It should instead provide them, particularly small industrialists, with the maximum incentives. It should encourage investment and initiative generally. Dr D. R. Gadgil, late Vice-Chairman of the Planning Commission, told the press in October 1970 that there had been "certain shortfalls" in vital sectors of industry and as a result industrial growth rate did not seem to be gathering momentum at the pace envisaged in the Fourth Plan.

The Working Committee of the ruling Congress has promised to provide in the next five years at least one earning member in every family with a monthly income of Rs 100. But far from taking speedy and effective steps to remove poverty from our midst, the government is even unable to define an unemployed person. According to the official document *Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1969-74*: "There is considerable divergence of opinion regarding the appropriate definitions of and suitable yardsticks for measuring unemployment." (p. 425.)

Economists have worked out a conservative estimate of the total unemployed in the country as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>550 million</th>
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<tr>
<td>Working class (40 per cent of total)</td>
<td>220 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed (15 to 20 per cent of working class)</td>
<td>30-45 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-earning population (60 per cent of total less unemployed)</td>
<td>300 million</td>
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</tbody>
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The main reason for the existence of such a large number of unemployed is the continuing explosive growth of population and the inability of our authorities to deal with this problem swiftly. In a developing economy, it should be possible to find jobs for an increasing number. But unfortunately the poor rate of utilized capacity in certain sectors of industry and lack of proper manpower planning results in unemployment increasing daily.

Although the 14 largest commercial banks were nationalized in July 1969, we still do not have a clearcut credit policy. Prices are rising fast and the rate of economic growth is a meagre 5.5 per cent. Millions cannot afford a square meal or medicines or proper clothing or cannot give their children elementary education or provide them with even the minimum amenities of life. It is obvious from these facts that our leaders have not been able to take suitable steps to attain their socialist objectives.

The government should never curb, as they have a tendency to do, the expansion of the larger business houses which have always accelerated the industrial process and enlarged our exports, nor should they disrupt private business and industry. They should remember what Abraham Lincoln said: “You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong; you cannot help the poor by destroying the rich; and you cannot build character and courage by taking away man’s initiative and independence.”

Though export promotion has been given high priority in our plans, the results so far have not been encouraging. Our share in total world exports continues to be less than 1 per cent. During the period 1955-65, world exports doubled, whereas Indian exports registered an increase of only 38 per cent. We should strengthen traditional exports, increase the share of non-traditional goods in the export trade, find new markets in all parts of the world and adjust our imports to accelerate the growth of our economy and reduce our dependence on foreign aid. All this can be done if our official policies are not guided by political considerations.

We should encourage the flow of knowhow from abroad where necessary in our national interests. This will enable us to find additional markets abroad for our goods.

Talking of economic affairs generally, C. Subramanian and
Chandra Shekhar, two prominent members of the ruling Congress Party, said in May 1970 at a conference of party leaders that the government had no right to continue in power if it did not keep its promises to the people. Chandra Shekhar said that the hope of 1969 had been replaced by the frustration of 1970. In 1969, the people looked to the Congress to give them a fair deal. Now the Naxalites\(^1\) occupied the centre of the stage. He asked whether the national budget was socialist and if the problem of social transformation had even been touched. Many thousands of poor peasants had been evicted in the past months in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and this had been accompanied by bloodshed. He concluded by saying that there was little time left to revive the faith of young people.

Subramanian, appointed Minister of Planning in April 1971, felt that distortions had crept into the economy because the industrial sector had been favoured. He regretted that followup action had been lacking after bank nationalization. Six months had elapsed and the hopes of the poor had yet to be fulfilled, employment had yet to be found for the educated and small industry had yet to be helped. No steps had been taken to formulate a new credit policy. If popular hopes turned into frustration, there would be trouble. He did not want to utter threats, but if Congress did not cater to the needs of the people, history was not going to wait for it. New forces were emerging to overtake it. If immediate economic measures were not taken, the party would be wiped out from the Indian political scene.

Mrs Gandhi replied that people in countries which went in for overnight revolutions were still paying the price. Change through consent was therefore necessary in a democracy. This was a slow but sure process of social transformation.

Five days later, the government acted again in haste. It decided to impose a ceiling of Rs 500,000 on individual holdings of urban property. This was presumably done, according to The Statesman of New Delhi, to forestall criticism from the party rank and file of

\(^1\)The most militant of the three communist groups subscribing to the Maoist ideology.
“inadequate implementation” of its programme. The *Statesman* said editorially: “So anxious indeed is the Prime Minister to keep the shine on her radical image that she has chosen not to wait for a response to her letter to the States. As our example of ideology in a hurry, a ceiling of Rs 500,000 on urban property promises to bear comparison with the bank nationalization.”

A country that allows its population to multiply as rapidly as we do cannot hope to progress. We can achieve self-reliance in food and a reasonable standard of living by raising our food production and at the same time controlling population. But till the advent of the “green revolution” consumption of food increased faster than production.

After the tempo of this revolution slows down, and if our population goes on increasing at its present pace, the annual growth in the demand for food will again outpace supply. India will need 149 million tons of grain by 1975, while production in that year will be 129 million. Our planners think they will make up this deficit of 20 million tonnes by a still further increase in production.

The better-fed among us consume about 2,000 calories per person per day against about 3,200 in the USA and 3,000 in the Netherlands. Nearly 40 per cent of the population of India is undernourished. With such a magnitude of hunger, how can we build up a strong generation for the defence and development of our country?

Nutritional deficiency should be reduced and a balanced diet ensured. Prices of high-protein grains and other foods should be brought down. This can only be achieved if all our political parties give up fishing for votes in the rural areas and agree to a reduction in the procurement price of cereals.

In the last ten years, pulses have become 130 per cent dearer, cereals 90 per cent, and oils 128 per cent. An average family spends 50 per cent or more of its total income on food. This situation must be rectified.

Since 1947, India has been importing more and more food from foreign countries, but despite this our people remain undernourished. This is due to poor planning, wastage, careless storage, and hoarding. Our planners visualize a nation-wide endeavour to develop agriculture to solve these problems. But from our past
Halting the Economic Drift

performance it looks as though we shall continue to import food for some years to come. The government should therefore take strong measures to become self-sufficient in food and to keep its price at a reasonable level.

Progress in agriculture is essential for the development of a poor country. Our economy is primarily based on agriculture, the source of livelihood for about 70 per cent of the population and which constitutes about half of our national income.

The continuous exploitation of our land for centuries without adequate attention to the fertility of soil and suitable steps to avoid water and wind erosion has led to the present widespread damage to arable land.

Agricultural growth can take place through increase in fertile areas and their productivity. Such growth helps keep down the cost of industrial production. Irrigation plays an important part in this, but three-fourths of our cultivated land depends for water on the rains. The actual irrigation likely to be achieved by the end of the Fourth Plan will fall short of the target by well over two million acres. Thus truncated, the growth of irrigation will be even less than that thought necessary for Asian countries in the Indicative World Plan for agricultural development of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.

Excess of water rather than its deficiency perhaps depresses rice yields in many parts of our country. Fertilizer application in the monsoon rice belt should be related to the total sunshine available or plants will be affected adversely. In spite of severe drought in various parts of the country five years ago, the use of fertilizers would have been more had supplies kept pace with demand. But domestic output has lagged far behind expectations.

Agriculture is not sufficiently mechanized because the majority of our farmers have small,\(^1\) fragmented holdings which do not provide enough financial resources or workload for modern machinery. The number of tractors used for agricultural purposes is about 100,000, and demand may double, on a conservative estimate, by 1980-81. The price of a tractor will not discourage a farmer

\(^1\)Politicians encourage the small farmer.
from buying one in view of the many credit facilities available to him. Cooperative tractor stations could hire machines to small farms. Repair and maintenance facilities should be extended in rural areas to encourage increased use of tractors. But the average size of an agricultural unit is generally too small to provide a reasonable standard of living to permit modernized production. In view of this, lowering the ceiling on holdings of agricultural land virtually amounts to preventing modernization and will have adverse effects on agriculture.

We must take courage in both hands, amend the laws of inheritance and to do away with the fragmentation of land. It is better for one brother to inherit a big piece of land and flourish than that five brothers get a small piece each and starve.

Production targets in agriculture have not been always realized and full efforts have not been made to bring additional land under cultivation. The land uncommitted at present and capable of improvement for cultivation is about 175 million hectares.

Government should have, apart from paying attention to consolidating small holdings and developing intensive techniques of cultivation suited to their needs, set up larger model farms with the latest techniques and adequate budgets. These farms should be put under agricultural experts and not amateurs.

Despite the tremendous increase in generation of electricity, India is still power-hungry. Inter-State jealousies continue to bedevil schemes which, if cordial relations had existed, would have fructified many years ago and transformed huge waste lands into fertile field and pasture. The Narbada, Beas and Ravi, Cauvery and Mahanadi irrigation and power schemes have all suffered because of irresolute Central direction of policy and overambitious, myopic State gauleiters promoting parochial short-term schemes which damage national productivity beyond repair. This has resulted in a criminal waste of river waters, which idly flow into Pakistan or into the sea, and for the right to which we have paid our neighbours large sums in foreign exchange. We can tackle this problem by harnessing our nuclear potential to generate electrical energy.

The capitalist has an important function in our society. Apart from the government, he is the only major agency capable of setting
up means of production and promoting national growth. The government cannot do without him and should give him every possible incentive. Instead, our administration puts many impediments in his way.

He, in turn, sometimes exploits the power which concentration of wealth gives him. He dislikes unnecessary curbs on essential materials, permits for foreign exchange, licensing procedures, price controls, and the preferential treatment the government gives to the public sector. He tries to get on the right side of the administration by various means, including giving jobs to the relatives of the people in power. He finances political parties and helps them "obtain" votes. He joins hands with foreign monopolies and tries to influence the government’s policies. But whatever his frailties, he has the means to raise capital, and without this industrialization cannot get into full stride. The future prosperity of the country largely depends on him. If Government can secure his cooperation, he can play a significant part in our leap forward.

Disputes arise between workers and employees as prices are rising without a corresponding increase in wages and as employers made big profits of which their workers got no share. Workers are asserting their rights, but due to absence of suitable leadership, they are unable to negotiate satisfactorily. Many trade unions have sprung up and become associated with various political parties which exploit them in different ways. These rival unions are divided, and frequent clashes among them throw them farther apart. Fear of losing their jobs is disappearing among our workers, who as a rule do not take pride in what they do, insist on more leisure and better terms of service, come late and go slow on work and take frequent leave when they are replaced temporarily by inexperienced men. Strikes and bandhs are the order of the day, by students, bus, taxi and scooter drivers and essential workers, and this paralyses public life ever so often while the administration looks on helplessly instead of dealing sternly with the miscreants. Disgruntled workers damage property. The need of the day is greater discipline, better management, and a higher code of conduct.

The general condition of our workers is better now than some years ago. There is, however, considerable room for improvement
in their housing, transport, schooling for children, canteen and cooperative facilities. More attention should also be given to family planning, labour welfare, recreational and cultural activities. There are still not enough incentives provided for better work and greater output, nor suitable training facilities through evening classes at factory sites for promotion to higher posts. The output of our workers, generally, needs to be increased. They deserve better wages only if their efforts result in better production.

Workers and peasants are the salt of the earth. They play a vital part in our lives. It is through their exertions that prosperity is achieved in various fields. They are entitled to share the fruits of their labours but they should conform to certain rules. True, their employers do not often recognise their unions and create their own instead. They sometimes victimize union leaders. They do not genuinely sympathize with the workers, who have many difficult problems. They do not set aside contributions to the provident fund but use this money in their own business. Yet employers have on the whole been fairly considerate to their workers.

On the other hand, workers have been taking an unduly uncompromising attitude for years. This tendency is growing worse each day. On minor excuses, they stop work or go slow, paralysing production in various fields and hurting our national interests. Professional agitators damage and sabotage machinery and other property, threaten and abuse, stage demonstrations dharnas and gheraos and waste valuable working hours.

Our politicians indirectly contribute towards labour unrest. To win votes and become popular, they encourage unruly workers by delivering speeches which are uncalled for, inflammatory and which the workers exploit. Simultaneously, as members of the government the same politicians are unnerved because of the ever-increasing demands of labour which are sometimes reasonable and sometimes riot.

Once, the government was not the biggest employer. Political manoeuvring then paid dividends. Now the position is different. The government has expanded a great deal and employs a large labour force in different enterprises. It is therefore embarrassed by the behaviour of pampered labour. This is a situation created
by the politicians themselves. Unless they adopt a sensible attitude in this matter, things will continue in a vicious circle.

Farmers want more houses, schools and dispensaries, facilities for storage, transport and marketing of their produce, credit to buy fertilizers and implements in larger quantities, more canals and tubewells, and state trading in grains to avoid middlemen. Land reforms have been properly implemented only in some states. Much can be done to improve the large acreage of barren land in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Orissa for cultivation.

We must introduce modern methods of tillage and ensure quick application of the results of research in the field through improved agricultural extension services. Little effort is being made to improve our cattle wealth through expert modern methods or to form a sufficient number of service cooperatives. Seventy per cent of our population depends on the land for a living, but this area is not capable of sustaining more than half this number.

Industrialization is not proceeding fast enough to absorb the surplus population. The village panchayats, to enlist popular and petty official support, indulge in corrupt practices. This has brought politics, intrigue, and misery into the simple lives of our peasants. Politicians make promises at election time to cure all these ills, but in vain.

Villagers, who form the bulk of our population, are friendly, hospitable and lovable. They are, however, fettered by customs and superstition. Their standards of literacy and hygiene are primitive. Out of a total of more than half a million villages, only a fraction have a protected water supply. Countless villagers therefore suffer from various waterborne diseases and a large number die of curable ones because proper medical facilities are lacking at the village level.

Our leaders must therefore teach sanitary habits to our masses and provide for them a clean water supply and drainage and emphasize the need to have well-balanced food and medical facilities in the health campaigns for our villagers, the prime producers of our national wealth.

Villages, and even most towns, have insufficient latrines. Many villages have no post office, road, school or dispensary. Despite
legislation against child marriage, this continues unchecked in the rural areas. No matter how poor they are, villagers do not take family planning seriously.

I wonder whether the lives of village folk can be transformed significantly in the foreseeable future in spite of all the projects drafted for rural uplift when it has not been possible for us to enforce even simple acts of social legislation such as removal of untouchability and raising the age of marriage. Will our traditional values and attitude change with the changing times? Will there not be too great a timelag in this process, and will it not be dangerous for the continuance of democracy, especially in view of the growth of our population?
CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

Education and Public Opinion

ILLITERACY IS STILL one of our biggest problems. According to the latest decennial census, only 29 per cent of all Indians can read or write. Ironically, banishment of illiteracy has been subordinated to less vital matters. Our backwardness in most social and economic fields stems from lack of education. Once we are educated, civic sense will improve, our progress will be more marked in a wide range of activities, our understanding of human affairs will be better, and thereby the country will progress faster.

There is something definitely wrong in our whole educational pattern. In countries like Japan, the USA, and the USSR there are roughly four stages of building up their cadres of administrative, technical, and highly skilled personnel:

(a) Selecting talent at the university stage. We make no personal assessment but depend on the results of the normal school or college examinations.

(b) Training talented young people through generous funds allocated by the State.

(c) Appropriate placing of trainees in various walks of life.

(d) Planned programme of continued inservice training so that at the end of eight to ten years they can, while still comparatively young, encounter with confidence practically all situations.

We should strike a balance and give appropriate emphasis to academic degrees and technical qualifications. We should also assess and utilize the aptitude of students in particular spheres. One example of a major waste of talent in our country is the large proportion of highly advanced and trained scientific personnel who find lucrative employment with better facilities abroad because
opportunities are lacking in India. We have done little to solve this problem.

The government has dealt with various aspects of education in isolated compartments. The way we have handled the urgent question of national language is an excellent example of our "goodhearted" indecisiveness. Since 1947 we have been playing with this problem and not facing up to the challenge it presents and the firm and decisive action it demands. The government should permit a free and full discussion among all concerned, but once a decision is taken after due consideration it should be implemented without any hesitation throughout the country. Government should lay down the law and impose it firmly without reacting to periodical agitation in different parts of the country.

Whatever the decision on Hindi and the other Indian languages, study of English should not be discouraged as it is a world language. It is the mother tongue of nearly 300 million people and the second language of another 300 million. It has become a useful language in this country and is a unifying force between the people of various States. Discouraging it would not only retard our progress in science, medicine, engineering, law, and other subjects but also lead to disintegration.

Hindi should be developed as the official language of India by all means except by coercion. A start has to be made at some stage in developing a national language in which all Indians may converse with each other. Even after 200 years of British rule, hardly 2 per cent can read, write, or speak English. Therefore it cannot become the language of our masses. But this process of building a national language should not be hustled.

One of our problems is that apart from the multiplicity of languages we have a separate script for each. While it is desirable that the regional languages continue to be used in the regions concerned, it is essential that we have a uniform script for all these languages.

It is a strange irony that in a country where more than 70 per cent of the people can neither read nor write, there should be breaking of heads over the national language.

Education is the foundation of democracy. But the problem
of a suitable system of education to meet the needs of the nation has been allowed to assume gigantic proportions, and the diversity of views of various States on it has been allowed to pose a serious challenge to our unity. Each time this question has loomed large before the Central Government it has felt that the time is not ripe to solve it as this might lead to a crisis.

Children’s education is not on patriotic lines. Their present upbringing is not satisfactory. Some grow up in an un-Indian atmosphere. Their textbooks should be better written and produced. In their present form they fail to stimulate the minds of the young. There is a wrong emphasis on various matters which affect their outlook. No wholesome personalities can be built up on such literature.

We do not devote adequate attention to bringing up our youth. When they have merit, this generally remains unrecognized and unrewarded. The result is an attitude of frustration that makes them a burden on society. This is no way to bring up the generation that will produce the leaders of tomorrow.

Inculcation of moral and spiritual values among young people should be an important function of the government. But no attention is paid to this fundamental aspect of education and we see the result all around us in the form of disgruntled and restless youth. Religion, in the wider sense, should form the basis of moral and spiritual values. What is actually happening in our country is that under the guise of propagating secularism, moral teaching is eschewed and each religious group is left to preach its own beliefs among its adherents, and this encourages bigotry and separateness.

We must fashion our education so that it enables people to meet big challenges in life with courage and determination. It should be mandatory that a student should get a degree and employment only if he has served in the national militia or spent a fixed number of (perhaps two) years in labour service in the countryside.

Indiscipline among students is a big problem and stems mainly from indiscipline among elders, including their teachers, whom they emulate. Besides, there are many other causes which need investigation by the authorities so that the basic flaws in our educational system may be removed.
Our aim should be to educate every citizen of this country to an adequate standard of literacy. Our first priority therefore should be to cover the entire country with a large network of schools with a uniform syllabus and standard textbooks as far as possible and as speedily as our finances permit. It is essential that teachers in such schools are adequately paid so that they do not become disgruntled and dissatisfied members of the community and infect their students with this malady.

One temporary solution to meet the shortage of our teachers is to organize a system by which senior students should teach their juniors. This will immediately give us a much larger number of instructors. This is not an ideal way of dealing with the shortage, estimated at 250,000 teachers, but it should work after careful planning and preparation as a temporary measure.

While everybody in this country should be literate, it is not necessary that they should acquire an unplanned university degree. Such qualifications compel them to seek white-collar jobs which are limited and leads to frustration. We should therefore determine from time to time the number of graduates required in various walks of life and accommodation at colleges of various types should be provided accordingly. At present, we are opening more and more colleges haphazardly merely to meet pressure from students wanting higher education. This ultimately leads to a decline in educational standards.

Most students can look forward only to a dismal future after their degrees. They are frustrated with the mismanagement of

1Teachers are apathetic as they are poorly paid, with no prospects of advancement. I once met a middle-aged teacher near Naraingarh in Punjab. Squatting on a charpoy, he was immersed in stitching his worrnout coat while the boys he was supposed to teach were gallivanting. When I asked him why he allowed his pupils to waste their time, he hesitated for a minute. Then, reassured, he replied that he was getting on in age and despite putting in nearly 20 years of service he was still paid a paltry salary which was not a living wage. There was little hope that his prospects would ever improve and he therefore had no incentive to work hard. Moreover, his profession was treated with scant respect. Whenever a VIP came to that town on tour, he was detailed to dance attendance on him. He led a dog’s life and had therefore now evolved a different philosophy. He said he hoped I understood why he was mending his coat during his hours of work.
their affairs and the incompetence of the authorities in solving their problems. There is no pre-university screening of students and excessive emphasis is laid on academic studies and not enough on technical and vocational education.

Sometimes the syllabi of scientific and technological subjects remain unamended for years at certain universities, regardless of the many advances in a subject in this period. Students are not given manual work, and we are still producing an army of clerks rather than leaders and thinkers. A mob mentality develops among students on account of overcrowding in classes. To some extent, their defiance of authority might be a legacy of the pre-independence agitation against the British.

The majority of our leaders have failed to make young people aware of what the country demands of them. They have also failed to involve them in the national crisis which has faced us so long. The young therefore go about without a purpose in life. Not finding their ideals in our leaders, they often idolise doubtful heroes and emulate their mode of life. Hence their moral fibre, towards the building of which little attention is paid in our educational institutions, remains comparatively un moulded.

The young need something tangible to keep them occupied such as studies, games, arts, crafts, in each sphere of which there is need for discipline. As not all students are suited for studies and are only superficially interested in them, and as they do not find anything concrete to utilize their talents, they ultimately become indisciplined and in many cases run amuck in a disturbed state of mind.

National developments are demoralizing our youth. The behaviour of their elders in different walks of life, and those in their immediate environment, leaves much to be desired. As an ever-increasing number seek education aimlessly, they do not on the whole fare well in life.

A large number of them get clerical or similar jobs of little significance and vast numbers remain unemployed. The talented among them are not offered suitable opportunities to make good in life. This leads to frustration and the discontented youth keep swelling in numbers, thanks to our insincere leaders of bold words but
slender deeds.

As a result, many of them are getting more restive each day and in desperation are driven to demand a change in our social order, though our society is basically conservative. The impatient and restless elements then either swing to the militant left, the Naxalites, or militant right, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or the Shiv Sena, or sometimes to organizations without specific ideological labels.

The sensitive and impressionable minds of some of our brightest young men and women are aroused to see the gap which exists between the rich and poor. They also cannot compromise with the dishonesty and incompetence which prevails in the country in all spheres, resulting in considerable anguish to the masses. Their anger and disappointment at our administrations' shortcomings and inability to run the country better erupts therefore inevitably in violence in various shapes in an attempt to improve this wretched state of affairs.

Our leaders must devise ways of giving our youth sufficient incentives, without which few can work for long in practice, and utilize their talents in fruitful fields. If this is not done, our youth will become one of our major liabilities instead of a tremendous asset.

Press and Public Opinion

There are 646 daily newspapers in India. There are about 2,700 weeklies and 5,970 other periodicals. Although we have about 158 million literates, our newspaper circulation is no more than 6.5 million. Seventy per cent illiteracy restricts the circulation of our newspapers to less than one-tenth that of Japan, whose population is one-fifth of ours.

There are two main categories of newspapers in India, those brought out in English and those in the Indian languages. The standard of newspapers in English is high and its readers more enlightened than others. But newspapers in the regional languages are improving steadily and will come in line with the English newspapers as the standard of education in the country improves.

Some of our eminent editors write fearlessly and are comparable
with the best in the world in quality of writing and their assessment of events. They maintain a dignified tone in reporting and comment and do not devote much space, like the Western press, to scandal. They, however, give too much space to the day’s proceedings in Parliament and also to official handouts and not enough space to stories of human interest.

Some editors have themselves to blame for surrendering their rights and privileges. They betray a lack of courage in their comments on leaders, ministers, and events, and give various excuses such as interference by the management, to explain away their timidity. They barter away the freedom of the press for recognition in wider fields.

The government is anxious that newspapers, wherever possible, should toe the line. It tries to control them by the official advertisements it gives or withholds. Ministers have been known to have sent for journalists and “advised” them to be “more objective.”

R. Madhavan Nair, editor of the Tribune of Chandigarh, is reported in the Indian Express of 29 May 1970, to have conveyed to the President of the All-India Newspaper Editors’ Conference in a letter that the Haryana Government had stopped advertising in his newspaper as it had published two editorials critical of the government. He said the Chief Minister of Haryana’s offensive was not confined to the stopping advertisements. He had also instructed the Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police in the districts to see that no government servant read the Tribune. Taxi and delivery vans carrying copies of the paper had been obstructed from plying in Haryana and some of them had been impounded on flimsy grounds. Correspondents of the Tribune were being harassed in ways open to the authorities.

According to K. L. Poswal, Haryana’s Home Minister, the controversy between the State Government and the Tribune had resulted from “some misunderstanding.” He said there was no question of the government banning the sale and distribution of any newspaper in the State provided no breach of rules or regulations were involved. He had every hope that this controversy would come to an end sooner or later and things would become normal again.

In India, 13 persons per thousand population read newspapers.
In our good-hearted ignorance and inertia, we are reluctant to think for ourselves, and unaccustomed to make an effort to find facts. Those of us who are educated adopt the easy course of picking up information from the press and those who cannot read do so from gossip. The press serves on a plate readymade views and gives us verdicts on events which we readily adopt as our own.

We have got so accustomed to relying on information from newspapers or gossip that if we have had recourse to neither we look blank and are unable to discuss current events intelligently with each other. If a particular group reads the same newspaper, everybody in that group shares the same views. We must therefore think for ourselves and formulate our own views and not depend entirely on those of others.

The press can indirectly accelerate the speed of our educational development. It also has the responsibility of building up sensible public opinion. So far this has not happened. Public opinion means a view held on a particular subject by “the man in the street,” who, in our case, though well-intentioned, is ill-informed, lethargic and semi-educated. Determination of facts needs education, understanding and effort, which he lacks, and time, which he cannot be bothered to find. In addition, poverty makes one timid, till one revolts on reaching the limit.

Independence of thought, an important ingredient of public opinion, eludes one in poverty. What is therefore essential for us is to become more educated, prosperous and energetic. We shall then not only be able to comprehend better what is happening around us, but if necessary, make an effort to discover it. The average reader of a newspaper will then not accept all that is printed and this in turn will improve the standards of our journalism. This will also give birth to public opinion in the country.
PART III

Remedies

To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;
To defy power which seems omnipotent;
To love and bear; to hope till Hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire and Victory.

SHELLEY—Prometheus Unbound
Chapter Twenty-five

Stirring Up the Nation

The spirit of this country is dead and must be aroused. Our people have been deteriorating in their character for a long time, and the rot is now evident in every walk of our life. Piecemeal action is not enough to meet this grave situation. Unless drastic steps are taken all round, we shall be unable to wake our nation from its deep slumber. Goody goody, indifferent or corrupt leaders are unable to do this and must be replaced by spirited, honest and determined men.

Our leaders have failed us, especially after Partition, for many reasons. We had, and still have, a semi-literate and backward electorate incapable of, and subjected to many undue pressures, in selecting suitable leaders. Once it selects the wrong men, a vicious circle begins. Most of our leaders reached their elevated positions not through merit but through luck and intrigue. Incapable leaders thus chosen, are in turn unable to select their colleagues suitably or to give us the correct lead.

As we are short of good leaders in all walks of life, the nation remains uninspired and is like a rudderless boat. Hence over a period, our affairs and character have improved little. All groups of people need somebody to lead them and get the best out of them. A good leader not only exercises control over a large number of people but also wins their hearts, possesses self-control in every sense, sound judgement, determination, and power of persuasion. These virtues have not been encouraged in our country, firstly by our alien rulers and, alas, even by our own leaders since Independence. So people have learnt bad habits instead of good.

Most of our present-day politicians are opportunists. Only impartial and strong leaders are capable of doing what is expected of them. Today, a politician spends a considerable sum on his election. He treats this as a good investment which brings him
into a powerful position instead of serving the interests of the country. He uses his extensive powers of patronage to help people get into influential positions, obtain licences, permits, and perquisites.

Our leaders, with few exceptions, are unequal to their responsibilities. Honesty does not often pay them and most of those who practice dishonesty seem to thrive. But we can console ourselves that nothing lasts forever and that this situation cannot continue for long. As has been said:

Truth forever on the scaffold,
Wrong forever on the throne,

Not forever!

Before some life can be infused into our people, it is necessary to change the Constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential system as in the USA. Under the present conditions, our Prime Minister is unable at times to act strongly. A strong leader under the presidential system alone will be capable of taking speedy and effective steps to deal with national problems. When we have a presidential system, one man, the head of state and government, can rule unquestioned for five years.

There should be a constitutional taboo on a President seeking election for a second term. This will prevent him from stooping to malpractices to continue in office. He will be able to take strong steps such as conscription and instill discipline into the masses, maximize production and control prices, remove unemployment and bring about other improvements.

The question many Indians ask today is: Can we solve our problems and improve the character of our people by democratic or dictatorial means? Let us not hedge on this issue but analyze it boldly.

A backward nation like ours, poor, illiterate, and under-developed in many ways, cannot progress by persuasion. Such an effort is a waste of time. You can reason with an enlightened person but you cannot sway an ignorant individual by gentle methods. He reacts to compulsion more readily. Further, if you take too much time in the process, as such methods always take, other evils rear up their head in the meantime. So speed and
determination, mixed with compulsion, are essential in a situation like this.

No large, backward countries are known to have progressed speedily under a democracy. Why then, do we think that we will succeed where others have failed? The main disadvantages of dictatorship are that it limits the individual's personal liberty, imposes curbs on speech and action and hence is cramping. But although we should retain democracy as our ideology, circumstances compel us, for some time at least, to implement our democratic policies firmly.

Many of us often think of desperate expedients and shortcuts, without weighing their implications, to solve our problems. For instance, disillusioned individuals, seeing our politicians have messed up our affairs in the last 20 years or so, frequently advocate suspension of democracy and a spell of military rule. The average soldier is perhaps a better man than his counterpart in other walks of life as the nature of his work instils in him certain desirable qualities. He is more honest, disciplined, secular, hardworking, cooperative and capable of working in a team, determined, more willing to make sacrifices, and even to die for his country.

His human approach to multifarious problems and his management is better. But if there is military rule the average soldier will not run the country. Are we sure, then, that there are at the helm of our military machine today the required number of men who are intensely patriotic, selfless, honest and dynamic, with the necessary vision and competence?

When people talk of a spell of military rule, they fail to realize that a dictator in uniform seldom abdicates willingly once he assumes power. Experience also tells us that not all military dictators are paragons of virtue and impose their orders, good or bad, with a bayonet. Nor is there much redress of grievances, and plenty of fetters on speech and action, under such regimes.

Moreover, a uniform alone cannot solve our problems and work wonders unless accompanied by the qualities of leadership, of which we are short in all walks of life today. Many defects in our character have percolated inevitably into the armed forces, which therefore share our national maladies. There is a crisis of leadership among
them as in the country as a whole.

All the same, destiny may have a windfall in store for the Army. If our affairs continue to go from bad to worse, at the present rate, the Army may be the only disciplined body left in the country capable of restoring order. In such a situation, with a demoralized people on their hands, our weakened administration may be compelled to ask a military leader to run the country on its behalf. He may either accept this invitation or be forced to assume power on his own "to save democracy."

The answer for a country like ours lies in a compromise between democracy and dictatorship. We should have a strong government whose parliamentary functionaries should be determined and capable individuals elected democratically, not through the influence of money. We should retain our democratic way of life and get to the root of our troubles, indiscipline, incompetence and dishonesty, and eradicate these evils within the framework of our Constitution by awarding deterrent punishment to defaulters.

Our Parliament, if composed of patriotic, honest, determined, and talented individuals, has enough powers to deal with any situation efficiently and our Constitution provides for steps to be taken in an emergency. We have a penal code designed for the same purpose. Why should we not make full use of these facilities?

When our people elect effective leaders, our country will be governed more efficiently without need for military rule, for after all a soldier's function is to fight wars and not to run a country. What we really want is strong and competent leaders who are democrats in outlook but implement policies in our national interest with an iron hand. If, for instance, people do not cooperate in the government's development efforts and other progressive steps such as restricting the size of families, or if they are guilty of violating discipline or endangering unity or other anti-national behaviour, or if they are corrupt, they must be punished without mercy. This would yield immediate results. So dictatorial means should be adopted to uphold and implement democracy. But in the process liberty of speech and action in legitimate fields should be permitted.

We should give our younger leaders greater opportunities to
prove their worth, as they do in Israel and North Vietnam. Such men and women should occupy the highest national positions. They will then provide a stimulating example. In our country, we demand tact and “experience” in our leaders, and this seems to be synonymous with weakness, caution, and old age.

There should be a system of retiring infirm and incapable ministers and other dignitaries. Many of these make repeated mistakes or suffer from constant ill-health but are seldom replaced on this account. They get one lease of life after another in our periodical Cabinet reshuffles and keep hopping from one portfolio to another as they either belong to a particular community or have rendered some other “invaluable service” to the ruling party in the past. If we look back 20 years, we will find that many of our ministers who proved unfit, have been kept on for one extraneous reason or another when they should have been packed off long ago. Our leaders should be fighting fit and their minds should be alert. They must infuse discipline in the ruling party and ensure that all their colleagues cooperate and work as a team. Any exception to this rule should be dealt with mercilessly.

Seminars of students, youth, Government officials, industrialists and intellectuals should be held to invite comments and pool ideas. Policy-planning cells should be set up in cooperation with capable public men and senior Government officials to advise ministers on complicated matters.

Cadres should be organized in order to train our people and instil discipline in them to ensure that they work hard. We should penalize laziness, lethargy, and incompetence. The harder we work, the more prosperous we will become.

None of the targets set by us in various fields should remain unfulfilled due to absence of hard work, lack of supervision and procedural delays. Nor should we impose an army of officers from outside on rural areas instead of training cadres from within the villages. That is why community development projects have so far failed to enthuse the masses.

Suwarish (recommendation) is the bane of our existence and should cease to play a major role in choosing men and women for various jobs (I suppose this practice is a part of human nature
but should be permitted only up to a point). Individuals will then be selected mostly on merit, much to our advantage.

Deterrent punishments should be awarded for thefts, corruption, and similar acts. For such crimes as kidnapping children, adulteration of food (leading sometimes to many physical ailments and deformities) and hoarding, which hits the poor, in particular, due to soaring prices and shortage penalties of even death should be imposed on the culprits. No political or other considerations should let the guilty get away with their misdeeds.

Heads of all organizations and officers in the private or the public sectors should have unfettered powers and no interference from higher quarters. Order will then be implemented implicitly and discipline maintained. Any misuse of such powers, if ever detected, should be punished.

National targets should be laid down for the requisite tasks. Prices should be controlled and a reasonable standard of living ensured to all. Indiscriminate strikes should not be allowed. After looking into the workers’ grievances, justice should be ensured. But unjustified indiscipline and staying away wholly or partially from work, on the part of any worker (in the public or private sectors) hurting national interests, should be dealt with sternly. Begging or eve-teasing should be penalised suitably. Unless our population is curbed, our enormous problems of unemployment cannot be suitably solved. India should evolve a new ideology, something between democracy and dictatorship, to meet her abnormal problems.

Seminars of students, youth, Government officials, industrialists and intellectuals should be held to invite comments and ideas. Policy-Planning cells should be set up in cooperation with capable public men and senior Government officials to advise ministers on complicated matters.

Once the masses and the government begin to work together towards common goals, a bright future is assured. But if, apart from the many threats to our security, communal and other riots keep breaking out in one part of the country or another, every now and again, chaos will soon prevail throughout India.
We should put our house in order soon or else some ambitious group, perhaps with the connivance of interested parties in India or abroad, is bound to exploit the situation. There is no shortage of such groups and self-centred men, without a trace of patriotism, who have many high ambitions and no dearth of opportunities.

Our civil administration should not, as it is doing at present, lean more and more on the shoulders of the armed forces in all sorts of "emergencies" which lie in its own realm. This not only shows its ineptitude but provokes avoidable military contempt towards it. It also gives the feeling to the forces that they could, and should, run this country. The government should therefore use the civil organs of administration at its disposal effectivley to solve our problems, use a militia in peacetime emergencies such as floods, fires, and riots and the Army as far as possible only in war.

We should have understudies to key Cabinet appointments, so that these can be filled, whenever necessary, without delay. If two men deputize for the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and one or two other important ministers, and similar arrangements are made in the ruling political party, there would be no scramble for such jobs and the problem of succession should present little difficulty.

We live today in a world of our own creation. If anybody makes a truthful analysis and happens to disagree with the powers-that-be, he is branded anti-national and reactionary. If his political views do not synchronize with theirs, he is labelled unpatriotic. Those who agree with everything the government says and are complacent about what is going on around us are hailed as "balanced" and "true sons of India." The truth is that many of our leaders, instead of giving us a realistic lead, are busy building up their own images, despite their inherent weaknesses, and have adopted bloated postures, posing as men of great strength.

Our people at all levels should understand the fact that independent thinking and consistent behaviour are the needs of the moment and that the country is more important than they. Only with this attitude will we be able to effect improvements in all directions, including the system which selects leaders. If we take
urgent steps to solve our problems, this would give us a sense of awareness and create a great awakening.

The crux of our problem today is that though many of us make excellent plans on paper, those who have to implement them neither have much sense of participation nor of motivation. Nor are they emotionally involved in these ventures apart from other defects.

We should therefore ensure that if a plan is to be put into operation on the ground, those associated with it should have the requisite field experience, also that they are honest, competent, and enthusiastic. People are driven towards corrupt practices, especially when they see highly placed individuals getting away with almost anything. They lose heart when they see that merit is not recognized and incompetent persons are patronized. If there were incentives, they would be encouraged to work harder and better. There should always be a difference between a donkey and a racehorse. Seniority alone is not enough for promotion.

Unity must be brought about and tolerance practised generally, giving equal opportunity to everybody. All factions should be wiped out. Once an example is made of those who obstruct our national efforts, others intending to do so will learn a lesson and keep in their places. Anybody inciting separatist tendencies should be dealt with mercilessly.

The new practice of politicians acting according to their conscience, recently introduced and encouraged by some of our leaders, has dangerous possibilities. Even if one is alone in life owing allegiance to none, one has no right to act on one’s conscience, indiscriminately. For instance, one’s conscience might tempt one to damage somebody’s property for personal reasons but social custom and the law cannot permit such an act.

If the tendency of acting on one’s conscience is not curbed, personality cults will soon reign supreme at the expense of national interests. Working as a team within the framework of society and obeying its dictates rather than acting according to one’s personal reactions, should therefore become the norm.

The administration should show our nation by positive attitude that it has the ability to solve complicated problems, like Kashmir
and Nagaland. For more than two decades these problems have remained unsolved. We should give the Nagas what they want or we should impose our policies and bring order to Nagaland soon. The same applies to Kashmir. At present we are spending enormous sums of money in these two areas without reasonable results.

We must learn to tolerate criticism. As Senator Fulbright has said, we should not be oversensitive to critics and adapt ourselves to a complex world. We must learn to welcome rather than fear the voices of dissent and not recoil in horror at adverse comment. We should stop clinging to old myths and face realities. We should extricate ourselves from the malady of chronic and excessive caution.

Instead of living in a make-believe world of our own creation, we should try and learn to live with war or warlike situations from time to time as Vietnam has done. We should take it for granted that war is inevitable and strengthen ourselves through determined action. We have had three wars since 1947 and may have another in the foreseeable future.

In 1947 it could be said that the war with Pakistan over Kashmir came soon after Independence. Before we had recovered from World War II and other upheavals, came partition. This gave us truncated and weak armed forces. In 1962, it could be said that we were not sufficiently prepared to ensure our security and underestimated the Chinese threat. But in 1965 we could not say that Pakistan sprang a surprise on us or that we were caught unprepared as we had been anticipating aggression from our neighbour for long.

In 1965, in the fitness of things, we should have defeated a country much smaller than ours and whose armed forces were one-third ours. It is all very well for us to have made tall claims of success in that war, but such delusions will not serve our national interests in the long run.

War is the price we have to pay for our survival. Peace is the dream of the wise, but war is the history of man. There have been 15,000 wars in the past 5,000 years, an average of three a year.

We should strengthen our forces. We should have a regular
army numbering three million, three times its present strength, similar to that of the Chinese, the Russian, and the American armies. We are a large country with major commitments and have a sensitive position geographically. Our forces should therefore have sophisticated weapons and our soldiers should be well trained and have patriotic fervour.

The armed forces should be kept in readiness to participate in war. They should not be used to aid the civil power in any way which affects its operational training adversely and for which a separate militia should be maintained.

We should have a national militia numbering 10 million. This is not a big target for a country with a population of nearly 550 million. Its training should include firing small arms, drill and physical activity, including sports. Its task should be to help the civil power in natural calamities and other emergencies, keeping the regular armed forces free to train for and fight wars. It should also act as the second line of our defence, whenever necessary, and be subject to active service.

This militia will place at the disposal of our nation a parallel labour force which can help expedite the construction of our communications, including roads and rail tracks and bridges, as well as large defence factories. It will increase the production of steel, cement, speed up agricultural works, including irrigation, extraction of strategic minerals such as petroleum, coal and uranium, build hydro-electric power stations, and work on state farms to increase production of grain and other foods. By accelerating our agricultural, industrial and other progress, this militia will increase our prosperity and pay for its own maintenance if its activities are economically productive.

This force will revolutionize our society and stir up patriotic feelings among our people. It will act as an inexhaustible source of disciplining and mobilizing our manpower on a large scale if young men are called up for service in rotation. It will ginger up our civilian activity and improve our character and national outlook and morale. It will also give us a tremendous sense of achievement.

This would have a direct result on the mentality of the soldier.
By reforming the civilian set-up we shall do the same in our military effort. The militia will act as a powerful reserve for national defence. In short, it would be a great national investment which would give our society a truly socialistic pattern.

It is imperative that the nation should become thoroughly disciplined. This is possible by imparting military training on the largest scale. We must change our mental outlook on this issue. Steps should be taken for the total mobilization of our national resources. As a first step, conscription should be enforced.

Every able-bodied citizen between 17 and 35 should be called up for a period of two years for compulsory military service in the national militia. No one should get a university degree or a job unless he or she has been with the Army or the national militia. This would not only discipline the whole nation but also increase our efficiency and accelerate progress in every field.

Emphasis on discipline should be laid in every institution. It should start being imparted from the earliest age to children. Patriotic fervour should be infused in all by every possible means and also by being made to sing stirring songs, extolling India. People should learn to wear clean and smart clothes and take pride in their appearance. Drill should be taught for precision and implicit obedience. There should be frequent public parades of our regular forces and the national militia, so that our uniformed men (and women) can develop pride in themselves and our masses may develop a feeling of confidence that a large reservoir of manpower stands behind all their activity and protects them from various threats. But this regimentation should have a democratic flavour.

Our soldiers, sailors, and airmen have many sterling qualities but to stir up an even greater spirit of sacrifice and patriotism among them, they should take the following vow, which disciples of a great leader of ours, Guru Govind Singh took, before being baptised:

Grant me, O Lord enough determination
So that I may not falter in doing good
That when confronted by the enemy on the battlefield,
I should betray no fear;
That I should always be sure of victory.
May my mind be trained to dwell upon thy goodness;
And when the last moment of my life should come,
May I die fighting in the thick of battle.¹

We should, during their school and college education, make our younger generation aware of the supreme sacrifices which stalwarts like Bhagat Singh and Subhash Chandra Bose have made on the altar of our freedom and thereby instil a sense of pride and patriotism in them: Bhagat Singh who kissed the gallows symbolically, before he was hanged for the sake of his country, and Bose who said before dying: “I have fought for India’s freedom till my last breath. Long live India.”

We should have flag ceremonies in which all present should be made to stand erect and salute our tricolour as a token of our solidarity and loyalty, when our national anthem is being played (and not be allowed to shuffle our feet and make various awkward movements).

In addition, youth parades should be held with everyone taking pride in their turn-out, with buntings fluttering, bands playing exciting tunes, stirring episodes should be related to students in this class from the lives of our past and present heroes (e.g. Rana Sanga, Rani of Jhansi, Shivaji, Bhagat Singh, Subhash Bose, etc.) so that they can be emulated. Everyone should take a suitable vow or make a pledge to serve the country. All this will instil discipline and devotion on a wide scale and help us to unite. India faces extraordinary problems internally. In addition, her security is threatened by hostile and formidable neighbours. Unless unconventional and sweeping steps are taken by the government the country will not become sufficiently disciplined and strong.

¹De Shiva bar moey hai
Shubh karman te kabthun an taron
Na darun harson jab jae larun
Nishche kar apni jit karon
Ar Sikh hon apne hi man ko
Ehe lalach hon gun tiyon uchron
Jab awah ki audhan bane
At hi ran men tab jujh maron.
to solve her problems.

We do not make enough sacrifices and feel strongly for our country. We even speak and think in a foreign language. What we must do is to develop determination and a patriotic frame of mind in all activities. For instance, we should fight any foreign power which sets foot on our soil to the last ditch. What have we done to those who have invaded our territory in the last 2,000 years? Did we fight them till the bitter end? Of late, we fight wars for short periods and sign a truce or a ceasefire at a crucial juncture. What we should do is to keep on fighting and not be in a hurry to compromise. In fact, all Indians should put the following couplet into practice:

SARFAROSHI KI TAMANNA AB HAMARE DIL MAIN HAI
DEKHNA HAI ZOR KITNA BAZOO-i-QATIL MAIN HAI
(Our hearts yearn to die for our country.
Let us see how powerful is the executioner's arm.)

Take, for instance, the Soviet Union which, during World War II, fought with her back to the wall and went through unprecedented suffering. One-third of her national wealth was destroyed and one-tenth of her population—twenty million people—lost their lives. But they went on fighting till they won a resounding victory. This sort of patriotic spirit should be emulated by us, if our race is to be regenerated. It will make a nation of us, for nations are created in war as modern history has proved uncontestably.
CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

Epilogue

Men at some time are masters of their fates:
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.
—Shakespeare, Julius Caesar

In finding fault with the affairs of my country, it is not my desire or intention to prove that there is no good in us, that we can never improve or that we lack patriotic men and women. I know that there are individuals who are prepared to die for India and who court death with the name of their country on their lips. But are such people available in sufficient numbers?

Do we make sufficient efforts to locate and place them in positions of responsibility? I have merely said that there has been a deplorable decline in our moral standards for many reasons, some beyond our control, and that we should make a concerted effort to stem the rot for our own sake.

If we continue to be complacent and do not improve our character, habits, and attitude of mind and make progress, we are bound to mess up our affairs more and more. A stage may come when their mismanagement or the breakdown of law and order, taking place in certain parts of our country at present, spreads throughout society and results in or synchronizes with a major upheaval like a prolonged war or the eruption of internal disorder, as a consequence of which many calamities may descend upon us.

According to The Statesman of 10 October 1970, Mrs Gandhi shares this view. She said at a public meeting that the gap between rich and poor had widened. If this was not removed soon, a violent revolution might become inevitable.

Time is precious under such circumstances, and every minute spent in complacency will bring us nearer the impending cataclysm.
Let us therefore earnestly hope that a dynamic and virtuous leadership will emerge in our midst and extricate us from this plight.

The volatile situation imminent is nothing new in history. The laws of nature assert themselves in the end if men fail to put their house in order and permit their misery to multiply. The situation which may follow may not necessarily have an ideological base. It may be nature's solution to the problem of human suffering.

This happened in the French Revolution, when the conscience of a nation rose up to remove the stench from its public life. The rumblings of free thought in the new France aroused many from their stupor all over the world. History repeated itself in Russia when the Czarist mismanagement of affairs and nepotism erupted in a revolution and brought the Bolsheviks to power in 1917. We should remember that a nation has to pay a penalty for continued instability, especially when it begins to burn the literature and thoughts of a sage like Gandhi in the year of his centenary.

When we are driven to endure physical torture in various shapes and forms and are killed and maimed in vast numbers, our slumbering selves will have a rude awakening. When practically every family in the country has to make all sorts of sacrifices and groans under the weight of heartrending experience, people will begin to understand what suffering means.

When we are deprived of our kith and kin, whom we hold so dear, when our personal and precious belongings are destroyed, when we are rendered homeless, destitute and are torn apart in many other ways, only then will we begin to stir. When we have just one choice before us, either to fight bitterly against impossible odds with our backs to the wall for our very existence, or perish, we shall begin to understand the difference between weakness and strength and also comprehend the true meaning of life. The best in us will then come out and the right leadership will emerge.

We shall learn what suffering, sacrifice, dedication, and diligence is and begin to do things well and competently. We shall then surmount our difficulties and become a nation to be reckoned with—like the Israelis and the North Vietnamese—or the Germans and the Japanese, and will believe, as they do, that no trial is too great for us. This confidence and courage will come to us because we
shall triumph over many challenges as have other nations. I do not
hope that all this will happen to us, but who can alter the law of
nature?

When we have gone through gruelling trials and paid a heavy
price for our failings as portrayed above, and with honesty of
purpose and a will to defend our country with patriotic fervour,
I firmly believe that our chastened countrymen will rise once
again. We will then be able to say as Milton did once:

Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing
herself like a strong man after sleep and shaking her invincible
locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth
and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam.
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