Erich Frauwaller

HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
ERICH FRAUWALLNER

History of Indian Philosophy

VOLUME I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDA AND
OF THE EPIC—THE BUDDHA AND
THE JINA—THE SĀMKHYA AND THE
CLASSICAL YOGA-SYSTEM

Introduction by Univ. Prof. Dr. Leo Gabriel

Translated from original German into English
by

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DEDICATED
TO MY BELOVED SON

ORTWIN
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*by Prof. Dr. Leo Gabriele*

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INTRODUCTION INTO INDIAN THOUGHT

by Leo Gabriel, Vienna

"So That I know, what the world
in its innermost core holds together"

(Goethe, Faust—Monologue).

There is a knowledge which does not aim at a particular object or a limited sphere of objects but which concentrates itself on the Unity of the Objects, on their connection. The thought directed on this unity must at last step beyond the objects and their empirical isolated relations and must transcend them in order to gain the horizon through which the Whole comes into view. This coming into view of the Whole is, however, the essence of the theory. The history of human thought, in philosophy as well as in science, shows that the thought has this relation to the Whole, that it is continually sustained in the direction of the unity and the total comprehension of the Knowable Whole. Whether the Whole of Reality can be comprehensible objectively in a definite collection of Knowledge is a different question; perhaps this remains no question for him who thinks that the Whole (inclusive) of the objects can again never be itself an object among others.¹

But when the whole as an object is never attainable on the objective level but is a truth which the thought will never be able to grasp, then another way must be trodden. The objects are not the objects of this goal which leads to something beyond them in the transcending movement of thought that leads to the Whole of existence beyond the objects. This way has also the starting point, the end-point or the goal, with the direction. The end-point or the goal is the whole; the starting-point, starting from which the direction sets itself towards the whole, is the point from which the thought must start, in order to be able to reach generally the Whole; it is the ground and for the widest, most comprehensive Whole, it is the last ground or the 'Ur-ground.'

Only from the highest peak of a mountain, there opens the
through the metaphysical, theoretical thought-form, through that thinking which, detaching itself from the empirical manifoldness, strives in such absoluteness after radical unification, after the unity from the root itself, after the unity arising out of the ultimate root, after an absolute unity of manifold things out of an ultimate ground or Ur-ground. When this thought starts, all multifariousness, all the manifoldness of the external world goes into the mill of the last doubting and deactivation. This empirical world is, in its compact immanence as the world, shaken up through the questionability of its variegated manifoldness, of the abundance of its form and look which overpower the naive mind of the sensuous or the materialistic. Now the mind wishes to withdraw itself from the power of the abundance and gain for itself a form of the world, not out of the sensuous, but out of the mind. The reflecting mind succeeds in overcoming the sensuous manifold through a significant unity and in allowing to understand out of it a meaningful and therefore an understandable whole, as the world only in general.²

This process of crisis seizes the world of the senses, of the sensuous experience in its whole extension, and therefore also the graphic forms of the gods of the polytheistic religion. When God Indra, in a song³, as one intoxicated with the Soma-drink is derided as a reeling drunkard, the godliness itself totters in its appearance and vanishes with it. This deep-reaching crisis of religious consciousness from which the most shining figure of the divine world, like Indra himself,—the remaining are seen ridiculed in a song as frogs⁴—does not remain spared, can only be explained through the breaking-in of a new, world-building thought which is able to—and wishes to—abstract itself from the several individual gods⁵. This thought breaks its old path through the twilight of the gods which was generated by it, and brings forth the sun of a new god which, with its light, still illuminates the sunken forms of the past. That it is, as a matter of fact, the philosophical, metaphysical thought of unity which here breaks forth, may be proved in isolated particular cases.

The four collections of the Veda (Ṛg-, Sāma-, Yajur, and Atharva-veda) contain as their inner kernel the songs and the prayers of sacrificial liturgy in religious poetry. Around this kernel, there are joined, following one another, like shells, the
Brähmaṇa works for the interpretation of the ritual and sacrificial ceremonies, the Āraṇyakas or forest books, embodying the thoughts, arising among the thinkers in the loneliness of the forest, and the Upaniṣads, containing the reflections arising out of meditative absorption in the Brahma, the holiest of all. Thus one can read into them a sequence of steps which leads, from the religious experiences and revelations of the poet and the seer of the past ages on the way of reflection and meditation, to making accessible the kernel of the Brahma itself, as in the Upaniṣads, through a meditative thought-process which stands out as essentially different from the Western Logic of ideas and dialectic. This process of the conviction of the transcending experiences in the thought-form of its available presentation is, at bottom, the process of the theory in which the Indian thought, in spite of the above-mentioned distinctive thought-structures, is connected with the Western thought. It is, therefore, well justified to lay, at the basis, the movement of thought, meditative-thoughtful formulation of the contents of the experience or knowledge, as the basic process for all the formulations of ideas in Indian speculation.

It is indispensable, for right understanding, to comprehend the start of this metaphysical-theoretical thought-movement rightly. While doing so, one should take into consideration that the meditative thought of the original texts arises out of religious poetry, from the songs and the prayers which belong to the constituents of sacrificial liturgy. This liturgy is holy service and consists as such, in the realization of a transcendent, holy order in the world, that order (ṛtam) according to which the sacrifice is to be performed. The songs and the prayers accompany the sacrificial performance and embody in their wording its full significance. The words of the ritual text have the magical power to procure and bring forth the holy and the whole order of the world out of the holy, divine, Absolute itself, wherein the wholeness of the world as the safe, intact whole of existence is secured out of the ultimate, transcendent ground, out of the Ur-ground. This essential identity of the ritual order with the absolute world-order, the essential character of its consummation for the maintenance and security of the order of the world, is the deepest significance of the ritual-cultic function. To produce
again and again the holiness and the wholeness of the whole world and to maintain it securely, is the maintenance of the truth of the cultic performance; it has the world before its eyes, a continual perfection of the intact wholeness which arises out of the connection with the Absolute, this maintenance, this cultivation of the cult, a continual construction and building of the world being carried out on the ultimate, absolute ground, wherein culture according to the name and the fact stands ultimate and the deepest.

So it can be no wonder that the meditative reflection would be able to awaken the meaning and picture of the world out of this cultic ground. The holy cult-event revolving round the one centre, around the Absolute, allows the universe to arise spiritually before the contemplative vision. This universe is the original occurrence of world-formation and the foundation of the world as the all related to the unity, out of the ultimate ground. This is the original idea of the Universe arising out of the religious-cultic thought. The meditative reflection of artificial world-formation leads over or beyond the contents of the revelation of religious poetry, in an elucidating, clear and perspicuous way, to the structure of unity, to the close compactness, and the connection of the one 'which the world in its innermost core holds together' and gives rise to the reflecting thought with its own independent sharpness. It is a necessary consequence that, with the reflecting-meditative thought joined with the contents of knowledge or experiences of religious consciousness, there sets in a movement of thought which strives after the absolute point of unity of the world and allows all existing things to be included in the Absolute Unity as existing alone. This movement emerges forth in the hymn of unity of Dirghatamas in which, together with the removal of the gods, the one God, standing supreme over the gods or better still, the one Godhead, springs forth, first as the one, Prajāpati, still thought of as a person, in order to present, however, later on, the (only) one, through more intensive formulation of meditative-abstractive thought in this beginning philosophical speculation. On account of this, this whole train of thought proves to be an original philosophical one and no more as a religious one, for which the concrete personalization of the ultimate ground of the world is always
typical and essential.

The song of unity (Ṛgveda 1. 164) culminates in the utterance: _ekam sad viprā bahudhā vandanti_ ‘the poets call, what is only one, many’._7 With this, it is clear that many gods are traced back by the religious poetry to one Godhead. The one (ekam) is not meant adjectively as a quality but as a substantive, as the upholding centre of reality. That is why it is said: _tad ekam_, the or that One. This One is at the same time everything, as it is emphasized in the Vālakhilya hymn⁸: _ekam vā idam bahudhā sarvam_ ‘This is one and has become all’. That is only possible through the fact that one has become wholly like a lump of salt⁹ which dissolves itself completely in the water of the sea and still remains contained therein. Therein becomes evident the limitless process of arising and passing away, ‘the rolling wheel’ (Nietzsche) of innumerable ups and downs, the godly process of _natura naturans_ which brings forth everything and at the same time remains withdrawing into itself everything. The nature of the becoming (origin) lies in the beginning in which everything in the course (of development) is decided up-to the end which is already set forth jointly in the beginning. It is a difficult problem to unite or reconcile this end, which already lies in the world and in the immanence, with the beginning which must lie in the transcendent, in order to secure the permanent cycle of being. The decisive beginning which contains everything in itself and allows everything to depart out of itself, is the Origin. So the Origin must necessarily be the one which holds everything in itself in a simple form and this One as the creative reality must necessarily be the Origin leading to the unfoldment of the whole. The hymn of creation¹⁰ thus emphasizes that which lies at the basis of all objects and their distinctions, the absolute occurrence of the origin as the creative impulse of the unity: “Not the non-being (_asad_) , nor also the being (_sad_), neither the death was at that time nor the life, neither the night nor the dazzling light of the day.” Thus the contrasts consisting of the dialectical texture of reality, until the last Ur-contrast of existence and non-existence, are overhauled in favour of the strong unity, the monology of the beginning.

Almost with the same words, Heraclitus has given expression¹¹ to the counterparts in the contrast: “Day and Night,
Youth and Age, Winter and Summer, Life and Death are one and the same. Because this originates out of that and that again out of this, when it changes. It is the unity of contrasts which confront one another as polar connections between the two but which becomes so effective in the case of objectively fixed entities that always the one being brings forth, out of the ultimate ground, its counterpart in disunion, as it is said, 'the combat or the fight is the father of all things.' Thus the contrast turns out to be as (an objective) cause and so makes itself clear in the dialectical process of the distinction of the Ur-ground and the original cause. Because the process of origin takes place dialectically as a process of factual contrasts, that is to say, as the consequences of one another which confront each other on the same level, therefore, in the truth of the objects. Dialectic is a becoming in the things which have already become, a setting-up or better an explanation in things already pre-supposed, unfoldment of the data, a splitting-up of the original union. This becoming is not a true origin, it is already presupposed. The movement of the Ur-ground is the bringing forth in the absolute Unity, the dialectical movement being the cause of the absolute duality. Therefore, the Ur-ground and the Cause distinguish the monistic and dualistic structure. We read in the hymn of Creation: "It breathed windless in the origination of that one (tad ekam), besides which there was nothing." Thus the duality is excluded. The windless breathing is as the contrastless occurrence of the original dynamic of becoming (or arising), the origin as the process in the absolute unity, out of the extreme concentration. As concentration, as an occurrence of inner collectedness held in the centre, the origin of the world is the creative process as it can be experienced in the mental creation, carried over identically in the Universe. That is why in the hymn of creation, 'the lightless moving up and down of the world-beginning' is brought in connection with the power of tapas, the heat of the begetting process as an indistinguishable creative primeval impulse. Thus nature and spirit as a creative process have been mixed to a higher unity of a worldwide universal occurrence of origin. The world rises forth out of the integral creativity and binds nature and spirit to the original creative unity in the primeval origin.
So we learn that the absolute creativity already consists in the concentration of the forces of nature and spirit. The creativity of the spirit and nature flows together in the One in the movement of the prime origin, in the primeval beginning "vertere in unum" i.e. turning into one in the becoming of the Universe. Thus it gets explained, why in the priestly verse\textsuperscript{15}, the speculatively gained unity is identified in a religious personification with the God Prajāpati, the begetting nature-force.

However, this process of the Universe agrees with the rising forth of the world out of the one, out of the unity of inner collectedness or composure through the structure of the meditative knowledge-processes; it becomes evident that through that process of meditative knowledge the ground or ultimate cause of the world arises. Concerning the identity of the original knowledge of the world with the true origin of the world, i.e. concerning the original truth or the origin of the truth in the whole, there is the philosophical speculation of the Veda, about the rising forth of everything out of the one as its entry or springing forth in the meditative spirit. The Vedic truth, from which the world of everything arises out of its inner collectedness in the One, is expressed in the word \textit{Brahma}. \textit{Brahma} is an 'Ur-word', which in its sense cannot be made accessible through any logical definition or through any formation of an idea defining an object. Thus there are the eight meanings of the word \textit{Brahma} which P. Deussen\textsuperscript{16} cites and there is also the compilation made by G. Misch\textsuperscript{17}, of the particular meanings of the word put forth by different authors which may be quite as right or wrong. : right so far as, so to say, they lay claim to being directions, as logical pointers, as a movement of thought in the direction in which its meaning can be gained metalogically; wrong, so far as, therewith, particular objective validities (facts or things or causes) have been meant inside a compact logical thought-system. The consummation of this thought raises great difficulties for those trained in Western Logic.

What is \textit{Brahma}? \textit{Brahma} is the holy Vedic word, the Vedic Logos, the word, which dissolves in itself all the objective relations of the world, which can be called by the word the Absolute. It is not a conceptual word, not one which gives meaning but an activating word causing the thinking person to become
a thinking self. It is the creative word, which does not constitute the objective world but realizes the thinking, the reflecting and the speaking themselves. Therefore, it is not the logical magic of words, which we in the West know, which consists therein that the word pointing to an object out of the mass of phenomena, elevates it but that original magic which realizes the thinking and the demonstrating spirit, that is to say, which actually brings into word or expression what, as a concrete case, is at the bottom of the presupposition of all abstract thinking and meaning. Because the power of the holy Vedic word, which originally in the cultic connection brought forth the ritual ordering (ṛtam) of the world out of the Absolute, preserves itself now on the stage of meditation, of self-absorption, in the contemplation of the religious texts therein, so that it brings forth their knowledge (‘Veda’ means ‘knowledge’) in the concrete itself, i.e. knowledge not in objectifying abstraction but in the highest concreteness as the knowing subject (prājña ātmā). Brahma is the Vedic word in which the absolute itself (brahma) becomes the absolute self (ātmā) in the knowing man, in the wise, in the Brāhmaṇas. Therefore it is said, “Brahma Ātmā asmi” (I am the Brahma). The monstrosity of the identification of the Absolute with the self does not, indeed, concern one’s own ‘I’ differentiated by others in its narrowness and restricted sense, the individual self, which I am and as an ultimate cause I am not. It concerns rather my true self which I, in the identity with all others (tat tvam asi) am real as an ultimate ground, the absolute self (ātmā) which on that account is one with the Absolute, indeed not objectively but as it was originally (‘urständlich’ as Schelling says). The ‘I’ is then the breaking-in, the self-opening of the Absolute, the revelation of the Absolute in meditative consciousness which, in this breaking forth, necessarily condenses itself into the ultimate substantial unity, into the uttermost concentration in the knowing self. This concrete, most compact unity of consciousness transcending all objects,—of which the transcendental unity of Consciousness in Kant is a mere weak image and only an epistemological abstraction—is the Ātmā of Vedic speculation.

The act of the knowing self is the meditation, the pure
view, the theory, which, going beyond all objects, the name and form (nāma-rūpam), has mediated the Ur-ground (the original cause), because, the Absolute (Brahma) comes to its consciousness in the self (Ātmā) and ‘enters’ into itself. The meditation turns out to be mediation or the means: the contemplative self-absorption as direct mediation of the Absolute in the inner self.

“That is my Ātmā in the innermost of the heart, that is Brahma. Having departed from here, I shall enter into it. He who has such knowledge, has no more any doubt. Thus speaks Śāṇḍilya, Śāṇḍilya.10”

In many passages the self is spoken of, as the way, the path-finder of the omnipresent Ātmā. “Because through him one knows all, as one with the help of a footprint finds out somebody.”11 It is the way on which the Brahma comes to itself, that is to say, it comes to its own self and it becomes ‘itself’ i.e. the Ātmā. This way is the original way of Brahma to the Ātmā. This way is the original movement of the Brahma to Ātmā. This movement restores concretely and dynamically the identity between the two—it concretizes both and allows both to grow together in the movement which completes itself in meditative self-consciousness and comes to be expressed in the holy Vedic word Brahma-Ātmā. Thus the word Brahma means the actual revelation of the absolute in meditative consciousness as process of realization of the meditating self (Ātmā). The highest point of Vedic speculation is attained around this process of the absolute Theory in the knowledge of the Ur-ground (the original cause). The un-objective structure of this meditative self-knowledge, a knowledge which is, however, both together meditative or negotiative is for the knowledge of the ground, the Ur-ground, and is emphasized by this absolute subject-character and characterized as follows: “You cannot see the seer of seeing nor you can know the knower of knowledge.”12 Then is the meditative accentuated, that peculiar way of the mediation in the immediacy of this self. “One knows everything through him, wherethrough one shall know him.”

As this absolute subject, which is not objectifiable, not objectively comprehensible, need not, however, in any way be set forth as the self, as the subject, as the absolute and abstract
'I', something should be put forth as the principle of deduction of a philosophical system, as in the case of Descartes or in the modern idealism of Kant up to Hegel. In these systems, the movement of the Absolute is set going from one pole, from the pole of the I, out of the fixed and constructive-dialectic position unfolding itself; thus in Fichte: The 'I' sets itself against the non-I, and sets itself as connected and restricted through the non-I.” This setting-forth dialectic is throughout an abstract-constructive act of reflection which, as against the Vedic meditation as its rational impossible reflex, can have the original force to perform that meditation which had been given to meditative consciousness. The meditative and the dialectic reflection differentiates itself already in respect of the living, concretizing operative force and thence, through the depth of the accessible reality in its contents. The epistemological-critical subject of modern Europan idealism refers itself formally to the object of knowledge, not to the reality and therefore it is in no way the Ātmā of Indian speculation. That subject shall guarantee and secure epistemologically the certainty of knowledge out of the knowledge i.e. out of the absolute idea of knowledge and must in this function necessarily be directed as the knowing subject on the knowable object in functional dependence—and therefore consist in the splitting of the subject and the object, of which there can and need be no talk in the Brahma-Ātmā process. If epistemological-critical subjectivity of the modern Idealism must put forth to such a great extent the subject-object-contrast as the dialectical structure of constitutive thought—and knowledge-process, this critically split subjectivity can be claimed so little for the Ātmā-self and this is not something only on account of the rigorous monism of the doctrine of aloneness "Alleinheitslehre" which must necessarily exclude any such duality of subject and object but out of the ground of the metaphysical position as such which in the last resort promotes the venture and the obligation to the self-commitment in thought, therefore, the knowledge for itself is not abstractly proved but assumes originally concretely the knowing self as the first unattainable, unobjective presupposition. This is also the sense of the doctrine of Yājñavalkya about the incomprehensibility of the Ātmā.11 “The Ātmā is not so and not so (neti-neti); he is incomprehensible because he is never
comprehended." In retrospect, there shine forth the words of the Creation-hymn


Therefore the wise with their searching reflection found in their hearts the binding together of existence and non-existence." The super-dialectical position of existence in the innermost self as the 'Ur-ground of the world in the heart', that is the Ātmā : the Brahma word which gains its original expression in the interior of the self. It is spoken of in an absolute way as being in the innermost part of the heart, what really is true; it is pronounced as 'the word of the heart', as the absolute truth which resides in the heart: "In interiori hominis habitat veritas" (Augustine) ('Truth dwells in the inner part of man'). This 'word in the heart' is not the Greek World logos, not also the divine-human logos, the Christian verbum caro factum (i.e. the word, which has become the man) because the Brahma-word goes deeper than the Greek Logos, up to the inner self as ur-ground but not up to the matter, not up to the stage when the absolute Self becomes the flesh (i.e. appears in flesh and blood), the incarnation but only to the stage when the Self becomes the mind or spirit, the inspiration, remains in the last absolute idealism which lies in juxtaposition to the body and the material world in the last alieness.

Now still the last question. If Brahma in Ātmā withdraws itself from self-comprehension, and accordingly all kinds of knowability, how can it then be expressed or is it only through negation ('neti-neti') somewhat expressible? Does not positive possibility of its expression already lie in this negation? And of which sort could such expression be? Certainly not of the logical form in which a definite predicate is posited or denied of a subject because this duality of subject and predicate would contradict as the objective relation of the absolute Unity of the Ur-ground. The Ātmā is no logical subject nor it is a psychological or epistemological subject. On the other hand, the paradox holds good to the effect that the absolute subject is a subject no more. That is to say, it is no formal subject as such. It cannot be interpreted, thought or set forth as a subject because it is itself the ground and presupposition for all expressibility, therefore for the expression as subject, for the interpretation as subject. Every definition, also the subject-definition fails in its absoluteness on which definitions are founded, so that
every definite assertion or expression fails. And still: does not a special relation to the Absolute fulfill itself in the expression of the ‘I’ of which the form of expression springs forth from its content and must bring itself to dissolution? We hear about it⁴⁸: “In the beginning, the Átmā was here alone. Seeing around he saw nothing else than himself.” ‘I am it’ was its first word or expression, therefore, the word ‘I’ arose. The word ‘I’, therefore, arose publicly out of the original beginning first reflection in which the Absolute, itself reflecting, comes itself to consciousness, to the first original reflex and image of itself. Thus the origin of consciousness coincides with the origin of the ‘I’ which as a result of this reflecting self-assertion, of this first self-reflection, as the first speculation attains to the presentation of the Self. The expression of the ‘I’ is accordingly reflective self-assertion following in the speculatio prima, original consciousness, in so far as it finds first and direct expression in the language. This first direct expression of the first reflection experiences, as the speculatio prima, its first unfoldment in the word as the Ur-word, in the creative phonetic-linguistic expression on the ground of reflection. The original movement of the creative reflection, taken together in its inwardness and outwardness, brings forth originally the I and its expression. Thus the ‘I’ expression unveils itself as the ‘pure act’ (‘actus purus’) of the first reflection in its first linguistic fulfilment and formation. In the act of reflection, there first arises, in its actual originality, in the reflecting self—also as a result of reflection, a first image and along with it principally the first presentation, the beginning of the expression in which the expression in images becomes the image in expression. We read therefore⁴⁹: “In the beginning, there was here only the Brahma alone. This knew only itself: I am Brahma. Therefore it became all. He who has known this from the gods, became what he has known. This is so equally among the Šis, as among men.”

Here is the expression or word which is one with existence. Originally, that is to say, in the first basic movement of thought, in the movement out of the ground, in the knowledge of the Ur-ground, saying and existence, thinking and being have grown into a complete unity and identity, that is to say, have become concrete. In the Absolute, lies the absolute identity
of thought and existence, the absolute truth, in the concrete participation of thought in the existence and of the existence in the thought in the Ur-ground, which does not divide thought and existence but decides its possible Unity and agreement as the truth of thought (logical truth) or truth of existence (Ontological truth) in its unity.

It is clear that this original thought connected with existence cannot be brought in consonance with the linear logical form but quite as little with a constructive-dialectical (form). We, therefore read²⁷: With 'it exists', 'it does not exist', 'non-existence is', or also 'Non-existence is not'; with firm (affirmation), mobile (negation), both in one (therefore thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis) or double cancelling²⁸, it veils only the door.' And still to the 'is' in the expression of the Absolute, a decisive essential meaning is attributed. We read²⁹: 'Not with words, not with intellect, not with the eye, he (Ātmā) can be comprehended but only with the word "(he) is" (asti), he becomes comprehensible, through it alone, its true nature becomes evident.' This "is" (asti) is not any sentence but is interpreted as the expression of the most concentrated declaration, as a word, in which everything that can be said in general, is said by way of summation or summarization. This 'is' is everything, 'is' which lies at the basis of everything. It must rather be interpreted as an interjection, an exclamation of a rapture "(He) is." It is the expression of an ecstatic rapture in which the abundance of experienced things itself forms for its content the comprehensive expression with a ravishing power, not from outside in an already given vocabulary but from inside changing originally and for the first time in its suitable linguistic form and size. This original form of expression which is rather the utterance of sound and still already a first crude articulation, brings forth the Ur-word 'is' (asti) as the most expressive expression of the original concentration of thought and knowledge, that meditative knowledge, in which the existence mediatively springs forth from the Ur-ground. This meditative concentration, the self-absorbed view, in which the self dives into self-absorption and sinks on the ground or bottom, in order to allow the whole to be understood out of it, is the absolute Theory which alone leads to transcendence and is capable of
comprehending the whole of existence out of the ultimate ground. We read therefore: "He who sees it, sees all. He who has reached the perfect existence of the all knower, and has attained to the timeless abode of Brahman where there is no beginning, middle or end—can he attain still to the place beyond it?" And will not the realization of the viewing into the Self which gives itself up to the Absolute, prove that it is not an objectively or subjectively dissociated view? In the absolute theory, there can be no difference between subject and object. Here the existence in its total and absolute unity comes into revelation, to the absolute truth of the Whole. Already with this objective Ur-conception of the Theory first achieved in India and with its absolute truth, the Indian thought joins itself with world-historical struggle of philosophy, with its striving for the absolute truth in the theory. Out of this ground, the wisdom of the Veda belongs to philosophy and every history of philosophy which leaves it out of consideration will remain necessarily incomplete.

Now it is naturally right that the Indian thought went beyond the speculations of the Upaniṣads but then it turns out to be a fall-off or the descending form of this first speculation. Thus the Sāṁkhya system and Buddhism as logical and ethical contrasts to the Brahma-Ātmā doctrine of the Upaniṣads allow the sense and content of this doctrine to rise forth as plastic (doctrines). The Sāṁkhya system and Buddhism as logical-critical and ethical-practical contrast-figures distinctly stand out against the theoretical (aloneness) or the monistic doctrine. One can, therefore, speak of these doctrines as the dialectical antithesis of the strong or rigorous unity-thought or monistic doctrine of the Veda. The Sāṁkhya negates the absolute and abandons the position of the Ur-ground. The thought of the Urground is dissolved through an objective world-thought. With this the absolute unity of the world disintegrates. From pantheism, the Sāṁkhya goes over to Atheism, and with it, as then also in Buddhism, the vulgar polytheism turns out to be thought-out compatible. From theological monism, one here steps into cosmological dualism. In place of the one Ur-ground which like an abyss devours all contrasts, there emerges forth the a priori firmly laid dualism, the unbridgable contrasts of nature (prak-
rtiḥ) -and spirit (puruṣaḥ), strikingly similar to Cartesian (Kartesian) dualism of 'ens cogitans' ('the thinking existence') and 'ens extensum' ('extended, expanded existence'). So also in the Śāṁkhya, the thought aiming at strong unity, is opposed by an analytical method; the qualitative contentwise mode of view is opposed by a formal quantitywise manner of thought "more mathematics". Again we are reminded of Descartes. The Śāṁkhya is, therefore, named as an 'enumerating system.' Nature and Spirit are as ultimately fixed original entities (urwesen) each one existing for itself, with no more objective definite existence to be traced back, no more elements yielding themselves to unity, in which the reality breaks asunder. The world ceases to be a sound, intact Whole, it has lost the Absolute, the holiness. The identity of Brahma and Ātmā is dissolved through the absolute difference of prakṛtiḥ and puruṣaḥ, the system of identity through the system of difference.

What here differentiates itself is shown then (compare the sketch attached as supplement at the end of this Introduction) indeed, by what previously was concretely connected back and coincident in the absolute unity of the one. Thus it becomes clear that the Vedic Brahma is the coincident form of the prakṛtiḥ i.e. of nature, and Ātmā, the coincident form of puruṣaḥ, of the spirit and consciousness (the name puruṣaḥ for Ātmā is found already in many passages in the doctrine of Yājñavalkya). What was amalgamated in the unity of the ground (ultimate cause) of the world, the nature (the prakṛtiḥ is female) and the spirit puruṣaḥ, is male, their intimate union representing the act of begetting, (indeed, the highest, world-building begetting) now emerges as an independently existing dualism, side by side with the rigorously limited (from one another) objective existences which, therefore, are not assimilable into a deep unity (for which they must give up their objective independence) and which only can be connected with another through the dual number, a connection which straightway demonstrates visibly the disunion which cannot be overcome. Thus there is produced, in fact, as the unique thought- possibility of synthesis, only the enumeration, the synthesis, more mathematics'. That indeed, one such system itself, which bases itself firmly on the analytical method, and strives after a synthe-
sis as a system towards the conclusion, which must intend a homogeneous total interpretation, in such a way begetting itself, proves sufficiently, how much the thought in the function of the theory regarding the strong unity of compact connection, is intent with a word on the construction of the Whole, which indeed on an objective level, as it shows itself, is not attainable from the point of contents, only formal in the form of enumeration, as a summation, as an aggregate. Consequently, such a thought must end in atomism. Indian thinking was too strongly fixed by the thought of the qualitative unity of the world in order to be able to end in the ultimate quantitative abstraction of the reality, as it is represented by atomism. The contrast of matter and spirit, however, signifies in the concrete reality which has grown together, a concatenation and a mixture of hostile elements in it. Thus the task for analytical thought is to separate them from one another. The mixture allows a great number of mixed or middle forms to arise between matter and spirit. A broad band, a spectrally analytically differentiable kind of stuff, with gradual different additions of the spirit, something like the eighteen products of the Lingam which produce the connection of the body and the soul. The spirit is split up into a plurality of subjects through these connections. When the spirit individualizes itself in the plurality of the spiritually conscious perceiving subjects, the one Nature only becomes for all these subjects an object of consciousness and sensations.

The Nature reflects itself in consciousness. This reflecting function is regarded as the nature of the spirit. The image is often equated with the purusha himself, with the man or the husband. Also in this connection the pure reflection (speculation) is said to be the performance of the spirit in relation to nature. With the pure passive reflection is, indeed, basically bound the sensation of suffering and pain. If one wishes to do away with pain out of this world, it is necessary to remove the conscious sensation, that is to say, to dissolve the connection of Nature and Spirit, to withdraw the spirit from Nature. This separation operates in one's own body so that this body becomes devoid of sensations and pain, becomes completely subject to nature, that is to say, to its unconscious working while the Spirit detached from Nature can unfold its own independent strength and effi-
ciency which were hindered in the connection with the body. The Yoga has formulated a method as the way to this goal. The required detachment of the Spirit from Nature is considered by the Sāṃkhya throughout as deliverance of nature from spirit which is affected by the consciousness of sensation and pain. The Nature becomes through this deliverance an unconscious reality standing independently in its own legitimate existence vis-a-vis the Spirit—a naturalistic turn. Behind this comprehension of the accidental and therefore separable connection of the body and soul and the possibility of their alternating union and detachment, there stands, as the background, the well-known doctrine of the transmigration of the Soul, an interpretation of the relation of the body and the Soul which underlines the Spiritualism of Indian thought.

In a certain contrast and nevertheless in objective connection with the older Sāṃkhya teaching, the doctrine of Deliverance undergoes its anthropological and ethical turn or change in Buddhism. Not the deliverance of Nature but the deliverance of the Self, of the Spirit dwelling in man, as self-deliverance out of worldly entanglements is to be attained through the way of leading a life of morality which Gautama Buddha, the illuminated one, has pointed out. This deliverance can be attained only through a radical denial of existence, as denial of existence in the world. Existence implies, in the birth, the coming-into-the world of man and during the life his existence in the world. Existence, since birth is rooted in the world; therefore the human self, the human spirit, if it is to come to itself, must be again uprooted out of the existence. This is the language of Buddha, although it is onesided and uttered with absolute accent from the point of the ethical possibility of man's existence and man's necessity, in so far as a man as an ethical being must make his own existence radical by himself, must make his own decision and must build up his own autonomy vis-a-vis the nature and the world, in order to be a true man in his self-existence. As against the predominating doctrine of the total unity of Nature and Spirit with which we have been acquainted in the pantheistic monism of the Veda, the radical denial of the world must necessarily follow in order to discharge or free the true self out of this religious-pantheistic involvement in nature. As against the theoretical, in the knowing
self (prajña ātmā), a practical-ethical self-realization must emerge. As against the optimism and positivism of the doctrine of total unity and its Nature-mystique, there must be a corresponding anthropological-ethical change, equally radical, of the world-denying pessimism and negativism. The Sāṁkhya forms already the first steps towards it. Thus the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa is the goal, to be reached step by step, of the overcoming of existence by man in the world-context, which attains the possibility of human self-existence in non-being as being which must be annihilated (to use the oft-mentioned expression of modern philosophy, which along with it implies an interesting historical relation).

We are anxious to clarify the predominant position of the Vedic doctrine of total unity straightway in its importance for the later doctrinal systems and the systems of the conduct of life, which are dependent on it. Out of the history of Indian thought, it has turned out that the Materialism, as it has come to a position of great influence in the Greek and especially in recent philosophy in the West, has been able to strike or produce only a weak wave, though among the Ārvākas it has brought to the fore sensualistic knowledge and the idea of reality circumscribed to the corporeal world.

With the renewal of Vedic speculation in the Vedānta, the Brahma-Ātmā doctrine was formulated into a scholastic traditional system which becomes as a prototype for all future time. The monism is intensified in this system in a rationalistic-constructive way. The sensuous perceptible nature as a totality of phenomena, the special position of which has been overstretched by the Sāṁkhya as well as by the Ārvākas, is set up again as an appearance and is explained as a variegated veil of delusion, as Māyā.

If we again consider once again the "Indian (einsatz) starting point in the case of the subject" (G. Misch), it appears necessary to ascertain clearly, in short, the sense of this starting point. This starting-point characterizes itself through the relation of the subject with the Absolute. This relation is not with an object but with the ultimate ground or Ur-ground of the world. Out of this ground, the subject is not a definite comprehensible object but it goes as such 'into the ground', dissolves itself in the objective nothing of the Ground for all objects. This nothing
is at the same time the fullness of existence condensed in a germ or seed, the existence at the beginning or the origin as the ultimate ground of all. It is the 'existence' indeed of a pure process, through which everything arises out of the ultimate undifferentiated oneness or unity as out of a germ (a 'golden germ') but which again goes into the ground, not in the sense of destruction, but of an enfolding and maintenance in the unity of the Ur-ground. This holds good for everything, which, in unfolding itself in the manifoldness of the reals, constitutes the world. This transition, however, from the original condition of enfolded existence to the following condition of the unfolded existence of all, is a jump, namely, the original jump—the Origin. Still the movement of the origin always in the unfoldment is a backmovement to the Ur-ground, it is created out of the permanent ground, in a permanent movement back to the ground, a reflection which is identical with the creative world-unfoldment. Thus is the cycle of nature, of rising and passing away, of permanent becoming, interrupted and is held firmly in the centre in the origin and thus the whole of existence as an intelligible world is removed to disappearance. The whole empirical world of manifoldness has a true, efficient and absolute continuance only in relation to the absolute unity through enfolding in the Ur-ground. The true reality thus reduces itself to the central core of the Absolute reflecting on itself alone, to the intelligible ground (cause) of the world. It implies that the world as a whole is conceived theologically, is considered from the point of the Absolute, which suggests a theological world-idea in the idea of begetting-creative nature with the permanent cycle of origin and destruction worked out in the form of thinking. We see a connection of the theological idea with the cosmological one, in which indeed the first is leading and gives a decisive turn to the conception. But how is it related with the anthropological idea?

We have three ideas of metaphysics which in fact form the basic themes of all systematic metaphysics. They are, namely, the themes of God, Man and Nature. In the oldest metaphysical thought, this triad is preserved and an attempt is made to clarify it. The kind of combination of these ideas—perhaps, it would be better to express it by composition rather than combination—fixes, from the point of its contents, the construction of every
metaphysical system, its theological, anthropological or cosmological character.

On the question regarding the consideration of the anthropological idea in Indian Metaphysics, we shall refer to the peculiar subject-position in it. Which is the meaning of the subject-position, straight in connection with the Ur-ground, in connection with the movement of the Urground of the Origin, in connection with the absolute process of the world? The absolute process of the world attains, in the subject, anthropologically to its revelation and this happens in the knowledge, in absolute knowledge, and mediates in the immediacy of this knowledge in self-consciousness. This immediate form of knowledge, which is all-embracing in its totality, out of the ultimate collective existence of the self on the Urground in the self-absorption of the original reflection is, in its consummation, the mediation which, therefore, is at the same time the mediation of the Urground. In it we have the most original and the first form i.e. the Ûr-form of the Theory. The originality lies therein that between subject and object, there is no distinction, because the meditative self-absorption implies straightway that in the knowing self, the whole of existence out of the ultimate ground, i.e., the Brahma in the Ātmā becomes evident and thus the Absolute can be unfolded to the view. Thus this meditation represents the origin of the pure idea as the summarizing intuitive view still not unfolded which in the beginning stands as the germ of a thought-system unfolding itself out of it.

That the absolute truth is not possible without relation to the absolute, and that the Theory is not possible without relation to the Theos is proved with all distinctness in the meditative movement of knowledge, which bursts forth in the beginning of Indian thought and philosophy. This movement of thought of meditation in connection with the corresponding Absolute is at the same time an existential one because, the self in the act of knowledge is realized in it, as existence comprehending in itself everything. In other words, in this original knowledge, the subject-objectsplit is not only abrogated but also the later distinction of (So-sein and Dasein) essence and existence (distinctio inter essentiam et existentiam = distinction between essence and existence).
The Sāṃkhya system and the Buddhistic Ethics cannot be considered without considering meditation. In the Sāṃkhya the absolute subject becomes detached into the Absolute subject i.e., it becomes detached from nature, as a result of which it, as a spiritual mirror or the reflecting spirit, no more brings about the consciousness of nature or the sensation of pain but serves to gain its independence in the unfolding of its own psychical powers.

With Yoga, as the methodical praxis of this meditation, the case was different, as Yoga helped to attain unexpected self-knowledge and free definition of the Self. It is the holding and practice of meditation with which the Buddha and his disciples reached the superconscious condition of withdrawal beyond all the instructive arrest or captivity of existence, a condition which represents the last goal of a super-individual self-realization. The Buddha and his disciples had detached themselves from existence from one step to another, falling in the depth itself of a peculiar abyss, in the complete absolute seclusion of a lonely self-existence which on the way of clear consciousness destroys all entanglements in instincts (sanskārāḥ). If the Sāṃkhya has shown how through the entanglement in the material nature, the self individualises itself, the Buddha points out the way to abrogate this individuation through the radical denial of the worldly and natural existence in favour of absolute self-existence. The unique goal of Buddhistic ethics is this self-withdrawal. And is not the striving of the Ātmā to attain back to its place of Brahma, to the full unity with the Absolute, as it emerges in the Upaniṣads, also such a move to an enraptured existence—to the ecstatic form of one’s existence? It is the mystical ecstasy, a religious and ethical form of life, a life of the composure of the soul in prayer and sacrifice, i.e. in the religious act of the cult which has originally led the knowledge in the meditation to that climax from which it would be able as absolute theory to attain the general beyond the empirical plane, the unity of all, the true universum, the whole of existence at a glance. It is the same ecstasy which in the case of the Buddha now leads, in consequence of a practical ethical conduct of life i.e. in a conscious ethical ‘methodik’, to the goal of self-absorption in the ultimate ground (cause),
the abyss of Nirvāṇa. Self-absorption becomes sinking into one's own self. In the Vedas, it brings forth the absolute Theory, in the case of Buddha, the absolute existence as the ethical conduct of life.

The philosophical total picture of reality, like the thought in Science which, directed towards a strong unity, traces itself back to this origin of absolute theory, is a form of the Theory. Every Ethics which deserves to be called by this name, goes beyond the empirical conditions of action and strives after general principles whereby there is produced not rarely a contradiction between the known ethical ideal with its claim to general validity, and the empirical conditions of action, the well-known contradiction between ideal and reality. “There will rarely be an ethics which, like the Buddhistic, tries to resolve this contradiction through the absolute denial of the empirical reality but even then, a relative denial through the higher ‘ought’ principle of moral obligation is indispensable. Still with this Ethics, on account of the radicalism of its start, the unique phenomenon of the ethical has attained impressive presentation in Buddhism—that phenomenon which Kierkegaard has characterized through the definition of the ethical as unconditional and general. The general-universal in the theory and practice with the whole radicalism of its claim to originality and unique importance has been brought to its first and original expression in the philosophy of ancient India. We speak of the fact that in this thought, the theory receives its first beginning and no doubt its original undifferentiated form, which holds together the whole and the ground (cause), the subject and the object, the (Sosein and Da-Sein), essence and existence, immanence and transcendence at one point, on the ‘archimedischen’ point, on that ‘which the world holds together in its innermost core’, on the Absolute. The Absolute does not fail to appear in any system but in no widely extended objective knowledge-connection it can always be accommodated because it is already the ground and the presupposition which, as we see in Indian philosophy, lies at the basis of all systems and of all knowledge not only historically but as a principle. All systems are relative to the Absolute; nevertheless in this relation to the Absolute they have a part in the absolute truth. To have discovered this relative Absoluteness on which the
philosophical and scientific thought depends is the imperishable performance and merit of Indian thought.

Besides the general connection in the establishment of the Ur-form of the theory, the Indian thought has still a special connection with the European development of recent times. After Descartes—by the way or incidentally, in contact with the distinctly visible threads of the thought of Augustine—had already discovered the ‘archimedischen’ point in self-consciousness of the thinking I (in his ‘cogito ergo sum’ = ‘I think, therefore, I am’), the philosophical system-movement was started after the further deepening of Cartesian thought-start in Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’; this philosophical system-movement belongs, under the name of ‘German Idealism’, to the systems built by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, in the history of Western philosophy. Schopenhauer, himself standing in this movement has full admiration for the "almost superhuman conceptions which were later laid down in the Upaniṣads of the Vedas." He had perceived the inner connection in the basic directions of both these idealistic thought-movements. Also F. Nietzsche spoke of the "wonderful family likeness of all Indian Greek and German philosophizing." P. Deussen, joining with Schopenhauer has undertaken the attempt to introduce the Indian speculation in the Universal philosophical history through an interpretation of the Upaniṣads from the Kantian stand-point. The comments of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche from the positions of their thought and the certainly onesided interpretation-attempt of Deussen place before us a task to comprehend the phenomenon emerging in this connection in a different way from what has been done till now. The German Idealism shows, in its structure of idealistic thought, a characteristically different stamp as against the Indian one. The ‘archimedische point’ (Descartes) is the point of original certainty in which a critical establishment of knowledge in the thinking subject withdrawn from any doubt is capable of being fixed. The thought of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche worked like a reagent-fluid and brought the basic constitution of this thinking subject, the ‘substance’ of the subject, to expression. This subject did not turn out as the knowing subject (prājña ātmā) of the Upaniṣads but as a willing, doing, active self, though, as a theory, it was supposed to be founded on know-
ledge (the ‘cogito’ unveils itself as ‘co-agito’). In the spontaneity of a free and sovereign disposition of the will the human self unfolds itself into the Subject which constitutes the world as an object. The creative formation and reformation of the objective world holds good as the Ur-ground-movement of thought. In the beginning was the act. The Logos is, according to Dr. Faust, translated by act. The free, creative act is the energy of the ‘cogito’ which sets to work the moral world (Fichte), as well as nature (Schelling), as also history (Hegel). The rising forth of the world out of the active spirit was quite different from a theoretical process of Ur-ground-meditation, from the inner contemplation in the absolute repose of pure meditation,—quite different from the ‘inner calmness of the sea’ of the Buddha. The contemplative inwardsness of the East appears alien and repugnant to the Western spirit. It is only natural that the spirit of activity or the action, of the pragmatic Eros which governs the West—its thought and its idealism—impresses the Indian as the spirit of pure show, of the absolute Theory. The Greek Spirit intuitively forming images and forms is the balancing or the harmonizing centre; that is why it gained the highest unfoldment in the artistic creations.

The German idealism is also a pragmatism. Schopenhauer discovered in the transcendental ‘cogito’ of Kant, the ‘Volo’ (Will), the “I—will” in the ‘I—think’ and separated both from one another in his ‘Welt als Wille und Vorstellung’ (‘the world as will and idea’). The ‘I’ is the ultimate foundational ground of unity of all objects, that is to say, of the total categorically arranged connection of ideas, the Will, and thus the Will is the general principle of reality, of the world-ground. The generalization of the ‘I’, according to a principle, up to the ultimate ground or the urground of the objective world produces, in the idea of the transcendentality, the exact and valid connection of the German idealism with the Urground and the all-unity doctrine of the Brahma-Atmā speculation of the Upaniṣads. It consists in the commonness of the thought of the Ur-ground in the subject in the beginning but the decisive difference out of the translation of that subject in the active form of the subject is, in the unfoldment of the will for governing the world through the realization of methodical knowledge in science and technique, the Baconian
programme of 'nova atlantis'-, for 'the will to power' (Nietzsche 'der Wille zur Macht') stamps the concise formula, which also illuminates the idealistic apriori-constitution of the valid world in consciousness. Therein becomes evident the scientific-technical World-relation of this epoch in its importance for the historical and skilled existence of man: as the epochal form of life of man who comes no more to himself, to constitute the ideal world in the will (idealism), to govern it as real (materialism) but loses his self-existence through a subjectivity which undoes subject in a predominant way. To overcome the human nihilism which this willing subject, the energy of the subduing spirit produces, Schopenhauer points out the way of romantic evasion or subterfuge in the contemplative spirit of the East. He teaches that man can himself withdraw from the wild chase of 'the will to live', from the senseless driving impulses of the world and save himself from the painful disappointments of this illusory existence and thus detach himself, through withdrawal into the contemplative ways of life of the artist, the philosopher and the saint. This suggests an approximation towards the meditative self-realization of the Indian. The spirit attains, for Schopenhauer, to the possibility of absolute self-unfoldment in the existence of a recluse, as Gautama Buddha has placed it as an ethical goal. The spirit of India becomes here living, indeed, out of its romantic motive of intense longing for the saving way of life, as a corrective and antithesis against the excessive world-activism of the West, through turning towards the historical way of life of the East which does not know this activism or which understood to overcome it. Romanticism is the 'dreamy intense longing which sees the possible future in the images of the past and which along with it naturally attains a feeling and understanding for the historical nature and becoming (of reality) and at the same time an openness for the original data; it, however, does not attain the force of power towards the true formulation of reality, why, not even the reality itself, though it may attain to a historically experienced or an ideally constructed reality. The succeeding materialistic and positive wave had, therefore, no difficulty in getting over this idealistic world-construction with its brutal realistic world-will. The softening dissolution of reality in a dream of longing was perhaps still artistically but not politically possi-
ble. This insight impelled Nietzsche to turn away from Schopenhauer’s impotent spirit of world-renouncing contemplation and to expect the achievement of a new political world-epoch out of the absolute rise or increase of the will to power. The romantic impulse, connected with the efficaciousness of the Eastern spirit-structure—itself in antithesis to Nietzsche with his ideal of totalitarian power-realization in the superman as a kind of Changanizkhwan of the spirit—has, up to the present time, decisively influenced the development of Europe. The proof for the efficacy of this impulse is the turn towards the graphic, whole, intuitive and concrete thought of life’s philosophy and phenomenology and back to the mystical ur-ground-thought in Schelling’s positive philosophy and towards the existentialism and further toward the tendencies of depth-psychological and parapsychological investigations which are directed towards the unconscious ground (plane) of the Soul.

Regarding the Existential Philosophy, it is the ‘existence’ which Kierkegaard means, the occurrence of the Origin out of the ethical decision of man. The self-realization of man in the act of moral decision is a structure of (or pertaining to) the will and not an act of theoretical reason which in Kierkegaard was too diminutive to come to a decision but it was practical reason. It lies in the line of idealistic thought which Jaspers, proceeding from Kant, has led to the logical end. It begins in Kierkegaard with an underestimation ‘of reason and science’, a new opposition of belief and knowledge which is characteristic of existential thought. Therein lies today the problematical question of existentialist thought that it likewise falls a victim to the modern process of willing; it indeed turns from the inside towards self-realization, not towards governing nature from outside. Martin Heidegger achieves, with this point of view, the overcoming of the existentialism through a new radical turn towards absolute Theory as the truth of being. Truth is to him, as (A- lethia), the unconcealed presence of being, that appearance in glory (Parusie), the presence of being out of the connection to the existence,25 indeed not capable of being fulfilled by Heidegger in an original thought-form of abstract thought (Parmenides), but in the thought which brings the existence into expression or language; because the ‘speech or language is the house or home of being.”26 What is meant is
an original way of thought in which the composition of poetry and thought are not different (as thought is, nevertheless, an act of speech), as we know this already in the beginning of philosophy in the religious poetry of the Veda and the pre-Socratic didactic poetry. Heidegger would like to renovate this original connection with existence in the original language, in the word not yet thought out, as he generally goes back to the original form of thought. This thought-attempt nevertheless conceals the temptation of thought to a forcible constructivity in the formation of ideas and words.

It appears that today a universal connection is being initiated in the spiritual sense in a new confrontation of the East and the West, such as never perhaps occurred in history and also there is an attempt to formulate, and give shape to the spiritual unity of the world which must necessarily precede the political unity. For this spiritual unity, the acquaintance of Eastern thought-components in the Western spiritual structure is consistent; it must be certainly an acquaintance, not an over-powering of this one through the other.

The development of natural sciences with the deviation from the rationalistic mechanistic thought, which has been dominant for a long time in the consideration of nature, shows the tendency of a Whole; formed, structural way of comprehension also in the new position of the Theory as methodically making available several constituents of action and positing a general law out of the appearance of the encroaching connections of the Whole. Recently in the natural sciences, a theoretical-philosophical thought effort has emerged to the forefront and this has as well led to the overcoming of isolated scientific border-questions giving rise to those problems which arise out of a differentiated classification of the whole of nature in independent layers and spheres, as also in the dominion of world-building synthesis of thought. All this points to a thought-attempt of an all-embracing integration, therefore towards an integral thought which has come to unfoldment today.

F. C. Northrop of the Yale University has written a book 'The Meeting of East and West'\(^{37}\), which is the fruit of his travels for study in India and China. In that book, he tries to establish the onesided cultivation of the intellectual components, in the
historical development of the Western mind or spirit, which have led to a purely abstract formalistic, constructive technical pattern of existence. He also appeals for the supplementation in the sense of genuine integration by components which he names as 'the aesthetic'. He means the intuitive, pure theoretical thought-pattern, not as poetical-artistic (Heidegger) but as religious, meditative knowledge and form of existence, as it was realized in the 'knowing self' of the ancient Indian Brahman-doctrine. India has entered today into this realization of the spiritual view (with reference to) the Urground (the ultimate cause) in the (field of) political reality. It was Mahatma Gandhi who on the basic position of a meditative-spiritual-action won the freedom of India through the principle of non-violence in the pure belief in the power of the spirit. While the world of the West in its onesided technical-constructive subjectivity in the holding of the subjectio, in the subjugation of the world swore, by the spirit of power, of which it is not yet rid—power which has proved truly devastating in two world-wars—, the power of the spirit arising out of the roots of inward non-violent nature of thought, as R. Tagore has recently proclaimed it, out of a religious subjectivity at its basis has become evident to this world as a non-violent existence ruling over the fate of mankind and of man.

_Indian Thought_

a graphical sketch

\[ \begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Vedānta} & \ldots & \text{Brahma} \\
\text{Cārvāka} & \ldots & \text{Prakṛti} \\
\text{Yoga} & \ldots & \text{Buddhism} \\
\text{The Absolute} & \leftarrow & \text{Ātmā} \ldots \text{Upaniṣads} \\
\text{Puruṣa} & \ldots & \text{Sāṃkhya}
\end{array} \]
NOTES
TO
“INTRODUCTION INTO INDIAN THOUGHT”

1) According to Kant’s ‘transcendental dialectic’, “the whole is never given but it is only given up,”; it is, therefore, not the object but the goal, that is to say, ordered to the striving will. Thought becomes ‘act of understanding’, Theory becomes the praxis of theoretical reason, its performance, its act. J. Piper speaks of the ‘work-idea’ of Knowledge in Kant. The tragedy of this thought: the thought is wasted and the action is blamed—German fate.

2) Hegel, ‘Wahrheit des Ganzen’.
3) Rgveda 10. 119
4) Rg 9. 91
5) The Absolute is the detachment from the empirical manifoldness and is, therefore, at the same time an Abstractio. The way of this thought to the Absolute is the abstraction. And so it is philosophical thought.

6) Rg 1. 164
7) In the abovementioned work, verse 46.
8) Rg 8. 58
9) Brhad-Āranyaka Up. 4, 5, 1-15
10) Rg. 10. 129

11) Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker S.A.—Fragment (ii) is translated as follows: “The same is the living and the dead, the waking and the sleeping, the young and the old, because this becomes, when it changes suddenly, that and that again, becomes, when it changes suddenly, this.” Further Fragment 67.

12) In the abovementioned work. Frag. 53
13) In the abovementioned work. Frag. 10: “.... and out of all, one and everything out of one.”

14) Rg. 10, 129, 7
15) Rg. 10, 121, 10
16) P. Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie 1. 1 (1897) p. 286

18) *Chāndogya* 3, 14  

19) *Brhad-Āranyaka* Up. 1, 4, 7  

20) *Brhad-Āranyaka* Up. 3, 4, 2  

21) *Brhad-Āranyaka* Up. 4, 5, 15  

22) Ṛg 10. 129. 4  

23) One could meet the same propositions against the Vedic Philosophy, which Augustine has raised as reproach against the Greek neo-Platonians: "Omnia ibi legi, sed quod verbum caro factum est, ibi non ligi" ("There everything is for the law, but where the word (God) has become man (i. e. but as Christ has become man), there it is not for a law") The latest dogmatising of the assumption of the corporeal reception of Marien into the heaven would show how much the incarnation is the constituent of the nature of Christian thought.  

24) Compare Note 21  

25) *Brhad-Āranyaka* Up. 1, 4, 1  

26) ibid 25  

27) *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* 4, 83 f.  

28) expression in brackets by me. It deals with the clue-verse (Kārikā) of the later Upaniṣads.  

29) *Katha* 3, 11-13  

30) *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* 4, 85  


32) F. Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (1885), Aphor. 20  

33) In his *Allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie: Die Philosophie der Upanishaden* 1, 2 (1899)  

34) Compare the great perspective of interpretation of the Cartesian Cogito and Nietzsche’s Will to power for the elucidation of the structure of being in Western metaphysics by Martin Heidegger in the ‘Holzwegen’.  

35) Heidegger’s ‘ontological difference’ of being and existence itself refers to as positive dissolution of the being in existence on the same Urground movement of nothing in the Vedic *Brahma-Ātmā* reflection.  

36) Compare M. Heidegger, ‘*Humanismus-brief*.’ On this
and on the following, I should remark as follows: The ways of thought and poetry (composition) have bifurcated. One can no more force his way back to the original unity of the root, without breaking both the branches of the fork. Rather an attempt must be ventured to stretch the thread like a string (of a bow) to join the outermost ends of the fork, in which we have found ourselves today, so as to be able to drive and carry the arrow of thought to the new goal. I name such a structure of new unity as integral thought.


38) Compare the monograph on Mahatma Gandhi by Romain Rolland.
FOREWORD AND INTRODUCTION TO THE WHOLE WORK
FOREWORD

This work, the first volume of which appears herewith, will bring into its compass a connected presentation of the Indian Philosophy from the beginnings to the present times. Originally, I had planned a comprehensive scientific work which would not only show the basic lines of development but also draw on all the results of research and sketch the problems candidly and would contain the rich sources and literary statements or passages. But this is not the time for a gigantic work of this kind. Besides, it demands at least a minimum of external favourable conditions which, at this period of my life, are denied to me. And above all such a work cannot be written here in Vienna where Indology has, since a few decades, been neglected. Besides that chief work, I had also thought of a second work which should bring the presentation of Indian philosophy to wider circles, i.e., not only for the Indologists but also for the philosophers and in general for everybody who has an interest in the subject. It is this work, the first part or volume of which I place here before the readers.

In the composition of this work, I have a threefold aim before my eyes. First of all, it should contain a presentation of total Indian philosophy from the beginnings to the present times in which every phenomenon of importance finds its corresponding place. Further I wish to bring to the reader a real history of Indian philosophy, not a crude assemblage of half-worked materials but as far as it is possible, a description of the origin of single doctrines and systems and of their development which should be beyond the accidentality of traditions. Finally it will be my attempt, so far as the coy material allows it, to give the work a readable form. It should not bring in scientific discussions but a presentation of the results of scientific research.

To reach this aim, a completely new working up of the stuff proved to be necessary. Some things which had been dealt with up to this time, in a disproportionate extent as in Vedic philosophy, had to be shortened. Incomparably some-
thing more must further be shaped out, and still more completely written anew. Some things much more important, which are lost, must be won back and supplemented and the unimportant which has remained casually preserved must be repressed to the proper proportions. And it was necessary to unburden the treatise as far as possible of scientific accessories. I have, therefore, basically renounced every polemic. A choice list of the most important literature and the necessary references are given in the notes.

In the face of plenty of stuff, it was further necessary to observe a number of restrictions. First of all I have dealt, in short, proportionately with beginnings. Though it is important to explore the source of all phenomena, the inquiry into the past beginnings loses itself all too easily in the dusky distance. The first task is to ascertain once clearly, what has originated. Then one can ask how it is originated.

Further I have left out of account entering into the question of foreign influence, interesting though it may be. It is necessary first of all to comprehend unambiguously and clearly the Indian facts and to present them in that form. Then can the question of dependence on foreign phenomena be raised. I have also desisted from citing the agreements with foreign philosophies. Above all, I have omitted the philosophic assessment and other appraisal of the material. I wish to describe exclusively the Indian philosophy in its originality, as it can be considered historically. Even further utilisation of the material is a problem by itself; besides, others may better solve it. The strength of one, who has opened the way for the first time to long distances in the primeval forest of Indian philosophy, is already heavily taxed in the undertaking.

On some points, I have indeed resolved, partly freely and partly under compulsion, to bargain for a loading of my presentation. First of all I have, during the presentation of particular doctrines and systems, advanced a short review of their external history and literature. I have done it because, many readers perhaps attach weight to it and in this sphere there is no pertinent handbook easily available. Further I have occasionally allowed the sources to speak, even at the risk of being lengthy. But I believe, such lengthiness is less
tiensesome than the dry presentation of pure doctrinal thought-contents. And the idea of the described subject gains essentially in graphic lucidity. Partly I have become more lengthy than I liked to be. But I would request the reader to consider the following:

He who gives shape to an already known stuff anew, can form it as he likes, emphasise the interesting, shortly touch upon the dry or leave it. But quite different is the case with one who presents a subject in the largest part for the first time. He can presuppose nothing as known, cannot refer to other presentations but must bring symmetry to the total stuff. And so a certain, perhaps somewhat tiresome lengthiness, cannot be occasionally avoided.

In one point I have indeed deliberately and consciously undertaken the debit-side or handicap of my treatise.

I have consciously and purposely abstained from recasting—as it is often seen—Indian philosophy to correspond with European taste. It was obviously necessary to arrange the thought-contents of the doctrines systematically. But I have carried in them neither European formulations of questions nor European formations of thought. I have avoided what interests or grips the European and to keep back or pass over the remaining which may not interest him. I have, on the other hand, endeavoured to present to the reader Indian philosophers as they are and to show what stirred them, how they put questions in their own way and sought the kinds of answers in their own way. The work on that account may be less stimulating and more irksome to read. But I believe, there is a great number of readers who are anxious to be acquainted with genuine Indian Philosophy and who will be thankful to me for this. Finally, I have desisted from giving in the eyes of the reader greater importance to the subject by accentuated spiritual illustrations. I have placed the things in the calm, clear light of the day. He who really understands to see the important and to assess it, will also know to value it.

Lastly I may still emphasize that my treatise is fully elaborated out of the sources themselves. The only exception is in regard to the presentation of the teachings of Jina which are based on W. Schubring’s ‘Lehre der Jainas’. For the most
part, I have gone my own way and have much differed from the presentations published hitherto. I have advanced, in short, proofs for my interpretations every time in the notes of the chapters concerned.

The Translation of the texts chosen is not a philological interpretation and is meant to be readable and understandable and is aimed at being a right impression of essentials. Such passages are, therefore, smoothed over. From many versions I have chosen versions which appeared to me better. I have skipped over unhesitatingly the controversial and the unimportant ones. As for the remaining, I wish to be able to satisfy further with writing in this respect on another occasion.*

I have translated philosophical terms on principle. It might have been an advantage to retain the Indian expressions for untranslatable ideas. But what is right for one system is also fair to another. But in a whole presentation of Indian philosophy, there are a multitude of words which stem out of a language which is completely foreign to most people and which would, therefore, disturb and bewilder them. The translation also has its own difficulties and disadvantages. To meet them, I have, therefore, chosen the following way: Above all, in the case of every technical term, I hold fast to its definite translation as far as possible, even where the meaning itself has undergone some change. How the term is to be understood, becomes evident out of the particular passage with sufficient clarity, whereas the retention of the same translation gives a fixed starting point for the fact as to which term is meant. Besides, I have included the Indian terms in brackets, perhaps in an overabundant measure. Ultimately, they are still the best basis in order to ascertain distinctly the different ideas. And he who has toiled through the treatise and the translations and has vainly endeavoured to ascertain as to which ideas lie concealed under the fluctuating and unclear translations, will give me the credit. It is obvious that he who has gained a great interest in the subject, will assimilate at least the basic ideas of the Sanskrit-language; to him, the

*A volume of selected translations appears accordingly in the series of philosophical Reading-books published by Bernhard Funk, publisher in Munich.
citation of the Indian terms will be doubly welcome. The man, however, to whom the Sanskrit language is completely foreign, can read the matter away, undisturbed.

I give the Indian words in the nominative case. After all, finally, it is a matter of personal liking. According to me, the stem-form appears to be appropriate and in its place in a linguistic work. In any other place, it makes on me the impression of a mutilation. In the transcription of the words, I hold to a scientifically customary way of transcription. It may have still many defects, but it has still the advantage to be acknowledged as uniform. And that is the most important consideration. How it is to be read is said in a few lines and this trouble is small in comparison with the uncleanness which the arbitrariness in transcription brings with it, which many times puts the experts themselves into confusion. Thus is said what was the most important to be said about the aim and the accomplishment of this work.

The draft of the present volume was already written down in the winter of 1947. The final conclusion and printing had to be greatly postponed on account of unfavourable times. In the case of a new revision, I felt it especially strongly how at every step, the problems allured further research. It could not otherwise be in a sphere where everything is in preparation. But in spite of that the attempt of a summarising treatise has its right and is even necessary. Science required that the draft of its results should not be indefinitely postponed. Above all, individual single research and synthesis should always impregnate each other. As a painter sketches his picture in broadest features, in order to execute it in its single parts and to give the first outline its final form, so also scientific isolated individual research requires the broad frame, which it finally fills and which first he uses, in order to arrange and see the problems rightly. In this sense, it is here attempted to sketch in broad features a picture of Indian philosophy and its development, as far as the present condition of knowledge allows it. The ground-lines stand and remain as I wrote them years ago. Only details are supplemented and set right. This attempt, fully new in its own way, to present Indian Philosophy may stand the test and give a picture of the hitherto
attained knowledge and suggest further research, until a later generation can seize it and can give the picture sketched here its final form. The next volume, I hope, would follow in the near future; for the preliminaries have far advanced and the first difficulties have been overcome through the enterprising spirit of Herr Otto Miller.

At the conclusion, I gladly fulfill the obligations to thank heartily all who have assisted me in the execution of this work. I began the composition of this work under the greatest difficulties, in the days of the Collapse, as a refugee without my usual working material and in the most modest circumstances. Already the procurement of the writing materials had been for a long time an almost insoluble problem. And the means of help which I could gradually procure were the most scarce, imaginable. That I could still begin the work was only possible through the fact that the ground-lines of earlier preliminary work had already been fixed. And I have experienced a disagreeable feeling that I had not the original texts at hand when I wrote out the presentation of the ancient times but had to take the help of the translations. Since then, I have had the possibility to go through the treatise once again and hope that no deficiencies have remained. But I should not omit to thank expressly those who have helped me in the most difficult period. They are, above all, Herr Prof. Amman and Herr Dr. Oberhuber of the University of Innsbruck who placed at my disposal in the friendliest manner the available material in their Institute. In Vienna, Herr Dr. Knobloch had the friendliness to look for me into different works which were inaccessible to me at that time. Finally, last though not the least, I thank the Farmer Stefan Haselberger in Fieberbrunn, with whom, I have found refuge with my family in the most difficult period; in his house I could begin the final working out of this work and could complete a great part of the first volume.

—E. Frauwallner
INTRODUCTION
PRONUNCIATION AND ACCENT OF INDIAN WORDS

Vowels

The vowels are, as in German, pronounced; only $a$ has a hollow sound. Length and shortness are to be exactly differentiated. $a$, $i$, $u$, are short, $\bar{a}$, $\bar{i}$, $\bar{u}$, long; $e$ and $o$ in Sanskrit are always long; they are short in Prakrit before conjunct consonants. $j$ is vowelized $r$ and sounds similarly as $\bar{r}i$.

Consonants

Among the aspirates, $kh$, $gh$, $ch$, $jh$, $th$, $dh$, $th$, $dh$, and $ph$, $bh$, the $h$ is distinctly audible and forms with the preceding consonant a peculiar sound. The palatals $c$ and $j$ sound like $tsch$ and $dsch$. The cerebrals $t$, $th$, $d$, and $dh$ are to be uttered with the tip of the tongue easily bent upwards. The nasals resemble the neighbouring consonants; $\bar{n}$ is guttural, $\bar{n}$ is palatal, and $\bar{n}$ is a cerebral nasal. $\bar{r}$ and $\bar{v}$ are pronounced as $j$ and $w$. $S$ and $\bar{S}$ are sch sounds of which the former is pronounced with the tip of the tongue but backward, the latter with the tip of the tongue easily bent upward. $S$ is always voiceless; $\bar{h}$ is a voiceless weak breath, in which the preceding vowel easily resounds. $\eta$ designates a nasal sound which adjusts itself mostly before a consonant.

Accent

If the last but one syllable is long, that is to say, contains the long vowel or the short vowel with the conjunct consonant, it carries the accent. If the last but one syllable is short, then the third last is accented; if this is short, the fourth last is accented.
1. THE PERIODS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The Indian Philosophy, to use a popular metaphor, is a mighty ocean which is difficult to navigate. No people of the earth have a philosophical and religious literature which can compare with Indian Literature in the size, richness and manifoldness of its contents. And that is no wonder. The Indians have always shown a special interest for philosophical and religious things. Besides, it is a literature whose origin extends beyond over three thousand years and in whose creation the whole gigantic land from Kashmir to Bengal and Ceylon has taken part. He, who confronts this literature for the first time, confronts, therefore, an overwhelming plenitude of phenomena and there is only too great a danger that a presentation which undertakes to bring to the reader this abundance may prove tiresome; that, likewise, the way be lost in an apparently endless expanse and that the plethora of pictures which exhibit themselves may prove bewildering. There arises, therefore, almost the imperious necessity to organize this mighty mass and to divide it into Sections which would facilitate the survey and thus bring order and clarity into the chaos which at first meets the eye.

Now the question arises, whether or not in this respect, the Indian tradition itself may not be able to give us the clue, out of which such an organization can allow itself to be gathered. But this question must be answered in the negative. It is an old maxim that the Indians lack a historical sense. No doubt, it is true, but it is true with the most important limitations. The Indians in their own way have preserved historical information in a rich measure and created works which are equal in rank to the performance of other people. But they lack the faithful sense of preserving facts, which, for instance, distinguishes the Chinese and they have not presented a writing of history after the manner of the Greeks. The same holds good in the sphere of Indian philosophy. They have preserved rich material which hands down precious building stone for the history of Indian philosophy, even though for the ancient times
too much of it is lost through the unfavourableness of tradition. But one would vainly seek for a history of philosophy, such as we demand, which not only deals with individual schools and systems but describes their origin, clarifies their source, and demonstrates the causal relations.

**Indian Sources**—As a matter of fact the consideration of the Indian sources shows a great wealth of historical material. Already in the Vedic period, frequently are attached to the texts, lists of teachers by whom the texts have been handed down. In the time of the systems, we find statements about their founders, their pupils and other important heads of schools. That is already the case in respect of the Sāṇkhya, the oldest of the systems. In later times, the sources flow richer. Thus of the later Vedānta Schools, there are handed down to us not only the lists of teachers but also the detailed biographies of the heads of the Schools and their pupils, besides catalogues of their works. Comprehensive and proportionately old are the items of information of the Jainas which, besides, contain quite exact and utilizable statements about their time for the last one thousand years. Still richer are the accounts of the Buddhists, though they are preserved for us many times only through Chinese and Tibetan transmission. Among their works, there are also such as can be designated the histories of the Church. The liturgical works deserve a special mention. Among them can be enumerated the works of Buddhist and Jain authors which contain an account about the different schisms and formations of sects in their schools and enumerate the characteristic doctrinal opinions of individual sects. But among the most important are the works which go beyond the frame of proper schools and handle in a summarizing way the teachings of the most important philosophical schools. Of these, two works are widely known in Europe and therefore deserve to be mentioned. They are the *Saḍdarśanasamuccaya* ('the compilation of the six systems') of Haribhadra¹ and *Sarpadarśanasāṅgraha* ('the summary of all systems') of Śāyānamādhava. Haribhadra, a Jain author, who presumably lived in the eighth century A.D., has presented in short verses with perfect impartiality the six most important systems of his time. Though his statements are only scanty, they have been, however,
supplemented by valuable commentaries of later times. Essentially copious is the work of Śaṇamādhava, a Vedānta-author of the fourteenth century A.D. It not only embraces the important and great group of systems but distinguishes itself by skilful utilization of sources. The arrangement of the material is also exceedingly impressive and lively. The author begins with the presentation of that system which, in his view, is the worst—viz. the system of the Materialists, then disproves, advancing from one step to another, one theory by another until finally the system of Śaṅkara, which he himself professes, forms the conclusion and the crown, as it were, of the whole book.

The development of Indian Philosophy: This short review already enables us to know the richness and the importance of the material by which the Indian tradition can enable us to steer our way to the history of Indian philosophy. And the importance of these materials is not abrogated by the fact that in this material numerous inaccuracies and legendary elements are contained. But the question raised in the beginning regarding the organization of Indian philosophical development cannot be still answered. Because the whole material, as already said, represents for us only the building-stone for the history of Indian Philosophy, but is itself far removed from any such history itself. Above all, the development on a large scale, with its organization and the inner connections, cannot be followed therefrom. Therefore an attempt must be made to undertake such an organization of materials itself and with this aim in view, it is necessary to bring the course of development before our eyes.

If, with this aim, we begin with the oldest period, it shows at first a clear, uniform line of development. In the oldest philosophical texts of the Veda, we still find beginnings—the questions which an awakening philosophical thought formulated, the questions, above all, relating to the bearer of life, fate after death, and the processes in sleep. And equally simple are, initially, the answers to these questions. But we can pursue step by step how these ideas are further rapidly developed. Overpoweringly bold thoughts have emerged. Soon in the latest layers of the older Upanisads the first highest point of
Indian philosophy is reached which appears to be connected with the name of Yājñavalkya and which culminated in the doctrine of the world-soul or the Ātmā or the Brahma. However, other thoughts were also at that time formulated, which have remained authoritative for the whole future—namely, such thoughts as the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul and the doctrine of works (Karma). The further development, as it appears to us in the old Epic texts of the Mahābhārata, shows these doctrinal thoughts already firmly rooted. We thus find a clear and consistent further continuation of the development. The circle of questions dealt with is gradually enlarged. The thoughts turn more towards the problems of the external world. Definite ideas are formulated about the Elements and their qualities (guṇāḥ), about the body and its organs. Besides, with the doctrine of the periodical world-origination and world-destruction is added a further important idea to those which further governed Indian thought authoritatively in its whole development. Thus the development matures to a first provisional conclusion with the formation of the oldest philosophical systems. These represented in so far something new, as with them, in place of the old teachings which alternated and were continually in flux, there appeared clearly formulated new edifices of thought firmly and unambiguously formed in their basic features and they were handed down in the schools of systems. It is, above all, characteristic of these systems that they lay claim to giving a full, all-embracing world-picture. Externally it comes to such outward expression that it becomes customary to place at the head of the presentation of any system an enumeration of total elements of existence out of which the world is created. From the point of contents, a system of this prime, early blooming period of philosophy could be organized, in general, in somewhat the following way:

There is put at the head or in the beginning the theory of knowledge which proves the foundation of every kind of right knowledge and is entrusted with the task of ascertaining and establishing the sources of knowledge out of which the system concerned has derived its doctrines. After the theory of knowledge there follows the proper World-picture, introduced with an enumeration of all the Elements of existence. Then
there is joined with it the description of World-edifice built out of these elements and of World-duration. Finally there are, at the conclusion, the inferences arising out of this world picture, inferences regarding human conduct, i.e., Ethics or, corresponding with the Indian conditions better expressed as, the doctrine of Deliverance.

The oldest system of this kind is the Sāṃkhya. It is a dualistic doctrine of Deliverance which, in essentials, is developed out of the thoughts of the Vedic and Epic period. But more important, by far, than the originality and novelty of the isolated thought-processes is the fact that here, for first time, the formulation and the summation has been carried out to form a compact system. Here is found for the first time the enumeration of the total elements of existence—the 25 principles (tattvāni) and the view cannot be dismissed out of hand that the name of the system is to be traced to the doctrine of enumeration which the name can be interpreted to mean. It is also the compactness and the logical consistency of system-building through which the Sāṃkhya has served as the prototype for all other systems and has attained, on a large scale, the effect not attained by any other systems. Because a large majority of popular theories not only in the Epic tales of the Purāṇas but also in most of the religious sects, have already early accepted in a rich measure the Sāṃkhya views and ideas and these have remained to this day the basic framework for their doctrinal edifice. The second important system of the older time—the Vaiśeṣika need not be much later than the Sāṃkhya. Philosophically it is important above all, through the fact that it connects the enumeration of all the elements of existence with the theory of categories, and thus sets up a philosophically established principle of classification. Among the rest, next to it stands,—especially in the older time—in the forefront, the Nature-Philosophy in which its doctrine of the atoms, above all, deserves mention. Both these two systems are leading at the beginning of our chronology. Besides it is still to be mentioned that materialistic streams also emerged early and had even already undergone, even before Christ, a systematic formulation under the name of the Lokāyata.

The creation of these older groups of systems gives a
prototype which has remained an authoritative standard for the whole future. Not only that. Under the influence of this prototype, thinkers of older doctrines also were stimulated to building them into a system. That is evidently seen especially in Buddhism. It had originally been a pure doctrine of deliverance which had restricted everything theoretical to the least possible limit. The theoretical discussions had, no doubt, comparatively set in among the circles of the monks but they had, at first, restricted themselves only almost to the technical details of Deliverance. Now here also the sphere of interest widened itself. Gradually, all fields of philosophical thought were drawn into the discussion until the development here also found its conclusion in the regular creation of a system. Thereby, especially fruitful and philosophically valuable thoughts were developed in these systems so that Buddhism through a series of centuries, especially from the second to the seventh, became leading in the intellectual life of the Indians.

The first attempts to build such systems ensued in the field of the Hinayāna, and numerous schools participated in it. Among them the School of the Sarvāstivādin had the greatest success; its system is worked out best and most comprehensively. As in the earlier mentioned systems we also find here as starting-point the enumeration of all natural data (dharmāḥ) out of which the phenomenal world is created. Then follows a theory of the Elements and Atomism. The world-creation and the world-periods are exhaustively described. But especially detailed, corresponding to the basic attitude of Buddhism, is the handling of all those subjects which stand connected with the theory of Deliverance. Consequently all psychical factors are enumerated and described in a thorough manner, as also the effect of action (Karma) and passions (Āsraṃbh). But the way of the Deliverance itself is treated in the most thorough way. A special emphasis is deserved by the logical consistency with which it is attempted to think out all thoughts to the end and it does not fight shy of any bold assumption, in order to find the explanation of the question in hand. This system has undergone a remarkable further formulation in the School of the Sautrāntika which softens and replaces, with advanced views, the old bizarre theories of the Sarvāstivādin.
The system of the *Sautrāntika* is still the least explored. Already now it shows that a series of fruitful thoughts had already developed in it. The systems of the *Mahāyāna*, however, tread on quite a different path. Here it is no more the building up of the phenomenal world with which the thought is occupied, but it is the question of its reality itself which is raised. The oldest of these systems, the system of the *Madhyamaka*, measures the phenomenal world with a yardstick of bold and inexorable logic, in order to show that it carries nothing but contradiction and, therefore, cannot be real. From that it follows that only an appearance of truth can be ascribed to it in contrast to the highest truth which alone is real but which lies outside all forms of thought of human knowledge and which, therefore, remains incomprehensible to our thought. As against it, the second great school of the *Mahāyāna*—the *Yogācāra* developed an idealistic theory which explains the external world as an idea and the creation of our consciousness.

Thus is reached the highest and at the same time a final point of development and a new thing initiates itself. Already the basic attitude of the just mentioned two systems which inquire not into the formation but into the reality of the external world, shows a remarkable shift of interest. And it holds good now in general. In the old as well as the newly created systems, it is, in these centuries around the beginning of our period of chronology, no longer the world-picture with which one is occupied, but it is the questions of the theory of knowledge and logic. Already in the centuries about the beginning of our chronology, thinkers had begun to occupy themselves thoroughly with the inquiry into the epistemological foundations of different theories and along with it, with the inquiry into the possibility of right knowledge in general. It is this that emerges now more and more to the forefront. It is especially discernible in the *Nyāya* system which emerged about this time. It originated somewhere in the second century A.D. as a mixture of the manual of the regulations of disputation with a simple natural philosophy and a doctrine of Deliverance. Soon, to the neglect of all other parts of the system, only one side, i.e. the theory of knowledge was cultivated and further developed. As a final result it alone forms almost the total contents of the
Nyāya system, while the Vaiśeṣika serves as the metaphysical foundation, its doctrines having been taken over almost unchanged. Similar is the case with Mīmāṃsā which entered the circle of the philosophical systems approximately about the same time. This had been originally a system of interpretation of the right meaning of the different ritual texts. Now it developed also a philosophical doctrinal edifice largely leaning on the Vaiśeṣika. But while the world-picture of the Mīmāṃsā never prominently came to the forefront and did not gain any special importance, the theory of knowledge which aimed at justifying the place of the Veda in the Mīmāṃsā as a permanently true revelation, was set forth in a large measure and it played a remarkable role in the philosophical discussions. Besides, there arose in Buddhism approximately about the middle of the millennium after Christ, one particular logical school whose representatives almost exclusively cultivated the field of the theory of knowledge and brought forth performances which count among the most important which Indian philosophy has to exhibit. Finally emerges the sister-religion of Buddhism—the Jīnism which, in the course of centuries, also built up a fully developed system, dealing, about the same time, with the sphere of the theory of knowledge in an exhaustive way and there arose in it a series of voluminous and important works which are exclusively devoted to epistemological and logical questions.

But already a new revolution announces itself, stronger than everything hitherto, directing the whole development on a new path. The old systems, as if their life-force had been exhausted, begin to decay since the middle of the first millennium after Christ and vanish mostly from the picture. The Sāṃkhya which during the first half of the first one thousand years after Christ had still played a predominant role, found about 500 A.D., its last well-known representative. Then it completely stepped into the background. The last important formulator of the Vaiśeṣika belongs approximately to the sixth century A.D. Then the system ekes out its modest existence only in union with the Nyāya, as the latter's metaphysical foundation. Of the Buddhistic schools, the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas soon lose their importance after the middle of the millennium.
after Christ, and the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra a little later. The logical school still flourished up to the end of the millennium and then soon died away. The Lokāyata also faded out about this time. Only the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and the Jain monasteries were able to assert themselves further. The Nyāya still continued to see a new blossoming in the second millennium. But the general impression is that the period of the old systems is past. And as a matter of fact, the systems which had lent this period their typical stamp had disappeared.

Still though the old vanishes about this time, the new also comes in its place. Simultaneously with the decay of the old systems, we see new doctrines coming up. But these are the constructions of a different sort and they have an entirely different origin. They are after all the Vedic Schools, but they are Śaivite and the Vaiṣṇavite Sects i.e. the religious circles and they are now the carriers of these new doctrines. Their development is carried out in two ways. Either the religious circles take over the thought-wealth of the old philosophical schools and thus develop regular systems out of them on their own soil or these religious circles put and carry their own spirit into the old systems and transform them into something completely new.

The first step in this direction was taken by the representatives of the Upaniṣadic doctrines. After their time Upaniṣadic doctrines had, after their acceptance as a holy doctrine into the collection of the Veda, become stiff and rigid and continued as such in priestly circles. As a revelation, they had been fixed in a stamped form and were not capable of any further free formulation. Only by way of interpreting and explaining the old texts, it was possible to bring in new thoughts. Now, firstly, the doctrines contained in the different Upaniṣadic texts were blended into a unitary edifice of thought under the drawing-up of the Śāmkhya ideas and were laid down in this form in a collection of aphorisms called Vedāntasūtrānī. On these Śūrāṇi originated, in course of time, a series of commentaries. But they were unimportant as compared with the contemporary philosophical systems which rarely paid any heed to them. However, in the second half of the first millennium A.D., there came a turning-point. About 700 A.D., the great
Vedānta teacher Śaṅkara wrote his famous commentary on the the Vedāntasūtras, in which by taking over the precious thought-
wealth out of the old philosophical systems—especially, above 
all, from Buddhism—he developed his monistic Māyā doctrine, 
which explained the world-soul, i. e. the Brahma as the only 
reality and the total world of phenomena as a phantasmagoria. 
Thus the first important system the—Vedānta—was created 
which gradually extorted recognition for it in the circle of 
philosophical systems.

A little later there set in a similar development among the 
sects of the Śaivas who worshipped Śiva as the Almighty God. 
These sects in older times possessed entirely simple doctrines 
which hardly deserved mention philosophically. Now, how-
ever, conditions changed. In the ninth century after Christ at 
the latest, we find, in the North, Śaivadarśana fully developed. 
This builds itself on the basis of Sāṅkhya theory, but it becomes 
comprehensive through a series of important thoughts and is 
so well thought out and rounded that it can be easily placed as 
a theological system beside the old philosophical systems. In 
the tenth century A.D., there blossomed forth in Kashmir the 
idealistic Pratyabhijñā-darśana school which is equal in rank, 
if not superior to the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. It found in Utpaladeva 
(c. 950 A. D.) a rigorous thinker and formulator of its philoso-
phical doctrines and in his grandson-pupil Abhinavagupta 
(c. 1,000 A. D.) the greatest systematizer who erected a 
mighty, monolithic edifice out of the confused mass of tradition 
from the holy scriptures of his school. In the 13th century 
A. D., the Śaivasiddhānta gained in the South its complete for-
mulation representing a Southern counterpart of the Śaiva-
darśana. The system of Vīraśaiva or Liṅgāyata which in the 
twelfth century gained a great importance and spread widely in 
the South-west shows a strong originality. Finally it is still to 
be mentioned that the Vedānta underwent a Śaiva interpretation 
and formulation through a Śaiva teacher named Śrīkanṭha. 
Indeed, his greatest dependence on the famous Vaisnavite phi-
losopher Rāmānuja met with a reproach and his system did not 
find great dissemination.

Still, earlier than the schools of Śaivas, the Tāntric theories 
had gained importance. In these, in contrast to the proper
Śaiva doctrines, a female principle of the Goddess of Sakti plays a special role.

Already in the first half of the first millennium A.D., we can observe how such doctrines of Sakti penetrated Buddhism. There arose mystical secret doctrines which partly led to a crude character of magic. Besides, it was developed as a regular system in the Vajrayāna which is essentially based on Madhyamaka thought. Though the Vajrayāna is separated from the older systems by a cleavage, it still deserves very much a place in the presentation of Indian philosophy. It is historically important because, on account of it, Buddhism was living and effective for centuries as compared with other systems. It remains to be observed that the non-Buddhistic Tāntric Schools also should not be passed over in silence, because they contain many original and remarkable ideas and their influence on the development of the Indian spiritual life must be estimated as high.

Chronologically last appear in the field the Schools of Vaiṣṇavas—the worshippers of God Viṣṇu. They bring forth their most important philosophical creations by leaning on the Vedānta, because they explain the old Vedāntasūtras in the theistic sense. Of the systems which thus originated, the oldest and the most important is that of Rāmānuja (c. 1100 A.D.) who taught a modified monism. Madhwa (also named Ānandatīrtha) (1300 A. D.) represents a pure dualism. Finally Vallabha (c. 1500 A. D.) preaches a strong rigorous monism. These are, however, the most outstanding representatives of the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta. Besides these there are also many others whose systems are in no way unimportant. It should be mentioned that in later centuries there arose above all a group of Vaiṣṇava teachers in whom the philosophical impulse, as against the religious, had strongly receded but who exercised a great influence and had numerous followers. As one of the most famous of these may be named Caitanya who lived at the beginning of the 16th century and whose doctrines found wide popularity in Bengal.

The picture of development that thus emerges is fully clear and unambiguous. There is a whole multitude of schools which simultaneously with the decline of the old systems, rose
up in their own way and stepped in their place. The new stream of development, derived therefrom, flowed further uniformly. A new revolution does not take place any more. As we have seen, the rise of the new systems begins about the middle of the first millennium A. D. Towards the turn of the millennium, their number grew and the rise in succession of new connected schools is quicker. It lasted for several centuries. The last highest point is reached in about 16th century. Then there is a pause and almost a standstill. But then only a few of these schools were completely dead. The great part of them continue even up to this day. Only in the last decades a new development begins to usher itself. Under the influence of the European culture, which since the establishment of English rule, has operated on India more and more strongly, Indian circles have got acquainted with European philosophy and have begun to appropriate it and discuss it. Thus is ushered in a new preparation of a new section of Indian philosophy which is characterized by the European prototype and confrontation with it. But up to now they are only the beginnings. The course of this development is provisionally neither to be neglected nor assessed.

The organization of Indian Philosophy: With this is concluded our review of the development-process of Indian Philosophy in its great features and we can now pass over to answer the question raised in the beginning regarding the organization of Indian Philosophy. While doing so, the already mentioned development of the last decades, which is caused by the influence of European Philosophy, is to be left out. Because, therein we have to deal with the introduction of a new section which stands under the influence of foreign thought and which therefore sharply stands out from the older Indian development. But for the earlier period, an organization of Indian philosophy can easily be secured. The great revolution, which we have been able to fix as occurring in the second half of the first post-Christ millennium and which is characterized by the decline of older systems and the emergence of newer doctrines, indicates evidently a turning point which separates the two different periods from one another. Therethrough, the total development is divided into two great sections of approximately equal duration, of
which each represents a homogeneous unity, held together through a uniform course of development. The first has its beginning in the Vedic Period, reaches its zenith with the creation of fully formulated philosophical systems, then declines in the period of the logical epistemological speculation and finally ends with the disappearance of the older systems about the end of the first millennium after Christ. The second begins with the emergence of newer systems—especially all on the soil of Śivaism and Viṣṇuism, about the middle of the first post-Christ millennium. It shows its most forceful vitality through the numerous new creations during the first half of the second millennium but the course of development suffers a relaxation and stops, though it continues in that arrested form even into our present times.

This distinction between these two great periods of development depends by no means only on external appearance but is established and justified on inner grounds. It is seen to be so on a more precise consideration. If we compare both these periods with each other, a deep-lying difference in their character can be ascertained between them. The systems of the first period are preponderantly atheistic, i.e. the highest God as a principle of world-explanation, as world-cause and world-director, plays in them no role. So also a divine revelation has no importance in them. Their doctrines are, on the other hand, scientifically developed without presuppositions. Again these are the systems which have produced the philosophically most significant thoughts. The systems of the second period, on the other hand, are preponderantly theistic. Mostly it is Śiva or Viṣṇu who appears in them as the almighty lord of the world. Their doctrines are derived from the revelations of the holy scriptures. So far as the philosophically important thoughts contained in them are concerned, they are borrowed from the systems of the older period on a far-reaching scale. It is also characteristic that those standing philosophically highest among these systems belong to the beginning of this period and that the philosophical element from them gradually goes on receding more and more. On that account, they are all the more important as religious creations and the religious motives such as the divine mercy, the
love of god, etc. play in them an overwhelming role. The difference of character between both the periods thus becomes clearly obvious. But then a further question arises whether these differences between these two periods can be shown to be due to any deeper cause. As a matter of fact, the cause can be explained as follows:

Already in the period in which both these periods detach themselves from each other, a deep-lying revolution takes place in the Indian body-politic. It is a revolution which allows the Hindu to arise out of the old Aryan Indian. It is above all to be traced to the fact that an indigenous element penetrates more and more strongly into the layer of the Aryan Immigrants. As a matter of fact, we see the Southern element more and more strongly represented in the philosophical sphere among the founders of new systems and schools in the later period. Perhaps the new layers imported by new immigrants play a certain role. The period of the storming in of the Huns about 500 A. D. has led a new series of tribes and people to infiltrate into India and they stand pre-eminent and strong politically in the succeeding centuries in North-West India. At any rate, the revolution of Indian national peoples' character taking place about this time on account of this contact makes itself noticeable in different spheres. The tracing back of the above-mentioned revolution in the Indian philosophical development to the same cause has, therefore, from the first, a certain probability. The first of these development-periods of Indian philosophy may be described as the creation of the Aryan immigrant and the second may be considered as Hinduistic.

Besides, it is worth noting that a similar process and a similar development can be observed in the sphere of ancient philosophy. Here rules, in the classical period, a philosophy which in all essential features shows a genuine Greek character. After the first preliminary steps of the pre-Socratic period, there is an establishment of great philosophical schools which are leading in the intellectual life of the people for many centuries and against which, all religious movements in the same period withdraw far into the background. About the beginning of the period which we are reckoning, however, a
change takes place. The influence of the philosophical schools wanes, while mighty religious streams overflow the banks and gain the heritage of ancient philosophies, partially with a richer acceptance of the wealth of philosophical thought. The impulse which impels these religious streams comes not out of Greece but out of the East. And the development ends with the victory of the most important of these religions over all others and also over philosophy, namely, with the victory of Christianity.

This parallelism contributes towards increasing the probability of the explanation given already for the difference of character between the two periods of development in Indian Philosophy. For the rest there remains for us the fact of difference on which it depends and after what has been said up to now, we can consider it as certain for every case. Thus there is supplied an answer to the question raised in the beginning viz. the question with regard to the organization of Indian Philosophy and we can now pass on to summarize the results of our statements already made corresponding to the above statements. I distinguish the following periods of Indian Philosophy:

(1) The Philosophy of the ancient Period. It begins with the philosophy of the Veda, culminates in the systems of the classical period, reaching about up to 1,000 A.D.

(2) The Philosophy of the later period. This covers the time from the middle of the first post-Christ millennium up to the present and is characterized by the preponderance of the Śāivistic and Vaiṣṇavistic systems.

(3) Modern Indian Philosophy: Under this I understand the new Indian Philosophizings under the influence of the European prototype, as they are observed in the last few decades.

This division can now be connected with the following presentation:

The presentation is organized again in two Parts of which the first deals with the philosophy of the ancient period. The second embraces the philosophy of the later period, to which there is a short supplement of modern Indian philosophy. Concerning the further classification of this division itself, the circumstances with regard to the philosophy of the ancient
period are simple. According to its course, it divides itself distinctly (i) in the early prime from its initial beginnings to the beginnings of system-building, (ii) then into the time of the system itself, (iii) and then into the period of the aftergrowth in which the system-building comes to a standstill and the cultivation of the theory of knowledge predominates. The things are less clear in the philosophy of the later period. Here we find no definite chronological steps of development which stand out distinctly from one another. Instead there are seen side by side different streams mingling with each other. It, therefore, appears to me better to organize the presentation of this period from this view-point according to which I differentiate the following streams of development:

First, the continuation of the Vedic thought-world and the beginning of the Vedānta up to the time of the system built by Śankara. Secondly, the systems built by the Śaivas. Thirdly, the decline of Buddhism and the rise of the Tāntric Schools. Fourthly, the Vedānta system of the Vaiṣṇava and the other Viṣṇuist Schools. Finally, is dealt the continuance still of the systems of the older period, so far as they continue in this period. A sub-division of the period of the modern Indian Philosophy renders itself to be unnecessary as it embraces only an entirely small compass of time. Thus is given an organization of Indian Philosophy which, in my view, largely does justice to the course of historical development and also simultaneously summarizes in clarity the phenomena belonging together, in well-arranged groups.
2. THE TRADITION

Now before we go over to the presentation of the Indian Philosophy itself, we must still deal shortly with one point—namely the question of tradition. It is self-evident that every historical science is to a large extent dependent on the condition of the tradition, with which it has to work. It will, no doubt, always attempt to overcome the limits which are put over it by the accidentality of tradition and to gain as far as possible a complete and right picture of its subject independent of the accidentality of the tradition. But always it is not possible, in the least, when a question of a science is dealt with, which still is stuck up in the beginnings. And in the case of Indology it happens all the more. We come across, therefore, while dealing with the sphere of Indian Philosophy, again and again, limitations which are set to our knowledge through the defect of tradition and which we, therefore, are not able still to overstep. And in my view, it is better to confess openly these limitations and to make them appear in our presentation, rather than to feign a knowledge which does not exist. We shall, therefore, cast a short glance on the Indian tradition and see which possibility it offers us and which limitations it puts upon us.

First, we must distinguish between oral and written tradition. The oral tradition in India, for example, plays a much greater role than elsewhere. It set in, many centuries before the period of written tradition and has accomplished unbelievable achievements. Already, long before the use of writing became customary, there arose namely the necessity to hand down great works faithful to the word and corresponding to that, a unique technique of oral tradition was formulated. This technique has stood the test. Whole masses of literature were preserved in this way and were handed down true to their letter, centuries after centuries. With this corresponds or is compatible the authority which the oral tradition had won in India. Especially, in the case of the holy texts of the Veda it holds good as the only venerable true form of tradition and the student has received, according to the Indian belief, the
holy doctrine rightly, if he has studied it not from books but has taken it over from the mouth of the teacher. The oral tradition of India corresponds, therefore, in its ability of performance in respect of the extent of the handed-down works and in its reliability, with all the demands which one can make on them. But there clings a great disadvantage which lies in the character of the oral tradition. It presupposes an uninterrupted tradition. Once the compact chain of oral tradition snaps, everything is lost beyond rescue. That tradition only has, therefore, been preserved, whose uninterrupted further continuance without any gap has been made certain through all periods. But that was unfortunately in India rarely the case. Therefore, out of the oldest period, which was dependent exclusively on the oral tradition, only a few masses of tradition are preserved. Everything remaining is lost. The information which these masses of tradition preserve for us, the pictures which consequently unroll themselves before us, hang or lie suspended in the air. The circumstances out of which they arose, the things which presupposed them, the lines of connections with one another remain to us, so far as they themselves give no information about them, concealed from us and it is often difficult and without prospects to wish to fill these gaps of the tradition. Such masses of tradition as are preserved for us are totally four in number. First, the Vedic collection of writings whose preservation we owe to the Brahmanical Vedic Schools. Then, the popular heroic epic and the religious epic for whose preservation the class occupying the station of the professional rhapsodists or minstrels and reciters took special care. Finally, the holy writings of the Buddhists and the Jainas whose continuance was made certain up to this day by the survival of their religions. These masses of tradition are massive and the information, they contain, is rich. But they restrict themselves from the point of time and space to a small sector. Everything remaining which the ancient times must have created is lost and the information connected with it is missing. Under these circumstances, I hold it proper to take into account in my presentation these limiting conditions of the tradition. In the following pages, I deal with these masses of tradition separately and try
only cautiously to draw the lines of connection where they appear to me certain to a certain extent. The mighty gaps of our knowledge must be, therefore, explicitly expressed and must be always taken into consideration.

The circumstances are entirely different in the case of the written tradition. Here is a deciding factor which conditions the destruction of old written works—the little durability of the Indian manuscripts. The material for manuscripts in India from very old times is the palm-leaves or the birch-barks. Paper came in only late. But this material is very severely susceptible to the influence of climate and the devouring by insects. In comparison with other lands, the manuscripts in India fall disproportionately to destruction. A manuscript, which would be older than the twelfth century A.D., is in India a rarity. Only there are a few exceptions that the manuscripts from the older times are preserved.' They are, above all, the manuscripts which have lasted for centuries in the mountain-valleys of Nepal on account of a favourable climate, the Indian manuscripts which have been preserved in the cloisters of Tibet and finally the manuscripts which have been preserved by the desert sands of East-Turkestan. These exceptions are preponderantly to the benefit of the Buddhistic literature. For the rest, we must reckon with the following rule in India: Works which are not continually again and again transcribed, decay after a few years into destruction.

It operates in the following way: Firstly, there are preserved works which have reached the rank of classical works and which maintain this continuity; in Philosophy these are the works which gave a final stamp to a system and were never displaced by new creations. With the creation of such works, all works of the earlier period used to lose interest and were no more written down and fell to destruction. That is the cause, why in India, in the most different spheres, the classical works of the oldest time are what remain preserved for us, while all the first steps leading to them and their forerunners are lost. That is also the case in the philosophical sphere. Therefore beyond the last steps of development holding good for us, almost only works of the following sort have remained preserved: Firstly works to which special authority is ascribed
as a result of its proclamation by a seer or as a divine revelation, like the basic collections of aphorisms of most of the systems. The Indian custom to compose a basic work as a commentary on an older writing led namely to the fact that for the sake of such commentaries also, the works which were commented upon, were further read and copied down. Thirdly, finally the convenient handbooks. In India, a disseminated knowledge and as far as possible the most all-embracing knowledge of different philosophical systems had been always very much esteemed, even though this knowledge did not reach the desirable thoroughness and depth. The consequence of this was that handbooks which imparted conveniently such a knowledge were always very much in demand. And as one demanded a knowledge of the old famous systems of the past, even though they were already dead and played a role more in academic discussions, one needed also for that a similar guiding textbook. Thus it came about that, of many systems of the older period, simple compendia remained preserved, while the philosophically important chief works were lost. Apart from the works of the three kinds described above, little is preserved of most of the systems of the ancient times. The tradition is partially fraught with frightening scarcity. Only in the second half of the first post-Christian millennium, the things improve. But the sources actually begin to flow richly in the second millennium.

Under these circumstances, we have to reckon with considerable difficulties in dealing with the written tradition in the presentation of the history of the period. Above all, the preliminary steps and the beginnings of individual works are missing. Only in the rarest cases, it is possible to express something definite about their origin and rise to development. And also otherwise what has been preserved for the ancient period is at least very scanty as compared with what has been lost. Still the position in comparison with the period of the oral tradition has been always better, as the preserved material does not restrict itself one-sidedly to a particular sphere, but is essentially of varied character. The task, therefore, to open up what has been lost and to supplement it is, therefore, facilitated in an important way. Unfortunately, the exploration of
this task has been accomplished so far in an inadequate manner. For the later period, the material available is no doubt rich and copious, but it has been rendered difficult because only a small part of the material is opened up and is printed. To work with the manuscripts was for me unfortunately not possible. The difficulties for a satisfactory presentation of this period are numerous. They emerge forth at least not so strongly as in the period of the oral tradition and it is to be hoped that as further research will succeed, so many of these difficulties will diminish within a foreseeable future period.
I  THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANCIENT PERIOD

A.—THE ANCIENT PERIOD
3. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDA

As we have seen in the preceding sections, out of the oldest periods of Indian Philosophy in which only oral tradition reaches back into the past, only four clusters of tradition are preserved and among these, the oldest is the traditional collection of the Veda. The Veda, therefore, stands in the beginning of Indian Literature in general as well as in the beginning of Indian Philosophy. But it would be a grave error to expect to find in the Veda a consistent collection of philosophical writings. The Veda has originally nothing to do with philosophy. Rather, philosophy makes its way into it only gradually, through a detour, in the following manner:

_Vedic Literature_: The ancient Indians had already developed a rich sacrificial cult and every great sacrifice consisted of not only ceremonial sacrificial rites distributed over a long period but also required the co-operation of a great number of priests. Prominent among these, were three kinds of priests who necessarily participated in such a sacrifice: the so-called _Adhvaryuṭi_ who carried out the proper sacrificial ritual accompanied with the utterance of the Vedic texts; the _Hotā_ who recited the holy psalms pertaining to the sacrifice; and the _Udgātā_ who sang the songs concerning it. Now, the Veda contains in its oldest and most important parts the handbooks or manuals for these different priests. The _Yajurveda_ contains the collection of utterances for the _Adhvaryuṭi_; the _Ṛgveda_, the collection of hymns for the _Hotā_, and the _Sāmaveda_ the collection of melodies for the _Udgātā_. These three collections have no special significance for Indian Philosophy. The collections of the _Yajurveda_ and the _Sāmaveda_ naturally contain nothing that could be considered as philosophical. The large extensive collection of hymns in the _Ṛgveda_ is, no doubt, most valuable as the oldest document of the Aryan Indian community and also exceedingly important from the point of linguistics as also that of cultural history. But essentially it teaches us about the world of gods of the ancient Indians, which has as little importance for Indian Philosophy as the Homeric world of gods for
Greek Philosophy. Proper, original philosophical ideas emerge only in the latest books of the Collection and are relatively unimportant. They also stand outside the proper main-stream of development so that they can legitimately remain out of consideration in a short presentation of Indian Philosophy. But beside the above-mentioned collections, the three parts of the Veda contain extensive liturgical texts which describe the different sacrifices and prescribe for the several priests their functions in these sacrifices. These texts are the so-called Brāhmaṇas. And in them, we find also pronounced philosophical texts. Their admission into the Brāhmaṇas took place in the following manner:

The Brāhmaṇas originated much later than the Vedic collections—especially later than the collection of the Rgveda and during this interval, the understanding about the character of the sacrifice had undergone a basic change. The sacrifices were no more considered as a means of winning the favour of the gods and of impelling them to fulfill the proffered request; they no more served as a way of thanking the gods for the fulfilment of the request; the sacrifices, on the other hand, were considered to hold good as magic rites, the exact execution of which could enforce the wished-for result, independent of the will of the gods. But this change in the basic idea underlying the sacrifice brought with it also a complete revolution in the character of the sacrifice itself. Every smallest rite, why, every word and every movement now gained an importance, because it could influence the operation and the result of the sacrifice. Thus only can be explained the enormous complexity to which the Vedic sacrifice had gradually developed. Not only this; the extent and the copiousness of details in the Brāhmaṇa texts becomes also understandable in this way. Because in a magical rite, the success of the magical spell can depend on the correct and exact execution of every detailed act,—nay—on the right pronunciation of every word, directions were required to be given, down to every separate detail. Besides, so many other things connected with these details found acceptance in these texts. For example, during the communication of magic, it was a wide-spread custom to narrate how it was employed successfully for the first time. In this connection, it would be
enough to remember the old German magical spells. Similarly, in the Brāhmaṇas, legends which give an account of the origin of several sacrifices are again and again narrated. In the case of many sacrificial ceremonies men of authority are cited and entire series of teachers through whom the ceremonies were handed down enumerated. But the most important thing is that the Brāhmaṇa texts contain also explanations of the symbolism of the sacrifice.

One of the most wide-spread forms of magic is namely the analogy form of magic and it plays a great role in the Vedic sacrifice. The forces of nature and the processes in them are symbolized by the implements of the sacrifice and the sacrificial rites and it was believed that one could successfully exercise influence on them through these symbols. But the presupposition underlying it was that the particular person who carries out the sacrificial rites and uses the sacrificial instruments knows their secret significance. Consequently, in the Brāhmaṇa texts, not only the different sacrifices are described but even the secret significance of different sacrificial implements and rites is also explained. By way of the promise of the reward it is always said: "He who knows this, gains it". In this way we know also a lot about the world-view of the ancient Indian. Cosmic forces and life-forces are mentioned. Natural processes are spoken of, as also the connections between macrocosm and microcosm. And although there are thus found loosely split fragmentary texts, remodelled by priestly thought, still their worth is by no means small. Especially fruitful in this respect are the last parts of the Brāhmaṇas, the so-called Āraṇyakas, the forest-books. These were decidedly meant for the hermits who, in accordance with the Vedic directions in that respect, had withdrawn to the forest towards the end of their life in order to live there a life of pious practices and reflection. For such hermits it was naturally not possible to perform big sacrifices. On that account, other things were for them of all the greater importance. It was taught as a secret teaching as to how different processes of daily life are to be understood as sacrifice in a deeper sense and how higher reward comes to the lot of one who carries it out in practice, knowing its secret significance. In this way the breathing-process was interpreted as a fire-sacrifice.
and a very rich reward is promised to him who always performs the fire-sacrifice through breathing, on the strength of this knowledge. In a similar way, many fragments of Indian Philosophy found entrance in the Āranyakas. As an illustration of this, there is the doctrine of the course of the cycle of water as the bearer of life. This doctrine will be described later on during this chapter. In this doctrine, the five stages in the course of this cycle (of water), are explained as so many sacrifices and herewith there originated the well-known doctrine of the Five Fires, the influence of which reached down to the philosophy of the Vedānta. Lastly, it came under the influence of the growing philosophical interest to such an extent that the philosophical texts in the Brāhmaṇas and Āranyakas were admitted into it without modification. There arose entire sections of preponderatingly philosophical contents which continually gained greater esteem and importance, more and more as the quickly advancing course of philosophical thought in its development moved on, breaking through its grooves. Lastly, the most important of these sections were separated from their original contextual connection and were handed down as independent texts. And these are the texts, which are known and have become famous under the name of the Upaniṣads and which represent the venerable monuments of Indian Philosophy.

The Upaniṣads are, therefore, nothing else than the philosophically valuable parts of the liturgical Brāhmaṇa texts, separated from them and independently handed down. The liturgical Brāhmaṇa texts had originally nothing to do with philosophy. It must, however, be emphasised in this connection— and no reader of the Upaniṣads who wishes to evaluate these Upaniṣadic texts need forget it— that the separation of these sections from their original connection took place in a very superficial and arbitrary manner. There have still remained in the Brāhmaṇas many philosophically important texts which have not been included in the Upaniṣads, as well as there are still included in the Upaniṣads, many fragments which contain nothing else than crude sacrificial symbolism and priestly speculation, but which philosophically are really unimportant. Here, therefore, it is necessary to separate the chaff
from the grain and to pick out, with a sure sense, the important from among them and arrange or place them in the right place.

Concerning the number of the Upaniṣads, it may be said that their number is not very large, though larger than the three Vedas. The transmission of the Vedic Collections of the Rgveda, Yajurveda and Sāmaveda was soon split into different Schools and every one of these Schools had its own liturgical tradition and corresponding thereto its own Brāhmaṇa. Now this equally holds good also for the Upaniṣads, as they originated, as connected with the Brāhmaṇas. To the extent to which the Upaniṣads were formed, every old Vedic School possessed its own Upaniṣad, though it was not so in every case. Thus, it comes about that the two Upaniṣads are handed down as belonging to the Rgveda, three to the Yajurveda and two to the Sāmaveda. The Aitareya Upaniṣad and the Kauṣitaki-Upaniṣad belong to the Rgveda, the Taśṭiriṣya-Upaniṣad, the Bhadāraṇyakopaniṣad and the Isa-upaniṣad belong to the Yajurveda and the Chāndogya-upaniṣad and the Kenopaniṣad belong to the Sāmaveda.

But we must, at the same time note that these, in no way, exhaust the literature of the Upaniṣads. Rather they are the Upaniṣads which have originated in the period of the Brāhmaṇas and which, therefore, alone are taken into consideration here. Besides, there is a whole multitude of works which, likewise, carry the name of the Upaniṣads. But these are essentially the products of a later period and also, from the point of their contents, remain separated from the older Upaniṣads by a deep chasm. This is so on account of the following circumstances:

The Upaniṣads of the Brāhmaṇa period belong to one and the same stream of development. Through them, it is possible to delineate a connected picture of philosophy of that time, to pursue the several lines of its development and to ascertain their mutual connections. But this stream of development suddenly breaks off. As it happened in the case of the collection of holy writings, here particularly in the formation of the Brāhmaṇa texts, a point was reached at which the collection was considered as concluded or closed and new texts were no longer admitted into it. On account of this, at first there was no formation or admission of new Upaniṣads. Only later
after a considerable lapse of time, when the older Upaniṣads had already attained to the status of holy texts and had, as such, won great esteem, the Upaniṣads were again composed after their pattern. In this way, first of all, the new Upaniṣads were ascribed to the old schools of the Yajurveda which had possessed until then no Upaniṣad; such were the Kāthaka-Upaniṣad, the Śvetāśvala-Upaniṣad and the Maitrāyana-Upaniṣad. Later came Upaniṣads which were allotted to the Atharva-veda, the Veda of magic spells, which was recognized as the fourth Veda only late. Such Upaniṣads arose in great number up to the late times so that finally in the collection of the total Upaniṣads, the holy number 108 could be reached.

But already, the earliest of all these Upaniṣads show a different spirit from the old Upaniṣads of the Brāhmaṇa period. They are distinctly the creations of a period in which the Upaniṣad-doctrines had already become the holy tradition of the priestly circles and show the influence of the Sāṁkhya philosophy and of the beliefs in Śiva and Viṣṇu. On account of this, we must reckon with another different stream of development from that in the older Upaniṣads. This another stream is it which led to the development of the Vedānta system. The Upaniṣads of this other stream can be counted at least as the first steps of that period of Indian Philosophy which we have designated as the philosophy of the later period, and which, therefore, will be described by us in the second part of our treatise. Here, on the other hand, during the philosophy of the Vedic period we have to do with the old Upaniṣads of the Brāhmaṇa period. And where this stream of development fails, we have to look around, otherwise, for other sources which continue for us this stream of development and these shall be found in the popular Epic and the holy writings of the Buddhists and the Jains. How this occurs will be duly shown.

Concerning the form of the Upaniṣads, it can be said that they were composed in free, easy prose. The attempt to facilitate, through memory, the continuance of its contents through special form, makes itself still not noticeable. Generally, the traces of the transmission through memorizing show themselves only in isolated thoughtless repetitions, in the case of the similarly recurring passages. Otherwise also, the transmission
is admirable and trustworthy, indeed only from that point of view in which the texts in the school-wise transmission of the Vedic Schools have been accepted. In the other cases, the preserved texts many times show that from this view-point also greater remouldings of them were possible. As far as the Upanisadic texts are concerned, an uncritical belief in their literal form will be out of place.

And now the question of the place and the period of the origination of the old Upanisads. In this regard, the direct tradition fails us. We are rather compelled to draw conclusions from the texts themselves and so far as it is possible, to put forth certain conjectures. According to them, first the unanimous agreement of the evidence shows that the proper home and classical region of the Brahmanical sacrificial cult was the doab between the Gaṅgā and the Yamunā. It is especially the region between the present Delhi and Agra and to the East thereof, the region in which the tribes of the Kuru and the Pañcāla lived. From there, the Aryan Indians and with them their Vedic culture disseminated themselves, firstly to the North of the Gaṅgā towards the East, until today's region of Bihar was reached. This whole area is considered in the Veda as the holy land. And it is the same area which we have to regard as the home of the old Upanisads. Also in them, in the first rank, there is always continuously the reference to the land of the Kuru and the Pañcāla. But in the latest and progressively advancing fragments, the King Janaka of Videha plays a special role; he was the king of a people who lived in the area of today's Bihar. Here also is seen the movement towards the East. This is of importance from the chronological point of view. The movement towards the East follows a shifting of cultural importance. About the time of the origin of Buddhism, Bihar is not only the political centre but also the focal point of the spiritual life of North India. The way for this shifting is already visible in the last periods of the Upanisadic epoch. And as the world of thought lying at the basis of Buddhism shows already a series of striking contacts with the latest fragments of the Upanisads which had originated in the East, the distance between the two from the point of time need not be too great. I would, therefore, like to place
the origin of the Upaniṣads of the Brāhmaṇa period somewhere in the space of the interval between 800 to 600 years before Christ.

Regarding the circles in which the Upaniṣads originated, the texts themselves give a good idea. The frame of narrations or stories in which the imparting of most of the doctrines is inserted shows a living picture of those times. Especially the life of the Brahmical circles, their external circumstances and their intellectual and spiritual interests are well characterized. It is a pronouncedly rural life, more of village background, on which the actions and processes take place. Cattle are the most precious possession and the chief interest really concerns itself with the prosperity of the herds of cattle. The Kings' Courts, which are spoken of, appear as not overstepping the external limits of the humble princes of districts or counties. This stands in sharp contrast to the city-culture which the writings in the Buddhist Canons bring before our eyes. But it is easily possible that in the Upaniṣads, as may have been the custom, the conditions of an older period are laid down. Similarity can be observed more often in both. Local differences and a rapid progress of development may have ensued and allowed the contrast to appear sharper than it, in reality, was.

Nevertheless, one point deserves a special mention. It is striking that in a whole number of Texts, it is not the Brāhmaṇas but the adherents of the Kṣatriya caste i.e. the Kṣatriyas who impart the instruction and that it is the Brāhmaṇas who are instructed. This is evidently taken out of the actual life itself. The Brāhmaṇas, who have handed down the text, would hardly think of contriving this sort of thing, if in actuality there would have been no basis for it. And we have already seen that the circle of sacrificial priests never felt at home in the philosophical speculations of the Upaniṣadic period; on the other, hand, the philosophical speculations had only penetrated the sacrificial mystique only in a secondary way. So it is absolutely not improbable to assume that the adherents of the warrior-caste were partly the authors of the philosophical speculations. Whether, as it occasionally occurs, one should go so far as to ascribe the chief role to them (the Kṣatriyas)
remains naturally problematical. The exact share of the Brāhmaṇas and the Kṣatriyas in the Philosophy of the Upanisadic period will never allow itself to be sharply demarcated. But the fact is that in the case of the doctrine of the course of the Cycle of Water, the nobility appear as the proclaimers of the doctrine. Equally also, in the case of the doctrine of Fire, the nobility repeatedly appear as its instructors. Finally also, it should not be forgotten that a little later in the period of the origin of Buddhism, the leading personalities—the Buddha and the Jina are descended from the family of the nobility.

With this, whatever important as such about the Upanisads has to be said, has been said and now we can go over to describe the doctrines contained in them.

With this aim in view, if we leave out of account all the sacrificial mystique and symbolism and turn to the beginnings of pure philosophical thought-processes, we meet with a surprising picture, in which we have to do with the real beginnings of philosophy. The questions, with which the philosophical thought is occupied, are very old. But they have been newly framed and newly answered. Forgotten are the Rgvedic Gods and their myths. If occasionally the god Agni appears, he is not the old Vedic God but only the lord of the fire-realm. The factors with which one here seeks to solve the framed questions are Nature-forces and Nature-processes. The spirit in which the solution of questions is sought to be attempted shows almost a scientific clarity and candour or freedom from any bias. How all this turn came about, remains for us provisionally hidden. But the impression cannot be avoided that they are the beginnings of a new thought, which meet us here, that a new period of history of the human spirit is introduced with these here in India, as almost at the same time in Greece.

The questions which form the starting-point and at first revolve around it are the questions of Life and Death, questions regarding the bearer of life and regarding the fate after death. The third attempt was to interpret the processes in sleep. To the simple men, sleep always appeared as a twin-brother of death and it was natural to unite both the phenomena in order to clarify the one with the help of the other. The central
question i. e. the question of the Carrier or Vehicle of Life was answered differently. It was believed that the element which was the vehicle of life may be found either in Water or Wind, or as it was better said, in Breath or again in Fire. Of these different doctrines, the doctrine which sees in Water a vehicle of life, developed most quickly to a rounded whole. We shall therefore consider it first.

The Water Doctrine: The basic fact, out of which the doctrine arises, is the living force of Water. The rain streams forth here on the earth and wakens the plant-world to life. No doubt, it is the sap in the plants, to which life sticks. Now one pursues further. With the nutrition the life-giving humidity of man is assumed; it preserves him and wakens, during begetting, new life. When man finally dies and his corpse is burnt, the humidity mounts again in smoke to heaven above. And thus the circle is complete. The question, still, remains from what ultimate source the life-carrying water comes. Here a connection is established with an originally old idea. One of the most peculiar phenomena which made a mighty impression on the primitive man is the change in the phases of the moon. An attempt has always been made again and again to interpret the mysterious phenomenon and different explanations have been faced. One of the explanations of this phenomenon is that the moon is a vessel which continually empties and fills itself again and again. It is said in an old Vedic Text that the moon is a bowl filled with the intoxicating drink of Soma which the gods drink. With this idea our doctrine now connects itself. The life-giving water, it is said, flows out of the moon. It comes out of it and goes back into it and in this way empties and fills itself constantly again and again. It is thus a regular cyclic course of the water and therewith of life, of which instruction is given here.

With it, was, however, united a further important complex of ideas viz., the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul. It had originated in the period of the Brāhmaṇas. The origin of this doctrine must have occurred, we think, in a somewhat following way:

It was an old belief that men continue to live after death and they lead their blessed existence in the realm of the Fathers
under the rulership of the first man and King—later called Yama, the lord of the Kingdom of the dead. But now the uneasy question emerged whether life in this realm of Yama could also be permanent. If it resembles life in this (earthly) existence in all other things, may it not also have an end just as here? The answer to this question was given in the affirmative. In that world beyond, life also must have an end and one must die. But then, whereto does the man who departs from that world reach? The following answer was given to that question: to this world. Thus life ranges alternately in this and the other world and life and death perennially change. With this there resulted the basic idea of the transmigration of the Soul, though the duration and the stages of this transmigration were outlined differently at different times and in different doctrines. As such, the transmigration of the soul as the circulation or cycle of life had to appear in the doctrine of Water as a life-bearing element.

With this, is also now connected further another important thought: the idea to be required to be born and to die again and again worked on the Indian mind oppressively like a bugbear. These appear as a permanent recurrence of the same similar danger and of the same similar agony. And now, therefore, the disquieting question arose: What is it that saves from this ever-new agony of death and from the repeated death? This impulse to escape from the ever-recurring Cycle of Birth and Death is the root of the Indian attempt towards Deliverance. As the Cycle of Water also appeared as an endless chain of birth and death, a similar attempt at deliverance from it asserted itself here also. Here the question was asked: Is there no way out, to escape from this permanent recurrence? In answer to this question, a doctrine of deliverance came into existence. Again this doctrine was joined with the very old belief about the Moon. According to that very old belief, there is in the moon a door to the heavenly world and that there is the bar or the bolt which in the alternation of the phases of the moon now pushes itself forth, now pushes itself away. The doctrine of the cycle of water makes use of this belief. The souls, who reach the Moon in their passage through the circulatory cycle of water, arrive
therein at the door of heaven and a possibility of Deliverance lies before them. The decisive factor in this case is the possession of Delivering or absolving knowledge. Because the Moon as a watchman of the heavenly world puts a question to them. One, who does not know the answer to the question, has to go back in the rain on the Earth and return to Birth and Death. Only he, who possesses the surest knowledge, which makes it possible to answer the question put to him, can step in through the door of heaven and attain Deliverance and therewith everlasting blessedness.  

Above are given the elements of which the doctrine of the cycle of water is composed. The idea of natural science of the water as a life-carrying element forms the core of the doctrine and is bound up with the idea of the transmigration of the soul and the doctrine of Deliverance. All the elements have been blended into a well-rounded unity. Its effect must have been all the more impressive, because it supplied answers to the urgent questions of the source of life, fate after death and at the same time pointed out the way to Deliverance. In this form is this doctrine preserved in the first Chapter of the Kauśitaki Upaniṣad. But it was not still its final form in which it was supposed to have continued. As we have already mentioned, this doctrine in its most intense form originated in the circles of the nobility. Only later, it was taken over by the circle of the Brahmin sacrificial priests, which resulted in giving a new stamp to the doctrine. The idea of sacrifice in the priestly world of thought as the highest power governing everything penetrated into this doctrine and provided the occasion to consider the most important stages in the doctrine of cycle of water as sacrificial offerings. Thus the doctrine was clothed in the mysterious symbolism of the sacrificial mystique and gained therewith the form in which it has been throughout retained. It forms part of one of the texts on which the later Vedānta system built its doctrinal edifice. We shall therefore reproduce it here in its main parts.  

Uddālaka Āruni, one of the most famous masters of Brahmanical sacrificial lore, is chosen by the King of Pañcāla to be his sacrificial priest. But Uddālaka does not go himself but sends his son Śvetaketu who has already completed his studies
and proudly feels himself as a perfect priest. The King, however, puts to him some questions, which he does not know how to answer. Abashed, Śvetaketu hurries back to his father and vehemently reproaches him that he (the father) has not instructed him sufficiently. But the father calmly replies that he has communicated to him everything which he himself knew and that he had never thought of withholding anything from him. He also said that he did not know the answers to the questions put to him by the King. And free from every conceit of his Brahmanical status, he himself proceeds to meet the King, in order to request him for instruction. He is respectfully received by the King who, however, at first hesitates but finally resolves on his request to impart the desired teaching to him. He begins as follows:

"That world is indeed a sacrificial fire; The Sun is its fire-wood, the rays its smoke, the day its flame, the moon its coal, the stars its sparks. Into this fire, the gods offer the faith (Sraddā) as offering. From this sacrificial offering, springs the King Soma (the Moon).

"Parjanya (the Rain-god) is indeed the sacrificial fire; the Wind is its firewood; the Clouds its smoke; the Lightning its flame; the Thunder its coal; the Hail-stones its sparks; in this Fire the gods offer King Soma; out of this sacrificial offering springs the rain.

"This world is, indeed, a sacrificial fire, the Earth is its firewood, the Wind its smoke, the Night its flame, the Directions its coal, the Region lying between, its sparks. In this fire, the gods sacrifice to the gods the offering of the rain. Out of this sacrificial offering springs nutrition (annam).

"The man is, indeed a sacrificial fire; the opened Mouth is its firewood, the Breath is its smoke, the Speech its flame, the Eyes its coal, the Ears its sparks. In this fire the gods sacrifice food. Out of this sacrificial offering springs the semen (retaḥ).

"The wife is indeed, a sacrificial fire; the Womb is its firewood, the Hair its smoke, the Privy parts its flame, What a man does into it is its coal, the Passion its sparks. In this Fire, the gods sacrifice the semen. Out of this sacrificial offering, springs the man. This man lives, so long as life endures. When
he dies, the Fire carries him thither from where he has come, from where he has originated.

"Those now who have such knowledge and who practise Belief (Śraddhā) as penance, enter into the flame of the funeral pile, out of that flame into the day, out of the day into the growing half of the month (Śuklapakṣaḥ), out of the growing half of the month into the half-year in which the Sun goes northwards, out of the half year into the world of the gods, out of the world of the gods into the Sun, out of the Sun into the lightning; in that place there is a man who does not resemble a human being, who carries them into the world of Brahman. For them, there is no coming back or rebirth. It is the way of the gods (Devayānam).

"Those, on the other hand, who practise sacrifice and pious deeds in the village, enter the smoke of the funeral pile, out of the smoke into the night, out of the night into the decreasing (Kṛṣṇa-pakṣaḥ) half of the month, out of the decreasing half of the month into the half-year in which the Sun goes southwards, out of that half-year into the world of waters, out of the water-world into the moon. This is King Soma and he is the food of the gods who consume it. After they have lived there for a while, they come back by the same way by which they went, from there into the ether (ākāsa), out of the ākāśa into the wind, out of the wind into the rain, through the rain on the earth. When they have reached the earth, they become or turn into food and are again sacrificed in the human Fire and are reproduced in the fire in the form of the wife and spring a new to life. In this way, they move in the cycle. This is the way of the Manes (Pitṛyānam).

"Of those tiny creatures being always reborn who never move by any of the two ways it is said, "Be born, die: It is the third place." Here the text ends.

Its form is undeniably impressive, with its solemn, uniform picture of the sacrificial fires and with its broadly unfolded description of both the paths of the dead, everything being clothed in the secret language of the sacrificial mystique. It is, therefore, no wonder that the text, as already mentioned, is counted among those texts which play a special role in the later Vedānta. It appears therein, on account of the five steps
of the course of the Water-cycle in the form of five sacrificial fires, under the name of the doctrine of the Five Fires (Pañca-gnividya); it is especially the doctrine of the two paths of the dead—the path of the Manes (Pitryānam) and the path of the Gods (Devayānam) with which the Vedānta teaching is concerned. But the development itself of the doctrine of the cycle of the water has reached its finished form formulated in our above-mentioned text. In general, it can be said that this doctrine did not turn out to be very fruitful. It was a great non-recurring conception which created the doctrine and simultaneously gave its basic thoughts a final form. Beyond that, it neither developed itself further inwardly, nor was able to give fruitful stimulation to other doctrines.

The Doctrine of Breath: Of quite a different sort from the doctrine of the Cycle of Water is the second doctrine to which we shall now turn, the doctrine of Breath (prāṇah) as the bearer of life. The basic idea, on which this doctrine is built up is the close intimate connection of Breath and Life. The man lives so long as he breathes and dies with the cessation of the breathing-activity. This basic idea, however, is not enough to base a doctrine thereon which should explain satisfactorily all the phenomena of life. After all the breath is only one of the expressions or manifestations of life besides many others which equally are very important and which simply cannot be traced back simply to the Breath. Especially the processes of knowledge and consciousness can hardly be explained as the operations of breath. The doctrine of Breath must, therefore, from the beginning, reckon with a multiplicity of life-forces, and it was its first task to bring them in accord in the scheme with the already accepted position of Breath, to show how within the Breath itself, a special importance can be ascribed to these life-forces. This task was discharged in a series of stories which are distinguished by a special peculiarity which is characteristic for the doctrine of Breath. For example, in those stories, the different life-forces emerge as personalities who independently speak and act. They remind, therefore, in this respect of the ancient well-known fable by Menenius Agrippa, of the strife between the belly and other limbs of the body.

The most well-known among these stories is the legend
of the quarrel of the life-forces regarding their rank or superiority. This story is contained in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad as well as in the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad. In that story it is narrated how once the different life-forces quarrel with one another for the superior rank and how, in order to decide this feud, resolve to depart from the body alternately. Thus it was supposed to demonstrate who may be the most important among them. Accordingly, speech, eyes, ears, thought (manāḥ) and semen leave the body, each respectively for one year and during this period, the body is not able to speak, see, hear, think and beget but continues to live on. When, however, the Breath began to pull itself out, it snatched or dragged all the remaining life-forces; the life-forces request him: "Do not pull out. We cannot live without you." With this, the quarrel is decided in favour of the Breath and his rank above all is thus recognized. As a token of this recognition the rest of the life-forces give him a share in their own nature and assume the designation ‘Breath-forces’ (prāṇāḥ).

In a second story in the Kauśitaki-Upaniṣad, the feud is decided in this manner: the life-forces enter the body and try to quicken or move it, but only when the Breath enters into the body, the body is able to raise itself. Why! even the priestly remodelling of this story does not fail to agree in this view. Thus it is narrated in the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad that the gods in their struggle against the demons tried to overcome them through the Udgītha, the main constituent (component) of the Vedic-Sacrificial melodies and pressed the life-forces, one after another, to sing for them the Udgītha. But these life-forces are attacked by the demons and struck with evil by them, until the turn of the Breath against whom, however, they could not prevail.

This first group of stories bases the first rank of the Breath on the fact that the man may well be able to live without the rest of the life-forces but not without the Breath and re-establishes the connection between the Breath and the remaining life-forces through the motif based on the medium of the legend. On another and different consideration is based a second group of stories; that consideration is, namely, that all the remaining life-forces become exhausted or tired and their activities are
interrupted in sleep; but on the other hand, the Breath continues uninterruptedly to remain active, so long as man lives. Thus the Brhadāraṇya-kopaniṣad\textsuperscript{15} narrates how all the life-forces seek to take an active part first of all according to the order of their creation. "I shall speak" spoke the speech; "We shall see," said the eyes; "We shall hear" said the ears; and the remaining life-forces do likewise. But then the Death in the form of the weariness seized them and held them in their grip. Only against the Breath, Death could not prevail. Then all other life-forces acknowledge his superiority and in order to protect themselves against death, assume his nature. Therefore they are called the Breath-forces (prāṇāh).

Here is, therefore, sleep interpreted as a temporary overpowering by Death which can, however, do nothing only against the Breath. Still out of this there comes forth something of importance. The same idea is extended to a number of Nature-forces which are juxtaposed as macrocosmic correspondences to the life-forces; here in this case it is the macrocosmic Wind which withstands death. Another interpretation is given to the phenomenon of sleep in a second text of the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad.\textsuperscript{16} In that text, for instance, the temporary extinction of the rest of the life-forces in sleep is comprehended as their temporary entrance into the Breath—an idea which has operated as a pattern for other doctrines. The similar idea was extended from the life-forces to the corresponding macrocosmic Nature-forces of which a temporary entry into the Wind is described. And as this text simultaneously represents the most well-known and impressive formulation of the Breath-doctrine, it will here be reproduced in brief.

Jānaśruti, a pious man, who gives away bounteously from his riches, who has got erected everywhere feeding-houses or hostels and has fed the people, hears at night the swans flying over his head, speaking among themselves. One swan extols the splendour of Jānaśruti's good deeds. But the second swan reprimands the first swan and says that Jānaśruti can never be compared with Raikva. On the question of the first swan as to what condition would be required by Jānaśruti to stand comparison with Raikva, the second swan replies to him that as during the play of dice, all the other remaining casts or throws of
the dice are added to and included under the winning Kṛta throw, so also the good deeds of all kinds are reckoned as belonging to him who possesses the knowledge of Raikva. His curiosity being aroused, Jánastruti sends out next morning a servant to search Raikva. The servant finds Raikva sitting under a cart, scratching his skin. Now Jánastruti goes out with 600 cows, a golden ornament and a chariot yoked with mules in order to request Raikva for instruction. But Raikva, laughing scornfully, dismisses him with his presents. Only when Jánastruti offers also his pretty daughter to him, Raikva resolves to speak and begins with his instruction as follows:

"The Wind is, indeed, a gatherer-in-himself, because when the fire goes out, it enters in the Wind; when the sun goes down, it enters in the Wind; when the moon goes down, it enters in the Wind; when the water dries up, it enters the Wind. The Wind thus gathers them all in himself. The same relation of the Wind stands in respect of the divinities.

"Now, it is the same relation in respect of one's own self. The Breath is, indeed, a gatherer-in-itself. For when one sleeps, then the speech enters in the Breath, the eyes enter in the Breath, the ears enter in the Breath, the thought (manah) enters in the Breath. Because the Breath gathers all these in itself.

"Both these are, therefore, two gatherers-in-themselves—the Wind among the gods and the Breath among the life-forces.

"These are, indeed, the five ones and five others which make up ten; it is the Kṛta-throw. That is why the ten imply the Kṛta-throw, food in all directions. He, who knows this, becomes the enjoyer of food."

In this second group of texts, there is, therefore, provided a further evident basis for the privileged position of the Breath and also the explanation given here for the connection of the rest of the life-forces with the Breath and their dependence on it rests on another appropriate idea. With the juxta position of the microcosmic and macrocosmic forces, a fruitful beginning was provided for a further extension of the doctrine. But unexpectedly the development came here to a stop. The ideas connected with the Breath as the bearer of life were not further spun out and the parallelism between microcosm and
macrocosm was not further utilized. It remains here only as a mere juxtaposition. Evidently the Breath proved to be not suitable to unite with itself further-reaching ideas. Above all, the fact that it was not easy to make the Breath the bearer of the decisive processes of knowledge, appears to have come in the way of the further formulation of the Breath-doctrine. Thus this doctrine after some promising starts remained stuck up. It has, no doubt, brought forth a few isolated valuable ideas and shaped them in an impressive way but it did not develop further and did not exercise any great influence. Thus the great conception, full of great potentialities, evidently failed. It is also characteristic that no eschatological ideas are connected with the doctrine of the Breath.

It is also to be noted that the doctrine of Breath was concerned with a limited group of ideas and did not in any way utilize all the ideas which were connected with it from olden times. Thus, we find in the Veda repeatedly the idea that there are many more breaths, which exercise different functions in the body; they are usually distinguished into five such breath-forces or breaths—the out-breath (prānaḥ), the in-breath (apānaḥ) the up-breath (udānaḥ), the through-breath (vyānaḥ) and the total-breath (samānaḥ). This idea is very old as is evinced by the fact that in Persian the through-breath (vyānaḥ) has become the usual expression for the soul. In India also, this idea has continued and we find it built into the different philosophical systems. But, for the Breath doctrine, as is evident, it did not come to be utilized and is not accepted by it.

The Fire-Doctrine—The third doctrine, to which we shall now turn, is by far the most important of all and in it the philosophy of the Vedic period reaches its climax or highest point. This is the doctrine which sees in the Fire the life-bearing element. The simple basic fact from which this doctrine springs and which we find already mentioned in the Upanishads, is the idea of the warmth of life which clings to the body, as long as the body lives and which vanishes with death. The doctrine proclaims the Agni Vaiśvānara, the fire which dwells in all men. This fire is heard in the rustling sound which one perceives, when one closes the ears. The efficacy of this
fire is expressed through the fact that it digests the food taken into the body.\textsuperscript{18}

In this simple basic idea, a series of other ancient ideas similar to it are early joined together—the ideas which we have already found in the doctrine of the Water; thus a doctrine rapidly developed and in its compactness and largeness of comprehension it can well be placed as of equal birth and rank, beside the doctrine of the course of the cycle of Water; why, it soon grew beyond it.\textsuperscript{19} First of all, it is assumed in it that the Fire enters men from outside, from Heaven. But while the waters stem out of the moon, the Fire stems out of the Sun. The Sun sends out multicoloured rays—white, brown, blue, yellow and red; likewise the variegated veins or arteries start from the heart of man in their unusually fine ramifications and open into or meet the rays of the Sun. It is the way which men connect with the Sun. By this way the Fire of life enters into men and returns back again into the Sun after death. Thus we get the idea of another course of cycle, namely the course of cycle of the Fire similar to that of the Water in the Water-doctrine.

As in the case of the Water-doctrine, here also in the Fire-doctrine, the contact with the complex of ideas connected with the transmigration of the Soul makes itself noticeable. The permanent recurrence, the continually new recurring death is perceived as full of agony. The man in the Sun with the golden teeth, originally the Fire-god Agni, appears now as \textit{Mrtyu}, the god of death who holds men fastened in the Solar rays as in cords and compels them again to experience continually new deaths. Out of this, there arises the urgent desire towards Deliverance. Here also, as in the Water-doctrine, a similar idea occurs. According to a very ancient idea, the Sun is not only a heavenly world but also a door to heaven. It provides an opening in the heavenly vault which separates this world from the light-world beyond. Here it is also assumed that this door of heaven opens for him who possesses the emancipating knowledge and that such a man freed from the agony of continual rebirth, above all, freed from the continual recurring death (\textit{punarnrtyuh}), enters into the Fire-world beyond, to enjoy permanent bliss.
With this, the circle of ideas, as in the case of Water-doctrine, is complete; it provides a homogeneous world-picture which supplies answers to the questions regarding the origin of life, the fate of the dead, and which also, besides, shows a way to Deliverance. But in contrast to the doctrine of the cyclical course of Water the doctrine of Fire does not stop here. Already early, there succeeded the first step advancing beyond this complex of ideas; the following ideas turned out to be decisive for the further development of the doctrine:

In the beginnings of philosophical thought, an obvious idea has emerged and always persisted in the different periods. That obvious idea was to bring Light and Knowledge in connection with each other. However, in the period of the fully developed philosophical systems it has been habitual in India to explain the character of knowledge through the image of light—which enlightens itself and others. The same idea already early emerged in the Fire-doctrine; the light-soul is defined as consisting of thought (manomayyukta). The advantage which this idea brought soon became visible. It succeeded in explaining better the relation of the Soul to the different life-forces, than in the case of the Breath-doctrine. Because in the Breath-doctrine, the connection of the independent life-forces with the Breath which, according to its nature, was entirely of a different sort, was rather forced or strained. Now, however, in the case of the Fire-doctrine it is assumed that the Fire-soul enters, with its several parts, life-forces and thus lends them knowledge and efficiency. Thus the dependence of the life-forces is made understandable in a convincing manner. Simultaneously, a way is paved for a shift in the comprehension of their character. Thus out of the independent Life-forces originate the organs of the Soul and a ground for the later idea of the sense-organs is prepared.

But this only is not enough. A new and better explanation of the Sleep-phenomenon is also made possible. Here in this case, the Fire-doctrine had originally worked with a very old ancient conception. A phenomenon which provided much food for primitive man’s thought is the manikin in the eye. It was asked from where it came and what it meant. It was not for a long time recognized as a reflected image. One liked to see
in it as the soul-manikin and especially in the Fire-doctrine this impression was evidently worked out. The eye has been continually again and again regarded as the microcosmic counterpart of the Sun and the manikin in the eye could therefore be easily considered as the microcosmic counterpart of the man in the Sun. With this view, the oldest explanation of sleep is joined in the Fire doctrine. It is said, the soul-manikin lives in the right eye, his wife in the left. They are occasionally given the names Indra and his spouse—Indrāñi. When a man sinks down into sleep, both these withdraw themselves in the cavity of the heart and there unite themselves. Because, “as one embraced by a beloved wife has no consciousness of what is outside or inside,”29 the soul, in the same way, loses its consciousness in this condition. That also explains the sense of well-being, the joy (ānandaḥ) in deep sleep. That is the joy, which the soul-manikin experiences in his union with his spouse. And by way of anticipation it may be said how such idea continued and ultimately became the root out of which the doctrine of the joy of the World-soul (the Brahma) has grown.

This ancient idea of sleep is now replaced by a progressive one for which a handle is provided by the comprehension of the soul as a spiritual principle. Just as the Breath-doctrine had taught that the life-forces withdraw themselves in sleep and unite with the Breath, the body therethrough losing its consciousness, so also in the Fire-doctrine it was taught that in sleep the light-parts of the Soul withdraw out of the life-forces which, along with the whole body, fall into unconsciousness. At the same time, it could be made possible in the Fire-doctrine (which was not possible in the Breath-doctrine), to distinguish between dream-sleep and deep-sleep and to explain the difference. With this object, the old idea of world-space (ākāśa) was further seized. There was one doctrine in the old times which saw in the world-space the highest principle and explained by it the origin of all things. It did not turn out to be capable of development and soon withered away. But the original idea which it had brought forth was taken over by the Fire-doctrine. According to the old confrontation of Microcosm and Macrocosm, the cavity in the heart was seen as the counterpart of the world-space. It was taught: “As the world-space
encloses everything, so everything is contained in the cavity of the heart. Indeed, the space inside the heart is as great as the world-space. In it are resolved the heaven and earth, the Fire and the Wind, the Sun and the Moon, the Lightning and the Stars. Everything that one here below possesses or does not possess, is resolved therein.” It was assumed that in sleep the Fire-Soul withdraws into the cavity in the heart and there finds everything again what this world contains. There it rambles about, rejoices in the fulfillment of its wishes and experiences different destinies exactly as in the Waking State. That is the condition of Dream-sleep. When the sleep becomes deeper, the Soul slips into the arteries of the heart, which represent the Way to the Beyond. Thus it withdraws itself temporarily from this World and with it its consciousness of this world vanishes. Then a man sinks into dreamless deep sleep.

With this explanation of the Sleep-process and the already described definition of the relation of the Fire-Soul with the different life-forces, the fire-doctrine had already reached a stage of development on which it had outstripped all other doctrines. It not only assimilated the total ideas of the Water-doctrine and the Breath-doctrine, it had also, in certain points, already gone beyond them. This development further marched forward. The doctrine of transmigration of the Soul was enriched in important respects. Because it was already the Fire-doctrine in which the view that the power of works or action (Karma) determined the course of the Soul in its transmigration first found a firm place.

As soon as the doctrine of the transmigration of the Soul got penetrated, the question next arose: what power conditions the course of this transmigration in isolated cases? Which causes lead men now to good or now to bad rebirths? These questions could be differently answered. An idea emerged namely that the last wish of the dying man determines the new existence. This idea is a living thought in oldest Buddhism and in the Bhagavadgītā. In the texts of the Fire-doctrine, on the other hand, there appears already the other idea that it is the good or bad works of men which shape their fate in their next existence. First of all, this idea appears as a secret knowledge and doctrine
which one shuns to express openly. In the great wisdom-contest of the Brāhmaṇas before King Janaka of Videha (of which contest we shall speak later on), one of the Brāhmaṇas named Aṛtabhāga puts a question to Yājñavalkya regarding the fate of man after death. And Yājñavalkya says: "Give me your hand, dear Aṛtabhāga! We both of us, alone, shall come to understand it, not here before all the people." And both of them went out and conferred with each other. Of what they spoke, it was of the work; what they praised was the work. One, indeed becomes good through good work, and bad through bad work." Already in the great conversation of Yājñavalkya with King Janaka, which represents the climax of the development of the Fire-doctrine, we find the doctrine of the works firmly bound up with the doctrine of transmigration. Thus one of the basic ideas got a break-through: the idea which has formed and determined the entire religious and philosophical thought of Indians.

And again a second idea out of the sphere of the doctrine of transmigration of the Soul begins to shape itself in the Fire-doctrine, in its final stage of development. That is the idea of the fine or subtle body (Śūkṣma Śarīram). As the soul-idea became more and more spiritualized, outgrowing the mythological thought-patterns, the question more urgently arose: What determines and leads the unreleased Soul after death between different re-births, the Soul, according to its nature, being not different from the released Soul? And out of this question developed the idea of the subtle body. It was assumed that the connection of the soul with the subtle body continued to last until the soul was released. This was explained as follows: The human body consists not only of the great elements which we perceive with our senses, but it also contains, besides, constituents of fine elements and organs which form a concentrated organism, the latter continuing even after being separated from the gross body. The popular belief of a fine-being which enters in the mother's womb during cohabitation and the experience in the state of meditation may have co-operated in the origination of this assumption. While the gross body disintegrates after death, the organism of the fine elements continues to remain bound up with the
Soul and accompanies it through different births. The personal peculiar qualities of man cling to it and in it are also bound the good and bad works which determine the course of transmigration. This doctrine of the subtle body was fully formulated in the later systems. We find in the latest texts of Fire-doctrine: "that during death, not only the soul alone leaves the body but also the knowledge, works and the life-forces (prānāḥ) accompany it."26 That is obviously the first step towards the doctrine of the Fine Body, the ground for which is here prepared. We can, therefore, say that the Fire-doctrine has at this point taken an important step forward.

All these advances in the Fire-doctrine imply a widening of the circles of questions with which the philosophical thought of that time was occupied. But by far more important and significant than this widening of the orbit of thought is the inner transformation of thought which carried itself out at that time in the sphere of the Fire-doctrine itself. Although the first startings of philosophy in India, as we have already emphasised in the beginning, imply actually a new beginning, in so doing, everything of the past was not however forgotten and all earlier connections were not thrown away. To expect such a thing would rather contradict the laws of development of human thought. Therefore, in the already described doctrines, we always find, beside the basic new idea, the very old mythical ideas recurring again and again which repeatedly constrain the new thought in its course. But now a change or a transformation prepares to usher itself. The old mythological habit to cling to images vanishes and the new thought creates for itself its new form. It gains wonderfully rapidly the capacity for abstraction and knows how to move on new paths, free from old bonds, with unbelievable independence.

One good example of this development is the new shaping of the doctrine of sleep as it lies before us described in the latest texts of the Fire doctrine.27 Here the old ideas of the micro-cosmic counterpart of world-space in the heart, of the variegated arteries of the heart and the many-coloured rays of the Sun, have vanished. Only in old verses which are occasionally quoted, they still emerge. It was taught that the Soul leaves the body in Dream-sleep and tarries in a transitional
state between this World and Beyond. What it experiences in the Dream, it does not experience in the mystical world of the heart, but it itself creates it out of the stuff of this world. It possesses this creative power. When a man sinks into deep sleep, the soul enters temporarily into the Beyond. The joy it experiences is no more the joy which the union of soul-manikin with his wife gives. Only in the form of the image this idea continues. It is, on the contrary, the joy of the World-Soul with whom it has a share in this condition. But from where does the unconsciousness of deep sleep come? The explanation is provided in a surprisingly bold manner which for that early time will amaze everybody who thinks historically. It was taught that although the Soul, according to its nature, is knowledge, it can only know if there is available a second as an object of its knowledge. But in deep sleep into which it has withdrawn temporarily from this world, there exists no second different from it which he can know and therefore, he sinks into unconsciousness. Now as a next step one did not hesitate to extend this idea consistently on to the State of the Released Soul who unites himself with the World-Soul and is ever free from all the patterns of this world. It is taught that he is without consciousness and experiences only the joy of the World-Soul like the deep sense of well-being in dreamless sleep.

Although the remodelling of the doctrine of the processes of sleep enables us to know the course of development that took place, it changes slightly the basic views underlying the Fire-doctrine. Exceedingly important and meaningful was, however, the recasting which the idea of the Soul had undergone under the influence of this new abstract form of thought. This recasting with a shift in the idea found its outward expression which stamped the spiritual nature of the Soul.28 Earlier, the nature of the Fire-Soul was above all defined as thinking (manāḥ). But this idea was too narrow and had already been too much fixed. The thinking (manāḥ), as for example, in the Breath-doctrine, was held as one life-force among others. Now it was resolved that this definition should be given up. Thinking (manāḥ) was no doubt here also enrolled as one of the life-forces and gradually became one organ viz., the mental organ of
thinking (*manaḥ*). As a definition of the Soul, however, the further more abstract idea of knowledge (*vijñānam*) was chosen.

This shift in the idea enables us to infer that a change in the understanding of the nature of the Soul which gave an impetus to this shift must have taken place. And as a matter of fact such a change has taken place and is of decisive importance. The knowledge had become in the course of development an excellent and in any case the only important definition of the nature of the Soul. With the penetration of this new abstract form of thought, the material nature of the Soul,—it was of the nature of fire,—was bound to recede and knowledge (*vijñānam*) as its unique character was bound to appear. This was actually the case. It was said that the Soul is pure knowledge. This refined idea of the Soul was on its side bound up with a surprisingly bold new thought. It was taught that the Soul as the bearer of knowledge knows everything but is itself unknowable. "You cannot see the seer of the sight, cannot hear the hearer of hearing, cannot think of the thinker of thinking, cannot know the knower of knowing. This is thy soul which indwells all things. What is different from it is full of sorrow." And now follows further a bold thought-jump. The soul is not only unknowable, it is also outside all forms of knowledge. It is undefinable and incomprehensible: "It is that what the Brāhmaṇas call the imperishable. It is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long; it is not Wind, it is not Space; it is without taste, without smell, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without thinking, without breath; it is without any measure, without inside and without outside. It does not eat anything, nor one eats it." This thought overpowering in its boldness was expressed unhesitatingly in the most unreserved and sharpest form. It was explained that the only possibility to know it is the knowledge of its unknowability. To speak about the soul is the denial of speech itself. "This is the soul of which it is said, 'not this, not this' (*neti, neti*). It is not perceivable because it is not perceived, indestructible because it is not destroyed, it is not sticking because nothing sticks to it. It is not bound, it does not totter and suffers no injury." Hand in hand with the spiritualization of the Soul-idea
and the receding back of the material nature of the Fire-soul, a deep-reaching revolution took place in the position and evaluation of life-carrying elements and the Soul. This is the most decisive remodelling which the Fire-doctrine has, in general, undergone. Through it, the old Fire-doctrine grew into a doctrine of the all-supreme World-Soul who dwells in man as the real 'I'. It is this remodelled doctrine of the World-Soul, of which one thinks when one speaks about the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and which has attained world-fame. This remodelling of the doctrine came about in the following manner: So long as the life-bearing element was seen in the Fire and the Soul was considered as a part of the Fire-world Beyond, the thought still remained caught up in the old mythological ideas. Although men had broken away from the belief in the old God-world and saw the governing World-power in Nature-forces, they still stood involuntarily under the influence of the idea that the life-carrying Fire and, above all, the Fire-Soul, in their own way, were subject to the force of the higher power, under whose suzerainty, the Soul remained. This groove of influence was bound to break, as the progressive thought got free gradually from the old mythological manner of thinking and through the refining of Soul-idea, the all-penetrating and almighty world-spirit came forth in the place of the life-bearing Fire. Now the consciousness awoke that this world-spirit itself is the highest Being, raised above all gods and subject to no outside power. The livelier as this consciousness grew, in a mightier way worked this idea. Men were not tired of praising the sublimity of the World-spirit which penetrates everything, operates in all, which, like a dam, keeps apart the worlds, and which is the Lord of all the Universe. The World-spirit was no longer named under the old name as the Fire which dwells in all men (Agnir Vaiśvānarāḥ) An expression was chosen out of the domain of the priestly thought-world and religious mystique—a word which was originally a magic word, and had designated conjured up magic-power. This wonderful secret world-power was named the Brahma. A second still mightier thought broke forth and did so with more sudden power. In the development of human thought we can often trace, how an idea gradually shapes itself, even to the
extent that it often already lies before us fully formulated, without the consciousness of its importance but then all of a sudden and impressively, the consciousness of its importance breaks through. Such was the case here also in the case of the fire-doctrine. It had been so far known that the Fire-Soul was a part of the life-carrying Fire out of the Light-World Beyond. The same also held good with regard to the relation of the soul to the World-spirit so far as one understands it. It is needless to say that the new position and evaluation of the World-spirit was also bound to bring with it a shift in the comprehension and assessment of the human soul. These conclusions, however, were not first of all thought out in all their implications. The mightier was their effect than man was conscious of. Suddenly, one came upon this knowledge: the highest all-powerful Brahma, which penetrates the whole world and governs it and of which my soul is a part, I am that itself. And this knowledge produced an overpowering and amazing effect. The highest Being is one’s own self the Ātmā! The old thinkers became as if intoxicated as this thought flashed upon them with direct suddenness. No wonder that from the point of this idea, everything else receded in the back-ground. The Ātmā, above all, appeared as the only precious one free from all earthly restrictions and inadequacies, and free from all sorrow, calm in itself, full of joy. Against this Ātmā, all earthly things were thought of as nothing and immediately one turned away from them in order to seek and know only the Ātmā.

One of the oldest texts which expresses this thought and mood connected with it particularly effectively is put in the mouth of Śāṇḍilya, the most reputed master of Vedic Sacrificial lore. It runs as follows:33

“One should adore the Ātmā. Thinking is his stuff, the Breath-force is his body, Light is his form, the world-space his self. His will is true. He is all-doing, all-wishing, all-smelling all-tasting, all-penetrating, wordless, care-free. This my Ātmā in the interior of the heart is small like a rice-seed, or a barley-seed or a millet-seed or like the kernel of the millet-seed; he is golden, like a light without smoke. This my Ātmā in the interior of the heart is greater than the earth, greater than the air-space, greater than the heavens, greater than these worlds,
all-doing, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting, all-penetrating, wordless, carefree. That is my Atmā in the interior of the heart, that is the Brahma. I shall enter into him when I depart from this life. For him who has come to this certainty, there is no more any doubt left. Thus spoke Śāṇḍilya."

In another text Yajñavalkya, the great Vedic teacher and proclaimer of wisdom, says to Janaka of Videha as follows:

"In the life-forces, it is this great, unborn Atmā consisting of knowledge. Here within the heart is a space, wherein he rests, the ruler of all, the lord of all, the governor of all. He neither becomes greater through good works nor smaller through bad acts. He is the lord of all, the governor of beings, the shelter of beings. He is the dam which holds them so that they do not collapse. The Brāhmaṇas try to know him through sacrifice, gifts, penance and fasting. He who knows him becomes a silent sage (muniḥ). The wandering monks leave their homes, because they wish him as their world (lokaḥ). That is why the ancient wise men who possessed this knowledge, did not desire offspring because they thought, 'What shall we do with the offspring, we whose world is the Atmā?' They therefore, abjure the desire for sons, the desire for possessions, the desire for (this) world and wander about as mendicants. The desire for sons is namely the desire for possession and the desire for possession is the desire for (this) world. Because both are desires.

"Therefore one, who knows this, becomes full of peace, self-controlled, patient and self-composed. In the Atmā, he sees the self. He takes everything for the self. Evil does not overpower him. The evil does not consume him. He consumes every evil. Free from evil, from passion, and from doubt, he becomes a Brāhmaṇa, he whose world is the Brahma."

With the creation of the doctrine of the World-spirit the Brahma and the knowledge of its sameness in essence with one's own self Atmā, the Fire-doctrine reaches the highest point of its development and found its final finished form. If we would summarize the essential statement of the doctrine, it would appear in the form as follows:

The highest essence, the kernel or the core of nature is the Brahma. It is, according to its nature, knowledge (vijñānam)
and bliss (ānandaḥ). Further definitions are not possible because the subject of knowledge cannot itself be known. It lies outside the sphere of every possibility of knowledge and outside all forms of human knowledge. Only through the rejection of all definitions, it can be defined, only through the knowledge of its unknowability it can be known. This sublime and mysterious Brahma is now the all-governing power which penetrates and shares the entire world. At the same time it is of like nature with the soul—the Ātmā. As soul, it enters into the body and animates it, penetrates the organs and grants them ability to know and efficiency to work.

The nature and working of the Brahma can be known best in the processes of sleep. When a man sinks into sleep, the soul withdraws from the organs of the body which consequently become bereft of consciousness and suspend their activity. During the dream-state, the soul tarries in a transitional state between this existence and beyond and creates, by virtue of his creative power, his dream-world. When the dream-sleep goes over into deep sleep, the soul temporarily withdraws completely out of this existence and unites himself with the Brahma. In this condition, he is without consciousness because knowledge alone without something knowable cannot be known. He experiences only a deep feeling of well-being, the joy of the Brahma.

So long as one is entangled in the cycle of transmigration, the soul wanders after death from one body to another. The kind of rebirth is determined by a man’s good or bad works. During the passage from one body to another, the life-forces (prāṇāḥ), the knowledge and deeds accompany it and form a kind of fine organism (sūksmaṁ śarīram) which brings about the bondage of the soul and holds it fast in the cycle.

The world in which the soul is entangled through this bondage is like everything which is different from the Ātmā, defective, unsatisfactory and sorrowful. The soul is affected through this bondage with grief which is foreign to its nature and can become free from this grief, only when this bondage is snapped. That is possible through knowledge and through the withdrawal from all earthly things, that is, through desirelessness. When the Deliverance is attained, the soul finally enters into
the *Brahma*. In this condition, the soul, like the *Brahma*, in its complete deliverance from all earthly things, is without consciousness, but he enjoys, as in deep sleep, the full bliss of the *Brahma*.

The final form of the Fire-doctrine is laid down in three texts which are all contained in the *Bṛhadārāṇyaka-Upaniṣad*. In all the three, Yājñavalkya is the spokesman. Yājñavalkya who appears as otherwise known as the outstanding expert in sacrificial knowledge emerges here also as the proclaimer of the highest wisdom. King Janaka of Videha, the prince of a region which is situated today in the Northern part of Bihar, plays the chief role. In the first of these there is described the great knowledge-wager of the Brāhmaṇās in the presence of King Janaka. Therein, it is narrated how King Janaka organizes a sacrifice at which a great multitude of Brāhmaṇas gather together. Janaka wanted to see who was the most learned among them and with this aim, promises a prize of a thousand cows. Yājñavalkya claims the prize for himself. And when the remaining Brāhmaṇās resist him, there begins the great wager-contest. In that contest, many interlocutors, one after another, put their questions to Yājñavalkya. He, however, knows the answers of all questions and remains the superior victor. In the second text which is the most important of all there is a conversation between Yājñavalkya and King Janaka. King Janaka begins with the inconspicuous question as to what serves men as Light. But one question joins itself with another and the conversation goes on. Now the sleep-processes come to be described. King Janaka urges on his questions to Yājñavalkya, until finally, Yājñavalkya gives an exposition of the deepest secret of his doctrine and imparts to him the knowledge about the nature of the Ātmā, about the transmigration of the soul and Deliverance. The last of these texts contains finally the legacy of Yājñavalkya. It will be reproduced here as an illustration of these texts. Yājñavalkya who, in accordance with the rules of the ordering of a Brāhmaṇa's life, is on the point of giving up his position as a house-holder, with a resolution to spend the rest of his life as a monk in the forest, bids farewell to both his wives:

"‘Maitreyi’, spoke Yājñavalkya, ‘I wish now to give up
this station (of a householder); therefore, I shall make partition
(of what I have) between you and Kātyāyanī. Then Maitreyī
said, ‘If this whole earth with all its riches, my lord, were to
belong to me, would I be immortal on that account?’ ‘No’, replied
Yājñavalkya, ‘Your life would be like that of the well-to-do.
But you cannot hope for immortality through riches.’ Then
Maitreyī said: ‘What have I to do with it, (the riches of the
earth), if I am not going to be immortal through it? Impart
to me rather, my lord, the knowledge which you possess.’
Yājñavalkya replied: ‘You have been, indeed, dear to me.
You have now increased my love for you. Come, seat yourself
and I shall explain it to you. Attend, however, very carefully
to what I say.’

‘And he emphasized as follows: ‘Indeed, not for the
sake of the husband, is the husband dear, but for the sake of
the Ātmā, the husband is dear. Not, indeed, for the sake of
the wife, is the wife dear, but for the sake of the Ātmā, the wife is
dear. Indeed, not for the sake of the sons, the sons are dear, but
for the sake of the Ātmā, the sons are dear. Indeed, not for the
sake of the wealth, the wealth is dear, but for the sake of the
Ātmā, the wealth is dear. Indeed, not for the sake of Brāhma-
ṇānāhhood, is the Brāhmaṇāhhood dear, but for the sake of the
Ātmā, the Brāhmaṇāhhood is dear. Indeed, not for the sake of
Kṣatriyāhhood, is the Kṣatriyāhhood dear but for the sake of the
Ātmā is the Kṣatriyāhhood dear. Indeed, not for the
sake of the worlds, the worlds are dear but for the sake of the
Ātmā, the worlds are dear. Indeed, not for the sake of the gods
are the gods dear, but for the sake of the Ātmā, the gods are
dear. Indeed, not for the sake of beings, the beings are dear,
but for the sake of the Ātmā, the beings are dear. Indeed,
not for the sake of the universe, is the universe dear, but for
the sake of the Ātmā is the universe dear.

‘The Brāhmaṇāhhood is denied to him who knows the
Brāhmaṇāhhood as other than in the Ātmā. The Kṣatriyāhhood
is denied to him who regards Kṣatriyāhhood as other than in the
Ātmā. The worlds are denied to him who knows the worlds
as other than in the Ātmā. The gods are denied to him
who knows gods as other than in the Ātmā. The beings are
denied to him who knows beings as other than in the Ātmā.
The universe is denied to him who knows the universe as other
than in the Ātmā. The Ātmā is the Brāhmaṇahood, the Kṣatriyahood, these worlds, these gods, these beings, this universe.

"One should indeed, O Maitreyi, see, hear, think of and know the Ātmā. Indeed, he who has seen, heard, thought over and known the Ātmā, has known the whole world.

"The position of one who knows the Ātmā is like one in the case of a drum. When the drum is beaten, the sounds issuing outside cannot be caught. He, however, who has seized the drum or the drum-beater, has also seized the sounds.

"The position of one who knows the Ātmā is like one in the case of a conch-shell. When the conch-shell is blown, its sounds, outside, cannot be seized. He, however, who has seized the conch-shell, or the conch-shell-blower, has also its sounds.

"The position of one who knows the Ātmā is like one in the case of a lute. When the lute is played, the sounds, issuing outside, cannot be caught. He, however, who has seized the lute or the lute-player, has also caught its sounds.

"As in the case of the fire which is made with moist fuel, the smoke-clouds spread themselves around; even so, indeed, is the breathing-forth of this Great Being. The Rgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Atharvan and Āṅgiras psalms, the histories, the old narrations, the sciences, the secret doctrines, the aphorisms, the rules, the interpretations and the illustrations— all this is His Breathing forth.

"Just as the sea is the gathering-point of all water, just so is the skin the meeting-point of all touch-experiences, the nose the meeting-point of all smells, the tongue of all taste-experiences, the eyes of all forms, the ears of all sounds, the thinking (manah) of all resolutions, the heart of all memories, the hands of all doings or achievements, the begetting organ of all voluptuous feelings, the anus of all evacuations, the feet of all movements of walking, the speech (the gathering-point) of all sciences.

"Just as a lump of salt, which one puts into the water, dissolves in water, the water drawn from any place in it being saltish, the same is the position; indeed, with this great, endless, shoreless Being consisting of pure knowledge. Out of these
elements it comes forth and into them again, it goes. But after
death, there is no consciousness. This, indeed, I say to you.'
Thus spoke Yājñavalkya."

"Thereupon, Maitreyī said, "You have put me in confusion,
my lord, when you say that there is no consciousness after death."
Yājñavalkya, however, replied, 'What I speak, does not,
indeed, bring confusion. What I have said should be well
understood. Where there is (present) duality, there one sees
the other, one smells the other, one hears the other, one speaks
to the other, one thinks of another, one knows the other. When,
however, all has become the Ātmā, how shall one see somebody,
how shall one smell something, how shall one hear anything,
how will he speak to somebody, how will he think of anybody,
how will he know anybody? How will he know Him through
whom all this is known? How will one know the Knower?
Now you know my teaching, Maitreyī. It, indeed, leads to
immortality.' Thus Yājñavalkya spoke and went away."

With these texts, the development of the Fire-doctrine
is not only inwardly complete, it also finishes generally for our
purpose. This is not because the doctrine would not and could
not have continued further. This is not probable when we
take into consideration the capacity of development which the
doctrine possesses. And besides, we can trace the after-effects
of the thought created by it not only in the oldest Buddhism
but also again in the philosophy of the Epic. But the tradition
snaps off. The texts which have been described above and which
were taken over by the Brāhmaṇas belong to the latest groups.
Then the collection of holy texts came to a close and new ones
were no more recognized. Therefore, the possibility to say
about the doctrine anything further ceases, in view of the
nature of the tradition of the oldest period to which we have
alluded. Only during the description of the oldest Buddhism
and of the philosophy of the Epic, we shall have to point out the
points of contact with this doctrine.

We have now dealt with the most important doctrines of
the Vedic period. There remain, however, two texts to
be described, which occupy a separate position and which,
therefore, must be dealt with separately. These two texts
are namely, the revelation (of his teaching) by Indra to Pratardana and the teaching of Śvetaketu.

The first of these texts, to which we shall first turn, forms the third Chapter of the Kausūtaki-Upaniṣad. Its outward clothing or form shows mythological features and is, from the point of its contents, not significant. Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, arrives in the heaven of Indra and when he is asked by Indra to choose what he wished to have, requests him to tell him what is most wholesome for men, what means the highest knowledge. Indra fulfills his wish and imparts to him the revelation for which the request was made. Then begins the presentation of the doctrine itself which is all the more significant and begins with the following statements:

"I am the Breath (Prāṇaḥ). I adore myself as the Ātmā consisting of knowledge (prajñātmā), as life, as immortality. The Breath is Life and the Life is Breath. Because as long as the Breath tarries in this body, so long the life stays. Through the Breath, one attains the immortality in the world beyond, and through the knowledge (prajñā) one attains the fulfilment of his wish. He who venerates me as life, as immortality, attains in this world the full duration of life and he gets immortality, imperishableness in the heavenly world."

Then on a further question from Pratardana, Indra, in continuation, imparts a series of several doctrines. The first of these deals with the front rank of Breath over all the remaining life-forces, and justifies it on the same grounds as those of the Breath-doctrine, namely that, a man can live without the remaining life-forces but that it is the Breath which animates the body and keeps it erect.

In the second passage, the position of the life-forces in sleep and in death is described; it is taught that in those conditions not only the life-forces but also their objects enter into the Breath. "When a man is so asleep that he sees no dream, then he attains to a unity with the Breath. Then the speech with all names enters into it, the eyes with all forms, the ears with all sounds, the thinking with all thoughts. When he wakes up, then, just as the sparks fly out separately from a flaming fire, so also the life-forces go forth out of this Ātmā
according to their stations, out of the life-forces the gods, out of the gods the worlds.”

And now follows the most important section, namely, a detailed explanation about the working of the life-forces, and their relation to the objects and to the knowledge \( (prajñā) \) embodied in the Breath. After having fixed, first, the nature of the life-forces as organs of knowledge, the following presentation of the doctrine is given: The organs, or as they are here named the Elements of knowledge \( (prajñāmātrāḥ) \) arise out of the Knowledge. They are, as it were, the limbs which have arisen out of it. So also the Objects, or as they are here called the elements of being \( (bhūtamatrāḥ) \) arise out of the organs. And no doubt, they are, according to outward appearance, the same parts removed from being or nature. The perception of the objects takes place in such a way that the knowledge enters into the organs and knows the objects through them. Because, the organs alone would not be able to do that. The knowledge which has entered into them, therefore, plays the essential and effective part in them. All the named essences, organs and objects are further conditioned by one another and depend upon one another. If there would not be the organs or the elements of knowledge, the objects or the elements of being or nature could not continue. If there would be no objects or the elements of being or nature, the organs or the elements of knowledge could not continue. But all together again depend on the knowledge embodied in the Breath, in which they come to a unity. Because, “that is no multiplicity; but just as the rim of the wheels is fixed in the spokes, and just as the spokes are fixed in the nave or the hub of the wheel, so also those elements of being or nature are fixed in the elements of knowledge and the elements of knowledge are fixed in the Breath. Then this Breath is the Ātmā consisting of knowledge \( (prajñātmā) \), is bliss, is not changing, is immortal”.

The text closes with the praise of this Ātmā consisting of knowledge and with its superior position over good and evil deeds which the Ātmā allows men to accomplish, in order to lead them above or downwards in the cycle of transmigration.

Already out of this short survey, the character and importance of the doctrine can be clearly gathered. Evidently,
the doctrine has not independently grown forth out of its own beginnings but it has originated through the taking over and assimilation of other thoughts, not indigenous to it. It is striking that there are not preserved in the doctrine the preliminary steps to which it can be traced. On the other hand, there are other doctrines, which can with certainty be recognized, out of which most of the views of Indra's teaching to Pratardana are borrowed. Among such other doctrines, there stands in the first place the Breath-doctrine. Out of it is derived the assumption of Breath (prāṇāḥ) as the highest entity, the way in which its front rank among the rest of the life-forces is justified by giving grounds; the second doctrine out of which the views of Indra's teaching are derived is the doctrine of sleep. With it are assimilated the ideas of the Fire-doctrine. To it can be traced that the Breath is considered as the bearer of knowledge (prajñā) and that the life-forces are not able to operate independently, but that they gain their efficiency of operation as organs only through the entry into them of the Breath and with it of knowledge. Finally a special agreement with the teaching of Yājñavalkya consists in the fact that the highest entity—the Breath—is defined as joy, and the course of transmigration of the soul is directed by the influence of action (Karma). Thus are found the essential elements out of which the teaching to Pratardana is built up, and it is undeniable that these elements are assimilated into a meaningful and well-rounded whole, so that it can, without any hesitation, be compared to the other doctrines of that period. But this is not the only thing wherein consists the unique importance of the teaching to Pratardana. This rather depends on a new idea with which it is connected and which emerges here for the first time; it is, no doubt, an idea of overpowering surprising boldness.

In the main part of our text, it is taught that out of the Breath as the highest entity, not only the life-forces as in Breath-doctrine, or as they have been here named the elements of knowledge (prajñāmātrāḥ), emerge but beyond and besides these elements of knowledge, there emerge the elements of nature or being (bhūtamātrāḥ) as objects corresponding to them. Both of these are conditioned by one another and are rooted in one another and depend, from their side, on the Breath, in
which they become a unity. Through this doctrine, the Breath, or as here it is called the Ātma consisting of knowledge, retains, as the highest entity, its place and importance, which itself far goes beyond the role of Brahma in the Fire-doctrine. Then there is the Brahma which, in spite of all its surprising greatness and sublimity, is an entity by itself in which the elements enter and out of which again they withdraw themselves. Here goes forth the whole world from the Ātma consisting of knowledge and is conditioned by it. A non-recurring process of creation is not dealt with here. Also, according to our text, in sleep, besides the life-forces, the gods and worlds enter into the breath and during the waking state, they again emerge forth out of it. It is an idealistic philosophy of the most ancient stamp with which we meet here. And sharply and directly these almost incomprehensible and bold thoughts emerge here.

It is no wonder that under these circumstances, we are moved by a desire to know how the origination of this bold, unique doctrine came about. But unfortunately, the means to answer this question are not available. Because, as we have already said, there are not preserved for us any preliminary steps out of which the origin and the development of the doctrine can be gathered. Suddenly and directly the doctrine confronts us fully developed in our text. But at least, some conjectures can be made as to wherefrom the impulse came which led to the origin of the doctrine.\(^{38}\)

First, it is not to be doubted that the idea to allow the life-forces to emerge out of the Breath, is taken over from the Breath-doctrine. It shows itself specially evident in the description of the sleep-process. While, for instance, in the philosophically advanced main section of our Text (Indra’s teaching to Pratardana), the elements of knowledge (prajñā-mātrāḥ) are derived from the Ātma consisting of knowledge and the elements of nature (or being) (bhūtamātrāḥ) are derived from the elements of knowledge, here also in the text life-forces (prāṇāḥ) are found emerging, according to the old manner, out of the Breath and the gods and worlds emerge out of the life-forces. And while the Elements of Knowledge and the elements of being (Nature) appear in the main section of our
text in their number as ten, in the description of the sleep-process, however, the life-forces appear as four in number, the same as in the Breath-doctrine. The borrowing of the rise of the life-forces from the Breath-doctrine is certain. Still the question remains: how did it come about that the worlds and the elements of nature (or being) arose out of the life-forces or the elements of knowledge. As an answer to this question, the following conjecture may be expressed:

We have repeatedly seen that the philosophical doctrines of the Vedic period are rooted, in many points, in the very old mythological ideas and have grown out of them. That also appears to be the case here. There is, for example, a very old ancient myth, according to which the world is produced out of the organs and the limbs of the human body; that is the myth of the first ancient man (purusah). This myth is found wide-spread among other folks and it narrates the manner in which the gods created the world, how they killed the first man and formed the world out of his limbs.\textsuperscript{39} We now find the same myth in India in its priestly remodelling, in the Rgveda, in the so-called song of the ancient man (purusasūktam), in which the killing of the ancient man and the creation of the world out of his limbs are described as a sacrifice. And it is remarkable that the same myth, which otherwise in the ritual literature of Vedic Schools is only rarely mentioned, already occurs in many forms\textsuperscript{40} in the works of the Rgveda-schools, to which also the Kauśitaki-Upaniṣad belongs. I, therefore, believe that the doctrine (of Indra's teaching to Prataradana), according to which not only the life-forces and the organs of the human body arise out of the Breath, but also again the worlds arise out of it, has been suggested by the myth of the primeval man.

The following details also speak in favour of the above view. We find one of the different formulations of the myth of the primeval man in the first Chapter of the Aitareya Upaniṣad in which the creation of the world is narrated as follows: The Ātmā first creates the worlds, heaven, air, space, earth and water. Then he fetches a man out of the water and creates out of him the guardians of the worlds. Thus it is said: "His mouth split itself like an egg, out of the mouth arose the speech,
out of the speech, the Agni (the fire-god). The nose split itself and out of the nose sprang the Breath and out of the Breath Vāyu (the wind-god). The eyes split themselves, and out of the eyes arose the eyesight, and out of the eyesight Āditya (the sun-god). The ears split themselves and out of the ears there arose the hearing, and out of the hearing, the Dīṣāḥ (the quarters), etc.” Similarly, in a second formulation of the same myth in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, it is said that out of the speech of the primeval man, the earth and Agni (Fire) were created, out of his breath, the air-space and Vāyu etc. It is not only the worlds but also the gods who arise out of the limbs of the primeval man. And we find the same idea preserved in a passage in our doctrine (of Indra’s teaching to Pratardana). Whereas, for instance, in the main section, it only taught that the elements of knowledge (prajñāmātrāḥ) arise out of the Breath and that the elements of being or nature (bhūtāmātrāḥ) arise out of the elements of knowledge, it is, however, said, in the description of the sleep-process that in the waking state, the life-forces (prāṇāḥ) emerge out of the Breath and the world and the gods arise out of the life-forces. Now, a short while before, we have seen during the comparison of just this description of the sleep-process with the corresponding ideas of the Breath-doctrine that this part of our text is more ancient than the main section and that the number four of the life-forces, which is in agreement with the Breath-doctrine, has been preserved in it; the main section, however, gives it up. It is, therefore, obvious to assume that this description also—of the rise of the worlds out of the life-forces—is more original than the presentation in the main section and that also the rise of the gods out of the organs represents an idea of more ancient times—the idea which has been given up and lost in the main section. This gives us simultaneously a remarkable agreement with the cited formulations of the myth of the primeval man and the conjecture expressed by us gains thus a probability. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the doctrine of our text describing the rise of the phenomenal world out of the organs and finally out of the knowledge of man is probably rooted in the very old views of the myth of the primeval man, and has developed out of it. But it must be acknowledg-
ledged that ability for abstraction and freedom of thought, which exhibits itself in the further formulation of this myth into a philosophical thought, is amazing and places itself equal in rank beside similar further formulations in the Fire-doctrine.

If we would shortly summarize the total impression of the already described doctrine of the Kausitaki-Upanishad, it can be said that, in spite of the fact that it has made use, in a large measure, of the borrowed thoughts, it can be counted, on account of its large compass, and the boldness of its thought, among the most remarkable creations of the Vedic period. Its effect, indeed, so far as the tradition allows us to judge, was not great. In the Vedic period, we find a few traces of its influence, more of an external kind, in the same texts of the Fire-doctrine. For the development of the future, it has remained without importance.

The Instruction of Śvetaketu:—And now we turn to the second and the last text which remains still to be described. It is the instruction of Śvetaketu by his father Uddālaka Āruṇi. This is the text from which the famous sentence comes, namely, “That thou art, O Śvetaketu” (tat tvam asi). This text is of an entirely special importance, because it shows especially evidently how easily a judgment which blindly trusts the accidental character of tradition can easily go wrong and only takes into consideration the continuance of the text. Because, had not this one text remained preserved for us, nobody would have assumed or even conjectured a similar, thought-process in this period.

Śvetaketu, the son of the famous Vedic teacher Uddālaka Āruṇi, who has also been named by tradition as the teacher of Yājñavalkya, returns to his father’s house, at the end of his studies; he is proud and conceited with his freshly acquired knowledge. But his father quickly damps his pride because he put to him a question whether he had received the instruction through which he had heard what was still unheard, whether he had thought of what was still unthought, whether he had known what had been still unknown. Śvetaketu was compelled to deny (such instruction) and requested his father to communicate to him this particular instruction. And Uddālaka Āruṇi fulfils his request in a long series of instructions. The
second part of these instructions describes, in a series of examples, the Ātmā as the fine subtle entity which penetrates and animates everything. And every instruction ends with the words: "What that fine subtle entity is—of which this universe consists—that is the only truth, that is the Ātmā, that thou art, O Śvetaketu." But though these instructions are formulated in a very beautiful and impressive manner, the first part is, from the point of its inward contents, far more remarkable. Because, this contains an entirely original doctrine of the Elements, the like of which is not otherwise to be found in the Upanisads.

According to this doctrine, the fountainhead—the spring of all things is a primeval entity, the existing Being (Sat). This being creates the heat or glowing fire (tejah), out of the fire springs the water (āpaḥ) and out of water springs the food (annam). The three are the primeval elements of which the whole world is composed. In them enters the Being as an animating principle and shapes the things according to their name and form (nāma-rāpe). In individual cases, the three primeval elements operate in the following measure: They participate in the shaping and the forming of all things and they are known through their particular form of manifestation. In the case of the fire, this is red, in the case of water white, and in the case of food black. For example, what appears in the Fire as red is the form of fire, what appears white is the form of water and what appears as dark, the form of food.

The operation of these primal elements shapes itself in a special way in the formation of the human body. For instance, when they enter the body, they become divided in those parts. Of the food, the grossest constituent part becomes excrement, the middle part flesh, and the finest part becomes the thinking organ (manah). Of the water, the grossest constituent part becomes urine, the middle part blood, the finest part Breath (prānah). Of the fire, the grossest constituent part becomes the bones, the middle part the marrow, and the finest part becomes speech (vāk). Thus the finest parts strive naturally upwards.

Hunger and thirst originate as follows: The three primal elements can, in an order reverse to that in which they have
been created, again enter among one another. When the food is now taken over by water and carried away, there arises hunger. When the water is carried away by the fire, there arises the thirst. Also during sleep, an entry of the primary elements into one another takes place; thus the thinking organ as the manifestation of the food enters into the Breath which is the manifestation of water. In a still further measure is the case during death, indeed, with a remarkable inversion of the process. Then, it is said, the speech enters the thinking-organ, the thinking-organ in the breath, the breath in the fire or heat and the fire in the highest entity, the Being (Sad).

The originality of the doctrine, presented here above, speaks for itself. It is an entirely different spirit which we meet with here, from the texts already described up to now. One would like to speak of it as an almost scientific attitude.

Here, as in the case of other Doctrines, there is no question of the vehicle of Life forming the centre of interest (as in other doctrines) but it is the doctrine of the Elements. Though the Ātmā as the primal basis of all existing things takes the first place as the basis of all existence, still it is above all with the material world that the thought occupies itself. Characteristically, the words of Uddālaka Āruṇī with which he introduces his instruction through the statements that everything that is not heard is heard, that everything that is not known is known, refer to the doctrine of the three elements. Because as it is later on explained, it is meant that he who knows the three prime elements also knows everything that is created out of them all. In this privileged position of the Elements in our doctrine there is no change by the fact that, according to it, the elements rise out of the Ātmā. As in the already described passage of the Kaushitaki-Upanishad, it does not deal with the rise of the elements after the manner of idealistic doctrine because there the elements come forth out of knowledge and remain conditioned by it and dependent on it. But it is a single act of creation through which the material world is created which now confronts the Ātmā as belonging to a separate foreign sphere and in which he, on his side, must enter.

As far as the doctrine of the Elements is concerned it represents something quite new. Up to this time, the interest
was one-sided and directed to other questions so that ideas about the number and the qualities of the elements were not yet clearly and definitely formulated. In fact, for the most part in general, no clear idea of the Elements had developed. In the Breath-doctrine, the number of elements if we can name them as elements—among which the Sun and the Moon appear—is a secondary consideration appearing there through the confrontation of the macrocosmic and microcosmic entities. And in the doctrine of the Kausātaki Upanisad, the numerous life-forces corresponding to an equal number of objects in the external world has been assumed and they can scarcely be called as elements. Here, in the teaching of Śvetaketu, on the other hand, the fixed number of the exactly defined elements with their qualities has been the ground-basis and the starting point of all further constructions. The creation of the elements out of the Ātmā in the way in which the present text puts it forward is also somewhat new. What is found about the accounts of creation in the older Upanisads, with one exception, does not go beyond the reach of the mythological sphere and they are so limited as to be called occasional improvisations. Firm views have not yet been formed. In our text of Śvetaketu's instruction, on the other hand, a doctrine removed from the mythological sphere is dealt with and in it a series of the origin of the elements with their constitution is fixed. But the essential and the decisive thing in favour of the originality of our Text is the formulation of the Element-doctrine itself. It is not the usual elements that are reckoned but the primal elements out of which are created not only the remaining things but also the usual elements which are formed through their mixture. It comes to this, then, that these primal elements arise out of one another and can continually be merged in one another. A very bold and, from the point of that earlier period, all the more surprising attempt is made to understand and explain the fullness and the manifoldness of the phenomenal world out of the simplest presuppositions. It is not the great basic idea alone to which this doctrine is restricted. It is also carried out in details in an original and far-reaching manner. The tripling of the elements during their entry into the body is also a very new and most highly remarkable idea. Again, it
is further to be emphasised that the psychical organs are
derived out of the Elements. Breath, speech and the thinking
organ again are all created out of the primal elements. The
total sphere of the phenomenal world outside the Atmā itself
is explained as arising out of these elements. Finally, these
attempts at clarification extend themselves also to such processes
as had not been taken into account by other doctrines. Not
only the customary ideas of Sleep and Death recur and are
adapted to the views of the Element-Doctrine, an explanation
also is given of hunger and thirst.

In the doctrine of the elements already cited from our
text of the Instruction to Śvetaketu, we have to deal with an
original and many-sided creation of the human spirit, which
deserves, therefore, the highest consideration. It would have
been all the more interesting, if we had been able to pursue
and understand its origin. But unfortunately, that course
remains for us denied. We do not find even once in the
tradition a sufficient starting point for even a conjecture.
Because, as we have already said, our text of the instructions
of Śvetaketu stands among the older Upaniṣads, as completely
sporadic and isolated. And also the continuance of the ideas
set forth in it cannot therefore be further pursued. Only
significantly later on, we shall again come across the similar
thought-processes, during the rise of the Śāṁkhya system and
they remind us in a remarkable way of the doctrine delivered
to Śvetaketu. There, we shall, therefore, have to come again
to this doctrine.

With this we have completed the survey of the Philosophy
of the Vedic period. It should, however, be noted that corre-
sponding to the frame of the present work, we have restricted
ourselves to the presentation of philosophically important doc-
trines. Isolated ideas and thought-processes, which remained
stuck up at the start, have occasionally been spoken of. Thus
the doctrine of different breaths—breathing-out (Prāṇaḥ),
breathing-in (Apaṇaḥ), breathing-up (Udānaḥ), etc., which are
working in the human body, or the idea of names and forms
(nāmarūpe) as a formative principle, which defines the nature
and uniqueness of different things. But many other doctrines of
that sort must be also slipped over—such as the doctrine of
the Taittirīya Upaniśad, which attempts to bring in accord the different comprehensions of the Ātmā with one another in such a way that it assumes different covers or layers which enclose one another progressively from the lower to the higher forms. Everything which only belongs to the sphere of priestly speculation and sacrificial mystique has been omitted. These take up a large part of the Upaniśad texts. Because they have nothing to do with real philosophy and would require a separate presentation for themselves.

Now we shall, towards the conclusion, shortly summarize the results of our consideration of Vedic philosophy. Before all, we have to deal here with a real effective beginning. It is a new sector of human thought which begins here. No doubt, they are the very old questions with which one is occupied. But they are newly shaped and answered in a new spirit. For explanation, one does not harp back to the ideas of gods or the metaphors of the mythical thought-world but a new comprehension of things is sought to find new solutions with scientific clarity. As a matter of fact, philosophical reflection has already emerged.

The kernel of questions to which one addresses himself is the question of the vehicle of life and fate after death. The question is answered by finding the bearer of life now one element, now another. The chief stream of development flows in such a way that the circle of questions is gradually widened, and forms of mythological thought which supplied at first numerous stimulations to thought have been again and again continually stripped off, and make way to abstract thoughts hitherto unknown. The search of the vehicle of life leads to the doctrine of the world-soul—the Brahma or the Ātmā and creates, along with it, basic thoughts which have exercised a decisive influence on the whole later development of Indian philosophy. Psychological questions also come up. Besides the soul—the vehicle of life—different life-forces in the body are believed and recognized, their number being assumed alternately differently; these life-forces appear as organs of the soul, thus preparing for the idea of the sense-organs. As against all this, the outside world—the world of matter—first of all awakens little interest. A series of natural forces or cosmic powers is known in their
different forces and is included in the thought-processes, especially as macrocosmic forces corresponding to the parts or forces of the human body. Only modest beginnings show themselves with regard to the doctrine of the Elements. There are no fixed views about the number and qualities of Elements. An isolated, yet indeed, a very remarkable attempt to create a doctrine of the elements, does not make much effect, as far as the tradition can allow us to judge. Also an attempt of an idealistic sort of world-explanation according to which, like the psychical organism, the total external world arises out of knowledge, remains stuck up and undeveloped in the beginning. Like the question of the outer world and the elements, the question regarding the origin of this world equally remains scarcely fruitful. Leaving aside stray statements, man remains caught up in the old mythological views. The same holds good in other spheres such as the construction of the world. Important results, on the other hand, are achieved in the sphere of Eschatology. Here with the doctrine of transmigration of the soul and the doctrine of works (Karma) as a determining factor for the course of transmigration, two ideas are created which govern the whole of later development and have become for the whole Indian philosophy almost independent presuppositions. With the doctrine of the fine body as a ground-basis of the transmigration of the soul is provided a precious idea forming the basis on which further development is built. Finally concerning Deliverance, the idea is provisionally not fully formulated. One is satisfied to designate the knowledge about the nature of the Ātmā and such other sporadic ideas such as the desirelessness or belief as the basic foundation for Deliverance. This is the picture, summarized in small features which the philosophical development of the Vedic period gives. If we wish to appreciate in a few words the performances or the achievements contained in that philosophy, we can say that in it simple ideas of antiquity and sublime new ideas are mixed in a peculiar way. There are very old mythical ideas with which the thought was associated but they are overcome with surprising quickness. An abundance of ideas of different sorts and of a bolder and newer kind emerges in its place and some among them belong to the most important and the sublime
which the Indian philosophy and human thought have created. But only on a few points the development leads to a conclusive result. On wide stretches, it deals only with the beginnings and starting points. Everything still is in the condition of origin and fluidity. Only the tradition ends for us with the Vedic period, yet the development rushes on rapidly forward. In so doing, which path it has broken through, will be seen in the following Chapter.
4. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EPIC

THE YOGA

The Epic is now to be dealt with as the second of the four masses of tradition of the ancient times. From the point of chronology, it is no doubt later than the tradition of the Buddhist and Jainistic canons. Still it is commendable to take it first because it designates in the most significant manner the further development of the Vedic thought in it. In the case of the original Buddhism and Jainism, one deals with, namely, the accentuated practical doctrines of Deliverance, in which the philosophical-theoretical bases are restricted to the most necessary things. This special strong tendency is found to be the case in Buddhism which only contains the fragments of philosophical speculation. In Jainism, in which this happens on a lesser scale, the age or the chronology of the theoretical elements contained in the Canon is uncertain on account of the unsatisfactory tradition, so that they cannot give the firm grounding-basis for historical construction. On the other hand, the epic offers a group of fully developed and clearly represented doctrines which are very well utilizable and which can be arranged distinctly from the point of the history of ideas. Besides the philosophical texts contained in the Epic are earlier than it was formerly assumed. Thus the texts to be considered here need to be pushed back far into the pre-Christian period. The scepticism, which was customary and convenient to suppose that the chronology of the ancient Indian literature was entirely in the dark, has proved here to be unjustified.

The Epic with which we have to do here is the popular heroic epic the *Mahābhārata*. The *Rāmāyaṇa* which is named along with the *Mahābhārata* in the same breath, is on the other hand, an artificial epic which therefore belongs to an entirely different layer of tradition and therefore, contains rarely anything pertinent. The religious epic, on the other hand, i.e. the Purāṇas, is essentially later and will be dealt with later.
The *Mahābhārata*, in its kernel, stems out of the ancient Indian age of the knights, of the proper age of the heroic epic. It deals with the strife among the brothers of an ancient princely family and has affected the people with its overpowering tragic pathos and has won the first place among the old epics. Now there emerged the same process which we can observe in the case of the epics of other people. The most favourite poem forms the assembling-point with which other poems and myths—a whole entire complex of sagas is united. Thus is the original core enlarged and widened into a most manifold sort, until it often assumes a multiple form of its original extent. Now the same was in the case of the *Mahābhārata* and no doubt, in a larger measure. It became the collecting basin of the total Indian national epic. Not only poems of heroes, but also religious and philosophical works of poetry, legends, the myths of the gods, etc., found their acceptance in this gigantic collection, out of the repertory of ancient rhapsodists. And thus the mighty extent was reached in one lakh of double verses in which form the Epic lies before us today.

This mighty collection contains, as already said, also numerous philosophical texts, partly isolated and partly united into a large group. By far the most famous among these texts is the *Bhagavadgītā*, the song of the Exalted one. It is an especially impressive passage put into the epic. When the warriors of both quarrelling families of princes stand face to face against each other for a decisive battle and Arjuna, one of the great heroes, sees among a series of his opponents before him his numerous relatives, he feels a shyness and hesitation to raise his weapons against them and expresses his hesitation to his charioteer Kṛṣṇa. Then Kṛṣṇa, an embodiment of the highest god Viṣṇu, begins to remove his scruples and unites in his narration a series of instructions and revelations which have attained fame under the name of the *Bhagavadgītā* and have exercised an influence on the widest circles more than any other small religious text. With the *Bhagavadgītā* is associated outwardly a fairly extensive collection of texts which carries the name of the *Anugītā*—the one sung after the *Bhagavadgītā*. For instance, the epic narrates, that after the victory, Arjuna requested Kṛṣṇa to repeat his instruction and that his wish has
been fulfilled with this after-song (the Anugitā). In reality however, there is no connection with the Bhagavadgitā and the Anugitā. The Anugitā is, rather, a unique collection of the most diverse and not the most important texts. But by far the greatest collection of philosophical texts which the epic contains is the so-called Mokṣadharma which teaches about the way to Deliverance. Bhīṣma, the oldest and the most venerable among the heroes of the princely family which destroys itself in the internecine struggle, lies heavily wounded on the battlefield; around him gather the surviving princes of the victorious party and he imparts to them instruction. This passage in the epic has become a true gathering-point of all didactic poetry, which fills the two extensive books of the work. Also numerous philosophical fragments are found among these and form their own section which in almost 200 chapters of the Text contains the most varied sort of material. It is this section which carries the name of the Mokṣadharma and it represents not only the most extensive but also the most important collection of the philosophical texts in the Epic. Because among these texts are found the oldest and most valuable texts which we find in the Epic in general. And we shall deal with these texts in the following preferential order.

There are most important philosophical texts and collections of texts in the Mahābhārata. It is, therefore, a manifold and voluminous material which lies before us. Its utilization is made difficult through the fact that the tradition offers no, or at the most inaccessible, starting points for the assessment of the age and value of isolated pieces. According to my view, the Indian estimate of the Bhagavadgitā does not correspond to its actual worth but depends on the most impressive introduction of the text as the revelation of the highest God at a fatefuly difficult moment. The influence which it has exercised on the basis of this evaluation is indeed enormous and need not be underestimated. But from the point of the history of ideas, its importance is less than the many texts of the Mokṣadharma. Concerning the age of these texts, there is at least something to arrive at, in connection with the relative chronology of the Mokṣadharma texts from the following considerations of some starting points. This collection owes its
origin, according to all appearances, not to one single once-occurring process of collection but appears through the gradual entry of texts always coming about anew and to have grown to its actual present extent. We, therefore, find the older texts more towards the beginning and the later texts more towards the end of the collection. Also the epic itself has evidently preserved a memory of this process. In its present form, the Mahābhārata, for instance, is put in the mouth of the bard Ugraśravas who recites it in the Naimiṣa forest to the holy seers assembled at the sacrifice. Ugraśravas himself repeats the recitation made by Vaiśampāyana, the pupil of the legendary author Vyāsa at the snake-sacrifice of King Janamejaya. In a number of the last and evidently also the latest sections of the Mokṣadharma, Ugraśravas takes up the words and brings them not as part of the epic itself, but as a supplement which Vaiśampāyana makes to the questions of Janamejaya. One has apparently hesitated to insert these late texts without further ado into the text of the older epic itself but has chosen the way which expresses its character as a later supplement. On account of this we can draw certain conclusions regarding their relative age from the sequence of the passages in the Mokṣadharma and the kind of their introduction into the text. But these conclusions are not compelling as their arrangement according to its chronology only holds true in a large collection and is disturbed often enough in the case of isolated passages through a later change and a shift.

Under these circumstances, in the case of the evaluation and chronological ordering of the texts, we are thrown essentially on inner grounds which come out of the contents themselves and it, no doubt, appears to me most advantageous to assume the classification of the texts according to the following point of view. It is a fact that the popular philosophical doctrines as we find them in the heroic epic and the religious epic, have been influenced to the greatest extent, just like the doctrines of the religious sects, by the Sāṃkhya system and almost everywhere the Sāṃkhya ideas form the scaffolding of the doctrinal edifice. Therefore the doctrines of the Epic which still show no signs of Sāṃkhya influence and therefore evidently belong to the oldest layer, can be summarized in one group.
A second group is formed of those texts which contain the preliminary steps of the Sāṃkhya or already presuppose the fully developed Sāṃkhya system itself. As the third group are finally the texts to be reconciled, whose contents of religious doctrines are formed on the Sāṃkhyistic basis. This classification is broadly justified according to the chronological succession and has at the same time the advantage that it offers a good basis for the organization of our presentation. Of these three groups, namely the first group is to be dealt with in the present chapter. The second will be best treated in the chapter on the Sāṃkhya system which is to be described. The third group will find its place in the second principal part of our work which embraces the philosophy of the later period and will have to occupy itself with the religious doctrines and systems.

Concerning the form of these texts, the enthusiasm with which the blossoming time of the Upaniṣadic texts is filled has lost its swing in the presentation in the Epic. Apart from some isolated impressive fragments, there preponderates a dry, didactic tone. Also the frames of narrations have lost the colourful liveliness and are for the most part dull and unimportant. Many times, they have been reduced to a pure formal technique. Linguistically, the texts are, throughout, clothed in the form of the usual Epic verse—the Śloka. The tradition is bad and careless. Many times, in the handed-down texts there can be recognized strongest corruptions. There come numerous interpolations and admixtures which render difficult the explanation and the assessment of the text. Everything here, as elsewhere, must be reckoned as due to the defect in the tradition and only a careful interpretation of the totality of every text can lead to trustworthy results in a certain measure.

About the time and the place of the origin, the texts contain no useful information, nor about the circles out of which the texts emerged. The frames of narrations are in greater part legendary and introduce a mythical person. And where the historical persons come forth, the assignment of particular doctrines to them appears without any guarantee or surety. When the fully-developed Sāṃkhyya doctrines are put in the mouth of the well-known Yājñavalkya and King Janaka of the
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Upaniṣads, one cannot put any trust in the assignment of another text to a person like the Śāṅkhyā teacher Pañcaśikha.

The Dialogue between Manu and Brhaspati: And now regarding the presentation of the doctrine itself. In that case, the first place will be taken by a text which expresses well the original character of the philosophical text in the Epic, which is still partly rooted in the ideas of the Upaniṣadic period, but which also contains partly new ideas which enable us to judge in which course the further development moves. Such is the dialogue between Manu, the father of the creatures and the wise seer Brhaspati (Manu-Brhaspati-Saṁvādah). The text is unfortunately largely badly corrupt. It shows no striking construction and no effective working out of the thoughts and was, therefore, easily exposed to interpolations and corruptions. Still the main thoughts can be comprehended with certainty. If we systematically arrange it, the picture in its basic features is as follows:

The highest entity is the Ātmā who is exalted above all others. He lies outside all earthly definitions and is inaccessible to the usual thinking or thought. But though he is not perceptible, one cannot therefore say that he is not. "As the other side of the Himālaya or the backside of the moon has never been yet seen by men, one cannot on that account assert that it is not, so also this fine subtle Ātmā in the essence is never seen with the eyes; one cannot, therefore, assert that he does not exist." And though the Ātmā is not ascertainable outside the body, he has not on that account ceased to continue. Because "just as the moon on the new-moon night is not to be seen because there is no sign visible, but on that account he cannot be said to have been destroyed, the same is the position with the embodied soul. Because on the new-moon-night, the moon is not visible because its usual habitation appears to have vanished. In the same way, that embodied soul is not perceptible, when he is free from the embodiment. And just as the moon, when he has found his habitation, again shines, so also the embodied soul appears again when he has found another body."

This Ātmā wanders, as long as he is entangled in the cycle of transmigration, out of one embodiment to another. While so doing, he is accompanied by a psychical organism which
he allows to issue out of itself for the duration of the embodi-
ment and which again enters into him at the time of Deliverance,
"just as the Sun-god, when he rises, allows the wreath of rays
to rise forth out of himself, and when he sets, he withdraws again
everything in himself". This psychical organism consists of
the knowledge (buddhiḥ), the thinking organ (manah) and the
five sense-organs (indriyāṇi). And no doubt, first the knowledge
goes forth out of the Ātmā, out of the knowledge goes forth the
thinking-organ, and out of this, the sense-organs. Besides this
psychical organism, the Ātmā is accompanied on his way
through the different embodiments by good and bad actions
(Karma). These join themselves in the thinking organ (manah)
and it is these which condition the constitution of several em-
 bodiments.

With the entry into the body, the sense-organs come into
contact with the external world and that comes about in the
following way: There are the five elements of which the exter-
 nal world, as also the human body, is composed; they are namely,
Ether (Ākāsa), Wind, Fire, Water and Earth; these elements
possess the five qualities (guṇāḥ), the ether audibility, the
wind touchability, the fire visibility, the water the taste and
the earth the smell. The same qualities have been now taken
over by the sense-organs out of the elements and they form
their objects. In this way the sense-organs know the things of
the external world and are captivated by them. This contact
is fatefully disastrous for the Ātmā. Because it leads to his
entanglement on account of the good and bad actions
and hinders the Delivering Knowledge. "Just as one, for
instance, sees his reflected image with his eyes in calm water,
so also one sees the knowing principle with the knowledge, when
the senses are brought to quietness. And just as a man no
more sees his image when the water is stirred, so also one can-
not see the knowing principle through knowledge, in the
agitated condition of the sense-organs".

The first precondition for the attainment of delivering
knowledge is, therefore, "the withdrawal of the sense-
organs through their withdrawal from the qualities of the
elements. Then it is valid to gather the knowledge
(buddhiḥ) in the thinking-organ (manah). Because the think-
ing-organ possesses the qualities of knowledge, it is furnished with the organs of knowledge\(^750\) and possesses, in this condition, its ability to know the Ātmā. "When, for instance, the thinking organ, which previously, through the sight of the things of the senses, allows itself to depart (from them), no more observes the qualities (gunaḥ) of the object lying before the eyes, then it gains an insight into the quality-less one".\(^51\)

"It may, therefore, be advanced that it is undiscoverable on account of the defectiveness of the qualities or according to its nature but that it makes itself similar to the knowable".\(^52\) And thus it is possible, when one has attained in the thinking organ the state of contemplations free from the qualities (nirgunaḥ samādhiḥ), to know the Brahma 'like the streak of gold on a touchstone of gold'\(^53\).

If this aim is reached, the Deliverance is also attained therewith. The psychical organism dissolves itself. The sense-organs (indriyāṇi) return into the thinking-organ (manah), the thinking-organ returns back into the knowledge (buddhiḥ) the latter dissolves itself in the Ātmā and therewith there ensues the entry into the Brahma.

Already this short summary of the most important statements in the doctrine enables the characteristic features of the doctrine to emerge forth, the features being remarkably outstanding in different details. The comprehension of the Ātmā is in essentials the same as in the Upaniṣads; only isolated definitions regarding it are sharply understood and come forth anew. It is said, for example, that the Ātmā is altogether neither being, nor non-being nor being-and-non-being and that he lies outside the chain of cause and effect. Also is to be mentioned the designation of the Ātmā as unmanifested or not-evident (avyakta) and we shall have later on to return to this characteristic of the Ātmā. Further it is to be noticed that there emerges the inclination to distinguish the embodied Ātmā as the Element-Ātmā (bhuṭatmā) from the highest Ātmā. In these apparently trifling changes, the most important questions are formulated in which the future plays an important role. But it remains provisional during these interpretations. Essential changes in the comprehension of the Ātmā as such are not yet them-
selves visible in our doctrine. Such are found only in the doctrine of the psychical organism.

This Psychical organism, as we have seen, consists of knowledge (buddhiḥ), the thinking organ (manah) and the sense-organs which in this sequence arise out of the Ātmā and again withdraw into it in the reverse order. Already this arising of the psychical organism out of the Ātmā suggests an innovation. According to my view, these ideas are not to be traced back to the doctrine of Breath in which all the life-forces arise out of the Breath, but they are to be traced to the Fire-doctrine according to which the parts of the Fire-soul enter into the sense-organs. But the general feature of the Indian philosophical development which seeks to comprehend things in the most distinct manner possible, and strives after clearly defined views and which makes itself already palpable in the period of the Epic, had evidently led to the formulation of the question which under the circumstances played a decisive role and according to which, therefore, are considered the proper sense-organs—the bodily organs in which the parts of the soul enter or these parts themselves. When it was decided in favour of the first possibility, one came to the conclusion that the sense-organs must have originated out of the elements—a solution which numerous doctrines and systems have, as a matter of fact, selected. When the decision turned out in the case of the second possibility, one was compelled to derive the sense-organs out of the soul. This way has been chosen by our doctrine. But an unclear intermediate solution was no more tolerated.

Of the psychical organs themselves the knowledge (buddhiḥ) represents a new creation. It is evidently created out of the self-evident quality of the soul, and here we meet with the same process which we have considered already in the period of the Upaniṣads, with regard to thinking (manah). In the Fire-doctrine of the Upaniṣads, there appears knowledge which, according to the schools concerned, is designated by different names vijnānam, prajñā, and evidently also buddhiḥ or matiḥ, as earlier, the thinking (manah) appears the essential quality of the Ātmā. And just as thinking (manah) was designated gradually as a concrete process, when it could be united with the continually abstract comprehension of the Ātmā, and
was therefore included on the side of the psychical organism, the same occurred also with knowledge. Also this was enrolled among the psychical organs. This was first the case in our doctrine and the same development of knowledge (vijnânam) occurs also, as we shall still see, in the oldest Buddhism and in the Sâṅkhya. The original connection of knowledge (Buddhiḥ) with the Ātmā shows itself in our text but therein, according to the text, it is the knowledge (buddhiḥ) in which the Ātmā becomes knowledge and perceptible.54

The new comprehension of knowledge (buddhiḥ) as a psychical organ led, indeed, to further inferences. There arose the necessity to precisely demarcate its role in the complex of the remaining psychical organs. When this attempt succeeded, it was retained as a psychical organ. There partly developed the inclination to build a ladder of rungs of the psychical organs still further. A beginning towards it shows itself in our text in the fact that in some verses, knowledge (jñānam) appears interpolated as the first emanation of the Ātmā between the soul and the discernment (buddhiḥ). There were also the doctrines which found discernment (buddhiḥ) as a psychical organ superfluous and therefore limited themselves to the thinking-organ (manaḥ) alone. We shall have to get acquainted with such doctrines still in the course of our presentation.

A further important change shows itself inside the psychical organism in our doctrine with regard to the place of the thinking organ (manaḥ). While this thinking organ appears in the doctrines of the older Upaniṣads as one of the life-forces on the same level with the remaining ones, it is in our text raised above the complex of the sense-organs and is placed as a central organ over them. As the character of the sense-organs was known more and more clearly, more and more distinctly their difference from thinking became evident; the thinking organ in contrast to them was not restricted to fixed objects and is not directly dependent on the sense-impressions. This shift in the position of the thinking-organ which was effected did not restrict itself to our doctrine but penetrated almost in general into the other doctrines.

Indeed, this shift led to further consequences. Just as in the case of discernment (buddhiḥ), it was also considered necessary
in the case of the thinking organ (manah) to define its new position more exactly. It led partly to the fact that, just as in the later Sāṃkhya system, definite functions were ascribed to it viz., wishing and reflection. Partly it was also a mediating organ. In the rest of our doctrine, it is noticeable that the ability of the thinking organ to think or to know is especially emphasised and that it plays a special role in the attainment of Delivering Knowledge. With this it will be better to deal in a section about the Yoga.

And now we come to the last and perhaps the most important change within the sphere of the psychical organism—the change in the comprehension of the sense-organs. Out of the life-forces of the Upaniṣadic period there have come in our doctrine the regular sense-organs and that is, in the usual number, five. This number five here, however, is of special importance because its fixing succeeds within a wider frame and is based more deeply in this way. The number five of the sense-organs is derived, for instance, out of the number five of its objects and this again is brought into contact with the number of the elements. According to our doctrine, there are five elements namely, the earth, the water, the wind, the fire and the ether (ākāsaḥ) and every one of these elements possesses its own characteristically occurring quality (gunaḥ), the earth the smell, the water the taste, the wind touchability, the fire visibility, and finally the ether the sound. To every sense-organ, there corresponds now as object one such quality which can be perceived only through this organ and every such quality clings to a definite element to which alone it is due.

It is obvious that here we meet with a uniform conception, a single thought-creation, which is characterized by regularity and harmony and which does not hesitate to exercise power over things for the sake of this harmony. Because the acceptance of the fifth element, of ether, distinctly owes its origin to the necessity to assign to the object of the fifth sense-organ its own bearer. We find, for instance, in India of the ancient period, firstly a start made with the widespread and obvious doctrine of the four elements. The basic thought of our doctrine, however, necessarily demanded besides the five sense-organs and their five objects also five elements whose qualities formed these
five objects. There remained, therefore, no other alternative but to bring in a fifth into the already known four elements. Of the five objects of the sense-organs, four easily allowed the qualities to get connected with them, viz., smell, taste, touchability and visibility. Now there remained the sound and it was therefore considered necessary to find a bearer for it. With this aim, the old idea of the world-space (akasa) was traced and seized upon; the world-space was imagined to be a material substance in the ancient times. It was stamped as an element and sound was ascribed to it as a quality. With this, however, our doctrine has enriched the philosophical thought-wealth of India with a characteristic idea. Because the number five of the elements has almost incessantly prevailed. And the world-space (akasa) which we now wish to name as an element in contrast to the later emerging pure space-idea of ether, is almost everywhere as the fifth element, the bearer of sound.

The enumeration of the sense-organs and the sense-objects, however, in no way exhausts the importance of the doctrine. It also plays an important role in the doctrine of Deliverance. As we have, for instance, seen, while reproducing the doctrine of our texts, the contact of the sense-organs with their objects is one of the main causes for the entanglement of the soul in the cycle of transmigration and its annulment is the unconditional pre-requisite for the attainment of the Delivering Knowledge. With this the doctrine of Deliverance has widened its important idea. Still, the question simultaneously raises itself as to the impetus which gave origin to this idea. According to my view this question is to be answered as follows: Already in the period of the Upanishads, ignorance was in no way assumed to be the only cause for the entanglement in the cycle of transmigration. In the latest form of the Fire-doctrine which, for example, especially resembles our text, in the great conference of Yajnavalkya with Janaka, the King of Videha, the bondage and Deliverance are made dependent on desire and desirelessness. For the stimulation of the desire, however, the connection of the sense-organs with the sense-objects is considered as decisive, just the annulment of the connection is considered for the removal of the same. Because, through
the contact comes the origination of sensations and feelings which awaken the desire. Thus the role of the connection between the sense-organs and the objects for the bondage and the deliverance of the soul becomes understandable. The essential cause for the entanglement in the cycle of transmigration is the desire through which it is conditioned.

In our text, these connections are not clearly expressed. But the consciousness of it is present. It is shown already therein that in one of the most important passages, which deal with the connection between the sense-organs and the objects, the decisive keyword 'thirst' (ūrṣah) occurs. Because this expression designates with entire speciality the fateful Desire which leads to the bondage of the soul. Besides, there is found, as we shall still see, a striking parallel to the views of our text in the doctrine of the oldest Buddhism. Also therein appears, besides the ignorance (avidyā), the desire designated as thirst (ṭhērā) as the original cause of entanglement in the cycle of transmigration and this thirst originates through the contact (sparśah) of the sense-organs with the sense-objects and the sensation (vedānā) springing out of it. And in the case of the way to Deliverance, the most important condition for the successful effort towards the Delivering Knowledge is, likewise, the withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects.

In this way, the role of the connection between the sense-organs and the sense-objects in the doctrine of Deliverance is clarified and justified on significant grounds. Indeed, there stand two original causes for the bondage of the soul—ignorance and desire—one beside the other; their connection with one another needs clarification. This clarification has in older Buddhism, as we shall still see, rather presented difficulties. The solution of our text is clear and simple. In accordance with it, the contact of the sense-organs with the sense-objects causes the disquiet and the turbidity of knowledge, impairs consequently the ability for knowledge and hinders the attainment of the Delivering Insight.

Thus are described in their largest measure the most important new views which our text contains. The doctrine of the transmigration of the soul brings forth nothing essentially new. That the course of transmigration and the constitution
of re-embodiment or re-birth is determined by good and bad actions (karma) is by this period an already generally held valid view. It is only to be mentioned that the actions themselves cling to the thinking organ (manah) and that so far as they disturb the Delivering Knowledge they are of importance for the process of Deliverance. With the fine body which accompanies the soul in its transmigration through the different embodiments, corresponds in our doctrine the psychic organism which the Atma allows to issue out of itself. Very remarkable, however, are the views about the process of Deliverance. According to our text, the delivering knowledge is, for instance, gained through the direct view of the Atma. In this case the most important consideration is as to how this direct view of the Atma comes about. We confront here, for instance, for the first time, a complex of ideas which belongs to the most original thoughts which the Indian Philosophy and Religion exhibit and which is united with the name of Yoga. This complex of ideas requires, however, in consonance with its importance and originality, a detailed treatment. We shall, therefore, in a separate section at the end of this chapter, present the first beginnings of Yoga and the form in which it appears in the doctrines of the Epic; there we shall then express the comprehension of Yoga as represented by our text.

Thus the conversation between Manu and Bhraspati contained in the doctrine is described. It is, as already said, especially characteristic for the steps of development of Indian Philosophy reached in the older Epic Texts and can therefore be considered as valid, as a typical example of these texts. In contrast to it, there are two texts which we wish to deal with conjointly with the Manu-Bhraspatisamhāda through the remarkable speciality which they bring.

The Questions of Śuka:—The first of them to which we shall now turn, forms the beginning of a series of instructions which Vyāsa, the legendary author of the Mahābhārata communicates to his son Śuka upon the questions from the latter; they there carry the name of 'the questions of Śuka' (Śukānupraṣṇa). The same text has also been taken over as an introduction in the famous law book of Manu but it is there changed through being remodelled in the sense of the Sāmkhya doctrine. Its contents form a doctrine of World-
ages and of world-creation and world-destruction which recur regularly at intervals.

It is to be assumed from the first that such a doctrine throughout brings forth nothing new, but that at least it is traced back to old suggestions and many times utilizes the old good points. As a matter of fact, that has been the case with our text. Especially this holds good of the doctrine of the world-ages. Just like the Greeks and the Romans, the ancient Indians also know, for instance, of the idea of a series of world-ages which follow one another and become worse and worse, until the most unsatisfactory age emerges, in which we live. Here lie before us very old ideas and the agreements with them are numerous. Also the number four of the world-ages is the same.\(^8\)

The first place is taken in the Indian tradition by the age \textit{Krita} as it is taken among the Greeks by the Golden age. It is the happiest age. In it, men live the longest lives. They know no disease and death implies for them no terror. They die after a life's duration of four hundred years according to their wish. The origin of the offspring occurs through a mere wish. The life of man runs calmly and happily. They know no sorrow and no hatred. All their plans succeed. It is the ancient age of truth and righteousness. Law and justice exist in them to the fullest extent with all their four quarters. There is no aggrandizement through injustice. For punishment one word is sufficient: ‘Fiel!’. Above all, religion and piety rule in full measure. The Vedas are completely known and there is no difference of opinion about their comprehension. The prescribed sacrifices are performed in consonance with the directives in that behalf and the rules for the different castes and the stages of life (\textit{āśramāḥ}) are conscientiously observed. In this age, the highest duty of man is penance (\textit{tapāḥ}).

In the next age which carries the name of \textit{Treta}, deterioration already sets in. Men live only three hundred years and are begotten not through mere wish but through contact. Law and justice already dwindle by a quarter. In its place come injustice, theft, untruth and deceitfulness. As punishment, censure or blame takes place. Also faith and
piety begin to dwindle. The knowledge of the Vedas becomes defective and uncertain. The sacrifices are no more conscientiously performed as in the Kṛta-age and the directions for the castes and the stages of life are no more exactly followed. It leads to the origin of the barbarous people. Hand in hand with the deterioration of men, there goes on also the deterioration of the environment. The strength of the earth and water, of plants and cattle begins to deteriorate. In this age the highest duty of man is knowledge.

In the following age, the age called Dvāpara, the general deterioration is on the increase. The life-duration lowers down to two hundred years. The procreation follows through begetting. Law and justice dwindle more and more and consist of only two quarters. The punishment comes into use according to the abilities of persons. The highest duty of man in this age is the sacrifice.

Finally, there follows the evil Kali age in which we live. The life-duration has sunk to a hundred years. Quarrel, and discord occur, wars break out, everything around is seized by evil. Law and justice consist now only of one quarter, finally dwindling only to a sixteenth part. The men continue to become worse, their vices and crimes become more serious and only through the punishment of death, they can be held under check. Unbelief and godlessness crowd out the Vedas more and more. The sacrificial cult decays. The offences against the duties of the castes and the stages of life become more and more numerous. Only among the Brāhmaṇas, there still holds good the law which was in the Kṛta age. In this age finally the highest task of man is the giving of gifts.

The doctrine of the world-ages is, however, not the only one in which our text is united with an old idea. The same holds good for the doctrine of world-creation and world-destruction. Especially the question regarding the origin of the world urges man towards it from very early times, and the myths which describe the origin of the world belong to the oldest wealth of tradition of the different nations. Similar is the case in India. Already in the Vedic texts, there appear the creation-myths, in a very great number. Indeed some of them must be emphasised. We do not find in India any myth which demanded exclusive
validity. The main part of the Vedic creation-myths are priestly inventions, momentary creations which have not penetrated deep. But there are found also among them genuine ancient good myths—the remnants of the popular myths—which had certainly spread far and wide. To such myth belongs the myth of the Creator-God who arises out of a golden egg and creates heaven and earth out of its shells. There is also the myth of the Lotus which grows out of the primeval waters and the creator-god arises from it. Or there is the myth in which the God in the form of the Boar fetches the earth out of the waters with his tusks. Such and similar myths were before the author of our text and stimulated him in the formulation of the doctrine of world-creation or at least demanded consideration from him.

Similar is the case with the doctrine of world-destruction. Only in this case, the treasure of myths is essentially smaller. But that is no wonder. The question regarding the future fate and the end of the world is less intimate than the question regarding its origin and belongs to a later period. We find, therefore, in the Vedic texts little that belongs to the category. Still the idea of the seven Suns whose flames once burn the earth is certainly an ancient good mythical inheritance. And also the legend of the great flood which once destroys the human generation and occasions the creation of a new one, depends on this complex of ideas and could communicate easily suggestions therefrom.

With such and similar material, therefore, the author of our text formulates his doctrine which yields in its principal features the following picture: The description of a measure of time forms the beginning, according to which the life of different group of creatures is measured and according to which finally the world-ages and the world-periods have been reckoned. According to that measure, the smallest unit of time is the moment (nimesaḥ=about 1/5 second); 15 moments form a second (kāṣṭha i.e. exactly 3 seconds); thirty seconds form a minute (kalā=exactly about 1½ minutes), 30 1/10 minutes form an hour (muhūrtam=48 minutes); 30 hours make a day (ahorātram); 30 days make a month (māsaḥ); 12 months make a year (samvatsaraḥ). According to these units of time, the living-age of different groups of creatures is measured. A day
of 30 hours is a day of man. It consists of a day and a night. The day serves as a period of work and the night of rest. Likewise, a month is a day of the manes (pitaraḥ), the spirits of the ancestors. The bright half of the month (suklapakṣah) in which the moon waxes is their day and serves as a period of activity. The dark half (keśnapakṣah) in which the moon wanes is their night and serves as the time of rest. A year, finally, is a day of the gods. The northward movement (uttarāyaṇam) i.e. the half-year in which the Sun moves towards the north and the day increases is their day. The southward movement (dakṣināyaṇam), the half-year in which the Sun moves towards the south and the day decreases is their night.

Such gods’ days are also the unit according to which the world-ages (yugāṇi) are reckoned and of these consist finally the highest time-units, the world-periods (kalpaḥ) or the days of Brahmā. Thus the duration of a particular world-age is as follows:

The world-age Kṛta extends itself beyond 4,000 years. It is ushered in by a morning-twilight of 400 years. The age Tretā encompasses 3,000 years. Its morning and evening twilights carry each 300 years. The age Dvāpara lasts only 2,000 years with a morning and evening twilight of 200 years each. The age Kali finally extends over merely 1,000 years and its morning and evening twilights are each restricted to 100 years. All the four world-ages together encompass, according to this measure, a time-space of 12,000 years. They together form an age (yugam) of the gods.

A thousand of such ages of the gods make now again a day of Brahmā, which thus lasts for twelve million years. Likewise equally lasts the night of Brahmā. The day is introduced with a world-creation and during its entire duration, the world continues under the continuing alternation of world-ages. The night begins with the world-destruction and during its duration, world-rest prevails. A Brahmā-day and a Brahmā-night together form the world-period (kalpaḥ) with the total duration of 24 million years. This is the highest time-unit, beyond which there is no more time unit. In a permanent series the world-periods roll on. In the mighty time-spaces, there continually alternate world-day and world night. And
there permanently follows the cycle of world-creation and world-destruction.

Now follows in our text the description of the world-creation. When the world-night is at an end, the Brahmā wakes up and allows the world to arise out of itself. First arises out of it the great Being (mahād bhūtam) which is counted still as the unmanifest (avyaktam). Out of this great Being, there springs the thinking (manaḥ) which already belongs to the sphere of the manifest (vyaktam). The thinking is again the origin of the elements. First, there springs out of manaḥ, ether, out of ether the wind, out of the wind the fire, out of fire the water and out of the water the earth. Everyone of these elements possesses one characteristic quality (gunaḥ) the ether the sound, the wind the touchability, the water the taste and the earth the smell. But they possess not only these qualities. Because every element takes over, during its origin, also the qualities of the foregoing element out of which it springs. The wind possesses, therefore, besides the touchability, the sound also, the fire besides the visibility, the touchability and the sound, the water besides the taste, the visibility, the touchability and the sound and finally the earth besides the smell, all the other remaining qualities, the taste, the visibility, the palpability, and the sound.

With this is finished the creation of the basic entities out of which all things are created and then begins the creation of beings and the world. First, there arises the creator-God Brahmā, also named as Prajāpati. He creates the gods, the manes and human beings. He, however, creates also the worlds with everything that fills them, the perishable and imperishable, the movable and the immovable. Finally he creates the Vedas and the sacrifices, the castes and the stages of life. Now begins the end of the world-age which has been described in the already described way and the world-occurrence rolls on until finally after the completion of the prescribed period the world-day comes to an end and with the beginning of the world-night, the world-destruction sets in.

This is carried in the following way: In the heaven, besides the Sun, there arise the seven blazing flames which set the whole world in conflagration, all beings are sacrificed and the fire destroys everything whatever is on this earth until it is
bare like the back of a tortoise. Now the water takes the characteristic quality of the earth, viz., the smell in itself, and through that the earth enters in water. So also the water with its characteristic quality of taste enters the fire, the fire with its visibility into the wind, the wind with its palpability into the ether. The ether with its sound dissolves itself into the thinking, the thinking dissolves into the great Being and finally this great Being also returns back into the Brahma. Thus the whole world vanishes and only the Brahma continues, calm and alone. The world-night breaks in. It lasts still and unmoved until again a new creation ushers in a new world-day.

With this the presentation of our text ends. The author has, as we have already said and expected, remodelled the old material in abundant measure. But he has formulated as a whole something completely new and has introduced important new ideas in many details. Philosophically important, indeed, is only one thing, namely, the doctrine of the elements and the remaining basic entities out of the Brahma. An important advance is made with this doctrine. In the Upaniṣads, we had found, for instance, only myths and priestly speculation on the question of the world-origination. The isolated attempt of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad in the instruction of Śvetaketu by his father Uddālaka Āruṇi to create a creation-doctrine on a philosophical basis did not penetrate and remained without any after-effect. Now there emerges in our doctrine (of Vyāsa) a deeply stamped philosophical doctrine which was supposed to gain important influence very quickly. Though it has not itself proved penetrating and has not found general recognition, it has still strongly operated and above all has gained great importance as a pattern for the creation-doctrine of the Sāṃkhya system. Further it has introduced an important problem anew in the philosophical discussions, though in our text it has not been expressly stated in our doctrine. It is the question of Monism or Dualism. In the Upaniṣadic period, this question had not been formulated and one had not become still conscious of its importance. The question was not raised whether the elements in which the world-soul enters are originally different from it or not and the assumption of attitude towards this question suggested no decisive sign of the different doctrines. The
things, however, changed with the introduction of a fixed doctrine about the world-origination. Now the urgent question necessarily arose whether the total world of phenomena is to be traced to a single fountainhead or whether we have to assume more first principles and the decision in this or that sense gained for the different doctrines great importance. Our doctrine (of Vyāsa) has chosen the first possibility. And it was of great consequence and importance that the Sāṁkhya system decided in favour of the second possibility.

If we consider the series of entities as they individually arise forth out of the Brahma according to our doctrine, there arise no special questions and difficulties. The great Being (mahād bhūtam), is, as related doctrines distinctly show, the great self (mahān ātīmā), i.e. the earthly soul. And we have already, in the presently described doctrine, mentioned the emerging inclination in this period which distinguishes the embodied soul from the Brahma. It is designated as the unmanifest (avyāktam) i.e., according to the explanation contained in the epic texts, it cannot be comprehended with the senses and is not subject to old age and death. As the next entity, there follows the thinking organ (manak). This is communicated to us by earlier doctrines. It is counted already as belonging to the sphere of the manifest (vyāktam); it, therefore, belongs to the perceptible world of phenomena. It deserves consideration that the thinking organ here appears as the only psychical organ and that there is no attempt to separate the psychical functions according to the organs. Out of the thinking organ, the next entity which arises is the ether. The sense-organs are not mentioned and we must, therefore, assume that, according to our doctrine, they are derived out of the elements. Then follow the remaining elements in succession—wind, fire, water and earth. This succession depends distinctly on the attempt to produce a ladder from the finest to the grossest elements and has also remained in future the most customary succession. Finally it is noteworthy to mention that here, not as in the dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati or as in other different doctrines, only one characteristic quality is ascribed to each element but that our doctrine represents the so-called Accumulation Theory. According to it, every element possesses,
besides its own special quality, still the total qualities of the foregoing element out of which it has sprung. According to this doctrine, therefore, it is not necessary to explain the manifoldness of the qualities in the different isolated things basically through the mixing of more or several elements but a more number of qualities can be traced back to one element alone. Also the comprehension that to every element only one quality is ascribed, has, just as exactly in the case of such a doctrine, found many adherents in future and we shall again still meet them also repeatedly in the philosophical systems.

The ideas out of which the creation-doctrine of our text is built are, therefore, clear and transparent and after what we have been acquainted with so far with the philosophy of the epic, need no further elucidation. Still the features are not lacking, which lend our text a characteristic stamp. They are: the one single unit of the psychical organ, the formation of the sense-organs out of the elements and the Accumulation-Theory. Special emphasis and consideration are deserved finally by the attempt of our doctrine, to derive not only the elements out of the Brahma but also all other entities and to arrange them in such a way that out of the finest elements gradually grosser elements spring forth until finally the grossest element—the earth—forms the final point of development. This comprehension appears obvious in the case of the arising out of the Brahma. But that another and different way could be followed is shown by the instruction of Śvetaketu in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, according to which the elements directly arise out of the Brahma while the fine or subtle organs—speech, breath and the thinking-organ only spring subsequently or supplementarily out of these elements. But in this point also, our doctrine as against that of the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad had greater effect. While the view of the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad did not show any further effect, our doctrine has already in this point become the prototype for the Sāmkhya philosophy and has consequently given a fillip to the form of the creation-doctrine which was supposed to have won, by far, the largest circulation in the whole of India.

Though the creation-doctrine of our text (of Vyāsa) has taken an essential step forward in further philosophical develop-
ment, it cannot be compared in general importance with the unique basic thought of the doctrine of permanent recurrence of world-periods and the continual alternation of world-creation and world-destruction. This mighty picture of the permanently and uniformly passing days and nights of the Brahma in a gigantic period has stamped itself so impressively on the Indian mind that it has become one of the ideas which have penetrated the total Indian sphere (of thought) almost unceasingly and have found enduring general recognition. Every system of the later period was compelled to accept this idea. And though the views of our texts were not carried through in isolated details, the basic idea was throughout victorious. On this depends the historical importance of our text (of Vyāsa). *The dialogue between Bharadvāja and Bhṛgu*.

We shall now turn to the last text which we wish to describe as an example of epic philosophy, namely, the dialogue between Bharadvāja and the sage Bhṛgu (*Bhṛgu-Bharadvāja-samvādaḥ*). This text is one of comparatively rare examples which are directed to more scientific interest. It has therefore, nothing to offer as purely philosophical. Though similar questions were handled differently in the philosophical systems, the doctrine in this dialogue deserves to be described here. Simultaneously the doctrine (in this dialogue) gives, along with the questions which are raised and original attempts at solution which are proposed, a welcome completion and supplement to the picture of the thought-world of the Indian thinker of that time.

According to the presentation of our text, there is originally only the ether which alone fills the whole universe. Out of it springs first the water “like a second darkness in the first darkness.” Out of the water, the wind presses forth and escapes roaring upwards. While so doing, the wind and water rub against each other and therethrough arises the fire which likewise strives upwards. Wind and fire take away a part of water above while a further part becomes thick and becomes the earth. The fire also thickens and collects itself and gives rise to the stars, especially the Sun. Thus the five element are described, of which everything remaining is constituted.

The five elements are characterized by the following
qualities: The ether through the fact that it allows space, the wind through the movement, the fire through the heat, the water through the fluidity and the earth through firmness. Besides, the characteristic quality of sound is ascribed to ether, the palpability to the wind, visibility to the fire, the taste to the water and smell to the earth. Everyone of these qualities is besides manifoldly arranged. The sound is sevenfold and no doubt, consists of the seven tones of the scale or the gamut. The palpability is twelvefold: warm, cold, agreeable, disagreeable, moist, clean, hard, soft, rough, heavy, light and penetrating. The visibility is sixteenfold: long, short, thick, angular, round, white, dark, red, yellow, dark red, solid, supple, slippery, hard and soft. The taste further is sixfold: sweet, saltish, bitter, acrid, sour and pricking. The smell is ninefold: agreeable, disagreeable, sweet, pricking, musty, suffocating, oily, scratching and pure. It is added that only the ether possesses the characteristic quality of sound alone. The wind possesses, besides the touchability, also the sound. The fire, besides the visibility, the touchability and the sound. The water besides the taste, visibility, the touchability and the sound. And finally the earth besides the smell, the taste, the visibility, the touchability and the sound. Further the identification is noteworthy that the sound which is no doubt the quality of the ether is, however, perceived when it is supported by the movement of the wind. Thus then in general, the elements can mutually strengthen one another in their operations.

Out of the elements, as is already said, are formed all things and all beings, movable and immovable. In this process the elements become the sense-organs of living creatures; the sense-organs accepted are the usual five in number. Just like the elements, the sense-organs exist completely in all creatures, also in plants. That is inferred out of the following considerations: Under the influence of heat, the leaves and blossom of trees fade away. This presupposes that the heat is experienced by the plants. The trees have, therefore, the sense of touch. Violent noises are able to disturb the fruits and the blossoms. The plants, therefore, must also have a sense of hearing. From the kind of behaviour, such as the one by which the creepers wind themselves around the trees
and crawl around on all sides, it is to be concluded that the plants also have a sense of seeing. Because, otherwise, these creepers could not find their way. From the influence which smell and fumigation exercise on the growth of plants, it can be said that they can also smell. Finally, the receiving of humidity through the roots and the influence flowing therefrom on the growth of trees lead to the conclusion that the trees have the ability to taste.

Concerning the presence of all the elements in the plants, the presence of earth and water need no further proof. The presence of ether is inferred from the fact that the plants continually possess the possibility to unfold their leaves and flowers. The ether must therefore be present, which allows them space. The existence of the wind is to be inferred from the sucking up of the water through the roots and the stems. Because without the existence of air, this sucking-operation would not be possible. Finally, as the process of assimilation succeeds through fire and wind, besides the wind, the fire must also be assumed to be in the plants.

Just like the plants, the animals and men are also composed of all the five elements and, no doubt, out of every element, five constituents of the body are each formed. Of the earth, consist skin, flesh, bones, marrow and sinews. The brightness of the body, the anger, the eyes, the warmth of the body and the internal fire of digestion arise out of the fire. Whatever contains hollow space: ears, nose, mouth, heart and bowels: stem out of the ether. The phlegm, bile, sweat, fat and blood spring out of water. And the five winds or breaths in the body depend on the wind.

The most important functions of life in human and animal bodies depend on the wind and the fire. The wind as breath (prāṇaḥ) has, just as the fire of life, its seat in the head and spreads itself from there through the body. Thus it divides itself into five breath-forces or breaths which fulfill different tasks. Besides the proper breath—the out-breath (prāṇaḥ), there stands first the down-breath (apānaḥ). It has its seat in the exit-passage of the bowels and in the opening of the bladder and causes the evacuation of faeces and urine. In the special exertion of strength, the up-breath (udānaḥ) is effec-
tive. The holding, together-breath (samānah) fans the fire in the body and keeps the sap in the body moving. Finally the through-breath (vyānah) works in the joints of the body. As a fire in the body, special mention must be made of the digestive fire. From the mouth to the anus, the bowels (gudāḥ), there extends a channel for nutrition. In it, in the region of the navel, the digestive fire has its seat. It is fanned by the breath which stretching along the body from above is driven back to the exit-passage of the bowels and again strives upwards. Now comes from above through the bowels the fresh nutrition which is digested by the fire and goes further on in a digested form. Through this are obtained sap-juices necessary for the nourishment of the body. In order to carry the sap to the whole body, there serves the system of arteries which pass from the heart to all the directions of the body and serve as channels for the sap of nutrition.

So far extends the main part of our Text which deals with the elements, their qualities, and their effect. The characteristic of these texts is striking. It is the spirit of natural science which here governs, the attempt to create a picture of the external world based on observation and experience. This spirit shows itself step by step likewise, for example, in the case of the origin of the elements. The idea of fire which originates out of the friction of water and wind, of the earth which comes into existence through the thickening (solidification) of water is separated by a gap from the thinking process of the text previously described, namely, the instruction of Śuka, which latter allows an element to arise out of the other out of purely theoretical considerations without further investigation into the why or the how. But in spite of this basic difference, the doctrine of Bhṛgu does not deal with schools which are completely foreign to it and whose development occurs without any connection with one another. It rather shows that the different threads are spun together to and fro. Thus our text of Bhṛgu is already so striking that, according to it, all elements spring out of only one, namely, the ether, without giving deeper reason for it, as in the case of the Ionian natural philosophy of the Greeks. The supposition thrusts itself upon us that a doctrine
after the manner of the already described text, according to which the elements arise forth out of the Brahma, must have served as the prototype. And this supposition proves true. We find, for instance, in our text the traces of the Accumulation Theory; according to it, of the characteristic qualities of the elements which correspond as objects to the sense-organs, one quality, namely, the sound is ascribed to the ether, two qualities—palpability and sound are ascribed to the wind, three qualities—visibility, palpability, and sound are ascribed to the fire. That contradicts the succession of the origination of the elements accepted here, according to which first water arises out of ether and then the wind and the fire spring forth. It, however, stands in accord with the doctrine of the text just described. And though for this doctrine already, the accumulation theory is characteristic, we shall have to see even in it the prototype of our doctrine. It is, therefore, evident that our doctrine in spite of its striking originality represents no remote separate development but that it stands in the middle of the philosophical development of the period.

If we enter more exactly into the details of our doctrine, it is seen that it contains no teachings which are philosophically of great importance. It would suffice, in general, to point out the enlargement of the questions and of interest in them which the doctrine brings within its purview, above all, through the more exact investigation of the qualities of the elements, through the discussion of the questions as to which elements and sense-organs are present in the animals and plants and through the ushering-in of the physiological problem. One point, however, deserves to be specially emphasised and demands a special treatment: this point is the question of the soul.

The part of our text, hitherto dealt with, is as good as purely materialistic. According to it, the total world of phenomena is formed only out of the elements. Also the body of living creatures, inclusive of the sense-organs, consists only of the five elements. Likewise, the most important bodily processes are traced back to the five elements. The doctrine does not know the psychical organ which does not owe its origin to the elements. Above all, however, apart from one or two
fugitive suggestions, there is no mention of a soul and the Brahma-idea is not also expressed. The question of the soul is broached only in the last part of our text to which we must now turn.

This part is sharply apart from the main part already dealt with and operates as a supplement. From the point of contents it is important; but unfortunately in its positive part it is strongly corrupted so that no full clarity can be reached. This part of the text begins with an unusually sharp attack of Bharadvāja against the view that there is a soul. Starting from the doctrine already described, Bharadvāja asks what meaning the assumption of a soul (jīvaḥ) has, when the most important bodily functions are fulfilled by wind and fire, when the processes of perception and knowledge depend on the sense-organs formed out of the elements. 'Also the death ensues through the disintegration of the body into the elements: for example, through the interruption of breath, the wind vanishes or through the interruption of the supply of nutrition, water and fire vanish but not because a soul departs from the body. Also in death or in the disintegration of the body, a soul is not to be perceived. But if no soul survives, for whose benefit, then, will the religious merit be? Or how will anybody return to a new life?'

Bṛgu, thereupon, explains first the survival of the soul by means of a comparison with the flame of which the fuel is burnt out. Just as according to a very ancient Indian idea, in such a case the element of fire does not vanish but remains only unmanifest or invisible, the same case is with the soul after death. Then Bṛgu justifies the assumption of the soul on the ground that it is that which knows through the sense-organs and experiences. The soul receives, therefore, the name of the thinking principle (mānasah). About its constitution nothing precise is expressed; only once it is designated as the thinking fire (mānasa'gniḥ). The soul tarries in the body, supported by the bodily fire and breath. To the usual knowledge it remains unknowable. Only the wise are able to see it in the state of meditation. This is all what a corrupted text with much admixture can allow us to gather with some certainty.

According to this part of our text, the existence of a soul
is to be acknowledged. About its nature and operation, nothing special is known so as to be expressed. That it represents a knowing principle, is for that period already a self-evident hypothesis. The designation as a thinking principle (mānasah) or as a thinking fire (mānasognīti) is rather ancient and reaches far back and reminds us of an early step of development of the Vedic Fire-doctrine. But one thing is important though the condition of the text does not allow it to come forth with the distinctiveness that is desirable. Here there is mention only of an individual soul. The idea of the world-soul, the Brahma, plays no role. This holds good, above all, in the case of the polemic of Bharadvāja. But it is also true with regard to the answer of Bhṛgu at least so far as the text appears reliable and does not consist of admixture. The phraseology also corresponds with that. The soul is here called, not as in the texts of the Upaniṣads or in the doctrines related to them, the Ātmā, the self but it is designated as the life or the individual soul (jīvaḥ). With this enters into our field of vision an idea of the soul which is very ancient and which plays an important role in the philosophical development of India but which, through the fault of one-sided tradition, completely disappears out of the range of sight in the Vedic period.

The idea that in every man a separate soul dwells and these numerous individual souls are completely different from one another is very ancient and obvious. To consider the individual souls as part of the world-soul is later and only a result of Vedic development. It comes about through the fact that the soul is interpreted as a part of life-bearing element which has its own sphere outside of man. The victorious penetration of the Vedic development, its supremacy by itself alone in the mass of tradition of the Vedic writings awakens now the delusive impression as though this had been the only authoritative idea in Indian philosophy of that period. Now is seen in our text a survival of that other ancient idea. Likewise, we shall find in the next chapter on Jīnism a doctrine which is built on the same idea. And it would be absurd to wish to assume a decay and new revival of this idea. We must presuppose that besides the doctrine of the world-soul, the Ātmā or Brahma predominating in our tradition, the assumption of
numerous souls different from one another had continually its adherents in India and was represented by many schools. And we shall still see that the same view also plays an important role in the rise of the later philosophical systems. And if our doctrine (of Bhrgu) offers to us in the sphere of Epic philosophy an example of the direction of development so little comprehensible in the rest of the tradition, the part of its importance does not depend in the least upon it.

If we now summarize, in short, what is, in their entirety, yielded by these considerations regarding the assessment of our text, we can say as follows: It is characteristic of the doctrine that the chief interest holds good in the case of the material world with which it more exhaustively occupies itself, than is customary among the texts of this circle. Hand in hand there goes with it the absence of the Brahma-idea in place of which there stands the old simple idea of the numerous individual souls. On this account, our text is a valuable example of an important development the importance of which is not on that account less because it is rarely realized during the description of the origin of the philosophical systems.

With this we can now conclude our treatment of the texts of the Moksadharma. Because, with the texts which are to be considered as the first steps of the Sāmkhya system and into which we must enter while presenting this system, the fragments already described give a sufficient picture of the philosophical doctrines in the period of the old heroic Epic. It must still be added that these philosophical texts form in no way the total contents of the Moksadharma. The Moksadharma contains, besides these, still an abundance of other things, old stories and legends, instruction about religious duties, about withdrawal from the world and renunciation, narrations about the value of the murmuring of prayers, about the power of penance and similar other things. But we can pass over all this because it does not stand in close connection with philosophical development. Only into one phenomenon we must closely enter, the phenomenon which confronts us for the first time in a clear recognizable manner and which belongs to the most original one that the religious life of Indians has brought forth, namely the Yoga. Yoga, according
to its nature, no doubt does not belong in the sphere of philosophy. But it has entered into so close a connection with the different philosophical doctrines and systems and has so strongly influenced the philosophical thought in many important points that its presentation even at least in its main features is indispensable. We shall therefore describe here the beginnings of Yoga so far as they are knowable from the Mokṣadharma texts. Later on, we shall be compelled to come back to it, while handling all other systems in which it has found a firm place. But above all it will be more exhaustively described during the presentation of the Yoga system which philosophically forms a branch of the Sāṃkhya school and in which the Yoga has preserved its distinct stamp.

The Yoga.—But first of all, what is the Yoga? By Yoga, the Indians understand that it is an attempt to attain the releasing knowledge or the Release itself by means of a systematic training of the body and spirit for inner composure through direct insight and experience. It is, therefore, no doctrine but a method and can, as such, enter into connection with different doctrines.

Regarding the origin of Yoga, it may be said that Yoga represents a typical Indian phenomenon which has grown well in the Indian soil. It has been attempted to trace it in its roots in Shamanic ecstasy and to connect it with penance (tapāḥ) which played so great a role in the Vedic thought-world. But the ascetic who gathers in himself magic fervour through fasts and self-mortification is, in spite of its contact with Yoga in some particulars, separated far by a gap from a Yigin who strives to see the highest in his restful inner composure. Above all, in the consciousness of an Indian, penance (tapāḥ) and Yoga have always remained two different things which are not mixed with one another. It is right that the Yoga is named sporadically only late in the Upaniṣads, while penance appears already in the earlier layers of Vedic literature and has taken much space. But it proves no causal connection. The ground for it is to be sought elsewhere. Just like the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, the Yoga has come late and by a detour in the Veda.—And that is intelligible. The penance and the power of magic gained through it lay closer and
more intimate to the magic thought of the Vedic sacrificial priests and inserted themselves easily and fruitfully into their thought-world. The Yoga, on the other hand, with its striving after Releasing Knowledge, stood far away from the magic world of the Vedic sacrificial cult and had for the priests, who in their Vedic texts already possessed the last and the highest revelation about everything, no further interest. It is accordingly characteristic that the Yoga has gained no significance in the late Ritualistic Philosophy of the Mīmāṃsā.

Yoga announces itself—naturally where its place is—in the old Upaniṣads. He who reads Śāṇḍilya’s teaching already cited in the so-called Śāṇḍilya hymn—and allows himself to be affected by its strength of feeling and rapture of speech, will feel that it is not theoretical knowledge which is communicated here but that it is a mighty experience under the impression of which the author stands. Because when it is said during the description of the Ātmā: “This my Ātmā in the interior of the heart as small as a rice-corn or a barley-corn or a millet-corn or a core of the millet-corn. He is golden like the light without smoke. This my Ātmā in the interior of the heart is greater than the heavens, greater than this world”, it is not a theoretical thinker who speaks here. It is a mystic who describes what he has experienced and seen and that is what is the most important. In the same way and almost in the same words, the Yogi of the Mokṣadharma describes his sight of the Ātmā.

Thus it is said in one of the passages⁶⁴: “Then the Brahma shines forth like a blazing smokeless flame, like the resplendent Sun. Like the lightning-fire in the firmament, the Ātmā then appears in his self.” And one verse further (wherein it is said), “The unborn, the ancient, never-aging, the permanent one who can be perceived during the perfect calm of the senses and who is smaller than the smallest and greater than the greatest is seen by one who is the master of the Ātmā through his Ātmā.” There can remain no doubt that it is the same kind of mystical experience which the author of the Śāṇḍilya hymn and the author of the Mokṣadharma Texts describe. And this description of the Śāṇḍilya hymn is no doubt something rare, but it is not the only descrip-
tion of this sort which we find in the older Upaniṣads. For instance, it is said in a passage of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad⁴⁵ : "The form of this Puruṣa is like a (yellow) saffron-garment, like a white sheepskin, like a (red) Indra-gopā insect, like a white blooming lotus when it suddenly shines forth." We need conclude that Yoga was already known to the thinkers of the Upaniṣads and its knowledge was gained not only through theoretical thinking, but in part it depended on the direct sight and mystical experience of Reality in Yoga.

When we turn now to the texts of the Epic, we find here the Yoga already far wide-spread and the texts which occupy themselves with it are so numerous that it is possible to gain a pretty good picture of the steps of development which Yoga had reached in the period of the Epic. In many texts, it appears right ancient and the descriptions which are given are smooth and simple. The Yoga experience, itself, is explained as a view of the Ātmā which proclaims itself as a shining of light, just as we have seen already in the Śāndilya-hymn. And the comparison with a smokeless flame or the lightning recurs again and again. About the way, how this experience can be realized, it is said that it depends on withdrawing the senses from the objects and on bringing the thinking to rest. It is described in the text as follows: 'One should roll together the group of the five senses and lock them up in thinking (manah).’ "As the tortoise again withdraws in itself the limbs which it had stretched out, so should one hold together the sense-organs through the thinking (manah)."⁶⁶ "One should not comprehend the sound with the ear, nor experience the touch through the skin or know the form with the eyes nor the taste with the tongue. One should also abstain from all experiences through the smell".⁶⁷ And one should sit like a log of wood. Because, if a rent or a crack occurs in one of the five senses, then the knowledge flies away through it, as the water flows away out of the lower end of a hose.⁶⁸ Especially is described the difficulty which lies in bringing the thought completely to rest. Because, "as a moving drop of water on a leaf moves to and fro on all sides, so also the thinking. Even when it is brought to rest for a moment to a certain extent and comes to a stand-still on the way of medi-
4. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EPIC

...tation, it will again ramble forth as if on the path of the wind, being comparable to the wind. But one must not relax in his efforts but must hold fast to them "like the fish that kills another bad fish." Because only when one brings to a standstill the thinking and the group of the five senses in this way, can the Yoga lead to success.

This is all what the ancient texts of the Mokṣadharma have to say about the Yoga. What they say is clear and simple. And no doubt it is the frequent old simplicity which confronts us here, in order to express what is essential.

The essential steps of the Yoga contained in the described Epic Texts are namely; (i) closing of the impressions of the outside world (ii) the suppression of the thinking process (iii) and finally the emergence of real Yogic experience on the shining forth of the Ātmā. It was not easy to bring in more. Mysticism is difficult to teach and to fit in a system. But the Indians would not be Indians if they had not attempted to understand Yoga theoretically and to erect a regular edifice of its teaching. And besides, a practical urgent need demanded a further formulation of the teaching. Because with the given directions, only a clever scholar could reach the desired goal. But he who did not possess such talents must necessarily require further instructions and guidance, as to how he is to behave and practice in order to gain the ability and fitness to reach the highest aim. In this way a fillip was given to the further building up of Yoga which, corresponding to what has been said, took a course in two directions: Partially it was attempted to understand Yoga rationally and to prove it theoretically. On the other hand, Yoga-praxis was built further systematically to create in a disciple through gradual aim-conscious preparation and training a fitness to attain the highest experience.

Concerning the theoretical explanation of the Yoga processes, the question with which one was occupied was: through what is the Ātmā known? The attempt at solution raised two possibilities into consideration—that the Ātmā knows itself or that it is known through a psychical organ. Indeed, of these two attempts at solution, one restricted oneself to setting up this or that assumption. A derivation from observation or
justification on grounds is never attempted. It is only reserved for the later time. Already in the case of the first of the two possibilities already mentioned, it is merely taught that the Yogi "sees the highest permanent Ātmā through his Ātmā, "that he illuminates or lights up his subtle self through his self". This stands in contradistinction to the teaching of the old Upaniṣad that the knower himself cannot be known. But this difficulty was not further faced. Only in later systems, as we shall see, an attempt was made to defend the self-knowledge of the Ātmā and to support it by means of examples or reasons.

In the case of the second assumption that the Ātmā is known through a psychical organ, it was further to be considered through which of the psychical organs it is known. Among the doctrines which recognize the thinking (manaḥ) as the only psychical organ, the decision was simple. And it came about that the Yoga-praxis (Yoga technique) reckoned only with one organ, namely, with the thinking organ and it in no way led to the assumption of a further organ. As a matter of fact, the classical Yoga-system presupposes only one organ in its practical parts, though theoretically, corresponding to the Sāṁkhya system it knows three psychical organs. Accordingly in the Mokṣadharma texts, it is most frequently assumed that the Ātmā is known through the thinking-organ (manaḥ), that "it is the torch of thinking with which he is viewed as the world-creator, as he stands there beyond the great darkness, himself not caught by that darkness." And this assumption appears to have governed the thought so preeminently that in the doctrines themselves which reckon with more than one psychical organ, this assumption was retained, although the knowing organ (buddhiḥ), which usually stands beside the thinking, is arranged or placed as a superior organ higher than it.

The already described dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati offers an interesting example. Besides, there is found the doctrine that the knowing organ (buddhiḥ) comprehends the Ātmā. Because, "as a garment covered by darkness is seen with the help of a lamp, so can man view the Ātmā with the lamp of the knowing organ (buddhiḥ)." These are, in essentials, the thought-processes in which the theoretical explanation of the Yoga moves itself in the Mokṣadharma texts.
Essentially greater are, on the other hand, the advances in the development of the shaping of the Yoga-praxis. The development extended itself in three ways: Firstly, a universal or general preparation through moral conduct was demanded. Secondly, one occupied oneself with the direct external(formal) preparations for the Yoga. Thirdly, the practice of concentration was set up and directions given, as to how real, proper concentration is to be gradually and step by step brought about.

The directions for moral conduct are of universal kind and have nothing special about them. As an example of the sort of directions the following passage may suffice: it runs as follows 24: "Meditation, study and gifts, truthfulness, modest bashfulness, straight-forwardness and patience, purity, refinement in conduct, bridling of the senses—these are the means through which his strength increases and he keeps off the evil away from himself. Then his wishes go into fulfilment and his knowledge advances forward. Free from sins, full of energy, moderate in food, master of his senses, lord over his passionate desire and anger, he may strive after the abode of Brahma." In the remaining part it may be mentioned that five hindrances (dosāh) of Yoga are named, which must be, above all, overcome: they are, namely, passion, anger, greed, fright and sleep. 25 This is the evidence of later attempts to systematize this subject which has already made its start here.

Concerning the external preparation for the Yoga, there is always again and again recommended moderation in food. Several exhaustive directions are given about the constituents of food which the Yogi is supposed to take for himself. As place for the Yoga-practices, one should choose mountain-caves, lonely sanctuaries, deserted houses, or the foot of a tree. As a favourable time for meditation the hours before and after midnight are named. One has to abstain from Yoga during the meal-times, and during evacuations. The regulation of breath is pointed out as a preparatory practice for Yoga. Exact directions are not given. The complicated directions of the later periods about the sitting postures of the Yogi and the formal practices of breath, which, later on play so great a role, are missing in the texts of the Mokṣadharmaka.

And now the most important, the proper Yoga-practices
themselves. The nearest and the most obvious was that, in order to help and point out to the pupil, the teacher described to him his own experiences and sensations in the condition of meditation, and tried to lead him on the same way. We find a good example of this in the description of the steps of meditation in Buddhism. But such experiences were too often ascertained to be personal. What the pupil required most, namely a definite comprehensible starting point, was, many times, found missing. So one was compelled to seek other means of help. In the later texts of the Mokṣadhārma we find accordingly systematic training practices cited, such as the later Yoga knows. There is a mention of the fettering (dāranāḥ) of the thinking-organ. By that is evidently meant, as in the later Yoga-system, the concentration of thought on a particular object.76 Further ten or twelve drives or impulses (codanāḥ) are spoken of, which, however, are not explained in closer detail.77 But the most important is the following: For systematic concentration-practices, there were chosen objects which were arranged step-wise (or step after step) and were placed before the pupil for continually higher and higher tasks. This was attained through the fact that objects, beginning from the Elements, were defined as continually rising to higher and higher spheres to which the aspirant pupil had, as it were, to raise himself (in meditation) until he had become finally ripe for the view of the Ātmā itself. Most favourable was the layout or condition of the doctrines which knew a world-creation through the evolution of the Elements and all the remaining entities as arising out of the Brahma. In the case of those doctrines, the desired-for ladder of the spheres or the entities which finally led to the Brahma was prescribed in the series of evolution and therefore, the directions for the Yoga-practices were joined to the series. These provided the aspirant pupil with the palpable starting-points which he had sought and towards which he could direct his practices and assess his progress. This kind of Yoga-practices arranged stepwise according to the spheres or entities in evolution was therefore very popular and there were assembled on that account numerous experiences and results which were then laid down in the texts of the doctrine. Of this sort is especially the following:
On the different steps of meditation, wonder-phenomena appeared to project themselves. Above all, one believed that he could see the godly form. It became easy to set in connection particular phenomena with particular steps of meditation. Besides, the mastery over the different spheres or entities in the evolution gave the feeling that one possessed supernatural powers. Soon there emerged the texts which describe the supernatural powers of the Yogi. It is said that ‘a Yogi, whose energies are inflamed, is able to parch the whole world like the Sun during world-destruction; that the frightening advancing death has no power over him; that he is able to divide his self a thousand-fold and can wander through all the forms of the earth’ and that he can do similar other things. Later attempts at systematization signify the same thing when, for instance, a number of wonderful powers (siddhayāḥ) are cited. And the obvious thought emerged forth to bring the wonderful powers in relation with the nature of the spheres or entities which were mastered. Thus it was taught that he ‘who masters the sphere of the earth gains control over the creative power of the earthly sort and like the unchangeable Lord of creation (Prajāpati) would be able to create creatures out of his body, only with his fingers and his thumb or with his hands and feet; that he has won mastery over the sphere of the wind and can shake the earth wholly above etc.’ Especially remarkable is the doctrine of the fine or subtle body, grown out of Yoga-experiences, which the Yogi can separate from his gross body. It is said occasionally expressly that it is this fine subtle body to which the described wonderful powers are ascribed and not the usual gross body. Finally there remains to be mentioned an important thought which appears forth in the Mokṣadharma texts. The assumption of the mastery over different spheres by the Yogi led to the idea that the Yogi assimilates with these spheres and enters into them. But in the case of the schools which represent the evolution-theory, it signifies that the Yogi goes through the series of evolution of different entities in a reversed succession or order and leads to the view that the Yogi is able, as it were, to make for himself the creation-process retrograde or in a reverse order and finally to enter the Brahma through the reabsorption of different entities into one another.
This thought or idea, as we shall further see, has become the leading idea of the täntric Yoga.

This is, in a few words, the picture which is produced out of the Mokṣadharma about the Yoga of that period. We find still doctrines of great antiquity which describe in a simple form how through the withdrawal from the impressions of the external world and the suppression of the thinking processes, the direct view of the Brahma is to be reached. But we find beginnings and starts made for the further formulation of Yoga and they are, no doubt, beginnings towards different directions. But what is most characteristic is that they are all, throughout, starts and beginnings. There is no point of which we can say that it is a conclusion and the authoritative formulation which the Yoga in the later systems is supposed to have preserved, announces itself here only in traces. Thus, however, the Yoga of the epic period shows the same characteristic stamp which also characterized the philosophical doctrines of this time.

If we now bring before our eyes, in short, what new things and advances the Mokṣadharma-texts, considered by us, contain, the most important can be summarized somewhat in the following way:

Concerning the doctrine of the Soul, it may be said that the doctrine of the Brahma or the Ātmā has become a firm positive inheritance for many schools. It has thereby suffered no essential changes. The Ātmā-idea was no doubt supplemented with supplementary positive particulars, but no further inferences were drawn out of it. Very important, on the other hand, is the fact that the idea of numerous individual souls has emerged for the first time in the orbit of the doctrines of that time.

Essential advances were made in the sphere of the psychical organism. The idea of the psychical organ was developed and the place of the thinking organ (manaḥ) was fixed as a central organ arranged over the head of all the sense-organs. Besides an attempt was made to introduce a further psychical organ, the knowing organ (buddhiḥ). Nevertheless, this came to no final result and above all the question about the distribution of the functions of different psychical organs continued to remain in a far-reaching uncertainty. The idea of the
sense-organs was, on the other hand, finally clearly formulated and its number five, which later on found almost general recognition, was ascertained for the first time. Also the question, whether the sense-organs are created out of the Ātmā or the elements, was for the first time raised.

Still greater are the advances in the sphere of the doctrine of the elements. It was not only that the idea of the elements was generally created first in this period. One came to the assumption of a fixed number of elements, and we already find here the number five which was taken over by all schools and the systems of the later times. Further one began to include the qualities of the elements in the sphere of investigations and research. The most important is in this case the assumption of the five qualities which corresponded with five sense-organs as their objects and which are characteristic for the five elements. About the distribution of the qualities, different views were formed and held. Partly it was taught that to every element, one of these qualities was ascribed. Partly the accumulation theory was represented, according to which these qualities of the elements dwell in them in the ascending number and, doubtlessly, corresponding to the succession of their origin. In many schools, whose interest was predominantly of a scientific kind, the doctrine of the elements and their qualities was essentially further formulated. Investigation and research were extended in these circles into the animal and the plant-world and into the physiological questions.

The doctrine of periodical world-origination and world-destruction brought in a new idea of more basic importance. This doctrine not only gained general estimation and was built into their systems by all the schools of the later times but it also gave an impetus to enter more closely into the question of world-origination and to replace the old creation-myths by philosophical doctrines. The first attempt of this sort is an Evolution-Theory which allows all entities to arise out of the Brahma. Nothing further came about in the period of the Epic. But the stone was kept therewith rolling and the questions were raised which were supposed in future to have won decisive importance.

In the sphere of the Deliverance-doctrine the idea was further mentioned: an important role was ascribed to the
contact of the sense-organs with the sense-objects in the matter of the bondage and deliverance of the soul and in this way the idea of the removal of the desire or passion was built into the doctrine of Deliverance. Finally with Yoga there entered the most remarkable and important phenomenon of Indian spiritual life in the sphere of philosophy and it begins to affect the theoretical development of the doctrine.

All in all, therefore, one may point to a stately or imposing result of the period of the epic. The ancient mythical ideas which in the Vedic period still play a great role are almost entirely overcome. A series of important ideas is gained and has now presented its final stamp. Also the sphere of objects, with which the philosophical thought occupied itself, is essentially widened. It is no more the question of the bearer of life and of fate after death which almost exclusively ruled the thought but it is more and more the total sphere of the phenomenal world which is included in the circle of consideration and reflection. Besides these great advances, the same period, however, shows also striking insufficiencies and shortcomings. Many important questions were well raised but their importance was not known; it is only the later period in which inferences or conclusions are drawn from them. And above all, the widening of the circle of objects with which one occupied oneself, follows unsystematically, and one might almost say, accidentally and leads therefore to no conclusion. The period of the epic philosophy shows, therefore, the typical features of a transitional period. The conclusion is brought about only by the founding of the different philosophical systems. Still on the way thereto, a mighty step forward is taken and we shall see in the further course of our presentation how the development of the Epic period directly opens into the creation of the oldest of the systems—of the Sāṃkhya. However, before we go over to it, we must turn nevertheless to two doctrines which likewise stem out of the period between the Upaniṣads and the origin of the oldest systems and offer a precious completion of the picture of the transitional period but which beyond this period are supposed to gain an entirely unexpected importance for the later development. They are the doctrines of the Buddha and the Jina.
5. THE BUDDHA AND THE JINA

Both the last masses of tradition arising out of the oral transmission, with which we have to deal now and to which old canonical works of the Buddhists and the Jainas belong are from the point of contents essentially different from the hitherto described masses of tradition. There are again two points which are important for us. While the Vedic Literature and the old Heroic Epic originally have nothing to do with philosophy, which enters into them accidentally through a detour, in the canonical works of Buddhists and Jains, on the other hand, a philosophically grounded doctrine of Deliverance forms the chief contents. The information about both these teachings is incomparably more extensive and detailed than what we have found about any doctrine in Vedic or Epic Literature. Further in both cases of the teachings they go back to the important Personalities of their Founders about whose life and conduct detailed accounts are available. We, therefore, tread, for the first time, on a historical ground. They are the historical personalities with whom we have to do and who become clearly comprehensible to us in their essential features of character. Not only that. The circumstances in which they lived, the life and the drive or the doings of their period—why, the very important political events which have been described meet us in living pictures. The situation is entirely different from the frame of narration of the older Upaniṣads which give legendary forms or from the Epic with its blurred mythical clothing.

These circumstances make it possible to present for the first time a short outline of their external history before the presentation of the doctrines themselves. We can describe the life of their founders and the place, time and circumstances of their origin. Concerning the presentation of the doctrines themselves we can bring much more exhaustive information than it was possible to do in the hitherto described doctrines. In Buddhism we can even ascertain the progress and development in the thought-world of its founder.
Both these masses of tradition give no total picture of the philosophical development of their time. It is only the teachings themselves which are reported in more detail. Opponents' doctrines are occasionally mentioned or combated and very shortly dismissed. For the doctrines themselves, the favourable tradition does not operate, as one would expect from their bulk. But that depends on other causes of which we shall have to speak later.

We begin with the presentation of the Buddhistic doctrines as far more importance is due to them than to the doctrines of Jina. A number of the most important philosophical systems has straight arisen out of the Buddha's teachings. Besides, the condition of tradition among the Buddhists is essentially better than in the case of Jainism.

The Buddhistic Canon: The canon of the holy writings of the Buddhists is 'the triad of baskets', the Tripiṭaka, so named according to the three baskets or collections of which they consist. These are (i) the collection of the rules of the order for the Buddhist monks and nuns—the Vinayapiṭaka (ii) the collection of the teachings of Buddha—the Sūtraṇiṭaka and (iii) the collection of the systematic treatises about the doctrine—the Abhidharmapiṭaka. Of these collections, the Vinayaṭpiṭaka contains some of the oldest parts of the canon like the old confession-formulae (prātimokṣaḥ, P. pātimokko)* for the monks and nuns. But they are philosophically without importance. The Abhidharma-piṭaka is acknowledged to be the latest collection and need not be considered for the presentation of the oldest doctrine. As it forms the starting-point of later philosophical systems, it may be considered better in that connection when they will be described. All the greater is the value of the third collection in the Sūtraṇiṭaka and it is this on which every description of the Buddha and his doctrine in its main contents must be supported. Besides, it is by far

*In the presentation of Buddhism and Jīnism I give the names and the terms originally in Sanskrit. I do this not only for the sake of symmetry but also, because in the later systems of schools which are the most important for the history of Indian Philosophy, it is the Sanskrit that rules. I insert also the many current Pali and Prākṛta forms where they deviate markedly from Sanskrit, with the sign P.
the most extensive. It consists, on its side again, of five collections: the collection of the long texts (Dirghagamaḥ, P. Dīghanikāyō); the collection of the middle texts (Madhyamatāgamaḥ, P. Majjhimanikāyō); the collection of the short texts (Kṣudrakam P. Khuddakanikāyō); and further the collection arranged according to groups (sanyuktāgamaḥ, P. Sanyuttanikāyō); and the collection arranged according to the rising number (Ekottarāgamaḥ, P. Aṅguttaranikāyō). The chief contents of these collections consist of the teachings of Buddha and his pupils. Partly, other texts are also included: Among such are the Songs (Gāthā) of monks and nuns, the famous collection of sayings (Udāna-vargaḥ, P. Dhammapadam), the history of the earlier births of the Buddha (jātakam) and similar other things.

The oldest parts of this canon already originated in the first decade after the death of Buddha in the region in which his teaching activity had taken place and were composed in the so-called Ardhamāgadhi—the language of intercourse in that region. But the Buddhist congregation with its quick growth soon came to a split, formed schisms and sects and with the cessation of the uniformity of the congregation ceased also the unity of the holy tradition. Every sect had its own canon and in course of time deviations of the most different kinds developed in them. Even the outer form also was subjected to changes. The old Ardhamāgadhi canon was translated in the different regions into the dialects of these regions. It was also translated into Sanskrit—the ruling literary language.81

Of all these different forms of canons, only a small part has been preserved. We fully possess only the Pali canon which bears its name after the language in which it was composed. It presumably traces itself back to the community of Kauśāmbi-Mālava in the middle part of India and belongs to a sect of the so-called Sthavira (P. Thera). Besides, in the late period, there have been found extensive remnants of the canons, composed in Sanskrit, of the Sarvāstivādin—a sect which spread itself very much first in North-west India. The canon was composed in Sanskrit. Of the canonical writings of other sects, large fragments have been preserved in Chinese translations e. g. of the Sect of the Mahāsāṃghika and the Dharma-
"guptaka. All these versions of the canon show manifold deviations; new researches have shown that surprising conclusions can be drawn out of these deviations with regard to the history of the old Buddhist order. Still, besides all these deviations, there stands fixed an extensive, common continuity which goes back to the old Ardhamāgadhi canon and inwardly bears the stamp of reliability. The presentation of the oldest Buddhist doctrine can be based on it. The worth of this oldest kernel of tradition is, indeed, impaired through a peculiarity of form which is conditioned by the oral tradition. In the Vedic times, the holy texts, as we have seen, were composed in completely free prose and were preserved through memorizing them and were further continued. Gradually, however, it was realized that the most trained human memory has its limits and the necessity became more urgent to find the ways and the means in order to facilitate the imprinting on memory of greater masses of tradition. Buddhism, therefore, chose the following way: Similar things were narrated according to the same scheme with the same words so that the monk, who had to learn the concerned texts and to transmit them as soon as he possessed this scheme, had been required in many cases to memorise only more individual specialities in the text in order to be able to master the whole of the series of the texts and to recite them. That is especially observable in the case of the Samyuktāgama and the Ekottarāgama. A whole number of similar texts is here summarized into a group. These texts are enumerated in the characteristic verse-form which provided the necessary keyword. And that was sufficient to enable a monk to recite all these texts according to the same scheme.

This peculiarity of tradition is felt to be very disagreeable for the presentation of old Buddhism, as many subjects and, above all, many points in the doctrine, when they are expressed, are presented and dealt with in the same wording. A good example of this is the description of the way of Deliverance proclaimed by the Buddha on which we shall speak exhaustively later on. This theme occurs in numerous texts of Dirghāgama and Madhyamāgama and continually recurs in the same wording in the same section. The result of this is that many important points of the doctrine are only once mentioned,
though, when they are expressed, they recur in the same stiff form. This makes their understanding essentially difficult. The manifold illuminating elucidations, which a subject undergoes through the fact that it is continually considered and described from other sides, are missing. Besides, one stiff formula is often ambiguous and unclear, so that all attempts to explain end finally in more or less probable conjectures.

There remains to say something about the form of the old Buddhistic texts. The form of the old Buddhistic doctrinal texts does not restrict itself to a systematic presentation of the doctrine. On the contrary, exactly as in the other Upaniṣads and the Epic, it is mentioned in every citation of doctrine, as to how it came about and what induced the Buddha to preach the word. A large number of teachings is, therefore, inserted in a living frame of narration, which like those of the older Upaniṣads, deserve to be valued as a precious testimony of the ancient Indian skilful art of narration. This sort of clothing or form has, besides, its special qualification here: Because among the overwhelming qualities of the Buddha belonged his wonderful dexterity to adapt the presentation of his doctrine to his hearers and to affect them from the right side. It is his ability to find the right way (upāyakauśalyam) which has been extolled in the later texts. We are even today amazed at this ability in the narration of the old Buddhist texts. At the same time, it confers this advantage that out of these descriptions we can get, in a richer measure than in the old Upaniṣads, a lively picture of the environment in which the life and teaching activity of Buddha played their part. We hear of kings' courts and nobles' republics, of thriving cities with rich traders and distinguished courtcezans, with magnificent gardens and intoxicating feasts. Besides we also experience the deep religious urge which moves through the time, of the pull towards Deliverance which seized the distinguished circles and drove the young noblemen to leave their homes and to betake to houseless conditions. As signs of the times, we learn of numerous teachers who go preaching through the land with their bands of disciples and of lonely ascetics meditating in the woods and striving for Deliverance. That is the environment in which the Buddha lived. Now we shall go over to that part which enables us to bring his life
itself before our eyes in its prominent features.

The Life of Buddha: According to tradition, the Buddha was born in the year 560 B.C. in Kapilavastu (P. Kapilavatthu) on the southern border of today's Nepal, as a descendant of the distinguished clan of the Śākya. His father who held the office of the king of the clan was called Śuddhodana (P. Suddhodana), his mother was called Māyā. He himself was called Siddhārtha (P. Siddhattho). He led the comfortable life of the distinguished youth of his position, married, when he was grown up, a young maiden named Yaśodharā (who is called in the Pali tradition as Bhaddakaccā) and had from her a son Rāhula (P. Rāhulo). Suddenly in the bloom of his youth, he took the decision to renounce the world and to go into a houseless condition. And so he left his wife and child and became a wandering ascetic in the 29th year of his life.

Later tradition has much to report and has many pretty and impressive stories regarding his youth and his decision to become a recluse and has built many beautiful and impressive legends about them. The old sources are all the more taciturn and very rarely does the Buddha himself speak of his life before his renouncing of the world. Occasionally he mentions that he possessed three palaces—one for the autumn, one for the winter, and another for the summer, where he passed different seasons and in which pretty maidens sang and played before him. He mentions further, how he, becoming conscious of his being subject to old age, disease and death, lost all life's vigour and how he finally “in young years, in blooming youth, in the first freshness of life, allowed his hair and beard to be shorn and shaved and how he, clad in yellow garments, left the home for the wilderness, even though his elders were against it and wept and shed tears.” But such kinds of communication on his part are short and rare.

More detailed is the account of the years of his striving after the illumination. This account can evidently be traced back to Buddha and we can consider it as historical in all essentials. According to that, he, first in his early period of ascetic life joined the two teachers—first Ārāda Kālāma (P. Ālāro Kālāmo) and then Udraka Rāmaputra (P. Uddako Rāmaputto). Both were Yoga-teachers who sought to lead their pupil to higher stages of
consciousness on the path of meditation—Ārāda-Kālāma to the sphere of Nothing (aṅkacanyāyatanaḥ, P. ākincānaññāyatanaṁ) and Udraka Ramaputra to the sphere beyond consciousness and unconsciousness (naivasamjñānāsasamjñāyātanam, P. nevasaṅkūṭasasāṅkūṭayātanam). The Buddha was soon able to reach that goal pointed out by them but did not feel satisfied with it. Therefore he left the teachers and attempted to find the way himself towards the the longed-for Deliverance.

Then follow the years of utmost strain and trouble. Above all, he practised the penance (tapā) which was held in high esteem in India and much loved since old times, to the uttermost limit of his capacity. He restrained his breath to the limit of consciousness and fasted until he was completely exhausted. But all was vain. Finally he realized: “What also the Ascetics and Brāhmaṇas in the past, present and future could have been able to suffer with painful and burning feelings—that is the highest (I have suffered); it does not go further. There must be another way to Illumination”. And he turned away from the penance as fruitless, and took plenty of nutrition again. And now came the great moment. One night on the bank of the small river Naimājanā (P. Neranjara) not far from the village Urubilvā (P. Uruvelā) in the countryside of Magadha, south of Patna, at the foot of an Aśvattha tree, he found the releasing knowledge and came to a certainty of having himself been liberated. This was then the 36th year of his life. Since then he named himself the Buddha.

Some weeks he tarried in that state in which he had found enlightenment, reflecting whether he should communicate the knowledge, which he had found, to men and should emerge as a teacher. Finally he took the decision full of great consequence. In Banaras, he held his first sermon before the erstwhile companions of his life as an ascetic and won the first pupils. The sermon became famous as the sermon of Banaras. With it began his long teaching activity which extended far beyond a generation. Only about the beginning and the end are more exact accounts preserved. The long decades between passed away in the uniformity and timelessness of the life of an Indian wandering monk. He preached before princes and manual workers, before Brāhmaṇas and traders, before ascetics and
court zeans with ever-rising success. When he finally died at the age of 80 in 480 B. C. at Kuśinagarī (P. Kuśinārā) he left behind him not only a well-knit order of monks and nuns but a large numerous community of lay adherents. He could look back on an imposing success of his activity. Still this result or success is only small, compared with the later victorious march of his teaching which was destined to conquer, beyond the limits of India, the mighty land of Asia and also, at the same time, was destined to become the starting-point of the most important creations of Indian philosophy.

The teaching of Buddha: What is this teaching which had such a future? He who expects to find an impressive edifice of philosophic doctrines with revolutionary new thoughts, will be greatly disappointed. What the Buddha proclaimed is no philosophical system but a very simple way of Deliverance underpinned with a few philosophic thoughts. In the teachings of the Buddhistic canons, we see again and again how the Buddha knows to work on his hearers with consummate skill and win them in favour of his doctrine. He, however, does not demonstrate the rightness of his system but he awakens the trustful confidence that the way pointed out by him is the right one. Also the way itself which he shows is not founded on a theory. And it is no wonder. Because he had not thought out and puzzled out his doctrine—but he became the Buddha in a practical way found through his own inner experience. But still it remains striking how strongly the speculation and the theory have been pushed into the background. And the question urges itself, as to how this is to be explained.

Now, I believe, an experience of early years had positively influenced the Buddha. By his time, the inspiring swing of thought of the Upaniṣadic period had already faded away. The plethora of different doctrines had led to the formation of numerous schools. Sceptical doctrines had emerged and the wranglings of different schools had degenerated in fruitless discussion and unedifying and unrefreshing squabbles among the Schools. We get still the echo of this situation in the restrained and reserved descriptions of other opposing schools in the Buddhistic canons. We hear of contradictions of numerous doctrines, of reproaches which the schools had
raised against one another. It is described in strong terms how inside the schools themselves strife and wrangling had come to such a pass that the heads of the school had to stand helpless, wringing their hands against them. The Buddha in the midst of his vehement attempts at Deliverance seems to have been repelled by these drifts and bitter disappointments, which were in store for him, arising out of the fruitless hair-splitting and dialectical pugilistic knock-outs; these must needs have necessarily defined his attitude to all theoretical philosophizing. To it therefore is to be evidently traced the fact that he turned away during his period of search from all theoretical ponderings or musings and turned towards the practical way of the Yoga and penance. Just from these circumstances, therefore, stems his abrupt and harsh denial of all philosophical discussions, in his later years. Out of this denial, finally arose the strong fundamental formation of his attitude which with its systematic elimination of all superfluous speculation has given its characteristic stamp to the oldest Buddhistic doctrine and the teachings of the Buddha.

In the doctrine itself, this elimination of superfluous theory is attained as follows:

In the matter of Deliverance, the negative side exclusively is pushed to the forefront. The Deliverance is not considered as attaining to a condition of blessedness beyond, like the entry into the Brahma but on this side as a release from the shackles of the cycle of transmigration and freedom from the grief of this existence. In this way, the most difficult questions about the soul and condition after death were pushed aside. It remained only to explain the causes of entanglement in the cycle of birth and the possibility of its elimination. But here also superfluous theoretical discussions were avoided. This was possible through the fact that as the way of Deliverance, Buddhism chose not the way of theoretical knowledge but the way of Yoga—the way of direct experience. The Buddha promised all those, who trustfully confided in his lead, to lead them on a way, as the goal of which they were bound to see the truth of the proclaimed doctrines through their own experience. There was, therefore, left no room for the theoretical kind. From the pupil who stood at the beginning of the way, trustful
confidence was demanded. On the other hand, he, who had attained the goal, had seen the truth itself and required no more proof. The incommunicable necessary statements of the doctrines were only to be explained and clarified, but not to be proved and demonstrated.

Finally concerning the teachings of the Buddha: The Buddha represents with inexorable rigour the principle, namely—only to proclaim what leads to Deliverance and dismisses all other questions relentlessly, not because he does not know the answer, but because he knows that they are all useless and take us away from the true goal. Famous is the story in which while he once stayed in the Śīṃśapāvana near Kauśāmbī, he appeared before his pupils with a handful of Śīṃśapā-leaves and directed to them the question whether the leaves which he held in his hand or whether the remaining leaves in the Śīṃśapā forest were more in number. On the pupils’ answer that the leaves in the forest must be more numerous, he said,—“So also, ye monks, what I know and have not proclaimed is also more than what I have proclaimed to you. Why, ye monks, did I not proclaim to you that? Because, that brings no gain, does not promote holy conduct, does not lead to withdrawal from the earthly, to the destruction of Desire, to the cessation of the perishable, to joy, to knowledge, to illumination, to nirvāṇa. Therefore, I have not proclaimed that to you.” In this way, is naturally cut off every possibility of going into the question and the discussion about the nature of the unconditioned absolute thing. To this attitude based on principle, the Buddha held fast unswervingly all his life. If, in spite of this, a pupil approached him with any far-reaching questions, he was superiorly dismissed with a reprimand. To obtrusive questions of outsiders, he gave no answer. He managed to slip away from scorn and ridicule with equanimity.

It is no wonder, then, that such an unconfused attitude, sure of its aim, taken by the superior personality of the Buddha did not fail to impress his environment. This attitude of the Buddha connected with the conscious restriction to the goal of Deliverance has essentially contributed to the early success of Buddhism. Vice versa, it is also understandable that the same attitude was not conducive to the development and growth of philosophical thought.
Thus it comes about that the doctrine of the Buddha contains little that is philosophically important. It essentially restricts itself to a few definite maxims or principles which are fixed, viz., to find the basis for the entanglement in the cycle of births and explain the possibility of emancipation. These maxims appear predominantly in the garb of rigid formulae which are largely obscure or vague and in the matter of explanation offer many difficulties, which depend on the peculiarity of the Buddhistic tradition that recites the same thing in the same rigid form. Still, these maxims are of no small significance and deserve to be explained and described in detail, because they belong to the most original stuff that the oldest period of Indian philosophy has produced and enrich the picture of the Indian philosophy of that time in essential features. Besides they are important for the later development because the important Buddhist systems of the later period were compelled to discuss these holy old formulas and were influenced in essential points in the formulation of their doctrines.

It is said, however, that the picture of old Buddhism would be false and its character would not be understood if we would restrict ourselves only to the description of the philosophically important principles. Because the preaching of the Buddha wished to show, in the first place, the way to Deliverance and the description of this way forms its central core and essential content. The handling of the way of Deliverance is therefore indispensable. It not only sheds more light on the Yogapraxis of those times but the knowledge of this way also forms an essential pre-requisite for the understanding of the later systems and their development. Its treatment within the frame of this present work is, therefore, justified. Therefore I begin the presentation of Buddha’s doctrine, in accordance with its aim and essential character, with the description of the Deliverance way, adding therein the description of philosophical thought processes which serve to establish the way of Deliverance and close finally with an orderly arrangement of the ideas contained in them in a frame which is provided to us by the general philosophical development of that time and by the hitherto described doctrines.

*The Buddhistic Way of Deliverance*: The description of the way of Deliverance itself must be preceded by the following:
As the Buddhists understand it, the Deliverance is, as a rule, attainable to one who has renounced the world and dedicates himself solely to this aim, i.e., to become the monk and the nun. For the Indian, who regards in his entire thought the transmigration of the soul as a self-evident pre-supposition, the decision of procedure is not so urgent. If he cannot decide to become a monk in this birth, he has always still the possibility to create conditions for Deliverance in another existence. Why, it is presupposed that those, to whom Deliverance is attainable in this birth, are enabled to get it because they have acquired the basis for it by untiring striving for it in former births. He who does not feel qualified or competent to become a monk and to direct all his activity to Deliverance alone, has the following possibility. He professes himself as a lay-follower and faithfully finds recourse in the Buddha, his teaching and in the Buddhist Community. At the same time, he accepts the obligations to observe a number of commandments whose observance is possible in worldly life also. He is prohibited from the following: Destruction of life (prāṇātipātaḥ P. (pāṇātipāto); taking what is not given (adattādānam, P. adinnādānam); committing illicit sexual intercourse (kāmamithyācāraḥ, P. kamesumīchācāro); lying (mṛsāvādah, P. musāvādo); giving himself up to the enjoyment of intoxicating drinks (surāmaiśyapramāḍasthānam, P. surāmerayapamāḍasthānam). In other respects, the lay follower seeks to acquire merit through good actions, especially by good actions towards the monk-community. On the ground of this merit, he has the hope to be able to step successfully on the path of Deliverance in the next birth.

For the way of Deliverance, we possess, in the texts of the Buddhistic canons, unusually good and old sources of the teachings of the Buddha, especially in the collection of the long and middle texts; a great number of them end with the fact that the Buddha describes to his hearers the way of Deliverance and this description recurs again and again in the same wording in all the passages. Especially I would therefore unhesitatingly like to ascribe this section which forms a fixed part of the old canonical Text-collection to the oldest strata of Buddhist tradition and make it the basis of the following presentation of the Buddhistic way of Deliverance.
I cite therefrom by way of abstracts, retaining everything essential and omitting, in the least, repetitions, which are characteristic of the canonical text of the Buddha but which are still wearisome and would occupy unnecessary space.

The section begins with a short description of the emergence of the Buddha which begins with the following wording: “There appears the perfect one (tathāgataḥ) in the world, the holy one (arhan, P. araham), the completely enlightened one (samyaksambuddhaḥ P. sammāsambuddho), gifted with knowledge and conduct, the tried one (sugataḥ), the knower of the world, the unsurpassable teacher of men, the teacher of the gods and men, the exalted one (bhagavān), the Buddha. He teaches this total world of heavenly gods (sadevakaḥ), of death-gods (samārakaḥ) and of Brahma-gods (sabrahmakaḥ). He teaches the total beings of ascetics and Brāhmaṇas, of gods and men, out of his own knowledge and view. He proclaims the doctrine which is beautiful in the beginning, beautiful in the middle and beautiful at the end and which is complete in content and form. He preaches the completely pure holy conduct (brahma-caryam, P. brahmacariyam).” Then the text runs further: “When a householder or his son or anybody hears the teaching, he is born in another position. After he has heard this teaching he holds faithful confidence (saddhā P. saddhā) towards the Perfect One. Filled with the faithful trust, he reflects: ‘Strictly limited is the life in the house—a dirty nook; freedom is in the leaving of the house (pravrajya P. pabhajya). It is not easy for anybody who lives in this house to lead a wholly perfect, wholly mother-of-pearl like life of conduct. How fine it would be, if I would shave off my hair and beard, put on yellow garments, and go into wilderness’. Thereupon, he leaves his small or great property, small or big relatives, shaves off his hair and beard, puts on yellow garments and goes into wilderness out of his house.”

Thus it is described how the disciple resolves to put trust in the Buddha, in order to step on the way of Deliverance.

Then follows the description of the way itself. In the beginning, there is the presentation of moral behaviour (śīla, P. sīlaṃ), the directions and prohibitions which regulate the life of the monks. At the head stand some basic commandments,
which recur in a similar form in most schools and sects. It is said: "After he has left the house he keeps to the directions and rules for monks; as he has renounced injury to living creatures (prāṇātipātaḥ, P. pāṇātipāto); he also abstains from injury to living creatures; he touches neither stick nor weapon; modest, full of sympathy, thinking of the well-being of all creatures, he lives in it. As he has renounced what is not given (adattādānam, P. adinnādānam) he abstains from what is not given. He takes only things which are given and desires things which are given. Without thievish thoughts, he lives with honesty of heart. As he has renounced unchastity (abrahmacaryam, P. abrahmacariyam), he lives a chaste and abstemious life. He renounces the illicit sexual intercourse to which the general rabble are devoted. As he has renounced lying (mṛsāvādāḥ, P. musāvādo), he abstains from falsehood. He speaks the truth and keeps his promise. He is reliable, trustworthy and does not disappoint men. As he has renounced slanderous speech (piśunā vāk, P. piśunā vāca) he abstains from slanderous speech. What he has heard, he mentions not again to disunite. The disunited he unites and the united he binds fast. He has joy in concord. He exults in concord; concord gives him happiness. He speaks words which promote concord. As he has renounced boastful harsh speech (paruṣa vāc, P. paruṣā vāca), he abstains from harsh speech. He speaks words which are not slanderous, are pleasant to the ear, hopeful, full of love, going to the heart, welcome to many men, gratifying to many persons. As he has renounced rash gossip (sambhimnapralāpah, P. samphappalāpo), he abstains from rash speech. He speaks at the right time, what depends on facts, and is useful. He speaks of the doctrine and of the discipline of the order. His speech is rich in content, enlivened with parables at the right time, well-measured and thoughtful."

Then follows a series of directions imposed on the monk: "He shuns injuring seeds and plants. He eats only once during the day, fasts by night and omits to eat out of hours. He avoids dance, song and music, uses no wreaths, perfumes and ointment, does not make use of high and broad resting places or beds. He takes neither gold nor silver. He refuses the acceptance of raw corn and raw flesh, of women and girls, of slaves and slave-girls, of goats and sheep, of fowl and swine, of
elephants, cattle and horses, of fields and plots of land. He does not send errands. He abstains from sale and purchase and every fraud with weights and measures. He keeps himself away from bribery and deceit, from mutilation, murder and robbing of freedom, from robbery, plundering and outrage or violence."

Then the section closes with a few maxims which describe the way of life of monks in general: "He is satisfied with the garment which covers the body, with the alms-food which satisfies his stomach. Wherever he goes, he carries all the things which are with him. As a bird carries, with it its feathers or wings wherever it flies, so is the monk satisfied with the garment that covers his body and the alms-food which satisfies his stomach. Wherever he goes, he carries all the things that are with himself. Because he observes this group of moral commandments (śilaskandhaḥ, P. silakkhandho) he experiences an inner spotless happiness."

With this, the description of moral conduct (śīlam) is closed. Then the text goes on to the guarding of the senses (indriyasamvaraḥ) which is described in the following way: "When he sees a form (rūpaṃ) with the eyes, hears a sound (sabdaḥ) with the ears, smells a scent (gandhaḥ) with his nose, tastes a relish (rasaḥ) with his tongue, feels something touchable (spravatayam) with the body or knows a thing or a thought (dharmaḥ P. dhammo) with the thinking (manoḥ), he neither observes the general nor the particular. The evil (pāpakāḥ) unwholesome (akusalaḥ, P. akusalo) things or thoughts of greed (abhidhīyaḥ, P. abhijjhaḥ) and of displeasure (daurnanasyam, P. domanassam) stream into him who does not protect the organ of the eye etc. Before that he tries to protect the organ of the eyes etc., and attains the guarding of the organ of eyes etc. Because he practises the guarding of the senses, he experiences blameless inner happiness without diversion."

Next follows joined with it the practice of wakefulness and consciousness (smṛtiṣamprajanyam, P. satisampajaṉaṇaḥ). "While going and coming, he does it consciously; seeing and looking around, he does it consciously; bending and extending the limbs, he does it consciously; while eating and drinking, he does it consciously; while evacuating, he does it consciously;
while waking, standing and sitting, sleeping and waking, talking and remaining silent,—he does all this consciously."

Now follows the most important part of the Way of Deliverance—the practice of Meditation. It falls into three parts: the preparation for meditation, the removal of hindrances and the attainment of the four stages of contemplation. Its description runs as follows: "When he has observed the group of moral commandments, has practised the guarding of sense-organs and cultivated the wakefulness and consciousness, then he seeks the sequestered resting-place, a forest, the foot of a tree, a mountain, a gorge, a mountain-cave, a cemetery, a wilderness, a place under the open sky or a heap of straw. There, returned from an alms-tour and having had his meal, he seats himself with legs crossed under, with his body straight, as he has realized the wakefulness (smṛtiḥ, P. sati)."

"He has renounced the greed (abhidhyā, P. abhijjhā) of the world; he keeps his mind (cetāḥ) free from desire, purifies his mind (cittam) from greed. He has renounced malice (vyāpādaḥ) and anger (pradosaḥ, P. padoso); he has kept and persists in keeping his mind (cittam) free from malice, thinks of the well-being of all living creatures, he purifies his mind of malice and anger. He has renounced stiffness and obstinacy (stūnam), P. thinam) and indolence (middham); he has kept free from obstinacy or stiffness and indolence; of clear wakefulness (ālokasaṃyñī), watchful and conscious he purifies his mind from stiffness and indolence. He has renounced excitement (auddhatyam, P. uddhaccaṃ) and repentance (kaukṛtyam, P. kukkucaṃ). He stays free from excitement. Of calm, inner spirit, he purifies the mind from excitement and repentance. He has renounced doubt (vīcikitsā, P. vīcikicchā). He keeps free from doubt. Free from confusion (akāthāṃkāthi) about the wholesome things or thoughts (kusala dharmāḥ), he purifies his mind from doubt."

"After he has renounced these five hindrances (nivāraṇāni) and known the enfeebling disturbances (upāklesāḥ, P. upakkilesā) of the mind (cetāḥ), he attains, through release from the desires and release from unwholesome things (akuśala dharmāḥ), between or during reflection (vītarkaḥ) and deliberation (vīcāraḥ), satisfaction (pritiḥ) and well-being (sukham) arising out of this discrimination (vivekajam) and remains therein." This is the first
stage of meditation (*dhyānam, P. *jhāna*).” “After reflection and deliberation have come to rest, he attains inner calm (*adhyātmasamprādāḥ, P. aṭṭhātaṃ samposādanaṃ*) and concentration of mind (*cetaso ekotibhāvah P. cetaso ekodibhāvo*). Thus free from reflection and deliberation, he attains to satisfaction and happiness arising through this composure (*samādhijaḥ*) and remains therein. That is the second stage of meditation.”

“After the falling away of happiness, he remains even-tempered (*upekkṣakaḥ, P. upekkhako*), vigilant (*smtimān, P. sato*), conscious (*samprajānana, P. sampajāna*) and experiences well-being with his body. That is of which the noble-minded (*āryaḥ, P. ariyā*) say ‘he is even-tempered, vigilant and remains in happiness.’ That is the third stage of meditation.”

“After he has done away with happiness (*sukham*) and unhappiness (*duḥkhham*), and still earlier after pleasure (*saumnanayam, P. somanassaṃ*) and displeasure (*daumnanayam P. domanassam*) are extinguished, he, free from discomfort and comfort, attains pure even-temperedness and vigilance (*upekṣasmtti-pari-suddhiḥ, P. upekkhāsatiparipratisuddhi*) and remains therein. That is the fourth stage of meditation.”

With it the path of Deliverance has reached the highest point and the disciple is now ripe to attain the releasing knowledge. It occurs in the following way; “After his mind has become composed, purified, spotless, free from disturbances, efficient and supple, firm and unwavering, he directs it on the knowledge of earlier births (*pūranamānasmttiñānam, P. pūbbenaivāṇasattatiñānam*). He remembers his many former births, one birth, two births, three births, four births, five births, ten births, a hundred births, a thousand births, a hundred thousand births, numerous world-destruction periods (*samvartakalpāḥ, P. samvaṭṭakappā*), numerous world-creation periods (*vivartakalpāḥ, P. vivattakappā*), numerous world-destruction and world-creation periods (*sam-varta-vivartakalpāḥ, P. samvaṭṭa-vivaṭṭakappā*). There I had this name, belonged to this family and to this caste, had this livelihood of life, experienced such joy and sorrow, lived so long, there I died and was separated from this existence and was born again, there I had this name, I belonged to this family and caste, had this livelihood of life, experienced such joy and sorrow, lived long thus far; then I have been separated from that
existence and have been born here again.' Thus he remembers himself with all his environments and particulars in many earlier births.'"

"After his mind has become composed, purified, stainless, free from disturbances, supple, efficient, firm and imperturbable, he directs it on the knowledge of death and of rebirth of beings (caturjapadajñānam, P. caturjapātañjānam). He sees with the heavenly, purified, superhuman eyes, how the creatures die and are born again and he remembers the low and the high, the pretty and the ugly, those on the good and bad paths, how they return, each according to his deed: 'They are affected with the bad behaviour of the body, of speech and of thought. They censure the holy, cherish false views, and act according to them. After the fall of their body, they go, after death, by wrong paths, go to the precipice and to hell. Those beings, on the other hand, who are possessed of the good behaviour of the body, of the good conduct of speech, of the good practice of thought—they do not censure the holy. They entertain right views and act according to right views, etc. They reach, after the fall of the body, after death, the good way, the heavenly world.' Thus he sees with the heavenly, purified, superhuman eyes how the creatures die and are again born and he knows the low and the high, the beautiful and the ugly, those who are on the good and bad ways, how they recur in birth, each according to his deed.

"After his mind has become composed, purified, spotless, free from disturbances, supple, efficient, firm and unwavering, he directs it on the knowledge of the destruction of stains or pollutions (āsravākṣayajñānam P. āsravakhayañānam). 'That is the sorrow' he knows according to the truth. 'That is the origin of sorrow' he knows according to the truth. 'That is the repeal of sorrow' he knows according to the truth. 'That is the way leading to the repeal of sorrow' he knows according to the truth. 'These are the stains' he knows according to the truth. 'That is the way leading to the repeal of stains' he knows according to the truth. Because he knows this, sees this, his mind is freed of the stain of Desire (kāmāsravaḥ, P. kāmāsavō), of the stain of being born (bhavāsravaḥ, P. bhavāsavo), of the stain of ignorance (avidyāsravaḥ, P.
avijjāsavo). In the released man, rises the knowledge of his Deliverance: 'Rebirth is no more, the holy conduct is complete, the duty is fulfilled, there is no more recurrence in this world.' Thus he knows!''

In this way, the disciple has reached his aim. He has not only attained by exertion the releasing knowledge but has also gained the certainty to be released himself. With that closes our text.

When we consider the way of Deliverance described above broadly, it shows thorough-going agreement with the way of the Yoga, as we have known it in the description of Epic philosophy. As there in the Epic, an observance of a number of moral commandments is demanded of a disciple who, putting his confidence in the words of the Buddha, has decided to step on the Way of Deliverance. The chief basic commandments are general commandments of morality as they always recur and meet us again in Jainism in the same form. The remaining rules govern the life of monks, no doubt, rigorously, but corresponding with the nature of Buddhism they do it without excessive severity. The guarding of the senses, which is next prescribed, agrees with the withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects as taught in the Epic Texts. The directions about the external preparations for meditation show equally a thorough-going agreement with the Epic. e.g., as the place of the meditation a mountain-cave or a foot of a tree in a forest is recommended. So also as we learn from other texts the first and the last third parts of the night are held to be a favourable time for the Yoga. The simple directions about the position of the body during meditation, the absence of knowledge about the complicated physical postures of later times may also be cited as in favour of agreement. The five hindrances (nivāraṇāni) which are to be eliminated to render the attainment of the Meditation possible have their correspondence in the five obstructions (kleśāḥ) of the Epic Yoga texts. Here, as in most of the older texts of the Epic, the meditation ends in the direct view of the striven-after knowledge.

Besides these agreements, there are, indeed, also some characteristic deviations. The guarding of the senses does not here form, as in the Epic Texts, the beginning of the proper
Meditation, but it belongs, besides moral conduct, to a general preparation. That depends on the following: A double role is ascribed to the withdrawal of the senses from their objects. It is calculated to prevent the excitement of desire so full of grave consequences for men and to render possible inner calm by eliminating all outside impressions. In Buddhism, on the basis of its theory of bondage and Deliverance from the cycle of births, the first task is overwhelmingly accentuated, resulting in the fact that keeping watch over the doors of the senses has been prescribed as a general obligation also outside Meditation. A further peculiarity of the Buddhistic Way of Deliverance is the practice of Vigilance and Consciousness which is to accompany all action. Finally, the meditation itself shows a special peculiarity. The essential thing about it is this: The Buddhistic meditation does not lead, like the meditation in the Epic Texts, to direct experience and view of the highest principle, but it negotiates or prepares the ground for the gaining of positive or definite knowledge. It occurs thus: The mind (cittam or cetaḥ), through preparatory practices and by traversing through different stages of meditation, maintains a completely special suppleness and efficiency (karmayatā P. kammamṣatā). This enables it, when it is directed towards a fixed subject, to view it directly and intuitively and to comprehend it with full clarity and evidence. It corresponds to the state in which during the four stages of meditation described in the Way of Deliverance, above all, the discursive thought (vitarkaḥ and vicāraḥ) and the feelings and experiences joined with it are not at all eliminated but every content of consciousness is eliminated. The mind remains, on the contrary, fully collected and composed (ekotihutaḥ, P. ekodibhuto), directed on one subject which it knows not by the way of thought, but intuitively, through direct perception.

This kind of knowledge as the goal of the Meditation-practices is in no way restricted to Buddhism. On the contrary, we shall meet with it also again in the classical Yoga-system. But it is characteristic that the Buddhism itself has placed this sort of Yoga-knowledge as its aim. And this aim has governed the constitution of the Way of Deliverance in its essential features. To that belongs especially the dominant role which
the vigilance and consciousness (ṣmṛtiḥ and samprajanyam, P. sati and sampajñāṇam) play in the Way of Deliverance; it is found missing in the epic Yoga. They occupy not only a peculiar place among the preparatory practices but they also belong to those characteristics which characterize the third and fourth stages of Meditation. Also we shall meet with them repeatedly in the supplementary practices of which we are going to speak. This role of vigilance and consciousness is however fully intelligible in the light of the above-described goal of knowledge. Because nothing else than the practice of these both is so suitable to promote the faculties of concentration and efficiency of the mind.

To summarize, in short, the Buddhist Way of Deliverance, which the old canonical texts describe, represents a good example of the typical Yoga-way of that time; but at the same time, it shows many original and instructive features. All this by no means exhausts what the old Buddhist texts have to say about the Yoga-praxis of their time. The description of the Yoga-way in the Epic, which restricts itself to the most indispensable and necessary steps, could be sufficient, as we have already pointed out there, only for the most talented disciples. Most of them before progressing far were required to undergo long troubles and tribulations and needed further instructions and preparatory pracatices in order to gain the ability to fight their way to the goal. In this respect, the older Buddhism with its extensive writings offers a richer material than any other source of antiquity. We shall therefore mention shortly what it has to say with regard to this.

*Meditation-Practices*: Especially instructive are some individual texts in which the Buddha describes to his pupils how he, during his attempts at illumination, had to contend with various difficulties and gives instructions from his own experience, as to how to remove their difficulties. Besides, entirely definite practices are found recommended to the disciples.

As the first preparatory practice of this sort appears the circumspect in-and-out-breathing. Characteristically, corresponding to our earlier statements, the breath-practices so popular in Yoga are formulated in Buddhism as practices of vigilance (ṣmṛtiḥ) and carry accordingly the designation as
vigilance during in-and-out-breathing (ānāpānasamāthā). They consist in the fact that the isolated breath exercises are consciously carried out and attentively pursued. Then the attention is simultaneously directed to other feelings and processes.

After breath-practices, three follow a group of other practices and qualifications or abilities which are to be cultivated. They are usually named together and always enumerated in the same order. They are the four awakenings of vigilance (smṛtyupasthānāni, P. satipaṭṭhānā), the four right efforts (samyakprahārāṇi, P. sammappadhāna), the four constituent parts of wonderful powers (ṛddhipādaḥ, P. iddhipāda), the five faculties (indriyāni); the five powers (balāni), and the seven limbs of Enlightenment (bodhyāṅgāni P. bojjhaṅgā). Occasionally in the last passage is named the noble eight-fold path (aryāstīgamārgaḥ, P. ariyo atthāṅgiko maggo), i.e. the path of Deliverance itself. Among these, the four awakenings of vigilance (smṛtyupasthānāni) play by far the most important part. They consist in the fact that the vigilance according to the order is directed to the body (kāyaḥ), the sensations (vedanāḥ), to the mind (cittam) and to the things or the thoughts (dharmāḥ, P. dhammā) and the thoughts are directed towards them. Of them, there is, in details, described the consideration of the body (kāyāṅupāsyaṇā P. kāyāṅupassana) which is first considered in its composition of elements and then in its disintegration after death, in order to awaken the abhorrence of and withdrawal from earthly things.

The four right efforts (samyakprahārāṇi) consist in the fact that the disciple endeavours to avoid future unwholesome things and thoughts (akuśalā dharmāḥ, P. akusalā dhammā) and to promote the present ones. Among the four constituents of wonderful powers (ṛddhipādaḥ) is to be understood the collectedness (samādhiḥ) which depends on the wish (chandaḥ, P. chando), on the energy (vīryam, P. viriyam), on the mind (cittam) or on the reflection (mīmāṃsā; P. mīmāṃsā) and which serves as the basis for practising the wonderful powers. The five faculties (indriyāni) are the faculties of belief (śraddhā, P. saddhā), energy (vīryam, P. viriyam), vigilance (smṛtih, P. sati), collectedness (samādhiḥ) and the insight (prajñā, P. paññā). As the five powers (balāni), are named the same five qualifications. Finally, as the seven limbs of Enlightenment (bodhyāṅgāni) are
considered vigilance (*sṃrtiḥ*), understanding of the doctrine (*dharma-pravicayāḥ*, *P. dhammavacayo*), energy (*vīryam*), satisfaction (*pritiḥ*, *P. piti*), composure (*praśrābdhiḥ, P. passaddhi*), collectedness (*samādhiḥ*) and equanimity (*upeksā, P. upekkhā*). The so-called four immensities (*apramāṇāni, P. appana-aṇīdhyo*) occupy a place by themselves. They consist in the fact that the practising aspirant awakens in himself the feeling of love (*maitrī, P. mettā*), of compassion (*karunā*), of cheerfulness (*muditā*) and of equanimity (*upeksā, P. upekkhā*) and radiates them towards all the directions. It is said to their credit that they are the means in order to attain to the world of god Brahmā.

Of entirely special importance are finally the practices of Meditation which aim at rising step by step to higher spheres or planes which we meet with in Buddhism. A stimulus towards these was evidently received by Buddha during the period of his striving for illumination. It is reported of both the teachers Ārāda Kālāma and Udraka Rāmaputra that they taught their disciple to attain such stages of meditation; Ārāda Kālāma taught him to reach the sphere of Nothing (*ākīṃcanyāyatanam, P. ākiṃcaṇṇāyatanam*) and Udraka Rāmaputra taught him to reach the sphere beyond consciousness and unconsciousness (*naivasamjñāsamjñāyatanam, P. nevasaṁjñānasamjñāyatanam*). That it deals with an old borrowed idea can be found from the fact that the sphere beyond consciousness and unconsciousness recurs in Jainism also. The Buddha took over these practices as he found them useful and beneficial although they could not be adopted according to their character in the series of steps of Meditation which form the kernel of his way of Deliverance. Before all, he taught his disciple the four spheres through which he had to go: the sphere of the infinity of space (*ākāśānantaśyāyatanam, P. ākāsanaṃcaśyāyananm*) and the sphere of infinity of knowledge (*vijñānaśyāyatanam, P. viṃśaṃcaśyāyatanam*) and the already named spheres of nothing (*ākīṃcanyāyatanam*) and of that beyond the conscious and the unconscious (*naivasaṁjñānaśaṁjñāyatanam*). These steps of the spheres are connected with the four stages of meditation of the way of Deliverance to form a unique ladder or a scale of steps. The remarkable thing about this is that the stages of meditation
which led to the attainment of the highest knowledge and through which followed an entry into the final Deliverance, did not form the ultimate or highest point of this ladder of steps. As in the four stages of Meditation of the Deliverance-Way, as already described, all contents of consciousness are not eliminated, they were bound to come, corresponding to the basic thought underlying the ladder of the steps of the spheres, among the quoted four spheres in which this elimination is carried out.

Besides this connection with the four meditation-steps of the Way of Deliverance, we, however, find the above-mentioned four stages of spheres enrolled also in other scales partially or fully. A ladder of this sort is the series of 10 Total-spheres (kṛṣṇāyatanāṇi, P. kasiṇāyatanāṇi). They are the total spheres of the earth (pṛthivi, P. paṭhau), of the water (āpāḥ, P. āpo), of the fire (tejas, P. tejo), of the wind (vāyuḥ, P. vāyo), of the blue (nīlam), of the yellow (pītam), of the red (lohitam), of the white (avādatam, P. odātam). The practices, belonging to them, consist in the fact that the mind is directed, according to the above series, on the mentioned Elements, colours, Space and Knowledge, until finally, it is accomplished with full clarity only on the picture of this one object.

The four stages of spheres are completely taken over in the so-called eight deliverances (vimoksāḥ, P. vimokha). Of these the first three are described as follows: On the first the aspirant sees the forms themselves, being conscious of these forms. On the second, he views the external forms, while he is not inwardly conscious of any form. On the third, finally he is exclusively devoted to the perception of something beautiful. With these three are joined the above-mentioned four steps of the spheres. The suppression of consciousness and feelings (saṃjñāveditanirdhaḥ, P. saṁñāvedayitarodho) forms the conclusion. This represents an eclipse of the four old steps of spheres and is occasionally inserted in places where these appear connected with the four meditation-steps of the Deliverance.

A related scale of steps without the four steps of spheres are finally the so-called eight conquests (abhibahuṣyatanāṇi, P. abhibhāyatanāṇi). In the first two of these conquests, the practising aspirant is inwardly conscious or aware of any
shapes—he first sees outside the circumscribed and then the uncircumscribed forms. In the next two he is inwardly conscious of no forms and sees first outside the circumscribed and then the uncircumscribed forms. Then follows the view of the four colours—Blue, Yellow, Red, White—already mentioned in the ten total spheres, in which there is no consciousness inwardly of any forms or shapes.

It is, therefore, an imposing series of practices which stand for disposal before the disciple of the Buddha so that he may train and cultivate his ability for meditation. It is striking and remarkable that many of these practices are formulated entirely without regard for one another; many of them are partially straightway contradictory. This holds good especially with the already dealt-with ladder of the spheres. In the ladder of the spheres, for example, the view of Colours is once enrolled in the view of the Elements, another time in the view of forms; again the four chief steps of the spheres or stages once appear bound up with the four meditation-steps of the Deliverance-Way, another time they appear connected with the view of forms while the two of them are taken over in the ten total spheres. The same overlapping with one another occurs in the faculties to be practised—the same faculties are summarized once as occurring as a group of five faculties (indriyāṇi), then as a group of powers (balāṇi). Similar things will confront us further in the course of our consideration of the oldest Buddhistic doctrines and may be considered as a pronounced peculiarity of the oldest Buddhism.

Many phenomena of this kind are now to be evidently explained thus: Different beginnings or steps of development of the doctrine remain jostling with one another. This is easily intelligible in the light of the peculiarity of the oldest Buddhism. A teaching which lays claim to have known finally and proclaimed a permanent truth cannot revoke or retract what has been said once. Nothing else remains but to place the new knowledge simply beside the old. I am of the view that in many such cases, different stages in the development of the thought of Buddha are preserved for us. But partially, the phenomena, mentioned above, may also depend on a defect in the ‘systematics’ (systematizing), which we may regard as the
characteristic hallmark of the old Buddhistic teaching. The denial of all theory and the restriction to a few groups of thoughts has namely led to the fact that no unitary thought-edifice came to be built up, and its isolated parts have not been carefully brought in unison. There is also no basis for the assumption that such a thought-edifice was at hand and was not proclaimed, on that account, by Buddha in order to avoid unnecessary and diverting discussions. On the other hand, what are available to us are, as a matter of fact, sporadic groups of thoughts which were only defined in order to give to the Way of Deliverance the absolutely necessary basis and which were never joined together to form a unity.

Connected with the Meditation-practices are now still other processes to be explained which, according to very old views, accompany these practices and which we have met during the description of the Epic Yoga viz. the supernatural phenomena and the miraculous powers which the practising aspirant wins on the different stages of meditation. The supernatural phenomena consist above all in the appearances of divine forms. These gods belong to different spheres and the pupil is able to find, as his knowledge or ability progresses, out of what sphere the gods rise and is able to carry on a dialogue with them. A further remarkable result of meditation is that the practising aspirant discharges a second mental (manomayaḥ) body out of his earthly one, as one would pull a blade of grass out of a sheath. This experience gains no greater importance in Buddhism but it recurs again differently and plays a part certainly in the Jaina doctrine of the five bodies of living creatures. The peculiar miraculous powers (rddhiprabhedāḥ, P. iddhipabhedā) lend to the pupil the ability to multiply himself, to appear and disappear at will, to hover through walls and crags, to sink in the earth and emerge forth again, to walk through the waters, to fly through the air, to touch the Sun and the Moon,—to increase the efficiency of his body until it extends to the world of God Brahmā. There also come, finally, many other supernatural powers: the heavenly ear (diyāśrotām, P. dibbasotām) which enables the aspirant to hear far off and supernatural sounds, the knowledge of others’ thoughts (cetahparyāyajñānām, P. cetopariyaṇāṇam), the remem-
brance of earlier births (puṣṭijñānam, P. pubbiṇīvisā-
nussatijñānam) and the heavenly eye (divyacakkhu, P. dībbacakkhu) which renders it possible to survey the course of the world and to know, above all, the laws of the cycle of being.

In accordance with the striving so pronounced in India towards external systematization and numerical summing up, these different powers and faculties were soon enumerated so as to be united into groups. The most usual group is the group of five supernatural forms of knowledge (abhijñāḥ, P. abhiññā). It embraces the above-enumerated wonderful powers (uddhijñāḥ), the heavenly ears, the knowledge of others’ thoughts, the remembrance of former births and the heavenly eyes. Besides, there is also the eight-fold knowledge (vidyāḥ, P. vijjā). It consists of clear-sightedness (vipaññāna, P. ānāpadassanā) i.e. the insight into the composition of the body out of the four great elements (mahābhūtāni) and of knowledge (vijñānam). In the second place, there is the above-mentioned ability to separate the mental body from the material body, the ability being also named as mental wonder-power (manomaya-uddhiḥ, P. manomayiddhi). Then follow the already enumerated five supernatural forms of knowledge. As the eighth and the last; there is the knowledge of the withering of stains (āsavakṣajñānam, P. asavakkhāyañānam) of which we have, still to speak.

With this is essentially exhausted what the oldest Buddhism has to contribute towards the knowledge of the Yoga-praxis of its time. Simultaneously also we have completed to a great extent the description of the Buddhistic way of Deliverance. We now come to the main subject of our presentation—viz. to the description of its philosophical doctrines which the teaching of Buddha contains. For that we can directly take up the thread of the Deliverance-Way with which we have already dealt. Because the proper aim and the conclusion of the Deliverance Way—which is the releasing knowledge—embraces two of the most important of these principles.

The Releasing Knowledge: As our recital of the way of Deliverance shows, the releasing knowledge is organized into three parts: When the disciple has reached the fourth stage
of Meditation and with it has acquired the efficiency (karmayādā) of the mind which enables him to catch sight intuitively with full clarity and certainty of every desired object, he directs it first of all on the knowledge of earlier births and is able to survey his destiny in a beginningless series of lives. He knows his destiny in the cycle of (births or) being. Secondly, he directs the mind to the origin and destruction of creatures and knows how the creatures die and how each of them is re-embodied according to its work or acts. With this he knows the great frame, in which his own destiny itself is involved, the world-law of the cycle of being itself to which all creatures are subject. But knowing both he has still gained no new knowledge. What he has hitherto seen, corresponds to the belief of the great majority of his contemporaries. Now it has become an unwavering certainty to him through the experience of Yoga. But now follows the last and the decisive step. He now directs his mind as a third step on the bondage in and Release out of the cycle of being and on their causes. He now knows first of all the sorrow, the origin of sorrow, the removal of sorrow and the way to the removal of sorrow. They are the so-called four Noble Truths (catvāry āryasatyāni, P. cattāri ariyasacāni). Then he knows the stain (āśravāḥ, P. āsavvo), the origin of the stain, the removal of the stain and the way of the removal of the stain. Simultaneously, with it, the stain disappears and he becomes himself conscious that he has by his exertion attained the Deliverance.

The last and the decisive step of Releasing Knowledge consists of two parts which represent the most important principles of the oldest Buddhism. The first of them—the four noble truths—is well known and holds valid generally as one of the most important parts of the teaching proclaimed by the Buddha. Far less known and considered is the second—the doctrine of the stain, its origin, its removal and the way of its removal. But it is not less important than the four noble truths. That the idea of stain deals with a very old conception will be seen in our presentation of Jīnism. Not without good reason, is the releasing knowledge, in the Buddhistic canons, called in its last part as the knowledge of vanquishing or the disappearance of stains (āsravakṣayajñānam, P. āsavakkhayajñānam). This princi-
people deserves therefore to be thoroughly dealt with and appreciated. Still it is better if we begin with the presentation of the four noble Truths to which we shall now turn.

The Four Noble Truths: These four noble truths form, according to a good and considerably older tradition, the contents of a sermon with which the Buddha opened his teaching activity—the sermon of Banaras. It is, for instance, reported that the Buddha, after he had gained illumination, first came in his wanderings to Banaras where he met the former five companions of the penance period of his life. He communicated to them the knowledge gained by him, won them as his disciples and thus made the beginning of the foundation of his community of monks. The sermon, in which he proclaimed his doctrine to them, is preserved in the Buddhistic canons; its contents suggest that therein is preserved, as a matter of fact, a good and trustworthy reminiscence of the event so big with consequences. The Buddha therein begins with a few words about his teaching in general which he calls the Middle Path (mādhyamā pratīpat, P. mañjhima pratīpadā) because he had kept himself away from both extremes—the life of enjoyment and the life of self-torture. That has a good reason. Because his five companions had turned away from him, when he, having known the excessive penance as fruitless, had withdrawn from it and had reproached him for having given up the attempt and turned towards excessive enjoyment. Then he begins with the preaching of his Four Noble Truths which are as follows:

“These, ye monks, are the four noble truths. Which four? The sorrow, the origin of sorrow, the removal of sorrow and the way leading to the removal of sorrow.

“What is sorrow (dukkham, P. dukkham)? Birth is sorrow, age is sorrow, illness is sorrow, to be united with the disagreeable is sorrow, to be separated from the dear one is sorrow, not to get what one longs and strives for, that is also sorrow—shortly, the five groups of seizing things or desires (upādāna-skandhāḥ P. upādānakkhandhā) are sorrow.

“What is the origin of sorrow (dukkhasamudayaḥ, P. dukkhasamudaya)? It is thirst (ṛṣṇā, P. taṁhā) which leads to rebirth, which is accompanied by pleasure and desire and finds pleasure therein. That is called the origin of sorrow.
“What is the removal of sorrow (duḥkhanirōdhaḥ, P. dukkhanirodho)? It is the complete denial and removal of thirst which leads to rebirth and finds pleasure therein. Its giving up and suppression—that is called the removal of sorrow.

“And what is the way which leads to the removal of sorrow? (duḥkhanirodhaṁgaṁini pratīpataḥ, P. dukkhanirodhaṁgaṁinī paśipadā)? It is the noble eight-fold Path—viz.—Right View, Right Thought, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Living, Right Striving, Right Vigilance, Right Composure. That is called the way leading to the removal of sorrow. These, ye monks, are the Four Noble Truths.”

This explanation of the four noble truths is accompanied by a description with the same extent and details, as to how the Buddha has known the four truths in the threefold way, and of how he attained to the consciousness of having reached therewith, through his exertion, the release and the highest illumination. The sermon ends here.

He who allows himself to be affected by this sermon with its measured, solemn recital in its entirety, will not fail to be impressed by it. The fourfold classification of the known truth as sorrow, its cause, its removal, the way of its removal which is borrowed from the Medical Method is impressive. But in general the emptiness or hollowness, from the point of contents, of this sermon is surprising. Measured according to the standard of that time, there is nothing special in it. The view that everything earthly is full of sorrow lies at the basis of the whole striving for Release which fills that period. To find the source of sorrow in thirst is also no new thought. Because, as we have already seen earlier, the teaching of Yaśñavalkya knows the desire as the cause of entanglement in the cycle of births. Only its designation as thirst is a more rare and less common expression. What finally concerns the way to Deliverance—the noble eight-fold path—it is not a clearly sketched out way but merely an undefined frame worded in general colourless expressions. The question now urges itself as to how this emptiness of contents (of the doctrine of four noble truths) is to be explained, and whether there is nothing in the Buddhistic canonical text which
completes or supplements the preaching of four noble truths and represents the things taught in it in a more detailed manner.

Now such texts are, in fact, available. For instance, we only need to consider, beside the noble eight-fold path, the presentation of the Deliverance way already cited, which deals with the same subject. Therein, however, springs before our eyes, the glaring difference between both these representations of the same subject. In the one here, on the one hand, there are blurred generalities, in the other, on the other hand, there is a clear and graphically sketched way which gives, at the same time, a lively picture of the way of life of the monks of those times. Still there is no contrast or difference between them two. The steps of the Way of Deliverance allow themselves to be easily inserted without any constraint in the frame of the eight-fold path. And where this is explained thoroughly in the canonical texts, it occurs in a manner which corresponds in a far-reaching way with the above described way of Deliverance. Thus the right view (samyagdṛṣṭiḥ, P. sammādiṭṭhi) corresponds to the trustful confidence in the preaching of the Buddha, which is a pre-requisite for stepping on the way of Deliverance. Right thinking (samyaksamkalpaḥ, P. sammāsaṅkappa), right speech (samyakkvāk, P. sammā-vācā) and right action (samyak-karmaṇaḥ, P. sammākammanto) correspond to the moral conduct which is binding on the monk and are elucidated in a number of directions which again recur in the described Way of Deliverance. Under right living (samyagājivaḥ, P. sammājaśvo) is to be understood the way of life of the monks which is described at the end of the description of the moral conduct in the way of Deliverance. The right striving (samyaguyāyamaḥ, P. sammāvāyāmo) consists in the fact that the monk endeavours to avoid the future unwholesome things or thoughts (akusala dharmaḥ) and eliminate the present ones, while he calls forth the future wholesome things and thoughts (kusala dharmaḥ) and promotes the present ones. All this corresponds, therefore, with the four right efforts (samyak-prahāṇāni). So also the right vigilance (samyak-smṛtiḥ, P. sammāsatī) corresponds to the four awakenings of vigilance (smṛtyupasthānāni). Because it is explained in such a way that the monk directs his vigilance serially on the body.
(kāyaḥ), the sensations (vedanāḥ), the mind (cittam), and the thoughts (dharmaḥ). Both have their correspondence in practices which have to be preparatory to the Meditation as we have described them in great number in connection with the proper Deliverance-Way. The right collectedness or composure (samyak-samādhiḥ, P. sammāsamādhi) is finally the meditation (dhyānam) itself with its well-known four steps. There lie here two presentations of the way of Deliverance which, though far different in their formulations from one another, allow themselves to be reconciled with one another in their basic ideas and build. But now with this we are confronted with new questions: How is this placing side-by-side of the two different presentations of the same subject to be explained? What is the relation between the eight-fold path and the described Way of Deliverance?

The question is to be answered, in my view, as follows: Both are traced back to the Buddha himself but represent the different stages of development of his teaching. The sermon of Banaras with its preaching of the eight-fold path stands in the beginning of his teaching activity. In it he presents the simple basic thoughts which had become an irrefutable certainty to him in the hour of his illumination. It is intelligible that here he gives basic directives in general words. Then follow the forty long years of his wandering life as teacher and preacher. Again and again it turned out to be necessary to give more exact guidance and instructions to disciples. And thus the preaching of the Deliverance-Way was continually more and more improved and widened and became more finished, until finally it gained the form with which we have got acquainted above.

For the view that we have to see different stages of development in both the forms of the preaching of the Deliverance-Way, there are the following reasons which speak for themselves: The declaration of the four noble truths which the sermon of Banaras contains and also of the noble eight-fold path entirely falls back in the background and plays a strikingly small part, if one thinks that it deals with the fundamental declaration of the doctrine. On the other hand, the described way of Deliverance assumes an overwhelmingly dominant place and recurs again and again in the most important collec-
tions of the old texts. It would hardly be intelligible, if it were understood that it deals with a further development of the doctrine out of the later times. And from the point of the general good condition and trustworthiness of the Buddhistic traditional texts, it would be doubly unbelievable that a later further formulation of the doctrine should have crowded out the word of the Master himself. This state of affairs becomes entirely different if we take the described way of Deliverance as representing the form of the doctrine which form it had received from the mouth of the Buddha himself, in the course of his long teaching activity. It forms part, then, of the final form of the teaching which has remained finally authoritative and its place in the tradition, then, becomes intelligible without further ado.

Again, the interpretation offered by us fits in well with the general picture which shows us the development of the Buddhistic doctrine. In the canonical writings, we find, not only in the case of the way of Deliverance, but also otherwise in the case of the basic doctrinal ideas, a clearly pronounced development and further formulation. But then a pause ensues, which lasts for a long time, until finally the development begins out of completely other roots and beginnings, leading to the rise of the later dogmatic and philosophical systems of Buddhism. All this, according to our interpretation, appears natural and intelligible. As long as the Buddha lived, he developed his doctrine in the course of his long life, made it more profound and further formulated it in particular details. That process ended with his death. The disciples, who still stood under the influence of his mighty personality, preserved the word of the Master reverentially and did not think of changing anything. It is remarkable that the oldest quarrels in the congregation were not with regard to difference of opinion or meaning but with regard to the deviations in the handling of the rules of the Order. As in course of time, the general philosophical development was forced towards the further formulations of the doctrine, there occurred a break and the new development was compelled to take place in a completely new spirit and out of new starts.

As in the case of the noble eight-fold path, the same
position stands in the case of the remaining doctrinal ideas contained in the Sermon of Banaras. Everywhere we find the same initial generality and indefiniteness. In the rest of the canonical writings we are able to observe everywhere a similar development as in the case of the eight-fold path. About the doctrine of sorrow, we shall still come to speak later. It is justified above all, on the basis of the perishableness of all earthly things. This is an idea which has determined the Buddhist feeling towards the world of phenomena most vehemently from the earliest beginnings. But philosophically it is only later that it has turned out to be influential during the rise of the Buddhistic systems. We shall deal with it there. Here in the first instance, we shall enter into the doctrine of Thirst (ṭṛṣṇā, P. ṭanha) a decisive idea which the four noble truths contain.

*The Doctrine of Thirst*: Now regarding Thirst, the sermon of Banaras only says that it is the cause of sorrow. How it occurs, in what way it causes sorrow, is not said in it. But here the remaining texts of the canon bring further clarification, teach a better understanding of the importance of this idea and show at the same time how it was gradually more sharply understood and further formulated. And there are two different ways in which the origin and working of Thirst was explained.

Concerning Thirst, in the first place, there is united with it the idea of the contact of the sense-organs with the sense-object of which we have already spoken while dealing with Epic philosophy. While dealing with the dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati we have for instance seen that, according to the doctrine recited there, one of the chief causes of the entanglement of the Soul in the cycle of being is that the sense-organs come into contact with the sense-objects and are fettered thereby and that to break this connecting bond is one of the most important pre-conditions of Deliverance. The oldest Buddhistic teaching employs the same idea with regard to the establishment of the idea of Thirst. Still it is here not a uniform, unitary complex of ideas on which it is built but they are different views which stand directly near one another unassimilated in a rather disconnected way, which peculiarity we have
already noticed as pertaining to the oldest Buddhism, during the description of Meditation-practices.

Very frequently we meet with the idea of the five qualities of things on which the desire directs itself (kāmagunanā) i.e. the sense-objects. Again and again the Buddha speaks of "the forms known through the eye, sounds known through the ear, smells known through the nose, tastes known through the tongue, touch known through the body, the wished-for or the desired, the agreeable, the satisfying, joined with the Desire and enticing" and warns against being entangled and infatuated by them. Besides there is the idea of the six external and six internal spheres (āyatanāni). These are again the sense-objects and the sense-organs corresponding to them which, as similar to those in the dialogue between Manu and Brhaspati, are juxtaposed near each other. In so doing the number six is attained through the fact that the thinking organ (manaḥ), appears, as in the ancient times, on the same scale with the sense-organs, all comprehensible things as objects of thought being ascribed to it under the name of the things or thoughts (dharmāḥ, P. dhammā). Lastly, a group of eighteen Elements (dhātavaḥ) is frequently mentioned. These consist of six external and six internal spheres (āyatanāni) i.e. the sense-objects and the sense-organs, and six forms of knowledge (viññānam, P. viññānapa) which are caused by them, the six forms of each, according to its origin, being as knowledge produced by the eye, the ear, the smell, the taste, the body and the mind.

These are different views which lie before us. But ultimately, they deal only with the different forms of the same basic idea—the positive and the decisive idea, viz., the understanding of the origin of Thirst and its supporting cause, the basic idea being one and the same. Through the contact of the sense-objects with the sense-organs, besides knowledge, feelings (vedanā) are also called forth; these waken the desire which carries the name of thirst. That is the origin of Thirst. Its removal, which is an unconditional prerequisite of Deliverance, ensues, according to the description of the way of Deliverance, in this manner: The man watches his sense-organs and guards them and does not allow himself to be transported by any passion, when or if they (the sense-organs) come in contact with the sense-objects.
The idea, above described, of the entanglement in the cycle of births through desire, through thirst and of the origin of thirst from the fateful contact between sense-organs, and sense-objects coincides, as already said, in essentials with the idea in the Epic—as mentioned in the dialogue between Manu and Brhaspati. The differences in general are very small. In the Epic, the separation of the sense-organs from their objects serves as a preparation for meditation while (in Buddhism) according to the teaching of Buddha, the guarding of the sense-organs has to go on continually and is the general precondition for the Deliverance as we have already mentioned in the description of the way of Deliverance. Of decisive importance is the following: According to the dialogue between Manu and Brhaspati, the desires called forth by the sense-organs are only one of the joint causes of the entanglement in the cycle of existence. The case, however, is different here. According to the sermon of Banaras, this entanglement in the cycle of existence is solely due to Thirst, and the Deliverance is made dependent on its removal. Its role is here, therefore, incomparably greater and more important. There is no wonder that it led to further inferences and conclusions.

Under these circumstances the binding of the sense-organs by the sense-objects was very easily felt to be inadequate for deriving therefrom far-reaching conclusions. One was induced to seek further causes of the origin of thirst and of its ominous effects. Such a course was found in the false idea of the ‘I’ and ‘mine’ (ahamkāraḥ and mamakāraḥ). So it came to the formulation of a second group of ideas which should serve to establish the idea of Thirst. This group of ideas was not only important for Buddhism; we shall meet it also in the Sāmkhya where it played a great role. That is dealt with, as follows:

The common man is easily misled to regard his earthly personality as his true self ‘I’ (ātmā P. attā). It leads him to attribute value to this ‘I’ and everything that is bound up with it. Through that wakes up the Desire, the Thirst. He clings to it, seizes upon it, as Buddhism would say (upādānam). It creates the bondage which fetters man to this existence and leads him from rebirth to rebirth, to new becoming (bhavaḥ). When, however, he knows that all this is not his true ‘I’ and does not
touch it in reality, then the desire is extinguished, he turns away from all earthly things, the fetters which bind him to this existence fall off and he attains Deliverance.

These ideas are ultimately in unity with the views which are already confided to us by the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. There in the Upaniṣads, the knowledge of the Ātmā, the self, the true ‘I’, holds good as decisive for leading to Deliverance. He who knows this true ‘I’ will withdraw himself from all other things and thus release himself from the earthly things. As, for instance, Yājñavalkya, in his last speech with his wife Maitreyī states impressively, it is only the ‘I’, the Ātmā which lends value to all things and it is only the right striving towards it which holds valid. What is different from it is all sorrowful (tato ‘nyad ārtam). The same thoughts occur also here in Buddhism but turned in another way, so to say, negatively formulated. It is not said here that a man shall know the true ‘I’ but that he need not take for the ‘I’ (ātmā, P. attā) what is not ‘I’. Because, otherwise the Desire clings to this false ‘I’, and brings about through it the entanglement in the cycle of being. The Deliverance ensues not because a man is conscious of or knows the true ‘I’ but because a man knows everything which is falsely regarded as the ‘I’ as the ‘not-I’ (anātmā, P. anattā) and thus the Desire is dissolved.

This group of ideas already occurs during the period of the Banaras Sermon; one of the most important ideas connected with it emerges already in the four noble truths. In the Buddhistic doctrine, all factors which make up the earthly personality and can be regarded falsely as the true ‘I’, are grouped together in five groups (skandhāh, P. khandhā). They are (i) the Form or as one can say better in this context, corporeality (rūpam) (ii) the sensations (vedanā) (iii) the consciousness (saṃjñā, P. saññā), (iv) the formations (saṃskārāḥ, P. saṅkhārā) and (v) knowledge (vijñānam, P. viññānam). In so far as the Desire sticks to the five groups and includes them in itself, clasps them, pulls towards them, they are also called the groups which are the objects to be seized (upādānakṣandhāḥ, P. upādānak-khandhā). This expression occurs in the noble truth of sorrow where it is said: “In short, the five groups of ‘seizing upon’ are sorrow.”
Further, the old Buddhist tradition reports that the Buddha gave a second talk to his first five pupils, conjointly with the sermon of Banaras. It is preserved and is called the sermon of the characteristic of the ‘not-I’.” In this speech, he states at length that the five groups of seizing (upādāna) need not be regarded as the ‘I’. Then he puts to his pupils the question:

“What mean ye, ye monks? Is the corporeality constant or otherwise?” They replied, “not constant, O Lord”—“What is impermanent—sorrow or joy?” “Sorrow, O Lord”—“When man considers what is inconstant, sorrowful, subject to change, can one, who has considered it, say, ‘it is mine, I am that, it is my self?’”—“One cannot, O Master.”—The same questions and answers are raised and given in connection with the four remaining groups. The Buddha closes with the following:

“The same, ye monks, that has been given or will be given or is given as corporeality, sensation, consciousness, formations and knowledge, no matter whether it be in us or in the outside world, whether it be gross or subtle, small or high, far or near—all these—corporeality, sensation, consciousness, formations and knowledge are not mine, are not the ‘I’, not myself. He who possesses the right knowledge must regard them in their true nature. He who regards thus, ye monks, he who is an expert, noble listener, he turns away from the corporeality, sensation, consciousness, formations and knowledge. Because he turns away from them, he becomes free from desire. Through the cessation of desire, he wins Deliverance; in the released one, there rises the knowledge of his emancipation: Destroyed is rebirth; holy conduct is complete; duty is fulfilled; there is no more return to this world. Therefore he knows.” Here therefore the thought of the false ‘I’ idea, from which one must get free in order to eliminate desire and to be released from the entanglement in the cycle of rebirth, is clearly expressed and broadly stated. It is after all the maxim of Yājñāvalkya that everything different from the Ātmā is full of sorrow, on which the doctrine is here built. Only it is given a different turn corresponding to the formulation of the doctrine, in the form that everything which is full of sorrow cannot be the ‘I’.

With the inclusion of this second circle of ideas, the explanation and the proof of the idea of thirst had found a satis-
factory form and had come therewith to a conclusion. A double proof was given, through the contact of the sense-organs with the sense-objects and through the false idea of the 'I'. As we have already seen, this comprehension and interpretation of the Thirst-idea goes back at least in its germ to the beginning of the teaching activity of the Buddha. With the explanation and the proof of the idea itself, however, the development did not yet come to an end. It was sought to formulate clearly and sharply the knowledge thus gained and to express it in a particular terminology. It occurred thus:

Corresponding to the double proof of thirst, thirst was distinguished accordingly as the thirst after desires i.e. \( \text{kāma-ṭṛṣṇā, P. kamataṭhā} \) that is to say, after the pleasures of the senses, and the thirst after birth, that is to say, after embodiment \( \text{bhavatṛṣṇā, P. bhavāṭṭāhā} \). But this only was not enough. Besides, thirst after annihilation \( \text{vibhavatṛṣṇā, P. vibhavatāṭhā} \) was added as the third. The teaching of Buddha shows, especially in its oldest form, the strongly stamped predilection to reject all extremes and to deny all contrasts or opposites. It is designated as the noble Middle Way in the Sermon of Banaras. As we shall see, when we shall come to describe the character of the Deliverance according to the Buddhist idea, the striving after annihilation itself was similarly rejected and was explained as a fateful way of error just as the clinging to this existence. It was, therefore, natural to insert the thirst after annihilation as the counterpart of the thirst after birth or existence. Thus, as mentioned above, it came to the division of Thirst into three. This division into three is already used by a part of tradition in the sermon of Banaras: There, in the noble truth of the origin of sorrow, it is added: "It is the thirst which leads to rebirth, which is accompanied by comfort and desire and finds pleasure therein, the thirst after desire, the thirst after birth, and the thirst after annihilation." This interpretation of the idea in this light is certainly testified in later texts and probably it originated only late.102

But this idea did not remain as it was. In course of time, the idea of thirst after destruction was allowed to fall away. Finally, the philosophically unclear designation 'Thirst', was
given up and the expression 'longing for' (rāgaḥ) was put in its place. Then one began to speak of longing after desire (kāmarāgaḥ), longing after birth (bhavarāgaḥ).^102

With this final comprehension of the idea of Thirst, the meaning and formulation of the most important thoughts contained in the Sermon of Banaras is concluded and we can thus now conclude our description of the four noble truths. Still the further development of Buddhistic doctrines went beyond these maxims. That occurred as follows:

As we have already emphasised, the proclamation of the Buddha in the Banaras Sermon mentions Thirst alone as the cause of the entanglement in this existence and makes Bondage and Deliverance respectively dependent on it and its removal. With it, it comes into contrast with other doctrines with which we have been hitherto acquainted. Because, all these other doctrines had taught ignorance i.e. the lack of knowledge with regard to the highest truth, as the cause of the entanglement in the cycle of existence. The Desire appeared beside it only as a subordinate cause. In the doctrine of the Buddha, on the other hand, Desire appears with its claim on exclusive validity. The contrast was too sharp and was bound to lead to hesitation, scruples and difficulties. One such difficulty came up thus: The Way of Deliverance which the Buddha knows leads to the attainment of the highest knowledge. But, then, how could knowledge bring Deliverance if ignorance was not the cause of bondage? Such and similar considerations must have soon confronted the Buddha during the propagation of his doctrine. As a matter of fact, he has reckoned with them and remodelled his doctrine decisively on this point.

Dependent Origination: We find, for instance, in the older texts of Buddhistic canons, besides the four holy truths, another principle or maxim which is equally definite, in order to explain the origin of sorrow and the possibility of its removal and which finds its last cause in ignorance. This doctrine brings to the fore the most important that Buddhism has to say regarding the theoretical establishment of the Deliverance-doctrine, and contains, besides, the most precious that it has contributed to philosophical thought. This is the twelve-membered or twelve-linked chain of causes or as it is, above all, called the doctrine of 'Depen-
dent Origination’ (pratityasamutpādaḥ, P. paṭiccasamuppādo). The simplest and the most frequent form in which the chain of causes is enumerated is as follows:

“Dependent on ignorance (avidyā, P. avijjā), arise or originate the ‘formations (of the mental attitudes) (sāṃskāraḥ, P. saṅkhāraḥ); dependent on the ‘formations’, originates the knowledge (vijñānam, P. viññāgam); dependent on the knowledge, name and form (nāma-rūpam); dependent on the name and form, the six spheres (sādāyatanam, P. salāyatanam); dependent on the six spheres, the contact (sparśaḥ P. phasso); dependent on the contact, the sensation (vedanā); dependent on the sensation, the thirst (trṣṇā P. tanhā); dependent on the thirst, the seizing upon (upādānam); dependent on the seizing upon, the becoming (bhavaḥ); dependent on the becoming, the birth (jātiḥ); dependent on the birth, aging and death, pain and lament, sorrow, affliction and despair (jarāmaranaśokaparidevanadukkhadurmanasopāyāsāḥ, P. jarāmaranam sokaparidevanadukkhadomanassupāyāsā). Thus comes into existence the origin of this whole mass of sorrow (dukkha-skandhaḥ, P. dukkhakkhandho).

“Through the abolition of ignorance, the formations (sāṃskāraḥ) are abolished; through the abolition of formations,” the knowledge is abolished; through the abolition of knowledge, name and form are abolished; through the abolition of name and form, the six spheres are abolished; through the abolition of six spheres, the contact is abolished; through the abolition of contact, the sensation is abolished; through the abolition of sensation, the thirst is abolished; through the abolition of thirst, the ‘seizing towards’ (upādāna) is abolished; through the abolition of seizing, becoming (bhavaḥ) is abolished, through the abolition of becoming, the birth is abolished; through the abolition of birth are abolished age and death, pain and lament, sorrow, affliction and despair. Thus comes into existence the abolition of this whole mass of sorrow.”

The sorrow is traced back to a series of links of which one conditions the other, the last being ignorance. It is also shown in connection with it how through the sublation of ignorance their causes are sublated, until the sorrow vanishes with its causes.

Before we go, however, to discuss basic thoughts and try to understand the chain in its totality, we must occupy ourselves
with a series of isolated questions. The principle of Dependent Origination has always been regarded as the most difficult and obscurest part of the teaching of Buddha and has, since the earliest times, given a fillip to numberless explanations and discussions. Under these circumstances, we must bypass a more precise description. We must first understand and try to determine the most important ideas contained in them singly before we can go to interpret and understand it as a whole.

When we consider the chain of causes singly, it is evident that a large number of them appears to be already known. It is the thirst and the ideas connected with it. The first of these ideas which we here meet with is the six spheres (sadāyatanam). By this are meant the six inner spheres i.e. the six sense-organs. Then next follows the contact (sparśaḥ) of these six inner spheres with six external spheres i.e. the objects of sense-organs and with knowledge (vijñānam). Through that springs forth the sensation (vedanā). This calls forth on its part the desires or the thirst. The thirst leads to the effect that one clings to this existence, that one is attracted by the five groups (skandhāḥ) which make up his earthly personality, regarding them as himself and likewise seizes upon them (upādānam). The result is, therefore, the beginning of a new existence (bhavaḥ). It leads to birth and with it to all sorrows which fill the human life.

All these ideas which we have met singly or separately in other passages of the canon and which there serve to explain thirst and its role, recur here. The new thing is only that they appear collected together towards a connected chain of causes and effects. For the rest, their position and importance is unchanged. Fully new, on the other hand, is the enlargement of this series by four further members or links and the further continuation through them of that chain of causes up to the ignorance as the last cause. We must, therefore, consider these four members of the series.

The matter is simple in the case of the first of these members—ignorance (avidyā). Ignorance, for instance, is naturally the reverse of knowledge which brings about Deliverance. In the doctrine in which Deliverance depends on the knowledge of the Ātmā, it is the ignorance of the Ātmā. Here where the releasing knowledge consists in the comprehension of the four holy truths, it is
the opposite of this. That is true of the explanation which the canonical texts give. According to them the ignorance, which represents the cause of all sorrow, is the ignorance of the four holy truths, or to express it more exactly according to its nature, it is the ignorance of the true nature of earthly existence and its basis.

Essentially more difficult and controversial is the second idea which we, on account of its ambiguity of different meanings, have rendered by the general expression ‘formations’ (*samskāraḥ*). Though complete certainty about its meaning cannot be reached, it can give a meaning which can lay claim to its great probability for itself. The Indian expression (*samskāraḥ*) which we have rendered by (*'Gestaltungen' formations*) is derived from a root which generally means ‘to prepare’, ‘to get ready’, ‘to form’ or ‘to shape’ and is fully alive and current in this application in the language of the Buddhistic canon. The word ‘formations’ (*Gestaltungen*) has also this general sense, just like the derived word ‘formed’ (*gestaltet*), (*samskṛtāḥ*) belonging to the root already mentioned. It implies, then, in the Buddhistic texts, just like this, everything that has arisen or become, that has sprung out of a cause and is therefore perishable in contrast to the permanent imperishable that cannot have originated. This meaning has remained current and alive and holds good also in the later Buddhistic ‘dogmatik’. Besides the word ‘formations’ (*samskāraḥ*), just like the verb to which it belongs, has an essentially restricted, particular meaning. It signifies that something is put in a condition of readiness which further influences and operates. The use of the word in this sense is taken over from living speech and has continued to remain valid. Thus the word ‘formation’ (*samsakāraḥ*) is used in a text of the classical Sāmkhya system to denote the condition of the wheel which is moving in rotation and continues to move of itself. In the same sense it has become a fixed term in the Vaiśeṣika system which, namely, denotes a swing (*vegaḥ*) which keeps the flying arrow in motion. But especially it designates an exertion of a mental influence or mental readiness and this use has remained current especially in the Buddhistic canon e. g. when anybody decides to do anything it is this mental readiness which is called a formation or preparation (*samskāraḥ*). This use gains for the doctrine gradually terminological
importance. Above all, it is the attitudes of the will for which the expression is used. The firm wish to be born again in a later life in a particular place—according to the Buddhist view such a wish can in fact lead to such a rebirth—is called formation, realness (samskāraḥ). The inclination towards good or bad is called the formation towards good or bad (punyābhisaṃskāraḥ and apiṇyābhi-
samskāraḥ, P. puṇābhisaṅkharo and apiṇābhisaṅkhāro) and affects definitely the knowledge (vijñānam) in the next birth. With it, we are already in the thought-orbit which governs the principle of Dependent Origination. Passages are found in which ‘formations’ (samskāraḥ) are defined as the six masses of the impulses of the will (sac cetanākāyāḥ, P. cha cetanākāyā) which direct themselves to the six objects of the sense-organs, an idea which is taken over in the later ‘dogmatik’. Again, in another passage, it is said that the ‘formations’ (samskāraḥ) determine the five groups (skandhāḥ) of future existence i.e. the personality in the next embodiment. It is these ‘formations’ (samskāraḥ) which are most probably meant, when the ‘formations’ are described as being formed out of the ignorance of the four holy truths and as leading to rebirth, age, death and sorrow. Thus evidently is the idea in the Dependent Origination to be interpreted. Among ‘the formations’ (samskāraḥ) are to be understood here the attitudes of the will or the impulses of the will which are directed towards the sense-objects and the earthly personality and lead, therethrough, to rebirth and new entanglement in the sorrow of existence. In the following we shall render this idea as impulses of the will, corresponding to the idea underlying it.

Significantly more simple is the explanation of the next two links of the chain of causes. The knowledge (vijñānam) which appears as the third member, is the central psychical organ. The place of knowledge is not explicitly expressed in general in the Buddhist texts. That is due to the attempt to shun that anything could appear as the firm bearer of personality, as the ‘I’. Therefore the perishable character of knowledge is accentuated particularly sharply and it is mentioned in the same scale with the different psychical processes as feelings, cognition, etc. But in spite of that, its real character can be clearly known from different utterances. In the description of the different Meditation-practices, we meet with the eight-fold knowledge (vidyā) in
which the insight into the composition of the body takes the first place. This insight into the composition of the body is described as follows.\textsuperscript{167} "Therefore he knows: 'It is my body, formed out of the four gross elements, begot by father and mother, built out of the eaten rice-porridge and sour rice-gruel, perishable, consecrated to the destruction, wearing out, disintegration and decay. It is my knowledge which is united and connected with it.'" The knowledge stands here as a constituent of earthly personality besides the four elements. Further, we find in the texts of Buddhistic canons frequently enumerated a group of six elements (dhātavaḥ) viz., earth (prthvī), water (āpaḥ), fire (tejāḥ), wind (vāyuḥ), space (ākāśaḥ) and knowledge (viṣṇānaṃ).\textsuperscript{108} Here also knowledge is mentioned on the same par with the Elements. Only it stands, as described in one of the texts, high above the other Elements. It is said there:\textsuperscript{109} "The knowledge, the invisible, the unending, the all-lighting; it is there where neither water nor earth, nor fire nor air are found, in which long and short, subtle and gross, pretty and ugly, name and form entirely cease." These facts allow only the interpretation that the knowledge is not merely a psychical process like sensation or consciousness but a real constituent of personality and as such a psychical organ.

That stands in full agreement with the general development with which we are acquainted in the Upaniṣads and the Epic texts. We have, for instance, seen in the description of the Fire-doctrine of the Upaniṣads that spirituality or mental character holds good as the peculiarity of the soul appearing first in the form of thinking (manāḥ). Then this thinking as the thinking organ was enrolled among the life-forces or sense-organs and the knowledge (viṣṇānaṃ, prajñā or buddhiḥ) appeared as the characteristic quality of the soul. Finally in the Epic in the teaching with which we got acquainted in the dialogue between Manu and Brhhaspati and equally, as we shall see, in the Sāṃkhya, the knowledge (buddhiḥ) was dragged on the side of the organs and was regarded as a psychical organ.

The same development is discernible at the basis of the oldest Buddhistic doctrine in which the same expression for knowledge, namely, viṣṇānaṃ was used, as in the doctrine of Yājñāvalkya in the Upaniṣads. In Buddhism this development is veiled,
as we have already noticed; the knowledge (vijñānam) is already named beside the different psychical processes as one psychical factor beside the other; this is actuated by the attempt not to allow any firm bearer of personality to appear. However, the consciousness that a special place is to be allotted to knowledge (vijñānam) as against different psychical processes, is never lost sight of. And in the later ‘dogmatik’ itself, in which that general attempt had developed into the formulation of a regular doctrine, a central place among the different psychical factors remained allotted to knowledge (vijñānam).

Still the question remains: What importance is ascribed to knowledge (vijñānam) in the chain of causes? The texts give a clear answer on the question. In one of the dialogues in which the Buddha explains in details to his dear disciple Ānanda, it is expressed as follows:¹¹⁰ “If the knowledge, O Ānanda, does not enter the mother’s womb, would the name and form form themselves there?” “No, Master.” “If the knowledge, O Ānanda after entering the mother’s womb, deserts its place, would name and form take part in the rebirth into this life?” “No, my Master.” “If, O Ānanda, the knowledge in the case of the boy or girl, when they are small, is lost, would their name and form grow, increase and thrive?” “No, my Master.”

Out of these passages, we get the valuable information that knowledge (vijñānam) in the oldest Buddhism is the essential bearer of the cycle of existence, which enters in the next embodiment after death and corresponds to the fine body (sūkṣmam sarīram) which we find in other systems. Besides, there appears, in the canonical texts the ancient idea of a spirit-being which is named after a group of nature-spirits or half-gods (gandharvaḥ, P. gandhabbo) and which enters the mother’s womb during coitus and thus assumes the place of the wandering fine body.¹¹¹ It is a typical juxtaposition found in the old Buddhistic texts. The philosophical form of the doctrine is, in any case, the wandering or transmigration of knowledge (vijñānam). From these cited passages, the chain of causes is understood as follows: the impulses of the will (samskārāḥ) as the cause of knowledge (vijñānam) do not call forth the knowledge itself but only bring about its entry into the mother’s womb. That is in tune with the doctrine of the later ‘dogmatik’¹¹² and then it is also understandable and
clear. Thus the chain of causes is not intended to explain the origin of the earthly personality but only the coming into existence of rebirth or re-embodiment. This is produced with the entry of knowledge (vijñānam) in the mother’s womb and the development of the corporeality connected therewith. Thus the third member or link of the chain of causes is explained.

It remains, now, to describe the fourth link viz. name and form (nāmarūpam). It offers no difficulties because the explanation also of this link is found in the previously cited passage of the Buddhistic canon. According to that, by name and form are to be understood the physical and the psychical organisms which are formed after the entry of the fine body into the mother’s womb in that connection. With this interpretation, the development of the idea of name and form can be easily brought into agreement.

Name and form is a very old idea which occurs already early in the Vedic texts and its importance is brought forth clearly out of numerous passages. One such passage may suffice as an example. In the Brāhmaṇa of the Taittirīya school of the Yajurveda, there occurs, in a passage, the description of the creation of creatures by the Creator-God Prajāpati. It is said: 113 “Prajāpati created the creatures. When these were created, they were still adhering or sticking to one another. Then he entered them with the form. That is why it is said: ‘Prajāpati is the form.’ He entered them with the name. That is why it is said ‘Prajāpati is the name’ ”—We meet with a similar passage in the Chāndogya-paniṣad occurring during the presentation of the doctrine of that Upaniṣad. When the creation of primeval elements out of the existent (sat) is described, there it is said: 114 “Then the godhead (sat) thought: now then I will enter in these three divinities (the three primeval elements) with my living self and spread out the name and the form.” The form is, therefore, an entity (or a principle) which first prepares the still formless matter and gives form to it through its entry into it and makes up in this way the essential constituents of things. So also the name, according to a very old idea, is a separate entity or principle which is closely united with the nature of different things and lends them a speciality which distinguishes them from all other named things.
These ideas were now taken over and further formulated by Buddhism. The old interpretation of the idea of ‘form’ still echoes. It is said in one passage:116 “Just as, ye venerable ones, a space limited by beams, straw and clay is called a house, even so, ye venerable ones, a space limited by bones, sinews, flesh and skin is called a form.” With the gradual development of the term ‘form’ (rūham) as an expression for the matter in general, the meaning of this idea in the double expression name and form shifted itself and became continually more and more a designation purely for corporeality. Finally, the following explanation could be given.116 “The four gross elements and what is composed of those four elements is called form, ye venerable ones!” Hand in hand with it, the meaning of the idea name—also shifted. Thereunder were obviously understood in contrast to corporeality the psychical factors, which besides knowledge (vijñānam) make up the earthly personality. Thus they were understood. It is said in the text quoted above in which form is defined as the four gross Elements,116 “Sensation (vedanā), consciousness (saṃjñā), will (cetanā), contact (sparśaḥ) and attention (manaskāraḥ)—these are named, ye venerable ones, the names.” Thus the expression Name and Form came to denote the earthly personality in its essential constituents. There was already an idea which, though created out of other thought-processes, was limited to define and restrict the earthly personality to its constituents of the five groups (skandhaḥ); it led to a natural inference to bring both these circles of ideas in accord with each other, viz, the idea of Name and Form and that of the five groups. Then in that process, the form, without further ado corresponded with the group-Form, (rūpaskandhaḥ). The name was equated with the rest of the three groups viz. sensation (vedanā-skandhaḥ), consciousness (saṃjñāskandhaḥ) and the will-impulses (saṃskāraskandhaḥ). Knowledge (vijñānam) was already stated as a separate third member of the causal chain. With the customary inconsistency found in the old Buddhism, the knowledge is once more partially named here among them. Thus the final interpretation of Name and Form was attained and was transmitted to the later ‘dogmatik’.117

Out of the Name and Form rises the fifth member of the causal chain—the sixfold sphere (sādāyatanam). This idea needs
no more elucidation. The Six Sense-organs are to be understood under them. That they are stated to be separate from the rest of the constituents of the earthly personality is to be explained by the importance which is attached to them for the entanglement in the cycle of being. Besides, Buddhism is not alone in carrying out this separation. The classical Sāmkhya, as we shall see in the sequel, when it speaks of the origin of the embryo, carries out this separation and speaks of the development of the body and organs, or as there the expression is used, of the product and organs (kāryakaraṇam). In respect of the sixfold sphere, we have, however, already found its connection with the links of the causal chain already dealt with and we can now conclude with this the interpretation and the classification of the links in their separation. Now let us summarize it in its total connection and see how the whole causal chain represents itself on the ground of this interpretation.

The last cause of entanglement in the cycle of existence is the ignorance i.e. the lack of acquaintance with the releasing knowledge viz., the four holy truths. In the man, who does not possess this knowledge, originate the will-impulses which are directed on the sense-objects and earthly personality. Driven by these will-impulses the knowledge (vijñānam), which is, like a fine body, a carrier of rebirth, enters into a new mother’s womb after death. Joined with this knowledge (vijñānam), the body and the psychical factors (nāmārūpam) develop themselves and also the sense-organs of the new creature which comes into existence. When this new being is born, there ensues the fateful contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The sensations of different variety arise and waken the passions, above all, the thirst which clings to the sense-pleasures and the supposed ‘I’, and leads, therethrough, to new bondage and new existence. Thus comes about rebirth and entanglement in the sorrow of existence and it goes on in the endless chain, so long as the releasing knowledge and the destruction of thirst does not put an end to the cycle.

When we review the causal chain in its totality, the separate links and ideas in it become intelligible but still in their totality they produce an effect of being odd and in a sense enigmatic. This feeling is justified. The Buddha himself has
characterized this doctrine as deep and profound and difficult to understand. And until today the doctrine of the Dependent Origination has remained one of the most controversial statements in Buddhism.

A part of the difficulties, which one would find therein, depends indeed only on misunderstanding. People have been many times misled by external similarities to compare the doctrine of causal origination, with the doctrine dealing with world-creation e.g. the evolution-theory of the Sāṃkhya. Thus seen, it indeed offers to the understanding insoluble difficulties. But this comprehension basically misses the mark. The causal chain is not an expression of world-occurrence in general, least of all a law of world-origin and world-destruction, but it is a law according to which the entanglement in the cycle of being occurs. It is especially clear during the description of the third link of the chain that the will-impulses (sāṃskārāḥ) do not call forth the knowledge (vijñānam) but they merely occasion its entry into the mother’s womb. As a law of the entanglement in the cycle of existence, the causal chain is, however, important, in that it allows the knowledge of the possibility of knowing the way to Deliverance and to derive out of it the way to the Deliverance. The Buddha has proclaimed it for that very reason. He has no interest in the law of world-origin and world-end. He has remained true to his basic only to teach that “which leads to the withdrawal from the principle earthly, to the destruction of all desire, to the cessation of the perishable, to joy, to knowledge, to illumination, to nirvāṇa.”

But as a law of entanglement in the cycle of existence, the causal chain is not without its difficulties. As we have seen above, it describes how ignorance and will-impulses cause a new birth. Then it describes the entry of this new birth. Further it shows how in this new existence the desire or thirst is awakened by the contact of the sense-organs with the sense-objects, giving a fillip anew to further rebirth. Then it concludes with the description of the new entanglement in the sorrow of existence. The links of the causal chain distribute themselves on three births. It describes twice the coming into existence of new rebirth or embodiment. This is done both times with other words and ideas and both times it gives a different proof for the coming in of re-
embodiment. Therein as a matter of fact lies the unclarity or difficulty which cannot be easily explained away.

Still the difficulty can be understood and explained in its genesis if we apply to its explanation the interpretation of the origin of the causal chain, which we have suggested in the beginning. According to that suggestion, the causal chain represents a further formulation of the first sermon of the Buddha. Originally, the Buddha had, as the sermon of Banaras teaches, considered only thirst as the prime cause of rebirth and showed how this thirst came into existence and led to entanglement in a new existence. Then the thought thrust itself on him that the final cause of Entanglement in the cycle of existence must be sought in ignorance and he has developed a similar thought-process which traced the coming into existence of rebirth to that ignorance. So the two similar rows of causes were formulated, both of them describing how one existence developed itself out of the other. It was now necessary to mix both into a unity and that has occurred in the twelve-linked causal chain, although in a really external manner. Thereby the second existence in the first series of causes was equated with the first existence in the second row and so that resulted in the distribution of all the links of the chain over three births.

A comparison of the two parts of the Causal Chain will speak in favour of this interpretation. It shows a clear advance of the younger or later first part as against the second part; it is an advance of the same kind as we have seen in the development of the Deliverance-Doctrine from the Noble eight-fold Path to the later Way of Deliverance and we need consider it as characteristic for the development in the thought of the Buddha. First it is only a small simple basic thought impressively understood and put forth but clothed in colourless and indefinite ideas. Later there was thoroughly elaborated a thought-process with valuable complements, which are above all, graphic and clearly intelligible. Thus in the second part Thirst (ṭṛṣṇā) leads to seizing after (upādāna) things. We have already spoken about the indefiniteness of the idea of thirst, and its gradual definite comprehension. But the idea of ‘seizing’ is equally indefinite and still blurred. As against that in the first part of the causal chain, ignorance (avidyā) calls forth the will-impulses (samskāraḥ). These represent a definite
psychical process and have besides created a new idea whose importance was bound to show itself in future. Still more evident is the development and advance in ideas in the next links of the Chain. On the seizing (upon) (upādānam), follows in the second part ‘becoming’ (bhavaḥ), a fully colourless idea and vague expression for the coming into existence of a new birth. On the other hand, the coming into existence in the first part as a result of will-impulses (samskārāḥ) in their essential steps is described quite clearly and graphically. First an entry of knowledge (viṣṇānam) into the mother’s womb, then the formation of psychical and physical organism (nāmarūpam), finally the development of the senseorgans (ṣaḍāyatanaṁ). This is a formulation of the doctrine which stands in the forefront in those times and equal in rank to all other contemporary doctrines if not even superior to them. The philosophically worthless idea of birth (jātiḥ) in the second part of the causal chain is finally allowed to fall away in the first part.

Though our interpretation of the origin of the causal chain gains in probability, still the purely mechanical mixing of both the two parts of the causal chain is remarkable and enigmatical. One is forced to ask whether, if to the Buddha this purely formal stringing together with one another of both the explanations of the entanglement in the cycle of existence was not shocking, why then he did not attempt to bring thirst and ignorance in closer connection, as for instance has occurred in the philosophy of the Epic in the dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati; because there in that dialogue of Manu, Manu derived, out of ignorance, thirst in place of the will-impulses. It is to be marked, after what we have hitherto seen, that the deficiency in systematization, the inability to mix different views and principles into a great unity was perhaps the greatest weakness of Buddha. Already many times we had occasion to point out how different, why, how contradictory thoughts stand directly near one another in the oldest Buddhistic teachings. It would not, therefore, be astonishing, if we meet with a similar phenomenon in the case of the Causal Chain. It is also, however, to be considered whether it was not psychologically impossible for the Buddha to annul or to replace the knowledge which had come to him in the hour of enlightenment and which had become an unwavering certainty to him. Here he stood inwardly before an invincible limitation. But a further
formulation through supplements and explanations was possible and that has occurred in the doctrinal statement of Causal Origination.

Thus we have explained the twelve-linked Causal Chain, according to its composition and origin. Through it we have got acquainted not only with the most important doctrinal statement of Buddhism but we have also found a very valuable example of the development of the old Buddhistic doctrine, and above all, of the inner spiritual development of the Buddha himself. In the beginning stands the preaching of the doctrine of Deliverance in the sermon of Banaras in the form of the four noble truths. In the end stands the doctrine of the Causal Origination. But the progress which this doctrine represents as against the four holy truths and the fact that it partly overhauls and replaces it, in part, had also come to the notice of the adherents of Buddhism and it is certainly no accident that in many texts during the description as to how Buddha found the illumination, the doctrine of causal origination has stepped into the place of the four holy truths as decisive knowledge.¹¹⁹

The Threefold Taint: With the creation of this doctrine of causal origination, the Buddhist teaching regarding the causes of the entanglement in the cycle of existence and the possibility of their removal assumed a final pattern. Ignorance and Thirst were pointed out as the root of all sorrow and simultaneously also the possibility of their destruction. There were only a few supplements and improvements which were added later on. One of these supplements was the already described formulation and a sharper comprehension of the Thirst-idea which first led to the differentiation as Thirst after the desires (kāmatṛṣṇā), the thirst after becoming (bhavatṛṣṇā), and the thirst after annihilation (vibhavatṛṣṇā) and finally found its final conclusion with the distinction between attachment to desires (kāmarāgah) and attachment to becoming or birth (bhavārāgah). Then came last the summing up of the total causes of entanglement in the cycle of existence in a unitary or uniform formulation. Three such causes were given with the distinction of both forms of thirst together with ignorance, the attachment to the desires, the attachment to becoming or birth and ignorance. These were summed up under a uniform designation which was chosen from an old ex-
pression which plays a great role in Jainism, that expression being Taint (āsravaḥ, P. āsava). Thus now three taints or stains were spoken of as the root of all sorrow and the cause of entanglement in the cycle of existence, the taint of desire (kāmāsravaḥ, P. kāmāsava), the taint of becoming or birth (bhavāsravaḥ, P. bhavāsava), and the taint of ignorance (avidyāsravaḥ, P. avidyāsava). With this we have arrived at the description of the last doctrinal statement—the teaching of Taint with which we have now to deal. Simultaneously we have found the key to its understanding. As we have seen during the description of the Deliverance-Way, the releasing knowledge culminates in a double insight. The disciple who on the highest stage of meditation directs his mind on the Bondage and Deliverance out of the cycle of existence and their causes, knows, first of all, the sorrow, the origin of sorrow, the removal of that sorrow and the way to the removal of sorrow. Then he knows secondly, the taint, the origin of the taint, the removal of the taint and the way of the removal of the taint. Of these two doctrines, we have already explained the four noble truths. We had to leave first unexplained the doctrine of taint, because the directly emerging expression taint (āsravaḥ) could not be interpreted out of the description of the way of Deliverance itself. But now we can get at its explanation without further difficulties. As we have already seen, this expression 'taint' (āsravaḥ), in contrast to the thirst named alone in connection with the four noble truths, sums up all the causes of sorrow. The disciple knows, over and above the four noble truths, all the causes of sorrow, its removal and the way of its removal. And the knowledge contained in the four noble truths finds through that its completion and consummation. Thus this doctrinal statement is explained.

Indeed, this explanation turns out to be a juxtaposition of two teachings which are at bottom similar. The thirst alone is recognized as the cause of sorrow, then the thirst in its two basic forms, together with the ignorance. Now, one asks, what this juxtaposition is supposed to mean, why one alone of the two knowledges is not enough. But after what we have stated so far, the answer to this question no more offers any difficulty.

The doctrine of the four noble truths was the knowledge which the Buddha himself had attained in the moment of his illumination. In it, the thirst alone was held as a valid cause of
all sorrow. In course of time, as we have seen, it was exhibited as inadequate; the doctrine was further formulated and completed until at last it came to the doctrine of taints to explain two forms of thirst, together with ignorance as the cause of sorrow. As soon as this occurred, the knowledge of the four noble truths alone was no more regarded as sufficient for Deliverance. One was compelled to widen the releasing knowledge in such a way as could reckon with the further formulation of the doctrine already described, so that on the knowledge of the four noble truths, there follows the knowledge of the taint—its origin, destruction, and the way to its destruction.

Therefore, in the description of the releasing knowledge in the way of Release, the two stages of development of the doctrine, as it occurs very often in old Buddhism, stand side by side. The older is the knowledge of the four noble truths which alone originally formed the releasing knowledge and which could not be ousted from its ancient place. Along with it, stepped in the knowledge of taints—their origin, destruction and the way of their destruction, which corresponds with the final form of the doctrine. It is also its all-embracing and important form. It forms the final and the highest point of releasing knowledge. When it is reached then the pupil has attained his goal. The knowledge which the disciple had first assumed, trusting credulously in the Buddha and which had induced him to step on the Deliverance-Path, has now become an irrevocable certainty through direct view and experience. And now the striven-for result comes in: The three taints vanish and the disciple knows: “Rebirth is annihilated, holy conduct has attained fruition, duty is discharged. There is no more return to this world.” With it he becomes the holy one (arhan) and has attained the last goal of the Deliverance-Way; he has found Nirvāṇa.

We have now concluded our presentation of the Buddhistic Deliverance-doctrine and with it are exhausted the contents of the Sermon of Buddha in essentials.

_Soul and the nature of Deliverance:_ Two questions, now, remain to be handled. They are, no doubt, in the Buddhistic canons entirely in the background and play only a subordinate part for the disciples of Buddha. But they have awakened more interest in Europe and are dealt with at greater length than what is contai-
ned in the preaching of the Buddha. They are the questions regarding the existence of the Soul and the nature of Deliverance. For instance, it was already early asserted that Buddhism denies the existence of the Soul and that therefore the Deliverance is extinction (nirvāṇa, P. nibbāna), an entry into Nothing. This assertion has aroused lively discussion and a whole literature. With it, the preaching of Buddha has assumed an entirely peculiar place in the development of Indian philosophy, giving rise to a whole series of difficult and interesting questions in connection with the doctrine.

In the frame of the general presentation of the history of Indian philosophy, there is no space to deal with these questions exhaustively. We must restrict ourselves to showing, in short, how the texts of the Buddhistic canon are related towards these questions. In my view, the things would not appear so difficult, if one would consider the problem from the beginning on the basis of the old canonical texts. If people had not been first acquainted with the phantastically embellished legends of later times, they would have hardly thought, as it occurred earlier, of doubting the historicity of the person of the Buddha and seeing in the accounts of his life a nature-myth. Even so, the question as to how the oldest Buddhism is disposed towards the problem of the Soul and the character of Deliverance, would have appeared from the beginning in a different light, if people had not been first acquainted with the later Mahāyāna texts, for the understanding of which at that time all pre-requisites were lacking and this was necessarily bound to lead to misinterpretation. But once it had occurred, it was difficult to change the accumulated prejudice.

If we consider, in an unprejudiced way, the texts of the oldest Buddhistic canon, the utterances are evident and intelligible and the form in which they are used completely corresponds to what we must expect from the otherwise wholly different attitude of the oldest Buddhistic doctrine. As we have said from the beginning, the preaching of Buddha is throughout governed by an attempt to avoid unnecessary theoretical discussions and to restrict oneself strictly to what led to Deliverance. Already in the two questions just mentioned, the risk to get entangled in endless discussion was especially great. That is
shown by a glance at the first text in the collection of long texts—the so-called Brhatmājālāsūtra in which the Buddha asserts that all doctrinal opinions obtaining in his time were, as it were, caught up as in a net. The questions with which these doctrines were occupied were, above all, the questions of the constitution of the Soul and its fate after death. The differences of opinion were exceedingly numerous.¹²⁰ We must expect that these questions, so far as the Deliverance-doctrine was concerned, did not absolutely require to be dealt with; so they were most rigorously kept at a distance by the Buddha and rejected. As a matter of fact, this was the case according as the canonical texts represent it.

The most well-known example in this connection is the narration of one pupil named Māluṇkyāputra¹²¹ who approaches Buddha and demands answer to the questions: Whether the world is permanent or not, whether it is endless or limited, whether the Soul and body are different or not, whether the released man lives after death or not. If the Buddha knows the answer, he should give the answer; if he does not know, he should honestly say, 'I do not know.' Thereupon, the Buddha first reprimands him with an attitude of superiority—"Have I ever said to you, Māluṇkyāputra, 'come and be my pupil, I shall teach thee whether the world is permanent or not, whether it is limited or endless, whether the soul is of the same character as the body or not, whether the released man continues to live after death or not,'"

"No, oh Master."

"Or, have you ever said to me: 'I wish, oh Master, to be thy disciple, teach me whether the world is permanent or not-permanent, whether the world is limited or endless, whether the soul is of the same nature as the body, whether the released man continues to live after death or not,'"

"No, Master."

"It is settled then, Māluṇkyāputra, that neither have I said such things to you nor you have said such things to me. Who are you, then, you silly man, and whom do you reproach?"

Now the Buddha uses a metaphor: "A man is hit with an arrow, his relatives fetch a physician in order that he might pull out the arrow, now the man says: 'I will not allow the arrow to be pulled out before I do not know who has shot it, with which
bow it was shot, and what is the arrow made of, etc.?" The
man would die, before the physician sets about, giving his treat-
ment. The same is the case of the disciple who seeks an answer
to these questions. He would die before he gets an answer. At
the same time, he would miss or neglect the only important
thing—to step on the Deliverance-Way. That is why, Māluūkyā-
putra, what I have not preached or proclaimed, does not re-
quire to be preached. What I have proclaimed requires to be
proclaimed. But what have I preached? 'It is the sorrow'—that
I have proclaimed. 'That is the origin of sorrow'—that I have
proclaimed. "That is the removal of sorrow"—that I have pro-
claimed. "That is the way of the removal of sorrow' that I have
proclaimed."

Still sharper is the rejection of these questions in a con-
versation with the wandering monk Vatsagotra (P. Vacchagotto). He puts the question to the Buddha whether the I, the Ātmā, is
or is not. But he gets no answer and had to go away unsatisfied.
And now Ānanda, Buddha's favourite disciple, asks the Buddha
why the latter had not replied to the question of Vatsagotra and
gets the following answer: "If I, O Ānanda, had replied 'the I
is', that would have confirmed the teaching of those ascetics and
Brāhmaṇas who believe in the imperishability; if I had replied,
'the 'I' is not', the doctrine of those ascetics and Brāhmaṇas, who
believe in the annihilation, would have been confirmed." The
wandering monk Vatsagotra who believes in the existence of the 'I'
still would have asked me in amazement 'My 'I' was still there
earlier. Is it, so to say, at present no more?' and he would have
plunged out of one bewilderment into a still greater one.—The
answers to these questions would not have led him to right
knowledge and Deliverance."

Can the mention of the 'I' or a soul be completely avoided
in the doctrine of Deliverance? Was one not straightway forced
to speak of a Subject who is bound and released? The Buddha
knew, how to avoid the difficulty, with consummate dexterity.
Thereby occurred to him one of the basic views on which the
Buddhistic doctrine of deliverance is built. As soon as, for in-
stance, the view of a psychical organism had formed itself in the
circles of philosophical schools, the question arose, as we have
already shown in the description of Epic philosophy, whether the
senses and the psychical organ are reckoned in the sphere of the soul or in the sphere of matter. The answer which was given in different doctrines ran differently. In the dialogue between Manu and Brhaspati (\textit{Manu-Brhaspati-Saṃvādaḥ}) we have got acquainted with the doctrine according to which the psychical organism arises out of the soul and returns back to it after Deliverance from the cycle of being. The second possibility was, above all, represented by the Sāṃkhya system and its first steps in the Epic, in which all the psychical organs with their functions are ascribed to matter, arise out of it and return back to it. This thought rests on the attempt which had its origin in the Fire-Doctrine of the Upaniṣāds and continued in the Epic and especially continued in the Sāṃkhya, to free the soul of all earthly definitions and to remove it from the orbit of origination and causal occurrences. Therefore in the Sāṃkhya, as we shall see in the sequel, all activity is removed to the sphere of matter and the soul is an inactive, pure onlooker. And the same view lies at the basis of the Buddhist doctrine of Deliverance. This is, no doubt, the most important and essential agreement of the oldest Buddhism with the Sāṃkhya.

As according to this view, all physical and psychical organs and functions belong to the world of phenomena, it was possible to allow all processes which lead to bondage and Deliverance, to happen in this sphere, without touching the idea of the soul or of the 'I'in any way. This possibility has been employed or exploited by the Buddha in a masterly manner. Thus we can explain the formulation of the causal chain which derives the different processes, leading to the entanglement in the cycle of being, from one another, without speaking of a subject. That has happened with full consciousness and the Buddha strongly rejects every attempt to depart from this formulation. When once a disciple asks: 'Who touches? Who experiences?', he is taught by the Buddha as follows\(^{123}\) : "This question is not admissible. I do not say 'he touches?'. If I had said 'he touches', then the question would have been admissible viz. 'who touches, O Master?' As I do not say so, and speak about it still, it would be admissible to ask me: 'Out of what, arises Oh Master, the touch?' The answer to that is: 'Out of the six spheres arises the touch. Out of the touch arises the sensation,'"—In the same way, all similar
questions are denied such as: “to whom do the will-impulses (sanskārāḥ) belong? to whom do old age and death happen, etc.?"

But there was a point where at least the naming of the ‘I’ could not be avoided. As we have seen during the description of the four noble truths, the thirst, self-clinging to this existence, was traced back to two different roots and one of them was the false belief that the earthly personality is the ‘I’. This wrong belief must be eliminated and here it was inevitable to speak of the ‘I’. But here also the Buddha knew how to evade the difficulties and to bypass the unpleasant questions, because, above all, he chose a purely negative formulation of his statements. It was as follows: He investigated first into what appeared to the ordinary man as a Being (sattvaḥ) or Personality (pudgalaḥ, P. puggalo) and showed that it is not a fixed unity but a bundle of alternating formations (sanskārāḥ) in a general sense. They are essentially five sorts of data or things of which the earthly personality is composed: Corporeality (rūpam), sensation (vedanā), consciousness (saṃjñā, P. saññā), will-impulses (sanskārāḥ, P. sankhārā) and knowledge (vijñānam, P. viññānam). They are the so-called five groups (skandhāḥ, P. khandhā) which meet us repeatedly and which as objects on which the desire is directed, carry the designation ‘groups of seizing’ (upādānakandhāḥ, P. upādānakkhandhā). “As one uses the word ‘Cart’ for that where the parts of the cart meet, so where there are five groups, there is the Personality; that is the general meaning”. All these five groups are perishable, above all, the knowledge which was formerly known to appear as the focal point of psychical complexes and could appear in the least as the ‘I’. “What is called the mind (citām) or thinking organ (manaḥ) or the knowledge (vijñānam), continually rises and sets, changing like day and night. As a monkey roves about among the trees in a forest, grasps one bough, lets it go and again grasps another, so rises and disappears what is named ‘mind’, thinking or knowledge, continually changing day and night.” From the perishableness of the five groups, the Buddha draws the following conclusions: He asks first: “What mean you, ye monks? Is the corporeality constant or inconstant?” “Inconstant, Master.” He questions further: “That which is inconstant—is it sorrow
or joy?" "Sorrow, O, Master." "That which is inconstant, sorrowful, subject to change—Can one after thinking over it, say 'it is mine, it is 'I', it is my self'—"One cannot, O Master."—Similar questions are formulated in respect of the four remaining groups and similar conclusions are drawn. The same way of argumentation is met with in the description of the doctrine of the characteristic of the 'not-I' and it recurs in the canon in numerous places. With this manner of argumentation the Buddha attained what he wanted. With that he rejected the false belief which sees the 'I' in the earthly personality. At the same time every assertion about the existence or non-existence of the 'I' is bypassed.

People have, indeed, intended to read differently through the denial of the 'I' by the Buddha by means of the above-recited arguments. But that goes absolutely too far. From the point of one who can judge without prejudice what is said is only that the five groups are not the 'I' and that is also the only aim which is served by the arguments. Every attempt to find more therein would go wide of the mark and miss it. Why, one could rather draw the conclusion out of the assertion 'that everything which is perishable and sorrowful cannot be the 'I' ' to the effect that the 'I' is imperishable and free from sorrow and that any one who argues in this way presupposes the existence of the Soul. Besides in the above arguments in the texts of the Buddhistic canon, it is never said that the 'I' does not exist but at the most that it is not comprehensible. This has been sought to be interpreted to mean that the Buddha chose this manner of expression in order not to deter the feeble among his pupils by the denial of the 'I' and by the idea of the annihilation resulting out of it during Deliverance. But such thought-processes lie quite far away from the preaching of the Buddha. He never canvasses for or woos his disciples, at least in such a crooked way. Finally, the Buddha himself protests against such interpretations of his words. In one of his sermons in which he has shown in his usual way that the five groups are not the 'I', he bursts out in this connection into the following words: "And I who thus speak and preach, Ye monks, some ascetics and Brâhmaṇas accuse me in an unrighteous and futile manner, falsely and wrongly: 'This ascetic, Gautama, is a nihilist, he teaches destruction and annihilation and ruin of the
once existing being' (sataḥ sattvasya), they say. What I am not, ye monks, and do not utter, regarding that the ascetics and Brāhmaṇas accuse me in an unrighteous futile manner, falsely and wrongly: "This ascetic Gautama is a nihilist, he teaches the destruction, the annihilation and this decay of the once, existing being," they say. Only one thing I teach ye monks, now as formerly: the sorrow and the removal of sorrow."

In short, we can, by way of summary, say that the Buddha rejects the question of the existence of the 'I' because he considers it as one of the questions which lead to fruitless discussions and wrangling and deflect from the proper goal of Deliverance. But the denial of the soul is not pronounced or expressed: on the contrary where an explicit utterance is found, the soul is only characterized as incomprehensible.

And now what about the question of Deliverance? The answer of this question is wishfully read out of the word 'extinction' (nirvāṇam, P. nibbāṇam) by which Buddhism designates Deliverance. This word denotes, for instance, the extinction of a flame and Deliverance is expressly compared with such extinction. It is said that as a flame goes out with its extinction and exists no more, the Delivered Man also is annihilated with the Deliverance. This thought-process, however, is based on a completely false presupposition and commits the serious mistake of introducing alien views into the Indian thought-world.

As we have already seen in the section on Epic Philosophy, in the description of the dialogue between Bhrigu and Bharadvāja, the flaming up and extinction of fire means for the Indian of the ancient times, not the origination and destruction of fire but that the already existing fire is therethrough visible and becomes again invisible. That is the reason why the metaphor is used for the fate of the soul after death. The statement in the texts in this regard is fully clear. It is said there that "the Soul which has entered the body, does not pass away when the body passes away but it is like a fire, after the fuel is burnt out. Just as the fire, when one does not put fuel into it any more, is no more perceptible, but on account of its entry into ether (ākāśa) is without a fixed place and therefore is difficult to be perceived, so also the soul, when it departs from the body, finds itself in a condition similar to the ether (ākāśa), but it is not perceived on account of
its fineness or subtleness. This state of things it is not in doubt." The Fire, therefore, does not pass away when it is extinguished but it only becomes imperceptible. The same idea lies at the basis of Buddha's statement when he compares Deliverance with the extinction of fire. He says for example in one passage: "As the way of the extinguished fire is not perceptible, similarly it is not possible to point out the way of the wholly Delivered who are taken out beyond the fetters and the flood of Desire and have reached unchanging Bliss." This one passage may suffice here. We meet with also further passages. We also come across further utterances and expressions which show clearly that the extinction was not understood as annihilation. It is said that there is a sphere of extinction (nirvāṇadhātuḥ), in which the Delivered one enters,—a city of extinction (nirvāṇapuram). So also, it is clear when the Buddha speaks of the city of the extinction as follows: "There is, ye monks, the unborn, unbecome, not made, not formed. Had it not been there, there would have been no way out for the born, the become, made, formed." The attempt, therefore, to read the idea of Destruction into the expression extinction (nirvāṇam) rests in the last analysis on a misunderstanding.

How do the texts of the Buddhistic canons express themselves with regard to the question of Deliverance? The question is put in the usual form: It is asked whether the released or as he is mostly called the perfect one (tathāgataḥ),—the Buddha—continues after death, whether he does not, whether he continues or whether he does not continue, or whether he neither continues nor does not continue. The handling of this question is essentially the same as that of the existence of the Soul. This is counted among the questions in which the risk of being involved in endless and fruitless discussion is especially great. The answer to this question is basically rejected by the Buddha. Thus the question appears among the questions of Mālunkyaḥputra on which the Buddha refuses to reply. Similar things we find in numerous passages. The question of the existence of the Released is therefore rejected; but there is no talk of his destruction.

Still the rejection of this question is not so exclusive as during the problem of the existence of the Soul. Evidently, the importance which the seeker after Deliverance attached to it was
so great that an answer could not be absolutely shunned. We find, therefore, many texts in which the reply is given and it is as follows: 'The condition of the Released is incomprehensible and inexpressible to human thought.' In one of these texts it is narrated how a monk named Yamaka had come to a heretical view: 'I understand the doctrine proclaimed by Tathāgata to the effect that a monk who has done away with all taints, when his body disintegrates and falls to destruction, disappears and does not exist after death.' Thereupon, Śāriputra, one of the most outstanding pupils of the Buddha, teaches him as follows:

"What meanest thou, friend Yamaka? Is the Perfect One of the same stuff or nature as the corporeality (rūpam), the sensation (vedanā), the consciousness (samjñā), the will-impulses (samskārāḥ) and the knowledge (vijñānam)? Do you hold this view?" "No, I do not, my friend." "What meanest thou, friend Yamaka? Is the Perfect One contained in the corporeality, sensation, consciousness, the will-impulses and knowledge? Do you think so?" "No I do not, my friend." "What do you think, friend Yamaka? Is the Perfect One different from the corporeality, the sensation, the consciousness, the will-impulses and knowledge? Do you regard it thus?" "No, I do not, my friend." "What meanest thou, friend Yamaka? Are the corporeality, the sensation, the consciousness, the will-impulses and the knowledge the Perfect One? Do you think so?" "I do not think so, my friend." "What do you think, friend Yamaka? Without corporeality, without sensation, without consciousness, without will-impulses, without knowledge: is that the Perfect One? Do you think so?" "No, my friend." "Therefore, friend Yamaka, the Perfect One cannot be comprehended by you here in the visible world, in his true nature and essence. Have you, therefore, the right to speak; 'I understand the doctrine proclaimed by the Exalted One, to the effect that a monk who is free from all stains, when his body disintegrates and falls to destruction, passes away and does not exist after death?" "This was, Friend Śāriputra, the heretical opinion, which I formerly cherished in my ignorance. But now when I have heard the venerable Śāriputra proclaiming the doctrine, the heretical opinion has been abandoned by me and I have known the doctrine." According to this text, therefore, the true nature
of the Perfect One cannot be comprehended in this existence; how much less then, in the condition of Deliverance!

The Buddha expresses himself similarly in many other passages. Thus he says in his dialogue with the venerable Upasīva:135

"As the light blown off by a whiff of wind comes to rest and disappears from sight, so enters the wise man, laying aside name and form, into rest, disappearing from sight."

"And on the question: 'Is one who has gone to rest, removed from existence? Does permanent existence belong to him, freed from sorrow? This you will proclaim to me, O wise man, because this regulation is known to you in its truth.'

'He replies: Him, who has gone to rest, no measure can measure. Of him to speak, there are no words. Blown away is it what the thought could not understand. To the speech every path is closed."

But his answer is more detailed in a conversation with the already mentioned wandering monk Vatsagotra.136 This Vatsagotra calls upon the Buddha once again and puts his questions to him. This time the Buddha allows himself to get engaged in conversation with him. One after another, Vatsagotra states different views, 'that the world is permanent or evanescent, infinite or limited, that the body and the soul are the same or different, that the Released one continues after death or does not.' The Buddha rejects all these views: Because they are 'a path of views, a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a stage-play of views, a convulsion of views, a fetter of views, full of sorrow, peregrinesness, despair, agony' and do not lead to withdrawal from the earthly things, to passionlessness, to the cessation of the perishable, to joy, to knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa.' On the question as to which view he himself owned or professed, he replied: 'A view lies far from the Perfect One, Oh Vatsa; because, Oh Vatsa, Tathāgata has known that, it is the corporeality (rūpam); it originates thus and dissolves itself thus; it is the sensation (vedanā), it originates thus and dissolves itself thus; it is the consciousness (samjñā), thus it originates and thus it dissolves; it is the will-impulses (sanskārāḥ), they originate thus and dissolve themselves thus; it is the knowledge (vijñānam), it originates thus and dissolves itself thus.' That is why I say that the Perfect One
is completely released from all the disturbances and from all the
stains (anusayāḥ, P. anusayā) with the ideas of the ‘I’ and mine,
through vanquishing, denying, suppressing, abandoning and
repudiating all opinions.’

Now Vatsagotra further asks: “Where, therefore, O Gautama,
is a monk whose mind is released (vimukta-cittaḥ) born again?”
“Origination or being born is not right.”
“Then, O Gautama, is he not born again?”
“Not being born again (non-origination) is not right.”
“Then, therefore, Gautama, is he born and not born again?”
“Being born and not being born, Vatsa, are not right.”
“Then, Oh Gautama, is he neither born nor not born again?”
“Neither birth nor non-birth, Vatsa, are right.”

“On the question; ‘Where, therefore, O Gautama, is born
again a monk whose mind is thus released’, you answer, ‘origina-
tion or birth, Vatsa, is not right’. On the question: ‘then, there-
fore, O Gautama, is he not born again?’, you reply, ‘non-origi-
nation or non-birth, Vatsa, is not right’. On the question, ‘then,
therefore, O Gautama, he neither originates nor he does not ori-
ginate?’ you answer, neither origination nor non-origination is
right, Vatsa.’ “I am, therefore, landed into uncertainty and
bewilderment. The clarity which I had gained through the earlier
speech with the Master Gautama, is now lost to me.”

Thereupon, Buddha begins his teaching: “Enough of uncer-
tainty, Vatsa, enough of bewilderment. Deep, Vatsa, is the doct-
rine, difficult to understand, full of repose, exalted, unattainable
to thought, subtle in meaning, comprehensible only to the wise.
To know it is difficult for you, as you hug other views, find satis-
faction and pleasure in others, adhere to other things and walk
other ways. I shall, therefore, direct on you counter-questions.
Answer them as well as they appear to you. What do you think,
Vatsa? : If a fire were to burn before you, would you know ‘here
before me the fire is burning’?” “When before me, O Gautama,
a fire would burn, I would know, here before me the fire is bur-
ning.”

“If one were to ask you, Vatsa, on account of what is this
fire which is burning before you, burning.” “I would answer the
question: ‘The fire that burns before me, burns through fuel,
grass and wood.’” "If now, O Vatsa, the fire before you were to
go out, would you know, ‘the fire before me has gone out’?”. “When, O Gautama, the fire before me would be extinguished. I would know that the fire before me is extinguished.” “If one were to ask you, Vatsa, in which direction has the fire, which is extinguished before you, gone—to the East, the West, the North or the South, what answer would you give to the question?” “That is not applicable here, O Gautama. This fire has the fuel, grass, wood, through it it burnt, consumed. Other fuel, grass, wood were not supplied to it; so it is considered as having gone out, being without nourishment.” “Similarly, Oh Vatsa, are the corporeality, the sensation, the consciousness, the will-impulses and the knowledge through which one could characterize the Perfect one,—if one wished to characterize him—all these are abandoned, rooted out with their roots, made level with a place where once a palm tree stood. They are destroyed so that they could never more be born again. Free from every comprehension, such as corporeality, sensation, consciousness, will-impulses and knowledge is the Perfect One, deep, immeasurable, unfathomable like the great sea. Origination does not come true, non-origination does not come true, origination and non-origination do not come true, neither origination nor non-origination do not come true.”

With this Vatsagotra is satisfied. He now understands the doctrine and professes himself as the pupil of the Buddha.

On the basis of the considered texts, we come to a similar result in the case of the nature of Deliverance as in the case of the question regarding the existence of the soul. As usual, it is rejected as a question leading to fruitless discussion. When the condition of the Released is described, it is characterized as incomprehensible to human thought and as inexpressible. On the other hand, there is no mention that Deliverance implies an annihilation. The texts speak on both questions clearly and give an unambiguous answer in a great plenty of passages. It is a somewhat different thing how these texts were interpreted in later times, how people were then inclined towards the described texts. But with regard to that point we shall have to occupy ourselves with the consideration of the origin of the Buddhistic system.

Now one point remains to be handled and explained: In
which views is the Buddhistic idea of the incomprehensibility of the soul rooted and out of which doctrines has it grown? On these questions the answer is possible with a fair amount of certainty. We are now familiar with the two different ideas of the soul in the hitherto described doctrines of ancient times. One, which reckoned, in a simple and ancient way, with numerous individual souls; the second, the highly developed and peculiarly formulated doctrine of the world-soul as it was created in the Upaniṣads. The doctrine of individual souls ascribes to them different qualities and considers them, above all, not only as the bearers of knowledge but also as active and efficient. On the other hand, one of the most essential features of the Soul-doctrine of the Upaniṣads is that all earthly qualities are denied to the Ātmā, that the Ātmā is held as unknowable and incomprehensible, so that finally in the doctrine of Yājñavalkya, knowledge and joy remain as the only definitions of the world-soul. We have further seen that this comprehension of the Ātmā continues in the Epic philosophy; the attempt there further operates to disrobe the Ātmā of all earthly definitions. Thus we have already mentioned that the Ātmā is designated as neither being nor not-being, nor being and non-being at the same time and that he lies beyond all causal occurrences. We shall further see that in the stream of development which leads to the origin of the Sāṃkhya system the same development continues and reaches its high-water-mark with the relegation of all occurrences—why, of all psychical processes themselves—to the sphere of Matter.

It will now be clear, at the first glance, that the Buddhistic interpretation of the Soul belongs to the same stream of development which had its origin in the Upaniṣads. Thus arises the decisive definition of the Soul as incomprehensible and inexpressible. The sporadic suggestions or echoes are also undeniable. When the Buddha speaks\(^{137}\) of the Deliverance in the following passage, it rings like a description of the world of Brahma: “There is, ye monks, a place where there is no earth nor water nor light nor air, nor infinity of space nor infinity of reason or understanding nor nothingness, neither consciousness nor unconsciousness, not this world nor that world, of both sun and moon. I call it, ye monks, neither coming nor going nor standing
nor Death nor Birth. Without base, without progress, without support or prop it is. It is the end of sorrow.” Further, the blessedness of Deliverance, of which the Buddhistic texts speak, is of the same sort as the joy of Brahma. Besides, when we bring into consideration that, as we shall see, the philosophical ideas with which the Buddha has worked, show different points of contact with the thought-world of the Upaniṣads—especially with the doctrine of Yājñavalkya, I have no doubt in assuming that the same views regarding the nature of the soul and Deliverance lie at the basis of Buddha’s teaching, as the ideas created in connection with the Fire-doctrine of the Upaniṣads. The definition of the soul and of the Released one as neither being nor non-being, as neither being and non-being at the same time, neither as being nor as non-being, further the relegation of all psychical processes to the sphere of Matter—all these bespeak the fact that the same tendency of further formulation was at work, as the one we could ascertain in the Epic texts.

With this, is exhausted in essentials what the preaching of Buddha contains in regard to the philosophical doctrines and ideas. We can now summarize the results achieved so far and attempt to arrange and fix the place of the doctrine of Buddha in the general development and ascertain the significance which attaches to it inside this development. With this aim, it appears best to put together the philosophical ideas in it in the same way as we have done in the case of doctrines up to now and to compare these with them.

The Importance of the doctrine of the Buddha: Let us begin with the doctrine of the Soul. This corresponds, as we have already seen, essentially with the Ātma doctrine of the Upaniṣads in the form as it is associated with the name of Yājñavalkya. The Soul, like the Ātma, is incomprehensible and inexpressible. The joy of nirvāṇa is the counterpart of the joy of Brahma. Besides in the relegation of the psychical processes to the sphere of matter, the same further development evinces itself as in the Epic texts which are to be considered as the first steps of the Sāṃkhya system, as well as in the Sāṃkhya system itself. It is to be further mentioned that in the designation ‘sphere of Extinction’ (nirvāṇadhātuḥ) the comprehension of the Soul in its elemental aspect comes to be expressed.
Ancient is the naming of the earthly personality as name and form (nāmarūpam). In it survives an old Vedic idea which has otherwise proved fruitless and was abandoned. Inside the earthly personality, knowledge (vijñānam) plays the most important role as the central psychical organ. It is originally the quality of the Atmā and is named as such in the doctrine of Yājñavalkya with the same expression as here. Its original Atmā-nature comes to be occasionally expressed in the Buddhistic descriptions when it is said in the already cited passage: “The knowledge (vijñānam) is the undemonstrable, the infinite, the all-illuminating. It is where neither water, nor earth, nor fire, nor air find place, in which length and shortness, fineness and grossness, beauty and ugliness, Name and Form entirely cease.” The controversial designation ‘all-illuminating’ becomes intelligible without much further ado as arising out of the original Light-nature of the Atmā. The further formulation of a psychical organ lies, as we have already described, in the current of general development, and has a correspondence in the Epic as also in the Sāṃkhya-system. The assumption of a sphere or an element of knowledge (vijñānadhātuḥ) is peculiar to Buddhism, an intelligible and necessary consequence, as soon as the knowledge (vijñānam) was pushed to the side of Matter, and the assumption of its arising out of the Atmā became consequently impossible.

Besides the knowledge (vijñānam), there stand the sense-organs. These emerge here as in the Epic as a more fixed idea and in a definite number. The ancient age of this idea lies in the fact that thinking (manāḥ) appears as the sixth sense-organ besides the usual five-sense-organs as in the Upaniṣads—especially in the teaching of Yājñavalkya and not as in the texts of the Epic as the central organ placed over, or superior to, all. The question of the descent of the sense-organs is not dealt with. Still they were considered as originating out of the elements as in the later ‘Dogmatik’.

Like the idea of the sense-organs, the idea of the Elements is similarly already fully developed. Still, we find no clear and fixed enduring ideas about the number and qualities of the Elements. Usually the four great elements (mahābhūtānāi) are mentioned: They are the earth (prthvi), water (āpah), fire (tejah),
and wind (vāyuḥ). These four great elements form the human body in which knowledge (vijñānam) has its seat. Besides we meet also with a series of six elements (dhātavaḥ) in which besides the named four elements, knowledge (vijñānam) and space (ākāśaḥ) also appear. As regards the qualities of the Elements, they are not introduced as such explicitly. As objects of the sense-organs a six-number is mentioned: forms (rupaḥ), sounds (śabdāḥ), smells (gandhāḥ), tastes (rasaḥ) and the touchable (spraṣṭavyam), to which the sixth is added, viz. the objects of thinking (manāḥ), the things or data of the mind (dharmāḥ). A joining of these objects with the Elements as the qualities of the same is not attempted. Besides, there also stands a series of five qualities on which the desire directs itself (kāmagunāḥ). They are forms, sounds, smells, tastes and the touchable objects, the same as the objects of the usual five sense organs. But there is no mention here, of a connection with the elements and a connection or an coordination with the cited six series is not formulated.

The doctrine of Deliverance is based on the idea of the migration of the soul and of the action (karma) as a defining or determining power directing this transmigration. Both are already met with in the doctrine of Yājñavalkya. Still, here as in the Epic they have already become views, which have gained a general vogue, as good as self-intelligible pre-suppositions. To the fine body which, through its wandering, provides the connection between different births, corresponds here the knowledge (vijñānam) which wanders from one embodiment to another. Besides there appears the popular idea of a visible, subtle spirit (gandharvaḥ) which is the bearer of this wandering. Above all, Thirst or Desire holds good as the cause of entanglement in the cycle of births. That is the view, which has the nearest contact with the one represented by Yājñavalkya in his great speech with Janaka, king of Videha. Besides there stands, as second cause, the ignorance which agrees with the general predominating view. The Way of Yoga holds as the Means of Deliverance. The immediately striven-for goal which is thereby achieved is thus an efficiency of the mind (citram), which being directed on the wished-for object, would be able to comprehend it through direct view with full clarity and definiteness. This Yoga goal is not represented in the Yoga texts of the Epic. Still, in view of the paucity of mater-
rials, it is not possible to decide whether it deals with a new formulation first put forward by Buddhism.

If we review the most important ideas and views on which the preachings of Buddha are based, it is easy to arrange them in the general development and they no doubt take a middle place between the Upaniṣads and the teachings of the Epic. We can say that the thought-world of the Upaniṣads lies at the basis of what is expressed especially clearly in the continued use of single ancient ideas. A number of close agreements shows an intimate connection especially with the teaching of Yājñavalkya. Such a connection as such is not improbable. Because this doctrine of Yājñavalkya, as the intimate connection of its legendary exponent with King Janaka of Videha shows, had its home in the East, near the home of the Buddha. The time-distance between them both need not be very great. Besides, the progress of development, in a series of its features is undeniable. It is a progress in the same sense as we could observe in the text of the Epic and strive after a similar stage of development as is reached there. In this connection it is to be noticed that nothing of this further formulation is of such a sort that we had the occasion to ascribe it only to Buddhism. It is, on the contrary, Buddhism which on its side participated in this general development. The only exception is the assumption of one element of knowledge (viññānadhātuḥ) as the basis of individual knowledge and of the idea evidently emerging, parallel to it, out of a sphere of extinction (nirvāṇa-dhātuḥ). But both these ideas were such as did not further turn out to be effective and gained no great vogue or dissemination.

Thus considered, the doctrine of the Buddha appears as one among others without any special peculiarities and new features which can be arranged easily in the general process of development. No special importance is due to it from the point of the general philosophical development. Even it shows, in comparison with other doctrines, different pronounced defects and weaknesses. Above all there is the deficiency of any ‘systematik’ or system, an inability to connect and bind individual ideas and conceptions into a well-knit compact unity. It is evinced in the doctrine of the Elements and their qualities where different contradictory teachings stand side by side—direct and unconnected.
A further weakness is the fluctuation in many ideas, no clear view being definitely formulated in any one of them. Among such can be enumerated, for example, the doctrine of the soul-migration. There appears, in the role of a fine body, once the knowledge (viśiṣṭānām), a mythical spirit (gandharvaḥ) at another time. If we consider the several passages, the conceptions like knowledge (viśiṣṭānām), mind (cīttam) and thinking (mānāḥ) appear to be thrown together pell-mell: Such defects and fluctuations are met with in the oldest Buddhism at every step. Of course it could be said that these defects and fluctuations concern the points of the doctrine to which little weight is attached and the comprehension of which, therefore, was considered to be indifferent. Perhaps it may hold good in the case of the doctrine of the Elements. But we find the mentioned deficiency in cases where such indifference is not in its proper place e.g. in the case of practices of meditation and there remains nothing left but to see therein, as a matter of fact, a weakness of the creator of the doctrine. Perhaps we may hit the correct right point, if we assume that, as so often in human life, here a deficiency of interest and want of ability together and the borders of both essentially overlapped one another.

In short we can say: The oldest Buddhism gets easily into the line of development which leads from the Upaniṣads to the teachings of the Epic. It shows no special and original features and produces no thoughts which further proved fruitful and helpful. On the other hand, if philosophically considered, it shows pronounced weaknesses and defects in comparison with other teachings.

We would be doing, however, a great wrong to the preaching of Buddha, by passing such a judgement. Because we would be merely judging as a philosophical theory which it was not intended to be. It was intended to be exclusively and more than any other theory a doctrine of Deliverance. It must be, therefore, considered as such while presenting and judging it. If we do this and leave applying the wrong measuring standard of other doctrines to it, the picture changes itself immediately and we get an entirely another impression.

In the first place, we see that whatever is connected with Deliverance is dealt with in much more detail and is more deeply thought out than in other theories. That is shown already in the
explanation of entanglement in the cycle of births. The ignorance as the prime cause of this entanglement is defined more exactly as the ignorance of Releasing Knowledge viz., of the four noble truths. Above all, the idea of thirst—the second cause—is sharply worked out and at last clearly fixed in an unambiguous manner, so that the two forms of thirst are distinguished and are defined as attachment to desires (kāmarāgaḷi) and attachment to birth (bhavarāgaḷi). That is not enough. It is shown in details how the attachment to desires is awakened, because the sense-organs enter into contact with their objects and call forth therethrough different feelings. It is also shown how the attachment to birth springs out of the false conception of the earthly personality as the 'I'. Still more detailed is the handling of the Way of Deliverance. It is a way clearly indicated in all its parts, leading the disciple in carefully serially arranged steps to his goal. The description of the definite steps of Meditation is more detailed than in any other theory hitherto known to us; an unusual abundance of spiritual mental practices enables the disciple to reach the ability for meditation which is aspired after by him. The constituents of releasing knowledge and the way it comes about are investigated and presented in greater details than in any other system. Further the closely related subjects beyond the strict limits of the Deliverance Doctrine are also considered equally thoroughly and thought out. In the theory of re-embodiment or Rebirth, the distinction of different processes—an entry of knowledge (vijñānam) into the mother's womb, the development of name and form (corporeality) and the origination of sense-organs—all this is something new and goes beyond what other doctrines of that time have to say. And new and original is also the attempt to comprehend the nature and composition of the earthly personality in the doctrine of the five groups (skandhāḥ).

Thereby, the shaping of this Deliverance-Doctrine leads to the formulation of a more important and new conception which does not fight shy, when necessary, to go its own fully new original way. One such idea is e.g. 'formations' or 'will-impulses' (samskārāḥ). What, however, above all, gives its special stamp to the whole form of the Deliverance-doctrine and in which it goes far beyond all other doctrines is that in the attempt to comprehend the definite events as exactly as possible, not only the
participating things and organs but also the individual different processes, especially the psychical occurrences are considered. There is not only the mention of the objects, the sense-organs, and knowledge (vijñānam) but also of their contact (sparśāh), of the sensation (vedanā) called forth therethrough, of the pleasure (chandaḥ) and desire (kāmaḥ), of will-impulses (saṃskārāḥ) and consciousness (saṃjñā). On account of this, everything becomes more lively and clearer. Simultaneously it is an excellent piece of psychology which is thus a gain for philosophical thought.

Thus seen, the preaching of the Buddha presents itself in a completely new light. It strikes a new way and creates new fruitful thoughts. Though it has not itself directly furthered the philosophical development of its time, still it has given valuable and far-reaching stimulus and impulse to the philosophical systems which later arose on the soil of Buddhism.

Thus, the theory of the oldest Buddhism, then, turns out to be the most peculiar phenomenon which has confronted us so far in our consideration of Indian philosophy. Partly, it works with the involuntarily old conceptions and ideas taken over from old times and moves itself in the transmitted, trodden paths. Partly it goes a fully new way and creates surprisingly new and original thoughts. Partly it proves itself unfruitful, not able to further the general philosophical development, not able to penetrate fully through the thoughts once taken over and to weld them into a great unity. Partly it shows an astonishing strength and depth of thought. Thereby every thing is formed in a peculiar and self-willed manner, and made subservient to a firmly fixed goal. That admits of only one interpretation. It is a strong, original personality who has created this doctrine and impressed his stamp upon it. And we are entitled to give credit to tradition and believe it and to see in this personality the founder of this doctrine—the Buddha.

This is also the place to remember that during the consideration of the Buddhistic doctrine we could fix a development in a series of features and it turned out as the most probable to trace back this development to the author of the doctrine himself. On that account, the oldest Buddhistic doctrine gains significance and interest in a new different respect. It is for the first time in the course of our consideration that a definite personality becomes
recognizable to us, why, that we can even observe a mental and spiritual development of this personality. We have merely considered a part of the influence of this personality, as our consideration moved itself in and was restricted only to the frame of philosophical development. But its originality has proved so strong that in spite of everything it stands pre-eminent in distinct features. This is the first Indian who appears comprehensible to us as man and thinker, at the same time as one of the most powerful personalities, whom India in general has produced, and one of the most important teachers of humanity or mankind, the wise one born in the family of the Śākyas, the Buddha Gautama.

But are we entitled to consider the doctrine above described as the creation of Buddha? Does he not himself speak that there were earlier Buddhas who had preached before him? Is there not shown a grave-mound of one of these Buddhas, of Buddha Kanakamuni—which was later renovated by the great emperor Asoka? Regarding this it is to be said that Buddha, according to his own utterance, did not take over his doctrine from his predecessor but he has newly found the doctrine which was preached in the hoary past. As it is described by him in one simile, a city submerged in a jungle has been newly discovered by him. Further according to the Indian way of thinking, the newness of a doctrine is in no way a recommendation. It is much more effective to refer it to a very old teaching, to some permanent Revelation, than to boast of the originality of the teaching. Finally the governing Indian world-view urges itself peremptorily toward such an idea. He who regarded and assumed that the world is permanent, that it renewed itself in the same unchanging rhythm and that world-creation and world-disappearance recur perpetually, cannot be content with the discovery and the preaching of the releasing Knowledge only once. It must always be renewed. It was therefore a self-intelligible conclusion that a precursor of Buddha was assumed who had already preached the doctrine in earlier periods and world-ages. About the real author of the doctrine, naturally nothing is said.

Now one last question. We have seen that the preaching of the Buddha in spite of its newness and originality was not important for the philosophical development of his time. It has not enriched the philosophical thought by any great ideas and intro-
duced no new feature into the world-picture of that time. On the contrary, it exhausted itself in the formulation of an original peculiar doctrine of Deliverance. How then is the immense dissemination that it has gained to be explained? And how is it that out of it were developed, in later times the most important systems brought forth by the classical period of Indian philosophy?

The answer is as follows: In the dissemination of the doctrine, the philosophical content or value played a small role. Quite the contrary. Everything that we have known of Buddha’s time shows that it was not the philosophical questions which formed the focus of interest. On the contrary, it was the path of withdrawal from the world, a deep longing for deliverance which filled the widest circles. It was these circles of thinkers who came across the doctrine of Buddha with its rejection of fruitless speculation and an entirely special energetic emphasis on the goal of Deliverance. And it is now only quite understandable that this doctrine with its effective formulation and conveyed by the mighty personality of the Buddha obtained quick and forceful results.

On the other hand, the development of important philosophical systems on the soil of Buddhism, in later times, is explicable, according to my view, from the same character of the oldest Buddhistic teaching. When after several centuries, system-building in the philosophical schools had reached its highest point and new revolutionizing ideas had begun to prepare the ground, the other older schools which had followed earlier philosophical thought-processes and had developed formulated systems were now bound down and fixed by these systems in a far-reaching way and were checked by them in their further possibility of development. It was otherwise with Buddhism. In it the old doctrine offered a series of fruitful and stimulating thoughts but no rigid system. Thus here was available for new thoughts a more fruitful fertile nourishing soil than elsewhere. In this way arose here the boldest and most powerful philosophical thought-creations. Together with the mighty religious impulses which were continually strong in Buddhism, they led to a building up of doctrines which could equally satisfy the spirit and mind and were able not only to take hold of the ‘lead’ spiritually in its homeland but also con-
quer, in their triumphant unparalleled march, the most important lands and empires of the East.

In this respect, I believe, the development of Buddhism resembles that of the greatest religion of the West—Christianity. In it, in the beginning, as in Buddhism, the message of healing which was energetically propagated was not accompanied by any all-embracing stiff, dogmatic formulations. This fact gave it, as against other religions, which about the same time sought to conquer the ancient world of the East, a powerful lead. First, the glad message which it brought and propagated with glowing enthusiasm influenced the largest circles. When the spiritual discussion began, Christianity, unhindered by rigid fixations, was able to take up the challenging struggle with the ancient thought-world on its own soil. The Manichaim, for example, with its phantastic myths which stood firm and irremovable as the basis of their beliefs, was a creation of another world, a foreign body in the spiritual life of the West. Christianity, on the other hand, unencumbered by such bonds was able to clothe its basic truths in the form of ancient thoughts and to make subservient to itself what the Greek spirit had obtained by great effort and created. Thus in struggle with philosophy it was able to seize the lead on the soil of the ancient world and to be spiritually the power which finally conquered the whole Western world.

The Teaching of Jina: We shall now turn to the sister-religion of Buddhism, viz. Jinism. It shows many similarities with Buddhism but it also stands in sharpest contrast with it. Externally, Jinism has not shown the success like Buddhism. It has not played a role in the spiritual life of India approximating to that of Buddhism which had a lead philosophically for centuries and which gave to the Indian thought a number of most important stimuli. While Buddhism carried its victorious march continually to newer lands, Jinism remained circumscribed within India. Still from the point of the history of philosophy, Jinism in its oldest form is not less important than the oldest doctrine of Buddhism, nay, it is even more important. While the Buddha, on account of his sharp denial of all Theory, has admitted little philosophical thought in his doctrine and has, therefore, contributed little to the increase in the philosophical wealth of his time, Jina, on the other hand, remained fully open to the speculations of his
surroundings and participated in them in a lively manner. The situation with regard to the two is as follows: The thought-processes of Buddha move themselves in the path of the great stream of development, which had its origin in the old Upaniṣads, winning a lead already in those times to which later on belonged most of the doctrines of the Epic period and which finally led to the origin of the Sāṃkhya system. On the other hand, Jinism, although it originated like Buddhism at the same time and in the same place, belongs to another stream which is not satisfactorily represented in the tradition and is therefore comprehensible only sporadically; but its importance is not to be underestimated. It is characterized by the fact that its interest is turned in the greatest measure to the external world and has brought forth in this sphere many of the most important ideas met with in Indian philosophy. As belonging to this stream is counted the conversation between Bṛgu and Bharadvāja described in the foregoing chapter. Out of it finally rose the Vaiśeṣika, the great counterpart of the Sāṃkhya system. To the same stream belongs Jinism. It contains the most precious material which, having no second as a rival, teaches us to know and understand the development of this stream.

So no small importance attaches to Jinism in the history of Indian philosophy, though it has not itself played a leading part. Unfortunately, however, the employment of the materials which Jinism has to offer is bound up with all sorts of difficulties. Especially when we try to inquire into the doctrine of the Jina himself, the difficulties increase terribly. It depends on two factors: firstly, on the composition of the Jinistic tradition, secondly on the inner grounds.

We shall first turn to the tradition, according to which the canonical writings of the Jaina demonstrate an imposing extent. Its canon consists of twelve limbs (Aṅgāni, P. Aṅgāim) of which eleven are preserved, of twelve auxiliary limbs (Upāṅgāni, P. Uvaṅgāim), of six punitive texts (Chedaśutrāṇi, P. Cheyasuttablām) which contain the regulations of the order and punitive directions for the Jain monks and nuns, of four basic texts (Mūlasutrāṇi, P. Mūlasuttāim), of a series of scattered texts (Prakīrṇāni, P. Painṇāim) and different isolated works. Many of these texts are quite bulky and their contents are manifold. We find in them the teachings of Jina, a systematic representation of his doctrines, the regulations of
the order of monks and nuns, a description of the life of Jina, legends of all sorts and many other things. It is not only a very bulky tradition but also a very rich one which lies before us. Besides, the canon of the Jaina was not required, like the preserved canonical writings of Buddhists, to submit to a translation in another language. It is today available to us in the same language—Ardhamāgadhī—in which Jina first proclaimed it. Still the canonical writings of the Jaina do not allow themselves to be compared from the point of reliability of testimony with those of the Buddhists. Of the two great schools, the white-clad, the Śvetāmbara and the skyclad, the Digambara, into which the Jaina Church was divided, only the Śvetāmbara have preserved the canon. In the case of the Digambara it is lost long since. The canon of the Śvetāmbara also, according to their own testimony, was fixed finally in its present form in a council in Valabhi in Kathiawar only a thousand years after the death of Jina. Though it contains a great abundance of old and oldest material, still it is penetrated by a much late material and for a large number of works, the late origin is explicitly handed down by tradition. External starting points or clues are wanting in the tradition of the Jaina, which would make it possible to fix the oldest part of the canon and to employ it for the knowledge of the doctrine of Jina himself. On the contrary, we are confronted with the difficult and often insoluble task of fixing the constituent parts of the tradition on internal grounds.

Thus, then, we come to the second point i.e. internal grounds. The doctrine of the Jaina raises the claim to be a proclamation or preaching of the All-knowing who made it known in an all-embracing and final form. It is understandable that such a comprehension places the greatest difficulties in the way of every further formulation and development of a doctrine. Because it would be audacious and absurd for ordinary men to wish to supplement or improve the revelation of the omniscient one. On that account, the Jaina have always made the assertion that the doctrine proclaimed by Jina, as it was revealed by himself, has continued unchanged. It explains the peculiar stiffness of the doctrine. But this assertion does not correspond with facts. Naturally changes and further formulations among them are not wanting. It is impossible from the first to trace back to the original foun-
der everything which the later Jaina system contains. There are many constituent parts thereunder which, according to our knowledge of the philosophical development in India, as a whole, can in no case belong to this time. In such cases, there must have been further additional formulations. But these have, so to say, been carried out in secret and were not admitted openly by the Jaina. Consequently, in the attempt to understand the development of the Jaina doctrine and to arrange chronologically the different constituent parts of tradition, great difficulties have grown, and it is no wonder that the research in this respect still stands in its initial stages.

In our attempt, therefore, to present the doctrine of the Jina himself, we cannot base it firmly on any sure results of research and must, therefore, have recourse to some expedient of resolving the embarrassing situation. I choose the following way: I leave aside all the parts of the doctrine which extend to such subjects as have not been dealt with in the remaining doctrines of ancient times and which, therefore, presumably must have belonged to the thought of a later period. What remains is that I pursue the subjects and the problems with which the period was occupied, in the same way, as I have done in the case of Buddhism and describe what the old canonical writings of the Jaina have to say thereon. In this way, I hope to give a true picture, in essentials, of the doctrine of the Jina.

Before we turn to the doctrine itself, we shall, in short, summarize what the old sources have to report regarding the life of the Jina. The Jina was born in the year 549 B.C. in the nobleman's family of Jñātā (P. Nāya) in Kuṇḍapura, a suburb of the city of Vaiśālī (P. Vesālī), which was also regarded as a favourite abode of the Buddha. It is the present-day Besārī to the north of Patna in the province of Bihar. His father is named Siddhārtha (P. Siddhatta), mother Trisalā (P. Tisalā). He himself carried in his civil life the name Vardhamāna (P. Vaddhamāna). He grew among the noblemen-companions of his age, married a pretty young maiden Yaśodā (P. Jasoyā) and had a daughter from her. Already early he made a resolution to be a recluse but carried it out only when he had got the consent of his elder brother Nandivardhana (P. Nandivaddhāna) after the death of his parents. He was at that time 30 years of age. First he spent two years in the same place
in self-mortification and contemplation, during which his thoughts grew mature. After these two years, he decided to lay aside all clothes and wander as a naked ascetic. The wandering life lasted for twelve years and the old texts describe in living colours how he, during this period, bore steadily the persecutions of the weather and the harassments of men and imposed upon himself the harshest privations. Finally these toils bore fruit. On a summer night on the bank of the Rjupālikā (P. Ujjvāliyā) not far from the place Jṛmbhikagrāma (P. Jambhiyagāma), omniscience dawned on him. Since then he carried the name Mahāvīra, the great hero or the Jina, the conqueror. Then followed years of untiring teaching activity in which he wandered preaching through the land, from Rājagrha (P. Rāyagiha) to Śrāvastī (P. Sāvatthī) and from Campa to Kausāmbī (P. Kosambī). He founded his order of monks and nuns and won numerous lay-followers. Especially among the nobility, from which he had descended, he had a great success. Above all, the king of Magadha, Bimbisāra whom the Jainas name as Seniya and his son Ajātaśatru called here as Kuṇiyā, were his patrons and promoters. When he died about the year 477 B.C. after a teaching activity of thirty-eight years, he left behind him a not too large but firmly bound community. The importance of his work can be measured by the fact that the Church established by him, though in contrast to Buddhism, it had no success of its mission outside the motherland, continues still in India even to this day.

Striking in this account are the similarities in the life of the Jina with the shortly described life of Buddha. But it is only the common religious stream of their period which led both on to similar ways. In their character both were so different so as to form a contrast. While in Buddha, the dominating feature is kindness, mildness, and a certain affability in all its dignity, in Jina, on the other hand, reserve and rigour or severity dominate. The Buddha adjusts himself to a certain degree with his circumstances. The Jina keeps or preserves to the limit of harshness or severity his ascetic principles. The Buddha rejects self-torture of asceticism as objectionable extravagance and teaches the “noble middle way”. The Jina affirms the penance and practises it to its extreme severity. In the same way is reflected the difference in all features of their character and in all particulars of their
As in the life and character of the founders, the same is the case with their doctrines. Both doctrines are creations out of the same period and have originated out of the same spirit of withdrawal from the world and the same longing for Deliverance. Both intended, in the first place, to show a practical way to Deliverance and the steps of this way demonstrate a great similarity in the outline. But the leading thought, which basically underlies both, is completely different. Further in the doctrine of the Jina, in contrast to Buddha’s hostility towards theory, a lively interest in philosophical speculation evinces itself. And in place of the few processes of philosophical thoughts, which we have found in Buddha, there stands in Jina a fully developed and a rounded off thought-edifice. That must now be considered in the actual presentation. Though according to the chief aim of the doctrine, the Deliverance-way has to assume the first place, still, the theoretical leading thoughts, which lie at the base, must first be described. In the presentation of the Deliverance Way, a systematic survey of the doctrine can be also linked.

The basic thought, on which the Deliverance-Doctrine of the Jina builds itself, is as follows: There is an endless number of individual souls (jīvāḥ). They are of restricted or limited size and adjust themselves to the size of the body. To them comes out of nature unrestricted view or insight (darśanam, P. dāṁsaṇam), unlimited knowledge (jñānam, P. nāṇam), unlimited power (vīryam P. virīyaṇ) and unlimited joy (sukham, P. suhaṃ). But only in the case of the few who have attained Deliverance, these qualities truly and freely come into being. Most of the beings are hampered in their operation by the entanglement in the cycle of being which continues from eternity.

Through every activity in Thought, Word and Deed there streams into the soul fine matter (āsravāḥ P. anḥaye or āsave) and fixes itself there firmly. It is this matter which among the Jaina carries the name of action (karma) and brings about the bondage of the soul. Its efficacy is manifold. First of all it restricts the natural qualities of the soul, its view or insight, knowledge, strength and joy and allows these in a limited measure to come to validity. Further it is the cause of the different bad qualities of men, above all, of their passions. Finally it occurs through them that the bad
and good deeds of men operate themselves in continually newer births. Thereby it determines not only the nature and duration of new births but also the joy and the sorrow which are apportioned to men in these births. Through the joy and sorrow which are experienced in new births, a requital of the accomplished good and bad work is carried out, old *karma* is discharged and the matter of which it is composed is secreted out of the soul. But through the activity which the new birth brings in, new matter penetrates the soul and through the influence of passions (*kaśāyāḥ*, *P. kaśāyā*) which thus play a role especially full of big consequences, it may get fixed there and become *karma*. Thus the cycle is complete. Every activity in life brings forth *karma* and leads therethrough to a new birth. Every new birth brings again with itself a new activity. Thus it goes on in an endless chain.

How is it possible to escape this cycle and how can Deliverance come into existence? It can only occur when the soul is freed from *karma* which clings to it and binds it. Therefore the instreaming of new *karma* must be prevented (*sāmvarāḥ*) and that which has already penetrated must be destroyed (*nirjarā* *P. nijjarā*). For that there are the following means. Above all, it is necessary to observe a strictly moral conduct because through it, the instreaming of new *karma* suffers an enormous diminution. Further, it is necessary to keep a watch over the sense-organs and to avert the external pernicious impressions transmitted through them. It is the sense-impressions which call forth the passions and render possible again the fixing of *karma* in the soul. Through the guarding of sense-organs, the passions are enfeebled, thus the *karma* flowing in uninterruptedly through every activity suffers a corresponding enfeeblement and it is easy to cancel or discharge it. The last and the most important means, finally, which brings about the destruction of *karma* entering the soul is the penance (*tapaḥ*, *P. tave*). Through the voluntarily imposed mortification, the *karma* present in the soul is artificially brought to ripeness and is prematurely extinguished. No doubt, through this artificial extinction, the present *karma* is destroyed much more rapidly than it would be possible in the usual course of things. Thus by unceasing toiling, there is the possibility of freeing the soul finally from every *karma*. With it comes to an
end the entanglement in the cycle of births and the soul rises to the highest state of world-space above, where it remains in a state of permanent blessedness.

On these basic views are, therefore, based the directions which the Jina gives to his disciples for reaching Deliverance. For that, as in the case of the Buddha, there is the self-evident supposition that the stepping on the proper Deliverance-Way is only possible to the monk who has renounced the world. But he also places before those who do not feel strong enough to take the decisive step of world-renunciation in this existence, the free opportunity to profess themselves as male lay followers (Śrāvakāḥ, P. Sāvage) or female lay-followers (Śrāvikā, P. Sāviyā) and thus to create the foundation for Deliverance in the later existence. The lay followers are obliged to take up a few moral commandments which are consistent with the worldly life. For the remaining it is expected of them that they should provide for the monk-community—an expectation which the lay-followers of the Jina have to this day fulfilled in a thorough-going measure. The chief moral commandments for the laymen are of a general kind, as we have found in Buddhism and carry the name of small vows (anuvratāni, P. anuvayāiyam) on account of their mild form as compared with the vows of the monks. They forbid injury to life (prāṇātipātaḥ, P. pāṇāivāye), gross untruth (maṛśāvādaḥ P. musāvāye), gross appropriation of others' property (adinnādānam), and command that they should be satisfied with their own wives (svadārasāṃtosaḥ, P. sadārasāṃtose) and the attempt to restrict the possession of property to a limited measure (icchāparimāṇam). Even beyond this, the lay adherents are obliged, corresponding to the rigorous nature of Jinism, to observe still further obligations interfering deeper into their daily life. They are additional vows (gūnavratāni, P. gūnavayāin) which require the lay follower to abstain from aimless behaviour which can cause injury (anarthadandaḥ, P. anarthadanda), not to extend their journeys in every direction beyond a fixed limit (dīvoratam P. disiwvayam) and to impose restrictions on the satisfaction of daily wants, above all, on eating and drinking and to avoid certain callings which are connected with the injury to living animals (upabhogaparibhogaparimāṇam, P. uvabhogaparibhogaparimāṇam). Then come finally the four practice-vows (Śikṣāvratāni, P. Sikkhāvayāin) which contain
partly similar instructions as those holding good for the monks. They require daily repeated prayers (ṣāmāyikam, P. sāmāyayānaḥ), a temporary restriction of the spheres of dwelling and activity (desāvacāśikam, P. desāvacāsya), fasts and keeping awake at night on fixed days (posadhaḥ, P. posahaṃ) and gifts to a guest, especially a monk (atiitihisamvibhāgaḥ, P. atithihisamvibhaga). With these are ended the essential directions for the adherents.

Turning to the directions which regulate the life of the monks, we have to distinguish them as of two kinds in consequence of the already described basic views: Directions calculated to prevent the penetration of new karma in the soul and which, therefore, serve as the defence (saṃvaraḥ), and others which are aimed at discharging the karma already present (nirjarā). At the head of the first group stand the general moral commandments. These agree in number and contents with the five basic moral commands. These agree in number and contents with the five basic moral commands for the laity; but they distinguish themselves by their essentially more rigorous wording and import, that is why they carry the name of the great vows (mahāvratāni, P. mahāvayāīm); e.g. in place of the matrimonial fidelity which is enjoined on the laity, absolute chastity is demanded of the monks, or in place of restriction of possession, there is the demand of full non-possession. In the second place as a means of defence against new Karma there is named discipline (guptiḥ, P. gutti) called watching over one's thought, speech and body. Next follows the five-fold wariness (samitiḥ, P. sam)ī). It consists in cautiousness in going (walking), speech, alms-collecting, in taking and laying down a thing and in the evacuation of the body. A further group is formed by the ten duties (dharmāḥ) of the monks—endurance (ksamā P. khamā), humility (mārdavam, P. maddavaṇ), uprightness (ārjavam, P. ajjavam), desirelessness (Śaucam, P. Sōvaṇ), truth (Satyam, P. saccam), self-discipline (Sānyamaḥ, P. Sānjame), penance (tapaḥ, P. tava), renunciation (tyāgaḥ, P. ciyāge), possessionlessness (ākīṃcanaṇyaḥ, P. ākīṃcanaṇya) and chastity (brahmacyayam, P. bambahā). Further there is a series of twelve considerations (anupreksāḥ, P. anuprēkṣāḥ) which are prescribed. They are (i) the perishableness of all things, (ii) helplessness of creatures (iii) the perpetual alternating change in the cycle of births (iv) the loneliness of every
being (v) the difference of soul and body (vi) the impurity of the body (vii) the perpetual streaming-in of *karma* in the soul (viii) the prevention of this instreaming (ix) the discharge of the already present *karma* (x) the permanence of the world (xi) the rarity of illumination which is difficult to attain (xii) and lastly the exaltedness of the doctrine so excellently preached by the Jina. Finally, the instreaming of new *karma* is also hindered by the patient endurance (*pariṣahat*) of different troubles to which the monk is exposed. Such troubles are enumerated twenty-two, such as hunger, thirst, heat, cold, stinging insects, hard bed, words of abuse, maltreatment and such other things. These are the most important instruments prescribed for defence against new *karma*.

Among the means of cancellation of the present *karma*, penance (*tapāḥ*) takes by far the first place. From ancient times, it consists in bodily mortification and that holds good in a great measure in Jinnism. The bodily mortification plays a great role in the life of Jina and it is quite in tune with the basic views that thus would the accomplished actions be artificially expiated. Besides, the idea of penance (*tapāḥ*) is understood in a wide sense to which corresponds the classification in the canonical texts. They make a distinction between external and internal penance. The external penance consists in different forms of fasts, in taking up tormenting postures of the body, and in the complete withdrawal from the surrounding world. As inner penance, there are held necessary confession, penance, disciplined behaviour, religious will to serve, study, indifference to all things earthly and last but the most important, the meditation (*dhyānam*, *P. jhāṇam*).

Corresponding to its importance, the meditation is dealt with more exhaustively than the remaining forms of inner penance and it is again divided into many sub-varieties. According to its character, it consists in the fixing of a definite thought which can be extended up to a duration of almost an hour (*muhūrtam* = 48 minutes). It can be salutary or wholesome but insalutary or unwholesome also. Unwholesome is the so-called sad meditation (*ārtam dhyānam*, *P. aṭṭam jhāṇam*) which is supposed to serve the elimination of the unpleasant and the winning of the pleasant feelings or sensations. Still more evil are the consequences of the so-called base kinds of meditation
(raudram dhyānam, P. roddam jhānam) which is directed on falsehood, theft, robbery and murder. Against both these kinds of unwholesome meditations, stands as wholesome, the religious and the pure meditation. The subject of the religious meditation (dharma-dhyānam, P. dhamma-jhānam) is made up of the holy doctrine, the deviations, the fruit of works, and the form of the creatures and the universe, arising out of it. The pure meditation (Śukladhāyānam, P. sukkajhānam) occupies itself with aberrations, the bad or the evil, the endeness of births and the perpetual mutation. It is divided on its side into four stages, according as its subject is contemplated each time in several of its states (prāhaktva-vitarkaṁ suklaṁ dhyānam, P. pukattaviyakkam sukkam jhānam) or only in one of them (ekatvavitarkaṁ suklaṁ dhyānam, P. agaṭṭaviyakkam sukkam jhānam). Thereby, in the first case the contemplation of one of these objects can pass over to the other (savīcāri, P. saviyāri); in the second it is not possible (avicāri, P. aviyāri). Further in the pure meditation, one distinguishes a stage where still a few of the activities of thought, speech and body are existent (Śūkṣma-kriyāṁ suklaṁ dhyānam, P. suhumakriyāṁ sukkam jhānam) and another such where the just described activity is extinguished (samucchinnakriyāṁ suklaṁ dhyānam, P. samucchinnakriyāṁ sukkam jhānam). Both these stages are only attainable to the omniscient and lead to the highest state, the stage of climax (śaileśi, P. selesi) which brings Deliverance.

It is to be mentioned that according to the Jain understanding, the individual steps of meditation are connected with the attainment of different wonder-powers (ṛddhiḥ, P. iḍḍhī). A systematic representation of these wonder-powers and their distribution over different steps of meditation are not given in the canonical texts, still it corresponds essentially, according to what we hear, to what is professed by Buddhism and other teachings. Here also the view holds true that the wonder-powers are not to be considered as an independent aim in themselves but appearing as secondary phenomena, without any importance for the seeker after emancipation. It is mentioned that through these wonder-powers is rendered possible the commerce with gods, the ability to penetrate the objects, to flee through the air in the most different postures. It reminds us of the wonder-powers which the asceticism confers according to a Brahmanical
view, when they talk of the power which is ascribed to the benedictons and curses of an ascetic. And with the magical splendour which the Brahmanical ascetic acquires corresponds the splendour of the fire with which an enraged monk may be able to destroy his enemy.

To summarize what has been said: the Jina has taught a whole series of means with which to destroy the old and to prevent the new karma. These means, as in Buddhism, were not summarized into the uniform Deliverance-Way in the canonical writings of the Jaina. Still occasionally ladders of steps are presented which represent the gradually advancing steps for the seeker of Absolution up to the point of the reaching of the goal. In the preserved writings of the canons these steps are mentioned fugitively and sporadically. Yet it will be enough if we speak of the most important of them. They are the fourteen steps of Virtue (gunaśthānāni, P. gunatthānāim).

The lowest of these steps is called a fully erroneous belief (mithyādṛśtiḥ, P. micchādīṭṭhi). On the next stage, the beings possess a foretaste of right credulity (sāvādana-samyagdṛśtiḥ, P. sāsāyaṇa-sammaddīṭṭhi). On the third stage wrong belief and right belief are mixed together (samyagmithyādṛśtiḥ P. sammāmicchādīṭṭhi). On the next two, the right belief is there but in the fourth the command is not yet followed (avirata-samyagdṛśtiḥ, P. aviraya-sammaddīṭṭhi). On the fifth stage in which the command is partially followed (deśaviratasamyagdṛśtiḥ, P. viraya-viraya-sammaddīṭṭhi). Then follow the next two steps—the sixth in which self-discipline, though attained, is disturbed through negligence (pramattasamyatāḥ, P. pa-mattasamajaye); the seventh in which it is not disturbed (apramattasamyatāḥ; P. apamattasamjaye). The eighth and the ninth stages both of which are designated through processes which are to be fully carried out in them; they serve to cancel karma but then are not prescribed in details in the canonical texts (apūrvakaṇaṇam, P. niyatāttibāyarasamparāye and anivṛttibādarasamparāyāḥ, P. aniyaṭ-tibāyarsamparāye). On the tenth stage the passions are present in a small measure (sūkṣmasamparāyāḥ, P. suhumin Samparāye). On the eleventh, the passions are suppressed (upāśāntakāśayavitarāgachadmaṣṭaḥ, P. uvasantamohe). On the twelfth, passions are destroyed (ksīnakaśayavitarāgachadmaṣṭaḥ, P. kṣīnamohe). The last two stages then follow which are those of the omniscient one:
in the thirteenth an activity of thought and speech and body is present in the omniscient (sayogikevali, P. sajogi kevali), and finally the fourteenth in which this activity has ceased (ayogikevali, P. ajogī kevali). The building of this ladder of steps is therefore clear and the gradual progress is evident. There are still isolated worth-mentioning doctrines in the assertions of the canonical writings but they are not collected here.

Thus we have summarized the most important basic features concerning the Deliverance-Way contained in the canonical writings of the Jainas. When we consider it in its totality, we must say that the picture which we have obtained out of the so-far described doctrines has not been essentially enriched. Still a comparison with the Buddhistic Way of Deliverance is exceedingly instructive and allows the common good points as well as the special features of both the doctrines to stand out fairly before our view. At the first glance, the common points preponderate. The Jaina monk, like the disciples of Buddha, goes out of his house into houselessness and takes over the same moral obligations. The vigilant watch over the sense-organs is the same. The five-fold wariness (samitiḥ) demanded of the Jaina monk reminds us of the watchfulness and consciousness (smṛti- samprajanyam) of the Buddhist monk. The fighting down of passions has also here as there the same correspondence. The twelve considerations (anupreksāḥ) of the Jaina monk can be compared with the similar Buddhistic four awakenings of watchfulness (smṛtyupasthānāni). In both, the Way of Deliverance finally leads to the highest step, into the practices of meditation to which a decisive role is ascribed in regard to the attainment of the striven-after goal. Nevertheless, the basic thoughts in both the Ways of Deliverance are fully different. The way of the Buddha is a way of Yoga, the way of the Jina is a way of penance (tapah). The Buddha seeks through inner composure to reach the highest knowledge and to attain Deliverance. The Jina strives to destroy the karma which has already penetrated into the soul and thus to end, in this way, the entanglement in the cycle of births. For the Buddha, the releasing knowledge is the last aim. For the Jina, the omniscience is produced as almost casual, a secondary phenomenon, when the soul has come, through the destruction of the karma stuff which has entered into it, into the unlimited
possession of natural powers and along with it of unrestricted knowledge. Also different importance attaches itself to the details of the Way of Deliverance corresponding to the different basic attitudes. In the case of a Buddhistic monk, the practice of wakefulness or watchfulness is to serve the inner composure as a preparation towards meditation. In the case of a Jaina monk the five-fold watchfulness or cautiousness is aimed at avoiding injury to living creatures, and to prevent the bonds of new karma. The consideration of the Way of Deliverance leads, therefore, to the same result, as the comparison of the lives of both these founders of the two religions: There is a far-reaching agreement in the outer circumstances but inwardly, in their nature and character there is the greatest difference—the sharpest contrast.

The importance of the doctrine of the Jina: We shall now go over to putting together the most important philosophical views contained in the writings of the Jinistic Canon. We shall, however, restrict ourselves to placing the views which we have found in the Upaniṣads and in the Epic in juxtaposition to the corresponding doctrines of the Jaina. Everything remaining will be said in the exhaustive presentation of the fully developed system of the Jaina-doctrine. It should by no means, however, be said that we intend to trace back to Jina what has been so far dealt with here and that much only. But, as we have already said, we are dealing with a solution of an embarrassing situation because the historical investigation of the rich Jaina-tradition has still hardly begun. I, however, believe that in this way there emerges a picture of the teaching of Jina, which, in essentials, is true and its place in the circle of the remaining teachings and in the frame of the general development can be rightly recognized.

We begin with the doctrine of the soul. The Jinism recognizes an infinite number of individual souls (jīvāḥ). They are limited and adapt themselves to the size of the temporary body for the time being. They possess by nature unrestricted insight, knowledge, power and joy—the qualities which do not come into operation on account of entanglement in the cycle of existence.

As a psychical organ there appears only the thinking organ (manah, P. mane). It is the carrier of consciousness (saṃjñā, P. 
saññā) which is to be understood in the widest sense and embraces a whole series of impulses and instincts which are characteristic of the different groups of living creatures. Partly, the thinking organ (manaḥ) is named on the same stage as the sense-organs. But mostly it is put in juxtaposition as non-sense-organ (anindriyam, P. no indiyam) against the proper sense-organs and is not to be included among them in their enumeration. But it is, in no way, a central organ as in the Epic texts. It is material; therefore, unspiritual (acittam) and un-animated (ajīvam) and consists of fine particles of Matter which are from their side heavy and light (aguru-laghu, P. agurulahu).

The sense-organs emerge as a definite idea and appear in the usual number of five. Already in the earlier texts the question is discussed, as to how many sense-organs are allotted to different sorts of creatures. They are formed out of the elements. It is also asked as to what shape they have, whether in their operation they touch the objects directly and similar other things.

The elements entirely step back in the presentation of the canonical texts. Still, the Jaina doctrine pre-supposes the number four. That is due to the fact that the space (ākāśaḥ, P. āgāste) has not become an Element. The qualities of the Elements—colour, taste, smell and palpability, appear regularly in the number four. The sound takes a special place. While dealing with the qualities of the Elements, not only the number is dealt with but the different sub-varieties of the qualities also are sought to be ascertained. It is further to be emphasised that in Jinism already early an ancient doctrine of the Atoms has emerged. Besides, physiological questions have occupied the minds of Jaina thinkers from the early times.

Regarding the world-picture, the Jaina-doctrine recognizes the regular alternation of better and worse world-ages. A regularly recurring world-creation and world-destruction is, on the other hand, unknown to it.

The ideas of the migration of the soul and of the determining power of actions (karma) form self-intelligible pre-suppositions for the doctrine of Deliverance. Peculiar and original is the view that actions cause an instreaming of matter into the soul which consequently is entangled in the cycle of existence. So the actions themselves become the chief cause of the bondage of the
soul. As against them, the passions step back into the background. They come into existence in the same way as the action, through the inflow of Matter into the soul but play only the modest role of a joint-cause in the bondage caused by the new inflowing Matter. The ignorance is absolutely without any importance for the explanation of entanglement in the cycle of existence.

As a bearer of the wanderings of the soul, a peculiar fine body—the so-called karma-body (kārmanasāriṇam, P. kammagāma sarīraṁ) is assumed, and it mediates the transition from one birth to another. In agreement with the view regarding the bondage of the soul, Deliverance results from the fact that the matter which has effected the bondage of the soul through its instreaming, is again secreted out of the soul. The means which serves that end is the penance (tapāḥ). The omniscience, which is gained on the last stages of Deliverance-Way, does not contribute directly to Deliverance but only through the fact that it enables one to have the knowledge of the right way to Deliverance.

If we attempt to arrange the place of the doctrine of the Jina in the general philosophical development, first, the idea of the soul is of decisive importance. Jinism teaches an infinite number of souls. It thus divorces itself from the great stream of development of Indian thought which originated in the Upaniṣads and is characterized by the doctrine of the world-soul, the Brahma. While most of the teachings of the Epic, of Buddhism and of the Sāṃkhya, as we shall see later, belong to or are derived out of this stream of development, Jinism represents a second stream of development with which we are acquainted hitherto only in one of the Epic texts namely in the dialogue between Bhṛgu and Bharadvāja. Unfortunately, that Epic text is so badly transmitted that about the soul doctrine, we cannot gather anything more from it than the fact that it assumes a plurality of individual souls. The Jaina doctrine hands down to us further particulars. Among them, the most important is that different qualities are ascribed to the soul. The nature of the souls is therefore not pure spirituality as in the Brahma doctrine of the Upaniṣads and in the doctrines derived out of it. But the souls according to the Jaina are the bearers of all mental processes, are efficient and capablc of action.
Out of this, however, flow significant results. In a doctrine which this view represents, it was not necessary to allow some psychical organism to arise out of the soul, still less necessary to remove all processes of knowledge and all occurrences to the sphere of matter. In Jinism, we, therefore, find no splitting of the knowledge (vijñānam or buddhiḥ) as a separate organ from the soul such as we meet with in Buddhism and shall meet with in the Śāmkhya. The sense-organs are here pure organs and arise out of the Elements. And also the peculiar comprehension of the thinking organ is required to be derived out of this idea of the soul. All these features are, however, found in the dialogue between Bhrigu and Bharadvāja. We shall meet them later in the description of the Vaiśeṣika system.

There is another important fact which is as follows: In the dialogue between Bhrigu and Bharadvāja, the doctrine of the numerous souls is connected with a pronounced interest in natural science. There the doctrines of the Elements and their qualities are dealt with, with unusual details. The composition of the human body was investigated as also the operation of the breath-forces and the digestive fire. Even questions like those regarding the sense-organs of plants were raised. Jinism evinces the same interest. The same questions are discussed here and more extensively than is the custom in other systems. Though these teachings need not be traced back to Jina himself, they appear here still very early and their exhaustive treatment is characteristic of the Jaina system. Jinism in its interest in the direction of natural science not only coincides with the dialogue between Bhrigu and Bharadvāja but also with the Vaiśeṣika. The Vaiśeṣika is predominantly a system of natural philosophy. Besides, the doctrine of the Atom may be mentioned as a special point of agreement. Further points of agreement will meet us still.

Finally I may especially emphasize a point which is peculiar to the Jaina doctrine, namely, the doctrine of action (karma). While the teachings hitherto dealt with had been content to explain action as a determining cause of the transmigration of the soul, without inquiring into its nature and the kind of its effects, Jinism raised this question and found an answer to it in the inflow of the karma-stuff into the soul. This answer is no doubt old-fashioned
or antique and jumbles different things which have been kept apart in other doctrines; but it is original and hurries on in advance of its times.

This short review enables us to see clearly the place of the Jaina doctrine and its importance in the history of Indian Philosophy. It contains numerous views and teachings. But above all, its importance lies in the fact that in it is recognizable a development which otherwise is comprehensible with difficulty in the older period. The total picture of the ancient period of Indian Philosophy is governed by that stream of development which has its origin in the Upaniṣads and which preserves its characteristic stamp, above all, through the doctrine of the world-soul (Brahma). To it belong not only most of the teachings of the Epic period but also Buddhism and the Sāmkhya system derived their origin from it. But it does not represent the only direction in which the development of Indian Philosophy moved. There was a second stream of development which, though it comes to the fore much less in our tradition, was not less important on that account. It does not recognize the doctrine of the world-soul. On the contrary, it substitutes in its place a plurality of souls. Thereby it is characterized by an interest which is pronouncedly directed towards natural philosophy. This second stream of development leads to the formation of the Vaiśeṣika which represents one of the most important systems which Indian philosophy has brought forth. It has created a series of most precious thoughts which belonged, until lately, to the fixed continuity of the Indian philosophical thought-wealth and it has helped in determining in an authoritative manner the total development of Indian philosophy. For this important second stream of development, the Jaina doctrine in the ancient period is the only highly rich source which we possess. How rich this source is and how much it teaches, we shall see in the description of the Vaiśeṣika and the later Jaina systems. This alone suffices to secure for Jivism an honourable place in the history of Indian philosophy.

With all this, indeed, nothing has been said of the philosophical worth of the doctrine of Jina himself, about what he personally contributed to the development of the philosophy of his time, i.e., about what should form the proper contents of this chapter. We must, however, as we have remarked in the begin-
ning, be satisfied with a solution of the embarrassing situation and cannot therefore expect that the personality of the Jina himself will be thereby comprehensible to us in his doctrine. But one thing we can well assume that he, as a thinker, was not unimportant, that he maintained an esteemed place beside the Buddha, his work having had a continuity to this day during the last 2,500 years. One thing may still be added. The Jina does not stand without a predecessor in the founding of his doctrine. That Jinism, just as Buddhism, receives continually a new proclamation of the doctrine by Jinas who emerge again and again in the course of numberless world-ages, signifies nothing much. But the information about the last of these Jinas i.e. about Pārśva is available in such a way that he is considered almost generally as a historical personality. And though we may not believe in the details of the information about his doctrine given in the Jinistic canon, we need, still, assume that the Jina got an incentive from Pārśva's doctrine during the creation and the shaping of his own.

We do not wish to close this chapter of Indian Philosophy without mentioning, in a few words at least, the remaining teachers and heads of schools who were the contemporaries of the Buddha and the Jina. The Buddha and the Jina were the greatest of their kind but no isolated or unique phenomena. It was religiously and in general spiritually, a mightily excited period in which they lived. They simultaneously established their doctrines which survived for over a thousand years. This effect is not to be credited alone to their mighty personalities but also to the powerful impulse which rose out of the thought-stream of their period and whose pre-eminent embodiments they were. This time-stream by which they were carried and which they led had seized the widest circles of the people in all positions and layers.

The Buddhistic writings as well as the Jinistic canons cite frequently other outside doctrines and school-tenets. Above all, the Buddhistic texts mention repeatedly a number of antagonistic school-heads and recite in short their doctrines. One of them is the Jina. There appears also a second among them whose importance reaches out far beyond the moment and who was the head of a school which survived for many centuries. He was Maskari Gosāliputra (P. Makkhali Gosālo and Gosāle Makkhaliputta),
the head of the Ājivika Sect. He played a certain role in the life of the Jina and as the Jain texts contain much about him, it is possible to make more precise assertions about his person and teaching.

Maskari Gosaliputra: According to that account Gosala, unlike the Buddha and the Jina, was of low descent. His father was supposed to be a professional beggar. He himself became a wandering ascetic very early in his life and joined Jina during the period of his toils and struggles. He remained his companion for six years and his being together with the Jina is not supposed to have remained without influence on the Jina. Then it came to a breach and since then it continued as bitter enmity. Gosala now directed himself towards the sect of the Ājivika of which he later became the head. About 493 B.C. a long time before the Buddha and the Jina, he is supposed to have died.

The most essential feature of his doctrine was a strong Determinism. “There is no reason, there is no cause of the tainting of beings; without reason, without cause they are tainted. There is no ground, there is no cause for the purification of beings; without ground, without cause they are purified. There is no force, no energy; man has no strength, man has no power. Every being, whatever breathes, every existing, living thing is powerless, without strength, without energy; through Fate, Chance and Nature, it experiences joy and grief in the six kinds of Birth.”144 Every being has, during an immense Time-space, to go through a definite number of births and to exhaust the different possibilities of existence until finally it attains Deliverance. Everything is carried out according to rigorous legality, which is impossible to break through. “As with bushels, joy and sorrow are to be measured; the duration of the cycle of being is firmly limited. There is no shortening and prolonging. There is no enlargement or diminution. As a ball of thread, thrown down, rolls itself off and goes to the end, even so the fools and the wise, while they wander in the cycle of being, make an end of their misery.”145 It is the doctrine which Gosala placed against those proclaimed by the Buddha and the Jina. In other respects it is to be marked that in his theoretical views he belongs to the same philosophical stream of development as the Jina.

The other heads of schools whom the Buddhistic tradition
knows are too unimportant to be mentioned here. It must only be mentioned, however, that among their doctrines, materialistic directions are also represented and that Agnosticism has also its adherents among them.

With this comes to a close our description of the last two masses of tradition out of the period of the oral transmission. Simultaneously ends the period out of which for the first time not only detailed information about the most important teachings is preserved but which also gives a living picture of the exponents or proclaimers of these doctrines and of their life and the drives or the urges of their surroundings. Now follow several dim centuries. In the meantime, the oral tradition goes over into the written tradition and gradually again information begins to be available. Again centuries elapse until the information becomes rich according to its extent and content, so that the teachings of individual schools, their development and their most important representatives become distinctly comprehensible to us. In the meanwhile, however, a profound deep-penetrating revolution has been inwardly carried out. In place of the numerous doctrines of antiquity which develop themselves and reciprocally alternate in a consistent flow, there now rise doctrines which becoming complete on all sides are transmitted school-wise with fixed statements of teaching and which have endured unchanged in their basic features through centuries. We are in the period of the philosophical systems.
B. THE PERIOD OF THE SYSTEMS
6. THE SĀMKHYA AND THE CLASSICAL YOGA SYSTEM

With the period of the systems, we enter into a new chapter of Indian Tradition—into the period of written Tradition. The beginnings of the philosophical systems, indeed, fall in the period of Oral Tradition because the transition from oral to written tradition followed not suddenly but step by step. Inside the oral tradition, however, an important change at that time was already being carried out. For instance, it had become evident that even the most trained memory has its limitations and that it is impossible to hand down by memory unlimited entire literature. So one had traversed on a new way. The usage of including further texts in the total full extent of (oral) tradition had been abandoned and one went over to the stage of preserving what was essential from the point of contents, the outer form having been given up. With this aim in view, what was required to be handed down in a fixed form, was compressed in the manner of catchwords in concise sentences, which were then committed to memory. These aphorisms were also named as the Sūtras (sūtrāṇi) like the works consisting of them (the Sūtras). In this form, the utmost conciseness and brevity only was striven after. It did not matter if the aphorisms (sūtrāṇi) in their constrained conciseness became obscure and also unintelligible. Because it was not the idea that they alone should supply the tradition of the desired stuff. The student who learnt from his teacher and committed the aphorisms to memory preserved simultaneously with him detailed oral elucidations. The aphorisms had only one aim viz. to hand down the necessary prop to memory and to render it possible at hand, to call to memory every time, by means of the catchwords, the whole stuff with all its details. This aim was fulfilled in the fullest measure.

We can observe the transition to the new form of tradition in the later layers of Vedic Ritual Literature. In the works of this layer, the aim of which was to summarize the total rules for the sacrificial ritual in a short survey-like form, we already find the Sūtra form employed. The interesting detailed way of the narration in the Brāhmaṇa-texts has vanished and in its place have
stepped short statements which attempt to express as much as possible in the fewest possible words. As a matter of fact, the wished-for goal was reached with this form. Because these works have succeeded in summarizing in short texts the total directions not only for the ceremonial Vedic sacrifice but also for all the customs and the ceremonies which accompany the Indian through the whole life from his birth to his death; these short texts contain everything essential and could be committed to memory without too great a strain.

The Indian Sūtra style has attained its highest cultivation in the school of the grammarian. Here one has gone so far as to create a whole system of abbreviations which gave the Sūtras an appearance of algebraical formulas and rendered it possible to convey the most difficult grammatical rules in a few syllables. The famous grammar of Pāṇini has succeeded in giving in a few pages the most complete presentation imaginable of the Indian language which not only embraces phonetics and accidence but also the doctrine of word-building and syntax.

The Tradition of the Systems: In a similar way, the Sūtra form was taken over by the representatives of different branches of knowledge and used for their purpose. The representatives of the philosophical schools were not the last in making use of this form of transmission. Thus it came about that almost all philosophical systems of the older period found their earliest formulation in the form of the Sūtras. And we have to give credit to this form of transmission that the works of the most important philosophical systems are preserved for us, out of a period to which no written tradition reaches back. The Sūtra-form had an undeniable advantage for the tradition of the philosophical Schools. One could in this way transmit to the pupils the system in such a way as to render it possible for him to understand the authoritative theory of the School with all its particulars and in all its precision—especially in obscure and difficult points. Nay, this way of transmission stood the test in the eyes of the Indian so much that even in a period when the written literature had become predominant since a long time, the texts of the Sūtra-style were composed in order to render it possible to preserve the wished-for material in the form worthy of being committed to memory.

For us, the Sūtra tradition is attended with many disadvan-
tages. The Sūtra-Text very often presents through its conciseness and obscurity difficulties in the way of understanding them, as the oral tradition which accompanied them originally is missing for us. The preserved commentaries which transmit to us their meaning and their understanding are frequently many centuries later than the Sūtras and give the interpretation of their own time which was essentially different in many cases from the original sense of the Sūtras. The following disadvantage is still more grave. The old basic Texts of different systems contain nothing of the thought-creations of the historically understandable philosophers whose personal stamp they bear, but merely represent the summary of the authoritative teaching of the School concerned. Nothing else was easier than to adapt the texts to the advances made in the progress of development. This could more easily occur through changing and supplementing or widening the scope of the handed down Sūtras or through the insertion of new Sūtras than by composing other works. The Sūtra-Texts of different systems that lie before us are the result of a long development and contain elements coming out of entirely different times. They, therefore, cannot be looked upon as testimony for a particular fixed stage of development. They are, on the contrary, in their form and constituents, certain for a particular period only, as its working is guaranteed by a preserved written commentary. What lies at the back viz. the age and the origin of their isolated constituents must be fixed first through troublesome isolated investigations. And very often such efforts undertaken remain infructuous. Because in the described form of the texts, more limitations are imposed on the philological critique than elsewhere. That the attempts made occasionally to date the texts in their totality and to determine the time of the origin of the system concerned have missed their mark need not be further substantiated after what has been said. Thus the value of the oldest testimony of the philosophical system is unfortunately very much reduced on account of the difficulty in its utilization.

The Sūtra-form was not the only means of oral tradition, of which use was made. Besides the aphorisms, there were also the so called aphoristic verses (kārikā). In such Kārikās, naturally, the same conciseness of expression could not be attained,
as in the case of the Sūtras. For that reason, they could not be so easily changed and supplemented with additions, because the personal peculiarity or the style of the author could find expression in them to a certain degree. We find examples of the texts in the Kārikā form early, already in the later layers of Vedic Literature. In the philosophical literature, they have gained importance only late. Above all, they were very popular in this field in the first post-Christian centuries. But they have never lost their importance entirely like the Sūtras. Even still, in a later period, the works in the Kārikā form were composed, when one wished to stamp on memory any material practically and conveniently. Just like the Sūtras, the Kārikās also required, on account of their conciseness, explanations and as we have said, such explanations were given from the beginning orally. But as the usage of writing continually spread more in daily life, it was obvious that those kinds of explanations should also be committed to writing and with this there ensued the first stage of transition to written tradition. Soon, such explanatory writings were composed in a very large number, and this commentary-literature gained in India an unusual importance. That is due to the tendency of Indians, to hold fast to what has been handed down from the past. It is not new creations of works that won great interest and esteem but the old venerable works—the holy revelations of the seers of the ancient past. So, instead of writing new works, one preferred to elucidate or comment again and again on the old Sūtra-texts which were regarded as having been declared by the legendary founders of the systems. Many an important philosopher chose rather the way of saying, what he had to say, in the form of the commentaries and interpret his thoughts into the old text, rather than by presenting them in independent works. Indeed, many basic and pioneering works in the form of commentaries were written and their importance far surpassed that of the basic text. The further consequence of this was that on such commentaries, on their side, new commentaries were again written and thus there arose a chain of commentaries and sub-commentaries. A calculation as to how much of the philosophical literature of India is written in the form of commentaries would produce a surprisingly large share.

Besides the commentaries there arose also independent
works of different kinds. Still, many of them may be called as half-
or-semi-commentaries, as a few choice Sūtras or isolated Kārikās
are chosen as the starting point in order to join them to their
own presentations. If the tradition had perhaps been better
preserved, then the relation between commentaries and independ-
ent works would have been more favourable for the independ-
ent works than what it appears to be at present. Because the
general conditions of tradition were more favourable for the
commentaries. Often, for instance, more important works were
preserved on account of the text on which they had commented.
Thus much work has remained preserved which alone (without
the text) would have fallen into decay. Independent works,
on the other hand, in which such reasons did not play their
part, perished beyond rescue, as soon as the interest in them
was lost. These things must be taken into consideration, while
assessing the different systems and their doctrines. Because
with the loss of independent works, are straightway lost the
works which, from the point of their contents, were inclined to
go in their own independent way. And the one-sided preserva-
tion of isolated commentaries may, in many systems, feign a
uniformity of doctrine which does not correspond with reality.

If we summarize what has been said so far, we can say
that in the period of the systems, besides an oral tradition, a
rich written literature developed, which embraced works of
different kinds and offered most manifold possibilities of com-
munication of information.

The Tradition of the Sāṃkhya: In this rich development the
oldest of the systems, the Sāṃkhya, with which we have now
to first occupy ourselves, had its full share and we know that
it possessed an extensive and manifold written tradition. The
Sāṃkhya, on one point, possesses an advantage as against other
systems. On account of its antiquity, its origin reaches far back
into the period of the oral tradition. Through that, in one of
the masses of tradition of that period, namely the Epic, a
material is preserved for us out of its beginnings. We can glance
at its genesis in the Epic which is denied to us in the case of
other systems. In spite of this fact, when seen in its entirety,
what has been handed down of the Sāṃkhya is frighteningly
inadequate. In its case, as one of the oldest systems, it occurred
that the decline had already begun before the period, out of which a great number of written works are preserved for us. Consequently, the total old literature of the system is lost. We possess out of that blossoming time only a short compendium in verse with commentaries belonging to it and perhaps a short Sūtra text. Of the works of the leading representatives of the School, nothing is preserved. Only small short fragments are all that have remained with us out of that one-time ancient wealth. What has been brought forth in writing by a later resuscitation of the system in the Middle ages cannot replace the loss of creations of the classical period.

Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that the presentation of the system is beset with greatest difficulty. A thorough description of its origin and development is provisionally impossible. Many parts of the teaching remain obscure in many particulars. With the outward history of the School, the things are not better. Neither about its founder nor about any of its important representatives, we have any complete or reliable information preserved for us. A few statements besides a number of legendary narratives are all that we have at our disposal. We must, therefore, restrict ourselves to drawing the ground-lines of development in their rough outline and presenting the most important ideas and statements of the system in their genesis and their importance. If we shall succeed in arriving at some probabilities, that is what can be available from the present state of things.

The History of the Sāmkhya: What first concerns the external history of the system, its founder is unanimously named by tradition as Kapila. The name is the only thing that appears reliable in this tradition. Everything that is otherwise reported about him is completely legendary. With regard to the Brāhmaṇa Āsurī to whom as the first pupil Kapila is supposed to have imparted his doctrine, the matter is not different. We also miss all information about the home and the period of the origin of the system. It is supposed that the Sāmkhya originated in the eastern part of the Gangetic valley near the home of Buddhism. But the grounds adduced in its favour are inadequate. Still the several points of similarities and contacts between both theories may lead us continually to believe that their homes
were not far from each other. On the same ground we need also assume that the Saṃkhya originated not long after the death of Buddha.

Important is, however, the following. We shall see that the Saṃkhya has risen out of that stream of development which had its origin in the Fire-Theory of the Upaniṣads and which lies at the basis of the doctrine of the Buddha and to which most of the theories of the Epic belong. This stream of development along with its theories which arose out of it dominated the thought of the Brāhmanical priesthood. As the Saṃkhya developed as one of the most important among these theories, it was able to gain an all-surpassing place in that circle which held firmly to the Upaniṣadic doctrines and cultivated them further. They could not keep themselves away from the influence of the Saṃkhya ideas. The religious Epic was fully penetrated with the Saṃkhya theories. The circles (of thinkers) who fostered the worship of Viṣṇu and Śiva took their theories from the Saṃkhya on which they built their theological systems. Thus the basic ideas of the Saṃkhya gained unusual dissemination and exercised, more than any other system, a stronger influence on the spiritual and, above all, the religious life of the Indians. We must deal with the influence of the Saṃkhya later on. Because it deals with a development which came to full validity only in the time of the religious systems. We shall deal with it better in connection with these systems, during the presentation of the philosophy of the later period. We shall restrict ourselves here to the description of the original proper Saṃkhya system.

As a philosophical system, the Saṃkhya was split into many schools. By far the most important among them is the philosophical school of the Saṃkhya in its narrower sense. At its head stands the name of Pañcaśikha. This Pañcaśikha is named in the first place among the famous teachers of ancient times and the greatest merit is ascribed to him for the spread of the doctrine. Despite this, however, he remains no less shadowy than Kapīla and Āṣuri. The assertions which are made about him show that he was reckoned as belonging to legendary ancient times and that memories of his personality are long lost. Under his name, a number of fragments are no doubt, well-preserved but it is debatable how far we need draw conclusions from them. It appears
that different works which wrongly carried his name (as an author) were in circulation.

We enter on firm historical ground with the classical time of the system. Here we meet with decisive names—Vṛṣagana, Vārṣagana, Vārṣagaṇya. They designate the leading head of the School and his adherents. Under these names a series of fragments are also preserved and they contain precious and reliable information which conveys to us important knowledge about the system of that time. Here also we cannot take hold of single personalities. That becomes first possible in the case of a late representative of the School—who is repeatedly and explicitly named as Vindhyavāsi (about 425 A.D.). He was the contemporary of the famous Buddhist ecclesiastic teacher Vasubandhu and vanquished Vasubandhu’s teacher Buddhāmitra in an open debate in Ayodhyā, the present-day Oudh. But he is supposed to have withdrawn from an encounter with Vasubandhu himself. It is reported that Vindhyavāsi composed a treatise on the Śāṁkhya system in 70 verses (kanakasaptatiḥ—the ‘golden seventy verses’) which was refuted by Vasubandhu in a work of equally 70 verses (paramāṁthasaptatiḥ: 70 verses about the truth). We possess from Vindhyavāsi a number of fragments which enable us to have a glimpse of his theoretical opinions in outline and show remarkable deviations from the ruling theory of the school. The last Śāṁkhya teacher of the olden times, of whom we hear, is Mādhava, who about 500 A.D., encountered in an open debate the Buddhist teacher Guṇamati. Different opinions of doctrine are reported by him and they show essential deviations from the present dogmas of the School. With him ends, according to the position of our knowledge of that time, the external history of the old philosophical school of the Śāṁkhya.

Besides this particular School, there stands a second direction of the School—the School of the Classical Yoga. The Śāṁkhya had already entered into a close connection with the Yoga from earlier times, in which the doctrine was maintained that the same releasing knowledge could be reached in two ways: by the way of logical thought as the philosophical school taught it, and by the way of meditation through the Yoga. Thus was formed the classical Yoga system which reconciled the Śāṁkhya theory with the Yoga-praxis. The Yoga-praxis was here conducted
6. THE SĀMKHYA AND THE CLASSICAL YOGA SYSTEM

systematically and as against the other directions of the Yoga it was designated as the Rāja-Yoga (King of Yoga). The theoretical basis corresponded well in its main basic features with the orthodox Sāmkhya system; but still it showed deviations so much that it was considered as a separate School. Patañjali is named as the head of the School. He is held as the author of the basic text of the School, called the Yoga-sūtra but is as a person perfectly legendary. Neither about his time nor about his place, anything reliable is known. For equating him with the famous grammarian Patañjali, there are no valid proofs. 148 Other important representatives of this School are not named in the older tradition. That is all that can be said about this second direction of the School.

Finally, still more shadowy remains the Third School. We know only this much about it that it represents a Tāntric direction and its head was the otherwise unknown Pañcādhikaraṇa. Only a few but interesting fragments give us information about the doctrinal opinions of this School.

The Literature of the Sāmkhya: Now a few words about the preserved works of the Sāmkhya School. 149 As we have already said, what has been preserved is frighteningly scanty. The Sāmkhya Sūtras which are handed down under the name of Kapila are recognizably a product of a later period. A second Sūtra Text the so-called Tattwasamāsah (‘Summary of truth’) may have arisen in an earlier period but with its extent of less than 60 words is so scanty and concise that nothing much can be got out of it. The remaining is the sole independent work of the old philosophical school, which is preserved to us—the so-called Sāmkhyakārikā. 160 It is a presentation of the system in approximately seventy verses. About its author Iśvarakṛṣṇa, nothing can be said nor about where and when the work originated. It must be older than 500 A.D., as it was already translated in Chinese about 560 A.D. This work has become famous, and rightly. Because it gives in its narrow compass a presentation of all the essential teachings of the system so systematically and with such clarity as is rarely reached by another work of a similar type of that time. As a philosophical performance, it counts, so far as we can judge, for nothing. What it reproduces is the transmitted system of the School. Original thoughts are absent. But as the old School was dead
and the living formulation and development of the system had ceased, this work, on account of its masterly presentation, has been considered as the authoritative presentation of the School. And since the seventh century A. D. it is regularly the Śaṃkhyākārikā that is cited when one talks about the Śaṃkhyā, while the famous teachers of the classical times and their works have fallen into oblivion.

Many commentaries on the Śaṃkhyākārikā are handed down. By far the most important among them is the Yuktidīpika (‘Light of Argumentation’), of an unknown author; this commentary must have originated151 about 550 A. D. It is the only work which deals with the theories of the classical Śaṃkhyā with greater details and is, in general, the most important source for the classical Śaṃkhyā. All the remaining commentaries are clarifications of the original Kārikā but they are poor in content and have little to offer beyond the text. The oldest among them is the commentary, which was translated together with the text into Chinese about 560 A.D. Therefore the original commentary must have been in existence before 500 A. D.152 It agrees extensively with a commentary which is preserved for us in Sanskrit under the name of Māṭhara.153 Somewhat later is the commentary of one Gauḍapāda whose equation, however, with the famous Vedānta-Teacher Gauḍapāda is unwarranted.154 Further about 850 A.D., the versatile polyhistor Vācaspatimiśra wrote his Śaṃkhya-tattva-kaumudi (‘the moonlight of the Śaṃkhyā truth’) which is in a manifold way famous as the best presentation of the system but from the point of its contents not less shallow and scanty than the rest of the works of the group.155 In the last place may still be named the concise commentary of Śaṅkarārya; it is essentially later but still it is based156 on an old tradition. This exhausts the source-works which are preserved for the classical Śaṃkhyā system.

Still scantier is the literature of the classical Yoga system. The groundwork of the school—the Yogasūtra157 ascribed to Patañjali—is, like all Sūtra-texts, concise and deals in reality only with the Yoga-praxis and, therefore, can hardly be counted as philosophical. Among the commentaries on the Yogasūtra we possess out of the older times only one and this at the same time is the only philosophically important work that has been preserved
for us. It is the commentary of Vyāsa. This commentary only gives a good and exhaustive clarification of the Sūtras but it also deals with the theoretical views so exhaustively that a good picture of the Sāṃkhya system, as it was taught by the Yoga School of that time, can be had from it. The author of the commentary, Vyāsa, is otherwise fully unknown. We neither know anything about his home nor about his period. It is a mere supposition if we assume that Vyāsa wrote his commentary about 500 A.D. On this commentary of Vyāsa, Vācaspatimiśra, whom we have named as the author of the Sāṃkhya-tattva-kākumudī wrote a sub-commentary—the Tattvavaisārādī (‘expertise in the truth’) about 850 A.D. i.e. about the same time as the Sāṃkhya-tattva-kākumudī. This work of Vācaspatimiśra is a good clarification of the commentary of Vyāsa but offers about it rarely anything essential. Finally the commentary which King Bhoja of Mālavā wrote under the title of Rājamārtandaḥ (‘King of Suns’) near about 1050 A.D. works on the old materials but brings forth nothing new beyond what Vyāsa has given. This is all that we possess of the old works of the classical Yoga system. Finally about the third School of Pañcādhikarana, nothing generally is preserved.

This is the material on which the presentation of the old Sāṃkhya system is based. Now we shall try, as it is possible with this material, to describe the genesis and contents of the system.

The Epic Ur-form of the Sāṃkhya: The Mokṣadharmac Section of the Mahābhārata contains a text to which a wholly especial importance is due. The importance is testified by the manner in which it is transmitted. This text appears in the Mokṣadharma in three places, which is quite an unusual thing. It is not a simple repetition of the same text, which also otherwise occurs occasionally, but they are three different versions of this particular text which lie before us. The deviations of these versions from one another are so great that it gives an evident impression of their having led a separate existence for a long time before they were taken into the great collection of the Mokṣadharma.

Already, the constitution of transmission is worth noticing. On account of great deviations among the three versions it is impossible to restore on wide stretches the wording of the
original text. We see here an unerring example as to how we must reckon with distortions in the Epic texts, how cautiously one should proceed in the interpretation of them and how careless it would be to build too much on a few words of the handed down texts. But by far the greatest is the interest which the contents of our text deserve. Because as already shown by the fact of the threefold handing down of the texts, the contents deal with a Text which must have enjoyed special esteem and unusual dissemination. It is, therefore, indispensable for every presentation of Epic philosophy to examine and ascertain thoroughly the contents of this text, as to wherein its significance lies. The introduction of the Text to which we refer is completely colourless and unimportant. It consists of only two formal verses which in two versions introduce the wounded hero Bhīṣma as the speaker. In another i.e. the third version, Vyāsa, the legendary author of the Mahābhārata, is introduced as the speaker. Nothing can be gathered with regard to the origin and the period of the origin of these texts.

The presentation of the doctrine begins with an enumeration of the five great elements (mahābhūtāni): Ether (ākāśam), Fire (jyotiḥ), Wind (vāyuḥ), Water (āpaḥ) and Earth (prthivī). Their qualities are sound (śabdaḥ), form (rūpam), touch (sparśaḥ), taste (rasaḥ), and smell (gandhaḥ). These great elements are the source and the final place into which all things finally decay. “Because into the great elements, out of which the things are created, the things again enter, continually again and again like the waves of the ocean. As a tortoise stretches forth its limbs and withdraws them again, so behave the smaller things in respect of the great elements.”

Before all, all the creatures have arisen out of the five great Elements. Out of the ether have arisen sound, hearing and the hollow spaces of the body; out of the fire, form, eyes and the digestive fire; out of the wind, touch, skin and breath; out of the water, taste and humidity (snehaḥ); and out of the earth, the smellable things and the sense of smell.

Besides these five sense-organs stands as the sixth the thinking organ (manaḥ), above it the knowledge (buddhiḥ) and above it the Soul or as it is here called the Knower of the place (kṣetrajñaḥ).

“The eye serves for seeing (ālocanam), the thinking organ
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raises the doubt (saṃśayaḥ), the knowing organ or knowledge (buddhiḥ) serves for decision (adhyayanasaḥ), the knower of the place (kṣetrajñaḥ) is designated as the onlooker (sākṣi)".160 By far the most important among the psychical organs is the knowledge (buddhiḥ). It is the knowledge which enters into the sense-organs and operates in them. That through which it sees is the eye. Hearing, it is named as the ear or the sense of hearing. Smelling, it becomes the sense of smell (the nose). Tasting, it becomes the sense of taste (the tongue). Through the skin, it feels the touch. The sense of knowing or knowledge changes itself in manifold ways. When it desires something, then it becomes the thinking organ (manaḥ). These are the places of the operation (buddhiḥ), separated fivefold for themselves. They are named the sense-organs (indriyāni). Over them stands the Invisible."161 The knowledge (buddhiḥ) has still one important quality, which appears in three different states (bhāvāḥ). Sometimes it experiences joy (pritiḥ), sometimes sorrow (duḥkham), sometimes it finds itself in a condition which is neither joy nor sorrow and is named as dullness or delusion (mohaḥ) —"Whatever conditions there are, they are all contained in these three."162 "Everything that is now connected with joy in the body or the mind (manaḥ), that is to be designated as the condition of goodness or good quality (sattvam). What is further connected with sorrow and causes the soul (Ātmā) sorrow, should be considered as the operation of passion (rajaḥ). What finally is connected with dullness, has no distinct object, and is not clearly thought and known; it shall be considered as darkness or obscurity (tamaḥ). Pleasure, satisfaction, bliss, joy and quietness of the mind, though they may be accidental or caused by some cause are the qualities of goodness (sattvam). Dissatisfaction, agony, pain, desire and impatience are to be considered the characteristics of passion (rajaḥ), whether they now appear without any reason or with any reason. Ignorance, delusion, thoughtlessness, sleep and indolence, as they also continously emerge, are the qualities of darkness (tamaḥ)."163

"The goodness (sattvam) and the soul (kṣetrajñaḥ) are always bound with each other, as fish with water and yet are different from each other. The goodness (sattvam) allows the qualities to proceed out of itself but not so the soul. The soul only sees it. But while it sees, it believes itself to be affected by it. It is not
possible to know the true nature of the soul through the usual form of knowledge (buddhiḥ) with the help of the sense-organs. Only when one has withdrawn the senses through the thinking organ (manāḥ), the soul shines forth like a flame. Then the earthly dross sticks no more to the soul, even as little as the water to the water-bird. The actions (karmāṇi) lose their power and one reaches the highest good."

"It is necessary to know that everything earthly occurs out of nature (svabhāvaḥ), that the qualities arise of themselves without any act on the part of the soul like the threads which issue out of the spider. When this is realized, one is able to remain calm and even-tempered, free from joy and grief and released from all doubt." The text closes with the description of a wise man who has attained knowledge, who has risen above the absence of clarity and above fear, whom the accomplished actions (karmāṇi) no more bind, and who, raised above joy and grief, has found the highest peace.

When we closely consider this Text in general, its construction becomes clear and consistent. It begins with the description of the Elements, their qualities and the formation of beings or principles out of the Elements. In the second place, there follows a description of the sense-organs and the psychical organs and the role of the most important among them, of knowledge (buddhiḥ) is described at great length. With that is joined easily the theory of the states (bhāvaḥ) of knowledge on which the bondage of the soul depends. That leads again to the description of bondage, to the mention of Release through the knowledge of the soul and to the description of the Released. Then the text once more harks back to the character of releasing knowledge and ends resoundingly with a comparatively lengthy description of Release, the end being underlined or distinguished effectively with a change in metre. The build of the text is clearer and more precise than any other text of a similar type. When we consider the brevity rich in content which marks its presentation, we can say that it, in its external form, stands outside and beyond the usual philosophical texts of the Epic. Its true importance becomes evident, when we enter into its contents with greater precision.

A great part of the views contained in it is already known
to us from doctrines described earlier; it would be enough if we go into it shortly and point out its descent. The theory of the soul is the same as in the Fire-Theory of the Upaniṣads. The place (position) of the knowledge (buddhi) depends on the definition of the soul as knowledge, as we have found it in the teaching of Yājñavalkya and the development towards the psychical organ has its counterpart in other Epic teachings and in the oldest Buddhism. In the teaching of Yājñavalkya, it will be remembered, the thinking organ (manaḥ) is partly coordinated with the sense-organs; similarly the sense-organs are formed out of the Elements and they become capable only through the entry of knowledge into them and exercise their activity.

Besides these agreements with the teachings of the Upaniṣads, there stands a series of further formulations which are characteristic of the old Epic Text. To that belongs a formulation of the theory of Elements, the fixing of the number of sense-organs, and above all, the confrontation of the five elements with the five qualities of the Elements and with the five sense-organs. We have mentioned and already appreciated, in the Epic philosophy, in the dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati, this juxtaposition. This juxtaposition could scarcely have originated and developed out of the present texts because the position of the thinking organ yet preserved and retained on the same stage with the sense-organs contradicts the basic thought of the text. But it is a characteristic sign of the stage of development on which our Text stands. Finally, the way is worth mentioning as to how according to our Text, the knowledge of the Ātmā succeeds after the withdrawal of the senses from outer objects through the thinking-organ (manaḥ) and then, the Ātmā shines forth like a flame. It is a typical kind of knowledge through the Yoga corresponding to the older Epic Period.

The views cited and the connections to other texts and doctrines depending on them give a good picture of our Text and render possible its arrangement in the general development. With its evident suggestions received from the old Upaniṣads and besides, with its characteristic further formulations as they characterize the Epic stage of Indian Philosophy, it is a typical example of the older philosophical Text of the Epic Period. It stands somewhat on the same stage of development as the already
mentioned dialogue between Manu and Brhaspati and may approximately belong to the same period. Its importance is in no way exhausted with the cited views and ideas, though these would produce a well-rounded doctrine which need not shun comparison with the average Epic text. It, however, depends on what new and original things it brings forth and they are the following:

In the dialogue between Manu and Brhaspati, the knowledge (buddhiḥ) and the sense-organs are described as coming out of the Ātmā and resolving back into it. We have shown during the description of these views that they can be understood as a further formulation of the teaching of Yājñavalkya. Our Text has, however, taken an entirely different road. According to it the sense-organs and also the thinking-organ (manāḥ), and knowledge (buddhiḥ) originate out of the Elements and are sharply separated as something of a different order from the soul. In this way, the contrast between Soul and Matter which was already demonstrated in the teaching of Yājñavalkya is accentuated and deepened. Then comes further the theory of the States (bhāvaḥ) of knowledge. Our Text teaches, for instance, as we have already seen, that the knowledge (buddhiḥ) can be found in three different states; these are designated as pleasure, grief and dullness and receive peculiar names of goodness (sattvaṃ), passion (rajaḥ) and darkness (tamaḥ). All sensations and feelings, which emerge in the body and the spirit, fall under these three states and are reckoned among them. Thus a greater part of the psychical processes is drawn into the sphere of consideration. What is decisive is that these processes are not ascribed to the soul but to the knowledge (buddhiḥ) and are therefore removed to the sphere of matter. Therefore not only the psychical organs but the psychical processes also belong, according to our Text, to the world of matter. The attempt of Yājñavalkya to raise the Ātmā over all that belongs to the world of phenomena has been here pursued and further reinforced or strengthened. From the thoughts and statements which are contained in the teaching of Yājñavalkya, our Text has seized some and further developed entirely different ones from those in the dialogue between Manu and Brhaspati. And this has occurred with full consciousness. Because on the thoughts thus employed, the theory of Deliverance
of our Text is built.

As we have already said, according to the theory of our text all psychical processes, all feelings and pleasure and pain, take place only in the knowledge (buddhiḥ) and come into existence without any intervention of the Soul, which in reality is not touched by them. But while the soul is constantly bound with the knowledge (buddhiḥ) it sees everything that happens in it and while it sees, it feels itself as struck and affected by it and believes itself entangled in pleasure and sorrow which in reality are foreign to it. Consequently the Deliverance comes, when the soul becomes conscious of its true nature, when it is recognized that pleasure and pain belong to earthly nature. Then the soul untouched by the earlier accomplished bad and good works (karmāṇī) finds the highest state.

These teachings are rooted in the ideas which are given in the teaching of Yājñavalkya, which are, namely, that everything different from the Ātmā is full of sorrow and that therefore one striving after Deliverance should turn away from all earthly things and should only seek and know the Ātmā. But the ideas are essentially further developed and more sharply worked out and more deeply laid. Above all, the sorrow, in which the soul is involved, is firmly grounded in and associated with the life of feelings and sensations. The sorrow takes place in the psychical organism but the soul erroneously refers to the latter as itself. This error provides an evident proof, why the true nature of the soul is not known by beings, as to why through this ignorance, entanglement in the cycle of being follows and why finally the knowledge of the Ātmā brings Deliverance.

Our theory has created and imported new thoughts which prove themselves fruitful and from which far-reaching effects were bound to follow. Indeed, the thoughts of our text are not completely new. We meet with similar thoughts in old Buddhism, in which everything earthly was separated from the world of Nirvāṇa by a deep gulf. Above all, all the psychical organs and processes were relegated to the sphere of matter and the thought that it is wrong to look for the soul—to look for the real ‘I’—in them, played an important role in the theory of Deliverance.

Still a direct connection of our text with or even its depen-
dence on the oldest Buddhism is not to be thought of. For the manner in which the thoughts are shaped in the Epic text and in the oldest Buddhism is far different. From the Buddhistic teaching of five groups (skandhāḥ) which form the earthly personality to the teaching of our Epic text regarding knowledge (buddhiḥ) and its states (bhāvāḥ), there is no common way which leads from the one to the other. Perhaps we may assume that our doctrine and that of the oldest Buddhism may have grown forth out of similar thought-processes and may have received suggestions out of the same circles. Their homes and their time of origin must not have been very far from each other. But they shaped and developed the received suggestions in a completely independent and original way. Of the dependence of our teaching on Buddhism or vice versa, there can therefore be no talk.

But, probably there are unmistakable relations and lines of connection of our teaching leading towards another direction. These connections lead, in the later time and in that case, no doubt, to the classical Sāmkhya. The deepening of the chasm between Soul and Matter prepared the way for the strong dualism of the Sāmkhya system. The role which knowledge (buddhiḥ) plays as a central psychical organ is on both sides the same. The fluctuating place of thinking (manah) now as sense-organ and now as an organ raised over all occurs in the Sāmkhya system again. The psychical functions, here as well as there, are parcelled out on different organs in the same way; ‘seeing’ (ālocanam) is ascribed to the sense-organs, the doubting to the thinking organ (manah) and decision (adhyayasāyāḥ) to knowledge (buddhiḥ). There is also agreement in terminology. The designation ‘knower of the place or field (Kṣetrajñāḥ)’ for the soul is characteristic for particular layers of the Sāmkhya. But above all, there exists undeniable connection between the theory of three states of knowledge (buddhiḥ) of our text and the characteristic teaching of the Sāmkhya system, namely, the three qualities of the primeval matter (prakṛtiḥ). The pleasure, the pain and the dullness in our text belong as qualities only to the knowledge (buddhiḥ). They are called in the first place the states of knowledge (bhāvāḥ). It is only after describing their different qualities that this expression (bhāvāḥ) is used for them. But the same
peculiar naming of these states of knowledge (buddhiḥ) and the qualities of primeval matter as goodness (sattvam), passion (rajaḥ), and delusion or darkness (tamaḥ) and the predominant role which they play in the theory of Deliverance is so striking that one cannot deny a connection between them.

When we consider all these agreements and what we have said about the place of our Text inside the general development—the close connection of our Text with the teaching of Yājñāvalkya in the Upaniṣads, its great similarity with the Epic Texts of older times and its near relationship with the thought-circle of old Buddhism, the inference forces itself on us that here we stand before the beginning of the Sāmkhya. It has shaped and summarized a number of important thoughts and ideas out of which the edifice of the Sāmkhya was later erected. On that depends the importance of our Text. For the first time a trail is blazed in them, which leads to the origin of the Sāmkhya system. As the Epic Text expressed in it the ideas which turned out to be so effective and introduced such a far-reaching development, its esteem and great dissemination in the Epic times is, therefore, understandable.

We have, therefore, found in the Mokṣadharma a text which once was esteemed and widely circulated, which contains a doctrine that belongs to the Epic period, whose home and time of origin need not be very distant from those of the doctrine of the oldest Buddhism. This doctrine shows nevertheless close connections with those in the older Upaniṣads and can be easily derived in its largest part from the doctrine of Yājñāvalkya. Besides it shows further formulations which are characteristic of the Epic period. Our text has further developed certain ideas of Yājñāvalkya in an original and significant way. All these further formulations show one form which evidently led to the later Sāmkhya system. Therefore in this teaching, the Ur-form of the later Sāmkhya system is to be seen. Our next task is to show how out of it gradually the classical Sāmkhya system has developed.

The frame of our narration forbids us from entering into details too much and so we must restrict ourselves to the following remarks for the older time. Besides the described text, the Mokṣadharma contains other old Sāmkhya texts which from the
point of contents stand right close to it and need not be essentially later. The further formulations of the doctrine contained in them are not very important. Only one thing deserves to be mentioned that the sphere of the sense-organs or as the Indians would call it sense-faculties (indriya) was further enlarged. Besides the five traditional sense-organs, five further are added, which embody particular faculties and carry the name of organs of action (karmendriya) in contrast to the usual five sense-organs which now receive the name, ‘the organs of knowledge’ (buddhindriya). The organs of action are the organ of speech, hands, feet, anus, the organ of begetting and their activities are speaking, doing, going, evacuating, and begetting. But this development of the theory of the sense-organs does not appear to be happy, and as a matter of fact, it is rejected by other systems. It is, however, understandable from the wider Indian idea of the sense-faculties and the oldest Buddhistic system-building shows that such thought-processes were far widespread. Above all it is important that a further step was taken which brings nearer the oldest preliminary stages of the Sāṁkhya of the later system.

The Introduction of the Evolution Theory: With this we finish what we had something essential to say about the oldest stages of the development of the Sāṁkhya. Now we come to the basic transformation which made the proper Sāṁkhya system grow out of the old teaching—the introduction of the Evolution-Theory, according to which the material world arise forth out of a single cause.

With the Evolution-Theory are connected a number of teachings or theories which have an inner relationship with it and which therefore must have necessarily the same source. They are the idea of the primeval matter (prakṛti), the theory of the three qualities of the primeval matter, and the theory of the 25 principles or entities. They have stamped upon the Sāṁkhya their essential features and their introduction indicates a most incisive change which the system underwent in the course of its long history. When these changes were introduced, to what period they go back, we cannot say. The theory of the 25 entities is associated with Paṇcaśākha explicitly by later tradition. The connection of this most decisive recasting of the system with the most famous representative after the legendary founder Kapila seems
to have a certain likelihood. From the point of time, there is no doubt about it because according to the testimony of the tradition Pañcaśikha belongs to the oldest period of the School. It is therefore most justifiable to ascribe this basic shaping of the system to him rather than to judge him from the fragments which evidently belong to the stages of the development of the theory. But we must be clear to ourselves that the apportionment of the Evolution-Theory to Pañcaśikha can be looked upon only as a convenient workable hypothesis. Any other certainty on this question cannot be reached. It is only certain that we have to see in the creator of the Evolution-Theory one of the most important thinkers whom the Sāmkhya School has brought forth.

In order to appreciate rightly the performance of this man and the doctrine created by him we must take several things into consideration. It is to be remembered that the most important thinker especially in so old a time never creates completely new and independent things. We find, therefore, beside the boldest new thoughts, a surprisingly strong dependence on the old thought-processes and suggestions. In the hitherto described period of Indian Philosophy—which is the early period of philosophical thought,—the ideas occupy themselves with simple, obvious questions and equally simple answers. They move in simple courses or tracks. Though they are clothed in ancient forms and metaphors, they still offer to us solution which appear to us emotionally natural and intimate and produce such effect on us.

But things have changed now. The province of question is continually more and more enlarged and exceeds, decisively, the boundaries of the simple and the obvious and things which appeared hitherto natural and self-evident are now questioned. It is a kind of emancipation of human thought which is being carried out. It also influences the constitution of the answers which are given to the questions. The thought must attempt new paths in completely unfamiliar spheres. It could not follow the natural feeling as its leader. Because the feeling refuses to do duty as soon as the region of the usual and day-to-day is abandoned. Often, therefore, singular and far-lying unfamiliar answers were given to the formulated questions and only gradually and step by step, the thought leads itself to solutions which appear to us from our stand-point as natural and obvious.
This period of philosophical thought—I may name it the period of queer, odd theories—offers greatest difficulties to the understanding, especially to one who is not accustomed to think it historically. Therefore one finds in the treatises of such periods an attempt to push aside the singular or at least to accommodate it to our line of thought and to make it palatable. But exactly through this, one blocks the way for the right understanding of the development in general. Because in so doing, one eliminates one of the most important periods of development which as a stage of transition is an indispensable prerequisite for the later development and makes it understandable. If one, on the other hand, understands and appreciates rightly this period in its originality and peculiarity, the succeeding creations of the philosophical high springtime become clear in their origin. Not only that. He, who understands rightly the queer theories as arising from the conditions of their time, will learn to value them as the most important performances of philosophical thought. He will be astonished at the boldness and consistency of their creators, who were never shy of shunning conclusions, in order to answer adequately the framed question and prepare the way for the coming period. From this historical point the following period of the Sāṃkhya philosophy must be considered, if it is to be valued and appreciated rightly in its significance. Our presentation will reckon with what has been said. We shall attempt, not only here but also in the corresponding periods of the remaining systems, to describe the theories of this period, which, though they appear to us queer, exhibit their genuine form and their full originality. At the same time we shall attempt to estimate them in their historical significance. And I hope that in this way, much in the total development, especially much as regards the origin of the classical form of the individual systems, will become clearer and understandable than hitherto.

The introduction of the Evolution Theory in the Sāṃkhya system occurred in the following way: In the section on the philosophy of the Epic viz. in description of 'The Question of Śuka,' we have dealt with the theory of the world-ages and the world periods. We have already pointed out on that occasion that the picture of the Universe continually vanishing and again renewing in mighty time-spaces worked so powerfully on the
Indian mind that it attained universal esteem. Every system and every school was compelled to accept that structure of the theory in one form or other. So it happened also with the Śāmkhya. The prototype, according to which it was formulated, is distinctly recognizable. It was either the theory recited in ‘The Question of Śuka’ itself or at least an entirely similar theory. Still the type is no way slavishly imitated in the Śāmkhya. The man who carried out this recasting of the Śāmkhya theory—I will call him Pañcaśikha for the sake of simplicity—probably stood under the spell of the prototype and could not get himself free from it so as to go his perfectly own way. But he was conscious of the conditions imposed by his theory and did not fight shy of taking account of them by energetic changes.

The main difficulty lay in the following respect: In the theory in ‘The Question of Śuka,’ the starting point of the Evolution theory and the source from which the world rises forth is the Brahma. Out of it the soul and the psychical organs arise and out of these organs, first, the elements. Such a kind of evolution was impossible in the Śāmkhya. As we have seen, the gulf between the Ātmā and Matter already implied in the teaching of Yājñavalkya was still deepened in the Epic basic form of the Śāmkhya. All activity and all occurrences were denied to the Ātmā and were removed to the sphere of matter. So it was impossible now to consider the Ātmā as a creative principle and allow the whole world to proceed out of it. Of this Pañcaśikha was well conscious. On the other hand, the power of the standard type in ‘The Question of Śuka’ was so great that he would not have been in a position to knock down completely the development-series given in it and set up something quite new in their place. And so he came to assume primeval matter—as a novel and a bold idea—as the starting-point of the Evolution-Series and as the source of the world and he allowed, first of all, like the prototype in ‘The Question of Śuka’ the psychical organs and then first the elements to arise from primeval matter.

According to Pañcaśikha, there is Ur-matter (primeval matter) or Ur-nature (primeval Nature) (pradhānam or prakṛtiḥ) which is permanent and ubiquitous. It is infinitely subtle and therefore cannot be perceived. But in spite of that it is found existing everywhere and out of it rises the total visible
Universe which again resolves back into it. On account of its fineness or subtlety, permanence and ubiquituousness, this idea of Ur-matter resembles the *Brahma* and thus one can trace, nevertheless, the influence of the prototype where in its place the *Brahma* stands. Still it is completely different from the *Brahma*; it is unspiritual and therefore Matter. Besides, it is active while the *Ātmā*, according to the Sāmkhyya idea, remains inactive in perpetual repose.

This acceptance of Ur-matter brings in not only a novel idea but also implies a fundamental important conclusion or decision. The contrast between the *Ātmā* and Matter is already given in the teaching of Yājñavalkya. In Buddhism and in the development which led to the rise of the Sāmkhyya, this contrast became still stronger. Of course, no special importance was orginally attached to it and as against other doctrines which allowed the whole world to arise out of the *Brahma*, the contrast had not been specially emphasised. Dualism and Monism were not still the categories of philosophical thought. But now there was a change. The origin of the world out of the *Brahma* as given in the standard type of the Evolution theory was rejected and its origin out of the Matter was accepted. Thus this contrast was brought clearly to consciousness and the ground for the later sharply expressed Dualism was prepared.

The acceptance of the Ur-matter was joined to a second important idea which gave the image of the Sāmkhya its characteristic feature. In the progress of the period when Pañcaśikha created his Evolution-theory, one was not content with formulating a theory but tried to give an exact account of the possibility of the theory and about its practical effect. Therefore Pañcaśikha was not satisfied with teaching the mere origin of the world from Ur-Matter but he dealt with the question how it may be possible that the whole manifold variety of the phenomenal world springs out of that Ur-Matter. And he came to the following solution. 185

In the time of the Upaniṣads an attempt was made in the teaching of Śvetaketu to derive the manifoldness of things from the most simple conditions—out of three Ur-elements; and as the Sāmkhya originated in Brahmanical circles in which the thoughts of the Upaniṣadic times continued to live, the theory was known
to Pañcaśikha and that provided him with the suggestion as to the way in which he attempted to solve the questions posed before him. In the teaching of Śvetaketu, it had been said that all things arise out of the three Ur-elements and that their different constitution depends on how these elements are mixed with one another and which of them preponderates. Now Pañcaśikha assumed that the Ur-matter possesses three qualities which are connected with one another in different forms. Now this quality preponderates, now that. The unending manifoldness of the mixture of these qualities (guṇāḥ) renders possible the infinite variety of things which, despite everything, arises out of the one Ur-matter.

The influence of the prototype is clear here. And it comes to be expressed, especially in one detail. In the teaching of Śvetaketu, fixed colours were ascribed to the three Ur-elements: white, red and dark. The same colours are attributed to the qualities of the Sāṁkhya in many layers of the Sāṁkhya tradition. An important difference is as follows: In the teaching of Śvetaketu, they are dealt with as elements. Pañcaśikha assumes them as the three qualities of one Ur-matter. This description had no importance in his time. The idea of the quality as a separate category of existence was not developed in his time. It is first the performance of the Vaiśeṣika system. Qualities appear at that time as reals or material, as independent entities. And thus were the qualities of Ur-matter understood by Pañcaśikha. They bind and unbind themselves, beget, multiply, prop each other and crowd each other out like independent elements. This image of their working impressed itself so emphatically on the formulation that it became enduring and was firmly established in the later system. In the authoritative European treatises, they have preferred to speak of them not as qualities but as constituents of Ur-matter. Of what kind are the three qualities (guṇāḥ) of the Ur-matter?

The reply which Pañcaśikha gave on this question first appears strange. He defines them as namely goodness (sattvam), passion (rajaḥ) and darkness (tamaḥ). This reply is intelligible if we consider the circumstances which brought it into being. On the Sāṁkhya system, from the beginning, corresponding to the circles out of which it arose, the character as the theory of Deliverance was strongly imprinted. In the Epic ground-text, as we have already shown,
the Deliverance doctrine occupies a third of that Text. We shall see, in the description of further development, that in the philosophical school of the Śāṃkhyā, the Deliverance-doctrine was formulated and fostered in such a way as reminds us of religious schools and sects. But in such an attitude, the interest in natural philosophy—the consideration of the outer world—stepped back. One did not try to probe or go to the roots or the bottom of the constituents of the outer world but a question was asked, how the outer world affected men and what role it played in respect of Bondage and Deliverance. The things of the world play, it was said, such a role by calling forth certain feelings, thus awakening desires, and causing the fettering of the soul. One occupied himself with the things of the world only so far as they were the cause of the feelings or sensations.

In the oldest period, one was content to conclude that certain fixed qualities (gunaḥ) of the Elements as the objects of the sense-organs not only call forth perception but that they also give an impulse to the rise of feelings. That no more proved satisfactory in the period in which Pāṇḍaśikha developed his Evolution-Theory. Then, one sought to understand exactly the causal connection. But thereby, he was not able to understand positively the coming into being of feelings. Nevertheless in the attempt to find a cause, he came to assume an objective correspondence to the feelings in the things themselves. It was thought that pleasure and pain develop in the things themselves. Such thought-processes were widespread and Pāṇḍaśikha also defined them. Already in the Epic ground-form of the Śāṃkhyā, a doctrine of feelings was given under the doctrine of the states (bhāvāḥ) of knowledge (buddhiḥ). There all the impulses of the soul were classified in those groups of states and these had the names: goodness (sattvam), passion (rajaḥ) and darkness (tamaḥ). When Pāṇḍaśikha tried to substantiate the origin of these feelings he was led to it in the described way, namely by assuming objective correspondence for them in the external world; then it appeared to him ready at hand to correlate them to the three corresponding groups of psychic states mentioned above. He, therefore assumed that goodness, passion and delusion or darkness dwelt in the things of the outer world as qualities. As these occurred to all things and could emerge everywhere, Pāṇḍaśikha came to see in them the qualities (gunaḥ) of the Ur-matter (prakṛtiḥ).
Pañcaśikha taught, therefore, that the Ur-matter (*prakṛtiḥ*) possesses the three qualities (*gunaḥ*), namely, goodness (*sattvam*), passion (*rajaḥ*), darkness (*kamaḥ*) which are the cause of the corresponding psychical impulses. These qualities exist simultaneously in the Ur-matter and originally hold themselves in equilibrium. So long as this is the case they are not perceptible. But as soon as the Ur-matter gets into movement for the beginning of creation, this equilibrium is disturbed. The qualities mix and connect themselves in different kinds. Now this quality predominates, now that. So comes about the origin of the manifoldness of things which all come forth out of the one Ur-matter.

With this theory of the Ur-matter and its three qualities Pañcaśikha had gained the starting-point for his Evolution Series. Simultaneously with it the greatest and the most important change was carried out as was considered necessary against the background of the prototype of the Evolution-Series in ‘The Question of Śuka.’ But the matter did not remain there only with one change. Changes proved necessary in the remaining members or limbs of the Series and those also in a great number. And that was so in the case of the first of these members of the series.

According to the teaching of the prototype (in ‘The Question of Śuka’), out of Brahma first arises the great Principle (*mahat tattvam*) or the great self (*mahān ātmā*) i.e. the soul and out of it the thinking (*manakāḥ*), as the central psychical organ. For Pañcaśikha such a course was impossible. Because for him, the whole Evolution-series lay in the sphere of Matter, while the Soul stood away and perfectly apart from it. Pañcaśikha could not allow the Soul to rise out of Matter but had to derive the highest psychical organ directly out of Matter. This he did. According to him out of Matter there arises as the first, the knowledge (*buddhiḥ*). The teaching of the type in ‘The Question of Śuka’ had influenced him so far that according to him, the designation, the great self (*mahān ātmā*) or simply the ‘great’ (*mahāt*) was carried over to the knowledge (*buddhiḥ*) which has been named so in the Sāmkhya ever since especially in places where the Evolution series is described.

The next member of the Evolution-Series, according to Pañcaśikha is, the ‘I’ consciousness (*aḥamkāraḥ*). That is a completely new creation to which he came thus: The recasting carried
out by him of the Śāmkhya extended also, as we shall see, to the theory of Deliverance. According to the Epic ground-form of the teaching, the entanglement in the cycle of birth is conditioned by the fact that that psychical processes occur in knowledge (Buddhiḥ) or in the sphere of Matter, that the soul believes them as erroneously referring to himself, that it is he who knows, feels and suffers. One of the most essential advances was that which he carried out in a sharper manner the separation between soul and matter than hitherto and that above all he drew rigorous inferences from the separateness and inactivity of the Ātmā. Pañcaśikha made the divorce between Soul and Matter sharper than hitherto. We could observe during the doctrine of the Ur-matter that the origin of Ur-matter is due to the fact that to the Pañcaśikha it appeared impossible to recognize, as creative Principle, the Ātmā which was by its nature inactive. In the case of I-consciousness, a similar thing happened. When all psychical processes are removed in the sphere of matter and are ascribed to the psychical organs, then the false ideas of I and mine could not be allowed as relating to the soul. The same must hold good also for all other ideas. There were two possibilities. Either to ascribe these ideas of I and mine to one of the given organs or to assume a new separate organ. As a matter of fact, views in this respect wavered. The old school of Patañjali ascribed these conceptions to knowledge (buddhiḥ). Pañcaśikha chose the other alternative. He assumed a separate organ called the I consciousness (ahamkāra). And that became and has remained the orthodox doctrine of the philosophical school.

Following the I consciousness, the next member of the Evolution-Series according to Pañcaśikha is the five Elements (mahābhūtāni). It also implies a deviation from the prototype wherein the Elements spring out of thinking (manah). Still this deviation or change is easy and understandable. In The Question of Śuka’ thinking (manah) is the central psychical organ. In the old Śāmkhya teaching, it preponderatingly came to be on the same scale with the sense-organs. It was, therefore, obvious to allow the elements not to rise out of it but out of the last final psychical organ—I consciousness—placed over all psychial organs. And that is what Pañcaśikha did.

But according to Pañcaśikha not only the Elements rise out
of the 'I' consciousness but the thinking (manāḥ) and the sense-organs also. These appear in 'The Question of Śūkha' in general, not in the Evolution series, but there they are formed out of the Elements. According to the Epic Ground-Text of the Śāmkhya of which we have spoken, they are produced out of the Elements. In this respect, however, there was a wavering of views in the Śāmkhya from old times. We already find in the Epic a text which, otherwise, no doubt stands completely on the soil of the old Śāmkhya theory treating the sense-organs on the same scale with the psychical organs.\(^{169}\)

It, otherwise, proves the influence also of that theory which allowed the sense-organs to arise out of the Ātmā. But in the Śāmkhya this was not possible; it, however, led to the theory which sought the origin of sense-organs in the psychical organ which was placed over all. Pañcaśīkha decided in favour of this view. But the fluctuation in view still remained further on and it is testified to us that according to the Tāntric school of Pañcādhikaraṇa, the sense-organs were derived out of the elements.\(^{170}\) The view of Pañcaśīkha prevailed and formed part of the theory of the philosophical school.

Thus the 'I' consciousness (aḥaṃkāraḥ) became the starting point of a double creation—on the one side, the source of the elements, on the other, of the sense-organs viz. of thinking (manāḥ), of the five sense-organs (budhīndriyāṇī) and the five organs of action (karmendriyāṇī). Now the question arose: How to explain the two different sorts of creations springing out of the same organ? Still the question was easily answered. Already in the doctrine of the Ur-matter we have heard that the rise of the manifold things out of one Ur-matter was thus explained. The three qualities which were assumed in the Ur-matter emerged in different combinations and mixtures and therethrough caused the difference or diversity in things. Now Pañcaśīkha fell back on the same explanation here also. In the 'I' consciousness, the three qualities of the Ur-matter are existent. When the goodness (sattvam) preponderates, embodying brightness, clarity and the faculty of knowledge, the group of the sense-organs arises out of it. When darkness (tamāḥ) which signifies heaviness and dullness predominates, there arise the five elements. The passion (rajaḥ) works as the driving quality in the case of both the products.
Now remains still the last member of the Evolution-Series of Pañcaśikha. According to his teaching, the five qualities of the Elements rise out of the Elements and form the objects of sense-organs. In contrast to the qualities of the Ur-matter, they are called particularities (vīṣeśāḥ). These qualities of the Elements are also mentioned in the prototype (in ‘The Question of Śuka’), though there they are not presented as a member of the Evolution-series. But that does not signify any essential difference.

Seen in its entirety, the Evolution Series of Pañcaśikha has the following pattern. Out of the Ur-matter, there arises first the knowledge (buddhiḥ) and out of the knowledge (buddhiḥ), the ‘I’ consciousness (ahamkāraḥ). This ‘I’ consciousness is the starting-point of a double creation. On the one side, it is the source of thinking (manah) and the ten sense-organs (indriyāni), namely the five senses of knowledge (buddhindriyāni) and the five organs of actions (karmendriyāni). On the other side, there spring out of it the five elements (mahābhūtāni). Finally, there arise out of the five elements their five qualities or particularities (vīṣeśāḥ).

With this theory, Pañcaśikha had created an equally valid counterpart of equal rank to the Evolution-Series in ‘The Question of Śuka’ and had at the same time enriched the Sāṃkhya system with important theoretical ideas. The importance of the Evolution Theory of Pañcaśikha is not exhausted with this. It plays a special role in the system in another respect. If we survey his evolution-theory as a whole, it shows its speciality as against its prototype in ‘The Question of Śuka’ in the fact, that all its members are differentiated from one another as separate entities (tattvāni) in their peculiarities. Homogeneous entities are brought together in groups. Above all the number of entities is numerically fixed in an exact manner. It has the following importance.

The Indian attempt for external (formal) systematization and numerical comprehension of things had led to the result that the philosophical schools endeavoured to compile the ideas in their theory in clear well-arranged enumerations. Thus, for example, the contemporary of the Buddha and the Jina—Kakuda Kātyāyana (P. Pakudha Kacāyana)—enumerates the seven masses (kāyāḥ) of which the whole existence is constituted viz. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Pleasure, Pain and the Souls (jīvāḥ). The Jaina have early summarized all things as masses of existence (asti-
kāyāḥ), P. Atthikāya) viz. souls (jīvāḥ), space (ākāśaḥ), movement (dharmaḥ), rest (adharmaḥ) and (material) stuff (pudgalāḥ). In this connection or context, is to be placed the theory of Pañcaśikha in which he puts forth the limbs of this Evolution-Theory in the form of a numerically fixed series of entities. Thus the Ur-matter and its creations make up the number of 24 principles into which finally the soul as the twenty-fifth makes its entry. In this row of 25 principles Pañcaśikha wished to summarize the total elements of existence, out of which the world is made. That explains the outstanding role which this series played in the Sāmkhya system formed by him, far beyond the doctrine of world-creation and world-destruction. In the Evolution-Series of Pañcaśikha are enclosed the essential contents of the Sāmkhya system; this communication of his evolution theory makes up the chief contents of the doctrinal exposition. On its knowledge depends finally the Deliverance. Therefore an old verse attributed to Pañcaśikha says: “He who knows the 25 principles, on whatever stage of life he may stay, whether his head is shorn of all hair, or whether it carries a braid or a tuft of hair—he attains Deliverance. There is no doubt about it.”

In the Sāmkhya-kārikā, the compendium of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, the authoritative presentation of the system in essentials ends with the enumeration and description of 25 principles.

With the shaping of the Evolution-Series, Pañcaśikha achieved a double performance for the Sāmkhya. He has introduced the Evolution-Series in the system. He has systematically summarized the theoretical contents of the Sāmkhya system and gave it the form which has remained so long as the system continued. The summarization of all elements of existence in a numerically fixed series excels in its sweep and precision all similar attempts hitherto made so much so that it appears rightly as the characteristic feature of the newly formed system. That is why the assumption is not to be rejected out of hand that the interpretation of the name Sāmkhya as a system consists rightly in the complete enumeration and that the system, therefore, gained its name when Pañcaśikha formulated anew the old doctrine and summarized thereby all the elements of existence and along with it the essential doctrinal contents of the system in its row of 25 principles.
Pañcaśīkha had, through the introduction of the Evolution-
theory, fixed in a considerable degree the form of the later
Sāṁkhya system and had impressed his stamp on it very strongly.
Still his influence on the formation of the system was not exhaus-
ted merely with the creation of the Evolution-Series. A further
characteristic feature owes its origin to him. We have already
said that according to the progress of his time, thinkers were not
satisfied with a mere formulation of a theory but occupied them-
selves with investigating and demonstrating more exactly its
practicability and with giving the account of how the phenomena
under consideration came into existence. Again they did not
merely inquire into the 'how', they also inquired into the 'why'
in order to prove it. One wished to understand wherethrough
the phenomena were called forth. It was also a characteristic
sign of this transition-period which confronts us, embodied with
such unusual clarity in Pañcaśīkha that one still was not able to
know the real cause of the character of things and therefore
seized upon the expedient of proving it through comparisons
and metaphors. Pañcaśīkha has used such metaphors in a great
number and among them some are very happy and are such as
have stamped themselves on our memory. As the ground lines of
the system drawn by him have endured in esteem, so also the
images created by him have asserted themselves and made up
one of the most original features which have determined the
picture of the system for all time.

One of the most important questions which thrust itself was
as follows: The sharp difference made by Pañcaśīkha between
the Ātmā and Matter brought some difficulties with it. The Ātmā
and Matter are perfectly heterogeneous things. The Matter is active
and efficient but unspiritual. The Ātmā is knowing but impotent
and powerless. Still the entire course of the world depends on the
cooperation of both. Bondage and Deliverance occur exclusively
in the sphere of matter. Still the Ātmā is affected, perplexed by
it. How is it possible? How can the unspiritual Matter work
aimfully with a fixed plan for the Ātmā? How can the inactive
Ātmā take part in this working?

These difficulties could not remain concealed before so
consistent a thinker as Pañcaśīkha. He offered a solution in the
form of the following happy metaphor. The Ātmā and the Matter
resemble a lame man and a blind one respectively. Apart, isolated from each other they cannot achieve anything; the lame man, because he cannot move; the blind man, because he cannot direct his activity aimfully. But the blind man takes the lame one on his shoulders and both come to their goal in happy cooperation. Similarly the inactive soul and the unspiritual matter unite themselves for the joint work and thus reach their goal.125

Such and similar metaphors have been employed by Pañcaśikha in a very large number, in order to elucidate and prove his theory. One of these metaphors must be specially mentioned which proved a view which has definitely attained lasting esteem, and has influenced the shaping of the doctrinal kernel of later religious schools. It was important to explain the cooperation of the Soul and Matter as it occurred, through the simile of the lame man and the blind man. Still more important it was to prove and make intelligible the original character and conduct of these two Basic Principles. Again Pañcaśikha did it through a metaphor. He placed the Soul and the Matter opposite to each other as Man and Wife and derived their heterogeneity out of their oppositeness. The Matter is the Ur-mother and is therefore a perpetually bearing (birthgiving) and creative principle. The Ātmā is the Man—the husband; his character is, therefore, to view, to consider and to know. Pañcaśikha gave these views a linguistic expression. The word which he chose for the Matter—prakṛtīḥ—was known to be feminine and could be understood as the female producer. It was, however, quite different with the customary designation for the Soul, the word Ātmā. The manly character was not correspondingly expressed in it. Pañcaśikha, therefore, replaced it by another word, which in older times signified the mannikin, which has played a role in the theories of primitive men but had not indeed gained any importance hitherto in the philosophical schools—by the word puruṣāḥ—the man. This word became in the Śāmkhya system a regular designation for the soul.

With this Pañcaśikha not only found an effective metaphor. What is more important is that out of these images fixed ideas were formed which stamped themselves ever on memory and thought. Thus in India the Knowing Principle has always been regarded as male, whereas the creative principle as female. With it is established a connection with the last end of development,
viz. that in the religious systems of the later period, the godly spirit is thought as male, his creative force is considered as female and the unity of this godly pair forms the God-head.

Lastly a few words about the Deliverance-doctrine of Pañcaśikha. The sharper separation carried out by him between Soul and Matter gave a fillip to further formulations. As already said, during the description of the Epic ground-form of the doctrine, the entanglement of the soul in the metampsychosis is explained by the fact that the Soul refers to himself the states (bhāvāḥ) of knowledge (buddhiḥ) which, in truth, belong to the sphere of matter, believes himself to be one with them, experiences joy and gloom and thus deludes himself as entangled in the sorrow of existence. And we have shown how Pañcaśikha consistently ascribed the false ideas of ‘I’ and ‘mine’, as well as all the remaining processes of knowledge, to the psychical organs i.e. to the sphere of matter and for that he assumed a separate psychical organ the ‘I-consciousness’. That led, when logically thought out, to the inference that all processes, which tend towards bondage and Deliverance, occurs exclusively in the sphere of matter. Pañcaśikha did not fight shy of drawing further sharper conclusions and of frankly explaining that it is merely Matter in operation which binds and delivers itself and only awakens the pretext of entanglement and Release. With it again, a question arose ; what drives the Matter to this business which occurs only for the Soul and from which she herself does not gain anything and what induces her to interrupt her action for the sake of Deliverance? And again, Pañcaśikha gave the reply through a comparison and a metaphor in which he employed the interpretation of Soul and Matter as man and woman. The matter resembles an actress who shows herself on the stage to the spectators and is active for others who see her play but themselves remain inactive. And as a lady from a good family hides herself bashfully when she is surprised and discovered and looked on by strangers, so the Matter also withdraws herself when her play is seen through by the Soul and shows herself no more before his view. 176

With this we close the description of the recasting which the Sāṅkhya system underwent in connection with the introduction of the Evolution-Theory. As we have advanced our view in the beginning, it is the most incisive or thorough-going change
which the system under-went in the course of its development. It was not merely the Evolution-Theory that was introduced but also through strong differentiation between Soul and Matter the later dualism of the System was established. New ideas were also created which changed the picture of the theory basically, above all, the idea of the Ur-matter (*prakṛtiḥ*) and its three qualities (*guṇāḥ*). What was decisive for the course of further development was the fact that through the formulation of the Series of 25 Principles (*tattvāni*) the real theoretical contents of the system were summarized in an authoritative form. On account of this the most important doctrinal statements of the system were firmly fixed and in spite of certain later additions and adjustments and supplementations in isolated points, anything in the basic lines was no more changed. Thus out of a doctrine which was continually in a fluid state, a fixed solid system came forth. We can therefore, look upon this recasting, by Pañcaśikha, of the old theore as the birth-hour of the proper Sāṃkhya system.

It would be a profitable task to show how the Sāṃkhya system created by Pañcaśikha gradually further developed, how on the edifice erected by him, stone on stone was laid until finally the classical system was perfected. But the state of research for the time being does not suffice for that purpose. Any such detailed description would be beyond the scope of the present work. We must therefore restrict ourselves to describing the most important changes which the future brought and we shall therefore go over to presentation of the classical system in its fully developed form.

**The System of Sixty Doctrinal Ideas:** The most important under these changes is the introduction of 50 ideas (*pratyayāḥ*). They ushered in a progress of a basic kind in the sphere of the psychology of the system. The representatives of the Sāṃkhya system themselves attributed special importance to it. This is expressed by the fact that the occasion for the introduction of this doctrine served also for the undertaking of the new arrangement of the doctrinal contents of the system. It occurred in the following way: The most important doctrinal points were put together as the ten basic doctrines (*mālikārthāḥ*) and these were combined with the mentioned 50 ideas (*pratyayāḥ*) and accordingly the thus newly arranged system was designated as the
system of 60 doctrinal ideas, as the \textit{Saṣṭitantra}. This system of 60 doctrinal ideas appears according to the tradition firmly associated with a particular school of the Sāmkhya, namely, the school of Vārṣagaṇa or Vārṣagaṇya. Just as for the sake of simplicity we have used the working hypothesis that the introduction of the Evolution-Doctrine be signified as the work of Pañcaśikha, we shall, without anticipating any final solution of the question, ascribe the erection of the system of the 60 doctrinal ideas to the head of the school—Vṛṣagaṇa.\textsuperscript{177}

Indeed, this recasting of the doctrinal contents of the system had no telling effect like the basic new formulations of Pañcaśikha. While everything that is named as Sāmkhya after Pañcaśikha is built on the edifice erected by him, the system of 60 doctrinal ideas has penetrated it through the philosophical school of the Sāmkhya in a strict sense, and that is, namely, through the school of Vṛṣagaṇa. The system of 60 doctrinal ideas has not crowded out or replaced the old arrangement of the material made by Pañcaśikha, but it is only introduced or added as supplementary. Thus in the \textit{Sāmkhyakārikā} of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, the classical treatise of the system, the principal doctrines and psychology are grounded on the system of the 60 doctrinal ideas, the \textit{Saṣṭitantra}, while the remaining handling of the theory, of the arrangement of the material follows Pañcaśikha.

The real novelty which the \textit{Saṣṭitantra} contains is constituted as we have already said, by the introduction of fifty ideas (pratyayāḥ). But before we turn towards them, it is better to cast, in short, a glance at the ten ground-doctrines (mūlikārthāḥ). Because these show well in what circumstances the system found itself, when the fifty ideas came up, what changes the system had undergone since Pañcaśikha and whereon the principal emphasis was laid. These ten ground doctrines are enumerated in an old verse as follows:\textsuperscript{178}

\begin{quote}
"The existence, unity, further fixity in aim, serving for other aims, the separateness and the inactivity, the connection, the disconnection, the numerous souls and the further enduring continuance of the body"\textsuperscript{*}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{*} \textit{astitvom ekatvom athisrto atisrto}
\textit{pārāśrito anvacho akartṛtā akartṛtā ca}
\textit{yogoyogoya bahavaḥ puṁsaḥ}
\textit{sthitīḥ sarīrasya ca ṣeṣavṛtīḥ.}
Old clarifications on this verse are missing. We have nothing else than mere catchwords. But much can be gathered from this verse. With this aim in view, we shall consider first of all these doctrines individually.

In the first place, the existence of Ur-matter is taught and for good reasons. Then Ur-matter was a new idea peculiar to the Sāmkhya, which was rejected by other systems and which therefore required to be defended and specially proved. Then follow the further definitions of Ur-matter. First of all it is one, it is a unity, which was required to be emphasised in contrast to the plurality of souls which latter, as we shall see, had been taken over as a new theory in the system. The next is the fixity of aim of the Ur-matter. By that what is meant is: it underlies as the basis of the law of causality and every causal occurrence takes place in it. Next it is taught that all workings of Ur-matter serve the ends of another—the interest of the soul. Then follow the qualities or properties of the soul. Of the soul it is said that it is different from and entirely of a different kind from Ur-matter. Then the soul's inactivity is emphasised. Then what is especially important, namely the plurality of soul is taught. Then the next principle is the binding of the soul with Ur-matter on which depends its entanglement in the cycle of births. Then along with it is dealt with its separation i.e. the Deliverance. Then finally the series is concluded by the further continuance of the body—which means that after the attainment of absolution, the body of the released one further continues to remain until the end of the concerned existence, with which the cycle of being finds first its final conclusion.

Thus seen, the ten ground-doctrines contain nothing special and nothing much new. The new, however, is the problem last touched in the doctrine, namely, how the existence of one, who has attained liberating knowledge, still continues. But it only handles an interesting individual question. But particularly and effectively important is only one new thing viz, the plurality of souls. How this new idea came about, is at present withdrawn from our knowledge. Probably, the stimulus to that came from other theories. The Vaiśeṣika had become a system at that time. According to its theory after the manner of natural philosophy, it accepted a plurality of souls. Between the systems with their doctrinal
edifices, there must have ensued a fundamental discussion much more lively than that in early times. The attacks of the opponents must have followed energetically and their own respective doctrines were sought to be proved much more thoroughly. And often one could not withdraw from the force of the opponent's argument. So we shall be able to ascertain in the Vaiṣeṣika many influences of the stream of development to which the Sāṃkhya belonged, and vice versa, the influence of the Vaiṣeṣika on the Sāṃkhya is naturally considerable. The possibility cannot, therefore, be excluded that this important change in the soul-doctrine ensued under the influence of the Vaiṣeṣika. As a matter of fact, at any rate, the classical system of the Sāṃkhya proves the plurality of the souls in the same manner as the Vaiṣeṣika. For the Sāṃkhya this change was not without its difficulties. The unity (being one) of the Ātmā had deeply imprinted itself on the ideas—especially that of the juxta-position of soul and Matter as man and woman. This opposition was disturbed through the assumption of the plurality of souls. The echo of the scruple which it raised appears in the theory of Paurika who assumed that there was the plurality of Ur-matter corresponding to that of the souls and that every soul had standing opposite to him his own Ur-matter. Still everything remains shadowy. And we can only ascertain and find the final result of the development in the classical Sāṃkhya system which teaches the plurality of souls but only the unity of Ur-matter.

Important as this new change is in the soul-doctrine, it does not alter the fact that the ten basic doctrines (mālikarthaḥ) contain nothing new. Still we can recognize in them an important further development of the Sāṃkhya teaching. The development consists not in the creation of new ideas but shows which ideas are assumed under the ten basic doctrines and in which sense. It is, therefore, striking that the great number of principles (tattvaṁ), which Pañcaśikha taught, entirely receded into the background. In place of the numerous material principles which are contained in his Evolution-Series, there appears here only their original Cause (Ur-ground)—the Ur-matter. There remain, consequently, two ground-principles—Soul and Matter on which the whole interest is centred. And the greatest part of the ten basic doctrines serves the aim, namely, of defining both these ground—
principles through ascertaining their qualities in their peculiarities, and of delimiting them in their difference from one another and juxtaposing them against each other. The whole course of the world is repeatedly derived only as out of the interplay of both these ground-principles. And out of their working together, come bondage and Deliverance, which is what is taught in the last of the ten basic doctrines and at which the whole compilation aims—

On the ground of the ten basic doctrines, as the real features of the Sāṃkhya, we can designate them as a basic reformulation of the fundamentals of the system, at the time of Vṛṣaṅgara. The fundamental principles Soul and Matter form the centre of interest and were sharply elaborated. But at the final point everything is directed to the aim of Deliverance and is pressed into its service.

Now we shall turn to the fifty ideas (pratyayāḥ) which, as we have already remarked, take the largest space in the system of sixty doctrinal ideas and are the most important of what has been added to the Sāṃkhya handed down so far. The introduction of these fifty ideas signified a real progress for the psychology of the system and placed it on a completely new basis. Still that was not the aim which its introduction originally served. Mere theoretical knowledge was, in old times, rarely the aim for which the thinkers in their research strove. They were rather the practical aims which they placed before them. The theoretical knowledge came in that connection almost unsought and it was often by a detour or a roundabout way that it was obtained. Chemistry in Europe thus rose out of the gold-seeking of the Alchemists. Similarly Psychology in India developed in connection with the Theory of Deliverance. That occurred in the following way:

Among the lively thinkers of those religiously stirring times a living interest was evinced for the details of the way of Deliverance and its process and for understanding the psychical factors which lead to deliverance. Thinkers, then, inquired into psychical processes and qualities, into virtues and vices which promote or hinder Deliverance, enumerated them, ascertained their effect and importance, arranged them in a scale and taught how they are to be practised or fought, in order to reach gradually the goal of Deliverance. Especially such considerations have
again a special interest for monks and ascetics and we shall find later in Buddhism especially striking and instructive examples of such a development. Such thought-processes lead deep into psychological questions and much theoretical knowledge was gained as a result of it. Finally, especially on a stimulus from the philosophical side, this knowledge was rounded into a regular psycho-logical system. This is the way in which the Śāṁkhyā developed. The introduction of the fifty ideas was, no doubt, the first step on the way.

As a matter of fact, the fifty ideas (pratyayāḥ) represent, in essence, the psychical processes and qualities which are of importance for the way of Deliverance. They are summarized in four groups which are named as ignorance (avidyā), error (viparyayāḥ), incapability (asaktih), satisfaction or complacency (tusṭīḥ) and perfection (siddhiḥ). The nature of these four groups is elucidated by the following story:¹⁸⁰

A Brāhmaṇa travelled with his four pupils along a street. One of the pupils saw in the twilight a suspicious object but was not able to differentiate whether it was a robber that was about to waylay him or a mere post standing on the way. He drew his master's attention to it. The master charged his second pupil to ascertain what the object was. He ventured but not near enough and explained that he was not able to see clearly. Now the Brāhmaṇa turned to the next pupil who then replied: “Master, what worth is it? Tomorrow comes here a great caravan whom we can join.” Only the last pupil rushed resolutely towards the object. There he saw forest-plants hanging down, and birds settled down upon that object. He came back and reported—“Master, it is only a treetrunk.” Of these four pupils, the first embodied ‘ignorance’. The second who did not move near and did not come to any resolution, embodied ‘incapability’. The third, who without any further attempt, remained satisfied and did not strive for clarity, embodied ‘satisfaction’ or ‘complacency’. The fourth, finally, who accomplished the decision, embodied ‘perfection’.

Every one of these groups falls into many sub-varieties. Ignorance is five-fold, incapability is 28 fold, complacency is nine-fold and perfection eight-fold. The explanations of these sub-varieties are fluctuating, as the origin of these theories is several
centuries before the composition of the sources preserved for us. Still the variations are not of such a sort that fundamental importance attaches to them. The character of the doctrine is, in every case, clearly expressed whether this or that explanation is sought.\textsuperscript{183}

For the five kinds of ignorance (avidyā), the following explanation is given: The first kind is when matter is considered higher than the soul. It is called dullness (tamaḥ). The second depends on the fact that one considers the body and the organs as the ‘I’. It is named delusion (mohaḥ). The things of the outer world are considered to be one’s belongings. This variety is called ‘the great delusion’ (mahāmohaḥ). The anger (krodhaḥ) is considered as the fourth variety and is named as ‘darkness’ (tāmi-sraḥ). The fifth variety finally is the fear of death (maranavipādaḥ) and carries the designation of ‘blind darkness’ (andhatāmīsraḥ).

The 28 fold incapability (ātaktiḥ) consists of eleven destructions or disabilities of the sense-organs (indriyavadhāḥ) and seventeen destructions or disabilities of knowledge (buddhivadhāḥ). In the eleven disabilities of the sense-organs, every time one sense of knowledge or organ of action or the thinking (manaḥ) is disabled. Its consequence is, for example, blindness, or lameness or madness. The seventeen disabilities of knowledge represent the contrast to the nine sorts of satisfaction and the eight kinds of perfection.

Among the nine varieties of satisfaction (tusṭiḥ) are four which concern the ‘I’ (ādhyātmikyaḥ) (concerning the ‘I’) in which one rests content with finding the highest entity in other principles instead of the soul. Thus one sees the highest entity in the Ur-matter (prakṛtiḥ), the second in the basic material (upādānam) of different things which means the elements, the next sees the highest entity in time (kālaḥ) and the last finally in fate or destiny (bhāgyam). The remaining five concern the outer world (bāhyāḥ). Their nature consists therein that one turns away from the objects of the external world, but not because he has found the highest knowledge. In them one is satisfied with lower motives. Firstly, there is the knowledge of toilsomeness with which the acquisition of the worldly goods is connected. Secondly, one has to deal with the difficulty to guard or preserve them. Thirdly, there is the insight into their perishableness. Fourthly, there
follows the knowledge that desires are not satisfied with enjoyment but that, on the other hand, they grow. The fifth and the last is enunciated as the insight that the acquisition and enjoyment of external goods are necessarily connected with injury to other creatures and therefore bring harm with them. Of the living eight perfections (siddhayāḥ), the first is contemplation (āhaḥ). This occurs when one without outside help gets knowledge through his own contemplation. The second is communication (sabdaḥ). Through it the knowledge is communicated by a teacher. In the third place stands the study (adhya-yānam) i.e. the acquisition of knowledge through the study of holy scriptures. The three next perfections consist in the defence against the threefold sorrow—the inner (ādhyātmikam) sorrow which is caused by sickness, the earthly or the material sorrow (ādhibhautikam) caused by men, animals and the objects in the surroundings and the sorrow due to the supernatural agencies (ādhidaivikam) which is caused by heat, cold, wind, rain, etc. After the defence against the sorrows, the knowledge is gained through one of the three first perfections. During the seventh perfection, the knowledge is gained through communication with a well-wishing friend (suhrtpraṭiḥ). The eighth perfection is accomplished with the help of gifts (dānam).

If we survey the group of 50 ideas, they themselves contain little that is of importance to psychology. Still the compilation is important as it gives subjects and tasks for further consideration. We shall, further, know many more examples in which, in the beginning of development, there were enumerations which give the impression of coarseness or randomness but which, when further thought out through probing and simplification and supplementation, advanced into valuable results. An important thought emerges early in connection with the compilation of the fifty ideas. It is as follows:

Such questions as—wherein the contained psychological processes consist, and whereon they depend—were raised. Above all, the question with regard to the first three perfections was raised: what is proper knowledge? How does it come into being? Thus a new important problem emerges. The formulation of the theory of fifty ideas falls quite in old times and therefore the answer given to the questions must be ancient. We have
already similarly seen that when Pañcaśikha created the theory of the Ur-matter and its three qualities, thinkers were not still able to distinguish the qualities from the substances as separate categories of existence and therefore the qualities were understood involuntarily as something material. Similar is the case here. The knowledge (buddhiḥ) was considered as Matter which fills the organs. This view was particularly stamped on the minds of the thinkers of the school of Pañcādhikaraṇa. This school compared the organs with empty river-courses into which the matter of knowledge (buddhiḥ) streamed in. From where did this knowledge-matter come? The next reply was: Out of the Ur-matter. This Ur-matter was present everywhere in its fine invisible form and ready every time to take a new shape for the origin of new things. It streams as knowledge into the organs. This view is strongly and firmly formulated by the School of Pañcādhikaraṇa and carried out most thoroughly. But besides there was also another conception which emerged. It is not necessary that new matter should always continually flow out of Ur-matter (prakṛtiḥ). The remodelled matter present in the organs is sufficient already to explain the change in psychical conditions. This depends on the alternation of qualities in the Ur-matter. When goodness (sattva) predominates in the shape of clarity (prakāśaḥ), knowledge sets in. When darkness (tama) preponderates, which in this role is designated as impurity (āsuddhiḥ), then ignorance and the remaining varieties of incapability (āsaktiḥ) come in. This view was generalized by the school of Patañjali. The school of Vṛṣagaṇa chose the middle way. According to him, only in sporadic cases, direct knowledge is traced back to the streaming-in of Ur-matter while the main mass of psychical processes depends on the remodelled Matter. This is the most important idea which was developed in connection with the theory of 50 ideas. We must mention the peculiarity of this doctrine which was characteristic of it at the time of Vṛṣagaṇa. We have already mentioned that the Sāmkhya, strictly speaking, in the beginning was connected with circles in which the religious theories were handed down and fostered and the Sāmkhya exercised its influence on them. Reverse also was the case that the Sāmkhya was influenced by them, as is palply evident from the school of Vṛṣagaṇa. A peculiarity which stamps itself on the religious sects is that their
views are clothed in mysterious and strange words and consequently a peculiar terminology is developed. In the school of Vṛṣagāna we come across such a sectarian terminology. In the group of ignorance, we have cited the names which are given to the five kinds of ignorance, ‘dullness’, ‘delusion’, ‘darkness’, etc. Similar and still more remarkable names appear in the case of the remaining groups. Thus the four kinds of satisfaction are called ‘flood’, ‘water’, ‘billow’ and ‘rain’. Equally remarkable like these names are the explanations given of them. The first satisfaction is called ‘flood’ (ambhati) because in it, the endless (amita) Ur-matter appears (bhāti) as the basic material of the world. The second satisfaction is called ‘water’ (salilam) because it directs itself on the basic material of things and the world enters or is dissolved (liyate) in this existent one (sati). Of similar kind are the explanations which are given for the remaining names. We find also similar names and interpretations in the case of the remaining ‘satisfactions’, as also in the case of the ‘perfections’. Not only in giving names is seen the influence of the religious sects; it also makes itself noticeable in the manner in which the stuff is introduced and shaped. Religious sects present their theories not in the abstract objective form like the philosophical schools. They would rather like to clothe them in the form of stories and they especially give them a drapery of myths. Such myths are of a different kind from the myths of old times. In them the myth was the usual form of religious thought and may be perhaps designated at least as a sectarian myth-making. The influence of such a myth-making kind shows itself in many parts of the Sāṃkhya theory of the old school of Vṛṣagāna. The theory of fifty ideas provides a good example in that respect. In the old tradition the origin of the fifty ideas traces itself back to the Creator God Brahmā who creates them in the beginning of the world-period and fifty ideas appear as divinities and sons of Brahmā. It is said: 182 ‘As bodies and organs of the gods embodied in exaltedness (māhātmyasārīrāḥ) were created, he saw himself alone and thought: ‘Well, I will create sons who will do my work and shall know me as higher and lower.’ While he thought thus, fifteen gods rose out of the main stream (mukhyasrotāḥ). When these were created, Brahmā, however, felt no satisfaction. Thereupon other 28 gods rose out of the cross-stream (tiryakṣrotoḥ). But still his mind could not
remain still. Therefore rose further nine gods out of the upward stream (ūrdhvasrotah). When these were produced, he still did not hold that his aim was reached. Therefore there further arose eight out of the downward stream (avāksrotah). Because this creation rose through the thought (abhidyānam) of Brahmā, it is called the Creation of Ideas (pratyayasargaḥ).” According to this description, there arise, therefore, the four groups in which the fifty ideas are divided, because they stream forth from God Brahmā. Thus the fivefold ignorance forms the main stream, the 28-fold incapability the cross-stream, the ninefold satisfaction the upward-stream, and the eightfold perfection the downstream.

And now a few words about the working of these groups. The four groups into which the fifty ideas are divided are further classified in the spheres of the living world. The fivefold ignorance of ‘the mainstream’ fills the plant-world, the 28-fold incapability of ‘the cross-stream’ the animal world, ninefold satisfaction of ‘the upward-stream’ the world of gods and the eight-fold perfection of ‘the downward stream’ the world of men. That the eight perfections as the highest do not form ‘the upward stream, but ‘the downward-stream’ and that the nine satisfactions formed ‘the upward stream’ has the following reasons: It can be conceived that ‘the upward-stream’ belongs to the world of gods. According to a widespread Indian view, the world of gods is not, however, the stage from which the deliverance can be attained at the earliest but it is the human world in which it can be attained. The world of gods signifies for the Deliverance-seeker a sideway, a blind alley, to which the excess of earthly merit leads, which may well yield perishable heavenly happiness but which does not bring Deliverance nearer. So characteristically the nine satisfactions are allotted to the world of gods and are equated with ‘the upward stream’. Because they imply that man may rest content with a lower goal and may neglect the higher ones, the perfections which lead to Deliverance belong to the world of men and represent ‘the downward stream.’

The four streams in no way preponderate exclusively in the worlds concerned. Even counterforces assert themselves, above all, in the world of men. The perfection is, no doubt, every time ready to flow out of the Ur-matter. But ignorance, incapability and satisfaction hinder it. Reversely, the perfection
works against the remaining streams, through right knowledge against ignorance, through the knowledge of the soul, which stands above Matter and all its modifications against the satisfaction. In this counterplay of the four streams, the man who aspires after deliverance must consciously interfere. He shall cultivate the perfections to work against ignorance, incapability and the satisfaction. Such is the importance which is attached to the fifty ideas for the way of Deliverance. Simultaneously, that is also the ground why the fifty ideas are incorporated in the system of sixty doctrinal ideas and that is why they take so large a space in it.

We have concluded our description of the development-stage of the Sāmkhya such as is embodied in the system of sixty doctrinal ideas (śāstītantra). The characteristics of the sixty ideas of which we have spoken are as follows: (i) a sharp elaboration of the fundamental and essential principles on a theoretical plane through the ten basic principles (mūlikārthāḥ) : (ii) Besides, a characteristically stamped emergence of the goal of Deliverance and an extensive treatment of the details of the theory and the ways of Deliverance as explained in the doctrine of fifty ideas.

But the thorough-going preoccupation with the details of the way of Deliverance does not, however, restrict itself to the formulation of the system of sixty doctrinal ideas and of the theory of fifty ideas. It developed also another similarly disposed complex of conceptions which partly belong to the same stage of development as the fifty ideas (pratyayah) and partly represent a later continuation of same thought-direction. With their peculiar formulations, they have added characteristic features to the picture of the then Sāmkhya system. Of these, we shall deal in short with at least the two most important theories viz. the Theory of the Five Bodily Winds (pañcā vāyavah) and the Theory of Five-fold Action (pañcā karmayonayāḥ).

The Five Corporeal Winds: Already in the philosophy of the Veda we have pointed out that we meet with the very old idea in the Veda of several Breath-forces which operate in the human body. They are out-breath (prāṇaḥ), in-breath (apāṇaḥ), the up-breath (udānaḥ), total breath (samānaḥ) and through-breath (vyānaḥ). These ideas had not greater importance at first. But as, during
the course of time, the philosophical schools widened their scope of interest and included in their sphere of research physiological questions, these ideas of breaths were again seized upon and built into the several systems. The bodily functions were restricted to these breath-forces, asor one now named them, they were traced to the corporeal winds (vāyavaḥ) and were thus explained. The basic view which occasioned the distribution of different functions among the several corporeal winds was that the out-breath (prāṇaḥ) drives forward, that the in-breath (apāṇaḥ) which was now understood as breath-away, drives downwards, that the total breath causes the holding together and the through-breath (udāṇaḥ) implies general penetration of the forces in the body and firm union or connection. The Sāmkhya also follows in this respect the general development and we shall see later in the systematic review of the doctrines of the classical system, how far their physiological views are determined by the idea of the five corporeal winds. But the idea did not remain stationary here. We have already emphasized that the development of the great part of the Sāmkhya system falls in its large measure in right old times and that in that period, man was not able to understand clearly all phenomena in their nature and that he was inclined to join or unite different things with one another on the ground of external similarities. The same process also worked in the case of the five corporeal winds. People were not satisfied with merely tracing the bodily functions to the corporeal winds but they also ascribed to them efficacy. All driving or attempting forward, all inclination towards the things of the world was derived from outbreath (prāṇaḥ), as also the inclination towards righteousness and justice, the attempt towards knowledge etc. In the breath-away (apāṇaḥ), were traced the sources of aversion and resistance. Haughtiness and pride were traced to up-breath (udāṇaḥ). The total breath (samāṇaḥ) was looked upon as the cause of joy in being together, the through-breath (svāṇaḥ) was considered as the cause of a specially firm binding, e.g. the fidelity which induces the wife to follow her dead husband on the funeral pyre. These workings of the corporeal winds were looked upon as the external effects while different functions in the body were placed against them as the inner effects.

It was exhorted that the external operations of the corporeal
winds played an important role on the way to Deliverance. It was said that one was to direct, towards righteousness, the inclination brought about through ‘out-breath’ (prāna) and direct the aversion brought about by breath-away (apāna), towards unrighteousness. Thus would goodness (sattvam) grow, darkness (tamaḥ) would be reduced and the knowledge (buddhiḥ) would develop into higher and higher forms. Similarly one was to avoid haughtiness brought forth by ‘up-breath’ (udānāḥ) and seek to capture goodness (sattvam) in himself, by means of ‘total-breath’ (samānāḥ) and should foster a knitting together of forces brought forth by ‘through-breath’ (vyāna) in respect of right knowledge. Then “in the case of the wise man who rightly enforces in his practices the operations of the corporeal winds, the pollutions or stains decrease and he reaches the lasting, imperishable place or the imperishable world.”

The Five-fold Womb of Actions: Less orginal is the theory of the five-fold womb of actions (pañca karmayonyayāḥ). Under these, one understands the five psychical qualities, namely, steadiness (dhrīḥ), belief (sradhāḥ), delight (sukham), the will to know (vividisā), and the lack of will to know (avividisā). The following definitions are given of these qualities. Steadiness is firmly clinging to a resolution; belief lies in the fact when a man is of the conviction that the acts taught in the holy scriptures must be unconditionally carried out, without thinking of any reward for it; delight is the inclination of the mind (buddhiḥ) which is called forth by the wish for any earthly or heavenly reward. The wish to know or wish for knowledge is the striving after knowledge and shall direct itself on the different subjects of the doctrine. The will not to know is the lack of any such attempt and is compared with the condition of stupor or sleep. Besides these definitions, there is also given the sphere on which these qualities extend themselves. The steadiness, no doubt, extends to everything, the belief in the different stages of life (āśravāḥ), the delight in earthly and heavenly rewards, the will to know the sphere of the manifest (vyaktam), the lack of will to know the sphere of the unmanifest (avyaktam). Finally it is taught, in which relation these qualities stand with the three qualities (gunāḥ) of Ur-matter. In the quality of steadiness the qualities of passion and darkness (of the Ur-matter) predo-
minate, in the belief the goodness and passion, in the delight
goodness and darkness, in the will to know passion, in the lack of
will to know, darkness. Thus everything important in this con-
nection is explained. Because, “he who knows, from the sign of the
fivefold womb of actions, the sphere of and the relation to the
qualities of Ur-matter, is to be considered as the bull (the best)
among the ascetics.” Of these five qualities, the first four should
be practised and cultivated as the germ of rectitude and of know-
ledge; one should manifest ignorance against all things which
bring unwished-for fruit. When one does it, one will not sink any
more downwards in the cycle of being but will ascend from one
step to another, until one attains the highest knowledge.

All this, philosophically seen, is frankly unimportant, The
bigger frame which distinguishes the doctrine of fifty ideas is
missing in it and it is not distinguished by any valuable ideas.
But it shows a typical example of how, in India, different
schools and sects had a predilection for spinning out the theories
of Deliverance. They seized on a group of qualities—be they
virtues or vices, defined them, arranged them in columns, classi-
ﬁed them from different points of view, suggested how they
operate during the process of Deliverance and did not neglect to
emphasize the importance of such knowledge with solemn
words. Unimportant in general as these theories are, they appear
important to the adherents of the sects concerned. We meet with
such similar phenomena again and again in different periods and
different schools. The described theory of the ﬁve-fold womb of
works may serve as an instance of a similar development in the
Sāmkhya. While we are on this topic, it is still to be mentioned
that in connection with these thoughts about the formulation of
the ways of Deliverance, there are also other considerations
made about the nature of Bondage and Deliverance. According
to an old Sāmkhya theory, there is three-fold Bondage—(i)
through the Ur-matter (prakṛti-bandhaḥ), (ii) through remodel-
lings or changes (vaikārikabandhaḥ), (iii) through sacrificial gifts
(dakṣiṇā-bandhaḥ). Similarly there is a threefold Deliverance
through knowledge, through the vanishing of desire and through
cessation of religious deeds (kṣetra-kṣayaḥ). It is evidently to be
understood in the following way. According to a widespread
view shared also by the Sāmkhya, pious actions do not lead to
Deliverance but bear heavenly rewards and bring a new bondage and lead like the bad actions to the entanglement in the cycle of transmigration. This bondage, according to some pious works which are especially regarded as full of merit, is the bondage of sacrificial rewards to the Brahmanical priests and is called the bondage through sacrificial rewards and is eliminated through the omission of religious works. A second bondage is conditioned by desire. It directs itself on the phenomenal world, that is, the transformation of the Ur-matter and can be snapped through the removal of passions. But according to the Sāṃkhya theory, the repeal of passion does not lead to Deliverance; through it one merely attains a temporary deliverance from the cycle of births; because he enters the Ur-matter only to set out again on the painful wanderings of transmigration on the inauguration of the next creation. So for him who is freed from all desires, this third kind of bondage by Ur-matter, still remains and it can be eliminated only by the releasing knowledge.

This theory of the three-fold Bondage and Deliverance traces itself evidently to outside influence. As we shall see in the description of the Vaiṣeṣika, the ideas about the cause of the entanglement in the cycle of births underwent important changes in course of time. Finally three such causes were accepted viz. ignorance, passion and action (karma). This number three was also taken over by the Sāṃkhya. No doubt it occurred under the influence of sectarian direction to which is also attributed the described formulation of the way of Deliverance, as the numerical fixing and the peculiar terminology suggest. But while other schools and systems, in which the idea of the three causes of Bondage had developed, understood how to unite them with one another, the Sāṃkhya was already too firmly fixed in its views to be able to implement such a union. Therefore all the three were abruptly placed near one another. So it came about that this theory could not take firm roots and could not maintain its ground. There was soon a return to the old inherited Sāṃkhya theory that the entanglement in the cycle of being depended only on ignorance. The scientific direction of the thorough-going Sāṃkhya, which gave its last classical stamp to the system, knew only this view.

This is sufficient to communicate an adequate picture of
the formulation which the Deliverance doctrine of the Sāmkhya underwent on the occasion of the formation of the system of the sixty doctrinal ideas in conjunction therewith. With it we can bring to end our description of this development-stage of the system. At the same time, we have also almost reached the end of the developmental history of the Sāmkhya. Because the system of sixty doctrinal ideas represents the last recasting which embraced the whole system and sought to give it a new stamp in its basic features. Since then changes or supplements were made where necessary only in single isolated points of the system. Still, of these changes, many are important and worth consideration. At least two of them we shall have to describe in this connection. They are (i) the conditions (bhāvāḥ) of knowledge (buddhiḥ) and (ii) the theory of the pure stuff or matter (tattvātrāṇi).

The Eight Conditions of Knowledge: We begin with the doctrine of the conditions (bhāvāḥ) of knowledge (buddhiḥ). The theory of the conditions of knowledge as found represented in the Sāmkhyakārikā, is of a similar kind and is described side by side with the theory of the fifty ideas. It is, therefore, necessary to clearly present its importance and its relation to the theory of the fifty ideas. With this aim, we shall first bring before our eyes its basic features, which will be somewhat as follows:

There are eight conditions or manifestations of knowledge or cognition (buddhiḥ): (1) merit (dharmaḥ) (2) guilt (adharmaḥ) (3) knowledge (jñānam) (4) ignorance (ajñānam) (5) passionlessness (virāgaḥ) and (6) passion (rāgaḥ) (7) power or cognition (aistvayam) (8) lack of power (anaisťvayam). These eight conditions embrace all psychical processes which happen in the knowledge (buddhiḥ). Their difference depends on the qualities of the Ur-matter. When the goodness (sattvam) preponderates, merit, knowledge, passionlessness and power exhibit themselves; when darkness (tamaḥ) preponderates, guilt, ignorance, passion and incapability prevail. The change in the conditions of the knowledge (buddhiḥ) is conditioned by the change in the qualities of the Ur-matter. As the qualities discharge themselves alternately, conditions of knowledge continually change themselves. Thus the whole psychic process unrolls itself. It is particularly important that the fate of the creatures in transmigration depends on these
conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) or cognition, above all, on merit, guilt, knowledge, and ignorance. Merit leads to better rebirths, guilt to worse rebirths, ignorance brings bondage and knowledge Deliverance.

As will be seen from the short recital above, it deals with a theory which seeks to solve the same questions and takes the same place in the system as the theory of the fifty ideas. Both wish to summarize the most important psychical processes and to investigate into their importance for the entanglement in the cycle of being and for Deliverance. We find a striking agreement in details. The eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) are considered like the fifty ideas as material in the ancient manner and are traced back to the streaming-in out of the Ur-matter and the reverse is similarly conceived and described in an entirely similar way and as the contrary effects of the four streams or currents into which the fifty ideas are divided. Still there is an enormous difference between both the doctrines, that of the eight conditions of knowledge and of fifty ideas. The theory of the eight conditions of knowledge represents a more advanced stage of development than the theory of fifty ideas.

The advance may be characterized shortly somewhat as follows: The theory of eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) offers a much simpler and still much more comprehensive division of psychical processes than that of fifty ideas. In the theory of the fifty ideas, a great number of psychical processes are summarized in four groups rather arbitrarily. One could think, their number can easily be increased. Again the formation of the group is quite motley and contains much that does not fit. Quite different is the case with the eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ). The theory of eight conditions of knowledge, on the other hand, distinguishes, in certain few varieties the psychical occurrences in which almost all psychical processes allow themselves to be arranged with ease. The group of knowledge and ignorance embraces all knowledge-processes. In the group of Power and Powerlessness are summarized every psychical efficiency and practice. Finally the group of Passion and Passionlessness contains all will-impulses. Besides in merit and guilt are included all moral factors and the effect of action (karma) in the sphere of psychical occurrences. The ground for
the difference between the two theories is this: The formulation of fifty ideas is exclusively determined by the interest of Deliverance and therefore it is dominated by a purely external viewpoint. The division of eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ), on the other hand, bases itself on the constitution of the psychic processes, and is, therefore, rooted in the nature of the subject and is much more effective. Simultaneously, herewith is first gained a deeper insight into the nature of psychical occurrences and we can speak for the first time of proper psychology. The progress is unmistakable.

We, therefore, conclude that in the doctrine of the eight conditions of knowledge and in that of the fifty ideas we meet with two doctrines of the same kind, of which one represents a more advanced development-stage than the other and was evidently designed to replace it. As a matter of fact the theory of the eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) in the classical Sāmkhya takes the same place as the earlier doctrine of the fifty ideas and represents a psychology of the classical system. But the doctrine of fifty ideas (pratyayāḥ) has not been completely supplanted. It was too firmly established in the system of sixty doctrinal ideas (sāśītantra) to be easily erased. Therefore it was maintained and kept up. Therefore, we find therefrom, in the Sāmkhyakārikā of Iśvaraκṛṣṇa, the classical presentation of the system, the theory of fifty ideas placed beside the eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ). The relation between the two theories remains naturally confused and unclear and the explanations which the commentaries give for their juxtaposition are unsatisfactory and forced.

Now to answer the question: how did the origination of the doctrine of eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) come about? For answering it, the fact is decisive that in the tradition, both the theories—the eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) and the fifty ideas—stand completely abruptly near one another. There is no connecting link which would bind both these stages of development in the Psychology of the System. There is no visible clue which would point that the doctrine of fifty ideas developed further into the doctrine of eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ). It is striking and it appears that the theory of eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) did not grow indepen-
dently on the soil of the Sāṃkhya but that it was either taken over from an outside source, or to say the least, it was shaped with the support of an outside theory. This conclusion is supported by the constitution of the theory.

Its most essential feature is that different kinds of psychical processes are distinguished: processes of knowledge, impulses of the will and the psychical endeavour or efficiency. A similar division is found in the Vaiśeṣika, where, as we shall see, they originated in a consistent development, because the qualities of the soul were first of all systematically attempted to be comprehended, arranged and organized. In the old Sāṃkhya, however, a germ for such a development is missing. Therefore, the conclusion seems obvious that the classification of the psychical processes in the Sāṃkhya was undertaken according to the prototype of the Vaiśeṣika. Besides, the following detail speaks in its favour: the popular conception about the soul on which the Vaiśeṣika theory is built, ascribed to the soul, besides knowledge, efficiency or the ability to work as the most important quality. Therefore, it is quite natural that in the completely developed form of the Vaiśeṣika, effort (prayatnaḥ) appears under the qualities of the soul. The conception of the soul, on the other hand, out of which the Sāṃkhya derives its views, considers the soul, as inactive and unable to do anything. Therefore, there is no proper ground from this side (i.e. of the Sāṃkhya) to assume efficiency under the psychical qualities. And in the case of the psychical organ to which the Sāṃkhya ascribed all psychical processes, it was natural to assume activity and efficiency arising out of it. The group of ability and inability or power and lack of power among the eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) is, therefore, evidently created just as the classification of psychical processes in general, according to the prototype of the Vaiśeṣika.

Especial importance for the decision of our question attaches itself finally to the group of merit and guilt. In that stream of philosophical development of which the Vaiśeṣika is the chief representative, in course of time, there came a point as we shall see, when questions were raised inquiring into the character of action (karma) and into the way in which its effect comes into existence. We shall see that different replies to these questions were attempted until finally only one arrived at
the view of the Vaiśeṣika that actions bring about merit and guilt which stick to the soul as qualities and bring about requital through their mediation. Of this whole development, no trace is to be found in the Śāmkhya. All of a sudden abruptly, there emerges the doctrine of merit and guilt which as psychical conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) stick to the psychical organ. Their acceptance of a borrowing is therefore fully justified. Here also the Vaiśeṣika proves itself as the prototype.

We may therefore consider as certain that the theory of the eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) in the Śāmkhya was created under the influence of the Vaiśeṣika. With this, we meet for the first time, a phenomenon with all its full distinctions, which has decisively determined the picture of the later development of the Śāmkhya, namely, the influence of other systems, We have already conjectured about such an influence with respect to the doctrine of the plurality of the souls—Now this will be for us a second example which is fully comprehensible. During the description of the discussion of the Śāmkhya vis-à-vis the remaining systems, we shall meet continually again and again influences of this sort. But they did not lead to any fruitful suggestions the utilization of which should have given a new impulse to the system. They remained predominantly as a mere acceptance of outside thoughts which were taken over but no more looked into or assimilated into the system proper. So these borrowings are the signs of the creative force in the Śāmkhya getting lax and feeble and show, therefore, a decline which a few centuries later led to the death of the system.

The Theory of Pure Elements: Now as the last change during the development of the Śāmkhya, of which we shall speak, is the Theory of Pure Elements (tānmātrāṇi). Thus it concerns a change in the Evolution-Series. According to the old Theory, the five elements (mahābhūtāni) arise out of the ‘I’ consciousness and out of the five elements arise their five particularities (vīśeṣāḥ)\textsuperscript{188} Now it was taught that out of the ‘I’ consciousness, five pure elements (tānmātrāṇi) arise. These five pure elements are characterized by the five qualities of the Elements and are named after them. One speaks, therefore, of the pure element of sound (śabdanāmātram), the pure element of touch (sparśatanmātram), the pure element of form (rūpatanmātram), the pure element of
taste (rasatanmātram), and the pure element of smell (gandhatan-
mātram). Out of these pure elements there arise further the five
elements. The qualities of the elements, on the other hand, are
struck off out of the Evolution-series.

It is remarkable about this doctrine that no valid ground
is found in the system, to make its introduction into the system
appear intelligible. Attempts are made to explain the introduc-
tion of this theory into the system by the argument that the pure
element, each one of them contains only one quality while the
Elements on the contrary, contain several more qualities,139 as
in the Accumulation Theory. But this view does not, in any way,
correspond with the general theory of the School. On the other
hand, the theory that Elements contain each only one quality
(guṇālī) is older. As one passed over to the idea that an ascending
number of qualities was possessed by the Elements, it was de-
cided to ascribe preponderatingly this rising number already to the
fine or pure elements.140 Therefore this attempt to explain this be-
comes weak. According to a second explanation, a great emphasis
is placed on the fine subtlety of the pure elements and their assu-
mination is based on the fact that they, as subtle matter, form the
fine or subtle body (sūkṣmam sarīram) on which the migration of
the soul depends.141 But of this the old Sāṃkhya system knows
nothing. According to the old Sāṃkhya, the fine or subtle body
is formed out of the fine material forms of usual Elements (mahā-
bhūtāni).142 Therefore, this attempt at explanation also collapses
by itself. What concerns the old Sāṃkhya doctrine itself, it knows
only to say that the pure elements are called by this name be-
cause in them the qualities of the Elements are available only
in their pure basic essence without their different sub-varieties.
Or it is said that the qualities of the Ur-matter in their pure
form are not perceived, but they are perceived first only in the
Elements. But that is a distinction on which, during the remain-
ing formulation of the system, no emphasis is laid and it there-
fore scarcely gives occasion for changing the traditional evolu-
tion-Series and formulating a group of new entities.

In my opinion, on the contrary, the impulse to this change
came from outside. During the later period of the Sāṃkhya, the
theory of 25 principles was frequently exposed to attacks. It was
in search of deeper reasons which would justify the positing of
particular things as independent entities. The compilation was found arbitrary and was objected to on the ground that many things as independent entities were assumed and others were not. That the qualities of the Elements besides the Elements themselves were considered as separate entities, must have given offence. Even so equally exactly, for example, the conditions of knowledge (buddhi) could have been considered as separate principles. Under the pressure of these attacks, it was decided to change the theory itself. The qualities of the Elements as separate entities were given up and the Elements themselves were explained as the last creation of Ur-matter. But this created a gap in the Evolution-Series of 24 entities which arose out of Ur-matter. Because the number 25 was too firmly rooted in the tradition, that one could have hardly been able to change it. The gap had to be filled up. For that the hitherto formed Evolution-Series gave the clue or the starting point. The qualities of the Elements had as the last evolute of the series received the name particularities (viśeṣāḥ). This name was passed on to the Elements which now became the last member of the series. In so doing, the above-mentioned interpretation was given, viz. that in the Elements, the qualities of the Elements appear in different sub-varieties or in them the special particular kind or character of the qualities of the Ur-matter comes into validity. In contrast to them, another appearance of Elements in which such is not the case, was assumed and was expressed to bring out this contrast by the name of non-particularities (aviśeṣāḥ). These subtle phenomenal forms of the Elements are the pure elements (tanmātrāṇī). They are, therefore, pure stop-gaps devised with the aim of filling the gap in the Evolution-Series created by the withdrawal of the qualities of the Elements. Therefore the remarkable fact is understandable why they play no role in the system and appear perfectly superfluous outside the Evolution-Series.

We find, therefore, here in a still sharper form the phenomenon which we could observe already in the doctrine of the eight conditions (bhāvāḥ) of knowledge. Here is no further formulation arising naturally out of the inner development of the system but the further formulations are occasioned by an impulse from outside. They were rather forced on the Sāṃkhya. Such phenomena represent, however, a typical sign showing
that a system is now at the end of its development and that its creative power is exhausted. The same has occurred to the Śāṅkhya. It is, therefore, time that we should end this presentation of its development.

The Classical Śāṅkhya System: We shall now pass on to give a summarizing picture of the system, as it presents itself in its conclusive form at the end of the classical period. It is, in essentials, the form in which it appears in the famous Śāṅkhya-ārīka of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. The classical form has found its final formulation in the Śāṅkhya-ārīka, and has never been surpassed and it has remained authoritative for the entire future. The basic features of our presentation would appear, thereby, as natural inferences, from the hitherto described development of the system. But it would, in no way, suffice to summarize, however systematically, the results of the hitherto described stages of development. There are other numerous details which had to be set aside and have not been mentioned, as we provisionally have dealt with the most important stages of development in their main features. And there are many parts of the system which have not been, up till now, touched, perhaps, on account of their having been looked upon as of less importance or it may be that the present position of our research did not allow us to present their origin in the frame of the development of the system. We shall now add everything and insert it in its place. Because it is only thus possible to allow to appear in its entire compactness and completeness the system in the form which it has reached at the end of the classical period.

At the head of the classical Śāṅkhya system stands the theory of knowledge. It teaches the means of right knowledge: sensuous perception, inference and trustworthy communication. The acceptance of trustworthy communication which includes the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the system practically unimportant. The system, in effect, reckons with only two means of knowledge—sensuous perception and inference. No doubt, it is the inference which is allotted a decisive role. Because the Śāṅkhya lays claim to proving strictly all its theoretical statements. And as the most important theories lie outside the sphere of perception, it
is the inference which supplies the proof. The Sāmkhya in its beginning has shaped its theory of knowledge—especially the theory of inference in a thoroughgoing manner and in an original way. This shaping or formulation however stands in closest connection with the theory of knowledge of the remaining systems whose development, above all, fills the last section of Indian philosophy of the older period. We shall, therefore, deal with it in the fourth volume of our work which embraces this period and will describe exhaustively the development of Epistemology and Logic.

At the basis of the whole world-occurrence there are two principles—Soul (puruṣah) and Matter (prakṛtiḥ). The Soul must be accepted as the opposite counterpart of Matter, because the whole operation of matter is tuned to serve the aim of the soul. Both the soul and matter are permanent and ubiquitous. In other respects they are in sharp contrast to each other. The Matter is one, Souls are infinite in number. The Matter is unspiritual (acetana), while the nature of the soul is pure spirituality. Above all, the Soul is completely inactive (akartā), while Matter is the cause of all actions and the origin of all things. In this way each one of both would be by itself unable to work aimfully—the matter on account of its unspirituality and the soul, because it is unable to do any action. Only when they connect themselves with each other and only when the soul lends its spirituality to matter and matter its efficiency to the Soul, then only the world comes into being. "Thus they unite, then, like a blind man and a lame man and therethrough the world-creation is brought into being."¹⁹³

The whole total world of Matter is, according to its innermost nature, a Unity. The cause of it is that all that is 'material' depends on the same ur-ground or the primeval cause. It is this Ur-matter (prakṛtiḥ or pradhānam) out of which the total world of phenomena springs. This Ur-matter alone can be designated as permanent and omnipresent. The several entities that arise out of it are perishable and limited. They are also numerous as against the unity of Ur-matter. While the Matter remains perpetually imperturbable, the things that come out of it always originate and vanish in perpetual change according to the law of cause and effect.
The origination of the phenomenal world in its entire manifoldness out of Matter is possible through the fact that the Matter unites in itself three different qualities. They are the goodness (sattvam), the passion (rajaḥ) and the darkness (tamaḥ). The Ur-matter consists of them and they are existent in a mixture of different kinds also in all the things of the phenomenal world. The goodness is light (laghu) and illuminating (prakāśakam). It causes the upward striving in the things and the agility in the organs. It drives away the darkness or obscurity and renders possible the comprehension of the objects of knowledge. The passion is prop-giving (upastambhakam) and active and movable (calam). It causes every kind of movement and occasions in the body the activity of the breath-forces (prāṇādayāḥ) and of the organs of action (karmendriyāṇi). Finally the darkness is heavy (guru) and hindering (varaṇakam). It is the cause that the things fall and mutually cover themselves. It is due to it that the organs are heavy or unwieldy and it makes difficult the knowledge of objects. Thus the good operates as illuminating and gratifying, the passion as impelling and afflicting, the darkness as hindering and perplexing. The three qualities are bound with one another in their work in the most various ways. They pair themselves and call each other forth alternately. Now they support or assist each other, now they abrogate mutually. Thus they are the cause of the multifariousness of things and of an entirely variegated character of the phenomenal world. That in spite of their contrast and their contrariness, they work together and do not paralyse one another, depends on the fact that now one preponderates, now another and then the remaining only support them. "Only in their more marked form (atiśayaḥ), their nature and action get hindered or arrested; their general character (sāmānyam), on the other hand, can stand together with the more marked form (atiśayaḥ) as Fire and Water during cooking or light and shade in a weak lighting."104

What concerns the origination of the phenomenal world out of the Ur-matter, concerns also the rising forth of the entities out of Ur-matter. With a view to clarifying the ideas better, the old designation of Ur-matter as the unmanifest (avyaktam) was seized back upon and as against it the world of
phenomena was placed as manifest (vyaktam).

The same expression which designated itself as the manifest, implies also the evident, that is, that comes into appearance or visibility, and thus it was now, here, comprehended. The Ur-matter is infinitely fine (sūkṣma) and, therefore, lies outside every possibility of perception. Through the fact that it (Ur-matter) develops into a phenomenal world, it comes forth out of its secrecy or concealment and becomes perceptible. The phenomenal world is positively perishable. But what to us appears as origination and passing away is not creation or destruction but only appearance and disappearance. It is said: “This threefold world vanishes out of visibility (vyaktikā), because it is taught that it is not permanent. But it continues also after its vanishing, because it is taught that it is not destroyed. Out of its dissolution, there emerges a fine or subtle condition (saukṣmyam) and out of this fine subtle condition, its imperceptibility. What is called destruction is therefore only a vanishing out from visibility.”

Another way of comprehending the origin of the phenomenal world out of the Ur-matter was that this origination-just as the appearance and disappearance, was considered as a change happening in this world of phenomena or as it was later said, it was a conversion (parināmaḥ). The Ur-matter or any material cause in general is one that gives form or shape (prakṛtiḥ). Everything that arises out of it is a changed one (vikṛtiḥ). The idea of conversion or change was defined still more exactly as an acceptance of a definite form or more sharply expressed as a definite compound or placing together or an arrangement of parts (sanniveśaḥ or sanstham). The basic change, through which the unmanifest matter goes over into the condition of manifestation, because it now becomes the phenomenal world, carries itself out in the following way: In the Ur-matter, the qualities of Goodness, Passion and Darkness have each suspended their own activity of transformation or conversion (niyeśitarināmaṁtvādharāḥ), they have withdrawn all their forces into themselves (upsamhṛtaśaktayaḥ), so that they continue only in a very fine form, with all differences having vanished (astamgatavīteśaḥ). They find themselves in a condition of equal distribution (śāmyaṁvastāḥ), in which its
nature is inexpressible (*anirdeśyasvabhāvāh*) and in which they are neither existent nor non-existent (*niḥsadasantaḥ*). During the beginning of creation, this equilibrium is disturbed (*vaiṣamyaṃ*). Now their different forces emerge into appearance and they assume their activity of transformation or change (*upaṭṭaparipāmaṇavīpaṃ*). First they enter into the condition of pure existence (*saṁśāstralakṣaṇaḥ*). But already their nature becomes comprehensible and expressible (*vyapadeśyarūpāḥ*). And now they go over into different combinations (*saṁnīveśavisesaḥ*) which make up the individual several entities (*tattvān*).

The first of the Entities which originates in this way is the sense of knowledge (*buddhiḥ*). Because it continues longer and is greater than all the remaining entities, which go forth out of it, it becomes named as also the Great (*mahān*). Its nature is definite knowledge (*adhyavasāyaḥ*).

Out of the sense of knowledge (*buddhiḥ*), there arises as the second, the ‘I’-consciousness (*ahaṃkāraḥ*). According to its form of appearance and the way of its operation it is already greater than the sense of knowledge (*buddhiḥ*). On it depend the ideas of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ and through their activity all knowledge, will-processes are referred to the I (*svātmāpratyayavamsañcaḥ*).

The ‘I’ consciousness appears in a threefold form according as one of the three qualities (*gunaḥ*) preponderates and is also accordingly designated threefold. When Goodness (*sattvaṃ*) predominates, the ‘I’ consciousness carries the name of ‘depending on the change’ (*vaikārikaḥ* or *vaikṛtaḥ*). When the Passion (*rajaḥ*) predominates, it is called ‘rich in lustre’ (*taivaṣaḥ*). When Darkness (*tamaḥ*) preponderates, it is said to be the source of the elements (*bhutādiḥ*). This distinction is important as through the difference in the form of its manifestation, the ‘I’ consciousness becomes the starting point of double creation. So far as it depends on transformation, it (*vaikārikaḥ*) is the starting point of thinking (*manaḥ*) and the ten sense-organs (*indriyāṇi*). Because goodness, which predominates in this manifestation, is bright and promotes knowledge. So far as it is the origin of the elements (*bhutādiḥ*), it allows the Elements first in the form of pure elements (*tanmātrāṇi*) to issue from it, because darkness (*tamaḥ*) which characterizes manifestation is dull and unspiritual. The form of manifestation called the lustrous (*taivaṣaḥ*) jointly works
in both the creations as it is filled with the driving force of passion.

In the first out of both the secréations of ‘I’ consciousness, the thinking (manaḥ) takes the foremost place. It stands above the ten sense-organs and is the organ of wishing (saṃkalpaḥ). Concerning the sense-organs, it is to be remembered that they are different from the physical organs. These latter are only their bearers (adhīṣṭhānāni). The sense-organs are not, therefore, formed out of the elements (bhautikāni) but they originate out of the ‘I’ consciousness (āhaṃkārāni). They fall into two groups. The one embraces the five sense-organs (buddhīndriyāṇī) : ear (srotam), skin (tvac), eyes (caksuṣi), tongue (jihvā) and nose (ghrāṇam). The second includes the five organs of action (karmendriyāṇi) : speech (vāk), hands (pāṇi), feet (pādāu), the organ of evacuation (pāyuḥ) and the organ of begetting (upastham).

The second creation of the ‘I’ consciousness are the pure elements (tanmātrāṇi). These are characterized by the five characteristic qualities of the elements—sound (śabdaḥ), touch (sparśaḥ), form (rūpam), taste (rasaḥ) and smell (gandhaḥ) and are accordingly named the pure element of sound (śabdatanmātram), the pure element of touch (sparśatanmātram), the pure element of form (rūpatanmātram), the pure element of taste (rasatanmātram), and the pure element of smell (gandha-tanmātram). Out of these spring the great Elements (mahābhūtāni) : Ether (ākāśaḥ), Wind (vāyuḥ), fire (tejaḥ), water (āpaḥ) and earth (prthivī). These differentiate themselves from the pure elements through the fact that they point to the specialities which the pure elements still miss. While the pure elements possess the qualities of the elements only in their general basic form, the great elements show them in their different sub-varieties. While, therefore, to the pure element of sound, only the sound in general is ascribed, the different forms of sound appear in the ether. The same holds good for the remaining pure elements. A further difference is that in the gross elements, the difference of things becomes palpable, it being conditioned by the different qualities (guṇāḥ) of Ur-matter and that, therefore, they are only experienced as peaceful (sāntāḥ), frightening (ghorāḥ) and confusing (mūḍhāḥ); on the ground of this difference, the great elements are designated as particularities (viṣeṣāḥ), while on the
other hand, the pure elements as non-particularities (āvīšeṣāḥ). According to the older Sāṁkhya doctrine, one of the named qualities of the element was ascribed to the pure elements (tanmātrāṇi) as well as to the gross elements. Thus the sound was ascribed to the pure element of sound and to ether, the touch to the pure element of touch and to the wind, the form to the pure element of form and to the fire, the taste to the pure element of taste and to the water and smell to the pure element of smell and the earth. The appearance of other qualities which were observed in daily life e.g., of form and touch in the earth was explained as due to the mixing of the gross elements to which these qualities belonged. Already outside the Sāṁkhya, the view had gained vogue that the Elements possess qualities in an ascending or increasing number e.g., the ether possesses the sound, the wind the sound and touch, the fire the sound, the touch and the form, the water the sound, touch, form and the taste and the earth the sound, the touch, the form, the taste and smell. This is the so-called Accumulation-Theory. This view gradually penetrated into the classical Sāṁkhya. As distinction was made between pure elements and gross elements, different views could form themselves with regard to the relation of the pure elements and the gross elements and about the distinction of qualities among them. Partly it was assumed that the pure element possessed only one quality and that the rising number of qualities in the gross elements was the result of the fact that in their origination, the pure elements got mixed in such a way that, for example, the ether only originated out of the pure element of sound (śabda-tanmātraṁ), that, on the other hand, during the origination of the following elements, the pure elements cooperated with the foregoing elements, so that the gross element, concerned, always jointly possessed the qualities of the foregoing. In general, the view was favoured that the qualities of the elements are present in the pure elements in the ascending number; and therefore the same ascending number was present in the case of the gross elements though every one of them originates out of one pure element (tanmātram).

One, however, did not stop with the characteristic qualities of the five elements. Soon other qualities were also fixed. A popular and an early widespread series of the qualities of the elements
is as follows: e.g. To the earth was ascribed form or corporeality (mūrtiḥ), to the water was ascribed humidity and stickiness, (snehaḥ), to the fire heat (uṣṇatā), to the wind forward-movement (praṇāmitā), and to the ether space-guarantee (anāvaraṇam) or extending itself over all sides (sarvatogatiḥ). People tried to comprehend the total qualities (gunaḥ) of the Elements systematically and fully and brought them together in a list. This list in the Śāmkhya has a somewhat motley, variegated look.

Accordingly the earth possesses the qualities of form (ākāraḥ, mūrtiḥ), heaviness (gauravam), roughness or dryness (raukṣyam), hindering or veiling (varaṇam), firmness (sthairīyam), preservation (sthitiḥ), the divisibility (bhedāḥ), patience (kṣamā), the darkness of the shadow (kṛṣṇacchāyā) and utility for all (sarvpabhogyatā).

The qualities of water are humidity or stickiness (snehaḥ), fineness (saukṣmyam), brightness (prabhā), whiteness (sauklyam), softness (mārdavam), heaviness (gauravam), coldness (śaityam), preservation (rakṣā), purity (pavitravam) and holding together (saṃtānaḥ).

As the qualities of fire, there are enumerated upward-striving (ürdhvagatiḥ), purification (pāvakatvam), burning (dāhakatvam), cooking (pācakatvam), lightness (lōghavam), the power of light or shining (bhāsvaratvam), perishableness (pradhoṃsitvam) and strength (ṣoṭaḥ).

To the wind proper are attributed horizontal or level movement (iīryaggatiḥ), purity (pavitravam), driving on (ākṣepaḥ), push (nodanam), force (bālam), dryness (raukṣyam), shadowlessness (acchāyatā) and coldness (śaityam).

The quality of the ether finally is that it allows everything to penetrate (sarvatogatiḥ), that it is never displaced (avyūhaḥ), and that it offers no opposition to the things (avistambhaḥ). One further occupied himself with the question as to how these elements operate and what importance they have for the world and beings. But the doctrine of the qualities of the elements did not gain great importance in the Śāmkhya. Because the scientific interest in this system was always very little. The old traditional five qualities of the elements have always been mentioned and considered from very old times. We shall therefore content ourselves with what has been said. With the rise of the gross
elements the series of entities which go forth out of Ur-matter becomes closed. They are twenty three: knowledge (buddhiḥ), ‘I’ consciousness (ahāmkāraḥ), thinking (manaḥ), the ten sense-organs (indriyāṇi), the five pure elements (tanmātrāṇi) and the five gross elements (mahābhūtāṇi). With the two ground-principles Ur-matter (prakṛtiḥ), and the soul (purusah) they make up the canonical number 25.

The development of 23 principles out of the Ur-matter is not a non-recurring process. Because the world-occurrence takes place in great periods there regularly alternate, though in immense time-spaces, world-creation and world-destruction and at the end of the world-day there follows the rest and the sleep of the world-night. When the world-day breaks in, there follows first the rise of 23 principles out of the Ur-matter in the described form. When this happens, they cluster themselves together into a prodigious ball or sphere. Though the world-egg or the Brahma-egg (brahmāṇḍa) contains the total Universe from the deepest hell to the highest heaven, still it appears tiny in the infinite world-space like a glow-worm which hovers in the air at night. It is only a fragment of the Ur-matter that changes into 23 principles. Only a part of this is formed into the world-egg. The remaining stores itself in the form of a gigantic, ball-like veil around the world-egg and it is enclosed at the outer-most end by the knowledge (buddhiḥ) and at the innermost end by the gross elements. Thus there is the series of origination.

When the World-egg is formed, Brahmā, the Creator God, originates in it immediately out of the Ur-matter; he is embodied in exaltedness (māhātmya-sarīraḥ) and creates beings and worlds. About the world-construction, the Sāṁkhya had similar ideas like those widespread in general in India. But they play with their phantastic mythological images a great role only in the popular direction. In the doctrine of the philosophical school they entirely step back. It would be, therefore, enough if we sketch with a few strokes the world-picture as it is presupposed by the Sāṁkhya.

The whole world-egg (Brahmāṇḍa) is filled with seven worlds. The nethermost is the Earth named Bhūrolka. In its deepest depths there are seven hells (narakāḥ) which are situated one upon another like storeys. In them bad characters atone for their sins of past lives in a long painful existence. The Indian phantasy
is never tired of painting the horrors of punishment in hells. Above the hells lie the seven underworlds (pātālānī). They are of fabulous splendour and are peopled by different kinds of spirits and demons. Next follows the surface of the earth. It is filled with seven continents which are washed around by an equal number of seven seas. In spite of their gigantic size they are called islands (dvīpāḥ) by the Indians in spite of their colossal greatness. In the centre there lies, like an immense round disc, the island of rose-apple-trees—the Jambudvīpa. From the east to the west, it is traversed by six mighty chains or ranges of mountains which divide it into seven zones (varsāk). The Southern-most is the Bhāratavarṣa (India) which is bounded by the Ocean in the South. The mountain which separates it in the North from the next zone is the Himālaya. In the fourth zone, in the centre of the Jambudvīpa and therewith also in the middle of the whole surface of the Earth, the gigantic divine mountain Meru rises. At its southern foot stands the rose-apple-tree (jambuḥ) which gives its name to the whole continent. The Meru according to the four world-directions is made of four precious stuffs: in the east of silver, in the south of beryll, in the west out of crystal, in the north out of gold. The wonderful blue of the heavens which we see is only the reflection of the southern side. The surface on the summit is the recreation-place of the 33 gods headed by Indra and is decked with wonderful places and pleasure-parks.

Around the Jambudvīpa flows the ocean. The next continent surrounds it like a ring and is again washed around by a sea. Then follow, in continually greater and broader rings, the remaining continents and the seas. The seas are composed of different kinds of liquids. Only the innermost sea which surrounds the Jambudvīpa is the Salt Sea. The following are, according to the sequence, of sugar, spirits, melted butter, acid cream, sweet milk and fresh water. The last of these seas is closed around by a mighty chain of mountains. Then follows the shell of the world-egg (brahmāṇḍa) and thus the boundaries of the Earth are reached.

Then comes the air-space-world (antarikṣalokāḥ). It is the world of the stars to which belong the Sun, the Moon, the planets, the fixed stars and 28 lunar houses (naksatrāṇi) which
like our Zodiac circle characterize the Moon path, according to the Indian view, around the mountain Meru up to the Pole Star (dhrwāh) which stands as the highest immovable crowning point.

Then begins the sphere of god-worlds. The first is the world of the great Indra (māhendralokaḥ), the Svarloka, where there dwell in continually higher spheres six classes of gods possessing supernatural wonderful powers and enjoying sense-pleasures with heavenly maidens. Their life endures for a world-period (kalpāh).

Then follows the world of Prajāpati (prājāpatyalokaḥ), the maharloka. It is divided into five spheres in which dwells an equal number of the classes of gods. They possess power over the great elements and live in the happiness of meditation (āhyānam). Their life extends over 1,000 world-periods (kalpāh).

Then, in conclusion, there are the three highest heavenly worlds consisting of the world of Brahmā (Brahmalokāḥ). The three heavenly worlds are the Janaloka, the Tapoloka, and the Satyaloka. They are divided respectively into four, three and again four spheres which are inhabited by an equal number of classes of gods. Their power continually stretches further over pure elements, sense-organs, and finally over the Ur-matter itself and their duration of life is continually greater until finally among the denizens of Satyaloka, life ends only with the dissolution and the destruction of the total universe.

The God Brahmā not only creates the worlds, he also creates beings who populate them. They fall into three groups: gods, men and animals. Of gods, there are eight classes: Brahma-gods, Prajāpati-gods, Indra-gods, ancestral spirits (pītarāh), the genie (gandharvāḥ), the snake-spirits (nāgāḥ), the demons (rāksasāḥ) and ghosts (pīśācāḥ).

Of these, only the first three are gods in the strict sense and they dwell in the already described worlds of Brahmā, Prajāpati and Indra. The remaining are supernatural beings who people the underworlds and different parts of the Earth's surface. Other super-natural beings as they are known to Indian mythology and which do not appear to be enumerated here, are arranged in these classes, according to the sense. The animals are divided into five classes, tame and wild animals (paśavaḥ and
mṛgāḥ), birds (paksiṇaḥ), the creeping, crawling animals (sa-rispāḥ) and plants (sthānarāḥ). The term 'animal' expresses a collective idea which does not embrace the animals only in the strict sense. In the group of men, there are no further divisions.

Jointly herewith, there may shortly be mentioned a classification of beings which was very popular in India, and which has also found entry into the Śāmkhya. Their origination is, namely, according to the kind. According to that, there originate gods and many men, of whose wonderful origin the holy tradition reports; partly they are born in a supernatural way, directly out of the Ur-matter, partly through the wonderful powers to be soon described; but some are born through the procreation by parents or also only through one of the parents. But in general, the creatures according to their origin are distributed, in general, in four groups: born out of the womb (jarāyujāḥ), born out of the egg (āndajāḥ), born out of sweat (svedajāḥ) and born out of germs and seeds (udbhijjāḥ). Those born out of the womb are the men, the tame and wild animals. Those born from the egg are the birds. Born from sweat are the tiny creatures. Finally the plants are born from the germinal seeds.

Important for the world-duration and for the doctrine of Deliverance is the distribution of the three qualities of the Ur-matter in the three groups of beings. Goodness (sattvam) predominates in case of the gods. Darkness (tamaḥ) predominates in the case of animals, while men stand under the influence of passion (rajaḥ). Besides this, the classical Śāmkhya system has nothing to say about the groups of creatures, which would be, of importance. Only the bodily and the mental constitution of men is so exhaustively dealt with that we shall later have to go into it specially.

Concerning the world-occurrence which unrolls itself after the completion of creation, the ideas move themselves in mythical ruts during the building up of the world. It is mentioned that the first being Brahmā the Creator and Kapila (the First Wise Man) originate directly out of Ur-matter. Then follows the period of the so-called six perfections or wonderful powers (sattadhikālaḥ). The first of these wonderful powers is the wonderful power of thinking (manahsiddhiḥ) in which men by virtue of predominant goodness (sattvam) and
rectitude (dharmaḥ) attain whatever they wish and also get progeny through mere thinking about it (abhidhānam). In this way, the sons of Brahmā are created. The second wonderful power is the wonderful power of the eyes (cakṣusiddhiḥ) in which a mere glance suffices for bringing about the fulfilment of wishes. During the third wonderful power, i.e. the wonderful power of speech (vākṣiddhiḥ), it is necessary only to speak out one’s wishes. In the ancient period, the fourth wonder-power—the wonderpower of the hand (hastasiddhiḥ)—the touch of the hand was requisite in order to attain the wish and to beget an offspring. At the time of the fifth wonder-power, the wonder-power of embrace (āślehasiddhiḥ), the progeny is begotten through embrace. Finally during the sixth wonder-power, the wonder-power of pairing or mating (dvamdvāsiddhiḥ) there comes into being the customary sexual intercourse. With it ends the period of six wonderpowers and begins the usual cycle of births.

The further course of world-occurrence corresponds with the general Indian ideas. The course of the world runs at least in our part of the earth through the steps of four world-ages (yugāni) which continually follow one another until the day of Brahmā and with it one world-period (kalpaḥ) ends. Then follows a world-destruction (kalpapralayaḥ) in which the whole world, except the highest Brahma-loka or the Satyaloka, is engulfed. Then sets in the Night of Brahmā which endures as long as his day. Thus follow each other the Day and the Night of Brahmā until finally the life of Brahmā runs its course. Now the general destruction (mahāpralayaḥ) destroys everything, not sparing even Brahmā himself. The entities which had gone forth out of Ur-matter begin to resolve themselves back in the reverse order, according as they were evolved until the original state again sets in, the Ur-matter standing alone in the undisturbed equilibrium of the three qualities. In that state of equilibrium the Ur-matter remains unmoved, until finally after immense time-spaces or world-periods, a new world-creation begins.

We now go over to the doctrine of man which, on account of its elaborate treatment in the system, requires a separate presentation. According to the Sāṃkhya theory, a man consists of a gross or external body (sthūlasarīram or bāhyasarīram) and, also of a fine body (sūkṣmaśarīram) with the psychical organism which
is the carrier of the soul’s migration. The gross body is composed of five Elements. It originates when the fine body enters the mother’s womb at the time of coition. The embryo is formed out of the blood of the mother and the semen of the father. Out of the blood of the mother originate hair, blood and flesh; out of the father’s semen bones, sinews and semen.* These six constituents set themselves in the fine body and cover the fine body like a cocoon which the silkworm spins. The gross body, as composed out of these six veils or covers, is called as constituted of six covers (ṣākṣauṭikam). The embryo gets its further building stuff out of the nutrition-juices which the mother takes for herself. They are carried to the embryo out of the blood of the mother through the navel-cord. The embryo develops through the stages of foetus (kalalam), pustule (budbudaḥ) and small lumps (peśi). Then the limbs and organs form themselves. Then at the same time comes in, as a first spiritual impulse, an obscure or dull form of ‘I’ consciousness. Finally it comes to birth with which begins a new course of life. Further than this the old system has not occupied itself with the gross body, its constituents and composition.

While the gross body in each birth comes to birth and dissolves again at death, the wandering organism named liṅgam lasts from the beginning of creation-period to its end. This wandering organism consists, as already remarked, of a subtle body and the psychical organism. The fine body is formed out of a fine material form of the gross elements.\(^{197}\) It is invisible and may be able to penetrate anything on account of its subtleness. It can go everywhere where a new existence is called to life. Its aim is to serve as the carrier of and support to the psychical organs in its wandering from one embodiment to the next. Because ‘as a picture cannot come into being without a supporting canvas, as a shadow cannot come into being without a post, so also the wandering organism cannot stand without a bearer, namely, without the gross elements (viṣeśaḥ).’ \(^{198}\) It is, therefore, called the body which leads over to another existence (ātvāḥikam sariram).

The Śaṅkhyā theory of the fine body was exposed to numer-

*In the place of the hair, the skin is also named and in the place of semen the marrow.
ous attacks against which they were required to defend, as differ-
ent systems denied the existence of a fine body. Inside the Sām-
khyā School itself, there was a difference of opinion. While the
orthodox schools of Vṛṣagaṇa and Pañcādhikarana taught that
the fine body endures from the creation to the end of the world-
period, Patañjali assumed that it comes into existence at the end
of life at the time of death, and brings the psychical organism in
the place where the new embodiment is to take place, and then
again the fine body disappears. Finally, as we shall still hear, Vin-
dhyavāsī has given up the doctrine of the fine body completely.

Far less disputed is the doctrine of the psychical organism
as the constituent part of the wandering organism. The connec-
tion that the psychical organs accompany the soul in its wandering
through different bodies had already been initiated at the time
of the Upaniṣads and had gained dissemination. We find, there-
fore, still in the Classical Sāmkhya remnants, from such early times,
of older views, about the composition of the psychical organism.
One such doctrine is the collection of eight (puryaṣṭakam) in the
city of the body or a group of eight breath-forces (pṛāṇaṣṭakam)
a designation which again recurs in different religious sects. This
collection of eight is explained as five corporeal winds—outbreath,
downbreath or breath-away, up-breath, total-breath and through-
breath to which thinking (manaḥ), abundance or fullness (pūlī),
and speech (vāk) are added. Under fullness is understood the
consciousness which is filled by the ‘I’ idea (ahamkārata sañvit).
We come across other explanations of the collection of eight in
later times. But they are further not worth noticing. The memory
of the original meaning of the old expressions and ideas was long
lost and they were interpreted frequently in different ways. In
the classical Sāmkhya this idea is purely a remnant of the older
time. In general it was replaced by a view which corresponded
with the basic doctrines of the system; it was that the psychical
organism consists of ten sense-organs and three inner organs.

This psychical organism is the most important constituent
of man. Especially it is also the bearer of life through the fact
that through the general working of the organs of which it con-
sists it keeps the corporeal winds (pṛāṇāḥ) in movement and thus
occasions the most important life-functions. The five corporeal
winds, as already mentioned, are the outbreath (pṛāṇāḥ),
the downward breath (अपानाḥ), the total-breath (सामनाḥ), the up-breath (उदानाḥ) and the through-breath (व्यानाḥ).

(i) The outbreath (प्रानाḥ) is the air which streams through the mouth and the nose. It is the bearer of respiratory processes. It becomes noticeable especially in violent excitement. (ii) The downward breath (अपानाḥ) moves downwards and works first of all in the abdomen. It carries the nutrition-juices and the bodily elements—wind, bile and phlegm—with itself downwards and causes the secreting and separation of urine, excrement and flatulence and drives the semen, menstrual blood, and foetus out of the body. It makes itself noticeable during evacuation and is stronger than outbreath (प्रानाḥ). (iii) The total breath (सामनाḥ) has its seat in the centre between outbreath (प्रानाḥ) and down-breath (अपानाḥ) and keeps both together. Its work appears evident, when the body of an animal, under excessive strain or load, seems to be divided into two halves as it were, on account of excessive strain. It is further noticeable in death in which it snaps the connection between प्रानाḥ and अपानाḥ which later leave the body, like the horses which have been cut away from each other. They leave the body in different directions. The total-breath (सामनाḥ), as its operation indicates, is stronger than the outbreath (प्रानाḥ), and down-breath (अपानाḥ). (iv) The upbreath (उदानाḥ) moves above the region of outbreath (प्रानाḥ), upwards in the head. It drives the nutrition-juices and bodily elements upwards. It is the basis of speech, as it enters into connection with the instrument of speech. Its working exhibits itself in sudden fright. It is stronger than the three foregoing breaths. (v) The through-breath (व्यानाḥ) penetrates through the whole body up to the ends of the hair and nails. It causes an equal distribution of nutrition-juices and bodily elements, occasions the movement of joints and keeps the remaining breaths in their places. Its working allows itself to be inferred when in a dying man the body from the foot upwards becomes gradually cold. It is the strongest of all breaths. We see, therefore, that the activity of the corporeal winds embraces the most important life-manifestations of the body. And as it depends on the general working of the psychical organism, the latter is the bearer of life. "So long as this activity under the prevalence of passion (रजाह) keeps the breaths in movement undisturbed, so long man lives."
Still more important than this general working of the psychical organs is the activity which especially attaches to and is peculiar to them. Because on the activity of the psychical organs depends the inner life of man and finally the final cause of the course of the world, of Deliverance and Bondage. They are the proper psychical processes.

One old classification characterizes the activity of the different psychical organs as seizing (āharaṇam), holding fast (dhāraṇām) and illumination (prakāśanām). This conception is evidently grounded on the ancient basic theory of the system of three qualities (gunaḥ) of Ur-matter. The different characteristics and the alternating preponderance of the qualities are expressed therethrough in the several organs. But it is a superficial classification which does no justice to peculiarities of the different organs. Therefore, it did not seize or strike deep root in the system. The fluctuations in its comprehension are characteristic of it. Once it is said that the organs of action seize the objects, the senses of knowledge retain or hold them fast, and thinking (manaḥ), the ‘I’ conciousness and the sense of knowledge (buddhiḥ) illuminate them. At other times, the seizing is ascribed to the organs of action, the holding together to the thinking (manaḥ) and the ‘I’ consciousness and the illumination to the senses of knowledge and to the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ). Thus there are several similar interpretations. We may not consider them, as they are without any importance. On the other hand, the activities which are ascribed to each one of the organs are important.

As we have already heard, the psychical organism consists of five organs of action (karmendriyāni), the five senses of knowledge (buddhindriyāni), the thinking (manaḥ), the ‘I’ consciousness (aṃkāraḥ), and the knowledge (buddhiḥ). The following five activities are peculiar to the five organs of action: speaking to the organ of speech, seizing to the hands, walking to the feet, evacuation to the anus, the bringing forth of sexual joy to the organ of begetting. The activities of the five senses of knowledge consist in the comprehension of the qualities of the five elements: thus the ear comprehends the sound, the skin the touch, the eyes the form, the tongue the taste, and the smell the scent. The thinking (manaḥ) is the organ of willing.
The 'I' consciousness is the bearer of the 'I' idea. The faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ) finally causes the particular or definite comprehension (adhyavasāyaḥ) of things.

Among these organs, we have to distinguish two groups, outer organs (bāhyakaraṇam) and the inner organs (antaḥkaraṇam). The outer or external organs are the five organs of action and the five senses of knowledge. The inner organs are the thinking (manaḥ), the 'I' consciousness, and the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ). Of these only the external organs come directly into contact with the objects. The inner organs comprehend them only through the mediation of the external organs. During every process of knowledge, the inner and the outer organs, therefore, work together. The process happens in somewhat the following way: "The sense-organs show the object. The 'I' consciousness refers itself to the object shown by the sense-organs. And knowledge (buddhiḥ) determines the objects referred by the 'I' consciousness to itself."²⁰⁰

At the same time, the inner organs are the central organs. While the external organs are restricted to the sphere of their special objects, the activity of the inner organs extends itself on all these objects as they are conveyed through a particular sense. Especially significant is the following distinction between the external and the internal organs. Only the activity of the inner organs is accompanied by understanding (pratyayaḥ). The external organs merely view the objects (ālokanamātram) only through the inner organ—above all—through knowledge (buddhiḥ) one becomes conscious of them. And it has also further consequences. Again through the inner organs, one may be able to remember the already perceived things. On account of that the inner organs are able to extend their activity to the past and the future. Thus the inner organs can stretch their activities over all the three stages of time—Past, Present and Future, whereas the external organs exclusively are restricted to the present objects.

Accordingly the relation between the external and internal organs can be presented as follows: The external organs are the tool of the internal organs; or as the old Sāṃkhya expresses it, the external organs are the gate (dvāraṇī) and the internal organs are the gatekeepers (dvārini). All impressions of the
outer world are received through the external organs but they are worked upon and utilized only by the inner organs. That holds true in an entirely special degree, in the case of knowledge (buddhiḥ)—the highest inner organ. The experiences and feelings of the remaining organs are directed to the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ) which gathers them and presents them to the soul who sees everything in it and believes therethrough that he himself experiences. At the same time, knowledge (buddhiḥ) is the bearer of psychical states (bhāvāḥ) which condition the fate of men in the cycle of births and on which depends the bondage as well as the Deliverance of the Soul.

These psychical states are eight in number: merit (dharmaḥ) and guilt (adharmaḥ), knowledge (jñānam) and ignorance (ajñānam) passionlessness (vīrāgaḥ) and passion (rāgaḥ), power or capability (aīstvāyam) and powerlessness or incapability (anainaśtvāyam). In them the most important psychical processes and qualities are summarized in four well-arranged groups, though their arrangement and explanation in particular cases is conditioned less by psychological interest than by attempt towards Deliverance. Merit and guilt determine the moral character of the psychical organism. Knowledge and ignorance embrace all knowledge-processes. Passionlessness and passion represent the different forms of wishes and desires while finally power and powerlessness determine the efficiency of the psychical organism.

In everyone of these groups, a distinction is made between good and bad forms of phenomena. It is not here an external distinction but is founded on the nature of things. According to the Sāṃkhya-doctrine, the psychical states are the forms of manifestation of matter and their constitution is conditioned by the qualities (guṇāḥ) of the Ur-matter. When now goodness (sattvam) predominates, they appear in their good phenomenal forms and when darkness (tamaḥ) preponderates, they appear in their bad forms.

Individually, the eight conditions (bhāvāḥ) of knowledge (buddhiḥ) are described and explained in the following way: Merit (dharmaḥ) and guilt (adharmaḥ) are small parts of matter which deposit themselves in the knowledge (buddhiḥ) during the accomplishment of good and bad works. In merit, the actions consist of goodness (sattvam), in guilt, they consist of dark-
ness (tamaḥ). They cling to knowledge (buddhiḥ) and are the
cause of the fact that the works, that have long since passed or
become a part of the past, bring reward or punishment. Only
when that occurs, they vanish.

Two kinds of merit and guilt are distinguished. The first
kind of merit is the fulfilment of religious duties, especially
brought about by the offering of prescribed sacrifices. Its reward
is rebirth in a heavenly world. The second kind of merit is gained
by the diligent practice of the fivefold control (yamaḥ) and
fivefold discipline (niyamaḥ). Of these, the five-fold control re-
quires one to injure no living creature (ahiṃsā), to speak the
truth (satyaṃ), not to steal (asteyaṃ), to be honest (akalakaśa)
and to preserve the chastity (brahmacaryaṃ). Under the five-
fold discipline are understood freedom from anger (akrodhaḥ),
obedience towards the spiritual teacher (guruśuṣṭrūśa), purity
(saucam), moderation in food (āhāralāghavam) and mental
composure (apramādaḥ). This second kind of merit promotes
the attainment of releasing knowledge. The two kinds of guilt
are the opposites of the two kinds of merit. They lead to worse
kinds of rebirth and prevent releasing knowledge.

Two kinds are distinguished in knowledge (jñānam) and
ignorance (ajñānam). The first kind of knowledge consists of
knowledge of usual objects and is divided into perception (pratya-
ksam), inference (anumānam) and tradition (āgamaḥ). The
second kind is the delivering knowledge. It consists in the knowl-
edge of the difference between Soul and Matter and can either
emerge directly or can be gained by practice. Both kinds of
ignorance form again the opposites of both the kinds of knowl-
edge.

In passionlessness (vairāgaḥ or vairāgyam) and passion (rāgaḥ)
four stages are distinguished. On the first stage of passionless-
ness, the ascetic carries the name of ‘the striving one’ (yatam-
ānaḥ). He toils to attain mastery over the sense-organs. If he
succeeds with some organs, he reaches the second stage, the
stage of separation or detachment (vyatirekaḥ). When he has
all external senses in his control and operates his desires only
in wish-dreams or pipedreams he stands on the third stage in
which only one senseorgan, namely, thinking (manāḥ) is opera-
tive (ekendriyāḥ). In the last and the fourth stage, he has fin-
ally also brought under his control the thinking (manah) and has gained mastery (vasitvam) over all senses. The passion forms the opposite to passionlessness and is equally divided into four steps which represent the opposites of the four steps of passionlessness.

The power (aitvaryam) is finally explained as the eight-fold wonder-power, which renders it possible to make oneself, at will, small (agimā) or big (mahimā), light (laghimā) or heavy (garimā), to reach distant things (prāptīḥ), to fulfil his wishes (prākāmyam), to gain control over nature (vasitvam or śītivam) and to select, according to his liking, for himself any place and a way of life (yatrabādāyasītvam). Here also powerlessness (anaiva-ryam) represents what is opposite to the corresponding eightfold classification of power (aitvaryam).

The emergence and operation of eight conditions (bhāvāḥ) of knowledge (buddhiḥ) in their different manifestations is caused by the alternating play of forces of the Ur-matter. Because as we have already remarked, they are conditioned materially and depend on the three qualities of the Ur-matter. Its good manifestations depend on the goodness (sattvam) and are named together under the name of clarity (prakāśaḥ). Its bad manifestations depend on darkness (tamaḥ) which works in unison with passion (rajaḥ) and forms a unity with it and they are summarized together under the name of impurity (asuddhiḥ). Just as the three qualities of Ur-matter stand in constant struggle and change and now this quality, now that quality preponderates and thus the motley manifoldness of the phenomenal world comes into existence, so also there is an uninterrupted struggle between clarity (prakāśaḥ) and impurity (asuddhiḥ) in the knowledge (buddhiḥ), causing variegated changes in the psychical events. Thus the qualities of the Ur-matter, existing in the psychical organs in general, are sufficient to explain all psychical processes. Only in rare cases, a new streaming forth out of the Ur-matter is to be assumed.

This alternating play of the eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) determines the fate of man in the cycle of transmigration. This occurs as follows: knowledge brings Deliverance, ignorance bondage. Merit and guilt direct the course of the Soul's transmigration. Merit leads upwards to a good existence,
guilt downwards to a bad one. Passionlessness leads to a temporary semblance of Deliverance through the entry into the Ur-matter (prakṛtilayah), whereas passion to the uninterrupted cycle of births. Power or capability (aistvaryam) brings unlimited power, while lack of capability (anaiśtvaryam) the opposite. In conclusion, it is to be mentioned that the classical Sāmkhya system has also preserved, besides the doctrine of eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ), also the doctrine of 50 ideas. But it stands there abruptly and without any relation to the doctrine of the eight conditions of knowledge (buddhiḥ) and is, in this stage of development, superfluous and without any original importance.

With this, our review of the world-picture of the classical Sāmkhya ends. We have seen how the world comes into and goes out of existence, how it is erected, which beings people it, and finally we have specially considered the most important group among these beings—the man according to his bodily and mental or spiritual constituents. But now the question arises: What is the cause which keeps the whole world in this process? Well, according to the Sāmkhya it is the matter which is able to effect it. But what is it which gives the impulse to its operation? The answer is: the interest of the Soul (purusārthaḥ). The matter comes into activity to bring about the Deliverance of the Soul. Its activity is therefore determined by an aim. It works for others' interest, as if it were its own.

But if its activity holds good for the deliverance of the soul and if the whole course of the world has the only aim to bring about this goal, why is the goal then not reached earlier? Why do embodiments or births in the change of the cycle of being come into being until finally the deliverance is attained after numberless births? It depends on the qualities (gunaḥ) of the Ur-matter. The matter possesses, above all, not only the goodness (sattvam) which leads to knowledge and deliverance but also the qualities of passion (rajaḥ) and darkness (tamaḥ). Thus the aptitude or talent of men in every birth contains also the traits which occasion action on their part which leads to rebirth until finally in the last existence, the goodness (sattvam) gives the turn and brings deliverance.

Now still another question. If the matter is alone able to operate, and if it is also still insentient, how may it adjust its work to
a particular goal? How can it have an aim to give the impulse to its activity? This difficulty is met by the Sāṃkhya by an appeal to an analogy. According to the school of Viṣṇagaṇa, it is the physical drive that draws the two lovers into union. The classical example is that of the milk of the cow. For the sake of the calf, to render its growth possible, the milk streams into the udder of the cow without any interference of the calf and without any intelligent directing principle. In the same way, for the sake of the soul, in order to bring about his deliverance, Matter sets itself in motion, although the soul is not able to exert any influence on it and the Matter itself is insentient. And thus originate the world and beings, their spirit or mind and body and they entangle the soul in existence, which leads it in a beginningless cycle of births from one embodiment to another.

This existence is full of sorrow; sorrow which itself clings to men (ādhyātmikam) accompanies them from birth to death. Sorrow is inflicted by other beings (ādhibhautikam). It is brought on by, powers of nature (ādhitaivikam). A being himself is plagued by sickness. Passions, sorrows, and cares torment him. Inimical animals and men threaten him. The inclemency of weather and natural catastrophes afflict him. But these sorrows can be combated. Sickness may be healed. One can seek out amusement and pleasure. The risks threatened by the enemies can be warded off with bravery and prudence. Precautions can be taken against the natural catastrophes. But all these means are inadequate. They do not operate unconditionally (anaikāntikatvam) and are not ultimately effective (anātyantikatvam). Sorrow strikes anew continually. Not much better is the case with the means recommended by religion. It is supposed that the offer of sacrifices prescribed in the Veda brings the promised rewards of heaven. But the performance of Vedic sacrifices as a means is not unobjectionable. It is connected with injury to living creatures, an offence against the highest command of morality. Besides, there is seen (in the Vedic texts) a diverse abundance of rewards promised for different sacrifices, so that there is no final and ultimate goal for which a sacrifice can be performed. And finally it is admitted that heavenly joys are evanescent and at last come to an end, and that at last the law of the transmigration (the cycle of being) causes even him who has ascended to the highest heavenly world, to
sink downwards and forces him to accept again the painful migration from one rebirth to another. There is, therefore, only one means which paves the way for ending completely the sorrow of existence and that is complete detachment from this existence viz. the Deliverance.

But how is Deliverance possible? In order to answer the question, it is necessary first of all to consider more exactly the character of bondage which is to be dissolved through it. The bondage cannot consist of mere juxtaposition (sāṇnidhyam) (being side by side) of Soul and Matter. Because the Soul and Matter both are permanent and omnipresent, their juxtaposition is equally permanent. Under these circumstances, no Deliverance would be possible. On the other hand, Bondage cannot be of that kind that the Soul suffers any change through it. Because that would contradict the doctrine that the soul is permanent and unchangeable.

To avoid this difficulty the Sāmkhya has assumed that Soul and Matter stand in mutual relation to each other as an onlooker (one who looks) and one looked at (d ras tr dr y abhāvalah). Thus is given the relation which conditions them mutually. Because there can be no onlooker if there is already nothing to be looked at. And there can be nothing to be looked at, if an onlooker does not exist. There is a reciprocal dependence, a tie of mutual interest (ausrukyam). Still none of both these entities suffers a change in its character. The relation is similar to that of a magnet and a piece of iron. These two (magnet and iron) influence each other through their merely being side by side. But that does not cause any change in the magnet or iron. Still there is an effective force which pulls both towards each other. The relation between the Soul and Matter is to be thought of in a corresponding manner.

Thus the character of Bondage is explained. According to the old Sāmkhya usage, this theory is sought to be proved and justified by an example. It is said that the Soul and Matter are related to each other like an actress and the spectator who sees her performance. The spectator is a calm and unmoving onlooker like the soul while the actress, like the Ur-matter, is active and toils for him. They are two different persons whose character is not changed by being thus connected together. Still a common bond—the interest—binds them. That bond of interest captivates
the onlooker in the demonstration and tries to satisfy the actress through her presentation.

On what does the interest of the soul in matter depend? The interest of the soul in matter is rooted in an error of the soul, the latter referring to himself what originally belongs only to the matter. According to the Śāmkhya view, as we have repeatedly mentioned already, all psychical occurrences are only carried out in the psychical organism—above all in the highest psychical organ, the knowledge (buddhiḥ). This knowledge (buddhiḥ), as the central organ, assembles what the remaining organs receive; in it happens every kind of knowledge and feeling while the soul only sees what is presented to it by the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ) without himself being touched by it. The knowledge however, stands nearest to the soul—as the highest phenomenal manifestation of matter. Because of all the qualities (gunaḥ) of matter, goodness (sattvam) by far preponderates in the knowledge (buddhiḥ) and is the illuminating and enlightening carrier of every kind of sentiment or spirituality. Through that there comes into existence the fateful mistake. The soul confounds himself with the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ) and refers to himself everything which in reality belongs to knowledge (buddhiḥ). According to a very old manner of expression, he regards knowledge (buddhiḥ) as 'I' and all processes in the (buddhiḥ) as 'mine'. He therefore believes that he suffers the pain which concerns really the knowledge (buddhiḥ). He imagines himself as entangled in the sorrow of existence, although in reality, according to its nature, it is all foreign to it.

Thus is carried out with all conceivable consistency the old basic view of the Śāmkhya which considers the Soul and Matter in sharp separation—the Soul as completely inactive and untouched by all earthly operations, while all occurrences and activities are removed to the sphere of matter. One did not fight shy to express with full sharpness the sharp separation between Soul and Matter. Neither bondage nor deliverance, it is said, in reality, concerns the Soul: “This (soul) is neither bound nor released, nor does it wander in the cycle of being. What wanders, is bound, and is released is only the Ur-matter appearing in manifold forms.” 201

Of Bondage and Deliverance of the soul, we can speak only in so far as one can speak of the doings of the servant as being
those of the master because the soul lords itself over matter. We are accustomed to attribute to the master that which immediately concerns only the servant. Thus the victory and the defeat of the hero are ascribed to the sovereign for whom the hero fights. He, who believes in a real bondage and deliverance of the Soul, is a fool.

The apparent entanglement of the Soul in Existence depends, in fact, on a mistake. Thus the possibility of Deliverance is pointed and the way to it is shown. It is necessary to eliminate this mistake. One must recognize that matter and above all its highest phenomenal manifestations, the goodness (sattvam) of knowledge (buddhiḥ) is completely different from the soul, that the soul is neither 'I' nor 'mine'. Then the interest of the soul as a driving force of matter is extinguished. He observes the matter no more nor does the matter show herself any more. Although this Ur-matter continues to work for other souls, she is as good as destroyed for the soul who has found Deliverance. With this, the goal, however, is reached. The connection between Soul and Matter is interrupted and the Soul is liberated.

That is set forth in an old metaphor. The spectator turns himself away, when everything that the actress had to show has been seen by him. She also suspends her play when the interest of the spectator is satisfied. And thus the whole world-play comes to an end as soon as the soul has appropriated the releasing knowledge which the matter intended to negotiate for him through her work. According to this explanation of the Deliverance process, one could believe that with the attainment of releasing knowledge, the Deliverance immediately sets in, as the cause of bondage is eliminated. But that is not the case. Because we see that the wise man who has attained Deliverance still continues to live. It is explained as follows: With the elimination of the error which binds the matter to the soul and impels it to work for the soul, the cause for a further action of Matter ceases to exist. But the impulse (samskāraḥ) already given still works itself out. The case is like that of the potter's wheel, which still continues to turn after the completion of the pot, works the given impulse out, until the communicated force exhausts itself and the wheel comes to rest. Even so, the existence towards which the matter has already received the impulse rolls itself out.
It is final, there being no cause for further activity of matter. Matter ceases work which would occasion further births and then follows the final Deliverance.

And now the last question. How is releasing knowledge found? According to the theory of the School of Vṛṣagana, it is possible by the way of logical thinking. Although the most important truths like the existence of soul and matter lie outside the sphere of perception, they are still knowable through inference, above all, through inference by analogy. On such inferences are based the decisive doctrines of the Sāṃkhya. The first who knew the true doctrine and proclaimed it is the first wise man Kapila. He belongs to that order of beings who originated at the beginning of creation and is, from his birth, in possession of perfect knowledge. From him it was first received by Āsuri from whom it was handed down further and was continued to be set forth in an unbroken succession by the masters of the Sāṃkhya and was laid down in the authoritative works of the School.

*The disputed or controversial doctrines*: This is in all essential features the picture which the fully developed system of the Sāṃkhya of the classical time offers. But we cannot close our presentation with it. The history of a philosophical system in India restricts itself not merely to the creation and formulation of the doctrinal edifice. Besides, the discussion with other systems plays not a small role. Why, such discussions appear in the forefront and often form the main activity of the school concerned, as soon as the system has reached its highest point and its development has ended to a large extent. As a result, wide stretches of philosophical literature preserved for us are filled with it. This discussion, however, extends by no means in the same way in the entire sphere of the system. On the contrary, there are some prominent doctrines which provoke the interest and the consequent attack of the opponent. And they come to be continually talked about whenever there is a talk about the system concerned. In many cases, these discussions in these systems (which have reached their highest point) lead to interesting formulations and precious refinements. But predominantly they degenerate into endless and fruitless disputes around a stiff firmly established dogma. Because the system grown aged could
and would be changed no more in its essential features; and so the same reasons and counter-reasons are reported with little changes in them, in tiresome monotony. The part of the philosophical literature of India which is filled with these discussions is therefore the most unsatisfying of all. But if we completely pass over these disputes of the school we shall produce a completely false picture of Indian Philosophy and of the life of the philosophical schools. So we shall at least in short describe some of most important of the disputed questions and the essentials which they have put forth.

The existence of Ur-matter: One of the most prominent and also the most remarkable doctrines of the Sāmkhya is, however, that of Ur-matter. The thought that all things consist of small ground-stuffs or elements was obvious. The assumption that out of some of these ground-stuffs the remaining arise-had also nothing special about it. But here they taught one Ur-matter (prakṛtiḥ), which stands above all these elements, which is, according to its nature, completely different from them, which, besides, escapes every kind of perception and can only be inferred. It was no wonder that this doctrine called forth contradictions. Above all, there was a demand for the proofs of the existence of Prakṛtiḥ.

The representatives of the Sāmkhya endeavoured to bring forward such proofs and they were five in number. 202 It was said that when many things show the same natural constitution, it points to the conclusion that they have arisen out of the same cause. The different potter’s wares such as pots and bowls etc. show the same nature and permit therefore the knowledge that they are all formed out of the same stuff—clay. So also all things of the phenomenal world show the same character which depends on the three qualities of goodness (sattvam), passion (rajāḥ) and darkness (tamaḥ) because they occasion joy, grief and confusion and operate, in effect, as bright, driving and obscuring qualities respectively. That leads to the conclusion that they also arise out of one and the same cause which is characterized by these three qualities and this cause is the Ur-matter.

A second reason, which was advanced, is the limitedness of the phenomenal world. When several products according to their multitude are limited, it shows that they have arisen out
of one particular cause. Thus a multiple of potter's wares is produced out of a certain quantum or quantity of clay. So also the number of entities (tattvāni) of which the phenomenal world is composed is strongly limited and is the same in every creation. From this it is to be concluded that a particular cause lies at the bottom and it is namely the Ur-matter.

There is also another reason. Every effect presupposes a cause in which a capacity to produce this effect lies. This cause in the state of capacity is represented for the total phenomenal world by the Ur-matter.

Another reason was also further inferred. Things which stand in the relation of cause and effect with one another, influence each other and mutually support each other in their operations. They, therefore, presuppose that they are already present before their mutual action begins. We can ascertain such mutual action in all the things of the phenomenal world especially in the three qualities of goodness, passion and darkness. An essential characteristic belonging to them is that they influence each other in the most diverse ways. The same holds good for all other things—for the Elements, their qualities etc.—i.e., thus for the whole world of phenomena. For this, it is therefore implied in its totality that the effect is already present, before the working of the cause operates. This earlier continuance is already there in the Ur-matter.

Finally, an original unity was concluded out of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world. It was shown by examples, how out of one basic cause, for example, out of milk, a multiplicity of different things goes forth, and it was concluded that the multiplicity of the total phenomenal world goes back to a condition in which all these differences are abrogated. This condition is found in the Ur-matter.

It should not be denied that all these inferences show an honest attempt to bring forth serious proofs for one's doctrines and it was attempted, above all, to penetrate into the nature of things and to derive their proofs out of them.

All this constitutes an excellent and appropriate part of the path-way which had been covered since the time of Pañcasikha. In the time of Pañcasikha one was content with citing metaphors and similes in place of proofs. But the weaknesses of
such inferences put forth are unmistakable. According to the condition of those times, they were proofs by pure analogy. One proves the bearings of facts in one or more examples and concludes therefrom their existence in a case which he is supposed to prove. The consequence of that was that this inference had no telling effect. Because the opponent knew how to counter them easily because he set forth, against the cited illustrations, counter-illustrations. Therefore the whole discussion remained without any result. Still, a more important way of thought connected with it was developed which allowed the right understanding of the above-cited proofs and it formed the characteristic doctrine of the system—viz. the Causality Theory of the Sāmkhya—the Satkāryavāda—that the effect is already present in the cause.

The Sāmkhya doctrine of causality: The classical school of the Sāmkhya taught: "The being is exclusively being; the not-being is exclusively not-being. Not-being cannot originate, being can never vanish."²⁰³

The doctrine in its sharp and original formulation belongs to the doctrinal statements of the Sāmkhya, which occupy the centre of the disputes of the schools. On account of this fact, it is befitting that we shall deal with it more closely. It is also interesting by itself and we shall pose the question how the origin of the doctrine came about. The classical system cites, as in the case of the existence of Ur-matter, five grounds to prove its doctrine of causality. But it does not help much. But it is an old law of development that it is not the arguments which occasion or cause the origin of a doctrine. There are, on the contrary, doctrinal statements which are already there first and the proofs are attempted as supplements to prove them. The doctrinal statements arise as direct knowledge out of the view of things. We must, therefore, ask out of what view our doctrine grew forth.

The following appears to lie at the bottom. It was observed that in numerous cases, different things arose from a basic stuff and in their destruction, their form only is destroyed, but the basic stuff continued to remain. It was seen that out of clay, different vessels were formed and on their shattering the clay still remained. In all these occurrences, attention was directed
one-sidedly to the material substance. In the course of development, under the stimulus of examples from other schools, this view of the origin and disappearance of things was clothed in a firm statement and was given the form of a Causality Theory. Then it was inferred that what originates and vanishes is nothing new but only an already existing thing appearing in a new form. This view of the origin and destruction of things was clothed in the statement of the Causality Theory in which the idea of the cause (kāraṇam) was restricted exclusively to the Material Cause. All other causes were given a modest secondary role as helping causes (kārakam). The matter is but the same in the cause (kāraṇam) and effect (kāryam), and one came to the formula that the effect is nothing new that originates but is already present in the cause. Every apparent origination and destruction consists only in a recasting or a change (parināmaḥ) of existing matter.

The doctrine, however, gained its full importance only through the fact that the same conception was extended to the relation of the phenomenal world and the Ur-matter.

We have already seen during the systematic review of the classical Sāṃkhya system that the rise of the phenomenal world out of the Ur-matter was not considered as a new creation but as a change (parināmaḥ) of Ur-matter. This idea was shaped into a greatly impressive form. It was considered that the one Ur-matter which fills everything, out of which the total phenomenal world forms itself and in which again it dissolves, is a permanent one which reveals itself in manifold ways, and which shapes and recasts itself perpetually anew. It was seen not as the original cause out of which something new or different arises but as Ur-matter itself, permanently changing and appearing always in new forms. Out of this view, the following knowledge was gained: The total phenomenal world is already present here in the Ur-matter from eternity. The apparent origination and disappearance is only the continual recasting of the permanent one Ur-matter. As the idea of the three qualities was included as the foundation of every recasting, the Causality-Theory was given the following form, for the total phenomenal world:

"The relation of Cause and Effect (kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ) is conditioned by the state of the qualities of the Ur-matter. The-
assumption of form by the fine qualities is the effect. Their remaining in unseparated condition in which all differences disappear is the Cause."

Through this shaping or formulation of the Causality-Theory the conception of the Ur-matter for the whole system was first rightly underpinned and its connection with the phenomenal world systematically established. As a matter of fact, the previously oft-repeated proofs for the existence of Ur-matter were devised and formulated on the ground of the Theory of Causality. Because it is clear, at the first glance, that one could think in that connection through it only out of the views already handed down and conclude on the same basic ground, out of the same character of things or infer about its original unity out of their manifoldness. And on this depends above all the importance of the doctrine for the system.

With this, important progress was achieved in the deepening and the formulation of one of the most important doctrinal statements of the system, of the doctrine of the Ur-matter. On practical considerations nothing much was indeed achieved in the discussion of the schools among themselves. Because although the assumption of the Ur-matter had gained a very strong support in this way, still another doctrine was introduced for its sake and that doctrine drew upon itself equally lively attacks of the opponent. The subject of dispute was shifted and it became necessary to defend this doctrine.

Thus it occurred, as we have already remarked, that as in the case of proving the existence of Ur-matter, five inferential grounds were adduced for justifying the doctrine of the effect being present in the cause (satkāryavādah). It is said, for instance, that from the non-existing, nothing can be derived (asadakaraṇam) and that led to the following considerations: If one could bring forth non-existent things, then wholly impossible things could be brought forth, as they are exactly non-existing like all the remaining things. "If", therefore, "non-existence is assumed as the cause for the origination of pots etc., it follows therefore that the horns would grow on the head of the hare because the same presuppositions come true in that case." Because nothing, non-existing, cannot be brought forth. "The non-existing things
are characterless; there exists no difference between them. On the other hand when the special difference is obviously seen, its existence must be admitted. 206 Again, further for bringing forth an object, the helping causes (kārakāṇi) such as the handworker and his tools must come in contact with the object. "Now in the case of non-existing things, on account of their non-existence, no connection with the auxiliary causes, which only cling to the existing, exists. If an origination is to be assumed without the existence of connection between causes, far-reaching conclusions would produce themselves." 207 If the activity of auxiliary causes were to be aimless, then the objects concerned would not be touched by them and these would be produced without their cooperation.

Another ground cited was that 'for producing a certain definite thing, a certain definite material is employed (upādāṇa-grahaṇam)'. Thus one takes, for production of oil, oilseeds, nobody thinks of using pebblestones for that. It has, therefore, only one definite sense when an inner connection exists between the character of the employed material and the produced effect. The same idea lies at the basis when one refers to the fact that only things to which belongs a definite capability produce an effect for which they are capable and qualified (saktasya śakya-karanāt).

These examples may suffice. A weakness in these arguments which are brought forth, just as in the case of those inferences adduced to prove the existence of Ur-matter, strikes the eye. As in that case, they have scarcely provided conclusive answers to the disputed controversial questions. Much more important than these proofs are the attempts made in connection with these discussions to penetrate deeper into the character of the causal occurrences and above all to understand the idea of change (parināmaḥ) more pointedly.

We have mentioned in our systematic review of the classical system that change (parināmaḥ) is explained as the assumption of a definite form or, more exactly, of a definite arrangement (sanniveśaḥ) of the parts of which the object consists. Now, ideas developed in the meanwhile by other systems were included. Meanwhile, one also learnt to distinguish between qualities (dharmaḥ) and their bearers (dharmaṇāḥ). The representatives of the
Sāṃkhya school employed this conception in order to explain the idea of change, for they said: “When an object gives up its former or earlier quality and assumes another without losing its character, it is called change.”

But the opponent would object that the destruction of a quality and the origination of another quality would militate against the basic tenets of the system that nothing, that exists, perishes, and nothing that is non-existing comes into being. The defender of the Sāṃkhya was compelled to have recourse to the assumption that what is meant is not destruction and origination but coming into view (āvirbhāvaḥ) and going out of view (tirobhāvaḥ) of the qualities. But the opponent would again retort that the Sāṃkhya knew no quality different from its bearer, and that if, therefore, the qualities (dharmaḥ) disappear, their bearers (dharmaṇaḥ) must also do likewise. Then a way out was sought and was presented in the following theory: In this period, in the other schools the idea of commonness or generality (sāmānyam) or a general character indwelling things had come into being. The strife between the realists and nominalists had broken out in India. And the Sāṃkhya system was compelled to discuss this new idea. The system bound by its old tradition was acquainted as little with the difference between qualities and their bearers as with the assumption of other categories of existence. But it was taught that in all things there was a peculiar indivisible character. This character of things united in itself the general (sāmānyam) and the particular (viśeṣaḥ). With the help of this doctrine the idea of change was sought to be explained: It was said that in the course of change, the special character of the thing changes itself, while the general persists. Still the Sāṃkhya theory of ‘generality’ (sāmānyam) was itself open to criticism and under the attacks of the opponent disappeared from the scene. So nothing much was gained out of it.

Another further attempt at interpretation remained stuck up in the beginnings. It was based on the idea of force or ability or potentiality (saktiḥ) and the idea means that the effect is present in the condition of capability, i.e. in a potential condition (saktvāmanā). But this conception was no more fully developed in the old Sāṃkhya. In general, the view remained that the effect, i.e. the fully developed things themselves, represents
the state of potentiality while its cause in the Ur-matter is a fine subtle form of this potentiality. And with this nothing much was gained.

Therefore, there appears in these thought-processes an earnest attempt to build the system further and to formulate it according to the progress of the times. The most essential feature, however, is that one was compelled to discuss new ideas which were created by other schools and felt the urge to take them over and elaborate them. But one did not succeed in incorporating them into the system, as the presuppositions behind them were missing. The Sāṃkhya as the oldest system had too many ancient views firmly built into its doctrinal edifice and would have been required to pull down the basic masonry of the doctrinal edifice in order to be able to keep pace with the acquisitions of the new times. And so the advanced thought-processes, which were acquired show only rightly the antiquity of the system and there come forth prominently weaknesses which were bound to lead soon to its decline.

In conclusion, we shall deal with a complex of questions which formed the centre of interest at the end of the classical period and were vigorously discussed: namely, the question of the nature and the coming into existence of knowledge-processes. One of the first among these questions was inquiry into how sense-perceptions came about and into the constitution and way of operation of their instruments—the sense-organs. Most widespread was the view that there are five sense-organs based on the number five of the Elements and their characteristic qualities which form the objects of the senses. As against this view, the Sāṃkhya taught, besides the five senses of knowledge (buddhindriyāṇi), still five organs of action (karmendriyāṇi). No wonder, that this doctrine called forth lively discussion and contradiction in other schools. Above all, the number of the organs of action was found to be arbitrarily limited. If a separate organ was assumed each for walking, seizing, speaking, etc. then, it was said, an organ which serves for swallowing food could equally well be assumed and some more of the same kind. But from the side of the Sāṃkhya, no one further entered into this discussion. The traditional number ten of the sense-organs was held fast. The organs of action stepped in the background in comparison with the senses of
knowledge which alone are important for the knowledge-processes. And so this discussion gained no greater importance.

Far more important was the question of the composition of the sense-organs. The most important antagonistic schools represented the view that the sense-organs are formed out of the Elements (bhautikānī). Against that view, the Śāmkhya held the view that the sense-organs have sprung out of the 'I' consciousness (āhaṃkārikānī) and form a separate group of entities. This view again was connected with the question as to how the sense-organs comprehend their objects, whether it is necessary for them to come in contact with the objects or not. Mostly it was decided that one such contact must take place. The difficulty arose with regard to the elemental character of the sense-organs. How can we explain this contact—especially the perception with the eyes, where obviously there is not found their contact with the objects? The adherents of the Śāmkhya believed that they would escape this difficulty by ascribing an entirely different character to the sense-organs. Thus it was thought that they would not be bound by the same conditions as the elemental organs. The contact with the objects which would be impossible in the Elemental character of the organs, could, therefore, be assumed in the case of sense-organs arising out of the 'I' consciousness.

Another further point of dispute was the question whether many sense-perceptions can take place simultaneously or not. Opposing schools answered this question differently. The most important of the schools—the Vaiśeṣika—decided that at one moment only one perception was possible. One had come to this view from the fact that only one object could stand at a time in the centre of attention. This fact was attempted to be explained as follows: It was assumed that the thinking organ (manaḥ) as a central organ stood over and above the senses and produced the connection between them and the soul. But the thinking organ (manaḥ) on account of its infinitely small size could only come in contact with only one sense-organ at any definite moment and, therefore, the soul could perceive only through one organ at a time, although perceptions may follow one another infinitely rapidly. This doctrine went against the ancient traditional Śāmkhya view of the nature of the thinking-organ (manaḥ). The Śāmkhya never admitted the
comprehension of the thinking organ (manaḥ) as a central and mediating organ. The Vaiśeṣika doctrine was, therefore, rejected and the Sāṃkhya asserted that many perceptions through different organs take place at the same time, as for example, in the case of the enjoyment of the sweet-scented cold cake (apūpaṭasaktulī).

In some other cases, there was a struggle to recognize the thinking organ (manaḥ) as the central organ above the sense-organs. The working together of the many sense-organs was observed: e.g., the sight of a sweet-smelling object stimulates the sense of taste (rasanam) and this induced movement towards the grasping of the object. One was perhaps inclined in such cases, to concede to the thinking organ (manaḥ) as the organ of wishing and desiring, a mediating function. But the view of holding the thinking organ (manaḥ) as a central organ was strongly rejected; the view generally prevailed that such working together of many sense-organs was independent of the thinking organ (manaḥ) and that it occurred through the self-dependent work of the Ur-matter, of itself (svabhāvataḥ).

Like the question of the working together of many organs, there was the next question which was raised. While the sense-organs work together with the inner organs (antaḥkaraṇāni), is this cooperation simultaneous or successive? Inside the school itself, different answers were given. Partly it was decided in favour of simultaneity, partly in favour of succession; for instance, the apparent case of simultaneity in the sudden jumping at the unexpected sight of a poisonous snake was explained through immediate succession, which appears erroneously as simultaneous. In the case of recollection-processes in which the perception of the renewed knowledge-process is separated by a long period, succession was held to, firmly in every case.

Besides the small organs, controversy also raged among the opponents regarding inner organs (antaḥkaraṇāni). First of all, the idea of the inner organs was, in general, found shocking by the opponent’s side. It was contended by them that thinking (manaḥ), ‘I’ consciousness (ahamkāraḥ) and knowledge (buddhiḥ) are knowledge-processes, but they are not organs. The division of three itself was found fault with. One learnt in course of time to clarify the psychical processes much better and more systematically and it was found unjustifiable to grasp, separately thinking ‘I’
consciousness and knowledge and to put them as independent entities. The Śaṁkhya had not much to reply and restricted itself to holding fast to the doctrine of three inner organs rooted firmly in the old system. The Śaṁkhya held fast to this division. In practice, during the investigation into the knowledge-processes, thinking (manah) and 'I' consciousness (ahamkāraḥ) completely stepped back so that, as a matter of fact, in epistemological questions, the Śaṁkhya in a far-reaching way reckoned only with one inner organ—knowledge (buddhiḥ). Nevertheless, attacks were directed against this also. The Buddhistic and the Vaiśeṣika Schools had come to emphasize strongly the instability and the quick change of the knowledge-processes. This militated against the fact that the Śaṁkhya asserted that the knowledge (buddhiḥ) is an enduring and persisting organ. But above all, the Śaṁkhya and their doctrine of knowledge (buddhiḥ) encountered a great difficulty which could not be avoided and had to be unconditionally discussed. It was as follows:

In the investigation of the knowledge-processes and their nature in the Śaṁkhya, as well as in other schools, a question arose. The question was: how, in general, the knowledge of an object comes into being. The Śaṁkhya like the different Buddhistic schools had decided for the assumption that it occurs in this way: that the organ of knowledge (buddhiḥ) assumes the form of the object concerned. It was, therefore, taught that first the sense-organs appear in the form of the perceived object, then the thinking organ (manah) takes it over from them, then the 'I' consciousness (ahamkāraḥ) takes it from the thinking organ and from 'I' consciousness finally the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ). But now the difficulty begins.

In the early period of the system, in order that the idea of the soul should be unburdened from all things earthly, the doctrine was posited that all psychical occurrences and with them all knowledge-processes take place only in the psychical organ of knowledge (buddhiḥ), whereas the soul remained as a pure observer, untouched by any earthly traces, in permanent unchangeability (kāsatthanityatā). Later on, a contrast in the nature of the Soul and the Matter was elaborated and explained to the effect that all events and
along with them, actions belong to the permanent changing Matter, while the Soul remains permanently inactive in its unchangeability and cannot work, and that, on the other hand, the Soul only is sentient (cetana) in contrast to the insentient Matter, whereas all knowledge and origin of consciousness can come only out of the Soul. Under these presuppositions it was necessary to show how, in general, knowledge is possible. How can the knowledge-process occur exclusively only in the organ of knowledge (buddhiḥ) when it is material and therefore insentient? How can the soul share in knowledge without going out of its permanent rest and inactivity?

First, it had been taught without any scruple that like the sense-organs and the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ), the soul also assumed the form of the concerned object and knows the object concerned. "Just as knowledge appears in the form of an object so also the Soul. In its workings (vṛttiḥ) the soul is not different from knowledge (buddhiḥ) and follows its activity."209 The opponents had, in hand, many objections one of which was that this militated against the unchangeability and the inactivity of the Soul so that the Śāṅkhaṇya must formulate their doctrine in another way. Then it was said: The soul does not really assume the form of the object but it only reflects it back again. "The image of the object which shines on the mirror-surface of the buddhiḥ goes over on to the soul which resembles a second mirror. Therein consists its knowledge, not that the soul suffers change. Although the mere image goes over to the soul, the soul does not lose its nature but its constitution remains the same as in the case of a mirror."210 But the opponents were not satisfied with that. They asserted that a mere reflection may bring with it a change of the soul. Then came another essentially artificial theory.

It was said that it was not the image of the object which went over to the soul but it was the sentiency or spirituality of the Soul which went over to the knowledge (buddhiḥ). "Although the ability of the soul to know and to experience (bhoktṛ saktiḥ) is immutable and cannot go over to any other object, still it, as it were, goes over to the mutable (buddhiḥ) knowledge and follows its working. Only because it is connected with the work of the buddhiḥ which has thus assumed the form of sentiency
(caitanyam) it is said that the working of the soul (jñānavṛttiḥ) is not different from the working of buddhiḥ (buddhivṛttiḥ). Thus the apparent going over of the spirituality of the soul to the buddhiḥ was explained more exactly as self-reflection. The knowledge (buddhiḥ) resembled a double-sided mirror. On the one side is reflected an image of the object which it (buddhiḥ) knows and on the other side the spirituality of the soul. And thus buddhiḥ is able to know things without implicating the soul itself in its own passion. There arises, besides the immutable spirituality of the Soul, a second mutable similar spirituality as it were, in the knowledge (buddhiḥ). The spirituality of the soul is as little affected when its image in the buddhiḥ participates in action, as the moon, when her image in water follows the movements of the waves.

With this doctrine of the co-operation of the soul and (buddhiḥ) the knowledge-processes found the final form. It is a subtle and an artificial theory but it met the demand made on it and it was the best solution which could be found under the given conditions.

These examples would be enough to show how the discussions of the Sāmkhya with the opposing schools ensued and we see therefrom how the Sāmkhya teaching was continually further formulated and developed. But in the contact with outside schools, to defend one's own doctrines against the attack of the opponent was not the only thing that mattered. Often it was the case that other schools had enlarged the sphere of their philosophical considerations or had created new ideas and had included them in the ambit of their investigations and it was necessary to give one's opinion on these ideas, to reject them or to work them into the system. We shall give a few examples of such cases.

**New Ideas**: Philosophically, the most important performance of the Vaiśeṣika was the formulation of its doctrine of Categorices. Sāmkhya, the philosophy of the oldest time, had known only one form of existence and all things with which they occupied themselves were considered with naive candour as material. This way of consideration was also preponderant when the Sāmkhya underwent its first formulation and we have observed its effect in the basic doctrines of the system: e.g.
in the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the three qualities of the Ur-matter or in the psychology of the system in its material interpretation of the psychical conditions. Gradually, it was realized that, e.g., things and their qualities represent two different forms of existence. It was the great achievement of the Vaiśeṣika that they made use of this knowledge with consistent logic in their doctrine of categories and tried to understand systematically all forms of existence. The material things as substances (dīrvyāṇi) were distinguished from their qualities. Besides they posited a third category of the similarities which bind several things with one another: the category of commonness (sāmānyam).

This doctrine gained so overwhelming an importance that the Sāṃkhya had to discuss it which it did. On the first glance it is clear that the doctrine of categories could, in no case, be simply taken over. As against the basic doctrine of 25 principles of the Sāṃkhya, it stands so heterogenous and irreconcilable that if it had to be inserted into the system, these 25 principles would have been required to be completely pushed off. Therefore, the Sāṃkhya chose another way. The ideas brought forth by the doctrine of categories were recognized, received into one’s own thought and worked upon. But it was avowed that the categories have separate states of existence. Qualities and movement were distinguished from the things—their bearers; but it was taught that they were not different from them. The quality (dharmaḥ) is nothing else than its bearer (dharman) and the working (vṛttiḥ) is nothing else than that which works (vṛttimati). They are not separate entities as such but different states of one thing, as it were.

In a similar way, the question regarding the nature of commonness (sāmānyam) was solved. This category was the most controversial one among all categories. As we have already mentioned, the question regarding the nature of genus had been also raised in India and a great controversy regarding it had been raised between nominalists and realists. According to the Sāṃkhya, the commonness (sāmānyam) was something real and rooted in the nature of things. Because it lies at the basis when several things of like nature are able to produce the same effect. But it is not an entity as such. Commonness (sāmānyam) and particularity (viśeṣak) are united with the nature of things and belong to them inseparably. The same thing, differently considered, appears
now as of the same kind, now of a different kind. This doctrine, which was designated as the doctrine of relativity (syādvādaḥ) was in future seized by the great Mīmāṃsā-teacher Kumārila. We shall meet with it later. Finally, it may be remarked in passing that the Śāṁkhyā also otherwise occupied itself with the ideas offered by the doctrine of categories. The Śāṁkhyā investigated more precisely into the ideas given in the doctrine of categories; e.g. two kinds of movements were distinguished: change (parināmaḥ) and moving on (prasyandahaḥ). Further, it was explained that the movement should be considered as change (parināmaḥ) when an object under the influence of co-operating causes (sahakārīṇaḥ) loses an earlier quality and assumes another. On the other hand, the movement of moving on (prasyandahaḥ) is seen in the activity of breathforces (prāṇaḥ), of the organs of action (karmendriyāṇi), in the rising up and falling of external objects and more things of that sort.

With this, concludes our presentation of the classical Śāṁkhyā system. The Śāṁkhyā is a stately edifice of doctrines comprehensively and carefully executed in individual points. It becomes intelligible how this system, long through centuries, played a leading part in Indian Philosophy. But there were also great weaknesses, which we have marked, at the end of the classical period. The system had irretrievably aged. Many of its basic doctrines stemmed out of ancient times and gave the impression of being oldish and odd and became—e.g. the doctrine of the three qualities of the Ur-matter—the target of the opponent’s derision. It became more and more difficult for the advocates of the Śāṁkhyā to follow the progress of general philosophical development. Entirely new and heterogenous ideas had emerged and could be reconciled with great difficulty with the ancient traditional doctrines of the system. The attempt to fit new ideas into them was finally forced to shake the very foundations of the system. Finally it was a desperate battle of statements and arguments which were put forth. This picture corresponds with the information that we get about Vindhyaśāsi and Mādhava, the last great Śāṁkhyā teachers.

Vindhyaśāsi: The older of the two was Vindhyaśāsi—the contemporary of the great Buddhist ecclesiastical preacher
Vasubandhu: He worked in the first half of the fifth century after Christ. And tradition reports that he remodelled the handed down system of the school of Vṛṣaṇa in essential points. The changes he introduced were of the most incisive kind.

One of the disputed doctrines in the classical period of the Sāṃkhya system was, as we have seen, the doctrine of the threefold division of the inner organ—thinking (manāḥ), ‘I’ consciousness (ahāmkāraḥ) and the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ). Vindhyavāsi did not fight shy of giving up this threefold division. He, however, did not strike them out of the list of the 25 principles. But he gave them a completely new interpretation. According to him the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ) is no psychical organ. Therefore he names it not with this name but uses the word current from very old times in the Evolution-Series: the great self (mahān ātmā) or the great principle (mahat tattvam). This great principle, according to his comprehension, is nothing else than the first general, still in certain respects, undefined form in which the Ur-matter comes into appearance, or as it was called in the ancient expression, it unfolds itself (vyaktiḥ). It is mere existence, while the Ur-matter is neither existing nor non-existing (niḥsadasat). The great principle is merely a mark or sign (liṅgamātram) whereas the Ur-matter is without a sign (aliṅgam). It represents the first inequality (vaśānyamātram) in the distribution of the qualities of the Ur-matter through which the ruling equality or equilibrium (sāmyāvasthā) in the Ur-matter is given up without, however, any fixed new distribution or composition coming into predominance. It is, therefore, characterized neither as an organ nor as a product (kārya-kāraṇāviṣṭaḥ) and has nothing to do with the psychical organism. Correspondingly, the role which it plays in the Evolution-Series is, according to Vindhyavāsi, different. It is the Ur-form and starting-point of all manifest matter common (sādhāraṇa) to all beings. It is only one from the Creation to Dissolution. According to Vindhyavāsi, out of it originate, besides the ‘I’ consciousness, also the five pure elements (tanmātrāṇi) and with them the total elemental world and not out of ‘I’ consciousness. The ‘I’ consciousness is the principle of individuation. It is not counted in the Psychical Organism. The Psychical Organ is only the organ of thinking (manāḥ).
Vindhyavāsī knows, therefore, of only eleven psychical organs—ten senseorgans and thinking (manāḥ). The thinking (manāḥ) unites in itself all functions which had been formerly attributed to the three inner organs. Above all, the thinking (manāḥ) gathers, as formerly the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ) did, all perceptions in itself and offers them to the Soul. Everything that was formerly said about the working together of the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ) and the Soul, holds good rather for the organ of thinking (manāḥ), according to Vindhyavāsī.

The second change which Vindhyavāsī took in hand was with regard to the doctrine of the psychical organism. It was as follows: The ancient doctrine of the soul, as it dominated the philosophical stream of development which led to the formulation of the Vaiśeṣika, was familiar with the conception—and the Jaina held to it firmly—that the soul has the size of the body in which it embodies itself and that in the case of every new embodiment, it adapts itself to the size of the new body. Similarly, the ancient Śāmkhya had taught that the wandering organism, that is, the psychical organs assume the size of body in which they enter for the time being, during the course of transmigration. As against that, the classical Vaiśeṣika introduced the theory that the soul is infinitely large. Similarly Vindhyavāsī went over to the view that the psychical organs are infinitely large. By so doing he gained many things for the doctrine of Sense-Perception. On this assumption, he could easily advocate the view that the sense-organs touch the distant objects during perception. He, therefore, taught that in the case of seeing and hearing the senses in direct contact with the objects receive the form on the spot and transmit it to the inner organs. It was also easy for him to explain how the senses perceive objects which are larger or smaller than the physical organs. For that he was in another respect compelled to bargain for an essential change in his doctrine, which he did. If the psychical organs are infinitely big, then there can be no wandering organism which enters from one body into another. Vindhyavāsī has also drawn this inference. He taught that there is no subtle body which wanders in the cycle of births. A re-birth—re-embodiment—rather ensues in this manner: the all-prevailing psychical organs cease their work in their abode of the former body and assume it again in the abode of the new body.
Another change in the old Sāṃkhya doctrine which is not testified by tradition as having been done personally by Vindhyavāsī but which belongs to his time and is well characteristic of it concerns the doctrine of the Elements. According to it, the five pure elements (tanmātrāṇi) possess the five characteristic qualities of the Elements—sound, touch, form, taste and smell—in the ascending number. Besides, to every one of the Elements, one further quality is allotted—corporeality (mūrtīḥ) to the earth, stickiness (sneḥaḥ) to the water, heat (uṣṇatā) to the fire, forward movement (pranāmitā) to the wind and extension everywhere (sarvatogatīḥ) to the ether. These represent the common constituents (sāmānyam) of the Elements concerned. The first-named sound etc.—the characteristic qualities of the elements are their special constituents (viśeṣaḥ). Commonness (sāmānyam) and particularities (viśeṣāḥ) unite themselves inseparably to the smallest units—the atoms (paramāṇavaḥ). Out of these, the gross Elements and the things of the outer world are composed.

This doctrine in its distribution of the qualities of the Elements shows a near contact with the Vaiśeṣika. The disputed doctrine of the pure elements (tanmātrāṇi) and their relation to the gross elements is thrown into the background. Instead of that the Atom-doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika is taken over and with the ideas of commonness (sāmānyam) and particularity (viśeṣaḥ) the category-doctrine is utilized.

Another important change in the system which belongs to the same period is as follows: According to the old Sāṃkhya, all world-occurrences which, in perpetual change of creation and dissolution, lead to constant re-birth, are conditioned by Ur-matter. As to the question which force is it that underlies all and calls forth these occurrences, the reply was that it is no other than the Ur-matter which operates of itself (svabhāvataḥ). In contrast to it a new view had sprung up in other systems and led to far-reaching inferences which had come to prevail in general. According to that view, it is the force of work (karma) which sets the whole Universe in motion. The good and bad deeds of creatures not only fix the condition or constitution of their re-birth but they also bring about rebirths themselves and it is they which keep the total world-occurrences going.

The effect of this (karma) doctrine was so great that the
Sāmkhya could not escape it. It resolved to take it over. But, for that one change was necessary. In a system like the Vaiśeṣika where the direct effects of the deeds—merit (dharmaḥ) and guilt (adharmah) cling to the soul and cause in a given time the ripening of suitable fruit, it was possible to trace all occurrences to these mysterious effects and with them to the deeds (karma). The case was otherwise with the Sāmkhya. According to it, merit and guilt belong not to the permanent and immutable soul but they are the conditions of the psychical organism, namely of the faculty of knowledge (buddhiḥ). But the psychical organism perishes at World-Dissolution and dissolves itself in the Ur-matter and even so its conditions (bhāvāḥ). Then the question is: what is it that causes world-creation and rebirth in the beginning of the new world-period? It cannot be action (karma) as the psychical organism with its conditions (bhāvāḥ) no longer exists up to that time.

For the solution of the difficulty, the Sāmkhya put up a new idea—the idea of the obligation or commitment (adhikāraḥ). So long as the soul is not liberated, the Ur-matter has an obligation towards it, to work for it and to bring about its Deliverance; it is this obligation (adhikāraḥ) which causes world-creation. As the final conclusion it is identical with the mutual dependence which binds the undelivered soul to Matter and as commonness of interests conditions their working together.

The Sāmkhya at the time of Vindhyavāsi knows a double cause of world-occurrence—the obligation (adhikāraḥ) and work (karma). At the end of the world-night, at the beginning of a new world-period, the obligation (adhikāraḥ) drives the Ur-matter towards World-Creation and brings about the first re-embodiment. Then the force of action (karma) sets in. The Good and Evil that the creatures accomplish during the period of the six wonderful powers occasions in their psychical organism the conditions (bhāvāḥ) of merit and guilt and these cause the uninterrupted chain of newer rebirths until the time when either the Deliverance ensues or at the end of the world-period, the psychical organism with its conditions (bhāvāḥ) dissolves itself in the Ur-matter.

In conclusion it is still to be mentioned that Vindhyavāsi endeavoured to adapt the ideas given in the doctrine of the categories to the Sāmkhya system. More exact knowledge of Vindhyavāsi’s contribution cannot be gathered on account of paucity of
information but we hear that he made efforts for the explanation of the idea of commonness (sāmānyam) and sought to define it more sharply as similarity (sārupyam).

All these changes of the Sāṃkhya doctrine show the same character. They are extended to the subject around which the controversies of the schools revolved and they are therefore occasioned by an outside impetus. They do not flinch back from making deep-lying changes in the doctrine taken over. But the attempt to preserve at least the ground-lines of the system and to adapt them to new changes is unmistakable.

 Entirely different is the last great Sāṃkhya teacher Mādhava. He broke through the last limits. As we have seen above, the Atom-doctrine of the Vaiṣeṣika was already taken over by the Sāṃkhya at the time of Vindhyavāṣī. But it was more a formal, external assimilation. In the Vaiṣeṣika, the Atoms were the permanent original cause of all elemental existence and the difference of the elements was already there from the beginning. Here, on the other hand, in the Sāṃkhya the traditionally handed down Elements were, no doubt, thought now as Atoms but they still originated out of the Ur-matter and were formed out of the three qualities (gunaṁ) of the Ur-matter. This was the target of the sharpest attack by the opponent and Mādhava was not frightened so as to withdraw and yield on this point. According to him, the atoms were no doubt formed out of the three qualities of the Ur-matter but they are different according to the elements and this difference goes already back to the Ur-matter. The three-foldness of the qualities which forms the Earth-atom is different from the threefoldness which forms the water-atom and both already are in existence in the Ur-matter. With this, however, the unity of the Ur-matter is given up. This doctrine is no more Sāṃkhya but Vaiṣeṣika clothed in a Sāṃkhya form.

 The same thing is seen in other spheres. As we have already heard before, the Sāṃkhya of the time of Vindhyavāṣī had assumed that the actions (karma) are the driving force in the world-occurrence. This doctrine was, however, recast, according as one's own system demanded and had been adapted to this system also. Mādhava, on the other hand, implemented it without any limitation. He drew the conclusion out of that and asserted that the world-occurrence is without beginning. He denied openly the
doctrine of the world-periods: in other words, he theorized in another way on the lasting bondage of the soul through the power of work (*karma*). In the doctrine of categories, he overthrew the transmitted theories and taught, for example, that the qualities (*dharma*) of things are different from their bearers—the things.

These are no simple changes of the doctrine. They shook the foundations of the system. A Sāṃkhya that taught these was no more Sāṃkhya. Mādhava has been called by his contemporaries the gravedigger of the Sāṃkhya (*Sāmkhyanāsakālā*) not without justice.213 The collapse of the Classical Sāmkhya was thus sealed. It had outlived itself and with its forcible attempts to adapt itself to the progress of the times, it only destroyed itself. And so the defeat which Mādhava suffered in the debating contest about 500 A.D. at the hands of the Buddhist teacher Guṇamati is, as it were, a symbol of the decay of the old Sāmkhya system which, with him, met its end. With this we have concluded our presentation of the proper philosophical school of the Sāmkhya and shall now turn to the second school, the Yoga School, or as it is also named, the Yoga-system of Patañjali. This expression is not, however, to be understood in such a manner as though it would deal with an independent philosophical system.

**The Yoga System**: The Yoga is not a system but a way of finding Deliverance and could be connected as such with different philosophical doctrines. Whether this occurred or not, depended merely on the circumstances. With the Buddhistic doctrine the Yoga was connected from the beginning, because it was the way by which the Buddha himself, the founder of Buddhism, had found Deliverance. On the other hand, Yoga was foreign to the Vaiśeṣika originally. But only in the Sāmkhya there was a clear consciousness of this relation; it was accordingly laid down that it is possible to attain emancipating knowledge in two ways: by the way of the logical theoretical knowledge and by the way of meditation i.e. Yoga. Therefore, inside the Sāmkhya there are these two different directions. Besides the philosophical school which had decided in favour of the path of logical theoretical knowledge, there was another which chose the path of the Yoga. Just as Vṛṣagana was considered the head of the Philosophical School, Patañjali the legendary
author of the Yogasūtraṇi was considered as the head of the second direction or school called the Yoga. Only in the period of later Indian philosophy when the systems of the older period had largely ceased and Hinduism, which had attained supremacy and further esteem, attempted to organize itself, the old Yoga-direction of the Sāṃkhya became a separate systematic formulation of the Yoga in the classical time and was considered an independent system—the Yoga-system of Patañjali. In reality, however, the Yoga-system of Patañjali deals only with that old school of the Sāṃkhya system. Concerning the doctrines of this School, the practical way of Deliverance naturally stands in the centre of the Yoga. Besides, there are theoretical views which underlie this path of deliverance and they have been treated quite fully. The theoretical views, as is to be expected under the given circumstances, cover largely the general basic doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, as we have known them during the description of the Philosophical School. Remarkable deviations from and supplements to the general basic doctrines of the Sāṃkhya are found and they merit consideration. We shall occupy ourselves with them before we go over to the presentation of the Yoga way itself. A detailed presentation of the development, like the one which we have tried to give during the treatment of the Philosophical School, is, indeed, not possible. It all lies in the tradition. As we have pointed out in the introductory part of our presentation of the Sāṃkhya, only one single work has been preserved for us out of the classical period; that is the Yogasūtra of Patañjali with the commentary of Vyāsa. That is not enough for basing the presentation of the development-process of the system. We must, therefore, restrict ourselves to giving a review of the proper doctrines of this School, as far as they appear in this one work.

The Theoretical Foundations of Yoga: We can pass over the general basic doctrines as they cover most extensively the view of the Philosophical School—especially as they correspond with the views preserved as those of Vindhyaavāsi. We are, however, confronted with important changes and amplifications in the sphere of Psychology and the path of Deliverance into which we must now enter more closely. That this was the sphere on which the School built up its further teaching is not to be
wondered at. When it was seen that its task was to investigate and present the process of Liberation through Yoga, it was then natural to occupy oneself thoroughly with the foundations on which these processes of Deliverance lay. In the case of these further formulations the Yoga School arrived at conceptions, which were presented with deeper knowledge and better-built ideas than the Philosophical School. We have seen during the description of the Philosophical School that outside influences are exceedingly strong in respect of the development-stages which the Sāṃkhya had reached at the time of Vindhyavāsī. We need not be surprised at them here also. But during this further formulation the strong influence of outside doctrines which has come to light here is remarkable. While the Philosophical School is, most of all, indebted to the most important philosophical system which had developed at that time besides the Sāṃkhya—the Vaiṣeṣika, the Yoga School borrowed its important new ideas on which the doctrine of Deliverance is built and elaborated from a different source which was no other than Buddhism.  

We begin with Psychology. Here the Yoga School tried to attain clarity about the course of psychical occurrences in order to be able accordingly to arrange the processes in Yoga. For this purpose, the basic psychological views which had been formulated by the philosophical school were first employed. Vyāsa, as we have already remarked, took over the basic psychological views in the form which has been preserved as that of Vindhyavāsi. Vindhyavāsi had given up the doctrine of the three psychical organs—the faculty of knowledge (buddhi), 'I' consciousness (ahām-kāra) and the thinking organ (manāḥ) and removed all psychical processes to the thinking organ (manāḥ) and explained the thinking organ as well as the psychical organs as infinitely great and all-penetrating (vibhu). The same holds good for Vyāsa. He reckoned only one psychical organ, the thinking organ or as it is mostly called by him, the mind (cittam). He considered it as all-penetrating (vibhu). The later philosophical school of the Sāṃkhya had learnt to distinguish between things and their qualities, and considered all psychical states as qualities (dharmāḥ) and the psychical organ as their bearer (dharmī). Vyāsa also has taken over this view. All psychical occurrences must, corresponding to the basic views of the Sāṃkhya that
every origin is a change (parināmaḥ) of the permanent Ur-matter and its qualities, lie at the basis of all things. This view was shared by Vyāsa. One such transformation, according to the latest interpretation of the philosophical school, consisted in the fact that the former qualities of things vanish and new ones come in their place while the things themselves persist. And accordingly every psychical occurrence is a transformation (parināmaḥ) of the psychical organ in which the former conditions (bhāvāḥ) or qualities (dharmaḥ) of the psychical organ are superseded by new ones.

These simple basic views held as valid by the philosophical school were shaped and further formulated by Vyāsa in his own way and in so doing he borrowed copiously from Buddhistic doctrines. There was at that time one Buddhistic School—the School of the Sarvāstivāda—which had won great influence and esteem. They had given shape to the old Buddhistic doctrine of perishableness of all things in the following way: They said: 'All things have their duration for a moment, they originate and immediately again perish. All things, which appear to continue long, really continue only through a series of such moments which follow each other immediately as in a film and call forth the semblance of continuity.' This doctrine was borrowed by Vyāsa so far that he ascribed the duration of a moment to the qualities of things on whose alternating alteration, every change (parināmaḥ) and with it every origination depends. Thus, all psychological processes consist of a continuous series of psychical conditions which endure for a moment only and dissolve in continual change.

This was not, however, sufficient. The School of the Sarvāstivāda connected the remarkable doctrine of momentariness of all things with a second still more remarkable doctrine. In order to explain the efficacy of action (karma) in the cycle of births which bears its fruit after a long time, an assertion (vāda) was made that everything is or does exist (sārvam asti), i.e. not only the present things really are but also the past and the future, that it is only a variety of its existence through which it distinguishes itself from another. This was the remarkable doctrine according to which the school got its name.

The difference of existence between present, past and future
things was sought to be explained in a different way. Partially it was traced to a difference in conditions (*bhāvāḥ*). The present, the past and the future are, according to the matter or material (*dravyam*), the same; only their conditions changed, as in golden vessels, which are broken in order to make some other things. Gold remains the same, only its forms change. According to a second view, the difference is due to a difference in a mark or a characteristic (*lakṣaṇam*). A thing which is present, past and future bears the characteristic of the present, the past and the future. But while one bears one characteristic it is in no way deprived of other characteristics (*lakṣaṇāni*); e.g. a man inflamed with passion for one woman need not, on that account, be free from passion towards another. A third view asserted the difference between states (*avasthā*). Just as a calculating bullet, in the place of one, implies one, in the place of ten implies ten and in the place of hundred, implies hundred, so also the things are considered different according as they take place in the time-scale: the present, the past and the future. The fourth view finally represents the opinion that things in different times are differentiated from one another only through their relation (*āpeksā*) just as a woman in relation to her mother is considered as the daughter, in relation to her daughter is considered as a mother.

Vyāsa seized these suggestions and transformed them for his ends in a peculiar way. He took over the basic statement that the past and future are according to their nature present just like the present time. As, according to his interpretation, in the origination and disappearance of things it was not new creation and destruction that occurred but only an alternating appearance and disappearance of new qualities, he asserted that the past and future qualities of things are real. Evidently he thought of bringing his view of the nature of transformation (*parināmaḥ*) in unison with the Sāmkhya doctrine that the existent originates only out of the existent. Vyāsa has adopted not only the basic thoughts. He also endeavoured to draw a corresponding exact picture of the transformation (*parināmaḥ*)-processes and elucidate the relation of things and their qualities during these processes, in all the three stages of time; and he harked back in the largest measure to the Buddhistic ideas but adapted them to his views in a thorough way; while so doing he again
took notice of the difference between things and their qualities. In this way, he gained the following picture of the transformation (parināma) -processes.

Every such process carries itself out in a three-fold form. The things change themselves according to their qualities (dharma-parināmaḥ) as during transition from one time-stage to another the characteristic of the time-stage changes. The quality, which disappears, lays aside its characteristic of the present and assumes the characteristic of the past. The quality, which comes into its place, lays aside its mark or characteristic of the future and assumes the characteristic of the present. This change does not, however, imply change in the substance (dravyānyathātvam) but only a change in its condition (bhāvānyathātvam), as gold remains the same in the remodelling of gold-vessels and only its condition changes. Further it is to be observed that a fixed time-stage is connected with the characteristic of that time-stage. But on that account it is not separated from two other time-stages. Just as the man who is seized with passion for one woman need not be free from passion towards another woman. Finally, the qualities at the time-stage of the present change according to their state (avasthāparināmaḥ), because, e.g. one and the same object grows old. With these changes of qualities in which the characteristic remains the same, it behaves like a calculating scale in which one, in the place of one, denotes one, ten, in the place of ten, denotes ten and a hundred denotes, in the hundredth place, hundred, or like a woman who in relation to different other persons is designated as a mother, a daughter or a sister.

All these three forms of transformation (parināmāḥ) together form one peculiar process of transformation. When, for example, a pot is formed out of a lump of clay, the clay changes according to its quality (dharmaḥ) as it lays aside its form of a lump and takes the form of a pot. The quality of the pot-form changes itself according to its characteristic (lakṣaṇam), as it lays aside the characteristic of the future and takes on the characteristic of the present. Finally, the pot changes itself according to the condition (avasthā), as the new pot gradually becomes old. It is, therefore one and the same process appearing in a threefold form. This holds true all the more so, as according to the Sāṃkhyya doctrine which has validity for Vyāsa, things and the qualities of things
are not separate entities as in the Vaiśeṣika but the qualities belong to the nature of the things themselves.

Vyāsa's doctrine of change (parināmaḥ) shows a noteworthy difference as against the Buddhistic interpretation. First, he considers, according to the theory which he holds valid, the distinction between the things and the qualities of things, the transformation (parināmaḥ) from a double view-point. Looked at from the point of things, things appear as a transformation of qualities. Looked at as qualities, on the other hand, from the point of qualities they appear as a transformation of the characteristic. Finally, he still adds out of his own originality the transformation of state (avasthāparināmaḥ). Still his leaning or inclination towards the Buddhistic prototype is unmistakable. Not only the suggestions for the comprehension of different forms of transformation stem from Buddhism but also particulars in the execution of ideas and the examples themselves are taken over.

This general comprehension of every transformation (parināmaḥ) holds good also for all psychical processes. In them, the psychical organ changes itself according to its quality, as for example, one idea disappears and another steps in its place. This idea again changes according to its characteristics, as the earlier idea lays aside the characteristic of the present and assumes the characteristic of the past while the later idea lays aside the characteristic of the future and assumes the characteristic of the present. Finally, the idea of the present can change, according to the state (avasthā), as, for example, when its vivacity or living force diminishes.

We, therefore, see that Vyāsa has formulated clear and detailed ideas about the psychical states and above all about the course of the psychical processes, although in so doing he has utilized suggestions from outside influence. But all is not exhausted with what has been said. Still we must speak of the doctrine which he has taken over and incorporated into his doctrinal edifice—the theory of the psychical impressions (sanskārāh) to which all psychical processes go back.

Vyāsa could receive the stimulus for accepting this theory from the Vaiśeṣika. According to the Vaiśeṣika system, all psychical conditions hold good as the qualities (gūṇāh) of the soul.
Their constitution and how they come into existence had been thoroughly investigated and presented by the teachers of this school. It was found that there is a form of knowledge viz. remembrance which is not conditioned like the remaining forms of knowledge by outside causes but depends on the inside cause; it goes back to an earlier knowledge. To explain it, it was assumed that this earlier knowledge leaves behind an impression (samskāraḥ) on the soul, which, on a given occasion, may call forth similar knowledge—a remembrance or a recollection. Vyāsa now has taken over this idea of the psychical impressions but he uses it more comprehensively than the Vaiśeṣika and, no doubt, in connection with a Buddhistic doctrine.

The leading Buddhistic systems of the classical period, as we shall see more exactly again in the presentation of the systems, know no soul and no psychical organ as the bearer of the psychical occurrences, but they only know the psychical data (dharmāḥ), which have each a duration of a moment and follow one another in close succession. Now there is a state in which the processes of consciousness are suspended and the normal psychical occurrence also suffers interruption. Then the question crops up before the representative thinkers of the system: how in such cases, may the once interrupted chain of moments of knowledge again later continue? The school of the Sautrāntika which was related to the Sarvāstivādin had taught an answer to this question that the interrupted knowledge-series leaves behind a germ or a seed (bījam) out of which springs up later a new knowledge-series. As a bearer of this seed, a kind of under-consciousness was assumed which continued in an uninterrupted series, also in cases where the normal consciousness has been suspended. This doctrine was finally generalized by the idealistic school of Yogācāra which asserted that all the knowledge-processes are called forth through impressions (vāsanāḥ) in the sub-concious and that these knowledge-processes on their side leave behind impressions in the sub-conscious, which are again the cause of newer knowledge-processes.

It is now this form of the doctrine which Vyāsa has taken over. According to Vyāsa, the total psychical processes are traced to the impressions (samskāraḥ or vāsanāḥ) in the psychical organ. They, on their part, again leave behind corresponding impres-
sions in the psychical organ so that impressions and knowledge-processes are called forth alternately and form a continuous succession in which they, as cause and effect, alternate or supersede.

With this ends our description of all the essential points in which Vyāsa has supplemented and further formulated the Śāṁkhyā doctrines in the psychological sphere. We shall now summarize shortly as a conclusion the doctrinal statements, which are of importance for the assessment of the Yoga processes. The following picture will emerge out of this summarization:

The carrier of all psychical occurrences is the psychical organ (manah or citā). All psychical states are the qualities (dharmaḥ) of this organ. They arise out of impressions (samskāraḥ) which cling to the psychical organ and themselves call forth such impressions as later bring forth similar psychic conditions. Every one of these psychical states lasts only for a moment. It appears and again disappears immediately to make place for the next. But all states—not only the present but also the past and the future—are really existent. Only they are found on another level of existence. That is especially important in the case of human passions which in a man, who is affected by them, are present, even if they do not straightforward rise to the level of outward expression or operation.

We shall now go over to the second sphere in which the Yoga School has surpassed the Śāṁkhyā and has accepted and incorporated outside suggestions viz. in the sphere of the doctrine of Deliverance. Here was the most important change which had carried itself out in the early classical period. The change concerned a shift in the place of the good and bad actions (karma) as the cause of entanglement in metempsychosis. According to an earlier comprehension, the action was not the cause of entanglement but it merely determined the course of the wandering of the soul. This comprehension was still valid at the time of the rise of the Śāṁkhyā and was also firmly held in the classical Śāṁkhyā until finally Vindhyavāsi and Mādhava in the days of the decline of the system sought to bring about a change on this point. But otherwise the comprehension of the system was that it is the unconscious work of the Ur-matter that brings about the bondage and consequent embodiment of the soul, while
action merely determines the kind of embodiment. In contrast to this, the later system had developed the view that the action (karma) itself was the cause of re-birth and the whole cycle of metempsychosis. Finally, the driving force of the world-occurrence was seen in action (karma). The emergence of this doctrine which we shall describe in the presentation of the Vaiśeṣika system led to far-reaching conclusions not only with regard to the views concerning Deliverance but also in respect of the whole system. We shall be able to observe the same during the presentation of the Buddhistic systems. The same doctrine now exercised a like influence on Vyāsa.

With regard to this doctrine of actions itself, its changed place in the frame of the system led to two consequences. An attempt was undertaken to inquire into the character and effect of action more exactly and to determine unequivocally the role which it played in respect of Bondage and Deliverance. Both these points are found faced by Vyāsa and we find here also the same leanings towards Buddhistic doctrines as in the psychological sphere.

As regards the action (karma) itself, Vyāsa inquires less into the character of karma than into the kind of its operation and effect. The chief difficulty to be explained in regard to it was how long the past actions are able to bring forth and exercise their effect. Like the Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhistic Schools of the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, Vyāsa taught that the action (karma) leaves behind impressions (saṃskāraḥ) in the psychical organ which bring forth its effect at a given time. It was easy for Vyāsa to do this as the most essential of its effect is seen in pleasure and pain which one experiences as a retribution of earlier actions. Pleasure and pain, which are psychical processes, arise like other psychical processes, out of impressions (saṃskāraḥ or vāsanāḥ) in the psychical organ. It appeared, therefore, only natural to remove the causes which gave stimulus to it in the sphere of the psychical organ. According to Vyāsa, it is imagined that the psychical organ is covered, as the fisherman’s net with knots, with numberless memory-impressions which are called forth by perceptions and feelings in the beginningless cycle of births in different forms of existence and which are able to bring forth, every time, perceptions and feelings of a like sort. Besides, the actions leave
behind impressions in the psychical organ; the impressions lie resting there and gradually mature for retribution until the moment comes when forth they bring their fruit. When this moment comes, they cause the origin of such ideas and such pleasurable or sorrowful feelings, and demand retribution. This occurs because they awaken and bring into operation those memory-impressions which are straightway able to call forth such ideas and feelings and which, in order that their operation should correspond to the form of existence of that moment, must be called forth by a similar experience in a birth of a similar kind.

As for the rest, the following rule holds good for the operation of action (karma): only a few actions — only especially great merit or especially grave guilt find their recompense or retribution in this life. Generally, the fruit of the actions ripens in later births. Now it is not possible that a few actions or every isolated action leads to its own ordained new birth, as otherwise the number of births caused by the actions would be so unlimited that the elimination of accomplished actions would never take place and that would annul just retribution.

We must rather assume that the impression, or as it is mostly called the sediment (karmāsayaḥ) in a life of accomplished actions conglomerates to a unity likewise at the end of this life and now its totality again brings about a new life. It exercises a threefold effect. It causes the coming about of new birth (jātiḥ), and further it conditions the duration of life (āyuḥ) in this birth; finally, it determines the enjoyment (bhogaḥ), that is to say, the pleasure and pain which one experiences in this life.

The rule about the working of the accomplished actions is not without an exception. Because every action is not unconditionally or absolutely bound to bring about fruit or ripening (vipākaḥ), as an Indian is accustomed to say. The rule of fruition or ripening (vipākaḥ) holds good only for some important merit or grave guilt. In the case of trivial actions, retribution can be prevented. So also a trifling guilt can be cancelled by great merit. Or an unimportant action can be merged into other actions (āvāpaḥ), without its operation especially coming into a valid effect. Finally, the ripening of actions can be deferred for a long time (cirāvasthānam) through the preponderance of other works. Considered as a whole, the above given rule retains
its validity to a large extent. So much for the manner of operation of actions.

The second point is as regards the question of the role which action plays in respect of Bondage and Deliverance. Here the main question which was to be answered was: how are the actions as the cause of entanglement in metempsychosis related to ignorance and passion which were so far regarded as the cause thereof? With regard to this question, Vyāsa decided in favour of the solution which the 'doctrinal' system, of Buddhist Schools had chosen. According to that, ignorance and passion are prerequisites for the action in order that it should take effect. Only when they exist, can the fruit of the actions come to ripeness. When they are abrogated, the force of action is also destroyed. It, therefore, can bring about no further embodiment and then Deliverance is won.

In particulars, Vyāsa formulates the doctrine as follows: As in the Buddhistic system, according to Vyāsa also, ignorance and passion together form a uniform group of psychical evil. Vyāsa named this group as five taints or pollutions (kleśāh). These pollutions are five in number, Ignorance (āvidyā), 'I' consciousness (asmitā), Desire or attachment (rāgaḥ), Hate (dveśaḥ) and the Urge to live (abhinivesāḥ). The character of Ignorance is to regard impermanent as permanent, impure as pure, sorrowful as delightful and nonself as self. The 'I' consciousness, depends on the fact that the soul and mind (cittam), the viewing and the instruments of viewing appear as one and the same. The attachment (rāgaḥ) consists in the fact that one craves for pleasure or what is preparatory to pleasure, in recollection of a former pleasure. Similarly, hate (dveśaḥ) consists in the fact that one turns away from sorrow or what is preparatory to sorrow, recollecting a former sorrow. The urge to live is finally the innate drive of every living creature to preserve its life—a drive which ultimately springs out of the agony of death which one has experienced in former life and which has left its impression on the mind.

So long as these taints (kleśāh) are present, the actions (karmāgni) are able to bring about fruit. Their relation is like that of a rice-corn which, so long as it carries husks, is able to put forth sprouts, but no more when the husks are removed. So also
the actions can bring about ripening so long as it is affected by taints but no longer when the taints are removed. In order to avoid a new re-birth through the force of actions and to win Deliverance, the destruction of taints is an absolute pre-condition.

Now the taints (kleśāḥ) are not always active. They can suffer interruption while other psychical conditions preponderate. But nothing is gained by it. Their seed, i.e. the impression in the psychical organ, out of which they spring, continues. As soon as a suitable object wakes them, they again appear forth. Therefore their destruction must be brought about in another way, which is as follows:

It is necessary to enseeble the taints (kleśāḥ). This is possible through a series of religious practices which are designated as kriyāyogaḥ. If they succeed, taints can be really destroyed. The means towards that is meditation. The fire of contemplation or meditation (prasāmkhyānam or dhyānam) burns out, as it were, the germinal force of impressions (vāsanāḥ) on which the taints depend. These impressions continue, but they are like seeds that have lost their germinal power. Although any objects are able to stimulate the senses, the taints (kleśāḥ) can appear no more. With that, action (karma) also loses its power. When the body falls at the end of this existence, taints are no more able to bring about new re-birth. The psychical organ which has fulfilled its task loses itself in the Ur-matter. With that, the last traces of taints disappear and Deliverance is attained.

How is this way of Deliverance related to the knowledge which, according to the Sāṃkhya, forms the pre-requisite of Deliverance? Through the weakening of taints, the mind (cittam) is able to reach the highest knowledge, which consists of the discrimination between the soul and the psychical organ. Through this knowledge, ignorance which is not only the first of taints, but is also the root of the remaining taints, is destroyed and thus knowledge leads to the destruction of taints and to the eventual Deliverance.

With the doctrines described above, we have given the theoretical foundations on which Patañjali and Vyāsa have based their presentation of Yoga as the way of Deliverance. However, before we turn to the description of this way of Deliverance
itself, we must shortly describe a doctrine which is many times regarded as a special peculiarity of the classical Yoga-system, but which, in reality, represents only a later external supplement or addition to the system, viz. the doctrine of God. Vyāsa taught, namely, that there is one highest God (Īśvaraḥ), who may through his mercy lead the Yogin forward in his endeavours. This highest God is a soul who, in contrast to the other souls, is a soul delivered for eternity. He chooses for his body the excellent form of Matter, the purest goodness (sattvam) and stands above or superior to all beings. He is omniscient and of incomparable absolute power. His work is inspired by compassion and is exclusively directed towards the welfare of beings. At every world-creation, he proclaims anew the holy revelations which lead beings to knowledge and piety. The expressive symbol for this highest God is the holy syllable Om. As the Yogi mutters this holy syllable Om and muses over God, he wins his grace. It is possible for him to overcome hindrances, which confront him and to reach the goal of meditation more speedily than otherwise the case would have been.

Even if we attach no weight to the contradiction, which the doctrine contains as against the basic views of the system, the most passing comparison with the proper theistic systems of later times would show how the doctrine of God in Yoga is a mere formal external addition. In those theistic systems, the Godhead is the all-surpassing cause of all world-occurrences, world-creation, world-duration, and world-destruction into which everything goes back. In the Yoga, on the other hand, the Godhead is dealt with as almost unemployed and idle. God helps, no doubt, through his grace, men seeking Deliverance. But on a larger view, beside him, the entire course of the world unrolls independently. The same is the case with the process of Deliverance. In the theistic systems, the grace of God plays a decisive role in respect of Deliverance. Many times, the sacrament transmits the releasing knowledge. In the theistic systems where Yoga leads the way to Deliverance in matters concerning the practices of concentration, it is the meditation of God and his qualities which take a large space. Nothing of this kind is found in the classical Yoga. Besides, in the chief steps of the Yoga-way, God is not generally mentioned; only in a
marginal way the devotion to God is mentioned as helpful and again it is one of the means besides other means and is in no way absolutely necessary. Without it, the Yoga-way can be successfully traversed. The formality of this addition is, therefore, palpable.

How is it, then, that the doctrine of God was incorporated into the system when every inner connection for it was lacking? The answer is: It is the feature of general development which has brought it, along with itself. Already in the general review about the process of development of Indian philosophy which we have placed in the forefront in the beginning of this work, it has been shown that since the middle of the first millennium after Christ, the philosophical systems of the older times, in which the God-idea played no role as a principle of world-explanation, were succeeded and crowded out by other systems bearing a pronounced theistic character. Already this development, however, evinces itself towards the end of the older period, because the God-idea penetrated several systems of the period. We shall find its example in the Vaiśeṣika. An attempt was made to carry the doctrine of God into the Sāṅkhya philosophical school but it remained without any lasting effect in the case of the philosophical school. On the other hand, the idea of the highest God, as we have seen already, has found a place in the Yoga school in the Yogasūtra with the Bhāṣya of Vyāsa—the only important work of the school preserved to us out of older times. One came to see in it the special characteristic of the Yoga system, although neither the old tradition attached any weight to it nor the place in the system justified such a judgment.

We shall now describe the Yoga praxis as it is represented in the Yogasūtra and the Vyāsabhāṣya. This task is not quite easy. As has already been early recognized, the Yogasūtra of Patañjali is composed of different constituents or elements which, in no way, give a uniform homogeneous picture. In the separation and singling out of these elements, there does not prevail general agreement of views, so that we cannot support ourselves by any generally acknowledged result. But a thorough treatment of the question as to how the Yoga-praxis came into being exceeds the limits of our frame of the general history of Indian philosophy. It would be enough, therefore, if
we restrict ourselves to seizing the essentials. And those can be ascertained with pretty certainty.

The description of the so-called eight-limbed Yoga (aṣṭāṅgayoga) forms the kernel in the Text. Widespread views are brought in, in a fixed definite form, therein. It is, therefore, no wonder that this form of the Yoga-way is not exclusively restricted to the classical Yoga system.

The Eight-fold Yoga: A few preparatory practices to the eight-fold Yoga are presented in advance in a summary form under the name of Active Yoga (kṛiyāyogaḥ). They are the penance (tapāḥ), Vedic studies (svādhyāyaḥ) and devotion to God (īśvara-praṇidhānam). They are supposed to serve to enfeeble the taints and to promote meditation. Then begins the proper eight-fold Yoga itself. As already the name expresses, it consists of eight parts or stages. These are the five-fold subdual (yamāḥ), the five-fold discipline (niyamāḥ), the postures (āsanaṃ), the regulation of breath (prāṇāyāmaḥ), the withdrawal of the sense-organs (pratyāhāraḥ), the collectedness (dhāraṇā), the contemplation (dhyānam) and meditation or absorption (samādhiḥ).

The first two stages contain directions about the general moral preparation. The five-fold subdual (yamāḥ) embraces the moral basic commands, not to injure any living creature (ahiṃsā), to speak the truth (satyaṃ), not to steal (aṣṭeyam), to practise chastity (brahma-caryam) and to renounce possession (aṇaparigrahaḥ). The five-fold discipline (niyamāḥ) supplements these commands through directions of a religious kind. It requires purity (śaucam), satisfaction or contentment (saṃtoshaḥ), penance (tapāḥ), Vedic studies (svādhyāyaḥ) and devotion to God (īśvara-praṇidhānam).

The claim or the demand that a general preparation of a moral kind leads the way to Yoga is old. We come across it in the old Epic and in the Deliverance-Ways of the Buddha and the Jina. Here in Yoga, however, it is carried out in a more thorough-going and systematic manner. The single commandments have been exactly described and circumscribed. The command not to kill forbids not only the destruction of life but demands that one should abstain every time and in every form from injury to living creatures. The command to speak the truth demands that word and thought correspond to facts. When one speaks in order to communicate something to others, the speech
need not be deceptive, nor false nor unintelligible. It should serve, besides, towards the well-being of beings and should not tend to injure them. The desire not to steal also means renouncing desire for other's property. The same holds good for chastity. Renunciation of possession implies that one renounces every possession, because one is conscious of mistakes and sins which are occasioned by its acquisition, preservation and loss, of the desires which it awakens, and the prejudices of other beings which it brings. The observance of these five commandments should be gradually raised up to the great vows (mahā-vratāni) which consist therein that they are rigorously observed in every respect without temporal and spatial restrictions.

Sinful thoughts (vitarkāḥ) must be combated. They consist in the fact that a man affected by greed (lobhaḥ), anger (krodhaḥ) and delusion (mohaḥ) not only does things which are forbidden but also causes them or approves of them. Sorrow and Ignorance follow therefrom as a consequence in unrestricted measure. Combating with them succeeds if their opposites are meditated upon (pratipakṣabhāvanam). Through the practice of non-injury towards living creatures, he brings about such an effect that the enmity of creatures vanishes. Through the practice of truthfulness, he attains the state in which his words are fulfilled. Through honesty (absence of theft), he attains the state in which all treasures are at his command. The chastity brings him supernatural powers. And through the renunciation of possession, he acquires the knowledge of the constitution of his past and coming (future) births. Finally are described the gains and the supernatural powers which the constant observance of the commands brings to the Yogi. Under the influence of his proximity, not only the enmity of creatures against him, but also the natural antipathy between animals—cat and mouse, serpent and ichneumon—itself becomes benumbed.

In a similar way, the five-fold discipline (niyamāḥ) is dealt with and described. The purity (sauca) is divided into external and internal purity. The external purity consists in the different baths and washes and in consuming pure food. The inner purity consists in the elimination of the impurity of the mind. This double purity brings about such an effect that one turns away his attention from his own body and from others' bodies. It leads
to the purification of fine matter, the goodness (sattvam) out of which the mind is formed, brings comfort (saumanasyam), concentration (aikāgyam), conquest of the senses (indriyajayah) and finally the ability to view the true 'I' (ātmadarśanayogayatvam). Satisfaction (saṁtosaḥ) implies that one remains satisfied with the satisfaction of the most urgent necessities. Its fruit is an unsurpassable sense of well-being. Penance (tāpaḥ) consists in enduring hunger and thirst, heat and cold and in the observance of rigorous silence. Further it embraces the different sorts of vows (vraṭāni). It brings as reward wonderful powers of the body and the sense-organs. Vedic study (svādhyaśyaḥ) is the reading of the holy scriptures which teach Deliverance and the silent muttering of the holy syllable Om. It leads to the close connection with one's own protective deity. The Devotion to God finally consists therein that one offers all his doings to God (sarvakarmārpanam). Its reward is the success of meditation.

The next three limbs of the eight-limbed Yoga-way represent the preparatory stages of the Yoga-way itself. Already in the earlier times, there are references to postures which the Yogi should undertake in his practices. The same also recurs here again in the theory of the seats or postures (āśanam). The Sūtra puts forth the essentials about it concisely and clearly. The seat or the posture must be firm and comfortable. It is attained through the loosening of the strain and the contemplation of the infinite. That is to say, the practising aspirant of Yoga should overcome every feeling of strain, every feeling of hindrance. Then he is no more affected or touched by the so-called contrasts (dvandvaṁ) such as heat and cold and can strive after meditation undisturbed. This is all which is simple enough. Vyāsa, besides, names, however, a number of particular postures such as the lotus-posture (padmāśanam), the staff-posture (daṇḍāśanam), the curlew-posture (krauñcāśanam) and similar others. Thus, here, therefore, is noticed a luxuriance of externalities or formalities which were to assume, in later Yoga-directions, such an enormous extent and importance (to which the later texts testify).

Also the next limb or stage, the regulation of breath (prānāyāmaḥ) is already connected with what has been known by us. Already in the Epic texts we have found the breath-regulation mentioned and the old Buddhisitic texts put forth detailed ins-
tructions as to how individual breathings should be attentively pursued and observed. We meet here in the Yogasūtras also similar things. It is taught that one should watch, in several individual breathings, the way of breath, its duration and its number. Besides, the holding or arresting of breath gains, however, continually more and more importance. And it marks an important difference as compared with Buddhism. While there in Buddhism, the breath-practices serve especially as practices of vigilance (smṛtiḥ) and are calculated to promote clear consciousness; in Yoga, on the other hand, there is an attempt to influence the state of consciousness directly through the arrest of breath. It implies therewith a development, which, in later Yoga directions, was bound to gain great importance, though here it remains confined to modest limits. It is taught that as a fruit of breath-practices, the hindrances to knowledge disappear and the mind gains therethrough the ability to concentrate itself on a fixed object.

The next stage is the withdrawal of sense-organs (pratyāhāraḥ). It forms a transition to the proper practice of Meditation (samādhiḥ). About the nature and importance of these stages, different views prevail. We have seen that in the old Buddhistic Deliverance Way, a watch over the sense-organs was demanded because the disciple, thus, shunned the sense-impressions which waken in him greediness or displeasure. It agrees with the fact, as according to different teachers these steps are to be so understood, that one should not allow oneself to be carried away by the sense-objects, that one, on account of the vanquishing of love and hate, experiences neither joy nor sorrow in the perception of sense-objects. In the Epic texts, on the other hand, we have found the view represented that it is necessary at this stage to keep off the mind from the objects, to withdraw it in itself as it were, in order to compose itself undisturbed by external impressions. It is this interpretation or comprehension with which Vyāsa finally agrees. According to that interpretation, the withdrawal of the sense-organs consists in the fact that one, on account of the concentration of the mind, perceives the sense-objects no more or as the Sūtra expresses it, that the sense-organs assume, as it were, the form of the mind (cittam) because their connection with the sense-objects is interrupted. The full mastery over the
senses is named as the fruit of this practice.

Herewith are concluded the five first or the so-called external members or stages of the Yoga-Way. Then follow the three last or inner limbs which lead to the highest goal—the absorption (sāmādhiḥ) and with it to the releasing knowledge. The first of these three stages is collectedness (dharana) in which the mind (cittam) is directed to one single object which may be outer or inner, chosen according to one's choice. Already in the Epic texts, it had been designated as an important pre-condition of meditation that the mind roaming all around is to be gathered at one point. The same is demanded here also. The mind (cittam) is unsteady. As we have heard, every one of its conditions lasts for a moment and is immediately replaced by the next. The collectedness of the mind practised only once is not enough. Because the same process of knowledge cannot endure continuously. But by constantly holding fast to the same object and by practice, it can be attained so that the first knowledge-process can be followed by one of a like kind and it includes, therefore, as it were, a stream of moments of knowledge, alike in kind with one another. Then there ensues calmness and a continuity of the knowledge. That is the second stage of meditation—the stage of contemplation (dhyānam). If such contemplation continues for a longer time, knowledge becomes continually clearer. We have heard that according to the older Sāṅkhya doctrine, the knowledge of an object ensues in such a way that the mind reflects the picture of the object, because it takes its form. This picture of the object in the course of contemplation becomes continually more and more distinct and lively. And as, according to the Yoga view, Yoga knowledge is free from thought, this picture alone finally fills the mind (cittam). Every experience as a subject steps back and the knowledge alone comes upon the perception of the object. To the practising Yogi, the object becomes known with such clarity and impressiveness that he trusts that he has known it with full certainty which far surpasses every kind of usual knowledge. Therefore he reaches a conviction that his mind (cittam) has gained supernatural clarity which makes it possible for him to know the truth of the desired object with unshakable certainty. He has thus reached the last and the highest stage of meditation.
the absorption (samādhiḥ).

These three inner limbs of Yoga—collectedness or concentration (dhāraṇā), contemplation (dhyānam) and absorption (samādhiḥ) form the three successively following stages of one and the same knowledge-process and are summarized and named under one name as control (saṃyamaḥ). The Yogi can direct the mastery of the mind and the clear-sightedness associated with it, on different objects and can continually advance from one stage of knowledge to another—to continually higher knowledge. It is not only knowledge which he gets through it but also supernatural wonderpowers which are connected with it. Thus, for example, when he directs the clear insight, which he has gained, on to the psychical impressions (saṃskārāḥ), he can know his former birth. If he directs his insight on the thoughts (pratīyāḥ) of others, he is able to read their thoughts. If he directs his clear insight on the form of the body, he is able to abrogate the perceptibility of the body and can make himself invisible. If he directs his clear insight on the sun, he knows the structure of the Universe. If he directs it to the pit of his throat, hunger and thirst vanish.

Vyāsa describes such and similar wonderful powers which are gained through the employment of the control of the mind (saṃyamaḥ) in a large number. We can pass over them as they have to do with our subject only little and as, besides, they have been dealt with well and exhaustively from different sides, recently in independent works.⁴⁴⁰ Besides, Vyāsa also shares the standpoint of the genuine philosophical Yoga that all these supernatural phenomena and wonderful powers are meaningless and without importance—why, they are even a hindrance—in the attainment of the proper goal of the Yogi, which is the deliverance.

We shall now turn to the last goal—the gaining of releasing knowledge. But in this we come across a difficulty. The total way, hitherto considered, is a mere method—a form of physical and spiritual preparation which is supposed to transmit the ability to win decisive knowledge. The contents of this knowledge and for that matter, the metaphysical views were hitherto a matter of indifference. On account of this, the Yoga-way in the same form was utilized by the adherents of the different doctrines and as a matter of fact Yoga has been used by different Schools. Different is the case with the releasing knowledge itself and with
the conceptions as to how this knowledge operates, and how it brings about Deliverance. These conceptions presuppose necessarily fixed views about the character of the bondage and deliverance. They are different according to the schools which employ the Yoga-way. Why, even the dependence of these conceptions on the theory lying at their base is so great that it itself validates the composite character of the doctrine and of the work of Vyāsa. We find in it, therefore, different descriptions of the Deliverance-processes which deviate from one another and which partly even contradict themselves. We are not in a position to engross ourselves in these single descriptions. We therefore, wish to restrict ourselves to recounting these ideas which best correspond with the ground-thoughts of the system of Vyāsa and the Sāmkhya doctrine in general, and it is as follows:

When the Yogi in the state of absorption has gained full mastery over his mind, he directs it on the discrimination of the soul from matter. He is conscious with full clarity that the purest form of matter (sattva) out of which the mind (cit) is formed, is completely different from the soul, that everything which he hitherto had regarded as his ‘I’, is not the ‘I’, that all entanglement in metempsychosis happens, in truth, in the realm of matter and that the soul is by no means touched or affected by it. With that vanishes the fateful error—the ignorance (avidyā), through which the soul imagines himself entangled in metempsychosis. And with the ignorance, disappear also all other taints (kleśāḥ) of the mind, their root being ignorance. In consequence, the good and bad actions lose their force to bring about a new re-birth. Because under the influence of taints (kleśāḥ) they were able to do so. Thus the chain of re-births comes to an end. Simultaneously with it, the matter fulfills its task (adhikārāḥ) and suspends its activity. The mind (cit) dissolves itself in it. The connection between the Soul and Matter is annulled and the Deliverance is attained.

This presentation is according to what we have gathered from the theoretical views of Vyāsa and is understandable without more ado and needs no further elucidation. This presentation according to Vyāsa partly gives the handed down Buddhistic doctrine, namely, that with the disappearance of taints (kleśāḥ) which are the final cause of bondage, the actions lose their force and
the entanglement in the cycle of births brought about there-through ends. Simultaneously are mixed with it the old Śāmkhya ideas that with the attainment of knowledge of the distinction between the Soul and the Matter, Matter suspends its activity and through that there ensues Deliverance.

In conclusion, if we consider the way of the eight-limbed Yoga in its totality, it yields a fully clear picture. There comes first the observance of moral commandments and external discipline such as is customary in general. Then there is set forth the mental training of an entirely positive definite kind. Through systematic concentration-practices, the knowing ability or faculty of the mind is raised to a supernaturally clear insight, so that the Yogi is finally able to know every desired object through direct view, with full consciousness and certainty. If he directs his mind to the factors on which Bondage and Deliverance depend, he will be able to understand the truth and to win releasing knowledge through it. This procedure is not new but it is already known to us. It is the same way by which the Buddha has found his Deliverance and pointed it out to his disciples. He also taught through systematic practices of meditation to win the unrestricted efficiency of the mind, which renders it possible to know the desired truth. But a direct dependence or borrowing is not, however, to be thought of. The form of meditation-practices had developed on both sides too differently to be considered as borrowing. It is the same basic comprehension of Yoga which has found its formulation in Buddhism as well as in the eight-limbed Yoga of Patañjali and Vyāsa.

The Yoga of Suppression: Still, this is not the only form of Yoga which we find represented in the classical Yoga system. Still another comprehension or interpretation has left traces of another theory behind and it is an interpretation of an entirely different kind. The description of the eight-limbed Yoga fills the second and the third book of the Yogasūtra. On the other hand, the case with the first book is different. It begins with the affirmation that the Yoga consists in the suppression of the activities of the mind (cittavṛttinirodhaḥ). It sounds quite different from what we have heard hitherto. The elucidations which are given in the following aphorisms also correspond to that. It is said that in this way the soul appears in its true pattern, whereas it, other-
wise, assimilates the activity of the mind.

The following view is set forth: According to the known Sāṃkhya doctrine, it is assumed that all psychical processes come into existence through the working together of the soul and the mind and the enmeshing of the soul in the cycle of births depends on this working together. Then, while the soul follows these processes, which, in reality, belong to the sphere of Matter, and refers them to himself, he imagines himself entangled in the sorrow of existence. In order to win Deliverance, the following road is taken: Through systematic Yoga-practices, the activity of the mind is to be more and more circumscribed and is finally to be fully suppressed. When this succeeds, the influence of the mind on the soul ceases and its activity can no more ensue. The soul appears, therefore, alone by itself in its true form, unaffected by anything earthly and thus is Deliverance won.

This comprehension of the way and the goal of Yoga is completely different from that with which we are familiar in the eight-limbed Yoga. There in the eight-limbed Yoga, the Deliverance is striven after by gaining the highest knowledge through Yoga viz. the highest knowledge of distinction between the soul and mind; on the attainment of this knowledge, the Matter suspends its activity, and does not bring about any further embodiment and with it any further bondage. Here in the Yoga of suppression, however, one seeks to reach Deliverance directly, because the activities of the mind are stopped and the bond between mind and the soul is untied. In the first case, the Yoga serves for getting knowledge, and its aim, therefore, is to raise the capacity for knowledge to the highest. In the second case, however, it is sought through the Yoga to suppress every mental activity and with it to eliminate every form of knowledge. Thus there are before us two different comprehensions or interpretations which are fundamentally distinguished from each other and even contradict one another. We therefore come to the result that the classical Yoga system has taken or received two different ways of Yoga and has tried to unite the way of the eight-limbed Yoga and the way of the Yoga of suppression of mental activities. The second way (the Yoga of suppression) stands in no way isolated, without examples.
In the case of the eight-limbed Yoga we have seen that it depends on the same basic views on which the Deliverance-way of the Buddha is based. Here in the case of the Yoga of suppression we find a counterpart in the Epic Texts. When, for example, it is said in the Epic text: "One should withdraw together the senses and the thinking organ (manāḥ) and lock them up within oneself until they come to rest or a standstill and that then the Ātmā shines forth like a smokeless flame," this is the same process as we find in the Yoga of the suppression of mental activities. We find also appropriate parallels in the Jaina Texts which are valuable for the understanding and explanation of the Yogasūtra. Texts which are composed out of the constituents of different descent and unite different doctrines in themselves, cite, in only rarest cases, these doctrines in the genuine unadulterated form. Mostly mutual influence and endeavour to equalize are noticeable. In the attempts so far made to divide the Yogasūtra in its constituent parts, much too little attention has been paid to it. That the Text of the Yogasūtra is composite and contains different constituents has been early recognized. But in analysing them, people proceeded, as if these constituents were merely strung together with one another and it was thought that for separating them, it was sufficient to ascertain the joints or junctures of these separate parts in the places where they together agreed or were well-matched. But things are not so simple. Apart from the fact that in such cases, the single constituents often had a long history behind them and had suffered many changes until they were united with one another, they are, besides, in their union [worked over and revised and then assimilated with one another in the most manifold ways. To those who worked over and revised and carried out the union, all the differences and contradictions remained naturally not concealed and they sought to clear them away and create an effective unity. In a real analysis, that must be taken into consideration. It is necessary to recognize this retouching or revising and to understand the original form of single doctrines. And it is often difficult. For that, kindred, connected texts which have not undergone retouching of such a sort, are of great value.

While considering the way of the Yoga through the
suppression of mental activities, we shall attempt to describe how it is represented in Patañjali and Vyāsa without going into those compensating and equalizing features which have been preserved through working them over, together with the rest of the text. The picture emerges somewhat as follows:

The activity of the mind which is to be suppressed is five-fold: right knowledge (pramāṇam), error (viparyayaḥ), fancy (vikalpaḥ), sleep (nidrā) and memory (smṛtiḥ). Practice (abhyaśaḥ) and desirelessness (vairāgyam) are the two means which serve to suppress them. The practice consists in the fact that one tries to persist in the endeavour for suppression. It succeeds when one pursues it long, uninterruptedly and in the right way. By desirelessness is to be understood the turning away in general from the things of the senses and from the objects of the outer world. Through it, every clue of an object (ālambanam) is withdrawn from the mind. When desirelessness has ascended the highest point, the mind finally resembles, as a Jaina Text has expressed it, “a bird, over the ocean, which, in vain, seeks support other than the ship from which it has flown and suspends its activity.”

But how is the suspension of the activity of the mind possible according to the psychological views of the Yoga system? The mind is filled by an illimitable number of the impressions (saṃskāraḥ) which call forth continually new processes of knowledge, while through these new knowledge-processes, again new impressions (saṃskārali) originate. How can this beginningless chain be interrupted? The Buddhism, with the Psychology of which that of Yoga is most closely related and which already knows a form of meditation in which mental activity is suppressed, the so-called suppression of consciousness and sensations (saṃjñāvedita-nirodhaḥ) assumes that the stream of knowledge-moments is discontinued during the stage of meditation and that during this period the psychical impressions (saṃskāraḥ) bring forth no new knowledge. The Yoga system takes another way. Here we meet with the view that the waking consciousness and the consciousness during the Yoga-practices which already bears the character of suppression (nirodhacittam) and so also the impressions which are left behind by the waking consciousness and the suppressed consciousness (vyutthānasamskāraḥ and nirodhasamskāraḥ) stand
in contrast to one another. The impressions of suppressed consciousness therefore enfeeble those of the waking consciousness and annul them so that finally the waking consciousness ceases to come into existence. This idea at least, according to the testimony of a later commentator, was consistently thought out further and carried to its conclusion. The impressions of the suppressed consciousness accordingly not only destroy those of the waking consciousness but in the course of further meditation or absorption they enfeeble themselves continually more and more and finally annul themselves as lead, which is mixed with gold, not only consumes in the heat of the fire the stains of gold but also consumes itself. Thus comes about at last the complete suppression of every activity of the mind. The ideas of Vyāsa shape themselves differently and in consonance with the Sāmkhya doctrine. According to him, the impressions originating during meditation or absorption weaken those of the waking consciousness and paralyse their force so that they are no more able to bring forth new states of wakeful consciousness. They themselves are not of that kind that they would impose a burden on the mind with further tasks (adhikāraḥ) or would cause a continuance of the activity of Matter. The Matter suspends its activity, the mind merges into it, and with that the Soul is released from its entanglement in the Matter.

This is the essential and the fundamental thing in the Yoga-way which should lead to the suppression of the activity of the mind. There have been independent attempts further to organize and improve the Yoga-way and to give in the hands of practising aspirant further clues and help. For example, a series of hindrances are cited and the means to eliminate them are enumerated. For that devotion to God (śvapraṇidhānam) also is named in that connection. The nature of God is also described in details, only once in the whole work. Then the means, are enumerated in a loose order, to make the soul quiet and composed. Thereunder appear also breath-practices. Further there are recommended the practice of love (maitrī), compassion (karuṇā), hilarity (muditā), and equanimity (upeksā). They are the same four practices with which we are acquainted as the four immensities (apramāṇāni) of the Buddha. Above all is to be mentioned an attempt to organize the Yoga-way, in,
order to give to the disciple clear clues for his practices and for a systematic progress of these practices. With this aim in view the steps on which the practices of meditation are accompanied by consciousness (samprajñātaḥ samādhiḥ) are distinguished from the steps on which the consciousness is extinguished (asamprajñātaḥ samādhiḥ). The stage on which the impressions are present in the spirit (sabijāḥ samādhiḥ) is distinguished from the last step, on which the aspirant succeeds in annihilating the impressions (nirbijāḥ samādhiḥ). Especially there is sketched out for the disciple a fixed plan of practices which is supposed to lead him from the stage which is inside the consciousness in meditation further on until a stage is reached when consciousness itself is overcome. For that, above all, the ideas of musing (vitarkaḥ) and reflection (vicāraḥ), which had been already utilized by the Buddha in order to distinguish them from the four stages of meditation taught to him, were employed; these, also though in another sense, appear among the meditation-practices of the Jīna. Four stages of conscious meditation or absorption were enumerated. On the first, the musing (vitarkaḥ) predominates. On the second the musing vanishes and in its place reflection (vicāraḥ) steps in. On the third stage, reflection vanishes and the practising aspirant is governed by a feeling of bliss (ānandaḥ). The characteristic of the fourth stage is finally the mere ‘I’ consciousness (asmitā). According to another classification, the four so-called comprehensions (samāpattayaḥ) are distinguished. The first is accompanied by musing (savitarikā). The second is free from musing (nirvitarkā). The third is accompanied by reflection (śavicārā). The fourth is free from reflection (nirvicārā). In this, the musing and reflection are defined in such a way that the musing occupies itself with gross objects and the reflection with fine subtle objects. It is this one distinction which agrees with the Buddhistic ‘doctrine’ and may have well been taken over from there.224 With the fourth and the last of these comprehensions (samāpattayaḥ), the mind attains its perfect clarity and the practising aspirant attains the highest truth-bringing form of knowledge (ṛtambharā prajñā). With this he stands directly before the stage of unconscious absorption (asamprajñātaḥ samādhiḥ), which, with the vanishing of psychical impressions, brings Deliverance.
This is quite sufficient to give an idea of how Patañjali and Vyāsa have set forth the doctrine of the Yoga of suppression. We can, therefore, conclude our description of this form of Yoga. Simultaneously we have also exhausted all the essential points which have to be described about the classical Yoga-system in general; and our presentation of the total system is herewith likewise finished.

Now there should follow the description of the third school of Śāṅkhya—the Tāntric School of Pañcādhihikaraṇa. But the materials for it are so scarce that a connected account of it of that time cannot be thought of, for the time being. It remains our task to summarize the results of our consideration of the Śāṅkhya and its development. We shall bring before our eyes what the Śāṅkhya has created and achieved in order to answer the question: What place does the Śāṅkhya occupy in the history of Indian Philosophy?

For that it is advantageous to undertake first the appraisal of the Yoga system. As our presentation has already shown, the classical Yoga system has no independent philosophical importance. It is, in all essential features, dependent on the Śāṅkhya doctrines as they were formulated in the philosophical school. Further formulations in the Yoga are found only in the sphere of Psychology and the Deliverance Doctrine. But also for these formulations themselves, there come in suggestions from outside, namely, out of Buddhism, though they are used partially originally and we cannot speak of mere slavish dependence with regard to them. Still we find nowhere any new thoughts which are philosophically really fruitful. The classical Yoga-system has, therefore, played no role in the circle of the philosophical schools of its time. It is not considered—why, it is not even generally mentioned—in the mutual discussions of the systems with one another.

Its importance lies rather in the Yoga-praxis. In the doctrine of the eight-limbed Yoga, there is, from the point of inward contents, created nothing new; but the elements taken over are brought in an unusual happy form which, with its clear organization and its systematic numerical arrangement, corresponds with the Indian spirit at its best. No wonder that this form of the Yoga won quick popularity and dissemination. This Yoga-way had now in the Yugasūtra and in the commentary of Vyāsa gained
a solid philosophical foundation which, no doubt, offered nothing new but which was created out of the best that had been brought forth by the philosophy of the classical period. It was an imposing edifice which Vyāsa had erected and which could not fail to exercise its influence in the long run. Thus it became effective. When the old philosophical system was dead, and one no more asked whether a work contributed anything new to the problems of the moment, the work of Vyāsa (Vyāsabhāṣya) appears in a new light. It appears as the most important representation of Yoga out of the older time. As the old systems went more and more into oblivion, and continued in the general picture only in their large features, the Yogasūtra and Yogabhāṣya came to be more and more regarded as the representative of an independent system. Thus it finally gained the validity as the basic work of the classical Yoga system and attained the name and esteem that remain up to this day. Therein lies its peculiar importance.

Now we shall direct our glance to the proper Sāṁkhya-system—the system of the Philosophical School. Almost for a thousand years, this system assumed an outstanding place in Indian Philosophy, partly having an undisputed lead, partly in successful contest with the other leading systems. Is this place deserved? Does it correspond with its philosophical worth? What has it created? What has it permanently added to the treasure of the philosophical thought-wealth?

Before we answer these questions, we shall recall, in short, what new thoughts the Sāṁkhya has brought forth. Above all, to such new thoughts belongs the sharp distinction between Soul and Matter, whereby all working is attributed to Matter, and only pure spirituality is admitted in the case of the Soul. Besides, in a systematical summarization, there are enumerated all the Elements of Existence in the series of 25 principles (tattvāni). Further, a new thing is the Evolution-Theory formulated by the Sāṁkhya—above all the doctrine of the Ur-matter and its three qualities. Among the psychical organs, the 'I' consciousness and five organs of action are new creations. Also the thorough-going treatment of the Elements implies a progress. About the doctrine of the World-periods, World-construction and World-occurrence, much has been formulated for the first time in the Sāṁkhya
circles. In anthropology, the doctrine of the wandering fine body was further built up here more than elsewhere. The doctrine of the fifty ideas (pratyayāḥ) brought an important advance in the sphere of Psychology. In the doctrine of Deliverance, the entanglement of the Soul in the Matter and the grounding of this entanglement through the error which does not distinguish between Soul and Matter are elaborated with classic exactness. Finally, the Causality-Theory of the Śāṁkhyā and the Psychological Theories—especially about the cooperation of the Soul and the psychical organs in the knowledge-processes are to be emphasized as important achievements.

The number of new essential doctrines of the Śāṁkhyā is, therefore, not small. But what is their philosophical worth? The distinction between Soul and Matter, as it was carried out by the Śāṁkhyā, especially the reference of all efficiency in working to the sphere of Matter, has not turned out to be happy. It produced the greatest difficulties in the way of explaining under this pre-supposition the co-operation of Soul and Matter. This doctrine was, therefore, rejected by all the remaining schools. The theological systems of the later times which have been built on the Śāṁkhyā doctrines extensively, have not accepted this doctrine. The attempt to summarize all elements of existence in a group of 25 principles, soon, met opposition. It was found arbitrary and unsystematic. It is not to be denied that other attempts—above all the Categories-Theory of the Vaiśeṣika—are superior to it. The doctrine of the Ur-matter met with rejection everywhere. The Schools of the classical period gave preference to the Atom Theory of the Vaiśeṣika. The doctrine of the three qualities (gunaḥ) was derided by them as odd and eccentric. The placing of āhaṃkāra as an independent psychical organ—the whole triad of the Inner Organs in general—turned out to be superfluous and was finally given up. The attempt to enlarge the circle of sense-organs through the five organs of action had still less success. In the treatment of the Elements, the Vaiśeṣika was superior to the Śāṁkhyā. The doctrines of the world-periods, world-construction and world-occurrence belong mainly to the sphere of mythology and are philosophically valueless. The doctrine of the wandering organism turned out to be superfluous and the example of Vindhyavāsī shows that the Śāṁkhyā could get on well without it.
The doctrine of the fifty ideas was soon overhauled, so that the Sāṃkhya itself was compelled to borrow the advanced psychology of other schools. The finely worked out Deliverance-Doctrine itself is quite a considerable performance but offers nothing extraordinary as compared with other systems. The theory of causality and the theory of knowledge are no doubt elaborated earnestly and carefully. But the Causality Theory in its over-pointed one-sidedness met with opposition in general. And the theory of knowledge—especially the doctrine of the working together of the Soul and the psychical organ relied with its artificiality exclusively on the presupposition of the Sāṃkhya about the constitution of Soul and Matter and had nothing to offer to other systems.

The reckoning, therefore, produces no favourable result for the Sāṃkhya. Most items turn out to be weak or unimportant and the sum-total that is supposed to prove its philosophical worth is scanty. But how, then, does this rhyme with the great role which the Sāṃkhya has played so long in the history of Indian philosophy so indisputably?

We have hitherto evaluated the performance of the Sāṃkhya and the result of its thought-achievement as it has been represented at the end of the classical period of Indian Philosophy. But such an evaluation must necessarily turn out to its disadvantage. The Sāṃkhya is the first and the oldest among the philosophical systems of India. It is not the first systems that usually bring forth the final and abiding thought but the last which stand on the highest point of development. The first are the pioneers and road-signs. They often give the most important suggestions. But the conclusion, the final form is reserved to its heirs, to carry the development to its perfection. The role of the Sāṃkhya is to be understood in this way. The great masters of the Sāṃkhya are pioneers. The doctrine of the Ur-matter and its three qualities, the question of the driving force behind the World-occurrences, the doctrine of fifty ideas and how they work,—all these opened new pathways to thought. The views are ancient. They belong to the period of strange theories and operate strongly. At that time one did not know to give proofs and arguments but helped himself with images and similes. But the ways are pointed out. Therein lies the great merit of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, not in which of its doctrines had a lasting continuity.
Still we must consider something more. Hitherto we have considered the things only from the horizon of the older period of Indian Philosophy. But that is not enough if we wish to reckon rightly the significance of the Sāṁkhya. The blossoming-time of the system of the classical period had no continuance. The hour, which signified that its time had passed away, soon arrived and new forces entered the field. With these forces the Sāṁkhya came again to be evaluated anew.

In the course of our presentation we have repeatedly emphasized that the Sāṁkhya, since the old period, had a strong support in the religious Brahmanical circles. Thus it could early penetrate different spheres and take root. We meet with the Sāṁkhya in the later Upaniṣads. Not only the popular heroic Epic, but also the religious epic of the Purāṇas is filled, in a far-reaching measure, with the Sāṁkhya thoughts. In the literature of the religious sects, in old legal literature (dharmaśāstra), everywhere we meet with the Sāṁkhya ideas. As towards the end of the first millennium after Christ, the old philosophical systems began to die and the religious streams rose high under the lead of Brahmanical circles, the old Sāṁkhya thoughts were again carried aloft and were effective in their full magnitude. Not only that. The religious systems, which were newly created, utilized, in connection with old tradition, the thought-wealth of the Sāṁkhya in a rich measure. Why, even an attempt was made to animate the old philosophical Sāṁkhya system again with the spirit of the new times. The success of these attempts was not great. But it betokens the power which the Sāṁkhya ideas had gained again. This course of development had led to the fact that a series of characteristic Sāṁkhya doctrines had won unusual dissemination so that one could say that until up to the newest times, the whole spiritual life of Indians was most strongly influenced by the Sāṁkhya ideas.225 The Sāṁkhya has, therefore, a double importance. Its work was pioneering in the development of the classical philosophy of Indians and essentially contributed toward leading this philosophy to its height. Further, through its close connection with Brahmanical circles, it has penetrated extraordinarily far into the entire Indian spiritual life and has up to the recent times participated in defining its form in essential features. If, therefore, its pure philosophical importance is less than that of many other systems,
its historical importance is all the greater. One can rightly assert that without the knowledge of Sāmkhya philosophy, a full understanding of Indian intellectual-spiritual development is not possible.
Bibliography (Select) and Notes

General Literature


1 I cite here also works which have newly appeared and could not be used in my presentation.


About the literature of different schools and systems is above all, to be compared the following:


1. The Periods of Indian Philosophy

The chapter about the periods of Indian Philosophy is bound to be regarded as an original presentation as it rejects the hitherto published presentations largely straightway on this point: After the description of the ancient period, the hitherto published works deal with the most important systems of the later period equally beside one another, as though, with the beginning of the system-building, the development of Indian philosophy had, in a large measure, concluded and that as if now the systems had continued beside one another without essential changes—a procedure which has necessarily become the source of different errors. In reality, the philosophical systems of India are separated from one another by a period of centuries and have themselves undergone again a centuries-long development which was often accompanied by the most intense changes. Why, I believe to have even shown that in the period itself after the beginning of the system-building, two great development-periods allow themselves to be distinguished, which
are essentially different from one another. And all this must naturally be taken into consideration from the beginning of the work.

The course of philosophical development can partly be gathered out of the history of philosophical literature. Indeed, a distinction must be made with regard to the importance of individual works. He who deals with Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' and a text-book of the teachings of the philosophy for intermediate schools will necessarily come to a wrong result. Further, the polemic of philosophical schools going on against one another among themselves is very rich in the information it gives. It can be known from it, which systems were considered to be of value at different times and what importance was attached to them. Finally the inner development of the doctrines themselves gives a decisive starting-point or clue. For a more exact establishment of the interpretation offered by me, I point to my essay, "Der arische Anteil an der indischen Philosophie" ('The Aryan Share in Indian Philosophy') (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Bd. 46/1939-pages 267-291). The following presentation, I hope, will give the best justification.


3. The Philosophy of the Veda Literature.

Oldenberg, H. : Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, Göttingen 1915.

Barua, B.M. : A history of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy, Calcutta 1921.


Ruben, W. : Die Philosophen der Upanishaden, Bern, 1947. Of the general works is especially P. Deussen's 'Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie' to be referred to here. Of that work, the second part of the first volume is exclusively devoted to the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

Translations

Deussen P. : Sechzig Upanisad's des Veda, Leipzig 1897,² 1921.

Hume R.E. : The thirteen principal Upanishads, Oxford 1921,² 1931.


Hertel, J. : Die Weisheit der Upanischaden, München 1920,² 1922.

Some more texts with translation:

Böhtlingk, O. : Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, Peters burg 1889; Chāndogyopaniṣad, Leipzig 1889.


In order to understand rightly the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, it is necessary, above all, not to bring in later things into them. Especially, one need not read into them the idealistic monism of Śaṅkara, as Deussen, above all, has done. The doctrine of Śaṅkara is separated from the older Upaniṣads by more than a thousand years and it entirely relies on other presuppositions and views which were created only in the transitional period. We shall come to speak of them in the second part of the present work. Further, there is no uniform, homogeneous philosophy of the Upaniṣads. Only the later Vedānta system has created an artificial unity. The old Upaniṣads know only a number of isolated texts, which are individually recited
as independent texts. They are repeatedly enough handed down in different contexts and thus prove their independence. The task for which the science stands is now to comprehend these different doctrines in their originality, to order or arrange them and to explain their origin and development. In my treatise, I have tried to discharge this task. In doing so, I have exclusively started from the doctrines themselves. I have avoided to gain or secure external clues out of the frame of narrations, as their historical worth appears to me to be utterly questionable. For different details, I point to my "Untersuchungen zu den älteren Upaniṣaden" (Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik, Volume 4/1926 p. 1-45). I even now hold the statements made in that work to be right in all essential points.


5) Kauśītaki-Upaniṣad II 5.


8) Besides the presentations on the transmigration of the soul and its origin in the general works on Indian philosophy, especially the works of Deussen and Oltramare, compare, above

9) Śatapathabrāhmaṇam XI, 1, 1 ; compare also J. Hertel, Die Himmelstore im Veda und im Avesta. Indo-iranische Quellen und Forschungen, Vol. II, Leipzig 1924.

10) Compare Jaininīyabrāhmaṇam I 18 and I 49, 7-50, 5.

11) The text is preserved in a two-fold form, in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad V, 3-10 and in the Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad VI, 2 (=Śatapathabrāhmaṇam XIV, 9, 1, 12-16). Further, the frame of narration in its kernel is the same as in the Kauśitaki-Upaniṣad. In the citation of the frame of narration, I have partly leant on that in the Kauśitaki-Upaniṣad. In the statement of the doctrine I have followed, as it appeared to me better, now the one and at another time the other version.

12) Chāndogya-Upaniṣad V, 1, 6-15, 2 and Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad VI, 1, 7-14.


14) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad I. 3. Compare Jaininīya-Upaniṣad-Brāhmaṇam I, 60, II, 1-2, II, 10-11 ; compare also Chāndogya-Upaniṣad I, 2, where the gods revere the life-forces as Udgītha.

15) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad I, 5, 21-23.

16) Chāndogya-Upaniṣad IV, 1—3. The text was translated by H. Lüders and was dealt with in details in his essay “Zu den Upaniṣads 1. Die Saṃsvargavidyā”, Sitzungs-berichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.—hist. Klasse 1916 (=Philologica Indica, Göttingen 1940, p. 361 ff.) I cite the text abridged.

18) Chāndogya-Upaniṣad III, 13, 7-8 and Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad V, 9.


20) ibid. p. 21-24.


22) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 3, 21.

23) For example, Satapathabrāhmaṇam X, 6, 3; Bhagavadgītā VIII 5 f.; Majjhimanikāya 120. Compare further F. Edgerton, ‘The hour of death, its importance for man’s future fate in Hindu and Western religions’, Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, Vol. VIII/1927, pp. 219-249.


25) Compare the Buddhistic doctrine of gandharvaḥ in the chapter on the Buddha and note 111 in the sequel.

26) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 4, 2.


28) ibid. p. 21 ff.

29) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad III, 4, 2.

30) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad III, 8, 8 (abridged).

31) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad III, 9, 26; IV, 2, 4; IV, 4, 22; IV, 5, 15.

32) Compare H. Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden and die Anfänge des Buddhismus, Göttingen 1915, p. 44 ff. About the origin and the importance of the word brāhma, compare, further, H. Oldenberg, Zur Geschichte des Wortes brāhma, Nachrichten der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Götting-

33) Śatapathabrāhmaṇam X, 6, 3 and Chândogya-Upaniṣad III, 14. In my citation, the introductory statements are abridged. In the rest of the treatment, I alternately follow now the one, another time, the other version.

34) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV, 4, 22-23 (abridged).
35) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad III.
36) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV 3-4.

37) The text is in two versions. Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad II, 4 and IV, 5. In my citation I follow predominantly the first version but also choose here and there, sporadically, the second.


40) Aitareya Āraṇyakam II, 1, 7 and II, 4 (=Aitareya Upaniṣad I).

41) Chândogya-Upaniṣad VI. The text has gained special notice as a prototype for the later Sāṃkhya system. For its interpretation, compare also H. Jacobi, Über das Verhältnis des Vedānta zum Sāṃkhya, Aufsätze zur Kultur-und Sprachgeschichte vornehmlich des Orients, Festschrift E. Kuhn, Breslau 1916, p. 37 ff.; H. Oldenberg, Zur Geschichte der Sāṃkhya-Philosophie, Nachrichten der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften

42) Taittirīya-Upaniṣad II, 1. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad is, however, a relatively late text.

43) Taittirīya-Upaniṣad II.

4. The Philosophy of the Epic. The Yoga

Literature


Among the general works, Deussen's 'Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie', especially contains in the third part of the first volume a detailed presentation of the philosophy of the Epic Period. As regards the literature about the first stages of the Sāṃkhya in the Epic, I give information about it in the Chapter on the Sāṃkhya system. For the beginnings of the Yoga compare:


Translations


Just as in the case of Vedic Philosophy, the most important presupposition or pre-requisite for the understanding of Epic Philosophy is also to separate neatly the different doctrines. There is no uniform, homogeneous Epic philosophy, but what lies before us, is an assemblage of independent texts which from the point of contents point to the sharpest differences, and from them every text must be separately dealt with and evaluated by itself. One who mixes up these different doctrines entangles
himself in a desolate muddle and makes vain efforts to come to a clear result. I have, therefore, in my presentation made the attempt to seize the oldest and the most valuable of texts lying before us in the Epic, to define the doctrines contained in them in their originality and to utilize them thus for the history of Indian Philosophy.

Concerning the period of these texts and the doctrines contained in them, external clues are missing. Inner grounds must, therefore, decide it and they speak in favour of an early start. It shows, how I have set forth in my presentation the relation of the texts dealt with, with the remaining doctrines of the older period and it will get still more clear during the description of the origin of the system of the Sāṃkhya as well as the Vaiśeṣika. The oldest form of the Sāṃkhya is found in the Epic. The doctrine of the world-ages, as it lies in 'the questions of Śuka', contains the prototype of the Evolution Theory of the Sāṃkhya and has found acceptance in a remodelled form as an introduction in the law-book of Manu. And the dialogue between Bhṛgu and Bharadvāja shows us in ancient form one of that Nature-doctrines out of which gradually the Vaiśeṣika grew forth. I, therefore, see nothing doubtful in tracing back the described texts far back in the pre-Christian period. The Mahābhārata, no doubt, as it lies before us, is late and is produced in this form only towards the middle of the first post-Christian millennium. But the kernel reaches far back in the pre-Christian period and it appears to me acceptable without further ado, that also the constituents which are generally united with this kernel, contain in parts right old material. I, therefore, do not hesitate to place the oldest philosophical texts which the Mahābhārata contains, not long after the time of the Buddha. For different details in the handling and the assessment of the texts I point to my 'Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma, I Die nichtsāṃkhystichen Texte', Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. XLV/1925, pp. 51-67.

44) Compare in this connection the observations of E. H. Johnston, Early Sāṃkhya, London 1937 p. 6. Occasionally there appear to be large sections taken over, which on their side, point again to a similar chronological layer.

45) Mahābhārata XII, 201-206. I follow the same number-
ing with regard to chapters and verses of the Mahābhārata as P. Deussen (the Calcutta edition of 1834-39).

46) Mahābhārata XII, 203, v. 6-7.
47) Mahābhārata XII, 203, v. 15-17.
48) Mahābhārata XII, 204, v. 13.
49) Mahābhārata XII, 204, v. 2-3.
50) Mahābhārata XII, 205, v. 9.
51) Mahābhārata XII, 205, v. 13. The transmission of this verse strongly vacillates.

52) Mahābhārata XII, 205, v. 20.
53) Mahābhārata XII, 205, v. 12
55) Mahābhārata XII, 204, v. 6.
56) Mahābhārata XII, 231-233.

58) For the doctrine of World-ages compare especially R. Reitzenstein and H. H. Schaedler, 'Studien zum antiken synkre-
tismus', Studien der Bibliothek Warburg VII, Leipzig 1926. Rich material is contained also in A. Olrik, Om Ragnarok, Kopenhagen 1902 and 1914, German by W. Ranisch 1922. A presentation of the Indian doctrine of the world-ages according to another section of the Mahābhārata is set forth by R. Roth, 'Der Mythus von den fünf Menschenanschlechtern bei Hesiod und die indische Lehre von den vier Weltaltern, Tübingen 1860. I follow in my presentation exclusively the statements of the Mokṣadharma.

59) The short hint of a creation-doctrine in the Taittirīya-
Upāniṣad II, I is relatively late and is rather an echo than the starting-point of an authoritative development.

60) The version of the text which was utilized in the Law-
book of Manu does not know 'the great Being' but allows 'the thinking' (manaḥk) to arise directly out of the Brahma. This is evidently an older doctrine and the introduction of 'the great Being' represents a late stage of development. Compare my 'Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma I. Die nicht Sāmkhyisti-
61) Mahābhārata XII, 183-187.
64) Mahābhārata XII, 240, v 19 f and 35.
65) Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad II, 3, 6.
Compare also Kena-Upaniṣad IV 29.
66) Mahābhārata XII, 328, v. 39.
67) Mahābhārata XII, 195, v. 6 f.
68) Mahābhārata XII, 240, v. 15.
69) Mahābhārata XII, 195, v. 12 f.
70) Mahābhārata XII, 240, v. 16.
71) Mahābhārata XII, 250, v. 6 and 302, v. 49.
72) Compare Mahābhārata XII. 308, v. 23.
73) Mahābhārata XII, 328, v. 40.
75) Mahābhārata XII, 240, v. 4 f = 275, v. 13 f;
Compare also 302, v. 11 and 303, v. 55.
77) ibid. p. 342 and 345.
79) Mahābhārata XII, 236, v. 22 ff.
80) Compare the fine subtle body which the Buddhist ascetic pulls like a blade of grass out of a sheath of leaves.

5. The Buddha and the Jina

Literature

Rhys Davids T.W. : Buddhism, London 1890; German, Leipzig (Reclam) 1899.
Hardy E. : Der Buddhismus nach älteren Pāli-Werken, Münster 1890, 3 1926.
Glasenapp, H.v. : Der Buddhismus in Indien und im Fernen Osten, Berlin and Zurich 1936.
Glasenapp, H. v.: Der Jainismus, eine indische Erlöungsreligion, Berlin 1925.


TRANSLATIONS

Total important texts of the Pāli-canon are translated in the Sacred Books of the Buddhists, London and in the Translation Series of the Pāli Text Society and they are:

Dīghanikāya by F.W. Rhys Davids, 1899-1910;
Majjhimanikāya by Lord Chalmers 1926-27;
Aṅguttaranikāya by F.L. Woodward and E.M. Hare 1932-1936.

Besides, before all, are to be named:
Dīghanikāya translated in selections by R.O. Franke, Quellen der Religion-geschichte, Göttingen und Leipzig 1913.
Der ältere Buddhismus (according to the texts of the Tripitaka), by M. Winternitz, Religious-Historical Reader edited by A. Bertholet, Vol. 11, Tübingen 1929.

The translations of the Jaina texts are before all, the following:

My presentation of the doctrine of the Buddha will appear to many as old-fashioned, because it does not follow the currents which were predominant during the last thirty years in the Western Buddhistic research. But according to my view, in science or knowledge, the new is not always the best or the most right, and I have not followed this current for good reasons.

Firstly, what concerns the interpretation which above all is put forth or represented by the Russian Scholars and which belongs to the essential doctrines of the later Dogmatics,—
especially the Dharma-doctrines already being ascribed to the Buddha—therein I see only an untenable anachronism. The third volume of this work will set forth detailed arguments in favour of this view which will be described there during the origin of the later Buddhistic systems and I must refer my readers to that volume and request them to be patient until then.

In an equally least degree, I can join in the interpretation which holds the canonical tradition of Buddhism as fully untrustworthy and either means that the attempt which wishes to ascertain anything certain about the doctrine of Buddha or which believes in the possibility of reconstructing Ur-Buddhism in a quite different way beyond the pale of the canonical tradition is without any prospects or futile. The scepticism must itself observe a certain rule. The handed-down source-material is still not untrustworthy, even if the external testimony is missing, at least in India where external historical frame is more defective than elsewhere. Corresponding to its nature or way, it must be assessed and dealt with in a different way. At least, such information, as long as it is not contradicted by counter-testimony or is improbable on inner grounds or reasons, has at least a claim to be equally or justly utilized as a working-hypothesis, until further research ratifies it or contradicts it. He, however, who, in spite of all this, rejects it, should not restrict himself to a mere negation or denial but on the other hand, he has the duty to explain his position and to justify it.

How does the position stand with the information or knowledge about the oldest Buddhism? In the writings of the Pāli-canon there lie before us bulky old collections of Texts and though the concluding redaction of the canon took place through many centuries after the death of the Buddha, it does not point against the antiquity of the material contained in it. We see, on the contrary, from the examples of similar collections that such material is often older by many centuries than the final wording or the form in which it lies before us. And as a matter of fact, the comparison of the Pāli-canon with other versions of the canon shows also an impressive common kernel. Now, Oldenberg in his classical work has shown that the Pāli-tradition contains numerous completely trustworthy features in respect of the personality of the Buddha and I do not see why the same should
not hold good for his doctrine, the transmission of which was certainly more opportune to his oldest adherents, than the transmission about his personality. Naturally we must reckon with or take into account different recastings or revisions (of the doctrine), as it is conditioned by a long oral tradition. But about the fact as to of what kind such recastings or revisions are, we find an abundance of examples and the differences in the isolated versions of the Buddhistic canon give us a clear view about them.

The principal mass of the handed-down teachings of the Buddha consists of sermons and provides comparatively little for the knowledge of his doctrines. Because a preacher does not set forth a ‘dogmatik’ but seeks to produce an effect on his hearers, corresponding to the circumstances and their capabilities and many a thought which he speaks out owes its origin to the particular moment. But in all these teachings certain basic thoughts and formulas continually recur again and again; and if we consider them in the frame of the total philosophical development of ancient India, they show an entirely original or unique stamp which is not comparable with any other like phenomena and almost compellingly trace themselves back to a definite original or unique Personality and I have no doubt in seeing in this the personality of the Buddha himself. The basic formulas may not, perhaps, have been preserved literally but I am convinced that they are handed down to us in a way appropriate for the purpose, from the point of their meaning and significance. And if their explanation is bound up with many difficulties, the task with which we are confronted is not essentially less difficult than, for example, in the case of the explanation of the doctrines of the pre-Socratics. On him, who, however, denies the words of the Buddha or intends to be able to reconstruct the original doctrine of the Buddha beyond his words, falls the duty to demonstrate in a trustworthy manner, how the handed-down doctrine of the canon arose and how it came about that the original words of Buddha were crowded out. Because, for the explanation of the transmitted tradition, we do not circumvent it. We must start from it and again come back to it, if we do not wish to lose ourselves in a flight of euphoria which necessarily leads to ruin sooner or later.
I have, therefore, built my presentation of the doctrine of the Buddha on these basic formulas. The main emphasis is laid on its interpretation and explanation. In so doing, I have kept before my eyes also the later 'Dogmatik', but in essentials I have explained them out of themselves and out of their own period. And I believe that thereby I have brought forward a number of new observations and points of view.

In conclusion, there is still one view which should be mentioned, that the oldest Buddhist doctrine was a popular religion of Paradise. Here I share the opinion occasionally expressed by L. de La Vallée Poussin that in Buddhism, side by side with the philosophical doctrines, naturally popular ideas are always given. But we need not place these directions one-sidedly in the forefront, even when casually the external testimony should be more favourable to them in the more ancient time, than for the doctrine of the canon. In every case, however, we do not, during this interpretation, escape the task to explain satisfactorily the origin of the canonical doctrine. As for the rest, the canonical doctrine alone is philosophically valuable and it, therefore, comes into the picture for the presentation of Indian Philosophy.

About my presentation of the Jaina doctrine, I have nothing further to remark that everything necessary has been said in the text.


83) About the life-time of Buddha, compare, before all, the summarizing discussion by L. de La Vallée Poussin, in the above-mentioned place, pp. 238-248; there also is further literature.

84) Compare e.g. Majjhimanikāya 77 (II p. 3) = Madhyamāgamaḥ 207.
85) Saṃyuttanikāya 56, 31 (V. S. 437f) = Saṃyuktāgamaḥ 404.

86) Dīghanikāya 2, 3, usw.; Majjhimanikāya 27, 38 usw. The text appears partly to have been enlarged. I cite the basic form.

87) Heiler, (Die Buddhistische Versenkung, München² 1922 p. 12 ff) gives a detailed description of this part of the way of Deliverance. He discusses also the different translations of the Text and sets forth rich statements of literature.

88) The Sūtra 128 of Majjhimanikāya = Madhyamāgamaḥ 72 gives a good example in this connection.

89) Compare especially Majjhimanikāya 118 (Ānāpānasatisuttam).

90) Compare before all Dīghanikāya 22 (Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasuttantam) and Majjhimanikāya 10 (Satipaṭṭhāna-suttaṁ) = Madhyamāgamaḥ 98.

91) The later ‘Dogmatik’ explains: ‘the distinction of data’ (dharmāḥ).

92) Description by F. Heiler in his above-mentioned work p. 24 f. with rich statements from literature. Numerous proofs also by E. Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asanga. Bibliothèque du Muséon 7, Louvain 1938, t. II p. 52*

93) Description with literature by F. Heiler in his above-mentioned work pp. 26-29, also 44 f.; see further S. Lindquist, Die Methoden des Yoga, Lund 1932, pp. 73-90. For Proofs for the eight exemptions, the eight conquests or overcomings, and the 10 total spheres, see É. Lamotte, in the above mentioned place, p. 52* f. Compare besides, the translation and notes by R. O. Franke. Dīghanikāya, Quellen der Religion-geschichte, Göttingen 1913, p. 212 f. and 210 ff.


95) Compare L. de La Vallée Poussin, in the above mentioned place, VIII, p. 211 ff.

96) Compare above all, S.Lindquist, Siddhi und Abhiṣekā, a study on the classical wonder of Yoga, Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift 1935: 2, Uppsala 1935; further F. Heiler, in the above-
mentioned place, pp. 33-36.

97) Mahāvagga 1, 6, 10 ff. (Dharmacakra-pravartana-
sūtram, P. Dhammacakkapavattanasuttaṃ). A detailed de-
scription of the different versions in which this Sūtra is handed
down, is given by L. Feer, les quatre Vérités et la prédica-
de Benarès (Dharmacakrapravartanam), Journal Asiatique
1870, pp. 345-471. Recently E. Waldehmidt, Vergleichende
Analyse des Catusparisatsūtra, Festschrift-Schubring, Hamburg
1951, p. 84 ff.

98) e.g. Dīghanikāya XXII, 21; Majjhimanikāya 141
(III, p. 251 f.) = Madhyamāgamaḥ 31 (T 26, p. 249 a 15 ff.).

99) With this idea compare the compilations by R. O.
Franke, Dīghanikāya, Quellen der Religionsgeschichte, Göttingen
1913, p. 44. A. 2.

100) See R. O. Franke, in his above-mentioned work p.
41, A. 6; the later ‘Dogmatik’ names all matter which belongs to
the earthly personality, which is received in it, upāttaḥ.

101) Mahāvagga I, 6, 38 f. The same thought-process
recurs many times in the same wording in the numerous pass-
ages of the Canon.

102) According to L. Feer (see his above-mentioned
work, see A 97, p. 408) the supplement occurs only in the Pāli-
tradition of the Sermon of Banaras.

103) So also in the group of the seven anusayāḥ.

104) The literature about the Pratītyasamutpāda is exceed-
ingly large. To be compared, above all, is the presentation by
H. Oldenberg, Buddha, Stuttgart10.12 1923, p. 251 ff. Further
in new literature see P. Oltranare, La formule bouddhique des
douze causes, Genève 1909; L. de La Vallée Poussin, Théori
des douze causes, Gand 1913; P. Masson-Oursel, Essai d’inter-
prétation de la théorie bouddhique des douze conditions, Revue
de l’histoire des religions, Paris 1915; O. Rosenberg, Die
Problemen der Buddhistischen Philosophie, Materialiën zur
Kunde des Buddhismus. Heft 7-8, Heidelberg 1924, p. 222 ff.

*This and other similar references in Sanskrit titles refer to the serial
number in the Chinese Tripiṭaka called Taisho Issaiyō, edited by S. Levi,
J. Takakusu and P. Demieville, (Tokyo 1924-29). The author has not
uniformly indicated within brackets as T in all such references in Sanskrit
titles, e.g. see notes 84, 85 etc.—Translator.

105) About the idea of Saṃskāraḥ, see, above all, H. Oldenberg, Buddha, Stuttgart 1910-12 1923, pp. 278-285; further R. O. Franke, Dīghanikāya, Quellen der Religionsgeschichte, Göttingen 1913, pp. 307-318.

106) Sāṅkhya-Kārikā v. 67.

107) e.g. Dīghanikāya II, 83 (I, p. 76); compare L. de La Vallée Poussin, Nirvāṇa, Paris 1925, p. 28.


113) Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa II, 2, 7, 1.

114) Chāndogya-Upaniṣad VI, 3, 2.


BIBLIOGRAPHY (SELECT) AND NOTES


119) e.g. Lalitavistara, ed. S. Lefmann, p. 346 ff; compare also H. Oldenberg, Buddha, Stuttgart10-12 1923.

120) Very characteristic is also the second Suttam of the Majjhimanikāya (I, p. 6 ff), above all p. 8=Madhyamāgamaḥ 10 (T 26, p. 432 a 16 ff).

121) Majjhimanikāya 63 (Cūla-Māluṇīkyasuttam)=Madhyamāgamaḥ 221.

122) Saṃyuttanikāya 44, 10. (IV, p. 400)=Saṃyuktāgamaḥ 961.

123) Saṃyuttanikāya 12, 12 (II, p. 13)=Saṃyuktāgamaḥ 372 (T 99, p. 102 a 22 ff.).

124) Saṃyuttanikāya 5, 10 (I, p. 135)=Saṃyuktāgamaḥ 1202 (T 99, p. 327 b 9 f.).

125) Saṃyuttanikāya 12, 61 (II, p. 95)—Saṃyuktāgamaḥ 289 (T. 99, p. 81 C 16 f).

126) Compare Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upaniṣaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, Göttlingen 1915, p. 303 ff; further F. O. Schrader, Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhas, Strassburg 1902, p. 4-6.


129) Basic for the question of Nirvāṇa is the work of L. de La Vallée Poussin : Nirvāṇa, Études sur l’histoire des Religions 5, Paris 1925 which shows that most Buddhist Schools have never considered Nirvāṇa as Nothing and that it also did not signify, in any way, the annihilation or destruction. Besides, compare, above all, Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Leningrad 1927.

130) Compare in this connection the appropriate remarks by L. de La Vallée Poussin, in his above-mentioned book, S. XXIII 58 and 145 ff; also A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Oxford 1923, p. 65 f.

131) Mahābhārata XII 187, v 2, 5-6. According to the Kumbhakonam edition, the translation would be as follows: “The Soul which has entered the body does not pass away when the body passes away, just as the fire does not pass away or
perish when the fuel is burnt out. When no fuel is brought to feed the fire, the fire is not to be seen although the fire exists because it has entered the ether (ākāśa), has no fixed place or locality and is difficult therefore to be comprehended. So also the soul, when it has departed from the body, has entered the ether and is, therefore, not to be perceived on account of its fineness or subtlety, like the fire without fuel.”

132) Udāna VIII 10=Saṃyuktāgamaḥ 1076.
133) Udāna VIII 3; Itivuttaka 43.
135) Suttanipāta 7074 ff. Translation according to H. Oldenberg.
137) Udāna VIII, 1.
139) The comparison of the Jina with the Buddha is well made by E. Leumann, Buddha und Mahāvīra, the two founders of Indian religions, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Buddhismus VI, München o. J. (1921); See especially p. 27 ff.
140) In the following presentation of the doctrine of the Jina, I rely, as I have already remarked in the Foreword, in the essentials, on W. Schubring, Die Lehre der Jainas, Grundriss der indoirischen Philologie und Altertum-skunde III, 7, Berlin 1935.
141) About Pārśva, compare, above all, W. Schubring in his above-mentioned work pp. 24-26; also M. Bloomfield, The Life and Stories of the Jaina Savior Pārśvanātha, Baltimore 1919.
142) F.O. Schrader handles the problem about the contemporaries of the Buddha and the Jina; ‘Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhäs, Strassburg 1902; Compare also B.C. Law, ‘Six heretical teachers’, in
BIBLIOGRAPHY (SELECT) AND NOTES

Buddhist studies, Calcutta and Simla 1931, p. 73-88.


6. THE ŚĀMKHYA AND THE CLASSICAL YOGA-SYSTEM.

LITERATURE

The basic presentation of the System has been still always: Garbe, R. ‘Die Śāmkhya-Philosophie, eine darstellung des indischen Rationalismus, Leipzig 1894. ² 1917.

Besides:


The book of Keith handles also in details the question of the Śāmkhya in the Upaniṣads and in the Epic and gives a good review about the hitherto expressed views on this topic. Compare also besides his presentation of the Śāmkhya in ‘the Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upaniṣads,’ Harvard Oriental Series 31-32, Cambridge, Mass. 1925, Vol. II, pp. 535-551. A new attempt to explain the origin of the Śāmkhya is made by


As isolated Studies are further to be named the following:


The following book deals with the origin of the Yoga-system:

Jacobi H.: Über das ursprüngliche Yoga-system, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, Berlin 1929 and 1930. About the presentation of the Yoga-system the following books are to be mentioned:
Tuxen, P.: Yoga; en oversigt over den systematiske Yoga- 
filosofi paa grundlag af kilderne, Kopenhagen 1911.
Dasgupta S.N.: Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, London 
& New York 1924.
Hauer J.W.: Der Yoga als Heilweg, presented according 
to the Indian Sources, Stuttgart 1932.
Eliade, M.: Yoga, Essai Sur les Origines de la Mystique 
Indienne, Paris and Bukarest 1936.

The following books deal with the Yoga-praxis:
Lindquist, S.: Siddhi und Abhinäñä, a study about the 

TRANSLATIONS

Garbe R.: Der Mondschein der Sāmkhya-Wahrheit, Vācas-
patimiśra's Sāmkhyatattvakaumudi, in German translation, be-
sides an introduction about the age and the origin of the 
Sāmkhya-Philosophy, Abhandlungen der Kgl. bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften XIX/3, München 1892.

Woods, J. H.: The Yoga-system of Patañjali, or the 
anient Hindu doctrine of Concentration of mind, embracing the 
mnemonic Rules of Patañjali, the comment attributed to Vyāsa 
and the explanation of Vācaspati Miśra, Harvard Oriental 

In the presentation of the Sāmkhya system I have fully 
gone in my own independent way, in respect of the origin of the 
system, as also in regard to the description of the classical 
Sāmkhya. The following reasons have determined my position.

What first of all concerns the origin of the system, it is 
not merely sufficient in that respect to gather the available 
Sources but it is necessary that they must be sifted, their worth 
must be proved and then only they should be utilized. He, who 
would wish to present a historical event or occurrence, would 
bring into being an odd result, if he were simply to join together 
all the available information into a total picture without selection. 
What holds good for history in general, holds good not in a less 
degree for the history of philosophy. In general, in the sphere of
philosophy, three kinds of sources are distinguished: independent works of a system, the presentations of its views by its opponents or finally other works which otherwise stand outside the system but which are influenced by the system concerned. Sources of the first rank are naturally only the works of the system itself. Presentations from outside hands give mostly a defective and a wrong picture. And he who has worked on such presentation in the case of a preserved system where verification is possible, will use greater reserve in dealing with the opening up of non-preserved systems and their stages of development. Concerning finally the influence on the works of other alien systems, only in rarest cases can a useful conclusion be drawn out of it. The utilization of the original doctrines follows in such cases so arbitrarily and under so far-reaching revisions that an attempt to reconstruct the prototype out of that is as good as prospectless or futile.

For the oldest history of the Sāṃkhya-system, there stand before us the following sources for consideration: firstly some Upaniṣads, secondly a great number of Epic texts and thirdly the presentation of the system in the works of the Buddhist poet Āvaghoṣa and in the medical work of Caraka. In the case of the last-named texts, the presentation is dealt with by an outside hand—by one outside the system. They can, therefore, be utilized with corresponding caution only to a limited extent. They are, however, not very old and fall outside our consideration for the history of the origin of the system. Concerning the Upaniṣads, we know the stream of development to which they belong. For instance, we know the starting-point in the Upaniṣads of the philosophy of the Vedic period, and we know the final point or culmination in the system of the Vedānta-sūtras. Out of this knowledge, however, we are compelled to say that this stream of development well points to the Sāṃkhya influence, but from which the original Sāṃkhya stands far away. The concerned Upaniṣads are, therefore, no testimony of the Sāṃkhya-development itself but carry mere traces of the Sāṃkhya influence and can, therefore, at their maximum, be included for sporadic conclusions. Quite different is the case with the Epic Texts. In the total sphere of the Epic, in the Mahābhārata as well as in the religious epic of the Purāṇas, the Sāṃkhya is the prevailing
philosophy and still up to the time of the classical Sāṃkhya, the philosophy of the Epic is considered as a branch of the Sāṃkhya (compare e.g. Yuktidīpikā, p. 108, 4 f.) Here we can, therefore, expect rightly the texts which show perhaps a certain tinge of a certain school-direction, but which embody the genuine Sāṃkhya. It comes to this, then, that the texts of the Mahābhārata, as we have already shown in the chapter on Epic philosophy, reach back to very early times. If anywhere, it is here that the possibility exists to come across texts which represent the first steps of the Classical Sāṃkhya.

On account of these reasons, I have built my presentation of the origin of Sāṃkhya exclusively on the Epic texts. On the other hand, I have completely excluded the Sāṃkhystically influenced texts of the later Upaniṣads as unreliable and misleading. I shall come to speak of them in the second part of my present work, where I shall deal with the stream of development to which they belong. The frame of the present work forbids an entry into the treatment of the relatively unimportant and later presentations of the Sāṃkhya in Aśvaghoṣa and Caraka.

Concerning the handling of the Epic Texts, what I have already remarked previously in the Chapter on the philosophy of the Epic, holds good. They should not be considered as a uniform mass or homogeneous collection but every text must be explained by itself and evaluated and then must be arranged or ordered in the general development. By such consideration, there can be found, as a matter of fact, texts which can lay claim to the fact that they should be considered as the first steps of the Sāṃkhya, above all the text which I have designated as the Epic basic text of the Sāṃkhya (Mahābhārata XII 194= 247-249=287) and I have, therefore, made this text the basis of my presentation. The presentation itself, I hope, gives the justification. In every case, however, this text is so important that every future presentation of the Sāṃkhya must discuss it.

With this is given the starting-point of my presentation of the Sāṃkhya. As the next step there follows the introduction of the Evolution-Theory. This Theory is still not known to the Epic basic text and that it is a secondary creation arises from the fact that the thought lying at the basis of its construction presupposes a rising forth from or the creation out of the Brahma.
I believe also that I have found its prototype and that prototype is in 'the Questions of Šuka' (Ṣukāṇupraśna). The antiquity of this prototype is guaranteed by the fact that its remodelling or revision serves already as an introduction to the law-book of Manu. Other details about it are found in my 'Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadhharma' (Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 45/1925 p. 51 ff., and Weiner Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vol. 32/1926, p. 200 ff). As for the rest, the introduction of the Evolution-Theory and its importance is dealt with in details in my presentation itself.

As the third step of development which already leads to the philosophical system of the classical period, I have considered the introduction of the system of sixty doctrinal ideas, of the Saṣṭītantra. What is to be understood by these doctrinal ideas is testified to us by the genuine old Sāmkhyya-tradition, which is guaranteed by Dignāga. Against that the testimony of the Pāṇcarātra does not come up. Because how the Ahirbudhnya-Saṃhitā misrepresents a tradition is shown, for example, by its handling of the eight-limbed Yoga. The importance of the system of sixty doctrinal ideas is described in details in my presentation. Simultaneously the position which the fifty ideas (praṇāyāḥ) assume in the Kārikā of Īsvarakṛṣṇa is explained in this way. Because, if they had not been deeply anchored so firmly in the system of sixty doctrinal ideas, it would not have been understood why these antiquated ideas are still retained beside the doctrine of the eight conditions (bhāvāḥ).

With these three steps, the origin and development of the Sāmkhya up to the formulation of the classical Sāmkhya gets explained in its essential features. For its further history, the following points of view should be kept before the eyes: In the first post-Christian centuries, the Sāmkhya is one of the leading philosophical systems. Until towards the beginning of the sixth century A.D., important representatives of the system are known to us. Then it becomes quiet. Dignāga (C. 480-540) is seen in his work combating a living system. In Dharmakīrti (c. 610-670) we find a mere weak echo of that. From that time, onwards, the compendium of the Sāmkhya-Kārikā holds good as the authoritative presentation of the system and in the Sāmkhyakārikā, there are the basic doctrines which are cited in the
Polemic and traditionally combated. It is a kind of discussion typical of the one found in the case of a system of the past. The literature of the system itself produces the same picture. In order to rightly assess the literature of a philosophical system one must distinguish between creative works which formulate the doctrines and build them further and the mere presentations of doctrines. Only works of the former kind are a real testimony of a living system. Mere presentations of doctrines, on the other hand, carry often traces of their time of origin but are in their nature timeless and are committed to writing as formulations which have long lost their living importance. Concerning the Śaṁkhya, there are preserved for us from the fifth century onwards only such doctrinal representations. Among them are counted total commentaries on the Śaṁkhya-kārikā under the names of their authors such as Māṭhara, Gaudapāda, Vācaspati, Śaṅkarārya. Only the Yuktidīpikā shows still an echo of the living old school-activity. Only in the second millennium, the picture changes. Among the commentators on the Śaṁkhya-Sūtras, above all in Vijñānabhikṣu, we meet with a new life. But it belongs to a new period and carries new features.

Out of these facts, however, important conclusions follow. The Śaṁkhya of the second millennium with Vijñānabhikṣu as the central point, which is separated from the old Śaṁkhya by a gap of many centuries, need not be dealt with on the same stage with this (old Śaṁkhya). It is not a part of the old Śaṁkhya but the creation of a later Renaissance and demands as such a presentation by itself. The classical Śaṁkhya, on the other hand, which was of so decisive importance for the history of Indian Philosophy, and which was counted as the leading system for many centuries is the Śaṁkhya of the pre-Christian and first few post-Christian centuries and it died about the middle of the first post-Christian millennium. The chief interest must, therefore, centre round it. On account of this, I have abstained in my presentation from entering into the Śaṁkhya of the later period. It will be described where it belongs according to its period, namely, in the philosophy of the later period. On the other hand, I have bestowed all my attention on the Classical Śaṁkhya. My presentation depends exclusively on the sources of the old period, the Śaṁkhya-kārikā and its commen-
taries. Especially I have, however, endeavoured to use side by side the fragments of the old school-tradition. In this respect, still much more can be gained, or attained. But I believe, I have stepped on and trodden the right way. The fourth volume of the present work will contain something which, besides the epistemology and the logic of the old systems, will also handle with that of the Śāṅkhya for which the sources flow somewhat richer than for the most of the remaining parts of the old system.

In the presentation of the Yoga-system, I have abstained from wishing to ascertain a Ur-form—(the original form) of the system. Above all, I consider the attempt of H. Jacobi to open up the beginnings of the original Yoga-system as unsuccessful. It stems from the presupposition that there was once an independent Yoga-system not dependent on the Śāṅkhya and that all doctrines of the classical system which appear to deviate from the Śāṅkhya, were to be ascribed to this original Yoga-system. That presupposition is, however, wrong. It is based on the fact viz. that in the group of the six orthodox systems, the Yoga is named as a separate system besides the Śāṅkhya and it is assumed that the close connection between the two is only secondary. The last of the six orthodox systems is quite late. The older period knows nothing of an independent Yoga-system but knows only the Yoga-school of the Śāṅkhya. Among all these, there is found nothing which Jacobi wished to ascribe to his original Yoga-system but which does not allow itself to be reconciled with this School.

But, even inside the Yoga-school of the Śāṅkhya, I have renounced to pursue a development. Because under the paucity of materials, a sufficient basis for such a pursuit is provisionally lacking. I have, therefore, contented myself with giving a description of the system as it lies before us in the Bhāṣyam of Vyāsa. This allows itself to be understood as a sub-variety of the Śāṅkhya system, arising out of the classical period in which, only isolated or sporadic points are remodelled under Buddhistic influence and are further worked upon or formulated. My main attempt was now directed on this score, i.e. to work out these specialities of the Yoga-school in a clear and well-arranged manner. I hope, I have succeeded. About the Yoga-praxis, only the
most necessary basic things have been expressed, corresponding to the frame of the present work.


147) The relation of the Sāṃkhya to Buddhism is a long disputed and much debated question. A good review about it in respect of literature bearing on it is given by M. Eliade, Yoga, Paris 1936, pp. 59-61; here may only be mentioned R. Garbe, Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie, Leipzig, 1917, pp. 6-18; H. Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, Gottingen 1915, pp. 178-223; A. B. Keith, The Sāṃkhya-System, London, 1924, pp. 23-33; Th. Stcherbatsky, The ‘Dharmas’ of the Buddhists and the ‘Guṇas’ of the Sāṃkhyas, Indian Historical Quarterly X/1934, pp. 737-760; compare also L. de La Vallée Poussin, Indo-européens et Indo-iraniens, Histoire du Monde t. III pp. 310 ff. I cannot believe in a dependence of Buddhism on the Sāṃkhya. So far as the facts cited, in general, prove true, they are of a general sort and explain themselves out of the fact that Buddhism and Sāṃkhya belong to the same stream of development. Characteristic sporadic features, as they characterize the originality of the system unequivocally are lacking among them. In this respect, Buddhism and Sāṃkhya are rather completely different. For my position towards this question, I have given reasons already a long time before, in a short essay (Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma, III. Das Verhältnis zum Buddhismus, Weiner Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vol. 33/1926, pp. 57-68) and believe that my whole presentation also in the present work justifies it.

148) About the identity or difference of the two Patañjalis, a long, unfruitful discussion has been carried on. M. Eliade gives a short review of this problem with citations from literature, Yoga, Paris 1936, pp. 27 ff.

149) It is here not the place to enter more exactly into the difficult questions in respect of the time of the isolated several works. Only I may remark about the Sāṃkhyaakārikā that it is, according to my view, a relatively later text, which,
however, reproduces the old school-tradition in contrast to the
innovations of the classical period which was declining. I hope
to be able to enter into this topic separately on another occasion.
About the period of the commentaries on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā—
above all, of the Māṭharavṛttiḥ and of the Gauḍapādābhāṣyam,
more has been written than what corresponds to their value from
the point of their contents.

150) The Text of the Sāṃkhya-kārikā is printed with trans-
lation and elucidation in P. Deussen’s Allgemeiner Geschichte
der Philosophie 1/3, Leipzig 1914, pp. 413-466. Of the numerous
editions is to be recommended that of S. S. Suryanarayana
Sastri, The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, with an introd-
tion, translation and notes, Madras 1930. Besides, the text is
regularly printed along with the commentary in the editions of
the Commentaries.

151) Yuktidipikā, ed. Pulinbehari Chakravarti, Calcutta
Sanskrit Series No. XXIII, Calcutta 1928.

152) translated by J. Takakusu, La Sāṃkhya-kārikā étudiée
à la lumière de sa version chinoise, Bulletin de 1 ’Ecole françoise
d’Extreme-Orient, Hanoi 1904.

153) Sāṃkhya-kārikā Māṭhara-vṛttisahitā, ed. Vishnu
Prasad Sarma, Chowkhamba Series, No. 296, Benares 1922.

154) The Sāṃkhya-kārikā with an exposition called Chand-
drikā by Nārāyaṇa Tirtha and Gauḍapādābhāṣyā’s commentary,
ed. Bechanarāma Tripāṭhi, Benares Sanskrit Series No. 9,
Benares 1883.

155) Of the numerous commentaries, may be named
Vācaspati Miśra’s Sāṃkhya-tattva-Kaumudi, ed. Ramesh Chandra,
Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. XV, Calcutta 1935.

156) Jayamaṅgalā, ed. H. Śarmā, Calcutta Oriental
Series No. 19, Calcutta 1926. I share the view expressed by Gopi
Nath Kaviraj in the introduction that it deals not with the work
of Śaṅkarācārya but of Śaṅkarārya.

157) P. Deussen includes the Text of the Yogasūtras with
their translation and elucidation in his ‘Allgemeinen Geschichte
der Philosophie’ I/3 Leipzig² 1914 p. 511-543. All the total
commentaries named by me are contained in the edition of
Kaśināth Śāstrī Āgāse, Anandāśrama Sanskrit Series No. 47,
Poona ²1919.
158) Mahābhārata XII, 194 = XII 247-249 = XII. 287. E. W. Hopkins gives a superficial and a completely insufficient treatment of the Texts, The Great Epic of India, New York, 1901, pp. 157-162. After a slighty, rather, careless recital of the contents and the enumeration of a number of variants of different versions, he says (p.161) : "A Sāṃkhya text is here changed into a later philosophy, with soul substituted for spirit, and the Yogin making guṇas. Hence also the intellect is grouped with senses as ignorant instruments of the soul, while Mind is Creative Soul." Of these three points on which his judgment is based, 'the Yogin making guṇas' is spun out of the verse XII, 194 v. 49 which P. Deussen translates as follows : "He who remains fettered through the connection with his own nature, who always allows the guṇas again and again to rise forth out of himself, like the spider which allows the threads to rise out of itself." Out of the words Svabhāvyuktyā (v.1. siddhyā)Yuktāh, Hopkins has created his Yogin. Besides the forms of the verses in the other two versions XII 249 v. 2 and 287, v. 40 contradicts his interpretation. The assertion "Mind (manaḥ) is creative soul (Atmā)" depends on the verse XII, 194, v. 44 which Deussen renders as follows : "The Sattvam and the Kṣetrajña have no common basis, the latter never mixes with the Sattvam, Manas and all qualities." In the other versions XII, 287, v. 36 corresponds with this. Compare 248, v. 20, compare also 239. v. 14 ; in none of these passages the word manaḥ is to be found. On such grounds Hopkins bases his assessment of this important text!

159) Mahābhārata XII, 194, v. 6f. = 247, v. 3b-4 = 287, v. 5f.


162) Mahābhārata XII, 194, v. 27 b = 248, v. 11 a.


164) See, above all, the pieces XII 219 and XII 276 ; compare my 'Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma, II, 'Die Sāṃkhystischen Texte, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 32/1925, p. 188 ff.


167) The view of the erroneous idea of 'I' and 'mine' (ahāṃkāraḥ and mamakāraḥ) which lies at the basis of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of ahamkāraḥ is wide-spread. It emerges in the older Upaniṣads (compare M. Steiner, Der Ahamkāra in den alteren Upaniṣaden, Festschrift R. Garbe Erlangen 1927, pp. 109-114). It plays an important role in the older Buddhism (compare the passages cited as proofs by R. O. Franke, Dīghanikāya, Quellen der Religionsgeschichte, Göttingen 1913, p. 44 A 2); its continuance further is testified e. g. by its occurrence in the Nyāyasūtra. The decisive new thing brought in by Pañcaśikha is the assumption of an independent organ as a bearer of these ideas.

169) Mahābhārata XII 252-253.
170) Yuktidipikā p. 108, 7f.
171) That this is the old Sāṃkhya doctrine and the doctrine of the Tanmātrās only a later reformulation or revision has been shown by O. Strauß, refuting all objections, in his essay 'Zur Geschichte des Sāṃkhya', Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Vol. 27/1913, pp. 257-275.


173) Māṭharavṛttīḥ, p. 38, 2 and numerous other passages.

174) Thus, above all R. Garbe, Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie, Leipzig 1917, pp. 189-191. On the other hand, especially F.

175) Sāṃkhyaśāstra v. 21.

176) Compare Sāṃkhyaśāstra v. 59 and v. 61.

177) The name Śaṣṭītāntram designates the system of 60
doctrinal ideas, but it was also the name of a basic work of the
School. That under the sixty doctrinal ideas, the ten basic doc-
trines (mālikārthāk) and the fifty ideas (pratyayāḥ) are to be
understood is testified to us by the commentaries of Paramārtha
and Māṭhara on Sāṃkhyaśāstra v. 72 and by the Yuśtidīpikā,
p. 2. Besides, the ten basic doctrines are known by Dignāga and
the verse quoted by me is also cited by Paramārtha, Māṭhara
and in Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaśāstra. This inter-
pretation of the sixty doctrinal ideas depends, therefore, on the
tradition of the classical Sāṃkhya-School and it is an authority
whose weight we have to bow to or respect. On the other hand,
the testimony of a sectarian text like the Aśtībuddhyanamithā
does not prevail against it and therefore the statements of
F. O. Schrader are weak (Das Śaṣṭītāntara, Zeitschrift d. Deut-

178) Māṭhara-vṛtttī p. 84, 18f. etc.

179) That the doctrine of the plurality of the souls is a
later innovation in the Sāṃkhya, which ensued under outside
influence, is also the view of H. Jacobi, ‘Über das ursprüngliche
Yoga-system’ II, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften 1930, p. 8 (327) f.; compare also H. Jacobi, Die
Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern, Bonn und Leipzig
1923, p. 21. In the details I have not been, indeed, able to
follow the views of Jacobi.

180) Paramārtha on Sāṃkhyaśāstra, v. 46, (p. 121).

181) I follow the presentation of the Yuśtidīpikā p. 153 ff.

182) Yuśtidīpikā p. 152, 10-15, compare 149, 9-11. Its
counterpart is found in the Creation-Descriptions of the Purāṇas.

183) Yuśtidīpikā p. 125, 27-127, 28 (Tattvasamāsaḥ 12).

184) Yuśtidīpikā p. 127, 29-129, 17 (Tattvasamāsaḥ 11).

185) Yuśtidīpikā p. 129, 13 f.

186) Yuśtidīpikā p. 128, 24 f.

187) The relation of the eight conditions (bhāvāḥ) and
the fifty ideas was hitherto not explained; see P. Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie I/3, Leipzig 21914, p. 502. Entirely arbitrary is the view of A. B. Keith, The Sāṃkhya System, London 21924, p. 96, that the verse of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā relating to the fifty ideas may be a later interpolation. The position of the fifty ideas in the system of the sixty doctrinal ideas speaks against it. Besides, the interpolation of an antiquated obsolete doctrine in a progressive presentation of the system would be ununderstandable.

188) Compare the note 171.


190) See Yuktiṭipīkā p. 141, 4-10. My statements in the essay ‘Zur Elementenlehre des Sāṃkhya’, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 34/1928, pp. 1-5 are partly to be rectified.


192) This sense comes out of the clear wording of the Sāṃkhyaḥakārikā v. 39-41 and the discussion of Saviṣṭeśaḥ Saṃsāraḥ. Compare also O. Strauss, Indische Philosophie, München 1925, p. 184 and the Note 182.

193) Sāṃkhyaḥakārikā v. 21b.

194) Yuktiṭipīkā p. 72, 5-7 etc.


196) The cosmological views of the Sāṃkhya are not presented in the philosophical texts in a connected manner but sporadic, occasional suggestions are provided to us in that connection. As these suggestions; however, agree with those in the presentations of the sectarian literature of the Purāṇas, there stands no hesitation to join or put them together and to supplement them, corresponding to these presentations (of the Purāṇas). Because those views form nevertheless a necessary supplement of the system and are many times presupposed as such.

197) Compare notes 191 and 192.
198) Sāṃkhya-kārikā v. 41
199) Yuktidīpikā p. 127, 14f.
201) Sāṃkhya-kārikā v. 62.
202) These reasons or grounds and their number were fixed in the system since long; their interpretation, however, changed in course of time. This change reflects itself in the fluctuating interpretations of the preserved commentaries. In my presentation, I do not enter into these fluctuations but follow, according to my discretion, one of these interpretations.
203) L’Abhidharmakosā de Vasubandhu, traduit par L. de La Vallée Poussin, Paris 1923-1931, V p. 63; see also additions.
204) Yuktidīpikā p. 31, 11 f.
205) Yuktidīpikā p. 63, 28 f.
206) Yuktidīpikā p. 65, 1 f
207) Yuktidīpikā p. 61, 19 f.
208) Yuktidīpikā p. 90, 12 f.
209) Compare Yuktidīpikā p. 95, 26 and 24.
210) See Kamalabāsi’s Tatvasamgrahapañjikā, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, No. XXX, Baroda, 1926, p. 114, 7-10.
211) Vyāsabhāṣyam p. 89, 2-6 etc.
212) There is no space here to substantiate my presentation of the doctrine of Vindhyavāsi more exactly. The fragments ascribed to him form the basis, besides the texts which, on account of their agreement with these fragments, can be considered as the citations of his views. Above all, I believe that the presentation of the Sāṃkhya in Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣyam is based on the views of Vindhyavāsi.
214) About the Buddhistic influence on the Yoga-system, compare, above all, L. de La Vallée Poussin, Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali, Mélanges chinois et bouddhique V/1936-1937, pp. 223-242; besides Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism and the meaning of the word ‘dharma’,

215) For the equation of cittam and manah, compare P. Tuxen, Yoga, Kopenhagen 1911, p. 99 f.

216) An all-embracing collection of materials for this doctrine with rich statements from literature is made by L. de La Vallée-Poussin in his treatise Sarvāstivāda (Documents d'Abhidharma), Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques V/1936-1937, p. 7-158.


219) Compare P. Deussen in his above-mentioned work, p. 507-543; for the most detailed treatment, J. W. Hauer, Der Yoga als Heilsweg, Stuttgart 1932, pp. 81-100.

220) Compare, above all, the above works of S. Lindquist cited under Literature.

221) That these two different forms of Yoga were not differentiated is the chief deficiency of the hitherto written presentations of the Classical Yoga. They seek to unite in a systematic construction the statements of the old texts and thus create an artificial unity which is alien to the old texts. Because the Yogasūtra, as well as the Bhāṣyam or Vyāsa themselves carry traces of its composite origin. The consequences of this union of contradictory elements are naturally obscurity and unintelligibility.

222) Amṛtacandra on Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāraḥ II v. 104; see Pravacanasāra, ed. A. N. Upadhye, Rāyachandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay 21935, p. 761, 7f.

223) Bhoja on Yogasūtra I, 18, see the edition of the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Poona 2 1919, p. 7, 6-9.

224) Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośaḥ II, v. 33; see

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3. INDEX OF INDIAN TECHNICAL TERMS

ajñānam—ignorance, nescience
adharamaḥ—guilt
adhikāraḥ—duty
anupreksāḥ—meditations
anaśvaram—incapability
anuākharaṇam—inner organ
apramāṇāni—immensities
abhijñāḥ—supernatural powers
abhīkṣaṇānāṁ—overcomings
avidyā—ignorance, nescience
avisesaḥ—nonparticularity
auyaktaḥ—unmanifest
asaktiḥ—inability
asuddhiḥ—impurity
astikāyaḥ—masses of existence
āhamkāraḥ—‘I’ consciousness
ākāśaḥ—space, ether
ātmā mahān—gross self
āyatanāni—spheres and stages of spheres
ārāṣṭrāṅgamārgaḥ—the eight-limbed noble/path
āsanam—seat, posture
āśrayaḥ (Jinistic)—action
āśrayaḥ (Buddhistic)—taints

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indriyāni—sense-organs and abilities
indriyasamvaram—watching over sense-organs
ṛddhiḥ—supernatural power
ṛddhipādāḥ—constituent parts of wonder-powers
aśvaram—power
karma—movement and action
karmayonayati—wombs of action
karmendriyāṇi—organs of action
kalpaḥ—world-periods
krtaṇayanāni—total spheres
kleśaḥ—taints
kṣetrajñaḥ—knower of the field
guṇaḥ—quality
guṇapasthānāni—stages of virtue
guptiḥ—discipline
cittam—mind
jñānam—knowledge
tattvāni—principles, entities
tapatiḥ—penance
tanāḥ—darkness
tuṣṭiḥ—satisfaction
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
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<td>substance</td>
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<td>dharmaḥ</td>
<td>merit</td>
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<tr>
<td>dharmaḥ</td>
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<td>dhāraṇā</td>
<td>holding, collectedness</td>
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<td>meditation, absorption, stages of absorption</td>
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<td>nāma-rāpam</td>
<td>name and form</td>
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<td>niyamaḥ</td>
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<td>pariṣadhaḥ</td>
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<td>pudgalah</td>
<td>personality</td>
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<td>purusaḥ</td>
<td>soul, spirit</td>
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<td>prakāśaḥ</td>
<td>clarity, clearness</td>
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<td>prakṛtiḥ</td>
<td>ur-matter</td>
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<td>knowledge</td>
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<td>prajñāmātrāḥ</td>
<td>knowledge-elements</td>
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<td>pratītya-samutpādaḥ</td>
<td>the doctrine of dependent origination</td>
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<td>pratyāhāraḥ</td>
<td>withdrawal of the sense-organs</td>
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<td>pradhānam</td>
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<td>pṛṇaḥ</td>
<td>breath</td>
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<td>breath-regulation</td>
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<td>balāṇi</td>
<td>powers</td>
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<td>bāhyakaraṇam</td>
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<td>buddhiḥ</td>
<td>knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>buddhiniṇī</td>
<td>organs or senses of knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>bodhyaṅgaṇī</td>
<td>limbs of enlightenment</td>
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<tr>
<td>brahmāṇḍam</td>
<td>world-egg</td>
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<td>bhāvaḥ</td>
<td>condition of knowledge</td>
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<td>bhātanātāḥ</td>
<td>elements of being</td>
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<td>manāḥ</td>
<td>thinking, thinking-organ</td>
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<td>mahābhūtānī</td>
<td>gross elements</td>
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<td>yamaḥ</td>
<td>subdual</td>
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<td>yugāṇi</td>
<td>world-ages</td>
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<td>rajaḥ</td>
<td>passion</td>
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<td>rāgaḥ</td>
<td>passion</td>
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<td>rāpam</td>
<td>corporeality</td>
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<td>liṅgam</td>
<td>wandering organism</td>
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<td>vāk</td>
<td>speech</td>
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<td>vāyavaḥ</td>
<td>corporeal winds</td>
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<tr>
<td>viśesaḥ</td>
<td>particularity</td>
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<tr>
<td>vṛttiḥ</td>
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<td>vairāgyam</td>
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<td>vyaktaḥ</td>
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<td>saḍāyatanaḥ</td>
<td>six spheres</td>
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<tr>
<td>saṃyamaḥ</td>
<td>control, restraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saṃskāraḥ</td>
<td>impulse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saṃskāraḥ</td>
<td>impressions, formations and will-impulses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sāmīja—consciousness
sātvam—goodness
samādhiḥ—absorption, meditation
samitiḥ—watchfulness
sāmānyam—commonness
sukṛtyāvādaḥ—causality theory
of the Sāṃkhya
siddhayah—supernatural powers
siddhiḥ—perfection
skandhāḥ—groups
smṛtisamprajanyam—watchfulness and consciousness
smṛtyupasthānāni—awakenings
of watchfulness
syādvādaḥ—relativity-doctrine

ERRATA

P. 229—twelfth line from the top: Instead of “These are the places of the operation (buddhiḥ)” the line should read as “These are the places of the operation of knowledge (buddhiḥ)”.
ERICH FRAUWALLNER

Born on 28.12.1898 in Vienna. Admitted in 1928 as University lecturer for Indian Philology and Ancient Cultural Sciences. From 1939-45, Professor for Indology and Iranistik. Since 1945, when the Faculty in the University was closed, he lived as Private Professor in Vienna. He is the corresponding member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

Publications: A long series of papers and articles on Indian Philosophy. The present work represents the summing up of the thirty years' preparation.
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