THE REBELLION

INDIA:

HOW TO PREVENT ANOTHER

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PREFACE.

Forbid to make any comment in India on the startling events now passing before my eyes, forbid even to make any enquiry into the causes of the rebellion, I turn—in common, no doubt, with many others—to England, where the liberty of the Press is not yet shackled.

I state a fact. It is not my intention here to discuss the merits of the Gagging Act. From many quarters abundant strictures will pour in on that subject.* The only point of view in which I wish

* The Calcutta journals expect to enlist the indignation of the English Press in their cause, as though it were a common cause. To me, such an event seems problematical. It seems to me almost impossible to predict what view will be taken of this measure by the Press in England. The danger is so imminent and overwhelming, and there is so prevalent a general idea that the English Press of India is licentious and scurrilous; it has been so assiduously branded as "lying," "rascally," and the like, that perhaps the Press and public at home may not regard the attack in its true light. They may regard it in some measure as necessary and merited, and there will be poured in from a hundred quarters, statements which may seem to justify Lord Canning’s Act. Be it remembered, however, that these representations proceed from the very parties who have everything to gain by the suppression of the liberty of the Press.
to present it, is to warn the people of England against being misled by this most iniquitous device for blinding them. I utterly deny that Lord Canning has shown any sufficient reason for his indiscriminate application of one and the same measure to the loyal English, and the treasonous Native Press. As well might we confound the power of Printing-house-square with the filth of Holywell-street. Lord Canning expressly says, that "poison has been poured into the minds of the people by a "portion of the Native Press, within the last few "weeks." "It is to this quarter then," he con-
tinues, "that I direct the attention of the members "of the Legislative Council." He expressly exone-
rates the European Press. He says, "the remarks "I have made against the Native Press, I do not "direct against the European Press;" he gives credit to the "many able and intelligent men who "conduct the newspaper Press in this country, for "the feeling they have shown at this period;" and forthwith, with an inconceivable logic, proceeds to say that he can draw no line of demarcation between the European and the Native Press, and at once confounds liberty and license, loyalty and treason, in one common catastrophe!

Now I warn my fellow-countrymen in England against being deluded by this feeble sophistry. Let them depend upon it, that this attack upon the
Press is in reality intended to screen the cowardice and incapacity of the real authors of the revolution. Lord Canning's arm may have dealt the blow, but there is a power behind which directed the arm. It is not that the crisis necessitated the measure; but that the crisis has been seized as the fittest moment for striking a long meditated blow at the Press, and gratifying a grudge of ancient standing. Political capital has been made out of the bloodshed in the North-West. The arm of the law was amply strong enough before the Gagging Act to meet the alleged evil: and the best proof is, that Mr. Beadon, since the passing of the Act, has prosecuted certain Native papers for treasonable writings published before. A public prosecution would at any time have been sufficient to curb the unbridled license of the Native Press. On Lord Canning's own shewing, it would have sufficed to legislate for the Native Press. If the intention had been merely to provide against the chance of injudicious statements, or erroneous information, finding their way to the public ear during a season of great excitement, the institution of a censorship would have met the object. Prevention is better than cure. But if it was sought to stifle all inquiry and all comment, then the measures of the supreme Government were admirably adapted towards accomplishing such a consummation. The Act itself is sweeping and indefinite enough: but the
real sting of the transaction lies in the conditions, since notified, on which licenses to printing presses will be granted. The first is as follows;—

1. "That no book, newspaper, pamphlet, or other work printed at such press, or with such materials or articles, shall contain any observations or statements, impugning the motives or designs of the British Government, either in England or India, or in any way tending to bring the said Government into hatred or contempt, to excite disaffection or unlawful resistance to its orders, or to weaken its lawful authority, or the lawful authority of its civil or military servants."

Under this the Government, and the very lowest of its civil and military servants, enjoy perfect immunity and impunity. Such acts as those of Mr. Thomas can no more be commented on: and Mr. Thomas's conduct is venial in comparison with many other illegalities, which are at this moment running their career. Any attempt to trace the causes of the rebellion to the wicked, foolish policy of the past few years; to show how the hesitation of military men, the incapacity of civilians, has precipitated an unavoidable event; how the Commissariat reforms of Lord Dalhousie have paralyzed our arm at the moment we would put it forth to suppress insurrection; every sug-
gestion for the future guidance of our rule, may be construed without warning or notice into an offence punishable by a fine of 5,000 rupees, imprisonment for two years, the seizure of a tradesman's entire stock in trade,—in short, total ruin; this at the discretion of the magistrate—such magistrates as obtain in India! The other conditions are these:—

2. "That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work shall contain observations or statements, having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among the Native population of any intended interference by Government with their religious opinions and observances."

3. "That no such book, pamphlet, newspaper, or other work, shall contain observations having a tendency to weaken the friendship towards the British Government of Native Princes, Chiefs, or States in dependence upon, or alliance with it. "The above conditions apply equally to original matter, and to matter copied from other publications."

The third is of course expressly intended to prevent any allusion whatsoever to our shameless usurpation of our neighbour's property—a cause which I, for one, believe lies at the very root of the rebellion.

Further, as these conditions extend to extracts
as well as original matter; no discussion in parliament on any Indian subject, no comment in any London journal, unless indeed laudatory of the Company, can be copied into an Indian newspaper under pain of the like penalties.

Even in France the Press has its three warnings. In Austria, despotism is not so despotic as it is in India. Our gag is a garotte.

Freedom of speech having been stifled, the Government can put forth what accounts it pleases, uncon contradicted, unobserved upon; and I venture to predict that every effort, both here and in England, will be made to divert public inquiry from the true sources of our misfortune. The mutiny will be purely military; it might have been crushed at its outbreak at Meerut, but for the strange inactivity of the military officer there in command. The people will have taken no part in the insurrection. The rebellion will have strengthened our power. The Civil Government has deserved well of its country. It is but one step further, a step in the right direction, many will deem it, after having deprived the Press of any power of reply, to attribute the origin of the war partially, and by degrees mainly, to its unbridled license. This calumny, indeed, false as it is foul,* has already been heard.

* The Friend of India has had its independence suppressed; its Editor has resigned; a gentleman in the employ of Govern-
Correspondents in several journals have openly asserted it; the sycophant throng echo the cry in the salons of our Government House; by and bye the chorus will swell into a diapason of scurrilous, lying abuse.*

* Scarcely was the ink of this sentence dry ere my predictions began to be verified. There is a dead set against the Press in general, and against some obnoxious journals in particular. In this Presidency the Athenæum is singled out for attack. Anonymous charges have been preferred against it in the Spectator, for having incited mutiny by certain articles which have appeared on military matters during the past three years. These articles excited great attention. They were directed to the correction of a gross wrong done to a meritorious body of officers in respect to their promotions. They were temperately and ably written, with a thorough knowledge of the subject. They received the sanction of the late Commander-in-Chief. At the very time they were appearing, an intimation was received by me, from indisputable authority, that the Governor-General regarded the Athenæum as the ablest paper in India. They drew the attention of the Home Authorities to the state of the question, and had a main share in procuring for some hundred officers a recognition of their undoubted rights. Such are the articles which are now assailed as calculated to excite mutiny in the Madras army! Lord Harris was, till lately, a warm admirer of the Athenæum. His lordship personally assured me that he admitted its ability and its utility; though he could not agree in the tone or the opinions of all the articles; that he had no wish to see its utility circumscribed. This was at a time when his lordship had the unvarying support of the Athenæum; and no man was ever borne with more
I bid the English public, then, call to mind Lord Canning’s own exoneration of the Anglo-Indian Press. If this insidious policy prevails, the people of England will be most thoroughly hoodwinked and deceived. The real causes of the rebellion will have been kept out of sight. Our wretched administration of a theoretically good system of government will be perpetuated; opportunity will have been thrown aside. Our giant warning neglected, India will be handed over without a remonstrance to those who have most signally, most fearfully proved themselves drivellers and imbeciles—we shall relapse for a while into our old career, and then will come the closing scene, sudden as patiently than his lordship by the Press. But he was somewhat roughly handled with reference to his share in the annexation of the Carnatic and Tanjore. This no doubt is treason in India, though a voice even from the Board of Control assured me that he who should write down annexation and centralization would be a second Hampden. The Athenæum has excited powerful odiums. It has exposed not any particular species of cant, but cant as a species; it has plainly called a spade a spade, and indulged in an awkward knack of going at once to the gist of the matter in hand, without respect to persons, fear, favour, or affection, reward or hope thereof. For this our gentility vote it low-toned. Some little high and mighty officials have left India with a determination to make it a personal request to the Times, forssooth, to write down the Athenæum! and I am quite prepared to hear the most lavish abuse bestowed upon the journal, now that it cannot reply to such accusations. Fortunately its columns remain; the matter therein, and the mode of handling it, speak for themselves, and afford the best refutation of the calumny.
the present, but far more complete—the loss of our Indian Empire, the massacre of every Englishman in India, when no one will be left to tell the tale.

So far as my ability extends, an effort shall be made to counteract the result of the Gagging Act. I will at least point out to the English public topics calling for their most serious consideration. The true path of investigation shall be opened out to them. With them will lie the responsibility of following it up, or turning aside from it.

The following pages have been jotted down contemporaneously with the progress of the rebellion, which will account for an occasional want of arrangement. They would probably under no circumstance have appeared even in England, certainly not in India, until men's minds had recovered their equilibrium and eqanimity—until the cause of order was secure; but now that an attempt is made by the highest authorities to stifle inquiry, these sheets cannot too soon be communicated to the people of England: because, unless independent men will come forward, it is certain that nobody else will. The Indian Government, the Civil Service, the Court of Directors, the Board of Control, have everything to gain by secrecy; they have everything to lose by publicity. By gagging the Press, the Indian Government has secured to itself the entire occupation of the public ear. It can put forward what it
pleases, keep back what it pleases, alter what it pleases, mystify what it pleases.

"Truth," said the first Lord Napier, "can hardly be obtained, to the disadvantage of powerful men, when such men are the sources of the information on which the cause is to be judged."

What sort of information, how full, how accurate, how arranged, is likely to reach England from those in authority? Let the papers on Sir Charles Napier's case laid before the Great Duke testify, upon which even that clear intellect and sound judgment came to the conclusion that there had been no mutiny at Wuzzeerabad in 1849!

Let me, in conclusion, offer one remark which I think is fairly justifiable. If what appears in these pages be assailed as prejudiced exaggeration, let my credit at least derive whatever strength is due to it from the fact, that no single statement which I have ever yet put forward, however startling and incredible, whether it appeared in the exposure of the administration of justice in Southern India, in the representation of the condition of the Madras Presidency, or in the Torture Report, has been shown to be untrue, or even incorrect.
THE

REBELLION IN INDIA.

WRITING in the early part of 1854, to the Right Honourable Robert Lowe, then Joint Secretary of the Board of Control, on the condition of the Presidency of Madras, I concluded a few prefatory words as follows: "A letter read in the House of Commons said, 'Woe be to India if the present crisis is allowed to slip by unimproved;' but I say, Woe be to England, for it cannot be too emphatically impressed upon the people of England at large, that this question of India is to them, properly considered, the one great question of the age. They may not so see it now; may we act with such prudence, benevolence, and justice, that they may not be forced so to acknowledge it hereafter."

A man who has studied history and observes the events of his time with ordinary intelligence, may perhaps claim a capacity for political prediction, without laying himself open to Voltaire's charge of being either an impostor or a madman! I am not
one lightly to adopt the opinions of others; lightly to form, or lightly to express, my own: what I wrote then was as clear and true to my own apprehension as it is now; though it was not forced upon me by any extraordinary events, but formed in times comparatively well adapted for calm consideration. But, perhaps, now that the same truth is thrust forward in a more startling and authoritative form; now that it is written in the blood of our murdered countrymen in India, illustrated by rebellion, and illuminated by the conflagrations at Meerut and Delhi, and Lucknow, and Allahabad, the people of England may be induced to concentrate their attention upon a matter of such vital importance; to investigate the foundations of the assertion, and deliberate upon the best means of remedy for the past and prevention for the future.

There has been of late years, it is true, a steadily but slowly increasing interest in Indian affairs on the part of Englishmen in England: but still India is comparatively little known, and little cared for. An Indian question is still, as Lord Monteagle called it, the "dinner bell" of Parliament. An Indian Budget is explained to empty benches; a lamentable ignorance and most culpable indifference on Indian affairs generally prevail among the masses; but the present crisis must, one would think, rivet general attention upon the position of Indian affairs. "Nemo observat lunam nisi laborantem, tunc urbes concussam, tunc pro se quisque superstitione vanê trepidat. Hæc tamen non annotamus quamdiu ordo servatur. Si quid turbatum est, aut præter..."
"consuetudinem emicuit, spectamus, interrogamus, " ostendimus."

There will be eagerness and excitement enough roused by a rebellion which ordinary forethought during times of dull peace and every day routine must assuredly have foreseen, and might probably have prevented. There will be more alarm in England than even in India; and already many will have rushed to the false conclusion that our empire in India is lost. Not that the present moment is the one of all others which a wise choice would select for discussing matters, the excitement attending which has not yet subsided. But India's extremity is the reformers' opportunity; if we do not strike at once, while the iron is hot, we shall have missed our chance of planting a telling blow; for it is to be feared that the public mind will soon relapse into its wonted apathy, either from a carelessness for that which has ceased to be novel, or because it will have been lulled by interested misrepresentations and assurances into a false security, through a feeling that the danger is past. This it is which induces me once again to come forward, and endeavour to impress upon the public mind the conviction, that this Indian problem is, properly considered, the subject of the age to England. The solemn question, which we cannot longer blink or put aside until some more convenient season, is simply this, Shall we throw away or shall we preserve our Indian Empire?

I do not say, because I do not believe, that it is lost; and I cannot too deeply condemn the character
of an unnecessary alarmist; but I do say that our general policy in India, for the last few years especially, has been tending to bring about such a consummation; and that if it be persevered in—if people will not investigate the true causes, and all the causes which may have helped to lead to the present insurrection with its attendant horrors; if they will allow themselves to be led aside from the proper course of inquiry, or to be lulled again into security and forgetfulness, by assertions that the evil was merely temporary and local, and that all spirit of disaffection has been extinguished—then I say that we shall lose our hold on India, and that the horrors we have just witnessed are as child’s play to the general massacre which will accompany the closing scene.

When the present rebellion has been suppressed (I write while it is still unchecked) and its immediate authors punished, I doubt not we shall be told that such outbursts visit India periodically; that we are stronger than ever, since the Native soldiery has seen the hopelessness of revolt. Historical precedents of former dangers, which threatened our empire with ruin, and which have been averted, will be quoted. It will be asserted, that the origin of the present crisis is purely military disaffection, such as that which formerly led to the mutiny at Vellore, or all but broke out among even the European officers of the Indian army in Clive’s time. It will be declared to be entirely isolated from the people; that the masses took no share in it, and that it does not afford any proof, indeed scarcely leads to any in-
ference, that the people at large are disaffected. Indeed the apathy of the people to the events passing among them will be cited as a convincing proof that the Government is in the main popular; and thus the rebellion will be vouched as a test both of our strength and our popularity. Those remedies, it will be said, are sufficient, which seek to improve the condition of the Native army, or by the increase of the European regiments, to counterpoise and overawe the turbulent Native troops. These and the like lines of argument will be sedulously put forth, because they flatter the vanity and screen the incompetency of our Indian civil administration. Indeed this drivelling cry, which, if it prevails now, will cost us our empire hereafter, has been already raised. Only a day or two ago, a civilian, high in office and of high repute, was heard expressing precisely the views which I have suggested, as he twitted a military officer with the outbreak of the sepoys, and contrasted military insubordination and military administration with civil administration and the quiet of the people; and with many these assertions will prevail.

The conduct of some of the villagers towards the European fugitives in the neighbourhood of Delhi, the ready assistance afforded by the Rajahs of Puttialah, Bhurtpoor, and Gwalior, may be regarded by some as signs that the rebellion is confined to the troops and those immediately influenced by them; but when was any revolution in India brought about by the people not of the military classes, though it may be presumed that we shall not readily
admit that the people at large had more reason to be contented with their former rule than our own? It is not that disaffection exists only in the army; the true difference is, that with the army disaffection is organized; among the people at large it has no expression, because it has no organization. The extent to which the people have participated in the rebellion cannot yet be ascertained. At first, the Government bulletins staunchly declared that the "people were with us to a man;" but that cry has long since ceased. It is, of course, good policy for the Government to endeavour to persuade districts yet peaceful of the truth of such an important fact; but I, for one, would no more pin my entire faith to such representations from such a quarter, than I would trust the Roman account of the Carthaginians, or the man's painting of the lion. There is no doubt that civil emissaries have been tampering in various quarters with military virtue. The Irregular Cavalry in the North-West has been burning the villages in the neighbourhood of which the telegraphic wires have been cut. I have seen many accounts which speak but ill of the temper of the people; and even while I write, a letter comes to hand from Mr. Fischer, than whom no man on this side of India more thoroughly knows the people. He writes: "I have been asked my opinion, and I think it was for Government, as to the state of the feelings of the Natives in these parts towards Government; and I replied that the people generally were disaffected, and that they had too much cause for it; indeed, that there was disaffection
"enough in the land for half-a-dozen rebellions, but " that the community was composed of so many " diverse and discordant castes and creeds, that they " could not unite against the common enemy: that " our strength lay in this condition of the country, " and in no merit of Government."

Sir Thomas Munro long since pointed out how very little we really know of the feelings of the Natives, and I question whether time has given us any deeper insight. The line of separation between the European and the Native is far more marked now than formerly. In our vanity and assumed superiority we utterly deceive ourselves. We assert that the Natives esteem us, and regard the change from Native to European rule as a blessing. We forget the antipathy between the Orientals and the European; we overlook the jealousy natural towards a conquering and superior race. "It would be well "for us," writes an Indian authority, "if we "governed the country as well as Aokbar." When Heber asked an intelligent Native if he would wish to become subject to British rule, the reply was, "Of all misfortunes keep me from that." We have levelled all ambition, all distinctions; we have destroyed the nobility and the gentry; we have substituted a nation of Peons and Ryots. Every commanding officer of a regiment deludes himself into the fatal mistake that his corps is loyal; that him at least the sepoys love. The 6th and 25th Regiments were stated to be mutinously disposed; the officers wrote to the libellous journals, indignantly asseverating the fidelity of these two corps.
The former was publicly thanked by the Governor-
General. The poor deluded officers are only con-
vinced of their mistake when the soldiers turn round
upon them and rend them, shooting them down and
mutilating their half-dead bodies with a terrible
ferocity. An officer writing from Neemuch to the
*Telegraph* and *Courier* says, "I have been many
"years with my regiment; I have lived among the
"men, marched over the length and breadth of the
"land with them; I have fought with them, trusted
"them, respected them, cared for them, treated
"them with kindness and consideration always,
"attended to all their wants; redressed, as far as
"lay in my power, their grievances; and yet these
"men have been hatching treason against the State
"for months—perhaps years: while coming to me
"and in daily intercourse with me, they have been
"treacherously plotting against my life, and with
"the foulest and blackest ingratitude I ever heard
"or read of, they sent me away with such a shower
"of bullets over my head as I never had before
"except at Chillianwalla; and not content with
"this, they burnt my house to the ground, and leave
"me and my family beggars."

I have moved myself much among all classes, and
claim to know something of the disposition of the
people. True, they may have exaggerated their
statements somewhat to me, and I take what I have
heard with caution; but the impression conveyed to
my own mind is, though I do not go so far as some
of my friends, that the people do not regard us with
anything approximating to affection, not even with
the esteem which the vanity of many prompts them to believe. There are no doubt instances now occurring of protection afforded to our fugitive countrymen by Zemindars and others; but the instances seem equally frequent, when the villagers thrust them forth and bid them pass on. Out of ten Thaseoldars in the Meerut district, but one has stood faithful to his post: and the efforts of the civilians to stem the force of the torrent of insurrection, if any have been made, have been too feeble even to attract a moment's notice. The whole civil administration has been struck down and paralyzed at a single blow. Where are the police and the constabulary, if any exist? What body has any civilian been able to organize? Who has stood by them? What check have they offered to the insurgents? What influence over the people have they shown? What vestige of power in the cause of order have they left? I do not say that they have not done their duty to the best of their ability, as gallant English gentlemen; but Metcalfe's assertions have been once more proved true: "When the storm begins to roar," says he, "the civil power, and all semblance of the existence of a government, are instantly swept away by the torrent." Their authority has fallen from them, and is scattered on the ground like water. They have been forced to seek protection within the pale of the British bayonets. On what spot beyond the shadow of those bayonets, since the present outbreak, has civil authority been found strong enough to stand alone? What agricultural population has it rallied in defence of order? Suppose that a similar
military insurrection had occurred in England, how many magistrates would have been able to raise local corps of the sturdy rustics, the soiled artizans and mechanics of the towns! How great would have been the contrast! The civil authority of India has thoroughly broken down on the first moment of peril and trial.

How far the English Government deserves well of the people, how far it commands the respect of the people, what are probably the feelings of the great body towards us, whether they prefer our government to those which have preceded it, I shall find an opportunity hereafter of considering. What I wish to guard against in the outset is, the false impression which I am perfectly confident it will be industriously endeavoured to produce, so soon as order is restored, that the condition of the people, as a body, has nothing whatever to do with the rebellion; that they are perfectly contented with the present dispensation; and that the insurrection was purely military.

But in discussing the present situation of affairs, it would be the height of folly to limit enquiry to the state of the army, when there may be lurking among us exciting causes of far more great and general dangers than that which we have not yet escaped. It behoves us to regard the present outbreak as a warning. Thankful that the spirit of rebellion has scarcely touched the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, and that rebellion itself has been crushed, we must then not only trace out all the causes which have immediately led to the out-
break, but, if we are wise, review our own position in India, and become familiar with all that may hereafter threaten our empire with peril or destruction. But little faith is due to specific and panacea. All practical politics are necessarily tentative and experimental; but it is expedient to listen to all expositions of the condition of our affairs, and all attempts to account for that condition, come they from what quarter they may; as well as to consider all suggested remedies, so as to select that which is apparently the best.

Now there is a passage in Sir George Cornewall Lewis's work on Politics which strikes me as singularly applicable on the present occasion.

It is as follows:—

"In the first place, then, it is a sound maxim of political, not less than of medical therapeutics, that all specifics for a malady are suspicious, while panaceas are to be absolutely rejected. The physician is taught, that he must not only understand the general nature of diseases, but that he must study the peculiarities of his patient's case, both as respects the origin and symptoms of his malady, and also his constitutional state of body. His remedies are to be applied so as to remove the cause of the disease, and restore the patient to health; for which purpose he is to observe the symptoms, and hence to form his plan of treatment. The circumstances in the patient's condition to which rational medicine looks, and from which plans of treatment can be properly drawn, are described as being four in number—1. Very
remote causes, which only predispose the body to
disease. 2. Remote exciting causes, which induce
the disease. 3. The proximate cause. 4. The
signs or symptoms of the disease, and the different
states of the patient. These maxims may be
transferred, with little alteration, to the conduct of
the politician. • When a political evil exists he
must examine its causes and symptoms, and form
his plan of treatment accordingly; he must distin-
guish the predisposing causes from the positive
direct causes which lead to it; and these, again,
from the occasion, or accidental cause, from which
it immediately springs. He must likewise observe
the effects which are symptomatic of its operation.
Thus, if an insurrection or popular disturbance
occurs in any country, its outbreak at the parti-
cular time and place may be owing to some casual
occurrence, of little moment in itself. This, how-
ever, is the immediate exciting cause. The dispo-
sition to disturbance may further be owing to some
special causes of local mal-administration; for ex-
ample, to some tax, or other fiscal burden to which
the people are subject. These may be the remote
exciting causes. Lastly, there may be a certain
state of the people with respect to their ignorance,
the relations of social classes, their historical recol-
lections, or some similar permanent phenomena,
which may predispose them to violent outbreaks.
When the disturbance has occurred, it will produce
certain consequences, symptomatic of its influ-
ence, which the practical politician must carefully
watch.
Let us follow this method of investigation. It is not my intention to write any history of the rebellion. We shall have ample accounts of the horrible particulars from the personal memoirs, the private letters, and published stories of the surviving Europeans, and the connected accounts for which they will doubtless furnish materials conjointly with official records. Then shall be chronicled a glorious though a mournful page in England's annals; for never have her sons and her daughters shown, respectively, more devotion to duty, or calmer fortitude. Then shall be read of many perilous escapes; many a hero falling at his post; many a lady sharing the duties of defence, or inspiring confidence by her noble calmness, or her uncomplaining bearing of the hardships of flight and hunger. Then shall many an act of the noblest courage come to light; and many a name of those who have fallen be illustrated by the history of his death. Finnis, who charged up to his regiment only to receive his death wound. Piele, who would not leave without his colours. Willoughby, who blew up the magazine at Delhi. Fletcher Hayes, the accomplished and the brave, the scholar-soldier. Young Hutchison, than whom England has not a nobler character amid a host of equals. Then shall the gallant independence of Neill, the stern determination of Lawrence, the unflagging marches, the fiery charges of Colburn be rehearsed, and England will at least have the melancholy pride of knowing that her offspring of to-day are as the offspring of her former generations, gallant in life, devoted in their death. But not for me is
such a task. I must turn to the political aspect of the lesson.

The signs or symptoms are clear enough. They are those of a wide-spread disaffection; a hatred not of obnoxious individuals who have given offence to their immediate inferiors; not a class feeling of the soldiery against their officers; but a general antipathy to the European race, which exhibits itself in the indiscriminate slaughter of women and children, as well as men, without reference to age, occupation, or station, attended by a savage ferocity aiming at total extermination. The Cavalry mutineers from Meerut, as they marched through the streets of Delhi, refused to plunder: they declared they came for life, not loot. Blood was their object, and they pointed to the marks of the fetters on their legs, as their reason and their justification. Do not let the fatal mistake in our diagnosis be committed of fancying, that this outbreak is merely the local exhibition of discontent on the part of a few disaffected regiments. It will be found to extend from one end of Bengal to the other, and probably to embrace all classes, civil as well as military. It leaps from one distant point to another almost simultaneously. Thus the same post brings intelligence of risings at Sattarah, at Nagpore, at Jhansi. Its origin is partly, if not principally, political. The answer of the sepoys to their officers at Neemuch may show us that. The dying speech of the traitor at Sattarah shows us that. Within three little months 50,000 soldiers have turned rebels!

The following is an imperfect list, but full, as far
as it can yet be ascertained of the sepoys who have become rebels. It represents a force of about 50,000 men:

19th Rt. N. I. Disbanded at Barrackpore, 19th April.
7th Rt. Oude Irregulars, Mutinied at Lucknow, 1st May.
34th Rt. N. I. 7 Companies at Lucknow, 5th May.
3rd Rt. Lt. Cy. Mutinied at Meerut, 10th May.
11th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Meerut, 10th May.
20th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Meerut, 10th May.
88th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Delhi, 11th May.
54th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Delhi, 11th May.
74th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Delhi, 11th May.
3rd Company 7th Batt. Arty. Mutinied at Delhi, 11th May.
The Sappers and Miners, about half the Corps, Mutinied at Meerut, 13th May.
46th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Ferozepore, 13th May.
67th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Ferozepore, 13th May.
The Sappers and Miners (300 men) Mutinied at Roorkee, 18th May.
9th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Alilgurh, 23rd May.
5th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Umballah, 23rd May.
60th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Umballah, 26th May.
55th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Murdaun, 31st May.
44th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Agra, 31st May.
67th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Agra, 26th May.
3rd Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Phillour, 30th May.
7th Rt. Lt. Cy. Mutinied at Lucknow (2 troops) 30th May.
18th Rt. N. I. (part only) Mutinied at Lucknow, 30th May.
48th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Lucknow, 30th May.
71st Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Lucknow, 30th May.
15th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Nusseerabad, 28th May.
80th Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Nusseerabad, 25th May.
72nd Rt. N. I. Mutinied at Neemuch, 3rd June.
24th Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Peshawur, 22nd May.
27th Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Peshawur, 22nd May.
51st Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Peshawur, 22nd May.
5th Rt. Lt. Cy. Disarmed at Peshawur, 22nd May.
16th Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Meean Meer, 14th May.
26th Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Meean Meer, May 14th.
49th Rt. N. I. Disarmed at Meean Meer, May 14th.
7th Gwallor Infantry Mutinied at Neemuch, June 3rd.
Artillery

Bhurtapore Leies Mutinied near Neemuch about the beginning of June.
12th N. I. Mutinied at Jhansi, June 5th.
Artillery

30th N. I. (one company) Mutinied at Jeyapore, June 3rd.
37th N. I. Mutinied at Benares, June 4th.
Loodianah Regiment of Sikhs Mutinied at Benares, June 4th.
6th N. I. Mutinied at Allahabad, June 6th.
70th N. I., and all the native troops at Barrackpore and Calcutta Disarmed, June 14th.
N. I. Regts. Disarmed at Mooltan, June 10th.
Harrianah Light Infantry Mutinied at Jhansi, May 29th.
Troops at Jhansi Mutinied about May 29th.
64th N. I. Disbanded at Shukhuddur, June 3rd.
28th N. I. Mutinied at Shajehanpur about the middle of June.
1st Nizam's Cavalry Mutinied at Aurungabad, May 23rd.
21st N. I. Disarmed at Peshawur, May 22nd.
1st N. I. Mutinied at Cawnpore, June 5th.
50th N. I.

2nd Lt. Cy.

22nd N. I. Mutinied at Fyzabad about June 6th.
1st N. I. Mutinied at Cawnpore, June.
2nd N. I. Disarmed at Barrackpore, June 14th.
6th N. I. Mutinied at Allahabad, June 4th.
10th N. I. Mutinied at Futtyghur, June.
17th N. I. Mutinied at Azimghur, June 3rd.
18th N. I. Mutinied at Barcilly, June.
22nd N. I. Mutinied at Fyzabad, June 9th.
28th N. I. Mutinied at Shajehanpur, June 22nd.
29th N. I. Mutinied at Moradabad, June.
27th N. I. Mutinied at Benares June 4th.
41st N. I. Mutinied at Singapore June.
43rd N. I. Disarmed at Barrackpore, June 14th.
53rd N. I. Mutinied at Cawnpore, June.
56th N. I. Mutinied at Cawnpore, June.
68th N. I. Mutinied at Bareilly, June.
70th N. I. Disarmed at Barrackpore, June 14th.
1st L. C. Mutinied at Neemuch, June 3rd.
2nd L. C. Mutinied at Cawnpore, June 3rd.
Malwa Contingent Mutinied near Neemuch about the beginning of June.
17th N. I. Mutinied at Azimgurh, June 3rd.

But all honour to the armies of Madras and Bombay; they seem staunch; and the few clamours that have been heard from the former have originated from the mismanagement of the authorities, and the complaints seem rational, if not justifiable, in the shape in which they were put forward.

At Bangalore, where I am now writing, a Native, well acquainted with the spirit and feelings of his countrymen, has declared that but for the presence of the European troops, there would not be a European alive in the station within a week. At Madras the ball on the Queen's Birth-day was danced out with the guard of honor (a European guard of H.M. 43rd) keeping watch over the merry makers, each man with twenty rounds of ball cartridge in his pouch. Since then, our Government has had a panic from Triplicane; fear only is said to keep the Mussulmen down: their brethren in Poonah have publicly offered up prayers for the success of the Native arms at Delhi and Meerut. If Oude was really ever a source of danger to us from the example which its internal condition afforded to its immediate neighbours, our policy has now constituted it a magazine full of inflammable materials in the very centre of our
territories, and those who best know the disposition of the natives of that kingdom towards us, do not hesitate to state that we are invariably regarded with feelings of bitter hatred. Lucknow has been in flames, and there Lawrence can do no more than hold his own. Oude is in an entire state of revolt. The Governor of the N.W. Provinces has officially declared the same with regard to his territories. Benares, Allahabad, Nusserabad Neemuch, Simlah, and many other places, have become the scenes of mutiny and outbreaks. It is impossible to limit the cause of outbreak to the offended religious prejudices of any particular caste. Mussulmen as well as Hindus, have turned rebels. Seikhs and Goorkhas have proved unloyal; irregulars as well as regulars, cavalry as well as infantry, sappers and miners, and artillery, all have been swept into the vortex of rebellion. No dependence can ever again be placed on the Indian army which has thus been faithless to its salt. So long as that army was faithful to us we were secure; but when it has turned against us, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" The rebellion is wide-spread and contagious. It shows signs of combination. It draws all religions as to a common centre. It has probably one common origin. It is truculent and exterminating; pitiless in its barbarity. It must be no ordinary frame of mind, no ordinary sense of wrong, which can so have banded men together in so desperate an undertaking.

Such are the symptoms. The proximate or alleged proximate cause, is that of the greased cartridges. It is no doubt matter of the gravest inquiry, whether
there is really a deep seated belief on the minds of the sepoys that we are attempting to destroy their caste by forcing them to pollute their lips with the fat of bullocks; and the Natives are so easily worked upon and credulous, especially in matters connected with their religion or their caste, that it is not at all improbable that this distrust of the new cartridges was not at the outset a mere pretext, but that a real excitement on the point has been brought about, partly by the carefully disseminated insinuations of designing agitators who skilfully hit upon a topic of alarm, which all could appreciate; partly by that species of infection or contagious panic which runs occasionally through large bodies. It may be the spark which has set fire to the train, but unquestionably the train existed before; I believe there is no one so weak as to fancy, that had there been no greased cartridges there would have been no rebellion. Sooner or later, and for some assigned cause of grievance or other, similar events would have occurred; and we may dismiss at once the opinion that the substitution of vegetable oils for animal fat will suffice to restore confidence to the soldiery, and prevent dissatisfaction for the future. It is impossible any longer to attribute the revolt of regiment after regiment to this cause. For fifty years the rifle companies of our Native regiments have used greased cartridges without a murmur. The obnoxious cartridge can have been served out to very few regiments, if any. In Lucknow the men declared they were prepared not only to bite, but to eat them, if the Company commanded. The real
nature of the grease used has been carefully explained to every regiment in the service: there has been no effort to insist upon the further issue and use of the obnoxious material. The Governor-General has publicly proclaimed the absence of any intention on the part of Government to interfere with the religion of the soldiery. The rebel cavalry at Delhi indeed expressly declared that their motives for massacre was revenge for the insult offered them by placing fetters on their legs. Regiments, of whose loyalty there was no previous question, and who had given no sign of disaffection, suddenly turned over to the rebels against whom they were brought. Here again it is not a question of grease which leads to rebellion; but the natural antipathy of race; the sympathy with those of their own creed and country, when the moment comes for making a choice between the ties of allegiance, and those of blood; between the stranger and brother. Fatal to us is the moment of that electric touch of nature which makes them kin. Unquestionably the causes of discontent which exist in the Native army lie far deeper: they must be thoroughly probed and searched.

Possibly the "General Service Order," which compels every recruit for the future to enlist for foreign as well as home service, may be thought by some sufficient to account for the discontent of the Bengal army. The Bengul regiments, it is well known, are averse to crossing the sea. It clashes with their caste prejudices; and many a high caste sepoy who had looked to his children and their children follow-
ing his own profession of arms, thus finds them suddenly cut off from an ancestral means of livelihood: and this may have pre-disposed the whole army to listen to the counsels of the designing and seditious.

The General Service Order 1012 of 1856, published on the 25th July, 1856, touched upon a most delicate matter, one not to be handled without a thorough knowledge of the Bengal soldier, and the feelings of the Natives in general. Lord Dalhousie had not ventured, amid his many changes, to promulgate so hazardous a change. Yet Lord Canning, raw to the country, within three months after his taking the reins of government, rushed in, where Lord Dalhousie had feared to tread. He might have otherwise remembered the mutinous spirit of the Bengal sepoys in the last century, when ordered on foreign service to Madras: their conduct in 1816 at Java during the expedition under Auchmuty: their conduct in Burmah, in the first Burmese war in 1824; above all, the recent refusal of the 38th regiment to embark for Burmah in Lord Dalhousie's reign, an epoch which may be marked as the starting point of the present rebellion. Of this anon.

The order was uncalled for at the present moment, because we have eighty-one regiments of the Madras and Bombay armies, available for foreign service. It was unwise, because it struck at the very root of the Bengal sepoys' contents. It would introduce some thirty or forty recruits a year into each regiment, enlisted on terms which the old soldiers would regard as derogatory to their rights, and which would ne-
cessarily lead to constant bickerings, recriminations, internal dissensions, in regiments composed of two such discordant classes, as the old and new soldiers must in the course of some six or eight years become. Unless, therefore, the Government was quite sure that it was strong enough to put down any dissatisfaction which so unpalatable an order was certain to call forth, its promulgation should have been at any rate deferred. But at that moment we had a miserably small European force in the country: and I can only regard this measure as another instance of that blind infatuation, and inflated self-sufficiency, which has taught us to regard our position in India as impregnable, and utterly to ignore the possibility of any existence, either of dissatisfaction at our most distasteful and unjust measures, or of power on the part of any portion of our Native subjects, military or civil, to resist or resent even what they might view with the most sullen indignation.

If grievances are really found to exist, they must be redressed; if the constitution of the army is defective, it must be altered; if the old loyal spirit of the sepoys has been shaken, it must be re-established; if we have Protestant bands among us, they must be coerced; but these are questions of detail which may be well left for the consideration of the highest military authorities; they are not matters on which I feel inclined to dwell, or could usefully do so, had I the inclination. Suffice it briefly to point out that the augmentation of our armies not having kept pace with the increase of our territories, the Native troops have now much heavier labour to perform than had
their forefathers; that they are cut up into small detachments, and generally do police rather than military duties;* that their pay has remained stationary while provisions and carriage have gradually risen in price, and that there will be found on inquiry many causes sufficiently accounting for the disaffection of the present soldiery. Thus the necessities of the civil administration of the State have almost denuded the regiments of their officers—a fatal mistake, if the cordial spirit of mutual reliance and esteem between officers and men is essential to discipline and confidence; and if a thorough supervision of the men's comforts and knowledge of their characters, and a candid representation of their wants and wishes, be thought instrumental towards engendering and promoting a spirit of content, affection, and respect. With the present skeleton staff of officers doing duty with each regiment, this is physically impossible: the few officers present on parade could not do all this important duty even if they would; but it is to be feared, that the few regimental officers who have not obtained staff appointments, the "Refuse," as a distinguished member of their own body has unjustly called them, get through their duties listlessly and superficially, partly from a sense of the hopelessness of otherwise discharging it, partly from a spirit of indifference produced by con-

* "Between the 1st January and the 31st October of the following year," says Sir Charles Napier, "of the Bengal Army 25,910 Infantry, and 3,364 Cavalry, total 29,080 soldiers, were furnished for treasure escorts alone, exclusive of all other civil duties."
trusting what they consider their own ill luck with the good fortune of their contemporaries on staff employ. The Regiment is not looked upon as what it ought to be—a man's home. The first effort, the first wish of the cadet is, either by interest or study, to get away from regimental duty to the more agreeable labours of a comparatively independent charge. And the effect upon the character of the privates may easily be conceived. "Military officers," writes Lord Dalhousie, in his Retrospective Minute, "have been withdrawn for this purpose from the regimental duties in the Artillery and in the Line in large and unprecedented numbers.

"The expedient is advantageous to the present interests of the officers, and it affords a material relief to the present necessities of the Government. But there seems good reason for apprehending that it will, after a time, prove deeply injurious to the military efficiency of the army. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the experiment will be treated on all hands as a temporary one." Lord Dalhousie omits to mention how many officers he withdrew from the regular army to officer his irregular forces; and this eking out the wants of civil administration at the expense of the efficiency of the army, though perhaps an immediate relief to the State, was but robbing Peter to pay Paul; or sewing on to one end of the blanket what was cut off from the other, under the pleasant self-delusion that the blanket was thereby made to do double duty.

So with regard to the Native officer. He is a very different personage from what he was in the
days of Clive. Then the cadet of some old family marched into the head-quarters of the regiment about to be formed at the head of a hundred of his retainers. He became at once an officer. He was familiar with his European superior, the regimental duties were performed by him, he was constantly in the battle field; so great was the trust reposed in him, so large the actual amount of duty he performed, that Munro thought one European officer sufficient for a company. Now, all this has changed. We have destroyed the class from which the Native officer was drawn. He is now a poor, old, decrepit creature, not rising from the ranks until he is scarcely fit for any thing but superannuation. Frequently he owes his promotion to favouritism and the influence of his officer, with whom he has ingratiated himself, rather than to any aptitude or merit of his own. He is no longer the leader and superior of the common soldiery; there is no clannish feeling in his favour. He is taken from their ranks, he is of the same quality as themselves; and once raised to the grade of an officer, his promotion goes by seniority. There is no longer the old bond of union between the European and the Native officer. They are not drawn together by common dangers in the field; the one springs from the English gentry; the other is no longer his equal in birth, in age, in pay, in temperament, but is drawn from an altogether inferior class of society; and the consequence is that there exists another community of feeling or of interests.*

* Sir Charles Napier gives a very different account of the status of the Native officer in the Madras army. But Sir
So again, take the Madras army for an example. With a very trifling increase to its strength, it has now twice the extent of territory to guard. Out of a total of fifty-two regiments, seventeen are on foreign service.

The remaining corps have to discharge the entire military duties of the Presidency. The result is that their work has terribly increased. Their tour for foreign duty comes round three times as rapidly as formerly; the long marches from station to station leave scarcely a moment’s breathing time. The men are plunged into debt by building houses at new stations, and by paying for carriage for their wives and families. One regiment, for instance, has had within the last few years to build houses and huts at no fewer than three stations: they have accomplished long marches; and on their return lately from Burmah, the men have had to pay sixty rupees per cart, to bring their wives and families from Burhampore to Vellore, a distance of 700 miles. I do not select this corps as particularly unlucky; it is but a fair average specimen of what is going on everywhere. The 17th Regiment might have been just as well spoken of; so might the 34th. The result is that the men are deeply embarrassed. A sepoy on seven rupees a month, who has to pay fifty or sixty rupees for his wife’s cart once in every two or three years, is unavoidably plunged in debt. He must borrow at exorbitant interest from the money-

Charles had no personal acquaintance with the Madrassoces. He never landed at Madras, and must have written upon hear-say information.
lender, and before he can reclaim the past, the "route" comes for a fresh march to far distant cantonments, and hurries him into fresh difficulties.

Then the character of the duties performed by the army is essentially changed. They are seldom led to battle and victory, as of yore; they are separated in small detachments, scattered over the face of the country, an entire regiment seldom meeting on parade. They form treasure parties, jail guards; they are, in fact, degraded from the functions of an army to those of an armed police; and this constant separation of a regiment into small fractional parts destroys its unity and esprit de corps.

These are among the first causes of discontent, and they admit of easy remedy. There are others less apparent, which have made the Bengal army a Prætorian band, not to be trusted, striving for mastery, determined to rule or die. Thirty thousand Goorkas, Sir C. Napier tells us, are necessary to coerce the pampered Bengal sepoys. True, Lord Dalhousie declared that Napier was libelling the Bengal army: which of the two was the most farsighted, let recent events decide. Probably it will be found necessary to reorganize our army and our military system. The institution of a staff corps, or—if that measure, as many military men assert, is not practicable in the Indian Army—something tantamount to it, whether by a system of "secording," or otherwise keeping up the full complement of European regimental officers, becomes essential, if the regiments are to be efficiently officered. The retention of a far larger number of Europeans, and,
as I would suggest, of East Indians, in the service of the Company, will be one very palpable measure.

Never again will it be wise to denude India of troops to such an extent as has lately been the case. The capital of the Presidency of Fort St. George has, at this moment, but a wing of H.M.'s 43rd and a few artillerymen to guard it. At Cawnpore, there appear to be about twenty Europeans, and a single gun is placed in position to protect the telegraph station! Probably the troops will be hereafter much more massed in cantonments, and their duties be more purely of a military character, even if our Government itself does not for many years to come assume the same characteristic; for the events of the two last months have thrown back the cause of civil progress for half a century at least. We must not place too much reliance on the increase of power which the electric telegraph and the railway place in our hands. It has been asserted, indeed, that when these machines were complete, we might even dispense with a part of our present military establishments; but late events prove that, although the electric telegraph and railway no doubt vastly increase our means for rapid communication and concentration against a foreign enemy, they afford us no safeguard against a domestic foe suddenly springing up among ourselves. So long as the Native army is faithful, we can direct their movements with a rapidity unknown before: the moment they become disaffected, the wires are sure to be cut, and the rail broken up; so that we may trust to a broken reed, if, in our reliance on these forces, we neglect our ordinary
roads: certainly we cannot reduce our army on account of the introduction of these appliances of modern science.

Some other facts are apparent enough even to a non-military observer.

In the first place, the ablest of our Indian soldiers and statesmen have ever been alive to the fact, that the chief danger to our empire lay, not in foreign invasion, but in the revolt of our own armies, and the antipathies of our own subjects. A gentleman once observed to Sir C. Metcalfe, that we had now so mastered all around, that there was no one left to contend with us. Sir Charles shook his head. "Why," replied his friend, "if any enemy arises against us, he must spring up out of the ground." "You have said it," was the retort of the sagacious statesman. The selections of Sir C. Metcalfe's papers, made by Mr. Kaye, are full of similar forebodings. Sir Charles Metcalfe was one of the ablest of English statesmen; one of the most experienced of our Indian rulers. Mr. Kaye's name stamps his views with an India House authority. Let us peruse a few.

"Our empire in India has arisen from the superiority of our military prowess. Its stability rests entirely on the same foundation. Let this foundation be removed, and the fabric must fall to the ground. Let this foundation be in the least shaken, and the fabric must totter. Whatever delusions may prevail in England respecting the security to be derived from the affections of our Indian subjects, and a character for moderation
and forbearance with foreign native states, it will probably be admitted in India that our power depends solely on our military superiority.

Yet there is reason to apprehend that our comparative superiority is in some measure diminished, in consequence of the general increase of discipline, experience, skill, and confidence, on the part of the military of India.

Again:—

Our situation in India has always been precarious. It is still precarious, not less so perhaps at the present moment, by the fault of the system prescribed by Government at home, than at any former period. We are still a handful of Europeans governing an immense empire without any firm hold on the country, having warlike and powerful enemies on all our frontiers, and the spirit of disaffection dormant, but rooted universally among our subjects.

That insuperable separation which exists between us and our subjects, renders it necessary to keep them in subjection by the presence of a military force, and impossible to repose confidence in their affection or fidelity for assistance in the defence of our territories.

It may be observed that the tried services and devotion of our Native army furnish a proof to the contrary of the preceding assertion. Our Native army is certainly a phenomenon, the more so as there is no heartfelt attachment to our government on the part of our Native troops. They are, in general, excellent soldiers, attached to regular pay,
"and possessing a good notion of the duty of fidelity to the power which gives them bread. There is no reason to apprehend their general defection as long as we continue tolerably successful. But if the tide of fortune ever turn decidedly against us, and any power rise up able to give good pay regularly, and aware of the use to which such an instrument may be applied, there will then be a general proof afforded of that want of attachment in our Native army, of which at present numbers of persons are not convinced."

Again:

"We are to appearance more powerful in India now than we ever were. Nevertheless, our downfall may be short work. When it commences it will probably be rapid, and the world will wonder more at the suddenness with which our immense Indian empire may vanish, than it has done at the surprising conquest that we have achieved. The cause of this precariousness is, that our power does not rest on actual strength, but on impression. Our whole real strength consists in the few European regiments, speaking comparatively, that are scattered singly over the vast space of subjugated India. That is the only portion of our soldiery whose hearts are with us, and whose constancy can be relied on in the hour of trial. All our Native establishments, military or civil, are the followers of fortune; they serve us for their livelihood, and generally serve us well. From a sense of what is due to the hand that feeds them, which is one of the virtues that they most extol,
"they may often display fidelity under trying circum-
stances; but in their inward feelings they par-
take more or less of the universal disaffection
which prevails against us, not from bad govern-
ment, but from natural and irresistible antipathy;
and were the wind to change—to use a native ex-
pression—and to set in steadily against us, we
could not expect that their sense of honour, al-
though there might be splendid instances of devo-
tion, would keep the mass on our side in opposition
to the common feeling which, with one view, might
for a time unite all India from one end to the
other."

Again:—

"Our greatest danger is not from a Russian inva-
sion, but from the fading of the impression of our
invincibility from the minds of the Native inhab-
itants of India. The disaffection which would
willingly root us out exists abundantly; the con-
currence of circumstances sufficient to call it into
general action may at any time happen.

"Our government is not a national government
that can rely on the affections of its subjects for
defence against foreign invasions. It is the curse
of a government over a conquered country that it
cannot trust the people. Our subjects are internal
enemies, ready at least for change, if not ripe for
insurrection; the best affected are passive votaries
of fate. We can retain our dominion only by a
large military establishment; and without a con-
siderable force of British troops the fidelity of our
Native army could not be relied on."
"Our danger does not lie in the military force alone of Native states, but in the spirit by which they are actuated towards us; and still more in the spirit of our subjects, from one end of India to the other. We have no hold on their affections; more than that, disaffection is universal. So that what to a power supported by the affections of its subjects would be a slight disaster, might to us be an irreparable calamity. The little reverse which we met with at Ramoo in the Burmah war, sounded throughout India like our repulse at the first siege of Bhurtpore, magnified and exaggerated as if it had been our death knell."

Again:

"I have noticed these circumstances at the risk of repeating what I have probably said more than once on former occasions, because the prevalent disaffection of our subjects, the uncertainty under which we hold any part of our Indian possessions, without the presence or immediate vicinity of a military force; the utter inability of our civil establishments to stem the torrent of insurrection; their consternation and hopelessness when it begins to roar, constitute in reality the greatest of our dangers in India; without which a Russian invasion, or any other invasion, might, I doubt not, be successfully met and repulsed. The authority of the late Governor-General in deriding internal disaffection and insurrection, as if they were quite contemptible, must have great weight, the more because it will be gratifying to our rulers to see such opinions supported by such authority. Differing
totally from those opinions, I think it necessary to
appeal to facts of recent occurrence. What hap-
pened in the Barasut, Ramghur, and Jungul Meiel
districts, may happen in any other part of our
country, without any other cause than the disaf-
fection already existing everywhere.

"Internal insurrection, therefore, is one of the
greatest of our dangers, or, rather, becomes so
when the means of quelling it are at a distance.
It is easy to decide it, because insurgents may not
have the horse, foot, and artillery of a regular
army; but it becomes serious if we have not those
materials at hand. Nothing can be a stronger
proof of our weakness in the absence of a military
force, even when it is not far removed, than the
history of such insurrections as have occurred.
The civil power and all semblance of the existence
of our government are instantly swept away by the
torrent."

These extracts are of singular significance at the
present moment, both as having been written long
before the present events, and as proceeding from
one of the greatest and best informed among Indian
statesmen. There is one other passage which I
would quote from the same authority. It is a com-
mon observation that our empire in India is one
purely founded on opinion. Sir Charles Metcalfe
thus forcibly analyzes the truth:—

"Some say that our empire in India rests on
opinion, others on main force. It in fact depends
on both. We could not keep the country by
opinion if we had not a considerable force; and no
"force that we could pay would be sufficient if it
were not aided by the opinion of our invincibility.
Our force does not operate so much by its actual
strength as by the impression which it produces,
and that impression is the opinion by which we
hold India."

Opinion may be the wider basis of the two: but it
would fall to-morrow if unsupported by our arms.

Plus nominis honor
Quam tuus ensis agit.

Especially has the Bengal army been regarded as
the source of danger. Its composition, the greater
number of high caste men and Brahmans in its ranks,
the repeated refusal of various regiments to embark
on foreign service, the whole history of the mutinies
—"passive respectful mutinies"—Sir Charles Napier
calls them, at Rawul Pindee and Wuzurabad in
1849, when thirty sepoy Battalions were implicated,
though Lord Dalhousie, when the danger was past,
called the whole affair "a farce;" all these things
lead us to look on the out-break of mutiny among the
ranks of the Bengal army without surprize. They
may teach us too that Sir Charles Napier by his wise
measures saved the empire in 1849 from a mutiny
which has been only postponed. Lord Dalhousie in
his famous Minute reviewing his whole administra-
tion states indeed, that "the position of the Native
soldier in India has long been such as to leave
hardly any circumstance of his condition in need of
improvement," and he called Sir Charles Napier
the salumniator of the Indian army for his having
asserted then there was a mutiny. But now, it is curious to see that all the Indian Journals, even those formerly most favourable to Lord Dalhousie, are full of quotations from Napier, who is declared to be little short of a prophet. Napier expressly says that "Mutiny with the sepoys is the most formidable danger menacing our Indian Empire." And again, "The ablest and most experienced civil and military servants of the East India Company consider mutiny as one of the greatest, if not the greatest danger threatening India; a danger also that may come unexpectedly, and, if the first symptoms be not carefully treated, with a power to shake Leadenhall."

But it is very far from true that the condition of the sepoy is such as scarcely to admit of improvement; and the condition of the army becomes necessarily the next subject for enquiry, since it is obviously there that we are likely to find one of the predisposing causes to revolt. I have already partially alluded to this subject, in advertizing to the pecuniary European regimental officers: the altered character and position of the Native officer; the quality of duties now performed by the soldiers; the increase of their fatigues, and their expenses. To these I would now add the following.

Of late years the European soldier in India has been greatly improved in position;* his pay, rations, tentage in the field, barracks, punka-pullers, followers in quarters, boxes for holding the kit of himself and

* See Lord Dalhousie's Minute, § 150—165.
family in cantonment, and canvass bags for the field; all have been granted, improved, or increased; his marches are made as rarely as possible; fine, healthy cantonments in the coolest hill stations are selected for him in preference to hot barracks in the plains; his comforts are all cared for; convalescents and recruits are looked after; annuities to soldiers as well as good conduct pay granted; but in all that time nothing has been done for the Native soldier.

Very far am I from implying that more has been done for the European troops than the interests of Government or their own merits justified; I merely desire to show the great contrast between the care of Government for that part of the Forces and of the Native army.

With the sepoy it has been different.
While his pay has remained stationary, his expenses have increased, both by the higher price of provisions and the more numerous and much longer marches he has now to perform. Formerly a regiment had at least six months' notice of its intended march. The sepoys had time to make their preparations, and they marched on to some neighbouring station, comparatively near. Now the order for the march comes in suddenly, and the sepoy is hustled off on a route of some four or even seven hundred miles. Nor does the sepoys' pay bear the same relative value to the present earnings of the mass of the people as in former years.

The employment of a soldier was then deemed honorable and ranked high in social opinion; the parties so employed enjoying a good standing in
social position and worldly wealth as compared with
the masses; now, the many public employments
given in our Courts of Justice, in the Revenue, and
Government Offices, and in the Public Works, have
all elevated another class of a less dominant caste far
above the sepoy in position and emoluments.

The only boon to the sepoy which I can call to
mind is the Order of British India, but it has been so
arranged, that a decoration which would be useful, if
worn by the Native officer with his corps, is generally
by the time of its bestowal, made the inducement for
the Native officer to take his pension and retire to
his native village. Thither he carries with him the
prize which accompanies the decoration—the money
allowance. Hence it happens that many Native
officers linger on long after they ought to retire, in
hopes of receiving the decoration and allowance, and
when they do get it, they immediately leave the
regiment, and all the useful influence of this valuable
boon goes with them.

There has been a vast quantity of useless tinkering
with the soldiers’ pay, clothing, rations, flogging,
the alterations in the articles of war, pensions for
wounds, compensation for dearness of provisions,
money rations, rations without money, all wretchedly
carried out, and invariably with a niggardly
spirit: guard duty has been severe and incessant;
personal escorts, treasure escorts, and jail guards
multiplied; frequent absences from the provinces;
withdrawal of right to have civil cases heard by the
courts in priority.

The military administration of India, instead of
being simple, is complicated, disjointed, and confused; instead of being vigorous, it is weak, vacillating, and ill-informed even in general matters, and lamentably ignorant in those minute details in which the Central Government so unwisely meddles.

The organization and sub-divisions into which the component parts of the army are formed, are irregular and contradictory. The three Indian forces are by Act of Parliament designated by the name of the presidencies in which they serve; the army of the presidency of Fort William, being usually styled the Bengal army, and belonging to the Government of that name. When the late Charter Act constituted Bengal a distinct Government, the control over that portion of the armed force of India ought to have gone to the newly-appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, just as the control of the armies of Madras and Bombay belonging to the local Governments of those presidencies; but jealousy of authority prevailed, and the command of this army was retained in the hands of the Governor-General of India.

No inconvenience would have resulted from the other arrangements, as the Bengal army would have been as much at the command of the Government of India as ever. Indeed, at this present time, there is a very large portion of the troops of the Madras and Bombay presidencies immediately under the direct control of the Government of India, as far as respects their positions as military bodies. The disadvantage of the Governor-General retaining the immediate and direct control over the army of Bengal, has been that the Governor-General of India
having all the vast civil concerns of this great Empire to care for, has also directed the most petty and unimportant matters connected with the welfare of a great army. Lord Dalhousie's temperament led him to supervise the most minute details of ordinary routine, and the result was such as might have been expected.

Let the past military management be looked into, to prove the utter folly of this administration. Dilatoriness, supineness, indifference, ignorance, and errors of deep import, have been the characteristic of the military system of India. Let the financial statement of the military Auditor-General of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, as sent home for the past five years, be returned to the House of Commons unmuti-lated. Then the people of England will see the remarkable division of forces, subsidiary forces, Punjab irregulars, Nizam's contingent, Nagaore irregular force, Oude force, local infantry, an innumerable host all holding direct and immediate allegiance to the man, the Governor-General, without the interventions of the Commander-in-Chief. Let a search-ing, honest investigation be instituted, and the true condition of the Bengal army will be dis-covered. Then it will appear that it has for years been the dominant body in the country: that the most extraordinary concessions have been made to its tyranny by the authorities; that the head caste man in the regiment, and not the commanding officer, has really been in command. That this very representation and others of a similar character have been in vain forwarded officially to
the superior authorities; that they have known and ignored the mutinous state of the troops whom they feared and gullied. At Mooltan, when the Bengal sepoys according to their privileges declined to work in the trenches, the cost of the hired labour to perform this work, was, in accordance with a standing order, directed to be stopped out of their pay. The men refused to permit this, and the officers actually paid the money out of their own pockets to hush the matter up! With such an army as that of Bengal, mutiny was a necessity. It was a mere question of time. The moment must have come in its history, as in the history of all such bodies, when it must either subdue the State it professed to serve, or be subdued. The policy of Lord Dalhousie has precipitated the event, it is true; but the event itself was nevertheless certain.

Those officers who were aware of the condition of the army and neglected to report it, are under a heavy responsibility; so are those at head quarters who have put aside such representations as reached them; so is Lord Dalhousie, whose despotic monopoly of power prevented many an honest man from making representations, which he knew would be unattended to, and call down displeasure on himself. Major Bird, I see, has publicly stated at Manchester, that the Company's troops had declared their readiness to join the King of Oude, if he would resist the spoliation of his kingdom. On what authority was this statement made? Was it known to others? Was any representation of this conveyed to head quarters? Was any notice taken of it?
Further, the jealousy evinced by the late Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, towards the exercise of power by the Commander-in-Chief, and his resolute determination to concentrate in his own hands the whole authority, military and civil, of all India, led him to deny to one and all in high office the right to exercise any authority by virtue of the office, except such as it pleased him to yield. Thus he refused such a man as Sir Charles Napier the right to exercise any independent action or discretion however trifling even in a crisis fraught with danger to the Empire, on the plea that the Governor-General possessed the priority of all talent and information. The plea was not, however, well founded, for men with a glimmering perception of what was coming were afraid to speak out. It was common talk, universally accepted, that no man in India could without danger to his individual prospects either oppose Lord Dalhousie, or make known to him unpleasant truths. From the commencement of our power up to this lord's government, though we exercised despotic power over the people, yet the European functionaries were allowed a liberty of speech and writing, and a certain independence of thought; and thus from the many minds, all interested in England's prosperity, truth and good suggestions reached the Government; but under Lord Dalhousie's administration, no man or body of men, however high in rank or power, good in intention, sound in views, dared to give expression to ideas opposed to those held by his lordship. Especially was this the case after the overthrow of Sir Charles Napier, and thus that mono-
poly of power which was mistaken for strength, was in reality the cause of fatal weakness: it struck down all independence even of thought, much more of action. It disgusted the honest and the able, and kept them aloof in a moody silence. It brought forward the pliant and the courtier. It repressed the communication of valuable, though unpalatable information, and led to the neglect of essential measures, and to the introduction of futile measures based upon an ignorance of the actual state of the soldiery, or upon half information, which necessarily led even the clearest intellect to mistaken conclusions. Lord Dalhousie listened to those who flattered him by prophesying smooth things. This, and his lordship's love of temporarily relieving the State by a show of economy, probably led to that most fatal of his measures of army improvement, the breaking up of the Commissariat Department.

"The substitution of hired cattle," his lordship writes,* "for the use of the Government, in lieu of "animals bred and maintained by the Government "itself, was a change hardly less important than that "which has just been noted. Though the measure "is described in a single sentence, it has given a large "permanent saving to Government, while it has pre- "served full efficiency in the public carriage of the "army."

So far from this being the case, I have just read a letter from an officer with the late Commander-in- Chief at the time of his death, stating that it was

* A Minute, par. 160.
utterly impossible to move sooner against Delhi, from there being not a camel or beast of burthen procurable. How much "permanent saving" this sacrifice of our means of moving our forces at a critical moment has effected, may be calculated by our present loss of life and treasure. The Hurkaru has the following pertinent remarks upon this subject:

"LORD DALHOUSIE AND COMMISSARIAT.—If the advance upon Delhi has been delayed principally or even partly by want of carriage, this forms another indictment in the heavy charges we have to bring against Lord Dalhousie. That nobleman, some three or four years ago, set himself to work to reform the Commissariat Department. It is probable that at the time he was in want of money, either for the conversion of the Five per Cents., for the Burmese war, or to swell his balances, for, we believe, his reform of the Commissariat, although heralded with much pomp and parade, resolved itself into an order to do away with the breeding establishment at Hissar, and to sell off the whole stock of Government camels on hand. A contract was at the same time entered into with Lalla Joteepersad to keep up a certain number of hired animals ready for service. The sale of the Government stock doubtless brought in a considerable amount of ready money, but what has been the practical result of the reform? Why, that at a most critical period—the most critical season of our rule in India—our troops, for the first time in history, have been unable to inflict
"prompt punishment upon mutineers,—and all for "want of carriage!"

"This is a sample of the penny-wise and pound-
"foolish policy of the man who, undoubtedly, pro-
"voked the present crisis."

That Lord Dalhousie's administration was sup-
ported by many, if not a large majority of the
Europeans in India, is undoubtedly; but this is simply
saying that men are selfish, and seek after the
loaves and fishes so plentifully at the command of a
Governor-General: but there is a considerable num-
ber of Europeans who regard his lordship's career
in a very different light—as one, during which a
greater amount of evil has been done to our real
power in India, more destruction of the independent
English feeling by his lordship's despotism, than
during any former government.

With reference to future military measures of
reform, the following seem most prominently worthy
of consideration.

1st. The distribution of our army on a totally
different plan from that of the single station and
detachment plan now in vogue, by which our forces
are, as Sir C. Napier says, scattered over the country
as by a pepper-box. The grouping of our forces in
large bodies at sundry principal cantonment stations
has, I believe, been lately recommended by the pre-
sent military authorities. It has the sanction of
Sir C. Napier and Sir C. Metcalfe; but it involves
necessarily an entire reorganization of our police,
upon whom must then fall all the civil duties of
treasure and jail guards, and other fatigue duties, now discharged by the army.

2nd. The introduction of some fresh element into the Native ranks, to counterpoise the influence of the Brahmins and men of caste. It is thus that able journal the Phæmik describes the influence of the Brahmins in the army of Bengal:—

"It is in the army, however, that the Brahmin is "most mischievous, that his propensities for intrigue "become most dangerously developed. Our Native "regiments are crowded with Brahmins. They "preponderate in most corps above all other castes. "Orders prohibiting their enlistment have hitherto "been next to useless. They enlist under false "names, professing to be of other castes; assured "that the presence of shoals of their kinsmen will "secure them, after enlistment, from recognition as "Brahmins by the other sepoys. The mischief those "priest-soldiers do is incalculable. They are at the "bottom of every plot, the components of every "punchayet; as they will, so must all others do. "Their numbers and their priestly influence give "them, in some degree, the command of the corps. "Europeans unacquainted with the internal struc-"ture of the Bengal Native regiments, can have but "the faintest notion of the influence for evil the "Brahmins of a regiment of Native infantry have "it in their power to wield. It is, indeed, difficult "to convey a correct idea of the bad influence these "bodies of priests can exercise, when inclination or "interests lead them to disaffection. Ireland, in a
"state of semi-rebellion, garrisoned by regiments, three-fourths of the men of which were Roman Catholics, would not furnish an ample illustration! If our readers can, however, fancy three-fourths of those Irish Catholic soldiers to be men invested with jesuitical influence over their fellows—nay, really jesuits—they will realize a picture that comes something near the mark. Is it wonderful that an army so organized should sooner or later mutiny—not merely mutiny, but boldly essay the destruction of British Indian rule? The wonder is, that it has not long before attempted what it is now trying to achieve. Until late years, however, any attempt of the kind must have seemed hopeless."

That we must henceforth continue to keep a far larger European force than hitherto in India for many years to come, seems unquestionable. But though such regiments would, under a system of cantonments, be quartered with Native regiments, they would still be perfectly distinct from them. Various propositions have from time to time been made, with reference to the source whence new blood may be infused into our Indian ranks. Lord William Bentinck proposed Malays; Sir Charles Napier advocated Goorkas; a proposition has lately appeared to enlist Africans; another suggests the addition of European companies to every Native regiment. This last would, at any rate, seem inexpedient. The European and the Native may forego their prejudices in seasons of pressing, common danger, as happened between the 13th Queen's and the 35th B.L.I.
during the siege of Jellalabad; but the latter brave regiment was spurned by the Bengal regiments for even such conduct, and there is little prospect of coalescence between the European and Native soldier. The former despises the latter as a "nigger;" the latter regards the former as a beef-eating, outcast Pariah. They have no community of language, thought, or habits; and the presence of the Europeans would afford no safeguard against the prevalence of sedition, the influence of punchayets, and the like, among the Native ranks. There is, however, another class admirably adapted for our purpose, a class whom we are bound to support, though it has hitherto been too much the custom to despise them— I speak of the East Indians. This rapidly increasing class is like the bat in the fable, between the birds and beasts; they are outcasts on either hand. They are miserably poor; they have contracted habits of early, improvident marriages, and produce families for whom they find it impossible to provide. Hence, we see plenty of emaciated specimens of humanity among them. But in all those instances in which good food and wholesome air have been allowed to operate, the East Indian frame becomes developed, and the individual is a stout, stalwart man. They speak English and one Native language, often more, indifferently; they are, with respect to habits of life, rather assimilated to their Asiatic than the European side of origin; there is a substratum variety in their composition, on which would naturally rise a proper esprit de corps. They would harmonize with the Native soldiery. As it is, they compose the bands
— the drummers, buglers, and fifers of our army. From their knowledge of Native habits and language, they would act as a constant police upon the Native sepoys, who could scarcely by any possibility carry on intrigue in the presence of such a detective; whilst the pride of British ancestry would ever render the East Indian loyal to the English interests, which they would identify with their own. The East India Company has been frequently urged to avail itself of this source for recruiting its army—hitherto without success. It is a fact that East Indians, unable to enter the Company’s army, have sailed to England, and there enlisted in the Queen’s forces. Any number required might be recruited at a short notice; and, while effectually serving ourselves, we should be doing bare justice to a race whose claim to our care we have been only too tardy in acknowledging.

3rd. The occupation of the country by a far greater number of British troops. That we must have many additional regiments from England quartered continually in India seems very certain. Whether England can spare a sufficient number seems problematical, looking to the vast territories she has to defend, and the increasing difficulty in finding recruits. Under these circumstances we must cast about to supply our wants by other means. One seems feasible, and well worthy of consideration; I allude to the plantation of military European colonies on our numerous healthy hills. What a power should we have in 5,000 British military colonists on the Neilgherries, trained to arms, nursed to cli-
mate, centrically placed, ready to descend by good roads, at an hour's notice, on any of the plains around, where their services might be required! A proposal of this nature has been started by Major Andrew Crawford of the Bombay army, and I take the following from a review on his work in the columns of the *Athenæum*:

"British India contains 840,000 square miles. Her population has been variously estimated at from one to two hundred millions. She is guarded by 260,000 combatants, of whom 41,475 are European troops; but she has no reserve, no militia, no conscription whatever. The extent of continental Europe westward of Russia is about the same as the extent of British India. The population may be about the same too. But the former supports 1,234,000 regular troops, whilst the latter, as we have just seen, is guarded by only 260,000! Yet, is this limited army contented and happy? Is even the commissioned rank satisfied?" Major Crawford replies in the negative. Promotion is slow; regimental employment is distasteful; brevet rank is unequally distributed. The average age of the whole body of general officers is about seventy-two. Yet these gentlemen, seldom possessed of *viriditas senectus*, are borne in the strength of the army. Nor is there less stagnation as the grades descend lower. Regimental colonels and majors are generally called to their appointments at the respective ages of fifty-three and forty-eight years, and after the respective lengths of service of thirty-six and thirty-two
years. Nor does the brevet rank give satisfaction. Commissaries, paymasters, and judge-advocates, have honours conferred upon them as lavishly as upon officers who have passed through the ordeal of fire. These honours, scattered without discrimination, are deprived of half their value, and the whole of their justice. The soldier, the sepoy, and the officer, are at present alike uneasy, and alike desirous of reform.

What then does Major Crawford propose? Why something not unlike the plan of industrial armies put forward by Charles Fourier, the Phalansterian. What a grand amount of labour is locked up in the Indian army! What magnificent public works are ill-provided with labourers! Yet in the ranks of our Indian army we possess an amount of labour which is represented by a money value of at least 7,500,000 rupees a year. We could spare upwards of 70,000 native infantry throughout the three presidencies, for works similar to those executed by the Roman legionaries—roads, bridges, canals, dams, tanks, harbours, and piers. In the Indian army there is some 30,000 artillery and cavalry, but these could not be employed like the infantry in indiscriminate labours. Their cattle is in number 35,564. The forage for it costs 3,912,040 rupees annually. Therefore, this artillery and cavalry should be colonized on the Austrian and Russian system, and be made to produce subsistence for themselves and their horses. By means of both these working systems, Government would save £1,141,204 annually. Prince Eugene
"started and carried out the latter system in Austria: and 45,000 men now form a colonized cordon of troops along the Turkish frontier, at posts 50 miles apart, in a line 800 miles in length. Russia, admiring and imitating the example of Austria, has now an establishment of 98,260 men, 71,210 horses, and 152 guns, all supported by military labour. They are among the best corps of the Russian army."

Our hills are healthy and well adapted for farming. They grow wheat and other cereals, and there is ample room for any number of men we may choose to locate upon them. Apparently some such scheme might be effected at a positive saving to Government. But beyond glancing at the suggestion itself, I profess myself unequal to consider it in detail.

4th. By some scheme or other a full working complement of English officers must be kept up, with every regiment of service. Whether this is to be brought about by a staff corps, or some other device, it is not my province to determine; but that it must be done, somehow or other, I think will be admitted by those who consider the necessary consequences of such an under-officer ing of corps, as a perusal of the army lists of the various presidencies discloses.

5th. The command of corps must only be entrusted to men who can efficiently perform their duty: men in the prime of life, or, at least, a hale and green old age; not men effete from senility, disease, or the effects of long residence in India; who cannot sit a horse, or hear a volley fired close to their ears, or speak audibly a word of command, or
distinguish between a stone or a stockade at thirty paces distance. Of these poor old gentlemen the army must be weeded; they have seen their day, and done their duty well in their time no doubt. By quicker promotion, by stronger inducements to retire, let them be gently compelled to seek home and repose, with all those honours which should attend old age; but, at all events, let them not continue to impair the efficiency of our military arm, while younger, abler, fitter instruments, are ready at hand at a moment's notice.

6th. The question of elevating the position and quality of the native officer demands attention.

7th. The just grievances of the sepoy call for inquiry and redress. On all these points I would venture to recommend a perusal of "Malcolm's Political History," and "White's Considerations on the State of British India."

One remark only I would venture to make here; a hope that after victory has crowned our arms, we may not tarnish our success by any unnecessary bloodshed. The rebels have put themselves out of the pale of quarter by their own inhuman atrocities. Let those who meet us in battle pay the penalty of their crimes by death upon the spot. But after the battle is over, may we remember mercy. There are, I know, many strong-minded persons among us who counsel utter extermination. "The rule," writes "Macaulay, "by which a prince ought after rebellion to be guided in selecting the rebels for punishment, is perfectly obvious. The ring-leaders, the "men of rank, fortune, and education, whose powers
“and whose artifices have led the multitude into error, are the proper objects of severity. The deluded populace, when once the slaughter on the field of battle is over, can scarcely be treated too leniently.”

True, the majority here are military who are guilty of the military crime of mutiny, as well as the civil crime of rebellion. They are doubly traitors; but, as Napier has observed, we cannot deal with thirty thousand men as we would with a single or a few mutineers; and it is to be hoped that the policy of Camillus rather than Pontius may prevail in our councils on the present occasion.

The further consideration of the treatment of the army I must leave to military authorities. I must apologize and crave forbearance indeed for having even said so much on a topic with which I am not professionally acquainted; but it was impossible with such a subject as the present before me, to pass in silence over any of those causes which may have predisposed men to revolt; but it is rather with the more remote and very remote exciting causes which I have to do; and these it is, which I desire to bring prominently under notice, because they are apt to elude observation, or to be denied; and it is impossible to devise the proper remedies, if the circle of our inquiries does not include within its circumference all the causes, remote as well as immediate, that may have led to a malady, which if not checked, will prove speedily fatal.

I do not say that these causes may be traced back in a regular series, each accounting for, and pro-
ducting the other. By asserting this, I should fall into the fallacy, or at least I should certainly be so accused, of enlisting every possible event into the service of a preconceived theory, and the foregone conclusion of a mere party writer.

What I say is, that we must bring under review every cause which seems likely to endanger our empire for the future; whether or not they shall be thought to be more or less connected or altogether unconnected with the recent rebellion. On this point opinions may differ. Some may see in every one of the topics which I am about to bring forward, only so many reasons accounting for the late revolt: others may deny the relation of cause and effect between them and that event. Whichever view be right, it is nevertheless prudent, if not imperative on us, to investigate them all.

The first is the general tone of feeling that the people of India entertained towards us. The most prejudiced, narrow-minded, short-sighted civilian of the old school, would scarcely venture at the present day to assert that our rule is loved by the Natives, or that they look to us with feelings of affection.

Let the reader refer back to the prophetic expressions, the repeated warnings, the statesmanlike convictions of Sir Charles Metcalfe. Nothing indeed is more remarkable than the blindness of the general run of civilians to the actual feelings of the people. They are so puffed up with an overweening idea of their own excellence, that they cannot believe the people disaffected under their superintendence; they are so wedded to the perfections of the Indian Go-
vernment, that they cannot conceive it distasteful to the people. They make no allowance for the existence among the Natives of those feelings which actuate themselves. They cannot believe that the Natives look with reverence, or affection, or respect to old institutions, old associations, old names, old dynasties. They look only to what they conclude their system ought to produce: they listen to the reports of their Sheristadars and Thasildars; the supple Bengalee is little likely to bring forward what shall prove humbling to “master’s” pride, or incur the loss of “master’s favor;” they ignore the necessary consequences of such an administration of justice and police as obtains throughout India. They glance only at the superficial state of the country; and even in their recent official dispatch in reply to the Bengal Missionaries’ Memorial, written so lately as the 11th March last, I find the following passage:— “We observe with great satisfaction that the Lieutenant-Governor expresses his absolute dissent from the statement made, doubtless in perfect good faith, that the people exhibit a spirit of sullen discontent on account of the miseries ascribed to them, or that there exists among them that bitter hatred to the Government, which has filled the memorialists, as they declare, with alarm as well as sorrow.”

I believe the following will be found to be something near the truth of the matter. There is indisputably a very large and influential population who hate us cordially. First of all, in daring as in bitterness, I would place the Mohamedans, who pursue us with a double hatred, both as Kaffirs to be exter-
minated on account of our religion, and as the race which has toppled them from their palaces and superseded them in the empire of the East. Next are the Brahmins, who, without the same intense religious prejudices, or the same open audacity of purpose, have nevertheless not marked their ascendancy over the millions who pass away from their hands without a deep animosity; nor is the effect of their revenge less formidable, because it exhibits itself in wily intrigue, in tampering with the soldiery, and underhand sedi-
tion, rather than in open violence. So again the high castes view us askance. Their importance is lost, they no longer fatten on the revenues of the country, or thrive by the oppression of the masses; a task, which so far as it is permitted at all, we have ourselves monopolized. The great Zemindars and other landholders, whose estates have passed from them, and such of their retainers as look back with regret to the feudal ancestral hall, nurse a bitter grudge against the English. The old landed aris-
tocracy, as a body, are angry at us for having broken down the privileges which they misused. But there anything like hatred or jealousy stops. The great bulk of the people, the ryots and cultivators of the soil are better off under our government, than any of its predecessors. Our policy is all in their favor. We have released them, at least in the Presidency of Madras, from the thraldom of their lords, who governed them ruthlessly; we have done much to level the distinc-
tions of caste, and to raise the Pariah to a higher social platform. We have striven to educate the lowest, rather than to keep knowledge locked up
exclusively in the breasts of the fortunate few. Our intentions have been excellent; we have marred them in performance; and the discontent of the masses is not levelled at the Government as a Government, but at the constant interference with their agricultural operations, which our mistaken revenue practice has most unnecessarily introduced, the feebleness of the administration of justice which envelopes the land in a cloud of litigation, and the corruption of the police, which leads to false charges and extortion on the one hand, while it is perfectly powerless to protect life and property from crimes of violence on the other. The natives have enough in all conscience to make them grumble, but their discontent is neither dangerous in its character, nor directed to the overthrow of the State. Were their condition at once bettered, as it very easily might be, by the introduction of those measures which have already been sanctioned as admitted essentials, they would speedily rise in prosperity, and become one of the happiest and most contented people in the world. I, for one, believe that the future has this in store for India, if our rule obtains; I believe that Madras, so assiduously declared to be "benighted," is far in advance of any other part of India, in respect to that social change to which I have alluded. We have here three distinct classes, the ryot, the merchant, and the Government official. At present all are in a transition state. The Thasildar has enormous powers of working good or harm: when education has raised the character of this class, their influences for good will vastly predominate. By lowering our heavy demands on the
agricultural class, and opening up communications for the purposes of traffic, we shall enrich the ryot and the merchant. In these three classes we have the germs of our future landed gentry, our merchant princes, and our ruling class. We have latterly shocked the prejudices of all by our repeated instances of flagrant bad faith in our respective treaty breaches with the native sovereigns of India; we have rudely staggered their belief in our honesty, and done what in us lay to alarm and alienate all classes. It may seem paradoxical, and I confess, I feel it difficult how to reconcile my statement of belief in discontent on the part of the masses with the admission that our Government is an improvement upon any form which has preceded it. Perhaps the difficulty is created by forgetting that though our predecessors' administration may have been worse than our own, it does not follow that our own is good. It may still be practically bad. This is but an illustration of Bentham's fallacy of false consolation by which the wretched condition of a people is complacently contrasted with one which is more wretched. It is not by what we have done, but by what we have left undone, that our claims to praise or blame must be decided. And it is in this direction, that our errors lie. We have governed too much for ourselves, too little for the people. Till very lately our primary object has been to extract revenue out of them, and they groan under a host of comparatively petty evils, the sum of which is large indeed, and ample enough to engender discontent and disaffection. Perhaps the
following remarks of Sir C. Metcalfe, may help to elucidate this seeming contradiction. He says:

"Persons unacquainted with our position in India might throw in our teeth, that this disaffection is the consequence of bad government, and many among us, connecting the two ideas together, are reluctant to credit the existence of general disaffection. But this feeling is quite natural without any mis-government. Instead of being excited by our misrule, it is, I believe, in a great degree, mollified by our good government. It exists, because the domination of strangers—in every respect strangers—in country, in colour, in dress, in manners, in habits, in religion, must be odious. It is less active than it might be, because it is evident to all that we endeavour to govern well, and that whatever harm our government does, proceeds from ignorance or mistake, and not from any wilful in-justice or oppression."

It is not possible to conceive a greater calamity to the people of India, than the present dissolution of the bands between them and us. Pen cannot describe, heart cannot conceive the misery in store for the natives of India, if every European were massacred to-morrow, and they handed over to their own devices. Internecine war, anarchy such as the world has not witnessed, would follow our destruction. There is no man strong enough, or wise enough, or good enough, among them, to reconstruct a Government; and it would be one universal scene of pillage and devastation throughout the country. As Tacitus
writes of the Gauls: "Pulsis Romanis, quid alium quam bella inter se gentium existent?"

But they reflect not on these consequences, apparent as they are to us. It is a trite remark that our own government in India is one emphatically of opinion. Macaulay has enshrined the power of an Englishman's "yea, yea" "nay, nay" in one of his epigrammatic sentences. The sepoy who once eat the Company's salt knew that, his pay would be punctual; his pension during old age, or the support of his family in event of his death in battle, ensured. The ryot, though we wrung his hard-earned rupees out of him, felt that he enjoyed a degree of security to which his ancestors were strangers. He was no longer subject to the predatory incursions of the Pindarees or Mahratta horse. He believed that as a general principle, a love of justice and fair dealing characterized the Englishmen set over him, however distant or patronizing the former might be. Kings confided in us, and gave up real power which they could not preserve, upon the faith of treaties which they fondly flattered themselves would at least leave royal dignity and a princely revenue to their heirs and successors so long, as in their own phrase, "the sun and moon endured." They watched us attempting to punish crimes of violence with the strong hand of the law, and endeavouring to administer civil justice amid the forgeries and perjuries which beset us at every step of a suit. Added to this, they were dumbfounded and stupified at the wondrous success of our arms: they regarded us
with a childlike admiration: they looked up to us as beings of a superior order, as the Mexicans and Peruvians looked on the followers of Cortez and Pizarro. Custom has somewhat marred our reputation; long familiarity has diminished our terrors; we have taught them the art of war by which we conquered their forefathers; as we every day approach nearer to them, they see us more and more distinctly. Those whom they mistook for gods, they discover to be mere men; education is beginning to enable them to judge us by a more rational standard, Minuit praeantia famam. May it not all end in the contempt of Caliban for Trinculo!

More true than ever is it at the present day that any government of ours in India must be one of opinion. When the Natives have once discovered their own strength, all attempts on our part at mere physical coercion are manifestly impracticable. We can never be but as a mere handful of strangers, when compared with the swarming millions of our subjects. When once combination among them becomes feasible, and a determination to combine is persevered in, the greater force must prevail over the lesser. When a hundred million combine, writes Sir Charles Napier, the game is up. And therefore, if we are to perpetuate our empire, we must effect it, not through physical force, but by such acts of justice, prudence, and benevolence, as may reconcile the Natives to our rule; make them regard us as benefactors, or rather as a portion of themselves; render ourselves so useful to them, that our presence shall
be a continued necessity, at least until they are themselves fitted to take their own government peacefully and powerfully into their own hands.

Our practical policy, as it appears to me, is diametrically opposed to all this. India is at this moment in a transition state; it is so by our own acts and measures; and yet we ignore the fact, and treat the Natives as though every thing was stationary. It was, no doubt, a perception of this truth which induced Lord Ellenborough boldly to proclaim that the spread of education is incompatible with the security of our empire in India. And so, no doubt it is, if we will cling to our old practice of despotic power; not so, however, if we are prepared to modify our principles of government to the altered condition of the people. Education is spreading; opinion is springing up; judgment is forming; and yet we seek to deal with the people as though they were the utterly ignorant, powerless, timid, child-like population, whom we conquered a hundred years ago. They are treading fast upon our kibes, and we seek to keep them socially and politically as great a distance from ourselves as ever.

Publicity is becoming every day less and less avoidable, and we would persevere in lines of action which could only be successful from the privacy of their perpetration. We dream that the spoliation of a kingdom, the reduction of a royal family to the miserable dependency of pensioners, the most open treaty breach, the absorption of vast estates, equal in size to an English county, can now be carried on with as complete impunity, attract as little notice,
and cause as little discussion as at a period when there was not a public journal and scarce a printing press in India. We fancy that people do not see our short comings in all the objects of good government, education, policy, and justice. We have given the people a standard whereby to measure us, and we are weak enough to suppose they will not use it. Let the sceptical study the leading articles in the Hindu Patriot, written by a Brahmin with a spirit, a degree of reflection and acuteness which would do honor to any journalism in the world. Our government has always been one of opinion; but there is this distinction between the present and past. Formerly it was a false opinion, compounded of ignorance and fear: now it is a true opinion, compounded of knowledge and reflection; or, at least, it is every day more and more nearly approximating to a true opinion, to which it must come at last. And this leaves us necessarily but one path to follow, that of truth and justice, on which alone we can preserve, in the opinion of the Natives, a character which will induce them to give us their voluntary, cheerful, and loyal support.

And it is precisely in proportion as we have of late years departed from these principles, that the belief of the Natives in our good faith and honesty of intention has been most lamentably shaken; for I conscientiously believe that the last eight years—call it at once the period of Lord Dalhousie’s rule, and the policy of aggression, spoliation, and confiscation which characterized his lordship’s administration under the Yankee euphemism of “Annexation,” have
done more to loosen our hold upon the respect of the Natives, than a century of previous efforts to rivet and enchain it. These eight years honestly, if unostentatiously, employed in the introduction of the necessary measures of domestic reform; in strengthening the administration of justice, for instance; in purging the police; in revising the rates and principles of assessment; in settling, on a satisfactory basis, the scheme of general education; in carrying out a complete revenue survey, and so improving the condition of our old possessions, instead of in coveting and grasping new; would, indeed, have consolidated our power, and with his lordship's great aptitude for business, unflagging powers of labour, and clearness of intellect, the happiest results might have been, nay, must have been, produced. But, unfortunately, consolidation was assumed to consist of usurping every square acre of land, for the occupation of which a pretext could be found. Our dominions would thus become more compact, and our power more uniform and substantial: whereas in reality every fresh acquisition was but a fresh element of weakness, both as it necessitated the spreading of our already insufficient agency, civil and military, over an ever extending area; and as the singular audacity of our bad faith, when treaty after treaty came to be regarded as so much old waste parchment, caused us to be regarded more and more with suspicion and distrust by the great body of the people. It is this accursed "Annexation" system which will probably be found
to be one of the principal, if not the principal, cause of the present rebellion.

Time, place, and opportunity befitting, I will pledge myself to prove that our various acts of annexation are one and all contrary to law, the construction of treaties, the facts of the particular case, the law of nations, and the principles of honour, honesty, and good faith. It would take up far too much space were I to enter into a thorough elucidation of the demerits of the confiscation of the respective territories and thrones of Sattarah, Surat, Nagpore, Oude, Tanjore, and the Carnatic. But I must briefly trace the outlines of the principal features of these cases, and the principles which were violated in carrying out the work of what Mr. Leoni Levi, a dry statistical compiler, can find no other word for than "spoliation."

I beg particular attention may be paid to the dissection of these cases, supported as all my assertions are by authentic official documents; because it is only by a thorough understanding of the whole facts, that the wickedness and folly of the annexation policy can be realized by the English public.

Let us first see what are the general principles by which the East India Company professes to be guided in such cases.

The Sattarah Blue Book furnishes us with the professed general principle.

There we find a general principle laid down by Lord Auckland and his colleagues, to "persevere in the one clear and direct course of abandoning no
“just and honourable accession of territory or revenue; while all existing claims of right are, at the same time, scrupulously respected;” a fair and open line of policy with which nobody can quarrel. Lord Dalhousie indorses the above as follows:—“I take this fitting occasion of recording my strong and deliberate opinion that in the exercise of a wise and sound policy, the British Government is bound not to put aside or to neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue, as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate States by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural, when the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of Government being given to the ceremony of adoption, according to Hindu Law.”

“The Government,” he continues, “is bound in duty as well as policy to act on every such occasion with the purest integrity, and in the most scrupulous observance of good faith: where even a shadow of doubt can be shown, the claim should be at once abandoned.”

These views are entirely in accordance with the expressed sentiments of the Court of Directors. In their Political Letter to the Bombay Government dated 11th June (No. 8), 1834 they write as follows:

“Whenever the tenure of the estate, and the custom of previous Governments are such that the refusal of your permission to adopt would be considered an act of hardness, still more when it would be considered an injury, the permission should be
"given; but otherwise not, unless as a reward merited either by special services or by general fidelity and good conduct, and especially by a good administration of the jagheer. It is your duty, we add, not to violate any express or constructive right, nor to defeat any just expectation, but when your refusal to recognise an adoption would not have any such effect, we are not disposed to renounce the prospective claims of Government, unless when the chief, or family, in whom the renunciation is solicited, may have deserved reward at our hands, and when this mode of conferring it is the most eligible in respect of the interests of all parties, including both the Government and the individuals of the jagheer."

Let us now see how these principles were applied in the case of the Rajah of Sattarah. Dying, he had adopted a son in the presence of the Residency surgeon. The Governor of Bombay had strongly minuted in favour of the recognition of the adopted son as Rajah. Mr. Willoughby asserted that the Company by a variety of rights, as successor to the Mogul, as suzerain, and lord paramount, had a right of veto on the adoption, so far as concerned succession to the Raj. Mr. Holt Mackenzie has conclusively shown the fallacy of this opinion. Mr. Willoughby seems to have been equally fortunate on this occasion, as on that to which he alludes in his late letter published in the Times, in convincing Lord Dalhousie that his reasoning was conclusive: though it may be thought not a very difficult task to convince a man already persuaded. Lord Dalhousie decided
against the succession. The matter came before the Court of Directors. Mr. Henry St. George Tucker, Mr. Shepherd, Major Oliphant, the Honourable W. L. Melville, and General Caulfeild wrote separate Minutes, in which they fully exposed the utter untenability of the legal plea of a power of confirmation as lord paramount; and also deprecated the annexation on the score of expediency asserted by Lord Dalhousie. Mr. Mangles minuted in favour of the annexation. Nine other Directors expressed their general concurrence in the views of Mr. Mangles. I would here quote a passage from Mr. Kaye's selection of Lord Metcalfe's papers on the law of adoption:

"The question is, whether chiefs and princes, not having heirs of the body, have a right to adopt a successor, to the exclusion of collateral heirs, or of the supposed reversionary rights of the paramount power, and whether the British Government is bound to acknowledge the adoption.

"In the disposal of this question there is a wide difference between sovereign princes and jagheerdars, between those in possession of hereditary sovereignties in their own right, and those who hold grants of land on public revenue, by gift from a sovereign or paramount power.

"Those who are sovereign princes, in their own right, and of the Hindoo religion, have, by Hindoo law, a right to adopt, to the exclusion of collateral heirs, or of the supposed reversionary right of the paramount power; the latter, in fact, in such cases, having no real existence, except in the case of absolute want of heirs; and even then the right is
only assumed in virtue of power, for it would probably be more consistent with right that the people of the States so situated should elect a sovereign for themselves.

In the case, therefore, of Hindoo sovereign princes, I should say that, on failure of heirs male of the body, they have a right to adopt, to the exclusion of collateral heirs, and that the British Government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it be regular, and not in violation of Hindoo law.

To this I would add my own humble testimony that the above exposition of the law is indubitably sound.

Now I would ask, if this was not a case in which Lord Dalhousie's dictum, that "whenever a shadow of doubt can be shown, the claim should at once be abandoned," ought to have been applied,—where was such a case to be found? Here were Sir George Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, and five of the Court of Directors one way of thinking; the Governor-General, the rest of the Council of Bombay, and nine of the Court of Directors, of another way of thinking. Those who take the trouble of reading the respective arguments, will, I think, not have much difficulty in deciding that those against the annexation are the most forcible. Here, too, was Sir C. Metcalfe's express authority, and I will venture to add the authority of any lawyer on Pundit, whose opinion it might have been thought worth while to ask. But the benefit of the doubt was not given; and the practice of the Company was, as usual, in direct opposition to its professions.
But it may be thought that the rule of the late Rajah was so disastrous, that political expediency required our taking his country, even if we stretched the law a point in so doing. So far from this, however, we have the testimony of Sir G. Clerk undisputed by any of his colleagues or Lord Dalhousie, that the Rajah's rule had been most excellent, his people happy, and his country flourishing. Was not this a case, then, for the application of the Court of Directors' principle of foregoing their privilege, when the head of the family might have, "deserved reward at our hands?"

Not at all: Lord Dalhousie thus meets that objection:

"I am unable to admit the force of the argument advanced by Sir G. Clerk, for its continuance, which is founded on the happy and prosperous condition of the state, and the just and praiseworthy government of the late Raja.

"These, indeed, would be strong arguments for its continuance, if the late Raja were yet alive, or if it could be shown that the excellence of his administration arose, not from his own personal qualities, but from the nature of the institutions of the State, by which the disposition of the Sovereign would always be guarded or compelled into an observance of the rules of good government.

"But if the excellence of his government proceeded only from the excellence of his own disposition, I find in that fact no argument for the continuance of his sovereignty to others, whose dispositions may differ widely from those so happily displayed by
"his Highness, and whose administrations may be as conspicuous for oppression and misrule as that of Shreemunt Maharaj has been for wisdom and mildness."

Further; there can be no question but that at the date of the treaty, the contracting parties never contemplated the exclusion of adopted heirs, which is the common custom over all India. If a man has no son, his religion compels him to adopt one, since it is only through the ceremonics and offerings of the son, that the soul of the father can be released from Purgatory. The adopted son stands to his adoptive father precisely in the same relation as though he were begotten. He succeeds to every hereditary right, precisely in the same way as though he were a naturally born son; and it is altogether contrary to good faith, to import into a treaty, by implication, terms of limitation which it does not expressly contain. Had the intention of the contracting parties been to confine the treaty to any particular class of heirs, apt terms would have been used; and we should have found the treaty to run, not with "heirs," but "natural "heirs," "heirs of the body," "heirs male," or the like.

Indeed the East India Company craves the application of this rule of construction to themselves, in their Petition to the House of Lords against the Surat Treaty Bill, in Ali Moorad's case. Therein they write as follows:—

"Your Petitioners desire that any pecuniary "engagements to which they are bound by treaty, "should be fulfilled as exactly as pecuniary con-
"tracts between man and man; but your Petitioners insist that in construing a treaty, the determination of what those pecuniary engagements really are materially depends on the consideration of the public and political relations existing between the contracting parties at the time of the treaty. To exclude such considerations would lead to an erroneous construction of the engagements involved in the treaty."

Sir G. Clerk forcibly refers to this principle of construction, one which Grotius has luminously insisted on, but which indeed requires no authority, since it rests on every man’s perception of common honesty. "In a matter such as this question of resumption of a territory," writes Sir G. Clerk, "I would observe, that we are morally bound to give some consideration to the sense in which we induced or permitted the other party to understand the terms of a mutual agreement. Whatever we intend in favour of an ally in perpetuity, when executing a treaty with him on that basis, by that we ought to abide in our relations with his successors, until he proves himself unworthy. We should look for escheats, not from such a source as the doubtful meaning of the stipulations of an agreement, but from the incorrigible misconduct of allies when thrown back, as they should be, on the responsibilities of the sovereign rights relinquished to them; rendering punishment in such cases signal and salutary, by abstaining from half measures, such as largely pensioning or managing
“for the delinquent, or substituting his child, wife, 
or minister.”

But Lord Dalhousie was not the man to be turned 
from his prey by any such consideration. He is 
silent as to this argument of Sir G. Clerk: but he 
will not admit that the decision is to be governed by 
a reference to the condition of affairs at the date of 
the execution of the Treaty, but by expediency, with 
reference to affairs as they stand now.

The Athenæum thus writes:—

"But Lord Dalhousie, in his Naboth's-vineyard-
view of the matter, argues as follows: — 'How-
ever wise the policy may have been which led to 
the creation of the State of Sattarah in 1819, and 
however strong the reasons which induced the 
government at that period to establish anew a Mahr-
ratta State on that side of India, I venture to 
think that the same reasons do not exist for its con-
tinuance now. The power of the Mahrattas at 
that period, still formidable, is no longer a source 
of anxiety to us; the territories of the Peishwa 
have for thirty years remained tranquilly in our 
possession; the supremacy of the British Govern-
ment has, year by year, become more firmly 
established; Scindia and Holkar have, in the 
course of events, been effectually reduced to harm-
lessness, and there is now no reason, as there 
formerly was, to apprehend the formation of alarm-
ing confederacies among Mahratta chiefs, nor any 
necessity for maintaining, as a counterpoise, the 
nominal sovereignty of the house of Seevajee.'"

"The territories," says Lord Dalhousie, arguing
for their annexation, "lie in the very heart of our own possessions. They are interposed between the two principal military stations in the Presidency of Bombay, and are at least calculated, in the hands of an independent sovereign, to form an obstacle to safe communication and combined military movement. The district is fertile, and the revenue productive. The population, accustomed for some time to regular and peaceful government" (the late Rajah's, mark you!), "are tranquil themselves, and prepared for the regular government our possession of the territory would give."

Such is the history of the annexation of Sattarah, the first in order, though not in baseness, of the many spoliations of native princes which followed during Lord Dalhousie's reign. It may seem extraordinary that any man would pursue a system of plunder in his public capacity, from the bare thought of which he would shrink in his private capacity. Sir George Lewis, perhaps, solves the difficulty, and explains and reconciles the paradoxical discrepancy.*

"A nation, represented by its Government, may have a collective character, independent of the character of any of its citizens, and this character may appear in its acts at successive periods of time; a Government may, for example, be faithless in its public engagements, though the persons composing that Government may be honourable in their private transactions. A false morality respecting national interests and patriotism may in-

* 2 Pol., p. 108.
"duke persons to resort to means on behalf of their "country which they would scorn to use for them-"selves." But Lord Dalhousie was a very strong-mined man; he held a very decided opinion as to the policy of "consolidating" our empire by "ab-"sorbing" all the States within it as opportunity arose: he had a fatal facility of penmanship which was his worst enemy; being skilled to make the worse appear the better reasoning, no scruple of con-
science ever turned him from what he considered the firm discharge of his duty; or, if he ever felt a "kind of remorse," it was of that fleeting kind of "holy humour" which the professional gentleman who "annexed" Clarence, in Shakespeare's play of "Richard the Third," tells us "was wont to hold "him but while one could count twenty;" and thus, though Lord Dalhousie had several times to furnish forth totally contradictory reasons for the same policy, he never was without a reason sufficient for the nonce to justify his conduct to himself and his masters—his admirers and dependents at any rate; nor was any obstacle so formidable that he was not prepared, to use his own phrase to General Outram, to "face" it.

Here is his lordship's creed:

"There may be a conflict of opinion as to the "advantage or the propriety of extending our al-"ready vast possessions beyond their present limits. "No man can more sincerely deprecate than I do, "any extension of the frontiers of our territories "which can be avoided, or which may not become "indispensably necessary from considerations of our
"own safety, and of the maintenance of the tran-
quillity of our provinces. But I cannot conceive
it possible for any one to dispute the policy of
taking advantage of every just opportunity which
presents itself, for consolidating the territories
that already belong to us, by taking possession of
States which may lapse in the midst of them; for
thus getting rid of these petty intervening prin-
cipalities; which may be made a means of annoyance,
but which can never, I venture to think, be a
source of strength; for adding to the resources of
the public treasury, and for extending the uniform
application of our system of government to those
whose best interests, we believe, will be promoted
thereby."

This is the key to the whole of his lordship's
"consolidation" policy. He may have persuaded
himself that our rule was such a blessing, that it
ought, at all hazards, to be imposed upon the entire
people; and thus, as all things appear yellow to a
man in the jaundice, every opportunity seemed
"just," which presented itself to his lordship. It is
a pursuance of this policy, which has done more to
loosen our hold upon India than all our other actions
put together. We have thereby destroyed the Native
belief in our good faith from one end of India to the
other; we have alarmed the few remaining princes
for the safety of their thrones and their revenues;
we have stirred up the angry passions of the soldiery,
who are making a final stand against the annihi-
lation of their ancient dynasties. But for the robbery
—I can call it by no other name—of Oude, probably
we should have had no rebellion. It is thence, as Sir C. Napier says, that the Bengal army is chiefly mounted. It is there, says Sir James Outram, that every family has at least one member in the Bengal army. Do these facts give us any insight into the origin of the rebellion? With another policy, should we not have had the support of Oude instead of a rebellion at Lucknow, if, indeed, any rebellion could ever have broken out. Who are our supporters at the present moment? The Rajahs whom we have spared! It is thus that the Mofussilite speaks of the Maharaja of Scindia:—

"We had occasion in a former issue to notice the admirable system of administration introduced by his Highness the Maharaja of Scindia into the territories of Scindia, which are fortunate enough to own him as their prince, and hope to continue our notice in an early issue. In the perfect quiet which has reigned throughout them during the past month of mutiny and plunder, we can gain a glimpse of the strength of his Highness' government, and the esteem in which it is regarded by his subjects. It is no small credit to the Maharaja's statesmanship, that, in the short space of a few years, he should have established such perfect order and organization throughout extensive provinces, in which anarchy and insubordination previously prevailed; that, in spite of mutinies and insurrections in adjacent quarters, not an instance of a dacoitee, even, has been reported in them.

"In the prompt and generous manner in which he has tendered assistance to the British Govern-
ment, the Maharaja has set an example to all Native princes. On hearing of the disturbances at Delhi, at the risk of the safety of his own capital, he at once forwarded the choice troops of his body-guard, whose drill and efficiency had been his especial care, to the seat of the North-west government at Agra; and at the same time made liberal offers of a further reinforcement. Afterwards, when intriguing villains, at the instigation of the scoundrels who have mutinied in our provinces, endeavoured to sow distrust between the faithful sepoys of the Gwalior contingent and their officers, and in the prosecution of their vile plot, did not hesitate to tamper, even, with his Highness’ name, the Maharaja at once offered an asylum to the European ladies and children; and, by removing them to his own place, and surrounding them with his own troops, proclaimed in the most marked and public manner the determination he had taken to stand or fall by the British Government. By this act he has effectually baffled the designs of any intriguers who may have hoped to seduce our troops from their allegiance by employing his name.

In the course the Maharaja has taken at this crisis, it is difficult to pronounce, whether the greater credit be due to his generosity or to his foresight. A less generous prince might have remained neutral; a less sagacious one might have declared for the cause of anarchy. To Scindia is due not only the credit of doing more than his duty to the British Government, but the sagacity
to perceive the inevitable result of the present dis-
turbances. At a time when many weaker and less
experienced minds see, in the disaffection of some
of our sepoys, the downfall of our power; the Ma-
haraja can perceive its re-establishment on a firmer
basis than before. While others may think each
petty station burnt, or each European officer trea-
cherously murdered, a victory over the British;
Scindia can see, that to destroy is not to construct,
and that though mutineers can do much damage
now, they cannot but fail in the work of consolida-
tion hereafter. While others think they see our
weakness in the paucity of European troops; the
Maharaja, enlightened by travel, knows well our
unbounded resources. He has seen the shipping
of Calcutta, and knows, that if every European
regiment in India were blown into the air, treble
their number would be sent from England to take
their places within six months. He knows it is
only ignorance of our resources which gives despe-
ration to the arms of our mutinous sepoys.

We have destroyed the only remaining stages for
the ambitious to play their parts on; we have re-
duced the families of sovereigns to the miserable
condition of pensioners; we have thrown their de-
scendants and dependants by thousands penniless
upon the world; we have frittered away the Native
nobility and gentry; the classes destined to rise on
their ruin have not yet emerged from obscurity; the
mercantile class, though important in point of
wealth, are numerically scanty; the great body of
the people consist of ryots and revenue servants,
or, as one of the Madras civilians designated them in the Torture Report, "the oppressors and the oppressed;" and every act of "annexation" and "consolidation" has only added to our embarrassed poverty and our weakness.

As to Lord Dalhousie's not conceiving it possible that any one can dispute the policy of "consolidation," let us see what opinion Mr. Henry St. George Tucker holds:—

"Those," says he, "who are eager for the extension of our territory, flatter themselves that we are extending our power as a necessary consequence; but the annexation of a principality to our gigantic empire may, in my opinion, become the source of weakness by impairing our moral influence over our native subjects. I remonstrated against the annexation (I am disposed to call it confiscation) of Colaba, the ancient seat of the Argria family, to which the allusion has been made in the Bombay minutes; and, far from having seen reason to modify or recall the opinion recorded by me on that proceeding, I have availed myself of every suitable occasion to enforce my conviction that a more mischievous policy could not be pursued than that which would engross the whole territory of India, and annihilate the small remnant of the native aristocracy. There are persons who fancy that landed possessions in India cannot be successfully administrated by native agency. In disproof of this notion, I would point to the Rampoor Jagheer in Rohilcund, which was a perfect garden when I saw it long ago, and which still-re-
“mains, I believe, in a state of the highest agricultural prosperity. Nay, I would point to the principality of Sattara, which appears to have been most successfully administered both by the ex-Rajah, Purtap Sing, and his brother and successor the late Rajah, Appah Sahib, who have done more for the improvement of the country than our Government can pretend to have done in any part of its territory.”

To this may be added the testimony of such men as the Duke of Wellington, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John Malcolm, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Sir Henry Russell, Mount Stuart Elphinstone, Lord Auckland, Sir Charles Napier, General Briggs, the Honourable Mr. Melville, Mr. Shepherd, and Lord Ellenborough—no mean names in the catalogue of Indian authorities. “We are lords paramount, and our policy is to acquire as direct a sovereignty over the 717,000 square miles still possessed by native princes, as we already have over the other half of India.” That is the key note of Lord Dalhousie’s aggressive policy. Let us listen to the emphatic convictions of some of the great men whose names I have quoted. They are too important to be omitted.

The Duke of Wellington writes:—

“In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves
"at the expense of the Mahrattas, we increase this
"evil; we throw out of employment and means of
"subsistence all who have hitherto managed the
"revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or
"have plundered the country. These people become
"additional enemies, at the same time that by the
"extension of our territory our means of supporting
"our government and of defending ourselves are
"proportionally decreased."

Sir Thomas Munro writes:—

"Even if all India could be brought under the
"British dominion, it is very questionable whether
"such a change, either as it regards the natives or
"ourselves ought to be desired. One effect of such
"a conquest would be, that the Indian army, having
"no longer any warlike neighbours to combat,
"would gradually lose its military habits and disci-
"pline, and that the native troops would have leisure
"to feel their own strength, and, for want of other
"employment, to turn it against their European
"masters. But even if we could be secured against
"every internal commotion, and could retain the
"country quietly in subjection, I doubt much if the
"condition of the people would be better than under
"their native princes. The strength of the British
"Government enables it to put down every rebellion,
"to repel every foreign invasion, and to give to its
"subjects a degree of protection which those of
"no native power enjoy. Its laws and institutions
"also afford them a security from domestic oppres-
"sion unknown in those states; but these advantages
"are dearly bought. They are purchased by the
sacrifice of independence, of national character, and of whatever renders a people respectable. The natives of the British provinces may, without fear, pursue their different occupations, as traders, meerassadars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits of their labour in tranquillity; but none of them can aspire to anything beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace: none of them can look forward to any share in the legislation, or civil or military government of their country. It is from men who either hold, or who are eligible to public office, that natives take their character; where no such men exist, there can be no energy in any other class of the community. The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in India. No elevation of character can be expected among men, who, in the military lines, cannot attain to any rank above that of Subadar (Captain), where they are as much below an (English) ensign as an ensign is below the Commander-in-Chief; and who, in the civil line, can hope for nothing beyond some petty judicial or revenue office, in which they may by corrupt means make up for their slender salary. The consequence, therefore, of the conquest of India by the British arms would be, in place of raising, to debase the whole people. There is, perhaps, no example of any conquest, in which the natives have been so completely excluded from all share of the government of their country as British India. Among all the disorders of the
"native states, the field is open for every man to raise himself; and hence, among them, there is a spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise, and independence, far preferable to the servility of our Indian subjects. The existence of independent native states is also useful in drawing off the turbulent and disaffected among our native troops."

Sir John Malcolm writes:—

"I am decidedly of opinion that the tranquillity, not to say the security of our vast Oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of the native principalities which are dependent upon us for protection. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp, that besides the other and great benefits which we derive from those alliances, their co-existence with our rule is of itself a source of political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost. They show the possibility of a native state subsisting even in the heart of our own territories, and their condition mitigates in some degree the bad effects of that too general impression, that our sovereignty is incompatible with the maintenance of native princes and chiefs.

"I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule. Considering as I do, from all my experience, that it is now our policy to maintain as long as we can all native states now existing, and through them, and by other means to support and maintain native
“chiefs and an aristocracy throughout the Empire of India, I do think that every means should be used to avert what I should consider as one of the greatest calamities, in a political point of view, that could arise to our empire, viz., the whole of India becoming subject to our direct rule. There are none of the chiefs who can venture to contend against us in the field. They are incapable, from their actual condition, of any dangerous combinations with each other, and they absorb many elements of sedition and rebellion. It is further to be observed on this part of the subject, that the respect which the natives give to men of high birth, with claims upon their allegiance, contributes greatly to the preservation of the general peace. Such afford an example to their countrymen of submission to the rule of foreigners—they check the rise of those bold military adventurers, with which India has, and ever will abound, but who will never have the field widely open to their enterprises, until our impolicy has annihilated, or suffered to die of their own act, those high princes and chiefs, who, though diminished in power, have still the hereditary attachment and obedience of millions of those classes, who are from habits and courage alike suited to maintain or to disturb the public peace.”

Sir Henry Russell writes:—

“The danger that we have most to dread in India lies entirely at home. A well conducted rebellion of our native subjects, or an extensive disaffection of our native troops, is the event by which
"our power is most likely to be shaken; and the
sphere of this danger is necessarily enlarged by
every enlargement of our territory. The increase
of our subjects, and still more of our native troops,
is an increase not of our strength, but of our
weakness; between them and us, there never can
be community of feeling. We must always con-
tinue foreigners, and the object of that jealousy
and dislike which a foreign rule never ceases to
excite."

Mr. Elphinstone writes:—

"It appears to me to be our interest as well as our
duty, to use every means to preserve the allied
governments; it is also our interest to keep up the
number of independent powers: their territories
afford a refuge to all those whose habits of war,
intrigue, or depradation, make them incapable of
remaining quiet in ours; and the contrast of our
Government has a favourable effect on our sub-
jects, who, while they feel the evils they are
actually exposed to, are apt to forget the greater
ones from which they have been delivered. If the
existence of independent powers gives occasional
employment to our armies, it is far from being a
disadvantage."

Lord Ellenborough says:—

"Our Government is at the head of a system
composed of native states, and I would avoid
taking what are called rightful occasions of appro-
priating the territories of native states; on the
contrary, I should be disposed, as far as I could, to
maintain the native states; and I am satisfied
"that the maintenance of the native states, and
the giving to the subjects of those states the con-

viction that they were considered permanent parts
of the general Government of India, would mate-

rially strengthen our authority. I feel satisfied
that I never stood so strong with my own army
as when I was surrounded by native princes—
ye like to see respect shown to their native
princes. These princes are sovereigns of one-third
of the population of Hindostan; and with refer-
ence to the future condition of the country, it
becomes more important to give them confidence
that no systematic attempt will be made to take
advantage of the failures of heirs to confiscate
their property, or to injure in any respect those
sovereigns in the position they at present occupy."

Mr. Shepherd, writes:—

"Throughout the short period of the wonderful
rise of the British power in India, our Governments
have adopted generally a system of decided con-
ciliation towards the native princes, chiefs, and
people. The former were found the best instru-
ments for conciliating towards us the good will of
their subjects. We managed generally so to com-
bine their interest with our own, that they soon per-
ceived that the success of our government proved
the best source of benefit to themselves, and thus
they became in a manner constituent elements of
our system of government. The language of Mr.
Elphinstone was, that the British Government is
uniformly anxious to promote the prosperity of its
adherents, it being a maxim of its policy that the
interests of such persons should be as dear to it as its own.

I attribute to this system the first and more early co-operation of the natives generally in our progress. A perseverance in the same course of moderation and forbearance, a cautious abstaining from interference with the native religion, a scrupulous regard to the maintenance of our honour and good faith, an impartial administration of justice, and, in fact, the general kind and benevolent treatment of all classes, did not fail to win the confidence of the people at large. An immense native army, second to none in efficiency and discipline, and whose attachment and fidelity have stood the test of no ordinary temptations, has also been the fruits of this system. And, at length, we have the amazing spectacle of a vast country, consisting of 600,000 square miles, and containing upwards of one hundred millions of inhabitants, governed through the medium of a handful of Englishmen.

May it not be fairly questioned, whether a system of universal conquest and assumption of territory, would have been equally successful? and if so, whether it is prudent, even were it just, to deviate from this successful course? I am the last person to wish to derogate from the importance of 'British bayonets' in India; without them we could have neither gained, nor retained, our magnificent empire. I am, however, equally persuaded that a bare dependence upon physical force, either in early or later times, although it might no doubt have maintained the security of our factories on
"the coast, and fully vindicated our national power;
"yet, under it, the civilizing influences of the British
"rule could never have been extended, and the range
"of our cannon must have continued to be the
"boundaries of our territory."

General Briggs writes:—

"If you do away with the right of adoption with
"respect to the princes of India, the next question
"will be, whether in the case of estates which you
"yourselves have conferred on officers for their ser-
"vices, or upon other individuals for their merits,
"they should be allowed to adopt. Here you are
"treading on delicate ground. If you are to do
"away with the right of individuals to adopt, you
"will shake the faith of the people of India; you will
"influence that opinion which has hitherto main-
"tained you in your power; and that influence will
"thrive through your army; and you will find some
"day, as Lord Metcalfe more than once said, 'we
"shall rise some morning, and hear of a conflagra-
"tion throughout the whole empire of India, such as
"a few Europeans amongst millions will not be able
"to extinguish.' Your army is derived from the
"peasantry of the country, who have rights, and if
"those rights are infringed upon, you will no longer
"have to depend on the fidelity of that army. You
"have a native army of 250,000 men to support
"your power, and it is on the fidelity of that army
"your power rests. But you may rely on it, if you
"infringe the institutions of the people of India, that
"army will sympathise with them; for they are part
"of the population; and in every infringement you
"may make upon the rights of individuals, you in-
fringe upon the rights of men, who are either them-
selves in the army, or upon their sons, their
"fathers, or their relatives. Let the fidelity of
"your army be shaken, and your power is gone."

In 1842, Lord Auckland writes:——

"I would at once put aside any reference to the
"prerogatives claimed and exercised by the Emperor
"of Delhi, or of any supposed rights which, it has
"been thought, might be assumed by us, because
"they were habitually enforced by those sovereigns,
"or by others, who have at different times held
"supreme rule within the various provinces of the
"empire. I would look only to the terms and spirit
"of the treaties or engagements which we have
"formed with the several states of India—and bring
"forward no other demand than such as, in reference
"to those engagements, may be indisputably con-
"sistent with good faith."

Again, when an attempt was made to deprive the
Rajah of Ooreha of his rights, as an independent
prince, on similar grounds, Lord Auckland, rejecting
the flimsy pretences, thus grasped the substance of
justice:——

"I cannot for a moment admit the doctrine, that
"because the view of policy upon which we may
"have formed engagements with native princes may
"have been by circumstances materially altered, we
"are not to act scrupulously up to the terms and
"spirit of those engagements."

Lord Metcalfe went even further: for he argued
that even in a *casus omissus*, native law and prac-
tice, and neither our supremacy nor our power, ought to prevail:

"Where there is a total failure of heirs, it is probably more consistent with right that the people should elect a sovereign, than that the principality should relapse to the paramount state, that state, in fact, having no rights in such a case but what it assumes by virtue of its power."

Lord Dalhousie, however, writes the author of a pamphlet called "The Native States," has reversed this sound policy. According to him, our supremacy, wherever an apology or an excuse can be raised, has to over-ride our treaties, has to interpret their language, and to decide all their difficulties.

"By these annexations, however," writes the pamphleteer, "a large body of Englishmen do, no doubt, gain. Patronage is increased, employment is increased, salaries are increased; at the cost, however, of the general revenues, and to their impoverishment." "Five native states," writes Mr. Sullivan, "have fallen within the last ten years. If we put on one side of the account what the natives have gained by the few offices that have been lately opened to them, with what they have lost by the extermination of these states, we shall find the net loss to be immense; and what the native loses, the Englishman gains. Upon the extermination of a native state, an Englishman takes the place of the sovereign, under the name of commissioner; three or four of his associates displace as many dozen of the native official aristocracy, while some hundreds of our troops take
the place of the many thousands that every native chief supports. The little court disappears—trade languishes—the capital decays—the people are impoverished—the Englishman flourishes, and acts like a sponge, drawing up riches from the banks of the Ganges, and squeezing them down upon the banks of the Thames. Nor is this all. Native princes and their courts not only encourage native trade and native arts, but under them, and because of their very weakness, public spirit and opinion flourishes: all that constitutes the life of a people is strengthened; and though the government may occasionally be oppressive, heavier far is the yoke of our institutions.

A few civilians, indeed, uphold the contrary doctrine. Mr. Toby Prinsep traces our financial embarrassments to our not being masters of the entire area of India. Mr. Campbell looks upon every independent prince much as an heir-expectant regards some bed-ridden uncle, whose shameless lingering keeps him unjustly out of the fair heritage of his broad acres. "It is only in this way" (annexation), he writes, "that we can hope gradually to extinguish the native states, which consume so large a portion of the revenues of the country!" As though they were not their own. In the same spirit the Court of Directors in their despatch on Tanjore affairs, say they will not create a right "for the sole purpose of perpetuating a titular principality at a great cost to the public revenue!"—that revenue being the portion which the Rajah reserved for himself and his family when he ceded to the Company the fair
kingdom of Tanjore, the "garden of Southern India," whence they have ever since drawn fifty lakhs a year! To those who take this view we would suggest the following considerations, taken from a pamphlet entitled "The Native States."

1st. Considerations for our own safety, arising, in the judgment of the eminent authorities already quoted, from the maintenance of the authority of our native allies.

2nd. The limited and restricted character of our supremacy, and the tendency which an avowal of our intention to disregard those limitations and restrictions has to degenerate our government to one of mere unlicensed and uncontrolled power and force.

3rd. The moral advantages of a strict adherence to good faith, of a generous interpretation of treaties, and of a liberal course of policy towards our inferiors.

4th. The risk, as experience warns us, that we run of only increasing our financial difficulties by extensions of our territories.

5th. The magnitude of the task of adding to our dominions a greater area than that we already rule.

6th. The evil effects which the immense extension of patronage at home, consequent on the further employment of European agency in our new acquisitions, may produce by increasing the power of home authorities.

7th. The danger to England as well as to India which a successful resistance in any one case may originate and produce.

8th. The injustice, the slaughter, and the cost of pursuing such a policy.
9th. The hopelessness of promoting the improvement and happiness either of our old or our new territories by such means.

Whatever "conflict of opinion" there may be regarding the policy of annexation, when there is a bonâ fide title to the territory, I apprehend, to use Lord Dalhousie's own words, that there can be no dispute as to the impolicy as well as wickedness of annexing territory when there is not really a lapse; when we can only create one by the most glaring bad faith, and a perverted construction of treaties which the Friend of India derides as "antiquated parchments," to the amazement and disgust of the Natives, and at the cost of our own character for honest dealing and a reverence for our word. Revenue is the object; it is the old story:

Si possis, recte, si non, quocunque modo, rem.

And the more I ponder on the subject, the more clearly comes home to me the conviction that this accursed, grasping annexation policy has paved the way for the rebellion now raging in the heart of our empire.

As one kingdom after another fell, a sullen silent discontent spread wider and wider over the native mind. The fall of Oude filled up the measure of indignation. At the slaughter of Neemuch, when the officers said to their native troops (says the Bombay Times), "You have eaten the Company's salt, why are you not faithful to it?" The answer, as the sepoys shot down and bayonetted them, was,
"You Banchats! have you been faithful to the King of Oude?" Does that not give us a glimmering of the truth? See how rebellion, the moment it extended beyond the focal centre of Bengal, leaps from point to point, where our annexation policy has usurped the sovereignty. Almost simultaneously we hear of insurrection at Nagpore, at Sattara, at Jhansi, and the fear of it at Triplicane, far apart and unconnected as those localities are from one another. Peruse the dying speech of the traitor at Sattara, as we call him—hero and martyr as the people regard him, and as we should ourselves regard him, were the fable narrated of ourselves and invading Russians—and reflect, whether his brief address to his countrymen does not throw light upon the feelings which prompted the rising at Sattara. The following is the account furnished to the Bombay Telegraph by an eye-witness:—

"SATTARA, 19TH JUNE, 1857.—Seventy men of the 14th Dragoons, and 100 of the 3rd Europeans have arrived. The former occupy the camp hospital, and the latter the engineers' workshops. The field service detachment S. M. I. Horsc marches in to-morrow. Several arrests have been made; the ringleaders are being brought in prisoners almost daily. The gallows-tree has hard work awaiting it. Its services were put in requisition this morning. Not being myself a lover of death scenes, I was not present at the rebel Putta-wallah's execution, but the following is a true account of the whole affair. At a quarter to seven
the prisoner, escorted by an European officer and forty men of the faithful 22nd Regiment N. I., marched into the enclosure surrounding the scaffold. The preliminaries of striking off the fetters, reading the death warrant, &c., &c., being gone through, the prisoner—having previously asked a native officer of the local corps to look after his children, to which request he received a very distant reply—in a bold, fearless manner mounted the drop and during the process of adjusting the noose and pinioning, he, in a loud firm voice, addressed the crowd in the following words (my informant knows Maharatta as well as English):—

Listen, all! As the English people hurled the Rajah from his throne, in like manner do you drive them out of the country. This is murder. I am illegally condemned, and have not been tried by judge or jury. This example is made to frighten you, but be not alarmed. Sons of Brahmans, Mahrattas, and Musselmens, revolt! Sons of Christians, look to yourselves!

The next kingdom that fell was that of Nagpore; and here it may be worthy of remark, that Lord Dalhousie does not consider such petty events as the lapse of Nagpore, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, "of sufficient importance to find a place in the paragraphs allotted to the foreign relations of the Honourable Company;" though he condescends to admit that they "are not unworthy of note." With regard to Nagpore, I have but little to say. Through mismanagement on the part of the family their rights have never been fairly placed before the
public; but we contrived, on the death of the Rajah, to commit an act of meanness, which, I will undertake to say, there is not a native in India who cannot appreciate. We seized, and sold by public auction at Calcutta, the jewels valued at some crore of rupees, which under any circumstances should have been scrupulously handed over to the family: and I am inclined to think that by this single act of petty larceny—villainy—we have covered ourselves with more ignominy in the eyes of the Natives than by any other which can be pitted against it. The following passage from Lord Dalhousie's writings strikes the key-note of our policy with regard to Nagpore.

Lord Dalhousie tells us in the thirty-second paragraph of his minute on the case, to be found in the "Rajah of Berar's" parliamentary return, pages 33 and 34, that "the essential interest of England requires that the territory of Nagpore should pass under the British Government; for the possession of Nagpore will materially aid in supplying a want, upon the secure supply of which much of the manufacturing prosperity of England depends." And so cotton stuffed the ears of Justice, who is deaf as well as blind.

The next, in order is the confiscation of the Carnatic, and almost simultaneously, the annexation of Tanjore. I shall examine these cases separately; but I must pause here to remark that Lord Harris, according to the statement of the President of the Board of Control, in his place in Parliament, and according to the Court's Despatch on Tanjore, coin-
cided with Lord Dalhousie in recommending the abolition both of Musnud and of Raj: a fact ever to be deplored by his friends and admirers. There are those in Madras, who, contrasting his government in Madras with his reputation gained in Trinidad—their great anticipations with his comparatively little performance—assert, that fitness for the management of an island, not bigger than one of our collectorates, is no criterion of capacity for the government of such a presidency as that of Madras, and they quote the words applied by Tacitus to Galba, "omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset;" but such men are forgetful of the utter powerlessness of a Madras Governor for good, and his total dependence upon the supreme Government in Calcutta. Lord Harris was selected for his supposed peculiar fitness for the task of remedying the proved ill condition of the people of this presidency. My belief is that, had he not been bound hand and foot by the supreme Government, he would have effected the object of his mission. But ere this, he has learnt how very different is the position of a Governor of Madras from anything he had been led to expect; how his council could thwart, and mislead him; how the supreme Government could render nugatory all his best-considered projects for 'reform. Lord Harris' papers on the Revenue Assessment deserved a more honorable reception than a year's repose in Mr. John Peter Grant's official despatch-box, whence they were dragged by the late General Anson, on his arrival at Calcutta. His lordship's conception of a
system of canals, immediately on his arrival in this country; his prompt measures for lowering the assessment in those localities, where it is proved to press too heavily; and his liberal extension of public works, though defeated by the supreme Government, demand commendation, and command respect. Far as I am from going along with Lord Harris in all his measures, I believe him to have sincerely at heart the good of the people, and to have actually sown the seed of much that will hereafter prove beneficial to the country. His lordship will hereafter claim to be judged of by the several papers which he has written, and the measures which he has proposed during his incumbency of office: and as he has originated little or nothing, but adopted the well-considered suggestions of the reformers, thoroughly discussed before his accession to power, his appeal will be triumphant. No one can doubt the general excellence of his intentions, or his straightforwardness of purpose, or the kindness of his heart: but he stands almost isolated; he has not a friend of any strength of judgment about him, on whom he can rely; it is said that even in matters wherein he might express an independent opinion, he has followed in the wake of the Governor-General; and I confess, it appears to me that he has missed an opportunity, such as occurs but once in a man’s life, of raising his character to the very highest, for honesty, determination, and foresight. Far be it from me to insinuate that in any recommendation which he may have made, his lordship did not write in unison with his own convictions. But Lord Dalhousie was at hand. The stronger mind
perhaps drew after it the weaker, and Lord Harris may have hastily coincided with the decisive opinions of his superior.

I have heard it stated by some of his lordship's friends, that he claims an independence of action in the advice which he gave concerning the Carnatic and Tanjore. If this be so, by all means let him have the full credit and merit of his counsel. What I feel is, that Lord Harris may not have had before him the *full legal* merits of these cases at the time he wrote. He may have been very forcibly impressed with the general desirability of bringing these dependent States under our own immediate government, and have trusted somewhat too much to the representations of various papers placed before him. It is his lordship's practice, far more than has hitherto obtained, to refer every question involving a point of law to the law officers of the Company. I cannot ascertain that any such necessary precaution was taken in either of these cases, notwithstanding they involved such important matters as the construction of treaties, and questions of Hindoo and Mahomedan law of succession. If, instead of falling in with the current of Lord Dalhousie's policy, and drifting along with it, Lord Harris had taken his stand upon the solemn footing of justice and good faith; had he manfully yet temperately declared that however desirable it might be to "consolidate" our dominions, the preservation of our character for good faith was dearer to us far;* had

* "I would," wrote the Duke of Wellington, to his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, "I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every
he pointed out how our construction of treaties in our own favour, contrary to the intention of the contracting parties, and the facts of the case, did not give us even that miserable pecuniary gain looked for from it, but which was nothing in comparison with the loss of honour and reputation in the eyes of the Natives, entailed on us by our acts; had he shown the danger of further persistence in such courses; had he predicted, as he might, the events of the present day, as the necessary consequences of our misconduct; then, although he might not have prevented the completion of the confiscation, he would at this very moment have been regarded as the first among the statesmen of the day, and might now have appealed to his advice, as that which, if followed, would have afforded us the best chance of escaping the perils on which we have now struck, the horrors which are now floating before us "like a "phantasma or a hideous dream." Even as a matter of policy, let alone honesty, I fancy the Government would at the present moment give a good deal to have acknowledged the Nabob of the Carnatic; at least the only danger which has been apprehended in Madras has been from the disaffected Mussulmen inhabitants of Triplicane, angry at the degradation of their prince, and poverty-struck by the withdrawal of his resources.

"other frontier in India, ten times over, in order to preserve "our character for scrupulous good faith." "What," he asked, "brought me successfully through the last campaign, "but strict adherence to British good faith; and what success "could I hope for in any future operations, if I were to tarnish "that faith.""
Let us now briefly consider the case of the Nabob of the Carnatic. This prince died leaving no child. His paternal uncle, Prince Azeem Jah, beyond all question was, and is, by the Mahomedan law, his heir and successor to the Musnad. He had been Naib-i-Mooklear (or regent) during the long minority of his nephew, the late nabob. On several occasions the Court of Directors had officially recognized him in writing as next heir to the Musnad.

Lord Dalhousie gives the following pithy reasons for declaring the nawabship "in abeyance," a somewhat equivocal term:—

"As the treaty, by which the Musnad of the Carnatic was conferred on his highness' predecessor was purely a personal one, as the nabob had left no male heir, and as both he and his family had disreputably abused the dignity of their position, and the large share of the public revenue which had been allotted to them, the Court of Directors had been advised to place the title of nabob in abeyance, granting fitting pensions to the several members of the Carnatic family."

The reasons assigned, it will be observed, are threefold:—

1st. That the treaty was exclusively a personal one.

2nd. That the nabob left no male heir.

3rd. That he and his family had disreputably abused their dignity and their revenue.

Of these, the second was subsequently withdrawn in Parliament, where it was admitted that the nabob had left an heir, his uncle the Prince Azeem Jah. I
am bound to suppose that the original statement was an oversight.

The third ground is also false in point of fact. I have lived fifteen years in Madras; I was present at the installation of the late nabob, and have been here ever since: he has lived, like many other eastern princes, a life of sensuality and extravagance. But so far as the European population are concerned, I do not believe he was ever heard of; and I have no hesitation in asserting, that foolish and improvident as the young man was, his conduct has never been of a quality approximating to what would justify such a punishment as this inflicted on him and his heirs. Indeed, we might just as reasonably have refused to allow the heirs of George the Fourth to succeed him on account of his irregular habits and his extravagance. And if titles can be taken away, revenues confiscated, and contracts treated as so much waste paper, on account of a disreputable abuse of dignity or a state of indebtedness, I know not what Lord Steyne in private life would be safe: whether vice, or mere abstraction of knockers by night, is to deprive a peer of his peerage and his estates, or how far a man may exceed his income before he and his heirs may be liable to such a penalty.

Here it will be observed that the family is ousted by the assertion that there is no male heir. In the Sattara case, there was no natural heir; in the Tanjore case, no heir at all. Now this may be very ingenious, but it is a species of ingenuity which is rather to be shunned than courted by honest men,
But the excuse is idle and childish, and it would be equally idle and childish to pursue it further. This, however, remains to be said, that for all the excesses of the late nabob's life the East India Company is responsible. He was under their care from his earliest infancy, and it was their bounden duty to have attended to his education morally and intellectually. But nothing was done. He was handed over to the offices of panders and parasites, perhaps from a desire that effeminacy and precocious indulgence might cut short a life which stood between the Company and the enjoyment of the Musnud. He was neither of bad parts nor of bad disposition; and had he been only moderately educated, his presence at Madras might have entailed great benefits upon the people, especially the Mussulman population.

The other ground is utterly untenable in law. I presume that Lord Dalhousie terms the treaty "an exclusively personal one," because it was made only with the former reigning nabob, not with his "heirs and successors." But any lawyer would have told Lord Dalhousie that these words are not essential, and that the character of a treaty must depend upon its objects.

"But if a contract is made with a king," says Grotius, "it is not therefore presently to be reputed personal; for, as it is well observed by Pedius and Ulpian, the person is often inserted in the contract, not that the contract is personal, but to shew by whom the contract was made. If it be added to the treaty, that it shall stand for ever, or that it is made for the good of the kingdom, or with him
and his successors, or if it be for such a limited
time, it will from hence fully appear that the


treaty is real. But when the conjectures are equal
on both sides, all that we have to do is to conclude
that those treaties which are favourable are real,
and that the odious are personal. Treaties made
for the preservation of peace and commerce are
favorable; nor are these for ever always odious as
some think, but such as are entered into for
mutual defence come nearer the favourable; or
offensive nearer the odious and burdensome."

In the present case, the treaty was for public
objects; it purports to provide for mutual defence
against enemies; it is to secure perpetual friendship,
and the like: several descents have been lost since,
and several heirs have succeeded under it to the
Musnud, with the recognition of the East India Com-
pany, without any fresh treaty being entered into.

It is true that the Company proposes to pension
the various members of the family, which puts one,
strongly in mind of the gallantry of Claud Du Val,
who would give back a watch or a trinket out of the
property he had plundered, to the pretty demoiselle
who danced a Coranto with him on the moon-lit
green. But the members of the nabob's family know
well what this promise of pensions means. A large
body of Carnatic stipendiaries have already their
agent in London representing their grievances. On
each death the pension is somewhat reduced; so that
as the family become larger, their means of subsis-
tence becomes smaller, and by this process of
whittling, the pension becomes "fine by degrees, and
"beautifully less," until in the fourth or fifth generation the unfortunate descendants of royalty are left beggars and paupers in the land where their fathers were once supreme.

I may add, that bad as is the act itself of depriving the lawful heir of his rights, the arrangements for carrying it out were, if possible, worse. Nothing could exceed the feebleness and bungling which have characterized the whole affair. A commission has been appointed to inquire into the late nabob's debts, but no act has yet been passed investing them with the necessary powers. The greatest discontent prevails, and the gravest injustice is being done.

The Tanjore case is, if possible, more iniquitous still; but as I am counsel for the Ranee de Jure, I shall allude as cursorily as I can to her case, lest I should be thought to write as an advocate.

There, the treaty was with the rajah, "his heirs and successors." The last rajah died without a son by birth or adoption, but leaving two daughters, one married, the other unmarried, and an infant by a deceased wife, and also sixteen other widows.

Lord Dalhousie pithily disposes of this kingdom as follows:—

"Very shortly after the death of the Nawab of the Carnatic, the Rajah of Tanjore deceased. He left "no son, and no male heir, direct or indirect, who "bore his name. The Honourable Court was there- "fore advised to resume the large stipend which the "rajah had enjoyed, as a lapse to the government, "pensions being granted to the members of the "family, as in all similar cases."
Here it will be observed that the family is ousted by the assertion that there is no male heir, but the treaty contains no such limitation, its terms are general.

"The faith of treaties is basely prostituted," writes Vattel, "by studying to couch them in vague or equivocal terms, to introduce ambiguous expressions, to revive subjects of dispute, to overreach those with whom we treat, and out-do them in cunning and duplicity. Let the man who excels in these acts boast of his happy talents, and esteem himself a keen negotiator; but reason and the sacred law of nature will class him as far beneath a vulgar cheat as the majesty of kings is exalted above private persons. True diplomatic skill consists in guarding against imposition, not in practising it."

The treaty, as I have said, was not limited to heirs male; the expression is simply "heirs;" and unless the Hindoo law and custom exclude the accession of females, they are just as entitled as males to all the benefits of the treaty.

The Resident reported very strongly to the Madras Government in favour of maintaining the Raj, and placing the youngest daughter on the throne. Here he was no doubt mistaken in law, for the senior widow is by the Hindoo law the heir, and so long as there is a widow, the daughter cannot succeed, though she is not incapacitated by reason. In his letter of 6th November, 1855, he writes as follows:—

"Yakojee, the first Mahrattah Rajah of Tanjore, had three sons, who each reigned in succession; the
third son, Tookojee had four sons, and was succeeded by the third, Bavasahib, as the eldest two were not born in wedlock; Bavasahib had no children, and, on his death, in 1737, he was succeeded on the Musnud by the widow Soojan-boyee Sahib. I am informed that similar successions took place at the latter end of the last century to the Musnud of Sattara: Taradyeesahib, widow of Maharajah Sahoorajah of Sattara and daughter of Soanjee Mohitay Humbeeroyee and Kolapoor, Doorgadyee Sahib, widow of Maharajah Sumbhajee, Rajah of Kolapoor, and daughter of Suntajee Momohtary Humbeeroyee, Teeja Ayee Sahib, widow of the above, and daughter of Nasreekur Sinday: but for this I have no record to refer to."

* In the Bill filed by Kamachi Bhyu, the senior widow of the rajah, a statement was introduced—framed upon this information—and the Company interrogated as to the fact. In their answer they set up a totally distinct state of facts. The Resident who professes to have drawn his facts from records before him, clearly states that Soojan Bee succeeded her husband in the regular course, and that the usurpation of the jungle rajah was after her death. But this would not suit the Company, and they therefore sent down to the new Resident at Tanjore, who furnished them with a new state of facts, I presume from new records. The Company now states that Soojan Bee's husband was a usurper, a fact nowhere mentioned in the Sattara Blue Book pedigree. That he left a nephew, Appoo Sahib, never before heard of, who was his legal heir,—that Soojan Bee was put on the Musnud by a revolution, and that she was deposed by another, by the jungle rajah, aided by troops from Fort St. David.

How these two official accounts can be reconciled it is hard to see. The object, however, of the answer is transparent; the fact that Soojan Bee actually reigned cannot be got over. It is
Now, he herein clearly pointed out the fact that Hindoo females were capable of reigning; although all the cases he quoted happened to be those of widows, not daughters. Lord Ellenbrough, I see, derided the idea of a female succession, in the case of Ali Borad; and though his lordship may be right with regard to Mahomedans, and subordinate appointments, such as that of nabobs, who, according to theory, hold only for life; or of the Nizam, who again was an appointee of the Mogul; yet I find one instance of a Mahomedan queen in Brigg's history. There can be no doubt that there is nothing analogous to the Salic law among the Hindoos; and that in the case of independent Hindoo sovereigns, such as were the Rajahs of Tanjore, the kingdom descends by inheritance, and not by appointment. If other instances of Hindoo widows succeeding their husbands be wanted, Indian history is full of them. There is the well known case ofoolsaja Bhayee, though she reigned as regent during the infancy of an adopted son. There is the case of an ugly precedent against those who assert that a female cannot reign; and the effect therefore is to be got rid of by a side wind. Lord Hardwick said, in the case of the Nabob of the Carnatic against the E. I Company, the answer was that of a corporation, and not upon oath: truth, therefore was not to be expected in it. The remark is happy, and its application to the present case easy. The genealogical trees admitted by the answer to be in the possession of the Government were moved for. The motion was won of course. The Company's solicitor who had attended the summons before the judge, was not ashamed to argue as a reason against these productions, that if the tree should show that a Ranee had reigned, it might place the Government in a very disagreeable predicament, nay, perhaps lead to a civil war!
Thara Bhayee, who reigned at Kolapoor from 1761 to 1772, though, as regent for an adopted son, she signed a treaty with the British as Maharajah in 1766. There is the illustrious example, Ahlia Bhayee, who reigned in her own right, whose character Malcolm has drawn, and whose memory even yet lives in the affections of the Mahratta people.

There was the Rance of Gurra, Doorgawatty, "as celebrated for her beauty as good sense," * who opposed Asuf Khan, with an army of fifteen hundred elephants, and eight thousand horse, and who, when she was wounded by an arrow in the eye, stabbed herself with a dagger snatched from the girdle of the Mahout, rather than be taken prisoner. There is the queen of Trichinopoly with whom Orme opens his history; she who succeeded her husband, and who defended her city against Chunda Sahib, till beguiled by his oaths and professions, she admitted him within the walls, fell in love with him, was deceived, and thrown into prison, where she died of grief. But the Resident's report of a female sovereign in this very family, Soojan Bee, must set this point at rest. Nevertheless, the Court of Directors, acting upon the unanimous recommendation of Lords Dalhousie and Harris, thus summarily disposed of the matter:

"To our Governor-General of India in Council:

"We now reply to your letter in the Foreign Department, dated 22nd January (No. 12.), 1856,

* Malcolm.
"and to the political letters from the head governor, 
dated the 9th of November (No. 15.), and the 
22nd November (No. 17.), 1855, reporting the 
death of Sewajee, the titular Rajah of Tanjore, and 
the opinions of your Government, and of the 
Madras Government, respecting the consequence 
which should follow that event.

"The Rajah died without leaving a son by birth, 
or adoption. He was himself the only son of his 
father, the Rajah Serfojee, with whom the treaty 
of 1799 was concluded, and Serfojee was only the 
adopted son of his predecessor, Rajah Fooljajee; 
consequently there cannot be any male claimant to 
the dignity, claiming through a male. But the 
Rajah has left two daughters, the younger of whom 
(the elder being disqualified by ill health) Mr. 
Forbes, the Resident, proposed to the Madras Go-

vernor, to recognize as successor to the titular 
dignity.

"By no law or usage, however, has the daughter 
of a Hindoo Rajah any right of succession to the 
Raj, and it is entirely out of the question that we 
should create such a right, for the sole purpose of 
perpetuating a titular principality, at a great cost 
to the public revenue.*

"We agree in the unanimous opinion of your Go-

vernor, and the Governor of Madras, that the 
dignity of Rajah of Tanjore is extinct."

It is remarkable how this Despatch avoids the case

* As though the revenue belonged to the Company, and not 
to the Rajah.
of the widow, and jumps from the case of an adopted son, to that of the daughter! It is remarkable too that no less than three times do the Directors repeat the word "titular," as though that were any reason for a breach of treaty! An article in the *Athenaeum* thus dwells upon this subject:

"The next striking feature in this production is the anxiety with which the writer insists upon the dignity being merely 'titular.' Twice in the short passage is this epithet crammed in, and we remember that when a member of the House of Commons, last session, made inquiry as to the threatened measure of destruction impending over one of the doomed principalities, the India House authorities thought it quite sufficient answer, to state that the dignity was 'merely titular,' as if, forsooth, that could liberate us from our solemn engagements, and was in itself ample justification of the most palpable and dishonest breach of faith, and violation of treaties. Is it pretended that the dignity is one whit more 'merely titular' now, than at the moment when the treaty was signed? If so, let the alteration, its date and character, be pointed out. What we really promised and bound ourselves to, was to uphold this 'titular dignity' intact, with all its privileges and emoluments, so long as a particular description of persons—the heirs of him with whom we signed the treaty—would be found to fill it. And though the dignity may be 'titular,' are the solid pecuniary obligations, which, by that same treaty, we pledged ourselves inviolably to perform, of the same unsub-
"stational character; are they, or were they ever, " 'merely titular,' and are we not solemnly bound in " honour and faith, in justice, nay, in very decency, " to fulfil them scrupulously, and to the uttermost " farthing, so long as the dignity, however 'titular,' " itself exists? These are questions which must be de- " cided by plain common sense, and with reference to " those common principles of honesty and fair dealing " which lie at the very foundation of human society, " and without an observance of which that society " must forthwith suffer entire dissolution. No casuist- " try, however subtle—no sophistry, however acute, " can get rid of this contract on the mere plea, that " the party with whom we made it reserved only a " titular dignity; and it is not worth while to waste " words upon the matter; our readers might well sus- " spect us of very little respect for their understanding, " if we insisted further upon so clear a point." I can myself testify to the fashion in which this order was carried out. A company of sepoys was marched suddenly into the palace; the whole of the property, real and personal, seized; the Company's seals put upon all the jewels, and other valuables; the soldiery were disarmed, and in the most offensive way; the private estate of the Rajah's mother, of the estimated value of three lakhs a year was sequestered, and still remains so; the occupier of every piece of land in the district, which had at any time belonged to a former rajah, was turned out of his possession, and bid come before the Commissioner, who constituted himself judge, to establish a title to his satisfaction; the whole of the people, dependent for their existence
upon the expenditure of the Raj revenues among them, were suddenly panic-struck at the prospect of being thrown out of employ; and in a week the Company succeeded in converting Tanjore from the most respectful, contented place in our dominions, into a hot-bed of sullen disaffection. The people venerate the Raj; and it would have been good policy in us to have paid something if necessary, "quieta non movere." The very sepoys have refused to receive their pensions. Kamatchee Bhooyee, the senior widow, and Ranee de jure, has filed a bill in the Supreme Court, for the recovery of the personal private estate of her late husband; she has obtained an injunction against the Company, to restrain them from parting with the property, in itself a humiliation; her claim to the Raj will be shortly contested in England, when I will guarantee a thorough ventilation of the whole of this extremely ugly case.

Here I would content myself with making the few following remarks. First; as to the general policy and justice of maintaining the Raj, the Resident thus touchingly writes to Government:—

"The Government will decide on the justice of this daughter's claim, and on the policy of maintaining the Raj. In considering the question, they will not lose sight of the manner in which we became possessed of Tanjore; it is not a conquered country; its acquisition never cost the British Government the life of a single soldier, nor the value of a single rupee; the cry of the orphan was never heard, nor was the tear of a widow ever shed, when the rule of the country passed from the
"rajah to the hands of our Government. In the
fifty years during which we have held possession,
we have, in round numbers, drawn from it a total
revenue of no less than twenty crores, or as many
millions sterling. Neither Surfojee nor Servajee
ever offered the smallest hindrance to our peace-
able settlement of the country, or in any degree
whatever departed from the strictest adherence to
the treaty; truly it deserves consideration how the
Government shall act towards the last descendant
of a royal line, to a daughter of those who, when
their aid was needed, were always our firm allies.

But the matter must be looked at also as it con-
cerns ourselves.* In 1829, when yielding to the

* A word here on Residents—the most pestilential form of an
Indian official. From the moment that Lord Wellesley substi-
duted his Native allies, their fall was certain, however slow.
The foundation of their independence was sapped. In the
commencement, the Resident at the court of a Native prince
was an officer of high importance. He had to watch carefully
against intrigues with other powers hostile to the British
interests. His was a diplomatic duty; he stood the medium of
communication between the Court to whom he was accredited,
and the Company whose deputed servant he was. But as the
power of the Native sovereign crumbled insensibly away, the
Resident imperceptibly encroached upon the proper bounds of
his authority. Instead of being merely the servant of the Com-
pany, he ultimately became master of the Native sovereign.
As the latter dwindled more and more into dependence, he
crouched more and more submissively before the ambassador,
on whose representations of his conduct to the Company he
fancied the stability of his titular princeedom to depend. He
never rose to a tone of manly independence; he was too timid
to remonstrate: the will of the Resident became law: till at
last an entire right of control was claimed over the most
"earnest remonstrance of the Rajah Surfojee against the intended abolition of the Resident's office, the Governor, Mr. Lushington, recorded a Minute in which he spoke of the obligation which should restrain us from any measure affecting our present prosperous relations with the people of the fruitful country of Tanjore—and it is impossible to doubt that the now prosperous condition of the district would be very greatly affected by the sudden withdrawal of a circulation amounting to about eleven lacs a year. So great diminution of the expenditure within the province must certainly lead to a difficulty in realizing the revenue; it is a small tract of land from which to raise fifty lacs a year, and it cannot be a matter of indifference to the producers whether more than a fifth of the revenue be spent among them or not."

Secondly; as to the special fitness of her Highness Kamatchee Bhooyee to succeed to the throne, on account of her personal qualifications, the Resident, on the trifling items of expenditure. A rajah could not buy a fowling-piece without the sanction and approval of the Resident. Hence the presence of the Resident was a continual source of irritation and annoyance to the royal family; whilst on the other hand the Resident grew more and more arrogant, until his original and true character was totally forgotten. He is now a sort of Cerberus, uniting the three separate functions of spy, jailor, and dry-nurse. His principal characteristic is the most overweening fanciful idea of his own importance. I have seen a letter from one of these worthies, in which he distributes his approbation and disapprobation of the various members of the royal family with a condescension truly imperial; though the inflation led one to fear for the writer the fate of the frog in the fable, who puffed himself out until he burst.
occasion of his leaving Tanjore for a seat in the Revenue Board at Madras, wrote a letter to her, most highly complimenting her on her conduct during a season of temptation and intrigue.

Oude, as it is the last, so it is the most scandalous and the most fatal of all our aggressions. There the meanest subterfuges had to be practised to bring about our object. There we were dragged through the greatest quantity of mud; there we excited the most powerful odium; there we are at this moment feeling most bitterly the actual effect of our wickedness.

This case is likely to be so thoroughly exposed in England, that it is superfluous here to do more than glance at the principal facts. My own impression is that this affair had long been plotting. The appearance of the "Life of an Eastern Prince"—to which the author did not affix his name, but which was cooked up by a literary hack—at that particular time, was a singular coincidence. The memoranda appear to have been some twenty years old: why were they hawked up just as Oude was to be seized? The writer appears to me nearly as bad as those he paints; he was probably some low adventurer; his book is full of lies, which any acquaintance with the East suffices to detect: the whole of the evidence in the Blue Book is, to my mind, most suspicious, and

*I am unable to set out the terms of this letter. It was simply read to the Rance by one of the Durbar. I applied to the Madras Government, as her agent, for a copy. The Madras Government saw no objection, but left the matter to the Resident who had returned to Tanjore as Commissioner. That gentleman refused me a copy. Kamatchee Bhooyee had in the interim determined to assert her rights.
cooked for a special object. A similar catalogue of crimes might easily be prepared in many of our own districts into which a commission was sent.* There is not a pretence for saying that the people of Oude ever threw themselves upon us for protection from a government, the ills of which they could no longer bear; it is not even asserted, that I can find, that the existence of Oude in the centre of our own dominions was a nuisance, and an example likely to spread into our possessions: we simply constituted ourselves judges of what was good for the people, and the duty of their sovereign; we claimed a right which has no legal existence, of interfering in the internal administration of an ally's country, to make its government square with what we consider it should be; we do in India precisely what we will not allow Russia to do in Europe. We make ourselves the mock and scoff of all the European Powers, even down to King Bomba, for our palpable, transparent violation in the East of principles by which we profess to be guided in the West;

Desinit in piscem mulier formosa superno;

and having resolved upon the accomplishment of the robbery at all risks, we set about carrying it out

* Mr. Halliday, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, in a recent Minute, thus writes: "The administration of justice is nowhere alleged to be worse in Oude than it is within our own districts; and it could not be possible, in the most barbarous country in the world, to discover anything more atrocious as a system, than is laid open in the recent report of the commissioners appointed to inquire into the practice of torture in the territories of Madras."
without any scruple or delicacy as to the measures which it entailed. We send General Outram—of all men in the world; upon whom all this seems to have fallen like an avenging Nemesis, the Scindian Bayard, the hectoring champion of the despoiled Ameers*—with orders to get up sufficient evidence for a pretext of attack. The "office" is given to a

* To the student of the East India Company's character, the career of Sir James Outram is not less instructive than that of Sir Charles Napier. It affords an admirable illustration of what awaits those who will do the Company's bidding, be it what it may; as that of Napier shows what will be the result of their displeasure. The two men could scarcely be placed in more complete antagonism. A Phutereh would delight to draw their parallel. Sir James Outram vilified Sir Charles Napier in the public prints; in vain the latter tried to bring him to a court-martial; he was too powerfully protected. The fourth volume of "Napier's Life" throws a singular light on this affair. Sir James does the dirty work in Oude with the most cheerful alacrity; he is rewarded with the command of the Persian expedition. What he might have done, if there had been an opportunity, I cannot say; but the most fulsome panegyrs have been sung over the most trumpery affairs there. He jeopardized his army by an expedition into the interior for no sensible object, and was only extricated by the darkness of the night and the saint-heartedness of the enemy from a most perilous position. The Times can be worked into comparing with Sevastopol, Mohammerah, a mere fort with sixteen guns, eight of which were honeycombed, and none of which ever fired a shot after the troops landed! and the Illustrated London News can be hoaxed into inserting a spirited drawing of a charge which never took place, save in the imagination of the artist. The most flaming order has just been published by the Governor-General, and the fortunate Outram, with all Napier's charges against him yet unanswered, is, it is said, named Provisional Member of Council—a graceful compliment to the army, which it will doubtless appreciate.
few British officers in the king's pay, who send in secret, exparte statements, which the king and his ministers have no opportunity of meeting, and the first scene is complete.

It was determined to take the kingdom into our own keeping for ever. But a treaty, that of 1837, stood in the way. Thereby it was provided, that in event of any such contingency as had now arisen, we were to take the kingdom into our temporary charge. How was this to be got over? Why, the best way was to declare that there was no such treaty; and this was accordingly done. True, it had appeared among treaties officially returned to Parliament (Lord Dalhousie felt that this was "embarrassing"), but then it was through the blundering stupidity of a clerk! In all Lord Dalhousie's allusions to the interviews and correspondence between Lords W. Bentinck and Hardinge with the King of Oude, he has distinctly given it to be understood that these noblemen gave the king timely warning of the extent of penalty to which he would be liable by a persistence in bad government, namely, that he and his heirs would lose the kingdom for ever. But Lord William Bentinck's Minute shews how utterly opposed he was to such a measure; and Lord Hardinge's letter distinctly refers to the treaty of 1837 as a valid, existing treaty, on which he warned the King he was prepared to act. He writes thus:—

"And in the deed of treaty of the year 1837, it
is stated, that 'It is become well known to the
public that the violations of such an important
agreement, and neglect in so essential a matter
“stipulated in the aforesaid treaty, which by no means becomes a ruler of the country, have repeatedly occurred on the part of the former rulers of Oude, so much so that blame on that account has been attached even to the functionaries belonging to the Government of the Honourable British Company, to the effect that what was just and proper has not been done towards the subjects of the territory of Oude.’ And in the seventh article of this treaty it is specified, that his Highness the King of Oude should immediately set about and cordially attend, conjointly with the Political Resident, to the affairs relative to the improvement of the police, and the organization of a system of administration of civil justice, and the collection of revenue in the territory of Oude, ‘and should your highness not be pleased to act, which God forbid, according to the advice and counsel of the Government of the Honourable British Company, or of the Political Resident, and should maladministration, perfidy, and open tyranny and oppression, which are so destructive and ruinous to the subjects at any time, take place in the territory of Oude, the Government of the British Company shall be at liberty to appoint and depute officers of its own; for such a period as it may deem necessary, for the settlement of any portion of the territory wherein the malpractices above alluded to may have occurred; and in that case, after receiving allowance for the whole expenditure, whatever sum of money may remain as balance shall be delivered into the royal treasury.’ And this deed of treaty,
"ratified in the year 1837, is an extension of the 
deed of treaty of the year 1801; as, in the deed, 
besides the power of interference by the British 
Government, its resolution to interfere, when neces-
sary, for the good management of the territories 
is specified."

The period of probation is then stated. The king 
is to be allowed two years to put his dominions in 
order; should he fail to do this, the following is the 
nature of the penalty, with the example of Nagpore 
cited as to its efficacy:—

"And your royal highness may rest assured that 
any measures which the British Government may 
determine upon for the removal of the malprac-
tices, shall not in the least degree be detrimental 
to the rights of your royal highness, nor at all 
degrading to your dignity; what I have now re-
solved upon, may be tried as an experiment for a 
short time. The British Government shall, to the 
utmost of its power, protect the subjects without 
abolishing the authority of the king, and, as far as 
possible, without altering the ancient usages. Al-
though the adoption of these measures is very diffi-
cult, yet the accomplishment thereof chiefly depends 
upon your royal highness aiding and assisting, with 
your heart and soul, the Madaraul Mohem and the 
Political Resident, and adopting such measures as 
will produce beneficial results; for instance, I 
relate an example of this: the dominion of Nag-
pore having been properly managed on behalf of 
the British Government, was afterwards made over 
to the proprietors of the country, and the results
“were the preservation of the rights and interests of the chief ruler, and the increase of revenue as well as the comforts of the tenants and subjects.”

How shamelessly was the true character of Lord Hardinge’s letter perverted. The fact was that the treaty, though ratified by the king, had never received the consent of the Directors. Their non-ratification, as to certain clauses only, had been communicated to the king: he was never informed of the non-ratification of the remainder. On the contrary, Lord Hardinge, as appears by his letter, treated with the king on the basis that the other clauses were valid and subsisting. Under these circumstances it is quite clear, in law and in good sense, that those clauses are living and operative; and that the Company cannot escape their efficacy on any such pretext as that, for the first time, put forward for them by their unscrupulous lieutenant.

Let us see what Grotius says as to the effect of silence:—

“In the next place,” he writes, “we should know whether there has been anything on the part of the sovereign, besides bare silence; for silence alone is not enough to prove a consent without some thing or deed, which probably would not have been, if that agreement had not been approved of. But, if any such acts happen, which cannot probably be referred to another cause, then it may justly be supposed to be ratified.”

What was Lord Hardinge’s letter?

Lord Dalhousie felt the difficulty; but the job was to be done: “per fas aut nefas,” and he says to General
Outram, there is no better way of meeting the difficulty than by facing it!

He writes as follows:—

"It is very probable that the king, in the course of the discussions which will take place with the Resident, may refer to the treaty negotiated with his predecessor, in the year 1837.

"The Resident is aware that that treaty was not continued in force, having been annulled by the Court of Directors so soon as it was received in England. The Resident is further aware that, although the King of Oude was informed at that time, that certain provisions of the treaty of 1837, respecting an increased military force, would not be carried into effect, the entire abrogation of the treaty by the Court of Directors was never communicated to his Majesty.

"The effect of this reserve, and want of full communication, is felt to be embarrassing. It is the more embarrassing, that the cancelled instrument was still included in a volume of treaties which was published, in 1845, by the authority of Government. There is no better way of encountering this difficulty than by meeting it full in the face!

"If the king should allude to the treaty of 1837, and should ask why, if further measures are necessary in relation to the administration of Oude, the large powers which are given to the British Government by the said treaty should not now be put in force, his Majesty must be informed that the treaty has had no existence, since it was communicated to
"the Court of Directors, by whom it was wholly annulled. His Majesty will be reminded that the Court of Lucknow was informed at the time, that certain articles of the treaty of 1837, by which the payment of an additional military force was imposed upon the king, were to be set aside. It must be presumed, that it was not thought necessary at that time to make any communication to his Majesty regarding those articles of the treaty which were not of immediate operation; and that a subsequent communication was inadvertently neglected. The Resident will be at liberty to state that the Governor-General in Council regrets that any such neglect should have taken place, even inadvertently."

This latter suggestion was certainly very considerate and handsome on the part of Lord Dalhousie, and no doubt likely to prove very consoling and satisfactory to the king.

The proclamation, after setting forth a long catalogue of misgovernment, proceeds entirely upon the right of interfering in the internal administration of the kingdom for the protection of the people, who, he it remembered, had made no appeal to us.

Only a very short time before, when the Resident at Hyderabad had recommended, as a temporary measure, the assumption of some of the provinces of that kingdom, Lord Dalhousie thus wrote:

"Whether it would not be for the mutual advantage of the Government of India, and of the subjects of the Nizam, that his territories should be transferred to other hands; whether that event
might not, even now, if it were desired, by some means be brought to pass; whether at some time the state of Hyderabad will not become a portion of the British Empire in India, are questions which I refuse to entertain.

I refuse to entertain them, because we acknowledge the Nizam as an independent prince. We have bound ourselves by treaty to shield him from an enemy, and we have guaranteed to him the exercise over his own subjects, of his own sole and absolute authority. The British Government therefore cannot honestly entertain, and has never entertained, any intention of open aggression on the independence of this prince. It nourishes no secret invidious design of standing aloof, whilst his country is fast crumbling under the weight of his own incapacity and folly.

But so long as the alleged evils of his highness’s government are confined within his own limits, the Government of India must observe religiously the obligations of its own good faith. It has no just right to enter upon a system of direct interference in the internal affairs of his highness’s kingdom, which is explicitly forbidden by the positive stipulations of treaty, which would be utterly repugnant to the wishes of the Sovereign, our ally, and is unsought by the people over whom he rules.

From this it is apparent how completely Lord Dalhousie was the creature of expediency; how he could turn round upon himself as the occasion suited; how unscrupulous he was in the means by
which he carried out the policy which he had pre-
determined.

Let it be remembered that the kings of Oude had
lent us many millions of money in the hour of distress;
and that Lord Dalhousie thus paints their relations to
us, and the picture will be about as black and com-
plete as possible:

"The rulers of Oude, however unfaithful they may
have been to the trust confided to them—however
gross may have been their neglect, however
grievous their misgovernment of the people com-
mitted to their charge—have yet ever been faithful
and true in their adherence to the British power.
No wavering friendship has ever been laid to their
charge. They have long acknowledged our power,
have submitted without a murmur to our supre-
macy, and have aided us as best they could in
the hour of our utmost need."

Lord Dalhousie appears to have been uncommonly
anxious to complete the spoliation of Oude personally,
before the arrival of his successor. After despatching
his general letter on the subject to the Court of
Directors on the 18th June, 1855, he writes them a
short note on the 3rd of July, modestly suggesting
that perhaps his eight years' experience might have
made him the fittest instrument for completing the
work, and submitting to their good will and pleasure.
Now the Court of Directors, in any matter which
concerns appropriation of other people's property, are
as eager as the bandit in "Gil Blas," who says to
Scipio, wondering at the weight of the portmanteau
on his shoulders—"Apprenez que lorsqu'il s'agit
"d'enlever le bien d'autrui, j'emporterai l'arche de

"Noe."

"They lap suggestions as a cat laps milk." Upon
this hint, therefore, they spake, and forthwith Oude
ceased to be. An army was gathered silently around
the devoted kingdom. Entreaties, menaces, bribes
were offered to induce the king to sign the treaty,
but in vain: he refused this cup of degradation.
His demeanour was calm and dignified. "I will
"throw myself at the feet of the queen," he said; and
his kingdom was taken from him. His people were
governed by the commanding force into silent sub-
mission; and with that blind superficial vanity which
has induced us to believe that we have only to will a
thing and it is done, the subjection of the kingdom
was deemed complete: Lord Dalhousie was flattered
to the skies for the masterly way in which he had
compassed so important a revolution without blood-
shed. The "Commissioner" and his myrmidons
stepped at once into their respective offices, and com-
enced operations, as though they had been familiar
with the task all their lives. The people meanwhile
made no sign—their sullen anger was mistaken for a
thankful acceptance of the new dispensation. All
the elements of danger—all the smouldering fires
ready to burst forth without a moment's warning—
were overlooked or despised; no extraordinary mea-
sures of precaution were taken; the reported fact that
40,000 men in the ranks of the British army were
enlisted from Oude, and that they represented the
feelings of 400,000 souls in that kingdom, was for-
gotten, and with a confiding simplicity, truly charm-
ing, Lord Dalhousie welcomed Lord Canning on his arrival at Calcutta with the first flashed message of the electric telegraph just completed between the two kingdoms—as the Emperor of France might tender a bouquet to his empress—"All is quiet in Oude."

It is the custom of Lord Dalhousie's admirers to compare his reign with that of Lord Wellesley. No analogy can be more faulty, flattering as it may, be to the vanity of the eulogized. Lord Wellesley arrived in India at a time when it was a question who were to be its rulers—the Europeans or the great Native powers. They had arms in their hands, they must be subdued or subdue; the struggle was sure to be a hard one. They were enemies of the most formidable character. His weapon was the warrior's sword. Lord Dalhousie made a bloodless onslaught upon titular princes—powerless, and our friends. His weapon was the pettifogging special pleader's pen. Lord Wellesley foresaw every danger; provided for every contingency. Lord Dalhousie lulled himself into the falsest security; he took no thought for the most obvious elements of peril. I take the following striking observations from the Athenæum:

"The annexation of Oude was a consequence of the report on the state of the country, by Sir James Outram, Resident at Lucknow. But there were other things, which, if not antecedents, should at least have been consequences, of that report. Had a statesman like Lord Wellesley been at the helm of affairs, they would undoubtedly have been so; for Lord Wellesley was a man who took a clear and
"comprehensive view of all the circumstances, possible as well as patent, which should attend a measure. He neglected no precaution; he threw away no chance. He was as ambitious as any Governor-General that ever ruled in India; but he never suffered his vaulting ambition to overleap itself, and leave, in its flight, a train of evils behind. The plans by which he carried out his measures were reflections of his comprehensive mind. They were probably as complete as any human contrivance could be; and it will be admitted that whatever he was suffered to carry out to his premeditated conclusion, fell into its place with as few disadvantages to the political and social state of Indian society, as any radical operation could well be attended with.

"We are speaking of the means, not the morale, of a measure. Whether it was right, or whether it was wrong, for Lord Wellesley to make war upon Tippoo, is not the question here. But the destruction of that sovereign was admirably compassed. Every difficulty was foreseen, and every exigency met; and the dynasty of Tippoo was plucked up, flung aside, and replaced by a new arrangement which fitted into its place as if it had been there untouched from the days of Vishnu."

"There are, however, minds,—and those of no inferior order,—which, when they fix a greedy eye upon an object, utterly lose sight of the difficulties with which it is surrounded. This, however, is not courage; but narrowness of view, incapacity, monomania."
"We all knew Lord Dalhousie's peculiar propensity—it was that of annexation; but beyond the glory of the acquisition of territory, and beyond the prestige of covering them with extravagant public works of questionable utility, his lordship heeded little of consequences. The relations of the new conquest with the old possessions, and the effect of its addition to the British territories upon the minds of the people within and without it, were questions which never seem to have occurred to him. He did not stop to consider in what light the transaction might appear to the people of India. Eager for fame and honours, and confident in his resources, his vision gloated only upon the coveted prize, and many circumstances of serious moment escaped his observation altogether.

"In the case of Oude, this blindness, neglect, monomania,—call it what you will,—is most strikingly apparent. The mistrustful and excitable population of India, and especially of the North West Provinces, required to have their suspicions appeased, and their prejudices quieted, by permanent and striking examples of British good faith, honour, and generosity. The King of Oude, in the eyes of the whole Northern population of our empire, was a living monument of British magnanimity and self denial. His kingdom was the richest province possessed by any native prince federated under the British Government. It was entirely surrounded by the resistless waves of the British power. And yet, for fifty years, such had been the honour of the Government of India, that
"it had not only abstained from invading the prerogatives of the sovereign of Oude, but had absolutely condescended on several pressing occasions to borrow money of him. But it is not our intention here to criticise the abstract right or wrong of the annexation of Oude, or the Imperial advantages or disadvantages of the policy of consolidation. What we mean to insist upon is this: that the measure was carried out in the most reckless manner, and that most important circumstances connected with it were entirely overlooked. In Lord Dalhousie's opinion, all that was necessary was simply to march a small body of troops to Lucknow, and issue the fiat of annexation. This done, everything, it was supposed, would go on in an easy, plain-sailing manner. The inhabitants might not be satisfied; the Zemindars might grumble a little in their forts; the Budmashes might frown and swagger in the bazaar; but what of that? The power of the British is invincible, and her armies could, if it were necessary, defeat ten thousand times as many traitors as might be expected to exist in Oude.

"There was here, however, a consideration, not a slight one, which escaped his lordship. Could his army be depended upon? Was there any tendency to disaffection within the ranks? If these questions could not be answered in the affirmative, it was little use to brag about the strength and invincibility of the British empire. But Lord Dalhousie did not even take the trouble to put them to himself. The annexation of Oude was his last
"act. The army of Bengal he left unaltered. He
did not even let fall an expression that any altera-
tion in it was required. What he did say, sug-
gested the reverse. He left India, and declared
her to be at peace without and within.
"Yet nothing might have been plainer to him
than that the elements of great danger were stored
up in the ranks of the Bengal army. He had, he
declared, read with the utmost attention the report
of Sir James Outram, on the state of Oude. Yet
in his measures for the annexation of that country,
he recklessly ignored the following paragraph:—
"Every agricultural family in Oude, perhaps with-
out exception, besides many of other occupations,
"sends one of its members into the British army.'
"The number of Oude sepoys in our service was
estimated by Colonel Sleman at 40,000; and he
thought that the relatives they represent might
probably amount to ten times that number, or
nearly one-tenth of the entire population of Oude.
"This fact, well known to everyone, and here deli-
erately stated in one of the most important
documents ever presented to him, made not the
slightest impression on Lord Dalhousie. No pre-
cautions were taken in consequence. Supposing
"the people of the territories of an Indian prince to
be attached to their Nawab—and no one possessing
experience doubts the fact—the annexation of
Oude, broad-cast the seeds of disaffection in nearly
every regiment in the Bengal service. Yet this
fact, so important, so open, so unmistakable,
"escaped the sagacity which was rewarded by news-
"paper and Parliamentary ovations and a pension of £5,000 a year. 'The eminently practical' statesman was utterly unconscious, or profoundly reckless, of the consequences that might issue from his act. The sepoys enlisted from Oude were left in their respective corps, there to conspire, rebel, and murder. It would have been no great stretch of statesmanship to have drafted them off into separate regiments, and brigaded them in provinces of the empire far distant from Oude, and far away from the turbulent population of the North West Provinces. The Emperor of Austria is too wise to garrison Hungary with Hungarians: yet Hungarians are very different to Oriental assassins under the influence of bang and superstition. We do not say that the annexation of Oude is the cause of the rebellion and all the detestable murders that have accompanied it; but we believe it had its full share in these horrible transactions, and we are certain that it was carried out in reckless defiance of the most ordinary prudence, and the most obvious consequences."

The retainers and admirers of Lord Dalhousie obtained fat places just as he was resigning the viceroyal dignity; and his lordship no doubt congratulated himself in secret on having brought his government to a conclusion by so every way appropriate an act as the appropriation of another kingdom. He left the empire "in peace without and within," and with the comfortable assurance that, looking round the whole political horizon, he thought it might be "safely said that there seems no quarter
"from which formidable war can reasonably be apprehended at present."

This,—with Oude smouldering in the centre of a disaffected Brahminical soldiery largely recruited from its bosom! Why if Lord Ellenborough had treated Gwalior in the same way, at this moment we should probably have lost our hold in India, nay, perhaps have had all our throats cut; though, as a gentleman in high office told me, that was a merely personal question, and would not prevent our country revenging our death and retaking India; not perhaps so easy a task as it was formerly, for we have taught the sepoys the art of war and the science of great guns, nor would officers be wanting from Russia or elsewhere to direct their battalions against our re-occupying force.

Lord Ellenborough gave the Gwalior man a good hiding, and left him with an assurance, that if he did not behave himself he would get a second and improved edition of the same work. In our extremity he is now our staunchest friend. Should we not have had also the assistance of the King of Oude, if we had not deposed him?

There is another Indian statesman, whose name is inseparably connected with Oude. Warren Hastings on his return to England, was gibbeted on a parliamentary impeachment, and the slow torture was prolonged for years. Lord Dalhousie has a coronet, and a pension of £5,000 a year. How different are men's lots:

*Ite crucem secleriis pretium tulit, his diadem!

I have detailed these cases at some length, because
it is desirable that their leading features should be thoroughly known; for though I do not ask others to share this opinion with me, I conceive that they have had no small share in causing the suspicion with which we are now universally regarded. Does any one suppose that these things can be done without being observed by the people at large; or that they are entirely indifferent to them? I do not mean to say, that there exists any patriotic feeling in favor of all the various thrones, such as would cause the people to rise in their defence; but that they view these acts with the greatest dissatisfaction is certain. Thousands, whose very existence depended upon the expenditure of the royal revenues among them, have been suddenly cast adrift on the world: men, whose forefathers had for a century found military service with the various rajahs, and who looked forward to a similar support for their children, find themselves suddenly disbanded; some, it is true, pensioned; but others cast on the world, without a trade or profession to fall back upon. The jewelers, the goldsmiths, the gardeners, the flower-sellers, all those for whom the habits of an eastern court found remunerative employment, have lost their livelihood. The dependents and servants are in the same predicament; and each sees only ruin and starvation staring him in the face!

Do the few remaining kings and princes not observe these acts with trembling and alarm? Why the distant King of Candahar reproached Dost Mahomed for his folly in having entered into a treaty with us,
and pointed out what must sooner or later be his fate from the condition into which all who had entered into obligations with us had fallen! Is it not natural to suppose that those who have fallen, and those who fear they are about to fall, have their emissaries and their correspondents in various parts of the country; the one endeavouring to recover what has been taken away, the others to prevent a similar contingency? I make little doubt that in Oude, and among the Bengal troops, this has been the case to a very considerable extent; and the following extracts from Indian Journals bear closely on this point. I quote from the *Athenaeum*:

"The following is an extract from a private letter received from a gentleman of tried abilities and long experience in the Northern provinces of the Empire:

"'The general disaffection towards the British Government which prevails throughout the country has nothing to do with caste or religious prejudices. The objection to the cartridges was a mere pretence for the outbreak, which was premeditated, and for which Mahomedans and Hindoos were equally prepared. The real origin and cause of that disaffection has been political misgovernment, and the unscrupulous annexation policy which has characterized Lord Dalhousie's administration, and which has been approved and rewarded with a pension at home. It is a gross error or perversion of truth to affirm that our rule and our system of government is preferred by natives of rank, and influence in India, to that of their own princes. It cannot be
"doubted that the deposition of the King of Oude "and the annexation of his territory has caused "great discontent in that province, of which most "of our Sepoys are inhabitants, and where their "families reside; but in utter disregard of the "feelings, wishes, and interests, of the inhabitants of "countries annexed, and in violation of every prin- "ciple of justice and good faith, the chief object of "Lord Dalhousie's Government has been the annihi- "lation of every native state, wherever an oppor- "tunity offered, or any plausible pretext. As "regards Oude, it was the mal-administration of the "king; but the present state of the British territories "appears no less to demand a more efficient Govern- "ment. What but political misgovernment has pro- "duced the discontents that are said to prevail on "the part of the Mahomedan population in and near "Madras. The causes of that disaffection is well "known to the inhabitants of that presidency. What "but political misgovernment and injustice has "caused so many appeals to England from the "acts and proceedings of the Indian Government! "There was a time when it was declared to be con- "trary to the honor and interests of the British "Government, to seek the extension of our Eastern "dominions; but for some years past annexation "has been the main object of the Government, and it "will ere long be seen how far extension of territory "has been productive of increase of revenue, or the "preservation of the peace and good order of the "country."

"Seemingly coincident with the views expressed
"in the above letter," writes the *Athenæum*, "are
the following hints from a sepoy, regarding the
probable causes which have led to the present
mutiny, and which are furnished to the *Lahore
Chronicle* by a correspondent of that journal":—

"'Well, So-and-so, what do you think of the
doings at Delhi, and Meerut, and other places,' I
remarked to a fine Goorka of my corps, a man who
has served nineteen years, an escaped prisoner
from Cabul, where he was made a Mussulman of?

'Sahib,' said he, looking round to see there was no
one near, 'I've served in different regiments, and
among Poorbeahs, before I was transferred to
this, and I've heard the Poorbeahs of this regi-
ment talking. Cartridges have nothing do with
it, that's only buhana;* listen, Sahib: the first
thing that alarmed and made them suspicious was
the order to enlist 200 Seikhs and Punjabees into
each line regiment; they then, thinking that
foreign enlistment would not end with only 200
men per regiment, began to fear that the day was
coming when they were no longer to be cocks of
the walk, and also, when they were no longer to be
in the majority, and suit their own pleasure about
going on foreign service. At the top of this came
the hookum, swearing in for general service all
recruits. All this has been burning into their
souls, and the annexation of Oude has brought
things to a climax.' 'What has Oude annexed to
do with it,' I exclaimed; 'when I was with my

*A pretext.
"own regiment, the men appeared to like the idea."
"True, Sahib," was the reply, "they liked it at first, for they thought you paid them to conquer, keep, and tax other countries, but that you would not exact tax to any amount from the country where they came from, from their families, but they found the difference; that instead of being better, they are worse off than before; that they, the lordly Brahmins and Rajpoots cannot lord it as they expected; that their Bhaees in the Nawabee song couldn't dumka the Nawab, and live free as they did before; in short, that they like not the fraternity and equality of our law in Oude. Then, Sahib, you forget it is no longer a Mussulman Nawab now at Lucknow, and the faithful are now small, also. As regards the inhabitants of Delhi raising their heads, are not the inhabitants of both cities, as well as the cities themselves, brothers and sisters, as regards the Mahomedan portions? Put these together, and form your own conclusions, Sahib,"* was the cautious wind-up. In the same way, Mr. Editor, form your own opinion of the Sepoy's yarn.

The transmission of the cakes has never been satisfactorily explained. The signal, whatever it was, passed across the country with the rapidity of the Bearded Flame in "Agamemnon," or the Fiery Cross in the "Lady of the Lake." It argues combination and secrecy, and a widely-spread mutual under-

* Subsequent events seem now pointing conclusively to the annexation of Oude, as the real cause of the rebellion.
standing; and I believe it will be found to have emanated from others than the sepoys.

But the evil by no means stops here: the same all-absorbing policy has been extended downwards from rank to rank, to the dregs of the people; and over every acre of land in the kingdom.* We have not contented ourselves with sweeping in the territories of potentates; we have grasped the possessions

* Nana Sahel.—No idea can be formed as yet of the utter state of disorganization which prevails in the Upper Provinces. Trade is wholly destroyed, the public highways everywhere overrun by thieves, the dispossessed Zamindars in nearly all the villages have emerged into daylight, and ousted their successors. Scores of petty Rajahs have proclaimed their independence, and make up for defects of title by ceaseless activity in the work of robbery and murder. Of all the villains engaged in those congenial pursuits, Nana Sahel would appear to be the most bloodthirsty. This man is the adopted son of the late ex-Poishwa, Bajee Rao, and as such laid claim to the reversion of his enormous pension; but the Government overruled his pretensions, and he is now reaping the harvest of his revenge. He has organized a corps of assassins, and not a day passes in which some poor hunted European is not brought in, and literally hacked to pieces. His last act of butchery was of wholesale character, and it is a pity that he has not a thousand lives to make expiation for it. An alarm had broken out, causelessly as it seems, at Futtyghur, and 132 persons, men, women, and children, in fifty boats left that place for Allahabad, but none of them reached their destination. They had advanced as far as Bhitoor, when Nana Sahel first fired upon them, and then pursued them in dhingies. The boats were boarded, and their occupants landed and dragged to the parade ground at Cawnpore. There they were huddled into a heap and fired at, but the work of destruction proving too slow, the wretches closed in with their tulwars and hacked them to death.—Friend of India, July 2.
of Polygars and Zemindars, whenever a plausible opportunity of applying the doctrine of "escheat" has presented itself. Thus we have quite destroyed the Polygars in the South, and nearly extinguished the Zemindars in the Northern Circars. Sometimes we succeed to a childless widow; sometimes we sell up a thriftless noble who has fallen into arrears; sometimes we take his estates into nursing, and our management is so splendid, that after a season they have to be brought to the hammer, and the Company purchases them in at the nominal upset price. Such was the lot of Luchmepully Naidoo, the great Vasoorreddy Zemindar. After twenty years of litigation to establish his title to his paternal estate, he was successful, only to find that in the interim the Company, who had taken his acres into their own keeping, had purchased his broad lands, perhaps as large as an English county, at a nominal price of 500 rupees; the sale being ordered, partly on account of the accumulation of arrears into which the estate had fallen during the Company's incumbency, partly on account of arrears accrued through the mismanagement of the defendant, to whom the Zemindary had been delivered by the Sudder, without any security, in spite of express regulation and the well-known practice of the Court! The Company, in their "benevolence," as they call it, allow Luchmepully a small pension, and either from distaste for further litigation, or from inability to find the necessary funds, he seems to have subsided into passive acquiescence with what he cannot help. Such acts as this are little calculated to engender any good
feeling towards us. The connections of these Zemindars ramify widely among the people. Many of their poorer relatives and dependents are to be found in the army, and the tidings which they hear at a distance, of the fall of the family house, whether it be through the slow grinding of the Revenue process in Madras, or the swifter crushing of the Civil Courts in the North-West, are not likely to allay any disaffection already existing from other causes. But we do not stop even with the Zemindars. There is in every district a large class, who, for good services, or other causes, have received grants of rent-free lands. In many instances parties claim as Enamdars, who have really no other title than that of long possession; and it may seem very plausible that such parties should be ousted, or made to contribute towards the general expenses of Government.* But it is surely bad policy to seek to disturb parties, who, although they can produce no grant to establish their original title, have nevertheless acquired a title to the land by long possession. Yet such is our course; in Bellary we are now striving to enquire into the titles of Enamdars;—a measure recommended by Sir Thomas Munro thirty years ago; practicable probably then, but most unjust now, after thirty years undisturbed possession. And it is thus that the Enam Commission in Bombay is spoken of. I excerpt from the *Athenaeum*:

"The Madras Government on a recent occasion,

* This might easily be done, to a great extent, by making them pay for Government water whenever supplied to them."
"in ordering that a number of Enamdars should be
converted into life-pensioners, the Enams being
resumed, trusted that no considerable period would
elapse before they were in a position to set on
foot the investigation of Enam tenures generally
throughout the Presidency.

"Upon the subject of the Bombay Enams, the
"Poona Observer, just received, has the following
"communication from an able public servant:"—

"'With reference to the insurrection in the
"North-West Provinces, and the disaffected state of
"parties in this part of the country, don't you think
"that the Enam Commission might, for a time at
"least, suspend its operations? You cannot imagine
"how very unpopular this Commission is, nor indeed
"can any one who does not only move about the
"country, but have free intercourse with the people.
"It was only the other day that a Brahmin called
"the head of the Enam Commission an Avatar; and
"being curious to know of what god he was consis-
t\-dered an incarnation, was at once told that he was
"the personification not of a god but of a demon—a
"rakshis! The words were brought out with much
"feeling, and many who were standing by partook
"of the spirit in which they were uttered. I believe
"the results of the enquiries made by the Enam
"Commission fall heaviest on the Brahmins; and,
"considering that since we sent the Peishwah to end
"his days on the banks of the Holy Gunga, they
"have been deprived of many sources of emolument
"and peculiar privileges, it cannot be wondered at
"that they feel very keenly the additional loss of
"the Enams they have hitherto enjoyed. It is to be
hoped that the insurrectionary spirit will not reach
Western India; but if it does, you may depend
that those who have suffered by the operations of
the Enam Commission will be the first to fan the
flame of rebellion. It has often occurred to me
that it was extremely impolitic to allow the opera-
tions of this Commission to extend over so large a
tract of country as they now do, inasmuch as how-
ever justly carried on, it was natural they would
create disaffection wherever they went. Had the
work been carried on Talooka by Talooka, the
wide-spread disaffection regarding it would not be
in existence, and we should have no cause for
apprehension, however slight. Owing to the pre-
sent method of carrying on the work, not a single
Talooka is, I believe, finished, so that not only
those whose Enams have already been confiscated,
but those Enamdars who have the confiscation of
their Enams in anticipation are equally disaffected
in all the Talookas."

Now, if we reflect upon the necessary consequences
of this vast universal effort to make ourselves the
sole landlords of the soil, we cannot but come to the
conclusion that there is ample cause for the general
disaffection of the people.

One consideration the history of these annexations
must surely force upon us: the necessity of forth-
with erecting a tribunal before which these disputed
questions of construction of treaties and titles may
be impartially decided. At present, that construc-
tion is put upon the treaty in each case as it arises,
which best suits the interest of the East India Company. They are all-powerful: the other contracting parties are entirely helpless and powerless. They cannot dispute a construction, to which they do not agree, by the only appeal left between really independent sovereigns or states, the *ultima ratio regum*, an appeal to arms. They petition Government; the Court of Directors. Some of the wealthier despatch emissaries to England, where they are bewildered by the difficulty of obtaining a hearing. Parliament is occasionally reached by some of the boldest and most fortunate. But Parliament is an unsatisfactory tribunal in such cases. The right is ever liable to succumb before India House interest, or Ministerial influence. A question of pure law is made a party question, and the wrong once perpetrated, must be supported at all hazards. Last year it was asserted by Ministers in Parliament, that the India House and the Board of Control were both desirous of submitting Ali Moorad's case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; but that the best legal authority had decided that this could not be done, even under the large powers of discretionary reference vested in Her Majesty by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Act. I presume because there was no suit, touching the matter, pending before the Judicial Committee. But I think it cannot be disputed that the Judicial Committee is of all other bodies the tribunal best qualified for hearing and determining the questions between the Company and the princes whom they have plundered. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council comprises not
only all the highest legal names in England, but all those of the retired Indian judges who have most distinguished themselves in the East. The tribunal is familiar with Indian questions. A Bar, containing several barristers of great Indian experience and success, as well as the first lawyers in England, practices before it. The questions to be raised are purely those of law and justice; construction of treaties, and points of Hindoo law, make up the whole dispute, so far as the expediency of obtaining more extensive territory, &c., is not concerned. The matter would thus be discussed purely on legal grounds; the decision could not be biassed by any party or political influence; and whatever the judgment in any particular case might be, it would give satisfaction to all parties, at least it would leave no just room for complaint by either. I would suggest, therefore, that this measure be at once adopted; for we should thus cut off at the very root one great cause, perhaps the greatest cause, of disaffection among our Indian subjects.

I have already shewn how the annexation policy is a source of weakness instead of strength, by its compelling us to spread an already insufficient civil agency over vastly extended territories, and to denude our regiments of their European officers, in order to eke out the scanty supply of instruments for civil administration; as well as by the feelings which it has engendered in the minds of the people. That those feelings exist, will not, I am sure, be matter of dispute. But I appeal to the testimony of Metcalf; though with him I agree that the quality of
our laws, compared with those which foreran them, has perhaps mollified its character. I do not assert that our Government is altogether bad; such an intolerable evil that the people will not bear the yoke. It is its comparative mildness which has made them bear the yoke so patiently and so long. I find a singular confirmation of my belief in an official report, in 1834, on the "Disposition of the Inhabitants of the Madras Presidency;"—

"The moderation and justice of our laws must be expected, eventually, to act beneficially on all our subjects, but more especially on the Ryots and poorer classes, who, whilst enjoying protection from oppression and moderate taxation, are peaceable and obedient under any Government granting such freedom; but, unacquainted with their habits and feelings, and ignorant of the action of our laws from our intercourse with them being so limited and so formal, their sentiments and designs are alike unknown to us, and require us, in consequence, to be more or less on our guard against those sudden disturbances which are created, and require to be suppressed in a manner peculiar to India. Experience shews how often commotions in India have arisen from causes the most trivial; in what a remarkable manner such insurrections have increased by the overpowering of eyes a small detachment of military; and how rapidly such success has extended the disaffected feelings over a great extent of country; and we ought, therefore, to distrust appearances of tranquillity, and be prepared
"to act with promptitude to crush the conspiracies
at once with overwhelming power, ere the conta-
gion can be spread."

I could myself furnish abundant instances of the
existence of such feeling from my own personal in-
tercourse with the Natives of all classes. Only yest-
terday, a body of Soucarts went to a French mer-
chant of great consideration, and, because he was a
foreigner, they opened out in a style which they
never would have used in the presence of an En-
glishman.

It is but a few weeks ago since I was positively
startled by the vehemence and passion of a Native
gentleman, the interpreter of the Supreme Court,
a person of rare acquirements—speaking, reading,
and writing some sixteen languages—a man of great
power of thought, wealthy, and now a member of
the University Senate. This gentleman, during the
retirement of the judges, when the conversation at
the bar table chanced to turn on the condition of the
Natives, dashed his clenched fist down, and, suit-
ing the action to the word, exclaimed, "I would lay
"down my head to-morrow, if I knew that thereby
"I could raise my countrymen from the corpse-like
"torpor, social and political, in which they are all
"sunk!"

What the condition of the people is in Madras,
the Torture Report and the disclosures of the state
of administration of justice sufficiently declare.
What it is in Bengal, and how far such a state of
society is compatible with internal peace, let the
petition of the missionaries of Bengal to the Governor-General testify.* Let this document also serve to decide whether the condition of Oude is worse than that of Bengal. I find a precis of this document ready to my hand in the article on Lord Dalhousie's Minutes in the New Quarterly:—

"The document," writes the reviewer, "is published in extenso in Allen's Indian Mail of the 31st of October last, a paper under the patronage of the Directors, and therefore of excellent authority in a case which tells against them so deeply as this does. The missionaries begin by stating that they are in the habit of meeting monthly for conference concerning such matters as relate to the progress of the gospel in India, and that they have frequently and carefully considered at their meetings the social as well as the spiritual condition of the people, adding, that they have had many opportunities of judging, both from personal observation and from intercourse with residents in the interior, what that condition really is. They go on to say that if they believed that the people were suffering from no evils but such as are being removed, or that their moral character was the sole cause of their calamities, they would not come forward to address the Government on the subject; but they say that they have long entertained the conviction that the circumstances of the case call on them to overcome all repugnance to bearing

* I see, by the last mail, that it has been moved for in the House of Commons.
their public testimony on behalf of the people, and they say that, with that view, they presented a petition to both Houses of Parliament prior to the inquiry into Indian affairs in 1852.

In that petition they quote themselves as stating that there is a vast amount of social disorganization and suffering in the whole country—that many evils with which the Government, as such, has to contend, are on the increase; that in many districts of Bengal, neither life nor property is secure; that gang robberies of the most daring character are perpetrated annually in great numbers with impunity, and that there are constant scenes of violence in contentions respecting disputed boundaries between the owners of landed estates. That the radical cause of these evils is, 'the inefficiency of the police and judicial system,' that the sole protection of the public peace in many places is a body of policemen, called village Chowkeydars, who are, in fact, the ministers of the most powerful of their neighbours rather than the protectors of the people—that the body of peace officers paid directly by the State will, on inquiry, be found to be entirely insufficient for the great districts for which they are provided; but that, few as they are, they will also be found to be oppressors of the people—that the records of the Criminal Courts, and the experience of every resident in the districts of Bengal, will bear testimony to the facts, that no confidence can be placed in the police force, either the regular force or the village Chowkeydars—that it is their practice to extort confessions by torture;
and that while they are powerless to resist the
gangs of organized burglars or dacoits, they are
corrupt enough to connive at their atrocities.
The missionaries go on to say, that a strict and
searching inquiry into the state of the rural popula-
tion of Bengal would lead to the conclusion that
they commonly live in a state of poverty and
wretchedness, produced principally by the present
system of landed tenures, and the extortion of the
Zemindars, aggravated by the inefficiency and
cruelties of the peace officers, who are paid by
the Chowkeydaree tax, or by Government. That
a well organised police, with a more extensive and
more effective judicial system, would do much to
check the outrages which arise from disputes
about land; but that, from the want of a complete
survey of the estates of the country, of a regist-
tration act to settle titles, and of laws to obviate
the infinite mischief of the universal system of
secret trusts, there is so much uncertainty about
the landed tenures and boundaries in Bengal, that
capitalists generally dread to purchase such pro-
property, and those who do, too frequently keep
bodies of armed clubmen, to take and keep by force
the extent of land to which they deem themselves
entitled. Between contending proprietors, amidst
scenes of constant conflict, and a prey to the cor-
rup tion and the oppression of the police, the
tenant is reduced, not merely to beggary, but also
in many cases to a state of the most abject and
pitiable servitude. The memorialists then add,
that a separate petition was presented to Parlia-
"mout in 1858, signed by 1,800 Christian inhabitants of Bengal, in which they stated that the police of the lower provinces totally fails, as respects the prevention of crimes, apprehension of offenders, and protection of life and property, but it is become an engine of oppression, and a great cause of the corruption of the people: that torture is believed to be extensively practised on persons under accusation; and that all the evil passions are brought into play, and ingenuities of all kinds, both by people and police, are resorted to; and they add, that this petition also bore strong and emphatic testimony to the wretched condition of the people, and the unsatisfactory state of the judicial system.

The memorialists proceed to observe, that they noticed with extreme regret, that the Parliamentary inquiry into Indian affairs was brought to a close before this subject of the social condition of the people was opened.

"It may be thought that we have quoted enough from this document to show the real character of Lord Dalhousie’s administration, which, while annexing countries on every side on the plea of rescuing the people from the alleged oppressions of Native princes, could leave such atrocities to be practised openly within his own government from first to last, without, as far as appears to the public, one single effort to redress. The memorialists, indeed, admit as some excuse for him, the pressure of many other urgent subjects, which had prevented his applying his powerful and vigorous
mind to the social condition of the people of Bengal; as if any other subject could be of more urgent obligation on him than the fulfilment of this, the first duty of a ruler, to those whom Providence had placed under his care: and as if he did not alike deprive himself of all moral right, and of all reasonable colour, to interfere with other crowned heads on the score of their alleged misgovernment, when such was the disgraceful state of the provinces under his own more immediate sway. We see much alleged by him in his minutes of the vast superiority of our own system; but there are few persons who will credit the statement in the face of such facts as these. We have not come to the end of the memorial, but we have given a pretty good specimen of it; and we shall be much surprised if, before we finish with it, there be not thought to be quite as much of real and proved mismanagement in our own provinces as, if all the tales in the 'Oude Blue Book' were true, could be charged against Oude.

To go on with this memorial. The missionaries say that, since the last Parliamentary inquiry, in 1853, into the affairs of India, closed, many circumstances and many recent publications have deepened their conviction, that the social condition of Bengal is deplorable in the extreme, and that the representations in their then petition fall short of the truth. They notice that, in a minute by the Lieutenant-Governor (Mr. Halliday) himself on the police and criminal justice in Bengal, it is admitted that, for a long series of years, complaints
have been handed down from administration to administration regarding the badness of the police under the Government of Bengal, and as yet very little has been done to improve it: that throughout the length and breadth of the country, the strong prey almost universally upon the weak, and power is too commonly valued only as it can be turned into money; that it is a lamentable, but unquestionable fact that the rural police, its position, character, and stability as a public institution, have in the lower provinces deteriorated during the last twenty years; that the criminal judicatures certainly do not command the confidence of the people; that whether right or wrong, the general Native opinion is, certainly, that the administration of criminal justice is little better than a lottery, in which, however, the best chances are with the criminal; and this is also very much the opinion of the European community; that a very small proportion of heinous offenders are ever brought to trial, and that it now appears that half of those brought to trial are sure to be acquitted; and that peculiar and accidental circumstances, partly temporary and partly arising out of the constitution of the civil service, have at this moment made the inexperienced condition of the magistracy more observable than it ever has been before, while it seems certain that the evil, during several successive years, is likely very seriously to increase.

The missionaries proceed to observe that they attach great weight to these remarkable and impor-
tart declarations, extracted by them from the local Governor's minute, and then go on to add some more home truths of their own. They say that the poor despair of obtaining redress, even against the greatest wrong that may be inflicted on them; and that they have reason to believe that a spirit of sullen discontent prevails even now among the rural population, from an impression that Government is indifferent to their sufferings. That they feel themselves bound to declare that they view with alarm, as well as sorrow, the continuance of evils which they have so long deplored, and the effects of which are seen in the demoralization and the sufferings of the people; and that they believe that measures of relief can with safety be delayed no longer, as, from the information they have acquired, they fear that the discontent of the rural population is daily increasing, and that a bitter feeling of hatred is being engendered in their minds. Finally, the memorialists pray that a commission may be appointed, consisting of men of independent minds, unbiassed by official or local prejudices, to institute a searching inquiry into all that now affects the condition of the population. Such is the picture drawn of Bengal under Lord Dalhousie's vice-royalty; and, drawn, be it remembered, not by powerful foreigners, wanting but a pretext for armed interference, but by a body of Christian missionaries of every denomination, members of the Church Missionary Society, of the London Missionary Society, of the Established Church of Scotland, of the Free Church of Scotland,
"and of the Baptist Mission. Nor, indeed, are the 
missionaries, who give so powerful a testimony to 
Lord Dalhousie's neglect of the social sufferings of 
the people under his rule, inimical witnesses, so 
their evidence cannot be impeached on this account. 
In many respects they appear to be highly favour-
able to him, and express a hope that, now that he 
has leisure, his special attention may be directed 
to the lamentable condition of the peasantry of 
Bengal."

So much for the social condition of that Presidency.
There is however one very enticing view of the 
subject of annexation, most assiduously put forward—
its £ s. d. side. It is constantly urged that an-
xecration pays. Lord Dalhousie says so. The Friend 
of India says so. The accounts are so made out 
as to say so. The India House says so. All 
their supporters, and all Lord Dalhousie's friends 
and advisers, echo the cry; and the world at large, 
without understanding the subject, or taking the 
trouble to enquire into the truth, joins in the chorus 
and believes its truth. This view of the matter is no 
doubt one particularly convincing to our mercantile-
minded nation; and the conviction that the policy 
pays, might well serve to cover a multitude of its 
sins. But the following extract from a petition pre-
sented to Parliament by the late Mr. Hume, (a 
gentleman especially well qualified to judge of such 
matters,) and other proprietors of India stock, may 
perhaps exhibit the matter in rather a startling light; 
may arrest the attention and excite the doubts of 
those who have taken for true all they have heard
upon the credit of others, without ever investigating the matter for themselves:—

"The Financial results of Indian annexations from 1765 to 1853.

To the Honorable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled. The Petition of the undersigned Proprietors of East India stock, and other persons, British subjects, interested in the welfare and good Government of India;

Sheweth,—That from the year 1765 to the year 1792 the limits of the British territory in India remained almost stationary; that in the year 1793, the revenues of British India amounted to £8,276,770, the charges to £6,066,924, so that the territory then yielded a surplus revenue of £2,209,846,—whilst the territorial debt amounted only to £7,129,934.

That between the years 1793 and 1813, large additions were made to that territory.

That in the latter year (1813), the gross revenues of India amounted to £16,764,700, the charges to £16,899,362, shewing an excess of charges over revenue of £134,362: that the debt in this period of twenty years had increased from £7,129,934 to £26,970,786; or to nearly four times its original amount.

That the Committee of the House of Commons on Indian affairs, which sat in 1832, reported to your Honorable House, that up to that period, the gross charges of the Indian territory had augmented in a greater proportion than the revenues.
"That in the year 1833—twenty years after 1813—the revenues amounted to £13,680,165, the charges to £13,630,767, shewing a surplus of revenue of £49,398, but which surplus was partly derived from the sale of the Company's commercial assets in India. That on the 1st of April, 1834, the debt amounted to £29,882,299.

"That on the 1st of April, 1849—fifteen years after—when the whole of Hindostan had been brought under our sway; the revenues of India amounted to £18,227,850, the charges to £19,700,465, shewing an excess of charges over revenue of £1,473,115, while the debt had swollen to £48,124,119.

"That from the year 1839-40 to 1849-50, the total charges of India were £183,369,266; the total receipts £168,622,144, shewing an excess of charges over receipts, during those ten years, of £14,747,062.

"That in 1839, the debt of India amounted to £32,269,178; in 1849, at the end of the next ten years, it amounted to £48,124,119, and that the debt has since increased, and is at this moment increasing.

"That the revenues of India amounted, in 1839, to £14,549,262; in 1849, to £18,227,850, shewing that in this decennial period the debt has increased several times as fast as the revenue.”

But in 1856 Lord Dalhousie professes that he has by his annexations increased the revenues of the Company by four millions sterling a year. In his retrospective minute he writes thus:
"By the several territorial acquisitions which have just been enumerated, a revenue of not less than £4,000,000 sterling has been added to the annual income of the Indian Empire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Revenue (£)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjaub</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pegu (1856)</td>
<td>270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagpore (less tributes)</td>
<td>410,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oude</td>
<td>1,450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sattara</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanu</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

£4,330,000

"Stated in general terms, the revenues of India have increased from £26,000,000 in 1847-8 to £30,000,000 in 1854-5, and the income of the present year, exclusive of Oude, has been estimated at the same amount of £30,000,000 sterling."

What are the revenues for 1857 and 1858 estimated at? What are they likely to realize?

Now it is a very easy plan to make even the most bankrupt concern, which has any returns at all, appear flourishing and paying, by exhibiting only the gross returns, without any deduction on account of charges, losses, or any other account on the debit side; and this is precisely the course which Lord Dalhousie has adopted. He takes, for instance, Pegu, a country without a population; he throws vast sums of money into it, for the purpose of roads and other public works; and, without making allowance for the expenditure, claims credit for all the fictitious prosperity suddenly excited. He gan-
risons it with seventeen regiments of Madras troops, without which force it would probably not be retained for six months; and allows the charge of all this military force to be debited, not against Pegu, but against Madras; and by this process, while the older territory is made to exhibit a deficiency, the newly annexed territory is made to exhibit a surplus. Sir Erskine Parry thus exposed this fallacy in the House of Commons:—

"Lord Dalhousie stated that the territorial acquisitions added to our Indian Empire during his vice-royalty had increased the revenue by a sum of £4,000,000 a year. But the noble lord only gave the gross receipts, and said nothing about the expenditure. Thus the revenue of the Punjaub was set down at £1,500,000, whereas there was a real deficiency on that territory of £59,000. So again, the revenues of Sattara were stated to be £180,000, but there was really a deficiency of £22,000. The income of Nagpur was said to be £410,000; its real amount was £100,000. The same remark applied to the noble lord’s statements with regard to the revenue from opium. The noble lord said it had increased from £2,730,000 in 1847-8 to £4,700,000 in 1854-5; but deducting the increased costs of its collection, the net amount derived from that tax was only £2,945,000."

This may seem almost incredible; but Indian finance is only another name for Indian juggling, and Sir G. Trevelyan has stamped Indian accounts with their proper character. The real facts are now thoroughly probed in the able article in the New
Quarterly Review, whence I extract the following:

"Nagpore, we are told in the minute, brings us an addition of £450,000 yearly; but in the Parliamentary accounts it is estimated at £400,000 only, from which the former tribute of £50,000, now lost to us, is to be deducted, leaving only £320,000 in all. It needs no ghost to tell us how completely our establishments there will absorb this trifling sum. Oude is said in the minute to bring us £1,450,000, though as yet it has brought us nothing; and though it only brought the king half the amount, a sum that will at best barely cover the additional expense we shall be compelled to incur there. Finally, Sattara is set down in the minute as giving us an addition of £150,000 per annum; while the Parliamentary accounts show that its charges amount to above £200,000, or nearly double the sum for which Lord Dalhousie takes credit. What the petty state of Jhansi brings we know not, as it is not specified in the Parliamentary accounts: his lordship tells us that it brings us £50,000. But after what we have seen of his calculations, in regard to other seizures, we shall take leave to doubt whether it really brings us any surplus whatever beyond that large surplus we are laying up for ourselves, of universal hatred, distrust, and desire to throw off a yoke so onerous. What does a late mail from India bring us but deep mutterings from Oude, and the news that placards—declaring death to the English, as the most faithless of rulers—have been..."
stuck up in all the principal mosques of Madras?
These symptoms may, and we dare say will, evaporate in smoke; but still they show the fire smouldering beneath the surface, and which is not less intense, if we are to believe the missionaries, whose memorial we quoted, throughout the oldest of our possessions—Bengal.

The last of the great annexations mentioned in the minute are the Hyderabad districts; but these go for nothing on either side; it being a part of the treaty under which we obtained them, that all surplus revenue shall be paid to the Nizam after his debt to us and the charges of management are paid.

We shall now proceed to examine the annexation policy of Lord Dalhousie, the only point it remains for us to analyse in the vice-regal reign. We have not room to enter into the question at length; but we may succeed, at any rate, in indicating the path of inquiry to those who may be desirous of going into it more deeply than accords with the necessarily brief notice of a review. The first point to be considered, in regard to the territorial acquisitions made by Lord Dalhousie, is the financial aspect of the question, and that we have already solved in a general way in our financial summary. So far from there being any visible result in the shape of pecuniary profit derived from them, we have shewn the whole increase of revenue, in the period of Lord Dalhousie’s government, to be actually less, by a considerable amount, than the sum which he gives as increase
in the opium revenue alone. Then, again, if we go into particulars, we find this fact at every turn confirmed. For instance, his lordship tells us that the Punjab annexation has brought an increase to the Indian revenue of £1,500,000; while the Parliamentary accounts estimate a deficit for the last year given of £58,000 sterling. Yet all the military charges, except the pay of local troops, are excluded, and these must amount to many hundred thousand more. Again, Lord Dalhousie tells us that the gain on Pegu is £220,000; but we find from the Parliamentary accounts that its whole revenue in the last year given, of actual collections, was only £80,000, and its expenses £160,000, or double the collections, exclusive of all the military and marine charges occasioned by it, and which have added so largely to the drafts on Madras and Bengal. What these charges may amount to exactly we know not; but the military, civil, and political, and marine charges in these presidencies, have increased since the taking of Burnah (and no doubt to a considerable extent in consequence of it) by more than £1,500,000 per annum." And again, the fallaciousness of the statement is thus further exposed:—

"Lord Dalhousie tells us in the 18th, 20th, and 21st paragraphs of his minute, that by his territorial acquisition he raised the revenue of India from twenty-six to thirty millions sterling; and that the opium revenue increased from £2,780,000 to £4,700,000 during his viceroyal reign. But, referring to the Parliamentary
account, we find that the gross revenue of India for the last year in which the accounts had been completed, 1853-4, was less than £27,000,000, instead of £30,000,000, as stated in the minute, including costs of collection, and every other preliminary charge. And we see from the same documents that, while the net revenue of India for the year 1846-7, the year immediately preceding Lord Dalhousie's advent, was £18,655,000 sterling; it was, in the year 1853-4, only £20,828,000, showing a difference in the whole of merely £1,673,000, instead of a difference of £4,000,000 annexations, and nearly £2,000,000 from opium, as the minute avers. In fact, the Parliamentary accounts establish incontestably a total absence of all the alleged profits on territorial acquisitions; the whole increase on a comparison of the two years leaving exactly £282,000 less than the increase which Lord Dalhousie, in the above-quoted paragraphs, tells us to have occurred in the opium revenue alone! Then, again, as to charges: the charges in 1846-7, the year before Lord Dalhousie's advent, were only £19,324,000, and the deficit was only £971,000, though there was in that year an unusual amount expended in war charges, it being the year in which were fought the battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal, and Sobraon. In 1853-4, though India was at peace with all the world, the charges amounted to £22,373,000, and there was a deficit of £2,044,000 besides. Now is this all, for the same accounts show that there was an addition made to the Indian debt of
"£8,354,000 sterling, within the period of Lord Dalhousie's government. Thus, not only has all the money obtained by annexation been swallowed up completely, but a vast addition has been made to our debt and charges, and annual deficit besides."

It is by such jugglery as this that annexation is made to appear to pay, for Madras supplies troops for garrisoning other countries, the subsidies for which are carried to the credit of the Supreme Government; the cost of garrisoning these countries is not set off against their revenues or subsidies, but suffered to fall on the revenues of Madras. The following table will shew that Madras, besides fifty lakhs a year, her annual quota to the Imperial expenses, is thus charged £1,225,759 a year for a charge which ought to be borne by other countries:

Charges borne by the Madras Presidency for Troops stationed in other Territories, the revenues of which are credited to other Indian Governments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per Annum £</th>
<th>Total £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuttack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half a company of Golunda...</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>31,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One regiment of Native Infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One troop of Horse Artillery</td>
<td>27,693</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One regiment of Light Cavalry (Nativo)</td>
<td>17,743</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negapatnam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half a battalion of European Artillery</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>194,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four regiments of Native Infantry</td>
<td>110,784</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carried forward</td>
<td></td>
<td>£225,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Annum</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brought forward</td>
<td></td>
<td>£325,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One company of European Artillery</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two ditto of Golconda</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three regiments of Native Infantry</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One regiment of Light Cavalry (Native)</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five European companies and two Horse Field Batteries of Artillery</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three regiments of European Infantry</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>552,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve ditto Native ditto</td>
<td>322,352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three companies of Sappers</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2876,777</td>
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Add, for miscellaneous military charges, according to statements laid before Parliament, one-fourth of the total outlay .................................................. 212,194

Add, for Commissariat, one-twelfth of total outlay ........................................ 79,900

Add, for cost of Staff, one-twentieth of total outlay ..................................... 43,888

Add, for Medical Department, one-sixtieth of total outlay ................................ 12,000

Grand Total ........................................... £1,225,766

And yet when the Madras journals point this out, they are told by the *Friend of India*, the quasi-government organ of Calcutta, that they are contending for mere local interests; that they should discuss subjects of general bearing, and not bring forward parochial squabbles.

Such is the fashion in which annexation pays pecuniarily. How it "pays" in other respects, let the present rebellion satisfy us.
Let it not, however, be thought that all men have been blinded to what was about to happen. Madras did not respond to the Calcutta call for a statue of Lord Dalhousie. The Athenæum has had no former praise to swallow; it has been steadfast in its measure of Lord Dalhousie's policy. It is thus that this journal wound up its articles on Oude:—

"The remainder of this history needs not to be told. We know how the head conspirators were rewarded; how Dalhousie received £5,000 a year; how Ootyam was made a K.C.B. But surely if retributive justice exists in the world, a terrible result, sooner or later, will accrue somewhere for the false, wicked, cowardly, traitorous annexation of Oude."

In England, some few, at any rate, have foreseen the necessary result of such acts. It is thus that Mr. Dickinson, in his pamphlet on the "Bureaucratic Government of India," after exposing the policy of annexation, warns his countrymen:—

"I cannot help warning my countrymen that if they stand by, and look quietly on, while this political martyrdom is once more consummated, their consenting unto the deed will leave a heavy debt of vengeance against them, not only on earth but in heaven; it will provoke that retributive justice which frequently allows an individual to escape, but never, never fails to overtake a nation. Let them weigh this well before they say, on our heads and on our children's be it! It is true, that we have an overwhelming mercenary army, and the word is passed, no danger above the horizon; but
"some may be coming; and in history we are always wise after the event; and when it is too late, when the bolt has fallen, and the penalty has been paid, then for the first time do politicians see why a Government based on injustice and bad faith could not stand; and what innumerable consequences of its own wrong-doing were all the while undermining its power. God forbid that we should be wise too late in India!"

The able writer in the Quarterly Review thus concludes his terrible articles:

"Of all Lord Dalhousie’s extensions of the Empire, the only one that is really beneficial was the final conquest of the Panjaub, though that is only beneficial in a military, and not in a financial, sense. By not obtaining the cession by treaty of Pegu, he has left our future tenure of it open to all that doubt and uncertainty which attach to possessions seized, but not confined to the captor afterwards by cession, under the rules and principles of international law. The other annexations made by him can give no strength to the Empire; for whatever political or military advantages they possessed were ours already, the sovereigns having long since been reduced to the positions of ciphers dependent on our will. In a pecuniary sense, these confiscations will not more than repay the costs of their management, even if they do that, while the outrage on all the established laws of succession, and the gross violations of treaties that have been involved in the seizure of them, have spread throughout all India the deepest feelings of distrust.
and discontent. It may be that the laws which
sanction the continuance of a throne, or of a
private heritage by adoption, may appear absurd
to Lord Dalhousie; but it is the fixed law of India
from time immemorial; and nothing could be
more solemn and more binding than the pledges of
our Government to the Natives, that their laws and
customs should ever be respected and observed.
To a man more deeply read in history than his
lordship appears to be, there is nothing very
wonderful, after all, in this very simple law.
Among the Romans it existed, as it did among
the Hindoos; and among them, too, the adopted
son, whether of a private citizen or of an emperor,
acquired at once all the rights and became subject
to all the duties of a natural heir. Nor in cases
where our own crown has appeared likely to be
disputed, has the precaution been neglected of
allowing of an adopted heir. It was for this
reason that our Eighth Henry was specially em-
powered by Parliament to name his successor; and
in this, the 19th century, a similar measure has,
for a similar purpose, been sanctioned by the legis-
lature of France. There, too, of all the evils that
can happen, the greatest is thought, as among the
Hindoos, to be that of a disputed succession; and
there, too, the Emperor Napoleon the Third has, in
the event of dying without issue (male), the pri-

tilege accorded to him of nominating a successor to
the throne.

While such have been the fruits within our
Empire of a policy at once so ignorant and so serdil,
the frontier on which we are told to rely as a barrier against Russia has been brought into a state of hatred and detestation of us, which never will die out. Perpetual raids, perpetual plunderings, perpetual village burning, are the work of our soldiers there, and all against men whose real crime consists in refusing to pay dues to us for their barren holdings from which their ancestors from time immemorial had been exempt. Nothing seemed too cruel for us, as nothing was too mean under this new plan for making India pay. To curtail enormous and wasteful salaries would have been unpopular with the Europeans; but there are no representatives, either in Parliament or in the direction of the hill tribes on the frontier, or of the widowed ladies of Sattara and Nagpore. A truly great government would have spurned the dribbles procurable from such sources; it was the fate of Lord Dalhousie to turn to such means for replenishing an empty treasury, and after all to fail.

His lordship has been compared by his flatterers to Lord Wellesley, and it is said that the idea is greatly encouraged by himself; but what acts was Lord Wellesley ever guilty of that could deserve any comparison with deeds like these? Lord Wellesley went to India when we were a weak power there; he boldly faced the Native princes in the plenitude of their arrogance and, aided by a Wellington and a Lake, he subdued them. Lord Dalhousie went to India when every Native prince was at our feet; and, saving in the case of the Sikh insurrection, ignoble indeed were the spoils
he won. Mud and mosquitoes were his chief enemies in Burmah; women and children were his prey at Sattara and Nagpore. A being weaker than a woman graced his triumphal car in Oude. Lord Wellesley attacked the Native powers because they were too powerful for our peace; Lord Dalhousie seized Sattara, as he tells us in his minute, because the Mahrattas were no longer to be dreaded, and so the annexation might be safely made. Lord Wellesley was Alexander of Macedon, conquering the then known world; Lord Dalhousie was Alexander's successor in the third generation, supposing his Empire to have remained undivided; confiscating the pensions and provinces, and poor remains of power that the conqueror had left.

Lord Wellesley left the Indian Empire consolidated, its greatness established; and our name for generosity after victory only equalled by that for reckless daring in war. In what state Lord Dalhousie left India, these pages, and those of the more independent of the Indian journals declare— as do the crowds of Indians now to be seen in London on every side, who have come to petition the throne of England against his acts. Ranjeet Singh, his lordship tells us, was most satisfied with those of his governors, against whom there were many complaints; and the criterion is not a bad one, either in the east or in the west. If the petitions of these people be fairly listened to, and reparation afforded them, where, on a careful investigation of the facts, it shall be seen that injustice has been done, all may yet be well. But
"if England is to claim that infallibility for the acts of her public servants in India, which she refuses rightly to accord to those of her public servants here, then we may rely on it, that new combinations will arise there to combat her power, and that she, too, will sink from the excesses of her despotism, as the Empire of so many other nations there has sunk before her. It should be remembered, that we treated the Afghans with similar contempt till we were rudely taught to know their power; and it were well, before we drive all India to desperation, to reflect that we are in numbers to the Natives but as one in five thousand, and that every Native of India is accustomed to the use of arms from his childhood upwards. They are a people whom justice, and generosity, and good faith may for centuries hold in subjection: but those are the worst enemies of England who endeavour to rule them on the principles of greedy rapacity, pursued from first to last by Lord Dalhousie."

Will Lord Dalhousie's statue ever now tower over Calcutta?

I have no hesitation in expressing my solemn conviction, shared by many an able man of my acquaintance, that the eight years of Lord Dalhousie's government have been the most fatal to our supremacy that have yet been recorded on the page of history. Had he employed his time in really consolidating our power by attention to our internal condition, by introducing the reforms into the army pointed out by Sir C. Napier; by reforming the administration of
justice, by reorganizing an effective police throughout the length and breadth of the land; by inquiring into the amount of the assessment, pushing on revenue surveys, and lowering the demand where too high; had he matured plans for education, and fostered that great cause with half the zeal he served his own ambition, he might perchance have less dazzled men for the moment with the meteoric brightness of his career, but he would have earned a more lasting and a nobler reputation. He would have left India really at peace within and without, the people contented with our government, and prospering under its sway. No doubt we shall have the brilliancy of the electric telegraph and the railway flashed across our eyes; but I say that these measures were none of Lord Dalhousie's originating, but were forced upon him by the pressure of public opinion; and both were measures calculated immeasurably to increase the centralizing power of government, as well as to benefit the people. His lordship's decision has, however, fettered us with a system of railways which is now generally admitted to be unsuited to the wants of the country. Colonel Arthur Cotton's principle of speed in completing the iron way, not speed of travelling upon it when completed, is now seen to be the correct view; too late, however, as we have hound us down to the "idol—speed." In education, Lord Dalhousie did nothing. The scheme came out ready cut and dry from home. It was not one of those exciting subjects, which would attract his energies. He was employed in the great works of annexation, consolidation, and centralization. By the
last he reduced all men to silence, save those pliant instruments who would be content to echo his sentiments, and lay before him only such information as was likely to prove palatable. But for this, would Lord Dalhousie ever have pursued the infatuated course he did towards the 88th Bengal Infantry, when they refused to proceed on foreign service to Burmah? He yielded to them; and from that moment mutiny may be said to have been sanctioned, and its future outbreak certain. The final catastrophe was merely from that moment a question of time. Other acts of his lordship have precipitated it; but, sooner or later, it must have come. It is thus that the Hurkaru treats the subject:—

"Our readers will not forget that Lord Dalhousie was the first Governor-General who succumbed to mutineers. When the 88th N.I. (the corps which raised the cry of mutiny in Delhi) refused to go to Burmah, Lord Dalhousie gave in; from that instant the feeling of the sepoys, in all probability, underwent a change towards their masters. That act was sufficient to demoralise an army; who can say that it did not do so?

"It has been the fashion in certain circles to abuse Lord Ellenborough. But, whatever might have been his faults, he never allowed himself to be conquered by mutineers. There are many in India who recollect that when the 4th and 64th Regiment refused to go to Seinde, they did not meet with the same mild treatment as the 88th when they declined to go to Burmah. The difference of
conduct on the two occasions showed the difference between the two men. Lord Ellenborough compelled the sepoys to carry out his order: the sepoys compelled Lord Dalhousie to put up with their resolves. The one saved India, the other brought it to the verge of ruin.

But our late Governor-General was not content with that. As we have shown above, he not only sowed the seeds of mutiny, but he took away all power of motion. By selling the camels, he succeeded in squaring his balances, and in making the army powerless for any sudden emergency! Napoleon, when he was malignedy by the titled miscreants of Europe, exclaimed, 'Posterity will do me justice!' and he was right. Lord Dalhousie, too, notwithstanding the flattery which was heaped upon him by his courtiers, may be well assured that justice too will be meted out to him.

Though Lord Dalhousie gave in to the mutineers, he marked his displeasure of their conduct by a side wind. He sent them to Dacca, the Sierra Leone of India; and when they had lost 300 men, he sent them to recruit at Cawnpore, where the gaps in their ranks were to be filled up by the inhabitants of the neighbouring kingdom of Oude. It is thus that the Dacca News describes the event:

'The Friend of India advocates despotism, as the mode of government best suited to Orientals. Let him listen to the history of the effects of an order of Lord Dalhousie's, and then tell us if he continues of the same opinion. At the commencement of the Burmese war, Lord Dalhousie was led to
believe that the 38th regiment of Native Light Infantry, then at Barrackpore, would volunteer to cross the Kala Pāwnē, and serve in Burmah. The regiment was asked to do so, and refused. Lord Dalhousie then determined that it should be punished, and ordered it to march to Dacca, the cantonments of which, from long neglect, had become the most unhealthy in Bėngal. The usual way of sending a regiment to Dacca is by water; but to mark his lordship's displeasure, the 38th was ordered to march by Jessore and Furreepore, districts quite unaccustomed to the passage of troops. There is no road, scarcely even a foot-path, beyond Jessore, about half the distance. The country is highly cultivated. The march, therefore, was one continued trespass for about eighty miles; orders were issued to the collectors to prepare rations for the troops. The collectors directed their Nazirs to take the usual steps to procure rations, and these gentlemen rejoiced in the prospect of securing, if judiciously managed, a competency on which they might retire, when too old to fulfil the ordinary duties of their appointments, or when they might happen to lose the favour of their European superiors. The country was given up to them to plunder, and they well knew how to make the most of it. Ryots of our own, living 40 miles distant from the line of march, were seized and forced to contribute to the purse of the Nazir their little stock of ghee and rice. But there were rivers to be crossed,—the Pudda, the Dėlassery, and the Booree Gunga. The Ghat
"Manjees were ordered to provide boats. They "seized every boat for 50 miles around, releasing "those who paid well. There was not a boat to be "had for purposes of commerce. The boatmen hid "or sank their boats till the storm was passed. The "usual supply of boats was not forthcoming for "months. At last the regiment arrived, and a finer "set of men we never saw. In a few months fever "had done its work. They were sufficiently "punished even to have satisfied Lord Dalhousie. "In three months the whole regiment passed three "times through the hospital; and at last, when their "young adjutant died, a firing party could scarcely be "mustered from the whole of the companies to do "the last honours to their officer. The muskets "with which they fired were brought to the burial "ground, from cantonments a distance of about half "a mile, on duckeries. The men were too weak to "carry them. But the consequences of Lord "Dalhousie's ill temper did not end here. He "determined that he should never again be placed "in a like situation, and that it should be possible to "march troops to Burmah from Bengal. He "therefore ordered the construction of the Dacca "and Arracan road; a road passing through pestilen-"tial jungles; a road which, expensive in construc-"tion, "will be much more so in maintenance, for the jungle "grows on it yearly, and there will be no traffic to "keep it down, for it can never compete with the "Megna and the sea as a means of carriage. How "does the Friend like our story of the effects of one "despotic act? If he is not yet convinced, we have
"several more for him."—Dacca News, July 5, 1856.

Who in the army, after the fall of Napier, would dare to act on his own responsibility, even at the most critical moment? Yes; one lieutenant on detachment in Pegu hung a party whom he caught in his camp, on the idea that he was a spy. Lord Dalhousie, after bringing Mr. Proctor to a court-martial on a charge of murder, of which he was acquitted, dismissed him from his staff appointment; and this finished the paralysis of the army. With an almost feminine jealousy of power, he was not content with grasping the reins of government; his fingers must gather up the minutest threads; he would examine all details of every proposition, however trivial. He claimed to decide with something akin to intuition, superior to all the experience of local knowledge. Thus matters of importance were deferred by the supreme Government from absolute want of time; thus business was slurred over, in order to its despatch; thus good suggestions were rejected, and unwise projects sanctioned, from a misconception of their respective merits. Thus reforms were denied the subordinate Governments, on one pretext or another; partly from requisition for more information, partly from an arrogant assumption of knowledge superior to that of the local authorities on the spot. The Governors and others were disgusted at the rejection of their well-considered plans, occasionally in language irritating or insulting; they disliked naturally to forward further propositions which would only entail upon them fresh snubbing,
and thus everything in the shape of necessary reform was at a standstill. I will give but one instance of the quality of supervision which the supreme Government claims to exercise over the subordinate Governments. In the educational department, the pettiest details must be submitted for sanction to the supreme Government; but the following extract from the Records of the Madras Government must suffice:

"On the 28th January last, the Madras Government applied to the supreme Government for its sanction to certain proposed establishments for the management of the Soopah and Yellapoor Talooks of the district of Canara. The establishments consisted of Tasildar, Sheristadar, Goomastahs, Moonshees, Record Keepers, Duffadars, Peons, Sweepers, &c., and involved a total increase of 298 rupees per mensem. The Madras Government proposed to raise the pay of one Moonshee from six rupees to seven rupees; of another, from six rupees to eight rupees; and of another, from eight rupees to twelve rupees; but to this increase the supreme Government refused sanction, as also to an increase of one rupee each per month proposed to be made to two sweepers."

What is the use of a Governor and Council, if they are not competent to decide such questions as these? I am very far from saying that centralization of a certain quality, and to a certain extent, is not necessary. There must be some supreme ultimate authority, beyond all doubt; but the system of centralization at present obtaining, begins at the wrong end. It arises from a jealousy of power,
which will permit nothing which it does not originate. The true principle of application of centralization would be, to hold the subordinate Governments ultimately responsible; to sanction approved schemes of reform and public works; to leave the carrying out of these schemes to the local Governments; and to watch narrowly the way in which they had executed their duties. Then the subordinates would work under a due sense of their responsibility; they would take care that no crude projects were submitted, and that all the work undertaken was effectively done. As it is, the local Governments are freed, practically, from responsibility; for the moment a measure is sanctioned, their responsibility ends. It may be advisable to alter the form of Government in Madras and Bombay; to do away with the expensive pageant of a Governor and Council, and to substitute a Lieutenant-Governor, as in the North-West provinces and elsewhere. Not that this change would work any good, unless really capable and experienced men be chosen for the office of Lieutenant-Governor. We must then seek out such men as Thomason, or Metcalfe, if they are to be found; for I should no more dream of strengthening a naturally feeble Governor, by disembarrrasing him of his two members of Council, than I should hope to cure a lame man by depriving him of his crutches.

The point of view in which this system of centralization affects the present subject of discussion, is the impediment which it has proved to necessary substantial reforms. The condition of the people is now comparatively well understood; the remedies
are pretty unanimously agreed on; but nothing has been done, and nothing will be done, so long as the jealousy of the centralizing spirit is paramount; and thus the causes of discontent and disaffection at work among the people are permitted to operate and spread without check or cure. This consideration it is which has induced me to dwell upon centralization in the present disquisition. And here I would beg to repeat that I am very far from making a sweeping assertion that our Government in India is altogether bad. On the contrary, it has very much that is good in it; and in theory and intention it is an infinite improvement upon any that has preceded it. Especially during the past few years has an impulse been given, by pressure from without, to its development of measures, which, if only carried out in their integrity, judiciously and prudently, must ultimately render the condition of its subjects nearly all that can be desired. It is against the lets and hindrances to practical activity that I direct my censures; that spirit of jealous centralization which overrules the conclusions of local experience; that system of continual reference which ever encourages procrastination; that "double" machinery, complex and antiquated, which may well be laid aside for an improved instrument, at once more simple and more efficient.

We have got our Government in India at last into the right grooves; it remains to remove all the obstacles to its more rapid progress, and to apply continuous force to ensure its perpetual motion. What these obstructions are it is easy to indicate.
They are the impediments which everywhere exist to the decent administration of justice; a topic which embraces a wide sphere of fact and observation, and which it is not my intention to enter upon with any particularity now. The civil service has the exclusive possession of the bench in the Mofussil, to the exclusion of trained professional men. The absurdities and the monstrosities which this state of things calls forth daily over the whole land, render life and property insecure, and prevent the influx of English skill and capital into the interior, for the development of the resources of the country. That law can be administered in such a manner as to create confidence in the Natives, is found by the recent petitions to Parliament from the Natives of all these presidencies, in which they record their unanimous satisfaction with the system of law and its administrations, obtaining at the several capitals. The basis of the civil service has been what is called “widened,” by throwing open its entrance to competition. But the boon is rather one to the public of England than to the public of India, since no line of demarcation has been drawn between the revenue and judicial branches; no special training made essential for the former branch. It was here that the remedy was wanting; and yet things are left just as they were. It becomes a question now, whether the shortest, the surest, perhaps the only way, of meeting an evil which has grown beyond all bounds, is not by at once placing professionally educated men upon the Mofussil bench. This
seems to me to be the real cause of the animosity lately displayed by the indigo planters and others in Bengal to the scheme of amalgamating the Courts, and creating a procedure whereby all men should stand equal in the eye of the law. It is not for the existence of any privilege or exemption itself so much that the British subjects in India contend, as for the protection of their life, liberty, and property, which they say would be imperilled by their being compelled to submit to such tribunals as exist in the Mofussil, where the European judge is ignorant, and the Native judge is both ignorant and malicious. Certainly there is much truth in this; present events, wherein rebellion is headed by Native judicial officers, and the fanaticism and exterminating spirit, as well as the diabolical cruelty which we have witnessed, may well cause alarm at the thought even of the possibility of being tried by such men; and when we reflect on the ease with which false charges and false testimony are brought forward, and the inability of the European appellate courts to grapple with falsehood which has passed current with the courts of original jurisdiction, we cannot but admit that there is much force in the statements and arguments of the Bengal planters and the inhabitants of Calcutta. The opposition which has been raised to what are called the Black Acts has had the effect, however, of tying up reform altogether. A peg whereon to hang an excuse for delay has been thus afforded, and advantage has been at once taken of it; whereas the true remedy consists not
in handing over the country any longer to amateur judges, but in causing the law to be administered by stronger hands. This, I am aware, goes to the root of exclusive civilianism; and it is sure to meet with determined opposition; but the question really now has come to this: Can an exclusive service be any longer maintained with safety to our empire in India? Is it not necessary to avail ourselves of practical experience and skilled professional labour, in order to secure such an administration of civil government as shall at any rate afford a reasonable prima facie probability that the Natives will be content with it, and that the English capitalist will no longer fear to risk his capital in the interior, where contracts cannot be enforced except at an expense, and after a delay, which render it more prudent to refrain from mercantile operations than to embark in them. I am aware that the new “Cotton Association” has a timid dislike of being thought to aim at any reform in India; but I am perfectly well assured that neither they nor any one else can look to the development of this country’s resources, until the administration of the law, including the organization of the police, is placed upon an entirely new footing.

There is one other great measure of Lord Dalhousie’s which must be examined, because I feel satisfied that it has been the source of widespread, if not universal, discontent;—I allude to his financial policy—his lordship’s conversion of the Five per Cent. Loan into a Four per Cent. Debt. This measure
has been much vaunted, and Lord Dalhousie appears to plume himself on having thereby saved the State £300,000 a year. The following account of the transaction, taken from the article in the _New Quarterly_, fully and accurately represents the facts of the case:—"There remains to us to remark upon Lord Dalhousie's conversion, 1853-54, of the Indian Five per Cent. into a Four per Cent. Debt. By this measure, he tells us, he saved £300,000 per annum to the Company, in the shape of difference in interest, and he adds, that the measure was one politic and successful in itself. The facts of the case we shall briefly detail, and equally briefly exhibit its results. In 1853, it was generally supposed that the marquis would shortly return to England, his term of office having expired, and also a portion of the additional year for which it was understood he had been requested by the Government at home to stay. Nothing, of course, was more natural, under the circumstances, than that he should desire to create so fair an impression on the minds of the people here, in regard to the results of his administration, as such a reduction was calculated to give; and if the reduction had been the legitimate fruit of his success, in dealing with the finances of India, it would have been impossible for any one to complain. As events afterwards proved, this was not the case. The whole thing rested on a fabulous foundation, and the consequence has been the creation, among the monied classes of India, of great, and we fear permanent, distrust. It is impossible to say how much of the creation of the
false impression, under which the conversion was 
assented to by the stock-holders, is attributable to 
the generally supposed organs of Lord Dalhousie, 
and how much to Lord Dalhousie himself; but the 
story of the affair which we shall give, is a very 
simple one, and we think it an accurate account of 
what occurred.

The marquis having expressed himself in public 
documents as very sanguine regarding the financial 
results of his annexation and other measures, though 
not probably more so than he really felt, the jour-
nals generally assumed to be the organs of the 
Government in India at once took up the cry. 
India was stated to be in a state of the highest 
financial prosperity, and the surplus revenue ac-
cruing from the annexations and public works was 
to make the 'embarras de richesses' the only 
embarrassment the Indian exchequer was ever likely 
again to feel. Four per cent. was the highest 
amount a Government so circumstanced could ever 
consent to pay for money; and allowing the con-
version at that rate was proclaimed to be a 
favour, the terms to the public generally being 
fixed for the present at only three-and-a-half per 
cent., even at that rate it was only prepared to 
borrow money, to be expended on remunerative 
public works—its own requirements being amply 
provided for under any events almost that could 
occur. This tale, oft repeated, had its effect upon 
the Indian public, and that effect was heightened 
by the parading before its eyes the great amount 
of cash balances in the Indian treasuries at the
time. By the uninitiated there were supposed to
be vast hoards lying in the vaults at Calcutta, in the
same way as one reads of the millions in the vaults
of the Bank of England. They were not aware
that it was simply the sum total of all the cash ba-
lances shown to be due at the date on all the
accounts of the collecting, and all the disbursing
officers of the East India Company, from the
Himalayas to Cape Comorin, and from Prince
of Wales’ Island to Aden, and the Persian Gulf;
that it embraced the whole funds for the payment
of all the civil, military, marine, and commissariat
charges of the empire, during the remainder of the
year, and the pay of every servant of the State,
from the Governor-General downwards, for the same
period of time; and that it also embraced all sums
already due on the public accounts of all kinds, but
which, at the moment when the balance was struck,
had not been actually issued and paid away. In
short, that it was the aggregate of all the money in
hand, in every treasury, for the current expenses
during the year of the whole Indian empire, the
disposition of every farthing of which had been
already anticipated, and not one penny of which
could have been diverted to the paying off the debt
without the certainty of bankruptcy to the State.

The talk of such a sum of totals scattered every-
where, as being available for the purpose for which
it was paraded, was about equivalent to the
"treat[ing] as available for a similar purpose the
"aggregate of all the cash balances in the hands,
"at this moment, of every collector, paymaster,
"commissariat-officer, and other disbursing func-
tionary, throughout the whole British and Colonial 
empire. The best proof of the true financial state 
of India, at the time when the conversion was 
effected, will be found by an analysis of the 
Parliamentary accounts of that year, and which 
were this year published. It will be seen from 
these, that in that very year, instead of Lord 
Dalhousie's being really in a position to pay off 
anything, he increased the public debt by upwards 
of £241,000 (having in the previous year added 
to it above 1,000,000); that in addition to this, he 
forestalled the sums applicable to the ensuing year, 
by reducing the annual cash-balance above a 
1,000,000, and that besides there was a deficit on 
the year of above £2,000,000 sterling. As a matter 
of course, therefore, he had almost immediately 
afterwards to appeal to the public for a loan 
of £2,500,000, and he then found the reaction 
so great, that he could only borrow this at five 
per cent. with a fourteen years' guarantee against 
reduction. Even on those terms there was a dif-
ficulty in obtaining subscriptions, so great as to 
have been only overcome, if private accounts are to 
be credited, by personal applications, by our public 
functionaries, to native capitalists, of a most un-
usual and most humiliating description. On this 
latter point, of course, we can only speak by hears-
say; but the difficulty found in filling up the loan, 
and the fact of a guarantee against reduction 
having been given, are matters of notoriety, and 
probably a similar guarantee will henceforth become
"a sine qua non in the eyes of our native capitalists. The last news from India is confirmatory of our view of the incalculable damage done to credit by the transaction; for now, too, a loan has again been opened by the Government, and again it is placed in the humiliating position of being unable within any reasonable time to fill it. If the reducing Indian credit to this low ebb is to be politic and successful, then indeed has the operation of 1853-54 been the most politic and successful measure that was ever taken."

Had there been really an overflow of cash in the public treasury, no doubt it could not have been more wisely applied than in the reduction of the public debt; but the transaction was little more than a transfer from one loan into another, and it is confidently asserted, that had the holders of five per cent. paper insisted upon cash payments, the measure must have fallen through, for want of funds. The thirteen crores of rupees in the public treasuries have melted away like morning mists, and no one has yet been able to trace what has become of them. But the measure caused the greatest lightness in the money market, and much personal private distress. Scarcely any gain has actually been made, since the Government has again been forced to borrow at five per cent.; while the public creditor is a heavy loser, in many instances, to an extent of twenty-five per cent. Further, the loss falls on charities, on widows and orphans, whose little all is in the funds; and the constant uncertainty which has since prevailed, consequent upon the Three-and-a-half per Cent. Loan,
the Four, the Four-and-a-half, and now again the Five per Cent. Loan, has sown suspicion among all the monetary classes in India. Of all tampering, tampering with the public credit is the most dangerous; and the extraordinary fluctuations in the money market which have followed Lord Dalhousie's great financial measure, have created a deep-seated distrust of us and our honesty in the Native mind.

Another topic worthy of the deepest consideration at the present moment—one which we are all too apt to overlook—is the mighty change which is passing over the Native mind. The Native at this very time is in a transition state; we are too apt to ignore the fact, and seek to treat him as though he were stationary. As we held ourselves towards him in the days of our earliest relation, so we do now; or rather we regard him with less kindliness of feeling, and more hauteur than in the early days of our acquaintance-ship. The gulf that separates the European and the Native has not been bridged over; if anything, it has widened. Intercourse is neither so frequent nor so friendly between us at the present day as in the old times of Munro or Ani. Now, I think it behoves us to recognise this truth, and comport ourselves accordingly: and I will not apologise for introducing here an extract from some observations which I made on this subject, at the late anniversary of Pachappah's charities, before the outbreak of the rebellion. Alluding to this matter, I said:—

"I have never shrunk from exposing to the Natives what I conceive to be their faults and their deficiencies, though it has brought upon me no little
"odium. I will not now shrink, even at a similar "risk, from telling the European portion of our "society what it behoves them at the present crisis "to be doing.

"I say crisis advisedly. For I believe we are in a "crisis. A change, mighty and spreading, is taking "place before our eyes in the Native mind and cha- "racter at this very moment. Its evidences are so "plain and palpable, that he who runs may read "them. The writing is displayed for us on the wall "in characters of fire; woe be to us, if we shut our "eyes to the warning.

"We are teaching the people to think: are we "prepared to carry out our act to its legitimate "necessary consequences? If not, far better were "it, with the boldness of Lord Ellenborough, to "avow at once, that the spread of education is in- "compatible with the maintenance of British rule "in India. Shall we ignore the change, or honestly "accept it, and its responsibilities? Is there any "one among us so infatuated, as to dream that after "we have taught the Natives to think, they will re- "frain from exercising their newly acquired power? "The very charm of novelty alone would suffice to "insure its exercise.

"We teach them principles of morality: are we in- "fatuated enough to imagine that they are not "questioning the reasoning on which we support a "declaration of war against a foreign state, or the ap- "propriation of the territories of our neighbours, or "that construction of old treaties which somehow "ever interprets them to our own advantage? We
inculcate in them the principles of jurisprudence:

do we suppose that they cannot spy out the naked-

ness of our present administration of justice, and

the mockery of our police?

We imbue them with a knowledge of political

science: shall we not expect to find them struggling

to assert their political rights, urging, as they have

already done, their claim to the abolition of all class

privileges, demanding that all men shall stand

equal before the law, requiring to be admitted to

an ever increasing share in the administration of

the country, pressing their admission to political

freedom, and a representative system which shall

give them the hold of their own purse strings?

Let him who doubts these things, look to the

increasing number of newspaper readers among

the Native community; let him look to the cha-

teracter of the Native Press, so unbridled in its

violence that a Bengal journal has advocated its

suppression. This alone necessitates the further

spread of education. 'A little knowledge is a

dangerous thing.' It is the crudity of their

knowledge which renders the Natives violent in

their political opinions. We must teach them

wisdom, as well as mere knowledge, and thus

correct the imperfection of their views. Above

all, let us look to the late Native meeting in

Calcutta, in support of the principle of what is

termed the Black Act. Who that reads the speeches

there made, can doubt that the Native mind has

undergone a mighty change; that it has learned

to think, and in European modes of thought;
that it sees clearly what are the rights of the
citizen, and is able to enforce them with arguments
eloquent and conclusive?
"In the old days which are past, the people
obeyed us in their ignorance, because they regarded
us as beings of a superior order, and crouched
before us as clothed with an irresistible power.
They crouched and cowered before us. Omne
ignotum pro magnifico. But it is the tendency
of familiarity to lessen wonder, even where it
does not engender contempt; and we have edu-
cated the people, so as to enable them to judge us
by a more correct standard. It is more true
now than ever, that our empire is founded upon
opinion. But there is this distinction: formerly,
it was a false opinion; now, it is a true one: for-
merly, opinion was the result of erroneous impres-
sions; now, it is founded upon more correct data:
formerly, it was based on ignorance; now, it is
founded on knowledge. Those whom they took
for gods, as the ancient Mexicans and Peruvians
mistook Cortez and Pizarro, they now find to
be men like themselves, their superiors it is
true, but still errant, fallible men.
"They will weigh our every act; and it behoves
us well to be circumspect as to the quality of
our every action. We must accept the truth
that the country is to be governed by us for
the sake of the people, and not of ourselves.
We must drop the habit of regarding ourselves as
mere exiles, whose first object should be to escape
from a disagreeable climate with the greatest pos-
sible amount of the people's money in the shortest possible time. We must look upon the land, as that of our adoption; and each of us, according to his means and opportunities, must help on the welfare of the Natives, in that station of life to which it has pleased God to call him.

We cannot ignore the fact of the change which our own educational measures have brought about. It remains, then, to accommodate ourselves to the consequence of our own policy.

We must recognise the right of the Natives to political advancement, as they fit themselves for employment; and the measures which are about to be sanctioned by the Legislative Council, founded upon the recommendations of your lordship's Government, for the larger employ of the Native agency in the civil and judicial administrations of the country, ought to be cheerfully accepted as a proof of the sincerity of the British Government to elevate the Native, and admit him to an increasing participation in political duties, in proportion as he shall prove his fitness for political duties by his advance in education.

But we must go further; we must admit them socially to our conversational circles. They are not to be regarded as an inferior race, unworthy of, and unfitted for, polite society. They have, of course, their peculiarities and mauvaise honte; perhaps we also have our peculiarities in their eyes; but it is by the constant collision of friendly intercommunications that the angles of difference are broken off and polished down; and it is worthy
of consideration whether the era has not arrived
for striving to establish friendships between our-
selves and the educated Natives? There are few
people, however repulsive their natural antipathies,
who do not soon come to esteem each other when
familiarity has been established between them.
We may learn much from them as well as teach."

Nor must we overlook the vastly increased power
of the Press. As a whole, the Press of India is con-
ducted with singular ability; and it is astonishing to
mark the giant strides with which it has advanced
within the last few years. It discusses all topics
with an ability which, looking back a few years, was
scarcely to be anticipated. The Press of Madras is
not, I am proud to believe, last in the race. The
existence of a free Press is incompatible with a des-
potism, however paternal.*

* After this was written came forth the Gagging Act! but I
will let the passage stand, because it may hereafter serve to
mark my conviction that the Press will ultimately prevail in the
struggle which Lord Canning has called into existence, or
rather his civilian advisers, if the statements in the Calcutta
papers are worthy of credit. It is not my purpose now to dis-
cuss either the necessity or the propriety of the Act. It has
thrown back India fifty years, and raised the most fatal bar to
the influx of European capitalists and enterprise into this
country. The only protection against the giant injustice in the
provinces has been destroyed; magistrates may now ride rough-
shod over the land; no man will be fool enough with his eyes
open to invest his money, or risk his independence in localities
where folly, or stupidity, or vanity, or pique may at any moment
ruin him, without a chance of his injury being heard of. While
I write, I know of three cases now pending in different parts of
this Presidency, in any one of which the acts of the official
It is too late now to dream of gagging the Indian Press, or fettering it with a censorship; and the Government must gradually be modified to meet the principles of liberal, constitutional self-government which are being now generated. If we retain India, a representative form of Government must sooner or later be introduced. The thin end of the wedge is already inserted; a commencement has been made by calling representatives of Madras and Bombay, and the North West Provinces, into the Legislative would necessitate immediate dismissal, but which here call for no public remark from Government. In one, a judge has been guilty of little short of felony in order to obtain possession of the whole of a man's papers after his conviction. In another, a magistrate, broke forcibly into a woman's house in order to obtain a deposition from her; and the third is of a somewhat similar quality, only with circumstances of aggravation. Let Manchester look to the liberty of the Indian Press, if it looks to the development of the cotton growing capabilities of this country!

Lord Canning seems to have thought he had not enough work on his hands even with the rebellion. That conflagration, one would have thought, might have been sufficient for the season: but he must light the candle at both ends, and have his death-struggle with the Press as well as with the people.

I have watched with much interest the rapid spread of calumny against the Anglo-Indian Press since the Act. First, Lord Canning exonernates the English portion of the Press: he limits his charge against the Native Press to the "last few weeks." But now charges have been preferred against the English Press of sedition during the last three years, in one quarter—during the last ten years in another. Since then, Sir T. Munro's well known minute has been quoted, and created a deep impression. The object of this is to show that rebellion is a necessary consequence of a free Press, and was from its
Council, and, however cautiously, the principle will have to be extended.

We must be more than ever on our guard against introducing any measure which the Natives may conceive, however erroneously, is aimed at their conversion. It appears to me that a most grave error has been committed in this Presidency by appointing clergymen inspectors of schools under the newly organized system of Government education. I can scarcely conceive a measure more calculated to alarm and offend the ignorant Natives in the Provinces. They are sure to connect the labour of such inspectors with covert attempts upon their religion. We thwart our own object, and create unnecessary alarm in the people at one and the same time. With the same view I would draw attention to the

very institution. Sir T. Munro is regarded as a seer, and is declared to have prophesied everything that has come to pass. With the unreflecting and the interested, this is convincing enough; but there is not a shadow of evidence of any complicity on the part of the Press. The rebellion has arisen from other causes, and seeks other objects than those which Munro feared must be instilled into the minds of the soldiery through the Press. There was a free Press, and there is a rebellion. There is a river at Macedon, and a river at Monmouth; but what is the connection between them? The rebellion has arisen from the avarice of the Government, which usurped friendly kingdoms *per fas aut nefas*—the cowardice of the Government which truckled for years to the Bengal army; the rash confidence of the Government which took no precaution against the effects of the resentment the deadly hatred which its spoliations and perfidy were sure to excite in the bosoms of the wronged. Not the comments of a free Press, but the act of the Indian Government have called forth rebellion.
necessity of placing the administration of the Pagoda funds under some responsible management. For many years the Pagoda funds were administered by the Government to the satisfaction of all parties. But in the year 1843 it was determined that the Government ought not to take upon itself any duties connected with the religion of the "heathen." The management of those vast interests was given over to the people, without any care being taken for protecting the funds from misappropriation. From that moment up to the present time, peculation has been going on. The Pagoda funds are entirely at the mercy of the respective managers; the people have no check over their expenditure; in every village there are two sects of Brahmins—the Vadagalas and the Tangulas. Some Pagodas have fallen under the management of the one sect, some under that of the other. In every case the sect out of power is at daggers drawn with the sect which has the management. Accusations are constantly brought before the magistracy; riots continually apprehended. Civil suits are instituted, too, by disputed rights, and every community is split up into furious dissensions. The Madras Association has brought this subject to the notice of Parliament in one of its petitions, and prayed the reasonable relief of a legislative Act, vesting the management of the funds in a central body of trustees; liberally offering at the same time to devote the surplus funds to the cause of secular education. If we wish to compose religious hatred, and let the people live in peace, we should grant this prayer.
We are far too apt, in our anxiety to introduce measures which we feel certain must result in the good of the community, to overlook their probable effect upon the suspicion of the people at large. We listen to the assurances of the poor educated Natives at the Presidency towns, who go with us, and see the aim and scope of the proposed changes, and we mistake their voice for that of the whole nation. When once suspicion is aroused, measures, which at any other season might be introduced without observation, are looked askance at; and it is thus that a vernacular paper seditiously stirs up the Natives by a reference to our late acts, legalizing the marriage of widows, and entitling converts to inherit:

"The Christians, in the first place, ought to have considered the reasons for which the Sepoys have mutinied. The Christians have not gone that way; but, though they are born of Hindoo families, they are yet ready to drink the blood of Hindoos. The Sepoys have mutinied for three reasons. 1st, Hindoo widow marriage. 2nd, That which has never happened during the time of any Rajah has become a legislative fact with the British Government; it has been curiously enough made a law by the British Government that sons, notwithstanding they leave the religion of their fathers, should be entitled to inherit their property. 3rd, Biting of the cartridges by which the Sepoys lose their caste. Still have Government insisted upon this being done. The Sepoys refused to do so, and were disbanded. Are not these three reasons sufficient enough to irritate them. They got angry and took Delhi. Agra and
"Cawnpore have ceased to be, and it is uncertain when Benares, Mirzapore, and other stations are to be plundered. Allyghur is taken. They have plundered 30 lacs of rupees from the Collectorate at Sultanpore, where a Zillah was established for the government of Oude, and taken that city, and cut down the white men and women whom they could find. The Sepoys, having heard that the Puttiallah and Sindia Rajahs will assist the British Government with their forces, have determined to take their dominions from them by violence."

So in our Education Minute we made a very unnecessary parade of the intentions to allow Missionary Schools to share in the benefits of grants in aid; a fair and proper plan enough, but which might just as well have been effected without proclaiming our purpose. What mischief such acts as those of fanatics like Maclean and Wheeler produce, it is impossible to calculate.

I need scarcely point to the absolute necessity of immediate measures for the improvement of the administration of justice, and the introduction of a police, who shall not be a source of terror to the people they are supposed to protect. What must be the social condition of the people under such a system of justice and police as now obtains, let the Torture Report, the Bengal Missionaries Petition, and the exposures made of the quality of the judges attest. It has been universally admitted that the most extensive reforms are necessary; the fact remains that nothing has been done. With respect to the administration of justice, it is true that we
are shortly promised the introduction of simple codes of civil and criminal procedure, which will sweep away a mass of unintelligible nonsense and puerility, which has been accumulating for half a century.

We are further threatened with Macaulay's Code, a body of law which deals so largely with the intention with which acts are committed, that it is not too much to say, only a highly qualified English Bench of professional judges could correct its tendency to produce oppressions the most grave, and impunity the most ridiculous. Entrusted to such a body as the lay Mofussil Bench, European and Native, its consequences may be disastrous.* A vast step has

* To give an idea of the quality of our highest Courts of Appeal, I would quote two cases, one from the Sudder of Bengal, the other from the Sudder of Bombay. True, I have quoted these before; but they cannot be too often brought under notice, I regard them as the "leading cases on the "effect of consent, and the doctrine of intention;" illustrations of the two legal maxims, "Consensus tollit errorem;" and "Non culpa, nisi mens sit rea."

"The first case is extracted from the Bombay Telegraph and "Courier of the 20th January last.

"The case was this:—

"Poolchund Nulchund, by caste aBanian, was charged with "wilful murder, having made three of his children "(Duvalu and Goshub, daughters, and Ambaram, a son) drink "bhang, and when the children were intoxicated, placed them "on a pile of wood, and set fire to the wood, whereby the "children were burnt to death. The case was tried by Mr. "Frere. The prisoner was found guilty. The sentence was as "follows:—You, Poolchund Nulchund, being found guilty of "murder; the sentence of the Court upon you is, that you be "imprisoned in solitary confinement for eighteen months, and that "you be twice flogged, receiving each time twenty-five stripes,
been taken in the proposition to divest the British subject of his privileges, and to submit him to the same tribunal as the Native. It is obvious that so long as the law compels a party accused of crime, his

"once on the commencement of the execution of this sentence, and once on your release from gaol!!!"

"In handing up the case for confirmation of the sentence to the Sudder, Mr. Frere observes: 'The only difficult feature presented in this case is the punishment that ought to be awarded. The convict pleads guilty, and there is no doubt of his having committed the murders with which he stands charged, and also having attempted suicide. It is never even suggested that he was deranged; and the crimes he has committed appear to have been caused by a kind of religious fanaticism alone.

'A sentence of death would have been no punishment to the prisoner, nor would the execution of it have served as an example to others—if others could be found likely to commit a similar crime. Nor did transportation appear to me a more fitting sentence to pass than death. I, however, thought that actual, not mere nominal flogging, and a long period of solitary confinement, in which the prisoner's health as well as his own life would be taken care of, would have a more salutary effect upon the prisoner, as well as the public, than any other sentence I could pass.'

'The case was considered in the Sudder on the 23rd of December, 1852, before Messrs. Legoyt, Grant, and Warden. Mr. Warden, in his minute, observes, on the 'exculpatory circumstances' urged by the prisoner in his confessions, which are, 'that the destruction of his children and the attempt to destroy himself, were the solemnization of a religious rite performed on a day when a passage to heaven was believed to be open to all who died on that day, and with the consent of such children as were old enough to express a consent;' whence, says Mr. Warden, 'it is to be deduced, that he believed the third, had he been old enough, would have consented also, and that the father consented on the child's behalf' !!!
accuser, and all the witnesses on both sides, to appear before the supreme Court at a distance it may be of a thousand miles, the European enjoys practically an impunity for all offences, except those

"Mr. Legeyt thinks the case ought to be sent back for inquiry as to the prisoner's state of mind."

"Mr. Grant argues as follows:—' The sessions judge has undoubtedly embarrassed the Court. He has forgotten that punishment is not intended to be malicious. If the culprit courted death and received it from justice, the latter would have been saved from the imputation of being biased, by the presumed devices of the culprit. The sentence is unquestionably an inadequate one; but it is considered also an unsuitable one, because the effect of solitary confinement upon such a mind would probably be insanity. If, then, solitary imprisonment will drive Poolchund mad, would not transportation be a mitigation?"

"Such is the Bombay case.

"The Calcutta case is this: It is taken from the *Englishman* of the 16th March, 1853.

"Nurst Jergia was tried by Mr. Garstin, the sessions judge of Sarum, for the murder of an infant named Tughroo, aged four months.

"The facts are as follow:—On the 22nd of December last, the prisoner desired the prosecutrix, her sister-in-law, the mother of the child, to take some rice to her brother in the fields. She did so; leaving the infant in prisoner's charge. On her return she found the child in the prisoner's arms much scratched, and swollen about the neck. The child died at eight o'clock on the eve of the same day. The prisoner admitted that she had squeezed the child's throat, and that it was her fate to destroy it. The evidence of a surgeon showed that the child had died by pressure,—strangulation. The prisoner's father-in-law deposed to the women having had frequent quarrels, and to the prisoner's threatening to kill the child if the mother did not leave the house.

"The Mahommedan law officer was for acquittal. Mr.
of the deepest dye. The Natives feel this grievance deeply, and they are now fully awake to its injustice. The great increase of Europeans in the provinces, owing to the railways, the telegraph, and the spread of private enterprise, necessitates a change in the law. The privileged class, as might be expected, has clamoured loudly against the change; but their most powerful arguments have been directed, not against the substantive measure itself, but against the hardship of having their lives and liberties submitted to judges of such a quality as now occupy the provincial bench.

In 1858 I was somewhat successful in showing the English public what the quality of the incumbents of the Mofussil Bench really was. I can only

"Garstin differing from him, the case was referred to the
"Sudder.
"Mr. Dunbar, of the Sudder, observes as follows:—'Con-
"sidering the case with which she might have completed her
"purpose, had her intention been to kill the child, I think it
"reasonable to infer she meant nothing more than to do such
"hurt to the child as would seriously alarm the mother, and
"compel her to leave the house. The depositions of the
"medical officer show that the congestion of the organs caused
"by the strangulation was greater than so young a child could
"bear. It is to be inferred from this, that if the child had been
"older, or the strangulation somewhat less, death would probably
"not have ensued. The prisoner could not of course be aware of
"the exact degree of violence which she could use without danger
"to life, and therefore probably injured the child to a greater
"extent than she contemplated. Giving her the benefit of the
"doubts which fairly arise in this case,' &c.

When these two cases have been successfully capped, I shall be happy to furnish my antagonists with more work of a still tougher description.
say that not a single measure has been taken since that time to improve it, and the crop of idiotcies daily impugned in the Sudder is as plentiful as ever. We have had the basis of the civil service indeed widened, as it is called, but there has been no line of demarcation drawn between the revenue and judicial departments: no special training introduced to qualify for the latter. A civilian, without any judicial experience, may at the present day, just as in 1853, be pitchforked on to the judicial bench, especially if he happen to have at all incurred the displeasure of Government in the revenue line. Only within the last few months has an instance precisely in point occurred in this presidency. A gentleman, for some twenty years in the revenue department, has suddenly been made civil and session judge over one of our most important districts, and, as he is troubled with a conscience, I have reason to believe that he bitterly deplores his own unavoidable deficiency. It would be too much to expect that the interests of the people, over whose welfare he presides, should have been consulted; and this proves that the system which prevailed in 1853, remains unaltered to the present day. The institution of a professorship of law has given an opportunity for raising up a decently educated body of Vakeels, but some time must elapse before their services are available to the public; still longer before their influence can make itself felt. Meanwhile, as if actuated by an inconceivable folly, we are acting with reference to this body just as we have with reference to our railroads. In a rude, poor country, where we should work with
the instruments most ready to hand, we cannot be satisfied until we have tools of the most finished workmanship. Thus, we have a first-class railway, crawling daubingly across the country, with a capacity for speed which it can never use, laid down at a cost which almost precludes the chance of a profitable return, instead of an inferior machine, which might have already stretched from coast to coast, and permitted the masses to make use of it for the purpose of locomotion. So with respect to our pleaders. We have at present a body of utterly ignorant, if not utterly unscrupulous, Vakeels, filling our courts. We might, if so disposed, supersede them by a class of men acquainted with the principles of law, and actuated by principles of professional honour: but no; we must not suffer these men to take their diploma in law until they shall have taken a degree in arts, to obtain which, three years must be spent at the University; a period which few, if any, of the law pupils can afford.

So with respect to the police. Their character was fully exposed by the Torture Report. I select the following picture of them from many others:—

"The police," says Mr. Saalfelt,* "has become the bane and pest of society, the terror of the community, and the origin of half the misery and discontent that exist among the subjects of Government. Corruption and bribery reign paramount throughout the whole establishment; violent torture and cruelty are their chief

"instruments for detecting crime, implicating innocence, or extorting money. Robberies are daily or nightly committed (and not unfrequently with their connivance), certain suspicious characters are taken up and conveyed to some secluded spot far out of the reach of witnesses, where every species of cruelty is exercised upon them; if guilty, the crime is invariably confessed, and stolen property discovered; but a tempting bribe soon releases them from custody. Should they persist in avowing their innocence, relief from suffering is promised by criminating some wealthy individual, and in the agony of despair he is pointed to as the receiver of stolen goods. In his turn he is compelled to part with his hard-earned coin to avert the impending danger. Even the party robbed does not escape the clutching grasp of the heartless peon and duffadar; he is threatened with being torn from his house, dragged to the Cutcherry, and detained there for days or weeks to the actual detriment of his trade or livelihood, unless he point out the supposed thieves: the dread of, or aversion to, the Cutcherry is so great, that the owner would sooner disavow the stolen article, and disclaim all knowledge of the property, though his name be found written upon it in broad characters."

The remedy proposed was the immediate and total separation of police and magisterial authority from the revenue functions of the civilians and present Native police. Lord Harris expressed surprise, shame, and indignation at the disclosures of the
Torture Report. He was not prepared to the whole length of depriving the civilians of magisterial authority; but he was prepared at once to separate the revenue and police functions. A scheme was prepared for a detective and preventive police, somewhat, I believe, upon the Irish plan. The Court of Directors admitted the case proved, and admitted the propriety of the remedy. The supreme Government has shelved the whole proposition indefinitely; and after two years from the date of the Torture Report we are precisely where we then were, so far as anything having been done is concerned. Can the people be well affected towards us? Can they be contented among themselves? Are they even secure in life and property? Are they enjoying that good government, to secure which they pay their heavy tribute to the State? Have they not just cause for their murmurs? Could anything else be expected from them?

And why is it that nothing has been done?

Aye, but this leads me to what some may regard as another of the "remotely predisposing causes" of late events in our diagnosis of the case; but which, for my own part, I will not avouch to be connected or unconnected with the rebellion: suffice it, that I call attention to the actual existence of the evil, and invite a consideration both of the facts and the deductions which may be made from them. I say, then, that at the root of the entire evil lies the Double Government in England. But for this, I do not believe that such iniquities as the annexations of our neighbouring territories, such open breaches of faith,
could be committed. But for this, there would be some hope of redress for the parties who feel themselves aggrieved. But for this, there would not be interposed such monstrous delay between the recognition of an evil and its remedy or removal. So long as "Leadenhall" is allowed to exist, will there be an obstruction to all sound reform which can be avoided or deferred. If we look to the Directors' public despatches everything will seem progressing admirably; but Macaulay has taught us how little confidence can be reposed in the paper professions of the Court. In his life of Warren Hastings occurs the following passage:—

"One thing, indeed, is to be said in excuse for him. The pressure applied to him by his employers at home was such as only the highest virtue could have withstood, such as left him no choice except to commit great wrongs, or to resign his high post, and with that post all his hopes of fortune and distinction. The Directors, it is true, never enjoined or applauded any crime. Far from it. Whoever examines their letters written at that time will find there many just and humane sentiments, many excellent precepts, in short, an admirable code of political ethics. But every exhortation is modified or nullified by a demand for money. 'Govern leniently, and send more money; practise strict justice and moderation towards neighbouring powers, and send more money;' this is, in truth, the sum of almost all the instructions that Hastings ever received from home. Now these instructions, being interpreted, mean simply,
"Be the father and the oppressor of the people, be just and unjust, moderate and rapacious." The Directors dealt with India, as the church, in the good old times, dealt with a heretic. They delivered the victim over to the executioners, with an earnest request that all possible tenderness might be shown. We by no means accuse or suspect those who framed these despatches of hypocrisy. It is probable that, writing 15,000 miles from the place where their orders were to be carried into effect, they never perceived the gross inconsistency of which they were guilty. But the inconsistency was at once manifested to their Lieutenant at Calcutta, who, with an empty treasury, with an unpaid army, with his own salary often in arrear, with deficient crops, with Government tenants daily running away, was called upon to remit home another half million without fail. Hastings saw that it was absolutely necessary for him to disregard either the moral discourses or the pecuniary requisitions of his employers. Being forced to disobey them in something, he had to consider what kind of disobedience they would most readily pardon; and he correctly judged that the safest course would be to neglect the sermons, and to find the rupees."

This is equally true at the present day. The "Code of Political Ethics" has had many benevolent additions since Warren Hastings' time, but any measure which necessitates an increased outlay may very safely be deferred by the Governor-General, either by further reference, or on the plea of want of
finances, without his incurring the displeasure of his "loving friends," however they may inculcate the necessity of immediate action. The Civil Service has little power of union or combination for the purpose of joint defence; but they possess a vast amount of "vis inertiae," a power of passive resistance; and, both at home and abroad, I firmly believe there is as little disposition as ever there was to cut down the exclusive class privileges of the self-styled "aristocracy" of India. Measures which deprive the civilians of any of their powers are naturally distasteful to them.

By the last mail I received a copy of the Directors' Despatch on the System of Police in the Bengal Presidency, moved for by Mr. Kinnaird. Let Members of Parliament peruse that document. They will see that it is a complete unreserved admission of the whole case alleged against the Police; yet the same post brought a letter to a friend of mine, in which the writer states, that he had just met a Madras civilian on furlough, who assured him that the statements which reached England were all highly exaggerated. It is thus that one line is taken in public, another in private; and again, let the Police Despatch be contrasted with the Despatch on the Memorial of the Bengal Missionaries, called for by Mr. Danby Seymour. There, though the evils are not denied, they are not admitted; and the excellent men who asked for a Commission of Inquiry are sneered at for not chanting the praises of Government.

If the police and magisterial duties of the revenue,
officers be taken away, they fear, though most mistakenly as it appears to me, that they will be left mere Collectors of Revenue, and that they may suffer in position, in privilege, and in pay. If the Mofussil Bench be thrown open to competition, and the successful practitioner at the Bar, be he European or Native, may look to elevation to the Bench, another "huge half-moon, a monstrous caustic out" is taken from their employment by the disagreeable interlopers who come cranking in; and the civilian looks forward with dismay to the day when he may have to address the swart occupant of his former bench in the words of Iago:

"The lusty Moor hath jumped into my seat."

The feeling is natural, necessary, and pardonable; but it should not be permitted to stand in the way of needful reform.

So again, the India House leans towards the protection of the interests of the civilians; and in proportion as the field of patronage has become more contracted, are their efforts concentrated in defending the strip yet left. So long, therefore, as the Court of Directors' existence is prolonged, may we look for continued delays in the execution of measures which have their nominal sanction and approval. Not a single measure of reform, that I am aware of, has been the spontaneous suggestion of the Directors: all the beneficial measures, public works, education, and the like, lately introduced, have been forced upon them from out of doors, wrung out of them by the pressure of public opinion.

But the evils of Double Government lie far deeper
than in mere passive resistance, or the tacit con-
nivance at procrastination above adverted to.

Its evils are its unnecessary costliness, its cum-
brousness, and its freedom from responsibility. It
has outlived the objects for which it was instituted.
Its cost is as follows, taken from Parliamentary
returns called for by Mr. Seymour in 1856:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board of Control</td>
<td>£29,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries of Directors of East India Company</td>
<td>7,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent expenses, including coals, candles, &amp;c.</td>
<td>32,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries of</td>
<td>94,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law charges</td>
<td>10,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£173,908</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A fair round sum for the home administration of India out of the revenue drawn from the Ryot, every allowance being made for sums squandered in unproductive guzzling and banquets to Governors and Commanders-in-chief about to sail; occasions for after-dinner platitudes, and a deal of preaching what is never practised: a goodly margin also being taken for the performance of a vast mass of utterly useless labour to search, arrange, abstract, &c., the shiploads of despatches and documents which are sent from India in quadruplicate. There is a Commissioner at present at work in India to revise the salaries of the Civil Service, with a view to ascertain what reductions can be made, what sinecures abolished, what superfluous duties omitted, how labour can be
economised, and outlay saved. Surely these are days when retrenchment as well as charity had better begin at home; and there is ample room and verge enough in the figures I have quoted for the practical application of frugality combined with far greater efficiency than has ever hitherto obtained.

It is the most costly piece of machinery that ever was invented. The item of Sundries alone (£32,000) exceeds the total charge of the home Government of all the colonies,—£25,000! Double Government is indeed a misnomer, since the Court of Directors has no real power: it is a Government carried on by a double agency, by which work and despatches are multiplied, mystification and perplexity encouraged and rendered easy, and all chances of redress for alleged injuries and grievances defeated; and from the facility with which inquiry is shifted from one quarter to the other, resulting in a practical irresponsibility.

That the Board of Control, or rather the President of the Board of Control, monopolises all the real power, I believe will not be denied, except by the tottering Directors themselves. In 1852 Lord Derby, then Prime Minister, told the House of Lords that, "In the Board of Control, practically speaking, the whole administration of the affairs of India rests." Lord Ellenborough said, "I know that when I was at the Board of Control, I administered the government. There is no doubt about that." Mr. Dundas said, "Without the whole powers of Government the Board of Control would be a nugatory institution." Lord Grenville said, "The whole authority of the Government was
"actually committed to the Board, and the carrying "on the Government in the name of the Company "was only what the Company had done themselves "in the case of the Indian princes, whose rule they "had superseded." Mill, the historian of India, says, "The real, sole, governing power in India is the "Board of Control; and it only makes use of the "Court of Directors as an instrument, as a subordi-"nate office for the management of details and the "preparation of business for the cognizance of the "superior power." Three years elapsed before the Directors were officially informed of the cause of the Afghan war. Lord Broughton says, "I ordered "that war." The last instance is that of the Persian "war. What share the Directors have in the Govern-"ment, what "balance of power" they actually constitute, what "sifting and revision of measures," what bringing to bear of two sets of independent minds upon each single topic our double form of government secures, let the following letter from the Court of Directors to the President of the Board of Control vouch:—

"East India House, Oct. 22, 1856.

"SIR,—In reference to the expedition for foreign "service, preparing at Bombay, under the orders (it "is presumed) of Her Majesty's Government, com-"municated through the Secret Committee, we are "requested by the Court of Directors to suggest, "for the consideration of the Board, how far it "may be just and proper to subject India to the "whole of the charges consequent on those orders."
"2. In the absence of all information of the causes and objects of the expedition, the Court cannot themselves form a judgment upon the subject; but, recollecting the correspondence which passed, regarding the expenses of the Afghan war, the Court submit that, simultaneously with the expedition, it should be decided how the expenses are to be borne. That was not done when the expedition to Afghanistan was undertaken, and it is probably owing to that omission that India has been exclusively charged with the very heavy burden of that war, notwithstanding the applications repeatedly made by the Court, which, though not admitted, have never in principle been rejected by her Majesty's Government. We have, &c.,

(Signed) "W. H. Sykes,

"Ross D. Mangles."

But the Court of Directors is powerful for evil, if it is powerless for good. They have always turned upon their best advisers. They insulted and maligned Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier, the two men whose counsels and intended reforms in the civil and military departments of administration, if attended to, would have saved the country from its present frightful state. Did it support Sir Charles Napier, in Lord Dalhousie's quarrel with him? Did it stifle inquiry, or call for investigation? Did it listen to the warning, that the Bengal army was mutinous, and that immediate measures were necessary for its reform, and the safety of the empire, or
did it side at once with its Governor-General, the whole course of whose aggrandizing policy was so entirely in consonance with its own wishes? Did it not rest satisfied with the assurance of Lord Dalhousie, that Sir Charles Napier was the calumniator of the Indian army; that his apprehensions of mutiny were unfounded; that the recent outbreak was a "farce;" that there was peace, "within and without;" that the condition of the Native soldier was such as to leave little for improvement?

The opportunity of repaying an ancient grudge against the conqueror of Scinde, who had been forced upon them by the nation at a moment of critical danger, was far too tempting to be thrown aside; especially as the same opportunity enabled them to shower fresh distinction on their brilliant petted servant, the Governor-General. But for the prejudices of the Board of Directors, the necessary measures with regard to military administration might have been taken, probably would have been taken. And thus it will ever be again. What becomes of the boasted aid which the experience of the Court of Directors brings to the Board of Control, in its ignorance of Indian affairs? What could the President of the Board of Control know of the real condition of the Indian army, its wants and acquirements, from his own personal acquaintance with the subject? To lean upon the prejudices of such a body as the Directors is to trust to a broken reed, destined to pierce the side of the confiding. Since the charter of William the Fourth, in 1833, the character of the East India
Company has been totally altered. They are no longer sovereign lords of the soil; they are mere trustees for the Crown. Where the power is, there also should be the name, and the undivided responsibility. The Double Government is emphatically a sham. The Directors are but a cloak for the irresponsible despotism of the minister. The reasons for which the Board of Control was constituted have expired with the altered state of circumstances. "But when the reason of old establishments," writes Burke, "is gone, it is absurd to preserve "nothing, but the name of them." The Government has long been practically, if not in theory, that of Her Majesty. Why is Her Majesty veiled from her Indian subjects, by a body which, in the language of Mill, is a mere "instrument, a subordinate "office for the management of details, and the "preparation of business for the cognizance of "the superior power?"

What valid reason can possibly be assigned for the longer maintenance of the Court of Directors as a separate body? In no other country in the world than England, could an empty form have been so long preserved, after its uses and objects had passed away. The Company was originally a mere joint-stock corporation of traders. For such purposes their constitution was perhaps well adapted. The magnitude of their concern justified a Proprietary and Directory; but when a wonderful series of events had converted the pedlars into princes, what likelihood was there, that a mere mercantile body should, exhibit the qualities necessary for the
statesmanlike conduct of an empire? They have lived on from hand to mouth. By a system of secrecy and mystification they have contrived to keep all knowledge, and all the weight deriveable from authority, to themselves; and have persuaded the public that any intermeddling with their functions, their peculiar experience and ample knowledge, would assuredly prove highly detrimental, if not dangerous or fatal, to our empire in the East; and now that by pursuing the wicked, foolish policy of annexation they have brought the empire to the very verge of extermination, who shall say that these trustees have not been guilty, grossly guilty, of a breach of their sacred trust? Through the instrumentality of the able men who have wielded power in India we have hitherto floated on the top of the stream; but the tide of fortune turns, and the policy of one man may plunge us into a vortex, whence escape is hopeless.

That the Directors of such an empire as India, extensive as all Europe, should be chosen by a proprietary body of elderly spinsters, and retired ship-captains, and city bankers, seems almost incredible. That the best men from India should decline to be dragged through the filth which such a canvass implies, is only to be expected. What the Court of Proprietors really is, the public has sickened at learning by the reports of the meetings of its Court, when vituperation and rant on one side, contemptuous indifference on the other, mark an assembly of those whom Burke calls, "vulgar politicians." It
is thus he describes them in the bitterness of his scorn:

"The tribe of vulgar politicians are the lowest of our species. There is no trade so vile and mechanical, as government in their hands. Virtue is not their habit. They are out of themselves in any course of conduct recommended only by conscience and glory. A large, liberal, and prospective view of the interest of states, passes with them for romance, and the principles that recommend it, for the wanderings of a disordered imagination. The calculators compute them out of their senses. The jesters and buffoons shame them out of everything grand and elevated. Littleness in object and in means, to them appears soundness and sobriety."

Surely the time has at last arrived when the Court of Directors must be snuffed out. Shorn of their patronage, possessing only the shadow of power, the weakness of senility alone can induce them to linger a little longer on the scene. They are effete and useless. They consume a very large sum annually, drawn from the pocket of the Ryot, without conferring any corresponding benefit upon him. Indeed, they stand between him and good, between him and rectitude for evil. They serve to mystify and perplex, as he, who in Parliament has had occasion to study their accounts, or call for returns of papers, knows to his amazement. They serve to shield the minister from responsibility, and to rid him of the importunate suitors who beset his door. Does any
one think that all the Native princes, and men formerly of substance, now in London, with their various petitions, have come across the ocean in spite of caste, habit, and prejudice, without a mighty sense of wrong impelling them? They are no mere pleasure-seekers, or sight-seers. They have come over, each with his charge of robbery and spoliation against the Company; fondly believing that justice is to be found among the people of England, but finding, to his amazement, that between the India House and the Board of Control he can never reach it by any appeal. Double Government is here perfect in its duplicity. He is bandied backwards and forwards from Leadenhall-street to Cannon-row; he can fix responsibility upon neither. He returns home at last, heart-broken and bewildered, to sit himself down a ruined man; one who tells all people that justice is as much a myth and a phantom in England as in India. But we shall again be pestered with the declaration that India, under the Directors, has at least been better governed than the Colonies. I utterly deny it. The Government of the Colonies may have been bad, but it has not been worse than that of India. *Qui procumbit humi, non habet unde cadat.* The Colonies, at least, have English laws and English trained judges to administer them. They have, at least, a police who are not a gang of robbers and torturers. Our policy with respect to the Colonies may have been mistaken; but they have always had among them the elements of domestic good government, such as India never enjoyed. The Colonies have now risen to the
stage of representative government in the progress of political development. In India we are still theoretically and practically a Despotism.* Education may have been neglected in both. In India, its commencement, as a comprehensive Government measure, dates from last year. The real explanation of this cry lies in the superior ability which the Colonists possess for making their grievances heard. There is indeed a dumbness of despair; but it is not that which has repressed the voice of Indian complaint. Could one tithe, one-twentieth, one-hundredth part of the petitions for redress, which annually find their way into the council chambers of our presidencies, be translated home, we should leave but small room for any wish on the part of the Directors* to compare the amount of Indian and Colonial complaints.

There is scarcely an individual in India who has not, or fancies he has not, some great grievance for redress. Either his Enam has been resumed by the Company; or he has been ruined by a suit-at-law; or he has been tortured by the police; or he has been worried with false charges, sometimes amounting to the capital crime of murder; or the magistrate has hauled him up out of spite, and imprisoned him, or broken into his domicile, or vexatiously made him find security; or he has been ruined by gang robbers, and can find no redress; or his property has been confiscated for the services of State, his bullocks and carts seized for the use of some marching regiment,

* We are positively retrograding. We have burked the freedom of the Press.
and gone on a tour, whence the probability is that they will never return; or he has performed work, or supplied materials for Government, and cannot get his accounts settled; or he has been driven to labour compulsorily on some public work;* or the collector has summarily given up his land to another, leaving him to the slow torture of a "regular suit;" or he is in hot-water with his Pagoda people, and has no tribunal to appeal to;† or the Sheristadar or Thasildar has played him some scurvy trick; or he has been unjustly convicted by the criminal courts, without, or even against, evidence. In short, the budget of complaints is full of proofs of an administration of affairs, feeble almost to inanition. I could give a hundred cases from my own experience, drawn from

* An Act has been prepared for legalizing compulsory labour in case of tank or cover breach, and settling a rate of remuneration. Some such enactment seems positively necessary in a country like this, where irrigation works are so numerous, and so much is at stake in their preservation. I heard an amusing instance of compulsory labour when I was in Tanjore. A tank was suddenly breached by a deluge of rain, and much damage would have been unavoidably done to the crops, but for the presence of mind of the Thasildar, who placed the villagers in the breach, shoulder to shoulder, and filled in the interstices of this human wall with wattle and dub, till other materials could be supplied for repairing the embankment! Surely the Thasildar must have been some university-bred plagiarist of Shakespeare—

"This man, with lime and rough-cast, doth present wall."

† I was lately engaged in an appeal in the Sudder, against a decree in a provincial court, in which the judge refused to entertain a claim to blow a trumpet during a procession, for the discharge of which office he had a yearly salary, because the judge thought it was a case of conscience!
all classes, and every rank of life, from the Prince dethroned by treaty-breach, down to the pauper Ryot wandering penniless over the country. Let one suffice; not selected because it presents any features of peculiarity, but because it is the latest which has come to my notice, if except a few idiotcies, in the shape of decisions of judges and magistrates, which I found awaiting me on my return to Madras, for appeal to the Sudder Adalut:

Going up to Bangalore the other day, I occupied the coupé in one of the railway carriages to Vellore. A Native, who, for aught his appearance betokened, might have been a master bricklayer or carpenter, came up to me on the platform, and asked if I had any objection to his sharing the coupé with me. Of course, I was only too glad of a companion; especially as a first-class Native passenger is somewhat of a "rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno"—and I speculated on his possible history. We soon entered into conversation, and the following is the sum of his story which he told me: "I am going to spend Sunday at my village-house, where I have an estate of about 2000 acres. This is an Enam bestowed on my father, who was a meritorious servant of the Company. On my brother's death the Government resumed the land, but the Court of Directors ordered it to be restored to me and my son. It is not all cultivated, and lately the engineers have been making some alterations in the channels, which have diminished the quantity of water in the tank, and I am not able to cultivate now so large a portion as formerly. I have also a Mootah
in Masulipatam. It is twenty miles long, by so
many broad. I and my father were eighteen years
in litigation to obtain possession of this Zemindary.
The collector was very much opposed to my
getting it, and threw every obstacle in his power
in my way. At last, the Sudder Court decided in
my favour; but it was not until after great delay
that the Masulipatam authorities put me in pos-
session, and the Sudder had to issue sundry pre-
cepts before the revenue authorities would obey.
No sooner was I in possession, than I found
another suit filed against me* in the Masulipatam
Court, by the Company, denying the right of the
last Mootadar, a Hindoo widow, to alienate the
property as against them, to whom, they say, but
for such alienation, the estate would have lapsed by
escheat. Thus, I find myself launched on a fresh
sea of litigation. Heaven knows if I shall ever
reach the shore. From the moment I have been
in possession I have met with the most extraordi-
ary opposition. The Thasildar and the very
peons know that the collector and the judge are
ill-disposed to my claim. Rumours are circulated
that I shall very soon be turned out, and though I
have paid my kist regularly I have never been
able to get a receipt from the revenue authorities
for a single instalment. My manager and agents
have been most shamefully used. The manager,

* Singularly enough, I had myself advised this suit whilst I
held the office of Government Pleader. The extent of the
power of a Hindu widow to alienate her estate is still a moot
point.
who I believe is a respectable and known to be a
useful man, together with many others, has been
charged with murder by the police authorities.
The whole charge is utterly false. The others
were imprisoned. My manager was so alarmed
that he made his escape, giving out that he was
gone on a pilgrimage to a holy place. The rest
were tried by the judge, and they were all con-
victed, and recommended to be hanged. When
the case reached the Sudder, the Court directed
the release of all the prisoners. The Sudder said
there was not a tittle of trustworthy evidence in
the case, and that it was clearly a conspiracy.
Thereupon my manager returned. He was forth-
with arrested, and the charge against him pro-
ceeded with. Several of the witnesses on the
former trial were now brought forward. They
declared that their former statements were false,
that they had been tampered with by the police,
and instigated to give false evidence. The widow
of the man alleged to have been murdered was
among them. It was found impossible to convict
the accused. But he was imprisoned and dis-
graced. The criminal judge, determined, if pos-
sible, to ruin my man, wrote to the Sudder, to
know if the depositions taken in the former case
should be used against him. (These were behind
the back of the prisoner, and many of the depo-
sants had declared them to be false.) The Sudder
replied that it was preposterous. The Masuli-
patam authorities are determined to take security
from my manager, as though there were a case of
"moral guilt or strong suspicion against him." He
is a ruined and degraded man. I don't know what
to do. If I take him back I shall only be sub-
ject to further annoyance and machinations; yet
he has always been a good servant to me, and I
believe him honest."

The tale may seem incredible to people in
England; but to me, the features were not at all
remarkable. I have heard many such, varied only in
detail, the general outline being the same. The
gentleman promised me the whole of the papers, and
I hope they will arrive before this is despatched, so
that I may verify his statements; but I see no
reason to doubt their general correctness!

Now let it be remembered that there are cases
like this all over the country. Can the people be
contented? Can they regard our Government with
esteem, or even with respect? Are not materials of
a most inflammable nature piled up everywhere?
May not general dissatisfaction still exist, although at
present it be smouldering?"

I would now briefly trace the progress of the efforts
which are pursued by those who try to obtain
redress for a grievance. An Enam, for instance, has
been resumed. The party ejected petitions the col-
lector who has just ousted him. His petition is
endorsed with a refusal to interfere, and returned to
him. He travels up to Madras, and presents a petition
to the Revenue Board, who either decline to interfere,
or remit him to the collector. He petitions the Govern-
ment, who follow the same course. Perhaps in ex-
treme cases, they direct the collector to report fully
on the matter. He is the party who has passed the decision. He supports his original view by every argument in his power. The petitioner never sees this report, which is a confidential communication between the Government and its subordinate. The Government minutes that the explanation offered by the collector is perfectly satisfactory, and declines to interfere. Perhaps the petitioner renew his attempts. He is referred to the Government endorsement of previous date. He has perhaps been hanging about Madras some two or three years during this process; he has expended all his means; he has been fooled by designing petition-writers in Madras who have wrung him of his last rupee under the false assurances of their influence with people in high places. But when the farce has been played out, he returns to his native village, or goes and hangs himself; or throws himself down a well, and is never heard of again. The number of petitions annually forwarded in this way, and thus annually disposed of, is enormous. The only limit to them is the utter hopelessness of success. The whole petitioning system is a vast delusion and mockery. I have traced the great majority of petitioners to the conclusion of their attempts; some few forwarded their memorial "in triplicate" through the Government to the supreme Government, and, after that, to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control—the "Double Government" at home. The Indian Government gives it a friendly kick in passing it forward; and, after a due interval, it is returned with an intimation, that the matter having been thoroughly
sifted by the authorities in India, the Board of Directors sees no reason to interfere. Let us now suppose that the memorialist is a dethroned prince, or a great zamindar. In such a case, an agent may be dispatched to England after the whole of the above process has been tried and failed, or the injured party may go in person to throw himself, as he hopes, at the feet of Her Majesty, there to claim a speedy justice. On his arrival in London he visits the Court of Directors, and is referred to the Board of Control. The Board of Control refers him back again to the Court of Directors. All this very courteously, it is true; but he soon finds out that there is no chance of a hearing, much less of redress, in either of those quarters. He obtains an introduction to some Member of Parliament. A question is asked in the House, which elicits an ambiguous or oracular reply. Papers are moved for, and if they are not garbled or mutilated, a tale of the gravest injustice, petty larceny, and villany; is disclosed. The flimsy pretexts of setting aside the plainest treaty are seen to have been suggested in India, and held satisfactory and conclusive in England. A debate ensues before some forty members. India House influence, Board of Control influence, ministerial influence is brought to bear upon the question. A burst of virtuous indignation escapes from any Director who may have a seat in Parliament: Mr. Mangles and others assure the House that, in their time, Indian Government was perfect, and they have no reason to believe it has deteriorated since; and the whole thing ends in smoke. An effort is then made
to get the matter referred to the Privy Council. A minister, it may be the Duke of Argyll or Mr. Vernon Smith, assures the country that the Indian Government is only too anxious to lay the dispute before that tribunal, but that the highest legal authority has declared it *extra vires*. Then, as a last effort of despair, a Bill is brought in, to give the party his rights. It is carried by a triumphant majority in a really large House of Commons. But the Lords very summarily kick it out. It is a private bill. It is unconstitutional, it is highly unprecedented and dangerous. Next Session a question is asked the President of the Board of Control touching the whereabouts of the unfortunate prince—call him Ali Moorad. In the recess, the India House hacks, and the journals which they can influence, have been industriously spreading reports of the utter untenableness of the claim, coupled with assurances that it is likely to be adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties by a compromise at the India House. The President of the Board of Control, however, has nearly forgotten the existence of the individual. He really does not know whether he is in England; he thinks he has been remitted to the Governor-General in India for a final settlement of his claims!

Now this is a counterpart of the course pursued in India. There, the general principle is laid down never to take a kingdom or a property where there is a "shadow of a doubt;" where the former incumbent "deserves well" of the Company, &c.; but every case that arises is found to be one to which the general rule does not apply; and that in the teeth of
the most conclusive facts. The kingdom is seized. So in England, the general profession is a desire to do justice to every claimant. But in each special case, all conceivable delays and obstacles are thrown in his way, every possible objection shewn, and he never does get justice. All this shakes our power in India where it has no root; we destroy the affections of the people, and we are set down as a nation of liars and robbers.

Now I say, that neither the original seizure nor the final denial of justice could take place were it not for the Double Government.

That is the root of the evil. If we had a Government acting publicly instead of secretly; if there were room for fair investigation instead of mystification; if the Government were restrained by a sense of its responsibility, and if it were immediately responsible to Parliament for all its acts, these deeds of spoliation could never have been attempted. Neither would redress be altogether hopeless, and its pursuit that mockery and delusion which it now is under the irresponsible despotism of the Double Government. But for the Double Government, let me ask, would it have been possible to stifle inquiry before the Parliamentary Committees in 1852? With a minister decently responsible to Parliament, and no India House influence on the back stairs, would not all the subjects of proposed inquiry have been thoroughly sifted? Would Lord John Russell ever have stood upon the "finality" of that superficial investigation which took place, and have left untouched the most important subjects—the administration of justice, and
the condition of the people? Why if those topics had
been sifted, such a state of things would have been
necessarily exposed as might perhaps have led to
measures sufficient to have prevented the present
rebellion. Look at the disclosures of the adminis-
tration of justice in Southern India; look at the
Torture Report; look at the Bengal Missionary
Petition. They will give some notion of what
might be expected to have come out, if these subjects
had been opened. But after a hasty inquiry into
some few out of the many topics laid down for
search at starting, the Committees were suddenly
closed, after the India House had polled its witnesses
on the spot, and before the people of India could send
their witnesses into the field. It was as though the
sheriff should declare the polling booths at an election
closed at twelve o’clock in the day instead of at the
pre-appointed hour.

But for the Double Government, could the Report
of the Law Reform Commissioners, such men as
Sir John Jervis and Sir John Romilly, and the others
who composed the Committee, have been shelved, a
dead letter up to the present moment? But for the
Double Government, could the President of the
Board of Control, in the year 1857, have made the
following vague reply to an inquiry as to the course
of Indian reform:

"As the subject was one of great importance, and
one on which much difference of opinion existed, he
sent out all the proceedings of the commission to
India, with the request that the proposed mode of
procedure and penal code suggested by them should
be carried through the Legislative Council in the form of Acts. With regard to the amalgamation of the Supreme Court and the Sudder Court, he believed it would require an Act of the Imperial Parliament, on account of the Admiralty jurisdiction. It was, moreover, a point on which great difference of opinion existed. The petition which the honourable and learned gentleman had presented that evening advocated a different view from that entertained by him; and as the question was extremely complicated, he thought it could be better discussed in India; but as soon as he received the report of the decision arrived at, he assured the honourable and learned gentleman that there should be no delay on his part in carrying out the views of the Legislative Council.

But for Double Government, is it possible that the cotton growing capabilities of India would not ere this have been developed, and the water communication with the great cotton growing districts of Berar and Nagpore have been opened—that cotton district, the fertility of which prompted Lord Dalhousie to break faith with the Sovereigns of Nagpore, and to spoil them of their kingdom? Would the great Godavery not have been opened? Would the Friend of India, in two lines, have dared to assert that the scheme for the improvement of the Godavery was impracticable, in the teeth of Lieut. Haig's numerous reports, and at the very moment when a friend of mine was bringing cotton down by it from Chanda to Coringa; and when the same gentleman, after proving the success of the experiment, has made
arrangements, single handed, for carrying down 10,000 bales by the river this very year? But for Double Government, should we have had the *Times* writing the tissue of sophistry which appeared in its columns on the 16th of May, with reference to the principles on which India must be governed, and the impossibility of Europeans ever successfully employing their capital in developing the resources of the country?

Would not that powerful organ, in possession of the most accurate information and perfect knowledge, instead of thus, perhaps unconsciously, furthering the policy of the India House, have been enlisted unequivocally on the side of those who, by a strong system of judicial administration, would invite English capital and enterprise into India, as the surest source of prosperity to the Natives? Would it not, while making the humiliating confession that Englishmen, in search of profitable employment or investment, will seek Sierra Leone rather than India, have stated the true causes of this indisputable and disreputable fact? Would the *Times* ever have written its insulting libel of the 10th June on the regimental officers of the Indian army, some of whom have been foully murdered, others died nobly at their posts, while the survivors are at this very moment reconquering the empire we have all but lost? Would it have dared to assert that the surviving officers of all regiments which have mutinied should be placed on half pay as a punishment and example? or would it not have traced events to their true causes, cast blame on the proper shoulders, and
denounced the accursed lust of dominion, the
tampering with religious prejudices, the infatuated
monopoly of power, aimed at by centralization, as the
source and origin of rebellion?

The Double Government must cease. It has
endangered our Indian Empire, and will eventually
destroy it, if permitted to continue its career. What
shall we substitute in its stead? Fox's principle of
a single Chamber for India was certainly preferable
to Pitt's scheme of control, notwithstanding the out-
cry raised against it at the time. After seventy
years we can look back calmly to the merits of the
respective schemes. The one, too, has been tried,
and found to have failed; nor do the dangers
anticipated to the nation and the constitution from
the vast amount of patronage which it was asserted
Fox's scheme would throw into the hands of the
minister of the day, any longer exist. Nor is there
now any cause for alarm, lest ministerial influence
should send out to India for its government those
useless younger branches and offshoots of the
aristocracy, who, it is said, have filled all offices in
the colonies: men whose only claim to employment
lay in their utter unfitness for success in any other
profession of life. I know not whether this is a true
picture of what has occurred in the colonies. It is
constantly started as a fatal objection by civilians in
India. But the patronage has been taken away from
the Government. It is now open to candidates of all
grades of life, and of all qualities of intellect, and of
all conditions of education. The civil and the
medical services are already open. The military may
easily be made so. There is no danger to the liberties of England from the patronage which a change in Double Government would throw into the hands of the minister of the day. That is a bugbear of which no man need stand in awe.

What then shall we substitute? Shall we transfer all power to the Board of Control? God forbid. The system which by any accident can place the control of Indian Government in the hands—I say it with all respect, but with the most painful conviction—of such gentlemen as Sir Charles Wood and Mr. Vernon Smith, must be radically wrong and rotten at the core. The only possible argument in favour of the continuance of the Board of Control, its power of nomination over the raw material of experience supplied from the quarter of Leadenhall Street, would be cut from under it by the extinction of the Court of Directors. Neither of these statesmen would, I fancy, lay claim to any personal experience of Indian affairs at the date of their respective acceptance of office, and our Indian Empire is a jewel of somewhat too great value for submission to mere experiment. Neither of the gentlemen I have named are remarkable, I believe—like the old Gallic kings, who stood superior by the head and shoulders to the common herd—for that overawing intellect which, if it does not supply the want of practical experience, at least blinds men to the defect. There must be nothing left to accident or chance, or at least as little as possible. In introducing a change we must take the best guarantee and security we can get for the probability of a really good and efficient
Government; and I believe we approach nearer to this in proportion to the publicity and responsibility under which the tenants of office act.

Let there be a single Chamber for the Government of India. Let its composition include all the elements of theoretical statesmanship and practical experience. Let the best heads that England and India can furnish be seen around its board. Let the principal members of the Ministry be members ex-officio. Let those of the retired Indian Civil and Military Services who have won the most distinguished reputation be their colleagues. Let some of the independent professions, men who have acquired fame and fortune in India, be associated with them. Let their deliberations be as public as is consistent with safety; let their ordinary transactions be communicated to the Press; let them be immediately responsible to Parliament; and we shall have a really efficient Government for India. Into the details of such a plan I do not propose to enter in a paper already run to an unexpected length. Suffice it to have chalked out a general scheme which seems to secure, to the greatest practical extent, all the advantages derivable from a combination of political wisdom and time-won experience.

Such seems to be the best means of Governing India. True, it is an experiment, but so are all political measures. Their success is always problematical; we may not achieve success, but we may do more—deserve it. Constituted as things are at present, I can only say that we reverse this order—we may obtain success, but we do not deserve it.
If that great sham, the Double Government, be abolished, and a single Chamber or Council for India be substituted, let us call things by their right names. Let us have no longer the real authority in one quarter, the nominal in another. The Government of India is in reality that of Her Majesty the Queen. Why should it be administered any longer in the name of the Company? Why should not the name be where the strength lies? Why is the Queen to be veiled from a hundred and fifty millions of her subjects, yet faithful and loyal, if they could throw themselves at her feet, not repressed by the intervention of a phantom which forbids their approach to the throne? Why should not the native bask in the sunshine of royalty, in common with every other dependency of the Crown, rather than be chilled by the "cold shade" of the Company? The Queen's name is a tower of strength; the critical moment has arrived for using it. In the formula of the old French monarchy, let the Indian Company be arrested "au par de roi." Let the Government of India be carried on directly, and ostensibly, and avowedly in the name of the Queen. This measure would afford us the easiest solution for the great financial embarrassment which must necessarily stare us in the face after the rebellion shall have been put down. Vast sums have been plundered, vast sums dissipated in the unproductive outlay necessary for suppressing the rebels. Society will have been disorganized over a vast breadth of country, cultivation neglected, labour idle. There must, therefore, be not only an actual deficiency in our treasu
but the certain prospect of a deficient revenue for the current year. The Friend of India estimates it at £3,000,000 sterling. Probably it will exceed that. Company's paper is selling at 42 per cent. discount; money will not be procurable in India at 7 per cent. With the Government carried on in the name of the Queen, and a Parliamentary guarantee, £10,000,000 sterling might be raised on England with ease at 5 per cent; and the Gordian knot, which we could with difficulty untie, may thus be cut. I believe, too, that this measure of governing in the name of Her Majesty would go farther to re-establish our power than any other which can be named. It would, at any rate, give us pause and breathing time. The people of India have a thorough distrust of the Company, thanks to long misrule and the crowning policy of Lord Dalhousie. In the abolition of the Company's Government they would see, rightly or wrongly, a recognition of its having abused its trust; they would believe that sympathy was felt in England for their condition; they would hope that under the new régime a totally different system would prevail; that the policy of further annexation would be abandoned; that treaties, and grants, and promises would be respected; that there would be a chance for the introduction of decent administration of justice, an escape from eternal litigation, and the chicanery and oppression of the army of revenue and police peons. They would have their expectations most forcibly arrested; every man would be a-gape and a-tiptoe to see what first measure signalized the accession of the new Govern-
ment; new in name, and, if we are not infatuated, new in practice.

If the Queen were to inaugurate Her Majesty's taking the reins of government into her own hands by some great signal act of justice, which all men could understand, and none could help seeing, such as the restitution to their thrones of those deposed sovereigns whose right and title might be shewn to be indisputable, I believe that all India would rejoice from one extremity to the other, and that at the same time that it decreed a bare act of justice, it would re-establish the shaken allegiance of the masses throughout the land.

But some such act must only be the forerunner of real, radical, social reforms. We might rest awhile on the credit and prestige of such an act. Perhaps this wisest of policies may be impossible, if the Company's rule is to be continued. Then the recognition of the despoiled princes might be regarded as a concession arising from our fears: and it would be whispered that this at any rate was one of the first fruits of the rebellion. Coming from the Company, it would be regarded with suspicion, and miss its effect. Coming from the Crown, it would not be so much regarded as a mere act of royal grace and favour, as the necessary consequence of the complaints and wrongs of the injured having at last reached the royal ear, and the primal source of the fountain—justice.

Such an act would be one of policy, as well as justice. Indeed, of its twofold motives, the former might predominate. We should in the first instance
unnistakeably arrest attention, and confirm a waver-
ing faith. We must gain time for the introduction of
those measures which will make India one of the
most flourishing kingdoms of the world, and its
people one of the richest and most contented.
But woe be unto us if we idle away the time
thus gained: if we do not at once set ourselves in
carneal to those great reforms, the necessity of which
has been proved and demonstrated, and admitted
over and over again, but which have never yet been
carried into execution. Instead of a restless ambi-
tion to be ever extending our boundaries, or swallow-
ing the independent kingdoms which each extension
brings within our circumference, let us display the
most scrupulous good faith to our old allies, in the
midst of us; let us study to render life and property
secure by the organization of a trustworthy and
efficient police; let us press forward those public
works, which will create material prosperity both
by the creation of produce, and the opening up
of communications for its carriage to home markets
or ports for foreign export; let us revise our demands
upon the cultivators of the soil, the great body of
the people, and wherever those demands are found
to press too heavily, reduce them; let us render the
titles secure by an accurate survey of their land
and registration of deeds; let us exercise economy
in the Government, in order that we may have
a larger portion of our annual revenues to expend
upon the wants of the people, and the country; let
us push on the great cause of education, whence alone
we can now raise an aristocracy in the place of that
landed aristocracy which has been destroyed; let us gradually advance the Natives to places of responsible and lucrative employment, and an ever increasing share in political importance, giving them thus a deeper and a deeper stake in the stability of the Government; let us gradually pave the way to representative institutions, treading, it is true, cautiously, but ever onward, and with a well understood and settled purpose; let us render ourselves, by our whole course of action, ever more and more independent of our army as the sole means of our maintenance of power; above all, let us purify and strengthen our judicial administration. There can be no happiness, no prosperity for a people, where a feeble judiciary involves all alike in the meshes of inextricable, interminable litigation; where false charges brought by enmity and supported by perjury and forgery, even though such charges hazard the life of the accused,* are as likely of success as the most righteous cause ever brought into a court of justice. But these reforms, and a host of others which might swell the catalogue, must now be introduced rapidly, or it may be too late.

Vidi ego quod primum fuerat sanabile vulner,
Discutum longae damna dedisse morae.

* See the case related in these pages, by the passenger in the railway-train.